# One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa*

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ABSTRACT

Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce inter-ethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams' victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country's national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

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*"Men and women of Ivory Coast, from the north, south, center and west:*
*we proved today that all Ivorians can coexist and play together*
*with a shared aim: to qualify for the World Cup.*
*We promised that the celebration would unite the people.*
*Today, we beg you, on our knees... Forgive. Forgive. Forgive.*
*The one country in Africa with so many riches must not descend into war.*
*Please lay down your weapons. Hold elections. Everything will be better."*

Didier Drogba after Ivory Coast's historical qualification to 2006 FIFA World Cup

## 1. INTRODUCTION

A vast literature has documented the detrimental effect of ethnic fractionalization on various aspects of socio-economic development. In particular, ethnically diverse communities tend to experience more corruption and conflict, and less social cohesion, public good provision, and growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).[1] The consequences of ethnic divisions are especially severe in Africa, where the arbitrary drawing of borders by European powers forced different ethnicities to cohabitate (Cederman et al., 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, forthcoming), and where ethnic cleavages were used by colonizers to divide and rule over the indigenous population (Mamdani, 2014; Herbst, 2014).

One question that remains largely unexplored is where inter-ethnic tensions originate from, and whether anything can be done to mitigate them. On the one hand, previous evidence suggests that inter-ethnic mistrust has deep historical roots, and can be traced back to experiences, such as the slave trade, occurred several centuries ago (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). On the other hand, other studies have shown that ethnic sentiments are surprisingly malleable, and can be primed by factors such as political competition or mass media (Eifert et al., 2010; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). Indeed, the desire to promote inter-ethnic cooperation by reinforcing national identity has motivated the adoption of "nation-building" policies in

[1] Two (non-mutually exclusive) sets of theories have attempted to rationalize the negative association between ethnic fractionalization and public good provision. According to some, lower public good provision in more ethnically diverse communities could be attributed to differences across ethnic groups in preferences over different types of public goods (Alesina et al., 1997), aversion for "mixing" with other ethnic groups (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), and/or preferences for public goods that benefit one's own ethnic group (Vigdor, 2002). Other theories have instead emphasized the importance of social sanctions and community pressure in sustaining collective action; because social interactions are less frequent between members of different ethnic groups, social sanctions that discourage free-riding are harder to enforce in more than in less ethnically homogeneous communities.

various African countries after independence (Miguel, 2004).[2] Yet, what collective experiences can contribute to appease ethnic tensions, and how long-lasting their impact may be, remains largely unknown.

This paper examines this question by looking at the impact of one phenomenon that, like few others, spurs nationalistic fervor: football. Specifically, focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, we test whether the victories of national football teams make people identify less with their own ethnic group and more with the country as a whole, and can ultimately contribute to reduce inter-ethnic tensions and conflict. Indeed, sport in general, and football in particular, has traditionally played a key role in nation-building in Africa. As argued by Darby (2002), football has greatly contributed to "construct a sense of national identity and to create a feeling of bonded patriotism cutting across tribal and ethnic allegiances". An eminent example of the unifying power of football is represented by the historical qualification of Ivory Coast to the 2006 FIFA World Cup under the charismatic leadership of Didier Drogba which, many argue, paved the way to a peaceful solution of the civil war that had ravaged the country for over five years (Stormer, 2006; Mehler, 2008).[3]

We aim to examine how the success of national football teams in important international competitions influences the strength of ethnic identification, attitudes towards people of other ethnicities, and actual inter-ethnic violence. To do so, we combine different empirical approaches and use data from a variety of sources. First, to study the impact of national teams' victories on individual attitudes, we combine survey data from four waves of the Afrobarometer with information on over 70 official matches by African teams held between 2000 and 2015. In this case, our identification strategy exploits plausibly exogenous differences in the timing of the interviews relative to the timing of the matches. In particular, we compare self-reported attitudes between individuals interviewed in the days immediately before a victory of their national team and individuals interviewed in the days immediately after. Since our regressions control for country$\times$year, language group (a proxy for ethnicity), and, in the most demanding specification, for country$\times$match fixed effects, we identify the effect from comparing individuals with the same ethnic background, interviewed in the same country, in the same period, but respectively before and after a given match, two groups which, we show,

[2] Examples of such policies include the change of the country's name (Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso), of the capital city (Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria), or of the national currency (Ghana, Angola), the introduction of military conscription, the promotion of national services (Zambia, Nigeria), the imposition of religious and linguistic homogenization (Sudan, Mauritania, Tanzania), the introduction of non-ethnic censuses (Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania), and land nationalizing (Ghana, Tanzania, Sudan). For a comprehensive survey of these policies and a discussion of their mixed results see Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013).

[3] Another notable example is represented by the unexpected success of the South African national rugby team - the Springboks - in the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which president Nelson Mandela masterfully exploited in his effort to build a common national identity and bridge racial divisions in the immediate post-apartheid period.

are comparable along most dimensions. Applying this approach to over 35,000 respondents in 24 countries, we find that individuals interviewed after a national team's victory are 4% less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity than those interviewed just before the match. This effect is sizable, corresponding to a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification. Furthermore, it does not appear to be short-lived; in fact, it is very persistent within the limited time window for which data are available (i.e., up to 30 days after the match), and becomes even larger several days after the match. Additional results further support the view that the victory of the national team - perceived as a successful collective venture - galvanizes national supporters and tilts the balance between ethnic and national identity in favor of the latter. First only a victory, and not the mere occurrence of an important match, affects ethnic sentiments. Second, the effect is driven only by victories in high-stake official games (i.e., Africa Cup of Nations and FIFA World Cup qualifiers and finals), while friendly matches are inconsequential. Third, the effect is substantially larger for unexpected victories than for predictable ones. Finally, the effect is similar for victories in home and away games, which indicates it is not driven by respondents' direct participation in the event.

These results are further corroborated by the fact that post-match respondents are also significantly more likely to trust other people, particularly members of other ethnicities. Crucially, respondents' lower emphasis on ethnic identity and higher trust in others do not merely reflect a generally positive mood due to post-victory euphoria. In fact, we find no effect of national team's victories on either trust in the ruling party or approval for the incumbent, a result which suggests that politicians' effort to use national teams' achievements to boost their own popularity may not pay off. Furthermore, we find that national team's victories do not affect respondents' optimism about their own or the country's economic prospects.

We then explore whether, in addition to people's attitudes, national team's victories have a tangible impact on violence and conflict. To do so, we combine the football data with data on the occurrence and severity of political violence events available from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) for the period 1995-2014. To investigate the impact of national team's success on violent conflict, and how persistent this effect may be, we resort to a different empirical strategy that allows us to analyze the evolution of conflict over a longer time span. Our approach exploits the quasi-randomness of the qualification to the final tournament of the Africa Cup of Nations (ACN) for teams that, prior to the last game of the group stage, could still qualify. In other words, for each two teams in the same group that, prior to the very last game, could still both qualify, we attribute the one that actually qualified to the treatment group and the one that barely failed to do so to the control group. We then compare the evolution of conflict in the six months before and after

the (missed) qualification for countries in the treatment and in the control group which, we show, are *ex ante* comparable along many dimensions. Our results indicate that countries whose teams (barely) qualified to the ACN tournament experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries whose teams (barely) did not. This effect is sizable and significant, and robust to controlling for country/qualifier and week fixed effects, as well as for the intensity of conflict in the months prior to qualification. Furthermore, the reduction in conflict intensity that follows a successful qualification campaign appears to be quite persistent, up to several months after the event.

Taken together our findings indicate that successful collective experiences - such as important sport victories - can be effective at priming sentiments of national unity and at attenuating even deeply-rooted ethnic mistrust, with tangible effects on violence. Though the effect of these events is likely to be transient, our results suggest that it may last long enough to open a precious window of opportunity for political dialogue, negotiations and reforms capable of producing long-lasting improvements.

Our research contributes to various streams of literature. First, it relates to previous work on ethnic identification. These contributions have provided suggestive evidence that the strength of ethnic identification may be malleable by factors such as electoral competition or economic modernization (Eifert et al., 2010; Robinson, 2014). Yet, due to data limitations and identification issues, it has been difficult to go beyond correlations and draw causal conclusions. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by providing robust causal evidence that the patriotic sentiments primed by important sport events can affect the strength of ethnic identity.

Our research also relates to previous work on the determinants of interpersonal trust which has documented how historical episodes, such as the slave trade, the introduction of the Napoleonic civil code, or the East German system of mass surveillance, had long-lasting effect on contemporary trust attitudes (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Buggle, 2016; Jacob and Tyrell, 2010). Our findings indicates that other more transitory factors can also have a substantial impact on trust attitudes, particularly towards people of other ethnicities. In this respect, our results are especially related to recent work by Robinson (forthcoming) who shows that manipulating the salience of national identity in a 'lab-in-the-field" experiment improves inter-ethnic trust, and by Miguel (2004) who argues that nation-building policies can improve inter-ethnic cooperation.

Finally, our work contributes to the vast literature on the determinants of civil conflict, by documenting that priming national identity can contribute to reducing violence.

## 2. DATA

### 2.1. NATIONAL FOOTBALL TEAMS' MATCHES

We collect information on all official matches played by men national teams of various sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990-2015; these data are available from the FIFA statistical office.[4] In particular, we focus on matches played for both the qualifying and the tournament phases of the two most important competitions for African national football teams: the Africa Cup of Nations (ACN) and the FIFA World Cup (WC).[5] For each match we have information on the date, the location, the opponent, the competition, the phase, and the final score. We use the information on the date of the match to combine the data with both the individual survey data and the conflict data described below. Overall, for the individual-level analysis, we use information from nearly 70 official matches played between 2002 and 2013 while the Afrobarometer surveys were administered. For the country-level conflict analysis, we also collect information on teams' standings in nine ACN qualifying rounds held between 1997 and 2013. In particular, we record all teams' standings before and after the final match of the group stage to identify teams that, prior to the last game, could still qualify to the tournament phase, and, among these, those that eventually did and did not.

