Short-term Debt and Financial Crises: What we can learn from U.S. Treasury Supply*

Arvind Krishnamurthy Annette Vissing-Jorgensen

PRELIMINARY. REFERENCES INCOMPLETE.

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Abstract

We present a theory in which the key driver of short-term debt issued by the financial sector is the portfolio demand for safe and liquid assets by the non-financial sector. Households' demand for safe and liquid assets drives a premium on such assets that the financial sector exploits by owning risky and illiquid assets and writing safe and liquid claims against these assets. The central prediction of the theory is that government debt should be a substitute for the net supply of privately issued short-term debt. We verify this prediction with data from 1914 to 2011 by showing the net supply of government debt, predominantly Treasuries, is strongly negatively correlated with the net supply of private short-term debt, defined to be the private supply of short-term safe and liquid debt, net of the financial sector's holdings of Treasuries (and reserves and currency). A second set of predictions of the model concern the quantity of money (i.e. liquid bank liabilities such as checking accounts). The theory predicts that when government supply is large, banks should hold more of the supply and use it to back issuance of more liquid bank liabilities. We confirm this prediction as well. Moreover, we show that accounting for the impact of Treasury supply on bank money results in a stable estimate for money demand and can help resolve the "missing money" puzzle of the post-1980 period. Finally, the theory predicts that the quantity of short-term debt issued by the financial sector should predict financial crises better than standard measures such as private credit/GDP. We also confirm this prediction.

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*Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management and NBER, a-krishnamurthy@northwestern.edu, and Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, NBER, and CEPR, a-vissing@northwestern.edu

1 Introduction

There is a great deal of short-term debt in the economy. Much of this debt is issued by banks and other financial intermediaries. Banks take deposits. Finance companies issue commercial paper. Broker-dealers and hedge funds borrow by issuing repurchase agreements. The process of securitization throws off short-term debt tranches. Even non-financial firms borrow using short-term debt, for example, when such firms issue commercial paper. As is now widely appreciated, the funding structures of financial firms play a role in amplifying financial crises, and there has been much interest in understanding the factors driving the prevalence of short-term debt in the financial sectors' capital structure. For example, our data suggests that the short-term debt issued by the private sector (what we refer to as net private supply, below), as a ratio to GDP, reached a peak of 0.957 in 2007. This number compares to an average ratio of short-term debt to GDP over the period from 1914 to 2011 of 0.503.[1]

Why is there so much short-term debt in the economy? It is an important fact that banks, across many countries and throughout history, have borrowed predominantly via short-term debt. This fact holds across many different tax regimes. Thus, an explanation relying on the favorable tax treatment of debt cannot be the first-order reason for the predominance of debt. The fact also holds across many different regulatory regimes. For example, during the free banking period of the US in the 19th century, there was no insurance on bank deposits (or lender of last resort) and yet banks carried high leverage. An explanation that relies on government insurance on bank deposits also cannot be the first-order reason for banks' reliance on short-term debt.

This paper provides evidence for a more primitive rationale for the prevalence of short-term debt, one that plausibly holds across many countries and histories. We show that investors have a large demand for safe and liquid investments, and that short-term debt satisfies this demand. Investors' demand translates into low yields on short-term debt that is safe and liquid. The financial sector supplies such debt by holding positions in other risky assets (loans, securities, etc.) that is funded by short-term debt. The corporate sector, particularly the high-grade segment, also satisfies this demand by issuing commercial paper. Our evidence supports standard theories of banking that emphasize the special role of banks in transforming illiquid assets into liquid assets (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom (2010)).

To arrive at these results, we exploit variation in the supply of government securities. In Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) we show that Treasury bonds are "money-like" in many respects. We establish this by showing that reductions in the supply of Treasury bonds lower the yield on Treasury bonds relative to other bonds that are less liquid and more risky than Treasury bonds, controlling for the default component of the non-Treasury yields. Moreover, reductions in the supply of Treasury bonds also lower the yields

[1] We start our empirical analysis in 1914, the first year following the creation of the Federal Reserve System.

on private sector assets such as Aaa bonds and commercial paper that are low risk and liquid (although neither as safe or liquid as Treasury bonds). Section 2 below reviews this evidence and section 3 offers a theoretical equilibrium model to explain how changes in Treasury supply can be expected to affect private bond yields. The argument is that reductions in the supply of Treasury bonds reduce a broad aggregate of safe/liquid assets and, given a special demand for safe/liquid assets, reduce the yields on such assets. A further implication of the theory is that reductions in Treasury supply should increase the supply of private sector assets that are safe/liquid substitutes because such assets carry a lower yield. Under the hypothesis that financial sector debt is safe/liquid, the theory predicts that the financial sector should issue more safe/liquid debt when Treasury supply falls.

We construct the supply of government securities, defined as the net supply of Treasuries, reserves and currency by the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve (i.e. we subtract out the Federal Reserve's Treasury holdings from total supply of Treasuries) and study the relation between this government net supply variable and the net private supply of short-term debt. The latter variable is the total of all short-term debt issued by the financial sector net of the financial sector's holdings of Treasuries, reserves, and currency (and net of any short-term assets but these are tiny in practice). We show that the private net supply variable is strongly negatively correlated with the government net supply. This result, together with the result of Treasury supply on the yields on private debt, suggests that such debt is special and that the financial sector issues such debt in large part to satisfy the special demand for safe/liquid debt. Moreover, we show that reductions in Treasury supply are correlated with increases in financial sector risky/illiquid loans. The picture that emerges from the data is that of a financial sector that is active in transforming risky/illiquid loans into liquid/low-risk liabilities.

These results are reminiscent of results from a large and older money demand literature. That is, our evidence suggests that financial sector debt is "money-like." However, the money-demand literature has given prominence to the liquidity features of a certain class of bank liabilities, namely liquid debt such as checking accounts at banks (included in M1). This implicitly assumes that no other financial securities are liquid enough that they can serve a similar purpose as checking accounts. Our results suggest that Treasuries do serve this purpose from the perspective of banks who use them to back checkable deposits. Informed by this broad money perspective, we argue that a liquidity aggregate such as M1 should also be influenced (with a positive sign) by the supply of Treasury bonds (even if one controls for the standard arguments in a money demand function, i.e. the nominal interest rate and income). In particular, our theory predicts that increases in Treasury bonds allow the financial sector to issue more liquid deposits thereby increasing private sector liquidity aggregates. We verify this prediction in the data. The effect of Treasury bond supply on M1 has not been recognized thus far in the literature. We show that accounting for such a relation can help reconcile some of the puzzling behavior in monetary aggregates since the 1980s (the "missing money"

puzzle and the instability of money demand relations). The combined evidence that Treasuries crowd out the private sector's net supply of short-term debt but crowds in liquid deposits emphasizes the need for careful analysis of the various components of banks' balance sheets both theoretically and empirically.

Our last set of results concern predicting financial crises. There is a growing literature that argues that private credit growth, notably growth in bank loans, is a strong predictor of financial crises. Under our banking view, the risk of a financial crisis is primarily driven by the mismatch between the illiquidity/risk of the financial sectors' assets and liabilities. That is, for predicting crises, it is not loan growth per-se that is important but rather loan growth that is funded by short-term debt. We use our measure of the net private short-term debt supply to predict crises in the U.S. and show that it has more explanatory power than ones based only on loan growth.

The next section of the paper reviews evidence on the impact of Treasury supply on bond yields. Then we lay out a model for understanding the relations between Treasury supply, private demand for short-term liquid and safe debt, and the private supplies of such debt. We then describe how we empirically measure government supply and the private supply variables suggested by the model. Finally, we present our empirical results linking net government supply, private supply, and financial crisis.

2 Evidence on the moneyness of Treasury bonds

Figure 0 is from Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The figure graphs the yield spread between Aaa rated corporate bonds and Treasury securities against the US government Debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. the ratio of the market value of publicly held US government debt to US GDP). The figure reflects a Treasury demand function, akin to a money demand function, that stems from investors demand for the high liquidity and safety of Treasuries. We argue in that paper that investors value these money-like features of Treasuries so that when the supply of Treasuries is low, the value that investors assign to the liquidity and safety attributes offered by Treasuries is high. As a result the yield on Treasuries is low relative to the yield on the Aaa corporate bonds which offer less liquidity and safety. Here are the results from that paper which support these conclusions:

1. Table I, column (3), of the paper shows that the coefficient on a regression of the Aaa-Treasury spread on the log of the Debt-to-GDP ratio, controlling for default risk and default risk premia, is -0.80 ($t-stat=-5.12$).

2. Table I, column (8), shows that the coefficient of the regression of short-term commercial paper rates minus Treasury bill rates (CP-Bills) on the log of the Debt-to-GDP ratio, after suitable controls, is -0.554 ($t-stat=-3.56$).

3. Moreover, we show that these effects are driven by investors' valuation of both the safety and liquidity of Treasury bonds. Table 2, column (5), shows that a regression of the spread between 6-month FDIC insured bank CDs and Treasury bills, which is likely a pure measure of the liquidity premium on Treasury bonds, on the log of the Debt-to-GDP ratio, after suitable controls, gives a coefficient of -1.884 ($t-stat=-1.71$). Table 2, column (4), shows that the regression of short-term low grade commercial paper rates minus high grade commercial paper rates (P2-P1 spread) on the log of the Debt-to-GDP ratio, after suitable controls, gives a coefficient of $-0.888(t-stat=-4.34)$. This spread measures the value of a safe short-term debt investment to investors because P2 rated commercial paper has much lower default risk than P1 rated paper, but has similar transactional liquidity.

