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September 15, 2026

Professors Emily Breza, Arun Chandrasekhar, and Davide Viviano
Workshop on Development Economics and Networks for Early-Career Researchers
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

Dear Professors Breza, Chandrasekhar, and Viviano,

I am writing to apply to the NBER Workshop on Development Economics and Networks for Early-Career Researchers on December 5, 2026. I am a dissertation-writing PhD candidate in Economics at Cornell University, working in development and labor economics. This PDF contains my curriculum vitae with a list of PhD coursework, a one-page statement of research interests, and an extended abstract with key results tables for the paper I would like to present.

The paper, *"Temporary Migration and Intra-Household Labor Reallocation: Evidence from India,"* is a chapter of my dissertation. It looks at household reallocation of labor after the male household head migrates in exchange for remittances. In India about a third of the population are internal migrants, mostly men who move to cities for work and later return. Using a panel that follows roughly 200,000 households every four months from 2014 to 2019, I estimate event studies around the head's verified departure and his verified return, and complement them with a shift-share instrument that carries commodity-price shocks at destination districts to origin households through the origin-destination migration flow matrix. When the husband leaves, his wife moves from homemaking into paid work and household income rises in poorer households. When he returns, household income falls and she exits paid work anyway, fully. What is striking is that the wife's response to the husband's migration depends on her position in the household. In the presence of parents-in-law her labor response is null; when they are not present, female labor increases when the household head leaves and falls when he returns. This temporary adjustment comes at the expense of permanent effects on children: their occupation shifts from student to homemaker, especially for girls aged 8 to 15, and does not recover after return.

I believe the paper fits the workshop because its central result is about household structure rather than about income or labor demand. The wife's response is specific to the structure of the household she lives in: the wife of a household head enters paid work when he leaves and exits when he returns, while a daughter-in-law living with her parents-in-law does not adjust in either direction, and the response does not track household income, which rises at departure and falls at return.

Separately, I am a co-investigator with Dev Patel (Brown) on a field experiment in Bolivia on how smallholder farmers share information about climate adaptation tools (index insurance and early warning systems) within their village networks. We elicit each farmer's willingness to pay to receive information about the two products and, unusually, their willingness to accept payment to transmit it, which lets us separate the demand for learning from the supply of teaching. We then randomly assign and incentivize peer informants, and in some communities pair informants and receivers by matching their elicited values. In a pilot across 60 communities, knowledge retention was higher not only among the targeted receivers but among non-targeted community members in villages with incentivized pairing, which points to a missing market for social learning: farmers who would be effective teachers do not teach unless paid, and those who would learn cannot buy that instruction on their own. Combining the elicited values with elicited village networks, we find that what receivers pay for is not the seed's knowledge but the seed's position: willingness to pay rises with the

informant's degree, diffusion centrality, and key-informant nominations, while informants' willingness to accept does not respond to their own centrality, so central farmers do not price the value of their position. Consistent with this, central informants generate more repeated conversations only when the experiment arranges and pays for the exchange, suggesting that the intervention activates a latent transmission capacity that the network alone does not.

My recommender is Johannes Haushofer, Cornell University, haushofer@cornell.edu. Thank you for considering my application. I am happy to provide any additional material.

Sincerely,

Jimena Romero Pinto

MARIA JIMENA ROMERO

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PhD student in Economics interested in labor, behavioral economics, and causal inference.

EDUCATION

Cornell University **Ithaca - NY, USA**
PhD in Economics *2026-Present*
Transferred from Stockholm University 2021-2024.
Coursework: Mathematics I and II, Macroeconomics I and II, Microeconomics I and II, Econometrics I and II, Development Economics I and II, Applied Empirical Economics I, Labor I, II and III, Design-based Research, Modelling for Applied Economists.

