Polarization, Foreign Military Interventions, and Civil Conflicts[*]

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Abstract

In a behavioral model of civil conflict external military interventions alter the resources available to warring groups and their probability of winning. Such a model highlights the importance of distributional measures along with the effect of interventions for conflict incidence. We test the model empirically and confirm the finding in the literature that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil wars. Furthermore, we find that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict in the presence of non-humanitarian and non-neutral, external military interventions. This result is particularly pronounced in the Middle East and North Africa where religious polarization is found to lead to high-intensity conflicts in the presence of external interventions. The results are robust to different definitions of conflict, model specifications, and data time span.

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I. Introduction

Civil wars and other types of political violence have grave consequences for human development and global poverty reduction efforts. As they disrupt economic activity and investments and destroy human lives and infrastructure, their effect is usually felt long after peace is restored. Civil wars are also more common in poor (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and politically unstable countries (Hegre et al., 2001), in slow-growing economies, abundant in lootable resources and unskilled labor (Collier and Hoffler, 2004), and in ethnically polarized societies (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012). This body of literature, however, provides only a limited explanation for the high incidence of civil conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The region is comprised of mostly middle-income countries; these countries were not highly polarized along ethnic lines and had good human development outcomes in the second half of 20th century (Ianchovichina et al., 2015). Yet, from 1965 to 2004, the average incidence of conflict by country in the MENA region far exceeded the corresponding incidence in the rest of the developing world; it was one and half times higher than the incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa, twice the incidence in Asia, and more than three times the incidence in Latin America and Caribbean (Table 1). What factors explain the high incidence of civil conflict in Arab countries during the same period? This paper explores one potential explanation: the role of non-humanitarian and non-neutral, external military interventions.

Previous studies of civil war incidence have emphasized different explanatory factors, but virtually all have related civil war to domestic factors and processes. Theoretical studies of internal conflict have focused on grievance-motivated rebellions (Gurr, 1970), the factors creating opportunities for collective action in mobilization (Tilly, 1978), and the role of rents from conflict in promoting support for violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Many studies have explored the hotly contested

link between ethnic and religious diversity and social conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not find a link between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict, but others insist that the ethnic cleavages may increase the risk of conflict (Ellingsen, 2000; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) and the duration of civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2004).[1] Arguing that there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more conflict, in societies where a large ethnic minority lives side by side with an ethnic majority, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that ethnic polarization,[2] not ethnic fractionalization,[3] is a significant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil war. They conclude that ethnic polarization has a robust and significant explanatory power on civil wars in the presence of other indices of fractionalization and polarization, while the statistical significance of religious polarization depends on the particular specification. Esteban and Ray (2011) formalize theoretically the link between distributional measures and conflict incidence and test these links empirically in Esteban et al. (2012). Assuming no external intervention, they find that all three indices of ethnic distribution – polarization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index – are significant correlates of conflict.[4]

This literature has largely overlooked the role of transnational factors on conflict incidence (Regan 2010), despite the importance given to international factors in popular accounts of civil wars (McNulty, 1999). The research on interventions has focused on the effect of interventions on the

[1] Collier et al. (1999) argue that the duration of civil wars is positively, though non-monotonically related to the level of ethnic fractionalization of the warring society. The implication is that polarized societies would generate longer civil wars because the cost of coordinating a rebellion for a long enough period could be prohibitively high in very diverse societies.
[2] Polarization measures capture the distance of the group distribution from the bipolar one where the population is split in half into two large groups.
[3] Fractionalization measures capture the extent of diversity in a country or society.
[4] This result holds under the assumption that the resources committed by the warring groups come only from individual efforts within countries and that each warring group's probability of winning equals their population share (Esteban and Ray, 2011).

length of civil conflicts and the involved countries or groups. This body of literature, reviewed in detail by Regan (2010), produces strong evidence that external interventions tend to lengthen civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000) and that they may escalate ongoing conflicts and play an important role in conflict settlement (Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2004; Regan, 2000; Walter, 1997). Albornoz and Hauk (2014) explore how interventions by global superpowers such as the U.S. affect the probability of civil wars around the world. They find such interventions to be a sizable driver of domestic conflict with the risk of civil war increasing under Republican governments and decreasing with the U.S. presidential approval ratings.

There are few studies that explore the question of how external interventions influence the incidence of civil wars. Cetinyan (2002) explores this question and finds that external support does not affect civil war incidence, but it influences the terms of settlement in the event conflict occurs. Gershenson (2002) also looks at this issue but in terms of sanctions, not direct military intervention. He finds that strong sanctions can compel the state to engage rebel demands whereas weak sanctions against the state can weaken the rebel's position. Gleditsch (2007) examines how transnational contagion from neighboring states affects the risk of conflict in a country and concludes that regional factors strongly influence the risk of civil conflict.

We contribute to the literature by exploring the question of how external military interventions influence the incidence of civil wars.[5] We rely on the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset of external military interventions around the world, the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars, and the databases on ethnic and religious fractionalization used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). We extend the model developed by Esteban and Ray (2011)

[5] Unless otherwise specified, external military intervention refers to the non-neutral and non-humanitarian type of such interventions.

in a way that allows us to capture the effect of external military intervention on the probability of winning of warring groups and the resources available to them. The paper highlights the importance of both distributional measures and external military interventions, which alter the balance of power among potential warring groups, as risk factors for conflict. We show that the equilibrium level of conflict depends not only on the distributional measures of inequality, fractionalization and polarization, but also on the effect of the interventions on the distributional measures. Specifically, we confirm the finding by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil wars. In addition, we find robust evidence that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict in the presence of non-humanitarian and non-neutral foreign military interventions. This result is particularly pronounced in the Middle East and North Africa, where we find that religious polarization in the presence of this type of external military interventions leads to high-intensity civil wars.

We organize the paper in the following way. Section II presents the theoretical model. Section III discusses the empirical model and data and Section IV presents the main econometric results. We discuss endogeneity issues and robustness checks in Section V and present a summary of findings and concluding remarks in Section VI.

II. Theory

We explore the equilibrium level of conflict attained in a behavioral model in which warring groups choose the amount of resources to commit to a conflict. In the model warring groups can receive external military assistance. This help may be extended for political, economic, or any other reasons and may come in the form of direct military assistance, i.e. a foreign army fighting on behalf of the warring group, or other assistance that alters the groups' chances of winning.

External assistance at one point can also give warring factions the assurance of support at a later time.

The model developed by Esteban and Ray (2011) defines the link between conflict and measures of inequality and polarization along non-economic markers such as ethnicity or religion. These group divisions enable parties interested in stoking conflict to channel antagonisms into organized action. However, external military interventions affect the behavioral incentives of the warring groups so leaving such influences outside the analysis may overestimate the importance of distributional factors as reasons for civil wars. We do not study the reasons for the intervention[6] and do not represent explicitly the preferences of the intervening external parties;[7] instead we focus on the incentives of the domestic warring factions in the presence of exogenous interventions. In particular, foreign support may motivate warring factions to intensify their efforts in raising resources and alter their probability of winning.

We consider a country with a population of N individuals belonging to m warring groups. In each group i, there are N_i individuals and $N=\sum N_i$, for $i=1,\ldots,m$. We assume these groups fight over a budget whose per capita value is normalized to unity and that a fraction of it, λ, is available to produce public goods. The winning group enjoys both a public prize,[8] whose value is given by λ, and a private prize, which is given as the remaining fraction of the budget and can be privately divided among the members of the winning group once it gets control over the resources.[9] Using the private good as numeraire, u_{ij} is the public goods payoff to a member of group i if a single unit

[6] Interventions may occur because by supporting the regime in power foreign governments may want to extract economic and political rents.
[7] This is not a problem as we focus on equilibrium conflict, not equilibrium intervention.
[8] The public prize can be enjoyed by all members of the winning group regardless of its population size and includes political power, control over policy, ability to impose cultural and religious values, among other benefits.
[9] The private payoff, with a per capita value μ, could be in the form of administrative or political positions, specific tax breaks, and bias in access to resources, among others.

per capita of the optimal mix for group *j* is produced. Then, the per capita payoff to members of the warring group *i* is $\lambda u_{ii} + \frac{(1-\lambda)}{n_i}$, if in case group *i* wins the war and λu_{ij} in case some other group is the winner. We assume that $u_{ii} > u_{ij}$ for all *i, j* with *i≠j*. This payoff difference defines the "distance" across groups: $d_{ij} = u_{ii} - u_{ij}$.

Individuals in each group commit resources *r* to influence the conflict's outcome. These resources include time, effort, risk, and finance. The income equivalent cost to such expenditure is *c(r)* where *c* is assumed to be increasing, smooth, and strictly convex, with *c'(0)=0*. If $r_i(k)$ is the contribution of resources by member *k* of group *i*, then $R_i=\sum r_i(k)$ is the total of all resources committed by group *i*. The total of all societal resources devoted to the war is $R=\sum R_i$, for *i=1,…,m* and assuming that *R > 0*, the probability of winning is given by $p_i=R_i/R$. The more resources group *i* commits to the conflict the higher its chances of success. If an external force provides resources to faction *i*, then group *i*'s probability of winning will be higher than that suggested by the domestic resources available to this group.

The overall expected payoff to an individual *k* in group *i* is given by the following expression: $\pi_i(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} p_j \lambda u_{ij} + p_i \frac{(1-\lambda)}{n_i} - c(r_i(k))$,[10] where $n_i=N_i/N$ is the population share of group *i*. Individuals choose resources *r* so as to maximize a mix of their own payoff and the group's payoffs:

$$U_i(k) \equiv (1-\alpha)\pi_i(k) + \alpha \sum_{l \epsilon i} \pi_i(l), \qquad (1)$$

[10] Since the private good is given in per capita terms, to divide it equally among the winning members of group *i*, the private good must be scale up by *N*.

where α is altruism and is a nonnegative number. If $\alpha=0$, individual k maximizes individual payoff, but if $\alpha=1$ then k acts so as to maximize the group's payoffs.[11]

Assuming that $r_j(l)>0$ for some l that belongs to j and not i, the solution to the choice of $r_i(k)$ is completely given by the interior first-order condition:

$$\frac{\sigma_i}{R}\sum_{j=1}^{m} p_J \Delta_{ij} = c'(r_i(k)), \qquad (2)$$

where $\sigma_i \equiv (1-\alpha)+\alpha N_i$ and $\Delta_{ij} \equiv \lambda d_{ij} + \frac{1-\lambda}{n_i}$ for all $j\neq i$ and $\Delta_{ii} \equiv 0$. According to this condition, the marginal cost of raising funds to fight equals the marginal benefit of fighting for any member of group i. Esteban and Ray (2011) show that a unique equilibrium exists and that in an equilibrium, according to condition (2) every individual k of group i makes the same contribution.

If we denote the ratio of the win probabilities to the population shares as $\gamma_i=p_i/n_i$ and the per capita resources spent on conflict as $\rho=R/N$, and assume that $c(.)$ is a quadratic function,[12] when we substitute for p_i and r_i in equilibrium condition (2) using the fact that in equilibrium all $r_i(k)=R_i/N_i$, and sum over all i, condition (2) is transformed into the following expression:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_j n_i n_j \frac{\sigma_i \Delta_{ij}}{N}\,. \qquad (3)$$

This transformed equilibrium condition is different from condition (17) in Esteban and Ray (2011) because we do not assume the probability of winning p_i equals the populations shares n_i, in other words, we allow for γ_i to differ from 1. There may be a substantial difference between the probability of winning ($p_i=R_i/R$) and the population shares (n_i) of a warring group i due to foreign military interventions by countries with a stake in the conflict's outcome. These interventions may

[11] Under some circumstances, discussed in Esteban and Ray (2011), α may exceed *1*.
[12] Given the assumption of quadratic cost function $c(\rho)=0.5\rho^2$, it can be shown that $c'(\gamma\rho)=\gamma c'(\rho)$.

change the relative sizes of warring groups, and therefore moderate the effect of polarization. A non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention may also promote greater resource mobilization and risk taking thus incentivizing warring groups to engage in high-intensity and prolonged confrontations with each. In short, allowing γ_i to differ from *1* and opening the possibility that $\gamma_i \neq \gamma_j$ for $i \neq j$, enables us to investigate how external military interventions may affect the probability of civil conflict.

In Esteban and Ray (2011) the variable γ captures the deviation of the win probability from the population share and can be thought of as "behavioral" correction factor. In our analysis, γ is represented as $\gamma_i = 1 + e_i$, where e_i is the deviation in γ from *1* due to the foreign military intervention.

