Local Government Proliferation, Diversity, and Conflict*

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Abstract

The creation of new local governments is a key feature of decentralization in developing countries. This process often causes substantial changes in contestable public resources and the diversity of the local electorate. We exploit the plausibly exogenous timing of district creation in Indonesia to show how these changes affect conflict. Using new geospatial data on violence, we show that allowing for redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict. However, these reductions are undone and even reversed if the newly defined electorates are ethnically polarized, particularly in areas that receive an entirely new seat of government. We highlight the violent contestation of political control as a key mechanism. Overall, these patterns of conflict illustrate the policy tradeoffs associated with redistricting in diverse settings with limited state capacity.

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1 Introduction

The age-old question of how to draw political borders has resurfaced in recent years with secessionist referenda in Scotland and Catalonia. This question is especially pertinent in developing countries today as decentralization has led to a proliferation of new governments at the subnational level—a process we refer to as redistricting.[1] These boundary changes often alter the composition of the electorate and access to public resources. The associated tradeoffs between diversity and the efficiency of public goods provision have well-established implications for the optimal size of political units (see Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). The implications for conflict are much less well understood.

This paper uses the creation of new local governments to study how changes in diversity and contestable public resources shape conflict. A more homogenous population located closer to the government should be easier to govern, improving welfare and reducing conflict. However, the creation of new local governments also creates new rents associated with, among others, public sector jobs and control over the policymaking process. These public prizes may be contested violently, particularly when the newly created administrative units give rise to a new power struggle between different groups and the costs of conflict are low. Understanding the relative importance of these offsetting effects on conflict is important for policy, but they have been difficult to disentangle empirically due to a host of identification and measurement challenges.

We resolve these challenges using a unique natural experiment in the ethnically diverse setting of contemporary Indonesia. Decentralization reforms begun in the late 1990s greatly eased the process of redistricting and led to a dramatic increase in the number of local governments from 302 in 1999 to 514 in 2014 (see Figure 1). The central government created a very favorable environment for splitting that allows us to examine the effects of locally-driven subnational splits. Crucially, the timing of redistricting was staggered across locations in a plausibly exogenous way.

Using novel, high frequency geospatial data on violence, we contribute to a new empirical literature showing how diversity matters for conflict (Arbatli et al., 2015; Desmet et al., 2015; Esteban et al., 2012, 2015; Spolaore and Wacziarg, forthcoming). We add novel evidence that redistricting into more homogenous units leads to a reduction in violence. However, these gains in stability are uneven across locations. Areas that receive an entirely new seat of government experience relatively more violence than those retaining an old seat of government. We show how changes in the composition of the electorate and ethnic polarization in particular play a central role in shaping the violent contestation of political control. Our results shed new light on how diversity interacts with decentralization policy in settings with limited state capacity.

Our empirical approach proceeds in several steps. We first identify the net effect of redistricting on conflict and then isolate distinct mechanisms associated with diversity and political institutions. We estimate this net effect at the original district boundaries in 2000, comparing districts that split earlier to districts that split later in a generalized difference-in-difference framework. The many steps in the process of redistricting create idiosyncratic variation in the timing of approval, and importantly, the national

[1] Grossman and Lewis (2014) document the global pervasiveness of this phenomenon across all levels of administration. For example, Nigerian states increased from 22 in 1990 to 37 in 2010, Ugandan Districts from 34 to 112, and Kenyan districts from 47 to 70 over the same period. Czechoslovakia and Hungary increased their municipalities by 50 percent between 1989 and 1993. Brazilian municipalities increased from 3,974 in 1980 to 5,560 in 2000. Vietnam increased its provinces from 40 to 64 between 1996 and 2003.

government placed a moratorium on district splitting between 2004 and 2006.[2] After a split, the *original district* is divided into a *parent* district, which retains the original capital, and a *child* district, which acquires a new capital and seat of government (see Figure 2 for an example). We use our rich data to then estimate effects at these disaggregated levels where we expect differential changes in the incentives for conflict. The new seat of government in the child comes with a host of contestable resources, including an increase in per capita revenue transfers from the center as well as positions in the local executive, parliament, and regional government institutions. Meanwhile, in the parent district, relatively less changes in terms of available fiscal resources and government positions.

Redistricting often leads to significant changes in the diversity of electorate, and we exploit these changes to understand how diversity shapes the conflict landscape. Ethnic fractionalization, which captures the likelihood of meeting someone outside your group, declines substantially on average at the original district level. However, some of the newly drawn borders encompass fewer, large groups, thereby increasing ethnic polarization. Using Population Census microdata from 2000, we construct measures of how homogenized the new districts are relative to the original district in terms of these two main diversity metrics. We are able to identify the mediating effects of changes in diversity because the timing of redistricting is unrelated to diversity and other district-specific correlates of conflict.

Our study is well suited to identify *how* diversity matters for conflict. Indonesia is home to over 400 ethnolinguistic groups, allowing us to distinguish between fractionalization and polarization. The latter captures differences in preferences across groups and the strength of association within one's own group. Drawing upon a theory of ethnic conflict due to Esteban and Ray (2011a), we view these standard diversity measures as a proxy for the potential identity-based coalitions through which mobilization takes place. When a contested good is private and divisible among members, intergroup distances—proxied by language—play less of a role while increases in group size reduce payoffs, bringing fractionalization to the forefront. On the other hand, polarization may amplify conflict when the contested resource cannot be fully excluded from losing groups. When these public prizes can be tailored to the winning groups' preferences—as with control over local government institutions—intergroup distances matter. Furthermore, payoffs to seizing such institutions are not as diminished by group size, and larger cohesive groups are more able to mobilize to their cause, bringing polarization to the forefront.

Contemporary Indonesia is an excellent context for testing theories of social and political conflict. Mass communal conflict largely subsided by 2003/4 and was replaced by more sporadic, routine violence. Our study is geared at picking up the latter, which include flare ups of identity-based conflict, resource-related violence such as land disputes, and violence around elections (Barron et al., 2014). These types of local violence remain a major policy concern in new democracies like Indonesia given not only their large economic costs but also their potential to escalate into more systematic large-scale conflict.[3] We draw upon new geospatial conflict data developed by the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System (known by its Indonesian acronym of SNPK). This is the largest single-country conflict database in the world with over 230,000 recorded incidents between 2000 and 2014. Based on reporting in over 120

[2]We define the timing based on the date that the formal law approving the creation of the new district was passed. Burgess et al. (2012) use similar variation in their study of deforestation.

[3]In our data, even if we examine the least violent years and restrict to non-crime violence, we observe around 500 annual deaths, 7,000 annual injuries, and 1,500 annual buildings damaged. Including crime and domestic violence more than doubles these numbers. Using a methodology due to Fearon and Hoeffler (2014), we estimate that the direct costs of non-crime conflict in the post-2005 period range from 0.2% - 0.5% of GDP.

media sources across the country, these detailed data allow us to examine the incidence of non-crime-related violence with further subclassifications of political conflict.

We find that the small average effect of redistricting on conflict masks considerable heterogeneity. Original districts that split up into more homogeneous units experience reductions in conflict, with changes in ethnolinguistic polarization being the most significant. At the more disaggregated level, child districts with high polarization experience relatively more violent conflict after redistricting. The timing of these differential changes in child districts is consistent with conflict over new, contestable public resources. Taken together, these results suggest not only that increasing public prizes in polarized areas increases conflict but also that increased homogeneity may help to reduce it. Overall results are muted in part because these forces offset each other and potentially because violence may be relocating from parent to child within the original district borders.

We show that these patterns of conflict appear inextricably linked to violent contestation of political control. Violence spikes around the time of the first election in child districts, especially in ethnically polarized areas with large, diverse groups. Moreover, this amplification effect of polarization persists beyond the election suggesting that ethnicity facilitates mobilization and also captures differences in preferences. However, these patterns do not hold for parent districts. Rather, parents with very different voting preferences from their child—observed in 1999 elections—experience significantly less political violence. These results suggest that there is something unique about the initial contest over political control. The findings are also consistent with the institutional growing pains of new polities and perhaps lower state capacity in polarized child districts (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010). However, our results hold up to accounting for initial security presence and public goods before redistricting, which suggests that low public sector capacity cannot explain everything.

Our paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, we add to a growing body of work on optimal borders by identifying the effects of an increasingly common policy of administrative unit proliferation on conflict (see Pierskalla, 2016a, for a survey). A large theoretical and growing empirical literature offers a framework for identifying suboptimal borders at the (sub)national level (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina et al., 2004; Bolton and Roland, 1997; Coate and Knight, 2007; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2005; Weese, 2015). The messy politics of border formation often explain departures from optimality (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005; Spolaore, 2008). The unique policy context in Indonesia allows us to take these complex determinants of border formation as given and focus on investigating its consequences. Our results build upon Alesina et al. (2011) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016), who highlight the adverse consequences of arbitrary, post-colonial partitioning of ethnic groups across national borders. We identify similar consequences for conflict in the policy-relevant context of decentralization. Our findings point to an important unintended consequence of redistricting, namely that, under certain conditions, violence may simply shift from the old to the new seat of government.[4]

Second, we provide new evidence on the nature of conflict over public resources and rents, which is a salient albeit disputed mechanism in the conflict literature. Several studies use shocks to the price of taxable commodities, such as oil and minerals, as sources of variation in the value of the state, but there is mixed evidence on how conflict responds to these shocks (see Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Dube and Var-

[4]Other work shows how redistricting can amplify the negative externalities associated with pollution and deforestation that were better internalized by larger administrative units (Burgess et al., 2012; Lipscomb and Mobarak, forthcoming).

gas, 2013). Moreover, recent work highlights several potential channels through which ethnoreligious diversity affects (resource) conflict (Amodio and Chiovelli, 2015; Arbatli et al., 2015; Caselli and Coleman, 2013; Desmet et al., 2012; Esteban and Ray, 2011a,b; Esteban et al., 2012, 2015; Morelli and Rohner, 2014; Spolaore and Wacziarg, forthcoming). We offer two innovations that provide novel insights into how and why diversity matters. We identify causal impacts of policy-induced *changes* in diversity within local government boundaries. This is important because diversity levels are often confounded with agro-climatic conditions (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012; Michalopoulos, 2012) or internal migration (Fearon and Laitin, 2011), both of which may shape conflict independent of diversity. Additionally, our focus on variation in contestable public resources departs from previous work largely focused on rival private goods like natural resources. By isolating sharp changes in public prizes in the form of new local governments, we provide strong support for a hypothesized distinction between fractionalization and polarization that has been difficult to causally identify in cross-country work.[5]

Finally, we highlight an important consequence of decentralization in diverse societies with limited state capacity. The focus on conflict goes beyond the standard questions of capture and corruption that pervade the literature on decentralization (see Mookherjee, 2015). Our work is related to Martinez-Bravo et al. (2014), who study a different decentralization reform: the introduction of local elections for village officials. In the Chinese context, local elections increase public goods expenditures. However, these benefits are more limited if not entirely undone in villages with high religious fractionalization (Padró i Miguel et al., 2012) or low social capital (Padró i Miguel et al., 2015). The redistricting process in our setting involves changes in the value of local political control *and* the composition of the electorate, which allows us to test additional hypotheses beyond those associated with changes in electoral accountability. A larger body of work examines how ethnic divisions shape public goods provision (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Burgess et al., 2015; De Luca et al., 2015; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). We complement this research by taking a step back to investigate conflict over control of the institutions that allocate these goods. Our results suggest that conflict can be a useful statistic for assessing the tradeoff between population homogeneity and effective public goods provision in the design of redistricting schemes.

The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we detail the context of district proliferation in Indonesia. In Section 3, we discuss how redistricting affects local rents and diversity. In Section 4, we present the new geospatial conflict data. In Section 5, we develop an empirical strategy that allows us to identify the different implications of redrawing borders. In Section 6, we present the main results and highlight key mechanisms. In Section 7, we conclude.

2 District Proliferation in Indonesia

This section provides background on Indonesia's extensive district proliferation. We first describe the important role districts play in government. We then document the wave of redistricting that led to

[5] Spolaore and Wacziarg (forthcoming) show that countries with more similar genetic roots are more likely to engage in cross-border conflict because those groups have similar preferences over the private goods often being contested in international wars. However, they note (as do Arbatli et al., 2015) that intergroup distance and polarization can exacerbate within-country conflict, which is more likely to involve contestation of public prizes (in addition to private ones). Together, these studies are consistent with the theoretical predictions in Esteban and Ray (2011a) on which we provide causal evidence. This recent work was motivated in part by earlier cross-country work linking ethnic fractionalization or polarization to adverse economic outcomes as well as conflict (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b).

a more than 60 percent increase in the number of districts in 15 years, elaborating on the delays and moratoria in the splitting process that we exploit for identification. For reference, the timeline in Figure 3 provides a summary of the key events over our study period.

2.1 Decentralization and the Political Context

Indonesia has four main tiers of government. The largest tier is the province, of which there were 34 by 2014. Provinces are divided into districts known as *kabupaten* and *kota*, the main administrative unit of analysis in this paper. In 2014, there were 514 districts. Districts are in turn divided up into 7,094 sub-districts (*kecamatan*), which are further subdivided into into more than 80,000 villages, the smallest unit of government.

Our study focuses on districts from 2000 to 2014. This period was characterized by far-reaching decentralization reforms aimed at devolving authority to the district level. The resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 ushered in a wave of laws that rapidly shifted the balance of power away from the central government and towards the districts. Effective January 2001, districts took over responsibility for nearly all public policy and service provision with the exception of the few areas naturally reserved for the central government (e.g., foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary policy).

Major electoral reforms also accompanied decentralization. With the 1999 reform, district heads (known as *bupati*s and *walikota*s) were locally elected for the first time since independence. At first, they were elected via majority vote by members of the local parliament, who were in turn popularly elected according to a closed-list proportional representation system. Beginning in 2005, district heads and their running mates were directly elected by majority vote. Parliamentary elections occur at the same time as national elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014), whereas district head elections vary in their timing across districts due to predetermined path dependence (Skoufias et al., 2014). The timing of these elections will play an important role in our investigation of mechanisms in Section 6.2.

Decentralization also led to a large increase in local government revenue per capita. Over our study period, 90 percent of district revenue comes from the central government with few strings attached (Hill, 2014). Real revenue per capita for the median district nearly doubled in real terms from USD 110 in 2000 to USD 205 in 2010.[6] Spending decisions are primarily made locally: budgets are proposed by a board overseen by the district head after a bottom up process that begins with requests at the village level. Budgets are then approved by the local parliament.

2.2 Creating New Districts

Concurrent with the wave of decentralization, the Indonesian government created many new districts through a process known colloquially as *pemekaran* or blossoming. After remaining steady from 1980 to 1998, the number of districts ballooned from 302 in 1999 to 514 in 2014 (see Figure 1). The redistricting in 1999 occurred before the new government regulation on *pemekaran* was established and substantively differ from later rounds of redistricting.[7] For identification purposes (and given data constraints), we

[6] Part of this increase is due to redistricting as discussed in Section 3.1. The revenue figures are calculated from the World Bank's Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (DAPOER).

[7] For example, a number were longstanding requests, and others were initiated by the central government (Fitrani et al., 2005). These areas only enter our data if they later split again. Only one area in our study splits again after 2008 (in January 2013),

focus on the major wave of redistricting that took place in 2001–3 and 2007–8. This proliferation of districts occurred across the archipelago as shown in Figure 4. We provide here institutional details on the redistricting process and highlight the sources of our empirical identification.

New districts are formed when existing subdistricts break off from their original district and create their own local government. After a split, the original district is divided in (at least) two: The single *parent district* contains the original capital replete with pre-existing local government institutions. The *child* district(s) receives a new capital, district head, parliament, and government apparatus in a new capital. Figure 2 provides an example of this distinction based on the splitting of Buru district into Buru (the parent) and South Buru (the child). Crucially, we are able to use subdistrict data to construct key variables at the child and parent district level over the entire study period 2000–2014 *even though these areas did not exist as separate administrative entities before redistricting*.

