Demand for Gender Equality in Conservative Contexts*

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Abstract

Gender inequality in conservative contexts may persist partly because of weak citizen demand for progressive policy. Estimating this demand requires eliciting truthful responses on a culturally sensitive issue and isolating voters' reactions to a single policy position. To overcome these obstacles, we use official voting records and two independently implemented field experiments in Turkish elections, in which opposition parties disseminated policy proposals on gender equality or conventional issues. The gender-equality proposals increased the opposition bloc's vote share by 1.1 percentage points (2.1 percent), an effect comparable to that of conventional proposals. This gain accrued not to the campaigning parties but to the opposition party with the strongest gender-equality record, suggesting that content and issue-based sorting, not partisan contact alone, shaped voting behavior. Post-election surveys reveal the opposite pattern: the gender-equality proposals reduced self-reported opposition support by an order of magnitude more than the administrative gain and led to more regressive stated gender attitudes. The divergence in self-reported voting is not explained by survey implementation; most plausibly, it reflects misreporting. Our findings indicate that elite advocacy can activate genuine demand for gender equality in conservative contexts even when stated preferences and attitudes suggest backlash.

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1 Introduction

Over the past century, societies around the world have experienced profound shifts toward more liberal values on cultural and social issues [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005].[1] This progress has recently slowed or reversed in many countries: V-Dem data show that women's civil liberties have declined alongside broader declines in democratic norms over the past two decades (Figure 1). UN Women (2022) similarly reports that democratic backsliding has coincided with backlash against gender equality, itself part of a broader backlash against sociocultural liberalization [Norris and Inglehart, 2019].[2] These changes can be partly understood as the outcome of an equilibrium between political supply, as competing elites change their platforms and policies, and political demand, as citizens' preferences evolve over time. For example, progress may stall or be reversed because voters do not demand change, because parties pursue their own ideology, or because parties fear backlash based on public signals, including polls, surveys, and public discourse. Especially in conservative, authoritarian, or polarized contexts, the signals of demand that elites observe may be distorted. Understanding how elite advocacy for progressive gender policies shapes citizens' responses is therefore essential for assessing the prospects for reform and the roots of ongoing sociocultural conflict.

The challenge in isolating these effects is threefold. First, political platforms bundle multiple issues, making it difficult to isolate citizen responses to a specific policy position. Second, the direction of causality is often unclear: citizens' preferences may drive parties' positions, or elite signals may shape voter preferences (e.g., Zaller [1992], Longuet-Marx [2025]). Third, commonly used methods for eliciting attitudes toward sensitive topics, such as surveys, are prone to misreporting (e.g., Kuran [1987, 1995], Blair et al. [2020]). Respondents may feel social pressure, fear repercussions for expressing their views, or use a survey as a low-stakes opportunity to express dissatisfaction. This concern is particularly acute under authoritarian rule, where progressive policies face strong opposition and freedom of expression is constrained. The first two challenges call for experimental variation in the positions parties take. The third calls for measuring responses in actual voting behavior rather than in stated preferences. Our design does both, which allows us not only to address the measurement problem but also to quantify it, by observing responses to the same campaigns in private behavior and in stated preferences.

[1] See Acemoglu [2013] for an overview of the "Rights Revolution" and Figure 1, which traces the evolution of women's civil liberties and democratic norms since 1900 according to V-Dem. The V-Dem measure of civil liberties encompasses women's access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

[2] While the academic literature on sociocultural backlash has largely focused on United States and a subset of Western democracies, these dynamics may generalize beyond these contexts, as suggested by reported trends by UN-Women [2025]) and documented in Figure 1.

We implement this design through two independently conducted field experiments in Turkey, a conservative, authoritarian context ranked 135th out of 148 countries in the World Economic Forum's 2025 Global Gender Gap Report, during a period of marked deterioration in women's civil liberties under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's more than two decades in power (Figure 1). Following a non-partisan approach, we contacted all five major parties and invited them to collaborate on a study of voter demand for gender-focused policies.[3] Two opposition parties agreed to participate: the İYİ Party during the 2023 national elections in Kars and the CHP during the 2024 local elections in İzmir, where the intervention was implemented at a considerably larger scale.

In both cases, neighborhoods were randomly assigned to receive either (i) a gender-equality campaign addressing domestic violence and women's legal rights, financial support for child and elderly care, and labor force participation; (ii) a non-gender campaign focused on government transparency (İzmir) or education (Kars); or (iii) no campaign. We measure voter responses using administrative ballot-box-level voting records covering more than 480,000 voters across the two project sites. In İzmir, we also conducted an individual-level post-election survey of more than 3,300 respondents, allowing us to compare private voting behavior with reported support and to examine mechanisms, including underlying attitudes and perceived norms.

Our first and central finding, based on the administrative voting records, is that there is privately revealed demand for gender equality. Pooling ballot-box-level returns across provinces, the gender-equality campaign increased support for the opposition bloc by approximately 1.1 percentage points (2.1 percent relative to the control-group mean), an effect similar in magnitude to that of the conventional campaign. We do not detect meaningful changes in aggregate turnout, suggesting that the campaigns operated through vote switching away from the socially conservative incumbent bloc rather than through mobilization. We also find no evidence of backlash in actual voting behavior when we examine heterogeneity by neighborhood-level socioeconomic status, education, ethnicity, and baseline opposition support. These patterns replicate across two sharply different contexts, a large, urban, relatively more liberal, and metropolitan province (İzmir) and a smaller, more rural, relatively more conservative, and economically less developed province (Kars), and are robust across election types and alternative specifications.

Despite their similar aggregate effects, the two campaigns reshaped support within the opposition bloc in distinct ways. The non-gender campaign primarily increased the vote share of the mainstream opposition party (the CHP), with statistically significant effects concentrated in the province where the CHP delivered the campaign. The gender-equality

[3]The initial idea was proposed by political party staff members.

campaign instead shifted support toward the DEM Party, the opposition party most strongly associated with gender equality and minority rights, in both provinces, even though the DEM Party delivered the campaign in neither. These results suggest that voters respond to the content of elite appeals rather than to only contact itself, consistent with theories of issue ownership [Budge and Farlie, 1983, Petrocik, 1996] rather than just partisan persuasion. This pattern also qualifies canonical models of electoral competition [Hotelling, 1929, Downs, 1957], in which shifting policy positions toward voters' preferences benefits the party adopting them, a limitation anticipated by Stokes [1963].

Our second finding is that stated preferences in the survey move in the opposite direction from revealed preferences measured using administrative data. Respondents in treated neighborhoods in Izmir report lower support for the opposition than respondents in control neighborhoods: 10.8 percentage points lower under the gender-equality campaign and 5.9 percentage points lower under the non-gender campaign, driven by reduced reported support for the CHP, the delivering party of both campaigns in Izmir.

The magnitude of the discrepancy between the two data sources restricts the set of explanations. In the administrative data, the campaigns increased opposition support by roughly 1 percentage point, so if survey respondents' votes moved with the rest of the electorate, truthful reporting would have produced an increase in reported support rather than a decline. Reconciling the two estimates through actual behavior requires respondents to be a self-selected group whose behavioral response is opposite in sign to, and an order of magnitude larger than, the population effect, offset by an even larger response among voters outside the survey. Absent heterogeneity of this severity, the gender-equality campaign treatment changed the answers, rather than the votes, of roughly one in ten respondents, and the non-gender campaign treatment changed the answers, rather than votes, of roughly one in twenty respondents. Consistent with this interpretation, the decline in reported opposition support is not offset by an increase in reported support for the incumbent. It is instead accompanied by higher reported abstention, despite no decline in administrative turnout, and by greater unwillingness to disclose vote choice. Treated respondents, but only for the gender-equality campaign, also express more regressive gender attitudes and are rated as less friendly by enumerators. That both campaigns reduced self-reported opposition support suggests that a feature common to the two treatments, either campaign contact or exposure to the policy issues, altered respondents' reporting incentives. The larger reduction under the gender-equality campaign, together with statistically significant differences between treatment arms across several related survey outcomes, suggests that gender content differentially affected reporting.

Consistent with the hypothesis that the survey-based results reflect misreporting, pre-

sumably among voters whose ballot-box behavior was unaffected by the treatment, we also find no issues with survey implementation.[4] Respondent demographics and survey rejection rates are balanced across treatment arms, bystander presence and behavior during interviews are the same across treatment arms, and the results are robust to reweighting to neighborhood demographics. Additionally, we do not find strong heterogeneous treatment effects by respondent demographics required to explain a reversal in sign through selective participation in either the administrative or the survey data. Selection on unobservable characteristics cannot be excluded, but any such account must generate the offsetting pattern described above for both vote choice and turnout while remaining invisible along every observable dimension we examine.

We evaluate three potential explanations for the misreporting: intra-household pressure, concerns about political monitoring by the governing party or the opposition party, and expressive dissatisfaction directed at the delivering party for promoting the particular policy issues. We find that the pattern of results is most consistent with expressive dissatisfaction among the delivering party's core voters, who supported the party at the ballot box despite disagreeing with the policy proposal. The evidence is suggestive, however, and is observationally similar to other mechanisms, such as the campaign treatments affecting voters' concerns about being tracked and appearing supportive of the opposition and progressive policies under an authoritarian and conservative government. Under any of these interpretations, the substantive conclusion is the same: the campaigns widened the gap between voters' private behavior and their reported behavior.

This gap matters for political equilibrium. If parties learn about demand from surveys and public discourse, then the signals they observe in our setting point in the opposite direction of voters' revealed preferences. A party experimenting with a gender-equality platform would conclude from public responses that the strategy backfired, when it in fact gained votes, and survey descriptive statistics would also be misleading. Progressive reform may therefore stall not only when voters oppose it, but also when elites underestimate support, avoid seemingly costly issues, or rely on distorted public signals. Similarly, backsliding in civil rights and liberties may reflect elite strategy under distorted signals or weak institutions rather than voter demand.

Our study relates to several strands of literature in political economy and development

[4]Reluctance to report support for the opposition bloc, especially the DEM Party, which originated in Turkey's pro-Kurdish movement and whose predecessors and current members have faced party closures, prosecutions, and accusations of links to the PKK, an armed Kurdish guerrilla group that countries like Turkey and the U.S. consider a terrorist organization, may help explain why the survey misses the administrative gains. It cannot, however, explain why the estimated treatment effect on the opposition bloc is negative rather than merely muted.

economics. First, we contribute to the literature on policy support and backlash in response to policies and laws on cultural issues (e.g., Cheema et al. [2023], Wheaton [2022], Gulesci et al. [2025], La Ferrara and Yanagizawa-Drott [2026]) and on the role of institutional signals, e.g., organizations, government, and political actors, in changing attitudes and perceptions of norms [Beaman et al., 2009, Bursztyn et al., 2020, Dhar et al., 2022, Tankard and Paluck, 2016]. The positive electoral effects we document demonstrate that even in a conservative, semi-authoritarian context, there is demand for gender-equality policies that parties can activate through policy promises. Our work therefore also complements the literature on the determinants of gender attitudes [Alesina et al., 2013, Bursztyn et al., 2020] by focusing on the supply side, i.e., how elite advocacy interacts with citizen preferences.

Second, we contribute to research on preference falsification and the measurement of sensitive political views (e.g., Kuran [1987, 1995], Frye et al. [2017], Blair et al. [2020], Frye et al. [2023]). Prior research documents systematic misreporting of vote choice and cautions that campaign treatments may affect who responds to follow-up surveys, thereby biasing survey-based treatment effects [Bailey et al., 2016]. Recent experimental evidence also shows that public observability can itself distort participation and expressed choices [Braghieri et al., 2026]. We extend this literature by comparing the effects of the same randomized campaigns in official electoral returns and post-election self-reports. The estimates differ not merely in magnitude but in sign, even though survey participation and observable respondent composition are balanced across treatment arms. Had we relied solely on survey data, we would have concluded that the gender-equality campaign triggered backlash; the administrative data reveal the opposite. While pinpointing the mechanism behind this divergence remains a task for future research, the substantive implication is the same: when treatments alter reporting incentives, survey-based estimates may not only understate true effects but also reverse their sign. This pattern is distinct from the well-documented concern that social desirability bias can distort estimated treatment effects in survey data [Bursztyn et al., 2025]. In our setting, progressive gender attitudes are socially desirable on average, yet the campaign produces more regressive survey responses and lower reported support for the party advancing gender-progressive policies, the opposite of what social desirability pressure would predict. This has implications for interpreting the literature on gender attitudes, where apparent backlash effects (e.g., Cullen et al. [2024]) may partly reflect measurement artifacts rather than genuine preference shifts, and for the design of policies targeting norms and values, where the risk of backlash is a central concern [La Ferrara and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2026, Moscona et al., 2026].