Yale University **New Haven - CT, USA**
Visiting Student in Economics *Sep 2024-May 2025*
Host: Mushfiq Mobarak

Harvard Kennedy School **Cambridge - MA, USA**
Master in Public Administration and International Development (MPAID) *2016-2018*
Coursework: Advance Quantitative Methods I and II, Microeconomics I and II, Macroeconomics I and II, Data Science, Development Economics, and Applied Econometrics.
Awards: Fulbright, Joint Japan/World Bank (JJWB) Graduate Scholarship

Universidad del Pacifico **Lima, Peru**
Bachelor in Economics

WORKING PAPERS

- Abadie, A., Doerr, A., Pinder, T. & Romero, J. "CausalGP: Bayesian Counterfactual Inference for Aggregate Interventions"
- Ibañez, A., Romero, M., Quigua, J. & Velasquez, A. (2022). "Responses to Temperature Shocks: Labor Markets and Migration Decisions in El Salvador". http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20230447 (AEJ: Economic Policy)
- Romero, M., Esopo, K., McGuire J., & Haushofer, J. (2021) "The Effect of Economic Transfers on Psychological Well-Being and Mental Health." [link]
- Romero, M., Dangwal, G. & Romano, E. "Education and Labor Supply Decisions Within Migrant Sending Households"
- Romero, M., Dangwal, G. & Das, M. "Weathering the Storm: The Impact of Weather Shocks on Migration in India"
- Romero, M. & Dangwal, G. "National Highway Expansion, Local Economy and Environment: Evidence from India"

WORK EXPERIENCE

Amazon — Prime **Seattle, USA**
Economist Intern *May 2026–Aug 2026*
- Conducted long-term measurement employing surrogate index method
- Produced a technical research document and code adapting the method to the Prime campaign setting and with actionable items

Amazon — Worldwide Integrated Marketing Systems and Intelligence (WIMSI) **NYC, USA**
Science - Economist Intern *Jul 2025–Oct 2025*
- Conducted research on causal inference methodologies for marketing effectiveness measurement, including Synthetic Difference-in-Differences and causal Gaussian process models for physical marketing campaigns
- Produced both a technical research document and a business-facing report with actionable recommendations for WIMSI marketing campaigns

Research Scientist *Oct 2025–Dec 2025*
- Conducted research and empirical analysis on Bayesian synthetic control methods, in collaboration with Alberto Abadie
- Developed a Python package for Bayesian synthetic control, deployed internally via Amazon Code

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) **Washington - DC, USA**
Research Fellow *Oct 2018 - Jun 2021*
- Research on migration, climate and conflict. Direct supervisor: Ana Maria Ibañez, Economics Principal Advisor during that period.
- Data visualization tasks on Covid-19 trends, Venezuelan migration in Latam, income inequality, and other relevant information for the work of the Vice-Presidency of Sectors and Knowledge (VPS).
- Coordinated the implementation of the research project "Inequality and Social Mobility in Latin America and the Caribbean" including call for papers, conferences, data visualization, and seminars.
- Coauthored the technical notes:
  - Elías, A.; Granada, I.; Näslund-Hadley, E.; Ortiz, P.; Romero, J.; Dávalos, A. (2022) "Migration and education: challenges and opportunities" http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004468

  - Zanoni, W.; Romero, J.; Chuquimarca, N.; Abuelafia, E. (2023) "Dealing with Hard-to-Reach Populations in Panel Data: Respondent-Driven Survey (RDS) and Attrition" http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0005194
- Research assistance to the Research Department in:
  - Malamud, O., Cueto, S., Cristia, J., & Beuermann, D. (2019). "Do Children Benefit from Internet Access?: Experimental Evidence from Peru". Journal of Development Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.11.005
  - Araya, R., Arias, E., Bottan, N., & Cristia, J. (2019) "Does Gamification in Education Work?: Experimental Evidence from Chile". IDB Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.18235/0001777

Busara Center **Remote**
Consultant *Aug 2020 - Jun 2021*
- Research on mental health and economic transfers.
- Research assistance in Oeindrila Dube, C., Haushofer, J., Siddiqi, B., & Voors, M. (2021) "Building Resilient Health Systems: Experimental Evidence from Sierra Leone and The 2014 Ebola Outbreak" https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa039

Ministry of Education **Lima, Peru**
Strategic Planning Specialist *Feb 2015 - Jul 2016*
- Responsible for the Strategic Planning Document of the Direction of Quality in Educational Management for the period of 2016-2021, including literature review, setting of goals, indicators and evaluation methods for the different teams.
- Estimated and monitored budget execution.
- Monitored a principals' training program directed to more than 50,000 principals nationwide.
- Established the methodology to estimate the number of principals nationwide.