We construct a new panel dataset that links the districts observed in 2014 back to their original district in 1980, identifying each new district created in between. In order to pick up any conflict generated in the interim period, we base the timing of redistricting on the month in which the new district is approved by the National Parliament, as indicated in legal documents. This granular district–month panel serves as our main data structure throughout the paper.

Redistricting Process. Local interest groups initiate the action to split in accordance with the redistricting mandate passed into law in 2000. First, the new district must have a minimum of three subdistricts. Second, there must be support for the split among parliamentarians and the district head in the original district. Third, the proposing parties must present technical research demonstrating the socioeconomic capacity of the new district in terms of, for example, potential GDP, financial institutions, education and health facilities, and transport and communication. Most proposals were submitted to and approved directly by the national parliament with no evidence of proposed splits being rejected (Pierskalla, 2016b).

The central government has twice halted the redistricting process by issuing national moratoria on the creation of new regions, the first of which occurred from 2004–6 and the second from 2009–2012.[8] Both periods are clearly seen in Figure 1. We exploit the first moratorium for identification purposes, building upon the strategy used by Burgess et al. (2012). Areas that were close to having the process completed in 2003 but not yet approved had to wait until at least 2007 to be created. Although we have not been able to obtain data on the number of proposals in progress or already submitted in 2004, a report by the National Development Planning Agency notes that 114 proposals for new districts were awaiting consideration in 2005–6 (BAPPENAS, 2007). The process of splitting has extensive scope for administrative delays, which adds further idiosyncratic variation to the date of approval beyond that provided by the moratorium. We revisit these idiosyncrasies in Section 5 and show that both sources of variation in the timing of redistricting are plausibly exogenous.[9]

and for simplicity we drop observations in 2013 and 2014 for this district. Results are unchanged under other treatments. Four other areas split for the first time in late 2012–13. However, we exclude these from the analysis in order to focus on areas that are credibly affected by a moratoria on redistricting that we describe below.

[8]The primary stated reason for the moratoria was the drain on fiscal resources. At the end of the first moratorium, the government tightened the law on redistricting. First, the minimum number of subdistricts increased to five. Second, these subdistricts must be within a parent district that had existed for at least seven years.

[9]While our identification relies only on variation in the timing of redistricting, it is helpful to understand why we see redistricting in some locations and not others. The potential incentives include, among others, efficiency gains (smaller districts can better provide public goods), homogeneity (less heterogeneity in taste allows public goods to be better targeted), electoral

After the law approving the new district has passed, there is an interim period before a new district head can be elected. During this time, an interim district head is appointed by the central government from a list of candidates generated locally. The interim district head establishes the most essential ministries/offices and partially staffs them. With the exception of a few of the earliest splits after which the district executive was elected by parliament, redistricting was followed by a direct popular election for district and vice-district head within two years (the average time to election is 21 months).

3 Redistricting and Changes in Rents and Diversity

Redistricting led to dramatic changes in the ethnoreligious composition of districts and the incidence of public resources. Here, we first show that splitting increases government jobs and fiscal rents. Next, we discuss our measures of diversity and show that, on average, new districts were drawn in a way that increased ethnoreligious homogeneity. We end by discussing testable implications for conflict.

3.1 Public Resources

We begin by showing that redistricting leads to a large change in public resources associated with political positions, civil servant jobs, and fiscal transfers from the center.

Size of Government. The creation of a new local government in the child district is the most direct consequence of redistricting. After the interim period, a new district head is elected and tasked with staffing each of the district's up to 30 new local government agencies. In the typical district, between 1200 and 2000 new jobs are created.[10] We have found no evidence that the total number of offices and jobs decrease in the parent district. Thus, the overall number of civil servants per capita increases substantially, and these newly created jobs are important for setting and executing public policy.

The district executive branch is complemented by a local parliament. The number of seats is determined by population size according to a step function and increases with district splitting. For example, a district with 400,000 people initially would have 40 seats. If it split into two equally sized districts, each would have 30 seats for a total of 60 compared with 40 originally.

Fiscal Rents. Redistricting also leads to an increase in overall transfers from the central government. Figure 5 compares per capita transfers from 2000 to 2012 in original districts with no splits to ones that had splits in 2002–3 and 2007–8, respectively.[11] All districts had similar average transfers until 2006,

gerrymandering, and rent seeking (new districts come with new jobs and 'pork'). The incentives are weaker, albeit still salient, for parent districts for which little is lost in terms of revenue transfers per capita, and there may be small gains in terms of the number of civil servant and parliamentarian positions per capita. Moreover, the local government no longer has to govern over such a vast and potentially heterogeneous area and may experience more favorable electoral chances. Prior studies in Indonesia find support for arguments based on rent-seeking, ethnic homogenization, and size-based efficiency (see Fitrani et al., 2005; Pierskalla, 2016b).

[10] The numbers for jobs are estimated based on field interviews conducted by the authors as well as province-level totals for 2008–12 reported by the National Development Planning Agency.

[11] The data come from Ministry of Finance reports included in DAPOER data (see footnote 6). We exclude districts in Java given that they follow a very different trajectory. After doing so, there are 137 districts with no splits, 59 districts that split between 2002–3 and 23 districts that split between 2007–8. We also estimate the effect of splitting on per capita transfers within our final sample of districts that split, using our identification strategy detailed in Section 5. Redistricting increases per capita

when areas that split in 2002–3 experienced a differential increase in average transfers of around USD 100 per capita. While average real transfers decline in 2009 and 2010 for districts that never split or districts that split in 2002–3, they increase for districts that split in 2007–8. This difference is smaller but still sizable at around USD 50 per capita. These flows constitute a sizable increase in rents given that average district revenue per capita is less than USD 300. That these differences appear 2–4 years after the splits is consistent with the fact that transfers to the child districts take at least 1–2 years to start flowing and tend to begin small.

Nearly all of the increase in average per capita transfers accrues to the child districts with relatively little change observed for parents. Like other districts, approximately 40 percent of these transfers will be spent on government wages and the rest will be spent on public goods in the new district. The decision on how to do so is entirely at the discretion of the new local executive and parliament.

To summarize, redistricting creates new contestable public resources associated with the infusion of revenue from the central government and opening of government positions responsible for public policy. These gains are concentrated in the child districts, with the parent likely having more government positions per capita but no increase in transfers per capita. We now turn to documenting how splitting changes the ethnoreligious diversity of the governed populace.

3.2 Changes in Ethnolinguistic and Religious Diversity

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and home to remarkable diversity with over 400 ethnolinguistic groups. It is predominantly Muslim, with minority Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist groups. The contemporary ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity is the result of long-run settlement processes dating back many centuries. As of the late 20th century, the distribution of different groups across administrative boundaries could be largely traced back to (i) subdistrict borders drawn by the Dutch colonial authorities before independence, and (ii) large waves of population resettlement from Java/Bali to the Outer Islands in the 1970s and early 1980s (see Bazzi et al., forthcoming). Here we describe our core measures of diversity.

Measuring Diversity. We capture ethnic and religious diversity using microdata from the universal 2000 Population Census. This data allows us to map the initial subdistricts in 2000 to their final 2010 district boundaries, providing us with measures of diversity in the child and parent districts as well as within the original district boundaries. We focus on three measures of diversity: ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, and religious polarization.

Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different groups, and as such increases with the number of equally sized groups. Formally, fractionalization in district d is given by $F = \sum_{g=1}^{M_e} \pi_g(1 - \pi_g)$, where M_e is the number of ethnic groups in the district, and π_g is the population share of group g as reported in the 2000 Census.[12] We also consider alternative measures of fractionalization that consolidate ethnic groups based on shared language and also incorporate linguistic distances between groups.

transfers by USD 53–90, or 20–35 percent of the mean, comparable to the estimates reported in Figure 5.

[12] In the average original district in our sample, there are 549 distinct ethnic groups with 21 (3) having greater than 0.1 (5) percent of the population. Consolidating ethnic subgroups based on language slightly reduces these numbers to 271 distinct ethnolinguistic groups, 18 (3) with greater than 0.1 (5) percent.

Meanwhile, ethnic polarization is defined as $P = \sum_{g=1}^{M_e} \sum_{h=1}^{M_e} \pi_g^2 \pi_h \kappa_{gh}$, where κ_{gh} is the distance between groups g and h. Following Fearon (2003), we use linguistic differences to proxy for differences in preferences between groups. We map each of the over 1,000 ethnic groups in the 2000 Census to a language in *Ethnologue*, which provides a full classification of the linguistic origins of each language (see Appendix A). We set $\kappa_{gh} = 1 - s_{gh}^{\delta}$, where s_{gh} is the degree of similarity between the languages spoken by g and h as given by the ratio of common branches on the language classification tree to the maximum possible (14), and δ is a parameter that selects the level of linguistic dissimilarity to be emphasized. Low δs emphasize differences between languages with the fewest branches in common; as δ increases, smaller differences become relatively more important until in the limit all differences are equal to 1 unless groups share a common language. Following Esteban et al. (2012), we set $\delta = 0.05$ as our baseline but also consider a range of values at the end of Section 6.1.

Ethnic polarization differs from fractionalization in two key respects. First, the squaring of the own group term emphasizes the role of own group identification in increasing tensions between groups. As such, it attains its maximum when there are two distinct, equally sized groups. Second, it formally incorporates distances between groups while the standard measure of fractionalization (F) treats the difference between any two groups identically. Running a horse race between these distinct measures will be important in testing recent theories of diversity and conflict. P and F are correlated at around 0.3, suggesting considerable scope for identifying differential effects.

We also account for religious diversity. We use a measure of polarization $R = \sum_{g=1}^{M_r} \sum_{h=1}^{M_r} \pi_g^2 \pi_h$, where M_r is the number of religious groups, and π_g (π_h) is the population share of group g (h). However, we acknowledge that this measure does not admit any notion of distance between religions. There are seven religions recorded in the Census, but in most districts, there is a single cleavage between a Muslim and one non-Muslim, typically Christian, group. As a result religious polarization is effectively identical to religious fractionalization.

Panel A in Figure B.1 shows the distribution of each diversity measure for the parent and child districts in our study. There is considerable heterogeneity within and between the group of parent and child districts. Table 1 provides additional summary statistics demonstrating this variation.

Changes in Diversity. To examine changes in diversity at the original district level, we compute the population-weighted average polarization/fractionalization in the new units (children and parent district) and subtract the polarization/fractionalization in the original district, expressing the final measure in percentage terms. For example, if an original district A becomes parent district B and child C, we calculate $\Delta P = \frac{\left(\frac{N_B}{N_A} P_B + \frac{N_C}{N_A} P_C\right) - P_A}{P_A}$. Note that Δ fractionalization, computed in this manner, is mechanically less than or equal to zero. Panel B in Figure B.1 plots these changes in diversity, and Table 1 shows significant declines in F and R but an increase in P on average.[13]

To better understand these changes in diversity, consider two examples. The district of Ngada split into Ngada and Nagekeo, and was roughly divided along ethnic lines with ethnic Ngada living in Ngada district and ethnic Nagekeo in Nagekeo district. Ethnic polarization declined from 0.043 to about 0.01 in both districts, and ethnic fractionalization declined from 0.7 to an average of 0.4. On the other end of

[13] Appendix Table B.1 compares Δ diversity for districts that split and those that did not between 2000 and 2010. We find statistically significant declines in F (as in Alesina et al., 2014) and R for those that split with no significant change in P.

the spectrum, Maluku Utara split into five new areas, three of which had increased ethnic polarization relative to the original area (about 0.06 relative to 0.04 originally). One of these was Pulau Morotai, which is composed of 43 percent Galela and 30 percent Morotai ethnics. Meanwhile, fractionalization in Maluku Utara was very high initially (0.92) and declined significantly in all areas.

In sum, the new boundaries arose in a way that reduced ethnic fractionalization and religious polarization, but not ethnic polarization. We view these measures of diversity as proxies for the potential identity-based coalitions through which group mobilization takes place. Although there are not ethnic political parties in Indonesia as in other developing countries, ethnicity is a salient force in politics. Aspinall (2011), for example, documents the important role of ethnicity as an organizing technology around local politics, and especially *bupati* elections, in the era of decentralization. As a result, the variation in realized diversity across the new districts has important implications for conflict that we describe next.

3.3 Implications for Violence

The process of redistricting provides a natural laboratory for exploring the drivers of conflict through the lens of theory. The first question we bring to the data is whether overall violence decreases after splitting up the area into smaller, more homogeneous units. If homogeneity attenuates tensions as predicted in Esteban and Ray (2011a) and Alesina et al. (2004), we expect violence to decline after redistricting, particularly in districts that experienced the largest reduction in ethnoreligious diversity. The Δ diversity measures noted above are well suited to test this hypothesis at the original district level.

However, the large increase in contestable rents associated with the new district governments may increase the incentives for violence. We expect some form of contest over who gets to allocate the increased public goods and how they do so. Ideally, this occurs peacefully through the democratic process, but if punishment costs are low, violence may be used to influence elections or the existing allocation of rents. Drawing upon Esteban and Ray (2011a), we hypothesize that these incentives will be strongest in areas with the most polarized preferences. The relative publicness of the prizes associated with the new government imply important roles for inter-group differences and the strength of own-group identification. Hence, polarization should be more important than fractionalization. Moreover, these incentives for conflict should be stronger in child districts, which experience a larger influx of new resources.

Our overarching goal is to understand whether a policy of locally-driven government creation can reduce violent conflict by creating more homogeneous governmental units or whether increases in rents and newly salient group cleavages can offset and perhaps undo the potential gains from homogenization. We test these hypotheses by using multiple empirical strategies and drawing upon newly available data on conflict described next.

4 Conflict: Context and New Data

The recent history of Indonesian conflict can roughly be classified into two periods: (i) collective violence during the democratic transition and initial decentralization reforms (1998–2003), and (ii) routine local violence from 2004–present. Violence in the first period included anti-Chinese riots, large-scale interethnic and interreligious violence (e.g., in Maluku), separatist conflict with the central government in Aceh, and terrorist acts by fundamentalist Islamic groups (Barron et al., 2009, 2014). Since 2004, large-scale

conflict has transitioned into more episodic sociopolitical conflict characterized by fewer fatalities. Understanding these sporadic, albeit increasingly routine, episodes of violence is of direct policy relevance to Indonesia today. These low intensity incidents—increasingly associated with elections, governance, and resource disputes—often reflect the ways in which power is violently contested in new democracies with low state capacity and as such pertain to a host of other developing countries.

We draw upon new monthly data on conflict from the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System. Hereafter, we refer to the data by its Indonesian acronym (SNPK). Like other geospatial conflict databases such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (see, e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), the SNPK data is based on reports of violence in over 120 media sources. Coverage begins in 1998 for nine conflict-prone provinces and increases to 15 provinces plus parts of 3 provinces in greater Jakarta beginning in 2005.[14] Thus, the data is not formally representative of Indonesia, but it does span all major island groups and covers a majority of the Indonesian population. Multiple regional newspapers are collected for each province to ensure district coverage. However, data coverage is unreliable in the earliest years, and hence we exclude 1998 and 1999 from the analysis. Crucially, conflict locations are recorded at the 2011 district level because most incidents have a subdistrict specified in the newspaper (see Appendix A).

Coders read articles and then use a standardized template to code the incident based on the underlying trigger. The incidents are first coded as domestic violence, violent crime, violence during law enforcement, or conflict. Within conflict, the coders further sort into identity, elections/appointments, governance, resource violence, popular justice, separatist, and other (could not be classified). In our baseline specifications, we analyze three main groupings of incidents: (i) *All*, which includes any reported incidents; (ii) *Non-Crime*, which drops the crime and domestic violence meta-categories; and (iii) *Political*, which includes identity, elections/appointments, governance, resource violence, and other. Categories (i) and (ii) help alleviate concerns about systematic miscoding.

The Political category is intended to capture conflicts most plausibly associated with the changing rents and changing ethnoreligious diversity that results from redistricting. Conceptually, elections/appointments and governance should capture conflict over who gets to allocate the public good. Resource violence should pick up disputes over the existing allocation of both public and private goods.[15] Identity violence is the most likely candidate to pick up differences in preferences.

