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Identity Politics and Organized Crime in Japan: The Impact of Special Subsidies on Burakumin Communities

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Abstract: In 1969 Japan launched a massive subsidy program for the outcastes known as burakumin. The subsidies attracted the mob, who diverted funds for private gain. Newly enriched, the mob now attracted large numbers of young burakumin away from legal business and intensified the tendency many Japanese already had to equate the burakumin with the mob. Although the resulting community centers and public housing improved burakumin infrastructure, they also lowered the cost of identifying burakumin neighborhoods.

We explore the effects of terminating this subsidy program in 2002. We do so by integrating 30 years of municipality data with a long-suppressed 1936 census of burakumin neighborhoods. We find that outmigration from municipalities with more burakumin increased significantly after the end of the program. Apparently, the subsidies had restrained resourceful burakumin from joining mainstream society. Conversely, once the mob-tied corruption and extortion associated with the subsidies neared the end, real estate prices in burakumin neighborhoods rose. With the subsidies gone, other Japanese found the burakumin communities more attractive places to live.

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In 2002, the Japanese Diet repealed its massive experiment in identity politics and targeted ethnic subsidies: the 1969 "Special Measures Act" (SMA). The Japanese burakumin (a traditional outcaste group) had historically faced discrimination. Through the SMA program begun in 1969, however, various governments paid them a broad range of substantial benefits.[1] By 2002, the governments had spent15 trillion yen ($125 billion), along with large amounts of funds outside the program as well.[2] The corruption, distorted hiring, extortion payments, and lost tax revenue tied to the program pushed its social costs higher still.

Many of the burakumin were descendants of people who had worked in ritually unclean jobs such as butchering and tanning. Some still worked in those jobs. Biologically indistinguishable from other Japanese, they were identifiable primarily by residence -- by whether they or their family lived in a buraku, one of the 4,000 to 5,000 outcaste communities scattered across Japan. The largest of these communities were well known. Most of the others were recognized only by long-time neighbors.

Through these targeted subsidies, the governments built community centers and public housing complexes. Although the buildings unambiguously improved the burakumin housing stock, they also identified the areas as burakumin neighborhoods. Worse, the large revenue at stake attracted the organized crime syndicates (colloquially called the yakuza). Burakumin in the criminal syndicates took prominent posts in the Burakumin Liberation League (BLL), the principal burakumin civil rights organization. There, they masterminded policy, intimidated government officials, and directed subsidies to themselves.

The result -- largely acknowledged by the BLL itself[3] -- was the diversion of substantial government funds to selected burakumin leaders and the criminal syndicates. Construction contracts went to favored companies. City governments bought land for the buildings at inflated prices from powerful burakumin. Local tax officials promised not to audit tax returns of companies certified by the BLL. City halls agreed to hire recommended burakumin. Mainstream businesses paid money to avoid accusations of discrimination. And the syndicates themselves fought each other bitterly over control of the enormous revenue stream.

The result was also a massive diversion of young burakumin talent. The targeted subsidies altered the relative returns to legal and illegal business. The newfound source of criminal income induced young men to choose criminal business activities over the

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[1] "Burakumin" is the term most commonly used in English. It was used widely in Japan during the first half of the 20th century, but the currently favored term in Japan is "dowa."

[2] 15 trillion yen is the figure routinely cited by authors in the field -- e.g., Kadooka (2012, 38, 69); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 126); Mori (2009, 78). We have not been able to determine the original source of this figure.. In Naikaku (1995), however, the government reports that as of 1993 the municipal governments had spent 10.3 trillion yen and the prefectural governments another 3.56 trillion yen.

[3] E.g., Kadooka (2004, 2005, 2009, 2012); Miyazaki (2004); Miyazaki & Otani (2000).

educational investment so essential to joining mainstream Japan. In the process, it also altered their incentives to leave the buraku for mainstream jobs. And as young burakumin men joined the mob, mainstream Japanese avoided the burakumin simply out of fear: the mob involvement itself drove discrimination.

In this article, we examine the results of the government's decision to terminate this targeted ethnic subsidy program in 2002. We identify the 4,000+ traditional burakumin communities through a long-suppressed 1936 census, and combine that information with demographic and economic data over 1980 to 2010 for the 1,700+ municipalities in Japan (this includes rural areas, since all of Japan is incorporated). With these data, we employ difference-in-differences regressions to explore the effect of the termination of the subsidy program.

We find that once the subsidies ended in 2002, outmigration from the traditional communities rose: increasingly, resourceful burakumin left to merge into the Japanese mainstream. Conversely, as the mob-tied corruption and extortion associated with the subsidies came to an end, real estate prices in burakumin neighborhoods rose as well: increasingly, mainstream Japanese found the burakumin communities more attractive places to live. .

We precede our statistical analysis with a discursive account of the facts about the burakumin and the mob that underlie the regressions. We describe the burakumin, the Japanese organized crime syndicates, and the changing ties between the two groups (Section I). In turn to the targeted ethnic subsidies in Section II, and to the resulting corruption in Section III. In Sections IV and V, we turn to our quantitative project, and explore the effect of the 2002 program termination. We describe our data and variables in Section IV and the results of difference-in-differences regressions in Section V.

I. The Burakumin and the Organized Crime Syndicates

I.A. The Burakumin:

1. Introduction. -- Writers routinely describe the burakumin as descended from people who worked in ritually unclean or otherwise disreputable jobs: butchers, for example, tanners, leather workers, and itinerant peddlers. The "paekjong" in Korea seem to have faced much the same situation. [4] As Howell (1996, 178) put it, the forefathers of the burakumin had "engaged in occupations that were considered to be unclean, especially those that entailed the pollution of death." Prior to the 1868 coup that displaced the Tokugawa regime, the government had placed them below the four nominally hierarchical and hereditary classes: the samurai, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. In 1871, the new government declared the burakumin "liberated."[5] At roughly the same time, government officials created family registries (koseki) within the new municipal governments. There, they sometimes described the liberated burakumin

[4] The massive dislocation and the destruction of family registries during the Korean War seem to have erased the "paekjong" (baekjong, Anon. 2012) as an identifiable group. The writers who claim that the discrimination against the Korean paekjong still exist seem to be Japanese scholars associated with the BLL (Kotek 2009).

[5] The Eta hinin no sho wo haishi mibun shokugyo tomo heimin doyo to su [Abolishing the Categories of Eta and Hinin, and Equalizing Status and Occupation with Commoners], Dajokan fukoku of Oct. 12, 1871, informally known as the Kaiho rei [Emancipation Edict]. See Pharr (1990, 77); Hankins (2014, 21); Upham (1980, 41); Totten (1967, 34).

as "former outcastes," as "new commoners", or as affiliated with a burakumin temple. By the most precise definition, then, a burakumin is anyone with an ancestor described in the 1873 registries (no longer available to the public) as a burakumin.[6]

Out of the current Japanese population of 127 million, the burakumin number about 1.8 million. In 1936, the government (through its Chuo yuwa burakumin organization) compiled a nation-wide census of the group (Chuo yuwa 1936; described in Section IV.C, below). It counted 999,700 burakumin.[7] Extrapolate 999,700 to 2010 by the Japanese population growth rate, and the 1.8 million figure follows.[8] The government conducted another census in 1975, and found only 1.1 million burakumin in the 4,374 communities designated under its subsidy program.[9] Apparently, 700,000 burakumin either lived in undesignated communities or had migrated into the public.[10]

Through a targeted ethnic subsidy program, in 1969 local and national governments began paying large amounts of money to the burakumin.[11] The legislature set the original statute to expire in 10 years, but through a variety of extensions and substitute statutes the program continued until 2002.[12] By the time the program ended the government had distributed 15 trillion yen.[13] From 1969 to 2000, Osaka prefecture alone spent 2.9 trillion yen. Of this, it invested 35.5 percent (1,019 billion) in

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[6] For more historical background to the modern buraku, see McCormack (2013), Pharr (1990, ch. 5); Kadooka (2016, 15)

[7] The count almost certainly misses some communities, as we discuss below. In 1871, the government reported a total burakumin population of 380,000 (Kadooka 2005, 24; Price 1967, 24; Wagatsuma & De Vos 1967, 115). It reported a population of 830,000 in 1920. See Chuo yuwa (1936, 336); Price (1967, 24); Wagatsuma & De Cos (1967 115).

[8] Many writers suggest a higher growth rate for the burakumin than for the mainstream population. This is less because of a difference in birth rates than because of the migration into the burakumin of the poorest of the mainstream, who became treated as burakumin by association. See generally Price (1967, 13); Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967, 114).

[9] Asahi (1982, 81). In 1963, the government found 1.7 million people (burakumin and non-burakumin) living in the designated districts. Kadooka (2005, 29). Naikaku (1995) reports 2,16 million people (including non-burakumin) living in 4,442 of the 4,603 designated districts in 1993. The burakumin population in the districts was 892,000. For other government censuses, see Shiomi (2012, 106 [1987], 107 [1993]); Takagi (1997, 48) (1986); Yamaguchi (2004) (claiming 900,000).

[10] The BLL itself insists that the burakumin number 3 million -- sometimes even 6 million -- but seems to lack much evidence for the claim. See, e.g., Upham (1980, 63); Buraku discrimination (n.d.). Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967, 117) write: "The current burakumin population estimates vary from one to three million. The higher figure seems to have been used for political purposes by the leftist outcaste leadership and has worked its way into the scientific literature as an established fact without solid evidence." To the same effect, see Price (1967, 11).

[11] Dowa taisaku jigyo tokubetsu sochi ho [Special Measures Act for Burakumin Policy Business], Law No. 60 of 1969.

[12] Chiiki kaizen taisaku tokubetsu sochi ho [Special Measures Act for District Renewal Policy], Law No. 16 of 1982; Chiki kaizen taisaku jigyo ni kakaru kuni no zaiseijo no tokubetsu sochi ni kanuru horitsu [Law Regarding the Special National Public Finance Measures Relating to Specified Measures for District Renewal Policy], Law No. 22 of 1987.

[13] Kadooka (2012, 38, 69); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 126); Mori (2009, 78). For the source of this figure, see note x, supra. In 1969, $1.00 equaled approximately 360 yen. By 2002 it equaled about 120 yen.

construction projects.[14] Although the program did dramatically improve the quality of burakumin housing, it also attracted the organized crime syndicates. Voters pressed politicians increasingly hard to stop the ensuing corruption. Ultimately, they complied, and terminated the subsidies effective 2002.

2. De Vos & Wagatsuma. -- The most thorough and balanced English-language study of the buraku remains the 1967 ethnographic classic by Hiroshi Wagatsuma, son of the eminent University of Tokyo Civil Code professor, and George De Vos (De Vos & Wagatsuma 1967a). On the eve of the 1969 targeted subsidy program, Wagatsuma, De Vos, and their several collaborators studied a wide variety of urban and rural, stable and transitional buraku.

Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967a) noted that burakumin tended to live near each other. In the mid-1960s, many Japanese still lived in cramped and unsanitary housing, but Wagatsuma and De Vos found the burakumin living in particularly dilapidated communities. They include telling photographs, and Upham (1980, 45) describes the neighborhoods graphically: [15]

> Public services -- fire protection, sewers, water lines, streets, street lights, public offices -- were often totally lacking. The housing stock was poor: usually old wooden tenements with common baths, kitchens, and toilets, and often lacking indoor plumbing altogether.

In truth, the phrase "burakumin community" was always something of a misnomer, because the buraku housed other people besides 1873-registry burakumin. Many residents had simply moved there for the lower rent. Today, the communities remain mixed. According to a 1993 government survey, only 41.4 percent of buraku residents were themselves burakumin. The prefectural means ranged from 2.7 percent in a Kyushu prefecture to 97.9 percent in a small prefecture in central Japan. Two prefectures with large numbers of burakumin were Hyogo, where 56.9 percent of the

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[14] Kadooka (2012, 38, 69, 96); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 25, 126); Mori (2009, 78).

[15] One should take these descriptions with a sense of skepticism. The burakumin were poor in the 1950s and 1960s, but so were many other Japanese. In a world where education was the principal avenue of social mobility, the burakumin were badly educated, but so were many other Japanese. The question is not whether the burakumin lived under poor conditions-- they did. What one would like to know is (a) whether the burakumin lived under worse conditions than similarly educated non-burakumin, and (b) whether the burakumin were less likely to pursue educational opportunities than similarly poor non-burakumin. We are aware of no evidence on either of these questions in the secondary literature.

Two personal anecdotes from Ramseyer: In the late 1950s, our family lived well in Japan, with a wall around our house. For several years, my childhood friend and his family of four lived in a small lean-to shack that his father had built against the outside of our wall. They had no electricity, water, or sewage. The father had no obvious employment, and drank too much. This being Miyazaki prefecture (see Table 1), they almost certainly were not burakumin. They were simply very poor.

Ten years later, our family of six lived in a small mountain village where my father worked on his anthropology dissertation. We lived in an ordinary working class family house. It was about 400 square feet. It had electricity, and cold running water in the kitchen, but the kitchen sink and floor were poured concrete. Until we added a corrogated plastic lean-to unit, the house had no bath. This was standard for working-class families in 1969 Japan.

residents of the designated buraku were burakumin, and Fukuoka, with 36.6 percent (Kadooka 2005, 57; Naikaku 1995).

According to the contributors to the Wagatsuma-De Vos volume, the burakumin who successfully left the communities and moved into mainstream society tended either to come from a community's middle class or to be the younger sons of the community's elite families. The oldest sons of the elite families did not leave (Donaghue 1967; Cornell 1967, 178). They inherited the family property and carried obligations within the community that tethered them to it. Yet even the most "elite" burakumin families needed the younger sons to leave. Well-to-do is relative, and the elite burakumin lacked the wealth to support more than one household comfortably in each generation relative to the opportunities available to them outside the buraku (Donaghue 1967, 146).

In the 1960s, few burakumin from the bottom of the community left. They lacked the necessary education and social skills.[16] One newspaper reporter recalled a conversation with a middle-aged buraku woman in the early 1980s (Kadooka 2004, 65-66):

> If you had come here 8 years ago, I probably wouldn't have served you tea. At the time, I still couldn't read. When people came from outside the buraku, I just moped around. I'd be thinking to myself, should I serve tea? Should I serve a dessert? But then I'd wonder, what do these folks usually drink? What do they usually eat? I was so scared that I just hid in the house. ...
>
> If I could, I'd like to move into town and live there. But you know, it's just too scary. The people in town are educated. And I don't know what to talk to them about. I really can't leave this village.