These effects are quantitatively significant. For example a one-standard deviation decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio from its mean value of 0.44 to 0.24 increases the premium on Treasuries relative to Aaa bonds by 44 basis points. They are also hard to reconcile as an effect on a risk premium using standard CAPM or C-CAPM arguments, so that the liquidity/safety premium arguments we offer in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) are plausibly the most important factors driving these effects. For example, take the following CAPM logic for these effects. As a set of extreme assumptions to maximize the possible effects, suppose that the correlation between the excess return on Aaa bond over Treasuries with the return on investors' overall wealth was one an that households have no human capital. The risk premium component of the Aaa-Treasury spread is then $\sigma_{Aaa-Treas}\times\gamma\times\sigma_W$, where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and σ_W is the volatility of the representative investors' wealth. Suppose that volatility of wealth is given by $\sigma_W=(1-\alpha_T)\sigma_{risky}+\alpha_T\sigma_{Treasury}$, where α_T is the fraction of wealth that is Treasury bonds. Moreover, suppose that Treasury bonds are riskless so that $\sigma_{Treasury}=0$, and hence $\sigma_W=(1-\alpha_T)\sigma_{risky}$. Then, the risk premium on the Aaa-Treasury spread is $\sigma_{Aaa-Treas}\times\gamma\times(1-\alpha_T)\sigma_{risky}$. This model implies that increases in Treasury supply by increasing α_T will cause the risk premium to fall. However, quantitatively this effect is likely to be small. Here is a simple calibration. Suppose that $\gamma\sigma_{risky}=0.4$ which is the Sharpe ratio on the market portfolio. Suppose that $\sigma_{Aaa-Treas}$ is equal to 2%, with the 2% chosen to give a risk premium on the Aaa-Treasury of 80 basis points, which is near the average level of this spread. Suppose that α_T is 18% which is approximately the ratio of Treasury supply to total net worth based on Flow of Funds numbers from 2011 (tables B.100 and L.209). Then if α_T went from 17.6% to $17.6\times(0.24/0.44)=9.6\%$, the spread would rise by $\sigma_{Aaa-Treas}\times\gamma\times\sigma_{risky}\times\Delta\alpha_T=200$ basis-points $\times 0.4\times(0.176-0.096)$ which equals 8 basis points and is much smaller than our empirical finding of 47 basis points. Accounting for human capital and a correlation less than one would substantially reduce the effect to be even smaller than the 8 basis points.

The evidence thus suggests the investors have a special demand for liquid and safe assets and that Treasury bonds, because they possess these attributes, have lower yields. The next section of this paper

offers an equilibrium model to reconcile this finding. The argument is that reductions in the supply of Treasury bonds reduce a broad aggregate of safe/liquid assets and, given a special demand for safe/liquid assets, reduce the yields on such assets. More interestingly, the model shows that reductions in Treasury supply should increase the supply of private sector assets that are safe/liquid substitutes because such assets also carry a lower yield. Under the hypothesis that financial sector debt is safe/liquid, the theory predicts that the financial sector should issue more safe/liquid debt when Treasury supply falls. We will verify this prediction in the data thus confirming the hypothesis that financial sector debt is safe/liquid and offering insights into to the determinants of the short-term debt funding of the financial sector and the risk of financial crises.

3 Model

Time is indexed by $t = 0, 1$. The economy has two classes of agents. Type N agents have a demand for short-term debt while type F has no special debt demand. Furthermore, there is a financial sector that raises equity and debt, makes loans and holds government debt. Assume that type N agents are unsophisticated agents who do not hold bank equity but may hold bank debt, whereas type F agents are sophisticated investors who own all bank equity. In this model, the N agents then reflect the non-financial sector demanders of short-term debt. The F agents reflect the financial sector that supply such debt to the N agents. The modeling omits short-term debt demanders who may also be owners of bank equity.

The government issues Θ units of liquid assets, exogenous to the model.[2] We measure Θ in units of market value. We measure agent N and agent F's holdings (θ_T^N and θ_T^F) in units of face value. We solve for the endogenous determination of the financial sector's supply of short-term debt assets. Figure 2 illustrates the relevant balance sheets which we explain in detail next.




Figure 2: Balance sheets of financial and non-financial sectors

[2] At this writing of the paper, we do not distinguish between short-term government debt and long-term government debt and treat Θ as the total value of all government debt. We intend to more fully explore the effects of government debt maturity in the next version. Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2012) have studied the effects of government maturity structure on financial sector risk within a theoretical model.

There is a unit measure of N-types who have a special demand for short-term debt. Each N agent maximizes utility function,

$$\max_{D^N,\theta_T^N} c_0^N + v\left(\frac{D^N}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^N}{1+r_T}\right) + D^N + \theta_T^N, \tag{1}$$

where r_D is the interest rate on deposits, r_T is the interest rate on government debt, and c_0^N is date 0 consumption. The agent purchases deposits and Treasury bonds which payoff $D^N + \theta_T^N$ at date 0 and offer an extra utility of $v(\cdot)$ (note that the discount rate is assumed to be one). The function $v(\cdot)$ takes as argument the market value of short-term debt. We assume that $v'(\cdot) > 0$ and that $v''(\cdot) < 0$. While we model the debt demand in reduced form, the literature has noted a number of possible rationales for a demand for short-term debt beyond its simple use for transfering resources to consume later. The money-demand literature motivates a role for checking deposits as a payment medium. The finance literature has motivated a desire for holding a liquid asset to meet unexpected consumption needs of households or unexpected production needs for firms. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) have shown that there is a demand from investors for "extremely safe" assets (above and beyond what can be rationalized by a CCAPM model) which may be satisfied by short-term financial sector debt as well as Treasury bonds. We first outline the model without taking a stand on the underlying driver of the demand. In the next section, we derive additional predictions of the model based on considerations of the demand for liquid assets.

Agent N's date 0 budget constraint is,

$$c_0^N + \left(\frac{D^N}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^N}{1+r_T}\right) = W_0^N.$$

The agent has an initial endowment of wealth W_0^N which we assume to be sufficiently large that in all equilibria we study the agent is able to set c_0^N strictly above zero.

F-types (financial sector) have no direct debt-demand. Their objective is to maximize,

$$U^F = E[W_1^F] - \frac{1}{2}Var[W_1^F], \tag{2}$$

given an initial endowment of wealth W_0^F. The F-types issue short-term debt to fund a capital investment that converts one unit of date 0 goods into $1+\tilde{r}$ units at date 1, where $\tilde{r}$ is a random variable and $E[\tilde{r}] = r_K > 0$. When taking the model to data, we interpret capital as lending by the financial sector to the private sector, which in practice is mainly banks' corporate loans and mortgage loans. We assume that only the F-types have access to this investment technology. Implicitly we have thus combined the bank with the corporate sector and assumed that banks own the housing stock and rent to households (one could add N-type utility from housing and rent payments to the bank without substantial changes in results).

F types issue debt of D^F, purchase Treasury bonds of θ^N, and invest in capital:

$$K + \frac{\theta_T^F}{1+r_T} = W_0^F + \frac{D^F}{1+r_D}$$

This results in wealth at date 1 of,

$$W_1^F = (1+\tilde{r})K + \theta_T^F - D^F = (1+\tilde{r})W_0^F + \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1+r_D}(\tilde{r} - r_D) \tag{3}$$

We allow that W_1^F may be less than zero. That is we do no impose limited liability on the F-types who are the owners of the financial sector. We do this primarily for simplicity as it ensures that deposits are riskless. More realistically, a model could allow for limited liability and government insurance of deposits. This would introduce risk-shifting incentives as well as a need for government banking regulation. While these issues are interesting, they do not directly touch on the subject of this paper and are moreover the subject of an extensive literature in banking.

We next solve for equilibrium. Note that D and θ enter the same into both objective and constraints for both N and F. That is, deposits and Treasuries are perfect substitutes. This observation has two implications. First, r_D is equal to r_T. Second, the equilibrium only pins down net debt holdings of $D^N + \theta_T^N$ for N and $\theta_T^F - D^F$ for F. This is an important observation because it implies that when considering the short-term debt provided by the financial sector in the data it is important to net out financial sector holdings of Treasury bonds against issued short-term debt.

Consider N's problem in further detail. The first order condition for choosing $D^N + \theta_T^N$ is,

$$\frac{1}{1+r_D} = 1 + \frac{1}{1+r_D} v'\left(\frac{D^N + \theta_T^N}{1+r_D}\right)$$

or, rewriting:

$$-r_D = v'\left(\frac{D^N + \theta_T^N}{1+r_D}\right). \tag{4}$$

Deposits trade at a premium so that $r_D < 0$ (with a sufficiently positive discount rate r_D would be positive but less than the discount rate). Equation (4) is a demand function for debt from N (i.e., $-r_D$ is the "convenience yield" cost of buying short-term debt and $\frac{D^N+\theta_T^N}{1+r_D}$ is the purchased amount of debt). Given our assumptions on $v(\cdot)$, the demand function is downward sloping.

F chooses the net debt supply, $D^F - \theta_T^F$, to solve,

$$\max_{D^F - \theta_T^F} E\left[(1+\tilde{r})W_0^F + \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1+r_D}(\tilde{r} - r_D)\right] - \frac{1}{2}\left(W_0^F + \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1+r_D}\right)^2 \sigma_r^2.$$

The first order condition is,

$$E[\tilde{r} - r_D] - \left(W_0^F + \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1+r_D}\right)\sigma_r^2 = 0$$

or,

$$r_K - r_D = \left(W_0^F + \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1+r_D}\right)\sigma_r^2 \tag{5}$$

There is a spread between r_K and r_D that is increasing in $D^F - \theta_T^F$. Equation (5) traces out a supply function for the net debt issued by the financial sector. Note that since r_K is fixed by technology, this first order condition really pins down r_D.

There are two market clearing conditions. First, the deposit market must clear,

$$D^F = D^N;$$

second, the Treasury bond market must clear,

$$\frac{\theta_T^F + \theta_T^N}{1 + r_D} = \Theta$$

We are interested in understanding how changes in Θ affect equilibrium. Equations (4) and (5) trace out the demand and supply for bank deposits. However, note that the effect of a change in Θ on D is ambiguous. On the one hand, focusing on the demand equation, more Treasury supply could increase θ_T^N and reduce demand for deposits. On the other hand, focusing on the supply equation, more Treasury supply could increase θ_T^F and increase the supply of deposits. The identity of who absorbs the Treasury supply is essential for pinning down D. While we will look at this question in the data, it does not appear clear and indeed the model says that is need not be clear. When we add money demand to the model (see Section 3.1), the model offers some structure on which agents may be expected to absorb the Treasury supply.