We substitute for σ_i and Δ_{ij} in condition (3) and obtain the following expression:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^{m} \gamma_j n_j n_i \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)}{N} + \alpha n_i\right]\left[\frac{(1-\lambda)}{n_i} + \lambda d_{ij}\right] \qquad (4)$$

After substituting for γ_i and re-arranging, condition (4) can be rewritten as

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\lambda)(m-1)}{N}\right] + \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\lambda)}{N}\right] K + \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)\lambda}{N}\right](G + G^e) +$$

$$\alpha\{\lambda(P + P^e) + (1-\lambda)[F + F^e]\}, \qquad (5)$$

where *G* is the Gini index:

$$G = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} n_i \; n_j d_{ij}.$$

The polarization measure, *P*, is the one discussed in Esteban and Ray (1994):

$$P = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} n_i^2 n_j d_{ij}.$$

The fractionalization index F is Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index,

$$F = \sum_{i=1}^{m} n_i(1 - n_i).$$

As external intervention alters the resources available to the warring groups,[13] the measures G^e and P^e represent the effect this intervention has on the distribution measures G and P through its effect on the behavioral parameter γ's or the external intervention parameters e's.

$$G^e = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{j=1}^{m} n_i \; n_j e_j d_{ij},$$

$$P^e = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{j=1}^{m} n_i^2 n_j e_j d_{ij},$$

$$F^e = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i\neq j}}^{m} n_i n_j e_j$$

$$K = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i\neq j}}^{m} n_j e_j$$

This leads us to:

Proposition 1: *Equilibrium per capita conflict*[14] *in a country is determined by the three distributional measures: the Gini index (G), the fractionalization index (F) and the polarization index (P); a factor, K, capturing the effect of external military interventions on the population sizes of the warring groups; and the influence of external military interventions on the distributional measures, as given in equilibrium condition (5).*

Proof: The discussion after (3) outlines the steps needed to prove that equilibrium condition (4) can be transformed into (5). If there is no external intervention (e_i=0 for all i) condition (5) reduces

[13] With intervention the probability of group i winning the war is not necessarily equal to the population shares (n_i).
[14] Equilibrium per capita conflict proxies for the equilibrium per capita resources spent on fighting on average in a country.

to the condition (18) in Esteban and Ray (2011). Since irrespective of whether conflict is over private or public goods, external intervention affects the probability of winning of the warring groups and the resources they raise, altering their effective population sizes, it also moderates the effect of distributional measures on conflict in a society.

As in most cases the distance between groups $d_{ij} = u_{ii} - u_{ij}$ is nonmonetary, it is challenging to arrive at a reasonable estimate of d_{ij}. For this reason, we adopt the approach in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and assume that the distances are the same, with $d_{ij} = 1$ for all $i \neq j$ and $d_{ii} = 0$. This assumption allows us to simplify condition (5) and use the distributional measures of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in the empirical parts of this paper. The simplified condition is:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\lambda)(m-1)}{N}\right] + \alpha(\lambda(P+P^e) + (1-\lambda)F) + \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)\lambda}{N}\right](F+F^e) + \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\lambda)}{N} + \alpha(1-\lambda)\right]K. \quad (6)$$

In this case, the equilibrium per capita conflict is determined by a combination of only two distributional measures - *P* and *F*, the extent to which external military intervention changes the sizes of the warring groups, and the influence of the intervention on the distributional measures.

If *N* is large, as in the baseline case in Esteban and Ray (2011), condition (6) transforms into:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \alpha(\lambda(P+P^e) + (1-\lambda)F) + \alpha(1-\lambda)K. \quad (7)$$

This condition suggests that equilibrium per capita conflict in the large country case depends on the extent of polarization and fractionalization, the effect of external intervention on polarization, and the effect of the intervention on the warring groups' sizes. If conflict is mostly over a public prize ($\lambda = 1$), the equilibrium per capita conflict depends only on the polarization measure and the

extent to which the intervention polarizes the society. If conflict is mostly over a private prize ($\lambda = 0$), the equilibrium per capita conflict depends only on the degree of fractionalization and on the nature of the intervention, i.e. whether it lowers or increases the probability of winning for the large groups within a country. If it lowers the probability of winning for the large group, conflict incidence declines; if it increases this probability, conflict incidence increases. In the general case, it is difficult to discern the effect of external intervention on civil conflict incidence without empirical testing, so next we test empirically the association between external military intervention and conflict prevalence.

III. Empirical investigation: data and concepts

We study 138 countries over 1960-2005 and divide the sample into five-year periods so we have a total of 1041 observations.[15] For comparison purposes, we first conduct the analysis for the period 1960-1999, considered by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), but then we estimate the model and test the robustness of the results over the full period up to 2005. We use the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars to construct the endogenous binary variable of civil war incidence, PRIOCW, which is set at 1 if a civil war occurred in a country *i* in period *t* and zero otherwise. We focus on intermediate and high-intensity civil wars, represented by categories 3 and 4 in PRIO and defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 yearly battle-related deaths and a minimum of 1,000 during the course of the civil war. Our focus on intermediate-intensity civil conflicts is in line with the literature's findings that external interventions prolong and intensify civil conflict. As military

[15] The number of observations in a specific empirical model depends on the independent variables included in it, as different variables have different missing observations. In the baseline model, the maximum number of observations is 1041.

interventions for humanitarian and peacekeeping purposes are implemented once civil wars have intensified, we focus only on non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions that are likely to alter the balance of power and the winning probabilities of potential warring groups as discussed in the theory section of this paper.

We utilize a logit model for the incidence of civil wars:

$$P(PRIOCW_{it} = 1) = \alpha + X_{1it-1}\beta_1 + X_{2it-1}\beta_2 + Int_nh_{is}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (8)$$

The independent variables, X_{1it-1} and X_{2it-1}, are the relevant distributional and control variables, respectively; and ε_{it} is the error term. The distributional factors and some of the control variables are time invariant; the rest are set at their values in period *t-1*. The binary explanatory variable, $Int_nh_{is,}$ is 1 if there has been an external military intervention in at least one of the four years preceding period *t* ($t\text{-}1 \leq s < t$) and 0 otherwise. We recognize that there may be reverse causality between intervention and conflict so we interpret the effect on the intervention variable as a conditional association, rather than a causal relationship. We describe each of these sets of variables next.

As in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), the distributional variables are ethnic polarization (*ETHPOL*), ethnic fractionalization (*ETHFRAC*), religious polarization (*RELPOL*), and religious fractionalization (*RELFRAC*). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that the indices of polarization and fractionalization differ, independent of the data source used in their calculations. We choose the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) to obtain the ethno-diversity measure, favoring it to the other two sources: the Encyclopedia Britannica (EB), and the ANM (1964). We do so because according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) the most accurate description of ethnic diversity is the one in the WCE. It contains details for each country on the most diverse

classification level, which may coincide with an ethnolinguistic family or subfamilies. There are also several sources of data on religious diversity. We adopt the *L'Etat des religions dans le monde* (ET) data, which are based on a combination of national data sources and the WCE, and provide information on the proportions of followers of Animist and Syncretic cults. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) consider this to be an important factor for the calculation of indices of religious heterogeneity.

The group of control variables includes explanatory variables found to influence the incidence of conflict in earlier empirical studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that GDP per capita is a proxy for the state's overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities. Rebels can expect a higher probability of success in a low-income society with weak state institutions. In addition, a low level of GDP per capita reduces the opportunity cost of engaging in a civil war. The log of real GDP per capita (LGDPC) is set at its value in the previous period in order to reduce the potential endogeneity problem between conflict and the level of real economic activity.[16] The log of the population (LPOP) in the initial year is also included in the set of control variables and set at its value in the previous period. Since the usual definitions of civil war always set a threshold in the number of deaths, we control by population as a scale factor. The size of the population can also be considered an additional proxy for the benefits of a rebellion as it measures potential labor income taxation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) also indicate that a large population implies difficulties in controlling what goes on at the local level and increases the number of potential rebels that can be recruited by the insurgents. Mountains (*MOUNTAINS*) are included as well since this terrain can provide a safe haven for rebels. Long distances from the

[16] As in Motalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we do not use annual data and GDP growth as an explanatory variable due to strong concerns about the potential endogeneity problem between economic growth and conflict.

center of the state's power also favor the incidence of civil wars, especially if there is a natural frontier between them, like a sea or other countries, so we include the noncontiguous state (*NONCONT*) variable in the set of control variables. As pointed out by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) the existence of natural resources provides an opportunity for rebellion since these resources can be used to finance the war and increase the payoff if victory is achieved. We measure this dependence using the share of primary commodity exports of GDP (*PRMEXP*) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Finally, in line with the literature we consider the effect of democracy, measured with the level of democracy using the Polity IV dataset score for general openness of the political institutions, transformed into a dummy variable that takes value 1, if the score is greater or equal to 4, and 0 otherwise.

We use the dataset of International Military Intervention (IMI)[17] to define the intervention variable Int_nh_{is}. This data set records interventions that are purposeful, are the result of conscious decisions of national leaders, and involve "the movement of regular troops or forces of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute" (Pearson and Baumann, 1993). The data set excludes interventions that involve paramilitaries, government backed militias, private security forces, and other military units that are not part of the regular military of the state. The IMI dataset contains a total of 1114 cases of military interventions which meet these criteria for the period 1946-2005; they have been further classified as neutral, supportive of government or rebels, humanitarian, and other types.[18] This enables us to define external military intervention as a binary variable, *Int_nh,* which takes the value 1 if there has been at least one intervention in the

[17] The IMI project was established in the late 1960s by Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann. Under their guidance, 667 cases of international military interventions spanning the years 1946 to 1988 were coded. Emizet N. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering expanded the IMI collection to 2005. Many studies have been done using the IMI data set, among others are Peksen (2012), Koga (2011), Sullivan and Koch (2009), Pearson et al. (2006), and Pickering and Kisangani (2006).


[18] For the full list of variables consult the International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 notebook at http://www.researchconnections.org/ICPSR/studies/21282.

target country during the four years preceding the current period and the intervention was not neutral and was not for humanitarian matters. In total, there were 172 intervention years of this kind during the period 1946-2005. The complete list of non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions by year, intervening country and target country is shown in Appendix Table 1.

Table 1 Averages of some major indicators (per country per period)

	Int_nh (1)	*PRIOCW* (2)	*RELPOL* (3)	*ETHPOL* (4)	(1)/(3)[1] (5)	(1)/(4)[2] (6)	(2)/(3) (7)	(2)/(4) (8)
MENA	.370	.267	.470	.525	0.79	0.70	0.57	0.51
SAFRICA	.166	.179	.701	.537	0.24	0.31	0.26	0.33
ASIAE	.095	.136	.507	.458	0.19	0.21	0.27	0.30
LAAM	.084	.086	.404	.646	0.21	0.13	0.21	0.13

Data sources: IMI for *Int_nh* in (1); PRIO for *PRIOCW* in (2); L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook for *RELPOL* in (3); WCE for *ETHPOL* in (4). Note: MENA stands for Middle East and North Africa; SAFRICA is Sub-Saharan Africa; ASIAE is East Asia; and LAAM is Latin America. Columns (5) and (6) display numbers for the incidence of external intervention per unit of religious and ethnic polarization, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) display numbers for the incidence of civil conflicts per unit of religious and ethnic polarization, respectively.



The numbers in Table 1 indicate that different regions have relatively similar levels of religious and ethnic polarization, but substantially different frequency of civil conflict and external military interventions. In the context of moderate levels of religious and ethnic polarization, the MENA region stands out with the highest incidence of civil conflict and foreign military intervention.

Figure 1, which is based on the data of Table 1, shows that countries with high incidence of civil conflict are places with higher than average levels of religious polarization (RELPOL) and external military intervention.

IV. Regression Results

We start by replicating the major results of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in columns (1), (2), and (4) of Table 2. These results point to the significance of ethnic polarization, not fractionalization, as a determinant of conflict. In their specification, religious polarization and fractionalization are not significant predictors of conflict.

A. External Intervention and Polarization

When we include the non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention variable (*Int_nh*), along with the indices of polarization and fractionalization, we find that both the intervention variable and the ethnic polarization index are statistically significant and have the expected positive signs (see columns (3) and (5) of Table 2). This result suggests that, conditional on a given degree of polarization, this type of external military intervention is associated with an increase in the incidence of civil war. We do not find such an association for other types of external military interventions, including interventions that are neutral (i.e. interventions that do not favor specific groups in a conflict) and/or are conducted for peace keeping, social and/or humanitarian purposes (see Appendix Table 2).

Expression (6) for the equilibrium per capita conflict in the theory section links the incidence of civil war to the distributional measures in the presence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention. It suggests that the relationship between such intervention and the distribution measures is non-linear and that the intervention alters the incidence of war through its

effects on the distribution measures. In the large country case, given in expression (7),[19] this effect comes through the influence of the intervention on the polarization measure. We reflect this effect by including an interaction term between the polarization measures and the external military intervention variable. The results, presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2, as well as those presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3 for the sample extended up to 2005,[20] suggest that ethnic polarization is a significant determinant of conflict incidence and that external intervention exacerbates the relationship between religious polarization and conflict. In other words, religious polarization combined with external military intervention is significantly and positively associated with civil war.