Only barely did the families studied by the Wagatsuma-De Vos contributors hold themselves together. In some buraku, noted one contributor, sexual attitudes were "relaxed," and families "fragile" (Sasaki & De Vos 1967, 130-34). Among the burakumin, wrote another, "illegitimacy is common" (Donaghue 1967, 140). As De Vos & Wagatsuma (1967, 229) themselves put it, "[i]n certain Buraku, at least among the lower strata of the community, there is considerable casualness about marriage ties and sexual fidelity."

Burakumin tended to marry other burakumin.[17] Poor people everywhere tend to marry locally, of course, but Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967) recount a variety of outside marriage plans derailed by parental opposition to a burakumin match. Indeed, the most moving tales of discrimination continue to involve broken engagements: two young people love each other, but one set of parents calls off the wedding after learning the other's background (e.g., Yamaguchi 2004).

Burakumin tended to work within the community itself. Poor and uneducated people everywhere tend to work locally, but some burakumin reported being blackballed by the large mainstream firms. Most simply farmed small rented lots, took low-end jobs

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[16] On the difficulty in passing, see generally Donaghue (1967, 141-51); De Vos & Wagatsuma (1967, chs. 11, 12).

[17] Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967, 119); Donaghue (1967, 140); Cornell (1967, 162).

in minor neighboring firms, worked within the buraku, or moved from one day job to another.

Crime was a fact of life in the buraku during the years before the targeted subsidies, though low by American standards, but the mob apparently was not. Contributors to De Vos & Wagatsuma (1967) reported higher delinquency rates among the burakumin than in the general population and more pronounced violence. De Vos & Wagatsuma (1967, 269-70) themselves wrote that the burakumin took welfare fraud as a matter of course. They observed that "Buraku men are allowed, if not expected, to be impulsive and physically aggressive, and the aggression is often directed toward their wives and children" (De Vos & Wagatsuma 1967, 231). In Kyoto, De Vos & Wagatsuma (1967, 265) found a delinquency rate among burakumin children over twice the general rate. In Kobe, it was more than three times higher (De Vos & Wagatsuma 1967, 266). The arrest rate for threat, intimidation, and extortion among burakumin boys was nearly double the level of their mainstream counterparts (De Vos & Wagatsuma 1967, 266-67). Yet contributors to the study rarely mention the organized crime syndicates.

Given the candor with which Wagatsuma, De Vos, and their contributors described so much else about buraku dysfunction it is hard to believe they would have hidden any connections to organized crime. Yet about mob ties they said nothing. That silence suggests (not proves, but suggests) that the organized crime syndicates played a smaller role in the buraku during the last years before the targeted subsidies than they would once the program began.

3. Buraku location. -- To receive subsidies under the program, a burakumin community needed to register with the government. Not all did. The 1936 burakumin census (Chuo yuwa 1936) counted 999,700 outcastes in 5,367 communities. By 1993, the government had registered 4,603 communities (Kadooka 2005, 30-36; Naikaku 1995), 85 percent of the 1936 total.

Most burakumin communities are small. Of the neighborhoods reported in 1936, 2,067 (38.5 percent) had 10 or fewer households. Of the eight prefectures where no burakumin neighborhood had chosen to take the SMA funds as of 1993, three had no burakumin neighborhoods at all in 1936.[18] The other five prefectures did have 309 communities in 1936, but they were small. Of the total, 246 of them (79.6 percent) had housed only 10 or fewer households in 1936.

The neighborhoods are not randomly distributed across Japan. In Table 1 we include the prefectural level distribution of burakumin in the 1936 census. By standard Japanese practice, we group the prefectures by region and order them roughly from the northeast to the southwest. In Figure 1, we illustrate this distribution on a map of Japan. The darkest areas are the prefectures with the highest density of burakumin (we use the "*Burakumin*" variable described in Section IV below). The seven prefectures other than Tokyo without designated buraku in 1993 were from the northeast or the Japan Sea shore. The burakumin live mainly in central-western Japan: around Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe, in the prefectures facing the Inland Sea, and in northern Kyushu. The buraku in Osaka and Kyoto are massive. In 1936, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, Mie, Wakayama and Hiroshima had 1,401 burakumin districts. Of these, only 159 (11.3 percent) had 10 or

[18] Some of this confusion reflects communities missing from the 1936 census, as discussed below.

fewer households. The three largest districts in 1936 Kyoto had 653, 955, and 1,815 households each. The three largest in Osaka had 881, 1,017, and 2,683 households. The 2,683-household district had a burakumin population of 17,435. In 1936, only seven other prefectures had a total burakumin population as large as this single district in Osaka (Chuo yuwa 1936).

[Insert Table 1 about here.]

[Insert Figure 1.]

4. Identifying burakumin. -- American observers puzzle over how anyone could identify a burakumin. Subtle ethnic and cultural differences do exist.[19] Within Buddhism, the burakumin more often align themselves with the Jodo shin denomination than other Japanese (Kadooka 2005, 65-70; Wagatsuma 1967, 89). Within Shinto, they more often worship at Shirayama shrines (Maeda 2013) — in fact, in 2015 one anti-BLL Internet site offered a list of Shirayama shrines as a proxy for burakumin neighborhoods. They more often work in the beef industry (Pharr 1990, 79), and the same site offered a list of slaughterhouses. Via the connection with tanning, they tended to manufacture the traditional Japanese drum. They sang distinctive ballads and songs. Some of the poorer burakumin spoke their own dialect (Sasaki & De Vos 1967, 135; Donaghue 1967, 149). Beyond that, the differences were minor.

To identify burakumin most precisely, an investigator needed to check whether the 1873 government registry identified an ancestor as a "new commoner." To many Japanese, these registries made the government complicit in discrimination, and in the late 1960s the Diet ended public access to them. Media continue to report occasional cases of people who fraudulently check another person's registry. Legally, however, only family members and a few specified others may now examine someone's registry entry.[20]

With the registries off-limits, someone who wants to identify a burakumin looks to where he or his parents live.[21] To check a prospective son- or daughter-in-law's background, he himself might try to trace it, or he might hire a detective agency (koshinsho). If he is an employer, he might keep a detective agency on retainer to check the backgrounds of job applicants (Tominaga 2015, 57). Detectives cannot do this openly everywhere. Osaka banned this detective service in 1985 and Kumamoto, Fukuoka, Kagawa, and Tokushima soon followed (Kadooka 2005, 43-44; Tominaga 2015, 55). In any case, the service is not cheap. To one reporter, a detective quoted a price of 500,000 yen (about $5,000) for a background check (Tominaga 2015, 36).

When the government closed the family registries in the 1960s, it set in motion two crosscutting phenomena. On the one hand, it became easier for an enterprising burakumin to leave the buraku and slip into the Japanese mainstream. On the other hand, it increased the odds that non-burakumin living in buraku would face discrimination.

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[19] See generally, e.g., (Tomotsune 2012, ch. 4).

[20] Tomonaga (2015, 27-28); Kadooka (2016, 15); Koseki ho [Family Registry Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, Secs. 10, 10-2.

[21] To some extent this happened before as well, of course. See Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967, 118); De Vos & Wagatsuma (1967, 246).

Recall that fewer than half of a buraku's residents are themselves outcastes. So long as a would-be discriminator could check family registries, he could distinguish the burakumin from the non-burakumin. After the closing of the registries, he had little choice but to use residence and parental residence as proxies for burakumin status.

News reports and surveys confirm this second effect. One journalist asked a detective how he decided whether someone was a burakumin. They are burakumin "if their parents were burakumin," he replied, "or if they came from a buraku." After all, he explained, "if they're currently living in a buraku, then they're burakumin" (Kadooka 2005, 50; 2016, 50). A 2005 Osaka survey asked the same question. Of the respondents, 50.3 percent replied that they looked at a person's address, 38.3 percent that they looked at the person's recorded home (i.e., registry) address, and others looked at the address of a person's parents or grandparents (Tominaga 2015 35).

Reports of discrimination yield analogous results. Consider a 1990 survey of residents from the traditional buraku in Osaka. Among the burakumin in the district, 28.9 percent reported that they or a member of their family had experienced some form of discrimination. Among the non-burakumin, 13.8 percent still had faced discrimination (Kadooka 2005, 50). More burakumin had faced discrimination than non-burakumin (probably because by 1990 the registries had only been closed for two decades), but even non-burakumin had faced some. For all practical purposes, the closing of the family registries converted the non-burakumin residents of the communities into burakumin as well.

5. Western scholarship on the Burakumin Liberation League. -- Most western observers of the BLL have focused on what they consider its role in championing burakumin rights. Take just the book-length analyses. Hankins (2014) interned for many months with the BLL's human rights wing. He studied at length and with great care its work to integrate the burakumin cause into the international human rights movement. He noted in particular its efforts to shift Japan to a more "multi-cultural" vision.

Bayliss (2013, 1) told of "the exploitation, prejudice, and marginalization that [burakumin] have suffered," and then turned to the BLL's response. The BLL members engage in "struggles to combat [their] treatment," he wrote. When they "denounce" people they consider discriminators, (Bayliss 2013, 2 n.2), they do so to incorporate policies that will "work for both the buraku communities and the wider political aims of the movement."

Bondy (2015, 3) wrote that the BLL "encourages burakumin pride and is determined to challenge discrimination wherever and whenever it is found." He discussed how the mainstream news outlets often avoid reporting on the burakumin, concluding (Bondy 2015, 6) that the "media are agents that silence public exposure to buraku issues."

McLauchlan (2003) interviewed 21 burakumin selected for him by the BLL. After detailing their stories, he declared (2003, 113):

> The BLL is clearly the champion of the residents of Buraku [X]. This very powerful organisation has unquestionably worked tirelessly to improve the circumstances of buraku residents ....

In his biography of the effective founder of the BLL, Jiichiro Matsumoto, Neary (2010) minimizes buraku violence, but cannot eliminate it. Before the Second World War, Matsumoto built a profitable construction empire in Fukuoka. He kept a solid grip on the market for railroad construction by cultivating a reputation as a man rivals challenged at their peril. It was a bloody reputation to cultivate. When one rival firm threatened his profitability, his workers waylaid and beat to death the firm's owner.[22] Neary (2010, 1) largely dismisses the incident, and assures his readers that Matsumoto "campaigned against the prejudice and discrimination that he and his fellow Burakumin encountered in their daily lives."

I.B. The Organized Crime Syndicates:

As of 2014, Japanese police counted 21 organized crime syndicates, the largest ones constituting federations of smaller units. Most of them are small. The three largest account for over 70 percent of the members and affiliates. The very largest -- the infamous Yamaguchi-gumi -- controls over 40 percent of the total mob manpower.[23]

By most accounts, police and prosecutors fight the syndicates aggressively. Even the most cynical journalists and scholars do not suggest that the syndicates successfully bribe either group very often. Police arrested 22,000 members or affiliates in 2014, including 5,000 on amphetamine-related crimes (55 percent of all amphetamine arrests). Of the 5,200 people they arrested for extortion (kyohaku and kyokatsu) in 2014, 1,700 came from the mob (Keisatsu hakusho 2015, 4, app. tabs. 1, 2-4). Of the defendants tried, judges punish mob defendants more severely than others. Among defendants tried for violence, they sentenced 31 percent to deferred sentences, but only 7 percent of the mob defendants (Hanzai hakusho 1985, tab. I-27).

The Japanese syndicates do not have reputations as black as the Mafia or drug gangs in the United States, and they are not illegal per se. Indeed, they maintain offices at publicly known addresses. Milhaupt & West (2000) identify several ways in which they help unwind dysfunctional government policy. Japanese tenant protection law stops developers from evicting tenants, for example, and the mob helps them evict the tenants anyway. Bankruptcy law introduces some inefficiencies, and the mob streamlines the process. That the mob sometimes remedies poor policy, however, should not distract from the violent and predatory nature of most of what it does.

I.C. The Ties between the Two Groups:

1. The buraku and the mob. -- During the period of the targeted subsidies, the crime syndicates maintained a prominent presence within the buraku. Journalist Nobuhiko Kadooka (2012, 28), himself from a Hyogo burakumin community and the most perceptive and balanced writer in the field, noted the overlap between the two groups:

> Do let me stress at the outset: it's not as if all Koreans in Japan, burakumin, and other minorities join the mob. The great majority of the minority

[22] Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 22-24, 54-58); Tottori Loop & Mishima (2012)

[23] Keisatsu hakusho (2013, fig. 3-13; 2015, 2-3); Boryoku josei (2009, 6). In 2015, the Yamaguchi-gumi split into two rival groups.

groups earn an honest living. Most men in the organized crime syndicates, however, are indeed members of minorities like the Koreans or the burakumin.

During these decades of SMA subsidies, observers consistently reported that burakumin men comprised a large fraction of the syndicates. In 1986, two American journalists reported that the police told them that 70 percent of the Yamaguchi-gumi came from the burakumin.[24] In 2006, a former official of the Public Security Intelligence bureau gave the Foreign Correspondent's Club a figure of 60 percent.[25] A senior member of the Fukuoka-based Kudokai (as of 2016, the most violent of the Japanese syndicates) said in a documentary that 70 percent of the group's members were either burakumin or Koreans.[26] Kadooka himself cited the don of the Kyoto-based Aizu-kotetsu-kai mob for the estimate that as of 1996 half of its 1,300 members were from the buraku (Kadooka 2009, 115; 2005, 82-83). Burakumin poet Yasutaro Uematsu (1977, 166-67) noted that 70 percent of Yamaguchi-gumi were burakumin. And burakumin journalist Manabu Miyazaki (Miyazaki & Otani (2000, 162) wrote that 90 percent of the mob were "minorities" (which would include Koreans too).[27]

An especially unfortunate illustration of these ties comes from a small town in northern Kyushu. According to the BLL (Noguchi 1997, 31), the place has the second-highest concentration of burakumin in the country: 61 percent of its residents live in a buraku. People from elsewhere in Japan call it "gang town." On Internet sites, they warn people to stay away. The town's modern history resembles less the well-ordered Tokyo, than the Wild West of a John Ford film: In 1986, someone shot the mayor in his office. In 2002, someone shot the chairman of the city council. In 2003, the police arrested the council chairman on weapons charges. Later the same year they arrested his replacement for his role in a car-theft ring. In 2005, someone firebombed the mayor's office.[28]

The most troubling aspect of the overlap between the burakumin and the criminal syndicates lies in the fraction of burakumin men who chose to join the mob. The size of that fraction during the years of the targeted subsidies discloses an enormous diversion of young talent -- a diversion out of preparation for life in the legal sector, and instead into fundamentally criminal behavior. To calculate the lower bound of the fraction of young buraku men in organized crime during these years, suppose the burakumin comprised only half of the mob and that the crime syndicates recruited randomly from the total burakumin population of 1.8 million. When the mob was at its height in the late 1980s,

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[24] Kaplan & Dubro (1986, 145). The Japanese Wikipedia entry for the two authors notes that the discussion was excised from the Japanese translation, presumably because the publisher feared buraku pressure.

