Very Long-Run Discount Rates

Stefano Giglio* Matteo Maggiori† Johannes Stroebel‡

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Abstract

We provide the first direct estimates of how agents trade off immediate costs and uncertain future benefits that occur in the very long run, 100 or more years away. We exploit a unique feature of housing markets in England, Wales and Singapore, where residential property ownership takes the form of either leaseholds or freeholds. Leaseholds are temporary, pre-paid, and tradable ownership contracts with maturities between 50 and 999 years, while freeholds are perpetual ownership contracts. The difference between leasehold and freehold prices represents the present value of perpetual rental income starting at leasehold expiry. We estimate the price discounts for varying leasehold maturities compared to freeholds and extremely long-run leaseholds via hedonic regressions using proprietary datasets of the universe of transactions in each country. Agents discount very long-run cash flows at low rates, assigning high present values to cash flows hundreds of years in the future. For example, 100-year leaseholds are valued up to 15% less than otherwise identical freeholds. Given the riskiness of rents, this suggests that both long-term risk-free discount rates and long-term risk premia are low. Together with the relatively high average return to housing, this also implies a downward sloping term structure of discount rates. Our results provide a new testing ground for asset-pricing theories, including the analysis of bubbles, and have direct implications for climate-change policy, long-run fiscal policy and the conduct of cost-benefit analyses. We find that households are relatively more willing to pay today to reduce for sure climate costs in the distant future, but relatively less willing to pay to only reduce the risk of bad climate outcomes, compared to the leading environmental models.

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*Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, NBER: stefano.giglio@chicagobooth.edu.
†Stern School of Business, New York University, NBER, CEPR: matteo.maggiori@stern.nyu.edu.
‡Stern School of Business, New York University: johannes.stroebel@stern.nyu.edu.

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Long-run discount rates play a central role in economics and public policy (Cochrane, 2011). For example, much of the debate around the optimal response to climate change centers on the trade-off between the immediate costs and the very long-term benefits of policies that aim to reduce global warming (Nordhaus, 2006; Weitzman, 2007; Barro, 2013; Pindyck, 2013). Similar cost-benefit analyses are required of all U.S. government agencies prior to proposing and adopting regulation.[1]

Unfortunately, there is little direct empirical evidence on how households discount payments over very long horizons, because of the scarcity of finite, long-maturity assets necessary to estimate households' valuation of very long-run claims. For regulatory action with "intergenerational benefits or costs," the U.S. Office of Management and Budget therefore recommends a wide range of discount rates (1% - 7%), lamenting that while "private markets provide a reliable reference for determining how society values time within a generation, for extremely long time periods no comparable private rates exist."

We provide the first direct estimates of households' discount rates for payments very far in the future, and find them to be low, much lower than implied by most economic theory. To estimate these long-run discount rates, we exploit a unique feature of residential housing markets in the U.K. and Singapore, where property ownership takes the form of either very long-term leaseholds or freeholds. Leaseholds are temporary, pre-paid and tradable ownership contracts with maturities ranging from 50 to 999 years, while freeholds are perpetual ownership contracts. The price difference between leaseholds and freeholds for otherwise identical properties captures the present value of perpetual rental income starting at leasehold expiry and is thus informative about households' discount rates over that horizon.[2]

Our empirical analysis is based on proprietary information on the universe of residential property sales in England and Wales (2004-2013) and Singapore (1995-2013). These data contain information on transaction prices, leasehold terms and property characteristics such as location and structural attributes. We estimate long-run discount rates by comparing the prices of leaseholds with different maturities to the price of freeholds across otherwise identical properties. We use hedonic regression techniques to control for possible heterogeneity between leasehold and freehold properties. This allows us to iden-

[1]For example, U.S. Executive Order 13563 and 12866 require all government agencies to "propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs."

[2]Focusing our analysis on real estate has several advantages. Real estate constitutes the most significant asset in most households' portfolios. Therefore, the term structure of discount rates applied to real estate cash flows contains important information about the time and risk preferences of households over long horizons. In addition, real estate is the only major asset class for which we have liquid markets in which agents trade finite-horizon contracts spanning hundreds of years. As such, it opens a new opportunities to study time and risk preferences over those horizons.

tify price discounts due to differences in lease length. We find that 100-year leaseholds are valued up to 16% less than otherwise identical freeholds. Discounts are even greater at shorter maturities, growing to 30% for leaseholds with 50 to 70 years remaining. The leasehold discounts are zero for maturities of more than 700 years.

The empirical results are consistent across the U.K. and Singapore, two housing markets with otherwise very different institutional settings. An important concern with our empirical approach is that the observed price differences might not only be driven by the different duration of the claims, but also by other differences between the two contracts. To alleviate such concerns, we provide evidence that the discounts are not related to either systematic unobserved structural heterogeneity across different properties, contractual restrictions in leasehold contracts, differences in the liquidity of the properties or a different clientele for the different ownership structures.

First, since leaseholds with more than 700 years maturity trade at the same price as freeholds suggests that price discounts between leaseholds and freeholds cannot be explained by fundamental differences in the general contract structure, such as the presence of restrictive covenants. This is confirmed by an analysis that estimates discounts only within leaseholds of different maturity. It also suggests that our hedonic control variables allow us to partial out all important sources of structural heterogeneity between leasehold and freehold properties. An analysis of rental listings across freehold and leasehold properties provides additional evidence: conditional on our observables we find no differences in the rental price of leasehold properties with different maturity and freeholds. This is further evidence that any sale price differences are not related to differences in the flow utility from these properties, but to the maturity of the contract. We also show that price differences are not driven by either differential liquidity of leasehold contracts with different maturities, or by the presence of a different clientele for leasehold and freehold properties. Finally, our estimates are not explained by potential financing frictions that might be important for short-maturity leasehold properties (50-70 years), since leasehold discounts remain substantial even for maturities of 150 or 300 years.[3]

To interpret the economic magnitude of the observed leasehold discounts, we first

[3]When we consider the possible role played by financing frictions for leaseholds, we identify two opposing forces. On the one hand, shorter leases could be attractive to buyers that are liquidity constrained. This effect makes leaseholds more desirable compared to freeholds and leads to smaller discounts. On the other hand, mortgage lenders typically require 30 years of unexpired lease term to remain at the end of the mortgage, suggesting that leaseholds have to be financed with shorter maturity mortgages once the lease length falls below 60 years. While this effect can contribute to lower valuations for short-term leases through the loss of collateral value, we show that it cannot quantitatively affect the discounts for longer-term leases. Intuitively, a lease that has 200 years remaining maturity will only incur potential losses to its collateral value 140 years from now. Any losses that occur that far into the future have little impact on present values at conventional discount rates.

analyze the predictions from a simple valuation model with constant discount rates across maturities (similar to Gordon, 1982); then, we consider the impact of risk and frictions in more general models. In the most simple constant-discount-rate model, rental income D_t grows deterministically at rate g and is discounted at a constant rate r. The prices for the T-maturity leasehold P_t^T, and the freehold P_t are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^T &= \int_t^{t+T} e^{-r(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} ds = \frac{D_t}{r-g}(1 - e^{-(r-g)T}) \\ P_t &= \lim_{T\to\infty} P_t^T = \frac{D_t}{r-g}. \end{aligned}$$

In this model, the price discount between leaseholds and freeholds is given by:

$$Disc_t^T \equiv \frac{P_t^T}{P_t} - 1 = -e^{-(r-g)T}$$

To calibrate the model, we estimate unconditional expected housing returns r and rent growth g in the U.S., the U.K. and Singapore. Consistent with Shiller (2006), we find real rates of rent growth to be low, about 0.5% a year. Expected real returns to housing are relatively high, between 7% and 9% a year, and primarily driven by high rental yields. The constant-discount-rate model predicts that even with a conservative rate of return of 6.5% and optimistic rent growth of 2% the price discount of 100-year leaseholds relative to freeholds should be at most 1%. This simple model highlights that the challenge for economic theory is to *jointly* rationalize a high expected return to housing with the low discount rates necessary to match the observed discounts for long-dated leaseholds relative to freeholds. We refer to these as the empirical "long-run valuation patterns."

We then consider whether the risk properties of housing can explain the long-run valuation patterns. While the leading asset pricing models were not specifically designed to match the prices of very long-dated cash flows, we can study the term structure of discount rates that they imply for these cash flows (see Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen, 2012). As such, our empirical evidence provides a new testing ground for the leading theoretical models of asset pricing. For cash flows with risk properties similar to those of rents, the external habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) produce an upward sloping term structure of discount rates, while the rare disaster model of Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2012) generates a flat term structure of discount rates. These models thus produce a tension between rents that are sufficiently risky to generate high average expected returns to housing and the fact that, as rents become riskier, long-term cash flows are discounted at progressively

higher rates thus generating smaller discounts for leaseholds with respect to freeholds. This makes it more difficult to match the observed long-run valuation patterns.

A model that can rationalize these valuation patterns requires a downward sloping term structure of discount rates.[4] Discount rates have to be sufficiently high in the short to medium run to contribute to high expected returns on housing, but also sufficiently low in the long run to match the observed value of long-run cash flows. Two existing classes of models can potentially generate this feature. A first class of models implies a downward sloping term structure of discount rates in (mostly) risk free environments. This class of models includes hyperbolic discounting, along the lines of Laibson (1997) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003), and the gamma discounting of Weitzman (1998, 2001). A second class of models implies a downward sloping term structure of discount rates via declining risk premia for risky cash flows. While assets that provide a hedge against aggregate risks may naturally display downward sloping discount rates in the very long run (Weitzman, 2012; Martin, 2012), the challenge of the long-run valuation puzzle is to explain low long-run discounts rates on risky assets like housing. One model that achieves this is the reduced form model of Lettau and Wachter (2007, 2011), which generates a downward sloping term structure of discount rates for risky assets because claims to long-run cash flows have lower exposure to the unexpected innovation to rents (or dividends), which is the priced shock in the model.

In addition to analyzing the long-run time and risk preferences of households, our estimates are uniquely suited to directly test the classic theories of infinitely-lived rational bubbles of Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Froot and Obstfeld (1991). These theories study bubbles that in expectation grow faster than the discount rate and therefore imply a failure of the terminal condition that would normally impose the present value of a payment occurring infinitely far into the future to be zero. We can directly test this condition by verifying whether leaseholds of very long maturity, 800 or more years, are valued identically to otherwise similar freeholds. Contrary to most of the empirical literature on bubbles, we do not need to assume a specific model of the "fundamental" value of the asset because *all* models that assume the absence of infinitely-lived rational bubbles, imply a zero value for claims to a payment at infinite maturity. We find no evidence of this type of bubbles, not even during periods of strong growth in house prices.

[4]We view our paper as complementary to the recent and innovative contribution of Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2012), who show that the term structure of equity discount rates is downward sloping. First, we focus on real estate instead of equity; both are important components of households' portfolios. Second, our estimates are directly informative about (very) long-run discount rates, i.e. 50-300 years, while their estimates focus on (relatively) short-run discount rates (1-3 years in the original paper, and extended to 1-10 years in Binsbergen et al., 2013). A nascent literature motivated by this contribution includes Belo, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2012) and Boguth et al. (2012).

Beyond the immediate implications for asset pricing theory, our results have implications for environmental economics. The literature on environmental policy has discussed extensively the importance of long-run discount rates in assessing the benefits of policies such as reducing carbon emissions (Gollier and Weitzman, 2010; Pindyck, 2013; Barro, 2013). For example, Stern (2007) calls for immediate action to reduce future environmental damage based on the assumption of very low discount rates. The authors argue that while agents discount the future over their lifetimes, they have an ethical impetus to care about future generations. This assumption has been criticized, amongst others, by Weitzman (2007) and Nordhaus (2006), who argued that "the Review's radical revision arises because of an extreme assumption about discounting [...] this magnifies enormously impacts in the distant future and rationalizes deep cuts in emissions, and indeed in all consumption, today." Much of the critique argued that asset markets reveal discount rates much higher than zero and often close to 6%, the private return to capital. However, such estimates are based on claims to infinite streams of cash flows and, as such, are not directly informative of long-run discount rates. We contribute to this literature by providing the first direct empirical evidence on long-run discount rates. Our long-run discount rates are higher than those in the Stern report but substantially smaller than those suggested by the unconditional return to the capital stock or housing.

Our results are of direct relevance for real estate economics and the ongoing effort to understand house prices. We add to the recent research effort to understand the return properties of real estate (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005; Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel, 2007; Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2010; Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2014) by focusing on a previously unexplored aspect of real estate: the term structure of house prices. Finally, our analysis contributes to the recent literature on historical comparative analysis of asset price behavior during financial crises and rare disasters as in Bordo et al. (2001); Barro (2006); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Schularick and Taylor (2012) by providing the first extensive analysis of house price behavior during these events.[5]

[5]The previous studies mostly focused on the behavior of equities, bonds, currencies, and government debt; an extensive study of housing had not been carried out predominantly because of the lack of sufficiently long historical house price index series. With respect to this comparative analysis, the closest paper is Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) who analyze real estate prices for 16 countries for 18 crises occurring in the period 1974-2008. We analyze real estate prices in 21 countries for 44 crises and 16 rare disasters occurring in the period 1870-2013. Our appendix details how we built a dataset of house prices in 21 countries often going back to 1900 and sometimes to the mid 18th century by bringing together a disparate number of original sources.A non-exhaustive list of original sources (for complete list see appendix) includes: Stapledon (2012); Mack and Martínez-García (2011); Eichholtz (1997); Ambrose, Eichholtz and Lindenthal (2013); Constantinescu and Francke (2013); Shiller (2000).

1 Housing Markets in Singapore and the United Kingdom

In this section we provide the relevant institutional details about the housing markets in the U.K. and in Singapore, focusing on the characteristics of freeholds and leaseholds. Appendix A.1 provides additional information, including details on the property taxation regimes.

1.1 Leaseholds and Freeholds in the U.K.

Property contracts in England and Wales come in two forms: permanent ownership, called a freehold, and long-duration, temporary ownership, called a leasehold. Burn, Cartwright and Cheshire (2011) define a leasehold as a grant of exclusive possession for a clearly defined, temporary period of time.[6] At least 1.43 million properties are owned as leaseholds (The Independent, 2013). Owning a leasehold provides ownership rights to the property for a period of time up to the maturity of the lease. Common initial leasehold maturities are 99, 125, 150, 250 or 999 years. During this period, ownership of the leaseholds entitles you to similar rights as the ownership of the freehold, including the right to rent out the property. Unlike in the case of commercial leases, the vast majority of the costs associated with a residential leasehold come up-front through the purchase price of the leasehold; annual payments are small to non-existent (see Appendix A.1). Leasehold properties are often sold in private secondary markets, in which case the buyer purchases the remaining term of the lease.

Once the leasehold expires, the ownership reverts back to the freeholder, a process called "reversion". However, it is common for leaseholders to purchase leasehold extensions ahead of leasehold expiry, and especially once the remaining years on the contract fall below 80, as discussed later. Over time, a number of laws described in Appendix A.1 have regulated the rights of leaseholders to extend their lease terms. For our sample period, leaseholds had the *right* to lease extensions at market prices. If leaseholder and freeholder cannot agree on the market price, it is determined by a government-run leasehold valuation tribunal.

While the leasehold confers a full ownership title to the leaseholder, in some cases the contract can contain covenants such as a restriction on the type of commercial activity that can be operated on the land. We discuss covenants in detail in the Appendix. Here, we simply note that if covenants on leaseholds contributed significantly in determining

[6] A necessary feature of a lease is that the tenant shall be given the right to exclude all other persons from the land, including the landlord. There is no limit of time for which a lease may be agreed upon, but a lease cannot exist in perpetuity.

the price of a leasehold, we would expect this to affect the very long maturity leaseholds (700 years or more), which also have covenants. However, the analysis of the following sections shows that very long leaseholds do not display a discount relative to freeholds, indicating that the covenants on those contracts do not significantly affect the price.

1.2 Leaseholds and Freeholds in Singapore

Residential properties in Singapore are also either sold as freeholds or leaseholds, where the latter have initial terms of 99 years or 999 years.[7] By far the largest freeholder is the government of Singapore, represented by the Singapore Land Authority (SLA). As in the U.K., there is a vibrant private secondary market for leaseholds, where buyers purchase the remaining terms of the original leases.

At the expiration of the lease, the ownership interest reverts to the freeholder. Leaseholders may apply for a renewal of the lease with the SLA before the expiration of the lease. The granting of an extension is decided on a case-by-case basis; considerations include whether the development is in line with Government's planning intentions, is supported by the relevant agencies, and results in land use intensification, the mitigation of property decay and the preservation of community. If the extension is approved, the Chief Valuer determines the "land premium" that will be charged. The new lease will not exceed the original, and it will be the shorter of the original or the lease in line with the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) planning intention.

2 Empirical Analysis

The estimation of the relative prices of leaseholds and freeholds is potentially challenging because the underlying properties are heterogeneous assets. Since leasehold and freehold properties could differ on important dimensions such as property size and location, comparing prices across properties requires us to control for these differences. We use hedonic regression techniques, which allow us to consider the variation in price over time and across lease terms for different properties while controlling for key characteristics of each property such as size, location and property age.

[7] There are also other types of less common lease structures. The first are private development 103-year leaseholds sold on freehold land. In addition, in November 2012 a plot of land at Jalan Jurong Kechil was the first to be sold for residential development under an initial 60-year lease agreement; though houses built there do not yet appear in our data.

2.1 Analysis - United Kingdom

2.1.1 U.K. Residential Housing Data

We begin by analyzing data from England and Wales. We have obtained administrative transaction-level data on all residential housing sales from the U.K. Land Registry between 1995 and 2013. The data include the price paid as well as some characteristics of the house: whether the property is a flat or a house, the type of house (detached, semi-detached or terraced), full address with postcode, and a "new construction" indicator.[8] In addition, the U.K. Land Registry has provided us with an indicator of whether the transaction was for a freehold or a leasehold property, as well as previously unexplored information on leasehold characteristics such as origination date and lease length. The leasehold associated to each transaction is the lease registered with the Land Registry at the time of the transaction.

Two limitations affect the combined transaction-leasehold data. First, until the Land Registry Act (LRA) of 2002 (which was enforced from October 2003, see Appendix A.1.3 for details), leasehold registration was not mandatory for all leases. In particular, until the LRA of 2002, leaseholds were valid and enforceable even if they were not registered with the Land Registry. This severely limited the incentive to voluntarily register a leasehold. Therefore, data before October 2003 is subject to measurement error, since transactions that occurred before October 2003 may have been associated with leaseholds that were not the true current ones. For this reason, we restrict our analysis on the period 2004-2013.

The second limitation is that the leasehold associated with each transaction in the Land Registry dataset is the most current the Land Registry had knowledge of at the time of the transaction. This is not a problem for our analysis except when the freeholder and leaseholder agree to a lease extension, the timely registration of which is encouraged, but not required. A problem occurs if the extension or change of the lease occurred before the transaction, but only was registered thereafter, something that we can detect in a subsample of manually inspected leasehold transactions. In those cases, the leasehold information associated with the transaction corresponds to the older and shorter lease, while the price paid was actually for the new and longer lease. This biases us against us finding a large price discount for short leases, because extensions always increase the number of years remaining, and a higher price (corresponding to a longer lease) would be mistakenly associated to a leasehold with fewer years remaining. In a small subset of the data for which we can identify lease extensions (because we observe transactions that

[8] Land Registry price paid data for London has also been used by Badarinza and Ramadorai (2014).

occur under both the old and the new lease), we observe that around 84% of extensions occur for leaseholds of less than 80 years remaining (Appendix Figure A.1 reports the distribution of years remaining at the time of the extension for this subsample). Since the problem is concentrated in the small number of leases below 80 years, in the paper we focus on estimating price discounts for leaseholds of maturity above 80 years, where extensions are rare.

Finally, for a large subset of the properties, we have been able to obtain property-level characteristics on the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, size of the house, age of the building, and various other characteristics, aggregated by Righmove.co.uk from "for sale" listings and other data sources. We are able to obtain at least some hedonic characteristics for about 80% of the properties transacting since 2004. For some properties, Rightmove also observes the "time on market" (i.e., the time between listing and sale), allowing us to test for possible liquidity differences between leaseholds of different maturities and freeholds. Finally, we have obtained "for rent" data for a subset of about 30,000 flats that were listed in London in 2011 and 2012.

2.1.2 U.K. Data: Summary Statistics

Our final dataset provides contains more than 8 million property transactions. Table 1 provides key summary statistics of the U.K. transaction sample. Houses in the UK are mainly a freehold market (95% of transactions are freeholds), with some very long leases and very few shorter leases. Flats, on the contrary, are mainly a leasehold market, with 97% of transactions being leaseholds. Since the market for flats and the market for houses are relatively segmented, and look different in their propensity to use a freeholds and leaseholds contract structure, we study the two markets separately.

The top panel of Table 1 presents the composition of the sample for flats. Our sample contains almost 1.4 million transactions for flats. About 3% of them are freeholds, and 27% are long leaseholds (700 years remaining or more). The rest of the contracts are shorter-maturity leaseholds, almost all of which below 300 years of remaining lease length at the point we observe the transaction. Figure 1 shows the distribution of remaining lease lengths for properties at the time of sale. For flats, there are many transactions with remaining lease lengths below 250 years and above 700 years, allowing us to trace out the term structure of leasehold discounts across different horizons. To reduce noise, we group leaseholds in buckets by lease length, as shown in Table 1.

The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the composition of the sample for transactions of houses. We observe just above 6.5 million transactions between 2004 and 2013, almost all of which (95%) are transactions of freeholds. Most of the remaining leaseholds are con-

centrated at maturities below 125 years or above 700 years: around 300,000 transactions, or 4% of the sample, are for leaseholds with 700 or more years remaining. The number of transactions for shorter leases is much smaller, with around 0.8% below 125 years and only 0.2% between 125 and 200 years. Given the lack of data for intermediate maturities for houses, when studying house transactions we will focus on the very long end (700+ years remaining) and the short end less than 125 years remaining.

While our dataset covers all of England and Wales, it is important to look at the geographic dispersion of our sample. We study it by looking at the variation in lease lengths within 3-digit postcodes, which corresponds to the geographic variation we exploit for our hedonic analysis. For each of the 2,375 such postcodes in the U.K., we compute the fraction of transactions that occur with each lease length remaining (grouped as in Table 1), as well as the fraction of freeholds. Table 2 presents the distribution of the shares of freeholds and each type of leasehold across postcodes.

To understand the geographic variation of freeholds and leaseholds, Appendix Figures A.2 - A.25 show maps of the shares of freeholds and leaseholds of different length remaining by postcode. Each maps focuses on one lease length group (e.g., 80-99 years remaining) and plots a postcode-level heat-map of the fraction of transactions that correspond to that group. Light green corresponds to the 10th percentile of the fraction among all postcodes in our sample, red to the 90th percentile. The maps show significant geographic dispersion for freeholds and leaseholds in the case of flats. For houses, leaseholds are more geographically concentrated, clustering around Manchester and Newcastle. However, the overall number of transactions for houses is large, so that we have within postcode variation in lease type in most postcodes in our sample, even if one contract type comprises the majority of the sample.