Finally, our paper contributes the field-experimental literature on campaign persuasion and voter responses to policy promises (e.g., Kendall et al. [2015], Cruz et al. [2024, 2025]).

Methodologically, we build on Pons [2018], Baysan [2022] and Acemoglu et al. [2025] by linking randomized door-to-door campaigns to official electoral returns. We extend the approach of previous research by randomizing exposure, within each experiment, to two substantively distinct sets of policy promises (one centered on gender equality and the other on conventional policy issues) while holding fixed the party delivering the campaign and the canvassing protocol.[5] This active comparison isolates message content from effects common to partisan contact. We find asymmetric party-specific electoral responses across campaigns: the gender-equality campaign generates gains primarily for a party that did not conduct the canvassing. These patterns are difficult to reconcile with generic contact or attention effects and provide direct evidence that the *content* of policy appeals shapes how voters reallocate electoral support, allowing us to contribute to the assumptions behind models of electoral competition [Hotelling, 1929, Downs, 1957, Stokes, 1963, Petrocik, 1996, Bélanger and Meguid, 2008].

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, Section 3 the experimental design and data, Section 4 the results based on administrative electoral data, and Section 5 the survey-based results and their reconciliation with the administrative estimates. The final section concludes.

2 Background

2.1 Gender Inequality in Turkey

Gender inequality in Türkiye remains substantial by international comparison. Compared to the 2024 OECD average female labor-force participation rate (FLFP, 54%), Türkiye's FLFP is substantially lower at 37%, placing it closer to India (32%) and Saudi Arabia (33%) and below Bangladesh (39%), all of which are characterized by relatively conservative gender norms [World Bank, 2026a]. These broader gender inequalities are also evident in patterns of gender-based violence. Based on 2023 data, 36.6 percent of ever-partnered women ages 15-49 reported having experienced intimate partner violence in Türkiye, compared with a global average of 24.7 percent [World Bank, 2026b].[6]

[5] Therefore, we also complement a related literature using variation in political positions to recover voter preferences on sociocultural issues [Adams et al., 2004, Elff, 2009, Evans and Tilley, 2012, Danieli et al., 2024, Gethin et al., 2022, Longuet-Marx, 2025]. We contribute to these studies by incorporating experimental variation alongside official electoral data.

[6] While administrative data on gender-based violence in Türkiye are limited, available statistics are consistent with the presence of worsening women's civil liberties. The Ministry of Family and Social Services of Türkiye reported a 58% increase in applications per center to Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers, from 2,037 to 3,214, between 2019 and 2024, a period during which these centers operated nationwide. See Ministry of Family and Social Services of Türkiye, Monthly Statistical Bulletins, available at

Turkey's contemporary international standing marks a significant reversal from past progress. When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded Turkey in 1923, he implemented drastic state modernization reforms, which included universal suffrage and a Civil Code abolishing polygamy and granting women equal rights in divorce, inheritance, and marriage, which advanced women's civil liberties beyond the global average (Figure 1). While transformative, these reforms reflected the efforts of an elite group rather than a broader grassroots movement. Some were exclusionary, including bans on the fez, chador, and veil in official settings. The benefits fell unevenly across society, more directly benefiting upper and urban classes while much of the majority rural, pious population remained "emancipated but not liberated" [Kandiyoti, 1987, White, 2003]. In the following eight decades, Turkey maintained a consistent advantage over the global average.

During the early years of Erdoğan's rule, certain civil liberties for women were also expanded, such as overturning the headscarf ban in public institutions. From 2006 onward, however, consistent with the global average, civil liberties in Turkey have declined alongside a decline in democratic norms, as indicated in Figure 1. The decline accelerated following the 2010 constitutional referendum, as the AKP consolidated control over the judiciary and the media and pursued socially conservative gender policies [Aksoy, 2018, Arat, 2022]. In 2016 and again in 2020, Erdoğan's ruling AKP pursued proposals that would have allowed men who sexually abused minors to avoid or suspend punishment if they married the victim [Solaker and Pamuk, 2016, McKernan, 2020]. In 2021, despite being the first country to ratify it, Türkiye withdrew from the Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe treaty designed to prevent and combat violence against women [Association for Monitoring Gender Equality (CEID), 2025].[7] However, this observed backsliding does not reveal whether voters support this reversal, tolerate it, or would reward parties that move in a more progressive direction.

2.2 Political Context, Parties and the 2023 and 2024 Elections

We implemented the two experiments in different electoral settings. The first experiment was implemented by the İYİ Party in Kars during the final weeks before the May 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections. These were high-stakes national elections after more than two decades of rule by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP, during which Türkiye saw one of the steepest erosions of democratic institutions worldwide—ranked second only to Nicaragua in V-Dem data [Freedom House, 2024]. They took place amid high inflation

https://www.aile.gov.tr/sgbd/istatistik-sayfalari/aylik-istatistik-bulteni/.

[7] Aşık and Mocan [2024] estimate that Turkey's 2021 exit from the Istanbul Convention caused approximately 65 additional female murders per year, concentrated in provinces with stronger support for the governing coalition and lower education levels.

and the aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes, in which over 40,000 people were killed. Gender equality was not a primary national platform issue during the election, so the İYİ Party's decision to campaign in Kars on gender equality and women's civil liberties was a departure from the dominant electoral agenda.

Two major blocs dominated the election. The governing AKP, allied with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, far-right) in the "People's Alliance," retained its parliamentary majority and secured President Erdoğan's re-election. Opposing them was the "Nation Alliance," led by the Republican People's Party (CHP, secular center-left) under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and joined by the Good Party (İYİ Party, a smaller center-right party) and several smaller parties. The pro-Kurdish and left-liberal Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party, formerly HDP) also played a meaningful role in the broader opposition camp. The DEM Party was part of the Labor and Freedom Alliance in the 2023 election period, which was made up of various other Kurdish and left-wing parties, but publicly announced its support for Kılıçdaroğlu for the presidential election. The AKP won about 35.6% of the parliamentary vote and the CHP had the second-highest vote share of about 25.3%, illustrating the ruling coalition's electoral resilience. In the second round of the presidential election, Erdoğan beat Kılıçdaroğlu with 52% of the vote share, securing his 20th consecutive year leading the nation.

The second experiment took place in İzmir before the March 2024 local elections, and the campaign was administered by the CHP. The March 2024 local elections were held across all metropolitan and district municipalities. In İzmir and most cities, the governing AKP and its ally, the MHP, again contested together as the "People's Alliance". The CHP changed its party leader to Özgür Özel, and the İYİ Party ran independently. Folllowing its predecessors, the DEM Party fielded two candidates (one female, one male) for both metropolitan and district mayor elections across several provinces including İzmir, whereas other parties nominated only one candidate per race, with varying demographic profiles. The CHP achieved notable gains, especially in metropolitan areas, and won the highest national vote share for the first time since the AKP came into power. While the CHP is associated with more liberal values, and was founded by Ataturk, gender equality and civil rights have not been a primary part of its platform and policy agenda. Therefore, similar to the other experiment, the campaign on gender equality and women's civil liberties was a shift from the status quo.

2.3 İzmir and Kars

We conduct our analysis in two provinces that were selected based on party-specific constraints. İzmir (population ≈4.4 million) is a large, urban, secular-leaning metropolitan area. Kars (population ≈270,000) is smaller, rural, and more conservative on average. Labor-market participation illustrates the disparities between the two provinces. Female labor-force participation (FLFP) is low overall and varies across regions: metropolitan İzmir exhibits a substantially higher FLFP rate (about 45%) than the more rural NUTS-2 region including Kars (about 32%), underscoring the heterogeneity in baseline gender norms and economic opportunities across our two study sites. [8]

The experimental sample in Kars, and its broader population, is more rural and smaller than in İzmir. The average number of registered voters per neighborhood is 5,058 in İzmir and 412 in Kars. Additionally, 58% and 80% of voters have less than a high school degree in İzmir and Kars, respectively. 43% and 77% of voters live in poor areas in İzmir and Kars, respectively.[9] Finally, 15% of our İzmir endline sample self-reports a non-Turkish language as their mother tongue (nearly all Kurdish), and the predicted Kurdish population share for our sample is 13% (6.4% for the whole province).[10] Kars is historically known for its large Kurdish population. Our predicted share for the experimental sample is 19%, and the provincial estimate is approximately 25.5%. Appendix Figure A-1 shows the party vote share distribution for each province. This figure shows that the opposition is dominant in our experimental sample in İzmir and the reverse is true in Kars. The CHP (35%) and the AKP (29%) are the two dominant parties in İzmir, whereas the AKP (52%) is the dominant party in Kars. The vote share across opposition parties is also more fragmented in Kars: the CHP has 11%, the İYİ Party 6%, and the DEM Party 18%. Therefore, another significant difference is the prominence of the pro-minority and Kurdish rights party in Kars, the DEM Party. Voter turnout is also lower in Kars: 76% compared to 87% in İzmir, despite turnout being generally higher for the presidential and general elections than for the local elections and turnout being compulsory.

[8] Data source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), Turkish Labor Force Survey microdata, 2019.

[9] Socioeconomic status (SES) of the neighborhood is based on the real estate website Endeksa's SES Index which uses a statistical model that combines data on household characteristics, demographic composition, and real estate indicators. Poor areas are defined as those classified under group C and below in the index. See the detailed description of Endeksa SES Index here: https://www.endeksa.com/en/blog/article/what-is-socio-economic-status-ses-why-is-it-important-in-the-choice-of-housing-and-land

[10] See Section B in the Supplementary Material for details on the prediction method.

2.4 Parties' Issue Ownership

The parties in our setting differ in their credibility on gender equality and minority rights. The AKP and MHP have largely adopted more conservative positions on sociocultural issues. The CHP and the İYİ Party can both credibly oppose the incumbent bloc, but neither has the same record of issue ownership on gender equality as parties originating from the pro-Kurdish rights movement, such as the DEM Party. Women have prominently participated in the armed Kurdish movement, and over decades they have also organized to ensure that women's rights and interests are embedded in the movement's formal political institutions (e.g., Al-Ali and Tas [2021]).

In the 2023 parliamentary elections, DEM fielded the highest share of female candidates (43%), ahead of CHP (27%), İYİ (26%), AKP (19.2%), and MHP (15.5%); it also elected the highest share of female MPs (47.4%), compared with CHP (18.5%), İYİ (11.4%), AKP (19%), and MHP (8%). Campa et al. [2024] also present data showing that, historically, party differences in the share of female elected officials are even starker at the local level. Between 2009 and 2015, the share rose from 0 to 1% for the AKP and from 1 to 5% for the CHP, but climbed from 21 to 45% for the pro-Kurdish party. The pro-Kurdish party appears under different names across this period because such parties are associated with the armed Kurdish movement and face frequent closures, re-forming under new labels. For these reasons, reporting support for the party in surveys may be sensitive.

Figure 2 summarizes V-Party (V-Dem) party positions for three Turkish political blocs across four dimensions: the degree to which the party relies on clientelistic practices to mobilize voters, the extent to which the party supports minority rights, the level of women's representation in national-level party leadership, and the degree of support for women's labor force participation using data from 2018 [Lindberg et al., 2022]. Scores are shown on a common -5 to +5 scale with confidence intervals reflecting uncertainty in country experts' ratings. Overall, the figure indicates that the AKP/MHP (People) is coded as comparatively less supportive across these dimensions (negative values), the CHP/İYİ (Nation) as moderately supportive (positive but smaller magnitudes), and the DEM as the most supportive, especially on minority rights and gender equality. The DEM and the CHP/İYİ are tied on the clientelism measure.[11] These differences imply clear partisan variation across the incumbent and opposition blocs, but also within the opposition bloc, in the credibility of gender-equality-promoting pledges, a feature we exploit when interpreting electoral responses to gender-focused campaigning.

[11] We include clientelism because it is the party characteristic most closely related to the CHP's campaign on transparency.