Summary statistics for our main conflict outcomes can be seen in Table 1. Violent non-crime incidents occur in around 36 percent of the district–months based on the 2010 borders. Political types of violence comprise a majority of these events and occur with around a 20 percent probability. Appendix Table B.2 provides a further, detailed breakdown of subcategories of violence, offering a sense of the typical incident in each category.

[14] We omit districts in Papua due to problems with the underlying geographic and administrative data. The later 2005 entrants pose no challenge to our identification. We know when these areas split (even if it is before 2005), and hence we allow them enter the data as postsplit if they have already split or as non-split if they are redistricted after 2005. Our results are robust to dropping these entrants, but we retain them in our baseline as they help with precision.

[15] The resource category includes conflict over private and public property (and market access) but does not distinguish between the two. We therefore retain it in the *Political* category, but results are similar when omitting it. Nearly all separatist incidents occur in Aceh pre-2005 during its decades-long secessionist conflict with the national government. We omit it from political violence on account of it following a quite unique logic forms other forms of political violence.

5 Empirical Strategy

This section develops our empirical strategy in two steps. First, we describe the baseline estimating equations for identifying the change in the average incidence and geography of conflict after redistricting. Second, we detail the framework for estimating heterogeneous effects based on population diversity. Third, we test and validate the underlying identifying assumptions.

5.1 Identifying the Average Effect of Redistricting

We restrict our econometric analysis to districts that split between 2000 and 2014 and are also found in the SNPK database. Nearly all of these splits occur in the two years before and after the moratorium on splitting from 2004–6. This gives us 52 original districts (d) in 2000 that broke apart into 133 districts by 2014. Among these, 29 original districts are observed from 2000–14 while 23 enter the data in 2005. These districts span 19 provinces across the archipelago.

Our main empirical strategy is a generalized difference-in-difference approach that exploits the plausibly exogenous timing of district splits. Our baseline specification is estimated on a monthly panel of original districts defined according to the boundaries in January 2000:

$$conflict_{dt} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{d,t-1} + \beta postsplit_{dt} + \theta_t + \theta_d + \theta_d \times t + \varepsilon_{dt}, \quad (1)$$

where β identifies the overall change in some measure of conflict after a redistricting of d is announced relative to the change over the same period for those districts that have not yet split due to the moratoria and other administrative delays. The parameters θ_t, θ_d, and $\theta_d \times t$ are month fixed effects (FE), district FE, and district-specific linear time trends. $postsplit_{dt}$ is an indicator equal to one for all months t after the district's first post-1999 redistricting was officially passed into law in month.[16] The month FE sweep out shocks to conflict incidence that are common across all districts (e.g., national policy innovations associated with conflict). The district FE take out time-invariant level differences in conflict incidence across districts, which is important given that certain regions of Indonesia are historically more prone to violence than others. Meanwhile, the district-specific time trends are important given (i) the secular decline in violence across Indonesia over this period (see Appendix Figure B.2), and (ii) the cessation of major hostilities in the longstanding violence in the provinces of Aceh and Maluku by the mid-2000s as noted in Section 4. The lagged dependent variable accounts for persistence in the unobservable shocks to conflict across months. Given our long monthly panel ($T > 100 \; \forall \; d$), there is little concern about dynamic panel bias, which is approximately equal to $1/T$ (Alvarez and Arellano, 2003; Nickell, 1981). Key results are robust to excluding the lagged term (see Section 6.3).

[16] Districts that split into three or four all at once pose no particular difficulty. Districts that split at two different points in time are more of a nuisance. Consider, for example, Manggarai district, which first created one child, Manggarai Barat in 2003, and then later the parent district was further subdivided to create Manggarai Timur in 2007. Out of 52 original districts, 11 split at multiple points in time. In our baseline setup, we only use the information provided by the first instance of redistricting. Results are robust to dropping these multi-split areas or to assigning the date of the split to the month in which the most splits took place for the given original district. At the more disaggregated level, we code the child district as splitting when they get their new government ratified and leave parents as having their first split. For example, Manggarai Timur would split in 2007 despite the fact that it was part of an area that was subjected to a split in 2003. The parent district of Manggarai meanwhile retains its status as having split since 2003. Note that it is extremely rare for child districts to subsequently split (we only have one case late in our sample period) largely because of a law passed in 2007 that required districts to have been in existence for at least seven years before redistricting.

In our baseline approach, $conflict_{dt}$ is an indicator for any reported incidents. We focus on the extensive margin of any incidents rather than the number of incidents because the monthly variation in conflict occurs primarily along the extensive margin.[17] We estimate all equations in the paper using linear probability models (LPM), which is preferable to nonlinear approaches such as conditional logit given the large number of FE and time trends and our primary interest in recovering causal estimates rather than predicting conflict per se. We cluster standard errors at the original district d level. However, inference is generally robust to a more conservative (quasi-) randomization inference approach in which we compare our baseline estimates to the distribution of estimates obtained from 1,000 versions of our data with randomly assigned redistricting dates (within the allowable period outside the moratorium).

Next, we disaggregate the original districts d into parent d_o and new children d_c as observed at the end of 2010. In this case, our baseline specification is estimated on a monthly panel of parent d_o and child d_c districts:

$$conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \beta postsplit_{it} + \eta \left(postsplit_{it} \times \mathbf{1}(i = d_c)\right) + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where β identifies the postsplit change in conflict on the territory within the parent district boundaries ($i = d_o$), and η identifies the differential effect of splitting within the child boundaries ($i = d_c$).

5.2 Ethnic Diversity and Heterogeneous Effects of Redistricting

We proceed to examine how the effects of splitting vary with diversity. Given the relative publicness of the prize associated with the new district governments, we expect ethnic polarization to matter relatively more than ethnic fractionalization (see Section 3).

At the original district level, we augment equation (1):

$$conflict_{dt} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{d,t-1} + \beta postsplit_{dt} + \sum_{j \in \{F,P,R\}} \phi_j \left(postsplit_{dt} \times \Delta j_d^0\right) + \theta_t + \theta_d + \theta_d \times t + \varepsilon_{dt} \quad (3)$$

where Δj_d^0 are the percentage change in diversity between 2000 and 2010 borders (see Section 3.2) for ethnic fractionalization ($j = F$), ethnic polarization ($j = P$), and religious polarization ($j = R$) indices based on the inhabitants of the original district d in the year 2000. The goal of this regression is to identify whether areas that split into more homogeneous and less polarized units experience a differential reduction in violence as compared to districts that did not draw their boundaries in this manner.

To identify the unconditional effects of ethnic fractionalization and polarization, we begin by including F and P separately. We next disentangle the contribution of each by including the two measures simultaneously. Although ethnic fractionalization and polarization are non-linearly related, there is significant scope for disentangling the separate contribution of each given the ethnic variation across the country and relatively low correlation between the measures.[18] Given the salience of religious cleavages in a few areas of Indonesia, religious diversity could be an important omitted variable to the extent that

[17] In Section 6.3, we show robustness to looking instead at the intensive margin of the number of incidents. We can also restrict to incidents in which there are reported injuries, deaths, or damage to buildings. Doing so leaves our results unchanged, and we retain the unrestricted measure to allow for possible misreporting of these various sub-outcomes.

[18] In the 52 original districts, ethnic polarization has a correlation of 0.30 with ethnic fractionalization. The correlation is 0.33 when based on the eventual parent and child district boundaries.

it is correlated with ethnic diversity and also an important vehicle for group mobilization. Thus, in a final variation, we add religious polarization to equation (3), which is very similar to religious fractionalization as noted in Section 3.2.[19]

While equation (3) examines how changes in violence resulting from redistricting are mediated by changes in diversity, it is important to keep in mind that with these changes in the diversity of the governed groups come changes in contestable public resources. To clarify this additional implication of redistricting, we proceed to the more disaggregated units of analysis: child and parent districts.

We allow for differential heterogeneous effects between parent and child districts based on the following equation:[20]

$$conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \beta postsplit_{it} + \sum_{j \in \{F,P,R\}} \phi_j \left(postsplit_{it} \times j_i^0 \right) + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

which we estimate separately for parent $i = d_o$ or child $i = d_c$ districts and compare coefficients across equations. As noted in Section 3.3, we hypothesize that polarization will be relatively more important than fractionalization, and we expect this differential effect to be even more pronounced in child districts.

The key idea underlying the estimates in equation (4) is that the redistricting led to a sharp change in the salience of ethnic and religious affiliation of those individuals within the newly formed borders, whereas before the split, the ethnoreligious diversity of the entire original district was plausibly more salient. The ϕ coefficients identify whether placing a new government in more polarized/fractionalized areas has differential effects on conflict compared to less polarized/fractionalized areas. As with the original district specification, we include the diversity measures both on their own and simultaneously.

5.3 Identifying Assumptions

This section establishes the identifying assumptions underlying our key estimating equations and provides initial evidence supporting a causal interpretation. Consistent with Burgess et al. (2012), the evidence suggests that the moratorium and idiosyncrasies in the application and approval process created plausible exogeneity in the time of new district creation across the country.

First, we show that the timing of redistricting is unrelated to salient determinants of conflict including the initial levels and changes in diversity. In Table 2, we estimate cross-sectional regressions that relate some initial characteristic x to the timing of the initial split in original district d—measured either as the number of months since January 2000 or an indicator for whether the district split after the moratorium.[21] We normalize all variables to have mean zero and standard deviation one for comparison purposes relative to the mean timing outcomes. There are no statistically or economically significant effects of initial diversity within the original district borders in 2000. Moreover, the timing appears to be independent of the way in which the new borders are drawn, which is important for recovering causal

[19] In the 52 original districts, ethnic polarization (ethnic fractionalization) has a correlation of -0.01 (0.44) with religious polarization. At the eventual 2010 boundaries, these correlations are 0.13 (0.27). Although not reported, key results are robust to using a quadratic specification of the Muslim population share as an alternative measure of religious diversity.

[20] While we prefer the sample splitting approach for simplicity, results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar when estimating these heterogeneous effects using a single equation with triple interactions of postsplit $\times$ diversity $\times$ parent or child.

[21] This test is similar to that used in Padró i Miguel et al. (2012) to establish the exogeneity of the timing of village elections. Results look similar based on the multivariate timing regression approach used by Burgess et al. (2012).

estimates in specifications (3) and (4). In particular, we find no significant effects of initial diversity within the eventual child and parent borders or of the realized change in diversity at the original district level. We find similarly insignificant effects of initial political party polarization and natural resource intensity as seen in the bottom two panels.

Second, we provide evidence of parallel pre-trends in conflict. One might worry about spikes or dips in conflict prior to redistricting. This would be especially problematic if such trends were differential with respect to diversity. We examine pre-trends in an event study framework by replacing $postsplit_{it}$ in equations (1)–(4) with bi-annual dummy variables pre- and postsplit. Given that our first districts split in June 2001 (18 months after the start of our data), we plot 3 pre-split coefficients for each specification. Appendix Figures B.3–B.7 show little indication of worrying spikes or dips before splitting. Overall, the lack of systematic pre-trends are consistent with the favorable environment for redistricting in which the central government ensured very limited losses for parent districts after splitting. In Section 6.2, we further examine the evolution of conflict after redistricting.

Third, in order to interpret the heterogeneous effects of diversity on conflict, we also aim to ensure that the diversity measures are not merely picking up the effects of other, correlated characteristics of districts that split. We address these concerns through the standard approach of interacting postsplit with an array of *initial* district characteristics that are plausibly correlated with both diversity and violence. Specifically, we augment equations (3) and (4) with interactions of postsplit and the following groups of variables detailed in Appendix A: *demographics* in 2000 (population, share of that population between the ages of 5–14 and 15–29, physical area), *political preferences* (vote share polarization from 1999 parliamentary elections), *district revenue* in 2000 (total fiscal transfers per capita from the central government), *public goods* in 2000 (post-primary education facilities per capita, health facilities per capita, distance to the district capital), *income* in 2000 (percentage of district with night lights), *security presence* in 2000 (distance to nearest police station or post), and *non-mineral resource intensity* (share of cash crop to total agricultural revenue in 2001, share of workers in agriculture and forestry in 2000). All variables except district revenue are constructed at both the original district level and the child levels. Our estimated heterogeneous effects of diversity remain broadly unchanged in this demanding specification.[22]

Fourth, we aim to rule out the concern that newspaper coverage and hence entries in SNPK data are changing in systematic ways with redistricting. In all specifications, we flexibly account for differences in the intensity of reporting by controlling for the number of active media sources used by coders for a given province–month (see Appendix A). However, we cannot exclude the possibility that a given paper sends reporters differentially to child districts and by the level of diversity (e.g., because elections are more interesting). This concern may be attenuated by the fact that nearly all media sources are responsible for coverage of regions much larger than that of a single district. Moreover, the fact that we find strong heterogeneous effects in child districts both during and outside election periods (see Section 6.2) suggests that the coverage bias would have to persist beyond the early draw of the new political activity in the child.[23]

[22] In further robustness checks in Section 6.3, we also consider specifications in which we account for the difference in these variables between the parent and child district(s).

[23] Also, to the extent that reporters differentially target high-population areas, we would expect the reporting bias to be especially strong in more populous newly created districts. Reassuringly, the interaction of postsplit with log population in the specifications noted above is small and insignificant for all violence categories.

Finally, we address further concerns about endogeneity in the timing of redistricting by focusing solely on those districts that split just before and just after the moratorium. This alternative strategy focuses more of the identification around the abruptness of the moratorium and the unexpected delay in splitting for those districts forced to wait until January 2007 relative to those that snuck in with a split announced in December 2003. This restrictive specification helps clarify an important source of our overall identifying variation but also comes at the cost of power with only 15 original districts around this timing threshold. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 6.3, the results are broadly consistent with our preferred specifications based on the full sample exploiting both the moratorium and the plausibly exogenous idiosyncratic variation in timing.

6 Results: District Proliferation and Conflict

This section presents a set of results suggesting that reductions in violence associated with increased ethnic homogeneity after redistricting may be offset by changes in contestable rents and the polarization of the electorate. We begin by showing no decline in the average incidence of conflict after redistricting. However, we find significantly larger reductions in violence after splitting in those original districts that experience the largest reductions in diversity. We then highlight important factors that may be moderating changes in overall conflict. We identify differential changes in child and parent districts and present a few key mechanisms linking the postsplit political process to conflict. We conclude by showing the robustness of our main results.

6.1 Main Results

We distinguish two first order implications of redistricting: (i) the increase in government capacity and accountability associated with bringing government closer to the governed in terms of physical proximity and preference alignment, and (ii) the change in the incidence of contestable public resources and institutions. If redistricting leads to more ethnically homogeneous districts, then we may see a reduction in conflict if (i) matters. However, the large increase in contestable resources may lead to an increase in conflict if (ii) matters, particularly if the new borders increased group polarization.

Net Effects: Original District. The estimates of equation (1) in Table 3 provide an initial sense of the net effect of these two forces in the average district. Column 1 shows a null effect of splitting on the likelihood of any violent incidents at the original district level. The point estimate is very small relative to the mean of around 86 percent of district–months with any reported incidents. The same holds for non-crime violence in column 2. Column 3 focuses on violence most plausibly associated with conflict over public resources and identity politics (see Section 4). Although imprecise, the estimate is economically significant, implying a 10 percent reduction in the likelihood of these types of violence. Overall, though, the estimates in Table 3 point to small average effects of splitting on overall violence. In the remainder of the paper, we show that these weak average effects mask important changes in the geography of violence and the composition of the electorate.

In Table 4, we estimate equation (3) to show how the border-induced changes in predetermined diversity mediate the overall change in conflict after redistricting. W include Δ fractionalization and

Δ polarization separately first (columns 1–2) and then simultaneously (column 3), adding Δ religious diversity in column 4.