Table 2 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-1999)

	(1)[1]	(2)[2]	(3)	(4)[3]	(5)	(6)	(7)
LGDPPC	-0.28	-0.42*	-0.34	-0.38	-0.30	-0.39	-0.39
LPOP	0.34**	0.40**	0.38**	0.44***	0.42***	0.44***	0.441***
PRIMEXP	-0.90	-1.07	-1.66	-0.86	-1.58	-1.28	-1.275
MOUNTAINS	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.003
NONCONT	0.08	0.28	0.37	0.48	0.56	0.49	0.489
DEMOCRACY	0.07	0.03	0.07	-0.04	0.02	0.10	0.103
ETHFRAC	1.19*	0.17	0.10	0.04	-0.11	-0.42	-0.433
ETHPOL		**2.28****	**2.69*****	**2.11*****	**2.48****	**2.73*****	**2.765*****
RELFRAC				-4.45	-3.83	-3.77	-3.771
RELPOL				3.28	3.02	2.46	2.462
Int_nh			**1.50*****		1.49***	0.21	0.301
Int_nh × RELPOL						**2.15***	**2.16***
Int_nh × ETHPOL							-0.16
Intercept	-5.82**	-6.29**	-7.14***	-7.54**	-8.17	-7.60***	-7.61***
N	850	850	850	850	850	850	850
McFadden's R^2	0.101	0.123	0.171	0.135	0.181	0.190	0.190
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.098	0.143	0.104	0.148	0.154	0.151

[1] Refers to column 1 in Table 1 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
[2] Refers to column 3 in Table 1 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
[3] Refers to column 8 in Table 1 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

[19] The large country case is the baseline case in Esteban and Ray (2011).
[20] When we include data up to 2005 we add one period to the sample employed in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

Table 3 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-2005)

	(1)[1]	(2)[2]	(3)	(4)[3]	(5)	(6)	(7)
LGDPPC	**-0.37***	**-0.52****	**-0.39****	**-0.45***	-0.38	-0.47	**-0.47**
LPOP	**0.37****	**0.42****	**0.44****	**0.46*****	**0.42*****	**0.45*****	**0.45*****
PRIMEXP	0.34	0.31	-0.27	0.25	-0.35	0.02	0.02
MOUNTAINS	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
NONCONT	0.35	0.60	0.64	0.75	0.80	0.74	0.74
DEMOCRACY	0.00	0.02	0.08	-0.05	0.03	0.10	0.10
ETHFRAC	1.10*	-0.06	-0.00	-0.03	-0.04	-0.32	-0.32
ETHPOL		**2.34****	**2.54****	**2.13****	**2.32****	**2.51****	**2.52****
RELFRAC				-4.52	-4.05	-3.94	-3.94
RELPOL				3.18*	2.98	2.42	2.34
Int_nh			**1.30*****		**1.28*****	-0.20	-0.17
Int_nh× RELPOL						**2.42****	**2.42****
Int_nh× ETHPOL							-0.05
Intercept	-5.74**	-6.10**	-6.53**	-7.23**	-7.61	-7.12***	-7.19***
N	937	937	937	937	937	937	937
McFadden's R^2	0.116	0.138	0.174	0.150	0.185	0.196	0.196
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	0.097	0.117	0.150	0.124	0.156	0.164	0.162

[1] Column (1) here is column (1) in Table (1) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the dataset extended to 2005.
[2] Column (2) here is column (3) in Table (1) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the addition of the MENA dummy to the regression and the dataset extended to 2005.
[3] Column (4) here is column (8) in Table (1) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the dataset extended to 2005.

B. The MENA Effect

We investigate next the robustness of the results to the inclusion of regional dummies. This way we address the relationship between geographical heterogeneity and civil conflicts. In Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) all countries not located in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America are included in the reference (base) region. The MENA countries therefore are included in the reference region along with all developed countries and the rest of the world. The inclusion of the Arab states with the base group poses a problem given the substantially higher incidence of civil wars and foreign military interventions in MENA compared with other parts of the world (Table 1).

The coefficient on the MENA dummy is large, positive, and significant, while all other regional dummies remain statistically insignificant (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 4). Furthermore, the inclusion of MENA reduces the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the ethnic polarization (ETHPOL) variable; it becomes significant only at the 10% level. Therefore, by

ignoring regional heterogeneity (because of aggregation choices) earlier studies may be overestimating the average effect of ethnic polarization on the incidence of conflict. Interestingly, the addition of the foreign military intervention variable to the regression model in column (3) raises the significance and magnitude of the ethnic polarization effect. When we add the interaction of the foreign military intervention variable with the two polarization indices (RELPOL and ETHPOL), only the interaction with RELPOL is significant and the coefficient on the MENA dummy also remains significant. Stated differently, the results in column (4) suggests that the intervention exacerbates the effect of religious polarization on conflict incidence but it does not have a similar effect on ethnic polarization. Next, we explore the channels through which the MENA regional effect translates into higher incidence of civil conflict.

In columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 we show results from the regression model with interactions between the regional dummies and the religious and ethnic polarization indices, respectively. In both cases, the MENA dummy loses its significance, the magnitude of its coefficient goes down significantly, and only the interactions of RELPOL with the MENA and the intervention dummy, respectively, remain significant.

Given the different degrees of religious polarization and the incidence of external military interventions across geographic regions, we include a triple interaction term that allows us to capture the region-specific dimension of the moderating effect of external intervention on religious polarization. The results in column (7) show that none of the three variables is significant by itself but the coefficients of the tri-interaction term for MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa are positive, large and highly significant. The interaction terms between the religious polarization and MENA variables and those between the intervention and religious polarization variables are also no longer significant.

Table 4 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) in the Presence of Regional Dummies (1965-1999)

	(1)[1]	(2)[2]	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LGDPPC	-0.41*	-0.41	-0.33	-0.42	-0.64*	-0.65*	-0.49	-0.50**
LPOP	0.38***	0.46***	0.45***	0.50****	0.58***	0.54***	0.52***	0.41**
PRIMEXP	-1.15	-2.17	-2.63	-2.39	-2.52	-2.33	-2.64	-2.14
MOUNTAINS	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.00
NONCONT	0.09	0.45	0.53	0.43	0.43	0.34	0.40	0.50
DEMOCRACY	0.09	0.57	0.52	0.60	0.61	0.62	0.65	0.34
ETHFRAC	0.26	0.62	0.44	0.05	-0.04	0.07	0.06	0.01
ETHPOL	**2.35****	**1.99***	**2.41****	**2.24***	**2.67****	**2.92**	**2.43****	**2.74****
RELFRAC				-4.79	-3.69	-4.93	-4.43	
RELPOL				3.13	0.57	1.43	2.59	
Int_nh			1.29***	**-0.56**	**-0.24**	**-0.49**	-0.37	
MENA	**Excluded**	2.40**	2.10**	2.10***	0.08	0.90	1.61	
SAFRICA	Included	1.03	1.04	0.75	0.07	-0.12	0.81	
LAAM	Included	0.49	0.52	0.32	-0.15	-2.05	0.32	
ASIAE	Included	0.99	0.91	1.41*	1.05	2.71	1.65**	
Int_nh×RELPOL				2.85***	2.41**	2.49**	1.88	**1.06***
Int_nh×ETHPOL				0.10	-0.09	0.24	-0.17	
RELPOL×MENA					**5.84***	**5.52***		
RELPOL×SAFRICA					1.81	1.76		
RELPOL×LAAM					1.62	0.55		
RELPOL×ASIAE					1.02	1.44		
ETHPOL×MENA						-1.39		
ETHPOL×SAFRICA						-0.04		
ETHPOL×LAAM						2.99		
ETHPOL×ASIAE						-3.22		
Int_nh×RELPOL×MENA							**4.52*****	**5.29*****
Int_nh×RELPOL×AFRICA							**2.04****	**1.04**
Int_nh×RELPOL×LAAM							**1.86**	
Int_nh×RELPOL×ASIAE							**-2.89**	
Intercept	-6.07**	-8.48**	-9.28**	-9.16**	-8.33**	-7.76**	-8.94**	-6.35**
N	846	850	850	850	850	850	850	850
McFadden's R^2	**0.127**	**0.169**	0.204	0.229	0.246	0.252	0.242	0.210
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	**0.093**	**0.133**	0.165	0.182	0.184	0.180	0.184	0.177

[1] Column (1) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
[2] Column (2) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the addition of MENA dummy to the regression. In Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) paper, there was no dummy variable for the MENA region, and MENA was included into the reference group.

The final specification in Table 4, shown in column (8), is our preferred specification. It is closest to the specification in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (1), with the difference that we have included the tri-variable interaction between military intervention dummy, the religious polarization variable, and the MENA dummy; we have dropped all other interaction terms and dummy variables that were insignificant in column (7). In this specification, the index of ethnic polarization is a significant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil war and

religious polarization combined with external military intervention is a determinant of conflict. This effect is pronounced in the case of MENA. We obtain similar results with the data set extended to 2005 (Table 5).

The magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term and can be of opposite sign (Ai and Norton 2003). We therefore plot in Figure 2 the predicted probability of intense civil conflict as a function of RELPOL, allowing for shifts in this curve by the two binary variables: Int_nh and MENA, and in figure 3, the marginal effect of Int_nh, differentiating between MENA and non-MENA regions. The predicted probability of civil conflict with external intervention in MENA is higher than that in non-MENA countries for any level of RELPOL higher than 0.25 and in both cases the predicted probabilities are significantly differ from zero at the 5% significance level (Figure 2). Foreign military interventions increase substantially the predicted probability of these types of conflict in MENA at much lower levels of RELPOL than in the non-MENA case, where substantial difference emerge at the highest levels of RELPOL (Figure 2).

In the case of MENA, the marginal effect of external intervention is statistically significant when RELPOL ranges between 0.32 and 0.59 while in the non-MENA cases, RELPOL needs to be higher, above 0.6 for external intervention to have a statistically significant effect on conflict incidence (Figure 3). At the averages for RELPOL in the data, the estimated marginal effect of intervention in the case of MENA is about 0.25 compared to 0.07 in the non-MENA case.


Table 5 Logit Regressions For the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) in the Presence of Regional Dummies (1965-2005)

	(1)[1]	(2)[2]	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LGDPPC	-0.42*	-0.50*	-0.43	-0.52*	-0.65**	-0.68**	-0.68**	-0.54**
LPOP	0.41**	0.47***	0.46***	0.50***	0.57***	0.55***	0.55***	0.37**
PRIMEXP	0.00	-1.32	-1.63	-1.34	-1.57	-1.50	-1.50	-1.22
MOUNTAINS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.01
NONCONT	0.44	0.88	0.92	0.77	0.75	0.66	0.68	0.56
DEMOCRACY	0.07	0.54	0.53	0.66	0.64	0.65	0.63	0.19
ETHFRAC	0.24	0.39	0.28	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03	0.31
ETHPOL	**2.15***	**1.88***	**2.10***	**2.33***	**2.58****	**3.32***	**3.25**	**2.29****
RELFRAC	-6.61**	-5.78**	-5.35*	-5.69**	-4.76	-5.29	-5.30	
RELPOL	4.77**	4.25**	3.94**	3.47*	1.68	1.84	1.89	
Int_nh			1.04***	-0.82	-0.55	**-0.64**	**-0.82**	
MENA	**Excluded**	**2.37****	**2.15****	**2.25****	0.81	1.82	1.87	
SAFRICA	Included	0.73	0.81	0.88	0.85	1.01	1.02	
LAAM	Included	-0.10	0.14	0.18	-0.03	-1.54	-1.55	
ASIAE	Included	1.41**	1.35*	1.71**	1.72**	3.10*	3.15**	0.60
Int_nh× RELPOL				**3.29*****	**2.89*****	**2.89*****	**3.07*****	**1.50*****
Int_nh× ETHPOL				-0.34	-0.49	-0.29	-0.49	
RELPOL×MENA					4.14	4.22*	3.39	
RELPOL×SAFRICA					0.68	0.92	0.84	
RELPOL×LAAM					0.94	0.38	0.36	
RELPOL×ASIAE					0.24	0.83	0.63	
ETHPOL×MENA						-1.92	-1.85	
ETHPOL×SAFRICA						-0.72	-0.66	
ETHPOL×LAAM						2.17	2.21	
ETHPOL×ASIAE						-2.98	-2.83	
Int_nh×RELPOL×MENA							**2.01****	**4.28*****
Intercept	-6.70*	-890**	-9.11**	-8.61**	-8.47**	-8.27**	-8.22**	-5.45**
N	937	937	937	937	938	937	937	937
McFadden's R^2	0.165	0.205	0.227	0.244	0.256	0.261	0.263	0.215
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	0.131	0.169	0.188	0.200	0.203	0.199	0.199	0.186

[1] Column (1) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the dataset extended to 2005.

[2] Column (2) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the addition of MENA dummy to the regression and the dataset extended to 2005.

Figure 2. Predictive Values of Int_nh_L14



*** This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in Column (8) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means.

Figure 3. Average Marginal Effects of Int_nh_L14 by Region





Figure 4 displays the difference between the marginal effects of external intervention in MENA and non-MENA countries along with their 95% confidence intervals. The predictive difference between the marginal effects of external intervention on the incidence of civil conflict in MENA and non-MENA regions is statistically significant at the 5% level only when RELPOL varies between 0.32 and 0.53. Since the average level of RELPOL in MENA is 0.47, we conclude that the marginal effect of external intervention is much stronger in MENA than in other developing regions.



V. Endogeneity issues and robustness checks

The possible mutual relationship between the dependent variable and one or more of the explanatory variables raises the issue of endogeneity bias. This section discusses how we deal with this issue and discusses robustness checks.

