Making Information Actionable:

Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Courts

By Matthieu Chemin[*], Daniel L. Chen[†], Vincenzo Di Maro[‡], Paul Kimalu[§], Momanyi Mokaya[¶], Manuel Ramos-Maqueda[‖**]

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We conduct a randomized controlled trial across Kenyan courts to tackle a major source of court delays: adjournments, i.e., postponements of cases to later dates without reaching a resolution. Partnering with the Kenyan Judiciary, we introduce a simple, cost-effective one-page document that outlines the main reasons for adjournments in each court. We test this intervention in two experimental arms: one where the information is shared with judges, and the other where it is shared with both judges and court user committees. Our intervention successfully prevents approximately 20,000 adjournments nationwide, with each adjournment previously delaying cases by an average of 3 months. The acceleration of court proceedings leads to a notable increase in the demand for and utilization of the legal system, increasing the filing of cases as well as citizen trust in the justice system. Our findings demonstrate that tackling the underlying reasons for court delays can substantially enhance both the perceived and actual performance of judicial systems, fostering greater usage and trust in legal institutions.

[*] Department of Economics, McGill University. Email: matthieu.chemin@mcgill.ca
[†] Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). Email: daniel.chen@iast.fr
[‡] World Bank. Email: vdimaro@worldbank.org
[§] Judiciary of Kenya. Email: paul.kimalu@court.go.ke
[¶] World Bank. Email: mmokaya@worldbank.org
[‖] World Bank; University of Oxford. Email: mramosmaqueda@worldbank.org
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I. Introduction

The efficiency of court proceedings has long been recognized as a key driver of economic development. Both cross-country and within-country studies find that delays in judicial processes undermine contract enforcement, reduce access to credit, and hamper growth (Djankov et al., 2003; Mehmood, 2022; Rao, 2022; Amirapu, 2021; Boehm and Oberfield, 2020; Lichand and Soares, 2014; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Visaria, 2009; Chemin, 2020). Yet courts across much of the world, especially in developing countries, remain notoriously slow. The average time to disposition of court cases in a commercial court exceeds 650 days, with delays on average longer in lower-income countries. Firms often consider the slow resolution of disputes as a significant hurdle for their business activity.[1] These delays erode access to justice, reduce trust in legal institutions, and discourage reliance on formal contracts.

Why do court delays persist? Despite decades of research, there remains a scarcity of rigorous empirical evidence on the causes and remedies of court inefficiency. This paper examines an often-overlooked explanation: weak accountability and performance monitoring within judicial systems. Judges and other court actors operate with substantial discretion, often under lifetime tenure and little external oversight. Higher judicial authorities cannot readily observe the effort of judges, reducing incentives to resolve cases efficiently. Adjournments, the postponement of hearings, are a salient manifestation of these frictions. They are among the most frequently cited reasons for court delays in both developed and developing countries (Runciman and Baker, 2016). These adjournments often arise from preventable sources such as judicial absence, party unpreparedness, or logistical failures, yet are rarely scrutinized. Legal scholars argue that the prevalence of adjournments not only prolongs proceedings but also diminishes their quality, leading to frustration among litigants, loss of files, fading memories, and disappearing witnesses (Messick, 2015). In Kenya, our study site, the Chief Justice explicitly identified "endless adjournments on frivolous grounds" as a major contributor to case backlog (Muriuki, 2019).

In this paper, we partner with the Kenyan Judiciary and the World Bank to evaluate a low-cost, scalable intervention designed to improve court efficiency through information provision. Specifically, we test whether delivering quarterly reports on court performance, summarizing the number

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[1] See the World Bank's *Doing Business* and *Enterprise Surveys*

of adjournments, their reasons, and key performance metrics, can reduce delays and accelerate case resolution. We refer to this intervention as the "One-Pager." To design this intervention, we leverage a large administrative dataset of over 14 million case-activity observations from 2016 to 2023, covering all Kenyan courts. This granular data allows us to quantify adjournments and classify their causes, whether linked to judicial absence, party unpreparedness, or failures to appear by other court actors such as the police, prosecutors, or witnesses. The One-Pager presents this information in a concise, accessible format, officially endorsed by the Judiciary.

The RCT, launched across 123 courts, includes two treatment arms: one where the One-Pager is received only by the judges in the court, and another one where both judges and Court User Committees (CUCs), which bring together civil society and court actors to discuss aspects related to court cases on a quarterly basis, also receive the intervention. This design allows us to discern different potential mechanisms of the intervention. The One-Pager sent only to judges makes their performance more visible to higher judicial authorities. In addition to that, the One-Pager discussed with CUCs makes their performance visible to external court actors. Thus, our design enables us to test the impact of informing civil society to create external accountability mechanisms relative to only informing judges and so creating top-down accountability mechanisms within their own organizational structure.

We implemented the intervention in two stages. A first wave (Wave 1) in 2019 tested the short-term effects of a single round of One-Pager distribution. A second wave (Wave 2) involved quarterly dissemination over a full year (August 2021–August 2022), allowing us to examine whether repeated feedback strengthens or sustains behavioral change. Furthermore, analyzing the results post-August 2022 enabled us to investigate any enduring effects that may have persisted even after the end of the intervention.

We find a significantly large reduction in adjournments, equal for both interventions (One-Pager and One-Pager_CUC) in Wave 2. Prior to the interventions, 20 percent of court hearings in Kenya ended in adjournment, a significant figure given that, on average, cases involve four hearings and hence most cases will experience an adjournment. The interventions reduce this probability in half. Considering the nationwide implementation of the intervention across two-thirds of the courts in Kenya, we estimate that this initiative averted a total of 20,000 adjournments, bearing in mind that an adjournment postpones a case by 3 months on average. These results are particularly notable given the limited costs involved: the intervention leverages administrative data already collected by the judiciary and requires only the analysis, production and dissemination of this information.

The similar effects of One-Pager and One-Pager_CUC suggest a common mechanism: making

judicial performance visible to higher authorities increases judges' effort. Since adding the CUC component does not change the results, the key channel does not appear to be additional oversight by court users. This interpretation is supported by the type of adjournments affected. We find a large decline in adjournments due to the court itself, especially judge absences. In contrast, there is only a small effect on adjournments caused by lawyers or unprepared parties. This pattern indicates that once judge-related adjournments become visible to higher judicial authorities (data that was not previously reported), judges respond by reducing them. The results therefore point to increased visibility of performance to higher authorities leading to greater judicial effort.

The impact of Wave 1, involving the dispatch of a single One-Pager, is not statistically significant. In contrast, the influence of Wave 2, characterized by the consistent distribution of four One-Pagers in every quarter over a year, is significant. This suggests that effects only materialize when One-Pagers are recurrently sent, serving as a continuous signal to judges that their conduct is subject to ongoing scrutiny. More broadly, the results suggest that judicial reforms need to be persistent, rather than one-off, to generate meaningful behavioral change.

The reduction in adjournments translates into greater speed of courts: the time to disposition decreases by 10 percent. We confirm that the effect is not coming from judges closing cases too fast or dismissing cases after receiving the One-Pager.

Faster courts improve the demand for justice: more people file cases after both interventions. The surge in case filings does not lead to congestion in the courts; instead, there is a parallel increase in resolved cases, contributing to an overall reduction in time to disposition. Specifically, we observe a rise in commercial cases (related to contract enforcement), but no discernible increase in and succession cases (pertaining to property rights security) or insolvency cases (related to credit markets). This allows us to discern the probable mechanisms through which faster courts influence the economy: in this case, the channel operates through contract enforcement. The heightened number of case filings suggests that individuals are more inclined to seek legal recourse, anticipating the benefits of a faster dispute resolution process.

To evaluate the potential mechanisms for this effect, we examine the impact of our intervention on trust in courts. We use nationally representative household surveys that contain a measure of trust in courts and merge them with our treatment data. We find an increase in trust in courts, especially so for repeat users of courts. Those more knowledgeable with courts experience a greater increase in trust, confirming that the effect of the One-Pagers are felt by court users. Our estimates are very similar to Acemoglu et al. (2020), where the potential effects of a judicial reform increase trust in courts. Thus, our results provide additional support to the argument that deep-rooted

mistrust in state institutions can be redressed.

This paper makes two main contributions to the economics of judicial reform and the broader literature on administrative data and bureaucrat performance.

First, we provide the first RCT testing whether informational feedback to judicial agents can reduce delays and improve the performance of courts. While the importance of legal institutions for economic growth is well established Djankov et al. (2003), most empirical work relies on structural reforms such as changes in laws, court procedures, or appointment systems. These reforms are often implemented progressively, raising endogeneity concerns. Recent quasi-experimental studies have addressed this challenge using clever identification strategies (Mehmood, 2022; Boehm and Oberfield, 2020; Kondylis and Stein, 2021; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Visaria, 2009; Amirapu, 2021), but few have employed experimental variation to isolate the impact of judicial performance interventions. Our study fills this gap by randomly assigning courts to receive performance feedback.

Our work also complements recent experimental research on information provision in legal systems targeting the demand side of justice. Sadka, Seira and Woodruff (2024) works with labor courts in Mexico to randomly provide litigants with information about legal processes. In contrast, our intervention targets the supply side by providing information directly to judges and court administrators. This distinction matters: while much of the policy debate in justice reform emphasizes laws, procedures, or citizen empowerment, we demonstrate that low-cost, light-touch feedback to decision-makers can significantly enhance the delivery of justice.

Second, our results contribute to the broader policy conversation on the role of data systems and performance management in public administration. As many governments increasingly digitize their case management systems, the ability to leverage this data for performance management and accountability are expanding (Mattsson, 2025; Dodge et al., 2025). Our study shows that such data, when analyzed and presented systematically, can be a powerful tool for improving institutional performance, even in sectors that are resistant to data-driven interventions, such as the judiciary.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the intervention. Section III presents the conceptual framework to understand and interpret the likely effects of the intervention. Section IV presents the experimental design and balance tests. Section V describes the empirical specification, while section VI discusses the results on legal outcomes. Section VII concludes.

II. The Intervention

A. Background

Until 2015, Kenyan courts did not systematically collect data. All case records were kept on paper and stored locally, making it impossible to measure adjournments systematically or provide judges with performance feedback. Consequently, the judiciary could not track judge attendance, especially in remote courts, or monitor excessive adjournment requests by lawyers.

In October 2015, the Kenyan judiciary introduced the Daily Court Return Template (DCRT), a dataset containing detailed information on every case going through Kenyan courts, with over 14 million case-activity observations to date. The DCRT includes data on the exact charge leveled against the defendant, the name of the presiding judge(s)[2], the number of plaintiffs/appellants, the number of defendants/accused, whether any of the parties has legal representation, how many accused were remanded in custody, and whether a witness has testified.

The DCRT records the outcome of each court appearance, including whether a case was adjourned. Table 1 shows that hearings end in adjournment 22 percent of the time, the stage with the highest rate of adjournments. Only 5 percent of appearances are adjourned at the judgment stage, when the case is being decided, or at the "mention" stage (where the court provides instructions for next steps). Other stages, such as case filing, have significantly lower adjournment rates. Thus, most adjournments occur during hearings, where the case's substance is discussed.

Table 1—Probability of Adjournment by Stage of the Case

	Probability Adjournment	N
Filing	0	63088
Hearing	22	189041
Judgement	5	61470
Mention	5	306631
Other	3	140176

Note: The data is at the High Court level. The data is from October 2015 to January 2019.

A 22 percent probability of adjournment is significant. Given that the average case involves four hearings, the probability that a case experiences at least one adjournment during the hearing stage is 88%. Considering the additional stages at which adjournments can take place, the likelihood

[2]The Kenyan judiciary consists of: Supreme Court, High Court, Employment and Labour Relations Court and Environment and Land Court (the superior courts) and Magistrate Courts (the lower-level courts). The superior courts have judges, and the lower-level courts have magistrates or judicial officers. For the sake of brevity, the term "judges" is used throughout the paper to refer to both judges and judicial officers.

of adjournment of each case is of approximately two thirds. On average, the wait time for the next hearing following an adjournment is three months. This contributes significantly to delays, considering the average time to resolve a case is 2.7 years. Legal experts contend that frequent adjournments negatively impact the quality of legal processes: litigants become frustrated, files can be lost, memories fade, and witnesses may become unavailable (Messick, 2015).

The DCRT includes the precise reason for the adjournment, as shown in Table 2.

While some adjournments are unavoidable, such as due to the death of a party (0.2 percent) or to allow parties to negotiate (0.2 percent), these cases are rare. The majority of adjournments reflect avoidable or preventable issues.

Twenty-seven percent of adjournments are initiated by the court itself. These occur when litigants are summoned to court on a specific day without prior notice that the judge will not be available. Such adjournments could largely be prevented if litigants were informed in advance of a judge's absence. The next most common cause of adjournments, accounting for 20 percent, is the lack of preparedness by the parties. These adjournments should be avoidable if reasonable preparation time is provided. Pre-trial conferences are specifically designed to allow parties to agree on a realistic schedule, and the Kenya Civil Procedure Rules explicitly advise that judges should not grant adjournments in these situations but proceed to decide the suit.[3] It is also the lawyer's responsibility to ensure that the parties are prepared on the day of the hearing.

Table 2—Adjournment by Cause

	(1) Share of Total Adjournments
Adjournment: Court	26.9
Adjournment: Parties not ready	19.9
Adjournment: Parties not present	19.4
Adjournment: Lawyer	20.2
Adjournment: Witness	6.2
Adjournment: Police Prosecution	1.3
Adjournment: Death Party	0.2
Adjournment: To Negotiate	0.2
Adjournment: Other	5.7

Note: The data is at the High Court level. The data is from October 2015 to January 2019.

[3]Kenya Civil Procedure Rules, Order 17, rule 4: Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith.

Nineteen percent of adjournments occur when parties are absent. The Kenyan code of civil procedure provides clear instructions for such cases: the judge can dismiss the case if the plaintiff is absent or proceed "ex-parte" if the defendant is absent.[4] Adjournments caused by lawyers themselves account for 20 percent. The Kenyan judiciary has issued clear guidelines to address such cases: "Judges and judicial officers will be required to be strict in considering applications for adjournments. Additional court adjournment fees ought to be levied upon parties who seek unnecessary adjournments to discourage the habit." (PMMSC report, p. 38)

Six percent of adjournments are due to absent witnesses. Kenyan laws outline procedures for dealing with witnesses who disobey summons, such as issuing warrants.[5] Finally, a very small number of adjournments are attributed to the police or prosecutors. There is an "Other" category, where reasons are entered as free text. In the experiment, we focus on the main sources of adjournments outlined above.