### 2.2. SURVEY DATA ON INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES

We use individual survey data from four waves of the Afrobarometer conducted between 2002 and 2013. The Afrobarometer is a series of nationally representative surveys covering several African countries. Interviews are conducted in local languages, and questions are standardized so that responses can be compared across countries. Questions are designed to assess respondents' attitudes on a range of issues, including attitudes towards democracy, political actors, markets, and civil society. For our analysis we focus on the questions regarding individuals' identification with the nation and with their own ethnic group, and trust in others, particularly in people from other ethnicities. In addition, we also use information on a range of respondents' personal characteristics, with particular regard to the main language spoken at home which, following Eifert et al. (2010), we use as a proxy for ethnic background.[6] Overall, we use data from 47 survey rounds conducted in 24 sub-Saharan African countries.

Our main outcome variable is a measure of ethnic identification, which captures the strength of an individual's ethnic identity relative to national identity. The variable is based on re-

[4] We disregard countries from the Maghreb region because, for these countries, Afrobarometer surveys do not include questions on ethnic identity.

[5] We also collect information on friendly matches which we use for a robustness check reported below.

[6] Language is the best available proxy for ethnic background since the Afrobarometer questionnaires did not systematically include explicit questions on the respondent's ethnicity.


sponses to the following question: *"Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [National] and being a [respondent's ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?"*. While in round 2 of the Afrobarometer respondents could only chose between the options "national identity" and "group identity", in rounds 3 through 5 they could pick any of the following five options: 0 ("only [National]"), 1 ("more [National] than [Ethnic group]), 2 ("equally [National] and [Ethnic group])", 3 ("more[Ethnic group] than [National]"), and 4 ("only [Ethnic group]"). In order to compare respondents' answers across rounds, we construct a binary measure of ethnic identity that takes value 1 for all respondents in round 2 who chose the option "group identity", and for all respondents in rounds 3 through 5 who reported feeling "only ethnic" or "more ethnic that national".

In Figure 1 we plot the share of respondents that reported stronger ethnic than national identity, separately for different countries in different years. The figure is based only on the responses of individuals interviewed in the proximity of national team's official games, which represents our sample of interest. As shown, the relative strength of ethnic identity varies considerably across countries, and even in the same country over time, possibly also due to the impact of the type of major sport events we investigate. One suggestive example in this regard is given by Mali, where more than 30 percent of the individuals interviewed in 2002 emphasized ethnic over national identity, but where less than 10% did so in 2013, when the Malian national football team achieved the third place in the Africa Cup of Nations, its best performance in the history of the competition. The strength of ethnic identity appears to be lower and more stable in other countries: for example in Tanzania, a country known for its effective nation-building policies (Miguel, 2004), less than 10% of respondents in any round emphasize ethnic over national identity.

To explore the impact of national team's victories on respondents' trust in others, we use four additional variables. First, we construct a measure of generalized trust computed as the average score in four separate questions regarding trust in i) relatives, ii) other acquaintances, iii) p, and iv) fellow countrymen, all defined on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 ("not at all") to 3 ("a lot"). Second, using questions on respondents' trust in people within and outside their own ethnic group, we construct measures of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic trust, also defined over the same 4-point scale, as well as measure of inter-ethnic trust premium given by the difference between the two.[7] To assess the effect of national team's victories on support for the government, we code two additional variables: trust in the ruling party (with answers ranging from 1 "not at all" to 4 'a lot") and approval of the president (with answers ranging from 1 "strongly disapprove" to 4 "strongly approve"). Finally, to examine whether victories

[7] Because the question on inter-ethnic trust was only included in round #3 of the Afrobarometer, the analysis on this aspect will rely on a substantially smaller sample.

FIGURE 1: ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OVER TIME AND ACROSS COUNTRIES



influence respondents' overall mood, we code two measures of respondents' assessment of their current living conditions and of the country's economic situation (on a 5-point scale ranging from less to more positive), and two measures of how they expect these conditions to evolve in the future (on a 5-point scale ranging from less to more optimistic).

### 2.3. Country-Level Conflict Data

To study the impact of national teams' victories on actual violence, in the last part of our analysis we use country-level data on conflict from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). The data, available for the period 1997-2013, include information on the date and location of any episode of political violence - i.e., battles, killings, riots - that involve either the government, rebel groups, militias, or civilians. The data also include information on the severity of the events, measured by the number of associated fatalities. Based on this information we construct three measures of conflict intensity at the country-week level: i) a dummy for whether any conflict event occurred, ii) the number of conflict events occurred, and iii) the number of casualties associated with these events. We also construct analogous measures specifically for ethnically-related conflict. Though the ACLED data do not explicitly distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic conflict, some of the information in the ACLED records can be used to indirectly make this distinction. Specifically, we code as ethnically-relevant conflict events that involves the participation of actors classified as ethnic militia or whose denomination refers to an ethnic faction (e.g. "Bete Ethnic Group"), or any event for which the ACLED records include a specific reference to ethnic tensions as a cause of violence. Such procedure is of course vulnerable to substantial measurement error, namely to the risk of coding as non-ethnic episodes that are in fact driven by ethnic motives. Yet, to the extent that it affects the dependent variable and is unrelated to the timing of qualification, measurement error should only reduce the precision of our estimates. According to our classification, about 6% of the observations in our sample can be classified as ethnically-related (i.e., observations for which at least one ethically-related conflict event occurred in a given country in a given week).

## 3. Individual-Level Analysis: Empirical Strategy and Results

Our empirical strategy to estimate the impact of national team's victories on individual attitudes is summarized by the following equation:

$$Outcome_{i,e,c,t} = \alpha + \beta PostVictory_{c,t} + \gamma' X_i + \Gamma_{c,t} + \Delta_e + \varepsilon_e \quad (1)$$

where $i$, $e$, $c$, and $t$ denote respectively individual, language group (a proxy for ethnicity),

country, and year. *Outcome* is one of the attitudinal variables described in the previous section; *Post-Victory* is the main regressor of interest and takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the days after a victory of her national team in an official match, and 0 otherwise; $X_i$ is the vector of baseline individual controls (i.e., education, gender, age, age squared, unemployment status and an indicator for leaving in a rural area); $\Gamma$, and $\Delta$, are country$\times$year and language group fixed effects, respectively; $\varepsilon_{e,t}$ is an error term which is heteroscedasticity-robust and is clustered by language group.

We also estimate an alternative and more demanding specification summarized by the following equation:

$$Outcome_{i,e,c,m,t} = \alpha + \beta PostVictory_{c,m,t} + \gamma' X_i + \Theta_{c,m} + \Delta_e + \varepsilon_{e,t} \quad (2)$$

where $m$ denotes the match, and $\Theta_{c,m}$ the country-match fixed effects. Hence, while when estimating equation (1) we identify the effect of *Post-Victory* by comparing respondents interviewed after *any* victory of their national team in a given year with all other respondents of the same country and language group interviewed in the same year, with equation (2) we compare respondents interviewed after a given match with others of the same country and language group interviewed before *the same* match.

We mainly focus on the sample of individuals interviewed in the 15 days before and after official matches of their national football team. We consider, in particular, the sample of respondents exposed to only one match, which includes over 30,000 individuals between treatment and control groups. For purpose of robustness, we also look at the larger sample of respondents potentially exposed to one or more matches, which includes more than 35,000 individuals. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the first sample. Half of the individuals were exposed to a match in the 15 days prior to interview. Roughly 18 percent of them experienced a victory, while 22 percent and 10 percent saw their national team losing and drawing, respectively.[8]

[8] In a robustness exercise we increase the length of the time window up to 30 days before and after a match. In that case the sample size increases to nearly 44,000.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Post-Played | 30,306 | 0.493 | 0.500 |
| Post-Victory | 30,306 | 0.175 | 0.380 |
| Post-Defeat | 30,306 | 0.221 | 0.415 |
| Post-Draw | 30,306 | 0.096 | 0.294 |

Sample includes respondents interviewed in the 15 days before and after an official game. *Post-Played* takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a game (regardless of the result), 0 otherwise.*Post-Victory*, *Post-Draw* and *Post-Defeat*take value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the 15 days after a victory, a draw, or a defeat, respectively.

Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-random nature of the date and final result of matches relative to the timing of the Afrobarometer interviews. Hence, our identifying assumption is that national teams' matches did not interfere with the implementation of the survey, or, more precisely, that victorious matches did not interfere differently than non victorious games. Such possibility seems especially unlikely since, as stressed by Eifert et al. (2010), the logistics involved in the implementation of the Afrobarometer survey - selection of the enumeration sites, setting up of the field teams etc. - require many months if not years of preparation, and are hardly related to the occurrence of sport events let alone to their unpredictable result.

To assess the validity of our identification strategy, we conduct a balance test for several respondent's characteristics that may potentially correlate with the timing of the interview and with the outcomes of interest. These include: gender, education, age, unemployment status, religious membership, whether the respondent belongs to the country's ethnic majority, whether (s)he lives in a rural area, and whether (s)he lives in an area where basic public goods are available.[9] To control for the possibility of social desirability bias, we also test that several characteristics of the interviewer are not systematically different between treatment and control groups. These include: gender, education, whether the interviewer speaks the same language as the respondent, and whether the interviewer thought anyone influenced the respondent during the interview. Specifically, we perform two separate balance tests: one comparing individuals interviewed before and after a match, regardless of the outcome of the match (i.e. played), and another one comparing individuals interviewed before and after a victory. To ensure that we compare respondents from the same country interviewed around

[9] Evidence suggests that these characteristics can potentially affect ethnic sentiments. For instance, Robinson (forthcoming) shows that urban status, education, gender, and formal employment all positively predict national identification (relative to ethnic). Regarding age, instead, Eifert et al. (2010) find no evidence that young people are more likely to self-identify in ethnic terms.

the same match, we regress each variable on either treatment including country-match fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the same level. The results are reported in Table 2.
We first show that individual characteristics are largely balanced between respondents interviewed before and after the same match (panel A). The only exceptions are education and gender, but the marginally significant differences in these two variables between treatment and control group are very small: on average individuals interviewed after a match were only 0.5 percent more likely to be men than women, and displayed lower educational attainment by just 12% of a standard deviation (or 8% of its mean value). Furthermore, the potential biases from these imbalances are likely to operate against finding an effect, since men and less educated people generally tend to display higher levels of ethnic identification (Robinson, 2014). The same pattern holds when comparing individuals interviewed before and after a victory of the national team (panel B). In any event, in all the regressions presented below we control for the entire set of respondents' individual characteristics, though their inclusion does not affect our results. Finally, regardless of whether they are defined based on all matches or just victorious ones, treatment and control groups are also balanced with respect to all interviewer-related variables.