To summarize, flats have a vast amount of variation across contract types (freehold vs. leaseholds), within leaseholds (by number of years remaining), and across geographic areas. As a result, transactions of flats will be the main focus of our study. For houses, we have limited variation (across contracts, year lengths and geographic dispersion) for leases shorter than 125 years and longer than 700 years. Since the amount of leasehold variation available is much lower than the one we have for flats, we will use houses as a robustness exercise.

In the next section, we study the difference between the prices of freeholds and leaseholds of various remaining lease length, conditional on observable characteristics. To understand the variation in these observable characteristics, which include the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, property age and property size, Figure 2 plots the distribution of the residuals of a regression of these hedonic characteristic on year $\times$ 3-digit postcode

fixed effects. These are the same fixed effects included in our main regression (3) below.

For flats, we find that conditional on the fixed effects, there is no systematic difference in observable characteristics across leaseholds with different remaining lease length; there appears to be some differences between freeholds and leaseholds. This is interesting because as discussed later, we will find the pricing variation between long leaseholds and freeholds to be essentially zero, and all the variation in pricing will occur *within* leaseholds of different remaining maturity.

For houses, instead, there are significant differences between the very long leaseholds (700+) and shorter leaseholds (<125 years remaining) in terms of observables, while freeholds and leaseholds look much more similar. This is another indication that short leaseholds in the UK market for houses are rare and more likely to occur in houses with particular unobservable characteristics: we will therefore use houses in the U.K. mainly as a robustness test, informative mainly about the very long end of the term structure.

2.1.3 Price Variation by Lease Length Remaining - UK

In this section we estimate the relative prices paid for leaseholds of varying remaining duration and freeholds for properties in England and Wales. Given the support of the "remaining lease length" distribution of houses and flats (see Figure 1) we construct J buckets for different remaining $MaturityGroups$. For flats, our $j = 1, ..., J$ buckets are: 80-99 years, 100-124, 125-149 years, 150-300 years, and 700+ years. For houses, given the lack of observations for intermediate maturities, we construct only 80-99 years, 100-124, and 700+ years groups. We then estimate regression (1). The unit of observation is a transaction i of a property of type g (only for houses: detached, semi, terraced) in 3-digit post code h (of which we have 2,375 unique observations in the data) at time t. We assign each leasehold with remaining maturity T_i to one of the $MaturityGroup_j$ buckets depending on the number of years remaining on the lease at the point of sale. The excluded category are freeholds, so that the β_j coefficients capture the log-discount of leaseholds with that maturity relative to otherwise similar freeholds.

$$log(Price_{i,h,t,g}) = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \beta_j \mathbf{1}_{\{T_i \in MaturityGroup_j\}} + \gamma Controls_i + \xi_h \times \psi_t \times \phi_g + \epsilon_{i,h,t,g} \quad (1)$$

We control for average prices in a property's geography by including 3-digit postcode by time of sale by property type (for houses, which can be detached, semi-detached, or terraced) fixed effects. This means that we are identifying leasehold discounts by comparing leaseholds to freeholds for the same type of property sold in the same area and at

the same time. We also include control (dummy) variables for whether the property is a new construction, as well as for the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, property condition, whether there is parking, and the type of heating. We also control for the size of the property and the age of the building in a flexible way by including dummy variables for 50 equally sized groups of these characteristics.[9]. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effects.[10]

Table 3 shows the results from regression (1) for flats; the different columns test the robustness of our estimates to different samples and specifications. In column (1) we control for the time of sale in the interacted fixed effects by including the month of sale, in column (2) by interacting the quarter of sale, and in column (3) by interacting the year of sale. In column (4), we interact all our controls with year dummies, to allow for time variation in the effect of property characteristics. In column (5) we report the results obtained by winsorizing prices at the 1% level. This reduces the effect of outliers. In column (6), we report the results obtained using only flats for which the property characteristics are not missing. Finally, in column (7) we report the results excluding the London postal district.

The coefficients β_i of our baseline case, column (1), are also plotted in Figure 3. Freeholds and leases with maturities of more than 700 years trade at approximately the same price: the coefficient on $\beta_{700+Years}$ is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggest that the present value of rents starting in 700 years is very small. It also means that there are is no significant unobserved structural heterogeneity between freeholds and long-run leaseholds, suggesting that our hedonic regressions allow us to compare properties partialling out all important structural differences. Finally, this implies that contractual restrictions such as leasehold covenants do not contribute to a significant price discount for leaseholds, since those contractual restrictions should depress the price of leaseholds independently of leasehold maturity.

Leaseholds with shorter maturities trade at significant discounts to otherwise identical freeholds: leaseholds with 80-99 years remaining trade at approximately a 16% discount to freeholds; the discount decreases to 10% for leaseholds with 100 to 125 years

[9] In all cases, observations with a missing characteristics are assigned a unique indicator variable. This means that we do not have to drop the observation from the dataset. As a robustness check, column (6) of Table 3 considers only properties with a complete set of observable characteristics.

[10] Clustering standard errors addresses possible concerns about the correlation of regression residuals across different transactions within the unit of clustering. If this correlation was driven by unobserved characteristics or events that affected all properties within the level of fixed effects the same way, the fixed effects would already pick this up and robust OLS standard errors would be consistent. Therefore, given the large number of fixed effects, this is a very conservative strategy to estimate standard errors. See Petersen (2009) for details.

remaining, 8% for 125-150 years remaining, and 3% for 150-300 years remaining.[11] The results are robust to the various specifications reported in the Table. In particular, they hold even if we exclude London from the analysis. These results suggest that there is significant present value attached to rents 100 or more years in the future.

One possible concern with the results presented above is that buyers might perceive a qualitative difference between owning a leasehold and owning a freehold, either because of restrictions on leaseholders or because of a psychological preference for ownership that goes beyond the desire to appropriate the infinite stream of rents. To show that this is not the case, Table 4 and the bottom panel of Figure 3 repeat the analysis excluding freeholds, and using only within-leasehold variation to estimate the discounts. In particular, the excluded category are the 700+ leaseholds, so all discounts reported here are relative to that group of leaseholds. The estimated price discounts between leaseholds with 80-99 years remaining relative to leaseholds with 700+ years remaining confirm our interpretation of significant present value attached to cash flows occurring in the very long run.

Table 5 repeats the analysis for houses. Discounts between leaseholds and freeholds are larger: leaseholds of 80-99 years remaining length trade at a discount of 31% relative to freeholds, and leaseholds with 100-124 years remaining trade at a 26% discount. Very long leaseholds with more than 700 years remaining trade for a small discount of around 1%. While larger in magnitude, the results are in line with the results for flats, though they are less informative given the limited use of leaseholds for houses as well as the geographic concentration of the leaseholds discussed above.

In the next section we provide additional evidence for our interpretation for the significant estimated leasehold discounts as capturing the present value of rents far into the future, by analyzing differences in rental prices, time on market and buyer characteristics for freeholds and leaseholds.

2.1.4 Rents - U.K.

An important identifying assumption of our analysis is that after controlling for observable characteristics, leasehold and freehold properties are similar except for the remaining maturity of the claim. In particular, our interpretation requires that the flow utility from these two properties is identical. This allows us to interpret the observed leasehold discounts as uniquely due to different durations of the stream of rents.

While an econometrician is unable to observe some characteristics that affect the flow utility from a property (like some dimensions of "quality"), to the extent that these char-

[11] The percentage discount is calculated as $1 - e^{\beta}$.

acteristics affect the prices paid for leasehold and freeholds they should also affect the annual market rents for these properties. Since a prospective renter is taking control of a property for only a short period, she should not care whether the owner is a leaseholder or a freeholder. Therefore, if our controls are correctly capturing the fundamental sources of heterogeneity among properties, we would expect rents not to differ significantly between leaseholds and freeholds.

To test this, Rightmove has provided us with a sample of around 29,000 rental listing prices for flats with a full set of property characteristics listed in London during 2011 and 2012. Figure 4 shows the price discounts for our full sample as well as the subsample for which we observe rental prices. Price discounts are very similar in both samples, suggesting our sample is representative on this important dimension. Note that in the rental sample we have dramatically less power to identify the leasehold discounts. Our identification comes from within-postcode within-month variation, and while we observe all 29,000 rental prices within 2 years, sale transactions of those properties potentially date back to 2004. Therefore, we have few of these 29,000 properties that transact in the same month and postcode.

In Columns (1) - (3) of Table 6, we estimate different specifications of regression (1) using the log of annual rents as a dependent variable. There seems to be no significant difference between rental rates of freeholds and leaseholds. Figure 5 shows the rental discounts graphically. These results provide strong support to the assumption that our controls are correctly capturing the main heterogeneity across houses, and no significant unobserved quality is left to confound the estimation of the maturity discount of leaseholds and freeholds.

2.1.5 Time on Market - U.K.

A different concern might be that while leasehold and freehold properties deliver the same flow utility, they could be differentially liquid in the resale market. If it took significantly longer for owners of leaseholds to find buyers, this could explain some of the price difference relative to freehold properties.

To test whether this can explain our data, Rightmove provided us with for-sale listings information for about 2.4 million transactions of flats and houses. For these transactions we calculate the time between first listing and sale, the time on the market. Appendix Figure A.26 shows the distribution of time on market for those properties. To test whether liquidity differs by duration of the lease, Columns (4) to (6) of Table 6 repeat the analysis of regression (1) using time on the market as the dependent variable. The result show that leasehold tend to stay a modest 3-6% longer on the market than freeholds. Importantly,

there is no pattern between remaining lease length and time on market that could help to explain the results in Figure 3. The highest time on the market is observed for leasehold of 150-300 years remaining, followed by the groups 125-149, 80-99, 100-124 and 700+. Difference in time on the market (which is a proxy for liquidity and search frictions) is therefore unlikely to explain our results.

2.1.6 Market Segmentation - U.K.

In our hedonic pricing regression (1) we are able to control for many characteristics of the property, such as property size and age, and the results in Section 2.1.4 suggest that these controls capture all important sources of structural heterogeneity between leaseholds and freeholds. However, we observe no characteristics of the buyers or sellers in our transaction sample. There might be a concern that the clientele for leasehold and freehold properties could be very different, which could explain the price differences that we observe. To address this concern, we analyze data from the Survey of English Housing (SEH), a household-level conducted annually between 1994 and 2008. It covered a wide range of topics, including whether the property is owned as a freehold or leasehold, as well as detailed characteristics for the households. We focus on the sample of owner-occupiers (excluding renters). Overall, we have a sample of 201,933 responding households, which allows us to analyze whether households owning leasehold and freeholds do indeed differ on observable characteristics.

Table 7 shows the results for important household characteristics. In columns (1) and (2) we show the mean and standard deviation of the outcome variable in the sample. For example, average weekly income of the household head was about £350. Column (3) shows the unconditional difference between households owning leaseholds and freeholds: households owning leaseholds have, on average, £48 less weekly income. However, we saw above that leaseholds and freeholds pertain to different property types in general (with freeholds being predominantly on houses), something we control for in our hedonic analysis. Since we would expect buyers of apartments (which are predominantly leaseholds) to be different to buyers of houses (which are predominantly freeholds). To analyze the conditional differences in buyer characteristics, we run regression 2, where we control for property type by region fixed effects, just as in the hedonic pricing regression 1. Geographic controls are more coarse, since the SEH only reports 354 unique local authority codes.

$$Outcome_i = \alpha + \beta Leasehold_i + \xi X_i + \phi_{PropertyType \times Region} + \varepsilon_i. \tag{2}$$

Columns (4) and (5) show the point estimates and clustered standard errors of the estimate of β, with column (5) controlling for other property characteristics that are observed in both the SEH and the transaction dataset, such as the number of rooms, the property age, and the floor on which the property is located. The evidence shows that the sample of households owning freeholds and leaseholds looks very similar. Depending on the specification, the weekly income of households owning leasehold properties is between £3 less and £8 more, relative to a sample mean and standard deviation of £350 and £450 respectively. Similarly, they are between 1.3 and 1.5 years younger, relative to a sample mean and standard deviation of 52 and 16. The number of household members and number of dependent children is essentially identical across groups owning freeholds and leaseholds. This is reassuring, since it makes it less likely that our results are driven by clientele effects related to differential bequest motives. Leasehold owners are no more likely to be first-time buyers or be married, and only 2% more likely to have a mortgage. Finally, there is not differential satisfaction with the state of the neighborhood across owner types.

2.1.7 Summary of Empirical Results: U.K.

In this section we have provided evidence that leaseholds with maturities between 80 and 300 years remaining trade at significant discounts to otherwise identical freehold properties, with discounts as large as 15% for leaseholds with about 100 years remaining. Leaseholds with more than 700 years remaining trade at identical prices to freeholds. This suggests that price discounts between leaseholds and freeholds are not driven by a fundamental differences in the contract structure, such as the presence of restrictive covenants, but are directly related to the maturity of the leasehold. It also suggests that our hedonic control variables allow us to partial out all important sources of structural heterogeneity between leasehold and freehold properties. This conclusion is further strengthened by our analysis of rents: conditional on our observables we find no differences in the rental costs of leasehold properties with different maturity and leaseholds. This again is evidence that any sale price differences are not related to differences in the flow utility from these properties, but to the maturity of the contract; as such, the leasehold discounts are highly informative about long-run discount rates. We also show that price differences are not explained by either differential liquidity of leasehold contracts with different maturities, or by the presence of a different clientele for leasehold and freehold properties.

2.2 Analysis - Singapore

2.2.1 Singapore Residential Housing Data

We have obtained transaction-level price data for all private residential transactions in Singapore from the Urban Redevelopment Authority. We do not use transaction prices for property sales by the HDB, which usually happen at below-market value (see Appendix A.2). We observe approximately 380,000 private market arms-length transactions between 1995 and 2013. For each transaction there is information on the transaction price and date, the lease terms, property characteristics such as size and age, as well as the precise location of the property. Table 8 provides an overview of the transaction sample used in the regressions. There are between 10,000 and 40,000 transactions per year. Between 30% and 60% of all private transactions each year are recorded for freehold properties. For leasehold property transactions, initial lease lengths are generally 99 years ore 999 years. We observe substantial dispersion in the lease length remaining at the time of sale, as shown in Figure 6. The top panel plots the remaining lease length of leases initially written for 99 years. The bottom shows the same distribution for leases of initially 999 years. There are no transactions of leasehold properties with 100 to 800 years remaining on the lease, and very few transactions with lease lengths less than 70 years.

For Singapore we observe fewer hedonic characteristics than for the U.K. The primary characteristics observed are property size, development size and property age. In Figure 7 we analyze whether properties with different remaining lease length differ along those dimensions in a systematic way, by plotting the residuals of a regression of the hedonic characteristics on property type $\times$ title type $\times$ 5-digit postcode fixed effects, similar to the fixed effects included in regression (3) below. We find that conditional on those fixed effects there is no systematic difference in those characteristics by lease length remaining, except that older properties, unsurprisingly, tend to transact with fewer years remaining on the lease.

2.2.2 Price Variation by Lease Length Remaining - Singapore

To analyze the relative price paid for leaseholds and freeholds we run regression (3). The unit of observation is a property i of type h (e.g., apartment, condominium, detached house, executive condominium, semi-detached house and terrace house), of title type s (either "strata" or "land", see appendix A.2), in geography g, sold at time t. For leaseholds the variable T_i captures the number of years remaining on the lease at the time of sale. As for the previous analysis for England and Wales, we split the 99-year leases into J buckets with different groups of lease length remaining ($MaturityGroup_j$). Given the support of

the remaining lease length distribution in Figure 6, we form buckets of leases with 50-70 years, 71-85 years, 86-90 years, 91-95 years and 96-100 years remaining. We also include a dummy variable for all 999-year leases, all of which have at least 800 years remaining when we observe the transaction. The excluded category are the freeholds. The key dependent variable is the price per square foot paid in the transaction.[12]

$$\ln(Price)_{i,h,s,g,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \beta_j \mathbf{1}_{\{T_i \in MaturityGroup_j\}} + \gamma Controls_{i,t} + \\ + \xi_h \times \rho_s \times \phi_g \times \psi_t + \epsilon_{i,h,s,g,t} \tag{3}$$

The results from this regression are shown in Table 9. In column (1) we control for 5-digit postcode by property type by title type by transaction quarter fixed effects. Beyond these 94,700 fixed effects, our other control variables include property age, size and type, as well as the total number of units in a development. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. The results are very consistent with our findings for the U.K.: The price paid for freeholds and otherwise similar 999-year leaseholds is economically and statistically identical. On the other hand, leases with durations of 100 years or less sell at a significant discount to otherwise identical freeholds. For example, a lease with 96-100 years remaining maturity trades at an 11.8% discount, a lease with 71-85 years remaining maturity trades at a 24% discount. The regression has an extremely high adjusted R^2 of above 95%. This suggests that there remains no significant variation in prices that is not yet explained by our control variables, and that our discounts are thus unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity between freehold and leasehold properties.[13] This is consistent with properties in Singapore being very homogeneous, in particular conditional on our tight geographic fixed effects.

In column (2) we further control for the transaction month rather than the transaction quarter. This is to address possible concerns that leaseholds and freeholds might transact at different times in the quarter, which, combined with aggregate market price movements over time could potentially explain our findings. While these additions increase the total number of fixed effects to approximately 98,000 and 140,000 respectively, the estimated discounts across all maturities remain the same in both specifications. The top panel of Figure 8 plots the coefficients β_j from regression (3) as reported in column (2) of Table 9. This provides a graphical display of the term structure of leasehold discounts.

[12] In order to avoid our results being primarily driven by extreme outliers such as luxury condominiums, we winsorize the price at the 1% level. This adjustments has little effect on the estimated coefficients.

[13] The adjusted R^2 remains at 95.3% if we exclude those instances where we only observe one transaction for a particular fixed effect, in which the fixed effects perfectly explains the transaction price.

In column (3) we restrict the transactions to those where the buyer is not the HDB. The results are essentially unchanged, suggesting that sales to the HDB generally happen at market value. In column (4), rather than controlling for the of the property age directly, we only focus on the sale of newly-built properties. The estimates for 95-99 year leases are unaffected. For leases with shorter maturities the estimates of the discount increase somewhat. However, since most leases get topped up to 99-years when the property gets rebuilt, there are very few to estimate the discount of new properties with 80 years lease length remaining. In column (5) we restrict our analysis to strata properties, which comprises the majority of all title types; in column (6) we restrict to land titles. 999-year leaseholds and freeholds trade at the same price. There are very few land title properties trading on 99 year leases, making it hard to estimate the lower end of the term structure of leasehold discounts. Nevertheless, while the estimates are very noisy (and there is not sufficient data to estimate every bucket), the point estimates for the land-title regression are similar to those of the strata-title regressions.

Within Leasehold Variation: As in the analysis of the U.K. data, there are potential concerns that what we are picking up in the above analysis is related to contractual differences between leasehold and freehold properties, and not the present values of rents far into the future. To address this concern, we re-run regression (3), restricting our sample to strata leases with an initial lease length of 99 years. The excluded category is leases with 96-100 years remaining. The results are shown in Table 10, and are extremely consistent with our findings for the U.K. as well as the analysis comparing leaseholds to freeholds. For example, across all specifications, leaseholds with about 71-85 years remaining trade at a 27-29% discount relative to leaseholds with 99 years remaining. The bottom panel of Figure 8 plots the coefficients β_j from regression (3) as reported in column (3) of Table 10.

3 Housing Risk and Returns, and Rent Growth Rates

As we pointed out in the introduction, understanding the price discounts estimated in the previous section requires, even in the simple world of the Gordon growth formula, information about the rate of return on housing and the growth rate of rents (r and g, respectively). Therefore, before moving to the theoretical analysis in the next session, we discuss here empirical estimates of r and g as well as historical evidence on the riskiness of housing.

We estimate the expected return to housing and the growth rate of rents for both the U.K. and Singapore using several methodologies and sample periods. We summarize our

findings in Table 11 and leave the details of the methodologies to Appendix A.3.

The top panel of Table 11 presents the estimated average housing returns for the U.K. and Singapore, as well as the U.S..[14] These are real net returns to housing because they account for maintenance, depreciation, taxes and inflation. Average real net returns are in the range $8-10\%$ for all countries considered. To be as conservative as possible, we choose a baseline estimate of: $r = 6.5\%$, almost two percentage points below the lowest return observed in any country in our sample. This benchmark is consistent with estimates for the U.S. in Flavin and Yamashita (2002), who find a real return to housing of 6.6%, and Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), who find a real return of 9-10% before depreciation and property taxes.

The bottom panel of Table 11 shows that average real rental growth rates are approximately 0.5% in all three countries. To be conservative, we set the baseline g to 0.7% which is the maximum observed value in the data.

Overall, our estimates are consistent with the notion that average house price growth over long periods of time is relatively low and the key driver of real housing returns is the high rental yield (see Shiller, 2006). Our estimated average capital gains are positive but relatively small despite focusing on samples and countries that are often regarded as having experienced major growth in house prices.[15]

Our estimates of average returns to housing imply a positive housing risk premium. Intuitively, houses are risky because they have low payoffs during bad states of the world such as wars, financial crises, natural disasters, and epidemics. Here we make this intuition formal by analyzing how house prices react during such events as well as their average correlation with consumption and personal disposable income.

The top panel of Figure 9 shows the average reaction of house prices to financial (banking) crises. House prices rise on average in the 3 years before the crisis, achieve their highest level just before the crisis (here normalized as time zero and a house price level of 1), and then fall by as much as 7% in real terms in the 3 years that follow the onset of the crisis. The fall in house prices during crises contributes to making housing a risky asset. The analysis reported in this panel of the figure is based on dates of financial crises in Schularick and Taylor (2012); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Bordo et al. (2001) for 21 countries for the period 1870-2013 and on our own dataset of historical house price

[14] U.S. housing returns, while not the focus of this paper, provide a useful benchmark because they have been the subject of an extensive literature (Gyourko and Keim, 1992; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005; Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel, 2007).

[15] For more evidence on low average real house price appreciation and low real rent growth rates see Appendix A.3.2.

indices for these countries.[16]

Similarly, the bottom panel of Figure 9 shows the average behavior of house prices during the rare disasters of Barro (2006); Barro et al. (2008). The blue dotted line tracks the level of consumption: consumption falls for 3 years ahead of achieving its lowest point (the trough in consumption is normalized here to be time zero) and then recovers in the subsequent 3 years. The green solid line tracks the house price level: house prices fall together with consumption in the first 3 years of the disaster but then fail to recover, as consumption does, during the following 3 years. The fall in house prices during these rare disasters contributes to the riskiness of housing. The consumption disaster dates for the 21 countries included in our historical house price index dataset are those defined by Barro et al. (2008).