[25] Lecture by Mitsuhiro Suganuma. In 2014, the lecture was available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNAJVnjlR2g. It has since been taken down, nominally over "copyright" concerns, though it was still available elsewhere on Youtube as of 2016. The statement comes from a senior member of the Yamaguchi-gumi.

[26] See http://blog.livedoor.jp/takeru25-6911/archives/2057059.html

[27] Rankin (2012) dismisses Suganuma's account as "distasteful insinuation." He describes Miyazaki as someone who "knows the situation well," but apparently misses Miyazaki's statement that the mob is composed overwhelmingly of "minorities."

[28] See, e.g., Fukuoka no oogun (n.d.); Boryokudan no machi (2011); Nottorareta machi (2015).

police reported that 23,000 men in their 20s and 27,000 men in their 30s were part of one of the gangs (Keisatsu hakusho, 1989). If the age composition of the burakumin tracked the general population,[29] 9.4 percent of the burakumin men in their 20s were part of the mob. Of those in their 30s, 11.1 percent were.

To calculate the upper bound, suppose that 70 percent of the mob came from the burakumin. Suppose further that the mob did not recruit its members from the 700,000 burakumin who had faded into the general population. Instead, it focused on the 1.1 million living in the communities that chose to take the targeted subsidies. By the same calculation, 21.4 percent of the 20-29 year old burakumin men in these designated communities would have been part of the mob, and 25.2 percent of men in their 30s.

As burakumin journalist Kadooka (2012, 20) put it, "for a long time, the buraku was the hotbed of the mob." The resulting stigma was self-reinforcing. If only a small proportion of a group chooses to engage in anti-social behavior (such as joining a gang), someone who is caught engaging in the behavior shows an unusual tendency to be anti-social. If a large proportion of the group is anti-social, however, the entire group is stigmatized, since it becomes rational for an outsider to suspect that even if someone was not caught, he was guilty anyway. In turn, this discrimination reduces the value of a clean record versus a stained one, since someone in the group faces suspicion even if he behaves impeccably (Rasmusen 1996). If enough people from a given neighborhood engage in crime, all will be suspect --- which in turn reduces the penalty to any one person from turning criminal. The self-reinforcing feedback continues because it becomes rational for outsiders to be suspicious of everyone in the neighborhood.

2. The BLL. –- The BLL split the buraku. Elite burakumin families formed the core of the groups working to improve community welfare (Donaghue 1967, 150-51). During the 1960s they also comprised the groups most concerned about the League's violent tactics (Cornell 1967, 160, 175). A "common complaint," noted Cornell (1967, 174) was that the BLL was "too much given to violence." Burakumin leaders worried "that the very aggressiveness of the [BLL] tends to heighten discrimination by publicizing and reviving hostility." Given that the BLL's founder Matsumoto had run a crew that beat to death the owner of his closest business competitor, they had reason to worry.

At the same time, the BLL leadership was itself split. During the subsidy decades, BLL leaders came to their posts from a variety of motives. Kadooka (2009, 313) recounts a conversation with a now-senior BLL official who was recalling the time he applied to join a BLL branch office in the 1980s. He had asked a BLL leader, who responded:

> "You. We'll let you in the branch. What are your demands?"
>
> "What do you mean, 'demands'?" asked the applicant.
>
> "Housing, job, taxes," The BLL leader continued. "Could be lots of things, right?"
>
> "I have a house," the applicant replied, "and I have a job."

[29] In fact, the 1993 government survey indicated that the burakumin were older than the general population. Of the burakumin living in the designated districts, 15.5 percent were 65 or older. Of the general Japanese population, 13.5 percent were 65 or older. See Naikaku (1995).

> "Then why do you want to join the branch?"
> "Because I want to work for liberation."
> "Huh? Now?" the leader quizzically replied.

In effect, the subsidy-era BLL included two distinct groups. The committed idealists and intellectuals wrote the books, collected the statistics, and -- judging from Western accounts of the League -- explained the League's work to visiting foreign scholars. The mob-affiliated entrepreneurs manipulated the subsidy programs for private gain. "There was a time," burakumin journalist Kadooka (2012, 53-54) recalled, "when the historic anti-discrimination group [i.e., the BLL] had current or former members of the mob holding important positions." After all, he continued:

> The buraku gave birth both to activists and to the mob. It wasn't unusual for BLL members to be current or former members [of the mob.] Some people marched into battle under the crown of thorns [i.e., the BLL symbol] out of anger against the discrimination. Others marched with plans to make their fortune through the [SMA-funded] buraku projects.

3. The BLL-JCP split. -- Much of the violent reputation of the modern BLL dates from its highly visible break with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) a half-century ago. Coincident with the enactment of the SMA in 1969, the BLL split with the Party. The League had long allied itself with both the Japan Socialist Party and the JCP, but in the late 1960s it split decisively with the Communists. American scholars have almost always accepted the BLL's claim that the schism was ideological. As Upham (1980) put it, the JCP argued that "Buraku liberation can only be completely achieved through a transformation of Japanese society that will liberate all oppressed Japanese." By contrast, the BLL asserted that "discrimination is pervasive in Japanese society and present among members of the working class and the Communist Party itself."[30]

Some Japanese writers instead describe the BLL-JCP battle as part of the intra-JCP civil war. As the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China split in the 1960s over control of the international communist movement, so did the JCP. One faction stayed loyal to and took money from the Soviet Union, while the other faction chose China. The BLL leaders allied with the Soviet faction. The Chinese group won the battle for control of the JCP and purged the pro-Soviet bloc. The BLL leaders found themselves ousted along with the rest of the Soviet faction, and retaliated by expelling JCP members from the League.[31]

Yet in truth the BLL and the JCP had more to split over than ideology or international politics: substantial money was at stake -- the SMA subsidies. Long-time Stanford anthropologist Thomas Rohlen (1978, 689) hints at the issue when he reports that the 1969 SMA "placed a very large amount of money from the central government at

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[30] See also Neary (1997, 67). For a detailed discussion of "the Marxist position" on the burakumin, see Ruyle (1979).

[31] Ichinomiya & Guruupu K21 (2013, 19, 263, 282); see also: http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik4/2007-01-04/2007010426_01_0.html

the disposal of local governments." The BLL fought, he observed, "to gain the lion's share of the money for its own activities, members and organization" (Rohlen 1978, 689).

In any case, the BLL purged JCP loyalists from its ranks. It is hard not to wonder whether the conservative Liberal Democratic Party's support for the BLL might not have been connected to the BLL's purge of the Communists. The purge split the opposition left. To implement the purge, BLL leaders turned to the mob. They organized a several-hundred strong brigade and charged it with ridding the League of JCP-affiliates. To run the brigade, they named two men, both of whom brought dual roles: as BLL branch office heads and as members of the mob.[32]

4. The violence. -- The BLL hit the JCP loyalists hard. Like its predecessor organization Suiheisha it had long treated enemies to what it called "denunciation sessions" (kyudan). Best-known in the West were the April 1969 attacks on JCP-affiliated teachers in the Osaka neighborhood of Yata. A JCP middle-school teacher running for a union post circulated a routine leaflet complaining of overwork tied to buraku-related tasks. The BLL declared him a "discriminator" (sabetsusha) and launched its denunciation. They dragged JCP teachers to a local community hall and harangued them in front of 200 burakumin for over 12 hours.[33]

If the Yata "denunciations" were the best known, the 1974 "denunciations" against JCP teachers in Yoka were perhaps the most brutal.[34] Rohlen was in the prefecture at the time, doing anthropological fieldwork on high schools.[35] We quote his account of the controversial event at length:

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[32] Mori (2009, 33); Kadooka (2012, 52); Kadooka (2009, 268-69); Ichinomiya (2013, 96-97).

[33] See Japan v. [parties omitted], 782 Hanrei jiho 22 (Osaka D. Ct. June 3, 1975) (acquitting BLL leaders of illegal arrest), rev'd, 996 Hanrei jiho 34 (Osaka High Ct. Mar. 10, 1981); Kinoshita v. Osaka, 693 Hanrei jiho 111 (Osaka D. Ct. Oct. 30, 1979) (awarding denounced teachers damages against the Osaka city); translations by Frank Upham of all three opinions available in Milhaupt, et al. (2012). For a BLL justification for the session, see Akiyama, et al. (2004, 89).

[34] Japan v. Maruo, 523 Hanrei taimuzu 109 (Kobe D. Ct. Dec. 14, 1983)(convicting BLL leaders of false imprisonment), aff'd, 1309 Hanrei jiho 43 (Osaka High Ct. Mar. 29, 1988), aff'd (Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 1990); [No names given], 1350 Hanrei jiho 107 (Kobe D. Ct. Mar. 28, 1990) (awarding Yoka teachers damages against BLL leaders); Morimoto v. [No name given], 1273 Hanrei jiho 38 (Kobe D. Ct. Sept. 28, 1987) (holding Yoka city officials liable for illegally paying funds to BLL), aff'd, 696 Hanrei taimuzu 100 (Osaka High Ct. Feb. 15, 1989). For a BLL justification of the incident, see Akiyama, et al. (2004, 95).

[35] Rohlen (1976, 685-86); see Pharr (1990, ch. 5). The events were not well-reported in the news media. Rohlen (1976, 684 fn 2) explains how he obtained his information: "The data for this report come from (1) the following daily newspapers: Akahata, Kaiho, Kobe, Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, and (2) the following weekly magazines: Asahi Janaru, Sandai Mainichi, Shukan Asahi, Shukan Sankei. I was doing fieldwork in Kobe high schools from July 1974 until June 1975, and was in daily contact with teachers, union leaders and prefectural education officials. When the Yoka event occurred, I was in a position to learn many more details (from union handouts, gossip and second hand accounts) than appeared in the press. Several teacher acquaintances were from the Yoka area and they also reported to me how their relatives and friends (local farmers) responded to the event. I was only a direct observer of one confrontation -- that between party and league supporters outside the courthouse in Kobe in June when the trial of the League's Tajima leaders opened. There were many contradictory accounts and interpretations of the event at Yoka High School in December 1974 and January 1975. I have attempted to include only what I regard as establish facts, but even the court records and police files when they are made public will probably contain much that stirs controversy. One source I depended on heavily was the Yoka students'

> As students filed out [of the high school], 52 of the teachers left the school in a group. Several hundred yards beyond the gate they found their way blocked by League trucks parked across the road, with several hundred ... angry League supporters waiting by the trucks. Upon reaching the crowd, the teachers sat down with arms linked in the style of Japanese demonstrators faced by the police. ... [N]o sooner had the teachers sat down than the League supporters began yelling at them to get back into the school, accusing them of racism ... and accompanying this verbal assault with physical attacks on the teachers. The sitting teachers were kicked and hit repeatedly. Some had their hair pulled and some were yelled at with bull horns held to their ears. The leader of the teachers' union local was beaten the most severely. He reportedly was stood up and knocked down until he could no longer walk. All but one of the teachers was forced back into the school ....
>
> Inside the school the beatings continued relentlessly. ... One teacher was burned with a lighted cigarette, another was picked up by his hands and legs and dropped on the floor repeatedly. The union leader, periodically unconscious, was made to drink from a bucket of water filled with cigarette butts and then the filthy water was forced up his nose. Buckets of cold water were thrown on the victims and the bull horns were used again and again. The violence lasted into the night .... Of the fifty-two teachers that left the school that morning, twelve were listed with broken ribs, vertebrae or tibia. Some of them had many broken bones. Thirteen, including the twelve just mentioned, required at least six weeks of hospitalization. Five more were hospitalized for a month, 15 for from two to three weeks, and 15 more for over a week.

5. The "one window" policy. -- BLL leaders sought exclusive control over the SMA targeted subsidies. In their words, they sought a "one window" policy: all funds would arrive through "one window," and it would be a window they controlled.

BLL leaders first imposed the one-window policy on the city of Suita in Osaka prefecture. In June of 1969, they demanded that the Suita government accept the policy. When the city government balked, they sent 300 BLL members. For three days, report BLL critics, they surrounded the mayor's house. They banged drums through the night. They cut his gas, water, and telephone lines. They scaled his wall and climbed onto his grounds. Eventually, the mayor acquiesced (Nakahara 1988, 128-29; Ichinomiya & Group K21 2013, 270).

The BLL moved from city to city. As necessary -- again, according to its critics -- it repeated the tactics. When it faced the Habikino city government (in Osaka prefecture), for example, BLL members occupied city hall for 122 hours, and confined

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newspaper accounts which received wide national distribution, thanks to the fact that they confirmed much of what the Communist party was claiming."

The fact that the major newspapers tended not to report the event could plausibly result from two very different concerns: they may not have believed the JCP's claims of BLL violence, or they may have believed the claims and feared that the BLL would attack them too. Years later, burakumin writer Uehara (2014, ch. 3) travelled to Yoka to speak to those involved in the event. He tends to corroborate the reports of extensive violence.

the mayor for 22.[36] They did not obtain control everywhere, and when challenged they could lose in court.[37] In time, most (not all) cities dismantled the one-window policies, but the BLL continued to push for the control.

Given the early one-window policy, if a community wanted a share of the SMA subsidies, it needed a BLL branch office. Predictably enough given the money involved, formerly reluctant burakumin communities across the country rushed to establish branches. In time, BLL membership soared past 200,000 (Kadooka 2012, 36, 65,304; Kobayashi 2015, 12).

6. Predictable consequences. -- (a) Exogamy. Several consequences followed from the subsidy-driven association with organized crime and violence. Most obviously, the association contributed to the continued reluctance of many mainstream Japanese to let their children marry into the group. Most modern Japanese will evaluate potential sons- and daughters-in-law as individuals. They will not care whether someone's grandfather had worked as a butcher, but they will care whether their child marries someone from a family with ties to an organized crime syndicate.

(b) Employment. For similar reasons, some mainstream employers continued to avoid hiring applicants from the community. Firms want employees who are honest, who work hard, who give and take as necessary to further the firm's goals. Again, many (perhaps even most) firms will evaluate potential applicants as individuals. Others, however, will see a background in a community known for extortion and mob violence as a risk they cannot afford.