3 Experimental Design and Data

This section provides an overview of the timeline and the design of the two experiments, and describes the survey and administrative data.

3.1 Timeline

In December 2022, we extended invitations to the five parties represented in parliament, the AKP, the CHP, the Peoples' Democratic Party (the HDP, predecessor to the DEM Party formed in 2023), the İYİ Party, and the MHP, to participate in a study investigating voter demand for democratic institutions ahead of the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections.[12] The İYİ Party and the CHP agreed to participate in the study. This involved disseminating information about the state and value of democratic institutions through a door-to-door information campaign in İzmir.

During the implementation phase of the previous study, the İYİ Party proposed that we also evaluate a small-scale door-to-door campaign in Kars, in which the local campaign team planned to share policy promises on gender equality and women's civil liberties as part of its campaign for the 2023 elections. Given the relevance of this topic to democracy and civil liberties, we agreed to evaluate their proposed campaign as a randomized controlled trial. We submitted a separate PAP for it because it could not logistically be integrated into the other study and was conducted at a smaller scale. The İYİ Party started campaigning less than two weeks before the presidential and general elections, and completed the intervention two days before the election. The İYİ Party designed the details of the campaign. This initiative was not part of the İYİ's broader national strategy, but the campaign team in Kars wanted to understand how such a platform shift would affect voters.

In December 2023, we invited the same five parties for a collaboration to replicate the study on gender equality for the 2024 local elections. We followed up with them in January 2024. In these communications, we introduced our research team, outlined the study's objectives, and requested a meeting to discuss the study in more detail. For the invitation email's translated version, see Supplementary Material Figure C-1. Following this invitation, the CHP and the İYİ Party agreed to collaborate; however, the İYİ Party was unable to implement the intervention. The CHP planned to implement the door-to-door campaign in four provinces –Adana, Manisa, Muğla, and İzmir– between March 3rd, 2024 and March 28th, 2024, stopping a few days before the election. While the CHP printed the required pamphlets for all provinces, they successfully implemented the campaign only in İzmir.[13] We

[12] See Acemoglu et al. [2025] for full details of the study on voter demand for democratic institutions.

[13] In Izmir, the treatment design was correctly pursued. 95% of the intended-to-treat households received

therefore administered the endline survey only in İzmir.

Data collection in İzmir began five weeks after the election due to Ramadan and the politically tense environment, and was completed in the first week of June 2024.[14] We did not implement a baseline survey given all of the uncertainty surrounding the election and the CHP's capacity to organize a campaign in different provinces. After the loss of the 2023 presidential election, the party's volunteer capacity dwindled. Additionally, the party headquarters was not fully aware that local politicians and staff did not want to coordinate with it. Finally, the party did not choose its candidates until just two months prior to the election.

3.2 Experimental Design for Kars and İzmir

3.2.1 Recruitment and Sample

Randomization between different policy promise treatments and the control group was at the neighborhood level in each experiment, as the neighborhood is the smallest geographic unit in official electoral data that we can track over time. The districts included in each sample were selected by the implementing parties. The details of sampling vary across the two provinces:

İzmir

There are 30 districts in İzmir, and 4 are included in our sample: Menderes, Menemen, Bayraklı, and Karabağlar. We used data from the 2023 Parliamentary Elections to exclude from our sample neighborhoods that were too remote, would require more time for our canvassers to visit a sufficient number of voters (number of registered voters was smaller than 150 or greater than 9,000), or where any party received more than 75% of the vote share and CHP received more than 65% or less than 10% of the vote share in the previous presidential election. The vote share cutoffs were determined by the party. Randomization is stratified by six quantiles of vote share for the National Alliance in 2023 Parliamentary

a pamphlet, and 37% of them opened the door to canvassers. In Muğla, the treatment design was partially followed. The canvassers were able to reach only approximately half of the treatment neighborhoods, and they only reached a subset of households within these neighborhoods. In particular, 25% of the intended-to-treat households received a pamphlet, and 14% of them opened the door to canvassers. In Adana and Manisa, the treatment design was not properly followed. They did not deliver the information properly or completely, and there is uncertainty about the accuracy of visits in treatment and control neighborhoods. We also discuss the details of the province-level issues in our AEA registry.

[14]Survey data collection around Turkish elections is challenging. After the 2023 presidential and general elections, we were unable to implement an endline survey, despite having implemented a baseline survey. These were historic and polarizing elections, as the opposition expected Erdoğan's longstanding rule to come to an end. The conditions were less tense after the 2024 local elections, and we waited to start data collection and create distance from the election.

Elections. We ended up with a final experimental sample of 146 neighborhoods, out of which 96 were randomly selected as treatment neighborhoods.[15] These treatment neighborhoods contained 305,571 registered voters according to our 2024 Local Elections rolls.

Kars

There are 8 districts in Kars, and 3 are included in our sample: Sarıkamış, Arpaçay, and Akyaka. We used data from the 2018 Parliamentary Elections to exclude from our sample neighborhoods that were outliers in terms of neighborhood size (number of registered voters was smaller than 150 or greater than 9,000) and had more than 50% of votes for the Nation Alliance, as required by the party. Randomization is stratified by district and terciles of the vote share of Nation Alliance in 2018 Presidential Elections.[16] We ended up with a final experimental sample of 91 neighborhoods, out of which 44 were randomly selected as treatment neighborhoods. These treatment neighborhoods contained 14,165 voters according to our 2023 Parliamentary Elections rolls. We needed to keep the sample size small due to having limited time for implementation and the İYİ Party's limited resources. Due to the small number of treated neighborhoods in Kars, we have statistical power to detect only large treatment effects on vote share and voter turnout.

The total number of registered voters and neighborhoods in our experimental sample for Kars and İzmir are shown in Appendix Table A-2.

3.2.2 Treatment Description: Policy Promise Campaigns

In both provinces, the intervention involved a door-to-door canvassing campaign in which canvassers distributed and explained a brochure presenting the party's policy pledges. Each treated neighborhood was assigned a single brochure type, and all households in that neighborhood were visited. The control group did not receive either of these two campaigns. Canvassers verbally explained the pamphlet content to any voting-age household member who opened the door, and they left behind a pamphlet regardless of whether the door was opened. While the front pages present policy pledges in both provinces, the back pages differ: in İzmir, the back page includes the district mayor candidate's name and surname, a photograph of the candidate, and the candidate's title, "District Mayor Candidate of X," where "X" denotes the district. In Kars, the back page contains no information or images; instead, the front page also includes the party and alliance labels.

In one treatment arm, which we refer to as the gender-equality campaign, voters received a brochure containing campaign policy pledges to promote gender equality. The İYİ Party

[15] We selected a well-balanced draw from among 10,000 re-randomizations to avoid other chance imbalances for each treatment arm (following Banerjee et al. [2017]).

[16] Stratification differed across provinces due to design considerations and partner logistics.

designed the original pamphlet for the 2023 elections. They chose to focus on three themes: economic empowerment, domestic violence, and financial assistance for child and elderly care. The İYİ Party also included its party logo and its affiliation with the Nation Alliance on the pamphlet, indicating its explicit support for Kılıçdaroğlu as the presidential candidate and the broader alliance. After expressing interest in collaborating for the 2024 local election, the research team shared the pamphlet with the CHP.[17] The CHP modified some of the details, but included the same three policy themes as the İYİ Party, in addition to its party logo and the name and picture of the district's political candidate. For example, both parties promised to establish job training centers for women, provide monthly basic income support, establish justice centers to provide legal support for victims of domestic violence, and provide monetary support for childcare and elderly care to facilitate labor force participation. Further details of the pledges can be seen in Appendix Figure A-2.

In the non-gender-specific campaign treatment arm, the brochure included policy pledges that were not designed to target preferences directly related to gender equality and addressed issues usually emphasized by the implementing parties. The topics of the pledges in the second treatment arm varied across the two experiments because of the parties' differing priorities. In Kars, the pledges addressed "youth" issues such as subsidizing university tuition, eliminating nepotism, and establishing universities' autonomy from the state. In İzmir, the policy pledges consisted of promises to use municipality resources more efficiently if elected, including increased savings, public participation in budget creation, and more transparent government expenditure. The party and alliance-related details remained the same as in the gender-equality campaign. The purpose of including a non-gender-specific campaign treatment arm is to isolate the effects of the specific campaign promises from party canvasser effects on vote share. The details of the non-gender-specific campaign can be seen in Appendix Figure A-3.

3.3 Data

3.3.1 Electoral Data: Kars and İzmir

Our analysis of administrative electoral results relies on official ballot box–level data on vote shares and turnout from the 2023 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and the 2024 Local Elections, obtained from the Turkish Supreme Election Council's website. Our sample comprises 117 ballot boxes in Kars and 1,383 in İzmir. Summary statistics for the pre-treatment electoral variables are reported in Panel A of Table 1 for İzmir and Table 2

[17] Following the Nation Alliance's unsuccessful performance in the 2023 elections, and broader ideological rifts, the İYİ Party left the Nation Alliance before the 2024 local elections.

for Kars.

3.3.2 Neighborhood Demographic Data: Kars and İzmir

We use two different data sources of neighborhood-level demographics to assess the robustness of our estimates to different survey weights and to further investigate the mechanisms underlying the treatment effect. First, we collected neighborhood-level demographic data shared by *endeksa.com*, a real estate data analytics and insights platform based in Türkiye. Based on information provided on their website, these data were sourced from the Turkish Statistical Institute in 2023. The dataset includes counts of neighborhood residents by educational attainment, marital status, the province of Türkiye from which their families originate, and the socioeconomic class of their area of residence. Socioeconomic classes are constructed and assigned by Endeksa using a neighborhood-level index they developed, which combines data on household characteristics, demographic composition, and real estate indicators. Second, we use administrative data on the neighborhood-level distribution of eligible voters' gender and age, provided by the political parties we collaborated with. Summary statistics for the neighborhood-level demographic variables used in our analysis are reported in Panel B of Table 1 for İzmir and Panel B of Table 2 for Kars.

3.3.3 Survey Data: İzmir

Between April 30, 2024 and June 3, 2024, we administered an endline survey in our sample of neighborhoods in İzmir to measure the treatment effect primarily on self-reported voting preferences, individual attitudes towards the issues addressed by election campaigns in both treatment arms, and their perceived norms on these issues. We aimed to survey between 16 and 20 respondents per neighborhood, and surveyors visited all neighborhoods in both the treatment and control groups.

Surveyors conducted door-to-door interviews using a random-walk sampling strategy. They began from four focal points in each neighborhood, which were selected to maximize residential coverage. After completing the first household interview, they proceeded to every fifth building, conducting one survey per building. Surveyors approached households and invited one voting-eligible household member to participate. Respondents were informed that the survey was being administered by researchers at a local university and focused on local government policies. We did not collect respondents' home addresses or any other identifying information.

The survey takes approximately ten minutes to complete and covers questions on: (1) Socio-demographic characteristics; (2) attitudes toward and perceived norms regarding gen-

der equality and corruption; (3) policy priorities and rankings of gender-progressive and other policies; (4) respondents' perceptions of political parties' competence in implementing different policies; (5) exposure to election campaigns; (6) additional respondent characteristics, including voting preferences in the district mayor election; and (7) interviewer-reported interview conditions. Details on survey summary statistics and balance tests are provided in Section 5.

4 Results Based on Administrative Electoral Data

This section examines the treatment effects of the informational campaigns on *actual* voting behavior using administrative election data. The analysis draws on the 2023 Kars intervention preceding the presidential and parliamentary elections and the larger İzmir intervention preceding the 2024 local elections, which included district mayoral, metropolitan mayoral, and municipal council races.

4.1 Empirical Strategy

Our focus is on intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, which capture the causal effect of assignment to the gender-equality campaign and to the non-gender-equality campaign. For each province, we estimate:

$$Y_{bne} = \alpha_e + \beta^G T_n^G + \beta^N T_n^N + X_{bn}' \delta_e + \varepsilon_{bne}, \tag{1}$$

where the subscript b, indexes a ballot box within neighborhood n. The index e denotes the election type, which includes the 2024 local elections for metropolitan mayor, district mayor, and council in the case of İzmir and the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in the case of Kars. The outcome Y_{bne} indicates the ballot-box–level vote share for different parties, candidates, electoral blocs, or voter turnout, constructed from official election returns of the respective election. The variables T_n^G and T_n^N are indicators for assignment to the gender-equality and non-gender campaign treatments, respectively. The vector X_{bn} includes pre-treatment ballot-box- and neighborhood-level characteristics, with coefficients allowed to vary by election type. Finally, ε_{bne} denotes the error term.