Figure 10 shows the time series of house prices and marks with shadowed bands years of crisis for the UK and Singapore.[17] The pattern of house price movement during crises in these two countries is similar to the average pattern described above. For example, house prices peak and then fall during major crises in the sample: the 1974-76 and 1991 banking crises in the UK, and the 1982-83 banking crisis as well as the 1997 Asian financial crisis in Singapore.[18] Similarly, both countries experience a drop in house prices during the 2007-08 global financial crisis.[19]

Figure 11 shows the performance of house prices during major wars, namely World War I and II (WWI and WWII). In both cases time zero is defined to be the start date of the war period, 1913 and 1939 for WWI and WWII respectively. The dotted line tracks house prices for 5 countries for the duration of WWI (1913-1918).[20] House prices fell throughout the war with a total fall in real terms close to 40%. Similarly, the solid line tracks house prices for 6 countries for the duration of WWII (1939-1945).[21] House prices fell by 20% in real terms from 1939 to 1943 and then stabilized for the last two year of the war, 1944-45.

[16] Appendix A.3.2 provides details of the crises dates and the house price series. The raw data are available on the authors' websites.

[17] All crises dates are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) except the periods 1997-98 and 2007-08 for Singapore. The latter dates have been added by the authors and are commonly documented to correspond to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the global financial crisis of 2007-08.

[18] The 1984 banking crisis in the UK proves the sole exception: house prices increase during this crisis.

[19] Badarinza and Ramadorai (2014) show that relative capital gains during the financial crisis occur in areas of London that have substantial presence of foreign nationals from countries particularly hit by the crisis (Spain, Greece) as well as Middle-Eastern and Russian origin. Their focus is on relative performance of house prices within London. Overall, house prices and rents not only fell in London during the crises but fell even for the richest areas such as Knightsbridge and Chelsea, which are typical destinations of high-end foreign purchases of homes (see Appendix A.3.2).

[20] Due to data availability for house price indices during this period, the countries included are Australia, France, Netherlands, Norway, and the United States.

[21] Due to data availability for house price indices during this period, the countries included are Australia, France, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.

Overall we find wars to be periods of major falls in real house prices, thus contributing to the riskiness of housing as an asset.

We have so far focused on specific adverse events that are likely to drive the riskiness of housing, we now investigate the average correlation between consumption and house prices over the entire sample rather than just the crisis periods. Table 12 reports the correlation, over the entire sample and for each country, of house prices changes with consumption changes. The correlation is always positive for all 21 countries, except for France (-0.05), and often above 0.5. The estimated positive correlation between house prices and consumption reinforces the evidence that housing is a risky asset: it has low payoff in states of the world where consumption is low and marginal utility is high.[22]

It is important to acknowledge the limitations of our analysis that is affected, despite extensive efforts, by a limited number of crises for which house price data are available and by the lower quality of house price time series before 1950. Even with these limitations, however, we stress that our results provide supporting evidence that housing is an asset with risks broadly consistent with its estimated expected return. In fact, our results are likely to underestimate the riskiness of housing because of three effects: index smoothing, fall in rents during bad times, and destruction of the housing stock during wars and natural disasters. We briefly analyze each effect below.

House price indices are (in most cases) by construction smoothed indices based on actual transactions and therefore underestimate the variation in house prices.[23] The use of smoothed indices, therefore, is most likely to underestimate both the fall in house prices during crises and rare disasters and the average correlation of house prices and consumption.

Moreover, we only analyzed the behavior of house price changes, the capital gain on a housing investment, and have not incorporated the behavior of rents, the dividend component on a housing investment. Unfortunately, due to the severe limitations in the availability of rental indices, we are not able to provide the same extensive evidence for rents as we did for house prices. We stress, however, that our results are likely to underestimate the negative returns to housing that occur during crises because rents tend to fall in such periods. Indeed, for the two countries for which high-quality long-history time series of rental indices are available, France for the period 1949-2010 and Australia for

[22] Appendix A.3.2 provides a similar analysis with a balanced panel of 22 countries for the period 1975-2012 focusing on the correlation between house price changes and changes in personal disposable income. We find all estimated correlations to be positive.

[23] For example, the most widely used type of index in our sample is the repeat-sales index. This type of index compares transactions over time of the same property and smooths the price changes to obtain an estimate of the average price change for all properties.

the period 1880-2013, we find rent growth to be positively correlated with consumption growth. The correlation coefficients are 0.36 and 0.15 for France and Australia, respectively.

Finally, our analysis of housing behavior during wars is also likely to be a lower bound for the riskiness of housing. We provided evidence that prices for representative properties fall during wars. A substantial part of the housing stock tends to also be destroyed during such events.[24] Therefore, the return to a representative investment in housing would be lower then the fall in index prices because it would incorporate the physical loss of part of the asset.

We summarize our results in the following stylized facts: *1)* housing is a risky asset that performs poorly during bad economic events, *2)* correspondingly it has expected returns of 6% per year; *3)* real rent growth rates are low (0.5% per year).

4 Discussion and Interpretation

Section 2 presented new facts about the relative pricing of freeholds and leaseholds of different maturities. Leaseholds with over 700 years of maturity trade at essentially the same price as freeholds for otherwise identical properties. For leaseholds with lower maturities the price discounts relative to freeholds range from 16% at 80-100 years remaining, to 10% at 100-125 years, to 8% at 125-150 years. In this section we introduce a simple pricing model with constant discount rates to analyze these price differences. This very basic model illustrates the main challenge that our empirical results present for economic theory: to *jointly* match the significant leasehold discounts and the high average return to housing.

We generalize this result by deriving a simple formula that relates the price discounts to risk-adjusted long-run discount factors and the expected appreciation of the freehold over the maturity of the leasehold. We use this formula together with our estimates of long-run capital gains on housing and information from the UK real gilts yield curve to relate the leasehold discounts to long-run risk premia. The data not only show that long-run risk-free rates are low, but also that long-run risk premia are low. This is inconsistent with the predictions of several of the leading asset pricing models.

[24]For example, Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) estimate that during WWII 30% of the nationwide housing stock in Germany was destroyed. The figure increases to 45% of the housing stock for the large german cities.

4.1 Constant Discount Rates and Leasehold Discounts

We start by considering the simple constant-discount-rate extension of the classic valuation model of Gordon (1982) that we discussed in the introduction. We assume that rents (cash flows) arising in each future period are discounted at a constant rate r, so that the t-period discount function is e^{-rt}. We also assume that rents are expected to grow at a constant rate g, so that expected rents follow: $E_t[D_{t+s}] = D_t e^{gs}$.[25] In this model, a claim to the rents for T periods, the T-maturity leasehold, is valued at:

$$P_t^T = \int_t^{t+T} e^{-r(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} ds = \frac{D_t}{r-g}(1 - e^{-(r-g)T}). \tag{4}$$

Correspondingly, the infinite maturity claim, the freehold, is valued at:

$$P_t = \lim_{T\to\infty} P_t^T = \frac{D_t}{r-g}.$$

The above valuation formula for infinite maturity claims is the classic formula by Gordon (1982). The price discount for a T-maturity leasehold with respect to the freehold ($Disc_t^T$) is:

$$Disc_t^T \equiv \frac{P_t^T}{P_t} - 1 = -e^{-(r-g)T}. \tag{5}$$

For any given maturity, the price discount decreases (in absolute value) the higher the discount rate r and the lower the growth rate of rents g. The first effect occurs because a higher discount rate reduces the present value of rents occurring far into the future. The second effect occurs because a higher growth rate of rents increases the actual rents occurring in the future.

4.2 Interpreting Long Run Valuation Patterns

At the estimated benchmark values of $r = 6.5\%$ and $g = 0.7\%$, the constant-discount-rate model from Section 4.1 implies a leasehold discount at 100 years of $Disc^{100} = -e^{-0.06*100} = -0.25\%$. In other words, the 100-year leasehold would be valued only 0.25% less than the freehold. The discount we find in the data is 16%, orders of magnitudes higher. More generally, the white bars in Figure 12 compare the logarithmic discounts obtained under our baseline calibration for different leasehold maturities with those observed in the data for the U.K. and Singapore (data is in black bars). The 700+ year leaseholds are valued at

[25] Technically, g is the sum of the expected growth rate of rents and a Jensen inequality term. Given the low variance of rent growth and in the interest of intuitive results, we ignore the latter term and refer to g as the expected growth rate of rents.

essentially a 0% discount to freeholds both in the data and in the model. However, the model cannot match the discounts observed for leaseholds with maturities of 300 years or less. For example, for UK leaseholds with 80-100 years remaining, we observe a log discount of 18% in the data. The log discount in the model for leaseholds with 80 to 100 years remaining is a mere 0.5%. Intuitively, a model of exponential discounting assigns essentially zero present value to cash flows occurring 100 or more years into the future when discounting at an effective rate $r - g$ of 6% or more.

This intuition is robust to even more conservative calibrations of r and g. We evaluate a "high rent growth rate" scenario by setting $g = 2\%$,[26] and a "low expected returns" scenario with $r = 5.5\%$ per year, significantly less than our lowest estimate. Figure 12 also shows the discounts obtained in the high-rent-growth and low-expected-return scenarios. Both robustness exercises only slightly increase the model implied discounts. Even the calibration that allows for both low returns and high rent growth cannot match the data, especially at longer horizons.

While the long-run discounts could be matched by an unrealistic calibration with a constant net discount rate of $r - g = 1.9\%$, this calibration would not be consistent with the high average return to housing and the low growth rate of rents. The simple constant-discount-rates model thus highlights the challenge for economic theory posed by our results: to *jointly* rationalize both a high expected return to housing and the low long-run discount rates necessary to match the observed discounts for long-dated leaseholds relative to freeholds.

4.3 General Formulas for Discount Rates, Leasehold Discounts, and Expected Returns

We now derive a more general formula that links the price differences between freeholds and leaseholds to stochastic discount factors and the capital appreciation of the freehold. Consider a claim to the risky rent at time T, denoted D_T. The present value at time t is

[26] Rents are unlikely to grow at a faster rate than consumption in the long run, since rent growth rates higher than consumption would imply that over time a larger and larger fraction of consumption expenditures would be devoted to housing. One might conjecture that "super-star" cities like Singapore or London might experience even higher rent growth in the future (Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2006). However, the past low growth rate of rents occurred in a period when London and Singapore were already major capitals of the world. This makes it unlikely that the observed discounts could be explained by the possibility of sufficiently high rent growth to induce g to be very close to r for a long period of time (Pástor and Veronesi, 2003). In addition, Section 2 showed that leasehold discounts for the U.K. are very similar outside of London. Finally, even if rent growth increased significantly, since prices and rents are cointegrated, in the long run the higher rent growth rates would correspond to higher capital gains. This would leave $r - g$ unaffected.

the expected dividend $E_t[D_T]$ discounted with some discount factor $R_{t,t+T}$:

$$P_t^{D_T} = \frac{E_t[D_T]}{R_{t,t+T}}. \tag{6}$$

Similarly, the price of a safe security that pays 1 for sure at maturity T is: $P_t^{1_T} = \frac{1}{R^f_{t,t+T}}$, where $R^f_{t,t+T}$ is the total return on the investment in the safe security when held to maturity (up to T).

Since the rent D_T is risky, we have $R_{t,t+T} > R^F_{t,t+T}$: risky cash flows are discounted at a higher rate than they would be if they were safe. We can decompose $R_{t,t+T}$ into a discount factor that would be applied even if D_T were certain, and an additional discount that compensates the agents for risk, the risk premium $RP_{t,t+T}$: $R_{t,t+T} = R^f_{t,t+T} + RP_{t,t+T}$. Asset pricing theory relates the discount factors $R_{t,t+T}$ and $R^F_{t,t+T}$ to a "stochastic discount factor" $\xi_{t,t+T}$ (SDF) that represents marginal utility in different states of the world. Assets are priced according to:[27]

$$P_t^{D_T} = E_t[\xi_{t,t+T} D_T], \tag{7}$$

The values of $R_{t,t+T}$, $RP_{t,t+T}$, and $\xi_{t,t+T}$ are directly related via this formula (see Appendix A.4.1):

$$\begin{aligned} R^f_{t,t+T} &= E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]^{-1}, \\ RP_{t,t+T} &= -\frac{Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]}{Var[\xi_{t,t+T}]} \frac{Var[\xi_{t,t+T}]}{E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]} \equiv \beta_{t,t+T}\lambda_{t,t+T}. \end{aligned}$$

The risk-free component of the discount factor is related to the inverse of the expectation of the long-term SDF, i.e. long-term marginal utility growth. The risk premium has the opposite sign to the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the rent, $Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, D_T]$.[28] A claim that pays a higher rent in states of the world when extra resources are less valuable, i.e. when marginal utility $\xi_{t,t+T}$ is low, is less desirable and thus discounted at a higher rate. Such an asset is risky, and its risk premium is positive. The risk premium ($RP_{t,t+T}$) can be further decomposed into an asset-specific "quantity of risk" term ($\beta_{t,t+T}$), which summarizes how strongly the payoff co-varies with the stochastic discount factor, and a common "price of risk" term ($\lambda_{t,t+T}$), that only depends on the

[27] Such strictly positive discount factor ($\xi_{t,t+T}$) exists under the assumption of no-arbitrage. The formula does not require assumptions about households preferences or market completeness. While it abstracts away from transaction costs and the indivisibility of the housing asset, it provide much intuition at relatively little economic cost.

[28] Recall that in this case $Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}] = Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, D_T]$ because $\tilde{R}_{t,t+T} = D_T / P_t^{D_T}$ is the stochastic return on investing in the risky asset.

discount factor $\xi_{t,t+T}$ and summarizes the compensation required for each unit of risk at that horizon.

We now derive a general representation for the leasehold discount. Intuitively, the price difference between a freehold and a T-maturity leasehold is the present value at time t of a freehold starting at time T. We can compute this present value by applying the valuation formula in equation (6):

$$P_t - P_t^T = \frac{E_t[P_T]}{R^f_{t,t+T} + RP_{t,t+T}}.$$

We obtain percentage discounts by dividing both sides by the time t value of the freehold (P_t):

$$Disc^T = -\frac{E_t[P_T]/P_t}{R^f_{t,t+T} + RP_{t,t+T}}. \tag{8}$$

This shows that the leasehold discounts estimated in Section 2 are related to two basic forces: the expected capital appreciation on the freehold (the numerator), and the discount factor (the denominator). The discounts are bigger the more households expect the price of the freehold to increase over the length of the leasehold. This is because the leaseholder does not benefit from these capital gains while the freeholder does. The discounts are also bigger the lower the discount factor, since this attaches higher present value to rents occurring far into the future.[29]

To interpret Equation (8), we combine our estimates of the leasehold discounts $Disc^T$ from Section 2 with estimates of long-run capital gains on housing ($E_t[P_T]/P_t$) from Section 3 and estimates of long-run risk-free discount rates ($R^f_{t,t+T}$) from the UK gilts real yield curve.

Figure 13 plots the average shape of the UK gilts real yield curve for the period 1998-2013, as well as for two subperiods: 1998-2007 and 2007-2013.[30] The real yield curve is flat on average for maturities between 1 and 25 years with an average real yield of 1.4%. The Bank of England also made available a 40 year real yield for the period 2006-2013; the average 40 year real yield during this period was 0.4%.[31]. This number should be interpreted with caution not only because of liquidity concerns but also because the period is dominated by the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. As Figure

[29]Notice that we can recover the discounts implied by the Gordon growth model in equation (5) by substituting the model's assumptions in equation (8): $R^f_{t,t+T} + RP_{t,t+T} = e^{-rT}$; $E_t[P_T]/P_t = e^{gT}$.

[30]The real yield curve is computed by the Bank of England and is available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/yieldcurve/archive.aspx.

[31]We are grateful to Zhuoshi Liu at the Bank of England for making these data available to us.

13 shows, the level of the yield curve shifted down during this period and the yield curve became hump-shaped. We conclude that the UK real yield curve is approximately flat on average for maturities between 1 and 25 years with a real yield of 1.4% and that there is some evidence for a mild downward slope at longer maturities with an an average 40 year yield below 1%.

Using a calibrated value of 1.4% across the term structure of risk-free discount rates, we can then decompose the total discount rate needed to match the leasehold discounts into the risk-free component $R^f_{t,t+T}$ and the risk premium $RP_{t,t+T}$. For example, if rents grow at a rate of 0.7% per year and prices grow in the long run at the same rate, the annualized risk premium $\frac{\ln(RP_{t,t+T})}{T}$ will be just above 2%.[32]

Our estimates of long-run discount rates provide further support for the volatility bounds on the permanent component of pricing kernels derived by Alvarez and Jermann (2005). Their bounds require estimates of the rate of return, or alternatively the discount rates, on risk-free claims of infinite maturity. The data limitations induced the authors to focus on maturities in the 25-29-year range. Our estimates provide further support for their bounds not only via the direct observation of low UK 40-year real yields, but mostly by observing the discount rates for assets very far into the future, 100 or more years. Since housing is a risky asset, our estimated discount rates provide an upper bound for the risk-free discount rates that Alvarez and Jermann (2005) are directly interested in. In fact, our very long-run total discount rates are sufficiently low for the upper bound to be informative and to show the calculations in Alvarez and Jermann (2005) to be conservative.[33]

In the next section we will apply the general framework developed above to various asset pricing models to verify whether they can help to rationalize the long-run valuation puzzle. These models can be understood as a choice of stochastic processes for the stochastic discount factor ($\xi_{t,t+T}$) and rents (D_t).

[32] As we mentioned before, the per-period discount rate that matches the leasehold valuations is 1.9%. This does not correspond to the sum of the risk-free yield 1.4% and the per-period risk premium we are calibrating here, 2.1%, because of the convexity of the exponential function that links per-period discount rates to the total discount factors of equation (8). Note that in any case this annualized risk premium, which refers to a specific horizon T, is not an expected return (which would refer to a one-period holding period), and therefore should not be compared with our estimates for the expected returns on houses.

[33] Table I Panel C in Alvarez and Jermann (2005) computes the volatility bound using as an input the average difference between long term and short term yields. They find the difference between 25 or 29-year bonds and 1-year bond yields to be 0.82%. Using UK 40-year and 1-year real yields we estimate that difference to be -0.4%. If we assume that our long-term claims to housing were completely risk free, we would estimate the difference to be 0.7% (the difference between our long-run, 100 or more years, 2.1% yield and the 1.4% 1-year gilt yield. This 0.7% estimate is a generous upper bound because it is very likely to include a positive risk-premium component. Performing all other calculations using the parameter estimates in Alvarez and Jermann (2005), we find the size of the lower bound for the volatility of the permanent component of the pricing kernel to be 1.0523 using the UK gilt estimate and 0.8879 using the leasehold-discounts. Both estimates are a higher lower bound than the 0.8701 reported by Alvarez and Jermann (2005).

5 Implications of the Findings

5.1 Asset Pricing

So far we have interpreted the estimated leasehold discounts in terms of simple models that require minimal assumptions. In this section we turn to general equilibrium asset pricing models that pin down both the expected return to housing $E[r_t]$ and the discounts of leaseholds at different maturities. While these models require more structural assumptions on both the stochastic discount factor and the dynamics of rents, they allow us to decompose the total discount factor at each maturity, $R_{t,t+T}$, into the risk-free component $R^f_{t,t+T}$, and the risk-premium $RP_{t,t+T}$.

We focus on three leading models of asset pricing: the external habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), and the variable rare disaster model of Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2012).[34] These models were not specifically designed to understand the term structure of discount rates in the housing market – and especially the very far end of the term structure – and therefore our empirical findings provide a new testing ground for these theories. We find that these models cannot jointly rationalize the high return to housing and large estimated leasehold discounts.

We also consider reduced-form models that highlight important features that general equilibrium models would need to match in order to rationalize the data. We stress that there is no attempt to provide a full model here; we simply want to clarify what new theory models should aim for in order to match the empirical patterns.

5.1.1 Risk, Return and Leasehold Discounts: General Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models

Our evaluation of the leading asset pricing models complements Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2012) who focus on the models' ability to reconcile the expected returns of short-dated dividend strips (up to 3 years) with the equity premium. We therefore only discuss the models briefly focus on the most important elements for the valuation of long-dated claims to housing. When calibrating the models we deviate as little as possible from the original papers' calibrations of the stochastic discount factor and cash-flows. In each model, we calibrate housing to be a risky asset with an average growth rate of dividends of 0.7% and an exposure to risk that ensures an expected return of 6.5%.

Figure 12 shows the discounts for long-dated leaseholds relative to freeholds implied

[34] For the rare disaster model see also: Rietz (1988), Gourio (2012) and Martin (2013).

by these three leading models together with those observed in the data. In all cases the models cannot match the discounts and tend to produce even smaller discounts than the constant-discount-rate model.

In the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and are concerned about shocks that persistently affect the growth rate of consumption.[35] Therefore, agents dislike claims to very long-term cash flows that are exposed to these long-run risks.[36] The model matches the expected return to housing only if housing is exposed to long-run risks. The model also implies that leaseholds with higher maturity are more exposed to long-run risks, and command higher risk premia.[37] This upward sloping term structure of risk premia produces even smaller discounts for leaseholds relative to freeholds compared to the constant-discount-rate model. Figure 15, which separates out risk-free yields and annualized risk premia, confirms the analysis of Hansen, Heaton and Li (2008) who show that the result is driven by risk premia that increase with maturity.[38] As pointed out by Beeler and Campbell (2012), risk-free bond yields in this model actually decrease with maturity. The real risk-free yield curve, however, appears to be approximately flat across maturities in the data (recall Figure 13).

In the external habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) agents care about their surplus consumption relative to a habit level, which itself depends on the history of aggregate consumption.[39] Negative shocks to consumption, with which rents are correlated, induce increases in risk premia because they bring current consumption closer to

[35] We calibrate the model following the parametrization of Bansal and Yaron (2004). The baseline calibration of the risky asset in that paper implies an expected return of 6.5% a year and, consequently, we maintain the same calibration here. We only modify the average growth rate of cash flows (rents) to match the observed 0.7% annual growth rate of rents as in our baseline calibration.

[36] Dew-Becker and Giglio (2013) show that half the total price of risk in the long-run risk model comes from fluctuations in consumption with cycles longer than 230 years and three quarters of the risk prices come from fluctuations longer than 75 years. These horizons correspond closely to the maturities of the leaseholds we consider in this paper.

[37] The same result obtains when agents have power utility but are ambiguity averse, as in Hansen and Sargent (2001). When the agent has a preference for robustness, he can be viewed as having a reference distribution for the relevant shocks (the true distribution) and a worst-case distribution, which is what he uses to actually price assets. Under the worst-case distribution he places relatively more weight on some bad states of the world, which correspond to states with persistently low consumption growth. Therefore, the model has the same asset pricing implications as the long-run risk model.