We will approach the problem differently and derive a market clearing condition for the net supply of deposits by the financial sector. We use the market clearing conditions to write the debt holdings of the non-financial sector as,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\theta_T^N + D^N}{1 + r_D} &= \Theta - \frac{\theta_T^F - D^N}{1 + r_D} \\ &= \Theta + \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1 + r_D} \end{aligned}$$


Let us define the net market value of short-term debt supply issued by the financial sector as,

$$M = \frac{D^F - \theta_T^F}{1 + r_D}.$$

We will construct this measure from financial sector data. We can substitute this expression for M back into equations (4) and (5) to represent demand and supply relations for M and the determination of $-r_D$ (or $r_K - r_D$), which is the expected return discount on deposits and Treasury bonds. The demand function is $-r_D = v'(\Theta + M)$ which is downward sloping. The supply function is $r_K - r_D = (W_0^F + M)\sigma_r^2$, which is upward sloping in M.[3] Unlike the case of D, the determination of M is unambiguous. The figure below illustrates.

[3] It is interesting to note that the premium $r_K - r_D$ is driven both by the special demand for debt by N and the risk aversion of F. That is, without a special demand for debt, the premium $r_K - r_D$ would be considerably smaller. Moreover, if F is risk neutral, the premium would be zero irrespective of N's debt demand.

Figure 3: Debt market equilibrium



There are two comparative statics that we highlight from this figure:[4]

- An increase in Θ is a left shift in demand that causes the premium, $-r_D$, to fall and M to fall. This comparative static is represented with the thicker demand schedule.
- An increase in the demand for debt – a right shift in the function $v'(\cdot)$ – causes the premium and M to rise.

Total capital investment of the financial sector can also be related to M:

$$K = W_0^F + D^F/(1 + r_D) - \theta_T^F/(1 + r_T) = W_0^F + M$$

Thus, an increase in Θ decreases M and reduces K. This is a crowding out effect. If the government supplies more liquidity, the non-financial sector reduces its need for financial sector supplied debt, which reduces funding of the financial sector and reduces lending. Conversely, an increase in the demand for debt increases M and hence increases K.

The final measure which is relevant for the analysis is the probability of a financial crisis which we take to be the probability that W_1^F falls below zero. Rewriting (3),

$$Prob[W_1^F < 0] = Prob\left[(1 + \tilde{r})W_0^F + M(\tilde{r} - r_D) < 0\right] \tag{6}$$

Note that total credit, K, does not enter this expression. Total credit is still informative in empirically forecasting crises because $M = K - W_0^F$, and in data, W_0^F (i.e. equity) does not vary much. A simple example to see the difference between K and M is as follows: imagine a bank that has equity of W_0^F and makes risky loans of $K = W_0^F$. Such a bank will never go bankrupt. Thus, it is M rather than K that should better predict crises in our model.

[4] We can also see that an increase in the volatility of $\tilde{r}$, σ_r, is a left-shift in supply, causing the premium to rise and M to fall.

Holding W_0^F and r_D constant, the probability of a crisis is increasing in M. There is also a general equilibrium effect on r_D which can affect the probability through changing the mean value of W_1^F, although in realistic cases the direct effect of M is plausibly more significant than the indirect effect. An increase in Θ reduces M and increases r_D. The direct effect reduces the probability of a crisis, while the indirect effect may reduce financial sector profits on average and hence increase the probability of a crisis. An increase in debt demand increases M and reduces r_D. The direct effect increases the probability of a crisis, while the indirect effect reduces it. In the summary below, we assume the direct effects dominate.

We summarize the main observations from the model which we will take to the data as follows:

1. *In equilibrium, only the financial sector's net debt supply, $M = \frac{D-\theta_T^F}{1+r_D}$, is pinned down.*

2. *An increase in Θ decreases M, the debt premium $r_K - r_D$, financial sector lending to the private sector, and the probability of a financial crisis. The effect on the amount of bank deposits (D) and on the size of the financial sector ($D+W_0^F$) is theoretically ambiguous.*

3. *An increase in debt demand increases M, the premium, financial sector lending to the private sector, and the probability of a financial crisis. The effect on the amount of bank deposits (D) and on the size of the financial sector ($D+W_0^F$) is theoretically ambiguous.*

3.1 Money Demand

We next modify the objective (1) to capture money or liquidity demand which is an especially important consideration for bank liabilities. Doing so allows us to clarify how changes in Treasury bond supply interact with money-demand effects and offers additional predictions of the model.

We divide the N agent into one-half measure of households (NH) and one-half measure of institutional investors (NI). The N household maximizes,

$$\max_{D^{NH},\theta_T^{NH},L^{NH}} c_0^{NH} + \mu\left(\frac{L^{NH}}{1+r_L}\right) + v\left(\frac{D^{NH}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NH}}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^{NH}}{1+r_L}\right) + D^{NH} + \theta_T^{NH} + L^{NH}. \tag{7}$$

Here, L^{NH} are checking/demand deposits paying interest rate r_L. The function $\mu(\cdot)$ is a standard money-demand function taking as argument liquid assets that can be used for transactions, unexpected expenditures, etc. The function $v(\cdot)$, as in the earlier specification, is a demand for safe debt so that all of checking accounts, Treasury bonds, and time/saving deposits (D^{NH}) are arguments. We write agent NH's date 0 budget constraint as $c_0^{NH} + \left(\frac{D^{NH}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NH}}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^{NH}}{1+r_L}\right) = W_0^{NH}$.

The N institutional investor maximizes,

$$\max_{D^{NI},\theta_T^{NI}} c_0^{NI} + \mu\left(\frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1+r_T}\right) + v\left(\frac{D^{NI}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1+r_T}\right) + D^{NI} + \theta_T^{NI}. \tag{8}$$

subject to $c_0^{NI} + \left(\frac{D^{NI}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^{NI}}{1+r_L}\right) = W_0^{NI}$. The function $\mu(\cdot)$ is also demand for liquid financial assets, but taking as argument only Treasury bonds. The idea here is that institutional investors (e.g., Microsoft, China) who need to hold a large quantity of liquidity are likely to hold it in Treasury bonds rather than in checking deposits. It is straightforward to mix these objectives and allow each N-type to hold both Treasury bonds and bank deposits with different liquidity valuations of these securities, but the present setup is simpler to exposit.

Consider the NH agent. Following the same analysis as earlier we get the following first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} -r_D &= v'\left(\frac{D^{NH}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NH}}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^{NH}}{1+r_L}\right), \\ r_D - r_L &= \mu'\left(\frac{L^{NH}}{1+r_L}\right). \end{aligned}$$

The first relation is the same as earlier, taking as argument all debt assets. There is a premium on all debt that is short-term but not necessarily liquid, given N's special demand for such debt. The second relation indicates that liquid checking accounts offer an even lower yield because they are valued for their liquidity.

Likewise for the NI agent, we find:

$$\begin{aligned} -r_D &= v'\left(\frac{D^{NI}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1+r_T}\right), \\ r_D - r_T &= \mu'\left(\frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1+r_L}\right). \end{aligned}$$

We aggregate across the first of these relations involving r_D to come up with the demand for debt from the N sector:[5]

$$-r_D = v'\left(\frac{D^N}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^N}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^N}{1+r_L}\right) \tag{9}$$

where the quantities with superscript N now refer to the aggregates across the N sector. This demand function is the same as in the model without money demand but incorporating the fact that liquid deposits (L) are also short-term debt and should thus enter the aggregate.

On the financial sector side, we modify the model as follows. We assume that F has to hold some liquid assets in order to be able to meet the liquidity needs that may arise from N possibly withdrawing demand deposits. In particular we require that,

$$\frac{L^F}{1+r_L} \leq \frac{\theta_T^F}{1+r_T} + \kappa. \tag{10}$$

[5] That is, first invert the demand curves:

$$\frac{D^{NH}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NH}}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^{NH}}{1+r_L} = v'^{-1}(-r_D); \quad \frac{D^{NI}}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1+r_T} = v'^{-1}(-r_D).$$

and then sum across to find the aggregate demand.

This relation is similar to Bansal and Coleman (1996), where demand deposits are required to be backed by liquid assets. The term κ is new and is the amount of capital investment that is liquid. We assume that F can pay a cost $\Phi(\kappa)$ to make some of its capital investment liquid. In practice this may mean investing resources in setting up a repo market against securities, creating a loan sales market, or an asset-backed securities market. With such an investment, F can treat a portion of its K as liquid and use it to back demand deposits. We assume that the function $\Phi(\kappa)$ is increasing and convex with $\Phi(0) = 0$.

With these changes, the budget constraint for F is,

$$W_0^F + \frac{L^F}{1+r_L} + \frac{D^F}{1+r_D} = \frac{\theta_T^F}{1+r_T} + K$$

and date 1 wealth is,

$$W_1^F = (1+\tilde{r})K + \theta_T^F - D^F - L^F - \Phi(\kappa).$$

We can substitute from the budget constraint to rewrite date 1 wealth as,

$$W_1^F = (1+\tilde{r})W_0^F + \frac{D^F}{1+r_D}(\tilde{r} - r_D) + \frac{L^F}{1+r_L}(\tilde{r} - r_L) - \frac{\theta_t^F}{1+r_T}(\tilde{r} - r_T) - \Phi(\kappa).$$

Let us define the net debt supply of the financial sector as:

$$M = \frac{L^F}{1+r_L} + \frac{D^F}{1+r_D} - \frac{\theta_T^F}{1+r_T}.$$

Then, the first order condition for D^F gives a supply function for all debt:

$$r_K - r_D = (W_0^F + M)\sigma_r^2 \tag{11}$$

As in the previous section, we can use the market clearing conditions to rewrite N's holdings of debt in terms of M:

$$\frac{D^N}{1+r_D} + \frac{\theta_T^N}{1+r_T} + \frac{L^N}{1+r_L} = \Theta + M$$

and, substituting into (9), we find a demand function from N:

$$-r_D = v'(\Theta + M). \tag{12}$$

Thus, the analysis of the previous section does not change with the addition of money and liquidity demand. The predictions of that analysis continue to hold. Increases in Θ reduce M, reduce the premium on deposits, reduce total lending of K, and reduce the probability of a crisis.

Let us consider two new predictions arising from the introduction of liquidity demand. First, note that for F, if $r_T > r_L$, F will purchase all of the Treasuries and issue more demand deposits. Thus in an interior equilibrium it must be that[6] $r_T = r_L$. This in turn means that we can write the liquidity demand from both

[6]It would be easy to modify the model so that $r_L < r_T$ as is likely in practice. For example, if we add some administrative costs for the financial sector of handling household checking accounts, then a spread would open between r_T and r_L.