TABLE 2: BALANCE IN COVARIATES

| | | Panel A: Played | | Panel B: Victory | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Covariate | N | Estimate | Std. Errors | Estimate | Std. Errors |
| Male | 30,306 | 0.005* | 0.003 | 0.006* | 0.004 |
| Education | 30,239 | -0.260* | 0.133 | -0.285* | 0.146 |
| Age | 29,880 | 1.094 | 0.727 | 1.142 | 0.784 |
| Unemployed | 30,306 | 0.008 | 0.014 | -0.007 | 0.013 |
| Major Ethnicity | 30,306 | -0.021 | 0.053 | -0.034 | 0.043 |
| Rural | 30,306 | -0.000 | 0.010 | -0.009 | 0.010 |
| Religious Group Member | 30,188 | -0.022 | 0.019 | -0.017 | 0.026 |
| Public Goods | 30,306 | 0.001 | 0.023 | -0.020 | 0.018 |
| Same Language | 30,306 | -0.045 | 0.037 | -0.027 | 0.046 |
| Influenced By Others | 30,258 | -0.004 | 0.005 | -0.002 | 0.007 |
| Male Interviewer | 30,306 | -0.006 | 0.014 | -0.011 | 0.019 |
| Interviewer's Education | 30,272 | -0.035 | 0.049 | -0.072 | 0.061 |
| Interviewer's Age | 30,306 | 0.052 | 0.123 | 0.157 | 0.151 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country-match level. Each panel presents point estimates and standard errors for 13 regressions of a covariate (listed at the left) on Played (Panel A) and Victory (Panel B). Played takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a game (regardless of the result), 0 otherwise. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. All estimates are based on OLS regressions using 56 country-match dummies to ensure that the comparison in the covariates is made between respondents in the proximity of the same game and in the same country.

### 3.1. RESULTS: NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

In Table 3 we test the empirical relationship between national team's victories and ethnic identification on the baseline sample of all respondents exposed to just one match. In column 1 we regress the dummy for stronger ethnic than national identity on a dummy for being interviewed after a victory, controlling for country-year dummies. The inclusion of country-year fixed effects, allows to control for all country-level confounds that vary between years, such as political or economic events (e.g., national elections, ethnic conflicts, nation-wide economic policies, yearly variation in commodity prices). The results indicate that national team's victories have a significant negative effect on the probability of self-identifying with one's own ethnicity as opposed to the country as a whole. The coefficient becomes larger and more significant in column 2 when we include the baseline set of individual controls. Results are even stronger and more significant in column 3 when we include language group fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the same level. The estimated effect is quite large: individuals interviewed after national team's victories are almost 4.5% less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity than other respondents of the same language group

interviewed just before; this corresponds to over a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification. In column 4 we include country-match fixed effects, hence restricting the comparison to fellow countrymen interviewed before and after the same victorious game of their national team. Even under this more restrictive specification the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of interest remain largely unchanged. In column 5 we examine the effect of different results of the national team's messages; the results indicate that while the successful performance of the national team weakens national identity, loosing or drawing a match has no particular effect. Finally, in column 5 we show that the results are qualitatively similar when estimating a non-linear probit model instead of the linear probability model used in the previous columns.[10]

TABLE 3: NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION


| | Dependent Variable: Ethnic over National Identity (0-1 dummy) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | Probit |
| Post-Victory | -0.014* | -0.020** | -0.037*** | -0.028** | -0.028** | -0.134** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.059) |
| Post-Draw | | | | | 0.007 | |
| | | | | | (0.034) | |
| Post-Defeat | | | | | -0.025 | |
| | | | | | (0.017) | |
| Country × Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No |
| Individual Controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country × Match FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 29,246 | 28,758 | 28,758 | 28,758 | 28,758 | 27,429 |
| R-squared | 0.059 | 0.070 | 0.104 | 0.105 | 0.105 | — |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns 1 and 2, clustered by language group in the other columns. Sample includes respondents interviewed within 15 days before and after an official game. $Post-Victory$, $Post-Draw$ and $Post-Defeat$ take value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the 15 days after a victory, a draw or a loss respectively, and 0 otherwise.

Next we examine how the effect on ethnic identification evolves in the days after a victory. In Figure 2 we plot the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for dummies

[10] We obtain similar results using, as dependent variable, the original 5-point measure of ethnic identification, which, however, is not available for all rounds of the Afrobarometer. The results, both OLS and ordered probit estimates, are reported in the appendix (Table A.1).

FIGURE 2: ETHNIC IDENTITY BEFORE AND AFTER NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES




The figure plots the coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals for nine dummies indicating 3-day blocks from 15 days before to 15 days after a victory of the national football team. The coefficient for the period between 3 to 1 days before the match is normalized to zero. Confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by language group. The coefficients are estimated from a unique regression in which we control for individual characteristics, country×year and language group fixed effects, and for the proximity to draws or defeats.

for 3-day periods before and after the victory. The coefficients are estimated from a unique regression in which we control for individual characteristics, country×year and language group fixed effects, and for the proximity to draws or defeats.[11] Since we normalize the coefficient for the three days before the victory to zero, the other coefficients indicate how ethnic identification changes over time relative to the eve of the event. The figure confirms that individuals are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identification after a victory of the national team, and indicate that the effect persists and, if anything, becomes stronger several days after the match. In contrast, ethnic identification does not seem to evolve in any particular way in the days prior to the match.

[11] Appendix Figure A.1 reports the coefficients obtained when including country×match instead of country×year fixed effect; the coefficients are very similar in magnitude though somewhat less precisely estimated due to the lower statistical power.

TABLE 4: ALTERNATIVE TIME-WINDOWS

| | Dependent Variable: Ethnic over National Identity (0-1 dummy) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | +/-15 Days | +/-5 days | +/-10 days | +/-20 days | +/-25 days | +/-30 days |
| Post-Victory | -0.028** | -0.035** | -0.026* | -0.027** | -0.026* | -0.026* |
| | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Country × Match FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 28,758 | 10,901 | 19,438 | 32,785 | 38,459 | 43,600 |
| R-squared | 0.105 | 0.144 | 0.118 | 0.096 | 0.095 | 0.097 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors clustered by language group in parentheses. Post-Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the $x$ days following a victory of the national team, with the value of $x$ indicated at the top of each column, and 0 otherwise.

We also test that our baseline results - based on a 15-day time window before and after a victory - are robust to the choice of alternative time windows. In Table 4 we estimate our baseline specification with country×match fixed effects on the sample of respondents interviewed in the 5, 10, 20, 25 and 30 days before and after a match. The results indicate that, regardless of what time window is selected, the effect of national team's victories on ethnic sentiments is remarkably stable, with a somewhat larger coefficient when focusing on the days immediately before and after the match.

We then explore what types of victories are more likely to affect the strength of ethnic sentiments. In particular, we examine whether the stakes of the match, the predictability of the victory, and the location of the match matter. In the first column of Table 5, we start by looking at whether ethnic identity is also affected by victories in friendly games, and how this compares to the impact of victories in official matches documented above. The results indicate that victories in friendly matches have virtually no effect on ethnic identification, consistent with the view that low-stakes games are less effective than high-stakes ones at spurring patriotic fervor. In the following two columns we test the hypothesis that surprising victories - e.g., against a prestigious rivals - are more consequential than predictable ones. To do so, we use data from the World Football Elo Ratings to create a measure of *ex ante* probability of a victory for the national team in a given match, and split victories between high-

TABLE 5: NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND ETHNIC IDENTITY: STAKES, EXPECTATIONS, AND LOCATION

| | Dependent Variable: Ethnic over National Identity (0-1 dummy) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Post-Victory | 0.011 | -0.312*** | -0.047*** | -0.044** |
| | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.020) |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country-Match FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample: | Friendly Games | Unlikely Wins | Likely Wins | Away Games |
| Observations | 28,767 | 6,585 | 15,225 | 13,777 |
| R-squared | 0.083 | 0.073 | 0.120 | 0.135 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for fraction of total games won. Based on win expectancies from the World Football Elo Ratings, less than 1/3 (more than 2/3) is defined as low (high) winning expectation.

and low-probability ones (i.e., rating smaller than $1/3$ and larger than $2/3$, respectively) [12]. The results indicate that, though all victories negatively affect ethnic identification, the effect is considerably larger for surprisingly positive performances. In the last column we restrict our analysis to victories in matches played away from home. The fact that these victories are also associated with a significant decline in ethnic identification suggests that the effect is not driven by people direct participation to the match the event but, rather, by the resulting wave of nationalistic fervor. In fact, the point estimate for away games is slightly larger than for the overall sample; in light of our previous findings, this can be attributed to the fact that away wins are less occur but trigger a bigger emotional reaction when they do.