[38] We calibrate the yield $r^f_{t,T}$ and the total per-period discount rate for a T-maturity asset r_t using the model, and report $rp_{t,T}$ as the difference between the two. As mentioned in the previous section, this per-period $rp_{t,T}$ does not have the interpretation of an expected return, which would correspond to the expectation of a holding period return for one period.

[39] We calibrate the model following the parametrization of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). We impose an average growth rate of rents of 0.7% per year, and a correlation of rent growth and consumption growth of 0.27 to ensure that expected returns on housing are 6.5%.

the habit level. Long-term claims, due to their high duration, are particularly exposed to these shocks and are therefore particularly risky. The model implies an upward sloping term structure of risk premia that contributes to generate low discounts for leaseholds compared to freeholds. Figure 15 confirms this intuition by showing that while risk-free yields are constant across maturities, risk premia are increasing in maturity. Therefore, while the model-implied flat risk-free term structure is consistent with the data (recall Figure 13), the increasing term structure of risk premia prevents the model from rationalizing the leasehold discounts.

In the disasters model of Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2012) consumption growth is subject to rare but large negative shocks, the disasters.[40] Agents dislike assets that are exposed to these disasters. While the presence of rare disasters increases risk premia, it does so uniformly across maturities because claims to cash flows at all horizons are equally exposed to the disaster risk. Therefore, discount rates will be the same at all horizons and equal to the average return (6.5%). Figure 15 confirms this intuition by showing that both risk-free yields and risk-premia are constant across maturities. The model is able to match the observed flat real risk-free term structure (recall Figure 13), but its performance on the leasehold discounts is similar to that of the constant-discount-rate model in Section 4.1: since risky cash flows far into the future are discounted at the relatively high average rate of return, the rare disaster model is not able to match the observed price differences between freeholds and long-run leaseholds.

In general, these models are subject to a tension between rents that are sufficiently risky to generate a high average expected return to housing and the fact that, as rents become riskier, long-term cash flows are discounted at progressively higher rates, generating small leasehold discounts. Therefore, taking into account that rents are risky and housing commands a nontrivial risk premium exacerbates the difficulty in explaining the observed long-run valuation patterns within these models.[41]

5.1.2 Matching Risk, Return and Leasehold Discounts: Reduced-Form Models

Given the inability of the current leading models of asset pricing to reconcile the price discounts between freeholds and long-run leaseholds with the high average return of

[40] We calibrate the model in Gabaix (2012) to match the expected return on housing from our baseline calibration (6.5%). This requires modeling housing as a slightly safer claim than equity with respect to disasters with an average resilience of 0.1 instead of 0.09. We also modify the growth rate of dividends (rents) to match the 0.7% annual growth rate of rents, as in our baseline calibration.

[41] While we focus on three very popular classes of asset pricing model, this tension in rationalizing the data extends to a number of other models such as the valuation risk model of Albuquerque, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2012) and the robustness model of Hansen and Sargent (2001).

housing, we next discuss two reduced form models that illustrate which features general equilibrium models would have to generate in order to match the data. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full model along those lines, we discuss a number of promising modifications to the existing general equilibrium models that could help to accommodate the new stylized facts suggested in this paper.

In reduced form, we find our estimates to be consistent with a downward sloping term structure of total discount rates. Discount rates have to be sufficiently high in the short to medium run to contribute to high average expected returns on housing, but also sufficiently low in the long run to match the observed discounts applied to long-run cash flows. A convenient analytical functional form to match the downward sloping term structure of total discount rates is a mix of hyperbolic and exponential discounting.

We assume that the discount function follows: $R_{0,t} = \frac{e^{-\rho t}}{1+\kappa t}$, where $\rho > 0$ is the subjective discount rate associated with exponential discounting, $\kappa > 0$ is the hyperbolic parameter. If $\kappa = 0$ we recover exponential discounting at $e^{-\rho t}$, while if $\rho = 0$ we recover hyperbolic discounting at $\frac{1}{1+\kappa t}$. This mixed form of discounting tends to behave like hyperbolic discounting in the short run and like exponential discounting in the long run. Since we are not aiming to decompose the total discount rate into the risk-free and risky subcomponents, we resume our assumption from Section 4.1 that rents grow at constant rate g. Otherwise, one can think of D_t as expected rents and $R_{o,t}$ as the risk adjusted total discount rate. In this set-up, the T-maturity leasehold is valued at:

$$P_0^T = \int_0^T \frac{e^{-(\rho-g)s}}{1+\kappa s} D_0 ds$$

Appendix A.4.2 derives analytic expressions for the resulting value, as well as for the value of the freehold. The model-implied discount between a T-maturity leasehold and the freehold is given by:

$$Disc_0^T = \frac{Ei\left(\frac{(T\kappa+1)(g-\rho)}{\kappa}\right) - Ei\left(\frac{g-\rho}{\kappa}\right)}{\Gamma\left(0, \frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)} - 1.$$

where $Ei(x)$ is the Exponential Integral and $\Gamma(x)$ is the Upper Incomplete Gamma function, both standard functions discussed in Appendix A.4.2. Figure 16 shows the discounts implied by a calibration of this reduced-form hyperbolic-exponential model that at the same time matches the observed discounts of leaseholds of different maturities and the average return to housing. The calibration is obtained by setting κ to 10% and ρ to 1.4%. This calibration implies comparatively higher discount rates for short term than for long

term cash flows. To illustrate this property, we analyze the evolution of the per-period equivalent discount rate:

$$r_T \equiv \rho + \frac{\ln(1+\kappa T)}{T}$$

where r_T is the equivalent per-period constant discount rate for maturity T. Figure 15 plots r_T, illustrating the dynamics that total discount rates of general equilibrium models would have to generate to match the data. The very short-run discount rate is $\rho + \kappa = 11.4\%$, the term structure is downward sloping, and the long-run marginal discount rate approaches $\rho = 1.4\%$.[42]

We also consider the reduced-form model of Lettau and Wachter (2007) that, by imposing further assumptions, does not only generate a downward sloping term structure of total discount rates, but also allows to analyze the risk-free and risk-adjusted subcomponents. Lettau and Wachter (2007) propose a reduced-form model in which the only priced shock is the unexpected innovation in rents (dividends).[43] Unexpected rent growth today is negatively correlated with future rent growth. Therefore, long-term claims to future rents are safer than short-term claims because short-term claims do not benefit as much from the future increase in rent growth that follows a negative shock. Figure 16 shows that this model is able to match the magnitudes of the discounts at different horizons. The intuition is that long-term claims in the model are relatively safe and therefore cash flows arising many years into the future are discounted at lower rates. Combined with our baseline calibration of rent growth at 0.7%, the model is able to generate leasehold discounts as large as those in the data. At the same time, the model is able to match the 6.5% expected return to housing because it implies high short term discount rates, as high as 20% per year for the first few years. Notice that the model generates a flat term structure of risk-free discount rates consistent with the one observed for U.K. real gilts (see Figure 13).[44] Consequently, the entire downward slope of the term structure of discount rates for risky cash-flows is due to a risk-premium that declines with the horizon. We conclude that while this model is not a micro-founded general equilibrium model, its functional form is very informative about the characteristics that any general equilibrium model would require in order to match the observed discounts

It is important to emphasize that without structural assumptions we cannot disentangle the risk-free component, $R^f_{t,t+T}$, from the risk premium, $RP_{t,t+T}$, in our estimates of

[42] The results are obtained as the limits when $T \downarrow 0$ and $T \to \infty$ (see Appendix A.4.2).

[43] See the original reference for model details. We use a quarterly volatility of rents of 6.2% instead of the original 7.2% and a growth rate of rents of 0.7% per year to ensure the model matches the 6.5% average return on housing.

[44] Lettau and Wachter (2007) exogenously set the level of the real yield to be 2%; this value is sufficiently close to the 1.4% observed in the U.K. data that we left it unchanged in our parametrization of their model.

total discount rates, $R_{t,t+T}$. Our estimates imply that the total discount rates are declining over the horizon T and are below 2.6% for horizons of 100 or more years. Since rents are risky (see Appendix A.3.2), the risk premium ($RP_{t,t+T}$) is likely to be positive even in the long run. In fact, since rents and consumption are likely to be cointegrated, claims to long-run rents should be as risky as claims to long-run consumption. In related evidence, Jeske, Krueger and Mitman (2011) show that the share of consumption expenditures on housing over total consumption in the U.S has been remarkably constant at 14.1% over the past 40 years.[45] Long-run rents in cities such as London or Singapore carry substantial systematic risk, since they load heavily on the performance of the global economy. Given the riskiness of housing, our estimates suggest that agents are not afraid of long-run risks (i.e. have low aversion to these risks): the price of risk ($\lambda_{t,t+T}$ in Section 4.3) is low for large T. As long as the risk premium is non-negative ($RP_{t,t+T} \geq 0$), then the risk-free component ($R^f_{t,t+T}$) has to be low to match the total discount rate. This implies that agents attach high present values to payments that occur for sure 100 or more years from now.

Finally, let us briefly point out recent and interesting avenues of theoretical research that could potentially generate new classes of general-equilibrium asset pricing models that rationalize the findings of this paper.

One possibility is to expand on the hyperbolic-exponential framework illustrated above. The models of Laibson (1997) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) consider the possibility that agents attach higher discounts to short-term cash flows than they do to long-term ones. In these models the variation in discount rates is driven by variation in the subjective discount factor, i.e. the rate of time preference. This approach has had widespread success in describing individual behavior in disaggregated environments, but has proven more difficult at the macroeconomic level due to problems of time inconsistency as well as the potentially countervailing equilibrium consequences that generate flat term structures of discount rates even in the presence of agents with hyperbolic time preference (Barro, 1999). A close-to-hyperbolic term structure of discount rates could also be derived in reduced form in an environment where agents have constant discount rates as long as there is uncertainty about the appropriate level of that discount rate. Weitzman (1998, 2001), in fact, points out not only that disagreement about the discount rate implies that long-term cash flows should be discounted at the lowest discount rate that is assumed to occur with

[45] This evidence pertains to total rents including growth in the housing stock and size/quality adjustments. Since the housing stock grows and people over time live in bigger and better houses, the growth rate of rents for a typical property is below the growth rate of consumption. However, the quality/quantity adjustment, while it clearly affects the long-run growth rate, is unlikely to affect the stochastic properties (risk) of rents.

positive probability,[46] but also that if the disagreement takes the form of a Gamma distribution the effective discount function behaves similarly to the hyperbolic one. Finally, in ongoing work Eisenbach and Schmalz (2013) provide an intriguing avenue of research by making the risk-aversion coefficient, rather than the rate of time-preference, dependent on the horizon.

A second possible avenue of research is to explore the environment of Lettau and Wachter (2007) with mean-reversion in cash flows and stochastic discount factors that mostly price near-term shocks. Nakamura et al. (2013) extend the rare disaster model to allow for an increase in expected growth following a disaster. This pick-up in growth after a disaster makes long-run consumption safer than short-run consumption thus generating a downward sloping term-structure of discount rates for risky claims. To quantitatively match the average return, in this case of equities, Nakamura et al. (2013) have to abandon the CRRA preferences of the classic rare disaster model in favor of Epstein-Zin recursive preferences.[47] These preferences induce the agents to worry about long-run risks. Long-run shocks are absent from the Nakamura et al. (2013) model and if introduced would induce a countervailing force, one pushing toward an upward sloping term structure, by increasing the long-run price of risk.[48]

To sum up, we conclude that our estimates of a total discount rate for 100 or more years of 2.6% imply two novel facts. First, agents have low discount rates for risk-free payments occurring far into the future (100 years or more). Second, given plausible estimates of the riskiness of long-run rents, agents have low aversion over risks that materialize in the very long-run. A complete theory that rationalizes these facts is an intriguing challenge for future research.

5.2 Environmental Policy

> *Any consideration of the costs of meeting climate objectives requires confronting one of the thorniest issues in all climate-change economics: how should we compare present and future costs and benefits? [...] A full appreciation of the economics of climate change cannot proceed without dealing with discounting.* **(Nordhaus, 2013)**

The above quote from Nordhaus's recent book on the economics of climate change

[46] See also Dybvig, Ingersoll and Ross (1996).

[47] Intuitively this occurs because the size of the disaster shock is now spread over multiple years and variation in continuation utility, present under Epstein-Zin preferences but not in CRRA ones, is necessary to make equities fall sufficiently low in the first year of the disaster shock.

[48] See Nakamura, Sergeyev and Steinsson (2012) for a quantification of the importance of long-run risks in a panel of developed countries.

summarizes a long debate on the appropriate discount factors to use in evaluating environmental policies. The economics literature on climate change, starting with the seminal paper of Nordhaus (1973), has pointed out that discounting is of central relevance to the tradeoff between immediate costs, through loss of output, and uncertain benefits that occur very far into the future.[49] Estimates of the appropriate discount rate range from the zero discounting of Stern (2007) to as high as 10% per year based on the returns to risky private investments.

The debate has mostly relied on theoretical arguments about the appropriate rate of discounting. For example, Stern (2007) argues for 0% discount rate on ethical grounds that induce the present generation not to discount the welfare of future generations; Nordhaus (2007) argues that a 0% discount rate cannot be reconciled with economic theory because it would imply an enormous burden on the current generation by attaching infinite values to many investments that are routinely available in private markets at finite prices.[50]

On the empirical side the debate tried to infer discount rates from the realized returns of traded assets such as private capital, equity, bonds, and real estate. These estimates of expected returns, however, reveal only the average returns on these assets. For example, our estimates in Table 11 suggest that the average real returns to residential housing are above 8%. However, the crucial estimates to evaluate climate-policy are the discount rates for cash-flows very far into the future.[51] We found such discount rates to be much lower than those implied by average returns and of the order of 2.6% or less.

We next discuss the guidance that our estimates of very long-run discounts rates offer for the academic and policy debate surrounding the appropriate discount rates for investments in climate change abatement. We do so by considering three leading environmental models: the DICE model of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Nordhaus (2008) the parameter uncertainty model of Gollier (2013), and the Gamma and tail-hedge discounting models of Weitzman (2001, 2012). It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full account of these models and we focus here only on the elements of discounting that are relevant for our purpose.[52]

[49] See also: Lind (1982); Cline (1992); Nordhaus (1992); Arrow et al. (1996); Weitzman (1998); Nordhaus (2001); Groom et al. (2005); Gollier (2006); Dasgupta (2007); Nordhaus (2007); Weitzman (2007); Gollier and Weitzman (2010); Gerlagh and Liski (2012); Goulder and Williams (2012); Pindyck (2013); Weitzman (2013).

[50] See also Koopmans (1965).

[51] Of course in models with constant discount rates the average return provides all the necessary information. We have, however, shown in Section 4 that such models cannot be reconciled with the data.

[52] Learning about climate change discounting from the discount rates applied to long-run real estate requires assessing the relative risks of these cash flows as well as the potential difference between private and social discount rates.

Our aim is to perform one of the basic analysis in financial economics: start with an observed traded asset, apply a model to infer from observed prices and cash-flows agents preferences for risk and time,

We have already documented that housing is a risky asset and we now turn to the question of the risk characteristics of investments in climate change abatements. There remains substantial disagreement over such characteristics with some economists arguing that they are risky investments whose payoff is positively related to future economic outcomes (Gollier, 2013) and other economists arguing that these investments are a hedge against future disastrous states and therefore similar to insurance contracts (Weitzman, 2012). We summarize the arguments below.

The first argument points out that the cost of climate change depends positively on economic growth because they are a by-product of production. Therefore, carbon emissions will be high in future states of the world when consumption is also high, and low otherwise. This makes climate change a hedge and, consequently, investments that aim to reduce climate change are risky. Along these lines Gollier (2013) simulates the DICE model of Nordhaus (2008) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and find a $\beta > 1$ for investments in climate change abatement technology.

The second argument conjectures that there could be disastrous climatic outcomes that lead to low consumption via feedback loops. In this view climate change is similar to a rare disaster and, consequently, investments that aim to reduce climate change are very safe (in fact hedging) investments. Along these lines Weitzman (2012) postulates that climate change abatement investments have a tail-hedge property because they pay a positive amount in states of the world when consumption is extremely low.

Recall that our estimates of long-run discount rates imply that agents attach high present value to risk-free investments that pay far into the future and that they are relatively unconcerned with long-term risks. Both factors contribute to generate low long-run total discount rates for risky long-term assets. Barro (2013), however, points out that to understand the implications of discount rates for climate change investments it is paramount to distinguish between the risk-free component ($R^f_{t,t+T}$) and the risk-premium component ($RP_{t,t+T}$). Our results imply that agents have a high willingness to invest in climate change abatement projects that reduce *for sure* the future cost of climate change because we find low long-run yields for risk-free cash flows. However, our results also imply that agents have a relatively less willingness to invest in climate change abatement projects that only reduce the *risk* of adverse future climatic events because we find low long-run risk premia for cash-flows that have risks broadly consistent with those illustrated above for climate change.

finally derive conclusions from what those preferences imply for interesting questions. This *modus operandi* has been often applied in financial economics and macroeconomics; for example a large literature infers agents' preferences from bond and equity prices and then draws conclusions about the relative costs of business cycles and growth Lucas (1987); Barro (2009).

Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Nordhaus (2008) develop a key workhorse model of climate change: the dynamic integrated climate-economy (DICE) model. This model features a constant rate of discounting for climate change abatement investment that is most often calibrated to be 4% (Nordhaus, 2013). In setting this rate Nordhaus favors an "opportunity cost approach", i.e. he considers the returns to alternative investments of similar riskiness that the government could undertake instead of investments in climate change. The 4% is chosen to reflect the author's preferred estimate of the average return to capital (see also Piketty, 2014). However, this return applies to an infinitely lived asset, the capital stock of the economy, which pays cash flows at all horizons. In thinking about an investment with an immediate cost and a long-run payoff, like climate change interventions, the appropriate discount rate is the one that applies to the long-term cash flows only. We have shown that this asset return can be substantially different, and in particular lower than the expected holding period return to the claim to cash-flows at all horizons. For example, our estimates of real estate average one-period returns are in the range of 6-10%, an estimate range also used by Nordhaus for real estate returns (Nordhaus, 2013); however, the returns to the claim to rents 100 or more years into the future are estimated to below 2.6%. We conclude that an important revision of the workhorse model of climate change should feature a non-constant, declining discount rate, and should focus on discount rates that directly relate to the long horizon of the setting. Two models of climate change that feature non-constant discount rates are analyzed next.

Gollier (2013) evaluates climate change policy in a model that combines parametric uncertainty about the growth rate of the economy with uncertainty about the probability of rare disasters. The model, in its benchmark parametrization, produces a downward sloping term structure of risk-free discount rates, but an upward sloping term structure of risk premia. The second effect tends to dominate for investments that are sufficiently risky. For example, Gollier (2013) derives a $\beta = 1.32$ for investments in climate change abatement and shows that for this investment the term structure of discount rates is upward sloping on average with a long-run discount rate of 4.6%. Intuitively, the implications of this model for discount rates are similar to the Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risk model discussed in the previous section because the parametric uncertainty about growth acts as a long-run risk shock. We have shown that this model cannot generate the term structure of discount rates implied by our data on leasehold and freeholds.

Our direct empirical estimates of discount rates are consistent with the decreasing term structure of discount rates suggested by Weitzman (1998, 2001). Weitzman provides two separate, but related, arguments for applying a downward sloping term structure of discount rates to climate change abatement investments. Weitzman (2001) generates a

downward slope in a reduced-form environment where a number of experts, who are assumed to have a constant discount rate, are polled regarding the appropriate level of the discount rate for environmental policy. The author then shows that if the disagreement among experts takes the form of a Gamma distribution, the resulting expert-average discount rate is of the hyperbolic type, i.e. it declines with the horizon of the investment. While Weitzman (2001) does not offer a fully specified general equilibrium model, his Gamma discounting offers an intriguing possibility to generate downward sloping term structures of discount rates.[53] Weitzman (2012) postulates that climate change abatement investments have a particular stochastic property: they hedge tail risk by paying a positive amount in catastrophic states of the world when aggregate consumption is very close to zero. These tail-hedge investments command a risk-premium that decreases with the horizon, thus generating an overall downward sloping term structure of discount rates. In this model, however, investments that are risky, i.e. that do not have the tail-hedging property, command either a flat or increasing risk premium and are, consequently, discounted using either a flat or an upward sloping term structure of discount rates. Our results, therefore, while consistent with the downward sloping term structures developed in Weitzman's work, provide a broader message of risk premia that decreases with the horizon even for risky assets. We find this message to be particularly important given the reasonable disagreement among economists over the riskiness, the β, of climate change abatement investments illustrated above.

Finally, let us stress that our estimated discount rates reflect *private* decisions on the side of agents and, arguably, represent an upper bound for the *social* discount rates that governments may wish to apply to climate change policies. It is often argued that climate change policy is affected by externalities that lead individuals to undervalue, compared to society as a whole, investments in climate change abatement. This occurs because individuals do not incorporate in their decision the positive externality of the environment. If this externality is quantitatively relevant, then our discount rates, that only reflect the individual decision to purchase assets at different horizon, are likely to be higher than the social discount rate that policy makers should use for climate change policy.

We summarize our contribution to the important debate on climate policy as providing the first direct estimates of discount rates at horizons that are relevant for these policies (e.g. 100 years and beyond), using market prices for traded, quantitatively important assets. Our findings that long-run discount rates are low, much lower than average re-

[53]Gamma discounting is also consistent with survey evidence. Layton and Brown (2000) surveyed 376 subjects to elicit their preferences for mitigating impacts of climate change that will occur in the distant future.

turns, can potentially suggest a radical reassessment of the value of climate policies.

5.3 Rational Bubbles

Our estimates of long-run discount rates can also be used to *directly* test for the presence of infinitely-lived rational bubbles. The existence of bubbles is one of the most fundamental, oldest, and most difficult questions in economics. In their recent survey of the literature on bubbles, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) emphasize that "identifying bubbles in the data is a challenging task. The reason is that in order to identify a bubble, one needs to know an asset's fundamental value, which is usually difficult to measure." We show that this is not the case for our tests, which are *model independent*.