B. The "One-Pager"

The goal of the intervention is to display for the first time the number of these adjournments on an official visually appealing document from the Kenyan judiciary. For this purpose, we develop the "One-Pager" (see Figure 1 below for an example).

The One-Pager is specific to a court, the example displayed in Figure 1 is for a magistrate court.

The first section of the One-Pager shows basic numbers of cases filed, cases resolved, rulings, and adjournments in that court during the month. The goal is to start with a section easy to understand for any judge.

The second section shows the "case clearance rate" (CCR), which is calculated by dividing the number of cases resolved by the number of cases filed within a month in a given court. This metric assesses the court system's ability to manage its caseload. A CCR below 100% indicates that more

[4]Civil Procedure Rules, Order 12, rule 1: If on the day fixed for hearing, after the suit has been called on for hearing outside the court, neither party attends, the court may dismiss the suit. When only plaintiff attends, Order12, rule: may proceed ex-parte

[5]Criminal Procedure Code section 145: Warrant for witness who disobeys summons If, without sufficient excuse, a witness does not appear in obedience to the summons, the court, on proof of the proper service of the summons a reasonable time before, may issue a warrant to bring him before the court at the time and place as shall be therein specified.

Criminal Procedure Code section 154: Issue of commission for examination of witness Whenever, in the course of a proceeding under this Code, the High Court or a magistrate empowered to hold a subordinate court of the first class is satisfied that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of the witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, the court or magistrate may issue a commission to any magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the witness resides, to take the evidence of the witness.

Civil Procedure Rules, Order 16, rule 10(3): Procedure where witness fails to comply with summons. In lieu of or at the time of issuing such proclamation, or at any time afterwards, the court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant, either with or without bail, for the arrest of such person, and may make an order for the attachment of his property to such amount as it thinks fit, not exceeding the amount of the costs of attachment and of any fine which may be imposed under rule 12.

Civil Procedure Rules, Order 28, rule 2: A commission for the examination of a person who resides within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court issuing the same may be issued to any person whom the court thinks fit.

FIGURE 1. EXAMPLE OF A ONE-PAGER

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

Baricho Magistrate Court
Court Monthly Feedback Report
February 2019

"My tenure will be defined by service delivery based on the performance of Court Stations throughout the country"

Honorable Justice David Maraga, Chief Justice

JUDICIARY
REPUBLIC OF KENYA

CRIMINAL CASES

Summary of Key Court Events the Month of February

Cases filed	81
Cases resolved	80
Rulings and judgments	21
Adjournments	76

Case Clearance Rate (CCR) Previous Three Months



Top Three Reasons For Adjournments the Month of February

Reason	Number	Percentage
Court not sitting	31	41%
Witness not present	19	25%
Partie(s) not present	6	8%

Recommended Action

Addressing	Court not sitting	increases CCR by	2%
Addressing	Witness not present	increases CCR by	1%
Addressing	Partie(s) not present	increases CCR by	1%

CIVIL CASES

Summary of Key Court Events the Month of February

Cases filed	41
Cases resolved	15
Rulings and judgments	14
Adjournments	29

Case Clearance Rate (CCR) Previous Three Months



Top Three Reasons For Adjournments the Month of February

Reason	Number	Percentage
Court not sitting	16	55%
Partie(s) not ready	4	14%
Police file not availed	3	10%

Recommended Action

Addressing	Court not sitting	increases CCR by	27%
Addressing	Partie(s) not ready	increases CCR by	7%
Addressing	Police file not availed	increases CCR by	5%

Notes

Case Clearance Rate (CCR)- Case Clearance Rate (Resolved ÷ Filed) × 100 measures the extent to which the court system is able to dispose of cases relative to the cases filed within a specified time period. A clearance rate of 100% implies that the court is coping with its workload. More than 100% clearance rate indicates that the court is reducing its pending cases while less than 100% means that the court is accumulating more cases.

Resolved Case (RC) - Any case where a judgement or a final ruling closing the case has been made at the end of period under reference. It also means a finalized case.

Filed Cases (FC)- Any case that is registered in court of law for arbitration in a given period.

cases are being filed than resolved, leading to an accumulating backlog. The Kenyan judiciary has established a target CCR of 100%. The CCR is one of the most relevant indicators of court efficiency and is used in all evaluations of courts within the Kenyan judiciary. It also influences judges' promotions and transfers, making it a well-known metric among them.

The novel part is the third section, which presents the number of monthly adjournments in the court. In particular, the feedback report highlights the top three reasons for adjournments for each specific court. For the particular court in Figure 1, the primary reason for adjournments is "Court not sitting", followed by "Parties not ready" and "Police file not availed" for civil cases. The goal is to determine whether openly displaying the number of these unnecessary adjournments in an official document will lead to a decrease in their occurrence.

Finally, the fourth section shows the link between adjournments and performance (measured by the CCR). More adjournments (i.e., delays) lead to a lower number of resolved cases and thus reduce the CCR. We quantify this relationship in the data and verify that there is indeed a negative correlation between both factors, i.e., more adjournments means less CCR. Appendix A provides greater details on this regression analysis. We estimate this relationship separately for civil and criminal cases. Based on data on and before 2018, we find a statistically significant coefficient of -5 for civil cases (and -1 for criminal cases), i.e., a 1 percentage point reduction in the proportion of adjourned cases would result in a 5 percentage point increase in the case clearance rate. The logic is simple: if there are less adjournments, more cases get resolved, which increases the CCR. One can then simply predict the impact on CCR if the top reason for adjournments was reduced from their current level in a certain month to zero.

The higher elasticity for civil cases relative to criminal cases provides a natural test for the importance of this section. Because the elasticity on CCR is greater in civil matters, we should observe stronger treatment effects in that category. We test this prediction directly in the data below.

After extensive piloting with officials in the Kenyan judiciary and judges, this analysis was judged slightly difficult to understand for judges not trained in statistical analysis and simplified to: "Addressing [the top reason for adjournment] increases CCR by [The prediction from the model]". This sentence is added on the One-Pager (see Figure 1 for an example). We predict the impact on CCR if the top three reasons of adjournments were addressed. These three sentences constitute the actionable information presented to the judge or to the judge and the public.

Adhering to the key conditions for success of information experiments identified by Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart (2022), our experiment leverages visually appealing One-Pagers to present new

and credible information drawn from the Kenyan judiciary's administrative dataset.

C. The Experiment

We implement two different treatments:

1) One-Pager: we send the One-Pagers to judges alone

2) One-Pager_CUC: as above, but also sharing the One-Pager with Court User Committees (CUCs), which includes court actors such as lawyers, prosecutors, the police, as well as representatives from local communities

Previewing our results, we find very similar effects of both interventions and merge them together for simplicity. We present in the Appendix all results with split treatments.

This experiment is implemented nationwide, including all the 123 court stations in Kenya.[6] One third of the courts receives the first treatment, another third receives the second treatment, and the final third is the control group.

We send one wave of One-Pagers in February 2019. We then send 4 waves of One-Pagers every quarter from August 2021 to August 2022.

To increase legitimacy, the One-Pagers were sent through the internal mailing system of the Kenyan Judiciary. It came with specific instructions from the Chief Justice to implement the recommendations of the One-Pagers. For example for the One-Pager_CUC treatment, the Chief Justice writes: "You will therefore receive a one page summary of your court every month which you will table for discussion during your quarterly Court User Committee (CUC) meetings, as a standing agenda item, with a view to identifying and implementing interventions aimed at improving service delivery and addressing the leading causes of adjournments in your court". The full text accompanying the interventions is available in Appendix B.

III. Conceptual Framework

A. Effect of the One-Pager on Court Speed

The intervention is based on a simple mechanism: judges exert more effort when their performance becomes visible. This is similar in spirit to Mattsson (2025), who shows that distributing performance scorecards increases bureaucratic effort through enhanced visibility.

[6]The experiment included all the high courts and magistrate courts of Kenya, but it did not include the Supreme Court and the four Court of Appeals, which were deemed to be too different from the regular courts in Kenya by the Kenyan judiciary.

Before the intervention, performance was largely opaque. Judges operate in remote courts, with no systematic reporting or analysis of adjournments. As a result, effort may be suboptimally low. The One-Pager increases transparency by reporting adjournments, data that had never previously been compiled or shared. By making these outcomes observable to higher judicial authorities, the intervention aims to reduce adjournments.

The One-Pager_CUC treatment was designed to further expand visibility of performance to other court users. In Court Users Committee (CUC) meetings, attended by civil society representatives, lawyers, police, and prosecutors, previously unreported adjournment data were shared. This mechanism would only be effective if judges care about how these local stakeholders perceive their performance.

Previewing the results, both interventions have virtually identical effects. This suggests that judges respond primarily to the perceptions of their superiors, not to those of civil society actors or other court users.

B. Effect of Court Speed on Access to Justice

If the One-Pagers improve court speed, this may, in turn, influence the use of courts. More people may file cases in court. The composition of cases provides an opportunity to examine the channels through which faster courts might impact economic development.

Twenty-six percent of cases are of a commercial civil nature. This includes cases of contract enforcement. With faster courts, firms might be more willing to file cases, knowing they will be resolved faster. However, the effect on the number of filed cases is not straightforward, as firms may respond by breaching fewer contracts in light of the greater net present value of penalties. In this paper, we will test the effect of both interventions on the number of such cases filed.

Table 3—Type of Cases

	Percent Cases
Commercial Civil	26.4
Succession	30.4
Credit	0.3
AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes	0.0
Criminal	32.2
Political	7.2
Family	3.4

Note: The data is at the High Court level. The data is from October 2015 to January 2019.

Thirty percent of cases are related to the process of succession. In Kenya, people must use the High Courts for a proper transfer of title in a succession process. Faster courts may entice more people into following the proper process. If more cases of succession are filed, there will be greater transfers and security of property rights, which may increase agricultural productivity. In this paper, we are able to test the first step of this reasoning with the DCRT data, i.e., whether faster courts translate into more succession cases filed.

Few cases are related to credit, and are related to insolvency, bankruptcy, or winding up petitions. In case a borrower does not repay, the lender must sue in court to seize the collateral. Faster courts may entice more lenders to use this avenue, which may translate into greater recovery of loans and more credit lending.

There are also anticorruption and economic crimes cases in the data, albeit in a very small number.

Thirty-two percent of cases are criminal in nature, 7 percent are political (judicial review, constitutional, and election cases), and 3 percent are family cases (divorce, child custody).

IV. Experimental Design

A. Randomization

The experiment was conducted nationwide, with the unit of randomization being a court station. A court station is a geographic compound that can include a high court and a magistrate court. Each court station has one CUC. We randomized at the court station level to minimize the spillover effects between treated and control judges within the same geographic compound. Instead, if a court station is treated, all judges receive the same intervention. Recall that the One-Pager is calculated at the court level, one for High Court and another one for Magistrate Court, such that both One-Pagers were sent if a court station was part of the treatment group.

One third of the court stations in Kenya were randomly selected to receive the treatment "One-Pager", whereby the judges receive the One-Pager. Another third of the courts receive the treatment "One-Pager_CUC", whereby all judges receive the One-Pager and the One-Pagers are also distributed to all members of the CUC to be discussed in the CUC meeting.

There are 123 court stations in Kenya. To achieve balance, we follow Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and use a stratification technique. We stratify based on geographical variables, since the effect may be different in different places. In practice, we established a list of 8 regions in Kenya to make sure that there was an approximately equal number of control and treated court stations in each of these 8 regions. Appendix C provides more details on how we determined these 8 regions.

We also stratify based on fast versus slow court stations, since the effects could be different depending on ex-ante court speed. One may expect a large effect of the interventions on slow courts, and possibly a smaller effect on fast courts, which are already more efficient in handling cases. Thus, it will be important to look at heterogenous effects of the One-Pager across fast and slow courts. The proper way to do this is to stratify on initial speed such that the sample is balanced across fast and slow courts. Appendix C provides more details on how we created these indicators of fast or slow courts.

We obtained ethical approval for this project (McGill REB 20-06-027), and filed a pre-analysis plan (AEARCTR-0006228).[7]

B. Balance Tests

Table D1 in Appendix D shows the balance test. There are not more adjournments, the primary outcome in this study, in the treatment group compared to the control group. If anything the treatment group has slightly more adjournments to start with, which should serve to bias downward the estimates. But the difference is not statistically significant. There no differences in the main outcomes considered in this paper: adjournments disaggregated by their cause, time to disposition or number of cases filed. There is good balance in High Courts or Magistrate courts, as shown in Tables D2. There is also good balance for trust in courts, shown in Table D3.

Additionally, we access other sources of data available before the experiment to verify balance. We use the 2019 Kenya Continuous Household Survey Programme (KCHSP), the 2013-2017 County GDP data, and the 2015 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) collected by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). To create a mapping between the court stations and the surveys in which the most disaggregated geographical identifier is at the county level, we calculate the fraction of court stations treated with the interventions. The treatment and control groups are well balanced for basic socio-demographics (gender, age, years on the job, education, household size), as can be seen in Table D4 in Appendix D. There is also good balance on investment, business creation, access to credit, consumption, and contracting behavior; as shown in Table D5. The treatment and control groups are also well balanced for their county GDP levels (Table D6), or when using the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2015-2016 (Table D7).

[7] https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6228

V. Empirical Specification

The main outcome specified in our pre-analysis plan was adjournments. To evaluate the effect on adjournments, we estimate the following specification:

$$Adjournment_{ict} = \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \sum_{j=-m}^{q} \beta_j OnePager_{cj} + \beta X_{ict} + \epsilon_{ict}$$

$Adjournment_{ict}$ is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case coming to court ends in an adjournment, 0 otherwise; such that the regression is predicting the average probability that a case will be adjourned. The subscript i corresponds to each individual court appearance. c refers to court c within a court station, t refers to the time period (a quarter-year).