Ethnic polarization has positive differential effects on conflict after splitting, particularly for non-crime violence. The inclusion of religious diversity increases the estimated coefficient on polarization for all categories, suggesting that it is an important omitted factor. Meanwhile, ethnic fractionalization has much weaker differential effects close to zero. The positive differential for polarization is consistent with Esteban and Ray (2011a) who argue that polarization should matter more than fractionalization when the resources being contested are relatively more public than private as is arguably the case with the redistricting process. Importantly, the null results for fractionalization are not driven by measurement error in the definition of ethnic groups. In column 2 of Appendix Table B.3 we consider a narrower definition of ethnic groups—groups are only considered different if they speak different languages—and find similarly insignificant heterogeneous effects of fractionalization.

Table 7 explores robustness of our full specification in column 4 to the inclusion of interactions between postsplit and the predetermined controls listed in Section 5.3. The addition of these 14 controls leaves the key qualitative and quantitative findings in Table 4 unchanged. Districts that split up in a way that increased ethnic polarization (or led to relatively smaller reductions in polarization) have differentially higher violence after redistricting. The same holds for religious polarization with changes in ethnic fractionalization mattering significantly less.

The estimates in Table 4 imply that original districts with large reductions in polarization after splitting experience a statistically and economically significant decrease in the likelihood of conflict. Figure 6(a) plots the predicted percentage change relative to mean violence, for different percentiles of Δ ethnic polarization where the 10th (90th) percentiles are roughly one standard deviation above (below) the mean. For example, an original district at the 10th percentile of the change in polarization ($\Delta P = -0.09$) experiences a 4% decline in the likelihood of any violence, a 9% decline in the likelihood of non-crime violence, and a 20% decline in the likelihood of political violence. These marginal effects are based on column 2 of Table 4 but are even larger for the specifications in columns 3 and 4. The median district also experiences a decline in violence in all categories, and significantly so for political violence. However, districts in the upper 20th percentile (with $\Delta P > 0$) experience little change in violence.

Together, these effect sizes suggest that in the absence of sufficient homogenization from splitting, there may be limited or no reductions in violence after redistricting. Overall, though, the results at the original district level are consistent with the conflict-reducing effects of a more homogenized population dominating the conflict-inducing effects of increasing the value of contestable public resources in such homogenized areas. However, as we show next, these gains in stability are uneven across child and parent districts.

Geography of Violence: Parent vs. Child. Although informative about overall changes in violence, estimating the model at the original district level obscures the very different implications of redistricting for parent and child districts. Exploiting the granularity of our data, we turn now to disentangle these implications. In all subsequent analysis, we retain this disaggregated look across parent and child districts in order to highlight important changes in the geography of violence caused by redistricting.

Table 5 reveals a small differential increase in violence in child districts after splitting relative to

parent districts where we see no change in violence on average. These estimates of equation (2) are somewhat imprecise but point in column 1 to an economically significant difference as child districts experience roughly a 7 percent increase in the likelihood of violence after the new borders are formally recognized. When focusing only on non-crime related violence in column 2, we find smaller insignificant results, suggesting that some of the average increase in violence in child districts may be due to crime. Yet, column 3 reveals a larger differential when restricting to those types of violence most plausibly associated with political contestation. In the following section, we show how that this differential grows over time after redistricting. These initial results in Table 5 provide suggestive evidence of conflict over the *allocation of new resources* associated with the creation of a new government.

Together with the results in column 3 of Table 3 for original districts, the reduction in political conflict for parent districts after splitting (albeit imprecise) is consistent with redistricting leading to a reduction in grievances. In the parent district, the preexisting government is now responsible for a smaller and more proximate population. This bringing of the government closer to the governed may therefore be offsetting any potential increase in conflict over the *reallocation of existing resources* after the split.

We further bolster this explanation in Table 6 by allowing for differential effects of redistricting across child and parent districts with varying degrees of initial diversity. We estimate the same litany of specifications as in Table 4 separately for child and parent districts and focus here on the most robust patterns.

Child districts with high ethnic polarization experience differentially more non-crime-related violence after redistricting. In Appendix Table B.4, we disaggregate these categories of violence even further and find that resource- and identity-based conflict are particularly prone to this exacerbation effect of ethnic polarization. Interestingly, ethnic fractionalization and not polarization appears to matter for the violence category that includes crime (in column 1), which potentially involves fighting over resources that are relatively more private than public. This particular result, though, is not robust to the inclusion of other initial child or parent characteristics interacted with postsplit in Table 7.[24] However, the positive differential effects of ethnic polarization remain unchanged with this robustness check.

In contrast to the overall effects for original districts, child districts appear to experience increases in violence at even low levels of diversity. Figure 6(b) plots the predicted percent change in violence at different percentiles of ethnic polarization (included on its own, matching column 2 of Table 6). For all violence, districts at the 10th percentile of polarization experience increases in violence after splitting. For child districts at the 90th percentile, we observe a statistically significant 13 percent increase in the likelihood of political violence. This amplification effect of polarization exhibits interesting time patterns discussed in the following section.

While we find significant heterogeneous effects for child districts, ethnic diversity and polarization in particular has weaker effects in parent districts. Ethnic fractionalization has a relatively smaller positive and mostly insignificant differential effect on all three measures of conflict after splitting whereas ethnic polarization has a negative and insignificant heterogeneous effect. Meanwhile, religious polarization amplifies political conflict after splitting suggesting some scope for diversity to shape conflict dynamics in newly defined parent districts. These patterns are similar when including additional controls $\times$ postsplit in Table 7.

[24] As with the earlier original district-level results, the effects of fractionalization hold when defining groups based on languages, which can be seen in column 2 of Appendix Table B.3.

The differences between parent and child districts are consistent with the change in the value of contestable public resources being larger in the latter. The other noteworthy difference is that parent districts experience a reduction in political conflict at all levels of ethnic polarization, whereas child districts displayed the opposite (see Figures 6(b) and (c)). Changes in other types of conflict are also close to zero or negative. This is consistent with parent districts being easier to govern and various interest groups easier to placate, thereby reducing incentives to conflict.

Discussion: What Role for Diversity? Null average effects of redistricting on violence mask compelling heterogeneity. Firstly, at the original district level, large reductions in diversity as a result of redistricting lead to a sizable reduction in the incidence of violence most plausibly related to contests over the determination of public goods. Homogenization likely dampens the incentives for conflict over how to distribute the new public prizes. Turning to the more disaggregated units, there is strong evidence that areas receiving an entirely new seat of government experience relatively more violence after redistricting, particularly in ethnically polarized areas.

It is important to note that when examining the more disaggregated units, we cannot rule out movements in violence from the parent to the child. That is, we cannot distinguish between a genuine reduction in violence in the parent offset by new violence in the child versus a movement of the same violent actors from parent to child committing similar acts.[25] No matter which is occurring, we are more likely to observe an increase in violence, be it reallocated or entirely new, in ethnically polarized child districts. Moreover, the original district results point to genuine decreases in violence postsplit in areas with more homogeneity within the new borders, which suggests that the redistricting process can generate meaningful reductions in violence as opposed to just reallocating it.

The results presented in Tables 3–7 paint a suggestive picture of the potential channels through which redistricting can affect conflict in diverse settings. In general, these results hold up to a battery of additional robustness checks discussed in Section 6.3. In the next section, we highlight a few key mechanisms aimed at further clarifying the two countervailing effects of redistricting on conflict.

However, before turning to mechanisms, we provide additional insights into the instrumental role of diversity. In particular, the general pattern of significance on polarization and not fractionalization merits further investigation. Recall that polarization departs from fractionalization in both its emphasis on own group size and the extent of intergroup differences. In Appendix Table B.3, we separately examine different measures of diversity $\times$ postsplit in our key specifications for original, child, and parent districts. As noted above, little changes when define fractionalization over ethnic groups based on shared language in column 2. Column 3 additionally uses the linguistic distance weight (κ) but does not square the own term (a formulation known as the Gini-Greenberg or G Index, see Desmet et al., 2009). This specification shows that the inclusion of non-constant distances between groups is important. For the child, though, the G Index remains less significant than polarization, indicating that both linguistic differences and own-group size matter perhaps because large groups are the most competitive in political

[25]The SNPK data suggest little cross parent/child border violence before or after redistricting (there are only 105 incidents out of 53,144 that have two subdistricts recorded as their location). The splitting process requires approval in the parent district that likely helps to ensure that accepted splits will not be further contested between parent and child districts. This further motivates the sample splitting approach in equation (4). Of course, it may nevertheless be the case that violence moves from the parent beforehand to the child afterwards, following the creation of the new capital.

contests.

We go a step further in Appendix Figure B.8 to show how the effects of ethnic polarization vary with the weight placed on linguistic dissimilarity (δ).[26] Recall that a high δ treats all groups as equally different, while a low δ places greater weight on groups with the most dissimilar languages. At the original district level in panel (a), polarization generally becomes less significant as δ increases. This suggests that deeper linguistic cleavages are associated with relatively more conflict (as in Desmet et al., 2012) after redistricting. We find similar patterns for non-crime and political violence in child districts in panel (b). As $\delta \to \infty$, polarization more closely captures fractionalization, which explains why the higher δ are associated with larger effect sizes for all violence in child and parent districts (the non-robust result seen in Table 6). Overall, our baseline results are robust across a range of δ, which is reassuring, but the patterns in Figure B.8 also suggest that the degree of intergroup differences matter above and beyond the relative group sizes captured by fractionalization.

6.2 Mechanisms Linking Redistricting and Conflict

Several mechanisms could explain the heterogenous patterns of conflict observed after redistricting. We argue here that many of our key results can be linked to the abrupt reconfiguration of the electorate and ensuing battle for control of newly created governments with limited institutional capacity. We identify violent surges around the first local election in child districts, and ethnic polarization amplifies violence both during and after the election. Parent areas, which already have government infrastructure and staff, do not experience a similar spike in violence around election time. In fact, parents with more dissimilar voting preferences to their children have reduced violence during elections after a split, consistent with the conflict-reducing effects of preference homogenization. On balance, the beneficial effects of increased preference homogeneity postsplit appear to be offset by violent contests over allocation of political control in child districts, yielding the null overall effects of redistricting on conflict.

Event Study. We begin by using an event study approach to identify the divergent effects of redistricting on political conflict across child and parent districts. In Figure 7, we estimate equations (1) and (2) allowing $postsplit_{it}$ to vary at the bi-annual frequency. In panel (b), there is a clear indication of a break in postsplit trends occurring around two years after redistricting when violence begins to decline significantly in parent districts (in the left graph) with an offsetting, differential increase in child districts (in the right graph). These patterns are consistent with two features of the institutional landscape after redistricting as discussed in Section 3.1: (i) the gradual flow of new contestable resources into child districts, and (ii) the typical time of the first post-split election for district head. Together, these differences across parent and child explain both the average 10 percent reduction in political conflict at the original district level in Table 3 and the time path of this decline in violence starting 2–3 years after redistricting as seen in panel (a) of Figure 7.

Using the same event study approach, we show in panel (c) of Figure 7 that ethnic polarization exhibits the largest effect on political conflict 1.5–2.5 years after redistricting. However, this amplification effect persists into later periods, suggesting that these differential postsplit effects of polarization

[26] We standardize each measure for comparability and divide the estimates by mean violence as in Desmet et al. (2015).

are not purely due to transitory election violence. In the next two subsections, we corroborate this interpretation by incorporating the district-specific timing of elections into our main specifications.

Election Period Violence. If the increase in violence after redistricting is due to contestation of public goods, then we should observe a differential increase in violence around the time of the first direct election for the head of the newly created district governments. The district head plays a crucial role in allocating many of the public resources detailed in Section 3. Additionally, these effects should be more pronounced in child districts where these resources are entirely novel. We provide direct evidence of these patterns in Table 8 by augmenting our baseline specification in equation (2) with indicators for the district-specific election periods before and after redistricting. In all cases, we define the election period as a six month window centered on the month of the election, but results are similar for other bandwidth.

In Table 8, we find systematic differences in the likelihood of violence around election time after redistricting. In column 2 for child districts, violence is 13 percent more likely during the election period than during other months after redistricting. These results suggest that mobilization around election times is a particularly important feature of the conflict landscape after redistricting. Indeed, in column 3, we find a significantly larger differential effect when focusing on political types of violence. The absence of a differential effect in column 1, which includes crime-based violence, is reassuring insomuch as it suggests that there is not simply a general increase in reporting of violence around election periods due to more intense media coverage.

Meanwhile, before redistricting, we find no differential upsurge in violence in child district areas around election times when residents were voting for the head of the original district based in the capital (of the parent district).[27] This difference pre- and postsplit is consistent with the large change in contestable rents experienced by residents of child districts. It may also be explained in part by the possibility that conflict-prone groups from the child district who used to travel to the original district capital to engage in violence around election times naturally reallocate efforts towards the newly created district capital after redistricting.

At the same time, we find no differential violence around election times when looking at parent districts newly separated from the neighboring child(ren).[28] Despite the scope for formation of new electoral coalitions and reallocation of rents, there does not appear to be any more violence around election times in the new parent districts. This apparent difference with child districts can be explained in part by the fact that the scale of the change in contestable political resources is relatively smaller in the newly created parent districts. Moreover, as we show below, these parent districts may have had different underlying political preferences than the child districts, and hence after splitting, the political process may have been generally more amicable.

Composition of the Electorate. Given the strong patterns of violence around elections in child districts, we now consider how diversity shapes such violence. Table 9 shows that there is relatively more violence around elections in those child districts where the newly relevant electorate is more ethnically

[27] Note that this result is only identified off of districts that split after the moratorium ended in 2006 given that direct elections for district heads only ensued in 2005.

[28] The elections in child and parent districts from the same original district often occur at different times after redistricting.

polarized.[29] This effect is borne out for nearly all types of violence and is particularly significant for political violence in column 3. Interestingly, the latter effect extends outside the election period as well, and Figure 7(c) suggests that these effects are concentrated in the post-election period when grievances among losing groups may be expressed violently. Nevertheless, the impact of polarization on political categories of violence is twice as large during election periods. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization retains its significant relationship with overall violence after redistricting as seen in column 1, but we see no associated amplification around election times.

With all of these results, it is important to note that ethnic polarization is not tantamount to political polarization. Although ethnicity plays an important role around elections (see Section 3.2), the absence of ethnic political parties in Indonesia suggest that the significant heterogeneous effects of diversity at the core of this paper reflect an instrumental role for ethnicity that is partly distinct from its impact on (deep) political preferences. Indeed, in Table 7, we showed that the large heterogeneous effect of ethnic polarization is robust to allowing for pre-2000 vote share polarization to have differential effects after redistricting. Nevertheless, as we show next, geographic differences in voting preferences do matter for post-redistricting conflict dynamics.

We return now to the parent districts in order to further understand how changes in the electorate affect violence after redistricting. If part of the impetus for splitting lies in the homogenization of political preferences to ease social conflict, then we expect violence to be differentially lower around election time after redistricting in parent districts with relatively more dissimilar voting preferences compared to their neighboring child areas. Moreover, we expect the opposite around election time before redistricting given that parent districts hosted the political seat of the original district.

We test these predictions in Table 10 using an index that captures the similarity in the 1999 vote shares. In particular, we define the dissimilarity in voting preferences between parents and children as $\Delta_{vote} = \sum_{c \in C} \pi_c \sum_{i=1}^{I} |share_{ip} - share_{ic}|$ where $share_{ip}$ is the share of votes for party i in subdistricts within the parent borders, $share_{ic}$ is the same share for party i within the child borders, and $I = 5$ includes the five parties with the most votes in the overall original district (see Appendix A for details on the voting data). We sum over multiple children in cases where $C > 1$, and the weight π_c captures the share of the total child population in 2000 that each child makes up. From an identification perspective, it is important to note that original districts with high Δ_{vote} split no earlier than those with low Δ_{vote} (see Table 2).

Overall, parent districts with divergent voting preferences compared to neighboring child districts experience relatively more violence before splitting and less violence after splitting, with both differential effects concentrated around election times. We see this in column 1 for all violence with the interaction of Δ_{vote} and election period having roughly equal and opposite sign pre- and postsplit. Reassuringly, these effects seem to be driven by the political subcategories of violence in column 3. Here, we also find that vote share dissimilarity is associated with lower violence even in non-election periods after redistricting. All of these results point to the potential reductions in violence afforded to parent districts after separating from children with different political preferences.