When the BLL decided to declare a firm "discriminatory" it threatened public "denunciation" unless the firm showed good faith. The easiest way to show good faith was to pay money. In 1975, the BLL attacked firms that bought books identifying the location of traditional burakumin communities. According to the BLL's most severe critics, it then formed a political arm that it funded through "contributions" from the firms it had just attacked. The "donations" ranged from 100,000 yen from the Rikkar sewing machine firm, to 3 million yen from Mitsubishi Real Estate (Terazono, et al. 2004, 298-99).

According to the BLL's most severe critics, the practice generalized. When the league accused an Osaka firm of "discrimination," reports one critic, the firm could avoid the "denunciation" by joining a "study group." Study groups were not free. Asserted one BLL critic, the League charged a sliding scale -- from 190,000 yen per year for firms with 101-500 employees, to 230,000 yen per year for those with 3001 employees or more (Tottori 2011, 60).

(c) Silence. Because of the extortion tied to accusations of "discrimination," mainstream media avoided saying anything about the community. The BLL routinely declared statements "discriminatory," and threatened denunciation. Even in 2015, former BLL author Kenji Kobayashi showed no qualms criticizing the Mainichi newspaper over

[36] Nakahara (1988, 128-29); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2013, 96-97, 270).

[37] E.g., Maeda v. Nishiwaki shi, 887 Hanrei jiho 66 (Kobe D. Ct. Dec. 19, 1977); Fukuoka shi v. Matsuoka, 870 Hanrei jiho 61 (Fukuoka High Ct. Sept. 13, 1977); see generally Upham (1980, 54-62).

a 1966 matter-of-fact headline: "Special Handling Is Inappropriate -- Dissent within Prefectural Office over Burakumin Policy Budget". He continued by criticizing the paper for publishing a letter to the editor (in 1967) that said "burakumin exist only in the mind." By that, the unfortunate but well-meaning author had meant that the distinction lacked any biological basis, and that "it's wrong to apply distinctions among human beings and among Japanese" (Kobayashi 2015, 89).

The examples are nearly endless. In 1981, the University of Tokyo Press published a Japanese translation of a book by Margaret Mead. In it, she used the traditional but derogatory and by-then politically incorrect term for the outcastes. The press withdrew the book, but the BLL continued its pressure anyway (Kobayashi 2015, 74-75). In 1982, a professor in a University of Tokyo workshop asserted that "there's no buraku problem in eastern Japan. It's just an issue for western Japan," he explained. "Even there, it's a financial dispute between the BLL and the JCP over the burakumin budget [the SMA subsidies]." For this, the BLL subjected him to "denunciation" (Kobayashi 2015, 76-77). These sorts of incidents make the entire field of burakumin news and scholarship a minefield.

II. Terminating the Subsidies

II.A. Early Targets:

As the 21st century opened, the government did not just end the subsidies; it sent in the police and prosecutors. For decades, police and prosecutors had tended to leave the BLL leadership alone. In 2004, however, they arrested Mitsuru Asada and ten other senior managers in the Hannan corporate group for defrauding the government of 5 billion yen. Asada had figured importantly in his local BLL branch office and had hired into the Hannan group two brothers with prominent positions in the Yamaguchi-gumi syndicate. The District Court sentenced Asada to 7 years in prison. The High Court reduced the sentence and affirmed.[38]

In 2005, police arrested landscapers in the burakumin trade association for rigging the bidding on Osaka city contracts. They arrested city officials too, catching them off-guard. "But we've been doing this for thirty years," one exclaimed. The court convicted them anyway (Kadooka 2012, 187; "Kaido" kei 2006).

News broke about the Ashihara Hospital. The hospital had served the burakumin community in Osaka and sported the BLL insignia proudly on its walls. It had also borrowed from the city 1.3 billion yen that it had not repaid. One nurse, herself a BLL member, complained:[39]

> The nurses and office workers are mostly local hires from the neighborhood. The hospital has half again as many workers as a normal hospital. You'd think that'd make the work easier, right? Not a chance. Too many of them are just loafing off ... The office workers watch TV during overtime. Some nurses can't even calculate how long they should run an IV. This stuff has implications for lives.

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[38] [Unnamed parties], 1918 Hanrei jiho 126 (Osaka D.Ct. May 27, 2005); see Kadooka (2012, 187); Ichinomiya, et al. (2012, 258-64); Ban (2016) (entry of July 24, 2010).

[39] Kadooka (2009, 271; 2012, 188-89). See generally Tomotsune (2012, ch. 3).

In 2006, police turned to the former head of the BLL branch office in the Osaka suburb of Yao. The man also worked as consultant to the Yamaguchi-gumi. Apparently, he had demanded benefits from city hall, and payoffs from firms that won public construction contracts. The police charged him with extortion and the court sent him to prison. His sentence was not long, and by 2014 the police had re-arrested him on new fraud charges.[40]

The media also began to report on Kyoto city workers. From 1996 to 2001, police arrested 16 city workers on amphetamine charges -- this in a country where voters expect (or at least hope for) immaculate lives of their government bureaucrats. Upon their arrest, police discovered histories of mob membership, cocaine use, paint-thinner abuse, and violence. Most of these workers had worked in departments where Kyoto ran preferential burakumin hiring programs (Terazono, et al. 2004, 47). Over the course of 2003-2006, Kyoto would discipline 70 employees for offenses ranging from battery and theft to absenteeism (Kadooka 2012, 191).

The bad news continued. From April 2006 to July 2007, police arrested another 15 city officials. This time their crimes again included using and selling amphetamines, but also involved destroying an ATM with a golf club, battery, and hit-and-run (Nakamura 2007, 4, 11-12).

By the end of 2006, the media reported that a BLL branch-office head employed by Nara city had reported for work just 8 days over the last 5-1/2 years. The rest of the time, he had called in sick and collected full pay. In truth, he had come to city hall regularly. But he had come (in a white Porsche, the media gleefully noted) to negotiate the terms of the city's contracts with the construction firm in his wife's name. The city duly fired him and the police arrested him on extortion charges relating to the construction work (Kadooka 2012, 191; Narashi 2006).

II.B. Legal Measures:

As the government moved to terminate the burakumin subsidies, so it began to restructure the law to facilitate prosecution. In 1991, it authorized prefectural governments to designate the mobs as organized crime syndicates based on factors like the number of members with criminal records.[41] Once they did so, police faced fewer procedural steps in moving against mob members. In 2011, it amended the statute to let them take additional steps against syndicates designated as especially dangerous (Kudo kai 2013; Ichinomiya, et al. 2016, 2). And through other legislation in 2000 and 2007, it facilitated police attacks against financial fraud and money laundering (Rankin 2012).

By 2010-2011, prefectural governments were passing their own anti-mob ordinances.[42] They typically left the wording ambiguous, but pressured ordinary firms to

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[40] Kadooka (2012, 190); Maruo (2006); Ichinomiya, et al. (2012, 150-51).

[41] Boryoku dan in ni yoru futo na koi no boshi ni kansuru horitsu [Law Relating to the prevention of Improper Activity by Members of Organized Crime Syndicates]. Law No. 77 of 1991.

[42] E.g., Tokyo to boryokudan haijo jorei [Tokyo Ordinance for the Exclusion of Organized Crime Syndicates], Jorei No. 54, Mar. 18, 2011; Aomori ken boryoku dan haijo jorei [Aomori Prefecture Ordinance for the Exclusion of Organized Crime Syndicates], Jorei 9 of Mar. 25, 2011; Iwate ken boryoku dan haijo jorei [Iwate Prefecture Ordinance for the Exclusion of Organized Crime Syndicates], Jorei 35 of Mar. 16, 2011; see generally Boryokudan (2012).

shun a wide variety of otherwise routine business with mob members. Usually, they banned local governments from contracting with mob entities. They encouraged firms to include in all contracts a clause that let them cancel a contract if a counter-party had mob connections. And they banned firms from investing in (or otherwise providing money to) mob affiliates.

Cumulatively, the statutes and prefectural ordinances put substantial pressure on the mob. Rankin (2012) reported "campaigns to prevent yakuza from participating in public auctions, to stop them from receiving welfare benefits, and to expel them from public housing projects." The Fukuoka police "cautioned a printing firm that had made business cards for a yakuza boss" (id.). And an Osaka court "sentenced a yakuza boss to ten months in jail for offering financial aid to the family of an incarcerated subordinate, an act of charity made unlawful" by the recent legal changes (id.).

II.C. Kunihiko Konishi:[43]

Yet the most headline-grabbing news involved BLL branch office head, Kunihiko Konishi. In 2006, police arrested the 72-year-old in his 30-something mistress's condominium. He had become an enormously rich man. His banker estimated that over the course of his life he earned 10 billion yen (Kadooka 2012, 101). He earned much of this money from loansharking and SMA-related kickbacks, but police also suspected him of laundering funds for the Yamaguchi-gumi. They tailed him for a year to identify the laundering (Mori 2015, 190-228). In turn, this led them to evidence of the embezzlement, and they arrested him on those charges in May of 2006.

Born in 1933 into a burakumin community between Osaka and Kyoto, Konishi dropped out after middle school. He spent multiple stints in prison for battery and extortion. He took up heroin. In due course he joined a branch of the Yamaguchi-gumi.[44] And in 1969, at the age of 35, he became head of the BLL branch office in the Asuka neighborhood of Osaka.

Konishi then convinced the city to let him turn a nearby lot into a parking facility. Nominally, he ran the lot through a neighborhood public service organization. In fact, he ran it fraudulently from the start. He told the city it held 90 cars; it actually held 200 to 400. Accounts vary, but at least by one of them he told the city it generated 70 million yen when it actually earned 200 million. In 2004, the city reported parking lot revenues over the first 30 years of 1.8 billion. Konishi had actually collected 5.0 billion, and forwarded the money, at least initially, to his syndicate.[45]

Konishi lived extravagantly. He owned a mansion in Nara (subletting his government-subsidized burakumin apartment in Asuka). He housed a succession of mistresses in assorted condominiums. He spent his evenings in lavish nightclubs, running bar tabs of 10 million yen per month (Kadooka 2012, 124). He rode a chauffeured Lincoln, and bought a Mercedes for his daughter (Ichinomiya & Group K21 2012, 79, 83; Mori 2009, 68). He entertained policemen at bars (Mori 2009, 128-30). He maintained close enough ties to the top leadership of the Yamaguchi-gumi that when

[43] See generally Kadooka (2012); Mori (2009); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 64-147).

[44] Kadooka (2012, 26, 29, 41); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 80); Mori (2015, 123).

[45] Kadooka (2012, 22, 60-63); Mori (2009, 22); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 71-76).

rivals gunned down the reigning don, they hit him in the lobby of a condominium held in Konishi's name (Kadooka 2012, 108).

Perhaps it was the scale of his corruption, or perhaps it was his prominence within the BLL. Prosecutors charged Konishi with embezzling 130 million yen from the parking lot (Kadooka 2012, 23). His earlier handler at the Mitsubishi UFJ (formerly Sanwa) bank killed himself before the police could move in. His current handler found himself arrested for aiding and abetting fraud.[46] The District Court convicted Konishi in 2007 and sentenced him to six years. He died later that year.

III. The Patterns of Corruption

III.A. Introduction:

During the three decades of the targeted subsidies, most corruption in the burakumin community occurred in one of five categories:

(1) Government contracts for infrastructural construction;
(2) Land sales to the government, primarily for infrastructure;
(3) Tax fraud;
(4) Accusations of "discrimination," after which a group would cancel denunciation sessions if a firm showed sufficient support for its efforts; and
(5) Control over the distribution of burakumin perquisites, including municipal government jobs.

The five tactics did not all follow directly from the SMA targeted subsidy program. They followed indirectly, however, by a straightforward logic: the subsidies drew large numbers of burakumin men into the organized crime syndicates; the syndicates raised the level of fear generated among mainstream Japanese; that fear increased the money some burakumin could extract from private firms or the government. Let us take each of the five in turn.

III.B. Construction Contracts:

Over the course of the SMA's targeted subsidy program, Japanese governments lavished 15 trillion on burakumin neighborhoods, much of it on construction. In just the single year of 1973, Osaka prefecture spent 66 billion yen, 75.9 percent on construction (Nakahara 1988, 132).

Because of the BLL's "one window policy," in most though not all areas the construction contracts went to firms that joined its Buraku Construction Association (BCA; the Dowa kensetsu kyokai). These firms paid the BCA 0.7 percent of the contract amount. According to one set of BLL critics, the practice earned the BCA 7 billion yen over about three decades.[47]

Nominally, only burakumin firms joined the BCA. Apparently, mainstream firms sometimes joined too. Profits on SMA-funded construction contracts were high enough, that is, that mainstream firms sought to become burakumin firms. To maintain

[46] Mori (2009, 18-19); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 68).

[47] Nakahara (1988, 132); Mori (2009, 77, 180); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2013, 108-11, 268); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 127).

appearances, the firm might name a prominent burakumin leader as its president, though a bribe might also suffice (Mori 2009, 180-83).

Some of the burakumin leaders who selected the winning bids apparently demanded tribute beyond the 0.7 percent BCA fee. Take Konishi. A businessman who handled the bidding for a mainstream construction firm explained (Mori 2009, 78, 180):

> If we were about to bid on an Osaka project, we usually visited Mr. Konishi first. After all, he ran the bidding. So if it looked as though the city was about to put a project out for bids, we'd visit him. We'd assemble a joint venture [with a BCA member firm], present it to him, and win his approval.

Once the firm won the bid, it paid 3 to 5 percent of the contract to Konishi personally (Kadooka 2012, 96).

Prominent burakumin could also divert subsidies to themselves through shell companies. To do so, they first formed a corporation. The corporation joined the BCA and partnered with a mainstream construction firm (like the one that visited Konishi). They bid on the government contract together, and on winning the bid the shell corporation took its cut and left the mainstream firm to do the work.[48]

According to its critics, some aggressive burakumin did not even limit SMA projects to buraku. Instead, at times they claimed to have found a burakumin community where none existed before. They arrived at an unsuspecting city hall with a large entourage and insisted that city officials designate a given area a buraku. They then demanded that the officials entertain bids for burakumin housing. If residents in the targeted area complained, they accused them of discrimination.[49]

In a more measured tone, one burakumin journalist reflected on the history of the construction projects. Writing in an official BLL publication, he observed (Kure 2004, 135; comments by Kadooka):

> I think there are cases where the business generated by the burakumin subsidies became the object rather than the means. The subsidies started because of the demand for improving the impoverished living environments. But there are lots of places where people instead organized BLL and [JCP-affiliated organization] branch offices in order to obtain the construction contracts themselves.