In our baseline specification, we follow our pre-analysis plan (PAP) and include: (i) a vector of neighborhood-level controls from prior elections (2023 for İzmir and 2018 for Kars), including turnout, the number of registered voters, and vote shares for opposition parties (CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and the combined vote share of remaining opposition parties); (ii) district fixed effects and indicators for sextiles of opposition vote share, capturing the

key stratification dimensions in both provinces; and (iii) the number of registered voters in the current election at the ballot-box–level.[18]

Our parameters of interest, β^G and β^N, capture the average treatment effects of the gender and non-gender campaigns relative to the control group that received no information. In addition to the province-specific estimates from equation (1), we report pooled treatment effects across provinces to provide an overall estimate of campaign impacts.[19] In the appendix, we present estimates by election type within each province.

In all specifications, we report standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level, as this is the level at which we conduct the randomization.

4.2 Balance and Compliance

Tables 1 and 2 report baseline covariates and the corresponding balance tests for each province. We find no statistically significant imbalances across treatment groups, although some baseline differences are economically meaningful. In İzmir, for example, the DEM vote share is approximately 1 percentage point higher in neighborhoods assigned to either the gender or non-gender campaign relative to the control group. In Kars, opposition vote share is 9.6 percentage points higher in the gender group compared to the control group. Although these differences are far from statistically significant (p-values for joint significance are 0.85 and 0.33, respectively), their magnitudes warrant attention. Vote shares are highly persistent across elections, and omitting lagged vote shares increases residual variation. Therefore, we pre-specified controlling for prior vote shares to increase statistical power and address baseline imbalance, even if they are not statistically significant. In the robustness section, we show that controlling for prior vote shares affects the magnitude of some coefficients–in the direction of the baseline differences–but in no case do these adjustments materially alter

[18] We submitted the PAPs around the time of each election, with the Kars PAP submitted first, in May 2023. At the time of the Kars PAP, there was uncertainty about whether and where a follow-up experiment would take place. Due to design considerations and partner logistics, the variables used for stratified randomization differed across provinces. In the 2024 PAP, we stated that we would estimate treatment effects separately by location and pool data across study locations, including Kars, to improve statistical power. For expositional consistency, our baseline specification therefore uses the same set of fixed effects in both provinces: sextile fixed effects based on prior opposition vote share. In Section 4.4, we show that the results are robust to instead controlling for the province-specific stratification variables used in the randomization: sextile fixed effects in İzmir, and tercile-by-district fixed effects in Kars. For the stratifying variables and neighborhood-level controls, we use the preceding election in İzmir and the 2018 general election in Kars instead of the 2019 local election, since the DEM Party did not field candidates in some districts included in the experimental sample in the 2019 local elections.

[19] Specifically, we estimate:

$$Y_{bnep} = \alpha_{ep} + \beta^G T^G_{np} + \beta^N T^N_{np} + X'_{bnp}\delta_{ep} + \varepsilon_{bnep}. \tag{2}$$

the direction of our results.

Appendix Table A-3 shows that canvassers successfully completed conversations and delivered pamphlets in 32 percent of visits in İzmir. Completion rates are similar across the gender and non-gender campaigns (p-value of equality across both campaigns is 0.58), and cross-treatment contamination—households receiving materials from a campaign different from their assignment—is rare and not differential across treatments.

4.3 Main Results

4.3.1 Support toward the Opposition Bloc

Table 3 summarizes the main treatment effects of the gender and non-gender campaigns on voting behavior using administrative records. Panels A and B report the province-specific estimates for İzmir and Kars, respectively, while Panel C reports the pooled estimates combining data from both provinces.

Column (1) reports the treatment effects on the opposition bloc's vote share.[20]

Panel A shows that, in İzmir, the gender-equality and transparency campaigns increased opposition vote share by 0.9 percentage points (s.e. 0.4) and 1.0 percentage point (s.e. 0.4), respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant, and we cannot reject that they are equal ($p = 0.892$).

Panel B shows positive, but less precisely estimated, effects in Kars. The gender-equality campaign increased opposition vote share by 4.9 percentage points (s.e. 1.8), equivalent to approximately 13 percent of the control-group mean. The non-gender campaign's estimated effect is 2.0 percentage points (s.e. 2.2) and is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Although the gender-equality estimate is larger, we cannot reject equality of the two treatment effects ($p = 0.256$).

The aggregated estimates in Column (1) of Panel C indicate a precisely estimated 1.1 percentage points increase in the opposition vote share in response to each campaign. This effect corresponds to a 2.1 percent increase relative to the control group mean and approximately 9 percent of its standard deviation.

Panel C pools the data from both provinces. Both campaigns increased opposition vote share by 1.1 percentage points (s.e. 0.4 in both cases). Both estimates are statistically significant and nearly identical ($p = 0.940$). Relative to the pooled control-group mean, these effects correspond to increases of approximately 2.1 percent, or approximately 9 percent of the outcome's standard deviation.

[20] *Opposition bloc* is defined as the set of political parties that participated in the relevant election and neither supported Erdoğan nor were members of the People's Alliance in the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections.

The 1.1 percentage point effect we estimate is comparable to, and if anything slightly larger than, those documented in related experimental studies.[21]

Column (2) reports effects on aggregate turnout. The pooled estimates are −0.2 percentage points (s.e. 0.4) for the gender-equality campaign and less than 0.1 percentage points (s.e. 0.4) for the non-gender campaign. Neither estimate is statistically significant, and we also find no significant turnout effects within either province. The increase in support for the opposition bloc therefore appears to reflect a shift away from the incumbent rather than greater electoral participation.

The previous results suggest that, in the context we study, campaigns on liberal issues, such as gender-equality policy promises, appear to produce genuine shifts in voter support rather than backlash. Moreover, the fact that the aggregate effects of the gender and non-gender campaigns are similar in magnitude is consistent with the idea that campaigning on these sensitive issues can be as salient to voters as campaigning on more traditional issues. An important question, however, is whether the similarity in coefficients instead reflects a persuasion effect—namely, that voters respond to contact itself and party influence, rather than to the specific content of the campaign. We now turn to explore this question.

4.3.2 Party-Specific Support

Columns (3)–(6) of Table 3 decompose the bloc-level effects by party, allowing us to assess which opposition parties benefit from each campaign. Interestingly, we find highly asymmetric effects by campaign type.

Pooling data across both provinces, the non-gender campaign significantly increases the CHP's vote share, raising it by about 0.9 percentage points in the pooled sample (s.e. 0.4), with no meaningful changes for other opposition parties. In contrast, the gains for the opposition bloc generated by the gender-equality campaign are driven primarily by increased support for the DEM Party; estimated effects on the remaining opposition parties are close to zero and statistically insignificant. The aggregate effect for the DEM Party under the gender-equality campaign is 0.6 percentage points (s.e. 0.2), and, as with the non-gender campaign, we observe the same pattern in both provinces. P-values for equality of the two campaign types within the same party are also reported. These equal 0.137 for the CHP and 0.126 for the DEM Party, the two parties primarily driving support in the non-gender

[21] For example, Acemoglu et al. [2025] find that informational campaigns aimed at correcting misperceptions about democracy in İzmir increased opposition vote share by 0.8 percentage points in the 2023 election. Baysan [2022] find no aggregate effects of messages on executive performance and power prior to the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum. Similarly, Pons [2018] show that a traditional campaign supporting François Hollande's presidential candidacy in the 2012 French election increased vote share by 0.8 percentage points.

and gender-equality campaigns, respectively.

Consistent with these differences, we reject the null hypothesis that either campaign generates equal effects across parties. The p-value for equality across all parties equals 0.043 for the gender-equality campaign and 0.044 for the non-gender campaign.

Panels A and B show similar party-specific patterns within each province. The gender-equality campaign increased the DEM Party's vote share by 0.6 percentage points (s.e. 0.2) in İzmir, equivalent to 11 percent of the control-group mean, and by 3.1 percentage points (s.e. 1.5) in Kars, equivalent to 19 percent of the control-group mean. By contrast, the non-gender campaign increased support for the delivering party in İzmir, raising the CHP's vote share by 0.9 percentage points (s.e. 0.4), but had no statistically significant effect on the delivering party in Kars: the estimated effect on the İYİ Party's vote share is −0.1 percentage points (s.e. 1.2).

4.4 Robustness

One important dimension of robustness concerns the set of controls. Although we detect no statistically significant imbalances across treatment groups (see Tables 1 and 2), the moderate number of clusters, i.e., neighborhoods, implies that even statistically insignificant differences may affect the estimates. Vote shares are highly persistent across elections, and omitting lagged vote shares increases residual variation. This consideration motivated our main specification, which includes prior election outcomes, as specified in our pre-analysis plan. To demonstrate robustness, Table A-4 reports estimates using alternative control sets for aggregated opposition vote share and turnout, and Table A-5 reports the corresponding effects for each opposition party. Varying the control set does not materially affect the qualitative conclusions, although the treatment effects are smaller when we control for past vote shares, consistent with small differences in baseline vote shares across treatment arms. Including additional covariates beyond lagged vote shares does not further alter the results. In all specifications, the informational treatment remains in the same direction as in Table 3.

Appendix Table A-6 reports two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates that instrument the share of completed conversations with random assignment for İzmir (information on completed conversations is not available for Kars). The estimates indicate that full compliance—a 100 percentage point increase in completed conversations—would raise the opposition's vote share by approximately 3 percentage points, with the gender equality campaign increasing the DEM's vote share by about 1.8 percentage points and the non-gender campaign increasing the CHP's vote share by about 2.9 percentage points. Because these estimates rely on

stronger identification assumptions, we prioritize the ITT estimates in the main text and interpret the 2SLS results with caution.[22]

Opposition vote share in Table 3 serves as a proxy for support for liberal positions, as incumbent parties have largely adopted less progressive stances on sociocultural issues (Section 2). Appendix Table A-7 reports estimates comparable to those in Table 3, but focus on incumbent rather than opposition parties. They show that the treatment effects documented above operate primarily through reductions in AKP vote share (and MHP in Kars; in İzmir, the MHP ran in coalition with the AKP and did not compete separately), rather than through declines in smaller parties.

Appendix Table A-8 estimates equation (1) separately for each election type, including the 2024 local elections for district mayor, metropolitan mayor, and council in the case of İzmir, and the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections in the case of Kars. The results are highly consistent for each individual election and closely align with those reported in Table 3.

In Tables C-1 and C-2 of the Online Supplementary Material, we also show the results for the neighborhood-level analysis and the results for Kars where we control for dummies for terciles, rather than sextiles, of opposition vote share for our strata fixed effects, since this was the original strata for the randomization. As discussed previously, we use sextiles in our main analysis for expositional purposes and so we can pool our data across provinces and implement the same empirical regression, but just with election fixed effects. The same patterns emerge as in our main analysis: the gender equality campaign treatment increased the opposition parties' vote share, but the change in vote share is mostly attributable to increased support for the DEM Party, rather than the delivering party, in either province.

4.4.1 Heterogeneity Analysis

Next, we investigate which voters are driving the campaign treatment effects on vote share in each province. Research investigating the rise of "populism," while focused on the U.S. and other Western democracies, finds that in recent years there has been partisan realignment between "left-wing" and "right-wing" parties by education level, and in the opposite direction by gender; these dynamics extend beyond Western democracies to countries such as Turkey. Some scholars attribute this realignment to sociocultural issues rather than economic factors and preferences [Longuet-Marx, 2025, Gethin et al., 2022]. Accordingly, we estimate

[22]Identification requires that assignment affect outcomes only through completed conversations. In our setting, however, canvassers left pamphlets when no one answered the door, so assignment may have influenced voting even in the absence of a conversation. For instance, if pamphlet-only exposure has a direct effect, the 2SLS estimates reflect both conversations and pamphlet exposure. If that effect is non-negative, the 2SLS estimates provide an upper bound on the causal effect of completed conversations.

heterogeneous campaign treatment effects using demographic data on neighborhood-level measures of education and socio-economic status. We also use data on Kurdish ethnicity because the Kurdish population constitutes the largest ethnic minority group facing significant human rights and civil rights violations in Turkey, and the pro-Kurdish political movement is strongly linked to gender equality advocacy (e.g., Campa et al. [2024]). Finally, we also incorporate baseline oppositional vote share for the heterogeneity analysis. We use these same variables for our heterogeneity analysis with the survey data, in addition to individual-level data on demographics, including gender.