A. Endogeneity issues

The real per capita GDP and the external military intervention are two endogenous variables. Civil conflicts affect real per capita incomes as they damage infrastructure, lead to loss of labor, skills and productivity, causing erosion in per capita incomes over time. This bias is likely to be particularly strong in the case of prolonged and high-intensity civil conflicts. Aware of this possible endogeneity, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) use periods of five years for civil wars and the GDP per capita in the beginning of the period. We adopt their approach of dealing with the endogeneity bias with respect to per capita income.[21]

In this section we attempt to address the endogeneity bias associated with external intervention and test the robustness of the results to a model specification that estimates equation (8) using predicted values for the intervention variable and its interaction with the religious polarization term. For this purpose, the next two equations represent a reduced-form specification for the intervention and interaction variables as follows:

$$P(Int_nh_{it} = 1) = F(X_{1it}, X_{2it}, PRIOCW_{it-1}, X_{3it}) \quad (9.1)$$

$$Int_nh_{it} \times RELPOL = F(X_{1it}, X_{2it}, PRIOCW_{it-1}, X_{3it}, X_{3it} \times RELPOL)\ . \quad (9.2)$$

In these equations we use the following additional instruments included in vector X_3it: BORD, representing the number of bordering countries to country *i*; NATO, a binary variable that takes the value 1 in the case the targeted country is a NATO member during the specific period t and 0 otherwise; and INTSTT, a binary variable that takes the value 1 in the case when at least in one of years t-4 to t-1, the target country was involved in an interstate conflict, and 0 otherwise. We make this choice of variables based on the findings of Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Miguel, Satyanath

[21] Another way to deal with the endogeneity is to add the lagged value of the dependent variable to the set of the right hand side variables. Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) added the lagged incidence of war to the list of explanatory variables to lessen the effect of endogeneity. The use of the lagged dependent variable can be effective, however, only in the absence of serial correlations in the errors of the estimated equation.

and Sergenti (2004), Gleditsch (2007), and Albornoz and Hauk (2014). In equation (9.2), we also include the interaction between the instruments and RELPOL.

We use a two-stage linear probability model (2SLPM) to estimate equations (8) and the system of equations (9.1) and (9.2). In the first stage, we estimate simultaneously the reduced-form system of equations (9.1) and (9.2). In the second stage, we estimate the incidence-of-civil-conflict equation, using the estimates of intervention and interaction terms from the first stage.

Table 6 displays the two-stage estimation results for the non-MENA countries in columns 2-4 and for the MENA countries in columns 5-7. We compare the estimation results for the non-MENA sample with those for the MENA sample because our results with the single equation models, shown in the previous section, reveal that only for the MENA region the interaction between religious polarization and the external intervention variables is positively and significantly associated with conflict.

In both cases the exclusion F tests confirm the strength of the instruments. Also, the Hansen J test of over-identification significantly confirms the absence of correlation between the instruments and the errors in the incidence-of-civil conflict equation for both MENA and non-MENA regions. These results convey a good evidence of the strength and suitability of our instruments, particularly in the case of the MENA sample. Our estimates are efficient for homoscedasticity and robust to heteroscedasticity.[22] The choice of 2SLPM rather than the two-stage logit model (2SLOGIT) is based on the conclusion of Angrist and Kruger (2001) that linear regression in the first stage generates consistent second-stage estimates in case of a dummy endogenous variable. Moreover, using nonlinear models such as probit or logit to generate fitted values in the first stage for use in

[22] We apply the STATA option of variance clustering at the country level.

the second-stage does not generate consistent estimates unless the nonlinear model happens to be exactly right.

Looking at the results from the first-stage estimation, while BORD by itself is not a significant determinant of external intervention, its significance and its positive effect on external intervention derive from its interaction with RELPOL. This is the case in both panels, but it is worth emphasizing that this interaction effect is particularly pronounced in the MENA case.[23] This is an interesting result as many countries in the Middle East border at least one country where there is a majority of the other Muslim sect. For example, Iraq where the population primarily belongs to the Shia sect borders a number of states with majority Sunni populations. In addition, the coefficient of primary exports is highly and positive significant in the first-stage estimation, and particularly large in the MENA case, suggesting that in this oil-rich region, external interventions may be driven by interests to secure access to crude oil among other reasons.

In the second-stage, in the conflict-incidence equation, the coefficients of the intervention and the interaction term with RELPOL are not significant in the non-MENA sample, but they are highly significant in the MENA sample. Moreover, in the MENA case, it appears that the effects of some of the other exogenous variables (e.g., PRIMEXP, LGDPC, and MOUNTAINS) on the incidence of civil conflicts in MENA are indirect, occurring either through the intervention variable or its interaction with RELPOL. ETHPOL is insignificant factor in explaining civil conflict in MENA neither directly nor indirectly.

[23] In MENA region, the mean RELPOL is 0.475 so the total effect of BORD on external intervention is positive and equal to 0.126 (0.316*0.475-0.024) and its effect on the interaction is positive and equal to 0.114 (0.303*0.475-0.030). In both cases, this effect is significant.

Table 6. Two-Stages Linear Probability Model Panel 1965-2005

	2SLPM World Panel without MENA			2SLPM MENA Panel		
	1st stage Eq. (9.1) (2)	1st stage Eq. (9.2) (3)	2nd stage Eq. (8) (4)	1st stage Eq. (9.1) (5)	1st stage Eq. (9.2) (6)	2nd stage Eq. (8) (7)
Dep. Variable	Int_nh_L14	Int_nh_L14 x RELPOL	PRIO1000	Int_nh_L14	Int_nh_L14 x RELPOL	PRIO1000
LGDPC	-0.089***	-0.009	-0.069***	-0.190	-0.037	0.028
LPOP	0.043**	0.023***	0.034***	0.049	0.065	0.029
PRIMEXP	0.581**	0.011	0.139	1.487***	0.340	0.001
DEMOCRACY	0.085*	0.035**	0.031	0.184	0.0.17	-0.171
MOUNTAINS	0.001	0.000	0.001**	0.004	0.000*	0.004
NONCONT	-0.067**	-0.039***	0.080**			
ETHPOL	-0.086	-0.053	0.182***	0.057	0.115	-0.018
RELPOL	0.255	0.682*	-0.075	1.517	2.478	-0.149
BORD	-0.011*	-0.009**		-0.024	-0.030*	
BORD^{x}RELPOL	0.030**	0.026**		0.316***	0.303***	
LAAM	0.057	0.030	0.036			
SAFRICA	0. 127**	0.072**	0.050			
ASIAE	0.109	0.018	0.000			
INTSTT	0.307***	0.034		1.127***	0.288**	
INTSTT^{x}RELPOL	-0.145	0.137		-1.242***	-0.275	
Int_nh_L14^			-0.247			-0.297*
Int_nh_L14^{x}RELPOL^			0.423			1.158***
Constant	0.068	-0.272**	-0.045	0.556	-0.774	-0.600
NT	741	741	741	99	99	99
Centered R^2			0.1273			0.1811
F test of excluded instruments	3.87***	3.51***		22.90***	17.44***	
Hansen J test			6.891			6.482

Note: We do not show results for REPUBLICAN and NATO as this variable remains insignificant in all specifications.^ indicates predicted values. In the first stage two equations, the interactions between the exogenous variables in equation (8) with RELPOL were included but the results were not reported to save place. The inclusion of these interactions does not change the major results.

B. Robustness checks

We test for the robustness of the results to changes in the conflict intensity in the single-equation logit model (Table 7). A comparison of the specifications suggests that the results, are very stable over the different specifications. Our tests support our earlier findings that religious polarization is significantly associated with civil conflict of moderate to high intensity only if there is external intervention; this effect is particularly strong for the MENA region.

In the 2SLPM case, we find that our results hold in the case of the high intensity conflicts (PRIO1000). This is consistent with our findings with the single-equation logit model and our intuition that interventions worsen the intensity of conflicts as fighters who are externally supported are less likely to protect the local population as they do not rely on local support.

Table 7 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars: Comparing Alternative Definitions of Civil War (1965-2005)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable	PRIO25	PRIO25	PRIO25	PRIO25	PRIO1000	PRIO1000	PRIO1000	PRIO1000
LGDPPC	**-0.61*****	**-0.49*****	**-0.68*****	**-0.53*****	**-0.75*****	**-0.50****	**-0.80*****	**-0.61*****
LPOP	**0.36****	**0.22****	**0.39*****	**0.24*****	**0.35****	**0.27****	**0.43*****	**0.33*****
PRIMEXP	0.17	-0.10	0.61	0.17	1.40	1.26	1.80	1.63
MOUNTAINS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NONCONT	0.92**	0.72	0.98**	0.78**	0.88	0.61	0.94	0.71
DEMOCRACY	0.25	0.24	0.28	0.24	-0.17	0.04	-0.12	0.11
ETHFRAC	-0.06	-0. 03	-0.26	-0.11	0.14	0.39	-0.18	0.14
ETHPOL	**2.22*****	**1.59****	**2.37*****	**1.82*****	**1.63****	**1.24**	**1.60**	**1.98****
RELFRAC			-2.11	-2.11			-3.67	-4.03*
RELPOL			0.89	0.97			1.90	1.66
Int_nh	**1.42*****	1.36***	0.50	**1.16**	**0.97*****	**0.83****	**-1.70**	**--0.54**
Dependent variable lag		2.74***		2.72***		3.19***		3.30***
Int_nh× RELPOL			**2.23****	1.44			**3.86*****	**4.54*****
Int_nh× ETHPOL			-0.64	-1.20			0.06	-3.04*
Intercept	--4.01*	-3.08**	-3.87*	-3.15**	-3.94**	-5.08***	-4.57*	-5.33***
N	937	855	937	855	937	855	937	855
McFadden's R^2	0.186	0.382	0.198	0.386	0.177	0.390	0.209	0.416
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	0.167	0.358	0.172	0.356	0.144	0.350	0.162	0.362

VI. Conclusions

This paper argues that non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military interventions alter the balance of power among potential warring groups and therefore should be included in the analysis. Specifically, in a behavioral model of civil conflict external military interventions alter the resources available to warring groups and their probability of winning. The paper shows that the equilibrium level of conflict depends not only on the distributional measures of inequality, fractionalization, and polarization, but also on the effect of the interventions on the sizes of warring groups and the moderating effect of the intervention on the distributional measures.

We test the extended model empirically and find that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil conflict and that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with conflict in the presence of external military interventions. This effect is particularly pronounced in the MENA region, where religious polarization is exacerbated by external interventions leading to high-intensity civil conflicts. Therefore, it appears that the weak explanatory power of religious polarization on the incidence of civil wars found in earlier studies is due to the fact that these studies do not consider the regional heterogeneity and the moderating effect of external military interventions on polarization. These results have important policy implications. They identify non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention as a possible channel for increased risk of high-intensity civil conflict in the Middle East and North Africa.

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Appendix

We provide definitions of all major variables used in the paper, beginning with the different measures of conflict.

PRIO25: "Armed conflict" from PRIO: a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 from the database; these refer to internal armed conflict. If a country has experienced a PRIO25 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1.

PRIOCW: "Intermediate armed conflict" from PRIO: includes all PRIO25 conflicts that result in a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the conflict. We consider only types 3 and 4 (internal armed conflict). If a country has experienced a PRIO25 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1.

PRIO1000: "War" from PRIO: same definition as PRIO25 with a threshold of battle related deaths of at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 (internal armed conflict). If a country has experienced a PRIO1000 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1.

F: Fractionalization, defined as $F = \sum_{i=1}^{m} n_i (1 - n_i)$, where n_i is the population share of group *i* and *m* is the number of groups. Data on group shares has been obtained from Fearon (2003b) and the Ethnologue project (http://www.ethnolgue.com).

DEMOC: Institutionalized democracy. Data source is Polity IV (2011). Democracy ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). As in MRQ, DEMOC takes a value equal to 1 if the score is higher than or equal to 4 and 0 otherwise.

ETHFRAC: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using the data of the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE).

ETHPOL: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization calculated using the data of the WCE.

LGDPPC: Log of real GDP per capita corresponding to the first year of each five-year period. See EMR (2012), and MRQ (2005) for data sources. In our update of the two data sets we used the same sources.

LPOP: Log of population (in millions) in the first year of each five-year period. See EMR (2012), and MRQ (2005) for data sources. In our update of the two data sets we used the same sources.

MOUNTAINS: Percent mountainous terrain. The data source is Fearon and Laitin (2003b), who use the coding of geographer A. J. Gerard N. Population, in millions. Source: Maddison (2011).

NONCONT: Noncontiguous states, referring to countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 kilometers of water. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003b).

PRIMEXP: Proportion of primary commodity exports of GDP. Primary commodity exports. Source: Collier and Hoeffler (2001).

RELFRAC: Index of religious fractionalization. Source: L'Etat des re´ligions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook.

RELPOL: Index of religious polarization. Source: L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook.

MENA= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a MENA country and 0 otherwise.

SAFRICA= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a Sub-Saharan country and 0 otherwise.

ASIAE= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is an East Asian country and 0 otherwise.

LAAM= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a Latin American country and 0 otherwise.