[29] This table is based on augmenting column 3 of Table 6 with the election period indicators. Results are similar when augmenting the specification in column 4 and interacting that indictor with religious polarization, which exhibits no differential effects on during election periods.

6.3 Further Robustness

Before concluding, we provide evidence of additional robustness of key results on the heterogeneous effects of diversity. We do so for the full specification of ethnic and religious diversity in column 4 of our baseline Tables 4 and 6.[30] Overall, this series of tests further bolsters our causal interpretation of the main findings.

First, we omit geographic subsets of the data in order to ensure our results are not driven by particular regions with a long and persistent history of conflict. Tables B.5 and B.7 (B.6 and B.8) show that the original (child and parent) district results remain unchanged when we exclude districts in Aceh and Maluku, respectively. If anything, the results for ethnic polarization become even stronger, which is consistent with our empirical strategy being geared towards identifying low intensity albeit still costly forms of social and political conflict.

Second, the results survive three alternative econometric specifications: (i) Tables B.9 and B.10 omit the lagged dependent variable, (ii) Tables B.11 and B.12 omit the district-specific time trends, and (iii) Tables B.13 and B.14 omit districts that enter the data in 2005, thereby ensuring a balanced panel.

Third, we demonstrate robustness to three identification concerns: (i) Tables B.15 and B.16 omit the years 2011 to 2014 to ensure results are not driven by periods well beyond the unexpected moratorium, (ii) Tables B.17 and B.18 omit the districts that split more than two years before the moratorium for an analogous reason, and (iii) Tables B.19 and B.20 restrict to districts that split immediately prior to the moratorium began in December 2003 and immediately after the moratorium was lifted in January 2007. As discussed in Section 5.3, this latter specification forces more of the identifying variation in timing to fall around the moratorium, but this limits our sample considerably. Nevertheless, the findings are remarkably similar to our baseline results in terms of their implied marginal effects. Given the limited sample, though, we maintain caution in interpreting the significance of these results but also note that the quantitative patterns are not driven by collinearity among the diversity measures as seen when comparing across columns that include different subsets of the three measures.

Fourth, as an alternative to the controls used in Table 7 (and detailed in Section 5.3), we interact post-split with the difference between these controls in the parent and child districts. These measures capture the possibility that redistricting has differential effects based not on the characteristics within parent and child districts but on the inequality between them. Tables B.21 and B.22 show that our baseline results generally withstand this alternative formulation.

Finally, the results are also robust to generalizing the dependent variable to the count of the number of incidents occurring in the given district–month. In Table B.23 (B.24), we re-estimate the specifications in Table 4 (6) using conditional fixed effects Poisson. The coefficients in these tables can be interpreted as average marginal effects (AMEs) by simply multiplying by the mean of the dependent variable reported at the bottom of the table. Although some are imprecisely estimated, the sign and magnitude of the AMEs are broadly in line with the estimated effects reported in our baseline tables for the extensive margin of any incidents.

[30] The average results in Tables 3 and 5 are similarly robust when subjected to the relevant tests discussed here.

7 Conclusion

This paper provides evidence on the conditions under which border-induced changes in diversity can reduce conflict. In an ethnically diverse country like Indonesia, redistricting may result in higher polarization within new borders. Combined with an increase in contestable public goods and potentially low state capacity, this is sufficient to offset, and in some cases reverse, any gains from bringing government institutions closer to the governed. In such cases, it is important to ensure proper expectations, free and fair elections, and sufficient state apparatus to ensure the transition proceeds smoothly.

We see two important directions for future research on the link between local government proliferation and conflict. First, a small but growing literature highlights the importance of *within*-ethnolinguistic or -religious group heterogeneity in culture (Desmet et al., 2015), genes (Arbatli et al., 2015), or income (Esteban and Ray, 2008; Mitra and Ray, 2014) in shaping conflict. This is an interesting question in the context of decentralization and one that can be explored using heterogeneity in responses to household survey questions on preferences, variation in vote shares for different parties of the same religion, and within-group educational differences reported in the Population Census.

A second question is whether redistricting can be a vehicle for a central government to constrain national secessionist tendencies. Coming on the heels of East Timor's independence and worried about breakaway regions in Aceh and Papua, Indonesian policymakers in the late 1990s strategically chose the district to be the primary administrative units allowed to proliferate. According to observers like Booth (2011), their goal was to placate grievances with the center and fracture the strength of broader regional identities. In future research, it would be interesting to explore whether this policy of "breaking up to stay together" stifled secessionist sentiments and ultimately reduced this type of violence.

We conclude with two caveats regarding policy implications. Redistricting until reaching a homogenous entity is certainly not an appropriate takeaway, particularly given that we have not accounted for economies of scale or other consequences of smaller administrative units. Moreover, this study does not address potential long term implications of reduced interactions with other groups; it may well be that the optimal long-term decision to create a new government involves having multiple groups. We simply caution that care must be taken when abruptly allocating valuable public resources to polarized areas. This is particularly important in the short- to medium-run period as new government institutions are formed.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Indonesia's Remarkable Wave(s) of Redistricting



Notes: These figures capture the evolution of new districts across Indonesia from 1980–2014 based on the month each district was passed into law.

Figure 2: Example of Redistricting into Parent and Child Districts



Notes: This figure provides an example from Buru district of the redistricting process as well as our nomenclature for the different administrative divisions.

Figure 3: Timeline of Events






Figure 4: Redistricting across the Country



Notes: This map plots the original and new district borders based on district-level shapefiles for 2000 and 2010.


Figure 5: Redistricting Increases Transfers




Notes: This figure plots the evolution of average central government transfers to three different groups of districts: (i) those that did not split between 2000 and 2010, (ii) those that split in 2002–3 right before the moratorium (in dashed lines), and (iii) those that split right after the moratorium in 2007–8. The data are from the DAPOER database from the World Bank.

Figure 6: Heterogeneous Marginal Effects of Diversity on Violence


(a) Original Districts (Column 2, Table 4)



(b) Child Districts (Column 2, Table 6)




(c) Parent Districts (Column 6, Table 6)




Notes: This figure shows the marginal effects of post-split × the given diversity measure relative to the mean of political violence at the original district level in graph (a), the child level in (b), and the parent level in (c) as estimated in the given specifications reported above the figures.

Figure 7: Event Study: Redistricting and Political Violence


(a) Average Effects of Splitting on Original Districts (Column 3, Table 3)



(b) Average Effects of Splitting in Parent vs. Child Districts (Column 3, Table 5)



(c) Heterogeneous Effects of Diversity in Child Districts (Panel C, Column 3, Table 6)



Notes: These figures report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study versions of the regression specifications in the results listed above the figures. In (a), the equation is analogous to equation (1) and given by: $conflict_{dt} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{d,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \beta_j postsplit_{d,t-j} + \theta_t + \theta_d + \theta_d \times t + \varepsilon_{dt}$, where j are 6 month bins beginning 18 months prior to splitting (i.e., $j = -3$ for months 18–13 before splitting) and ending 60 months after (i.e., $j = 9$ for months 55–60 after splitting) with an additional $j = 10$ for all months after 60. Hence, the reference period includes all periods greater than 18 months before splitting. In (b), the equation is analogous to equation (2) and given by: $conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \left[\beta_j postsplit_{i,t-j} + \eta_j \left(postsplit_{i,t-j} \times \mathbf{1}(i = d_c)\right)\right] + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where the j periods are as defined before. Note that the left graph shows the β_j coefficients, and the right graph shows the η_j coefficients. In (c), the equation is analogous to equation (4) and given by: $conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \left[\beta_j postsplit_{i,t-j} + \sum_{k \in \{F,P\}} \phi_j^k \left(postsplit_{i,t-j} \times k_i^0\right)\right] + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where the j periods are as defined before, the left graph shows the ϕ_j coefficients for fractionalization and the right graph for polarization. Results look similar for these coefficients when including religious polarization or including each measure on its own.

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	2000 Borders: Original Districts					
	Conflict Incidents					
	Any	Any Non-Crime	Any political	Post-Split	Entered Data in 2005	
Mean	0.861	0.631	0.413	0.787	0.347	
Standard Dev.	0.346	0.483	0.492	0.409	0.476	
	Ethnic Polarization	Ethnic Fractionalization	Religious Polarization	Δ Ethnic Polarization	Δ Ethnic Fractionalization	Δ Religious Polarization
Mean	0.017	0.612	0.119	0.032	-0.091	-0.045
Standard Dev.	0.016	0.256	0.070	0.206	0.141	0.094
Min	0.003	0.062	0.001	-0.565	-0.732	-0.552
Median	0.013	0.689	0.130	0.007	-0.047	-0.008
Max	0.095	0.957	0.233	0.736	-0.000	0.090
	2010 Borders: Parent and Child Districts					
	Conflict Incidents					
	Any	Any Non-Crime	Any political	Post-Split	Child Indicator	Entered Data in 2005
Mean	0.616	0.364	0.204	0.607	0.768	0.356
Standard Dev.	0.486	0.481	0.403	0.489	0.422	0.479
	Ethnic Polarization	Ethnic Fractionalization	Religious Polarization			
Mean	0.017	0.531	0.114			
Standard Dev	0.016	0.276	0.076			
Min	0.002	0.030	0.000			
Median	0.013	0.629	0.124			
Max	0.131	0.943	0.247			

Notes: At the 2000 level, there are 52 Districts and 15 Years, for 7,956 monthly observations. At the 2010 level, there are 133 Districts and 15 years, for 20,220 monthly observations. *any* includes all crime and non-crime violence; *non-crime* restricts to non-crime violent conflict; and *political* restricts to those categories of violence most plausibly associated with the implications of redistricting including identity, elections/appointments, governance, resource violence, and other. See Appendix A for variable definitions.

Table 2: Plausibly Exogenous Timing of Redistricting (52 Original Districts)

	Dependent Variable	
	no. months until split	1(post-moratorium split)
	mean: 53	mean: 0.31
Ethnolinguistic & Religious Diversity		
original district ethnic fractionalization	2.415	0.011
	(4.578)	(0.071)
original district Δ ethnic fractionalization	4.020	0.051
	(2.969)	(0.049)
child district ethnic fractionalization	2.683	0.009
	(4.283)	(0.069)
parent district ethnic fractionalization	4.884	0.051
	(4.273)	(0.066)
original district ethnic polarization	-1.226	-0.006
	(3.029)	(0.048)
original district Δ ethnic polarization	3.857	0.000
	(3.905)	(0.064)
child district ethnic polarization	-1.130	-0.002
	(3.418)	(0.045)
parent district ethnic polarization	2.447	0.045
	(4.180)	(0.071)
original district religious polarization	1.044	-0.024
	(3.683)	(0.060)
original district Δ religious polarization	-1.244	0.024
	(2.677)	(0.040)
child district religious polarization	-1.965	-0.063
	(4.014)	(0.060)
parent district religious polarization	2.516	0.013
	(4.043)	(0.063)
political Preferences		
vote dissimilarity between parent and child	-5.414	-0.073
	(3.248)	(0.049)
original district vote polarization	-1.923	-0.006
	(4.335)	(0.072)
Natural Resources		
original district share of workers in agriculture	3.729	0.045
	(4.403)	(0.070)
original district share of workers in forestry	-3.171	-0.079
	(3.704)	(0.054)
original district cash crop share by value	2.810	0.033
	(4.122)	(0.063)
original district resource revenues	1.183	0.009
	(6.270)	(0.089)

Notes: Each cell is a different bivariate OLS regression of the timing of the first split on initial district characteristics. The dependent variable in column (1) is the month that each original district split minus the months since January 2000 and in column (2) is an indicator for whether the spit happened after the moratorium in from 2004–6. In the bottom two panels for political preferences and natural resources, we are restricted to 49 original districts for which we have additional controls as used in the robustness checks discussion in Section 6.3. All regressions also control for the year of entry into our sample (2000 or 2005). Coefficients are based on standardized variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 3: Average Effects of Redistricting on Conflict

Original District Level

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.000	-0.010	-0.044
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Observations	7,904	7,904	7,904
District Borders in	2000	2000	2000
No. of Districts	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	0.862	0.631	0.413
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that district–month. *all* includes all crime and non-crime violence; *non-crime* restricts to non-crime violent conflict; and *political* restricts to those categories of violence most plausibly associated with the implications of redistricting including identity, elections/appointments, governance, resource violence, and other. All specifications also control for lagged conflict, which is simply the one month lag of that indicator. Results are unchanged in this and all tables when omitting the lagged term. $postpslit$ is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original or parent district experiences its first redistricting and the child district is officially passed into law. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 4: Ethnoreligious Diversity and the Effects of Redistricting on Conflict

Original District Level: 2000 Borders, 52 Districts, 7,904 District–Months

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: All Violence Mean: 0.862			
post-split	-0.002	-0.008	-0.026	-0.025
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.028)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.023		-0.160	-0.255
	(0.213)		(0.225)	(0.231)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization		0.116	0.157	0.259
		(0.091)	(0.116)	(0.152)*
post-split × Δ religious polarization				0.314
				(0.236)
	Panel B: Non-Crime Violence Mean: 0.631			
post-split	0.001	-0.021	-0.025	-0.025
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.028)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	0.110		-0.041	-0.199
	(0.161)		(0.174)	(0.160)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization		0.162	0.172	0.341
		(0.071)**	(0.094)*	(0.102)***
post-split × Δ religious polarization				0.520
				(0.209)**
	Panel C: Political Violence Mean: 0.413			
post-split	-0.033	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054
	(0.027)	(0.026)**	(0.030)*	(0.029)*
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	0.121		-0.006	-0.138
	(0.157)		(0.157)	(0.140)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization		0.143	0.145	0.287
		(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.117)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization				0.437
				(0.217)**
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District-Specific Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postpslit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table 5: Average Effects of Redistricting on Conflict

Child and Parent District Level

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.004	-0.003	-0.024
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)
post-split × child	0.042	0.007	0.035
	(0.024)*	(0.026)	(0.022)
Observations	20,087	20,087	20,087
District Borders in	2010	2010	2010
No. of Districts	133	133	133
Mean Dep. Var.	0.616	0.364	0.204
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postpslit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original or parent district experiences its first redistricting and the child district is officially passed into law. The child indicator equals one for child districts. There are 52 parent and 81 child districts. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 6: Ethnoreligious Diversity and the Effects of Redistricting on Conflict

Child versus Parent Districts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Child Districts				**Parent Districts**			
	Observations (District–Months): 12,183				Observations (District–Months): 7,904			
	Panel A: All Violence							
	Child District Mean: 0.536				Parent District Mean: 0.739			
post-split	-0.091	0.017	-0.091	-0.115	-0.094	0.013	-0.072	-0.080
	(0.040)**	(0.030)	(0.040)**	(0.046)**	(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.058)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.249		0.248	0.232	0.142		0.165	0.146
	(0.069)***		(0.074)***	(0.075)***	(0.079)*		(0.087)*	(0.106)
post-split × ethnic polarization		1.122	0.045	-0.054		-1.278	-2.305	-2.249
		(0.845)	(0.886)	(0.861)		(1.949)	(2.087)	(2.119)
post-split × religious polarization				0.290				0.151
				(0.298)				(0.331)
	Panel B: Non-Crime Violence							
	Child District Mean: 0.286				Parent District Mean: 0.484			
post-split	-0.019	-0.033	-0.032	-0.053	-0.064	0.016	-0.048	-0.071
	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.055)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.037		-0.001	-0.015	0.109		0.125	0.071
	(0.059)		(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.077)		(0.081)	(0.073)
post-split × ethnic polarization		1.779	1.783	1.695		-0.846	-1.626	-1.465
		(1.030)*	(1.061)*	(1.006)*		(1.607)	(1.802)	(1.807)
post-split × religious polarization				0.259				0.435
				(0.183)				(0.277)
	Panel C: Political Violence							
	Child District Mean: 0.152				Parent District Mean: 0.284			
post-split	-0.008	-0.016	-0.018	-0.034	-0.094	-0.015	-0.080	-0.114
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.047)*	(0.037)	(0.046)*	(0.037)***
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.032		0.004	-0.007	0.114		0.128	0.049
	(0.039)		(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.075)		(0.083)	(0.070)
post-split × ethnic polarization		1.315	1.297	1.230		-0.617	-1.412	-1.180
		(0.381)***	(0.406)***	(0.378)***		(1.389)	(1.743)	(1.707)
post-split × religious polarization				0.197				0.625
				(0.161)				(0.209)***
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District-Specific Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postpslit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. There are 52 parent and 81 child districts. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 7: Robustness Checks on Heterogeneous Effects of Diversity Interacting Post-Split with Other Predetermined Controls