Table 4 shows the results of our heterogeneity analysis in İzmir. The results indicate that the only significant source of heterogeneous treatment effect for the gender-equality campaign is the predicted Kurdish neighborhood-level population share. The estimates in Panel A imply that neighborhoods with a Kurdish population share 10 p.p. higher show a gender-equality campaign treatment effect that is about twice as large. In Table 5 for Kars, we also do not see any striking heterogeneous treatment effects for the gender equality campaign; the treatment effect is somewhat lower in neighborhoods with a higher oppositional vote share. Overall, we do not see evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects by education level, predicted Kurdish population share, or socio-economic status. The heterogeneity analysis for Kars, however, needs to be treated with caution given the small sample size. We revisit this heterogeneity analysis for Izmir when discussing the survey-based data.

4.4.2 Interpretation of the Electoral Analysis Results

There are a number of mechanisms that can explain why voters increased their vote share for a party that did not deliver the campaign messages and why they voted for DEM, specifically. The campaigns may have increased the salience of gender-related policies, changed the issues that voters consider most important (agenda-setting), or legitimized and made mainstream an issue neglected by most parties other than the DEM Party. Under all of these explanations, voters prefer the party for which there is "issue ownership" [Petrocik, 1996] It's also possible that the implementing parties were viewed as insincere and instrumentalist in promoting gender equality. This could have had a demobilizing effect for some of their voters, while mobilizing progressive voters to increase support for the DEM Party. It's less likely that the explanation is related to strategic voting where voters supported the DEM Party in order to benefit the other opposition parties. This is because, on aggregate, the DEM Party's vote share increases at the expense of the incumbent parties' vote share rather than other opposition parties.

Taken together, these findings are more consistent with issue-based voter sorting than with a pure persuasion or contact effect. If campaign visits operated mainly by increasing

goodwill toward the delivering party, we would expect that party to benefit regardless of content. Instead, when the campaign emphasizes gender equality, voters disproportionately shift toward the opposition party that is most strongly associated with that issue. As discussed previously, the DEM Party has a longstanding record in advocating for gender equality and is ranked highest on this issue by V-Party. This pattern indicates that the campaigns increase the salience of policy positions and that voters respond in a discerning manner, selecting the party they perceive as most aligned with their preferences. Therefore, in two distinct contexts, which vary significantly by gender inequality levels, and the campaign delivering party, we see similar patterns in voter sophistication.

5 Results Based on Survey Data

This section discusses the intervention's effects on self-reported voting measures, contrasts them with results from administrative data, and reviews additional survey outcomes, including voters' views on gender equality issues. This analysis focuses exclusively on İzmir, where we conducted the endline survey five weeks after the 2024 local elections.

5.1 Empirical Strategy

For survey-data outcomes, we estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{ni} = \delta + \gamma_G T_n^G + \gamma_N T_n^N + X_n'\theta + v_{ni}, \tag{3}$$

where i indexes individuals interviewed in neighborhood n. T_n^G and T_n^N are indicators equal to one if individual i resides in a neighborhood assigned to the gender or non-gender campaign, respectively. X_n denotes the vector of controls, and v_{ni} is the error term. This specification is the individual-level analogue of equation (1), and we include the same baseline set of controls.[23]

As in the previous section, standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. We weight each observation by the ratio of registered voters to survey respondents in the neighborhood, so that neighborhoods contribute in proportion to their voting population and the estimates are comparable to those in the administrative analysis.

[23]The only exception is that, because we cannot map survey respondents to ballot boxes, ballot-box-level controls (e.g., the number of registered voters in the same electoral year) are included at the neighborhood level.

5.2 Summary Statistics and Balance

A total of 3,378 participants completed the endline survey, comprising 1,180 from neighborhoods assigned to the control group, 1,108 assigned to the gender treatment campaign, and 1,090 assigned to the non-gender treatment campaign.

Appendix Table A-9 presents summary statistics and balance tests for survey implementation characteristics (Panel A) and endline demographic characteristics (Panel B). Although measured post-treatment, these variables are largely predetermined and unlikely to respond materially over such a short horizon, so they provide informative, albeit imperfect, tests of balance in these characteristics. Our primary objective in conducting these balance tests is to check if the treatment assignment affected the composition of respondents. Out of 26 covariates tested for balance, employment status is imbalanced at the 5 percent level, and below-median income is imbalanced at the 10 percent level. Given the number of covariates tested, this degree of imbalance is consistent with chance; nevertheless, we include baseline controls in our preferred specification and show that the results are robust to their exclusion. The table shows that the sample is evenly split between men and women, 53% report having less than a high school degree, and 15% report having a mother-tongue that is not Turkish.

Appendix Table A-10 presents summary statistics for the non-demographic endline survey questions, including self-reported voting preferences, views on gender and other sociocultural issues, perceptions of others' views, assessments of party competence, and policy preferences. We have four attitudinal questions on gender inequality, which we use to construct an index. We find that 41% of respondents agree that men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce, 29% agree that men make better political leaders, 3% agree that beating a wife can be justifiable, and 57% agree that children suffer when the mother works. It is worth noting, however, that all of these attitudinal measures, except whether children suffer when a mother works, are significantly different from what respondents believe about their neighbors, which we also illustrate in Figure 3. We asked respondents how many of their 10 closest neighbors agree with each statement. The gender inequality index increases from 32% for respondents' own attitudes to 42% for their beliefs about neighbors' attitudes. In particular, 15% believe that their neighbors agree that beating a wife can be justifiable. The only variable that is not different is beliefs about the negative consequences of mothers working, for which there is majority agreement in attitudes, suggesting that social desirability bias is more muted for this issue. Agreement with all of these questions, except for the impact of mothers working, again increases when we ask about the rest of Turkey, but it is worth noting that İzmir is more liberal relative to the national average (e.g., the female labor force participation rate in Izmir is 45% while the national average is 36%). Respondents believe that 30% of Turks agree that beating a wife is justifiable. This is close to the 2023 national average (37

percent) of women reporting experience with intimate partner violence, according to data from the Demographic Health Survey and as disseminated by the World Bank.[24] These gaps between respondents' reported own views and their perceptions of others are consistent with social-image concerns in reporting sensitive attitudes.

The attitudinal question related to the non-gender campaign measures respondents' views on whether corruption can be eradicated from politics. Unlike the gender-related measures, we find that attitudes about whether corruption can be removed from politics do not vary relative to perceived local norms or country-wide norms on this issue; 51% of respondents believe corruption can be eradicated from local politics while respondents believe that 54% of their neighbors, and 51% of Turks believe that it can be eradicated.

We also measured respondents' perceptions of parties' competence to implement gender-equality related policies versus transparency-related policies. While the CHP is considered the most competent in implementing both policies, reflecting the overrepresentation of opposition supporters among survey respondents, it is considered more competent on transparency.[25] Voters' perceptions of the CHP's lower competence in implementing gender-equality policies are driven by 25% of respondents believing there is no difference between parties in their ability to implement gender equality related policies versus 16% for transparency-related policies. We also asked voters their policy preferences for two policies related to gender inequality (domestic violence and labor force participation), one related to transparent and efficient use of municipality funds, and one related to urban infrastructure projects to create jobs and reduce congestion. 42% of voters list gender-equality related policies in their top two preferred policies, versus 63 to 64% listing the other two in their top two preferred policies.

5.3 Treatment Effects on Reported Behavior and Attitudes

5.3.1 Self-Reported Voting

Table 6 reports treatment effects of the intervention on self-reported voting behavior in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election. Column (1) shows effects on overall opposition vote share and indicates that respondents in neighborhoods assigned to either campaign report lower support for the opposition bloc relative to those in control neighborhoods.

[24] See data source description here: https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/turkiye

[25] Overall opposition support is similar across the survey and administrative data (59% vs. 52.6%), though CHP is overrepresented among self-reporters (54% vs. 41.6%), while İYİ and DEM are underrepresented. AKP is underrepresented in self-reports (22% vs. 43.2%). These patterns also likely reflect, at least in part, the 12% of respondents who declined to state a party preference, as well as well-documented tendencies toward misreporting of vote choice and turnout in surveys. Official voter turnout is also .76, while it is reported as .81 based on our surveyed sample.

The estimated decline is 10.8 percentage points (s.e. 3.5) for the gender campaign and 5.9 percentage points (s.e. 2.8) for the transparency campaign (the non-gender campaign in İzmir). These correspond to reductions of approximately 18 percent and 10 percent, respectively, relative to the control-group mean of 0.586.

Column (2) shows that the gender campaign reduced reported turnout by 8.4 percentage points (s.e. 2.8), whereas the estimated effect of the non-gender campaign is smaller (–2.4 percentage points) and non-statistically significant.

Columns (3)–(6) decompose these effects by party and show that the aggregate decline in reported opposition support in Column (1) is driven by reduced self-reported support for the CHP, the delivering party in İzmir.[26] Column (3) reports declines of 11.9 (s.e. 3.5) and 5.6 (s.e. 2.9) percentage points in reported CHP support under the gender and transparency campaigns, respectively. Columns (4)–(6) show no statistically distinguishable effects on reported support for other opposition parties. We reject equality of effects across opposition parties for the gender campaign ($p = 0.011$); with the corresponding p-value for the non-gender campaign being 0.175.

Finally, Column (7) shows effects on the probability that respondents prefer not to disclose their vote choice. The gender campaign is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase (s.e. 2.8), while the estimate for the non-gender campaign is 0.8 percentage points (s.e. 2.2). Neither estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero.

The findings in Table 6 stand in stark contrast to the results based on administrative voting data (reported in Table 3; see also Appendix Table A-8 for estimates specific to the district mayoral election), which show that the same interventions increased overall opposition vote share. In the administrative data, these gains are driven by increased support for the DEM in response to the gender campaign and for the CHP in response to the non-gender campaign, and correspond to decreases in the AKP's vote share rather than in the other opposition parties. In the survey data, by contrast, we find no positive effect on overall opposition support and no evidence of differential responses across opposition parties beyond the CHP. Moreover, the decline in turnout observed in the survey data is not present in the administrative data.

Notably, the negative treatment effects of the gender campaign on opposition vote share, turnout, and CHP vote share, as well as the positive effect on nonresponse to the vote-choice question, are systematically larger in absolute value—though not always statistically distinguishable—than those of the non-gender campaign. This pattern suggests that the

[26] Self-reported voting results are based on the survey question, which was personalized to each respondent's district: "Please state, which party did you vote for the [district name] district municipality in the local elections of March 31st?"

divergence between administrative and survey results is more pronounced for the gender campaign.

As a robustness exercise, we directly estimate the effect of campaign assignment on the difference between administrative and survey vote shares under a common specification. This allows us to assess the statistical significance of the gap and to ensure that the observed differences are not driven by differences in specifications or election types. To do so, we compute neighborhood-level vote shares for the district mayoral election in both data sources and regress their difference on treatment assignment, following a specification analogous to equation (3), estimated at the neighborhood level with the outcome defined as the difference between the two measures. Appendix Table A-11 reports these results and confirms that this gap is statistically significant and mirrors the patterns described above.

The divergence between the effects on administrative outcomes and survey responses raises two broad possibilities. One is that the survey data fail to sufficiently represent the underlying voting population or there survey implementation issues. An alternative is that respondents misreport their behavior. We investigate these two possibilities in turn after presenting results on attitudes, perceptions of norms regarding gender inequality and corruption, and heterogeneity analysis.

5.3.2 Attitudes and Perceptions of Norms

Table 7 reports the treatment effects of the campaign interventions on attitudes toward gender inequality and corruption. Higher values indicate greater agreement with each statement.

The gender-equality campaign increases the gender-inequality index by 6.9 percentage points (s.e. 2.3) in Column (1), corresponding to a 22 percent increase relative to the control mean. Examining the subcomponents (Columns (2)–(5)), we observe more regressive attitudes regarding whether men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce (9.6 percentage points, s.e. 3.3), whether men are better political leaders (9.2 percentage points, s.e. 3.3), and whether children suffer if the mother works (7.1 percentage points, s.e. 4.2). We do not detect a statistically significant effect on whether beating one's wife is justifiable. The non-gender campaign does not have statistically significant effects on any of the gender-related outcomes, and the estimated coefficients are smaller in magnitude. The p-value for the test that the two campaigns have the same effect on the gender-inequality index is 0.079.