$OnePager_{cj}$ is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 in the j^{th} quarter after a court first received a One-Pager , 0 otherwise. Recall that the first One-Pager (wave 1) was sent in in February 2019, we thus consider the first quarter (months of January, February, March) of the year 2019 as treated. We then sent 4 more waves in every quarter between August 2021 and August 2022 (Wave 2). The omitted category is the last quarter of 2018, the quarter just before the One-Pagers.

The model has q lags (after the One-Pager) and m leads (before the One-Pager) to test for parallel pre-trends before the treatment. The coefficients of interest in this specification are the β_j for the j time period after the One-Pager.

We merge the two treatments OnePager and OnePager_CUC together since the effects of both interventions are very similar, and present the results split by treatment in the appendix.

X_{ict} is a vector of controls which can include: legal representation of the defendant, number of witnesses for the plaintiff or defendant. Moreover, we include detailed case code fixed effects [8] and judges fixed effects.

ϵ_{ict} is a stochastic error term. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the level of courts.

VI. Results

A. Effect on Adjournments

The figure below presents the dynamic treatment effects on adjournments. Each point corresponds to a different β_j, capturing the effect of the One-Pager intervention in a given quarter.

Following Wave 1, there is a small decline in adjournments in the first quarter, but it is not

[8] Case codes are used for administrative purposes to categorize the 42 different types of cases.

statistically significant. The effect quickly dissipates, which is consistent with the fact that only a single One-Pager was sent during this phase.

After August 2021, four additional One-Pagers were distributed quarterly (Wave 2, indicated by the dashed lines). At this point, adjournments decline sharply. The graph shows an approximately 5 percentage point reduction in the probability that a case ends in adjournment.

Importantly, the reduction persists even after the intervention ends in August 2022, suggesting a sustained behavioral response. In contrast to the short-lived impact of the single One-Pager in 2019, repeated dissemination over a full year generates a sizable and durable decline in adjournments.

This has clear policy implications: transparency reforms of this type must be sustained over time to induce lasting changes in judicial behavior. Figure E1 in Appendix E further shows that the effects are nearly identical across the two treatment arms.

Figure 2. Effects on Adjournment





We find no effect of the intervention in lower-level courts (Magistrate Courts in Kenya). We had pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan to look separately at High Courts and Magistrate Courts.[9]. The difference is intuitive. Delays are substantially more severe in High Courts, so an intervention focused on delay reduction is more likely to generate meaningful improvements there. On average, cases take 1,575 days to be resolved in High Courts, compared to 562 days in Magistrate Courts. With baseline delays nearly three times larger, the scope for reduction is considerably greater in High Courts, which helps explain why the treatment effect is concentrated in that level of the judiciary.

One potential concern is that judges did not change their behavior but instead manipulated recorded data once adjournments became monitored. This explanation is unlikely. Judges do not enter the data themselves; case information is recorded by court clerks during public proceedings. Moreover, the Kenyan judiciary places strong emphasis on data integrity. Dedicated statistical officers regularly conduct back-checks and provide training to court staff to ensure accuracy. These institutional safeguards substantially limit the scope for strategic misreporting, making genuine behavioral change the more plausible interpretation of the results.

To streamline the presentation of results, we aggregate the dynamic treatment effects into broader time periods rather than reporting quarter-by-quarter estimates. We define "After Wave 1" as a binary indicator equal to 1 from the first quarter of 2019 onward. Similarly, "After Wave 2" equals 1 from the third quarter of 2021 onward. The omitted category (baseline) is 2018.

To assess pre-trends, we define a "Pre" period covering 2015 to 2017. This specification allows us to test for differential trends prior to the intervention while summarizing post-treatment effects in a more parsimonious way.

We interact these period indicators with the treatment variable and report the results in Table 4.

The main result is a statistically significant reduction in adjournments during Wave 2. In Column (1), which focuses on High Courts, Wave 2 is associated with a 4.3 percentage point decline in the probability that a case ends in adjournment, consistent with the graphical evidence.

In contrast, Column (2) shows no significant effect in Magistrate Courts, mirroring the absence of an effect observed in the event-study graph.

The effect on High Courts remain statistically significant after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing using the Sharpened False Discovery Rate (Anderson, 2008). This method adjusts p-values within a family of outcomes by accounting for the number of hypotheses tested and the rank of

[9] https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6228

each p-value, thereby controlling the expected proportion of false discoveries. The smallest p-value of this family of 2 outcomes (0.03 for High Courts) is below the adjusted 10%/2 (outcomes)×1 (rank) = 0.05 threshold, with an FDR-adjusted p-value of 0.06.

Table 4—Effects on Adjournments

	(1)	(2)
	Adjournment	
	High Courts	Magistrate Courts
OnePager * After Wave 2	-0.043**	0.0029
	(0.019)	(0.0082)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.0055	0.0023
	(0.013)	(0.013)
OnePager * Pre	0.018	0.0055
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24
Observations	1984942	12536890

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. In Column (1), the sample is restricted to High Courts, and in Column (2), to Magistrate Courts.

This is a very large result since this is a nationwide intervention affecting two thirds of the courts in Kenya. During Wave 2, 449,327 cases went to court in the two treatment groups. The probability of a case ending in an adjournment decreased by 4.3 percentage points, according to the findings. 4.3 percent of 449,327 cases translates into 19,321 cases that did not end in an adjournment due to the intervention.

The time between two hearings is 91 days. Therefore, avoiding 19,321 adjournments results in a substantial reduction in the time cases spend in court.

Table E2 in Appendix E reports the effects separately for the two interventions, OnePager and OnePager_CUC. The estimated coefficients are nearly identical, and the difference between them is not statistically significant. This shows that what drives the results is increased visibility of performance to higher judicial authorities. Expanding transparency to other court users, such as representatives of civil society, lawyers, police, or prosecutors, does not generate additional effects.

The results are similar if we omit the variable "Pre" and all its interactions, such that the omitted category is the entire period from 2015 until January 2019, as shown in Table G1 in Appendix G.

In Appendix H, we show the heterogeneous effects on slow versus fast courts as specified in our

pre-analysis plan. We find a larger effect in courts that are slow to start with, which means that the interventions works especially in slow courts in need of improvement.

The results are robust to the inclusion of different sets of control variables in the model, as shown in Table 5. Column (1) presents the main result from above. Column (2) controls for case code fixed effects.[10] Column (3) includes controls for the complexity of the case (legal representation and number of witness for the plaintiff or defendant). Column (4) includes judges fixed effects.[11] Regardless of the type of controls included, the results remain very similar.

Table 5—Effects on Adjournments in HC

	(1) No Controls	(2) Case code FE	(3) Controls	(4) Judge FE
OnePager * After Wave 2	-0.043**	-0.044**	-0.043**	-0.035*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.0055	-0.0070	-0.0055	-0.0037
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)
OnePager * Pre	0.018	0.021	0.018	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Observations	1984942	1984941	1984942	1984942

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. Column (1) replicates the main result, whereby the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), 42 case code fixed effects are added. In Column (3), the presence of legal representation and number of witness for the plaintiff or defendant is added to the model. In Column (4), 285 judge fixed effects are added.

We do not find any evidence of spillovers. In Appendix I, we collect the GPS data on all courts and calculate the minimum distance of control courts to treated courts. We find no effect of being nearby treated courts. This is to be expected given our method of randomization. Recall that we randomized at the court station level. A court station is a geographic compound that can include a high court and a magistrate court. We did this specifically to minimize spillover effects. Court stations are far from each other (the average minimum distance is 42km), such that it is unlikely that the One-Pager would also have an effect in control courts.

Another way to interpret the magnitude of the effect is to compare with the average proportion of cases ending in an adjournment in the control group at baseline: 6.3 percent. The intervention

[10]Case codes are used for administrative purposes to categorize the 42 different types of cases.

[11]There are 384 judge fixed effects. To keep all the data, the value of zero is assigned to the cases where the judge id is missing.

essentially eradicates adjournments.

An average probability of adjournment of 6.3 percent in the control group may appear small, but this is because the data includes all stages of cases, including filing or mention which are less adjourned.

We focus now on hearings, which are more likely to be adjourned. Table 6 shows a large reduction of adjournments for hearings: a 7 percentage point reduction. The average in the control group at baseline is 18 percent, this corresponds to a (7/18=) 39 percent reduction in adjournments. There is also an effect on mentions (coming to court to get directions from the court). Figure F in Appendix F shows the graphs for all the outcomes of the paper.

Table 6—Effects on Adjournments of Hearings

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Case Stage:			
	Hearing	Filing	Mention	Judgement
OnePager * After Wave 2	-0.070*	0.0013	-0.040**	-0.037
	(0.037)	(0.00079)	(0.018)	(0.028)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.0060	-0.00059	-0.015	-0.0030
	(0.034)	(0.0011)	(0.012)	(0.019)
OnePager * Pre	0.049	0.0023*	0.012	0.020
	(0.031)	(0.0013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.18	0.00068	0.031	0.023
SD	0.38	0.026	0.17	0.15
Observations	331217	182657	905293	167689

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to hearings in Column (1), filing of a case in Column (2), mentions (asking for directions from the court) in Column (3), and judgment in Column (4).

B. Effect on Adjournments by Cause

We next disaggregate adjournments by cause to better understand the mechanism. Column (1) of Table 7 shows a clear and sizable reduction in adjournments attributable to the court itself. There are also declines in adjournments due to absent parties and lawyers (Columns (3) and (4)), but these effects are much smaller in magnitude. The bulk of the overall reduction is therefore driven by court-caused adjournments.

This pattern is consistent with the model: judges increase effort when their own performance becomes more visible through the One-Pagers.

Table E3 further shows that the effects are nearly identical across the OnePager and OnePager_CUC interventions, reinforcing the interpretation that visibility to higher authorities is the key mechanism.

There is no effect on adjournments due to witnesses in column (5) or police / prosecutors in column (6), but this may be due to the low number of such adjournments in the first place.

Table 7—Effect on Adjournment by Cause

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Cause of Adjournment:					
	Court	Parties Not Ready	Parties Not Present	Lawyer	Witness	Police Prosecutor
OnePager * After Wave 2	-0.035**	-0.0017	-0.0053***	-0.0039**	-0.00021	-0.00049
	(0.014)	(0.0022)	(0.0018)	(0.0017)	(0.0012)	(0.00038)
OnePager * After Wave 1	0.0033	-0.0041	-0.0017	0.00085	-0.00076	0.00025
	(0.0075)	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	(0.0020)	(0.00090)	(0.00092)
OnePager * Pre	0.0076	-0.0017	0.0012	0.0072**	0.00060	-0.000076
	(0.0066)	(0.0035)	(0.0036)	(0.0028)	(0.0018)	(0.00100)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.011	0.0045	0.00084
SD	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.067	0.029
Observations	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The next columns are defined similarly, with adjournment due to parties not ready in Column (2), not present in Column (3), lawyers in Column (4), witnesses in Column (5), and police / prosecutor in Column (6).

C. *Effect on Adjournments by Type of Case*

We next examine heterogeneity by case type, civil versus criminal. The One-Pager reports separate statistics for both categories (see Figure 1), and in Kenya the Case Clearance Rate (CCR) for both civil and criminal matters is central to judicial promotion. [12]

However, our model linking adjournments to the CCR (see details in Appendix A) shows a larger elasticity for civil cases. This is reflected in the "recommended action" section of the One-Pager: reducing adjournments translates into a larger improvement in the CCR for civil cases than for criminal cases.

This difference provides a test of the mechanism. If judges respond to the incentives highlighted in the "recommended action" section, the treatment effect should be stronger for civil cases.

Table 8 confirms this prediction. Column (1) shows a larger reduction in adjournments for civil cases, while Column (2) reports a smaller effect for criminal cases. This pattern supports the view that judges respond to the incentives embedded in the performance metrics.

Table 8—Effect on Adjournments by Type of Case

	(1)	(2)
	Adjournment	
	Civil	Criminal
OnePager * After Wave 2	-0.080**	-0.029
	(0.038)	(0.052)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.041	0.0088
	(0.028)	(0.046)
OnePager * Pre	0.015	0.098**
	(0.026)	(0.048)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24
Observations	189208	108718

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to civil cases in Column (1) and criminal cases in Column (2).

[12] Performance Management and Measurement Understandings Evaluation Report, 2022/2023, 8th Cycle of Performance Management Implementation.

D. Effect on Quality

A potential concern is that the One-Pager improves speed at the expense of quality. We examine this in Table 9.

In Column (1), the dependent variable is whether a judgment in a High Court is subsequently appealed. Appeals are commonly used in the legal literature as a proxy for decision quality, as a high appeal rate may signal weak or flawed rulings. We find no increase in appeals of judgements following the intervention.

Another concern is that judges may respond to performance pressure by closing cases prematurely to raise their CCR. Column (2) addresses this possibility. The dependent variable equals 1 if a case is terminated, dismissed, struck out, or otherwise closed. We find no significant effect of the intervention on case closure rates.

Overall, there is no evidence that the One-Pagers increase appeals or induce judges to close cases strategically. The reduction in adjournments does not appear to come at the expense of judicial quality.

Table 9—Effect on Quality

	(1)	(2)
	Appeal	Case Closed
OnePager * After Wave 2	0.00052	0.0075
	(0.00045)	(0.0064)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.00075	-0.027
	(0.00066)	(0.030)
OnePager * Pre	-0.000072	-0.025
	(0.000073)	(0.031)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0	0.057
SD	0	0.23
Observations	1984942	1984942

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the judgement of the case is appealed, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in the case being either terminated, dismissed, struck out, or case closed; 0 otherwise.

E. Effect on Time to Disposition

To analyze time to disposition, we adopt a different identification strategy based on the case filing date. Cases filed after the start of Wave 2 are considered treated.

A key challenge is that the average time to disposition is 2.7 years. As a result, most cases filed in 2022 or 2023 are not resolved by the end of the data collection period (March 2023). To address this truncation issue, we focus on cases filed in the second half of 2021 (August–December 2021). These cases are exposed to the intervention and a substantial share are resolved by March 2023.

We therefore interact the treatment indicators with a dummy equal to 1 for cases filed in the second half of 2021. For completeness, we also interact treatment with indicators for cases filed after 2022, but we do not report those coefficients, as most such cases remain unresolved. The omitted category is cases filed before the first half of 2021.