N agents in terms of the spread $r_D - r_L$:

$$r_D - r_L = \mu' \left(\frac{L^{NH}}{1 + r_L} \right) \quad \text{and,} \quad r_D - r_L = \mu' \left(\frac{\theta_T^{NI}}{1 + r_T} \right).$$

Aggregating across the N sector, the demand for liquidity is,

$$r_D - r_L = \mu' \left(\frac{L^N}{1 + r_L} + \frac{\theta_T^N}{1 + r_T} \right). \tag{13}$$

Turning back to the F agent, the first order condition for κ gives,

$$r_K - r_L = \Phi'(\kappa) + (W_0^F + M)\sigma_r^2$$

Liquifying capital costs at the margin $\Phi'(\kappa)$ which in turn allows F to issue more checking deposits and earn the premium $r_K - r_L$, but at risk cost of $(W_0^F + M)\sigma_r^2$. We can subtract this spread expression from (11) and set $r_T = r_L$ to write a supply of liquidity function,

$$r_D - r_L \quad = \quad \Phi'(\kappa) \tag{14}$$

Equations (13) and (14) can be used to understand bank's choices over Treasury holdings. The market clearing conditions are, for the checking deposit market:

$$\frac{L^N}{1 + r_L} = \frac{L^F}{1 + r_L} \left(= \frac{\theta_T^F}{1 + r_T} + \kappa \right)$$

and for the Treasury bond market:

$$\frac{\theta_T^F + \theta_T^N}{1 + r_T} = \Theta.$$


We combine these conditions to write a market clearing in terms of total liquidity demand from the N sector (left-side) equal to total physical liquidity supply of government bonds plus liquid private capital (right-side):

$$\frac{L^N}{1 + r_L} + \frac{\theta_T^N}{1 + r_T} = \Theta + \kappa \tag{15}$$

Figure 4 graphs the market clearing condition (15). The downward sloping line is the relation $r_D - r_L = \mu'((L + \theta_T^N)/(1 + r_T))$. The upward sloping line is the relation $\Theta + \kappa$, where $\kappa = \Phi'^{-1}(r_D - r_L)$. The figure illustrates the effect of an increase in Θ on the equilibrium. In the figure, such an increase leads to a right-shift in total liquidity supply. This causes the liquidity premium $r_D - r_L$ to fall, total liquidity to rise, and each of L and θ_T^N to rise since each is decreasing in $r_D - r_L$.

We can also understand how the financial sector changes their backing of deposits. With a smaller liquidity premium on issuing deposits, equation (14) implies that F agents reduce κ. But since L rises, it must be that F purchases more Treasuries (higher θ_T^F) to back up the increase in L. Thus, we have that $\frac{\theta_T^F}{\kappa + \theta_T^F}$ $\left(= \frac{\theta_T^F/(1+r_T)}{L/(1+r_L)} \right)$, which we refer to as the financial sector's deposit coverage ratio, rises with Θ.

Figure 4: Liquidity market equilibrium



The analysis offers the novel insight that an important driver of a monetary liquidity aggregate such as M1 will be the total supply of government debt. This occurs because the supply of deposits is in part driven by the availability of liquid assets such as Treasury bonds, as backing. Moreover, the supply of deposits is driven by both Treasury backing as well as liquid capital. Thus the model further implies that as the supply of Treasuries rises, the financial sector substitutes away from using liquid capital and uses more Treasuries to back the deposit supply.

To summarize, the model with money/liquidity demand offers several more observations which we take to the data:

1. *There are two premia arising from investor preferences for debt: (1) a liquidity premium measured as* $r_D - r_T$ *where* r_D *is the interest rate on safe but less liquid debt such as time and savings deposit rate or commercial paper rates, and* r_T *is the interest rate on liquid Treasury debt; and, (2) a debt premium measured as* $r_K - r_D$*, where* r_K *is the expected return on an illiquid and risky loan.*

2. *Increases in* Θ *decrease both* $r_K - r_D$ *and* $r_D - r_T$*.*

3. *An increase in* Θ *leads to an increase in* L*.*

4. *An increase in* Θ *leads to an increase in the financial sector's deposit coverage ratio defined as* $\frac{\theta_T^F/(1+r_T)}{L/(1+r_L)}$*.*

Note that (1) and (2) are in line with the empirical evidence we have outlined in Section 2 from Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). Thus, we will focus on testing (3) and (4).

4 Empirical framework

We focus on the period from 1914-2011. We start our analysis in 1914 following the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 in order to avoid any instability in supply or demand functions due to changes in financial sector risk as a result of the Federal Reserve.

The next section explains our data definition of the government's supply of safe and liquid assets. Section 4.2 explains our empirical framework for constructing the financial sector's balance sheet and mapping it to the concepts in the model.

4.1 Defining government net supply of safe and liquid assets

We are interested in the government's supply of safe and liquid assets, Θ. The main component of this is Treasury securities, but to capture the full impact of the government one should also consider the role of the Federal Reserve. We therefore add reserves and currency and security repurchase agreements that are liabilities of the Federal Reserve, but subtract the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasuries as well as security repurchase agreements on the asset side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet since these are used to back the reserves and currency and thus do not represent securities available for the private sector to hold.[7] Our definition is thus as follows:

Government sector net supply of safe and liquid instruments (Θ)
=Treasuries at market value
+Reserves
+Currency, except for the part held by the Treasury
+Net security repurchase agreements issued by the Federal Reserve
−Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve

We construct Treasuries at market value as in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) who construct it based on the book value of Treasuries/GDP from Henning Bohn, multiplied by a market/book adjustment

[7] There are some other categories on both the asset and liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, but these are small in most years. The part of government supply coming from the Federal Reserve (reserves+currency+net security repurchase agreements issued by the Federal Reserve-Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve) average only 5.5 percent of GDP, while our total supply variable averages 47.0 percent of GDP. Conceptually it makes sense that the Federal Reserve's contribution to the net supply of safe and liquid assets is small. If, as a simple case, the Federal Reserve issued currency and reserves and backed these 100 percent with Treasury securities, then Federal Reserve's contribution to the net supply of safe and liquid assets would be zero. The part of government supply coming from the Federal Reserve is at its highest (reaching almost 20 percent of GDP) around 1940 due to substantial amounts of reserves and currency being backed by gold. It was less than 1 percent of GDP in 2007 but then increased to about 8 percent as a result of purchases of agency debt and agency MBS purchases financed by reserves under the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing programs.

calculated by the authors using data from the CRSP bond database. From 1945 on reserve data are from FoF L.109 line 28, currency from FoF L.109 line 29+35+36+37, net security repos from FoF L.109 line 38-line 9, and Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve from FoF L.109 line 12. Prior to 1945 we obtain reserves from Banking and Monetary Statistics (1914-1941 Section 3 Table 39, 1941-1970 Section 3 Table 3.1), currency from Friedman and Schwartz (Table 1), and Federal Reserve Treasury holdings from Banking and Monetary Statistics (1914-1941 Section 13 Table 149, 1941-1970 Section 13 Table 13.4). Repurchase agreements were not used by the Federal Reserve during this period. Note that Friedman and Schwartz's currency measure excludes holdings of the Treasury, consistent with our definition above. However, Friedman and Schwartz's currency measure also excludes currency holdings of banks. We therefore add bank holdings of currency with data obtained from All Bank Statistics (1959) Table A-1.

4.2 Constructing an overall balance sheet for the U.S. financial sector

We use data on the financial sector from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FoF) from 1952 to 2011. Prior to 1952 we use data from All Bank Statistics (1959) Table A-1.

To test the implications of our model we need to address a series of issues regarding the financial sector.

First, the financial sector is increasingly complex, extending far beyond just commercial banks. We need to construct a comprehensive framework to capture all parts fo the financial sector. Conceptually, in our model F refers to any institution who is a supplier of liquid/safe assets backed by holdings of capital and government bonds. From a certain point of view, one could think that F is also a liquidity demander since F owns Treasuries. But this is a mistake. The key to identifying F is that F is a net supplier of liquidity/safety, after netting out Treasury holdings. Following this identification, we define the financial sector as the following sectors in the Flow of Funds Accounts, with FoF Table numbers indicated:

L.110 U.S.-Chartered Commercial Banks

L.111 Foreign Banking Offices in U.S.

L.112 Bank Holding Companies

L.113 Banks in U.S.-Affiliated Areas

L.114 Savings Institutions

L.115 Credit Unions

L.121 Money Market Mutual Funds

L.127 Finance Companies

L.129 Security Brokers and Dealers

L.130 Funding Corporations

L.124 Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)

L.125 Agency- and GSE-Backed Mortgage Pools

L.126 Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS)

L.128 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

Prior to 1952 we use data for "All Banks" (i.e. commercial banks and mutual savings banks) from Table A-1 in All Bank Statistics (1959).[8]

Second, in the model, the bank deposits (D and L) are contracts written between Ns and Fs. In the world, the existence of an interbank market means that Fs also write safe/liquid claims with each other. It is well understood that there are chains of liquid/safe assets and liabilities that Fs write with each other that arise in the interbank market, the repo market, etc. Our model has nothing to say about the amount of these interbank claims so that it would be inappropriate to include the amount of interbank claims in our measure of M. Interbank claims net to zero within the banking system. We address this by constructing, for each financial instrument, both the total asset and the total liabilitites of the financial sector and then working with the net holdings of that financial instrument. We then sort instruments into those that are net assets and those that are net liabilities for the financial sector, based on averages from 1914-2011 of the ratio (Assets-Liabilities)/GDP.

Third, in practice the financial sector's holdings of safe and liquid assets supplied by the government are not only Treasuries but also bank reserves and vault cash. We include these in our empirical measure of θ_T^F.

Fourth, while our model has only two asset categories (Treasuries, risky investments) and three liability categories (checkable deposits L, other deposits D, and equity W_0^F), the financial sector holds many types of instruments within each category. A total of 33 different types of instruments show up as an asset and/or liability of one or more of the 14 parts of the financial sector from the FoF listed above (this is after grouping some similar subcatories together). Prior to 1952 (in All Bank Statistics) less detail is available so many of the 33 categories are set to zero. We list the 33 categories in Table 1. The first two are those supplied by the government/Federal Reserve. We group the remaining 31 categories into short-term assets (short-term debt securities not supplied by the government /Federal Reserve), long-term assets (long-term debt securities not supplied by the government /Federal Reserve), and equity-type investments on the asset side and short-term debt (broken into checkable deposits and other short-term debt), long-term debt and equity-type claims on the liability side.