Reference group = European and other developed countries.

X*Y= is the interaction of variables X and Y.

Int_nh: The same as the first measure with the restrictions that the intervention was not for humanitarian matters and was not neutral. This restriction lowers the number of observations from 303 to 172.

Appendix Table 1: Non-neutral, non-humanitarian external military interventions

Intervener	Target	Start Year	End Year	Description and sources
PAK	AFG	1949	1949	Tribal Disp.--Disp. 82/NYT
PAK	AFG	1989	1996	Pakistan military supports Mujahadeen rebels (RIA, Reuters, UPI)
RUS	AFG	1991	1995	Russia attacks rebel bases in Afghanistan (Bercovitch, AP, AFP, UPI)
USA	AFG	1998	1998	US uses cruise missiles to attack suspected terrorist facilities (Xinh, IP, DP)
PAK	AFG	1998	1998	Pakistani air raids intended to aid Taliban government in Afghanistan (TASS)
UKG	ALB	1946	1946	Corfu Channel--Butterworth
GRC	ALB	1949	1949	Balkans--Keesings
YUG	ALB	1999	1999	Yugoslav troops enter Albania (OC, AFP)
MOR	ALG	1963	1964	Border-NYT/Kees/Hasna/Butterw
MOR	ALG	1984	1984	Border Incurs--NYT
DRC	ANG	1975	1976	Ang-Kapln/Klnghof/LeoG/ACR/NYT
SAF	ANG	1976	1979	Anti-SWAPO/Pro-UNITA-LT/NYT
SAF	ANG	1980	1988	Anti-SWAPO-LTimes/NYT/ARB
SAF	ANG	1989	1989	S. Africa aids Unita opposition in Angola (GM, Xinh)
NSAs	ANG	1995	1997	UN (UNAVEM III) in Angola to restore peace and reconciliation (UN website)
NSAs	ANG	1997	1999	UN (MONUA) in Angola took over for UNAVEM III mission to restore peace and reconciliation
SAF	ANG	2000	2002	Nambia pursues rebels into Angola (FT)
ARM	AZE	1992	1994	Armenian territorial dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan (PLC, NYT, BBC, UPI)
IRN	AZE	1993	1993	Iranian forces sent to guard dams in Azerbaijan and provide humanitarian aid (AFP, AP, Xinh)
ARM	AZE	1997		Armenia shells Azerbaijani territory (AP)
IRN	AZE	2001	2001	Iranian planes violate Azerbaijan airspace in dispute over oil-rich territory (AFP)
QAT	BAH	1986	1986	Disputed Islands-Disp87/NYT
MLI	BFO	1974	1975	Border--Disputes 82/NYT/ARB
MLI	BFO	1985	1985	Border-Disp87/FAf/NYT/SLPD
CUB	BHM	1980	1980	Bahama Fish Zone--NYT/Jessup
USA	BHM	1980	1980	Bahama Fish Zone--NYT/Jessup
IND	BNG	1991	1991	Indian border guards exchange fire with BDR (Reuters,Xinh)
MYA	BNG	1991	1991	Myanmar (Burmese guards) attack Bangladeshi camp (Reuter,CT)
MYA	BNG	1994	1994	Burmese troops lay landmines inside Bangladesh territory (Reuters)
MYA	BNG	2001	2001	Myanmar exchanges gunfire with Bangladeshi troops (Worldsource)
CRO	BOS	1992	1995	Croatian troops enter Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight Muslim-led army (HS, Reuters, AFP, BBC)
YUG	BOS	1992	1995	Yugo supports rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina (FT, Uppsala, CSM)
ZIM	BOT	1975	1980	Disrupt Opponents--ARB/NYT
ZIM	BOT	1983	1983	Hot Pursuit Rebels-ARB
UKG	BRU	1962	1963	Rebel.--James & Small
UKG	BRU	1984	1988	Oil Fields--NYT
GRC	BUL	1948	1949	Balkans/GrCivWar--NYT/Riggs-P
RVN	CAM	1955	1973	Islands Dispute--Liefer
USA	CAM	1964	1969	Pursue V.C.--NYT/Liefer

DRV	CAM	1964	1975	VN Insurg.--Shawcross
USA	CAM	1969	1973	VN Insurg.--Shawcross
RVN	CAM	1970	1973	VN Insurg.--Shawcross
DRV	CAM	1975	1977	Border Disp-Keesings/Shawcross
THI	CAM	1977	1978	Border Shelling--NYT
LAO	CAM	1979		Khmer War-NYT/Keesings/FoF
FRN	CAO	1960	1960	Anti-Rebel--NYT/LeVine
NIG	CAO	1993	2006	Nigeria occupies part of Cameroon in territorial dispute (AFP, African Security Review)
CEN	CAO	2001	2001	Central African Republic dismantles border customs post and occupies a small area of Camaroon (FT)
FRN	CDI	1966	1966	Anti-Guin/Ghan-ARB/AR
ANG	CDI	2002		Angolan troops support Ivory Coast government by protecting airport and the President (AFP)
DRC	CEN	1979	1979	Student Rebel.--ACR
RNSAs	CEN	2001	2002	COMESSA peacekeeping mission following aborted coup in Central African Republic (BBC, AP, AFP)
CHA	CEN	2002	2002	Chadian troops cross into Central African Republic and attack troops and destroy radio station (AllAfrica, AFP)
RNSAs	CEN	2002		CEMAC sends peacekeeping force to Central African Republic (AllAfrica, AFP, FT)
FRN	CHA	1960	1965	Admin. North--Pittman
FRN	CHA	1977	1977	Transport Chad Troops-NYT
LIB	CHA	1979	1981	Invasion-Pittman/USDS-GIST
NIG	CHA	1983	1983	Island Clash-ARB/Disputes 87
USA	CHA	1983	1983	Trans. Zairians--ARB
DRC	CHA	1983	1984	Support Habre--ARB
FRN	CHA	1983	1984	Support Habre--ARB
LIB	CHA	1983	1987	Support Goukhouni--ARB
FRN	CHA	1986	1987	Oppose Libyans--ARB/NYT
FRN	CHA	1990	1990	France sends limited reinforcement to Chad to aid in repelling Libyan invasion (Reuter, UPI, WT, Xinh, LM)
FRN	CHA	1991	1992	French intervenes in Chad to protect French nationals (WP, FT, CSM, LM)
SUD	CHA	2004	2004	Sudanese conflict leads to bombing into Chad (DP, AFP)
ARG	CHL	1958	1958	Beagle Ch.--NYT
ARG	CHL	1982	1982	Beagle Ch.--Disputes 82
FRN	CHN	1946	1946	Take Admin.--Viet Backgrnd
	CHN	1950	1950	Korean War--NYT
TAW	CHN	1950	1950	Tai. Str. Bomb Cities-Keesings
POR	CHN	1952	1952	Border Clash--NYT
TAW	CHN	1954	1955	Taiwan Str.-Disp82/Stolper
TAW	CHN	1958	1979	Taiwan Str. Counter-Shell/NYT
IND	CHN	1962	1962	Forward Ind. Posts-Maxwell
IND	CHN	1965	1969	Disp. Territory--NYT/Keesings
RVN	CHN	1974	1974	Paracels-Wash Post/Disp82
DRV	CHN	1981	1981	Border Clash--WSJ/NYT
DRV	CHN	1984	1985	Border Clash--NYT

DRV	CHN	1987	1987	Border Clashes--Disputes 87
FRN	COM	1989	1989	France sends troops and naval vessels to take control of Comoros security (FT, WP, NYT, LM)
FRN	COM	1995	1995	France intervenes to reverse coup in Comoros (DP, AP, LM)
NIC	COS	1948	1948	C.R. Civ. War--FoF/NYT
NIC	COS	1978	1979	Sandan. Revol-- Newsw/LTimes
NIC	COS	1983	1985	Contra War-NYT/Jessup/FoF/Kees
YUG	CRO	1991	1995	Yugoslavia bombs Croatia (WP, GM, USA)
YUG	CRO	1999	1999	Yugoslav forces cross UN zone in Croatia (AFP, BBC)
RUS	CUB	1962	1962	Missile Crisis--NYT/Kaplan
RUS	CUB	1978		Pilots during Ethio.--Kaplan
GRC	CYP	1974	1974	Coup-Butterw/Disp82/87/NYT/Ks.
BUL	CZE	1968	1969	Prague Sp.--Skilling/Kaplan
GDR	CZE	1968	1969	Prague Sp--Skilling/Kaplan
HUN	CZE	1968	1969	Prague Sp--Skilling/Kaplan
POL	CZE	1968	1969	Prague Sp--Skilling/Kaplan
RUS	CZE	1968	1969	Prague Sp.-Skilling/Kaplan
POR	DRC	1964	1964	Anti-Ang.Rebel-ARB
UGA	DRC	1965	1965	Anti-Tshombe Reb-AR/NYT/FoF
ETH	DRC	1967	1967	Assist Anti-rebel-ARB/AR
CUB	DRC	1976	1976	Bomb Town--ARB
EGY	DRC	1977	1977	Shaba I--NYT/ACR/Keesings
FRN	DRC	1977	1977	Shaba I-ARB/NYT/Keesings
MOR	DRC	1977	1977	Shaba I--NYT/ARB
SEN	DRC	1977	1977	Shaba I--Nsweek
UGA	DRC	1977	1977	Shaba I--ARB/LTimes
RWA	DRC	1996	1998	Rwandan troops enter Zaire after cross border firing to assist Tutsi rebels (AFP, Reuters, LAT)
UGA	DRC	1996	1998	Uganda troops cross into Zaire to attack rebel bases (Herald, Reuters)
BUI	DRC	1996		Zaire accuses Burundi, whose troops are aiding Tutsi rebels (NYT)
ANG	DRC	1997	2002	Angola intervenes in Congo in support of rebel leader Laurent Kabila (AP)
RWA	DRC	1998	2002	Rwanda sends troops to support DRC government opposition groups (AP, Xinh)
UGA	DRC	1998	2003	Uganda sends troops to DRC to support groups opposed to Kabila (AP, Xinh, DP)
CHA	DRC	1998	1999	Chad intervenes in DRC in support of Kabila (DP, AP)
SUD	DRC	1998	1999	Sudan sends troops to DRC in support of Kabila (AP, AFP)
RNSAs	DRC	1998	2002	SADC (Namibia,Zimbabwe,Angola) aid Kabila in Congo against rebels (AFP, Xinh)
RWA	DRC	2004	2004	Rwanda pursues rebels in DRC (Econ., FT, Xinh)
RWA	DRC	2004		Rwanda pursues rebels in DRC (Econ., FT, Xinh)
RVN	DRV	1964	1965	Boat&Bomb Raids--PPap/NYT
USA	DRV	1964	1975	Air War--Lessons/PPapers
CAM	DRV	1975	1978	Border Dispute--Keesings
MAL	DRV	1984	1984	Spratly Is.-Disp87/Keesings
CHN	DRV	1984	1985	Border Clashes-NYT/Keesings
CHN	DRV	1984	1988	Spratly Is-CSM/Disp87/Keesings

CHN	DRV	1987	1987	Border Clashes--Disputes 87
PER	ECU	1951	1951	Old Border Dispute-NYT/FoF
PER	ECU	1984	1984	Border Dispute--NYT
PER	ECU	1995	1995	Peru carries out air raids against Ecuador in border conflict (IPS, DP, AFP)
ISR	EGY	1950	1950	Gaza Raids--Khouri/NYT
ISR	EGY	1954	1956	Gaza/Raids-Khri/NYT/FoF/Jssp
FRN	EGY	1956	1956	Suez-Khouri/FoF/Ks/Flck-Pwll
UKG	EGY	1956	1956	Suez-Khr/FoF/Ks/F-P/Lld/Dpy
ISR	EGY	1956	1957	Suez-Khouri/FoF/Kees/Dupuy
ISR	EGY	1958	1958	Huleh--NYT/LTimes/Fof
IRQ	EGY	1959	1959	Mosul Rebel-FoF/LT/NYT/Butterw
ISR	EGY	1960	1960	Syr DMZ-NYT/vHrn/Khri-MEJ/FoF
ISR	EGY	1967	1967	Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees.
RUS	EGY	1967	1967	Deterrence--Khouri/Kaplan
ALG	EGY	1967	1967	Pre-War/Israel--Jessup
SUD	EGY	1967	1972	Post67-Jessp/NYT/O'Bl/Ks/FoF
ISR	EGY	1969	1970	War Attrition--Khouri/Jessup
ALG	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
IRQ	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker
KUW	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker
LIB	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker
MOR	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker/Whetten
PRK	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
SUD	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
TUN	EGY	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
ISR	EGY	1973	1974	1973 War--Whetten/Jessup
LIB	EGY	1977	1977	Lib-Egy Raids--NYT
GAB	EQG	1972	1972	Claim Islands--ARB/ACR/LeM
MOR	EQG	1979	1979	Patrol/Execute Ex-Pres--ARB
ETH	ERI	1998	2001	Ethiopia exchanges fire in border war with Eritrea (DP, AFP, BBC)
SOM	ETH	1964	1964	Som Irredentism-NYT/Keesings
YPR	ETH	1977	1978	Somal War/Drivers-Kapln-Legum
SOM	ETH	1977	1978	Invade Ogaden-Jessup/NYT/ACR
ERI	ETH	1998	2001	Eritrean planes bomb Ethiopia and cross into Ethiopian territory (CH, AP, KNS)
SEN	GAM	1971	1971	Retal./Smuggling--ARB
SEN	GAM	1980	1980	Anti-Libyan--ACR/NYT
SEN	GAM	1981	1988	Restore Gov/Confed-NYT/ACR/ARB
RUS	GDR	1953	1953	E. Ger. Riots--NYT/Butterworth
RUS	GDR	1961	1961	Berlin--Kaplan
CZE	GMY	1985	1985	Warn plane--NYT/Facts on File
SEN	GNB	1990	1990	Senegal engages in border clash with Guinea-Bissau over disputed territory (BBC, Xinh, LM)
GUI	GNB	1998	1999	Guinea aids the government of Guinea-Bissau to contain a military rebellion (AP, AFP)
SEN	GNB	1998	1999	Senegal aids Guinea-Bissau's government to help contain a military rebellion