Table 10 shows that treated cases filed in the second half of 2021 experience a reduction in time to disposition of 107 days, approximately three months. This effect is substantially larger than what would be implied mechanically by the 5 percentage point reduction in adjournments (each adjournment delaying a case by roughly three months).

Two mechanisms may explain this magnitude. First, adjournments have a compounding effect: reducing the probability of adjournment at each hearing lowers the likelihood of subsequent hearings and delays, generating nonlinear gains. If hearing 1 is adjourned, there is a greater probability it will go to hearing 2, which is also more adjourned. Second, the intervention may operate through additional channels. By making the case clearance rate more salient, the One-Pagers may induce broader increases in judicial effort beyond the reduction in adjournments alone.

Table 10—Effects on Time To Disposition

	(1) Time to Disposition
OnePager * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-106.6***
	(38.9)
Court FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
Control Group mean	992.9
SD	1355.1
Observations	181444

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent. The sample size is smaller since time to disposition is only defined for resolved cases.

We find a very similar impact of both interventions in Table E6 of Appendix E, or when using censoring regression models to account for the fact that we observe time to disposition only for cases that have been resolved.

F. Effect on Access to Justice

So far, we document fewer adjournments, no deterioration in quality, and shorter time to disposition.

We now examine whether faster courts improve access to justice. If cases are resolved more quickly, potential litigants may be more willing to file claims, increasing demand for judicial services. High Courts handle a broad range of cases, including commercial disputes, succession, credit (insolvency and bankruptcy), anticorruption and economic crimes, criminal matters, political cases (constitutional, election, judicial review), and family cases.

To measure access, we compute the number of cases filed per court per day. Appendix Table L1 shows that results are similar when aggregating monthly or quarterly, though daily data provide greater precision.

Table 11 reports the main results. In Column (1), Wave 2 is associated with a significant increase in filings. Before the intervention, courts received about 2 cases per day; after Wave 2, this rises by roughly 1 additional case per day, a 50 percent increase. Wave 1 has no significant effect, consistent with its limited impact on performance. Pre-trends are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Column (2) shows that the increase is driven primarily by commercial and civil cases. There is little or no effect on succession (Column (3)), credit (Column (4)), anticorruption and economic crimes (Column (5)), criminal (Column (6)), political (Column (7)), or family cases (Column (8)).

The rise in commercial and civil filings suggests potentially important downstream economic effects, as improved court efficiency appears to stimulate demand for dispute resolution in economically relevant domains.

A natural question is how potential litigants become aware of improved court performance following the One-Pagers. One plausible channel is through repeat players, such as lawyers and firms, who interact frequently with the court system and are therefore better informed about changes in court efficiency.

Table 12 examines this mechanism. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation. We observe a significant increase, suggesting that lawyers, who are likely aware of faster case processing, file more cases after the intervention.

Column (2) focuses on cases filed by organizations. Here again, we find a significant rise in filings,

Table 11—Effects on Number of Cases Filed

	(1) Total	(2) Commercial	(3) Succession	(4) Credit	(5) Anticorruption and Economic Crimes	(6) Criminal	(7) Political	(8) Family
OnePager * After Wave 2	1.00*	0.42*	-0.012	0.12	0.0027	0.31	-0.022	0.44
	(0.52)	(0.23)	(0.068)	(0.14)	(0.0028)	(0.24)	(0.086)	(0.50)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.47	0.064	-0.18	0.25	0.0019	-0.40	0.046	0.18
	(0.42)	(0.32)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.0019)	(0.38)	(0.054)	(0.24)
OnePager * Pre	0.64	-0.24	0.51	-0.040	0.0010	0.29	0.042	-0.031
	(0.64)	(0.17)	(0.44)	(0.042)	(0.0010)	(0.33)	(0.057)	(0.028)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	2.01	0.61	0.28	0.0049	0	0.99	0.11	0.033
SD	6.18	2.36	1.85	0.083	0	5.05	0.52	0.22
Observations	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per day per court. The other columns are defined similarly with the number of cases filed per day per court for commercial cases in Column (2), succession cases in Column (3), credit cases (insolvency, bankruptcy, and winding up cases) in Column (4), anticorruption and economic crimes in Column (5), criminal cases in Column (6), political cases (i.e., judicial review, election and constitutional cases) in Column (7) and family cases (child custody, divorce) in Column (8).

indicating that firms respond to improved court speed.

Overall, the increase in case filings appears to be driven by repeat players who are more informed about court performance and better positioned to respond to improvements in judicial efficiency.

Appendix Table E8 shows that the effects are slightly stronger under the One-Pager_CUC intervention, which is logical since in the One-Pager_CUC treatment, court users participate in CUC meetings where the One-Pagers are discussed openly, increasing awareness among lawyers and other stakeholders.

Table 12—Effects on Number of Cases Filed by Repeat Players

	(1) Filed with Legal Representation	(2) Filed by Organizations
OnePager * After Wave 2	1.80**	1.67**
	(0.71)	(0.72)
OnePager * After Wave 1	0.51	-0.12
	(0.46)	(0.54)
OnePager * Pre	0.60	0.57
	(0.36)	(0.44)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	1.16	1.31
SD	3.63	5.22
Observations	62883	62883

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed by organizations.

A natural concern is that the increase in case filings could congest the courts and offset the gains in speed. Table 13 addresses this issue. Column (1) shows that the rise in filings is matched by an increase in the number of cases resolved. In other words, courts process more cases rather than accumulating them. Column (2) reports the effect on the Case Clearance Rate (CCR), defined as the ratio of cases resolved to cases filed. The CCR increases slightly, although the estimate is not statistically significant.

Overall, the evidence indicates that the higher inflow of cases is accompanied by a commensurate increase in judicial output. There is no sign of backlog accumulation, suggesting that improved court efficiency expands both demand for and supply of justice services.

Table 13—Effects on Number of Cases Resolved

	(1) Number Cases Resolved	(2) Case Clearance Rate
OnePager * After Wave 2	0.53*	7.72
	(0.30)	(10.5)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-2.04	-29.7
	(1.43)	(60.6)
OnePager * Pre	-1.64	-8.16
	(1.35)	(53.7)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	2.18	146.5
SD	8.16	585.0
Observations	62883	44412

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases resolved per day per court. In column (2), the dependent variable is the CCR (the ratio of cases resolved over cases filed times 100). The sample size is smaller since some courts have zero cases filed in the day.

G. *Effect on Trust in Courts*

In this section, we examine the impact of the intervention on trust in courts, as pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan.[13] We focus on the Afrobarometer question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" Respondents answering "haven't heard enough" are excluded. The remaining responses (0–3 scale) are rescaled to 0–100, interpreted as an approval rating.

Because the most granular geographic unit in Afrobarometer is the county, we construct a treatment intensity measure equal to the fraction of court stations treated within each county. We interact this intensity with survey-wave dummies. Round 6 (2014) is the baseline; Round 5 (2011) tests pre-trends ("Before"); Round 8 (2019) captures Wave 1; Round 9 (November 2021) captures short-run Wave 2 effects; and Round 10 (2024) captures longer-run effects after discontinuation.

Table 14 shows that trust increases by 8 percentage points after Wave 2, relative to a control mean of 53 percent, a 16 percent increase. This magnitude is comparable to Acemoglu et al. (2020), who find an 18 percent increase in trust following information about court reforms. The effect attenuates by 2024, suggesting that sustained dissemination may be necessary. Wave 1 effects are smaller, consistent with its limited performance impact. There is no evidence of positive pre-trends; if anything, treated areas exhibit a negative pre-trend.

To understand mechanisms, we test whether effects are concentrated among individuals more likely to interact with courts. Using earlier Afrobarometer rounds containing a question on court contact, we show that men, urban residents, individuals with secondary education, and members of politically connected ethnic groups[14] are more likely to report contact with courts (see Table N1 for more explanations). We use these characteristics to construct a predicted-contact index and classify respondents above the median as likely court users.

Column (2) shows that trust increases significantly among likely court users, while Column (3) shows weaker or no effects among others. This pattern supports the mechanism: the One-Pager increases trust primarily among individuals more knowledgeable about courts, who are more likely to observe and internalize improvements in judicial performance.

In Table N2, we confirm heterogeneous effects on Trust based on the individual variables: male, urban, secondary education, and from a connected ethnic group. In Table E10, we split the treat-

[13] In our pre-analysis plan, we had specified that if another round of the "Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey" would become available, we would look at investment, business creation, access to credit, consumption. To date, only the Afrobarometer survey is available post-Wave2. Accordingly, we focus on the Afrobarometer's "Trust in courts" question, as outlined in the pre-analysis plan.

[14] This follows an insight uncovered by a recent empirical literature on judiciaries that some ethnic groups with more political connections capture local judiciaries by nepotism (Behrer et al., 2021; Sanchez De La Sierra, 2021)

Table 14—Effect on Trust in Courts

	(1) Trust Courts	(2) Trust Courts	(3) Trust Courts
		Contact with Courts = 1	Contact with Courts = 0
OnePager * Wave 2	8.34*	12.22**	4.72
	(4.44)	(5.43)	(6.63)
OnePager * 2024	6.18	4.29	7.16
	(5.64)	(5.41)	(7.73)
OnePager * Wave 1	4.29	1.52	5.58
	(5.78)	(5.73)	(6.34)
OnePager * Before	4.71	3.20	5.53
	(6.21)	(7.06)	(6.97)
Observations	11,606	5,913	5,693
R-squared	0.051	0.065	0.054
County fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES
Mean control group	53.65	52.93	52.93
SD control group	32.83	32.53	32.53

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering "haven't heard enough to say" are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of treated court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. The variable "Wave 2" is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable "2024" is equal to 1 in Round 10, and captures longer-run effects. The variable "Wave 1" is a dummy equal to 1 in round 8 of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable "Before" is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011.

ments in two (OnePager and OnePager_CUC) and find similar results for both treatments.

As a robustness exercise, we present in Appendix M the effect on trust in other state institutions, such as the president, parliament, local government, the police and the army. Consistent with expectations, we find no significant effects of the One-Pager interventions on these institutions.

VII. Conclusion

This paper presents evidence from the first nationwide experiment designed to reduce court delays by addressing a widespread inefficiency: excessive and unnecessary adjournments. In partnership with the Kenyan Judiciary and the World Bank, we design and evaluate a light-touch, feedback form (the "One-Pager") that summarizes performance metrics and highlight the top three reasons for adjournments. In one treatment arm, the One-Pagers are shared with judges in each court, increasing the visibility of performance to higher judicial authorities. In a second treatment arm, the One-Pagers are also shared with Court User Committees (CUCs), local forums comprising both court actors and civil society representatives, further increasing the visibility of performance to these court users.

The intervention results in a large and significant reduction in adjournments, with a very similar effect across both interventions. The probability of a hearing being adjourned decreased from 20% to 10%, implying a nationwide reduction of approximately 20,000 adjournments. Given that each adjournment causes an average delay of three months, this corresponds to a substantial time saved in court.

The near-identical effects of the OnePager and OnePager_CUC interventions indicate that the key mechanism is visibility to higher judicial authorities, rather than visibility to other court users such as civil society representatives, lawyers, or police.

Moreover, we observe a marked decline in adjournments attributable to judge absenteeism. This pattern is consistent with the mechanism: when judges' performance becomes observable to their superiors, they increase effort.

We find that the intervention increases case filings, particularly in commercial cases (linked to contract enforcement). This pattern suggests that faster courts raise the demand for justice, especially in economically relevant domains. At the same time, trust in courts increases, most strongly among individuals who are more likely to interact with the judiciary. Together, these findings point to improved access to justice and enhanced confidence in legal institutions. Future research could examine whether these effects translate into changes in contracting behavior, higher investment, and broader economic development.

The intervention was feasible because of the institutional environment. In recent years, the Kenyan judiciary has implemented substantial internal reforms, including the creation of a Performance Management Directorate, digital case-tracking systems, and formal performance evaluations. These reforms generated the administrative data and institutional capacity necessary to design and scale the One-Pagers. The results therefore highlight how information-based interventions can im-

prove judicial performance when data exist, leadership supports reform, and incentives are aligned with service delivery. In contexts where such conditions are absent, foundational reforms may be required before similar interventions can succeed.

In sum, the study shows that targeted, data-driven feedback can meaningfully improve judicial performance in environments with supportive institutional infrastructure. The approach is scalable, low-cost, and relies on administrative data already collected in many judicial systems. As countries confront persistent case backlogs and inefficiencies, structured performance feedback and transparency mechanisms may offer a practical and replicable pathway to enhance efficiency, access, and trust in justice systems.

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ONLINE APPENDIX (Not For Publication)

Appendix A: Model in the One-Pager

We use the DCRT data to measure the link between adjournments and court performance. We use the following specification:

$$CCR_{cm} = \beta_0 + \beta_{adj} Adj_{cm} + \alpha_c + \delta_m + \varepsilon_{cm} \qquad (1)$$

where c is for court c, m for month m, CCR_{cm} is the CCR of court c in month m, Adj_{cm} is the proportion of cases seen in the month ending with an adjournment, α_c court fixed effects, δ_m month-year fixed effects, and ε_c is the disturbance term.

We estimate this relationship separately for civil and criminal cases. Based on data on and before 2018, we find a statistically significant coefficient β_{adj} of -5 for civil cases (and -1 for criminal cases), i.e., a 1 percentage point reduction in the proportion of adjourned cases would result in a 5 percentage point increase in the case clearance rate. The logic is simple: if there are less adjournments, more cases get resolved, which increases the CCR.

These estimates are quantitatively large since the average proportion of cases ending with an adjournment is 14 percent, and the average clearance rate is M=94 (SD=64). Thus reducing adjournments from 14 to 0 percent, i.e. eradicating adjournments, would be associated with a [14*5=] 70 percentage point increase in the clearance rate.