Finally, we analyze whether certain segments of the population are more responsive to the patriotic influence of national teams' victories. In particular, interacting the dummy *Post-Victory* with various individual characteristics, we test whether the effect is larger for men vs. women, for younger vs. older cohorts, for more vs. less educated individuals, and for

[12] The World Football Elo Ratings are based on the Elo rating system, developed by Arpad Elo. Win expectancy is computed based on the following formula: $W_E = \frac{1}{10^{(-dr/400)}+1}$ where $dr$ is the difference in ratings plus 100 points for a team playing at home. Since the World Football Elo ratings are not publicly available for the the entire period of our analysis (i.e., 2000-2015), we construct them based on FIFA ranking data. See appendix for further details.

people in urban vs. rural areas. The results, presented in Appendix Table A.3, indicate that, with the partial exception of rural status which displays a marginally significant coefficient, none of these attribute is associated with a stronger effect of national team's victory, which suggests that important sport achievements influence the public as a whole and not just sport fans.

### 3.2. National Team's Victories and Inter-Ethnic Trust

We then examine whether national teams' victories also affect individual propensity to trust others, particularly people from other ethnicities. First, we look at the effect of victories on trust towards other people in general, i.e., generalized trust. In column 1 of Table 6 we estimate our baseline specification with country $\times$ match fixed effects using generalized trust as dependent variable. The result indicate that, following a victory of the national team, individuals tend to generally trust others more. In column 2 we test whether this effect is stronger for inter-ethnic trust, using as dependent variable the self-reported measure of trust in people of other ethnic groups. Again the coefficient on *Post-Victory* is negative and significant; furthermore, it is larger than the one for generalized trust which suggests a stronger effect on trust outside one own ethnicity. This is confirmed by the fact that the coefficient on *Post-Victory* remains large and significant even when explicitly controlling for generalized trust (column 3). To further test for the larger effect on trust across rather than within ethnic groups, in columns 4 and 5 we use as dependent variable a measure of inter-ethnic trust premium, given by the difference between trust outside and within one's own ethnic group. Consistent with the previous findings, national teams victories' improve respondents' relative propensity to trust people of other ethnicities, regardless of whether generalized trust is controlled for.

### 3.3. National Team's Victories and Other Attitudes

An important question is whether weaker ethnic identity and higher inter-ethnic trust reflect a genuine change in attitudes or, rather, a generally euphoric mood due to national team's achievements. One way to test this hypothesis is to examine whether victories are also associated with changes in other attitudes unrelated to ethnic sentiments. We perform this exercise in Table 7. In column 1 we start by assessing whether national team's victories are associated with an increase in respondents' trust in the ruling party. When estimating our most complete specification we find that *Post-Victory* has no significant effect on the outcome of interest. A similar pattern emerges in column 2 when we use as dependent variable the respondent's approval rate for the president. These results indicate that football-driven patriotic shocks do not necessarily translate into generally more positive political attitudes

TABLE 6: NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND TRUST IN OTHERS

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Generalized Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust Premium | Inter-Ethnic Trust Premium |
| Post-Victory | 0.124*** | 0.254** | 0.145*** | 0.047* | 0.076** |
| | (0.033) | (0.106) | (0.038) | (0.028) | (0.033) |
| Generalized Trust | | | 0.586*** | | -0.156*** |
| | | | (0.030) | | (0.016) |
| Country × Match FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 27,563 | 8,091 | 8,089 | 8,077 | 8,075 |
| R-squared | 0.225 | 0.193 | 0.390 | 0.056 | 0.079 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Post-Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Generalized trust is the average level of trust in relatives, other acquaintances, other countrymen, and neighbors. Inter-ethnic trust is the self-reported score of trust in people of other ethnicities, while Inter-ethnic premium is the difference between the latter and trust in co-ethnics.

and into higher support for incumbent rulers.

To further rule out that the effect of national team's victories is driven by general euphoria, we then test whether victories affect respondents perception of the country's and of their own economic situation and prospects. In column 3 and 4 we estimate our baseline specification using as dependent variable dummies for whether a respondent reports having a positive assessment of the country's current economic conditions, and positive expectations of whether they will improve in the near future, respectively. In column 5 and 6 we do the same using as dependent variables dummies for whether a respondent has a positive assessment of her own living conditions, and expects these to improve in the future. The lack of significant coefficients in any column further corroborates the view that football-driven patriotism does not make individual more optimistic in general, and does not alter their perception of the conditions they live in.

TABLE 7: NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND OTHER ATTITUDES

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust in Ruling Party | President's Approval | Assess Country's Economic Conditions | | Assess Own Living Conditions | |
| | | | Present | Future | Present | Future |
| Post-Victory | 0.007 | -0.019 | -0.020 | -0.008 | -0.021 | -0.036 |
| | (0.034) | (0.044) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.017) | (0.023) |
| Country × Match FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 31,703 | 31,419 | 33,467 | 33,457 | 33,437 | 33,438 |
| R-squared | 0.167 | 0.224 | 0.118 | 0.175 | 0.116 | 0.187 |

*Post-Victory* takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Trust in Ruling Party is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent reports trusting the ruling party (either "somewhat" or a "lot") and 0 otherwise. *President's Approval* is a dummy that takes value 1 if the respondent reports approving the president's performance in the previous 12 months (either "approve" or "strongly approve") and 0 otherwise. The other dependent variables are dummies for whether the respondent's has a positive assessment of the current economic conditions of her own living conditions respectively ("good" or "very good"), or positive expectations about the evolution of the country's and of their own conditions in the future respectively ("better" or "much better"). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses.

All the results presented so far are based on the sample of individuals exposed to just one game. In Appendix Table A.2, we replicate the results on the larger sample of individuals who, in the days prior to the interview, may have experienced more than one match of their national team, which is rather common in the case of back-to-back matches. In this case,

the treatment is less clear-cut since a team may have contrasting results in different matches (e.g. win one but loose another one). To address this issue we use as main regressor of interest either the share of all matches won or the share of available points won (with a win corresponding to 3 points, a draw to 1, and a loss to 0). The results confirm that a more successful performance by the national team is associated with a reduction in the strength ethnic identification, and an increase in generalized and inter-ethnic trust, while there is no effect on other opinions or expectations.

## 4. Country-Level Analysis: Empirical Strategy

The results presented so far indicate that football-driven positive shocks contribute to reducing ethnic identification and inter-ethnic mistrust. An important related question is whether the documented attitudinal change may contribute to decrease actual violence, and how long-lasting this effect may be. To shed light on this issue we analyze how civil conflict in Sub-Saharan African countries evolves following important achievements of their national football teams. Specifically, we attempt to exploit quasi-experimental variation in whether a team qualified for the tournament stage of the African Cup of Nations (ACN), the most important continental competition for African national teams which generates widespread popular attention. The ACN involves two phases: i) a qualifying stage in which all teams compete, and ii) a final (or tournament) stage in which only the teams that ranked best in the qualifying round compete for the title. In the qualifying round teams are divided into groups, each teams plays each of the others twice (one at home and one away) with each match assigning a certain number of points, and the team(s) with more points (usually one or two) qualify to the final round. The qualifying stage is usually very competitive, and qualification is often decided only in the last match day based on just a tiny point margin or goal difference. Our strategy consists in i) identifying teams that, until the last match day of the group stage, were both in the position to qualify, but one of which barely did while the other did not, and ii) compare the evolution of conflict in the two countries in the six months before and after the qualification.

Our identification strategy is summarized by the following equation:

$$Conf_{c,q,t} = \alpha + \beta Qual_{c,q,t} + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \delta^k Conf_{c,q,t-k} + \sum_{t=-25}^{25} \Gamma_t + \Delta_{c,q} + \varepsilon_{c,q} \qquad (3)$$

where $c, q$, and $t$ denote country, qualification, and week since qualification (-25 to +25). $Conf$ is one of the three following measures of conflict intensity in a given country in a given week: a dummy for whether any episode of conflict has been recorded, ii) the number of conflict events recorded, iii) and the number of fatalities associated with those episodes.

*Qual*, our regressor of interest, is a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries of teams that have qualified only in the weeks after qualification, and 0 otherwise. $\sum_{t=-25}^{25}\Gamma_t$ is a set of dummies for each of the weeks before and after qualification, while $\Delta_{c,q}$ are country $\times$ qualification fixed effects. To control for possible auto correlation in conflict events, we also control for the occurrence of conflict in the previous weeks (up to four). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by country $\times$ qualifier.

### 4.1. Qualification to CAN and Social Conflict

For our analysis we use data from ACLED on the occurrence and severity of violent conflict events in Sub-Saharan African countries between 1997 and 2013, with a particular focus on the months before and after each ACN qualification campaign. As mentioned above, our key comparison is between countries that barely qualified to the ACN finals (our treatment group) and those that did not (our control group). The underlying identification assumption is that if two teams in the same group got to the last match day with concrete chances of qualifying, which one would actually qualify will be determined by quasi-random circumstances, such as a goal scored in the final minutes of the last match by one side or the other. One example of such scenario, depicted in Figure 3, is available from 2012, when three teams in qualifying group A, Mali, Zimbabwe, and Cape Verde, were in the position to qualify until the last match day while only one team, Liberia, was already eliminated. In the last two matches while Cape Verde defeated Zimbabwe, Mali was not able to beat Liberia but still managed to qualify due to a one-goal difference. In this case Mali would be included in the treatment group while both Cape Verde and Zimbabwe in the control group.