Investment Specialist

- Oversaw the approval and implementation of the first Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects in education in Peru, including coordination between areas, establishing project deadlines, and monitoring products of the engineering team.
- Supervised implementation of 17 Accelerated Public High Schools for Top Students (COAR in Spanish), with a budget over US$ 20 MM per school. Achieved approval of the Ministry of Economics and Finance of the first school under the OXI modality ("Works for taxes") at the national level in Peru.
- Reviewed private proposals for Educational IT projects in public schools, and coordinated in the definition of parameters of projects including budget, scope, goals, content and indicators and evaluation methods. Oversaw the formulation of IT public project on 1600 high schools with budget over US$ 250MM. Oversaw formulation of pilot project of tablets on 60 primary schools.

Apoyo Consultoria **Lima, Peru**
Public Policy Consultant *Apr 2013 - Feb 2015*
- Consolidated the investment Master Plans (forecasting demand, air traffic, investment gap, investment costs, and social and economic benefits) of six airport concessions and established methodology for upcoming six airports of Aeropuertos del Peru.
- Diagnosed capabilities of Regional Governments in rural land titling and developed an investment plan for Inter-American Development Bank.
- Diagnosed current problems related to crime in Peru, including literature review, survey, and public databases analysis for the World Bank and Ministry of Public Affairs.
- Developed a grading system to rank Public Directors for National Authority of Civil Service.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) **Paris, France**
Research Assistant *Sep 2013 - Dec 2013*
- Assistance in a study of mining regulations and macroeconomic development in Peru and Colombia.
  - Korinek, J. (2015), "Managing the Minerals Sector: Implications for Trade from Peru and Colombia", OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 186, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrp6wrc2r7l-en

Rimac International **Lima, Peru**
Investment Analyst *2010-2013*
- Analyzed potential of equity and fixed income investments in private telecom and retail companies with fundamental valuation.
- Monitored telecom and retail portfolio giving warning signs and forecasts. Periodical update of the portfolio's valuations.

SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS

Presented in: Agricultural & Applied Economics Association (AAEA) Annual Meeting (2022), ASWEDE (2022, 2023), Oxford VI Workshop on Immigration, Health and Wellbeing (2022), 1st Stockholm University-MPI Workshop on Behavioral Economics (2022), Stockholm-NY Conference in Experimental Behavioral Economics (2023), International Economic Association (IEA) World Congress (2023), Yale Development Lunch (2025), Fourth Forced Displacement Working Group (FDWG) (2025), Third Junior Workshop on Economics of Migration (2025)

TEACHING

Cornell University **Ithaca, NY**
Teaching Assistant *2026-Present*
- Development Economics

Stockholm University **Stockholm, Sweden**
Teaching Assistant *2022-2023*
- Introduction to Quantitative Methods

Harvard Kennedy School **Cambridge - MA, USA**
Summer Instructor *2024, 2023, 2018*
- Information, Data and Decisions
- Quantitative methods

Teaching Assistant *2017-2018*
- Math Camp in calculus and statistics.
- Introductory statistics: API 205 "Politics and Policies: What Can Data Tell Us?, Fall 2017

Universidad del Pacifico **Lima, Peru**
Teaching Assistant *2010*
- Introduction to Microeconomics
- Macroeconomics I

OTHER SKILLS

Coding STATA, Python, R, Github
Languages Spanish (native), English (fluent), Portuguese (fluent), French (intermediate)
Software LaTeX, ArcGis, Tableau, Pycharm

Statement of Interest and Research Interests

Jimena Romero Pinto, Cornell University

I am a PhD candidate in Economics at Cornell working in development and labor economics. What drives my research is a wish to understand economic problems in developing economies employing causal inference tools. Before the PhD I worked at Peru's Ministry of Education and the Inter-American Development Bank, and I hold an MPA/ID from the Harvard Kennedy School. I was a visiting student at Yale in 2024-25 hosted by Mushfiq Mobarak, and I have worked as a research intern at Amazon on causal inference, including Bayesian synthetic control with Alberto Abadie.

The dissertation chapter I would present uses a four-monthly panel of about 200,000 Indian households to study what happens to the family when the male head migrates temporarily, and what happens when he comes back. The design combines event studies around verified departure and return with a shift-share instrument in which destination labor-demand shocks reach origin households through the origin-destination migration network. The result that organizes the paper is that the wife enters paid work when her husband leaves and exits it fully when he returns, even though household income moves in the opposite direction at both points. That rules out income as the driver and points to his presence. The mechanism tests show the response is invariant to the hours he used to contribute at home but depends on the wife's position in the household's authority structure: wives of household heads respond fully, howver not under their parents-in-law.