	Dep. Var.: any . . . incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
	Panel A: Original District		
	Table 4, Column 4 Specification		
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.099	0.216	-0.178
	(0.158)	(0.180)	(0.305)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.284	0.172	0.311
	(0.081)***	(0.107)	(0.127)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.304	0.480	0.397
	(0.180)*	(0.191)**	(0.204)*
	Panel B: Child District		
	Table 6, Column 4 Specification		
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.061	-0.021	-0.062
	(0.131)	(0.084)	(0.073)
post-split × ethnic polarization	-0.137	2.056	1.069
	(0.983)	(0.791)**	(0.404)**
post-split × religious polarization	0.152	0.039	0.224
	(0.414)	(0.236)	(0.215)
	Panel C: Parent District		
	Table 6, Column 8 Specification		
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.131	0.090	-0.066
	(0.130)	(0.106)	(0.099)
post-split × ethnic polarization	-3.531	-3.748	-2.260
	(3.116)	(2.607)	(2.212)
post-split × religious polarization	0.060	0.273	1.158
	(0.428)	(0.588)	(0.287)***
Other Predetermined Controls × Post-Split	coefficients not shown		
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District-Specific Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postpslit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. All specifications interact post-split with the three diversity measure in addition to a set of "other predetermined controls" including a host of pre-2001 district-specific characteristics (at the given level of analysis) capturing demographics, vote share polarization, fiscal transfers, public goods, income, security presence and natural resource intensity (see Section 5.3 for details).There are 52 parent and 81 child districts. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 8: Differential Effects During Election Time

Child versus Parent Districts

	Dep. Var.: any . . . incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	0.040	-0.005	0.001	-0.008	0.001	-0.027
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.026)
pre-split election period (original district)	-0.015	-0.008	-0.004	0.003	-0.059	-0.010
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.039)
1st election period post-split	-0.014	0.038	0.060	0.026	-0.011	0.027
	(0.023)	(0.020)*	(0.021)***	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Observations	12,064	12,064	12,064	7,785	7,785	7,785
District Borders in	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010
No. of Districts	80	80	80	51	51	51
Mean Dep. Var.	0.540	0.289	0.153	0.735	0.476	0.278
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that parent or child district–month (see the notes to Table 3. *postpslit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The pre-split election period equals a 6 month window around the the district-specific date of the election for the district head at the level of the original district. This is only possible for districts that split after 2006 because before 2005, these elections were not held as the district head was appointed by the central government. The pre-split election time is the same for both parent and child districts. The first post-split election period is defined similarly and varies across (parent and child) districts. There are 52 parent and 81 child districts. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 9: Ethnolinguistic Diversity, Elections and Conflict

Child Districts

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.080	-0.026	-0.016
	(0.039)**	(0.038)	(0.028)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.240	-0.019	-0.008
	(0.072)***	(0.059)	(0.039)
post-split × ethnic polarization	-0.169	1.687	1.116
	(0.923)	(1.091)	(0.441)**
1st election period post-split	-0.081	-0.053	-0.025
	(0.030)**	(0.033)	(0.029)
ethnic fractionalization × 1st election period post-split	0.048	0.141	0.095
	(0.073)	(0.069)**	(0.065)
ethnic polarization × 1st election period post-split	2.321	1.196	2.152
	(1.282)*	(0.667)*	(0.780)***
Observations	12,064	12,064	12,064
Mean Dep. Var.	0.540	0.289	0.153
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that parent or child district–month (see the notes to Table 3). See the notes to Table 8 for details on the election variable. $postpslit$ is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual child district boundaries in 2000. Including religious polarization as well does not change the results. There are 80 child districts in this specification. All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table 10: Political Preference Differences, Elections and Conflict

Parent Districts

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.012	0.042	0.022
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.048)
pre-split election period (original district)	-0.131	-0.029	-0.165
	(0.067)*	(0.121)	(0.079)**
vote share dissimilarity × election period pre-split	0.703	-0.141	0.781
	(0.287)**	(0.507)	(0.401)*
1st election period post-split	0.162	-0.118	0.156
	(0.094)*	(0.137)	(0.100)
post-split × vote share dissimilarity	-0.001	-0.183	-0.228
	(0.201)	(0.205)	(0.156)
vote share dissimilarity × 1st election period post-split	-0.732	0.495	-0.634
	(0.362)**	(0.571)	(0.464)
Observations	7,427	7,427	7,427
District Borders in	2010	2010	2010
No. of Districts	49	49	49
Mean Dep. Var.	0.750	0.486	0.282
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that parent or child district–month (see the notes to Table 3). See the notes to Table 8 for details on the election variable. *postpslit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The vote share dissimilarity measure captures the difference in vote shares between parent and child districts for the top five parties in the 1999 parliamentary elections at the original district level (see Appendix A for details). All specifications include lagged conflict, dummies for the number of active media used by coders for the given province–month, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the original district level in all columns. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Online Appendix

A Data and Variables

We describe here the key variables and data sources used in the paper.

A.1 Administrative Divisions

Original District: This administrative unit defines all areas based on the 2000 boundaries.

Child District: This represents the subdistricts that eventually become their own new district with an accompanying capital.

Parent District: This represents the subdistricts that stay with the original district capital after other subdistricts split off.

postsplit: This is an indicator that turns on after the month that parliamentary legislation first established a new district within the original district boundaries. In most cases there is only one split event per original district. Multi-splits have a second split at a later date. We explore robustness to alternate ways of handling multi-splits.

A.2 Conflict

The conflict data comes from the Indonesian National Violence Monitoring System (known by its Indonesian acronym SNPK). The data are reported at the 2011 district level, and hence we can calculate conflict within both the 2010 and 2000 borders over the years 2000–2014 . Our main conflict measures are binary indicators for any conflict in a given district–month, but we also consider the number of incidents as a robustness check.

Any Incident: A dummy for whether SNPK recorded any violent incident in the given month.

Any Non-Crime Incident: A dummy for whether SNPK recorded any non-crime and non-domestic violence incidents in the given month.

Any Political Incident: A dummy for whether SNPK recorded any resource, governance, election, identity or non-classified violent conflict incident in the given month. Resource conflict is triggered by resource disputes (most commonly land and restricted access to public locations). Governance conflict is triggered by disputes over government policies or programs (most commonly corruption and poor public service quality). Election incidents are triggered by electoral competition or bureaucratic appointments (most commonly pertaining to the district level). Identity-based incidents are incidents that are triggered by disputes between ethnicities, religions, or long-standing enmity between resident groups (most commonly religious or between residents of different areas).

Active Media: Using data obtained directly from SNPK managers on newspaper availability and usage by province and month, we calculate the number of papers used in any given province-month. All conflict specifications control flexibly for media availability by including dummies for the number of active papers in any given province-month.

Entered 2005: SNPK coverage begins in 1998 for nine conflict-prone provinces and increases to 15 provinces plus parts of 3 provinces in greater Jakarta beginning in 2005. The data are not reliable for

1998 and 1999, and hence we focus on 2000–2014 in the paper.

A.3 Diversity

All measures are computed using the universal 2000 Population Census. Since this contains data at the village level, metrics can be constructed at both the 2000 and 2010 borders.

Ethnic Fractionalization: Ethnic fractionalization in district d is given by $F = \sum_{g=1}^{M_e} \pi_g(1-\pi_g)$, where M_e is the number of ethnic groups in the district, and π_g is the population share of group g as reported in the 2000 Census. We observe over 1000 ethnicities and sub-ethnicities speaking over 400 languages. We also consider the related Greenberg-Gini version, which allows for non-binary distances between groups: $G = \sum_{g=1}^{M_e} \sum_{h=1}^{M_e} \pi_g \pi_h \kappa_{gh}$ where κ_{gh} captures the linguistic distance between groups g and h as detailed below.

Religious Polarization: Religious polarization, $R = \sum_{g=1}^{M_r} \sum_{h=1}^{M_r} \pi_g^2 \pi_h$, where M_r is the number of religious groups, and π_g (π_h) is the population share of group g (h). There are seven religions recorded in the Census, but in most districts, there is a single cleavage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim group. As a result religious polarization is effectively identical to religious fractionalization in our data (with a correlation of 0.96).

Ethnic Polarization: $P = \sum_{g=1}^{M_e} \sum_{h=1}^{M_e} \pi_g^2 \pi_h \kappa_{gh}$, where M_e, π_g, and π_h are as defined before, and κ_{gh} is the distance between groups g and h. We map each ethnic group in the 2000 Census to a language in *Ethnologue*, which provides a full classification of the linguistic origins of each language (see Bazzi et al. (forthcoming)). We set $\kappa_{gh} = 1 - s_{gh}^{\delta}$, where s_{gh} is the degree of similarity between the languages spoken by g and h as given by the ratio of common branches on the language classification tree to the maximum possible (14), and δ is a parameter that selects the level of linguistic dissimilarity to be emphasized. We set $\delta = 0.05$ in our baseline, but consider alternate values. Ethnicities with missing languages are given province-specific average pairwise distances (κ's) between all other languages. Missing ethnic groups are necessarily grouped together, but separately from the "other" category, and also given province-specific average distances. We drop foreigners as they represent a minute fraction of the population, but we retain the ethnic Chinese.

The following measures are constructed only at the original district level:

Δ **Ethnic Polarization**: To examine changes in diversity at the original district level, we compute the population-weighted average polarization in the new units (children and parent district), subtract the polarization in the original district, and express it in percentage terms. For original district OD becoming parent district d_1 and child(ren) d_2 (d_3 and so forth if multiple children), with populations $N_{d_1} + N_{d_2} + ... = N_{OD}$ and ethnic polarization levels P_{d1}, P_{d2}, P_{OD}, we calculate $\Delta P = \frac{\sum_{d \in D}\left(\frac{N_d}{N_{OD}} P_d\right) - P_{OD}}{P_{OD}}$.

Δ **Ethnic Fractionalization**: For original district OD becoming parent district d_1 and child(ren) d_2 (d_3 and so forth if multiple children), with populations $N_{d_1} + N_{d_2} + ... = N_{OD}$ and ethnic fractionalization levels F_{d1}, F_{d2}, F_{OD} we calculate $\Delta F = \frac{\sum_{d \in D}\left(\frac{N_d}{N_{OD}} F_d\right) - F_{OD}}{F_{OD}}$. It is worth noting that Δ fractionalization, computed in this manner, is mechanically less than or equal to 0.

Δ **Religious Polarization**: For original district OD becoming parent district d_1 and child(ren) d_2 (d_3 and so forth if multiple children), with populations $N_{d_1} + N_{d_2} + ... = N_{OD}$ and religious polarization levels

R_{d1}, R_{d2}, R_{OD} we calculate $\Delta R = \frac{\sum_{d \in D}\left(\frac{N_d}{N_{OD}} R_d\right) - R_{OD}}{R_{OD}}$.

A.4 Government Transfers

In our robustness checks, use we use the the sum of the three main sources fiscal revenue for districts:

Total District Revenue: District revenue figures come from the World Bank's Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (DAPOER), which in turn obtains data from the Indonesia ministry of finance data. They are given for each district at the time of existence. We aggregate up to the 2000 district boundary and separately also consider only parents. Population data is taken from the same dataset. All figures are inflation adjusted using 2010 as the base year.

DAU/DAK Revenue: District revenue in Indonesia is divided into a general allocation grant (*Dana Alokasi Umum*, DAU), some shared taxes, shared natural resource rents, and the special allocation grant (*Dana Alokasi Khusus*, DAK), as well as limited own revenue. DAU/DAK revenue focuses on the portion of revenue not due to natural resources or shared taxes.

Initial Resource Revenue: Natural resource revenue such as that from oil/gas and mines is first transferred to the center and then partly returned to the district (and to a lesser extent nearby districts) based on percentages that vary by product and over the course of the study period. We use the level in 2000 to proxy, albeit imperfectly, for the presence and value of natural resources in the original district.

A.5 Voting

1st Election Period: Direct local elections for district head first occurred in June 2005. Newly split districts typically have an election 1.5–2.5 years after splitting. We collected data on the date of elections in each district and construct an indicator that equals one in the 6 month window around the election date. Most child district's first election is a direct election. The only exception is 2001-2002 during which the split district had their district head elected by the new local parliament, in accordance with practice at the time.

Vote Share Dissimilarity: We use data on vote share by party and subdistrict in the 1999 district parliamentary (DPRDII) elections—the first of the post-Suharto era—to construct a measure of vote share dissimilarity between what ends up as the parent district and what ends up as the child district. Forty-eight parties competed in these elections. We compute dissimilarity in vote shares of the top 5 parties by vote share at the original district level: $\Delta_{vote} = \sum_{c \in C} \pi_c \sum_{i=1}^{I} |share_{ip} - share_{ic}|$ where $share_{ip}$ is the share of votes for party i in subdistricts within the parent borders, $share_{ic}$ is the same share for party i within the child borders, and $I = 5$ includes the five parties with the most votes in the overall original district. We sum over multiple children in the cases where $C > 1$, and the weight π_c captures the share of the total child population in 2000 that each child makes up.

Political Polarization: We use the aforementioned 1999 subdistrict vote shares for all 48 political parties to construct a measure of party polarization at the original district level. The measure for a given district is given by $\sum_i \sum_j share_i^2 share_j$.

A.6 Other Variables

Population Shares: We use the Population Census in 2000 to compute the share of the population that is aged 5–14 and 15–29 at the original, child, and parent district levels.

Light Intensity: We use night lights in 2000 to proxy for initial GDP (Henderson et al., 2012). We use mean stable light intensity at the village level, which ranges from 0 to 63. This attempts to filter out background noise and unstable sources of light. We compute the (population weighted) average light intensity across villages at the 2000 and 2010 boundary level (using 2000 data).

Cash Crop Share: We use the 2003 administrative village census (*Potensi Desa* or *Podes*) to calculate the value (price $\times$ quantity) of each crop produced within the 2000 and 2010 district borders. To proxy for agricultural resources, we compute the fraction of district agricultural output that is composed of nearly 30 cash crops, the most important among which include palmoil, rubber, coffee, and cocoa.

Agriculture and Forestry Employment Share: From the universal 2000 census we compute the fraction of workers in agriculture and the fraction of workers in forestry, fishing and livestock for the 2000 and 2010 district borders.

Distance to capital and police post: Using *Podes*, we compute average (population) weighted distance to the district capital and to the nearest police post or police station. We use the 2000 round of *Podes* to compute these variables for both the 2000 and 2010 district borders.

Number of Health Clinics and Hospitals Per-Capita: Using the 2000 round of *Podes*, we construct the number of health clinics and hospitals per-capita at both the 2000 and 2010 district borders.


Number of post-primary educational institutions: Using the 2000 round of *Podes*, we compute the number of junior secondary schools, senior secondary schools, and universities per-capita at both the 2000 and 2010 district borders.

B Additional Results


B.1 Figures

Figure B.1: Distribution of (Changes in) Ethnoreligious Diversity

(a) Initial Diversity in Parent and Child Districts




(b) Δ Diversity at the Original District Level




Notes: The graphs in (a) plot the distribution of initial levels of ethnoreligious diversity in parent and child districts realized by 2010 (i.e., based on the 2000 populations). The graphs in (b) plot the distribution of our measures of the percentage change in ethnoreligious diversity at the original district level, Δ diversity measures in the paper.