Table 1 shows the resulting financial sector balance sheet. For each instrument we focus on (assets-liabilities)/GDP (or (liabilities-assets)/GDP for instruments that on average are net liabilities) thus taking out cross-holdings within the financial sector. Cross-holdings tend to be large for instruments that on average are net liabilities for the financial sector as shown in Panel B. Notice for example the substantial holdings by the financial sector of money market mutual fund shares, commercial paper, security credit agency and GSE-backed securities, corporate bonds issued by ABS issuers, and equity (mainly investments by bank

[8] In the next version of the paper we will use Flow of Funds data back to 1945, the first year these are available.

holding companies). This makes it clear that considering the financial sector as a whole is important.

As for the size of the various categories, on the asset side the financial sector is holding substantial amounts of Treasuries as well as cash and reserves, with ratios to GDP averaging 10.8 percent. The other main asset category is long-term assets, mainly mortgages, bank loans and consumer credit. Short-term assets and equity (on the asset side) are very small categories. The overall size of the financial sector relative to GDP averages 80.9 percent, but is much higher in recent years with the latest value at 152.6 percent. Figure 1 Panel A illustrates that the asset side of the financial sector's balance sheet has fluctuated widely over time. Holdings of assets supplies by the government increased dramatically from 1930 to the mid-1940s but have since declined aside from a spike up in recent years. Long-term assets have followed an opposite pattern. On the liability side of the financial sector's balance sheet, the vast majority of liabilities are in the form of short-term debt. On average checkable deposits and savings and time deposits are the largest categories, with money market mutual fund shares becoming increasingly important over time. Long-term debt is also becoming increasingly important over time, due mainly to ABS issuer issuing substantial amounts of long-term debt. Figure 1 Panel B illustrates the evolution of the three main categories on the liabilily side. Panel C shows the decomposition of short-term debt into checkable deposits versus other short-term debt. The two sub-components of short-term debt tend to move in opposite directions making the sum look more stable that either of the parts.

Consider how the assets and liabilities in Table 1 map into the model. On the asset side, long-term assets correspond well to what we have called risky/illiquid capital (K) in the model. Short-term assets do not map well into K (since they are unlikely to be either very risky or illiquid). Thus we will subtract them from the short-term debt on the liability side and consider "net short-term debt", defined as short-term debt minus short-term assets. We also subtract the financial sector's holdings of assets supplied by the government in our net short-term debt measure consistent with the fact that only the net debt supply, $M = \frac{D-\theta_T^F}{1+r_D}$, is pinned down in the model. As for equity on the asset side, we could consider it part of K, or net it against the equity on the liability side. We do the latter. On the liability side short-term debt corresponds to $L + D$ (with checkable deposits mapping to L and the other short-term debt categories to D). Long-term debt does not fit well into the model (since it is unlikely that long-term financial sector debt satisfies the N agent's special demand for very safe assets). Therefore we will subtract them from the long-term debt on the asset side and consider "net long-term investments", defined as long-term assets minus long-term debt. We note that as shown in Table 1 short-term assets and equity on the asset side are very small and long-term debt is small except for the last couple of decades, suggesting that the main netting issue is not about these categories but about making sure to subtract the financial sector's holdings of assets supplied by the government in our net short-term debt measure.

Table 2 shows the financial sector balance sheet with short, long, and equity categories netted. Net

long-term investments corresponds to K in the model, net short-term debt to $L+D$, and net equity to W_0^F. Figure 1 Panel D shows the evolution of the three net categories over time. It is clear from this graph that fluctuations in net long-term investments are driven almost entirely by fluctuations in net short-term debt with equity financing being fairly stable over time.

5 Results

We focus on testing the predictions of the model that regard the impact of government supply on quantities and the risk of financial crisis, although we will have additional evidence that may be consistent with a demand shock for safe/liquid assets. Note that the predictions of the model regarding the impact of Treasury supply on prices (i.e. spreads) are confirmed in results (1) - (3) in Section 2. The main quantity predictions were:

P1. *An increase in Treasury supply* Θ *decreases net short term debt* $M=\frac{D^F-\theta_T^F}{1+r_D}$ (defined as short-term debt minus short-term assets minus the financial sector's holdings of assets supplied by the government).

P2. *An increase in Treasury supply* Θ *decreases net long-term investments* K *(*defined as long-term assets minus long-term debt).

P3. *An increase in Treasury supply* Θ *leads to an increase in checkable deposits* L*.*

P4. *An increase in Treasury supply* Θ *leads to an increase in the financial sector's deposit coverage ratio defined as* $\left(\frac{\theta_T^F}{1+r_T}\right) / \left(\frac{L}{1+r_L}\right)$ (the financial sector's holdings of assets supplied by the government/checkable deposits)

P5. *The probability of a financial crisis is increasing in net short-term debt,* M*. An increase in Treasury supply* Θ *decreases the probability of a financial crisis by reducing net short-term debt* M*.*

5.1 The impact of government net supply on the financial sector's balance sheet

Table 3 and Figure 2 Panel A provide strong evidence in favor of prediction 1 and 2. In the left block of each panel we estimate regressions of various dependent variables (all scaled by GDP) on government supply/GDP and a trend. Regressions are estimated by OLS but with standard errors adjusted up to account for large positive autocorrelation in the error terms. Based on a standard Box-Jenkins analysis of the error term autocorrelation structure we model the error term as an AR(1) process. One could consider using a GLS estimator (which in many of the regressions would approximately amount to running the regressions in first differences), but as argued by Cochrane (2012) this removes a lot of the most interesting variation in the data. The regression estimates in Table 3 Panel C show that increases in government supply lead to dramatic

reductions in the financial sector's net short-term debt and its net long-term investments, with regression coefficients in both cases around -0.5 and significant at the 1 percent level. The negative relations are apparent in Figure 2 Panel D and seem consistently present over the 98 year period. These results suggest that a one-dollar increase in Treasury supply reduce the net short-term debt issued by the financial sector by 50 cents, and reduce long-term lending of the financial sector by 50 cents.

The trend is significant in the regressions for both net short-term debt and net long-term investments. The importance of the trend is also apparent in Figure 2 Panel D. There seems to be "too much" net short-term debt and net long-term investments in the last few decades. One possible explanation may be a demand shock for safe/liquid US assets due to purchases by foreigners. The hypothesis that there has been demand shock for US safe assets over the last few decades has been made prominently in the literature on global safe-asset imbalances (see Bernanke, 2005, Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009, Caballero, 2010).

If we think of the N agents in the model as both US investors and foreign investors, then a shock to the demand for debt can be interpreted as an increase in the function $v'(\cdot)$, which then leads to an increase in the supply of such debt by the financial sector. If instead we think of the N agents of the model as only US investors, and supposed that the foreign investors only purchased Treasury securities, then the foreign investor effect is a reduction in total government supply, Θ, which then increases the US investor N's demand for such debt. Either interpretation leads to an increase in the net short-term debt issued by the financial sector. Figure 2 Panel A includes a graph of government supply in which we subtract foreign Treasury holdings. Doing so produces a more stable relation between the government supply net of foreign holdings and the financial sector's holdings of government assets. In Table 3 Panel A, the middle and right-most blocks of regressions, we include foreign treasury holdings/GDP as a regressor (with data from FoF L.209 from 1945 on and set to zero before that when foreign treasury holdings as far as we can determine were negligible). In the middle block we omit the trend while we include it in the right block. The foreign demand variable is strongly significant and including it reduces the coefficient on the trend substantially.

5.2 Government net supply and the equilibrium quantity of money

There is a large literature on the determinants of the quantity of money. This literature has given prominence to the liquidity features of a certain class of bank liabilities, namely liquid debt such as checking accounts at banks (e.g., M1). This implicitly assumes that no other financial securities are liquid enough that they can serve a similar purpose as checking accounts. Our results suggest that Treasuries do serve this purpose from the perspective of banks who use them to back checkable deposits. Therefore, as we have argued theoretically in Section 3.1, the quantity of liquid bank liabilities will be affected by the supply of Treasury bonds.

We revisit the determinants of equilibrium money quantities in this section. Our purpose is two-fold. First, focusing on the incentives of private suppliers of money (the financial sector), our theoretical model of

a liquidity transforming financial sector has predictions for the link between liquid bank debt and government net supply. We will present evidence confirming these predictions (predictions 3 and 4 above), thereby offering further support for our model. Second, many authors have commented on the instability of traditional money demand functions (see Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990). The finding in the literature is that while there is a stable relation between real money demand M1/P, the nominal interest rate (typically measured as the commercial paper rate), and real income, in the period before 1980, this relation breaks down post-1980. The most prominent puzzle in the literature is the "missing money" of the post-1980 period, when interest rates fell but money balances did not rise commensurately. We will show that accounting for the effects of Treasury supply, as in our model, as well as changes in foreign holdings of Treasuries, can help account for the missing money.

Table 3 Panel C tests prediction 3. Increases in government supply are associated with increases in liquid short-term debt (checkable deposits) with a regression coefficient of about 0.21. Figure 2, Panel B, plots the two underlying series where one can see the positive relation.

Table 3 Panel B shows that increases in government supply leads to an even larger increase in the financial sector's holdings of government supplied assets, with a regression coefficient of about 0.45. Figure 2, Panel A, plots the two series, and one can see the strong positive relation between the two series. These two results indicate that the financial sector's deposit coverage ratio is increasing in government supply consistent with prediction 4. This is illustrated in Figure 2 Panel C, which illustrates the positive relation between the government supply and the financial sector's holdings of government assets divided by checkable deposits. Regressing the deposit coverage ratio on government supply/GDP and a trend results in a coefficient of 1.18 with a t-statistic of 2.35.

In Table 4 we present estimates of money demand, measured as log of M1/P divided by real GDP(M1 is checkable deposits plus currency), where we include log(government supply/GDP) as a regressor in addition to the standard regressors of log of nominal yield of the 3-month commercial paper rate and log of real GDP (see e.g. Teles and Zhou (2005)). In Panel A we use data on checkable deposits from our framework plus currency data from Friedman and Schwartz (1970). In Panel B we use data on M1 from Friedman and Schwartz. The two measures of M1 should conceptually be identical absent data issues and they are in fact very close, see Figure 3 Panel A (we will investigate the small difference further in the next draft).