The classic infinitely-lived rational bubble models of Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Froot and Obstfeld (1991) feature a failure of the no-bubble condition, which is routinely imposed in most economic models. The no-bubble condition requires that the present value of a payment occurring in the limit as the horizon goes to infinity is zero:

$$\lim_{T\to\infty} E_t[\xi_{t,T} P_T] = 0,$$

where $\xi_{t,T}$ is a model-implied discount factor between date t and T and P_T the price of the asset at time T. Our data is uniquely suited to test this condition because we can estimate the present value of a claim to rents occurring at very long horizons, for example $T = 999$ years. More formally:

$$P_t - P_t^T \approx \lim_{T\to\infty} E_t[\xi_{t,T} P_T], \qquad \text{for large T.}$$

Intuitively, the difference in value between a freehold (P_t) and a 999-maturity leasehold (P_t^{999}) is the present value of the claim to rents starting 999 years from today and extending to the infinite future (i.e. the present value of a freehold 999 years from now, $E_t[\xi_{t,999}\ P_{999}]$). Therefore we can test whether the no-bubble condition holds, on average, by testing whether the discount of very long leases to freeholds is zero. We correspondingly formulate our null hypothesis of no-bubbles as: $Disc^T = 0$ for $T > 700$ years.[54] The estimates of extreme long-run discounts for Singapore and the UK are reported in Figures 3 and 8. In all cases the point estimates of the discounts are negligible and not statistically significant for T sufficiently large, 700 or more years. We conclude that there

[54]Our test differs from the predictability test for bubbles suggested by Cochrane (2011) because we test the existence of a bubble directly in the level of an asset price. Cochrane's test focuses on whether the bubble accounts for any variation in price-dividend (or price-rent) ratios over time and therefore cannot rule out the existence of a constant, and possibly sizable, bubble.

is no evidence in our data supporting the presence of infinitely-lived rational bubbles.[55] As an even more stringent test, Figure 17 show that there is no evidence of a bubble at any point in time between 2003 and 2013 in the UK (top panel) and between 1995 and 2013 in Singapore (bottom panel). It does so by showing that the price of freeholds P_t and those of leaseholds with more than 700 years of maturity left $P_t^{>700}$ are essentially identical, and certainly within the 1% confidence interval of each other, at all points in time.

This latter time-series test is of particular interest because it shows the absence of an infinitely-lived rational bubble even at the peak of the housing market in 2007 after years of strong house price growth, when many commentators where hinting at the presence of a large bubble. For example, Gali (2014) motivates his theoretical analysis of infinitely-lived rational bubbles by appealing to this consensus view: "the spectacular rise (and subsequent collapse) of housing prices experienced byseveral advanced economies over the past decade is generally viewed as a key factor underlying the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, as well as a clear illustration of the dangers associated with speculative bubbles that are allowed to go unchecked". In contrast to this consensus view, we find no evidence of this type of bubble.

The strength of directly testing the no-bubble condition is that all models that assume the absence of infinitely-lived rational bubbles have the same implication: that the fundamental present value of a payment occurring in infinite time ($\lim_{T\to\infty} E_t[\xi_{t,T} P_T]$) is equal to zero. We do not need to specify a model (a choice of $\xi_{t,T}$ and of a stochastic process for rents) in order to obtain a fundamental value to compare to the valuation in the data. All no-bubble models imply that such fundamental value is zero. Our direct testing methodology is made possible by the uniqueness of our data that allows us to identify the terminal no-bubble condition. Such tests have been elusive because we do not normally observe traded claims to payments that only occur extremely far into the future. Our direct tests contrasts sharply with a large previous literature (for example: Flood and Garber (1980); Evans (1991); Diba and Grossman (1988*b*,*a*); West (1987)) that had to either deal with the thorny problem of establishing fundamental values or find indirect ways to test for bubbles.[56]

We note, however, that our bubble tests should not be interpreted as providing evidence for the absence of *all types* of bubbles. We provide evidence against a specific type of bubble that is common in the theoretical literature: the infinitely-lived rational bubble.

[55] While the literature has already put forward theoretical arguments for the fragility of the existence of infinitely-lived rational bubbles (for example Tirole, 1985), our tests provide direct empirical evidence for the absence of such bubbles.

[56] See Flood and Hodrick (1990) for a review of the deep econometric problems that had a chilling effect on the empirical literature attempting to test for the presence of bubbles.

Our tests are uninformative with respect to the presence of finitely-lived bubbles of the kind described for example in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2008).

6 Robustness Checks

6.1 Financing Frictions

Financing friction also have the potential to affect the relative valuation of leaseholds and freeholds.[57] Leaseholds, in particular short dated ones, require lower upfront payments to take ownership of a property (even if only for a limited number of years). If households have high future income that they cannot borrow against, these shorter leaseholds are more attractive than longer leaseholds or freeholds, in particular given the ability to extend leaseholds at the leaseholder's request. This credit constraint effect makes shorter leaseholds more desireable, *increasing* their valuation relative to a frictionless benchmark. Since this effect makes it more difficult to explain the observed long-run valuation patterns, we do not assess its quantitative implications.

On the other hand, short maturity leaseholds are harder to mortgage-finance than long maturity ones. For example, U.K. mortgage lenders typically require 30 years unexpired lease term to remain at the end of the mortgage (Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2013). Mortgages in the U.K. generally have maturities between 10 and 30 years with the most common term length being 25 years. This means that leasehold purchases have to be financed with shorter duration mortgages once the lease length falls below 55 or 60 years. The loss in "collateral value" for these leaseholds could contribute to the large discounts we observe in the data, particularly for leases in the $50-70$ years of maturity basket.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full general equilibrium model of housing in the presence of collateral and borrowing constraints. Instead we consider a simple deviation from the constant-discount-rate model in Section 4.1 to quanitfy the impact of a reduced form collateral constraint on leasehold discounts. Assume that for the last $\bar{T}$ years of lease maturity the house has lower collateral value. We model this has an effective rent for the last $\bar{T}$ years that is a fraction $(1-\alpha)$ of the original rent. This loss corresponds to the per-period shadow value of liquidity (i.e., the per-period cost to the

[57] See Mian and Sufi (2009); Keys et al. (2012) for a discussion of the importance of financing frictions in housing markets. In Appendix A.1 we discuss that ground rents and service charges cannot explain the observed discounts between leaseholds and freeholds. Many other frictions, such as long-run uncertainty about the enforcement property rights in countries such as Singapore should reduce the relative valuation of freeholds and leaseholds.

buyer of having to use own resources or a shorter duration mortgage). Alternatively, we can interpret α as the total loss in value once the leasehold reaches 60 years of remaining maturity due to the fact that new potential buyers will no longer have access to long-maturity mortgages and might need to make a larger downpayment. The value of the lease and the implied leasehold discounts with respect to freeholds are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^T &= \int_t^{t+T} e^{-\rho(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} (1 - \alpha \mathbf{1}_{\{s>t+T-\bar{T}\}}) ds; \qquad (9) \\ Disc_t^T &= e^{-(\rho-g)T} + \alpha \left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - e^{-(\rho-g)T} \right) - \mathbf{1}_{\{T<\bar{T}\}} \alpha \left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - 1 \right). \end{aligned}$$

The formulas are derived and discussed in more detail in Appendix A.4.3. In Figure 18 we set $\bar{T} = 60$ and solve the model for different values of of α. We parametrize r and g as in our baseline estimate at 6.5% and 0.7%, respectively. For the proportional value of the collateralizability of the house (α) we explore a range between 5% and 20%, which we believe to be a conservative estimate. The figure shows that even for α as high as 20%, the model cannot match the empirical discounts at essentially any horizon.

Most importantly even *unrealistically* high assumptions on the loss of collateral value for short duration leaseholds cannot help to explain the discounts for leases of long maturities (for example 150 or 250 years). Intuitively, a lease that has 200 years left today will only incur potential losses of its collateral value 140 years from now, when the lease will have 60 years left. Any losses that occur so far into the future have little impact on present values at conventional discount rates. To show this, separately for the U.K. and Singapore we calibrate the model under the value of α that matches the discount on the shortest-maturity bucket. This requires to set α to an unrealistically high 78% for the U.K. and to 34% for Singapore. Even at this unrealistic calibration, the cannot match the discounts observed at higher maturities. For example, for the U.K. the predicted discount in the bucket 125-150 years remaining would still be only 1.5%, relative to the observed 8%.

7 Conclusions

We provide novel estimates of very long-run discount rates by exploring unique features of the U.K. and Singapore housing markets where properties trade as either freeholds (infinite maturity ownership) or leaseholds of various maturities. We find that low long-run discount rates, much lower than routinely assumed by economic theory, are necessary in order to explain both the relatively high expected return to housing and the observed discounts between long-run leaseholds and freeholds. Our results provide new insight

on the term structure of house prices, a new testing ground for theoretical asset pricing models, including the theory of bubbles, and a direct estimate of the long-run discount rates that are crucial to evaluate environmental policies and other immediate actions that only have payoffs very far into the future.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Distribution of Remaining Lease Lengths at Sale (U.K.)




Note: This figure shows the distribution of years remaining on the lease at the point of sale for the leasehold transactions in our U.K. transaction sample, for flats and houses separately.


Figure 2: Hedonic Characteristics by Leasetype - UK Flats




(a) Bedrooms, flats




(b) Bedrooms, houses




(c) Size, flats



(d) Size, houses




(e) Property Age, flats




(f) Property Age, houses

Note: This figure shows the distribution of residuals from a regression of property characteristics on property type × title type (strata or land) × 3-digit postcode times property type times year fixed effects for leaseholds with different remaining lease maturity and freeholds. The characteristics plotted are: number of bedrooms, size of the property in square meters, age of the property

Figure 3: Price Discount by Remaining Lease Length (U.K. flats)




(a) Relative to Freeholds



(b) Relative to Leases with 700+ years remaining


Note: This figure shows β_j coefficients from regression (1). In the top panel the discounts of each of leaseholds are relative to freehold properties, and correspond to column (1) in Table 3. In the bottom panel the price discounts are relative to leaseholds with more than 700 years remaining, and correspond to column (1) of Table 4. The analysis is conducted only within flats. To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties of a certain maturity, construct $e^{\beta} - 1$. We include 3-digit post code by transaction year-month fixed effects. We also control for the size, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, property age, property condition, whether there is parking, and the type of heating. The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of the estimate using standard errors clustered at the level of the fixed effects.

Figure 4: Price Discount by Remaining Lease Length, Properties with Rental Data




Note: This figure shows β_j coefficients from regression (1) as in Column (1) of Table 3, allowing for a different coefficient for properties for which we observe rental data (second bar).

Figure 5: Rental Discount by Remaining Lease Length




Note: This figure shows β_j coefficients from regression (1), where the dependent variable are monthly rents. The sample is a subsample of London flats in 2011 and 2012. The figure uses the same controls as in our baseline regression, Column (1) in Table 3. The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of the estimate using standard errors clustered at the level of the fixed effects.

Figure 6: Distribution of Remaining Lease Lengths at Sale (Singapore)




Note: This figure shows the distribution of years remaining on the lease at the point of sale for the leasehold transactions in our Singapore transaction sample.


Figure 7: Hedonic Characteristics by Leasetype - Singapore



(a) Property Size




(b) Development Size




(c) Property Age

Note: This figure shows the distribution of residuals from a regression of property characteristics on property type $\times$ title type (strata or land) $\times$ 5-digit postcode fixed effects for leaseholds with different remaining lease maturity. The top panel shows residuals for the total area in square meters, the middle panel for the total project size and the bottom panel for property age.

Figure 8: Price Discount by Remaining Lease Length (Singapore)




(a) Relative to Freeholds




(b) Relative to Leases with 95-100 years remaining

Note: This figure shows β_j coefficients from regression (3). To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties of a certain maturity, construct $e^{\beta} - 1$. In the top panel the price discounts are relative to freeholds. In the bottom panel, we restrict to an estimation within strata leases with initial lease length of 99 years; the excluded category are those leaseholds with 95-100 years remaining. The dependent variable is the log price foot paid for properties sold by private parties in Singapore between 1995 and 2013, corresponding to Column (2) in Table 9. We include fixed effect for the 5-digit postcode by property type (apartment, condominium, detached house, executive condominium, semi-detached house and terrace house) by title type (Strata or Land) by transaction month. We control for the age of the property (by including a dummy variable for every possible age in years), the size of the property (by including a dummy for each of 40 equally sized groups capturing property size) and the total number of units in the property. The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of the estimate using standard errors clustered at the level of the fixed effect.

Figure 9: House Price Riskiness I




(a) Financial Crises




(b) Consumption Disasters

Note: The top panel shows average real house price movements relative to financial crises in Schularick and Taylor (2012), Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The bottom panel shows average real house price movements and average real consumption relative to the trough of consumption disasters identified by Barro et al. (2008). House prices and consumption volumes during the reference year are normalized to 1. See Appendix A.3.2 for a description of the countries included and the data series and crises considered here.

Figure 10: House Price Riskiness II




(a) U.K.



(b) Singapore

Note: The figures show the evolution of real house prices in the U.K. (top panel) and Singapore (bottom panel). Shaded regions for the U.K. are financial crises identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009): 1974-1976, 1984, 1991 and 2008-2009. Shaded regions for Singapore include the 1982-1983 financial crisis identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), as well as the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. See Appendix A.3.2 for a description of the data series studied here.


Figure 11: House Price Riskiness III




(a) Housing During World Wars

Note: The top panel shows the evolution of real house prices for countries with available house-price time series during World War I (Australia, France, Netherlands, Norway, United States) and World War II (Australia, France, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United States). See Appendix A.3.2 for a description of the data series studied here.

Figure 12: Constant Discount Gordon Growth Model: Model-Implied Discounts vs. Data




(a) U.K.



(b) Singapore


Note: The figure shows the discounts for leaseholds observed in the U.K. (top panel) and Singapore (bottom panel) together with discounts predicted by a number of parameterizations of the constant discount model. The baseline calibration has $r = 6.5\%$ and $g = 0.7\%$. A "low expected return" calibration takes $r = 5.5\%$, while a "high rent growth" calibration takes $g = 2\%$.

Figure 13: UK Gilts Real Yield Curve




Note: The figure plots the real yield curve for UK gilt bonds as computed by the Bank of England.

Figure 14: Asset Pricing Models: Model-Implied Discounts vs. Data




(a) U.K.




(b) Singapore

Note: The figure shows the discounts for leaseholds observed in the U.K. (top panel) and Singapore (bottom panel) together with discounts implied by the long-run risk model, the variable rare-disaster model, and the habit-formation model. The calibrations impose that housing has expected return of 6.5% and growth rate of rents of 0.7%.


Figure 15: Asset Pricing Models: Discount Rates by Maturity




(a) Long-run risks




(b) Disasters



(c) Habits




(d) Lettau-Wachter




(e) Hyperbolic

Note: Total per-period discount rates, risk-free yields, and risk premia for leading asset pricing models.

Figure 16: Lettau-Wachter and Hyperbolic Discounting Reduced-Form Models: Model-Implied Discounts vs. Data




(a) U.K.



(b) Singapore


Note: The figure shows the discounts for leaseholds observed in U.K. (top panel) and Singapore (bottom panel) together with the discounts implied by a parameterizations of the Lettau-Wachter and hyperbolic discounting reduced-form models in Section 5.1.2 using $r = 6.5\%$ and $g = 0.7\%$, $\kappa = 10\%$ and $\rho = 1.4\%$.

Figure 17: Time Series of 999-Year Leases and Freeholds




Note: The figure shows the time series of the price level of 999-Year leaseholds and freeholds in Singapore between 1995 and 2013. Estimates are obtained from a regression of log(price/sqft) on 5-digit postcode by property-type by title-type fixed effects, the same control variables as Table 9 and a separate dummy for each year by lease type (Freehold, 99-Year Lease, 999-Year Lease). All price levels are relative to freeholds in 1995. The vertical bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of the estimates using standard errors clustered at the level of the fixed effect.

Figure 18: Financing-Frictions Reduced-Form Model: Model-Implied Discounts vs. Data



(a) U.K.



(b) Singapore

Note: The figure shows the discounts for leaseholds observed in the U.K. (top panel) and Singapore (bottom panel) together with discounts implied by a parameterizations of the financing-friction reduced form model in Section 6.1 using $r = 6.5\%$, $g = 0.7\%$, and different values of α. The last value of α is chosen so that the shorter-maturity discount is matched exactly.

Tables

Table 1: Sample Overview U.K.

		Share of Transactions by Contract					
Flats	N	Freehold	80-99	100-124	125-149	150-300	700+
2004	183,599	0.03	0.19	0.37	0.08	0.05	0.28
2005	168,435	0.03	0.16	0.39	0.09	0.07	0.27
2006	212,734	0.03	0.14	0.39	0.10	0.08	0.27
2007	219,402	0.03	0.13	0.40	0.11	0.08	0.25
2008	116,048	0.03	0.12	0.41	0.11	0.10	0.24
2009	93,861	0.03	0.11	0.42	0.10	0.08	0.26
2010	99,663	0.02	0.13	0.41	0.09	0.08	0.27
2011	97,733	0.02	0.13	0.40	0.09	0.08	0.27
2012	98,464	0.02	0.14	0.39	0.09	0.08	0.29
2013	83,444	0.02	0.15	0.37	0.09	0.09	0.28
Total	1,373,383	0.03	0.14	0.39	0.09	0.08	0.27

		Share of Transactions by Contract				
Houses	N	Freehold	80-99	100-124	125-200	700+
2004	955,112	0.94	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.05
2005	803,983	0.94	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.05
2006	1,000,714	0.94	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.04
2007	942,575	0.94	0.004	0.006	0.002	0.05
2008	470,987	0.94	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.04
2009	480,827	0.95	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.04
2010	510,342	0.95	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.04
2011	513,179	0.95	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.04
2012	511,817	0.96	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.04
2013	438,598	0.96	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.03
Total	6,628,134	0.95	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.04

Note: This table shows the data sample for the U.K. analysis. The top panel is for flats, the bottom panel is for houses. For each year we show the number of transactions, as well as the share of transactions in each bucket by remaining lease length at the point of transaction.

Table 2: Summary Statistics U.K.: Fraction of leaseholds and freeholds by post code

Houses	Mean	Std	10th perc	25th perc	Median	75th perc	90th perc
% Freeholds	0.943	0.128	0.857	0.966	0.986	0.993	0.997
% 80-99	0.008	0.021	0	0.001	0.003	0.007	0.015
% 100-124	0.008	0.032	0	0.001	0.003	0.006	0.012
% 125-200	0.003	0.020	0	0	0	0.001	0.003
% 700+	0.039	0.114	0	0.001	0.004	0.014	0.078

Flats	Mean	Std	10th perc	25th perc	Median	75th perc	90th perc
% Freeholds	0.076	0.133	0.009	0.018	0.038	0.076	0.164
% 80-99	0.177	0.157	0.006	0.052	0.145	0.263	0.388
% 100-124	0.322	0.191	0.070	0.182	0.322	0.440	0.562
% 125-149	0.069	0.077	0	0.021	0.051	0.088	0.153
% 150-300	0.052	0.094	0	0	0.017	0.058	0.138
% 700+	0.304	0.229	0.042	0.126	0.259	0.443	0.636

Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the fractions of freeholds and leaseholds of each maturity bucket by 3-digit U.K. postcode.

Table 3: U.K.: Impact of Lease Type on Price Level - Flats

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lease Length							
80-99 Years	-0.176***	-0.178***	-0.179***	-0.178***	-0.170***	-0.157***	-0.175***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
100-124 Years	-0.110***	-0.109***	-0.106***	-0.110***	-0.105***	-0.111***	-0.073***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
125-149 Years	-0.089***	-0.088***	-0.086***	-0.090***	-0.083***	-0.086***	-0.060***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
150-300 Years	-0.033***	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.028***	-0.027***	-0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
$>$ 700 Years	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005**	-0.005	-0.012***	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Fixed Effects	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Quarter	3-digit PC × Year	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓, × year	✓	✓	✓
Restrictions	·	·	·	·	Wisorize Price	Nonmiss. Hedonics	Exclude London
R-squared	0.729	0.721	0.712	0.731	0.738	0.776	0.616
N	1,373,383	1,373,383	1,373,383	1,373,383	1,373,383	953,660	1,028,031

Note: This table shows results from regression (1) estimated for flats. The dependent variable is log price, for properties sold in England and Wales between 2004 and 2013. To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties we compute $e^{\beta_j} - 1$.We include 3-digit postcode by transaction time fixed effects. In columns (2) and (3) the transaction time is the transaction quarter and year, respectively, in the other columns the transaction month. In column (4) we interact the controls with the transaction year. In column (5) we winsorize the price at the 1st and 99th percentile, in column (6) we only include properties for which characteristics are not missing, and in column (7) we exclude transactions in London. We also control for the size, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, property age, property condition, whether there is parking, and the type of heating. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).

Table 4: U.K.: Impact of Lease Type on Price Level - Flats, relative to 700+ year leaseholds

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lease Length							
80-99 Years	-0.173***	-0.173***	-0.174***	-0.172***	-0.165***	-0.144***	-0.170***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
100-124 Years	-0.107***	-0.104***	-0.101***	-0.105***	-0.100***	-0.099***	-0.069***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
125-149 Years	-0.086***	-0.084***	-0.081***	-0.085***	-0.078***	-0.074***	-0.056***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
150-300 Years	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.029***	-0.024***	-0.015***	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Fixed Effects	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Quarter	3-digit PC × Year	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓, × year	✓	✓	✓
Restrictions	·	·	·	·	Wisorize Price	Nonmiss. Hedonics	Exclude London
R-squared	0.732	0.724	0.714	0.733	0.740	0.778	0.620
N	1,338,244	1,338,244	1,338,244	1,338,244	1,338,244	931,198	996,907

Note: This table shows results from regression (1) estimated for flats, excluding freeholds and computing the discounts relative to the 700+ leaseholds. The dependent variable is log price, for properties sold in England and Wales between 2004 and 2013. To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties we compute $e^{\beta_j} - 1$.We include 3-digit postcode by transaction time fixed effects. In columns (2) and (3) the transaction time is the transaction quarter and year, respectively, in the other columns the transaction month. In column (4) we interact the controls with the transaction year. In column (5) we winsorize the price at the 1st and 99th percentile, in column (6) we only include properties for which characteristics are not missing, and in column (7) we exclude transactions in London. We also control for the size, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, property age, property condition, whether there is parking, and the type of heating. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).

Table 5: U.K.: Impact of Lease Type on Price Level - Houses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lease Length							
80-99 Years	-0.375***	-0.378***	-0.379***	-0.375***	-0.364***	-0.332***	-0.374***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
100-124 Years	-0.296***	-0.298***	-0.298***	-0.297***	-0.286***	-0.273***	-0.290***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
$>$ 700 Years	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.007***	-0.011***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Fixed Effects	3-digit PC $\times$ Month	3-digit PC $\times$ Quarter	3-digit PC $\times$ Year	3-digit PC $\times$ Month	3-digit PC $\times$ Month	3-digit PC $\times$ Month	3-digit PC $\times$ Month
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓, $\times$ year	✓	✓	✓
Restrictions	.	.	.	.	Wisorize Price	Nonmiss. Hedonics	Exclude London
R-squared	0.783	0.781	0.777	0.785	0.790	0.820	0.765
N	6,628,133	6,628,133	6,628,133	6,628,133	6,628,133	5,453,962	6,393,099

Note: This table shows results from regression (1) estimated for houses. The dependent variable is log price, for properties sold in England and Wales between 2004 and 2013. To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties we compute $e^{\beta_j} - 1$.We include 3-digit postcode by transaction time fixed effects. In columns (2) and (3) the transaction time is the transaction quarter and year, respectively, in the other columns the transaction month. In column (4) we interact the controls with the transaction year. In column (5) we winsorize the price at the 1st and 99th percentile, in column (6) we only include properties for which characteristics are not missing, and in column (7) we exclude transactions in London. We also control for the size, number of bedrooms, bathrooms, property age, property condition, whether there is parking, and the type of heating. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * ($p<0.10$), ** ($p<0.05$), *** ($p<0.01$).