FIGURE 3: EXAMPLE OF CLOSE QUALIFICATION: GROUP A, CAN 2012

| Team | Pld | W | D | L | GF | GA | GD | Pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mali | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 9 |
| Zimbabwe | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 8 |
| Cape Verde | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 6 | -1 | 7 |
| Liberia | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 10 | −5 | 4 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08/10/2011 | Liberia | 2 – 2 | Mali |
| | Cape Verde | 2 – 1 | Zimbabwe |

| Team | Pld | W | D | L | GF | GA | GD | Pts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mali | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 10 |
| Cape Verde | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 10 |
| Zimbabwe | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 8 |
| Liberia | 6 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 12 | −5 | 5 |

Table 8 reports the countries included in the control and treatment group (46 and 55 respectively) for each qualifying campaign. In Table 9 we test whether the countries in the two groups are balanced along a range of characteristics that may affect conflict. We focus in particular on the following variables, measured in the year prior to qualification: GDP per capita, poverty rate, income inequality, life expectancy, population density, share of urban population, political corruption index of political, and autocracy index, as well as two measures of past conflict intensity, i.e., the number of active conflicts, and a dummy for whether the country experienced a civil war in the 1990s.[13] In column 1 and 2 we report the mean for each variable separately for treatment and control group, and in column 3 the p-value for the difference. The only two variables that are somewhat unbalanced (differences significant at the 10% level) are autocracy and political corruption, which are both somewhat higher for treatment than for control countries. The differences are however rather small corresponding to respectively a third and a fourth of a standard deviation on the sample of Sub-Saharan African countries for the period of interests. In column 4 we test whether covariates are balanced between countries that did and did not qualify in the same qualifying campaign; to this end, we report the coefficients from separate OLS regressions of each covariate on our treatment variable and on a set of nine qualification campaign dummies. The results indicate that the difference is insignificant for all but three variables: political corruption, autocracy,

[13] Data on GDP, poverty rates, income inequality, life expectancy, population density, and share of urban population are from the 2017 version of the World Development Indicators (2017); data on political corruption are from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, v6.2); data on autocracy index are from the Polity IV project; data on civil conflicts in 1990s are fromFearon and Laitin (2003); the indicator of active conflict is constructed based on the UCDP PRIO Conflict dataset.

and poverty rates. Yet, in our empirical analysis we control for country $\times$ qualifier fixed effects which capture all observable and unobservable factors, specific to a country in a given year, that may affect conflict.

TABLE 9: BALANCE CHECK

| Variable | Qualified | Not Qualified | *P*-Value of Difference | Within Qualification Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| GDP per Capita | 1689.92 | 2252.11 | 0.396 | -515.812 |
| | | | | (568.896) |
| Poverty Rate | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.246 | 0.048* |
| | | | | (0.025) |
| Gini Index | 44.18 | 44.49 | 0.826 | -0.119 |
| | | | | (2.282) |
| Life Expectancy | 53.82 | 54.17 | 0.785 | -0.447 |
| | | | | (0.930) |
| Population Density | 45.10 | 65.66 | 0.131 | -21.190 |
| | | | | (18.468) |
| Urban Population Rate | 37.88 | 38.25 | 0.909 | -0.175 |
| | | | | (2.775) |
| Autocracy | 1.64 | 2.31 | 0.081 | -0.674* |
| | | | | (0.313) |
| Political Corruption | 0.66 | 0.72 | 0.084 | -0.065* |
| | | | | (0.029) |
| Fraction Civil War 90's | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.603 | -0.037 |
| | | | | (0.059) |
| Number of Conflicts | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.696 | 0.039 |
| | | | | (0.083) |

For a set of covariates (listed on the left) in the year before the end of each qualification process to the CAN, columns (1) and (2) report the unconditional means for (barely) qualified countries (46 observations) and (barely) not qualified countries (55 observations). Column (3) reports the p-value associated with the mean difference test between (1) and (2). A second test is presented in column (4) which presents the OLS coefficients from separate regressions of each covariate on a treatment status (i.e, qualified) conditional on 9 qualification process dummies to ensure that comparison in the covariates is made between countries in the same year. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses (in column 4). Each test includes 101 observations, except in poverty rate and Gini index with 100 observations.

To further corroborate our identification strategy, we also test that conflict was not evolving differently in the treatment and in the control group prior to qualification, a situation that would threaten our Diff-in-Diff approach. To do so, we estimate a variant of equation 3 pooling observations for treatment and control groups and assigning a fictitious treatment for the pre-qualification period to countries that will eventually qualify. Specifically, this variable

TABLE 8: TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS BY QUALIFYING PROCESS

| Tournament Year | Treatment Group | Control Group |
|---|---|---|
| 1998 | Angola, ***Namibia***, *DRC*, and Mozambique | ***Zimbabwe***, *Mali*, *Senegal*, Gabon, Liberia, and *Malawi* |
| 2000 | Togo, Ivory Coast, and *Congo* | Guinea, *Mali*, *Liberia*, and *Uganda* |
| 2002 | Zambia, Burkina Faso, and DRC | *Angola*, ***Zimbabwe***, ***Madagascar*** ***Lesotho***, and Gabon |
| 2004 | ***Benin***, *Kenya*, ***Rwanda***, Mali, DRC, South Africa, and ***Zimbabwe*** | Zambia, Togo, *Sierra Leone*, Ivory Coast, ***Madagascar***, and *Uganda* |
| 2006 | DRC and South Africa | Burkina Faso |
| 2008 | Ivory Coast, *Sudan*, Senegal, Guinea, *Namibia*, *Benin*, and South Africa | Gabon, ***Gambia***, Uganda, ***Eritrea*** ***Equatorial Guinea***, Mozambique, and DRC |
| 2010 | Zambia and *Malawi* | *Rwanda* and Guinea |
| 2012 | Mali, *Guinea*, ***Niger***, Angola, and *Sudan* | *Zimbabwe*, *Sierra Leone*, Nigeria, Malawi, *South Africa*, Cameroon, ***Cape Verde***, *Uganda*, *Kenya*, ***CAR***, and ***Gambia*** |
| 2013 | Ivory Coast,*Ethiopia*, ***Cape Verde***, Niger, Angola, Togo, *DRC*, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Zambia | Malawi, Botswana, *Uganda*, *Sierra Leone*, Senegal, *Liberia*, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Guinea, Mozambique, *Zimbabwe*, Gabon, and ***CAR*** |

NOTE: Italic is used to denote that an overdue qualification was at stake (defined as at least 3 years without qualifying to the CAN finals). Italic bold is used to denote that a first-time qualification to the CAN finals was at stake. Due to the lack of conflict data, Mauritius is not included in the analysis despite of the fact that it did not qualified to the 2000 CAN the last match-day.

takes value 1 for the 12 weeks prior to qualification and 0 otherwise. If conflict was evolving differently in the two groups in the pre-qualification period, we would expect the fictitious treatment to display a significant coefficient. The results, reported in Table 10, seem to rule out this possibility: regardless of what measure of conflict is used and whether we control for conflict in previous weeks, we find no evidence that conflict was evolving differently in the 12 weeks pre-qualification in countries that would eventually qualify relative to countries that would not.

TABLE 10: PARALLEL TRENDS TEST

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variable: | Dummy for Any Conflict | | Number of Events (log+1) | | Number of Fatalities (log+1) | |
| 12 Weeks Before Qualification | 0.036 | 0.040 | 0.048 | 0.040 | -0.107 | -0.103 |
| | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.067) | (0.056) | (0.104) | (0.081) |
| Country × Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 Lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 2,525 | 2,121 | 2,525 | 2,121 | 2,525 | 2,121 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.023 | 0.008 | 0.040 | 0.008 | 0.033 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers 25 weeks before the end of qualification process (i.e. pre-treatment period). The variable 12 Weeks Before Qualification takes value 1 during the 12 weeks immediately before the end of the qualification process for the countries that will eventually qualify to the CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

### 4.2. QUALIFICATION TO ACN AND CONFLICT

In Table 11 we examine the effect of national teams' (close) qualification on conflict prevalence and intensity. We start by estimating, in column 1, our baseline specification with country × qualifying campaign and week fixed effects (equation 3), using as dependent variable a dummy for whether any conflict event occurred in the country in a given week. The results indicate that the probability of experiencing conflict is significantly lower in the months following the qualification; the effect is sizable corresponding to a 9% decrease in the probability of conflict in a given week. The effect remains largely unchanged in column 2 where we control for conflict in each of the previous four weeks.[14] The results are

[14] The results are virtually the same if we include the four lags of conflict occurrence one by one or in any combination. Also they are very similar when estimating a Probit model rather than a linear probability model (results shown in Table A.4).

qualitatively similar in columns 3 and 4 when we use the two measures of conflict intensity, i.e., (log+1 of) the number of conflict events occurred, and (log+1 of) the number of fatalities associated with them respectively. The effect is economically sizable: countries whose teams barely qualified experience a reduction of 18% in the number of conflict episodes and of 20-23 % in the number of fatalities relative to countries whose teams barely did not. The table also report the long-run impact of the qualification, which takes into account the effect of a reduction in today's conflict on future violence. We obtain analogous results when using the number of conflict episodes and victims (i.e, without the log transformation), and when estimating negative binomial regressions (see Table A.5).

TABLE 11: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Conflict Dummy | Conflict Dummy | Number of Events (log+1) | Number of Fatalities (log+1) |
| Post-Qualification | -0.078** | -0.068** | -0.105*** | -0.147** |
| | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.038) | (0.058) |
| Conflict variable $_{t-1}$ | | 0.112*** | 0.261*** | 0.163*** |
| | | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.032) |
| Conflict variable$_{t-2}$ | | 0.012 | 0.069*** | 0.129*** |
| | | (0.019) | (0.026) | (0.024) |
| Conflict variable$_{t-3}$ | | 0.023 | 0.041* | 0.051** |
| | | (0.017) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Conflict variable$_{t-4}$ | | 0.009 | 0.076*** | -0.018 |
| | | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.032) |
| Long-Run Impact | -0.078 | -0.081 | -0.190 | -0.218 |
| Country × Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 4,646 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.024 | 0.118 | 0.070 |

The sample includes the 25 weeks before and after the close qualification for 101 country × qualifier pairs. The variable *Post-Qualification* takes value 1 for the team that qualified for the weeks after the qualification and 0 otherwise. The dependent variables are respectively a dummy for whether any conflict event was recorded in the country in a given week (columns 1 and 2), the log (+1) of the number of conflict events recorded in a given week (column 3), and the log (+1) of the number of fatalities associated with those events (column 4). All conflict data are from the ACLED dataset. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country × qualifier reported in parentheses.