Because the construction projects involved such vast resources, they generated tensions within the criminal syndicates as well. The bloodiest period in the history of Japanese organized crime occurred in the mid-1980s, when war broke out between rival factions of Yamaguchi-gumi. It was not a simple succession fight, explains burakumin writer Manabu Miyazaki (Miyazaki & Otani 2000, 73). It was a fight for control over the massive revenue from the targeted subsidies.

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[48] Konishi himself owned the Noma komuten firm. It had very little equipment but won massive numbers of bids. Over one 5 year period, it captured over 2.1 billion yen's worth of city contracts. Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 83-84, 125, 238-39,); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2013, 271-72).

[49] Nakahara (1988, 28-44, 106-08); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2013, 267-68).

III.C. Land Transactions:

Sometimes, well-connected burakumin sold the government the land to use in the construction projects at inflated prices. Critics report examples from a wide variety of locations. When the government redeveloped Asuka, Konishi himself pocketed enormous gains (Kadooka 2012, 86). He bought land low, reported burakumin journalist Kadooka, and resold it to the government high. For a fee, he also negotiated high-priced sales of other people's land to the government.

One Osaka real estate agent observed (Kadooka 2012, 85-86): "Once Konishi became branch office head, I learned how to tell where a road was going to go in, and where housing would soon be built." He watched what Konishi bought, he told Kadooka. "Konishi once acquired a plot of district land for 17 million," he recalled. "He then sold it to the government for 30 million."

Consider several transactions between the Kita-Kyushu city government and BLL leaders in the 1970's. The Asahi newspaper initially broke the story, but it is not a story the BLL denies. The League disciplined the individuals involved, and Kadooka (2004, 63-64) candidly discusses (and criticizes) the corruption in a volume published by the BLL itself. The newspaper staff noted (Asahi 1982, 11):

Purchase by seller	Transfer to city	Intervening time	Price Multiple
9/24/1973	10/26/1973	1 mo.	1.7
9/28/1978	5/26/1979	7 mo.	1.8
12/17/1974	12/17/1974	0	2
2/17/1977	5/12/1977	3 mo.	3.5
12/_/1977	6/_/1978	6 mo.	3
7/2/1980	2/23/1981	8 mo.	2
4/24/1980	3/3/1981	10 mo.	3.2
11/14/1978	11/24/1978	10 days	3
8/3/1978	12/13/1978	4 mo.	7.3

The first line, for example, indicates that one burakumin bought land on September 24, 1973 which he resold to the city on October 26 for 1.7 times the amount he paid. The BLL official who conducted the second of the nine transactions made a 290 million yen profit on it, and he sold several other parcels to the city as well. All told, he earned 1.3 billion yen from land he sold to the government (Kadooka 2004, 63).

Problematic land transactions could also involve rentals. Ryu Matsumoto, grandson to mid-century burakumin leader Jiichiro Matsumoto, made a fortune renting land to the government. He represented a northern Kyushu district in the national Diet and has served in the cabinet. He has also chaired the Fukuoka prefectural BLL and served as vice chair of the national BLL.[50] As cabinet minister in 2010, he was the

[50] Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 44). Matsumoto's wife's sister was for a time married to a senior member of the Fukuoka mob (id., at 60).

wealthiest of all government bureaucrats. As a Diet member in 2011, he had the fifth highest income of all national legislators.[51]

Matsumoto earned much of this income from airport land rental. A former military airbase, the Fukuoka airport was located in a heavily residential area. Ryu Matsumoto's grandfather Jiichiro, who had good military connections, bought the airport land as it became a Japanese military base. The Japanese base turned into an American base and eventually into a civilian airport. Title passed from Jiichiro to grandson Ryu. The airport annually negotiated its rental charge with its landlords. When the airport needed to expand, the government suggested relocating it outside the city. Matsumoto vehemently and successfully fought the move, and his income stream remains (Ichinomiya & Group K21 2010, 24; 2012, 50).

III.D. Tax Fraud:[52]

Over the course of the three SMA-subsidy decades, many burakumin firms demanded special tax privileges. In one of its official histories, the BLL recounts with pride how this came to be (Buraku 1978, 106-26). In December 1967, forty members of the Osaka BLL and its new subsidiary organization, the Osaka Burakumin Business Federation (OBBF; Osaka fu dowa chiku kigyo rengo kai) marched into the local office of the National Tax Administration (NTA). They accused the staff of "discriminatory" taxation, and vowed to fight them with (their words) "aggressive" tactics (Buraku 1978, 109). A burakumin had sold a piece of land, they explained, and his auditor had refused to believe he could have sold it for so little (Buraku 1978, 109). The forty BLL and OBBF members "denounced" the tax staff for five hours.

The OBBF reappeared in the tax office the next month, the official history continues, this time with 400 burakumin. "The national tax office had refused to learn the reality of the buraku and its discrimination," it explained. So they pursued the tax agency staff for another five hours and scored (again, their words) "a knock-out" (Buraku 1978, 109).[53] The tax office agreed to seven principles, which included:

> 3. Returns ... that are submitted through the OBBF and under its supervision shall be accepted in full. Should there be a need to audit the content, the audit shall be conducted through the OBBF with its cooperation.
>
> 4. Burakumin business [dowa jigyo; i.e., business related to SMA projects] shall not be taxed.

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[51] He was grandson by adoption. Biologically, he is Jiichiro's brother's grandson. Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2012, 16, 43-51); see Tottori Loop & Mishima (2012).

[52] This account is available from a wide variety of sources. For relatively balanced versions, see Kadooka (2002, 88-92); Mori (2009, 115-20). For the BLL's own account , see Buraku (1978, ch. 9-2). For sources highly critical of the BLL, see Hira (1991, 53-74); Terazono, et al. (2004, 122-200); Ichinomiya, et al. (2004, 33-44); Nakahara, et al. (1988, 146-52).

[53] Buraku (1978, 109). The agreement was apparently renewed in 1978. See Ichinomiya, et al. (2004, 34). Both the BLL itself (Buraku 1978, 111) and its critics (Ichinomiya, et al. (2004, 34); Nakahara (1988, 147)) claim that the NTA agreed to adopt the same approach nationally. That said, the courts have adamantly denied that the national government would ever have agreed to such terms. E.g., Koku v. Sakamoto, 226 Zeishi 3337 (Osaka High Ct. June 15, 1995), aff'd on other grounds 226 Zeishi 3316 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1997)(appeal brief quoting lower court).

In effect, it seems, the local branch of the National Tax Office agreed to let the OBBF distribute tax cuts as it pleased. "An NTA official explained that income of 10 million yen would be reduced to 3 or 4 million," wrote one journalist (Kadooka 2012, 92). "Income of 20 million would be reduced to 5 or 6 million. In effect, two-thirds of income would be treated as tax-exempt."

Eyeing the prospect of a two-thirds tax discount, firms fought for the privilege of joining the buraku. Again, BLL officials in positions of power made that possible. According to one 1997 survey, 15 of the 52 Asuka OBBF firms had offices and owners outside of Asuka (Kadooka 2012, 92). Someone who knew Konishi well explained (Kadooka 2012, 92):

> It must have been sometime in the mid-1970s. I was asked by someone to give Mr. Konishi 6 million yen. It was in gratitude for letting him join the OBBF. ... You really were supposed to be burakumin. But other people were members too. In their cases, they had to pay money.

What was true for Osaka and Konishi generalized. Some mainstream firms bribed their way into the OBBF burakumin organization. Nationally, critics estimated that about one-fifth of OBBF members were not burakumin firms; they joined by paying someone to introduce them to the organization. Once members, they paid the OBBF for the qualified tax exemption -- typically, a price of about 20 percent of the tax avoided.[54]

OBBF membership did not provide total tax immunity, especially since the courts were not willing to enforce the policy.[55] There were limits, and already in 1989 the Osaka District Court declared 37 billion yen over the limit. The Diet had not yet discontinued the SMA subsidy programs, and the prosecutors had not yet moved on Konishi. Nonetheless, in 1986 prosecutors filed charges against Tokyo Pabuko (and related entities), the largest manufacturer of Japanese slot machines, and against the advisor who helped file its tax returns.[56] The firm had joined the OBBF and under-reported its income by 37 billion yen, some 98.5 to 99.9 percent. To enable it to join, an OBBF leader had put his mother on the firm's board. With its new burakumin status secure, the firm thought it could safely under-report its income. For the privilege, it paid the adviser 700 million yen, 200 million of which he kept as his personal fee and 500 million of which he transferred to the OBBF.

The District Court sentenced the advisor to 2 years and 8 months in prison and a 200 million yen fine.[57] It was not pleased with how the Osaka tax office handled OBBF

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[54] See Ichinomiya, et al. (2004, 39, 43-44); Nakahara (1988, 152); Hira (1991, 64-66); Terazono, et al. (2004, 122-36, 200).

[55] Prosecutors could be particularly hard on burakumin groups that sponsored tax evasion in exchange for fees. See Koku v. Sakamoto,, 226 Zeishi 3337 (Osaka High Ct. June 15, 1995), aff'd on other grounds 226 Zeishi 3316 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1997).

[56] The case was widely reported. Koku v. Nakatani, 197 Zeishi 2713, 1989 WLJPCA 07066001 (Osaka D. Ct. July 6, 1989), modified 197 Zeishi 2670, 1992 WLJPCA 08266004 (Osaka High Ct. Aug. 26, 1992). See also, e.g., Hira (1991, 58-65); Ichinomiya, et al. (2004, 39-44).

[57] Koku v. Nakatani, 197 Zeishi 2713, 1989 WLJPCA 07066001 (Osaka D. Ct. July 6, 1989).

returns: "The burakumin organization was used for tax evasion, and it cannot be said that the response of the local tax office was unproblematic." On appeal, the advisor's lawyers stressed the OBBF's special arrangement with the tax office. They quoted the third of the seven principles and argued that in the wake of the principles the tax office had never required any of the OBBF's other 9,000 members to amend a return. On the impropriety of it all, however, the High Court agreed with the District Court: "In the background to this case, there has been a problem in the response of the local tax office." It cut the sentence to two years, and affirmed.[58]

III.E. Extortion:

As the targeted subsidy programs began to shift resources into burakumin-controlled criminal groups, some of those groups coupled accusations of "discrimination" with extortion. Firms responded by paying them to go away.[59]

Observers date the phenomenon to the 1980s. Freelance journalist Manabu Miyazaki was himself burakumin, the son of a mob leader. He (Miyazaki & Otani 2000, 73) reports:

> This period [in the mid-1980s] was the time when outcaste extortion was at its peak. ... During this period, the sheer scale of revenue coming into the mob changed. Earlier, the mob had done things like sell amphetamines. But compared to these traditional activities, the amount that the mob could obtain through outcaste extortion was vastly higher.

By the time the Ministry of Justice surveyed the problem in 1989, the extortion had turned epidemic. The Ministry contacted 5,906 firms, of whom 4,097 responded. Of the respondents, 17.5 percent reported they had been targeted by at least one burakumin group for extortion within the course of 1988. Typically, group members would shout at firm employees over the telephone, accusing the firm of not understanding the burakumin problem. Sometimes they boasted about their ties to politicians, and sometimes they threatened to cause regulators to investigate the firm (Homu sho 1989, 33).

The groups did not leave firms alone after only one call. Targeted firms were approached 3.2 times on average, 8.8 times within Osaka. From most firms, they demanded money -- such things as cash, subscription to over-priced publications, or loans. From the construction firms, they demanded a cut of the contracts (Homu sho, 1989, 11, 33-37). One third of the firms attacked agreed to at least some of the demands. The smaller firms were the most likely to succumb. Among the firms with 1,000 or more employees, 25.0 percent of the targeted firms acceded to at least one demand, but among those with fewer than 50 employees, 38.8 percent agreed (Homu sho 1989, 50).

III.F. Perquisites.

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[58] Koku v. Nakatani, 197 Zeishi 2670, 1992 WLJPCA 08266004 (Osaka High Ct. Aug. 26, 1992).

[59] The "politically correct" term for these extortion attempts is "fake burakumin actions," or "ese dowa koi." The BLL uses the term for extortion attempts it has not authorized ex ante and for behavior it decides to renounce after the fact (e.g., Konishi's; see Kadooka 2012, 208). Apparently following this logic, Rankin (2012) writes that the "yakuza themselves exploit the situation by posing as Burakumin rights groups and pressuring businesses to pay them compensation."

1. Financial perquisites. -- Under the SMA, the national and local governments did not just pay contractors to build community centers; they also provided burakumin families with a long list of other benefits.[60] In cities where the local government had accepted the BLL's one window policy, the League dictated who would or would not receive these benefits. When the BLL excluded its rivals (e.g., burakumin affiliated with the JCP), the excluded families sometimes sued. The families generally won, and over time the local governments dismantled the one-window policies in most areas.[61]

2. Housing. -- The government built public housing specifically for burakumin families. Because it heavily subsidized the rent, the units were highly desirable for people already living in the neighborhoods. Through its one-window policy, the local BLL elite could decide which families would live in the subsidized apartments. In 1980s Asuka, claims burakumin journalist Kadooka, some League leaders extracted as much as 700,000 yen from families for access to these units (Kadooka 2012, 86-87; see also Nakahara 1988, 78).

With their newfound private wealth, some BLL leaders left the community and built themselves nice homes elsewhere. Some of them kept their subsidized public housing units, and sublet them to other families -- sometimes to non-burakumin families (Kadooka 2012, 153-54). With housing as with construction and tax benefits, mainstream Japanese could and did bid for admittance to burakumin status.

3. Jobs. -- Soon after the SMA took effect, the BLL sought preferential hiring policies from local city halls. The SMA statute itself did not mandate this preferential hiring any more than it mandated the one window policy. Shortly after its enactment, however, burakumin began "denouncing" city governments and extracting promises to hire more outcastes (Nakahara 1988, 86). Several city governments acquiesced. By the early 2000s, men and women hired under these promises would form the bulk of the Kyoto employees arrested on amphetamine and other criminal charges (Nakamura 2007, 22).

The city of Kyoto delegated hiring in several municipal departments. Formally, it used an exam, but only formally. Substantively, it gave burakumin "a free pass." Because of the split between the BLL and the JCP, it allocated hiring quotas to both the League and a JCP-affiliated burakumin group. These organizations nominated candidates for employment, and the city hired as they specified. Naturally, the

[60] Lists of these benefits appear at, e.g., Terazono (2005, 37-40), Terazono (2004, 292-93); Upham (1980, 49).