Table 6: Rents and Time on Market analysis

Dependent variable:	Log(Rent)			Log(Time on Market)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Lease Length						
80-99 Years	-0.021	0.001	0.008	0.059***	0.060***	0.047***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)
100-124 Years	-0.024	-0.004	0.003	0.048***	0.048***	0.022**
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)
125-149 Years	-0.005	0.007	0.014	0.063***	0.060***	0.059***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.021)
150-300 Years	-0.020	-0.001	0.009	0.080***	0.076***	0.071***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.018)
$>$ 700 Years	0.037	0.051**	0.057***	0.028***	0.028***	0.017***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Fixed Effects	3-digit PC and Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month	3-digit PC × Month
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓, × year	✓
Restrictions	·	·	Winsorize Price	·	·	Nonmiss. Hedonics
R-squared	0.674	0.746	0.766	0.070	0.092	0.073
N	29,020	29,020	29,020	2,409,181	2,409,181	1,290,825

Note: This table shows results from regression (1) where the dependent variable is rents (columns (1) to (3)) or time on market (columns (4) to (6)). The sample for rent data is the universe of London flats for which rent and hedonics data is available during 2011 and 2012. The sample for the time on market analysis is restricted to the sales for which Rightmove.co.uk reports time on market. Controls and fixed effects are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * ($p<0.10$), ** ($p<0.05$), *** ($p<0.01$).

Table 7: Characteristics of Buyers of Leaseholds and Freeholds: U.K.

	Sample		Leasehold Δ		
	Mean	St. Dev.	Unconditional	Conditional I	Conditional II
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age Head of Household (years)	52.30	16.01	-2.68	-1.54	-1.30
				(0.21)	(0.20)
Weekly Income (£)	350.2	450.6	-48.07	-3.01	5.60
				(4.56)	(4.45)
Number of people in household	2.53	1.27	-0.48	-0.03	0.02
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Number of dependent children	0.55	0.94	-0.19	-0.01	0.02
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Head of Household Married	0.64	0.48	-0.21	-0.01	0.01
				(0.01)	(0.01)
First Time Buyer	0.40	0.48	0.11	-0.00	-0.01
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Currently Has Mortgage	0.59	0.49	0.03	0.02	0.02
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Very Satisfied with Neighborhood	0.47	0.50	-0.06	0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	0.00

Note: This table provides summary statistics on characteristics of owners of freeholds and leaseholds in the Survey of English Housing. The underlying contains information on 201,933 households in England surveyed between 1994 and 2008. The first two columns provide the sample means of the outcome variables. Column (3) provides the unconditional average difference between leasehold owners and freehold owners (e.g., on average, heads of household owning leasehold properties are 2.7 years younger than heads of households owning freehold properties). Columns (4) and (5) show the β coefficient of the following regression: $Outcome_i = \alpha + \beta Leasehold_i + \xi X_i + \phi_{PropertyType \times Region} + \varepsilon_i$. Column (4) does not include any additional controls in X_i, column (5) includes dummy variables for property age, the number of rooms and the floor on which the property is on (the control variables that overlap with the transaction dataset). In other words, these columns show the difference between freehold and leasehold owning households, conditional on living on the same property type (flat, semi-detached house, etc.) and living in the same local authority. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect.

Table 8: Data Sample - Singapore

		Share of Transactions by Contract						
	N	Freehold	50-70	71-85	86-90	91-95	96- 100	800+
1995	12,412	0.575	0.001	0.034	0.029	0.004	0.270	0.087
1996	18,434	0.492	0.001	0.024	0.020	0.025	0.298	0.140
1997	12,534	0.402	0.001	0.045	0.003	0.023	0.453	0.073
1998	13,095	0.311	0.001	0.029	0.002	0.029	0.576	0.052
1999	23,500	0.503	0.002	0.044	0.002	0.064	0.304	0.082
2000	12,615	0.490	0.007	0.049	0.004	0.092	0.273	0.084
2001	11,577	0.392	0.005	0.036	0.015	0.107	0.406	0.040
2002	17,618	0.421	0.003	0.033	0.013	0.133	0.337	0.060
2003	9,807	0.441	0.006	0.055	0.035	0.140	0.262	0.061
2004	11,231	0.522	0.006	0.049	0.050	0.123	0.192	0.058
2005	16,771	0.575	0.014	0.039	0.057	0.111	0.134	0.070
2006	24,261	0.587	0.008	0.038	0.074	0.101	0.132	0.061
2007	39,203	0.521	0.013	0.040	0.126	0.083	0.138	0.079
2008	13,919	0.475	0.015	0.056	0.159	0.084	0.138	0.073
2009	32,967	0.490	0.011	0.056	0.106	0.064	0.194	0.078
2010	34,481	0.466	0.011	0.083	0.097	0.051	0.225	0.066
2011	25,236	0.378	0.009	0.083	0.070	0.040	0.370	0.049
2012	36,652	0.329	0.016	0.085	0.039	0.040	0.444	0.047
2013	15,215	0.267	0.014	0.067	0.026	0.049	0.535	0.042
Total	381,528	0.457	0.009	0.053	0.059	0.068	0.285	0.069

Note: This table shows the data sample for the Singapore analysis. For each year we show the number of transactions, as well as the share of transactions in each bucket by remaining lease length at the point of transaction.

Table 9: Impact of Lease Type on Log(Price) - Singapore

	Relative to Freehold					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Lease Length						
50-70 Years	-0.409***	-0.426***	-0.487***	-0.464***	-0.424***	NA
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.039)	
71-85 Years	-0.275***	-0.264***	-0.273***	-0.469***	-0.262***	-0.328**
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.133)
86-90 Years	-0.215***	-0.212***	-0.216***	-0.111***	-0.210***	NA
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.015)	
91-95 Years	-0.148***	-0.142***	-0.146***	-0.169***	-0.142***	-0.179
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.667)
96-100 Years	-0.125***	-0.127***	-0.132***	-0.127***	-0.129***	-0.213
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.617)
> 800 Years	-0.010	-0.007	-0.002	0.019	-0.008	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.122)
Fixed Effects	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Quarter	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Restrictions	·	·	Private Buyer	New Only	Strata Only	No Strata
R-squared	0.977	0.979	0.978	0.981	0.977	0.985
N	378,768	378,768	220,044	223,810	333,684	45,084

Note: This table shows results from regression (3). To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties relatives to freeholds, construct $e^{\beta_j} - 1$. The dependent variable is the price paid for properties sold by private parties in Singapore between 1995 and 2013. We include fixed effect at the 5-digit postcode by property type (apartment, condominium, detached house, executive condominium, semi-detached house and terrace house) by title type (Strata or Land) by transaction date. In column (1), the transaction date interaction is for the transaction quarter, in columns (2) - (6) the transaction month. We control for the age of the property (by including a dummy variable for every possible age in years), the size of the property (by including a dummy for each of 40 equally sized groups capturing property size), and the total number of units in the property. In column (3) we only focus on properties that were bought by a private individual (and not the HDB); in column (4) we only focus on properties that were built within the last 3 years of our transaction date. In columns (5) and (6) we conduct the analysis for Strata and non-Strata titles separately. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).

Table 10: Impact of Lease Type on Log(Price) - Singapore

	Relative to 96-100 Year Leases			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lease Length				
50-70 Years	-0.376***	-0.469***	-0.489***	-0.599***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.107)
71-85 Years	-0.348***	-0.358***	-0.327***	-0.325***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.039)
86-90 Years	-0.221***	-0.223***	-0.207***	-0.196***
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.034)
91-95 Years	-0.058***	-0.072***	-0.067***	-0.056**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Fixed Effects	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Year	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Quarter	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month	5-digit PC × Prop Type × Title Type × Month
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Restrictions	.	.	.	New Only
R-squared	0.955	0.967	0.970	0.969
N	172,690	172,690	172,690	82,408

Note: This table shows results from regression (3). To convert into percentage discounts for leasehold properties relatives to freeholds, construct $e^{\beta_j} - 1$. The dependent variable is the price paid for strata properties with initially 99-year leases sold by private parties in Singapore between 1995 and 2013. The excluded category is for transactions with leases with 96-100 years remaining. We include fixed effect at the 5-digit postcode by property type (apartment, condominium, detached house, executive condominium, semi-detached house and terrace house) by title type (Strata or Land) by transaction date. In column (1), the transaction date interaction is for the transaction quarter, in columns (2) - (6) the transaction month. We control for the age of the property (by including a dummy variable for every possible age in years), the size of the property (by including a dummy for each of 40 equally sized groups capturing property size), and the total number of units in the property. In column (3) we only focus on properties that were bought by a private individual (and not the HDB); in column (4) we only focus on properties that were built within the last 3 years of our transaction date. In columns (5) and (6) we conduct the analysis for Strata and non-Strata titles separately. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).

Table 11: Expected Returns and Rental Growth

	United States		Singapore		United Kingdom	
	Balance Sheet	Price/Rent	Balance Sheet	Price/Rent	Balance Sheet	Price/Rent
Gross Return	10.3%	10.7%	10.4%	10.3%	12.5%	10.9%
Rental Yield	8.3%	9.8%	6.1%	6.0%	9.7%	6.9%
Capital Gain	2.0%	0.8%	4.3%	4.3%	2.8%	4%
Depreciation	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%
Taxes	0.67%	0.67%	0.5%	0.5%	0%	0%
Net Return	**8.1%**	**8.5%**	**8.4%**	**8.3%**	**11%**	**9.4%**
Sample	1953-2012	1988-2012	1985-2012	1990-2012	1989-2012	1996-2012
Real Rent Growth		0.1%		0.2%		0.7%
Sample		1988-2012		1990-2012		1996-2012

Note: This table shows our estimates for net real returns to housing and real rent growth in the U.S., the U.K. and in Singapore. See appendix A.3 for details.

Table 12: Time Series Properties of Real House Price Growth

	Period	Real HP Growth		Real Cons. Growth		
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Correlation
Australia	1901 - 2009	2.50%	12.1%	1.51%	5.00%	0.102
Belgium	1975 - 2009	2.92%	6.00%	1.56%	1.49%	0.438
Canada	1975 - 2009	2.38%	7.69%	1.64%	1.71%	0.433
Denmark	1975 - 2009	2.00%	9.24%	1.03%	2.68%	0.538
Finland	1975 - 2009	2.17%	8.70%	2.09%	2.75%	0.710
France	1840 - 2009	2.06%	11.8%	1.53%	6.32%	-0.054
Germany	1975 - 2009	-0.005%	2.33%	1.71%	1.56%	0.494
Japan	1975 - 2009	0.00%	4.45%	2.00%	1.59%	0.502
Italy	1975 - 2009	1.28%	8.10%	1.69%	2.12%	0.165
Netherlands	1807 - 2009	2.78%	21.6%	1.46%	7.57%	0.090
New Zealand	1975 - 2009	2.46%	8.01%	0.90%	2.34%	0.578
Norway	1830 - 2009	1.82%	11.6%	1.78%	3.83%	0.243
Singapore	1975 - 2009	7.18%	19.5%	3.37%	2.98%	0.348
Spain	1975 - 2009	3.15%	8.07%	1.54%	2.57%	0.593
South Africa	1975 - 2009	1.13%	10.1%	0.90%	2.98%	0.707
South Korea	1975 - 2009	0.60%	7.93%	4.58%	4.43%	0.370
Sweden	1952 - 2009	1.55%	6.04%	1.66%	1.98%	0.537
Switzerland	1937 - 2009	0.04%	7.17%	1.55%	3.85%	0.187
U.K.	1952 - 2009	2.89%	9.55%	2.22%	2.12%	0.700
U.S	1890 - 2009	0.04%	7.36%	1.80%	3.41%	0.148

Note: The table shows time series properties of annual growth rates of real house prices (as described in Appendix A.3.2) and real consumption, as collected by Barro et al. (2008). Column (1) shows the sampled considered. Columns (2) and (3) show the mean and standard deviation of real house price growth. Columns (4) and (5) the mean and standard deviation of real consumption growth. Column (6) shows the correlation of real house price growth and real consumption growth.

Appendix

Not for publication

A.1 Institutional Appendix - United Kingdom

A.1.1 Historical Background

The history of leasehold property ownership in England has its roots in feudalism, a system of land use and ownership that was common in Europe between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, and introduced in England following the Norman Conquest. Land was owned and controlled by a military or political sovereign ruler, who gave portions of land he or she owned to a number of lords as "tenants-in-chief," or "tenants-in-capite." The lord, in turn, could allow another person, a vassal, to use smaller portions of the land for a fixed period of time in return for pledging allegiance and military or other service to the lord. See Burn, Cartwright and Cheshire (2011) for a detailed review of the history of real property law.

? describes the historical debate regarding the origins of common lease length terms of 99, 125 and 999 years: *Matthew Bacon, author of "A Treatise on Leases and Terms for Years" published in London, England, in 1798, explains in various parts of his book that the ninety-nine year period represents three lives, but Bacon does not indicate why such a term was selected as the length of time a lease was to prevail. It is supposed by some that there was an English common law which prevented a lessor from granting a lease for 100 years and that it was therefore made for a somewhat briefer period, but no real evidence has ever been found to substantiate this theory.* 1000-year leases were also common, with Jack Cade in Shakespeare's *Henry IV, Part II* exclaiming that "Now I am so hungry, that if I might have a lease of my life for a thousand years, I could stay no longer." **?** also discusses theories of moving from 1000 year to 999 year leases: *Lord Coke, who lived in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in his writings on the subject of leases suggested that a lease for 1,000 years might on its face suggest fraud and it is thought that to avoid such a contingency the lessors of those early days set upon 999 years as the extreme limit for the life of a lease. Such leases, in any event, were made at that time.*

During the 1920s various legislation was introduced to control rents and restrict the right of landlords to evict tenants. Many landlords, facing dwindling profits, started to sell long leases (typically 99 or 125 years) of their properties as a means of increasing revenue without losing ownership of their land. This marked the beginning of the modern leasehold system. As the construction of flats increased following World War II, lease-

hold ownership increased significantly. During that period, leasehold contracts were the only means available to subdivide and sell properties in a multi-occupancy building. This is because freehold ownership could not yet be applied to flats, as the relevant freehold property law required a separate land boundary to be visible on a map.[58]

A.1.2 Leasehold Extensions

Over time, a number of laws have regulated the rights of leaseholders to extend their lease terms. There are three key Acts of Parliament that regulate this process. The 1967 Leasehold Reform Act enables tenants of houses (not flats) held on long leases to acquire either the freehold (a process called "enfranchisement") or an extended lease term. The 1993 Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act conferred rights to collective enfranchisement and lease extension on groups of flat owners in the same building who have been in occupation for a number of years. The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act of 2002 extended the right to lease extensions to individuals who have owned (but not necessarily occupied) flats for at least two years.

The above laws codify the bargaining process for a lease extension in the following way. First, the leaseholder files a proposal for extension, with an offered premium. The freeholder agrees, or proposes a counteroffer, and the two parties can then bargain on the final price of the extension. If the two parties cannot agree on a price, the leaseholder can ask a Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT) to assess the "fair value" of the extension. Such tribunals are part of Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service. Each tribunal usually consists of three members: a lawyer, who is often the chairman, a valuer and a lay person. There are five regionally based Tribunal offices (London, Northern, Midland, Eastern and Southern). There is no fee payable for LVT applications to determine the terms or price in respect of enfranchisement or applications to determine the terms or price in respect of lease extensions. Any order made by the LVT may be enforced, with the permission of the county court, in the same way as a county court order.

The "fair value" determined by the LVT is intended to be the market value: the amount that the property "might be expected to realize if sold on the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer." This guarantees that the leaseholder is able to remain in the property for a longer term if she is willing to pay the market value for the extension. This removes some of the bargaining frictions that can be associated with the cost of moving and that result in a potential hold-up problem by the freeholder. Using an analogy to the bond market, this is equivalent to saying that the short-term investor can roll over her

[58] See http://www.leaseextension-uk.info/leasehold-history.html for more details.

investment at what will be the prevailing interest rate without paying major transaction costs when doing so. Therefore, the reduction of this friction suggests that the price paid for a leasehold will more closely reflect the value of the rental income that accrues over the term of the leasehold.

A.1.3 Leasehold Registration

In the U.K., land registration is governed by the Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002. Until then, the registration of leasehold and freehold interest has been governed mainly by the 1925 Land Registration Act. The two Acts regulate the registration procedures of interests in real estate, both freeholds and leaseholds. In both cases, the law identifies cases in which registration of freehold and leasehold contracts is voluntary or mandatory, and disposes the limits and procedure to follow to register an interest. The main objective of the 2002 reform was to further encourage voluntary registration of contracts, and extended the cases of mandatory registration.

In particular, under the current law, registration of a contract is mandatory when a leasehold of 7 years or longer is granted or transferred, or a freehold is transferred. When no transfer occurs, registration is not mandatory, though encouraged by the law. This could for example be the case for lease extensions. Finally, the law establishes that failure to register an interest will make the interest lose the so-called overriding status: the owner of the interest may be vulnerable to successive transfer of the title that are registered.[59]

A.1.4 Tax Treatment of Leaseholds and Freeholds

Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the tax authority for England and Wales, gives equal treatment to the price paid for any term of leasehold or for a freehold when levying Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) on residential property transactions.[60] HMRC does not levy property taxes on actual ownership, it only taxes transactions (changes in ownership).

A.1.5 Ground Rents, Management Fees and Leasehold Covenants

There are three other important institutional features that one might be concerned to reduce the value of leaseholds relative to freeholds: ground rents, service charges and lease-

[59] See http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/professional/guides/practice-guide-15 and http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/professional/guides/practice-guide-25.

[60] The first £125,000 are exempt from stamp duty, with rates rising progressively thereafter. For more details see: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/sdlt/calculate/leasehold.htm.

hold covenants. Below we describe the relevant institutional details. Neither is important enough to explain a significant part of the estimated difference. In addition, since ground rents, management fees and covenants are present for leaseholds of all maturities, the fact that 700+ year leaseholds trade at the same price as otherwise identical freeholds, and the fact that the discounts remain when estimated within leasehold properties, shows that they cannot contribute significantly to leasehold discounts relative to freeholds.

Ground Rents: A leaseholder sometimes has to pay annual ground rent to the freeholder. The original rationale for the ground rent was that the purchase price of the lease only covered the temporary ownership of the structure. The land still belongs to the freeholder who has the right to request that the lessee makes regular payments for the use of the land, the ground rent.

Ground rents are customized on a property by property basis and no centralized database exists. This makes it hard to control for them in the regression analysis. However, the amounts involved are usually very small (£10-100 per year for a typical property) and in many cases are either zero or a symbolic amount ("a peppercorn"). In the 2011-12 English Housing Survey, amongst those households reporting to pay ground rents, the median household reported annual rents of about £25. In addition, all leases extended under the Leasehold Reform Act of 1993 are set at peppercorn levels. Even in cases where the ground rent is in principle positive, it is often zero in guid, because for the rent to be collected the freeholder has to make a specific written request to the leaseholder. Oftentimes such requests are not made because the amount collected would be too small to cover the administrative costs.

Service and Insurance Charges: Service charges are payments by the leaseholder for services provided by the landlord. These include maintenance and repairs, insurance of the building and, in some cases, provision of central heating, lifts, porterage, estate staff, lighting and the cleaning of common areas. In the 2011-12 English Housing Survey, 46% of leaseholders reported paying a service charge; amongst those households the median annual payment was about £750.

While maintenance costs can be non-trivial, as long as the maintenance is carried out at fair value (the private market cost of the works) service charges do not provide a problem for our analysis, since freeholders would also have to pay for the maintenance of the property. Having the landlord conduct maintenance may even be efficient, because she will likely enjoy significant economies of scale.

A potential problem exists if freeholders might attempt to extract monopoly rents via

the service charge, as suggested by some newspaper articles **?**. We do not, however, believe that this is a likely explanation of the leasehold discounts estimated in the data. The ability to extract rents is severely limited. First of all, under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 an application can may be made to a Leasehold Valuation Tribunal to challenge the reasonableness of service charges. Secondly, The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 provides a right for leaseholders of flats to force the transfer of the landlord's management functions to a special company set up by them - a "right to manage" company. This does not require the landlord's consent, and significantly limits her ability to extract unreasonable service charges.

Similarly, in some cases the lease requires that the leaseholder insures the property, usually a house, through an insurer nominated or approved by the landlord. The tenant may consider that he can get cheaper insurance from different companies and may be concerned as to the cover provided. The provisions of Section 164 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 provide a right for the leaseholder to arrange his own insurance, provided he notifies the landlord.

Leasehold Covenants: A further concern might be that contractual covenants in leasehold deeds place restrictions on leaseholders that reduce the value of the leasehold relative to the freehold. We have analyzed hundreds of leasehold contracts provided to us by the Land Registry to determine whether or not such contractual restrictions might explain the estimated discounts. Many leaseholds do not carry restrictions; others contain only old, out-of-date restrictions, which, while technically still in place, are generally not enforced.[61]

When present, we find four main types of covenants. The first and most common type of covenant involves restrictions on the **broad type of land use**, such as restricting structures to be residential rather than commercial. Usually these are consistent with council zoning regulations, which would also apply to the owners of freeholds:

> No building now or hereafter to be erected on the premises hereby transferred or any part or parts thereof shall at any time hereafter be used for any other purpose than that of private dwelling houses buildings and appurtenances belonging thereto and no block of flats hotel factory or retail shop or other premises for the sale of goods by retail shall be erected on the premises hereby transferred and that the Purchaser and its successors in title and assigns will

[61] For example, a leasehold for a flat states that "A Conveyance dated 20 June 1864 made between (1) [Person A] and (2) [Person B] contains restrictive covenants but neither the original deed nor a certified copy or examined abstract thereof was produced on first registration."

not at any time use exercise or carry on or permit to be carried on upon any part or parts of the premises hereby transferred or any buildings for the time being erected or to erected or standing thereon any trade manufacture or business or do any act or thing which may be or grow to be in any way offensive noxious or dangerous to the Vendor or its Superior Lessors or tenants or the owner or tenants of adjoining property forming part of the Vendor's estate or any part thereof and will not use or permit to be used the premises hereby transferred or any buildings erected thereon or any part thereof for the purpose of manufacturing storing selling supplying or distributing either by wholesale or retail ales beers wines spirits or any other intoxicating liquors nor shall any house or building erected or to be erected on the premises hereby transferred or on any part thereof be converted or used for such purposes or used as a cinema or a club or clubs at which intoxicating liquors may be stored sold or supplied.