				(AP, AFP)
YUG	GRC	1948	1948	Balkans--Facts on File/NYT
BUL	GRC	1952	1952	Bul-Gr Is.-NYT/Keesings
TUR	GRC	2002	2002	Turkish jets cross into Greek airspace (AP)
RUS	GRG	1993	1993	Russian support for Abkhazia (Neuman and Solodvnikin)
RUS	GRG	1993	1993	Russian support of Tblisi government in Georgia (Neuman and Solodvnikin)
RUS	GRG	2002	2002	Russia pursues Chechen rebels into Georgia (AFP, NYT)
USA	GUA	1987	1987	Insurgency--NYT/FoF
BLZ	GUA	1995	1995	Belize border guards attack Guatemala village (DP, UPI, AFP)
BLZ	GUA	2001	2001	Belize troops enter Guatemala in territorial dispute (FT, AP)
BLZ	GUA	2002	2002	Belize soldiers cross border and arrest Guatemalans (AP)
POR	GUI	1970	1970	Guin-B.-NYT/ACR/LTms/AR
VEN	GUY	1970	1970	Border Disp-Disp82/FoF/NYT
SUR	GUY	2000	2000	Suriname gunboats and aircraft move into Guyana in a territoral dispute over oil rights (AP)
CUB	HAI	1959	1959	Raiding Party--FoF/NYT
USA	HAI	2004	2004	US aids in restoring order in Haiti (AP, AFP)
CAN	HAI	2004	2004	Canada aids in restoring order to Haiti (AP, Barrier)
CHL	HAI	2004	2004	Chili aids in restoring order to Haiti (AFP, Xinh, AP)
FRN	HAI	2004	2004	France aids in restoring order in Haiti (AFP, UPI)
NIC	HON	1957	1957	Border Dispute--NYT
SAL	HON	1976	1976	Border Flareup--Disp.82
NIC	HON	1980	1981	Contra War--Keesings
SAL	HON	1981	1982	Insurgency--Disp82/NYT
NIC	HON	1984	1985	Contra War--NYT
NIC	HON	1986	1988	Contra War--NYT
USA	HON	1986	1988	Contra War--NYT
USA	HON	1988	1988	Contra War--NYT
SAL	HON	1989	1989	El Salvador air attack against Honduran rebels (UPI, IPS, Xinh)
NIC	HON	1991	1991	Nicaraguan forces exchange fire with Honduran troops (UPI)
NIC	HON	2000	2000	Nicaraguan patrol boat fires on Honduran naval vessel in disputed waters (AFP, Xinh)
RUS	HUN	1956	1958	Hung.Rev.--Donelan/Grieve
UKG	ICE	1958	1959	Iceland Fishing--FoF
CHN	IND	1962	1962	Ch-In Border-NYT/Dsp82/Mxwl/Ks
PAK	IND	1965	1965	Rann of K.--NYT/MEPD/FoF/Kees
CHN	IND	1965	1969	Disp. Territory--NYT/Keesings
PAK	IND	1965	1966	Kashmir-Dsp82/MEPD/Ks/EncyWar
PAK	IND	1971	1971	Chase rebels--NYT
PAK	IND	1971	1972	Bangla D.-Jackson/Butter./MEPD
CHN	IND	1975	1975	Border Clash--NYT
	IND	1979	1979	Border Dispute--Keesings/NYT
	IND	1981	1985	Island Dispute--Disputes82
PAK	IND	1990	1990	Pakistan exchanges cross-border firing with India in Kashmir region (FT, Indep, GM)

BNG	IND	1991	1991	Bangladeshi Rifles (BDR) crosses border to return fire on Indian border guards (Reuters, Xinh)
PAK	IND	1991	1991	Pakistani troops enter Indian zone of Kashmir (UPI, AFP)
PAK	IND	1999	1999	Pakistani soldiers infiltrate Indian controlled area of Kashmir region, known as the Kargil War (DP, Global Sec.)
BNG	IND	2001	2001	Bangladeshi soldiers occupy homes in India (AP, Xinh, AFP)
RUS	IRN	1946	1946	Azerbaijan-Butterw/Heravi/Kapl
IRQ	IRN	1966	1966	Kurdish War--NYT/FoF
IRQ	IRN	1972	1974	Shatt-NYT/Abdulghani/Keesings
IRQ	IRN	1979	1979	Kurdish War--NYT/Keesings
IRQ	IRN	1980	1988	GulfWar-D82/87/FAf/GIST/S-K/Gs
UKG	IRQ	1946	1947	Iran Strike-NYT/Btrw/Ks/Fof
SYR	IRQ	1963	1963	Kurdish War-O'Ballance/NYT
ISR	IRQ	1967	1967	Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees.
IRN	IRQ	1969	1969	River Shipping-Jessp/FoF
IRN	IRQ	1972	1974	Shatt/Kurd-NYT/Abdlgni/MEPD/Ks
RUS	IRQ	1973	1975	Kurdish War--Kaplan
IRN	IRQ	1980	1982	Shell and Retal.--NYT/Jessup
ISR	IRQ	1981	1981	Destroy Reactor--FAf/NYT/Perl
IRN	IRQ	1982	1988	Gulf-Disp82/87/FAf/Jesp/GIST
TUR	IRQ	1983	1987	Kurd Rebel-NYT/FAf/FoF/WashP
FRN	IRQ	1991	1991	France moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Desert Sheild Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle, LM)
UKG	IRQ	1991	1991	Britain moves into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (Des. Shield Factbook, USA, Gulf War Chronicle)
USA	IRQ	1991	1991	US moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
IRN	IRQ	1993	1993	Iranian forces attack Kurdish rebel bases in Iraq (AFP, Xinh)
IRN	IRQ	1994	1994	Iran attacks rebel bases in Northern Iraq (AFP)
USA	IRQ	2003		US topples Iraqi government (DP, AFX, CNN)
SYR	ISR	1951	1951	Huleh Drainage--NYT
SYR	ISR	1954	1955	Gal. Attacks-Khouri/NYT/FoF
SYR	ISR	1957	1958	Huleh Drainage--NYT/LTimes
EGY	ISR	1958	1958	Huleh--NYT/LTimes/FoF
EGY	ISR	1960	1960	Syr DMZ-NYT/vHrn/Khri-MEJ/FoF
SYR	ISR	1962	1962	Shelling--Khouri/NYT
SYR	ISR	1964	1967	Water/Fatah/Galilee-Khouri/NYT
EGY	ISR	1967	1967	Subs Shell Coast--Jessup
IRQ	ISR	1967	1967	Six Day War--Safran
IRQ	ISR	1968	1968	W.Bank Shell--Keesings
JOR	ISR	1968	1968	W.Bank Shell--Keesings
EGY	ISR	1969	1970	War of Attrition--Khouri
EGY	ISR	1969	1969	Syr. Border/DMZ--NYT
SYR	ISR	1970	1970	Golan Clashes--Jessup/FoF
EGY	ISR	1973	1974	1973War-Monroe-Hockley/Whetten
SYR	ISR	1973	1974	1973War-Butterw/Whet/Jessup

IRQ	ISR	1991	1991	Iraqi Scud attack against Israel (WP,PAL)
LIB	ITA	1986	1986	Attack US Base--FAf/NYT
ISR	JOR	1948	1949	Pales. War--NYT/Jessup
UKG	JOR	1948	1957	Pal.War-Khouri/Keesngs/NYT/FoF
ISR	JOR	1950	1988	Occup. Territ.--NYT/FoF/Khouri
ISR	JOR	1951	1951	Border Clashes-FoF/LTimes
ISR	JOR	1953	1954	Retal Raids-Khouri/Jessup/NYT
ISR	JOR	1956	1956	Fedayeen Retal.-Khouri/Jessup
SYR	JOR	1956	1957	Suez Wartime--NYT
SYR	JOR	1957	1957	Nasserism--NYT
UKG	JOR	1957	1957	Nasserism--Jessup
IRQ	JOR	1957	1958	Nasserism/Leb.-NYT/Butterw
SAU	JOR	1957		Nasserism--NYT
USA	JOR	1958	1958	Air Cover UK--Butterw
UKG	JOR	1958	1958	Iraqi Rev.--Butterw
ISR	JOR	1965	1966	Retal. Fatah--Khouri
ISR	JOR	1967	1968	Six Day War-Khouri/Jessup
IRQ	JOR	1967	1970	Pre-War/Israel--Jessup/NYT
SAU	JOR	1967		1967 War Deter-Keesings
ISR	JOR	1968	1970	Raids/Shell-NYT/Jessup/Kees
USA	JPN	1953	1953	Attack USSR planes--NYT/Kees.
UGA	KEN	1976	1976	Cattle Raid--ARB/NYT
UKG	KEN	1982		Anti-Poaching--NYT
UGA	KEN	1987	1988	Border Cross-NYT/LTms/FAf/ARB
UGA	KEN	1989	1989	Ugandan air attack on Kenyan Village (AP, Bercovitch)
SAU	KUW	1961	1961	Iraqi Threat--Butterw/Zacher
UKG	KUW	1961	1961	Anti-Iraq-Jessup/Butterw/NYT
SAU	KUW	1973		Deter Iraq-Butterworth/Jessup
IRQ	KUW	1975	1977	Border Disp.--Butterw/NYT
IRN	KUW	1980	1988	Gulf War-WSJ/CQ
IRQ	KUW	1990	1990	Iraq invades Kuwait and establishes a provisional government (AP,UP, BBC)
BAH	KUW	1990	1991	Bahrain troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
BNG	KUW	1990	1991	Bangladesh troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
CZE	KUW	1990	1991	Czechoslovakia troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
EGY	KUW	1990	1991	Egyptian troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
FRN	KUW	1990	1991	France troops, air, navy part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook, LM)
HON	KUW	1990	1991	Honduras troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
MOR	KUW	1990	1991	Morocco troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
NIR	KUW	1990	1991	Niger provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)

OMA	KUW	1990	1991	Oman provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
PAK	KUW	1990	1991	Pakistan provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
QAT	KUW	1990	1991	Qatar provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
ROM	KUW	1990	1991	Romania provides medical team and NBC experts as part of the Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SAU	KUW	1990	1991	Saudi Arabia aids in Persian Gulf Coaltion in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SEN	KUW	1990	1991	Senegal provides troops for Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SYR	KUW	1990	1991	Syrian troops in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
UAE	KUW	1990	1991	UAE troops in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
UKG	KUW	1990	1991	UK troops, air, naval support for Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle)
USA	KUW	1990	1991	US restores Kuwaiti government in Desert Storm (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle)
AFG	KUW	1991	1991	Afghanistan troops aid Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
NTH	KUW	1991	1991	Netherlands provides air defense batteries as part of coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SIE	KUW	1991	1991	Sierra Leone provides medical team and troops for coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
FRN	KUW	1994	1994	French send frigate to aid force in defending Kuwait (UPI)
BAH	KUW	1994	1994	Bahrain sends naval and air force to defend Kuwait (UPI, Xinh)
OMA	KUW	1994	1994	Oman sends naval forces to defend Kuwait (UPI, Xinh)
UKG	KUW	1994	1994	UK bolster US forces opposing Iraq border buildup (Reuters, APF)
USA	KUW	1994	1994	US build up in Kuwait to respond to Iraqi border build-up (UPI, AP)
	KUW	1994	1994	UAE sends troops and 6 mirages to defend Kuwait (UPI, AFP)
USA	KUW	1996	1996	US buildup of troops in Kuwait after Iraq's provocation (SDUT, Reuters)
FRN	LAO	1946	1946	Take Colong-Adams/Champassak
DRV	LAO	1959	1964	Est. Outposts--Jessup/NYT
USA	LAO	1961	1962	Advis.Combat--FoF/NYT
USA	LAO	1964	1973	Counter-Insurg.-As.Sch./Karnow
DRV	LAO	1964	1975	Civil War--Singer-Small/Zacher
USA	LAO	1965	1973	Attack HCM Trail--FoF
THI	LAO	1965	1974	C-Insurg-Jesssup/Zacher/SLPD
RVN	LAO	1966	1973	Counter Insur.-Karnow/PPap
DRV	LAO	1975	1988	Defend Govt.--For. Aff./NYT
THI	LAO	1975	1978	River/Border--NYT/Keesings
THI	LAO	1980	1982	Mekong Disp-Disp 87/Keesings
THI	LAO	1984	1988	Border Disp.--NYT/Disputes 87
ISR	LEB	1948	1949	Pales. War--Khouri
USA	LEB	1957	1957	Jordan Crisis--NYT
USA	LEB	1958	1958	Leb Civ War-Butterw/NYT/FoF
SYR	LEB	1963	1963	Border Clashes--NYT/FoF