A second option would be a field experiment in Bolivia with Dev Patel (Brown) that studies information networks within communities. In a pilot across 60 communities we elicited willingness to pay both to receive and to transmit information about the two products, randomly assigned peer informants, and paired some informants and receivers by matching elicited values. Knowledge retention was higher, among receivers and among other community members, in villages with incentivized pairing, which suggests a missing market for social learning that can be uncovered by design.

I would like to learn from participants how to take these papers to the state of the art in networks, and how the mechanisms they uncover matter for growth. In the first case, we see that the presence and position of different family members determine whether women work, with a permanent effect on children who move into homemaking. In the second, we are looking at what lies behind a missing market for information, and how that gap can prevent the diffusion of technologies farmers would otherwise adopt. This workshops presents a valuable opportunity to learn from the leading researchers in the field, and to get feedback on how to make the papers more relevant to the development, growht and networks literature.

Temporary Migration and Intra-Household Labor Reallocation: Evidence from India

Jimena Romero Pinto (Cornell University), Gargi Dangwal (Stockholm School of Economics)
Extended abstract, September 2026

Question. In India about a third of the population are internal migrants, mostly men who move to cities for work and later return. This paper asks what happens to the family the migrant leaves behind, and uses the answer to address a larger puzzle: why do married women in poor countries work so little? Female labor force participation in India is around 30 percent, and the leading explanations are labor demand (no suitable jobs), household need (the income constraint is slack), and the household itself (norms enforced by the husband and his family). Temporary male migration is a rare setting in which the last two can be separated. The husband's departure removes him from the household while, for poorer households, raising income through remittances; his return restores his presence while lowering income. We ask whether the wife's labor supply follows the husband's presence or the household's need, who enforces the constraint when he is away, and who bears the cost when her time is reallocated.

Data. We use the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey, a panel that follows roughly 200,000 Indian households every four months from 2014 to 2019 (pre-COVID). It records each member's activity status, occupation, income by source including remittances, detailed expenditure, and whether each member is living away from the household in each wave, so a migration spell is observed at the person level from verified departure to verified return.

Empirical strategy. Two complementary designs. First, event studies with the de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille (2024) estimator for non-absorbing treatment, on a sample of households whose male head or main earner migrates, matched on baseline characteristics to households that never do. Treatment is anchored to the migrant's own departure and, in a second set of event studies, to his verified return, so the response to separation and its reversal are estimated on the same axes. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Second, a shift-share instrument: each household's baseline propensity to migrate, estimated within the matched sample, is interacted with commodity-price fluctuations weighted by industry employment at destination districts and allocated to origins through a leave-one-out, distance-weighted sum over the origin-destination migration matrix. Specifications include household, origin-district, and survey-round fixed effects. The IV recovers a local average treatment effect for households that migrate in response to destination labor-demand shocks; the event study recovers the average effect across all migrant households. The two agree in sign; the IV is larger, as expected when the compliers are households pulled by a destination boom. Table 1 reports the first stage: the instrument is strong (Kleibergen-Paap F above 500) and its coefficient is the same in origin districts with dense and with sparse migrant networks at baseline, so the compliers are not concentrated in high-migration origins.

Main results.

The spouse (Table 2). At the husband's departure the wife's probability of being economically active rises by 4.7 percentage points and of being a homemaker falls by 5.6 points, and her own income rises. At his return each of these reverses fully: economic activity falls by 7.8 points and homemaking rises by 7.4, and her exit is from salaried and informal wage work rather than from the family farm, so it is a market exit and not reclassification. Household income per capita rises at departure in the bottom deciles and falls at return. The added-worker story predicts more entry at return; a story of a permanently released constraint predicts she stays. Both are rejected. The IV estimate on the matched sample confirms the departure response with a first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F above 400.

Presence, not his time; and who enforces (Table 3). If the wife responds to the home-production hours her

husband took with him, the response should be larger when he was a farmer or ran the family business than when he was a wage earner who contributed no such hours. It is not: the departure and return responses are statistically indistinguishable across the three groups (all pairwise $|z| < 1.2$). If instead the constraint is enforced by the household, the response should depend on who holds authority over the wife's time when the husband is away. It does: the wife of a household head enters paid work at departure ($+14.3$ points) and exits at return (-20.6), and a senior woman in the household does not dampen this; a daughter-in-law whose husband migrates from his parents' household, with both parents present, does not move at departure or at return. With only a widowed mother-in-law present she responds about half as much as a head's wife. The moderator is the wife's position in the household's authority structure, not the mother-in-law as such, and the time-substitution story predicts the opposite sign (other adults free her).