By contrast, we find no statistically significant treatment effects on the non-gender attitude outcome in Column (7), which is more directly related to the transparency campaign.

Table A-12 shows little evidence that either campaign treatment affected nonresponse to the attitudinal questions. The only statistically significant estimate is a 0.9 percentage-point increase (s.e. 0.4) in nonresponse to the wife-beating question under the gender-equality

campaign.

Table A-13 reports the treatment effects of the campaign interventions on perceptions of local norms (among ten closest neighbors) and perceptions of country-wide norms (among ten citizens chosen from a nationwide survey). We find no significant effect of the gender-equality campaign on perceptions of norms regarding gender equality. The transparency campaign leads respondents to perceive a larger share of their neighbors as holding regressive gender-related views, with the effect concentrated among respondents who already viewed most of their neighbors as conservative, although the effects of the two campaigns are not statistically distinguishable from each other. Neither campaign has significant treatment effects on perceptions of norms regarding corruption.

5.4 Robustness

Table A-20 shows that the results on self-reported votes, votes, and perceptions of norms are robust across three sets of controls: the same set used in the administrative analysis, controls for demographics that show imbalances between treatment and control groups, and the full set of respondent demographics.

Our main findings are highly stable when we re-estimate the baseline specification using post-stratification weights that reweight survey respondents to match neighborhood-level demographic distributions (see Appendix Table A-17).

5.5 Heterogeneity Analysis

Table A-15 reports heterogeneous treatment effects for each voting-related outcome using demographic data from the endline survey and administrative data from Endeksa. Column (1) of Panel A shows that the negative treatment effect on reporting voting for the opposition is larger among women, and statistically significant, but not when voting for CHP is the outcome variable. The only other noteworthy variables for which we detect significant heterogeneous treatment effects are whether the respondent reports non-Turkish language as their mother tongue (Column 7) and the predicted share of the Kurdish population (Column 11). The additive treatment effects on vote share, however, are not statistically significant. For these variables, the heterogeneous treatment effects are positive, which is consistent with the administrative voting results where the only source of significant, and positive, heterogeneous treatment effects on the opposition vote share is the predicted share of Kurdish people in the population.

Panels A and B of Table A-16 report the heterogeneous treatment effects on attitudes regarding gender equality and corruption. While the gender campaign caused backlash

in attitudes on average, it is possible that it also persuaded some voters to adopt more progressive attitudes. However, we find no evidence of meaningful heterogeneous treatment effects.

Unlike the results for gender-related attitudes, we see some evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects for perceptions of gender-related norms, as shown in Panel C of Table A-16. For both campaign treatment arms, respondents in neighborhoods with a higher predicted Kurdish population share and a less educated population perceive their neighbors as more progressive; the opposite is true in neighborhoods with a higher opposition vote share. Similar patterns hold for perceptions of country-wide norms. While suggestive, one interpretation is that campaign contact leads respondents to update their beliefs about how neighbors responded, in opposing directions: perceptions of neighbors become more progressive where the administrative data show the largest actual vote shifts, and more conservative elsewhere, so that the gender campaign's null average effect may reflect offsetting responses.

5.6 Reconciling the Administrative and Survey-Based Estimates

The magnitude of the gap between the survey-based and administrative results guides the set of plausible explanations. In the administrative data, the campaigns increased the opposition's vote share by roughly 1 percentage point. If the behavior of survey respondents resembled that of the full electorate, truthful reporting would imply an increase in reported opposition support, and the entire reported decline would reflect changes in reporting rather than behavior. The alternative is that survey respondents are a self-selected group whose behavioral response differs sharply from the population's. Because the administrative estimate applies to the full electorate, however, this alternative faces an adding-up constraint: if voters of the type who respond to surveys reduced their actual opposition voting by 10.8 percentage points, the offsetting increase required among the remaining voters ranges from approximately 6 to 13 percentage points for respondent-type population shares between 30 and 50 percent.[27] Effects of this size are an order of magnitude larger than those documented in the door-to-door campaign literature, including our own administrative estimates. The same constraint applies to turnout, for which reported abstention rises by 8.4 percentage points against an administrative effect near zero.

The available evidence based on observable characteristics in our survey and administrative data is also inconsistent with heterogeneity of this form. First, as discussed above,

[27] If voters of the respondent type constitute a share s of the electorate and their behavioral effect is τ_r, the effect among the remaining voters must equal $(\beta - s\tau_r)/(1-s)$, where β is the population effect estimated in the administrative data. With $\beta = 0.01$ and $\tau_r = -0.108$, the implied effect is 6.1 percentage points for $s = 0.3$ and 12.8 percentage points for $s = 0.5$.

Table 4 shows little evidence of meaningful heterogeneity in treatment effects across neighborhoods by opposition support, education, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status in the administrative voting data. If anything, the estimates suggest broadly similar effects across these dimensions, and that the treatment effect is marginally more positive in neighborhoods with a larger predicted Kurdish population. Second, consistent with this pattern, in Appendix Table A-15 we also find no systematic heterogeneity in the survey results across a richer set of respondent demographic characteristics. One exception is respondent gender, but only for opposition vote share (not CHP vote share), and the treatment effect is still negative for men. Another exception is whether the respondent reports their mother-tongue as non-Turkish, with the predominant category being Kurdish, and the predicted Kurdish share in the population. However, the sign of the heterogeneous treatment effects are positive and consistent with the administrative data based results.

Although our survey method cannot guarantee the representativeness of the subset of voters who engaged with the canvassers and the campaign, it does allow us to ensure some comparability with the voting population in our sample. We have one variable that we can directly match with our neighborhood-level demographic data: the population share with less than a high school degree (58%). In our endline survey data, 53% of respondents in our control group have less than a high-school degree. As reflected in the summary statistics table (Appendix Table A-10), we asked the surveying company to have an equal share of female and male respondents. Beyond demographic comparability, the survey data also align in terms of voting behavior. Table A-21 shows that survey data and administrative electoral data are positively and strongly correlated for the opposition bloc, CHP, and AKP, while the correlation is weaker for the minority parties, the IYI Party and the DEM Party. As previously discussed, the results are also robust to reweighting using neighborhood-level demographic distributions (Appendix Table A-17).

A different possibility we explore is that issues related to differential survey implementation across treatment could plausibly account for the results. In particular, we examine whether differential effort or behavior by the survey firm or enumerators across treatment arms may have affected responses. As shown in Appendix Table A-9, however, we find no evidence of systematic differences across treatment arms along a wide range of survey implementation characteristics, making this explanation unlikely. In particular, if exposure to the campaign affected households' willingness to participate in the survey, the resulting sample could disproportionately reflect voters with systematically different political responses. Yet, rejection rates are balanced across treatment arms, and the composition of respondents does not differ meaningfully across observable dimensions.[28]

[28] In the sample-selection framework of Lee [2009], and under the assumption that campaign exposure shifts

Overall, we find little evidence that issues related to survey implementation or representativeness can account for the observed patterns in self-reported voting outcomes. This motivates a closer examination of alternative explanations for the divergence between administrative and survey-based measures, which we turn to next.

5.6.1 Misreporting and Potential Mechanisms

We explore an alternative explanation for the pronounced divergence between treatment effects on administrative voting outcomes and self-reported voting outcomes: misreporting of actual voting behavior, particularly among voters unaffected by the campaign treatments at the ballot box. While a muted treatment effect on reported support for the opposition would be consistent with respondents having concerns about reporting campaign-induced support for the CHP, or especially the DEM Party, because of state repression, we focus on explanations for the opposing signs of the treatment effect in the survey and administrative data. Discrepancies between realized and reported vote choice have long been noted as a potential concern in the literature (e.g., Frye et al. [2017], Blair et al. [2020], Frye et al. [2023]); however, to the best of our knowledge, there is limited empirical evidence documenting the extent to which such misreporting meaningfully affects estimated treatment effects in practice.[29]

This misreporting can arise for several reasons in survey settings, particularly in contexts involving sensitive political or social issues. One potential source is intra-household dynamics. Campaign messages that emphasize contested topics may generate disagreement among household members, leading some respondents to feel pressure to conform in their reported answers or to withhold information altogether during the survey (e.g., Bursztyn et al. [2017]). If campaign messages on sensitive issues generated disagreement within households, this could increase the likelihood that other household members were present during the interview. To test this direct implication, enumerators recorded whether others were present at the time of the survey. As shown in Table A-18, we find little evidence that the gender-equality campaign increased intra-household monitoring, although this does not rule out pressure prior to surveying and after the campaign treatments, and other forms of indirect treatment effects [Egorov et al., 2026]. We also do not find meaningful heterogeneous

survey participation in only one direction, balanced response rates imply that treatment assignment did not change the composition of respondents, so the bounds on the treatment effect for respondent types collapse to the point estimate. The remaining concern is therefore not bias in the survey estimate for respondents, but the possibility that respondents' behavioral response differs from that of the broader electorate, which we address.

[29] A large related literature examines why voters tend to overreport turnout (e.g., Anderson and Silver [1986], Ansolabehere and Hersh [2017]), documenting, for instance, the role of social image concerns, as well as other potential mechanisms [Dellavigna et al., 2016].

treatment effects among vulnerable subgroups such as women.

Misreporting may also stem from external factors, such as respondents fearing political monitoring by an authoritarian government or resenting being tracked by the opposition party. Even though our survey clearly stated that it is independent, confidential, and collects no identifying information—including names or addresses—individuals may still worry that interviewers are affiliated with political actors or that their individual responses could eventually be accessed by parties or authorities. In such settings, respondents may strategically tailor their answers to avoid potential repercussions or to align with what they perceive to be the interviewer's expectations, rather than reporting their true behavior. Alternatively, surveys provide a low-stakes environment in which respondents may express views that diverge from their actual behavior. For example, core supporters of a political party may disagree with specific campaign positions yet continue to support the party at the ballot box for other policy or identity related reasons. In this context, reporting lower support, withholding responses, or adopting more conservative stated positions may serve as a costless form of expression rather than a reflection of actual voting behavior.

To investigate these external facors, Tables 6 and A-19 show that the decline in self-reported support for the opposition is not primarily offset by increased reported support for the incumbent. Instead, it is accompanied by a significant decline in reported turnout, despite no corresponding decline in administrative turnout, and a marginal increase in unwillingness to disclose vote choice. This pattern is consistent with respondents being skeptical about revealing their true voting behavior to enumerators, whether due to concerns about political monitoring or because the survey offers a low-stakes opportunity to signal dissatisfaction without altering their actual vote, with the latter explanation being more likely since turnout is compulsory. Perceptions of party competence provide additional evidence that underlying party evaluations did not change. As shown in Appendix Table C-4, neither campaign affects which party respondents consider most competent to implement gender-equality-related or transparency-related policies. The gender-equality campaign does, however, increase non-response to both competence questions, by 6.6 percentage points (s.e. 3.0) for gender-equality policies and 7.4 percentage points (s.e. 2.9) for transparency policies, relative to means of 14 and 11 percent. We also observe changes in respondents' interactions with enumerators. Appendix Table A-18 shows that the gender-equality campaign increases enumerator-reported hostility. This pattern is less suggestive of fear and more indicative of reluctance or expressive resistance, consistent with respondents signaling dissatisfaction.

Finally, the comparison across treatment arms suggests two margins: a response common to both campaigns, reflected in lower reported support for the delivering party, and an additional gender-specific response, reflected in lower reported turnout, more regressive gender

attitudes, greater hostility, and nonresponse to the party-competence questions. The gender equality campaign treatment may have exacerbated a common mechanism or indicates a different mechanism by which these outcomes were affected.

While further research is needed to pinpoint mechanisms behind misreporting, these patterns would arguably be less likely to emerge if the divergence between administrative and self-reported outcomes were driven mainly by survey quality or implementation issues. Reported behavior and attitudes can therefore suggest backlash even when revealed voting behavior indicates increased support.