Figure B.2: Trends in Violence, 2000–2014




Notes: These figures use SNPK data to plot the evolution of conflict across provinces and across typologies.

Figure B.3: Event Study: Original District Specification (Table 3)




Notes: These figures report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study versions of the regression specifications in Table 3. The specification is analogous to equation (1) and given by: $conflict_{dt} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{d,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \beta_j postsplit_{d,t-j} + \theta_t + \theta_d + \theta_d \times t + \varepsilon_{dt}$, where j are 6 month bins beginning 18 months prior to splitting (i.e., $j = -3$ for months 18–13 before splitting) and ending 60 months after (i.e., $j = 9$ for months 55–60 after splitting) with an additional $j = 10$ for all months after 60. Hence, the reference period includes all periods greater than 18 months before splitting.

Figure B.4: Event Study: Parent vs. Child District Specification (Table 5)




Notes: These figures report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study versions of the regression specifications in Table 5. The specification is analogous to equation (2) and given by: $conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} [\beta_j postsplit_{i,t-j} + \eta_j (postsplit_{i,t-j} \times \mathbf{1}(i = d_c))] + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where the j periods are as defined in the notes to Figure B.3. Note that the left graph shows the β_j coefficients, and the right graph shows the η_j coefficients.

Figure B.5: Event Study: Heterogenous Original District Specification (Table 4)



Notes: These figures report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study versions of the regression specifications in Table 4. The specification is analogous to equation (3) and given by: $conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \left[\beta_j postsplit_{i,t-j} + \sum_{k\in\{F,P\}} \phi_j^k \left(postsplit_{i,t-j} \times \Delta k_i^0\right)\right] + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where the j periods are as defined in the notes to Figure B.3, the left graph shows the ϕ_j coefficients for fractionalization and the right graph for polarization. Results look similar for these coefficients when including religious polarization or including each measure on its own.


Figure B.6: Event Study: Heterogenous Child District Specification (Table 6)




Notes: These figures report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study versions of the regression specifications in Table 6. The specification is analogous to equation (4) and given by: $conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \left[\beta_j postsplit_{i,t-j} + \sum_{k\in\{F,P\}} \phi_j^k \left(postsplit_{i,t-j} \times k_i^0\right)\right] + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where the j periods are as defined in the notes to Figure B.3, the left graph shows the ϕ_j coefficients for fractionalization and the right graph for polarization. Results look similar for these coefficients when including religious polarization or including each measure on its own.

Figure B.7: Event Study: Heterogenous Parent District Specification (Table 6)


Dep. Var.: Any Violence



Dep. Var.: Any Non-Crime Violence




Dep. Var.: Any Political Violence




Notes: These figures report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study versions of the regression specifications in Table 6. The specification is analogous to equation (4) and given by: $conflict_{it} = \nu + \alpha conflict_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \left[\beta_j postsplit_{i,t-j} + \sum_{k\in\{F,P\}} \phi_j^k \left(postsplit_{i,t-j} \times k_i^0\right)\right] + \theta_t + \theta_i + \theta_i \times t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where the j periods are as defined in the notes to Figure B.3, the left graph shows the ϕ_j coefficients for fractionalization and the right graph for polarization. Results look similar for these coefficients when including religious polarization or including each measure on its own.

Figure B.8: Varying the Linguistic Distance Parameter in Ethnolinguistic Polarization


Original District Specification (Table B.3, Panel A, Column 4)



Child District Specification (Table B.3, Panel B, Column 4)



Parent District Specification (Table B.3, Panel C, Column 4)



Notes: These figures report point estimates and 90% confidence intervals on the interaction between post-split and ethnolinguistic polarization for varying values of δ, the parameter that governs the importance of small versus large differences in linguistic structure. Recall the formula for polarization: $\sum_{g=1}^{M_e}\sum_{h=1}^{M_e}\pi_g^2\pi_h\left(1-s_{gh}^{\delta}\right)$, where s_{gh} is the degree of similarity between the languages spoken by g and h as given by the ratio of common branches on the language classification tree to the maximum possible (14). Each point in each graph is from a separate regression akin to the specification in column 4 of Table B.3 where ethnolinguistic polarization is the only measure of diversity used in the regression. The red dot corresponds to our baseline specification as seen in that table. For comparison purposes across values of δ, all results are based on standardized effect sizes in terms of a standard deviation change in polarization relative to the mean of the given dependent variable. Results are similar when additionally controlling ethnic fractionalization and religious polarization.

B.2 Tables

Table B.1: Redistricting-Induced Changes in Diversity Across Districts, 2000–2010

	Average . . .		
	ΔEthnic Fractionalization	ΔReligious Polarization	ΔEthnic Polarization
Non-Splitters	0	0	0
	–	–	–
District Split Since 2000	-0.065	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.001)
p-value: Difference-in-Difference	[<0.001]	[0.003]	[0.366]
No. of Districts non-split	223	223	223
No. of Districts split	213	213	213
Mean for 304 Districts in 2000	0.421	0.069	0.015
Mean for 436 Districts in 2010	0.443	0.075	0.016

Notes: This table reports the average percent difference between each diversity measure in the original district in 2000 and the diversity measures for that districts' parent and child districts that came into being by 2010. Both measures in the difference are based on the populations living within the given boundaries in the year 2000 as reported in the Population Census. The measures of fractionalization and polarization are as defined in the paper. If the original district did not experience any redistricting by 2010, then its difference is zero by definition.

Table B.2: Incident Counts by Category and Sub-Category (2000-2014)

	Category	Sub-Categories							
	ELECTIONS	Other	National	Provincial	District	Sub-District	Village	Other office	In Pol Party
Num of Incidents	**1191**	38	99	175	664	5	130	32	48
Num of Deaths	**29**	2	4	5	13	0	3	1	1
Num of Injuries	**909**	25	77	90	574	4	93	18	28
Num of Buildings Destroyed	**203**	0	4	7	151	0	39	2	0
Num of Kidnappings	**11**	0	1	3	5	0	0	0	2
Num of Sexual Assaults	**0**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	Category	Sub-Categories							
	GOVERNANCE	Other	Tenders	Corruption	Public Serv	Prices/Subsidies	Programs	Splitting	Law Enforcement
Num of Incidents	**1132**	1	103	83	227	51	327	97	243
Num of Deaths	**36**	0	8	1	1	0	2	15	9
Num of Injuries	**939**	1	48	80	81	37	199	190	303
Num of Buildings Destroyed	**160**	0	0	2	8	0	10	118	22
Num of Kidnappings	**3**	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
Num of Sexual Assaults	**1**	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

	Category	Sub-Categories						
	RESOURCE	Other	Land	Nat. Res	Man-made Res.	Access	Environment	Salary/Labor
Num of Incidents	**2401**	25	1284	216	140	410	129	197
Num of Deaths	**461**	10	298	62	44	25	4	18
Num of Injuries	**2790**	13	1718	255	101	423	111	169
Num of Buildings Destroyed	**1125**	0	879	28	47	149	10	12
Num of Kidnappings	**32**	0	9	1	0	11	0	11
Num of Sexual Assaults	**0**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	Category	Sub-Categories									
	IDENTITY	Other	Inter-Eth	Inter-Rel	Intra-Rel	Migrants	Migrants/Eth	Village	Gender	Sports	School/Uni
Num of Incidents	**1479**	33	173	625	50	14	13	348	0	87	136
Num of Deaths	**3721**	1	1037	2603	2	5	5	57	0	4	7
Num of Injuries	**3839**	45	137	2591	22	11	13	813	0	90	117
Num of Buildings Destroyed	**19605**	0	2514	16422	50	4	307	308	0	0	0
Num of Kidnappings	**94**	0	0	93	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Num of Sexual Assaults	**1**	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	Category	Sub-Categories									
	POPULAR RETALIATION	Other	Insult	Traffic Accident	Debt	Theft	Vandalism	Sex Indiscretion	Assault	Vice	Sorcery
Num of Incidents	**5977**	0	998	99	45	3549	50	302	839	36	59
Num of Deaths	**533**	0	110	15	16	253	4	8	97	2	28
Num of Injuries	**7560**	0	1465	116	43	4366	72	397	1029	28	44
Num of Buildings Destroyed	**423**	0	62	1	0	41	12	1	300	2	4
Num of Kidnappings	**60**	0	3	0	1	1	0	0	55	0	0
Num of Sexual Assaults	**3**	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0

	Category SEPARATIST VIOLENCE	Category OTHER CONFLICT	Category LAW ENFORCEMENT	Category DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	Category VIOLENT CRIME
Num of Incidents	**5001**	**821**	**3020**	**4740**	**35061**
Num of Deaths	**5359**	**96**	**363**	**868**	**5607**
Num of Injuries	**4923**	**1040**	**3500**	**2407**	**18538**
Num of Buildings Destroyed	**3110**	**142**	**15**	**13**	**1572**
Num of Kidnappings	**1010**	**5**	**1**	**6**	**1248**
Num of Sexual Assaults	**6**	**0**	**2**	**1429**	**7718**

Notes: All columns are counts. Counts are for the districts in our estimation sample over the period 2000-2014. Our sample consists of 73 (2010 border) districts from 2000-2004 and 133 districts (2010 borders) from 2005-2014. For descriptions of the 10 categories see Section 4. For further details on each sub-category, see http://www.snpk-indonesia.com. Other conflict, separatist violence, violence during law enforcement, domestic violence, and crime have no further subcategories.

Table B.3: Further Differentiating the Heterogeneous Effects of Diversity

	Diversity Measure					
	ethnic fractionalization	ethnic language fractionalization	ethnolinguistic fractionalization ($\delta = 0.05$)	ethnolinguistic polarization ($\delta = 0.05$)	religious fractionalization	religious polarization
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Panel A: Original District (Table 4 Specification)					
Dep. Var.: any ... incidents						
all	-0.023	0.070	0.200	0.116	-0.048	0.004
	(0.213)	(0.165)	(0.176)	(0.091)	(0.150)	(0.123)
non-crime	0.110	0.121	0.199	0.162	-0.041	0.115
	(0.161)	(0.102)	(0.114)*	(0.071)**	(0.123)	(0.144)
political	0.121	0.134	0.195	0.143	0.024	0.098
	(0.157)	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.088)	(0.136)	(0.118)
	Panel B: Child District (Table 6 Specification)					
Dep. Var.: any ... incidents						
all	0.249	0.275	0.140	1.122	0.182	0.466
	(0.069)***	(0.073)***	(0.159)	(0.845)	(0.107)*	(0.280)
non-crime	0.037	0.032	0.164	1.779	0.116	0.307
	(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.233)	(1.030)*	(0.083)	(0.193)
political	0.032	0.044	0.147	1.315	0.083	0.235
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.101)	(0.381)***	(0.061)	(0.149)
	Panel C: Parent District (Table 6 Specification)					
Dep. Var.: any ... incidents						
all	0.142	0.158	-0.229	-1.278	0.107	0.332
	(0.079)*	(0.079)*	(0.287)	(1.949)	(0.110)	(0.279)
non-crime	0.109	0.141	0.013	-0.846	0.191	0.520
	(0.077)	(0.083)*	(0.244)	(1.607)	(0.103)*	(0.270)*
political	0.114	0.121	0.190	-0.617	0.258	0.683
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.209)	(1.389)	(0.088)***	(0.222)***

Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression and indicates the effect of the given diversity measure $\times$ post-split. The specifications are based on Tables 4 and 6, but here the diversity measures enter the regression on their own (as in columns 1 and 2 of those baseline tables) rather than alongside other measures. The diversity measures by column: (1) ethnic fractionalization with groups as reported in the Census, (2) ethnic fractionalization with ethnicities grouped into languages, (3) Greenberg-Gini index with $\delta = 0.05$, (4) ethnolinguistic polarization with $\delta = 0.05$, (5) religious fractionalization, (6) religious polarization (with no intergroup distance). The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). $postsplit$ is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The diversity measures in Panel A are based on the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The diversity measures in Panels B and C are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. There are 52 parent and 81 child districts. All specifications include month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table B.4: Dissecting Conflict in Child Districts

Dependent Variable	Any . . . Incidents						
Category	resource	governance	electoral	identity	pop. just.	law enforce	other
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
post-split	-0.017	0.003	-0.023	0.015	-0.008	-0.026	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.008)***	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.006)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.008	0.010	0.045	-0.065	-0.048	-0.002	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.016)***	(0.026)**	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.015)
post-split × ethnic polarization	0.816	-0.021	0.101	0.590	1.314	0.967	0.201
	(0.254)***	(0.406)	(0.173)	(0.251)**	(0.765)*	(0.338)***	(0.240)
Observations	12,183	12,183	12,183	12,183	12,183	12,183	12,183
Mean Dep. Var.	0.057	0.036	0.032	0.024	0.104	0.065	0.021
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Controls × Post-Split	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent conflict incidents of the given categorization in that district–month. $postsplit$ is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual child district boundaries in 2000. Including religious polarization as well does not change the results. There are 81 child districts. All specifications include month FE, district FE, and initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table B.5: Omitting Districts in Aceh from Column 4 Results in Table 4

Original District Level	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.025	0.026	-0.032
	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.033)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.300	-0.120	-0.090
	(0.233)	(0.149)	(0.159)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.265	0.275	0.251
	(0.163)	(0.096)***	(0.117)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.354	0.629	0.473
	(0.244)	(0.214)***	(0.216)**
Observations	6,651	6,651	6,651
No. of Districts	45	45	45
Mean Dep. Var.	0.861	0.618	0.427

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 45, having excluded the 7 from the province of Aceh. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.6: Omitting Districts in Aceh from Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.117	-0.009	-0.035	0.001	0.022	-0.093
	(0.070)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.048)*
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.231	-0.045	0.000	0.078	0.009	0.001
	(0.088)**	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.115)	(0.081)	(0.085)
post-split × ethnic polarization	0.220	2.307	1.146	-1.515	-0.555	-0.822
	(0.777)	(0.912)**	(0.395)***	(2.307)	(1.950)	(1.911)
post-split × religious polarization	0.322	0.028	0.222	-0.040	0.127	0.654
	(0.376)	(0.187)	(0.209)	(0.352)	(0.342)	(0.270)**
Observations	10,572	10,572	10,572	6,651	6,651	6,651
No. of Districts	72	72	72	45	45	45
Mean Dep. Var.	0.514	0.258	0.151	0.738	0.467	0.294

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 45, having excluded the 7 from the province of Aceh. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.7: Omitting Districts in Maluku from Column 4 Results in Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.019	-0.023	-0.057
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)*
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.246	-0.132	-0.161
	(0.265)	(0.210)	(0.179)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.318	0.373	0.413
	(0.181)*	(0.149)**	(0.147)***
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.236	0.542	0.596
	(0.297)	(0.270)*	(0.278)**
Observations	6,854	6,854	6,854
No. of Districts	46	46	46
Mean Dep. Var.	0.893	0.654	0.413

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 45, having excluded the 6 from the province of Maluku. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.8: Omitting Districts in Maluku from Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.116	-0.059	-0.042	-0.120	-0.101	-0.120
	(0.050)**	(0.047)	(0.031)	(0.067)*	(0.064)	(0.043)***
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.233	-0.033	0.001	0.295	0.131	0.078
	(0.081)***	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.092)***	(0.095)	(0.069)
post-split × ethnic polarization	0.512	2.220	1.219	-2.517	-1.153	-2.253
	(0.679)	(1.078)**	(0.516)**	(3.759)	(3.084)	(2.379)
post-split × religious polarization	0.115	0.168	0.152	-0.181	0.354	0.742
	(0.370)	(0.267)	(0.206)	(0.252)	(0.344)	(0.251)***
Observations	10,131	10,131	10,131	6,854	6,854	6,854
No. of Districts	69	69	69	46	46	46
Mean Dep. Var.	0.585	0.309	0.154	0.776	0.508	0.285