In Figure 2 we provide additional graphical evidence of the impact of qualification on conflict and examine the duration of this effect. To this end, we plot the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the interaction terms between the treatment variable and dummies for eleven four-week periods in the months before and after the qualification. The coefficients are obtained from a regression which also include 50 week dummies and 101 country×qualifier dummies. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we normalize to 0 the coefficient on the four-week periods immediately before qualification. The results indicate clearly that the occurrence and the number of conflict events (top and bottom panel respectively) decrease sharply in the weeks following the qualification to the CAN tournament. Indeed, all the coefficient for the post-qualification periods are significantly different

TABLE 12: EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT AFTER QUALIFICATION

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variable: | Conflict Dummy | | Number of Events (log+1) | | Number of Fatalities (log+1) | |
| 1-12 Weeks Post-Qualification | -0.061* | -0.056** | -0.149** | -0.107*** | -0.238** | -0.169** |
| | (0.032) | (0.027) | (0.069) | (0.038) | (0.100) | (0.069) |
| 13-25 Weeks Post-Qualification | -0.090** | -0.078** | -0.214** | -0.116** | -0.229* | -0.144* |
| | (0.040) | (0.035) | (0.098) | (0.054) | (0.121) | (0.080) |
| Country × Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 Lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.024 | 0.014 | 0.119 | 0.012 | 0.070 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process for 101 country×qualifier pairs. The variable 1-12 Weeks After Qualification takes value 1 during the 12 weeks immediately after the end of the qualification process for the countries that barely qualify to the CAN, 0 otherwise. The variable 13-25 Weeks After Qualification takes value 1 starting the 13th week after the end of the qualification process for the countries that barely qualify to the CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

than 0 at the 10% level and most of them at the 5% level. Two additional patterns emerge quite clearly. First, none of the coefficients for the periods before qualification is significantly different than zero, confirming the absence of any differential trend in countries that would later qualify, documented in Table 10. Second, the effect of qualification on conflict persists and, if anything, becomes stronger as more time passes since qualification, especially three months after.

To further test the persistence of the effect in Table 12, we re-estimate our diff-in-diff specification splitting the post-qualification period in two sub-periods: i) the first 12 weeks after qualification, and ii) the following 13 weeks. The results document a reduction in conflict occurrence and intensity of a similar magnitude for the two periods; in fact, the point estimates for the second period are somewhat larger and more significant when using the dummy and the number of events as dependent variables (columns 1-4), but slightly smaller for the number of fatalities (columns 5-6). Results are largely similar when controlling for the lags of conflict (columns 2, 4, and 6). Combined with the results on attitudes, these findings provide robust evidence that important achievements of the national team, by priming a sentiment of national unity and by reducing inter-ethnic cleavages, can contribute to reduce violence in a tangible and rather persistent way.

## FIGURE 4: OCCURRENCE OF CONFLICT AND NUMBER OF CONFLICT EPISODES BEFORE AND AFTER QUALIFICATION

FIGURE A: OCCURRENCE OF CONFLICT (4-WEEK BANDWIDTHS)






FIGURE B: NUMBER OF CONFLICT EPISODES (4-WEEK BANDWIDTHS)




Figures plot coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for interactions between the dummy for countries that barely qualified to the ACN and 11 dummies for 4-week period included between 25 weeks before and after the qualification. The coefficient for the 4 weeks immediately before the qualification is normalized to zero. The dependent variable for the top panel is a dummy for whether any conflict event has been recorded in the country in the week, while for the bottom panel is (log+ 1) the number of conflict events recorded in the country in the week. The regressions also include week and country $\times$ qualifier dummies. Confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country $\times$ qualifier.

### 4.3. Effect of Qualification on Conflict: Heterogeneity

As for the case of national team matches, we examine the possibility that surprising qualifications, which further spur sentiments of national unity, have a stronger effect on conflict. Indeed, it seems plausible that qualification to the ACN tournament may be perceived as an especially important achievement for teams that never qualified in the past or that did not qualify in a long time, as opposed to teams - such as Ghana or Ivory Coast - that generally do. To test this hypothesis in Table 13 we estimate our baseline specification separately for i) countries that had not qualified in three or more years and ii) countries that had never qualified. The results provide strong support for the above-mentioned hypothesis: the reduction in the occurrence and intensity of conflict is generally larger and more significant for overdue and first qualifications than for the others, with the exception of the decrease in the number of fatalities which is marginally insignificant for first qualifications.

TABLE 13: OVERDUE AND FIRST QUALIFICATION EFFECTS

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variable: | Conflict Dummy | | | Number of Events (log+1) | | | Number of Fatalities (log+1) | | |
| Sample | Full | Overdue qualif. | 1st qualif. | Full | Overdue qualif. | 1st qualif. | Full | Overdue qualif. | 1st qualif. |
| Post-Qualification | -0.068** | -0.114** | -0.158** | -0.105*** | -0.168*** | -0.218*** | -0.147** | -0.224*** | -0.082 |
| | (0.026) | (0.044) | (0.072) | (0.038) | (0.059) | (0.102) | (0.058) | (0.082) | (0.047) |
| Country × Qualifier FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 lags of conflict | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4,646 | 2,346 | 828 | 4,646 | 2,346 | 828 | 4,646 | 2,346 | 828 |
| (Pseudo) R-squared | 0.024 | 0.031 | 0.090 | 0.118 | 0.161 | 0.221 | 0.070 | 0.077 | 0.092 |

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset. An overdue (first-time) qualification is defined as reaching the last match-day with chances of qualifying to the CAN finals after 3 or more years (for the very first time). See Table 8

### 4.4. Qualifications and Ethnic Conflict

In Table 14 we investigate the effect of qualification to the ACN tournament on conflict events classified as ethnically related according to the procedure described in section 2.3. When estimating our most comprehensive specification - with country × qualifier and week fixed effects and lags of conflict - we find that national team's qualification to the ACN finals reduced the occurrence of inter-ethnic violence (column 1), as well as its intensity measured both by the number of conflict events and associated fatalities (columns 2-3). Though smaller than for overall conflict, the effect is rather sizable with the qualification reducing the likelihood of ethnic violence by one third of the mean value of the dummy variable.[15]

Table 14: Impact on Ethnic Conflict

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variable: | Dummy for any Conflict | Number of Events (log+1) | Number of Fatalities (log+1) |
| Post-Qualification | -0.024** | -0.022* | -0.066** |
| | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.031) |
| Long-Run Impact | 0.029 | 0.034 | 0.086 |
| Country × Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 Lags of Conflict | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4,646 | 4,646 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.029 | 0.083 | 0.055 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Ethic conflict is coded using conflict data from the ACLED dataset.

Finally, we analyze two alternative explanations of the negative effect of qualification on conflict documented above. The first one is that the decline in conflict may be partly due to the coincidence with the ACN tournament, which, in some cases, took place within six months from the qualification. Indeed, since the ACN finals are very popular and are broadcast around the continent, they may distract many individuals who may otherwise engage in violence, particularly in countries that qualified. To test for this possibility, in Table 15

[15] As shown in Table A.6, the results are similar when using the number of conflict events and fatalities instead of their log +1 version.

we re-estimate our baseline specification excluding from the sample the weeks during which CAN finals were taking place. The results indicate that, regardless of which measure of conflict we use and whether we control for lagged conflict, the effect of qualification on conflict remains virtually unchanged [16]

TABLE 15: EFFECT OF QUALIFICATION AND ACN FINALS

| Dependent variable: | Dummy for any conflict event | | Number of conflict events (log+1) | | Number of fatalities (log+1) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Post-Qualification | -0.076** | -0.066** | -0.179** | -0.106*** | -0.231** | -0.151** |
| | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.070) | (0.037) | (0.094) | (0.060) |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 Lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Excluding ACN Finals | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4,782 | 4,378 | 4,782 | 4,378 | 4,782 | 4,378 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.023 | 0.015 | 0.112 | 0.013 | 0.071 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process, except for observations in weeks wherein the CAN finals took place, which are excluded (268 weekly observations). Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

The second possibility relates to the news-based nature of the ACLED conflict data. A conflict event is recorded by ACLED only if it is mentioned by at least one of a multiplicity of local, national, or international media, in addition to reports by local NGOs. It is in principle possible that the qualification of the national team to the ACN tournament may lead to an increase in the number of football-related news in local media that may crowd out news about the conflict, potentially leading to a mechanical reduction in the number of conflict events recorded by ACLED.[17] To the extent that football-related news are likely more extensive during the finals of the ACN, the results in Table A.10 are reassuring that this aspect is not driving our results. Yet, it could be that football-news increase in the months prior to the

[16] As an additional test in appendix Table A.10 we look at the entire sample but include a dummy for the weeks during which the ACN's finals are taking place only for teams that qualified. The results are largely consistent with those in Table 15.

[17] Evidence that news coverage of important sport events on TV can crowd out news about other issues, such as natural disasters or conflict, is available from Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) and Durante and Zhuravskaya (forthcoming).

ACN finals, as the discussion about players' selection and teams' prospects intensifies. One way to test the crowding-out hypothesis is to verify that the effect is not driven by less severe conflict events which should be more likely to go unreported due to competition from football news than events involving a higher number of fatalities. We implement this approach in Table 16 where we estimate our baseline specification for the occurrence of conflict events of increasing severity, i.e. involving 10 or more fatalities, 25 or more fatalities, and 50 or more fatalities.The fact that the results are similar for the different samples, both in terms of magnitude and significance, suggest that reporting bias is not driving our results.