We use the estimate β_{adj} obtained above to predict the impact on CCR of reducing adjournments. We take the absolute value since β_{adj} is negative (more adjournments mean less CCR). One can then simply predict the impact on CCR if the top reason for adjournments was reduced from their current level in month m (i.e., $AdjTop1_{cm}$) to zero with the formula:

$$PredictionCCR_{cm}AdjTop1 = |\beta_{adj}| \times AdjTop1_{cm}$$

The interpretation is: a reduction in the top reason for adjournment from current levels (i.e., $AdjTop1_{cm}$) to zero is associated with an increase in CCR by $PredictionCCR_{cm}AdjTop1$. After extensive piloting with officials in the Kenyan judiciary and judges, this sentence was judged slightly difficult to understand and simplified to: "Addressing [the top reason for adjournment] increases CCR by [$PredictionCCR_{cm}AdjTop1$]". This sentence is added on the One-Pager (see Figure 1

for an example). We predict the impact on CCR if the top three reasons of adjournments were addressed. These three sentences constitute the actionable information presented to the judge or to the judge and the public.

Appendix B: Instructions from Chief Justice

Here is the full text of instructions from the Chief Justice accompanying the One-Pager_CUC. The text for the other intervention One-Pager is the same except for the paragraph mentioning the CUC meetings.

Figure B1. Instructions by Chief Justice



REPUBLIC OF KENYA

THE JUDICIARY

THE SUPREME COURT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE / PRESIDENT, SUPREME COURT OF KENYA

Ref: DPOP/IE/Vol.1 (2)

21st January, 2019

The Head of Station
Bomet Law Court
P.O. Box 21
BOMET

RE: PILOTING OF THE SUMMARIZED MONTHLY COURT FEEDBACK REPORT ("ONE-PAGER & CUC")

I take this opportunity to thank you for the adoption of various data collection and reporting tools for courts. Among these tools is the Daily Court Returns Template (DCRT) which the courts have used diligently to account for the cases that are handled and resolved on daily basis. These returns have enabled the Judiciary to prepare statistical reports which have been helpful in informing policy decisions such as resource allocation, placement and promotion of judges and judicial officers. Furthermore, the Judiciary through the Directorate of Planning and Organizational Performance has been providing regular comprehensive statistical reports to courts which are used to inform the day-to-day operation of courts with regard to resolution of cases.

It is against this background and our commitment as the Judiciary towards continuous improvement of feedback mechanisms that we have designed a simplified tool referred to as the "**Monthly Court One-Pager Feedback Report**" (or the "One-Pager"). The one-pager will be prepared by the based on the DCRT submissions by courts. It will provide a summary of monthly court statistics as well as leading causes of adjournments that will inform decision making for speedy handling and disposal of cases and reduction of backlog. The tool will be used by select courts on a pilot basis and in the process we will assess its relevance and effectiveness and thereafter have it adopted by all courts.

In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that your court has been selected, through a systematic random sampling technique, to participate in the pilot. You will therefore receive a one page summary of your court every month which you will table for discussion during your quarterly Court User Committee (CUC) meetings, as a standing agenda item, with a view to identifying and implementing interventions aimed at improving service delivery and addressing the leading causes of adjournments in your court. The discussions, resolutions and interventions thereof will be submitted to the National Council on the Administration of Justice (NCAJ) Secretariat as part of the CUC meeting minutes.

Balanced scales of justice ensure transformation

1

Chief Justice Chambers | Supreme Court Building | **Telephone:** +254 2221221
Email : chiefjustice@court.go.ke | david.maraga@court.go.ke
P.O. Box 30041- 00100 | Nairobi, Kenya

www.judiciary.go.ke

FIGURE B2. INSTRUCTIONS BY CHIEF JUSTICE



Appendix C: Sampling for Experimental Design

To achieve balance, we stratify on geographical variables and on a slow/fast court dummy.

For the geographical variables, we established a list of 8 regions that do not correspond exactly to the official regions but that make sense distance-wise to organize potential future regional meetings to debrief court stations about the interventions. For example, Thika court is in Central province but it is easier and cheaper for them to travel to Nairobi for the meeting. Therefore, Thika was classified in Nairobi, not Central.

We also stratify on a slow/fast court dummy. To build this dummy, we use average time to disposition at the station level. We compute the median of time to disposition, and define a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the court station is above the median time to disposition, 0 otherwise.

We then stratify on 1) regions, and 2) time to disposition. This means creating 8 (regions)*2 (above median time to disposition, i.e., slow stations, or below median time to disposition, i.e., fast stations) = 16 strata of court stations. Within each strata, we then split the court stations into three groups: control, "One-Pager" and "One-Pager + CUC". This produces a sampling plan with 41 stations in the control group, 41 in the "One-Pager", and 41 in the "One-Pager + CUC".[15]

This procedure ensures that the treatment is balanced on time to disposition. In fact, one can regress time to disposition on control, "One-Pager" and "One-Pager + CUC", and we find a t-statistic of -0.38 and -0.29 respectively.

This technique does not ensure that the treatment and control groups will be balanced on other variables. To check this, we regress treatment on four other variables: number of cases filed at the station level, number of adjournments civil, number of adjournment criminal, and due process.[16] The number of cases filed at the station level is a proxy for court size. Ideally, one would like to have a balance of small and big courts in each treatment group. The number of adjournments is an important intermediate variable in this project since the One-Pager aims at reducing adjournments. Finally, due process will be an important outcome of this project since one would expect the One-Pagers to increase speed, but not at the detriment of due process.

[15]The size of the strata can vary: for example, strata1 has 8 stations. The issue is that 8 cannot be neatly divided by 3 (for Control/One-Pager/One-Pager_CUC). The sampling plan starts by assigning 2 stations to control, 3 to "One-Pager", and 3 in the "One-Pager + CUC". To make sure that the control group does not always get less stations, we rotated the order of the treatments. This achieves a 44/40/39 split. We then randomly select three stations from the Control group and assign one of them to One-Pager, and two of them to One-Pager_CUC. This ensures a 41/41/41 split. All of this is done randomly, such that balance is achieved in the end.

[16]To get an estimate of due process, we used the 2017 Court User Satisfaction Survey and calculated the average of answers to the section "court room experience". Question 19.1 The judge/magistrate was courteous 19.2 My matter took the time I was expecting 19.3 The judge/magistrate listened and led the hearing well 19.4 My matter was started in time 19.5 The judge/magistrate made decision in a timely manner 19.6 The judge/magistrate was neutral in his/her decision. Average: 70%, as in "COURT USER SATISFACTION SURVEY, REPORT BY PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, JUNE, 2017"

The maximum t-statistic across all these variables is 1.84.

To achieve even better balance, this process can be repeated by rerandomizing: we draw 10,000 allocations to treatment and control, and chose the one that shows best balance on the observable variables. In that winning iteration, the "minimum maximum" t-stat is 0.57.

In particular, this plan achieves balance on the number of cases filed per station. When regressing number of cases filed per station on control, "One-Pager" and "One-Pager + CUC", we find a t-statistic of 0.15 and 0.32 respectively.

Appendix D: Balance Tests

D1. Balance Test in the DCRT

The specification is:

$$Adjournment_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 OnePager_c + \gamma_t + \beta X_{ict} + \epsilon_{ict}$$

$Adjournment_{ict}$ is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case coming to court ends in an adjournment, 0 otherwise; such that the regression is predicting the average probability that a case will be adjourned. The subscript i corresponds to each individual court appearance. c refers to court c within a court station, t refers to the time period (a month-year). The sample is restricted to the year before the experiment, i.e., 2018. We choose the year 2018 since the balance tests for other years before 2018 are shown in all tables, identified by the variable called "Pre".

$OnePager_c$ is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the court station is in the OnePager or OnePager_CUC treatment group, 0 otherwise.

X_{ict} is the set of the stratification dummies: the 8 regions, and the dummy for above median time to disposition.

ϵ_{ict} is a stochastic error term. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the level of courts.

Table D1 shows the results for High Courts and Table D2 for Magistrate Courts.

In Column (1), we see that the two treatment groups do not have less adjournments to start with. If anything they have more adjournments, which would serve to bias downward the estimates; however the difference is not significant.

The rest of the row shows adjournment by the stage of the case, by restricting the sample to hearings in Column (2), filing of a case in Column (3), mentions (asking for directions from the court) in Column (4), judgments in Column (5), and other types of curt appearances in Column (6). The Treatment group does not have less adjournments to start with. If anything, the treatment group has more adjournments on hearings, and especially on mentions.

The next shows the adjournments disaggregated by their cause. Column (7) shows that there are not less adjournments caused by the court in either treatment groups. Overall, the adjournments disaggregated by their cause are well balanced.

The next row shows the adjournments disaggregated by their civil or criminal nature. Once again, the adjournments for civil and criminal cases are well balanced.

The next rows shows good balance for cases closed or the time to disposition. For this test, we restrict the sample to cases filed in the base year, i.e., 2018. Those cases have a similar time to disposition in both treatment groups, indicating that the treated courts were not faster to start with.

The next row shows the balance test for cases filed: there are not more or less cases filed in either treatment groups prior to the experiment. There are more commercial cases, a result only significant at the 10% level. There is also good balance for cased filed by repeat players. There are more cases resolved in the treatment group, a result only significant at the 10% level, and similar CCR.

Table D1—Balance Test High Courts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Adj.	Adjournment By Stage of Case:				
		Hearing	Filing	Mention	Judgement	Other
OnePager	0.016	0.039	0.0036	0.020***	0.0036	-0.0056
	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.0023)	(0.0064)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Control Group mean	0.063	0.18	0.00068	0.031	0.023	0.033
SD	0.24	0.38	0.026	0.17	0.15	0.18
Observations	279532	56994	33728	120766	27026	38148

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
			Adjournment By Cause:			
	Court	Parties Not Ready	Parties Not Present	Lawyer	Witness	Police Prosecutor
OnePager	0.0026	0.0053	0.0040	0.0030	0.0012	0.0010
	(0.0045)	(0.0033)	(0.0028)	(0.0028)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)
Control Group mean	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.011	0.0045	0.00084
SD	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.067	0.029
Observations	279532	279532	279532	279532	279532	279532

	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Adjournment		Case	Time to
	Civil	Criminal	Closed	Disposition
OnePager	0.014	0.018	0.026	7.97
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(6.33)
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063	0.057	354.3
SD	0.24	0.24	0.23	443.6
Observations	187897	88511	279532	23549

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)
				Number Filed Cases			
	Total	Comm. and Civil	Succession	Credit	Criminal	Political	Family
OnePager	0.57	0.45*	0.19	0.0045	-0.24	0.14	0.063
	(0.62)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.0069)	(0.49)	(0.11)	(0.076)
Control Group mean	2.89	0.75	0.14	0.0042	1.78	0.16	0.067
SD	8.83	2.37	0.45	0.073	7.97	0.61	0.33
Observations	8514	8514	8514	8514	8514	8514	8514

	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
	Number Filed Cases		No. Cases	CCR
	Legal Rep.	Org.	Resolved	
OnePager	-0.029	-0.26	3.00*	65.5
	(0.39)	(0.56)	(1.59)	(67.5)
Control Group mean	1.64	2.15	3.89	223.3
SD	5.06	7.98	12.9	842.3
Observations	8514	8514	8514	5324

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, month fixed effects are included. The stratification dummies are included (the 8 regions, and the dummy for above median time to disposition). The sample is restricted to the year 2018. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to hearings in Column (2), filing of a case in Column (3), mentions (asking for directions from the court) in Column (4), judgment in Column (5), and other types of appearances in Column 6). In Column (7), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The next columns are defined similarly, with adjournment due to parties not ready in Column (8), not present in Column (9), lawyers in Column (10), witnesses in Column (11), and police / prosecutor in Column (12). In columns (13) and (14), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to civil cases in Column (13) and criminal cases in Column (14). In Column (15), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in the case being either terminated, dismissed, struck out, or case closed; 0 otherwise. In Column (16), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent. The sample size is smaller since time to disposition is only defined for resolved cases. The sample is restricted to cases filed in 2018. In Column (17), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per day per court. The other columns are defined similarly with the number of cases filed per day per court for commercial cases in Column (18), succession cases in Column (19), credit cases (insolvency, bankruptcy, and winding up cases) in Column (20), criminal cases in Column (21), political cases (i.e., judicial review, election and constitutional cases) in Column (22) and family cases (child custody, divorce) in Column (23). In Column (24), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation. In Column (25), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed by organizations. In Column (26), the dependent variable is the number of cases resolved per day per court. In column (27), the dependent variable is the CCR (the ratio of cases resolved over cases filed times 100). The sample size is smaller since some courts have zero cases filed in the day.

Table D2—Balance Test Magistrate Courts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Adj.	Adjournment By Stage of Case:				
		Hearing	Filing	Mention	Judgement	Other
OnePager	0.0082	0.0052	-0.000034	0.0083	-0.0099	0.0032
	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.00049)	(0.0083)	(0.019)	(0.0078)
Control Group mean	0.15	0.39	0.00090	0.044	0.045	0.023
SD	0.36	0.49	0.030	0.21	0.21	0.15
Observations	1581971	475799	73785	635592	113950	265158

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
		Adjournment By Cause:				
	Court	Parties Not Ready	Parties Not Present	Lawyer	Witness	Police Prosecutor
OnePager	-0.0013	0.0060*	0.0017	0.0039**	0.00092	-0.0012
	(0.0057)	(0.0031)	(0.0044)	(0.0017)	(0.0038)	(0.0025)
Control Group mean	0.048	0.015	0.021	0.011	0.028	0.016
SD	0.21	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.16	0.13
Observations	1581971	1581971	1581971	1581971	1581971	1581971

	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Adjournment		Case	Time to
	Civil	Criminal	Closed	Disposition
OnePager	0.018	0.011	-0.0036	0.038
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.0023)	(2.30)
Control Group mean	0.15	0.15	0.030	213.2
SD	0.36	0.36	0.17	382.1
Observations	561623	1009682	1581971	250112

	(17)	(18)	(19)
	No. Cases Filed	No. Cases Resolved	CCR
OnePager	-0.65	0.90	28.6**
	(1.30)	(1.92)	(13.8)
Control Group mean	9.62	10.8	156.1
SD	12.6	17.2	249.0
Observations	28767	28767	25941

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, month fixed effects are included. The stratification dummies are included (the 8 regions, and the dummy for above median time to disposition). The sample is restricted to the year 2018. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to hearings in Column (2), filing of a case in Column (3), mentions (asking for directions from the court) in Column (4), judgment in Column (5), and other types of appearances in Column 6). In Column (7), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The next columns are defined similarly, with adjournment due to parties not ready in Column (8), not present in Column (9), lawyers in Column (10), witnesses in Column (11), and police / prosecutor in Column (12). In columns (13) and (14), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to civil cases in Column (13) and criminal cases in Column (14). In Column (15), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in the case being either terminated, dismissed, struck out, or case closed; 0 otherwise. In Column (16), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent. The sample size is smaller since time to disposition is only defined for resolved cases. The sample is restricted to cases filed in 2018. In Column (17), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per day per court. The other columns are defined similarly with the number of cases filed per day per court for commercial cases in Column (18), succession cases in Column (19), credit cases (insolvency, bankruptcy, and winding up cases) in Column (20), criminal cases in Column (21), political cases (i.e., judicial review, election and constitutional cases) in Column (22) and family cases (child custody, divorce) in Column (23). In Column (24), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation. In Column (25), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed by organizations. In Column (26), the dependent variable is the number of cases resolved per day per court. In column (27), the dependent variable is the CCR (the ratio of cases resolved over cases filed times 100). The sample size is smaller since some courts have zero cases filed in the day.