ISR	LEB	1965	1965	Fatah--Khouri/NYT
ISR	LEB	1969	1971	Retal. Raids--NYT/Jessup
ISR	LEB	1972	1973	Retal Syr/PLO-Jessup/NYT
LIB	LEB	1972	1982	Pro-PLO--FAf/Keesings
SYR	LEB	1973	1973	Isr-Syr Dogfight in L.-NYT
ISR	LEB	1974	1982	PLO-Jsp/FAf/MPD/Pgny/Ks/FoF
ISR	LEB	1982	1985	Leb Civ War-NYT/FAf/MEPD/FoF
ISR	LEB	2001	2001	Israeli air raid on a Syrian military position in Lebanon (AFP, AP)
SAF	LES	1982	1982	ANC--ARB/SLPD
RNSAs	LES	1998	1999	SADC peacekeepers in Lesotho (AFP, DP, BBC)
FRN	LIB	1957	1957	Alg. Rebels--NYT
UKG	LIB	1958	1958	Nasserism/Iraq--NYT/FoF
EGY	LIB	1977	1977	Lib-Egy Raids--NYT
PAK	LIB	1977		Air Force Troops--NYT
USA	LIB	1986	1986	Anti-Lib. Bombing--FAf/NYT
MOR	MAA	1977	1979	Anti-Polisario-ACR/MacF
MOR	MAA	1981	1981	Hot Pursuit--NYT
SEN	MAA	1989	1990	Senegal aids nationals in Mauritania after territorial dispute (UPI,Xinhua,BBC, LM)
YUG	MAC	1994	1994	Yugoslavia sets up reconnaissance posts in Macedonia, leading to some firing (Xinh, AFP, AP)
THI	MAL	1969	1976	Joint Counter-Ins.--Jessup
THI	MAL	1977	1981	Joint C-Insur--NYT/Kees./FoF
UKG	MAS	1968	1968	Ethnic Violence--NYT/Keesings
GUA	MEX	1982	1983	Refugee Camps-Kees./NYT/FoF
RUS	MLD	1992		Russian troops aid Moldovan seperatist group against Moldovan government (AP, LT)
BFO	MLI	1985	1985	Border-Disp87/FAf/NYT/SLPD
RUS	MON	1966	1988	Deter PRC--Kaplan/NYT
FRN	MOR	1956	1961	Post-Indep/Alg-NYT/FoF/C-H/Ks
FRN	MOR	1962	1962	Unauth. Airraid--NYT
ALG	MOR	1963	1964	Border-NYT/FoF/Ks/Hasna/Btrw
FRN	MOR	1976	1978	Anti-Polisario-NYT/ACR
SPN	MOR	2002	2002	Spanish forces evict Moroccans from disputed island (AP)
CHN	MYA	1951	1953	Border Sanctuaries--NYT
CHN	MYA	1955	1956	Disputed Territ.--Zacher/NYT
CHN	MYA	1969	1974	Anti-Nat./Guer.--WashP/FoF
THI	MYA	1997	1997	Thailand shelling in Burma to prevent border crossings (AP)
THI	MYA	1999	1999	Thailand fires on Burmese ships territorial dispute on Andaman sea (Bernama, Xinh)
ZIM	MZM	1976	1979	Zim. Revol (Moz)-NYT/ARB/Kees
SAF	MZM	1981	1981	Raid ANC--ARB/NYT/FAf/AR/ACR
SAF	MZM	1983	1983	Raid ANC--ARB/NYT/SLPD/AR/ACR
SAF	MZM	1984	1985	Transport Rebels--NYT
SAF	MZM	1987	1987	Anti-ANC Raid--SLPD/NYT
ANG	NAM	1999	1999	Namibia allows Angola to attack UNITA within Namibia, end date approx (AP)

CHN	NEP	1960	1961	Nepal Border--NYT/Keesings
HON	NIC	1980	1981	Border/Contras--Kees./NYT
COS	NIC	1984	1984	Retal Firing--NYT
HON	NIC	1985	1985	Down Copter--FoF
HON	NIC	1986	1988	Contra War--NYT
HON	NIC	1991	1991	Honduras fires on Nicaraguan patrol boat (UPI)
CAO	NIG	1998	1998	Cameroon attacks Nigeria using helicopter mounted machine guns in territorial dispute (AP, AFP)
CHA	NIR	1993	1993	Chad forces pursue rebels into Niger (BBC, LM)
UKG	OMA	1952	1972	Buraimi Oasis-Butterw/NYT/D82
UKG	OMA	1957	1959	Dhofar Reb.-NYT/MEPD/Keesngs
UKG	OMA	1966	1977	Dfr-Jsp/MPD/Tnd/Ptsn/Ks/NT/FoF
RUS	OMA	1973	1973	Transport S.Yem--Kaplan
YPR	OMA	1973	1976	Dhofar Rebel.-Kaplan/Keesings
IRN	OMA	1973	1979	Dhofar-Jessp/NYT/Keesings/FoF
JOR	OMA	1975	1975	Dhofar-Petrsn/Butterw/Halliday
YPR	OMA	1981	1982	Post-Dhofar-Bidwill/Disp87/MEJ
IND	PAK	1948	1949	Kashmir--NYT
IND	PAK	1965	1965	Kashmir-Disp.82/MEPD/Kees
IND	PAK	1965	1966	Rann of K.--NYT/MEPD/FoF/Kees
IND	PAK	1965	1966	Ind-Pak War-Disp82/MEPD/Kees
AFG	PAK	1979	1979	Fire on Refugees--Ltms/DTel
AFG	PAK	1980	1980	Afgh. Insurg.-Jessup/NYT
RUS	PAK	1980	1982	Afgh. War--NYT
RUS	PAK	1983	1988	Afgh War-CSM/Keesings
AFG	PAK	1983	1988	Afgh. Insurg.--WSJ/Keesings
IND	PAK	1984	1987	Kshmr Glacier-Disp.87/Keesings
AFG	PAK	1989	1990	Afghanistan fires Scuds and RPGs into Pakistan (BC, Xinh, Reuters)
IND	PAK	1990	1990	India initiates firing into Pakistan after mobilizing troops in disputed territory (Globe,PLC,WP,FT)
IND	PAK	1998	1998	Indian troops fire on Pakistani troops along Kashmir border (AP)
USA	PAK	2004	2004	US pursues Taliban insurgents into Pakistan (AFP)
COL	PAN	1959	1959	Exile Rebel.--NYT
USA	PAN	1959	1959	Exile Rebel.--NYT
USA	PAN	1988	1988	Noriega Dispute--NYT
USA	PAN	1989	1990	US removes Panamanian government (WP, NYT)
ECU	PER	1953	1953	Insp. Border Markers--NYT
ECU	PER	1978	1978	Border Dispute--NYT
ECU	PER	1981	1981	Border Dispute--NYT/Disputes82
ECU	PER	1995	1995	Ecuador bombs Peru over border dispute (AFP, DP)
ECU	PER	1997	1997	Ecuadorean soldiers plant mines in Peru (AFP, Xinh)
ECU	PER	1998	1998	Ecuador troops cross border into Peru (AP, AFP)
RVN	PHI	1974	1974	Spratly Is.--NYT
USA	PHI	1989	1989	US aids Philippine government after coup attempt (AP, UPI, Xinh)
CHN	PHI	1998	1999	China adds structures and troops to reef in waters disputed with Philippines

				(AP, AFP)
MAL	PHI	1999	1999	Malaysian navy takes disputed Sprately shoal from Philippines (AP)
RUS	POL	1956	1956	After Poz.Riots--Fejto/Butter
DRC	POR	1975	1975	Pro-FNLA-Hallett/Legum/LeoG
SAF	POR	1975	1975	Occupy-Legum/AR/ARB/Hallett
INS	POR	1975	1976	E.Timor-Zacher/Disp.82
USA	PRK	1950	1950	Korean War--NYT
SAU	QAT	1992	1992	Saudi Arabia forces attack Qatar military post (AP,TS)
CHN	ROK	1950	1953	Korean War--Lukacs
PRK	ROK	1992	1992	N.Korea crosses into DMZ in S.Korea (WP, NYT)
PRK	ROK	1999	1999	N. Korea engages in naval battle with heavy shelling against S. Korea over crab fishing rights (SFC, Kyodo)
	RUS	1950	1950	Korean War--Rees
CHN	RUS	1969	1969	Ussuri River--An/Salisbury
USA	RVN	1961	1965	Anti-Insurg.--Karnow/PPap
DRV	RVN	1964	1975	Insurgency--Karnow
AUL	RVN	1965	1972	VN War-NYT/Bowman/Stanton
NEW	RVN	1965	1972	VN War-NYT/Bowman/Stanton
USA	RVN	1965	1973	Ground Troops-PPap/NYT/WSJ
PHI	RVN	1966	1970	VN War-NYT/Bowman/Stanton
THI	RVN	1966	1972	VN War-NYT/Bowman/Stanton
ROK	RVN	1966	1973	VN War-NYT/Bowman/Stanton
BEL	RWA	1990	1990	Belgium troops aid Rwandan government from rebel attack (UP, AP, LM)
FRN	RWA	1990	1990	France defends Rwandan government from rebel attack (CT, WP, NYT, LM)
DRC	RWA	1990	1991	Zaire sends troops to aid government of Rwanda (AP, UPI, LM)
FRN	RWA	1993	1993	French troops sent to Rwanda to reinforce existing troops and protect and evacuate French nationals (AP, Indep, UP, LM)
DRC	RWA	1996	1996	Zaire shells across border into Rwanda (Reuters)
HON	SAL	1969	1971	Football War--Butter/Disp/NYT
HON	SAL	1976	1976	Border Flareup--Disp.82
HON	SAL	1982	1983	Insurgency--Disp82/NYT
EGY	SAU	1962	1967	Yemen War-NYT/Btrw/Ks/Bdb/Wn
YPR	SAU	1969	1970	S.Y.War & Territ-NYT/Jessp/FoF
PAK	SAU	1981	1988	Protect Royal Family--NYT
ARG	SAU	1990	1991	ARG provides a destroyer to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
AUL	SAU	1990	1991	AUL provides frigates & supply ship to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Coalition)
BAH	SAU	1990	1991	BAH provides troops to SAU through Gulf Council (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
BEL	SAU	1990	1991	BEL provides aircraft & ships for SAU in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
BNG	SAU	1990	1991	BNG provides troops for SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
CAN	SAU	1990	1991	CAN provides combat aircraft & ships to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
CZR	SAU	1990	1991	CZR provides a chem. defense & hospital units to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)

DEN	SAU	1990	1991	Denmark provides 1 warship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
EGY	SAU	1990	1991	Egypt provides ground and paratroops and combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
FRN	SAU	1990	1991	France provides troops and Legion, 32 combat aircraft, and large carrier group to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle, LM)
GRC	SAU	1990	1991	Greece provides 1 frigate to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
ITA	SAU	1990	1991	Italy provides 8 combat aircraft, 2 frig, 1 supply ship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
KUW	SAU	1990	1991	Kuwait provides troops through the Gulf Council and 25-30 combat aircraft (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
MOR	SAU	1990	1991	Morocco provides ground and mechanized infantry troops for Op. Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook, LM)
NEW	SAU	1990	1991	New Zealand contributes a hospital team and one medical transport aircraft for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
NIR	SAU	1990	1991	Niger provides infantry troops in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
NTH	SAU	1990	1991	Netherlands give 18 combat aircraft and 2 frig and 1 supply ship for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
OMA	SAU	1990	1991	Oman contributes troops through gulf council in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
POR	SAU	1990	1991	Portugal provides supply ship for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
QAT	SAU	1990	1991	Qatar provides troops as a gulf council member in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
RUS	SAU	1990	1991	Soviet Union provides guarded missile destroyer, anti-sub warfare ship, 2 supply ships for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
SEN	SAU	1990	1991	Senegal provides 500 troops for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
SPN	SAU	1990	1991	Spain provides one ship for Operation Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
SYR	SAU	1990	1991	Syria in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
UAE	SAU	1990	1991	UAE in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Des. Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
UKG	SAU	1990	1991	Britain provides troops, aircraft, & naval fleet to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chron., Shield Factbook)
USA	SAU	1990	1991	US in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (US Today, Des. Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
YEM	SAU	1994	1995	Yemen clashes with Saudi Arabia over ill-defined demarcation line (UPI, AFP, Reuters)
IRQ	SAU	2001	2001	Iraqi troops fire on Saudi troops in cross border raid (AP, AFP)
POR	SEN	1961	1973	Guin-B Rev-AHBk/ACR/ARB/NYT/AC
MAA	SEN	1989	1990	Mauritania aids and evacuates nationals in Senegal after territorial dispute (UPI, Xinhua, BBC, LM)
GNB	SEN	1990	1990	Guinea-Bissau engages in border clash with Senegal over disputed territory (BBC, Xinh, LM)
GUI	SIE	2000	2001	Guinea launches artillery attacks against Sierra Leone (AP, AllAfrica, AFP)
PNG	SOL	1992	1992	Papua-New Guinea pursue rebels in Solomon Islands (AP, Reuter, Xinh)
PNG	SOL	1993	1993	Papua New Guinea troops attack village in Solomon Islands (Xinh, UP)