Note that while those covenants restrict the use of land and future structures to be residential, there are no further restrictions on the construction of such new residential properties. Some leasehold covenants do place restrictions on the **construction of a new structure**. To the extent that there are such restrictions on new structures, many times they again relate to restrictions placed by the council, and would equally apply to all new structures that freeholders might want to erect (see in particular point 3 of the following leasehold covenant):

> The land tinted pink on the filed plan is subject to the following stipulations contained in a Deed dated 10 August 1923 made between (1) [Person A], (2) [Person B] (3) [Person C].
>
> 1. No church chapel synagogue or other place of public worship or instruction manufacturing premises institution nursing home lunatic asylum sanatorium creche school public motor garage licensed premises theatre cinematograph theatre or other place of amusement shop or business premises shall be erected on the premises and no buildings now or at any time to be erected thereon shall at any time be used except as private dwelling houses only but no objection shall be made to user of the premises at present erected on the land as a private residential hotel.
> 2. Any dwelling house when erected on the said premises shall be of the value of £900 at least in prime cost of materials and labour exclusive of any outbuildings stabling or motor garage.

3. The front wall of any dwelling houses to be erected on the premises shall range and be set back from Poynders Road within the boundary line to be fixed by the London County Council and in accordance with the provisions of the Housing and Town Planning Scheme of the District.

Other, covenants require the permission of the freeholder for certain redevelopments (i.e. placing a structure close to the property edge):

> A Conveyance of the land in this title and other land dated 10 March 1914 made between (1) [Person A] (Vendor) and (2) [Person B] contains the following covenants: Covenant by Purchasers with Vendor his heirs and assigns that the Purchasers their heirs and assigns would not place or suffer to be placed any building whatsoever other than walls or fences under 6 feet in height on any part of the lands thereby conveyed nearer than 30 feet to the road called Lambton Road without the previous consent in writing of [Person A] or the person or persons claiming in succession to them.

In general, however, a covenant against the making of improvements without consent is subject to the proviso that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. This was determined by Section 19(2) of the 1927 Landlord and Tenant Act:

> In all leases whether made before or after the commencement of this Act containing a covenant condition or agreement against the making of improvements without a licence or consent, such covenant condition or agreement shall be deemed, notwithstanding any express provision to the contrary, to be subject to a proviso that such licence or consent is not to be unreasonably withheld; but this proviso does not preclude the right to require as a condition of such licence or consent the payment of a reasonable sum in respect of any damage to or diminution in the value of the premises or any neighbouring premises belonging to the landlord, and of any legal or other expenses properly incurred in connection with such licence or consent nor, in the case of an improvement which does not add to the letting value of the holding, does it preclude the right to require as a condition of such licence or consent, where such a requirement would be reasonable, an undertaking on the part of the tenant to reinstate the premises in the condition in which they were before the improvement was executed.

As described by Burn, Cartwright and Cheshire (2011), the word "improvements" refers to improvements from the point of view of the tenant, and the statute applies even though

what he proposes to do, for example, the demolition of part of the main structure of a building, will temporarily diminish the value of the premises (see Lambert v Woolworth & Co Otd, 1938).

The third class of covenants relate to the **joint use of infrastructure** such as access roads:

> The land is subject to the following reservations contained in a Conveyance of the freehold estate in the land in this title and other land dated 10 October 1878 made between (1) [Person A] and (2) [Person B]: Reserving nevertheless to the said [Person A] his heirs and assigns owner or owners for the time being of any messuage to be erected on the adjoining land on the South of the said premises thereby granted the right of using a Drain already constructed under the South side of the back yard of the Southernmost of the said messuages thereby granted to connect the drain from the said messuage so to be erected on the adjoining land on the South of the said premises thereby granted as aforesaid with the said Drain the use whereof was thereinbefore granted by the said [Person A] with liberty for the said [Person A] his heirs and assigns tenants or occupiers and his and their servants and workmen at all reasonable times to enter the back-yard of the Southernmost of the said messuages thereby granted for he purpose of connecting and repairing such Drain such Drain in the said backyard to be kept in repair when and so soon as the same should be used by the said [Person A] his heirs or assigns tenants or occupiers at the joint expense of the said [Person A] his heirs and assigns and of the said [Person B] his heirs and assigns and each of them would pay to the other of them on demand one moiety of the expenses incurred by the other of them in repairing such last mentioned Drain.

Unless there is specific agreement to the contrary, a tenant is free to grant his interest to a third party, either by assignment or by underlease, see Burn, Cartwright and Cheshire (2011). A fourth set of covenants we sometimes encountered therefore requires leaseholders to obtain the freeholder's permission to **sublet the property**, i.e. to rent it out to somebody else. These requirements usually stipulate that the freeholder cannot "unreasonably withhold" consent to a sublet, and sometimes allow the freeholder to charge a fee for registering a sublet. These terms for subletting property are regulated in Section 19(1) of the 1927 Landlord and Tenant Act, which provides as follows:

> In all leases whether made before or after the commencement of this Act containing a covenant condition or agreement against assigning, under-letting,

charging or parting with possession of demised premises or any part thereof without licence or consent, such covenant condition or agreement shall, notwithstanding any express provision to the contrary, be deemed to be subject

1. to a proviso to the effect that such licence or consent is not to be unreasonably withheld, but this proviso does not preclude the right of the landlord to require payment of a reasonable sum in respect of any legal or other expenses incurred in connection with such licence or consent; and
2. (if the lease is for more than forty years, and is made in consideration wholly or partially of the erection, or the substantial improvement, addition or alteration of buildings, and the lessor is not a Government department or local or public authority, or a statutory or public utility company) to a proviso to the effect that in the case of any assignment, under-letting, charging or parting with the possession (whether by the holders of the lease or any under-tenant whether immediate or not) effected more than seven years before the end of the term no consent or licence shall be required, if notice in writing of the transaction is given to the lessor within six months after the transaction is effected.

Furthermore, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 places on the landlord the burden of showing that any refusal or the imposition of any conditions was reasonable. He need only show that his conclusions were such as might have been reached by a reasonable man in the circumstances, but it is for him and not the tenant to prove this. It also gives a tenant the right to sue for damages suffered as a result of a landlord's unreasonable refusal. Subsequent common law cases have further regulated the maximum fee that freeholders can charge for the granting of approval for a sublet. In Holding and Management (Solitaire) Limited vs. Cherry Lilian Norton (LRX/33/2011), the court decided that a fee in excess of £40 + VAT was not merited.

A.2 Institutional Appendix - Singapore

Residential properties in Singapore can be classified into land titles or strata titles. Land title properties occupy land that is exclusive to the owner (like a detached house), whereas a strata title comprises units in cluster housing (flats or apartments) or in condominium developments. Owners of strata properties enjoy exclusive title only to the airspace of their individual unit. The land that the development is built on is shared by all the owners of the project, based on the share of the strata title unit owned by each owner. Owners are free to sell their individual unit. In order to sell the land, they will have to go via an "en bloc" sale, which requires a minimum of 80% of the owners' consent.[62]

A large fraction of the Singaporean housing stock consists of Housing and Development Board (HDB) properties, mostly in the form of flats. The HDB flats are part of a state-subsidized home-ownership program and leases are often granted at below market values. We exclude these properties from our analysis and focus instead on the private market.

Finally, property taxes are independent of the form and duration of ownership. Property taxes are levied on the *Annual Value* (AV), the tax-authority assessed 1-year rental income of the property. For rental properties, the tax rate is set at 10% of AV; for owner-occupied properties, it rises from 0% on the first $6,000 to a marginal rate of 6% for AVs exceeding $65,000.[63] The rental income, and therefore the Annual Value, of a property is unaffected by the length of the lease under which the property is owned. Property transactions are also subject to stamp duty irrespective of the form and duration of ownership.[64]

[62] 80% consent is necessary if the development is at least 10 years old and 90% consent is necessary if the development is less than 10 years old.

[63] Starting from January 1, 2014, property taxes were made more progressive. For details see: http://www.iras.gov.sg/irasHome/page04.aspx?id=2094. This is after the end of our sample, and should thus

[64] Stamp duties are transaction taxes, and are assessed on the purchase value of the property. The first $180,000 are assessed at 1%, the next $180,000 at 2% and each additional increase in the sales prices at 3%. See http://www.iras.gov.sg/irasHome/page04.aspx?id=8748fordetails.

A.3 Data and Empirical Appendix

We are deeply indebted to a number of researchers, statistical agencies, and scholars that have either made their data available online, shared it with us on request, or have in general been available to discuss long-term house prices and rent behavior with us. For convenience to future scholars, a replication dataset with all the raw data series for this section of the paper is available on our websites. The original sources of each series are acknowledged here and should be cited in future use of our replication dataset.

A.3.1 Average Real Housing Returns and Rental Growth

In this section we estimate r and g for the U.S., the U.K. and Singapore. We briefly describe our methodology and findings, and provide the details of the data and estimation procedure in section A.3.1.2 below. We employ two complementary approaches to estimating average returns to housing. The first approach, which we call the balance-sheet approach, is based on the total value of the residential housing stock and the total value of housing services consumed (the dividend from that stock). We obtain this information from countries' national accounts.[65] We control for the growth of the housing stock over time in order to back out the return series for a representative house. The second approach, which we label the price-rent approach, starts from the price-rent ratio estimated in a baseline year and constructs a time series of returns by combining a house price index and a rental income index. This approach focuses on a representative portfolio of houses and, therefore, does not need to correct for changes in the housing stock. After adjusting for inflation, both methods provide estimates of the gross real returns to housing ($E[R^G]$). To compute net returns, we subtract maintenance costs and depreciation (δ) and any tax-related decreases in return (τ). We estimate net returns as $r = E[R] = E[R^G] - \delta - \tau$.

The top panel of Table 11 presents the estimated average housing returns for the U.S., England-and-Wales, and Singapore. Our estimates for housing returns in the U.S. follow Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010).[66] While U.S. housing returns are not the focus of this paper, they provide a useful benchmark because they have been the subject of an extensive literature, including Gyourko and Keim (1992), Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) and Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007). The balance-sheet and the price-rent approaches provide similar estimates for the

[65] To determine the total consumption of housing services, these measures impute the value of the owner-occupied equivalent rents, the housing services consumed by individuals from living in their own house. See **?** and **?** for a description of the construction of these measures.

[66] We thank Stijn van Nieuwerburgh for sharing the data and for insightful discussions on estimating housing returns.

average annual real gross return ($E[R^G]$): 10.3% and 10.7% respectively. We calibrate the impact of maintenance and depreciation (δ) at 1.5% and the property tax impact τ at 0.67%.[67] We conclude that average real net returns in the U.S. housing market are between 8% and 8.5%. This is similar to the estimates in Flavin and Yamashita (2002), who find a real return to housing of 6.6%, and Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), who find a real return of 9-10% before netting out depreciation and property taxes.

Column three and four in Table 11 report our estimates for the Singaporean housing market. The balance-sheet and price-rent approaches provide similar estimates for the average annual real gross return ($E[R^G]$): 10.3% and 10.4%, respectively. We assume the cost of maintenance and depreciation to be 1.5%, in line with the estimates for the U.S., and the property tax impact to be 0.5%.[68] A conservatively low estimate of the real net returns in the Singapore housing market is therefore between 8.3% and 8.4%.

The two rightmost columns of Table 11 report the estimates for the housing market in England and Wales. The balance-sheet and the price-rent approaches provide similar estimates for the average annual real gross return ($E[R^G]$): 12.5% and 10.9%, respectively. We maintain the calibration for the cost of maintenance and depreciation at 1.5%. There are no property taxes to be considered in England and Wales. Average real net returns in the U.K. housing market are approximately $9 - 11\%$.

Overall, the estimates show that real expected returns for housing are between 8% and 10% for all countries in our international panel. These estimates are in line with the existing literature, and robust to the different methodologies.[69] Our estimates for the U.S. and England-and-Wales are consistent with the notion that average house price growth over extended periods of time is relatively low, as argued by Shiller (2006), and the key

[67] **?** provide an overview of the literature on depreciation. For example, **?** estimates the annual depreciation rate of housing units in the U.S. to be between 0.36% and 1.36%. Depreciation is also a key calibration parameter for much of a recent literature in macroeconomics that considers households' portfolio and consumption decisions with housing as an additional asset. **?** chooses a depreciation rate equal to 1% on an annual basis; **?** include an annual depreciation rate of 1.5%. Property taxes in the U.S. are levied at the state level and, while there is variation across states, are generally around 1% of house prices. Property taxes, however, are deductible from federal income tax. We assume that the deductibility reflects a marginal U.S. federal income tax rate of 33%. The net impact is therefore $(1 - 0.33) * 0.01 = 0.67\%$.

[68] Singapore levies a 10% annual tax on the estimated rental income of the property. A lower tax rate applies to owner-occupied properties (6%), but we use the more conservative (higher) rate for rental properties. See section 1.2 for details. The tax impact on returns is the tax rate times the average rent-price ratio, estimated at 5%. Hence, $\tau = 0.1 * 0.05 = 0.5\%$.

[69] We also note that since most movements in rent-price ratios are driven by movements in house prices and not by movements in rents, see **?**, our estimates of returns are relatively unaffected by the time period chosen. For example, since 2013 rent-price ratios in the U.S. have declined to approximately their 2000 levels (see Figure A.28), ending the sample in 2005 would have produced a slightly lower average rent-price ratio. However, focusing on that period would also exclude the house price crash from our estimates of capital gains, thus leading to higher estimated average capital gains. In the overall estimates of expected returns, the higher estimated capital gains would be offset by a lower estimated rent-price ratio.

driver of real housing returns is the high rental yield. Our estimated average capital gains are positive but relatively small (even for Singapore where they are the highest) despite focusing on samples and countries that are often regarded as having experienced major growth in house prices.

A.3.1.1 Real Rental Growth

In order to calibrate the parameter governing rent growth (g), we estimate the average growth rate of rental income, obtained directly from rental indexes. The national accounts and the rental index provide similar growth rate estimates on the sample where both are available.

The estimated real growth rate of rents is close to zero. For the U.S., our estimate (0.2%) is in line with the estimates of **?** that obtain a median growth rate of 0.4% per year. We obtain a similarly low estimate (0.2%) of average annual rental growth for Singapore, while the U.K. estimate is somewhat higher at 0.7%. As for the case of real average house price growth, our estimates of small-to-negligible real rent growth are in line with Shiller (2006). In our baseline estimates, we calibrate g to be 0.2%.

A.3.1.2 Details on Estimation Procedures

This section describes the methodology and data used to compute average real returns and rent growth for residential properties. We report the details of the calculations in an online appendix.

The balance-sheet approach Following Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), this approach uses information about the value of the stock of residential real estate to estimate the value (price) of housing and total household expenditure on housing as a measure of the value of rents in each period. Since we are only interested in the return to a representative property, we need to control for changes in the total housing stock. We proxy for the change in the stock by population growth, assuming that at least over long periods the per capita stock of housing is constant. We derive the gross return to housing in each period as:

$$R^G_{t+1} = \frac{V^H_{t+1} + CE^H_t}{V^H_t} \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t+1}} \frac{L_t}{L_{t+1}},$$

where V^H is the value of the housing stock, CE^H is the household expenditure on housing, π is the CPI price level index, and L is population.

- For the U.S. we follow Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) and use data from the Flow of Funds (obtained from the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). For the value of the housing stock we sum the value of two series: owner-occupied real estate and tenant-occupied real estate (FL155035005, FL115035023) from the Flow of Funds. From the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis we obtain: (i) household expenditure on housing in each period, series number DHUTRC1A027NBEA of the National Income and Product Accounts (personal consumption expenditures - services: housing and utilities); (ii) Population estimates (POP); and (iii) the Consumer Price Index (U.S.ACPIBLS).

- For the U.K., using the same procedure, we combine the value of the total stock of housing (series CGRI) and the total expenditures on housing (series ADIZ) from the National Accounts (available from the Office of National Statistics). From the same source, we obtain the CPI (series D7BT). We adjust for the change in the stock of housing using the population growth series from ONS for England and Wales.

- We use a similar procedure for Singapore. From the National Accounts (from singstat.gov.sg), we obtain the value of the private residential stock of housing (series M013181.1.1.1 P017199) and the private consumption expenditure on housing and utilities (series M013131.1.4 P017135). We obtain the series for the population growth (that proxies for the change in the stock of housing wealth) from the World Bank (series SP.POP.GROW). Finally, we obtain the CPI series from the National Statistical Office (singstat.gov.sg).

The price-rent approach This approach constructs a time series of returns by combining information from a house price index, a rent index, and an estimate of the price-to-rent ratio in a baseline year. Without loss of generality suppose we have the rent-to-price ration at time $t = 0$. We can derive the time series of the rent-to-price ratio as:

$$\frac{P_t}{D_{t+1}} = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \frac{D_t}{D_{t+1}} \frac{P_{t-1}}{D_t}; \qquad \frac{P_0}{D_1} \quad given.$$

where P is the price index and D the rental index. Notice that, given a baseline year $\frac{P_0}{D_1}$, only information about the growth rates in prices and rents are necessary for the calculations. We then compute real returns using the formula:

$$R^G_{t+1} = \left(\frac{D_{t+1}}{P_t} + \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right) \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t+1}}.$$

- For the U.S. we follow Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) and

use the Case-Shiller 10-city house price index (series SPCS10RSA from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), and compute rent growth using the BLS shelter index (the component of CPI related to shelter, item CU.S.R0000SAH1 from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). However, differently from Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), we choose 2012 as a baseline year for the rent-price ratio, which is estimated at 0.1, because of the availability of high quality data for that year. We obtained two independent estimates for the rent-price ratio in the base year of 2012. The first estimate is the price-rent ration implied by the balance-sheet approach. The second estimate is a direct estimate obtained using data by the real estate portal Trulia. Figure A.27 shows the distribution of rent-price ratios across the 100 largest MSAs provided by Trulia.[70] Both independent estimates imply a rent-price ratio of 10% in 2012. Figure A.28 suggests that these rent-price ratios are close to their long-run average.

- For Singapore we obtain a time series of price and rental indices for the whole island from the Urban Redevelopment Authority (the official housing arm of the government: ura.gov.sg).

  To estimate the baseline rent-price ratio, we use data from for-sale and for-rent listings provided by iProperty.com, Asia's largest online property listing portal. We observe approximately 105,000 unique listings from the year 2012, about 46% of which are for-rent listings. To estimate the rent-price ratio we run the following regression which pools both types of listing, which follows a similar methodology as Figure A.27 in the construction of rent-price ratios for the U.S.:

$$\ln\left(ListingPrice\right)_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_i ForRent_i + \gamma Controls_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{A.1}$$

  The dependent variable, $ListingPrice$ is equal to the list-price in "for-sale" listings, and equal to the annual rent in "for-rent" listings. $ForRent_i$ is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the listing is a for-rent listing. The results are reported in Table A.1. In column (1) we control for postal code by quarter fixed effects. The estimate coefficient on β_i suggests a rent-price ratio of $e^{\beta_i} = 4.5\%$. In columns (2) - (4) we also control for other characteristics of the property, such as the property type, the number of bedrooms, bathrooms as well as the property type, size, age

[70] We thank Jed Kolko and Trulia for providing these data. Trulia observes a large set of both for-sale and for-rent listings. The rent-price ratio is constructed using a MSA-level hedonic regression of log(price) on property attributes, zip code fixed effects, and a dummy for whether the unit is for sale or for rent. The rent-to-price ratio is constructed by inverting the exponent of the coefficient on this dummy variable.

and the floor. In columns (3) and (4) we tighten fixed effects to the month by postal code level and the month by postal code by number of bedrooms level respectively. In all specifications the estimated rent-price ratio fro 2012 is 4.5%. Finally, note that if we instead used the rent-price ratio obtained from the Balance Sheet approach as a baseline estimate in 2012, we would obtain a higher total return (as the baseline in 2012 would be 6% rather than 4.5%). We choose 4.5% to be as conservative as possible.

- For England and Wales we use the house price index from the U.K. Land Registry to compute price appreciation and we use the CPI component "Actual rents for housing" (series D7CE) from the Office of National Statistics as a rental index. As a baseline we used the 6% rent-price ratio in 2012 obtained from the balance-sheet approach.

A.3.2 The Riskiness of Housing

This section provides the details underlying the analysis carried out in Section 3 as well as extra robustness checks.

Table A.2 reports the availability of house price data and the associated financial crises are rare disasters. The second column in Table A.2 shows the time coverage of house price indices country by country. We have often been able to go far back in time; for example, we sourced data as far back as 1819 for Norway, 1840 for France, and 1890 for the U.S. The third and fourth column of the table report dates of banking crises or consumption rare disasters if any occur for the country in the time period provided in the first column. Banking crises dates for all countries, except Singapore, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, and South Africa, are from Schularick and Taylor (2012). Banking crises dates for the countries not covered by Schularick and Taylor (2012) are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).[71] Rare disasters dates in the last column of the table are the year of the trough in consumption during a consumption disaster as reported by Barro et al. (2008). We note that Ireland and South Africa are not covered by Barro et al. (2008).

For each country we obtained the longest continuous and high-quality time series of house price data available. To make the data comparable across countries and time periods, we focus on real house prices at an annual frequency. Finally, to increase historical comparability across time within each time series, for each country we report for the en-

[71] For this second set of countries/dates, we have also consulted Bordo et al. (2001) that confirms all dates in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) except for 1986 for South Korea and for 1989 for South Africa.

tire time period the index for the unit of observation (for example, a city) for which the longest possible high quality time series is available. For example, since a house price index for France is only available since 1936, but a similar index is available for Paris since 1840, we focus on the Paris index for the entire history 1840-2012. We stress, however, that for each index and country we have carried out an extensive comparison analysis with other indices and in particular with indices that are available for the most recent time period in order to ensure that we are observing consistent patterns in the data. We detail here the sources for each of the 21 countries in our sample:

- **Australia**: Real annual house price indices are from Stapledon (2012). For our analysis, we use the arithmetic average of the indices (rebased such that 1880 = 100) for Melbourne and Sydney.

- **Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, South Korea, and Spain**: Real annual house price indices are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.[72] The sources and methodology are described in Mack and Martínez-García (2011).

- **France**: Nominal annual house price index and CPI are available from the Conseil Général de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable (CGEDD).[73] We obtain the real house price index by deflating the nominal index by CPI. For our analysis, we use the longer time series available for the Paris house price index.