The cost: children (Table 4). The wife's home time is replaced by daughters. Among children aged 8 to 15, enrollment falls progressively with the length of separation, from about 1.4 points one period after departure to 8.8 points after six periods (two years), with girls affected first and most; children who leave school report homemaking rather than earning. After the father's return there is no re-enrollment (-4.2 points three periods after return, -8.1 for girls), even though household spending on education rises. The shock is temporary for adults and permanent for girls.

Table 1: First stage: destination commodity-price shocks and the head's migration

Dependent variable: head migrated all three quadrimesters of the year	All matched households	By baseline district migration prevalence	
		Below median	Above median
$s_{ot} \times \hat{\lambda}_i$ (excluded instrument)	0.144^{***}	0.145^{***}	0.144^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)
s_{ot}	-0.025^{*}	-0.020	-0.031^{*}
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.015)
x_{dt}	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Kleibergen-Paap F	521.6	217.6	334.0
Outcome mean	0.151	0.148	0.155
Observations (household-years)	92,500	45,742	45,993

Notes: Yearly matched household panel, 2014 to 2019. s_{ot} is the leave-one-out, distance-weighted sum over other districts of employment-weighted commodity-price shocks (standardized); x_{dt} the district's own shock; $\hat{\lambda}_i$ the household's baseline migration propensity estimated within the matched sample. Household and year fixed effects; standard errors clustered by district. Baseline district migration prevalence is the share of 2014 CPHS households in the district with a member living away; split at the matched-sample median (11 percent). The interaction of the instrument with the above-median indicator in a pooled specification is -0.001 (SE 0.013), $p = 0.94$. * $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 2: The wife's labor supply at the husband's departure and at his return

Outcome (wife)	Event study: at departure	Event study: at return	IV (2SLS): migration year
Economically active	$+0.047$	-0.078	$+0.187^{***}$
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.034)
Homemaker	-0.056	$+0.074$	$+0.046$
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.064)
Own income (Rs per month)	$+654$	$-1{,}283$	$+92$
	(74)	(291)	(625)
Household income per capita (Rs), bottom decile[a]	$+603$	-923	
	(81)	(222)	
Kleibergen-Paap F (first stage)			420.8
Treated households	5,140	4,351	3,553
Observations			103,326

Notes: Sample is female spouses of male migrants, aged 18 to 65 at baseline, in matched migrant households and their matched controls (full spouse sample). Event-study columns report the average de Chaisemartin-D'Haultfœuille effect over six post-event periods (two years), with treatment anchored to the migrant's verified departure and, separately, to his verified return; three placebo leads, maximum $|\text{lead}| \leq 0.02$ on binary outcomes. IV column: 2SLS on yearly data, endogenous variable is the head migrating in all three quadrimesters of the year, instrument is baseline propensity $\times$ destination commodity-price shock propagated through the origin-destination flow matrix; household, origin-district and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district. *** $p < 0.01$. [a] Departure: average effect for households in the bottom decile of baseline income (deciles 2 and 3: $+493$ (133) and $+407$ (93); the full-sample effect is close to zero). Return: full sample of returning households.

Table 3: Presence, not his time; and who enforces. Wife's response by pre-treatment household type

Split (measured before departure)	Treated HHs	Econ. active departure	Econ. active return
A. Migrant's occupation before leaving			
Family farm	521	$+0.059$ (0.021)	-0.114 (0.040)
Family business	967	$+0.040$ (0.019)	-0.091 (0.044)
Wage or salaried work	2,702	$+0.066$ (0.012)	-0.082 (0.022)
Pairwise differences		all $\lvert z\rvert < 1.2$	all $\lvert z\rvert < 1.2$
B. Wife's position in the household			
Wife of head, nuclear, or with a senior woman at home	182	$+0.086$ (0.038)	-0.256 (0.080)
Daughter-in-law, both parents-in-law at home	1,528	$+0.016$ (0.010)	$+0.007$ (0.020)
Daughter-in-law, widowed mother-in-law only	358	$+0.052$ (0.029)	-0.074 (0.064)
Daughter-in-law, no parent-in-law at home	143	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.075 (0.066)

Notes: Same estimator and sample as Table 2, run separately on disjoint subsamples defined by the treated household's pre-treatment type; matched controls inherit the type of their matched treated household. Panel A splits by the migrant's occupation in his last at-home survey round; panel B by the migrant's relation to the household head and the co-resident parents-in-law at baseline. Average effects over six post-event periods, standard errors in parentheses clustered by district; differences across subsamples tested with two-sample z-tests. [b] Inverse-variance pooling of two disjoint cells, wife of a household head in a nuclear household (1,408 treated) and with a senior woman at home (182); the two are statistically indistinguishable (all $|z| < 0.7$). [c] Senior-woman cell only; the nuclear cell did not converge for this outcome. – : estimator did not converge in that cell.