Before discussing the results, it is worth understanding why Treasury supply may affect money demand and help resolve the missing money puzzle. In our model, money balances for the NH agent is determined by $r_D - r_L$. Most papers in the literature set r_L equal to zero, but it is typically recognized that this may not be a good assumption. In the period after 1980, financial innovation leads to the creation of checking or near-checking accounts that pay interest. Even in the period pre-1980, non-interest-rate effects such as the density of bank branches which affect the ease of withdrawing cash from a bank account should enter

the spread $r_D - r_L$. Thus, it is clear that $r_D - r_L$ is mismeasured in money demand estimations and it is possible that such mismeasurement is the source of the instability in money demand. While we do not directly measure $r_D - r_L$, our theory suggests that optimizing banks will choose the supply of bank deposits based on $r_D - r_L$ and the cost of backing the deposits with Treasuries. When Treasury bonds are abundant, the cost of backing falls, which increases the supply of bank deposits and reduces $r_D - r_L$ (for example, with more Treasuries around, our model predicts that banks should open more branches). In the missing money period, Treasury supply falls, which works against the fall in the level of interest rates by introducing a factor that raises $r_D - r_L$. By accounting for this latter effect, our model helps explain the missing money puzzle.

The comparison of panel B, column (1) and column (4) reveals the standard instability result reported in many other papers: over the period from 1914 to 1979, a money-demand function with a unit income elasticity and interest rate elasticity of -0.28 is a good fit for money demand; over the period from 1914 to 2011, the same regression produces an extremely poor fit for money demand with the regression R^2 falling from 64.5% to 11.5% and interest rate elasticity going from -0.28 to -0.17. The R^2 difference is ameliorated if we allow for income elasticity different than one, as in column (2) and column (5). But now the estimated elasticities on the interest rate and on income differ considerably over the two samples, again underscoring the instability result. In columns (3), (6) and (7), we add our government supply variables as suggested by the theoretical model. From our theoretical model, foreign investors' purchase of the Treasury supply can be thought of as a reduction in the supply of Treasuries to domestic banks and investors (i.e., a reduction Θ). Thus, we expect a negative coefficient on foreign holdings, which is indeed what we find in column (7).[9] Notice now that the coefficient estimates on interest rate, income, and government supply are all quite similar over the two samples when comparing column (3) and (7) (Foreign Treasury holdings were small for most of the pre-1980 period so we omit that variable for the pre-1980 sample). In short, adding government supply variables leads to a stable estimate of money demand over the entire sample. Finally, note that government supply is important both in the pre-1980 period and the post-1980 period, as indicated by the significant coefficient estimates on government supply and the substantially higher R^2 in column (2) than in column (1). That is, the fact that the pre-1980 money demand estimates from the literature were stable was lucky, as even over this period the demand function had omitted an important covariate.

Table 4, Panel B presents the same results using Federal Reserve and Friedman and Schwartz measures of money. The results are not driven by our construction of money aggregates. Visually, one can see from Figure 3 that our measures and the standard M1 and M3 measures are quite similar over the sample.

Figure 4 presents the money-demand instability results graphically, focusing on the "missing money" period post-1980. In Panel A, we graph the predicted value of money based on the specification of column

[9] We do not take the log of Foreign Treasury holdings/GDP since it is set to zero before 1945.

(2) of Panel B (allowing income elasticity to differ from one) and column (3) (including government supply), as well as actual M1/GDP. The graph illustrates that the predicted values from column (3) provide a better fit of the data after around 2000, but there is still lots of money missing. Figure 4, Panel B, suggests what is missing. We plot the missing money based on our estimates from column (3) against foreign holdings of Treasury bonds. The two lines show strong trends after around 1980 in opposite directions and of similar orders of magnitude. Theory does not provide a clear prediction on what the magnitude of the relation between foreign treasury holdings nad money since foreign purchases of US asset have multiple facets: Foreign purchases of Treasuries work like a decrease in Treasury supply thus leading to increase in the cost for banks of obtaining safe backing for deposits and thus a decrease in deposits, but foreign purchases of e.g. financial commercial paper work in the opposite direction.

Given the evidence that government supply appear to crowd in M1 and that we showed above that government supply crowds out net short-term debt, one would expect that the relation between government supply and measures of money depends strongly on which component of money is analyzed. To show this we include estimations for non-M1 M3 (i.e. M3-M1) relative to GDP in Table 4 Panel B (and for our corresponding measure Other short-term debt/GDP in Table 4 Panel A). Notice that the government supply/GDP and foreign Treasury holdings/GDP now enter with opposite sign compared to the M1 regressions.

5.3 Predicting financial crises

The last prediction of the model that we test is that the probability of financial crisis (by which we mean a banking crisis) should be increasing in net short-term debt and that an increase in Treasury debt should decrease the probability of a financial crisis. The mechanism behind this relation in the model is that the probability of a crisis is increasing in net short-term debt M and an increase in Treasury supply reduces M.

The US has had three major banking crisis during the 98 year period we study, associated with the Great Depression, the S&L crisis, and the Great Recession. We obtain the specific timing of the first year of each of these crises from Schularick and Taylor (2012) who date them 1929, 1984, and 2007. We estimate logit models to predict crisis. We follow the methodology of Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) who use variables known in year t to predict crisis in year $t + k$ with k either 1 or 3 years. Observations are dropped if year t itself is a crisis year or any of year $t - 1$, ..., $t - 4$ were crisis years in order to avoid biases due to the fact that we are predicting the first year of a crisis and if you are currently in a crisis then you mechanically cannot be at risk of entering a new crisis until you get out of the current one. Error terms are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Table 5 Panel A presents the main estimations. Column (2) (predicting a crisis in any of the next 3 years) and column (7) (predicting a crisis next year) uses net short-term debt as predictor and confirms the part of prediction 5 that says that the risk of a crisis increases in net short-term debt. The regressions include a

trend, so for reference columns (1) and (6) show results with a trend as the only predictor. To get a sense of the ability of the various models to predict crisis, we follow Schularick and Taylor (2012) and estimate Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. The curve corresponding to Table 5 Panel A column (2) is shown in Figure 5 Panel A. The ROC curve plots the true positive rate (i.e., of all the crises that did happen, what fraction did you predict?) against the false positive rate (i.e., when the regression predicts crisis, how often does it not actually happen?). To get a curve, various cutoffs for the predicted probability are used to classify whether the model predicted a crisis or not. A model with no explanatory power results in a 45 degree line whereas a model with a perfect fit would result in an line going vertically from (0,0) to (0,100) and then horizontally from (0,100) to (100,100). For example, consider the curve estimated based on net short-term debt. If one is willing to accept a false positive rate of 40 percent, then one would predict 89 percent of the crisis that in fact took place. Goodness of fit can thus be measured based on the area under the ROC curve (AUROC), with 0.5 corresponding to no explanatory power and 1 to a perfect fit.

In column (2), we report the AUROC and its standard error when using net short-term debt as a predictor, indicating statistically significant predictive power (AUROC=0.864 with a standard error of 0.067, implying that the AUROC minus 2 standard errors are above 0.5). In columns (3) and (8) we add net equity/GDP as an additional predictor, corresponding to W_0^F in equation (**??**). It enters with a negative sign, as expected, and is significant when predicting crisis one year ahead. In columns (4) and (9) we compare our findings to what one would obtain using the most popular predictor in the banking crisis literature, namely private credit/GDP (see Schularick and Taylor (2012), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), and International Monetary Fund (2011) for recent examples). Private credit is used to refer to lending by the financial sector to the non-financial private sector (i.e. not to the government). This corresponds to (Short-term assets + Long-term assets) in our framework. This asset-side based predictor of crisis is seen to also have predictive power, although not quite as much as our net short-term debt/GDP measure. The ROC curve based on using private credit/GDP is also included in Figure 5 Panel A. It is substantially above the 45 degree line, but lower than that based on net short-term debt/GDP. In practice short-term assets are small, so conceptually private credit/GDP differs from net short-term debt by not subtracting long-term debt, and not subtracting net equity (in our framework Net short-term debt net=Net long-term investment + Net equity, and private credit captures the asset component of net long-term investment). Since net equity does not fluctuate much, the main difference in the movements of private credit/GDP and net short-term debt will be driven by whether a lot of the private credit is financed by long-term debt or not. As shown in Table 2 Panel B, long-term debt has increased in prominence over time as a funding source for the financial sector (currently standing at 14.3 percent as ratio to GDP). This suggests that the distinction between the two predictors is likely to remain relevant going forward. Moreover, as discussed in the model, private credit is informative in forecasting crises because it is correlated with net short-term debt. An expansion of private credit that

is funded purely through equity or long-term debt leads to little liquidity/maturity mismatch and should not lead to a crisis. Thus our results clarify that the crisis variable that should be of most interest is net short-term debt and not private credit.

Turning to the role of Treasuries, columns (5) and (10) of Table 5 Panel A use our measure of government supply/GDP as predictor of crisis, along with the asset demand shock measured as Foreign Treasury holdings/GDP. The results confirm the second half of prediction 5 that an increase in Treasury debt should decrease the probability of a financial crisis, and conversely for the asset demand shock. Figure 5 Panel B graphs the predicted probability that a crisis will occur over the next 3 years from each of the models in Table 5 Panel A column 2-5. All of the models show a dramatic increase in the probability of crisis starting in the early 2000s. The private credit/GDP model appears to do a poor job predicting the crisis of 1929, with the other models all showing an increase in predicted probabilities leading up to that crisis. As for the S&L crisis, both the net short-term debt model and the private credit model has the predicted probability peaking in 1987. It is possible that the dating of the crisis to 1984 is a bit too early in the sense that data from the FDIC show that the peak of the S&L crisis is much later than 1984, with the largest numbers of S&L and bank failures during the period 1980-1994 occuring in 1988, 1989 and 1990, see FDIC (1998).