D2. Balance Test for Trust in Courts

Table D3 shows the balance in trust in courts across treatment and control groups. Column (1) shows that trust is not significantly different in the two treatment groups versus the control group.

Table D3—Balance Test Trust in Courts

	(1) Trust courts	(2) Occup. Contact Courts	(3) Other Occup.	(4) Secondary Educ.	(5) Primary Educ.	(6) Urban	(7) Rural	(8) Male	(9) Fem.	(10) Connected	(11) Unconn.	(12) Likely user	(13) Not Likely user
One-Pager	-7.95	-11.16*	-6.09	-11.89**	-5.48	-10.95*	-7.04	-7.93	-7.87	-10.37*	0.61	-11.13*	-5.42
	(5.47)	(5.82)	(5.78)	(4.94)	(6.57)	(5.75)	(6.02)	(5.65)	(5.87)	(5.85)	(6.07)	(5.73)	(6.06)
One-Pager_CUC	-7.41	-3.37	-8.75	-5.64	-8.62	-6.65	-4.85	-6.27	-8.59	-8.42	-1.22	-6.67	-8.33
	(6.90)	(7.57)	(6.63)	(6.90)	(7.56)	(6.36)	(7.79)	(6.51)	(7.75)	(7.34)	(7.64)	(7.03)	(7.55)
Observations	2,282	770	1,512	1,000	1,281	850	1,432	1,166	1,116	2,036	246	1,356	917
R-squared	0.006	0.011	0.006	0.010	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.009	0.001	0.009	0.005
Mean control group	55.78	57.49	54.92	54.23	56.99	52.43	57.77	55.06	56.54	55.45	58.54	54.50	57.62
SD control group	31.16	31.06	31.19	30.16	31.90	31.08	31.06	31.11	31.22	31.32	29.77	31	31.33

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering "haven't heard enough to say" are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. "One-Pager_CUC" is defined similarly. The variable "Wave 2" is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable "Wave 1" is a dummy equal to 1 in the previous round (round 8) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable "Before" is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011. In Column (2), the sample is restricted to occupations in greater contact with courts. In Column (3), the sample is restricted to all other occupations. In Column (4), the sample is restricted to respondents with secondary education or more. In Column (5), the sample is restricted to respondents with primary education or less. In Column (6), the sample is restricted to respondents living in urban settings. In Column (7), the sample is restricted to respondents living in rural settings. In Column (8), the sample is restricted to males. In Column (9), the sample is restricted to females. In Column (10), the sample is restricted to connected ethnic groups. In Column (11), the sample is restricted to unconnected ethnic groups. In Column (12), the sample is restricted to respondents scoring above the median of the prediction index of contact with courts. In Column (13), the sample is restricted to respondents scoring below the median of that index.

D3. Balance Test in the KCHSP

We use the Kenya Continuous Household Survey Programme (KCHSP). The continuous data collection was implemented all throughout 2019 by the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) which allows us to look at the effects of the intervention before and after the treatment. This data is a representative sample of Kenya. It includes individual-level data with basic sociodemographic, a labor force survey with measures of entrepreneurship, investment and access to credit, as well as some variables on contracting behavior.

We present a balance test focusing on the first quarter of 2019. We regress the outcome on the variable $FracOnePager_c$ which is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers.[17] For example, the county of Mombasa has 5 court stations, two of which received the One-Pagers; a fraction of (2/5=) 0.4. This fraction varies between 0 and 1, such that there are some counties with no court stations receiving One-Pagers and other counties where all court stations receive One-Pagers.

Table D4 below restricts the sample to quarter 1, and simply regresses the outcome on $FracOnePager_c$ and $FracOnePagerCUC_c$.[18]

In Column (1), the constant term shows that 50 percent of the individuals are male in the counties with no treated court stations.[19] This proportion is not significantly different in counties with more treated courts, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients of $FracOnePager_c$ and $FracOnePagerCUC_c$. Thus, the sample is well balanced across treatment and control groups as far as this variable is concerned.

The average age is 25 years old, number of years on the job is 8.5 years (for those with a job), 49 percent of the sample went to primary school, 20 percent went to secondary school, and the average household size is 3.3. The proportion of the sample with primary education is slightly lower for the treatment arm One-Pagers, but not for the other treatment arm of One-Pagers sent to CUC.

Table D5 below shows the balance test with the following economic outcomes: investment (purchase of farm inputs for crop production in Column (1) and income from self employment in Column

[17]The KCHSP data's most disaggregated geographical variable is at the county level.

[18]We cannot include the stratification dummies in these regressions (the 8 region dummies and the Slow/Fast dummy) since these stratification variables are defined at the court level, whereas the KCHSP is at the individual level, with county being the most disaggregated geographical variable. For the 8 region dummies, the Kenyan judiciary established their own list at the court level that does do not correspond exactly to the official counties but that make sense distance-wise to organize potential future regional meetings to debrief court stations about the interventions. For example, Thika court is in Central province but it is easier and cheaper for them to travel to Nairobi for the meeting. Therefore, Thika was classified in the Nairobi region, not Central. Thus, there is no exact correspondence between an individual living in a certain county and the region created by the Kenyan judiciary. The Slow/Fast dummy is similarly defined at the court level, it is thus impossible to assign a specific individual to a Slow/Fast dummy since one does not know exactly which the individual would file a case were he to do so.

[19]In this table, we display the constant term and not the mean dependent variable as in all other tables since they are the same in this particular table. There are no variables in this model other than $FracOnePager_c$ and $FracOnePagerCUC_c$, therefore the constant term is also the mean of the dependent variable in the control group.

Table D4—Balance Test (quarter 1 of 2019)

	(1) Gender	(2) Age	(3) Years on Job	(4) Primary	(5) Secondary	(6) HH Size
FracOne-Pager	-0.02	-1.59	0.37	-0.09*	-0.05	0.22
	(0.01)	(1.59)	(1.63)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.31)
FracOne-Pager_CUC	0.00	-0.06	0.81	-0.08	-0.00	0.15
	(0.01)	(1.40)	(1.49)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.28)
Constant	0.50***	24.89***	8.46***	0.49***	0.20***	3.30***
	(0.01)	(1.02)	(0.93)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.17)
Observations	22,732	22,732	5,409	22,732	22,732	22,732

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the county. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, ** Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1) the dependent variable is gender, a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for males, 0 for males. The variable "FracOne-Pager" is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers. In Column (2), the dependent variable is age in years. In Column (3), the dependent variable is the number of years on the job. In Column (4), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has completed any years of primary school, 0 otherwise. In Column (5), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has completed any years of secondary school, 0 otherwise. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the size of the household.

(2)), business creation (applications to permit to start businesses in Column (3) and transitions to entrepreneurship in Column (4)), access to credit (applied for a loan from a bank to look for a job or start any kind of business/income generating activity in Column (5), contracting behavior (written labor contract in Column (6)), and wage in Column (7)).

All the coefficients are not statistically significant, except for contract for the One-Pager intervention, significant at the 10 percent level. (but not for the One-Pager sent to CUC intervention). Getting one significant coefficient out of 14 in this table (7 outcomes * 2 interventions) is expected at the 10 percent level.

Table D5—Balance Test With Economic Outcomes

	(1) Agri. Inv.	(2) Income Self Emp.	(3) Permit Business	(4) Transition Entrepreneur	(5) Applied Loan	(6) Contract	(7) No PAP Wage
FracOne-Pager	0.01	-23.51	0.00	0.02	-0.00	-0.04*	-19.31
	(0.01)	(31.77)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(37.94)
FracOne-PagerCUC	0.01	25.96	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-28.83
	(0.01)	(52.84)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(43.87)
Constant	0.00	260.12***	-0.00	0.13***	0.00	0.14***	263.06***
	(0.00)	(25.04)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(26.51)
Observations	22,732	5,456	11,465	19,504	11,465	8,271	2,154

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the county. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, ** Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the answer to the question: "Did the household purchase farm inputs for crop production during the last month (Yes/No)". This questions is asked for each and every crop produced. The dependent variable is the sum of all answers at the household level. Results are similar if we take takes a dummy taking the value 1 if the household answers yes for any crop produced by the household, 0 otherwise. The variable "FracOne-Pager" is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers. The variable "Post" is equal to 1 in the quarters 2, 3, and 4, and equal to 0 in quarter 1. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the earnings after expenses for both worker employers and own account workers, otherwise called income from self-employment in the dataset. In Column (3), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answered: "Applied for permit to start business" to the question: "In the past 4 weeks what actions has ... taken to look for a job or start any kind of business/income generating activity? rank the three main ones". This questions is only asked to unemployed persons and persons not in the labour force. In Column (4), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual is a working employer or an own-account worker, 0 otherwise, conditional on being a year ago employed, unemployed, student, housewife, retired, family worker, incapacitated, discouraged worker. In Column (5), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answered: "Applied for a loan from a bank" to the question: "In the past 4 weeks what actions has ... taken to look for a job or start any kind of business/income generating activity?". In Column (6), the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual answers "a written contract" to the question "Is ... employed on the basis of". Other answers are verbal agreement, implied contract, no contract. In Column (7), the dependent variable is payment for wages and gross salary in the last one month, trimmed at the 5 percent level.

D4. Balance Test With County GDP

Table D6 below shows the balance test using County GDP collected between 2013 and 2017 by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (all figures are in Million USD PPP). There is no significant association between county GDP and the fraction of court stations treated with either the One-Pager or the One-Pager_CUC.

Table D6—Balance Test With County GDP

	(1) CGDP2013	(2) CGDP2014	(3) CGDP2015	(4) CGDP2016	(5) CGDP2017
Frac. One-Pager	-466.66	-493.80	-557.23	-473.94	-476.21
	(448.76)	(515.86)	(623.72)	(753.35)	(886.56)
Frac. One-Pager_CUC	857.06	977.13	994.50	1,150.76	1,189.46
	(1,783.93)	(1,973.39)	(2,190.73)	(2,460.23)	(2,667.47)
Observations	47	47	47	47	47
Mean control group	2062	2062	2062	2062	2062
SD control group	3298	3658	4083	4618	5038

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, ** Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the 2013 county GDP, expressed in Million USD PPP. The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers.

D5. Balance Test With KIHBS

This section presents the balance test using the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2015-2016. Column (1) of Table D7 shows a regression of gender (1 for males, 0 for females) on the fraction of court stations in the county treated with the One-Pager or One-Pager_CUC. There is no significant association there. Columns (2), (3), and (4) show no significant relationship between age, highest grade completed and wage in 2015.

Table D7—Balance Test With KIHBS

	(1) Gender	(2) Age	(3) Highest Grade Completed	(4) Wage
Frac. One-Pager	0.01	-1.75	-0.10	-18.26
	(0.01)	(1.52)	(0.13)	(27.01)
Frac. One-Pager_CUC	-0.00	-0.98	-0.11	51.98
	(0.01)	(1.41)	(0.09)	(40.48)
Observations	92,846	92,846	69,353	38,681
Mean Dep Var	0.494	23.50	4.144	174.9
SD	0.500	30.76	2.352	394.3

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence-interval, ** Significant at 95 percent confidence-interval, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1) the dependent variable is gender, a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for males, 0 for males. In Column (2), the dependent variable is age in years. In Column (3), the dependent variable is equal to the highest grade completed. In Column (4), the dependent variable is the wage, defined as the basic salary in last month. The variable "Frac. One-Pager" is the fraction of court stations in a county that received the One-Pagers.

Appendix E: Splitting Treatments

In this section, we split the treatments in two: OnePager and OnePager_CUC, to investigate the differential effects of the two interventions.

The overall result is that the effects of the two interventions are very similar, statistically indistinguishable.

Figure E1 shows the effect on adjournment. The points in blue are the treatment effects for the One-Pager intervention, while the points in red are the treatment effects for the One-Pager_CUC intervention.These points are very close to each other.

Figure E1. Effects on Adjournment - Splitting Treatment



Table E2 shows very similar effects of both interventions on adjournments. The difference is not statistically significant: in Column (1), the p-value of the t-test of equality of coefficients is 0.19.

Table E2 shows very similar effects of both interventions on the two stages of the cases involving many adjournments: hearings in Column (1) and mentions in Column (3).

Table E3 shows very similar effects for the One-Pager or One-Pager_CUC intervention

Table E4 look at the effects on adjournment by the type of case: civil or criminal. Recall that the total effect of the OnePager intervention is the sum of the coefficients "OnePager * After Wave 1" and "OnePager * Wave 2". Therefore, the effect of the One-Pager_CUC interventions is -0.056

Table E1—Effects on Adjournments - Splitting Treatment

	(1)	(2)
	Adjournment	
	High Courts	Magistrate Courts
OnePager * Wave 2	-0.054**	-0.0022
	(0.020)	(0.0093)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.038*	0.0070
	(0.020)	(0.010)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.0052	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.015)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	-0.0057	-0.0032
	(0.014)	(0.016)
OnePager * Pre	0.033*	0.011
	(0.019)	(0.015)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.014	0.00035
	(0.014)	(0.017)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24
Observations	1989618	12535121
Test Equality	0.19	0.44

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. In Column (1), the sample is restricted to High Courts, and in Column (2), to Magistrate Courts.