Table 4: Children's enrollment during separation and after return

Children aged 8 to 15, in school	After departure: $t{+}1$	After departure: $t{+}6$	After return: $t{+}3$
All children	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.068 (0.013)	-0.042 (0.025)
Girls	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.081 (0.018)	-0.081 (0.035)
Boys	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.064 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.030)
Education spending per capita (Rs), average effect			$+59$ (11)
Treated children observed at the horizon	2,257	952	257

Notes: Event-study coefficients at the indicated period after the father's verified departure (left two columns) and after his verified return (right column), same estimator and clustering as Table 2. Children who leave school report homemaking rather than earning. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district.

Learning From Whom? Paying for Social Learning about Climate Risk Tools in Rural Bolivia

Jimena Romero Pinto (Cornell) and Dev Patel (Brown)

Extended abstract for the NBER Workshop on Development Economics and Networks, December 2026

Motivation. Most models of technology diffusion treat the decision to pass information along as free: once a farmer is informed, her neighbors learn from her at a rate governed by the network. In practice the transmission of information is a costly, bilateral act. A potential teacher must spend time, and a potential learner must decide whom to approach and whether the approach is welcome. If teachers do not internalize the value of what they know, and learners cannot buy instruction, then social learning is undersupplied even in dense networks, and the standard seeding advice (inform the most central node and let the network work) may deliver far less than it promises. We study this margin directly in a field experiment on two climate adaptation tools that are new to smallholder farmers in the Bolivian altiplano: an index-based drought insurance product and a hail and flood early-warning system (EWS). Both are technically simple to describe but easy to misunderstand, which makes the quality of the person one learns from matter.

Design. The pilot covers 67 rural communities. In every community, two randomly selected farmers (the *informed*) received a scripted briefing on both products at baseline. Every respondent then stated, for each of roughly seven listed community members, a willingness to pay (WTP) to be taught about the products by that person and a willingness to accept (WTA) to teach that person, using an incentive-compatible BDM procedure. This gives us a directed price on every sampled dyad from both sides, so that we can separate demand for learning from the supply of teaching. We also elicited the community's information-sharing network (free-text "with whom do you talk about farming"), a socializing network, and open key-informant (KI) nominations. Communities were then randomized. In *matched* communities, each informed farmer was paired with a recipient chosen on the basis of the elicited values, and the pair was paid to hold a facilitated conversation about the products (59 arranged pairs in 38 communities). In control communities the informed farmers were left to transmit on their own. At endline we measure knowledge with eight factual questions about the two products, reported conversations, and WTP for the products themselves, for the informed, the recipients, and the non-targeted members of every community.

Results. Three main findings emerge from the pilot. First, paying for a single conversation moves knowledge well beyond the pair: recipients in matched communities answer 1.25 more of eight questions correctly than comparable farmers in control communities (30 percent of the control mean), the informed farmers who were paid to teach also know more at endline (+1.15), and non-targeted community members who were neither informed nor paired score 0.43 questions higher (10 percent, $p < 0.10$), a spillover not explained by how much the informed farmers knew or by how many were willing to teach. Second, WTP rises with the potential teacher's diffusion centrality and degree on the information-sharing network and is 10 percent higher when the teacher is a nominated key informant, while the teacher's own centrality has no effect on the price she asks to teach. Villagers know who the spreaders are and will pay for them; the spreaders do not price their position. Third, that position is only activated by the intervention: in control communities, more central informed farmers are associated with fewer reported conversations about the products among non-targeted members, whereas in matched communities a one standard deviation more central informed pair raises the probability that a non-targeted member reports multiple conversations by 8 percentage points ($p < 0.01$). Together these results point to a missing market for social learning in which the value of a link lies in the teacher's position, the teacher does not internalize that value, and a small subsidy to the first link is what sets the network in motion.