Authors, please upload your paper here.




Market Design Group Meeting

Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Organizers


October 8 and 9, 2010


NBER, 2nd Floor Conference Room

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, Massachusetts




Friday, October 8




Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER at 8:15 am and 8:30 am



8:30 am




8:55 am

Opening Remarks



9:00 am

Dynamic Auctions




Should Auctions Be Transparent?


Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner, Yale University




Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Durable Goods: Posted Prices and Fire-Sales


Simon Board, UC, Los Angeles


Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University



10:30 am




10:45 am

Auction Design: Theory




Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders


Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania


Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University




Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information


Lawrence Ausubel and Oleg Baranov, University of Maryland



12:15 pm




1:15 pm

Design of Online Markets




Hidden Market Design: A Peer-to-Peer Backup Market


Sven Seuken and David Parkes, Harvard University


Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Mary Czerwinski, Kamal Jain, Sidd Puri, and Desney Tan, Microsoft




Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information


Gary Bolton, Pennsylvania State University


Ben Greiner, University of New South Wales


Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne




Propose with a Rose?  Signaling in Internet Dating Markets


Soohyung Lee, University of Maryland


Muriel Niederle, Stanford University and NBER


Hye-Rim Kim and Woo-Keum Kim, Korea Marriage Culture Institute



3:30 pm




3:45 pm

Empirical Approaches in Matching Markets




Gaming the School Choice Mechanism


Yinghua He, Toulouse School of Economics




Aggregate Matchings


Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, and Matthew Shum, California Institute of Technology



5:15 pm





Shuttle leaves NBER for Royal Sonesta Hotel at 5:15 pm



6:00 pm

Dinner, Bambara Restaurant, Hotel Marlowe, 25 Edwin Land Boulevard, Cambridge, MA



Saturday, October 9




Shuttle leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER at 8:15 am and 8:30 am



8:30 am




9:00 am

Applications of Large Matching Markets




Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets


Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University


Parag Pathak, MIT and NBER


Alvin Roth, Harvard University and NBER




Participation (versus Free Riding) in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange


Itai Ashlagi, MIT


Alvin Roth, Harvard University and NBER



10:30 am




10:45 am

Auction Design: Applications




Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment


Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford Univeristy


Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Labs




Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions


Susan Athey, Harvard University and NBER


Dominic Coey, Stanford University


Jonathan Levin, Stanford University and NBER



12:15 pm




1:15 pm

Matching Market Design




Incentive Compatible Allocation and the Exchange of Discrete Resources


Marek Pycia, UC, Los Angeles


Utku Unver, Boston College




Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks     not to be posted


John Hatfield and Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University


Scott Kominers, Harvard University


Alexandru Nichifor, University of Maastricht


Alexander Westkamp, University of Bonn



2:45 pm






7 sessions, 40 minutes per paper, no discussants, 10 minutes for general discussion