- **Netherlands**: Nominal annual house price index for Amsterdam and CPI for the Netherlands are available from Eichholtz (1997); Ambrose, Eichholtz and Lindenthal (2013).[74] We obtain the real house price index by deflating the nominal index by CPI.

- **Norway**: Nominal annual house price index and CPI are from the Norges Bank.[75] We obtain the real house price index by deflating the nominal index by CPI.

- **Singapore**: Nominal annual house price index for the whole island is from the Urban Redevelopment Authority (http://www.ura.gov.sg). CPI is from Statistics

[72] The data are available at: http://www.dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice/, last accessed February 2014.

[73] http://www.cgedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/les-missions-du-cgedd-r206.html, last accessed February 2014.

[74] Part of the data are are available on Eicholtz website at: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Main/Sitewide/Content/EichholtzPiet.htm, last accessed February 2014.

[75] http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-stability/historical-monetary-statistics/, last accessed February 2014.

Singapore. We obtain the real house price index by deflating the nominal index by CPI.

- **Sweden**: Nominal house price index for one-or-two-dwelling building and CPI are from Statistics Sweden. We obtain the real house price index by deflating the nominal index by CPI.

- **Switzerland**: nominal house price index is available by Constantinescu and Francke (2013). Among the various indices the authors estimate, we focus on the local linear trend (LLT) index. The data are available for the period 1937-2007. We update the index for the period 2007-2012 by using the percentage growth of the house price index for Switzerland available from the Dallas Fed.[76]

- **U.K.:** Annual nominal house price data are from the Nationwide House Price Index. We divide the nominal index by the U.K. Office of National Statistics "long term indicator of prices of consumer goods and services" to obtain the real house price index. The Nationwide index as a missing value for the year 2005, for that year we impute the value based on the percentage change in value of the house price index produced by the England and Wales Land Registry.

- **U.S.**: Real annual house price data are originally from Shiller (2000). Updated data are available on the author's website.[77]

For all countries except Ireland the real annual consumption data are from Barro et al. (2008) and available on the authors' website.[78] For Ireland the data on consumption is from Central Statistics Office Ireland.

We also provide a robustness check for the correlation between house price growth and measures of economic activity. The main body of the text focused on consumption growth in 12. By contrast, Table 12 uses data from Mack and Martínez-García (2011) to report the correlation between annual real house price growth and personal disposable income in a panel of 21 developed and emerging countries. The average correlation is 0.37, with a minimum of 0.05 for Luxembourg and a maximum of 0.63 for Spain. Overall, this evidence further corroborates the fact that housing returns are risky.

Figure A.29 plots the growth rates of rents and personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in the U.S. since 1929. In periods of falling PCE, in particular the Great Depression, rents also fell noticeably. The bottom panel shows that there is a (weak) positive

[76] This source is described in the second bullet point above.
[77] Available at: http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm, last accesses February 2014.
[78] Available at: http://rbarro.com/data-sets/, last accessed February 2014.

relationship between the growth rates of rents and personal consumption expenditures. This suggests that housing rents tend to increase when consumption increases and the marginal utility of consumption is low.

Finally, we briefly discuss here the dynamics of rents and prices for the most desirable neighborhoods in central London during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. These desirable areas, like for example Kensington and Chelsea, have experienced a strong influx of foreign money that has focused on purchasing high-end homes. Figure A.30 shows that despite the foreign inflows these areas experienced both a fall in house prices and a pronounced fall in rents during the crisis.

A.4 Theoretical Appendix

A.4.1 The Stochastic Discount Factor

Starting with the fundamental valuation equation $P_t^{D_T} = E_t[\xi_{t,t+T} D_T]$ and the definition of return $\tilde{R}_{t,t+T} = \frac{D_T}{P_t^{D_T}}$, we have:

$$1 = E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}\tilde{R}_{t,t+T}] = E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]E_t[\tilde{R}_{t,t+T}] + Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}].$$

Re-arranging we obtain:

$$E_t[\tilde{R}_{t,t+T}] = E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]^{-1}\left(1 - Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]\right) = R^f_{t+t+T} - Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]^{-1},$$

where the last equality follows from the definition $R^f_{t+t+T} \equiv E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]^{-1}$. Finally, we re-arrange the definition of returns, take conditional expectations, and substitute in the above derivation for expected returns to write:

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^{D_T} =& \frac{E_t[D_T]}{E_t[\tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]} \\ =& \frac{D_T}{R^f_{t+t+T} - Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]^{-1}} \\ =& \frac{D_T}{R^f_{t+t+T} - \frac{Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]}{Var_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]}\frac{Var_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]}{E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]}} \end{aligned}$$

which provides the expressions in the main body of the paper by defining:

$$\begin{aligned} R_{t,t+T} &\equiv E_t[\tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]; \\ RP_{t,t+T} &\equiv \beta_{t,t+T}\lambda_{t,t+T}; \\ \beta_{t,t+T} &\equiv -\frac{Cov_t[\xi_{t,t+T}, \tilde{R}_{t,t+T}]}{Var_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]}; \\ \lambda_{t,t+T} &\equiv \frac{Var_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]}{E_t[\xi_{t,t+T}]}. \end{aligned}$$

A.4.2 Details on Hyperbolic-Exponential Discounting

We include here details for the derivations in Section 5.1.2 of the paper. First, let us focus on a model of pure hyperbolic discounting. In continuous time, the hyperbolic discount function is simply $\frac{1}{1+\kappa s}$ where $\kappa > 0$ is the subjective hyperbolic parameter. To gather intuition, assume that rents were constant at D. Let us value the T lease contract. For

simplicity consider the $t = 0$ starting condition.

$$P_t^T = \int_0^T \frac{1}{1+\kappa\, s} D ds = D\frac{\ln(1+\kappa\, T)}{\kappa}.$$

The obvious problem with this type of discounting when applied to longer term assets is that the valuation of claims diverges (even without dividend growth) as the horizon T increases ($T \to \infty$). A similar problem occurs for the gamma discounting of **?** that derives a similar functional form for its effective discount rate.

In the paper, therefore, we augmented the hyperbolic discount function to include an exponential term: $\frac{e^{-\rho s}}{1+\kappa s}$, where $\rho > 0$ is the subjective discount rate associated with exponential discounting. This form of discounting tends to behave like hyperbolic discounting in the short run and like exponential discounting in the long run. The T-maturity leasehold is valued at:

$$P_0^T = \int_0^T \frac{e^{-(\rho-g)s}}{1+\kappa s} D_0 ds = D_0 \frac{e^{\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}} \left(Ei\left(\frac{(T\kappa+1)(g-\rho)}{\kappa}\right) - Ei\left(\frac{g-\rho}{\kappa}\right)\right)}{\kappa},$$

where $Ei(x)$ is the Exponential Integral function defined as:

$$Ei(x) \equiv -\int_{-x}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-t}}{t} dt.$$

The freehold is correspondingly valued at:

$$P_0 = D_0 \frac{e^{\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}} \Gamma\left(0, \frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)}{\kappa},$$

where $\Gamma(x)$ is the Upper Incomplete Gamma Function defined as:

$$\Gamma(0,x) \equiv \int_x^{\infty} \frac{e^{-t}}{t} dt.$$

The discount is now:

$$Disc_0^T = \frac{Ei\left(\frac{(T\kappa+1)(g-\rho)}{\kappa}\right) - Ei\left(\frac{g-\rho}{\kappa}\right)}{\Gamma\left(0, \frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)} - 1.$$

The per-period equivalent constant discount rate r_T for horizon T solves $e^{-r_T T} = R_{0,T} =$

$\frac{e^{-\rho T}}{1+\kappa T}$, and is hence obtained via the formula:

$$r_T = \rho + \frac{\ln(1+\kappa T)}{T}.$$

This is the formula reported in the main text. Notice that we also have $\lim_{T\downarrow 0} r_T = \rho + \kappa$ and $\lim_{T\to\infty} r_T = \rho$.[79] So that total discount rates start at $\rho + \kappa$ and then decay over the horizon to ρ.

Similarly, marginal discount rates $r(s)$ can be derived by defining the discount function as $R_{0,T} = exp\left(-\int_0^T r(s)ds\right)$. Then an application of Leibniz's rule for differentiation under the integral sign yields: $\dot{R_{0,T}} = -r(T)R_{0,T}$, where $\dot{R_{0,T}}$ is the time derivative of function $R_{0,T}$. Hence, we have the result hat $r(T) = -\frac{\dot{R_{0,T}}}{R_{0,T}}$. Finally, applying this formula to the exponential-hyperbolic discount function, $R_{0,T} = \frac{e^{-\rho T}}{1+\kappa T}$, one obtains the result:

$$r(T) = -\frac{\dot{R_{0,T}}}{R_{0,T}} = \rho + \frac{\kappa}{1+\kappa t}.$$

Marginal discount rates are therefore monotonically decreasing from $\rho + \kappa$ to ρ. We conclude, therefore, that r_T are also monotonically decreasing.

We next derive the expected, instantaneous returns to the freehold. Before deriving the expression for the current hyperbolic-exponential model, we report the derivation for the simple Gordon growth exponential model. In the main draft we have argued that the constant discount rate r of the Gordon growth model should be calibrated to the average return of the freehold. We confirm here that this logic is correct. The return on the freehold is given by:

$$\frac{dP_t + D_t dt}{P_t}.$$

In the Gordon growth environment capital gains are $\frac{dP_t}{P_t} = gdt$. This can be derived recalling that $P_t = \frac{D_t}{r-g} = \frac{D_0 e^{gt}}{r-g}$ and taking the time derivative. The rental yield is $\frac{D_t}{P_t} = r - g$. We conclude that total returns on the freehold in the Gordon growth model are:

$$\frac{dP_t + D_t dt}{P_t} = gdt + (r-g)dt = rdt.$$

We now derive the formula for explicated returns to the freehold in our hyperbolic-exponential model by analogy with the Gordon growth model derivation above. The capital gains in our hyperbolic-exponential model are $\frac{dP_t}{P_t} = gdt$. This can be derived by

[79] The first limit follows from a simple application of l'Hopital's rule

recalling that $P_t = D_t \frac{e^{\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}}\Gamma\left(0,\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)}{\kappa} = D_0 e^{gt}\frac{e^{\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}}\Gamma\left(0,\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)}{\kappa}$, and taking the time derivative. The rental yield is $\frac{D_t}{P_t} = \frac{\kappa}{e^{\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}}\Gamma\left(0,\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)}$. We conclude that total returns on the freehold in the hyperbolic-exponential model are:

$$\frac{dP_t + D_t dt}{P_t} = gdt + \frac{\kappa}{e^{\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}}\Gamma\left(0,\frac{\rho-g}{\kappa}\right)}dt.$$

If $\kappa = 0$ then the return to the freehold is simply ρ, and we are back to the exponential discounting model. An increase in κ for a given ρ has the following comparative statics: the returns to the freehold increase, short term discount rates increase, long-term discount rates are unchanged, and leasehold discounts $(Disc)$ increase in absolute value. These dynamics are precisely what allow the reduced-form hyperbolic-exponential model to reconcile the long-run valuation pattern.

A.4.3 Details on Financing Frictions

We assume that for the last $\bar{T}$ years of lease maturity the house has lower collateral value. We model this has an effective rent for the last $\bar{T}$ years that is a fraction $(1-\alpha)$ of the original rent. The value of the lease now follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^T &= \int_t^{t+T} e^{-\rho(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} (1 - \alpha \mathbf{1}_{\{s>t+T-\bar{T}\}}) ds \qquad (A.2) \\ &= \int_t^{t+T} e^{-\rho(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} ds - \alpha \int_{t+T-\bar{T}}^{t+T} e^{-\rho(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} ds + \\ &\quad \mathbf{1}_{\{T<\bar{T}\}}\, \alpha \int_{t+T-\bar{T}}^{t} e^{-\rho(s-t)} D_t e^{g(s-t)} ds \\ &= \frac{D_t}{\rho - g}\left[1 - e^{-(\rho-g)T} - \alpha\left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - e^{-(\rho-g)T}\right) + \mathbf{1}_{\{T<\bar{T}\}}\, \alpha\left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - 1\right)\right] \end{aligned}$$

Notice that the first multiplicative term in equation (A.2) is simply the valuation of the freehold under the Gordon-Growth formula $\left(\frac{D_t}{\rho-g}\right)$. The first term inside the squared bracket $\left(1 - e^{-(\rho-g)T}\right)$ is the Gordon-Growth price adjustment for the value of a T-maturity leasehold as shown in equation (4). The second term inside the squared bracket is the loss in value for the T-maturity leasehold due to the frictions. Notice that this term is zero whenever there are no frictions ($\alpha = 0$ and or $\bar{T} = 0$). The last term inside the squared bracket $\left(\mathbf{1}_{\{T<\bar{T}\}}\, \alpha\left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - 1\right)\right)$ captures the notion that if a leasehold has already

less than $\bar{T}$ years left than it would be valued at:

$$P_t^T = \frac{D_t(1-\alpha)}{\rho - g}(1 - e^{-(\rho-g)T}),$$

so that the leasehold is then valued as if the rents where only a fraction$(1-\alpha)$ of the original ones. Notice that the value of the freehold is unaffected by the frictions because by definition it never loses its collateral value:

$$P_t = \lim_{T\to\infty} P_t^T = \frac{D_t}{\rho - g}.$$

The model implied discounts are now:

$$Disc_t^T = e^{-(\rho-g)T} + \alpha\left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - e^{-(\rho-g)T}\right) - \mathbf{1}_{\{T<\bar{T}\}}\,\alpha\left(e^{-(\rho-g)(T-\bar{T})} - 1\right).$$


Let us focus on the case in which $T > \bar{T}$, i.e. if we are valuing a leasehold with maturity beyond the problematic threshold. Notice the following effects:

1. $\frac{\partial Disc_t^T}{\partial \alpha} > 0$, the discount increases the greater the per-period collateral benefit.
2. $\frac{\partial Disc_t^T}{\partial \bar{T}} > 0$, the discount increases whenever the threshold for financing increases.
3. $\frac{\partial Disc_t^T}{\partial \alpha \partial T} < 0$ and $\lim_{T\to\infty} \frac{\partial Disc_t^T}{\partial \alpha} = 0$, the marginal effect of the loss in collateral value on the discount decreases with maturity of the lease and is zero in the limit of very long leases.

The last property is the most relevant for our robustness exercise. It states that no matter how high the frictions are ($\uparrow \alpha$), their effect decreases with the length of the lease. As we have shown in the main body of the paper, this effect makes the frictions quantitatively incapable of explaining the observed discounts, especially for long term leases (100 or 200 years for example).


Appendix Figures

Figure A.1: Distribution of years remaining at lease extension




Note: The figure shows the distribution of the number of years remaining at the time of a lease extension for the subsample of 21,974 properties for which we can identify the time of the extension. The vertical bar corresponds to 80 years remaining.

Figure A.2: U.K. Flats: Fraction of Freeholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of freehold flats in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.3: London Flats: Fraction of Freeholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of freehold flats in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.4: U.K. Flats: Fraction of 80-99 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 80-99 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.5: London Flats: Fraction of 80-99 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 80-99 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.6: U.K. Flats: Fraction of 100-124 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 100-124 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.7: London Flats: Fraction of 100-124 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 100-124 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.8: U.K. Flats: Fraction of 125-149 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 125-149 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.9: London Flats: Fraction of 125-149 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 125-149 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.10: U.K. Flats: Fraction of 150-300 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 150-300 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.11: London Flats: Fraction of 150-300 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 150-300 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.12: U.K. Flats: Fraction of 700+ years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 700+ years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.13: London Flats: Fraction of 700+ years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of flat transactions with 700+ years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.14: U.K. Houses: Fraction of Freeholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of freehold house transactions in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.15: London Houses: Fraction of Freeholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of freehold house transactions in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.16: U.K. Houses: Fraction of 80-99 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 80-99 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.17: London Houses: Fraction of 80-99 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 80-99 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.18: U.K. Houses: Fraction of 100-124 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 100-124 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.19: London Houses: Fraction of 100-124 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 100-124 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.20: U.K. Houses: Fraction of 125-200 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 125-200 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.21: London Houses: Fraction of 125-200 years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 125-200 years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.22: U.K. Houses: Fraction of 700+ years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 700+ years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes.

Figure A.23: London Houses: Fraction of 700+ years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 700+ years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. Green and red correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.24: U.K. Houses: Fraction of 700+ years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 700+ years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. White corresponds to the 10th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes, while black corresponds to 1%

Figure A.25: London Houses: Fraction of 700+ years leaseholds




Note: The figure shows the fraction of house transactions with 700+ years remaining in each UK 3-digit postcode. White corresponds to the 10th percentile of the distribution of the fraction across postcodes, while black corresponds to 1%. The figure zooms in on London.

Figure A.26: Distribution Time on Market




Note: The figure shows the distribution of the time on market observed in our data.

Figure A.27: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Price-Rent Ratio in the U.S.




Note: The figure shows the distribution of the rent-to-price ratio for the 100 largest MSAs in the U.S. in September 2013 as constructed by Trulia, which observes a large set of both for-sale and for-rent listings. It is constructed using a metro-level hedonic regression of $\ln(price)$ on property attributes, zipcode fixed effects, and a dummy for whether the unit is for rent. The rent-to-price ratio is constructed by taking the exponent of the coefficient on this dummy variable.

Figure A.28: Price-Rent Ratio Timeseries in the U.S.




Note: The figure shows the time series of the price-rent ratio in the U.S. as constructed by http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/.

Figure A.29: Rent Growth vs. PCE Growth in U.S.



Note: The figure shows the annual growth rates of the "Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Rent of primary residence" (FRED ID: CUUR0000SEHA) and "Personal Consumption Expenditure" (FRED ID: PCDGA) since 1929.

Figure A.30: House Prices and Rents in Prime Central London Areas during the 2007-09 Financial Crisis



Note: The figure shows the time series of house prices and rents for Prime Central London, Kensington, and Chelsea for the period January 2005 to January 2012. The series are monthly and available from John D Wood & Co. at http://www.johndwood.co.uk/content/indices/london-property-prices/

Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Rent-Price Ratio Singapore - 2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
For-Rent Dummy	-3.095***	-3.131***	-3.123***	-3.107***
	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.025)
Fixed Effects	Quarter × Postal Code	Quarter × Postal Code	Month × Postal Code	Month × Postal Code × Bedrooms
Controls	·	✓	✓	✓
Implied Rent-Price Ratio	4.5%	4.4%	4.4%	4.5%
R-squared	0.804	0.873	0.872	0.872
N	106,145	105,189	105,189	105,189

Note: This table shows results from regression (A.1). To convert into rent-price ratios, we take e^{β}. The dependent variables is the price (for-sale price or annualized for-rent price) for properties listed on iProperty.com in Singapore in 2012. Fixed effects are included as indicated. In columns (2) and (4) we also control for characteristics of the property: we include dummy variables for the type of property (condo, house, etc.), indicators for the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, property age, property size (by adding dummy variables for 50 equal-sized buckets), information on the kitchen (ceramic, granite, etc.), which floor the property is on and the tenure type for leaseholds. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effect. Significance Levels: * ($p<0.10$), ** ($p<0.05$), *** ($p<0.01$).

Table A.2: House Prices, Banking Crises, Rare Disasters

	House Price Index Time Period	Banking Crises	Rare Disasters
Australia	1880 - 2013	1893, 1989	1918, 1932, 1944
Belgium	1975 - 2012	2008	
Canada	1975 - 2012		
Denmark	1975 - 2012	1987	
Finland	1975 - 2012	1991	1993
France	1840 - 2010	1882, 1889, 1907, 1930, 2008	1871, 1915, 1943
Germany	1975 - 2012	2008	
Japan	1975 - 2012	1992	
Ireland	1975 - 2012	2007	NA
Italy	1975 - 2012	11990, 2008	
Netherlands	1649 - 2010	1893, 1907, 1921, 1939, 2008	1893, 1918, 1944
New Zealand	1975 - 2012	1987	
Norway	1819 - 2013	1899, 1922, 1931, 1988	1918, 1921, 1944
Singapore	1975 - 2012	1982	
Spain	1975 - 2012	1978, 2008	
South Africa	1975 - 2012	1977, 1989	NA
South Korea	1975 - 2012	1986, 1997	1998
Sweden	1952 - 2013	1991, 2008	
Switzerland	1937 - 2012	2008	1945
U.K.	1952 - 2013	1974, 1984, 1991, 2007	
U.S.	1890 - 2012	1893, 1907, 1929, 1984, 2007	1921, 1933

Note: The table shows time series availability for house price indices in the second column. The third and fourth column report dates of banking crises or consumption rare disasters if any occur for the country in the time period provided in the first column. Banking crises dates for all countries, except Singapore, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, and South Africa, are from Schularick and Taylor (2012). Banking crises dates for the countries not covered by Schularick and Taylor (2012) are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Rare disasters dates are the year of the trough in consumption during a consumption disaster as reported by Barro et al. (2008). NA means that the country is not covered by the source dataset.

Table A.3: Time Series Properties of Real House Price Growth

	Real HP Growth		Real PDI Growth		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Correlation
Australia	3.20%	6.89%	1.43%	2.77%	0.093
Belgium	2.80%	5.87%	1.17%	2.27%	0.436
Canada	2.51%	7.63%	1.37%	2.10%	0.489
Switzerland	0.94%	4.73%	1.12%	1.63%	0.445
Germany	-0.29%	2.31%	1.27%	1.70%	0.288
Denmark	1.57%	8.99%	1.09%	2.29%	0.211
Spain	2.05%	8.26%	0.83%	2.46%	0.631
Finland	2.04%	8.19%	2.07%	3.21%	0.482
France	2.52%	5.23%	1.22%	1.58%	0.358
U.K.	3.53%	8.54%	2.20%	2.74%	0.355
Ireland	3.70%	9.73%	1.83%	3.59%	0.529
Italy	0.60%	8.28%	0.82%	2.44%	0.325
Japan	-0.24%	4.28%	1.55%	1.40%	0.587
S. Korea	0.59%	7.70%	3.95%	4.58%	0.235
Luxembourg	3.94%	6.68%	2.84%	3.75%	0.054
Netherlands	2.32%	9.43%	0.48%	3.25%	0.472
Norway	2.76%	7.23%	2.22%	2.52%	0.064
New Zealand	2.20%	7.73%	0.98%	3.45%	0.530
Sweden	1.50%	7.27%	1.34%	2.28%	0.431
U.S.	1.13%	3.89%	1.60%	1.56%	0.371
S. Africa	0.88%	9.65%	0.53%	3.05%	0.373

Note: This table shows time series properties of quarterly frequency annual growth rats of real house prices and personal disposable income between 1975 and Q2 2013, as collected by **?**. Columns (1) and (2) show the mean and standard deviation of real house price growth. Columns (3) and (4) the mean and standard deviation of real personal disposable income growth. Column (5) shows the correlation of real house price growth with real personal disposable income growth.