- 0.057 = -0.113, very similar to the effect of the One-Pager intervention, which is -0.0071 - 0.13.

Table E5 finds no negative effect on quality for both the One-Pager and One-Pager_CUC interventions.

Table E6 splits the treatments and finds similar effects across the two interventions. In Column (2), we use a censoring model accounting for the fact that we observe time to disposition only for cases that have been resolved. We use a tobit model with an upper limit at 635 days, since cases filed in August 2021 but not resolved by March 2023 have been in the system for that period of time. Column (2) shows the same decrease in time to disposition.

Table E7 shows the results for the number of cases filed. The impact of the OnePager and OnePager_CUC is very similar: they increase the number of cases filed by respectively 0.95 and 1.03 cases per day per court. These effects are statistically indistinguishable, as evidence by the p-value of 0.92 of the t-test of the equality of the coefficients.

Table E8 shows the effect on number of cases filed with legal representation, and number of cases filed by organizations. The effects are stronger with One-Pager_CUC, which is logical since

Table E2—Effects on Adjournments of Hearings - Splitting Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Case Stage:			
	Hearing	Filing	Mention	Judgement
OnePager * Wave 2	-0.087*	0.00016	-0.050***	-0.052
	(0.046)	(0.00041)	(0.017)	(0.037)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.060	0.0018*	-0.037*	-0.031
	(0.036)	(0.00095)	(0.019)	(0.028)
OnePager * After Wave 1	0.0092	-0.000023	-0.030**	0.014
	(0.042)	(0.0011)	(0.013)	(0.018)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	-0.014	-0.00087	-0.0084	-0.0097
	(0.036)	(0.0013)	(0.013)	(0.021)
OnePager * Pre	0.044	0.0011	0.018	0.025*
	(0.037)	(0.0014)	(0.030)	(0.014)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.052	0.0029*	0.0078	0.018
	(0.037)	(0.0017)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.18	0.00068	0.031	0.023
SD	0.38	0.026	0.17	0.15
Observations	331217	182657	905293	167689
Test Equality	0.39	0.063	0.26	0.46

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to hearings in Column (1), filing of a case in Column (2), mentions (asking for directions from the court) in Column (3), and judgment in Column (4).

in the One-Pager_CUC intervention, other courts users are involved in the CUC meetings, where the One-Pagers are openly discussed.

Table E10 shows that the effect on Trust is positive and significant for the OnePager intervention. However, the t-test of the equality of the coefficients between OnePager and OnePager_CUC has a p-value of 0.3, not statistically different.

Table E3—Effect on Adjournment by Cause - Splitting Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Cause of Adjournment:					
	Court	Parties Not Ready	Parties Not Present	Lawyer	Witness	Police Prosecutor
OnePager * Wave 2	-0.046***	0.000017	-0.0056***	-0.0050**	-0.00072	-0.00080
	(0.015)	(0.0025)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)	(0.0019)	(0.00051)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.031**	-0.0023	-0.0053**	-0.0035*	0.0000010	-0.00035
	(0.015)	(0.0023)	(0.0020)	(0.0018)	(0.0012)	(0.00043)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.00066	-0.00066	0.00036	0.00042	-0.00025	0.00045
	(0.0069)	(0.0028)	(0.0028)	(0.0033)	(0.0015)	(0.0014)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	0.0053	-0.0058*	-0.0027	0.0011	-0.00100	0.00017
	(0.0087)	(0.0031)	(0.0029)	(0.0019)	(0.00090)	(0.00092)
OnePager * Pre	0.0090	0.0025	0.0058	0.0081*	0.00064	-0.00040
	(0.0082)	(0.0052)	(0.0040)	(0.0046)	(0.0018)	(0.0014)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.0069	-0.0037	-0.0011	0.0067**	0.00058	0.000088
	(0.0081)	(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0030)	(0.0022)	(0.0011)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.011	0.0045	0.00084
SD	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.067	0.029
Observations	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942	1984942
Test Equality	0.13	0.22	0.84	0.42	0.66	0.46

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The next columns are defined similarly, with adjournment due to parties not ready in Column (2), not present in Column (3), lawyers in Column (4), witnesses in Column (5), and police / prosecutor in Column (6).

Table E4—Effect on Adjournments by Type of Case - Splitting Treatment

	(1)	(2)
	Adjournment	
	Civil	Criminal
OnePager * Wave 2	-0.13***	-0.035
	(0.043)	(0.068)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.057	-0.024
	(0.038)	(0.055)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.0071	0.047
	(0.034)	(0.055)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	-0.056*	-0.018
	(0.028)	(0.052)
OnePager * Pre	0.022	0.064
	(0.031)	(0.061)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.012	0.13**
	(0.029)	(0.054)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.063
SD	0.24	0.24
Observations	189208	108718
Test Equality	0.0088	0.86

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a hearing ends in adjournment due to the court, 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to civil cases in Column (1) and criminal cases in Column (2).

Table E5—Effect on Quality - Splitting Treatment

	(1) Appeal	(2) Case Closed
OnePager * Wave 2	0.00023	0.020
	(0.00026)	(0.015)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	0.00028	0.018
	(0.00026)	(0.012)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.00025	-0.013
	(0.00028)	(0.034)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	-0.00030	-0.029
	(0.00028)	(0.039)
OnePager * Pre	-0.000047*	-0.012
	(0.000024)	(0.036)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	-0.000035	-0.032
	(0.000022)	(0.045)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0	0.057
SD	0	0.23
Observations	1137776	1137776
Test Equality	0.52	0.92

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the judgement of the case is appealed, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case in court ends in the case being either terminated, dismissed, struck out, or case closed; 0 otherwise.

Table E6—Effects on Time To Disposition - Splitting Treatment

	(1)	(2) Censoring
OnePager * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-89.1*	-51.1*
	(47.8)	(30.5)
OnePager_CUC * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-115.4***	-72.1***
	(42.3)	(26.1)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	992.9	992.9
SD	1355.1	1355.1
Observations	181444	181449
Test Equality	0.56	0.49

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent. The sample size is smaller since time to disposition is only defined for resolved cases. In Column (2), tobit model with an upper limit at 635 days.

Table E7—Effects on Number of Cases Filed - Splitting Treatment

	(1) Total	(2) Commercial	(3) Succession	(4) Credit	(5) Anticorruption and Economic Crimes	(6) Criminal	(7) Political	(8) Family
OnePager * Wave 2	0.95**	0.25	0.050	-0.037	0.00023	0.67*	0.0075	-0.032
	(0.42)	(0.17)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.00025)	(0.34)	(0.064)	(0.12)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	1.03	0.53	-0.051	0.21	0.0043	0.085	-0.040	0.73
	(0.76)	(0.33)	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.0043)	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.80)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.55	-0.37**	-0.0022	0.0088	-0.00013	-0.20	0.035	-0.014
	(0.41)	(0.17)	(0.039)	(0.0091)	(0.00015)	(0.38)	(0.042)	(0.078)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	-0.42	0.34	-0.30	0.40	0.0032	-0.52	0.052	0.30
	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.0032)	(0.42)	(0.072)	(0.39)
OnePager * Pre	0.35	-0.41*	0.34	-0.00062	0.000039	0.53*	-0.042	-0.057*
	(0.57)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.0055)	(0.000070)	(0.30)	(0.100)	(0.029)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.83	-0.13	0.62	-0.061	0.0017	0.15	0.094	-0.011
	(0.88)	(0.21)	(0.66)	(0.064)	(0.0017)	(0.40)	(0.058)	(0.037)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	2.01	0.61	0.28	0.0049	0	0.99	0.11	0.033
SD	6.18	2.36	1.85	0.083	0	5.05	0.52	0.22
Observations	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883	62883
Test Equality	0.92	0.41	0.32	0.26	0.32	0.069	0.74	0.33

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per day per court. The other columns are defined similarly with the number of cases filed per day per court for commercial cases in Column (2), succession cases in Column (3), credit cases (insolvency, bankruptcy, and winding up cases) in Column (4), anticorruption and economic crimes in Column (5), criminal cases in Column (6), political cases (i.e., judicial review, election and constitutional cases) in Column (7) and family cases (child custody, divorce) in Column (8).

Table E8—Effects on Number of Cases Filed by Repeat Players - Splitting Treatment

	(1) Filed with Legal Representation	(2) Filed by Organizations
OnePager * Wave 2	0.59	0.99*
	(0.41)	(0.57)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	2.57**	2.10*
	(0.99)	(1.05)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.37*	-0.10
	(0.20)	(0.54)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	1.08	-0.12
	(0.71)	(0.60)
OnePager * Pre	0.32	0.37
	(0.25)	(0.41)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.79	0.69
	(0.50)	(0.53)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	1.16	1.31
SD	3.63	5.22
Observations	62883	62883
Test Equality	0.041	0.33

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed with legal representation. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed by organizations.

Table E9—Effects on Number of Cases Resolved - Splitting Treatment

	(1) Number Cases Resolved	(2) Case Clearance Rate
OnePager * Wave 2	0.61	12.5
	(0.40)	(16.4)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	0.48	4.83
	(0.34)	(11.1)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.90	8.12
	(1.15)	(61.9)
OnePager_CUC * After Wave 1	-2.76	-51.9
	(2.10)	(71.0)
OnePager * Pre	-0.67	-0.39
	(1.18)	(64.1)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	-2.25	-13.7
	(1.96)	(59.9)
Court FE	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	2.18	146.5
SD	8.16	585.0
Observations	62883	44412
Test Equality	0.76	0.66

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases resolved per day per court. In column (2), the dependent variable is the CCR (the ratio of cases resolved over cases filed times 100). The sample size is smaller since some courts have zero cases filed in the day.

Table E10—Trust with Courts - Splitting Treatment

	(1) Trust Courts	(2) Trust Courts Contact with Courts = 1	(3) Trust Courts Contact with Courts = 0
OnePager * Wave 2	10.69**	18.73***	3.87
	(5.21)	(6.23)	(7.14)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	5.59	5.85	5.87
	(4.96)	(5.49)	(7.67)
OnePager * 2024	7.59	6.87	7.49
	(6.03)	(6.41)	(7.80)
OnePager_CUC * 2024	4.46	1.95	6.85
	(6.32)	(5.68)	(9.05)
OnePager * Wave 1	5.26	4.06	4.61
	(5.89)	(6.04)	(6.48)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 1	3.14	-0.89	6.92
	(6.53)	(6.52)	(7.52)
OnePager * Before	7.60	8.74	5.36
	(6.87)	(7.67)	(7.59)
OnePager_CUC * Before	1.31	-2.73	5.87
	(6.23)	(7.00)	(7.54)
Observations	11,606	5,913	5,693
R-squared	0.051	0.066	0.054
County fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES
Mean control group	53.65	52.93	54.42
SD control group	32.83	32.53	33.21
Test Equality	0.330	0.0612	0.758

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering "haven't heard enough to say" are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of treated court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. The variable "Wave 2" is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable "2024" is equal to 1 in Round 10, and captures longer-run effects. The variable "Wave 1" is a dummy equal to 1 in round 8 of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable "Before" is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011.

Appendix F: Graphs

In this section, we present all the graphs for the analysis in Figure F.

Panel A shows the main effect on adjournments in the whole sample.

Panel B restricts the sample to certain stages of the case: there is an effect on adjournments in Hearings and Mentions, the two stages of the case most likely to be adjourned. For hearings, the point estimate is below 10 percentage points in some quarters. The results are less statistically significant, possible because of the smaller sample size for hearings. For mentions, there is a small effect of Wave 1, but much smaller than the effect of Wave 2.

Panel C shows a large reduction of adjournments by the court. There is a small effect on adjournments because of parties not being present or because of lawyers.

Panel D shows a large negative effect on time to disposition: a reduction by approximately 100 days. This analysis is by the quarter in which the case was filed. Therefore, the x-axis represents when the case was filed. As explained in the text, we can only consider cases filed in the first or second quarter of Wave 2 since only these cases have a chance of being resolved by the end of the data in 2023. For these two quarters, the effect is negative, in line with the main results of the paper.

Panel E shows that the number of cases filed increases immediately after wave 2. This may sound surprising, however recall that the increase in cases filed comes from people knowledgeable about the courts: lawyers and organizations, as shown in the last two graphs. These repeat players know about the courts and observe the reduction in adjournments that come with the intervention.

FIGURE F1. TREATMENT EFFECTS

A. Whole Sample



B. By Stage of the Case





C. By Cause of adjournment







D. Time to Disposition



E. Cases Filed







Appendix G: Robustness Check

In Table G1, we omit the variable "Pre" and all its interactions. The omitted category is the entire period from 2015 until January 2019. The results are very similar.

Table G1—No Pre Period

	(1)
One-Pager * Wave 2	-0.078***
	(0.019)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.052**
	(0.020)
One-Pager * Wave 1	-0.019
	(0.015)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.026**
	(0.010)
One-Pager * Transition	-0.025
	(0.021)
One-Pager_CUC * Transition	-0.0094
	(0.019)
Court FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063
SD	0.24
Observations	1984942

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise.

Appendix H: Heterogeneous Effects

Table H1 shows the heterogeneous effects on slow versus fast courts as specified in our pre-analysis plan. The idea is to check whether the effect is concentrated in slow courts in need of improvement.

Column (1) replicates the main finding for all courts.

Column (2) shows that the effect is stronger in initially slow courts, versus fast courts in Column (3). A court is classified as slow if its average time to disposition in 2018 is above the median. Thus, the One-Pagers work better in slower courts. This is confirmed in Columns (4) and (5), which shows the differential response in courts above or below the median level of adjournments: once again, we see that the One-Pagers work better in courts with a high number of adjournments at baseline (in the year 2018).