ETH	SOM	1964	1964	Border Clashes-AD/ARB/NYT/Kees
ETH	SOM	1977	1978	Attack Base/Planes--NYT
ETH	SOM	1982	1985	Border Insurg.-NYT/Jessup/Ltms
ETH	SOM	1999	2001	Heavy Ethiopian artillery shelling into Somalia (AFP, Xinh)
FRN	SPN	1958	1958	Defend Sp.Sah/Maur.-NYT
MAA	SPN	1975	1976	Annex/Anti-Polis.-NYT/ARB/ACR
MOR	SPN	1975	1976	Annex/Polisr-NYT/ARB/FoF/Kees
ALG	SPN	1976	1976	Pro-Polisario--NYT/FoF
MOR	SPN	2002	2002	Moroccan soldiers camp on island disputed with Spain (AP, FT)
RUS	SUD	1970	1971	Sud.Civ.War-Kaplan/Wai
EGY	SUD	1970	1972	Sud Civ War-Epirle/NYT/Ks/Time
USA	SUD	1984	1984	Transport Egy.--AR/ACR
EGY	SUD	1984	1985	Anti-Libya--AR/ACR
LIB	SUD	1986	1986	Sud Civ War-WSJ/NYT/Ks/ACR
UGA	SUD	1997	1997	Ugandan soldiers cross into Sudan in pursuit of rebels (AFP)
ERI	SUD	1997	1997	Eritrea attacks rebels in Sudan (AFP)
ETH	SUD	1997	1997	Ethiopia bombards Sudan and captures POWs (BBC, AFP)
USA	SUD	1998	1998	US carries out air strikes against suspected terrorist facilities in Sudan (TNS, PI)
ERI	SUD	1998	1998	Eritrea bombards Sudanese town in border clash (AP, Xinh)
SAF	SWA	1985	1986	Raids-ANC/Renamo-SLPD/NYT
FRN	SYR	1946	1946	General Strike--NYT/Jessup
ISR	SYR	1948	1949	Pales. War--NYT
ISR	SYR	1951	1951	Huleh Drainage--NYT
IRQ	SYR	1951	1958	Deter Isr.--Keesings/LTms
ISR	SYR	1954	1955	Retal Raid-Khouri/NYT/FoF
EGY	SYR	1957	1958	Tur-Syr-FoF/Ks/Ptran/MPD/NYT
EGY	SYR	1958	1961	UAR Merger-NYT/Jessup
ISR	SYR	1962	1962	Attack Villages-Khouri/NYT
ISR	SYR	1964	1967	Water/Fatah/Galilee-Khouri/NYT
ISR	SYR	1967	1967	Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees.
IRQ	SYR	1969	1970	Arab Command-NYT/FoF/Ks/Jessup
ISR	SYR	1970	1970	Golan Clashes--Jessup/Fof
JOR	SYR	1971	1971	PLO Conflict--NYT/Keesings
ISR	SYR	1972	1973	Anti-Guer/Golan-Jessp/NYT/Kees
RUS	SYR	1973	1973	Transport Mor. Troops--Kaplan
IRQ	SYR	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
JOR	SYR	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
KUW	SYR	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
MOR	SYR	1973	1973	1973 War-Whetten/Kaplan
ISR	SYR	1973	1974	1973 War--Monroe-Hockley
SAU	SYR	1973	1976	1973 War-Whetten/NYT/Kees/FoF
RUS	SYR	1983	1988	SAM Missiles--FoF/Kees/NYT
ISR	SYR	2003	2003	Israeli air raid on Syria (Int'l Herald, FT, AP)
RNSAs	TAJ	1992	1992	CIS protects Tajik border from Afghan fighters (RPD, FT, CSM)

CHN	TAW	1950	1958	Taiwan Str.-Jessup/NYT/Kees
CHN	TAW	1954	1955	Tai. Str./Islands-Disp82/Kees
CHN	TAW	1958	1978	Tai.Str./Qmoy-Disp82/Keesings
RVN	TAW	1974	1974	Spratly Is.--NYT
POR	TAZ	1966	1967	Incursions--ARB
UGA	TAZ	1972	1972	Bomb/Rebel Incurs--ARB
POR	TAZ	1972	1973	Attack Frelimo-ARB/ACR/LTms/AR
BUI	TAZ	1973	1973	Border Raids--ACR/ARB/NYT
UGA	TAZ	1978	1978	Incurs/Annex-NYT/ARB/ACR/A/H/S
LIB	TAZ	1979	1979	Ug. War Bombing-NYT
BUI	TAZ	1995	1996	Burundi pursues Hutu rebels into Tanzania (IPS, AFP, Xinh)
FRN	THI	1946	1946	Lao Rebel-Adams/Champassak
MYA	THI	1953	1953	KMT Suppression--NYT
AUL	THI	1962	1962	Border Deterrence--NYT
NEW	THI	1962	1962	Border Deterrence--NYT
UKG	THI	1962	1962	Border Deterrence--NYT
USA	THI	1962	1962	Deter Lao Crossing--FoF
USA	THI	1966	1976	Counter-Insurg.--NYT
MAL	THI	1969	1976	Joint Counter-Ins--Jessup/NYT
LAO	THI	1975	1978	River/Border--NYT/Keesings
CAM	THI	1976	1978	Border Attacks--Keesings/NYT
MAL	THI	1977	1981	Joint C-Insur--NYT/Kees./FoF
CAM	THI	1980	1980	Counter-Insurg.--Keesings
DRV	THI	1980	1987	Counter-Insurg-WSJ/FoF/NYT
LAO	THI	1980	1982	Mekong Disp-Disp 87/Keesings
LAO	THI	1985	1988	Border Disp.--NYT/Disputes 87
MYA	THI	1992	1993	Myanmar troops seize Karen rebel camp and maintain presence in Thai territory (NYT, Xinh)
MYA	THI	1999	1999	Myanmar fires on Thai ship in territorial dispute on Andaman sea (Bernama, Xinh)
MYA	THI	2005	2005	Burmese troops cross into Thailand (BBC)
FRN	TUN	1956	1960	Alg/Guer-NYT/Jessp/Butterw/Ks
FRN	TUN	1961	1962	Alg/Bzrte-Jesp/Ks/NYT/Btrw/AfD
USA	TUR	1957	1957	Syr-Tur Disp-NYT/FoF
IRQ	TUR	1962	1962	Kurdish Reb.-Kees/FoF/NYT
IRQ	TUR	1965	1965	Kurdish War--NYT
IRQ	TUR	1974	1974	Kurdish Reb.--FoF
DRC	UGA	1965	1965	Anti-Tshombe Reb-AR/NYT/FoF
SUD	UGA	1965	1971	Pursue Rebels-Butterworth/ARB
LIB	UGA	1972	1972	Support Amin--ARB/Jessup
LIB	UGA	1979	1979	Oppose Tanz.--NYT/A/H
KEN	UGA	1989	1989	Kenyan troops fire into Uganda (BBC, Bercovtich)
DRC	UGA	1996	1996	Zaire engages in cross border raids against Uganda (AP)
SUD	UGA	1998	1998	Sudanese air raid in Uganda (AFP)
BEL	UKG	1946	1949	Join German Occup.--NYT

DEN	UKG	1946	1949	Join German Occup.--NYT
NOR	UKG	1947	1949	Join German Occup.--NYT
INS	UKG	1963	1963	Sarawak Raids--James & Small
EGY	UKG	1963	1964	Yem War/Aden-NYT/MEJ/Ks/Bdb/Wn
YAR	UKG	1963	1964	Border War-NYT/Jessp/MEJ/Ks
YAR	UKG	1965	1965	Border Firing--NYT
IRN	UKG	1971	1971	Occupy Gulf Is.--Disp.82
ARG	UKG	1976	1976	Chase UK Ship-FoF/LTimes/R&E
ARG	UKG	1982	1982	Falklands--Disputes 82
COL	VEN	1987	1987	Coastal Dispute--NYT
UKG	YAR	1954	1954	UK-Aden--NYT
UKG	YAR	1958	1959	UK-Aden--NYT/Keesings
EGY	YAR	1962	1967	Yem War/Butterw/Badeeb/Wenner
UKG	YAR	1963	1965	Retal Aden-Yem-NYT/Jesp/MEJ/Ks
UKG	YAR	1966	1966	Aden/Attack Village--MEJ
RUS	YAR	1967	1968	Yem. Civil War-Kaplan
SYR	YAR	1968	1968	Yem Repl. Soviets--Kaplan
YPR	YAR	1968	1970	Yem. Civil War--NYT/Jessup
YPR	YAR	1972	1972	Rebels-Jesp/NYT/Btrw/FoF/Kees
YPR	YAR	1979	1979	Yem Invas-NYT/Jessp/Ec/Kees
SAU	YAR	1980	1980	Border & N-S Merger-NYT/Disp87
SAU	YEM	1994	1995	Saudi Arabia clashes over southern provinces being claimed by Yemen (UPI, AFP, Reuters)
ERI	YEM	1995	1998	Eritrea captures Hanish island after conflict with Yemen (AFP)
SAU	YEM	1998	1998	Saudi Arabia occupies Yemeni territory in dispute (AP, AFP)
SAU	YPR	1969	1970	S.Y.War & Territ-NYT/Jessp/Fof
YAR	YPR	1972	1972	Rebel Disp.-Jessp/FoF/Keesings
OMA	YPR	1972	1975	Dhofar Rebel.-Jessp/Keesings
YAR	YPR	1979	1979	Yem Invas-NYT/Jessp/Keesings
CUB	YPR		1976	Dhofar Reb.-Peterson/Keesings
UKG	ZAM	1965	1966	Protect from Rhod-- FoF/NYT
POR	ZAM	1966	1972	Ang/MozRebel-Ptman/NYT/ARB/ACR
SAF	ZAM	1976	1980	Invade W. Zam.-SLPD/ARB
ZIM	ZAM	1977	1980	Anti-Rebel-NYT/ACR/ARB/AR/Kees
SAF	ZAM	1981	1982	Anti-SWAPO--ACR
SAF	ZAM	1986	1986	Bomb Lusaka-SLPD/NYT/FoF/ARB
SAF	ZAM	1987	1987	Anti-ANC/Zam.-NYT/FAf
ANG	ZAM	2000	2000	Angolan troops fire on Zambian troops patrolling and violate Zambian airspace in pursuit of rebels (Allafrica, BBC)
SAF	ZIM	1985	1985	Raid ANC--SLPD
SAF	ZIM	1986	1986	Punitive Raid--NYT
IND		1947	1947	Junagadh--Donelan
IND		1948	1948	Hyderabad--NYT
IND		1948	1950	Protect Trade Rts.--NYT
CHN		1950	1951	Tibet--Jessup

PAK	1977	1988	Air Force Troops--NYT
IRN	1992		Iran seizes shared territory from United Arab Emerates (Indep,WP,GM)

Appendix Table 2 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-1999)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LGDPPC	-0.30	-0.47*	-0.46*	-0.46*	-0.45*	-0.46*
LPOP	0.42***	0.46***	0.46***	0.46***	0.46***	0.46***
PRIMEXP	-1.58	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.10	0.13
MOUNTAINS	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NONCONT	0.56	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.77
DEMOCRACY	0.02	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05
ETHFRAC	-0.11	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	.01	-0.04
ETHPOL	**2.48*** **	**2.14** **	**2.14** **	**2.14** **	**2.16** **	**2.16** **
RELFRAC	-3.83	-4.70	-4.66	-4.60	-4.82*	-4.70
RELPOL	3.02	3.30*	3.30*	3.23*	3.39*	3.32*
Int_nh	1.49***					
Neutral		-0.39				
Peace keeping			0.29			
Social				-0.07		
Humanitarian					.67	
NTSH						.22
Intercept	-8.17	-7.21***	-7.36**	-7.21**	-7.39***	-7.27**
N	850	933	933	933	933	933
McFadden's R^2	0.181	0.152	0.152	0.151	0.156	0.152

Column (1) refers to column (5) in Table 2

'Neutral' refers to interventions that are neutral in nature, i.e. they do not favor particular groups involved in a conflict. 'Peace keeping' refers to interventions of troops involved in transport and/or patrol/guard operations. 'Social' refers to social protective interventions and 'Humanitarian' refers to humanitarian intervention. NTSH is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the intervention is at least one of the above four forms of interventions ('Neutral', 'Peace Keeping', 'Social', 'Humanitarian'), and 0 otherwise. These definitions are based on ICPSR #21282 codebook.