TABLE 16: CONFLICT OCCURRENCE BY NUMBER OF FATALITIES

| Dependent Variable: | Dummy for at least one conflict event in a week | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Events with 10 or more fatalities | | Events with 25 or more fatalities | | Events with 50 or more fatalities | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Post-Qualification | -0.042** | -0.035** | -0.034** | -0.027* | -0.030** | -0.022* |
| | (0.021) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Mean dep. variable | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.043 | 0.042 | 0.024 | 0.023 |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 Lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.026 | 0.011 | 0.045 | 0.012 | 0.053 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

This research examines how successful collective experiences that prime national pride and sentiments of unity can contribute to alleviate inter-ethnic tensions and reduce violence. We investigate this issue in the context of sub-Saharan Africa by looking at the impact of national football teams' victories on both individual attitudes and acts of violence.

We first combine information on over 70 official games by Sub-Saharan African national teams over the period 2000-2015 with survey data for over 35,000 individuals interviewed in 24 countries in four rounds of the Afrobarometer. Comparing the responses of individuals

interviewed in the days immediately before and after a match, we find that a victory of the national team is associated with a significant decrease in the probability that individuals report a strong sense of ethnic (as opposed to national) identity. The estimated effect is sizable - accounting for a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification - and robust to different specifications and controls. In particular, our results still hold when restricting the comparisons to individuals within the same ethnic group interviewed before and after the same match. Our findings also show that football-driven shocks are also associated to an increase in trust in other people, in general, and individuals of other ethnicities, in particular. In contrast, they have no significant impact on respondents' trust and support for the incumbent, suggesting the absence of a "rally 'round the flag" effect, or optimism regarding present and future economic conditions.

To test whether the effect of football-driven sentiments of national pride and unity extends beyond attitudes to more tangible behavioral outcomes, we then look at the evolution of conflict around the time of important national teams' achievement. We find that countries whose national teams (barely) qualified to the CAN tournament experience significantly less conflict events in the six months following the qualification than countries whose teams (barely) did not.

In sum, the empirical evidence that we presented in this paper suggests that priming "national pride" can have a sizable and robust impact on self-reported ethnic identification, inter-ethnic trust, and conflict. Our findings suggest that, even in regions where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, transitory shocks can reinforce national identity, reduce inter-ethnic mistrust and, by this means, have a tangible impact on conflict intensity.

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## APPENDIX

### CONSTRUCTION OF FOOTBALL RATINGS TO COMPUTE WINNING EXPECTATIONS

In order to compute winning expectations we use the formula proposed by the World Football Elo Ratings which is based on the Elo rating system, developed by Arpad Elo. A win expectancy is computed based on the following formula:

$$W_E = \frac{1}{10^{(-dr/400)} + 1}$$


Where $dr$ is the difference in ratings plus 100 points for a team playing at home. Since the World Football Elo ratings are not publicly available for the entire period of our analysis (i.e., 2000- 2015), we construct them based on monthly FIFA ranking data with the following procedure:

1. Using the last available World Football Elo rating (see Table A.11 ), [18] we estimate the coefficients of a simple linear relationship between ranking and rating. That is, we run a OLS regression of ELO ratings on ELO rankings (sample size is 234 countries)

2. We then apply the estimated coefficients in 1. (intercept = -5.26 and slope = 1943.27) to each monthly FIFA ranking to compute a weekly ELO rating.

[18] The rating corresponds to February 17th, 2017 and was downloaded from http://www.eloratings.net/world.html

FIGURE A.1: ETHNIC IDENTITY BEFORE AND AFTER NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES




The figure plots the coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals for nine dummies indicating 3-day blocks from 15 days before to 15 days after a victory of the national football team. The coefficient for the period between 3 to 1 days before the match is normalized to zero. Confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by language group. The coefficients are estimated from a unique regression in which we control for individual characteristics, country×match and language group fixed effects, and for the proximity to draws or defeats.

TABLE A.1: ORDERED DEPENDENT VARIABLE

| | Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity (0rdered, 0-4) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OLS | | Ordered Probit | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Post-Victory | -0.086*** | -0.044 | -0.091*** | -0.049 |
| | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.034) |
| Country-Year FE | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country-Match FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 25,293 | 25,293 | 25,293 | 25,293 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise.

TABLE A.2: MULTIPLE GAMES

| | Ethnic Identification | Generalized Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust Premium | Trust in Ruling Party | President's Approval |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **Panel A: Share of Victories** | | | | | | |
| Share of Victories | -0.033*** | 0.073* | 0.147*** | 0.077** | -0.004 | 0.025 |
| | (0.010) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.034) |
| Generalized Trust | | | 0.589*** | -0.154*** | | |
| | | | (0.030) | (0.016) | | |
| Observations | 35,069 | 33,910 | 8,200 | 8,186 | 31,983 | 31,864 |
| R-squared | 0.100 | 0.232 | 0.389 | 0.079 | 0.195 | 0.214 |
| **Panel B: Share of Points Won** | | | | | | |
| | Ethnic Identification | Generalized Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust | Inter-Ethnic Trust Premium | Trust in Ruling Party | President's Approval |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Share of Points Won | -0.033*** | 0.085** | 0.147*** | 0.077** | 0.016 | 0.031 |
| | (0.010) | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.036) |
| Generalized Trust | | | 0.589*** | -0.154*** | | |
| | | | (0.030) | (0.016) | | |
| Observations | 35,069 | 33,910 | 8,200 | 8,186 | 37,735 | 37,556 |
| R-squared | 0.100 | 0.232 | 0.389 | 0.079 | 0.165 | 0.212 |
| Multiple Games | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country-Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Share of Victories accounts for the fraction of total games won. Share of points Won accounts for the fraction of total possible points obtained (a win, draw, and lose awards 3, 1, and 0 points, respectively).

TABLE A.3: VICTORIES AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION: HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS

| | Dependent Variable: Ethnic over National Identity (0-1 dummy) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Post-Victory | -0.043*** | -0.039** | -0.053*** | -0.043*** |
| | (0.012) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.011) |
| Interaction | 0.013 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.038* |
| | (0.011) | (0.004) | (0.000) | (0.020) |
| Uninteracted Term | -0.024*** | -0.018*** | -0.003*** | -0.002 |
| | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.012) |
| Interaction Term | Male | Education | Age | Rural |
| Country-Match FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Language FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 28,758 | 28,758 | 28,758 | 28,758 |
| R-squared | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.104 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. *Post-Victory* takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise.

TABLE A.4: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT PREVALENCE (PROBIT)

| Dependent Variable: Conflict Prevalence (1 if at least one conflict in week, 0 otherwise) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Qualification | -0.336** | -0.301*** | -0.200** | -0.308** |
| | (0.133) | (0.117) | (0.079) | (0.128) |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Random Effect Model | No | No | No | Yes |
| Qualifying Country Indicator | No | No | Yes | No |
| 4 lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | No |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4,650 | 4,278 | 5,050 | 5,050 |

Estimates from Probit regression models. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.5: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT INTENSITY (ML-NB)

| Dependent Variable: | Num. Events | | Num. Fatalities | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Qualification | -0.440** | -0.332** | -0.803** | -0.797** |
| | (0.194) | (0.146) | (0.327) | (0.335) |
| 4 lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |

Estimates from negative binomial regression models. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.6: CONFLICT INTENSITY (IHS TRANSFORMATION)

| Conflict Measure | Dependent Variable: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation of | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All Conflicts | | | | Ethnic Conflicts | | | |
| | Num. Events | | Num. Fatalities | | Num. Events | | Num. Fatalities | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Qualification | -0.225** | -0.136*** | -0.265** | -0.174*** | -0.041 | -0.028* | -0.088* | -0.068** |
| | (0.090) | (0.048) | (0.106) | (0.066) | (0.026) | (0.015) | (0.046) | (0.031) |
| 4 lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.013 | 0.111 | 0.012 | 0.068 | 0.010 | 0.080 | 0.011 | 0.061 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

## TABLE A.7: CONFLICT PREVALENCE BY TYPE OF CONFLICT

| | Dependent Variable: Conflict Prevalence (if at least one conflict in week, 0 otherwise) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Riots | | Attacks on Civilians | | Government | | Battles | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Qualification | -0.089*** | -0.083*** | -0.063** | -0.052** | -0.045 | -0.043* | -0.014 | -0.005 |
| | (0.030) | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.024) | (0.032) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.020) |
| 4 lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.017 | 0.037 | 0.014 | 0.032 | 0.008 | 0.024 | 0.010 | 0.022 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

## TABLE A.8: CONFLICT INTENSITY BY TYPE OF CONFLICT (NUM. EVENTS)

| | Dependent Variable: Log of 1 + Number of Conflict Events by Type | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Riots | | Attacks on Civilians | | Government | | Battles | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Qualification | -0.124*** | -0.100*** | -0.084 | -0.055* | -0.086 | -0.051 | -0.019 | -0.000 |
| | (0.039) | (0.027) | (0.051) | (0.029) | (0.058) | (0.033) | (0.043) | (0.026) |
| 4 lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.018 | 0.085 | 0.012 | 0.070 | 0.008 | 0.096 | 0.011 | 0.093 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.9: CONFLICT INTENSITY BY TYPE OF CONFLICT (NUM. FATALITIES)

| | Dependent Variable: Number of Fatalities by Type (Log+1) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict Type: | Riots | | Attacks on Civilians | | Government | | Battles | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Post-Qualification | -0.004 | -0.011 | -0.132** | -0.112** | -0.112 | -0.066 | -0.152** | -0.106** |
| | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.062) | (0.054) | (0.073) | (0.048) | (0.074) | (0.053) |
| 4 lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.011 | 0.020 | 0.011 | 0.022 | 0.009 | 0.035 | 0.011 | 0.047 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.10: INCAPACITATION EFFECT DUE TO CAN FINALS?