[61] E.g., Higashi v. Osaka shicho, 30 Gyoshu 1352 (Osaka High Ct. July 30, 1977)(school expenses); Fukuoka shicho v. Matsuoka, 870 Hanrei jiho 61 (Fukuoka High Ct. Sept. 13, 1977)(housing loan); Maeda v. Nishiwaki shi, 887 Hanrei jiho 66 (Kobe D. Ct. Dec. 19, 1977) (housing loans); Boryoku ni hantai shi, etc. v. Ashiya shi, 979 Hanrei jiho 107 (Kobe D. Ct. Apr. 25, 1980)(meeting space access); Nagai v. Osaka-shi shokuin rodo kumiai, 987 Hanrei jiho 112 (Osaka D. Ct. June 25, 1980) (union member meeting); Kono v. Kita-kyushu shi, 1005 Hanrei jiho 150 (Fukuoka High Ct. July 8, 1980) (nursery school access). See generally Upham (1980); Terazono 2004, 203-04, 287); Ichinomiya, et al. (2013, 264-65); Asahi (1982, 52-55, 60-69).

burakumin groups nominated on the basis of "how much the person had contributed to the movement."[62]

Policies varied by city. In Kyoto, the city gave the burakumin leaders effective hiring authority for the sanitation bureau, the waterworks, the traffic bureau, and the education committee. In Osaka, it assigned the burakumin leaders hiring authority for school office positions, cleaning work, and the school lunch kitchens. In Kyoto, burakumin hires constituted about one-fourth of the government employees; in Osaka they came to 4.4 percent. Among the residents of the Kyoto burakumin communities, 34.5 percent worked for the city.[63]

The city jobs paid well. According to one BLL critic, Osaka sanitation workers in 2012 earned 6.6 million yen per year. Workers in private trash disposal firms earned 4.2 million (Ban 2016; entry of 2/11/2012).

IV. Empirics:

IV.A. The Effect of the Targeted Subsidies:

Let us now turn to the effect of the termination of these subsidies. We reason that the targeted programs during the SMA years caused the following five phenomena. In turn, these phenomena affected both a young burakumin's decision to pursue education and enter the Japanese mainstream, and the desirability of housing within the buraku to non-burakumin.

Hypothesis 1. The programs raised the returns to burakumin identity. -- The portfolio of policies that the BLL extracted from the national and municipal governments increased the return to identifying oneself as burakumin. If -- but only if -- one identified as burakumin, one could enjoy the financial benefits, the subsidized housing, the job preferences, and the tax advantages. Those returns lowered a burakumin's incentive to leave the community and melt into the Japanese mainstream.

Hypothesis 2. The programs increased fear and resentment against burakumin. The BLL tactics generated outrage. Some of its leaders maintained close ties to the mob. Sometimes, those leaders exploited the ties to extract revenue and favorable policies from the municipal and national governments. Sometimes they extorted money from mainstream firms. To stifle opposition, sometimes they terrorized the media.

Groups cannot do this without building resentment, resentment even against members who disapprove of the tactics. That resentment, in turn, will increase the hostility burakumin encountered. The greater the hostility, the harder enterprising individuals will find it to leave the community and join mainstream Japanese society.

The subsidy-driven ties between the burakumin and the mob (see Hypothesis 4, below) similarly increased the discrimination burakumin encountered. As noted earlier, many (if not most) Japanese will not care whether someone's grandfather worked as a butcher. They do care whether that person runs with the mob or comes from a family with close ties to the mob. The targeted subsidies raised the returns to crime, and drove

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[62] Nakamura (2007, 18-19); Terazono (2004, 56).

[63] Kadooka (2012, 73); Terazono (2004, 57); Nakamura (2007, 4, 19).

many young burakumin men into the syndicates. To the extent that this increased mob presence among the burakumin, it increased anti-buraku animus.

The connection between the SMA and discrimination was not lost on the burakumin -- or even on the BLL. As one burakumin put it (Terazono 2005, 46):

> As long as we have these special facilities [provided by the SMA], our neighbors will think we enjoy special favors -- and the hostility against us will continue.

Writing in a book published by the BLL itself, burakumin journalist Kadooka complained (2004, 48):

> These scandals involving the BLL (and the [JCP- and LDP-affiliated] buraku organizations) did not just reproduce and expand the negative image of the liberation movement. They reproduced and expanded the negative image of the ... buraku residents themselves
>
> I can't be the only one who thought, hey BLL, what in the world did you think you were doing?

Hypothesis 3. The programs reduced the transaction cost of discrimination against the burakumin. By channeling SMA revenue into community centers and public housing complexes, the BLL constructed visible markers of burakumin location —- markers that were literally concrete. A mainstream Japanese could identify a burakumin only by residence. Absent the SMA construction projects, many areas would be known as buraku only to long-time members of the municipality. With the projects complete, burakumin neighborhoods were simple even for out-of-town visitors to identify.[64]

Effectively, the SMA lowered the transactions cost of discrimination. No longer was it necessary to hire a knowledgeable detective; no longer necessary were bribes to trace back someone's confidential family registry: a person could simply ask whether someone's address was near a SMA community center (Kadooka 2016, 51). Even now, lists of these community centers remain readily available on the Internet. This crude technique will not identify all burakumin neighborhoods, and it will sweep in non-burakumin who happen to live near a community center. But the cheaper it becomes for mainstream Japanese to identify a buraku, the harder an enterprising burakumin will find it to leave the community.

Hypothesis 4. The programs raised the returns to organized crime. -- For the criminal syndicates, the targeted subsidies were easy money. Critics of the BLL describe the SMA as central to the growth of the mob during the period. Some of its most strident critics argue (Ichinomiya, et al. 2012, 4):

> The reason that the Yamaguchi-gumi has become Japan's largest designated criminal syndicate lies primarily in the SMA. With the stated goal of

[64] Kadooka (2016, 10) articulated the tension between the BLL leadership and the bulk of the burakumin themselves: "the buraku liberation movement sought the liberation of burakumin as burakumin. In fact, however, many burakumin sought liberation from their status as burakumin."

> improving the bad living environments in the outcaste areas, the statute stayed in effect from 1969 to 2002. During that time, an enormous amount of money -- 15 trillion yen -- flowed into the former burakumin communities. The Yamaguchi-gumi identified these funds, and turned them into a source of the capital it needed to expand its power.

Burakumin journalist Miyazaki (Miyazaki & Otani 2000, 73) does not explicitly name the statute, but he notes clearly the change in mob income at the time. During the 1980s, he writes, "the sheer scale of revenue coming into the mob changed." Compared to its income under its traditional activities, "the amount [it] could obtain through outcaste extortion was vastly higher."

In turn, for young burakumin, the mob offered a relatively more attractive career than it had in years past. It required little education. And in the pre-subsidy years, it had paid very little. Under the subsidy regime, however, the potential returns to organized crime skyrocketed. It now promised an ambitious young burakumin the potential for very high pay.

Hypothesis 5. <u>The programs lowered the marginal returns to education</u>. -- Through their violent tactics, the burakumin groups acquired the power to place favored members in municipal jobs. Because they could make these appointments unilaterally, students who wanted city jobs sensed less urgency to master the high school curriculum. Kazuo Nakamura (2007, 21), twice an unsuccessful JCP candidate for the Kyoto mayor's office, quotes a burakumin resident:

> The hiring program was a real impediment to the resolution of the buraku problem. ... Many of the children and young people ... could have chosen a variety of paths after they graduated from high school or university. Once this program came into effect, though, they knew they could find a job in government whether or not they studied. It simply destroyed their ambition.

Not only could a young burakumin find a job in city hall, he could work in an organized crime syndicate (Hypothesis 4). Neither job required much schooling. In effect, the combination of the preferential municipal hiring and the large returns to organized crime decreased a young burakumin's incentive to invest in his education.[65].

IV.B. <u>The Effect of Subsidy Termination</u>:

We reason that the termination of the subsidy programs in 2002 had the following four effects.

Effect 1. <u>Ending the programs increased out-migration from burakumin neighborhoods</u>. -- With the targeted subsidies gone, the most resourceful burakumin should increasingly choose to leave the community. They earn fewer perquisites from remaining (H1), and face less hostility from the outside community (H2). Note, however,

[65] Nakamura (2007, 20). Kadooka makes the same point at (2016, 199).

that the community centers and housing projects do continue to facilitate discrimination (H3).

Effect 2. Ending the programs increased investment in education. -- With emigration easier, with the mobs offering low pay, and with municipal jobs subject again to competitive hiring, young burakumin should invest more heavily in education (H5). Over time, this should cause still higher levels of emigration.

Effect 3. Ending the programs lowered the power of organized crime. -- For the mob, the targeted subsidies provided a key source of revenue. As the subsidies disappeared, the syndicates should become less attractive to young burakumin (H4). Hence:

(a) The syndicates should shrink in size. They will recruit fewer new members, and recruit less heavily from among the burakumin.

(b) With the subsidies gone, mob members will have little reason to intervene in BLL affairs. BLL membership should fall. Recall that the leadership of the league traditionally drew from both intellectuals and the mob. With the subsidies gone, many mob members would disappear from BLL affairs and the relative influence of the intellectuals and idealists should increase.

(c) Discrimination against burakumin should fall. With fewer ties between the burakumin community and the mob, those Japanese who avoided burakumin out of fear (H2) will no longer discriminate against them.

Effect 4. Ending the programs increased real estate prices. As burakumin adopt the educational focus shared by their non-buraku neighbors (Effect 2), as the criminal syndicates lose power (Effect 3), and as burakumin-induced government corruption comes to an end, buraku neighborhoods will become increasingly attractive places for mainstream Japanese to live. With less organized crime, government corruption, and extortionate subsidies, the aversion that many mainstream Japanese held to living in buraku neighborhoods should decrease. To the extent that this aversion declines, real estate prices will rise.

IV.C. Buraku Location:

1. The 1936 census. -- Our study of the effect of subsidy termination turns on locating burakumin neighborhoods. We do so with a 1936 census conducted by the government through its affiliated burakumin organization, the Chuo yuwa jigyo kumiai. The 342-page handwritten document gives the location of each community, the number of burakumin households in each, and the burakumin population in each. Most of the information dates from 1935.

We have taken this list and converted the 1936 locations to modern municipalities. For the most part, only the largest cities retain the names they had in 1936. The vast majority of the present-day 1,742 municipalities have split, merged, and changed names, often multiple times. For each entry in the census, we traced the 1936 community to its current location.

We obtained the 1936 census in late 2015. Writing pseudonymously as Tottori Loop, one Tatsuhiko Miyabe had briefly posted the document on his Internet site.

Miyabe apparently works as a free-lance writer and publisher and for several years has waged a bitter anti-corruption campaign against the BLL. When in early 2016 he threatened to publish hard copies of the 1936 census, the BLL sued. On April 18, 2016, the Yokohama District Court enjoined him from publishing the hard copies and ordered him to dismantle his website. It is not clear what the court would have done if Miyabe had simply posted the census, but he also listed the names, home addresses, and home telephone numbers of 140 BLL leaders and listed the most common burakumin family names in several communities. Out of deference to this court order, and because they contain little value to scholarly readers, we omit the identities of the 1936 communities in this article.[66]

We have no reason to doubt the general reliability of the 1936 census. Given that Chuo yuwa was more moderate than the violent Suiheisha that evolved into the post-war BLL, one might have expected the BLL to attack it. The BLL does not. Instead, at least one official BLL publication relies on the actual totals given in the census (Noguchi 1997, 13). Wagatsuma & De Vos (1967, 117) rely on its numbers as well.

To be sure, the census is not entirely complete. For example, though Wagatsuma (1967, 93) refers to a burakumin community in Aomori, the census includes no such area. The prefectural distributions from a 1920 government census (reproduced at Wagatsuma & De Vos 1967, 116 and Chuo yuwa, 1936, 336) similarly show burakumin communities in some northeast areas not listed in the 1936 census.

Nonetheless, the 1936 census correlates closely with several other post-war prefectural censuses. Despite the massive migration within Japan during the war and early post-war years, the locations of the burakumin communities have remained largely unchanged. The BLL itself published burakumin censuses for Osaka (in 1958) and Nagano (in 1963). Another group published them for Wakayama (in 1952), and still another for Tottori (in 1979). The pairwise correlation of the Tottori burakumin population (for each modern municipality) in 1979 with the population given in the 1936 census is .696, for Osaka in 1958 it is .985, for Nagano (households) in 1963 it is .987, and for Wakayama in 1952 it is .978.[67]

In Panel A of Table 1, we report the prefectural distribution of burakumin according to the 1936 census. We order the prefectures by standard government practice, roughly from the northeast to the southwest. As discussed earlier, note that very few buraku appeared in central and northeastern Japan. Instead, most burakumin lived in the Kansai prefectures (Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama), and several of the prefectures farther to the southwest. Other than Shiga, every Kansai prefecture had more burakumin than any of the 23 prefectures to the northeast. Kansai is also the focus of the BLL. And together with Fukuoka, it is the center of Japanese organized crime. Indeed, the Yamaguchi-gumi itself began in the early 20th century as a Kobe (Hyogo) dockyard gang.

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[66] See Dowa chiku (2016); Hisabetsu (2016); Kadooka (2016, 60-65)

[67] Several of these post-war books are widely available from libraries. Miyabe had also posted these on his website. Out of deference to the 2016 court order against Miyabe, we omit the names of the books.

In Panel B, we give the cities (using the 2015 municipal boundaries) with the most burakumin in 1936. None of these cities lies to the northeast of Kansai. Instead, each is either in Kansai itself, or in regions further to the southwest.

2. BLL branch offices. -- For comparative purposes, we use a list of BLL branch offices. We took this list from the Internet, where it was probably posted by someone hostile to the BLL. Here too reliability is an obvious question, but note that the correlation coefficient between (a) the number of branch offices in a municipality, and (b) the 1936 burakumin population, is .570.[68]

IV.D. Variables:

1. Burakumin variables. -- We calculate the following variables for burakumin neighborhoods:

> **Burakumin:** The number of outcastes living in 1936 in the area covered by the modern municipality, per 10,000 of the municipality's population in 1980.
>
> **BLL Branch Offices:** The number of BLL branch offices in a modern municipality, per 10,000 of the municipality's population in 1980.

We include selected summary statistics in Table 2. Note that about half the Japanese municipalities (812/1742) include a burakumin community. Note too that about 100 municipalities with a burakumin community (812-701) do not have a BLL branch office.

[Insert Table 2 about here.]