Table H1—Heterogeneous Effects

	(1)	(2) Slow	(3) Fast	(4) High Adjournment Court	(5) Low Adjournment Court
OnePager * Wave 2	-0.059***	-0.077**	-0.023	-0.10***	-0.035
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.027)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 2	-0.045**	-0.053	-0.048	-0.085**	-0.025
	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.023)
OnePager * Wave 1	-0.00023	-0.0091	0.027	-0.020	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.016)
OnePager_CUC * Wave 1	-0.019**	-0.022**	-0.0040	-0.032*	-0.013
	(0.0081)	(0.0098)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.0081)
OnePager * Transition	-0.0061	-0.023	0.035	-0.0041	-0.0017
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.018)
OnePager_CUC * Transition	-0.0025	-0.0044	-0.017	0.0081	-0.0045
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)
OnePager * Pre	0.031	0.020	0.044	0.019	0.035
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.024)
OnePager_CUC * Pre	0.011	0.0013	0.029	-0.0012	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.0097)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063	0.075	0.033	0.10	0.047
SD	0.24	0.26	0.18	0.30	0.21
Observations	1984942	1553363	425189	806688	1171864

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. In Column (2), the sample is restricted to courts with an average time to disposition in 2018 above the median. In Column (3), the sample is restricted to courts with an average time to disposition in 2018 below the median. In Column (4), the sample is restricted to courts with an average proportion of adjournments above the median in 2018. In Column (5), the sample is restricted to courts with an average proportion of adjournments below the median in 2018.

Appendix I: Spillovers

In Table I1, we test for the presence of spillovers. To do so, we focus on the control group. We use the GPS data collected on all courts. For each court in the control group, we calculate the minimum distance to the nearest court treated by the One-Pager.

We then regress the main outcome, i.e., adjournment on this minimum distance, interacted with all the time periods considered. The intuition is that the closest a control court is situated to a treated court, the more likely a control group might be affected by the intervention.

We find no evidence of this in the data. In Column (1), we find no effect of being nearby treated courts after Wave 2. There is a small negative effect after wave 1, however the magnitude of the coefficient is very small. Moreover, it is the period "After Wave 2" which is interesting in the sense that there is a reduction in adjournment in treated courts which may spill over to control courts

Table I1—Spillovers

	(1) Adjournment
Min Distance to OnePager * After Wave 2	0.00049
	(0.00031)
Min Distance to OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.00056**
	(0.00025)
Min Distance to OnePager * Pre	-0.00025
	(0.00030)
Court FE	Yes
Day FE	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063
SD	0.24
Observations	308424

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. The variable "Min Distance to One-Pager" is the minimum distance to the nearest court treated by the One-Pager.

Appendix J: Duration specification

Table J1 presents a duration specification. The variable "Months Since Wave 2" captures the number of months since Wave 2. We also include a squared term "Squared Months Since Wave 2" since Figure 2 shows an effect which is growing over the months, but slightly reducing (in absolute value) over time, hence nonlinear (quadratic) time effects.

Column (1) confirms these results: the coefficient of "OnePager * Months Since Wave 2" is negative, i.e. an effect growing over time, but at a decreasing rate, since the coefficient of "OnePager * Squared Months Since Wave 2" is of the opposite sign (i.e., positive).

Table J1—Effects on Adjournments

	(1) Adjournment
OnePager * Months Since Wave 2	-0.0094*
	(0.0051)
OnePager * Squared Months Since Wave 2	0.00040
	(0.00029)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.0056
	(0.012)
OnePager * Pre	0.018
	(0.014)
Court FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
Control Group mean	0.063
SD	0.24
Observations	1984942

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the case-activity ends in adjournment, 0 otherwise. In Column (1), the sample is restricted to High Courts, and in Column (2), to Magistrate Courts.

Appendix K: Censoring model

In the table below, we use a censoring model accounting for the fact that we observe time to disposition only for cases that have been resolved. We use a tobit model with an upper limit at 635 days, since cases filed in August 2021 but not resolved by March 2023 have been in the system for that period of time. Table K1 shows the same decrease in time to disposition.

Table K1—Censoring model

	(1) Time to Disposition
One-Pager * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-51.1*
	(30.5)
One-Pager_CUC * Filed in Aug-Dec 2021	-72.1***
	(26.1)
Court FE	Yes
Month FE	Yes
Control Group mean	992.9
SD	1355.1
Observations	181449

Note: Tobit model with an upper limit at 635 days. Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the time to disposition, trimmed at 99 percent.

Appendix L: Different levels of aggregation for number of cases filed

When calculating the number of cases filed, we must sum over a certain unit of time. We present below the results when calculating the number of cases filed at the daily, monthly and quarterly level.

The advantage of the data is that it is collected at the case level, every day, as its name indicated (Daily Court Return Template). Each day, court clerks must enter the data for all cases. This offers a granularity in the data which is worth exploiting. Calculating the number of filed cases at the daily level ensures a large sample size. As shown in Column (1), the data at the daily level has 62,883 observations, more than when aggregating at the monthly level (N=3,763) or at the quarterly level (N=1,311). This has an effect on the number of time fixed effects which can be included. In Column (1), we are able to include 2,759 day fixed effects, but only 94 month fixed effects in Column (2) and 32 quarter fixed effects in Column (3).

The results are very similar in Columns (1), (2), and (3), in the sense that the treatment (after wave 2) increases the number of cases filed, but less significant (p-value=0.11 in Column (2) and p-value=0.12 in Column (3)), which is expected regarding the smaller sample size and fewer time fixed effects.

Table L1—Effects on Number of Cases Filed

	(1) Day	(2) Month	(3) Quarter
OnePager * After Wave 2	1.00*	15.1	43.9
	(0.52)	(9.34)	(27.6)
OnePager * After Wave 1	-0.47	-7.42	-16.6
	(0.42)	(6.64)	(17.0)
OnePager * Pre	0.64	9.23	31.5
	(0.64)	(11.4)	(32.3)
Court FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Time FE	2,759	94	32
Control Group mean	2.01	28.6	82.5
SD	6.18	41.5	99.9
Observations	62,883	3,763	1,311

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per day per court. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per month per court. In Column (3), the dependent variable is the number of cases filed per quarter per court.

Appendix M: Trust in Other State Institutions

In Table M1, we look at the effects on trust in other state institutions. The One-Pagers have an effect on trust in courts, but no effect on trust in other state institutions, such as the president in Column (2), parliament in Column (3), the local government in Column (4), the police in Column (5) or the army in Column (6).

Table M1—Effect on Trust in Other State Institutions

	(1) Trust Courts	(2) Trust President	(3) Trust Parliament	(4) Trust Local Government	(5) Trust Police	(6) Trust Army
One-Pager * Wave 2	9.99*	2.12	1.91	7.55	0.22	3.45
	(5.34)	(9.52)	(6.72)	(8.02)	(5.20)	(4.13)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 2	4.41	-11.54	-6.91	-0.02	-5.88	-0.79
	(5.02)	(9.26)	(5.38)	(4.81)	(4.11)	(5.05)
One-Pager * Wave 1	4.45	0.44	-0.48	5.53	-0.24	2.60
	(5.89)	(6.12)	(4.67)	(5.55)	(6.13)	(5.51)
One-Pager_CUC * Wave 1	1.33	-7.77	-11.34**	0.30	-9.12	-0.46
	(6.42)	(6.82)	(5.02)	(6.06)	(6.50)	(6.06)
One-Pager * Before	7.41	7.25	6.95	10.20	3.03	5.43
	(6.69)	(9.41)	(7.20)	(7.61)	(6.03)	(5.19)
One-Pager_CUC * Before	1.94	-7.75	-2.04	6.08	-1.52	-2.39
	(6.19)	(9.28)	(6.81)	(6.81)	(6.33)	(5.35)
Observations	9,315	9,472	9,357	9,320	9,534	9,253
County fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean control group	55.78	68.01	52.20	50.86	38.93	64.74
SD control group	31.16	33.59	31.65	32.37	33.36	32.41

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering "haven't heard enough to say" are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The question relates to trust in the president in Column (2), parliament in Column (3), the local government in Column (4), the police in Column (5) or the army in Column (6).
The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. "One-Pager_CUC" is defined similarly. The variable "Wave 2" is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable "Wave 1" is a dummy equal to 1 in the previous round (round 8) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable "Before" is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011.

Appendix N: Contact with Courts

In Table N1, we look at the determinants of contacts with courts. The question is: "In the past two years, have you had contact with government courts?" (0=No, 1=Yes). This variable is only available in rounds 8 and 6 (collected before Wave 2).

In Column (1), the explanatory variable is "Male", 1 for males, 0 for females. Column (1) shows that males have more contact with courts.

The rest of the table show that people living in cities (Column 2), with secondary education or more (as opposed to primary education) (column 3) also frequent more the courts.

In Column (4), we look at ethnic groups and their political connectedness with executive power. We use an insight uncovered by a recent empirical literature on judiciaries: some ethnic groups have better access to courts because of their political connections to the co-ethnic executive that may have captured local judiciaries (Behrer et al., 2021; Sanchez De La Sierra, 2021).

To measure the political connectedness of each ethnic group, we use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset collected by Vogt et al. (2015). The data is collected from hundreds of national and regional experts who are asked to classify ethnic groups according to their degree of access to executive power. For example, in Kenya in 2018, data from EPR indicate that the Kikuyu-Meru-Embu and the Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu tribes were the senior partners, and the Kisii and Mijikenda were junior partners. These tribes are thus classified as the "Connected" group. In contrast, the Luhya, Luo, and Kamba are classified "powerless" and the Somali "discriminated" so they are classified as the "Unconnected" group. Each year, the classifications can change depending on the political fortunes of each ethnic group.

Column (4) shows that the "Connected" ethnic groups have more contact with the courts, in line with the theory.

In Column (5), we include all variables together. This column shows that all coefficients retain their significance even when included together. These factors are thus important in determining access to courts.

We use the results in Column (5) to build a prediction index of contact with courts. We predict for each individual in the database their likelihood to contact courts. Recall that the data on contact with courts is only available in rounds 6 and 8.[20] We thus use the value of the explanatory variables in Column 5 together with their regression coefficients to predict the likely contact with courts. We then split the sample according to the median of this prediction. Respondents with a

[20]The results are similar if we use only round 6 collected before any treatment including Wave 1 of the One-Pagers. We use both rounds 6 and 8 to increase the sample size, and because Wave 1 of the One-Pagers were found to have a relatively small effect on court speed, therefore unlikely to change the composition of people with contact with courts.

likelihood to contact the courts above this median are considered "Likely court user", while other respondents are considered "Not likely court user". This classification is then used in the main body of the paper in Table 14.

Table N1—Contact with Courts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Contact with Courts				
Male	0.04***				0.04***
	(0.01)				(0.01)
Urban		0.02***			0.02**
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Secondary			0.02***		0.02*
			(0.01)		(0.01)
Connected				0.03***	0.03***
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Age					0.00**
					(0.00)
Age Squared					-0.00*
					(0.00)
Constant	0.06***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***	-0.05*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Observations	4,797	4,797	4,789	4,797	4,781
R-squared	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.013
Mean control group	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842	0.0842
SD control group	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent answers Yes to the question "In the past two years, have you had contact with government courts?", 0 otherwise. This variable is only available in rounds 8 and 6 of the Afrobarometer survey. In Column (1), "Male" is equal to 1 for males, 0 for females. In Column (2), "Urban" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is situated in an urban setting, 0 in a rural setting. In Column (3), "Secondary education" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent acquired secondary education or more, 0 if only primary education. In Column (5), 'Connected" is equal to 1 if the respondent is from an ethnic group that is either a senior partner or junior partner in government, 0 otherwise. In Column (6), all explanatory variables are added together, also including age and the square of age.

We present the heterogeneous effects based on the individual variables: male, urban, secondary education, and from a connected ethnic group.

The results show greater effects for males versus females, urban versus rural, secondary versus primary education, and from a connected ethnic group versus unconnected one.

Table N2—Trust with Courts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Trust courts								
Sample	Full	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	Secondary	Primary	Connected	Unconnected
OnePager * Wave 2	8.34*	10.95**	5.62	9.82**	7.74	9.25*	8.77	5.60	2.39
	(4.44)	(5.38)	(5.12)	(4.74)	(5.52)	(5.14)	(6.24)	(4.78)	(6.10)
OnePager * 2024	6.18	2.90	9.33	5.23	7.44	5.01	8.89	-0.89	7.97
	(5.64)	(6.06)	(6.38)	(6.06)	(6.44)	(5.96)	(6.51)	(5.23)	(6.50)
OnePager * Wave 1	4.29	1.05	7.37	6.09	3.98	6.69	3.98	1.03	-1.99
	(5.78)	(6.59)	(6.55)	(6.41)	(6.27)	(5.91)	(6.25)	(5.22)	(5.17)
OnePager * Before	4.71	3.61	5.73	7.08	2.98	11.23*	0.35	4.89	-4.16
	(6.21)	(6.07)	(7.06)	(8.82)	(6.09)	(6.64)	(6.44)	(6.63)	(5.51)
Observations	11,606	5,892	5,714	4,402	7,204	5,642	5,964	7,635	3,971
R-squared	0.051	0.058	0.061	0.057	0.048	0.055	0.062	0.059	0.070
County fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean control group	53.65	54.09	54.09	49.55	49.55	51.89	51.89	54.87	54.87
SD control group	32.83	32.83	32.83	32.51	32.51	32.20	32.20	32.52	32.52

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the court. *** Significant at 99 percent confidence level, ** Significant at 95 percent, * Significant at 90 percent. In all columns, the dependent variable is the question: "How much do you trust Courts of law, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). People answering "haven't heard enough to say" are excluded. The answers are rescaled on a 0-100 scale. The variable "One-Pager" is the fraction of treated court stations receiving the One-Pager per county. The variable "Wave 2" is a dummy equal to 1 in the last round (round 9) of the Afrobarometer survey collected in November 2021. The variable "2024" is equal to 1 in Round 10, and captures longer-run effects. The variable "Wave 1" is a dummy equal to 1 in round 8 of the Afrobarometer survey collected in September 2019. The baseline period is round 6, collected in 2014. The variable "Before" is a dummy equal to 1 in the round 5, collected in 2011.
Column (1) includes the whole sample. In Column (2), the sample is restricted to males, in Column (3) to females. In Column (4), the sample is restricted to urban settings, in Column (5) to rural settings. In Column (6), the sample is restricted to individuals with a secondary education, in Column (7) to primary education. In Column (8), the sample is those from a connected ethnic group, in column (9) from an unconnected one.