In general, one may not expect government supply/GDP and Foreign Treasury holdings/GDP to work as well in terms of predictive power as net short-term debt/GDP (an expectation that is born our in the one-year ahead predictions in Table 5 Panel A), since the part of net short-term debt/GDP that is not explained by these variables may also have predictive power for crises (whether or not this is the case is not addressed by our model). Table 5 Panel B shows crises can be predicted using both the predicted value from regressing net short-term debt/GDP (or private credit/GDP) on government supply/GDP and Foreign Treasury holdings/GDP, as well as the residual from this regression.[10] Which component has the larger coefficient depends on whether one predicts crisis starting over the next three years or in the next year.

Since our analysis (at this point) focuses only on the US, we only have 3 banking crisis in our sample (despite using almost 100 years of data). Performing out of sample analysis is therefore difficult so we only attempt one simple exercise. We estimate the models in Table 5 Panel A using data for 1914-1999 and calculate predicted crisis probabilities for the subsequent years to see if the models would have predicted the recent crisis based on the prior historical data. This is the case for both the net short-term debt/GDP model and the private credit/GDP model with the other two models doing worse (this could suggest overfitting when included two predicted values in a sample which in the pre-2000 data has only 2 crisis).

[10] We do not decompose net equity/GDP into a predicted value and a residual since Table 3 showed no evidence of a relation between this variable and Governmetn supply/GDP or Foreign Treasury holdings/GDP.

6 Conclusion

To be added. Also to be added: The effect of the maturity structure of government debt. Analysis for other countries than the US.

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
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
Figure 0. Relation between Aaa-Treasury yield spread and Treasury supply




Taken from Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, JPE, 2012. Corporate bond spread and government debt. The figure plots the Aaa-Treasury corporate bond spread (y axis) against the debt-to-GDP ratio (x axis) on the basis of annual observations from 1919 to 2008. The corporate bond spread is the difference between the percentage yield on Moody's Aaa long-maturity bond index and the percentage yield on long-maturity Treasury bonds.

Figure 1. Financial sector balance sheet, 1914-2011


Panel A. Instruments that are net assets on average across years



Panel B. Instruments that are net liabilities on average across years



Panel C. Sub-components of short-term debt



Panel D. Financial sector balance sheet with short, long, and equity categories netted, 1914-2011






Figure 2. Impact of government supply on financial sector balance sheet, 1914-2011


Panel A. Impact on short, long, and equity net categories



Panel B. Impact on sub-components of short-term debt



Panel C. Impact on ``deposit coverage ratio'' (financial sector holdings of government supplied assets/checkable deposits)



Panel D. Impact on financial sector holdings holdings of govt supplied assets






Figure 3. Money supply measures and their relation to our financial sector debt measures
Panel A. M1/GDP and our corresponding measure



Note: Should conceptually be identical absent data issues


Panel B. (M3-M1)/GDP and our measure of the financial sector's short-term debt/GDP other than checking deposits



Note: Should not conceptually be identical if M3 misses some types of short-term debt.

Figure 4. Explaining M1/GDP

Panel A. Predicted values, estimations use data from 1914-1979



Panel B. Relation between ``missing money'' and foreign demand for liquid/safe US assets






Figure 5. Predicting banking crisis in the US, 1914-2011
Panel A. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, full sample



Panel B. Predicted crisis probability, full sample



Panel C. Predicted crisis probability, regressions estimated using data up to 2000




Table 1. Financial sector balance sheet, 1914-2011

Panel A. Instruments that are net assets on average across years

Instrument	(Assets-Liabs.)/GDP, avg. for 1914-2011	(Assets-Liabs.)/GDP, end of Q3 2011	Assets ($B)	Liabs. ($B)	Assets-Liabs. ($B)	Assets ($B)	Liabs. ($B)	Assets-Liabs. ($B)
			End of Q4 2007			End of Q3 2011		
Assets supplied by government (Treasury/ Federal Reserve)								
1. Treasury securities	10.8	5.6	245	0	245	848	0	848
2. Vault cash and reserves at Federal Reserve (assets), Federal Reserve float+Borrowing from Federal Reserve banks (liabilities)	4.0	10.9	64	-1	65	1,648	-1	1,649
Sum	14.8	16.5	310	-1	310	2,496	-1	2,497
Short-term assets								
3. Customers' liability on acceptances	0.3	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Foreign deposits	0.2	0.6	102	0	102	87	0	87
5. Trade credit	0.1	0.2	105	62	42	47	16	31
Sum	0.6	0.8	207	62	145	134	16	118
Long-term assets								
6. Mortgages	31.4	83.0	13,500	154	13,400	12,800	181	12,600
7. Bank loans	15.1	11.7	1,915	261	1,654	1,910	129	1,782
8. Consumer credit	7.9	14.1	2,531	0	2,531	2,147	0	2,147
9. Municipal securities	3.9	1.4	713	167	546	637	427	210
10. Miscellaneous	3.2	11.6	3,432	413	3,019	3,434	1,670	1,763
11. Other loans and advances (loans made by GSEs or finance companies, syndicated loans, other)	2.6	5.9	1,898	796	1,101	1,264	362	901
Sum	64.1	127.9	23,989	1,792	22,251	22,192	2,770	19,403
Equity								
12. Investment by bank holding companies (in nonbanks)	0.7	5.5	390	0	390	829	0	829
13. Corporate equities	0.4	1.0	289	0	289	145	0	145
14. Investment in foreign banking offices	0.3	0.9	225	0	225	140	0	140
15. Mutual fund shares	0.0	0.3	31	0	31	38	0	38
16. Equity interest under PPIP (for funding corporations)	0.0	-0.1	0	0	0	0	9	-9
Sum	1.4	7.5	935	0	935	1,153	9	1,144
Overall sum	80.9	152.6						

Panel B. Instruments that are net liabilities on average across years

Instrument	(Liabs.-Assets) /GDP, avg. for 1914-2011	(Liabs.-Assets) /GDP, end of Q3 2011	Assets ($B)	Liabs. ($B)	Liabs.-Assets ($B)	Assets ($B)	Liabs. ($B)	Liabs.-Assets ($B)
			End of Q4 2007			End of Q3 2011		
Short-term debt								
17. Checkable deposits and currency	20.5	6.7	209	708	499	294	1,313	1,019
18. Savings and time deposits	36.6	54.0	388	7,463	7,074	528	8,725	8,198
19. Money market mutual fund shares	3.2	12.8	702	2,780	2,078	635	2,578	1,943
20. Federal funds and security RPs	1.9	2.3	702	2,324	1,623	612	968	356
21. Securities loaned (for funding corporations)	1.1	4.8	0	1,415	1,415	0	727	727
22. Commercial paper	1.1	0.1	961	1,300	338	514	527	14
23. Interbank liabilities to foreign banks	0.3	1.2	0	28	28	0	178	178
24. Interbank liabilities to domestic banks	0.3	0.7	0	18	18	0	105	105
25. Security credit	0.3	4.6	432	1,078	646	439	1,134	695
26. Acceptance liabilities	0.1	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
27. Taxes payable	0.1	-0.2	0	38	38	0	-30	-30
Sum	65.6	87.0	3,393	17,150	13,757	3,022	16,224	13,203
Long-term debt								
28. Agency- and GSE- backed securities	6.1	30.0	2,846	7,077	4,231	3,004	7,560	4,556
29. Corporate and foreign bonds	0.9	14.3	2,828	6,037	3,209	2,315	4,492	2,177
Issued by ABS issuers	3.0	13.3	0	3,841	3,841	0	2,023	2,023
Issued by other fin. inst's	-2.1	1.0	2,828	2,196	-632	2,315	2,469	154
30. U.S. govt. loans to GSEs	0.02	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sum	7.0	44.4	5,674	13,114	7,440	5,320	12,052	6,733
Equity								
31. Financial sector equity	6.9	12.6	0	1,475	1,475	0	1,907	1,907
32. Investment by bank holding companies (in bank subsidiaries), or by parent (in savings inst. and finance comp.'s), or by affiliates (for security brokers and dealers) or by funding corp.'s in security brokers and dealers	1.1	6.5	1,623	2,280	656	1,983	2,971	988
33. Foreign direct inv. U.S.	0.2	2.1	0	280	280	0	324	324
Sum	8.2	21.2	1,623	4,034	2,411	1,983	5,203	3,220
Overall sum	80.9	152.6						

Table 2. Financial sector balance sheet with short, long, and equity categories netted, 1914-2011

Instrument	(Assets-Liabs.) /GDP, avg. for 1914-2011	(Assets-Liabs.) /GDP, end of Q3 2011	Assets ($B)	Liabs. ($B)	Assets-Liabs. ($B)	Assets ($B)	Liabs. ($B)	Assets-Liabs. ($B)
			End of Q4 2007			End of Q3 2011		
Net long-term investments =(Long-term assets)-(Long-term debt)	57.1	83.5	18,315	-11,322	14,812	16,872	-9,282	12,671
Overall sum	57.1	83.5	18,315	-11,322	14,812	16,872	-9,282	12,671
Net short-term debt =(Short-term debt)-(Short-term assets)-(Assets supplied by government)	50.3	69.8	3,910	17,212	14,212	5,652	16,240	15,817
Net equity =(Equity on liability side-(Equity on asset side)	6.8	13.7	2,558	4,034	3,346	3,136	5,212	4,364
Overall sum	57.1	83.5	6,469	21,246	17,558	8,787	21,452	20,181

Table 3. Impact of Treasury supply on financial sector balance sheet, 1914-2011

Panel A. Short, long, and equity categories netted, 1914-2011

Instrument	1914-2011, trend included						1914-2011, no trend included					1914-2011, trend included						
	Govt. supply/GDP		Year			Partial R2 of Govt. supply/ GDP	Govt. supply/GDP		Foreign Treasury holdings/ GDP			Govt. supply/GDP		Foreign Treasury holdings/ GDP		Year		
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2		Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2
Net long-term investments=(Long-term assets)-(Long-term debt)																		
	-0.512	-4.10	0.005	2.39	0.776	0.332	-0.549	-6.95	2.310	7.86	0.899	-0.543	-7.25	1.945	4.58	0.001	0.91	0.905
Net short-term debt=(Short-term debt)-(Short-term assets)-(Assets supplied by US govt./Federal reserve)																		
	-0.493	-5.20	0.005	4.27	0.864	0.326	-0.530	-5.92	2.227	6.38	0.885	-0.514	-8.16	1.335	3.74	0.002	2.69	0.928
Net equity=(Equity on liability side-(Equity on asset side)																		
	-0.019	-0.61	-0.0003	-0.31	0.116	0.021	-0.019	-0.65	0.083	0.49	0.050	-0.029	-1.35	0.611	4.86	-0.001	-4.37	0.677

Note: In all panels of this table, the dependent variables are scaled by GDP. Estimations are by OLS with standard errors estimated assuming AR(1) error terms.