6 Conclusion

We use two independently implemented field experiments to evaluate how elite advocacy of progressive gender policies shapes voters' preferences using actual voting behavior in Turkey, a conservative context. Our central finding is that there is private demand for gender equality. Administrative voting records show that gender-equality campaign promises increased opposition support by approximately 1 percentage point, comparable to a conventional policy campaign. The gains are concentrated in the party with the strongest credibility on gender issues rather than the delivering party, qualifying models in which a party shifting policy positions toward voters' preferences is rewarded. This pattern is consistent with issue-based sorting rather than party persuasion, and it replicates across two sharply different contexts.


Our second finding is that reported preferences contradict the administrative data and instead show backlash. The same campaign reduced self-reported opposition support by an order of magnitude more than the administrative gain and led to more regressive stated gender attitudes. We show that this reversal cannot be attributed to survey implementation, and that attributing it to selective participation would require behavioral responses among survey respondents that are opposite in sign and an order of magnitude larger than the administrative estimate, offset by even larger responses among the remaining electorate. While more work is needed to pinpoint the mechanism, the evidence is consistent with misreporting.

Taken together, the findings reveal genuine latent demand for progressive gender policies in a conservative, authoritarian setting, but that the reported signals of that demand can be misleading. This suggests a feedback mechanism, where elite actors and the public rely on distorted signals of voter preferences, to explain why progress on gender equality may stall or regress.

Future work is needed to study broader equilibrium effects, including how competing parties and incumbents respond and how a party can build credibility when shifting its


policy toward voter preferences on an issue in which it has less credibility. Our findings suggest that in a setting where an authoritarian leader oversees backsliding in womens' civil liberties, opposition parties can effectively counter it by promoting progressive policies rather than assuming such backsliding reflects true voter demand. Future research should also examine whether reported backlash has behavioral consequences of its own, and the mechanisms driving it, even if it does not appear in privately revealed demand.

Figure 1: V-Dem




Notes: This figure uses Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data to show the evolution of the democracy index and women's civil-liberties index from 1900 to 2020 for the globe and Turkey. The vertical axis reports the index values (unit–free and comparable across indices) and the horizontal axis shows calendar years. The vertical dashed lines mark 1923, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Republic and instituted reforms empowering women, and 2003, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Prime Minister of Turkey.

Figure 2: V-Dem Party Characteristics



Notes: This figure summarizes party positions for three Turkish political blocs across four dimensions based on 2018 data: clientelism, support for minority rights, women's representation in national-level party leadership, and support for women's labor force participation. The parties included in the figure account for 89.5% of the total vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. *Women in Workforce* measures the extent to which the party supports equal participation of women in the labor market. *Gender Equality* measures the share of women in national-level leadership positions within the party. *Minority Rights* measures the extent to which the party supports the rights of minorities. *Clientelism* measures the degree to which the party relies on clientelistic practices to mobilize voters. Higher values indicate greater support for or prevalence of the given characteristic. Scores are shown on a common -5 to +5 standardized scale with whiskers representing 95% confidence intervals, where 0 represents the average value across all country-party-years in the sample.

Figure 3: Attitudes and Perceptions of Norms



Notes: Using endline survey data from respondents in the control group, this figure plots individual attitudes toward gender norms and corruption relative to respondents' perceived share of neighbors and fellow citizens, respectively, who agree with these same statements. The statements include: "*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women*," "*On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do*," "*It can be justifiable for a man to beat his wife*," "*When a mother works for pay, children suffer*," and the non-gender specific statement, "*It is possible to eradicate corruption from politics, for example, through reducing bribes and increasing transparency of municipal spending.*"

Table 1: Balance Across Treatment Groups in the İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean			p-value
	Control	Gender Equality	Transparency	difference
A. 2023 Electoral Variables				
A1. Main Presidential Election Variables				
Registered Voters	5,057.97	5,529.79	5,201.35	0.76
Turnout	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.93
Vote Share Opposition	0.58	0.59	0.59	0.85
A2. Presidential Election Variables by Alliance				
People's Alliance	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.85
Nation Alliance	0.57	0.58	0.59	0.85
A3. Main Parliamentary Election Variables				
Registered Voters	5,057.97	5,529.79	5,201.35	0.76
Vote Share Opposition	0.60	0.61	0.62	0.85
Turnout	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.96
A4. Parliamentary Election Variables by Party and Alliance				
AKP	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.85
MHP	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.97
CHP	0.35	0.36	0.35	0.96
IYI	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.72
DEM	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.90
Rest of the Opposition	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.74
People's Alliance	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.84
Nation Alliance	0.46	0.46	0.46	1.00
Ancestral Alliance	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.93
Labor Alliance	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.84
Others	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.34
B. Neighborhood Demographics				
Share of residents living in poorer areas	0.43	0.47	0.44	0.34
Share of residents with less than high school degree	0.58	0.58	0.56	0.81
Number of households	2,188.85	2,402.20	2,279.48	0.76
Number of residential buildings	808.01	878.08	821.91	0.88
Number of streets	57.81	65.82	62.71	0.63
C. Tiles				
Sextile 1	0.09	0.10	0.04	0.33
Sextile 2	0.21	0.13	0.18	0.65
Sextile 3	0.17	0.16	0.23	0.81
Sextile 4	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.98
Sextile 5	0.12	0.22	0.18	0.57
Sextile 6	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.99
D. District				
District 1	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.90
District 2	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.97
District 3	0.22	0.19	0.14	0.67
District 4	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.97

Notes: This table reports balance tests across the three experimental arms (Control, gender-equality campaign and transparency campaign) for the İzmir field experiment. Variables are at the neighborhood level and observations are weighted by the number of ballot boxes in a neighborhood. Columns (1)–(3) report mean values for each variable by arm and Column (4) reports the p-value from tests of equality across arms. Panel A contains sub-panels A1–A4 presenting balance tests on variables from the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections by party and alliance. Panel B, C, and D do so for neighborhood demographics, sextiles of opposition vote shares in 2023 parliamentary elections and district dummies, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table 2: Balance Across Treatment Groups in the Kars Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean			p-value
	Control	Gender Equality	Youth	difference
A. 2018 Electoral Variables				
A1. Main Presidential Election Variables				
Registered Voters	412.24	392.39	358.74	0.68
Vote Share Opposition	0.36	0.46	0.37	0.31
Turnout	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.84
A2. Presidential Election Variables by Alliance				
People's Alliance	0.64	0.54	0.63	0.31
Nation Alliance	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.99
No Alliance	0.15	0.25	0.16	0.52
A3. Main Parliamentary Election Variables				
Registered Voters	412.24	392.39	358.74	0.68
Vote Share Opposition	0.36	0.45	0.35	0.33
Turnout	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.73
A4. Parliamentary Election Variables by Party and Alliance				
AKP	0.52	0.46	0.51	0.59
MHP	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.25
DEM	0.18	0.28	0.17	0.51
CHP	0.11	0.08	0.10	0.58
IYI	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.38
Rest of the Opposition	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.29
People's Alliance	0.64	0.54	0.65	0.32
Nation Alliance	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.99
No Alliance	0.19	0.28	0.18	0.49
B. Neighborhood Demographics				
Share of residents living in poorer areas	0.77	0.79	0.80	0.31
Share of residents with less than high school degree	0.80	0.85	0.85	0.29
Number of households	161.02	133.32	121.07	0.44
Number of residential buildings	136.19	130.86	118.63	0.67
Number of streets	6.87	2.82	4.41	0.19
C. Tiles				
Sextile 1	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.96
Sextile 2	0.16	0.14	0.19	0.95
Sextile 3	0.15	0.21	0.19	0.82
Sextile 4	0.18	0.14	0.15	0.93
Sextile 5	0.18	0.11	0.19	0.66
Sextile 6	0.18	0.21	0.15	0.85
D. District				
District 1	0.13	0.18	0.15	0.90
District 2	0.29	0.25	0.26	0.93
District 3	0.58	0.57	0.59	0.99

Notes: This table reports balance tests across the three experimental arms (Control, gender-equality campaign and youth campaign) for the Kars field experiment. Variables are at the neighborhood level and observations are weighted by the number of ballot boxes in a neighborhood. Columns (1)–(3) give the mean of each variable by arm and Column (4) reports the p-value from tests of equality across arms. Panel A contains sub-panels A1–A4 presenting balance tests on variables from the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Panel B, C, and D do so for neighborhood demographics, sextiles of opposition vote shares in 2018 parliamentary elections and district dummies, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table 3: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. İzmir 2024 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.002	0.002	0.006***	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.000	0.009**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.892	0.542	0.144	0.156	0.147	0.784
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.102					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.074					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ (Delivered by)	DEM	Rest of Opposition
B. Kars 2023 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.049***	0.011	0.006	0.013	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.020	-0.008	0.012	-0.001	0.019	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.256	0.323	0.743	0.389	0.507	0.939
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.021					
	Youth p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.316					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
C. Pooled Results						
Gender Equality	0.011***	-0.002	0.003	0.002	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Non-Gender Equality	0.011**	0.000	0.009**	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	4,383	4,383	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266
Mean	0.514	0.753	0.403	0.034	0.060	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.940	0.643	0.137	0.122	0.126	0.777
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.043					
	Non-Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.044					

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on electoral outcomes using official administrative records. Panels A and B report results from the İzmir and Kars experiments, respectively, estimated using the equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Column (1), turnout in Column (2), and vote shares for individual opposition parties: the CHP in Column (3), the İYİ Party in Column (4), the DEM Party in Column (5), and the remaining opposition parties in Column (6). Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in the year of the experiment (2024 for İzmir 2023 for Kars); neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the previous parliamentary elections (2023 for İzmir 2018 for Kars); as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares in the previous parliamentary elections (2023 for İzmir 2018 for Kars). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on 2024 Election Outcomes in İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A.Predicted Kurdish Population Share						
Gender Equality	0.008**	-0.002	0.002	0.001	0.005***	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	-0.000	0.010**	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.079**	-0.039	0.050	0.019	0.033	-0.023
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.016)
Transparency × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.004	-0.017	-0.019	0.010	0.019	-0.006
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.014)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.575	0.696	0.061	0.250	0.070	0.441
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.022	0.265	0.207	0.068	0.202	0.149
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.670	0.609	0.819	0.364	0.465	0.618
B. Opposition Vote Share in 2023 Parliamentary Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.004	0.002	0.002	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.011**	0.002	0.011**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	0.005	0.039	0.016	-0.001	-0.020	0.009
	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Transparency × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	-0.029	-0.032	-0.041	0.013	-0.005	0.005
	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.740	0.284	0.080	0.104	0.153	0.895
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	0.710	0.244	0.556	0.980	0.364	0.249
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	0.660	0.342	0.405	0.394	0.866	0.605
C. Share of population with less than median education degree within a neighborhood						
Gender Equality	0.010**	-0.003	0.002	0.003	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.004	0.009*	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	0.009	0.008	-0.014	0.018	0.014	-0.008
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Transparency × Less than median education degree (%)	0.005	0.040	-0.007	0.000	0.014	-0.002
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.923	0.187	0.170	0.061	0.320	0.970
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	0.642	0.882	0.746	0.103	0.244	0.303
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Less than median education degree (%)	0.695	0.221	0.958	0.965	0.386	0.671
D. Z-score of Neighborhood-level SES Percentile Rank						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.003	0.002	0.005**	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.012**	0.002	0.012**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × SES Z-score	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency × SES Z-score	0.007	0.008	0.009**	-0.001	0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.577	0.311	0.055	0.140	0.334	0.505
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × SES Z-score	0.228	0.940	0.566	0.366	0.273	0.713
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × SES Z-score	0.016	0.179	0.007	0.517	0.453	0.139