2. Panel variables. -- Our panel data derive from a wide variety of government sources. They cover all 1,742 Japanese municipalities.[69] There are no unincorporated areas in Japan, so this covers the entire country. These government sources treat Tokyo as a prefecture, and each ward (ku, shi) as a municipality. They treat the other large cities (e.g., Yokohama, Osaka) as single municipalities. In compiling the data from past years, the government reports that it has traced the modern municipalities back to the composite geographical areas. In other words, if a given area shifted from one municipality to another, the government followed the current geographical lines to re-calculate the values for the relevant municipalities in the years prior to the shifts. Table 2 contains summary statistics.

We calculate the following:

a. Dependent variables.

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[68] The site uses a fictitious variation on the BLL's name. Out of deference to the 2016 court order against Miyabe, we omit the location of the site.

[69] We downloaded the data for all of these variables from the central government website: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/chiiki/CommunityProfileTopDispatchAction.do?code=2

Out-migration: Number of Japanese citizens who leave the municipality, per 10,000 population, every year from 1996 to 2010 (Somusho, Jumin, various years).

Real estate prices: mean prices of surveyed pieces of real estate, in yen per square meter times 1,000, available for every year beginning in 1993 (Kokudo, various years).

b. Control variables.

Income: Per capita reported taxable income (personal only) for the preceding year in millions of yen (about tens of thousands of dollars), every year from 1985 to 2010 (Somusho, Shichoson zei, various years).

Population: Population, divided by 1000. Because the Japanese government publishes a population census only every five years, we interpolate for the intervening years (Somusho, Kokusei, various years).

Density: Population, divided by area of municipality, in tens of hectares (100,000 sq. meters), every year from 1981 to 2010 (Somusho, Kokusei, various years).

Birth rate: Births per 10,000 population, every year from 1980 to 2010 (Kosei, Jinko, various years).

Death rate: Deaths per 10,000 population, every year from 1980 to 2010 (Kosei, Jinko, various years).

V. Results

V.A. Out-migration:

1. DID. -- With the end of the targeted subsidy program, emigration out of the burakumin neighborhoods increased. In Table 3, we use a standard difference-in-differences design to explore the effect of the program termination on burakumin emigration. More specifically, we ask whether the presence of more burakumin is associated with a bigger shift in emigration after 2002. As our dependent variable, we use the out-migration rate (per capita) from each municipality. In all regressions, we use year fixed-effects. Because the number of burakumin in a municipality in 1936 does not change over the course of 1980-2010, we do not use municipality fixed-effects. In each case, the regression is OLS.

We begin with the simplest design (Reg. (1)). As independent variables, we use (a) the number of burakumin in the municipality in 1936 (per capita); (b) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year was after 2002; (c) the interaction between the number of burakumin and the post-2002 dummy; (d) population; and (e) per capita income. In later regressions, we add (f) population density (to proxy for urbanization), (g) the birth rate (to proxy for age distribution), and (h) the death rate (to proxy for age distribution).

[Insert Table 3 about here.]

Crucially, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant: after the programs ended in 2002, out-migration increased more at the municipalities with high burakumin concentrations than elsewhere. In general, the cities with more burakumin had lower out-migration rates than other cities (as the negative coefficient on the basic *Burakumin* variable indicates). Although this remains true even after 2002, the out-migration rate from municipalities with *burakumin* begins to climb.

In Regression (2), we add population density and the birth and death rates, but the basic point remains unchanged: after 2002, the rate at which people began to leave burakumin areas increased more than the rates at which they left the other municipalities.

Note several other points. Richer families are more mobile than poorer: migration is positively correlated with income. Younger families are more mobile than older: migration is positively correlated with the birth rate. Urban families are more mobile than rural: migration is positively correlated with population density.

2. BLL branch offices. In Regression (3), we use the same specification as Column (2) but identify burakumin communities by the number of BLL branch offices. As noted earlier, the correlation between the 1936 population and several post-war prefectural censuses is high. We nonetheless offer the number of BLL branch offices per capita as an additional test for how accurately the 1936 census captures the location of modern burakumin.

The results remain unchanged: with the end of the SMA targeted subsidies, the rate at which people left the cities with higher numbers of BLL branch offices increased more than it did elsewhere.

3. Year-interaction terms. To study the pace at which out-migration from burakumin communities increased after 2002, in Regressions (4) and (5) we interact our burakumin variable with the specific post-2002 years -- in Regression (4) with the 1936 burakumin population, and in Regression 5 with the BLL branch offices. The results are similar.

Consider Regression (4). The coefficient on the number of burakumin per capita in 1936 is again negative: cities and towns with more burakumin generally had lower out-migration rates than others. Starting about 2005, however, the migration-deficit in burakumin communities began to disappear. The difference in migration out of burakumin and non-burakumin areas continued to increase until 2008, by which year two-thirds of the original deficit in the out-rate from burakumin areas (.0267/.0403) had disappeared.

According to observers, the key to leaving the buraku is education. Journalist Kadooka (2009, 107) quoted a middle-aged burakumin:

> Once summer arrives, some of the elementary and middle school students hang around in front of the cultural center and sniff paint thinner. ... By third or fourth grade, you can tell that these kids aren't keeping up in school. The other ones -- the kids who can handle the school work -- go on to good universities and get good company jobs. They leave the buraku to live their own lives.

Writes one former activist (Ban 2016; post of 2/19/2012), "talented young people and those with self-confidence leave the buraku." For the most part, "the only people left are old people and those who work in [government] administration."

V.B. Regional Effects:

As an additional check on our exercise, turn to the regional and municipal-level regressions in Table 4. As Table 1A shows, the Kansai cities of Kobe, Osaka, and Kyoto had the largest burakumin communities in 1936. Other large communities appear on the island of Shikoku across the Inland Sea and in Okayama, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka to the west. Organized crime is also primarily a Kansai and Fukuoka urban phenomenon. Tokyo has its gangs too, but the core of the mob lies in the Kansai cities and Fukuoka (it is one of the few areas of life in Japan *not* centered in Tokyo).

[Insert Table 4 about here.]

Recall our claim: we posit that the large influx of government funds under the SMA presented the criminal syndicates with a massive source of new income. This increase in the expected revenue from criminal activity systematically diverted young burakumin away from legal businesses. Rather than invest in their education and leave the buraku, young men quit school and joined the mob. When the funds stopped in 2002, the relative expected returns from illegal and legal activity shifted back toward legitimate business. More than before, young men now invested in their education, found jobs in mainstream Japan, and left. For most practical purposes, they ceased to be burakumin.

Turn first to Table 4, Panel A. For these regressions, we partition our dataset by the median municipal population (29,200) in 1980. In Column (1), we regress out-migration per capita at the larger cities on the Table 2, Regression (2) variables. In Column (2) we do the same for the smaller municipalities. Organized crime is primarily an urban phenomenon, and the significant increase in burakumin out-migration after 2002 appears only among the larger cities.

In Panel B, we estimate the same regressions for the various geographical regions. Japanese organized crime has its core in the Kansai region, and in both Kansai (Reg. (1)) and Shikoku, (Reg. (2)) the out-migration from the buraku increases significantly after 2002. In the prefectures to the east and north, burakumin communities are smaller and fewer. The results for those areas are qualitatively similar though not significant: the coefficient on the interaction term is even larger than for Kansai and Shikoku, but the standard errors are larger too (Reg. (5)). The criminal syndicates play a smaller role in the Chugoku area (primarily Hiroshima and Okayama), and the coefficient on the interaction term there is not positive (Reg. (4)).

The Kyushu results (Reg. (3)) reflect the decimation of the coal industry. During the first-half of the 20th century, the northern Kyushu prefecture of Fukuoka served as the center of the coal industry. Most Kyushu burakumin lived in Fukuoka and many worked the mines. Japanese coal is no longer competitive and the burakumin in the former mining towns now have little work other than environmental cleanup efforts. The town described earlier as something out of the "Wild West" (Sec. I.C.1.) is one of these decimated coal-mining towns. People had been leaving these communities long before

2002. For Fukuoka itself (Panel C Reg. (5)), the coefficient on *Burakumin* is a positive .063 with a t-statistic of 3.39. Out-migration from the Fukuoka buraku did not increase for a simple reason: it was already very high.

In Panel C, we also estimate the basic regression for the four principal Kansai prefectures. We find no increase in post-2002 burakumin out-migration from the relatively rural Wakayama. The results for the region's urban core -- Hyogo, Osaka, and Kyoto -- however, are consistent: after 2002, out-migration increased. Together with Fukuoka, these three Kansai prefectures are urban; they contain most of the largest buraku in the country; they and constitute the core of the BLL; and they are home to some of the principal organized crime syndicates. The coefficient on the interaction term ranges from .02 for Kyoto to .05 for Osaka to .06 for Hyogo. The coefficient for Osaka is not significant, but for Hyogo and Kyoto is significant at 1 and 5 percent.

V.C. Real Estate Prices:

In Table 5 we explore real estate prices. Unambiguously, as the targeted subsidies came to an end, real estate prices in cities with larger burakumin communities rose. In Regressions (1) and (2), we regress municipality-level real estate prices on the independent variables used in Table 3, Regressions 1 and 2. As one would expect, prices are higher in wealthier cities, in denser cities, and in areas with an older population. Crucially, however, the interaction term between the 1936 burakumin population and the post-2002 years is positive and significant: prices in cities with larger burakumin neighborhoods rose more than prices in other cities after 2002. In Regression (3) we identify the burakumin neighborhoods by BLL branch offices rather than the 1936 census. The results remain unchanged.

[Insert Table 5 about here.]

In Regression (4) and (5), we regress real estate prices on the specific year-interaction terms used in Table 3's Regressions (4) and (5). The subsidy program was initially limited to ten years. It continued through a series of temporary extension statutes, but voters increasingly objected to the corruption, extortion, and mob power that ensued. Facing that voter pressure, the government signaled that it would end the subsidies several years before it actually did so. We expect that real estate professionals would impound those expectations in market prices before 2002, and so the results show.

We interpret the data as indicating that once people knew that the government would end the subsidies in 2002, they began bidding up the real-estate prices in burakumin areas. With the end to the subsidies in sight, they expected the mob to lose power, the extortion to fall, and the burakumin themselves to turn from criminal to legal careers and integrate themselves into mainstream society. And so, for the most part, the burakumin did. All else equal, the typical poor person would no doubt still prefer to live outside of a burakumin neighborhood. But all else is not equal, especially in a market equilibrium. The burakumin areas offer lower rents. Many are closer to the central city and promise a shorter commute. As the general hostility toward the burakumin declined, mainstream Japanese moved to the formerly burakumin areas and bid up the price of real estate.

In Table 6, we replicate the Table 4 robustness checks using real estate prices as the dependent variable. The results suggest a phenomenon analogous to Table 4: the areas driving the positive price effect were the areas that had earlier housed the most militant BLL branches and the most concentrated organized crime syndicates. Note first that if we partition the database by the median municipality population, the coefficients on the interaction term are insignificant for both the large and the small municipalities. The post-2002 outmigration from burakumin communities was an urban phenomenon (Table 4 Panel A). By contrast, the post-2002 increase in real estate values for the burakumin communities does not seem limited to either rural or urban environments (Table 6 Panel A).

[Insert Table 6 about here.]

In Panel B of Table 6, we divide the panel data by region. As with the increased burakumin out-migration (Table 4 Panel B), the buraku real estate price increase is a function of the Kansai and Shikoku areas. It was in Kansai that the BLL established its reputation for militancy and violence, and it is from Kansai that the Yamaguchi gumi reaches out to the rest of Japan. It was in Kansai (along with Fukuoka) that the BLL and the mob most flagrantly corrupted the government administration behind the subsidies, and most heavily recruited young burakumin men. When the government terminated those subsidies, it was in Kansai that real estate prices in burakumin communities most clearly rose.

In Panel C of Table 6, we trace the effect on subsidy termination on real estate prices by prefecture. Again, the regressions indicate that the positive effect on real estate prices stemmed from the core urban burakumin neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the data set does not provide real estate price information for Osaka. For the two other urban Kansai prefectures of Hyogo (with the city of Kobe) and Kyoto, burakumin real estate prices rise unambiguously after 2002. In the northern Kyushu prefecture of Fukuoka (home of the hyper-violent Kudo kai mob), buraku real estate prices similarly rise after the termination of the subsidies in 2002.

V.D. Other Developments after 2002:

As Japan dismantled the targeted programs, governments shifted some burakumin community centers to other uses and opened some burakumin public housing to the general public (Kadooka 2012, 244; 2016, 276-77). Cities stopped or shrank their preferential hiring programs. In addition to the out-migration and real estate price increases, other changes followed.

The BLL withered. With no money to distribute, it no longer attracts young burakumin. From over 200,000 during the subsidy years, membership has fallen to 50,000. Those who remain in the group are old. More than half are over 60 (Kobayashi 2015, 12; see Kadooka 2009, 26; Kadooka 2012, 246). The BLL may also be taking a softer line. In its 2004 collection of critiques of the Terazono, et al. (2004) volume, the official BLL publishing house included unorthodox burakumin writers Kadooka and Miyazaki (Kaiho 2004). Kadooka heavily criticized the league in his chapter, but the BLL published it anyway. At least among burakumin writers, perhaps the BLL no longer enforces a party line.

The organized crime syndicates, too, are shrinking. With the SMA expired, they no longer earn large revenues from targeted construction projects. With closer police attention, they do not even earn the revenue they once did through extortion and gambling. From 91,000 members and affiliates in 1991 to 85,300 in 2002, total syndicate personnel fell to 78,600 by 2010. From there, it dropped precipitously to 46,900 in 2015 (Keisatsu, Heisei 27 2015, 2). Key to our argument, not only has mob membership declined, the decline is concentrated among younger members (Keisatsu, Hakusho 1989, fig 1-6; 2015, fig 2):

Age	1988	2006	2010	2014
29 & under	30%	11%	8%	5%
30s	31	29	25	21
40s	28	23	29	33
50 & over	11	37	38	41

At one time, 10-25 percent of young burakumin men joined the mob. Now, almost nobody does (see also Kadooka 2009, 113-14). The mob numbers only 47,000, and only 5 percent of those men are younger then 30 – 2,300 young men. Even if 70 percent of these men were burakumin, the number of young burakumin in the syndicates would only come to 1,600.

Extortion, too, has declined. By the time the Ministry of Justice commissioned its 10th survey of burakumin extortion in 2013, the extortion had plummeted (Jinken 2014). In 1988, 17.5 percent of the firms reported having been subject to burakumin extortion, including 16.4 percent of the construction firms, 14.5 percent of the banks, and 14.2 percent of the Osaka firms. Of the 4,398 respondents in 2013, only 5.1 percent reported extortion attempts. Those who experienced extortion included only 9.7 percent of the construction firms, 1 percent of the banks, and 3.8 percent of the Osaka firms. In 1988, the Osaka firms that had experienced extortion had suffered on average 8.8 attempts. In 2013, they received only 1.9 attempts (Jinken 2014, app. tabs. 1, 2, 6).