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 45, having excluded the 6 from the province of Maluku. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.9: Omitting the Lagged Dependent Variable from Column 4 Results in Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.027	-0.026	-0.056
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)*
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.285	-0.237	-0.156
	(0.258)	(0.169)	(0.145)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.308	0.369	0.305
	(0.170)*	(0.111)***	(0.121)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.389	0.566	0.475
	(0.263)	(0.225)**	(0.223)**
Observations	7,956	7,956	7,956
No. of Districts	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	0.861	0.631	0.413

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.10: Omitting the Lagged Dependent Variable from Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.118	-0.057	-0.036	-0.076	-0.080	-0.117
	(0.051)**	(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.037)***
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.247	-0.014	-0.004	0.166	0.085	0.056
	(0.081)***	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.117)	(0.077)	(0.071)
post-split × ethnic polarization	-0.307	1.830	1.272	-3.068	-1.621	-1.491
	(0.985)	(1.175)	(0.460)***	(2.255)	(1.877)	(1.776)
post-split × religious polarization	0.307	0.265	0.192	0.132	0.452	0.640
	(0.326)	(0.200)	(0.172)	(0.371)	(0.296)	(0.222)***
Observations	12,264	12,264	12,264	7,956	7,956	7,956
No. of Districts	81	81	81	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	0.536	0.286	0.152	0.739	0.484	0.284

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.11: Omitting District-Specific Time Trends from Column 4 Results in Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.015	-0.035	-0.076
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.045)*
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.017	-0.128	-0.213
	(0.208)	(0.230)	(0.238)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	-0.047	0.258	0.285
	(0.126)	(0.125)**	(0.130)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization	-0.034	0.474	0.777
	(0.202)	(0.295)	(0.259)***
Observations	7,904	7,904	7,904
No. of Districts	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	0.862	0.631	0.413

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, and district FE. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.12: Omitting District-Specific Time Trends from Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.072	-0.061	0.025	-0.090	-0.111	-0.030
	(0.042)*	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.048)*	(0.065)*	(0.074)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.095	0.029	-0.068	0.112	0.139	0.012
	(0.054)*	(0.052)	(0.037)*	(0.078)	(0.074)*	(0.077)
post-split × ethnic polarization	0.628	0.758	1.245	-0.295	-2.337	-2.896
	(0.676)	(0.533)	(0.348)***	(2.060)	(3.481)	(3.943)
post-split × religious polarization	0.363	0.357	-0.115	-0.057	0.316	0.030
	(0.209)*	(0.178)**	(0.109)	(0.249)	(0.256)	(0.289)
Observations	12,183	12,183	12,183	7,904	7,904	7,904
No. of Districts	81	81	81	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	0.536	0.286	0.152	0.739	0.484	0.284

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, and district FE. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.13: Omitting Districts that Enter the Data in 2005, Column 4 Results in Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.017	-0.032	-0.041
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.036)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.198	-0.243	-0.047
	(0.243)	(0.171)	(0.146)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.232	0.367	0.224
	(0.160)	(0.117)***	(0.122)*
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.288	0.543	0.380
	(0.240)	(0.218)**	(0.224)
Observations	5,167	5,167	5,167
No. of Districts	29	29	29
Mean Dep. Var.	0.829	0.583	0.364

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 29, excluding the 22 who enter the conflict database in 2005. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.14: Omitting Districts that Enter the Data in 2005, Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.086	-0.080	-0.041	-0.079	-0.095	-0.116
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.044)**
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.147	-0.032	-0.046	0.077	-0.002	0.018
	(0.088)	(0.072)	(0.047)	(0.120)	(0.069)	(0.079)
post-split × ethnic polarization	0.064	1.958	1.655	-2.648	-2.135	-1.816
	(0.903)	(0.926)**	(0.278)***	(2.138)	(1.808)	(1.730)
post-split × religious polarization	0.375	0.357	0.249	0.417	0.893	0.752
	(0.334)	(0.192)*	(0.167)	(0.413)	(0.255)***	(0.273)**
Observations	7,780	7,780	7,780	5,167	5,167	5,167
No. of Districts	44	44	44	29	29	29
Mean Dep. Var.	0.488	0.263	0.135	0.691	0.437	0.245

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 29, excluding the 22 who enter the conflict database in 2005. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.15: Omitting Years 2011–2014 from Column 4 Results in Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	0.045	-0.062	0.004
	(0.055)	(0.088)	(0.112)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.309	-0.404	0.174
	(0.294)	(0.399)	(0.448)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.392	0.622	0.216
	(0.212)*	(0.362)	(0.373)
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.591	0.388	0.216
	(0.295)*	(0.392)	(0.418)
Observations	1,665	1,665	1,665
No. of Districts	15	15	15
Mean Dep. Var.	0.825	0.563	0.374

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.16: Omitting Years 2011–2014 from Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.160	-0.316	-0.313	-0.117	-0.018	-0.158
	(0.105)	(0.042)***	(0.059)***	(0.122)	(0.135)	(0.145)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.070	0.333	0.162	0.084	0.033	0.070
	(0.135)	(0.077)***	(0.060)**	(0.083)	(0.110)	(0.132)
post-split × ethnic polarization	7.972	-3.825	2.866	-3.340	-7.719	2.134
	(4.831)	(3.652)	(3.532)	(4.754)	(3.984)*	(3.929)
post-split × religious polarization	0.395	1.030	1.060	0.802	0.888	0.842
	(0.542)	(0.127)***	(0.162)***	(0.181)***	(0.439)*	(0.410)*
Observations	1,998	1,998	1,998	1,665	1,665	1,665
No. of Districts	18	18	18	15	15	15
Mean Dep. Var.	0.449	0.225	0.122	0.732	0.470	0.307

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.17: Omitting Early Splits from Column 4 Results in Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.024	-0.020	-0.049
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.267	-0.190	-0.135
	(0.243)	(0.168)	(0.145)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.262	0.310	0.264
	(0.164)	(0.110)***	(0.119)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization	0.311	0.428	0.457
	(0.255)	(0.201)**	(0.227)**
Observations	7,010	7,010	7,010
No. of Districts	46	46	46
Mean Dep. Var.	0.846	0.601	0.396

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 46, excluding the 7 that split in 2001. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.18: Omitting Early Splits from Columns 4/8 Results in Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.096	-0.014	-0.019	-0.112	-0.096	-0.123
	(0.045)**	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.061)*	(0.061)	(0.039)***
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.246	0.010	-0.004	0.154	0.079	0.030
	(0.078)***	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.108)	(0.078)	(0.071)
post-split × ethnic polarization	-0.665	0.073	0.851	-0.716	-0.293	-0.184
	(1.340)	(0.923)	(0.504)*	(1.785)	(1.762)	(1.595)
post-split × religious polarization	0.176	0.093	0.147	0.219	0.514	0.664
	(0.288)	(0.178)	(0.162)	(0.329)	(0.291)*	(0.204)***
Observations	11,289	11,289	11,289	7,010	7,010	7,010
No. of Districts	75	75	75	46	46	46
Mean Dep. Var.	0.520	0.270	0.147	0.726	0.458	0.274

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 46, excluding the 7 that split in 2001. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.19: Restricting Table 4 to Districts that Split in 2003m12 or 2007m1
Original District Level: 2000 Borders, 15 Districts, 2,385 District–Months

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: All Violence Mean: 0.822			
post-split	0.065	0.043	0.023	0.010
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.080)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	0.055		-0.165	-0.616
	(0.369)		(0.418)	(0.433)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization		0.140	0.190	0.614
		(0.152)	(0.202)	(0.262)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization				0.931
				(0.280)***
	Panel B: Non-Crime Violence Mean: 0.545			
post-split	-0.009	-0.027	-0.063	-0.080
	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.066)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-0.005		-0.288	-0.854
	(0.221)		(0.377)	(0.227)***
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization		0.158	0.245	0.778
		(0.179)	(0.275)	(0.209)***
post-split × Δ religious polarization				1.171
				(0.330)***
	Panel C: Political Violence Mean: 0.375			
post-split	-0.013	-0.030	-0.023	-0.035
	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.030)*	(0.066)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	0.110		0.056	-0.365
	(0.288)		(0.421)	(0.253)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization		0.064	0.047	0.443
		(0.160)	(0.233)	(0.184)**
post-split × Δ religious polarization				0.872
				(0.327)**
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District-Specific Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table restricts to the 15 original districts that split in December 2003 (right before the moratorium) and January 2007 (right after). Nine split in 2003 and six split afterwards. The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). $postsplit$ is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original or parent district experiences its first redistricting and the child district is officially passed into law. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, and district-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district but should be interpreted with caution given the small number of clusters. Bootstrap-based refinements are in progress. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table B.20: Restricting Table 6 to Districts that Split in 2003m12 or 2007m1
Child versus Parent Districts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Child Districts				**Parent Districts**			
	Observations (District–Months): 3,100				Observations (District–Months): 2,385			
	Panel A: All Violence							
	Child District Mean: 0.486				Parent District Mean: 0.730			
post-split	-0.199	-0.108	-0.237	-0.347	0.020	0.003	-0.010	-0.131
	(0.087)**	(0.113)	(0.109)**	(0.107)***	(0.146)	(0.080)	(0.151)	(0.157)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.440		0.384	0.379	0.004		0.016	0.005
	(0.136)***		(0.173)**	(0.153)**	(0.178)		(0.169)	(0.177)
post-split × ethnic polarization		13.021	5.700	7.627		1.545	1.709	2.930
		(7.639)	(9.016)	(8.152)		(5.554)	(5.329)	(5.785)
post-split × religious polarization				0.759				0.740
				(0.564)				(0.273)**
	Panel B: Non-Crime Violence							
	Child District Mean: 0.237				Parent District Mean: 0.484			
post-split	-0.092	-0.058	-0.098	-0.180	-0.000	0.116	0.162	-0.014
	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.099)*	(0.144)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.096)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.127		0.119	0.114	-0.054		-0.057	-0.073
	(0.071)*		(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.168)		(0.152)	(0.109)
post-split × ethnic polarization		3.143	0.866	2.293		-8.901	-9.495	-7.755
		(4.412)	(4.384)	(4.031)		(5.054)	(4.931)*	(2.525)***
post-split × religious polarization				0.564				1.075
				(0.256)**				(0.234)***
	Panel C: Political Violence							
	Child District Mean: 0.140				Parent District Mean: 0.318			
post-split	-0.056	-0.112	-0.101	-0.171	0.070	-0.009	0.018	-0.128
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.093)*	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.130)	(0.093)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.030		-0.035	-0.039	0.114		-0.033	-0.046
	(0.082)		(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.119)		(0.117)	(0.097)
post-split × ethnic polarization		5.990	6.669	7.905		3.374	3.027	4.493
		(4.363)	(4.633)	(4.353)*		(4.540)	(4.302)	(2.262)*
post-split × religious polarization				0.487				0.888
				(0.266)*				(0.209)***
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District-Specific Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table restricts to the 20 child and 15 parent districts that split in December 2003 (right before the moratorium) and January 2007 (right after). Ten children and nine parents split in 2003, and ten children and six parents split afterwards. The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator equal to one if there was any violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). $postsplit$ is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. All specifications include month FE, district FE, and initial district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district but should be interpreted with caution given the small number of clusters. Bootstrap-based refinements are in progress. Significance levels: $*$: 10% $**$: 5% $***$: 1%.

Table B.21: Alternative Robustness Controls × Post-Split, Panel A in Table 7

	Dep. Var.: any . . . incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-3.259	-0.738	-0.021
	(1.023)***	(0.845)	(1.238)
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	0.121	0.536	0.343
	(0.251)	(0.188)***	(0.132)**
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	0.047	0.067	-0.115
	(0.170)	(0.125)	(0.082)
post-split × Δ religious polarization	-0.223	0.495	0.285
	(0.277)	(0.264)*	(0.267)
Observations	7,069	7,069	7,069
No. of Districts	47	47	47
Mean Dep. Var.	0.882	0.652	0.428

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, district-specific time trends, and the difference between the initial child and parent characteristics used in Table 7 in levels. For example, rather than the share of the population aged 5 to 14 in the original district in 2000, we include the difference in that share between parent and (the average) child districts within the original. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.22: Alternative Robustness Controls × Post-Split, Panels B and C in Table 7

	Dep. Var.: any . . . incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.255	-0.166	-0.260	-2.736	-0.669	-0.129
	(1.013)	(0.690)	(0.502)	(1.221)**	(1.268)	(0.898)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.310	-0.023	-0.078	0.310	0.136	0.189
	(0.137)**	(0.083)	(0.061)	(0.100)***	(0.094)	(0.072)**
post-split × ethnic polarization	0.005	2.005	1.880	-3.147	-3.401	-4.129
	(1.343)	(0.857)**	(0.530)***	(2.507)	(2.684)	(1.597)**
post-split × religious polarization	0.245	-0.124	-0.104	-0.218	0.337	0.493
	(0.398)	(0.171)	(0.155)	(0.405)	(0.463)	(0.187)**
Observations	10,990	10,990	10,990	7,069	7,069	7,069
No. of Districts	74	74	74	47	47	47
Mean Dep. Var.	0.563	0.303	0.159	0.766	0.503	0.294

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include lagged conflict, month FE, district FE, district-specific time trends, and the difference between the initial child and parent characteristics used in Table 7 in levels. For example, rather than the share of the population aged 5 to 14 in the child (or parent) district in 2000, we include the difference in that share between parent and (the average) child districts within the original district. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.23: Intensive Margin Conditional FE Poisson version of Column 4, Table 4

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents		
	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
post-split	-0.085	0.008	-0.241
	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.133)*
post-split × Δ ethnic fractionalization	-1.875	-0.705	-0.692
	(0.571)***	(1.006)	(0.822)
post-split × Δ ethnic polarization	1.006	0.310	1.010
	(0.436)**	(0.531)	(0.800)
post-split × Δ religious polarization	1.902	1.471	2.110
	(0.678)***	(0.845)*	(1.253)*
Observations	7,904	7,904	7,904
No. of Districts	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	7.594	2.622	0.873

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). The coefficients reported are based on conditional fixed effects Poisson and can be converted to average marginal effects by simply multiplying by the mean of the dependent variable at the bottom of the table. *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the original district experiences its first post-2000 redistricting. Δ of the given diversity measure captures the percentage change in diversity between the original district in 2000 and the population-weighted average of initial diversity within the emergent parent and child districts in 2010. The regressions also include month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.

Table B.24: Intensive Margin Conditional FE Poisson version of Columns 4/8, Table 6

	Dep. Var.: any ... incidents					
	all	non-crime	political	all	non-crime	political
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
	Child Districts			**Parent Districts**		
post-split	-0.101	0.205	-0.299	-0.293	0.086	-0.159
	(0.186)	(0.226)	(0.330)	(0.180)	(0.222)	(0.259)
post-split × ethnic fractionalization	0.033	-0.560	-0.014	0.321	-0.042	-0.833
	(0.279)	(0.421)	(0.558)	(0.395)	(0.530)	(0.385)**
post-split × ethnic polarization	1.820	6.663	10.328	5.162	5.852	-7.182
	(2.065)	(3.308)**	(4.242)**	(6.359)	(7.814)	(10.277)
post-split × religious polarization	1.480	0.100	1.244	-0.090	-2.416	3.398
	(1.051)	(1.305)	(1.561)	(1.215)	(1.589)	(1.797)*
Observations	12,183	12,183	12,183	7,904	7,904	7,904
No. of Districts	81	81	81	52	52	52
Mean Dep. Var.	1.645	0.533	0.215	5.059	1.800	0.542

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of violent incidents of the given categorization in that original district–month (see the notes to Table 3). The coefficients reported are based on conditional fixed effects Poisson and can be converted to average marginal effects by simply multiplying by the mean of the dependent variable at the bottom of the table. *postsplit* is an indicator equal to one for all months after which the child district is passed into law or the parent district experiences its first redistricting (i.e., is split out from an original district and loses the child district). The ethnoreligious diversity measures are based on the population residing within the eventual parent and child district boundaries in 2000. There are 52 parent and 81 child districts. The regressions also include month FE, district FE, and district-specific monthly time trends. Standard errors are clustered by original district, of which there are 52. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.