Panel B. Instruments that are net assets on average across years

Instrument	1914-2011, trend included						1914-2011, no trend included					1914-2011, trend included						
	Govt. supply/GDP		Year			Partial R2 of Govt. supply/ GDP	Govt. supply/GDP		Foreign Treasury holdings/ GDP			Govt. supply/GDP		Foreign Treasury holdings/ GDP		Year		
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2		Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2
Assets supplied by US govt. or Federal Reserve	0.446	9.33	-0.002	-2.66	0.899	0.715	0.460	10.54	-0.813	-4.23	0.923	0.456	11.33	-0.578	-2.34	-0.001	-0.96	0.931
Short-term assets	-0.009	-1.93	0.0002	3.84	0.722	0.086	-0.010	-1.48	0.058	1.77	0.401	-0.008	-1.96	-0.030	-1.21	0.0002	3.67	0.749
Long-term assets	-0.496	-3.40	0.010	3.00	0.776	0.104	-0.574	-3.55	4.828	7.30	0.918	-0.555	-4.41	3.760	5.12	0.003	1.51	0.938
Equity	0.0002	0.01	0.0006	2.35	0.635	0.000	-0.005	-0.90	0.212	17.01	0.934	-0.005	-0.88	0.317	10.36	0.0000	0.19	0.934
Sum (size of financial sector)	-0.058	-0.38	0.009	2.98	0.725	0.002	-0.129	-0.86	4.400	4.96	0.888	-0.112	-0.87	3.472	4.62	0.003	1.28	0.908

Panel C. Instruments that are net liabilities on average across years

Instrument	1914-2011, trend included						1914-2011, no trend included					1914-2011, trend included						
	Govt. supply/GDP		Year			Partial R2 of Govt. supply/ GDP	Govt. supply/GDP		Foreign Treasury holdings/ GDP			Govt. supply/GDP		Foreign Treasury holdings/ GDP		Year		
	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2		Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	Coef.	t	R2
Short-term debt	-0.056	-0.71	0.003	4.24	0.713	0.012	-0.080	-0.94	1.472	4.43	0.682	-0.067	-0.98	0.728	1.88	0.002	2.05	0.767
Liquid ST debt: Checkable deposits	0.214	7.19	-0.003	-11.21	0.956	0.200	0.236	4.26	-1.310	-5.11	0.827	0.220	12.92	-0.395	-4.13	-0.003	-10.7	0.974
Other ST debt	-0.269	-3.02	0.007	5.94	0.899	0.082	-0.316	-2.47	2.782	4.81	0.812	-0.286	-4.41	1.123	3.02	0.005	4.73	0.938
Long-term debt	0.016	0.25	0.005	4.17	0.775	0.000	-0.025	-0.21	2.519	3.91	0.895	-0.012	-0.15	1.817	3.55	0.002	1.36	0.929
Equity	-0.019	-0.48	0.0003	0.189	0.048	0.012	-0.024	-0.75	0.405	2.50	0.420	-0.034	-1.31	0.928	6.19	-0.001	-3.65	0.757
Sum (size of financial sector)	-0.058	-0.38	0.009	2.98	0.725	0.002	-0.129	-0.86	4.400	4.96	0.888	-0.112	-0.87	3.472	4.620	0.003	1.28	0.908

Table 4. Including Treasury supply in money demand functions

Panel A. Using money measures constructed by us from Flow of Funds Accounts and All Banking Statistics

	ln((Checkable deposits+currency)/GDP)							ln((Other short-term debt)/GDP)			
	1914-1979			1914-2011				1914-2011			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
ln(Nom. yield on	-0.281	-0.241	-0.105	-0.172	-0.105	0.048	-0.097	0.139	0.074	-0.096	-0.026
3-mo com. paper)	(-3.91)	(-4.74)	(-2.24)	(-1.37)	(-2.02)	(1.01)	(-2.47)	(1.13)	(1.08)	(-1.77)	(-0.44)
ln(Real GDP)		-0.173	-0.233		-0.408	-0.447	-0.226		0.397	0.440	0.334
		(-2.66)	(-4.64)		(-4.06)	(-7.50)	(-3.77)		(3.69)	(6.98)	(3.45)
ln(Government			0.261			0.465	0.277			-0.515	-0.424
supply/GDP)			(3.72)			(4.19)	(3.79)			(-4.11)	(-3.92)
Foreign Treasury							-3.87				1.867
holdings/GDP							(-4.45)				(1.35)
Constant	-2.168	-1.581	-0.718	-2.044	-0.544	0.511	-0.668	-0.425	-1.885	-3.052	-2.483
	(-8.37)	(-5.74)	(-2.49)	(-11.68)	(-1.51)	(1.58)	(-2.33)	(-2.40)	(-4.68)	(-8.54)	(-5.73)
N	66	66	66	98	98	98	98	98	98	98	98
R2	0.645	0.813	0.880	0.115	0.799	0.893	0.950	0.077	0.737	0.854	0.868

Panel B. Using conventional money measures from Friedman and Schwartz and the Federal Reserve's H6 release

	ln(M1/GDP)							ln((M3-M1)/GDP)			
	1914-1979			1914-2011				1959-2005			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
ln(Nom. yield on	-0.267	-0.233	-0.109	-0.174	-0.115	0.022	-0.11	0.035	0.085	0.013	-0.016
3-mo com. paper)	(-3.98)	(-4.37)	(-2.20)	(-1.56)	(-2.34)	(0.48)	(-2.90)	(0.58)	(1.51)	(0.27)	(-0.37)
ln(Real GDP)		-0.145	-0.200		-0.362	-0.397	-0.197		0.374	0.397	0.572
		(-2.10)	(-3.68)		(-3.63)	(-6.82)	(-3.31)		(3.91)	(5.45)	(4.60)
ln(Government			0.238			0.415	0.244			-0.343	-0.309
supply/GDP)			(3.19)			(3.97)	(3.46)			(-2.74)	(-2.42)
Foreign Treasury							-3.509				-2.079
holdings/GDP							(-4.09)				(-1.72)
Constant	-2.183	-1.689	-0.903	-2.093	-0.761	0.180	-0.89	-0.555	-1.846	-2.481	-3.069
	(-9.03)	(-5.81)	(-2.95)	(-13.34)	(-2.13)	(0.58)	(-3.19)	(-2.67)	(-4.71)	(-7.55)	(-7.65)
N	66	66	66	98	98	98	98	47	47	47	47
R2	0.650	0.783	0.846	0.143	0.792	0.882	0.938	0.009	0.685	0.816	0.835

Note: In both panels regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors assume AR(1) error terms, except in column (4) and (8) in each panel in which AR(1)-based standard errors are infeasible because the AR(1) coefficient in the error term process is above 1. In these cases we use Newey-West standard errors based on 5 lags.

Table 5. Predicting banking crisis in the US, 1914-2011

Panel A. Using predictors directly

	Dummy=1 if first year of a US banking crisis is in year t+1, t+2, or t+3					Dummy=1 if first year of a US banking crisis is in year t+1				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Net short-term debt/GDP		25.73	36.73				22.74	60.76		
		(2.82)	(3.10)				(1.69)	(2.53)		
Net equity/GDP			-33.37					-91.27		
			(-1.25)					(-2.64)		
Private credit/GDP				8.017					7.12	
				(3.19)					(1.72)	
Government supply/GDP					-18.87					-12.72
					(-4.04)					(-3.45)
Foreign Treasury holdings/GDP					21.92					16.07
					(2.19)					(1.06)
Year	0.016	-0.108	-0.165	-0.069		0.016	-0.103	-0.294	-0.065	
	(0.84)	(-2.36)	(-2.76)	(-2.29)		(0.50)	(-1.36)	(-2.34)	(-1.27)	
Area under ROC curve (AUROC)	**0.633**	**0.864**	**0.878**	**0.783**	**0.876**	**0.636**	**0.860**	**0.895**	**0.741**	**0.820**
Standard error for AUROC	0.135	0.067	0.058	0.084	0.047	0.261	0.129	0.078	0.198	0.09
T	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79

Note:

Logit model estimation with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity (White). Regressions include a constant (not reported for brevity). t-statistics in parenthesis.

Observations are dropped if year t, t-1, t-2, t-3 or t-4 was a the first year of a crisis.

Definitions:

Net short-term debt/GDP=((Short-term debt)-(Assets supplied by US govt./Federal reserve) -(Short-term Assets))/GDP

Net equity=(Equity on liability side-Equity on asset side)/GDP

Private credit/GDP=(Short-term assets+Long-term assets)/GDP

Panel B. Using predicted values and residuals from regressions of predictors on government supply/GDP and foreign Treasury holdings/GDP

	Dummy=1 if first year of a US banking crisis is in year t+1, t+2, or t+3			Dummy=1 if first year of a US banking crisis is in year t+1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Net short-term debt/GDP, predicted value	27.95	52.58		20.448	43.80	
	(2.95)	(3.52)		(1.53)	(2.89)	
Net short-term debt/GDP, residual	15.77	30.92		33.943	61.37	
	(1.59)	(2.27)		(2.33)	(2.73)	
Net equity/GDP		-62.10			-60.33	
		(-1.96)			(-2.47)	
Private credit/GDP, predicted value			9.49			5.92
			(3.15)			(1.60)
Private credit/GDP, residual			3.82			10.35
			(1.14)			(1.48)
Year	-0.102	-0.212	-0.072	-0.110	-0.238	-0.063
	(-2.41)	(-3.08)	(-2.31)	(-1.43)	(-2.55)	(-1.23)
Area under ROC curve (AUROC)	**0.868**	**0.879**	**0.811**	**0.835**	**0.871**	**0.738**
Standard error for AUROC	0.065	0.055	0.076	0.075	0.055	0.099
T	79	79	79	79	79	79

Note: As for Panel A.