VI. Conclusions

In 2002, the Japanese government repealed its three-decade-long experiment in identity politics and targeted subsidies for the burakumin outcastes. In the process, it terminated one of organized crime's most lucrative sources of revenue. We described how the mob diverted these funds, and the effect that the funds had on young burakumin men: by changing the relative expected returns to legal and illegal activity, the funds shifted the young out of the legal sector and into organized crime.

Quantitative study of the burakumin is difficult for a simple reason: they can be identified only by neighborhood. By making family registries confidential, the government raised the cost of discrimination -- but also of studying the issue. We overcome this problem through the 1936 burakumin census. Having fortuitously acquired a copy of this census, we identify the 4,000+ traditional burakumin neighborhoods. We trace each community to the modern municipal boundaries used for Japanese social statistics. We then construct a municipality-level three-decade panel dataset covering a wide variety of social and economic variables.

With this dataset, we test whether program termination caused resourceful burakumin to integrate themselves into mainstream society, and other Japanese to find the burakumin neighborhoods more attractive places to live. We find evidence of both phenomena. As the program ended, burakumin increasingly left the community and fade into the Japanese mainstream. Simultaneously, the fall in the corruption and the extortion along with the decline in the mob and the BLL caused the burakumin neighborhoods themselves to become more attractive places to live. As the end of the program neared, resourceful burakumin moved out of the buraku and into the Japanese mainstream, and other Japanese bid up real estate prices in the burakumin neighborhoods.

Table 1: The Geographical Distribution of Burakumin

A. Prefectural Distribution of Burakumin, 1936:

Prefecture	Burakumin households	Burakumin population
Northeast and Central		
Hokkaido	0	0
Aomori	0	0
Iwate	0	0
Miyagi	0	0
Akita	16	105
Yamagata	0	0
Fukushima	173	998
Ibaragi	877	5,329
Tochigi	2,581	15,863
Gunma	4,870	30,005
Saitama	5,402	32,875
Chiba	559	3,533
Tokyo	1,378	7,248
Kanagawa	933	5,400
Niigata	787	4,363
Toyama	1,601	8,132
Ishikawa	563	2,671
Fukui	559	2,892
Yamanashi	341	1,818
Nagano	3,956	24,036
Gifu	910	4,457
Shizuoka	2,655	16,132
Aichi	2,732	13,593
Kansai		
Mie	8,303	41,926
Shiga	5,862	28,287
Kyoto	9,893	47,692
Osaka	19,565	104,375
Hyogo	24,043	128,963
Nara	7,399	37,444
Wakayama	9,685	48,620
Chugoku		
Tottori	3,835	21,999
Shimane	1,727	7,796
Okayama	9,772	48,430
Hiroshima	9,022	47,685
Yamaguchi	4,484	21,751

(Continued on next page)

Table 1 (Continued)

Prefecture	Burakumin households	Burakumin population
Shikoku		
Tokushima	4,926	25,578
Kagawa	1,701	7,384
Ehime	9,783	51,970
Kochi	7,206	37,709
Kyushu		
Fukuoka	15,774	71,913
Saga	454	2,366
Nagasaki	648	3,189
Kumamoto	2,690	14,612
Oita	1,770	9,559
Miyazaki	211	1,055
Kagoshima	1,908	9,934
Okinawa	0	0

B. Cities (2015 boundaries) with the Most Burakumin in 1936

City	Prefecture	1936 Burakumin Population	Variable "Burakumin"
Osaka	Osaka	60,882	229.9
Kobe	Hyogo	35,701	261.1
Kyoto	Kyoto	24,391	164.8
Fukuoka	Fukuoka	18,225	167.4
Wakayama	Wakayama	15,930	397.5
Hiroshima	Hiroshima	13,356	134.5
Himeji	Hyogo	12,650	255.6
Tsu	Mie	12,639	476.1
Matsuyama	Ehime	12,549	283.8
Kitakyushu	Fukuoka	11,220	105.3

Sources: See text.

Figure 1: Geographical Density of Burakumin



Notes: The figure shows the density of burakumin (using the Burakumin variable described in Section IV of the text) within Japan. The darkest areas (Osaka, Hyogo, Wakayama, Ehime, and Fukuoka) are the prefectures with the highest density.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

	n	Min	Median	Mean	Max
	Dependent variables				
Out-migration	24,761	55	401	432	3,690
Real estate prices	19,953	0.54	30	63	5,180
	Burakumin variables				
Burakumin					
All	1,742	0	0	115	5,008
Burakumin > 0	812	.674	118	246	5,008
BLL Branch Off PC					
All	1,742	0	0	.461	13.0
BLLBO > 0	701	.0119	.631	1.15	13.0
	Control variables				
Income	45,290	.2	1.1	1.1	9.5
Population	54,002	.192	27	71	3,689
Density	52,260	0	22	100	2,203
Birth rate	54,000	0	92	94	390
Death rate	54,000	0	87	91	697

Sources: See text.

Table 3: Determinants of Out-Migration Rates

Dep var: Out-migration	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) .
Burakumin	**-.0479*** **	**-.0403*** **		**-.0403*** **	
	(.0116)	(.0100)		(.0100)	
BLL Br Off			**-13.7*** **		**-13.7*** **
			(2.44)		(2.44)
Year after 2002	**-68.3*** **	**-60.5*** **	**-61.6*** **		
	(3.48)	(5.15)	(5.16)		
Burakumin*YrAft02	**.0145*** **	**.0127*** **			
	(43.2)	(44.1)			
BLLBrOff*YrAft02			**3.989*** **		
			(1.08)		
Burakumin*2003				-.0075	
				(.0048)	
Burakumin*2004				.0059	
				(.0049)	
Burakumin*2005				**.0153*** **	
				(.0055)	
Burakumin*2006				**.0178*** **	
				(.0071)	
Burakumin*2007				**.0169*** **	
				(.0056)	
Burakumin*2008				**.0267*** **	
				(.0070)	
Burakumin*2009				**.0197*** **	
				(.0059)	
Burakumin*2010				.0083	
				(.0060)	
BLLBrOff *2003					-.324
					(1.380)
BLLBBrOff *2004					**1.969***
					(1.119)
BLLBrOff *2005					**3.595*** *
					(1.589)
BLLBrOff *2006					**7.014*** **
					(1.854)
BLLBrOff*2007					**5.026*** **
					(1.576)
BLLBrOff*2008					**6.924*** **
					(1.763)
BLLBrOff*2009					**6.414*** **
					(1.620)
BLLBrOff*2010					2.024
					(1.343)
Population	-.0254	-.0389	-.0397	-.0389	-.0397
	(.0187)	(.0255)	(.0256)	(.0255)	(.0256)
Income	**151*** **	**81.4*** **	**82.5*** **	**81.4*** **	**82.5*** **
	(17.2)	(28.5)	(28.4)	(28.5)	(28.4)
Density		**.1552*** **	**.1528*** **	**.1552*** **	**.153*** **
		(.0203)	(.0203)	(.0203)	(.0203)

(Continued on next page)

Table 3 (Continued)

Birth rate		**1.883*** **	**1.856*** **	**1.883*** **	**1.855*** **
		(.367)	(.364)	(.367)	(.364)
Death rate		.305	.321	.305	.320
		(.345)	(.344)	(.344)	(.344)
R^2	.165	.245	.247	.245	.247

Notes: Coefficients, followed by robust standard errors. n = 24,760.

Regressions are OLS, with year fixed effects and clustered standard errors. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Sources: See text.

Table 4: Determinants of Out-Migration Rates: Robustness Checks

A. By Municipality Size:

Dep var: Out-migration per capita

	(1)	(2)
Burakumin	-.0265	**-.031*** **
	(.0178)	(.0096)
Year after 2002	**-78.2*** **	-4.37
	(5.52)	(9.30)
Burakumin*YrAft02	**.0240*** **	.00275
	(.0071)	(.0051)
n	11,711	13,049
R^2	.502	.209
City Size	Large	Small

B. By Region:

Dep var: Out-migration per capita

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Region:	Kansai	Shikoku	Kyushu	Chugoku	Other
Burakumin	-.0149	-.00516	**-.0357***	-.0242	**-.1619*** **
	(.0164)	(.0066)	(.0207)	(.0337)	(.0519)
Year after 2002	**-96.0*** **	**-82.4*** **	**-30.9***	**-91.9*** **	**-48.7*** **
	(7.98)	(12.4)	(17.4)	(12.3)	(7.47)
Burakumin*YrAft02	**.0162***	**.0113***	.00122	-.00662	.0215
	(.0091)	(.0060)	(.0104)	(.0143)	(.0150)
n	3,246	1,375	3,493	1,605	15,041
R2	.385	.396	.156	.285	.278

C. Principal Prefectures

Dep var: Out-migration per capita

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Prefectures:	Hyogo (Kansai)	Osaka (Kansai)	Kyoto (Kansai)	Wakayama (Kansai)	Fukuoka (Kyushu)
Burakumin	**-.0368***	-.0291	-.0070	-.0353	**.0630*** **
	(.0191)	(.0306)	(.0162)	(.0275)	(.0186)
Year after 2002	**-123.8*** **	**-76.9*** **	**-84.0*** **	**-79.2*** **	16.395
	(27.4)	(20.3)	(18.0)	(17.2)	(11.086)
Burakumin*YrAft02	**.0628*** **	.0471	**.0201** **	.00691	**-.0186***
	(.0175)	(.0402)	(.00975)	(.0100)	(.0102)
n	614	632	390	450	900
R^2	.757	.629	.632	.158	.615

(Continued next page)

Table 4 (Continued)

Notes: All regressions also include Population, Income PC, Population Density, Births PC, and Deaths PC.

Coefficients, followed by robust standard errors. Regressions are OLS, with year fixed effects and clustered standard errors.

***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Sources: See text.

Table 5: Determinants of Real Estate Prices

Dep var: Real estate prices	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Burakumin	.003617	.00182		.00182	
	(.00374)	(.00241)		(.00243)	
BLL Br Off PC			-1.03		-1.03
			(.744)		(.744)
Year after 2002	**-47.251*** **	**-53.412*** **	**-53.944*** **		
	(3.568)	(10.231)	(10.198)		
Buraku*YrAft02		**.004435** **	**.004435*** **		
		(.001674)	(.001674)		
BLLBrOf *YrAft02			**2.10*** **		
			(.614)		
Burakumin*2003				**.006633*** **	
				(.002037)	
Burakumin*2004				**.004805*** **	
				(.001575)	
Burakumin*2005				**.004945** **	
				(.002066)	
Burakumin*2006				**.004065** **	
				(.002001)	
Burakumin*2007				**.003645** **	
				(.001772)	
Burakumin*2008				.002870	
				(.002104)	
Burakumin*2009				**.004753*** **	
				(18,303)	
BLLBrOf*2003					**2.42*** **
					(.560)
BLLBrOf*2004					**2.34*** **
					(.628)
BLLBrOf*2005					**2.38*** **
					(.693)
BLLBrOf*2006					**1.94*** **
					(.723)
BLLBrOf*2007					**1.98*** **
					(.653)
BLLBrOf*2008					**1.57** **
					(.762)
BLLBrOf*2009					**2.29*** **
					(.633)
Population	**.0567***	-.0117	-.0117	-.0117	-.0117
	(.0296)	(.0116)	(.0116)	(.0116)	(.0116)
Income	**214.3*** **	**160.1*** **	**160.0*** **	**160.1*** **	**160.0*** **
	(33.00)	(54.49)	(54.49)	(54.50)	(54.50)
Density		**.214*** **	**.2139*** **	**.2140*** **	**.2139*** **
		(.0309)	(.0309)	(.0306)	(.0309)
Birth rate		**-.267** **	**-.2682** **	**-.2669** **	**-.2681** **
		(.0120)	(.0120)	(.0120)	(.0120)
Death rate		.338	.3397	.3376	.3399
		(.229)	(.2295)	(.2287)	(.2296)

(Continued on next page)

Table 5 (Continued)

R^2	0.53	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66

Notes: Coefficients, followed by robust standard errors. n = 19,951 or 19,952.

Regressions are OLS, with year fixed effects and clustered standard errors. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Sources: See text.

Table 6: Determinants of Real Estate Prices: Robustness Checks

A. By Municipality Size:

Dep var: Real estate prices

	(1)	(2)
Burakumin	**.01585***	.00181
	(.00944)	(.00173)
Year after 2002	**-116.440*****	**-17.077*****
	(19.845)	(1.282)
Burakumin*YrAft02	-.000934	-.000870
	(.0110)	(.00120)
n	7,499	12,452
R^2	0.746	0.668
City Size	Large	Small

B. By Region:

Dep var: Real estate prices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Region:	Kansai	Shikoku	Kyushu	Chugoku	Other
Burakumin	-.00695	.00108	-.00118	.00167	**-.0558****
	(.00488)	(.00134)	(.00197)	(.00533)	(.0270)
Year after 2002	**-52.430*****	**-12.305*****	**-7.439*****	**-12.307*****	**-62.780*****
	(6.058)	(3.883)	(1.445)	(3.711)	(12.367)
Burakumin*YrAft02	**.01066*****	**.00283***	-.000706	.000793	.00393
	(.00294)	(.00143)	(.00191)	(.00494)	(.00748)
n	2,209	1,309	2,676	931	13,096
R2	0.800	0.694	0.801	0.800	0.670

C. Principal Prefectures

Dep var: Real estate prices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prefectures:	Hyogo (Kansai)	Kyoto (Kansai)	Wakayama (Kansai)	Fukuoka (Kyushu)
Burakumin	**-.0430*****	-.0157	-.00195	-.000789
	(.0108)	(.0117)	(.00444)	(.00266)
Year after 2002	**-95.572*****	**-55.839*****	**14.710*****	**-13.614*****
	(18.208)	(12.332)	(4.948)	(3.363)
Burakumin*YrAft02	**.0392*****	**.0229****	.00316	**.00607*****
	(.0124)	(.00975)	(.00279)	(.00220)
n	466	349	346	779
R^2	0.912	0.902	0.764	0.878

(Continued next page)

Table 6 (Continued)

Notes: All regressions also include Population, Income PC, Population Density, Births PC, and Deaths PC.

Coefficients, followed by robust standard errors. Regressions are OLS, with year fixed effects and clustered standard errors.

***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Sources: See text.

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