| Dependent Variable: | Conflict Prevalence | | Num. Events (log+1) | | Num. Fatalities (log+1) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Qualification | -0.075** | -0.065** | -0.190*** | -0.111*** | -0.240** | -0.157*** |
| | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.072) | (0.037) | (0.094) | (0.060) |
| During CAN Finals | -0.024 | -0.027 | 0.100 | 0.050 | 0.134 | 0.101 |
| | (0.043) | (0.039) | (0.092) | (0.067) | (0.152) | (0.122) |
| Country×Qualifier FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Week FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 Lags of Conflict | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 | 5,050 | 4,646 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.024 | 0.014 | 0.119 | 0.012 | 0.070 |

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country×qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. The During CAN Finals takes value 1 for the qualified teams during the weeks in which the CAN finals are taking place, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

## TABLE A.11: ELO RATING AND RANKING

| Rank | Team | Rating | Rank | Team | Rating | Rank | Team | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Brazil | 2073 | 78 | Jamaica | 1510 | 157 | Suriname | 1221 |
| 2 | Argentina | 2028 | 80 | Jordan | 1504 | 158 | Curacao | 1208 |
| 3 | Germany | 2018 | 81 | Haiti | 1499 | 158 | Dominican Republic | 1208 |
| 4 | France | 1989 | 82 | Martinique | 1495 | 160 | Yemen | 1205 |
| 5 | Chile | 1968 | 82 | Guatemala | 1495 | 161 | Hong Kong | 1201 |
| 6 | Spain | 1961 | 84 | Guinea | 1491 | 162 | Antigua and Barbuda | 1193 |
| 7 | Italy | 1924 | 85 | Armenia | 1482 | 162 | Malta | 1193 |
| 8 | England | 1909 | 86 | Kuwait | 1471 | 164 | Bermuda | 1190 |
| 8 | Portugal | 1909 | 87 | Iraq | 1467 | 164 | Papua New Guinea | 1190 |
| 10 | Colombia | 1908 | 88 | Oman | 1462 | 166 | Guyana | 1181 |
| 11 | Mexico | 1902 | 89 | Libya | 1458 | 167 | Solomon Islands | 1179 |
| 12 | Uruguay | 1898 | 89 | Uganda | 1458 | 168 | South Sudan | 1177 |
| 13 | Belgium | 1886 | 91 | Georgia | 1447 | 169 | Lesotho | 1175 |
| 14 | Netherlands | 1870 | 92 | Gabon | 1443 | 170 | Liechtenstein | 1158 |
| 15 | Croatia | 1861 | 93 | Lithuania | 1442 | 171 | Afghanistan | 1155 |
| 16 | Switzerland | 1836 | 94 | Zambia | 1438 | 172 | Belize | 1136 |
| 17 | Ecuador | 1832 | 95 | Cape Verde | 1428 | 173 | Barbados | 1122 |
| 18 | Poland | 1830 | 96 | Congo | 1427 | 174 | Grenada | 1116 |
| 19 | Peru | 1816 | 97 | Bahrain | 1424 | 174 | Singapore | 1116 |
| 20 | South Korea | 1782 | 98 | Estonia | 1419 | 176 | India | 1115 |
| 21 | Ireland | 1781 | 99 | Northern Cyprus | 1418 | 177 | Malaysia | 1111 |
| 22 | Costa Rica | 1768 | 100 | Trinidad and Tobago | 1417 | 178 | Saint Lucia | 1092 |
| 23 | Iran | 1766 | 100 | Thailand | 1417 | 178 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 1092 |
| 24 | Turkey | 1765 | 102 | El Salvador | 1412 | 180 | Sao Tome e Principe | 1084 |
| 25 | Ukraine | 1747 | 103 | Azerbaijan | 1406 | 181 | Eritrea | 1077 |
| 25 | Iceland | 1747 | 104 | Zimbabwe | 1404 | 182 | Gibraltar | 1066 |
| 27 | Japan | 1745 | 105 | Benin | 1399 | 183 | Myanmar | 1060 |
| 28 | Wales | 1739 | 106 | Latvia | 1395 | 184 | Mauritius | 1053 |
| 29 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1738 | 107 | Kenya | 1390 | 185 | Puerto Rico | 1016 |
| 30 | Sweden | 1736 | 108 | Togo | 1388 | 186 | Comoros | 987 |
| 31 | Slovakia | 1733 | 108 | Reunion | 1388 | 187 | Sint Maarten | 973 |
| 32 | United States | 1719 | 110 | Kazakhstan | 1386 | 188 | Seychelles | 961 |
| 33 | Serbia | 1709 | 111 | Kosovo | 1383 | 189 | Pakistan | 960 |
| 33 | Senegal | 1709 | 111 | Cyprus | 1383 | 190 | Maldives | 959 |
| 35 | Australia | 1701 | 113 | Macedonia | 1382 | 191 | Dominica | 950 |
| 36 | Denmark | 1695 | 114 | Namibia | 1371 | 192 | Cayman Islands | 948 |
| 37 | Paraguay | 1685 | 115 | Lebanon | 1370 | 193 | Andorra | 938 |
| 37 | Cameroon | 1685 | 116 | Sierra Leone | 1368 | 194 | Nepal | 918 |
| 39 | Egypt | 1678 | 117 | New Caledonia | 1363 | 195 | Aruba | 906 |
| 40 | Czechia | 1676 | 118 | Equatorial Guinea | 1350 | 196 | Bahamas | 898 |
| 41 | Ivory Coast | 1672 | 119 | Angola | 1345 | 197 | Bonaire | 896 |
| 42 | Russia | 1671 | 120 | French Guiana | 1341 | 198 | Greenland | 885 |
| 43 | Hungary | 1668 | 121 | Palestine | 1338 | 199 | Saint Martin | 880 |
| 44 | Venezuela | 1666 | 122 | Swaziland | 1330 | 200 | Taiwan | 871 |
| 45 | Austria | 1665 | 123 | Moldova | 1327 | 201 | San Marino | 861 |
| 46 | Romania | 1662 | 124 | Tanzania | 1315 | 202 | Guam | 855 |
| 46 | Nigeria | 1662 | 125 | Liberia | 1313 | 203 | Somalia | 843 |
| 48 | Uzbekistan | 1657 | 125 | Mozambique | 1313 | 204 | Wallis and Futuna | 838 |
| 49 | Panama | 1654 | 127 | Mauritania | 1311 | 205 | Tuvalu | 822 |
| 50 | Scotland | 1649 | 128 | Burundi | 1309 | 206 | Cambodia | 821 |
| 51 | Greece | 1635 | 129 | Rwanda | 1305 | 207 | Cook Islands | 820 |
| 52 | Slovenia | 1632 | 130 | Ethiopia | 1303 | 208 | Laos | 819 |
| 53 | Northern Ireland | 1626 | 130 | Malawi | 1303 | 209 | Bangladesh | 815 |
| 54 | Burkina Faso | 1618 | 132 | Botswana | 1295 | 210 | Samoa | 814 |
| 55 | Bolivia | 1614 | 133 | Cuba | 1292 | 211 | Saint Barthelemy | 791 |
| 56 | Israel | 1607 | 133 | Central African Republic | 1292 | 212 | Saint Pierre and Miquelon | 762 |
| 57 | South Africa | 1604 | 135 | Zanzibar | 1291 | 213 | Djibouti | 754 |
| 58 | Algeria | 1600 | 136 | Sudan | 1290 | 214 | US Virgin Islands | 748 |
| 59 | Morocco | 1597 | 136 | Niger | 1290 | 215 | Monaco | 732 |
| 60 | Honduras | 1596 | 138 | Fiji | 1285 | 216 | Turks and Caicos | 718 |
| 61 | Democratic Republic of Congo | 1592 | 139 | Vietnam | 1284 | 217 | Montserrat | 715 |
| 62 | Saudi Arabia | 1581 | 140 | Gambia | 1278 | 218 | Macao | 707 |
| 63 | United Arab Emirates | 1577 | 141 | Guinea-Bissau | 1275 | 219 | Sri Lanka | 705 |
| 64 | Montenegro | 1571 | 142 | Faroe Islands | 1273 | 219 | Tonga | 705 |

Data downloaded on February 17th, 2017 at http://www.eloratings.net/world.html

TABLE A.5: ELO RATING AND RANKING (CONTINUATION)

| Rank | Team | Rating | Rank | Team | Rating | Rank | Team | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 65 | Ghana | 1567 | 143 | Guadeloupe | 1271 | 221 | Mongolia | 672 |
| 65 | Tunisia | 1567 | 144 | Nicaragua | 1265 | 222 | Federated States of Micronesia | 664 |
| 65 | New Zealand | 1567 | 145 | Tahiti | 1262 | 223 | Brunei | 645 |
| 65 | Belarus | 1567 | 146 | Turkmenistan | 1258 | 224 | East Timor | 642 |
| 69 | Bulgaria | 1566 | 147 | Indonesia | 1257 | 225 | British Virgin Islands | 626 |
| 70 | Albania | 1560 | 148 | Chad | 1253 | 225 | Bhutan | 626 |
| 71 | Norway | 1554 | 149 | Saint Kitts and Nevis | 1250 | 227 | Anguilla | 620 |
| 72 | Qatar | 1553 | 150 | Madagascar | 1245 | 228 | Eastern Samoa | 602 |
| 73 | Syria | 1537 | 151 | Tajikistan | 1244 | 229 | Niue | 595 |
| 74 | Finland | 1532 | 152 | Vanuatu | 1241 | 230 | Vatican | 577 |
| 75 | Mali | 1523 | 153 | Mayotte | 1225 | 231 | Kiribati | 566 |
| 76 | North Korea | 1522 | 154 | Philippines | 1224 | 232 | Tibet | 553 |
| 77 | China | 1511 | 155 | Kyrgyzstan | 1223 | 233 | Palau | 491 |
| 78 | Canada | 1510 | 156 | Luxembourg | 1222 | 234 | Northern Mariana Islands | 454 |

Data downloaded on February 17th, 2017 at http://www.eloratings.net/world.html