Notes: This table reports heterogeneous treatment-effect estimates for the 2024 İzmir field experiment using ballot-box–level administrative election results. Estimates are ITT effects from the equation (1) that interact the assignment to the gender-equality and transparency campaigns with neighborhood characteristics. Panel A examines heterogeneity by interacting treatment indicators with the predicted share of Kurds in a neighborhood. Panel B interacts treatments with the neighborhood's pre-treatment opposition vote share in the 2023 parliamentary elections. Panel C interacts treatments with share of population with less than median education degree and Panel D interacts treatment with a socioeconomic-status (SES) Z-score. Heterogeneity variables are demeaned prior to interaction in Panel A, B, and C. In each panel, Columns (1)–(6) report treatment effects on the aggregated opposition vote share, turnout and vote shares for the CHP, İYİ, DEM and other opposition parties, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in 2024 local elections; neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of gender and transparency treatment effects and of treatment-by-covariate effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on 2023 Election Outcomes in Kars Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ (Delivered by)	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A.Predicted Kurdish Population Share						
Gender Equality	0.054***	0.007	0.013	0.013	0.030**	-0.003
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.003)
Youth	0.025	-0.010	0.011	0.000	0.023	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	-0.071	0.014	-0.137***	-0.023	0.038	0.001
	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.016)
Youth × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.053	-0.173***	0.074	-0.044	-0.013	0.025
	(0.082)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.115)	(0.017)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.229	0.319	0.922	0.416	0.706	0.997
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.773	0.781	0.004	0.843	0.363	0.897
p-value: Youth+Youth × Predicted Kurdish Population (%)	0.343	0.008	0.272	0.415	0.935	0.224
B. Opposition Vote Share in 2018 Parliamentary Elections						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.007	0.009	0.012	0.029*	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.018	-0.012	0.014	-0.002	0.016	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	-0.078	0.008	-0.102**	-0.010	-0.017	0.000
	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.092)	(0.020)
Youth × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	-0.096	-0.175***	0.074	-0.037	-0.120	0.022
	(0.108)	(0.056)	(0.093)	(0.055)	(0.124)	(0.020)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.224	0.285	0.804	0.382	0.477	0.951
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	0.697	0.864	0.066	0.970	0.901	0.872
p-value: Youth+Youth × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	0.483	0.003	0.390	0.524	0.440	0.383
C. Share of population less than median education degree within a neighborhood						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.015	0.010	0.009	0.029*	-0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.021	-0.007	0.014	-0.001	0.018	-0.004
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	-0.145	0.043	-0.119	0.060	-0.070	0.078*
	(0.158)	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.171)	(0.155)	(0.046)
Youth × Less than median education degree (%)	0.589	0.082	0.336*	0.199	-0.046	0.069*
	(0.433)	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.214)	(0.311)	(0.037)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.201	0.269	0.847	0.527	0.582	0.756
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	0.547	0.682	0.385	0.686	0.800	0.107
p-value: Youth+Youth × Less than median education degree (%)	0.167	0.696	0.054	0.352	0.931	0.088
D. Z-score of Neighborhood-level SES Percentile Rank						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.009	0.004	0.016	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.004)
Youth	0.024	-0.011	0.017	-0.001	0.019	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × SES Z-score	-0.013	0.023	-0.001	-0.044***	0.018	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.004)
Youth × SES Z-score	0.041*	-0.002	0.065***	-0.026*	-0.007	0.003
	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.004)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.300	0.259	0.402	0.244	0.525	0.998
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × SES Z-score	0.100	0.156	0.858	0.092	0.024	0.514
p-value: Youth+Youth × SES Z-score	0.045	0.579	0.000	0.080	0.717	0.839

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment-effect estimates based on ballot-box–level administrative data from the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Kars. Estimates are ITT effects from the equation (1) that interact the assignment to the gender equality and youth campaigns with neighborhood characteristics. Panel A examines heterogeneity by interacting treatment indicators with the predicted share of Kurds in a neighborhood. Panel B examines heterogeneity by interacting the treatment indicators with the neighborhood's pre-treatment opposition vote share in the 2018 parliamentary election; Panel C interacts them with the share of the neighborhood's population having less than a median education degree. Panel D interacts treatments with a socioeconomic-status (SES) Z-score. In panels A, B and C the heterogeneity covariates are demeaned before interaction. In each panel, Columns (1)–(6) report treatment effects on the aggregated opposition vote share, turnout and vote shares for the CHP, İYİ, DEM and other opposition parties, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in 2023 parliamentary elections; neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2018 parliamentary elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2018 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-values testing equality of gender equality and youth treatment effects and of treatment-by-covariate effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table 6: Treatment Effects on Self-Reported Voting at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
			Opposition by party				
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition	Prefer not to answer
Gender Equality	-0.108***	-0.084***	-0.119***	0.004	0.000	0.005	0.043
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.028)
Transparency	-0.059**	-0.024	-0.056*	0.002	-0.007	0.001	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.022)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.586	0.814	0.538	0.014	0.029	0.006	0.120
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.178	0.047	0.079	0.734	0.449	0.555	0.222
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.011						
	Non-Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.175						

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on self-reported voting at İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. The outcomes include opposition vote share in Column (1); self-reported turnout in Column (2); the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares in Columns (3)–(6); and the fraction of respondents who prefer not to answer the vote-choice question in Column (7). Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of treatment effects across campaign arms and across opposition parties. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table 7: Treatment Effects on Individual Attitudes at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Index Subcomponents				
	Gender Inequality Index	Men has more right to job	Men are better political leaders	Beating wife is justifiable	Child suffer if mother works	Possible to eradicate corruption
Gender Equality	0.069***	0.096***	0.092***	0.005	0.071*	-0.016
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.030	0.034	0.022	0.012	0.036	-0.028
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.320	0.407	0.286	0.029	0.571	0.537
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.079	0.060	0.051	0.385	0.350	0.743

Notes: This table presents treatment effects on individual attitudes measured in İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. The outcomes are constructed based on the individual level of agreement with the statements: (i) "*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women*"; (ii) "*On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do*"; (iii) "*It can be justifiable for a man to beat his wife*"; (iv) "*When a mother works for pay, the children suffer*"; and (v) "*It is possible to eradicate corruption from politics, for example, through reducing bribes, increasing transparency of municipal spending*". Columns (2)–(6) include indicator variables equal to 1 if a respondent agrees or strongly agrees with statements (i)–(v), respectively. Column (1) includes an index constructed as the average of the outcomes in columns (2)–(5). Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

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
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Figure A-1: Party Vote Shares




Notes: This figure plots the distribution of party vote shares in the study's experimental neighborhoods in İzmir (2024 local elections) and Kars (2023 parliamentary elections).The bars display vote shares for the main opposition parties (CHP, İYİ, DEM), the incumbent parties (AKP, MHP) and the residual "rest" category.

Figure A-2: Gender Equality Campaign

Region: İzmir
Implementing party: CHP



Region: Kars
Implementing party: İYİ



Notes: The figure reproduces the front page of the brochures used in the gender-equality treatment. Separate panels display the front page of the pamphlets distributed by the CHP in İzmir and the İYİ Party in Kars. The back page of the CHP pamphlets includes the district mayor candidate's name and surname, a photograph of the party's district candidate, and the candidate's title, "District Mayor Candidate of X," where "X" denotes the name of the district in which the campaign was conducted. The back page of the İYİ Party pamphlets contains no information or images.

Figure A-3: Non-Gender Equality Campaign

Region: İzmir
Implementing party: CHP
Transparent and Accountable Government Expenditure



Region: Kars
Implementing party: İYİ
Supporting Higher Educational Attainment and Removing Nepotism



Notes: This figure displays the front page of the brochures used in the non-gender (transparency/youth) treatment. Separate panels show the front pages of pamphlets distributed by the CHP in İzmir and the İYİ Party in Kars. The back page of the CHP pamphlets includes the district mayor candidate's name and surname, a photograph of the party's district candidate, and the candidate's title, "District Mayor Candidate of X," where "X" denotes the name of the district in which the campaign was conducted. The back page of the İYİ Party pamphlets contains no information or images.

Table A-1: Variable Definitions

Variable	Description
	Panel A. Field Experiment
Outcome Variables	
Opposition	Vote share of all opposition parties in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 elections for Kars, defined as parties that neither supported Erdoğan in the 2023 presidential elections nor were members of the People's Alliance in the 2023 elections.
Turnout	Share of registered voters who cast a valid ballot in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 elections for Kars.
CHP	Vote share of the CHP in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars.
İYİ	Vote share of the İYİ Party in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars.
DEM	Vote share of the DEM Party in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars.
Rest of opposition	Combined vote share of all opposition parties other than the CHP, İYİ Party, and DEM Party in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars.
Incumbent	Combined vote share of parties that either supported Erdoğan in the 2023 presidential elections or were members of the People's Alliance in the 2023 elections, in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars.
AKP	Vote share of the AKP in the 2024 local elections for İzmir and the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars.
MHP	Vote share of the MHP in the 2023 parliamentary elections for Kars. In İzmir, the MHP ran in coalition with the AKP and did not compete separately.
Rest of incumbent	Combined vote share of all incumbent parties other than the AKP and MHP.
Baseline Variables	
Predicted Kurdish population share	Share of neighborhood residents with Kurdish background, measured as the maximum of: (i) the combined vote share of DEM and HÜDA-PAR in the 2018 parliamentary elections for Kars, and the higher of the 2018 and 2023 parliamentary election results for İzmir; and (ii) Selahattin Demirtaş's presidential vote share in 2018 within the neighborhood. Demeaned prior to interaction.
Opposition Vote Share in 2023 Parliamentary Elections	Neighborhood-level vote share of all opposition parties in the 2023 parliamentary elections, defined as parties that neither supported Erdoğan in the 2023 presidential elections nor were members of the People's Alliance in the 2023 elections. Demeaned prior to interaction.
Opposition Vote Share in 2018 Parliamentary Elections	Neighborhood-level vote share of all opposition parties in the 2018 parliamentary elections, defined as parties that neither supported Erdoğan in the 2023 presidential elections nor were members of the People's Alliance in the 2023 elections. Demeaned prior to interaction.
Share of population with less than median education degree within a neighborhood	Share of neighborhood residents in education categories at or below the tier containing the 50th percentile of the population, where ordinal education categories are ranked from lowest to highest. Based on data from Endeksa.com sourced from the Turkish Statistical Institute in 2023. Demeaned prior to interaction.
Z-score of Neighborhood-level SES Percentile Rank	Z-score of the neighborhood-level socioeconomic status percentile rank based on Endeksa's SES index.
	Panel B. Endline Survey
Outcome Variables	
Self-Reported Voting Outcomes	
Opposition	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for any opposition party in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election, defined as parties that neither supported Erdoğan in the 2023 presidential elections nor were members of the People's Alliance in the 2023 elections.
Turnout	Share of survey respondents reporting having voted for a party in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election.

Continued on next page

Table A-1 – Variable Definitions (Continues from Previous Page)

CHP	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for the CHP in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election.
İYİ	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for the İYİ Party in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election.
DEM	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for the DEM Party in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election.
Rest of opposition	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for any opposition party other than the CHP, İYİ Party, and DEM Party in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election.
Incumbent	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for any party that either supported Erdoğan in the 2023 presidential elections or was a member of the People's Alliance in the 2023 elections.
AKP	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for the AKP.
Rest of incumbent	Share of survey respondents reporting a vote for any incumbent party other than the AKP, using the same definition of incumbent as in the field experiment outcomes.
Prefer not to answer	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent declined to disclose their vote choice.
Individual Attitudes	
Gender inequality index	Average of four binary indicators equal to one if the respondent agrees with: (i) men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce; (ii) men make better political leaders; (iii) beating one's wife can be justifiable; (iv) children suffer when the mother works for pay.
Men have more right to job	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent agrees that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
Men are better political leaders	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent agrees that on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.
Beating wife is justifiable	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent agrees that it can be justifiable for a man to beat his wife.
Child suffers if mother works	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent agrees that when a mother works for pay, the children suffer.
Possible to eradicate corruption	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent agrees that it is possible to eradicate corruption from politics, for example through reducing bribes and increasing transparency of municipal spending.
Perceived Norms	
Local norms: Gender inequality index	Average of four binary indicators, each equal to one if the respondent's estimate of the share of their ten closest neighbors who agree with the corresponding statement exceeds 50%: (i) men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce; (ii) men make better political leaders than women; (iii) beating one's wife can be justifiable; (iv) children suffer when the mother works for pay.
Local Norms: Possible to eradicate corruption	A dummy equal to one if the respondent's estimate of the share of their ten closest neighbors who agree that it is possible to eradicate corruption from politics, for example through reducing bribes and increasing transparency of municipal spending exceeds 50%.
Country-wide norms: Gender inequality index	Average of four binary indicators, each equal to one if the respondent's estimate of the share of fellow citizens in Turkey who agree with the corresponding gender inequality statements, elicited as the number out of 10 in a hypothetical national survey, exceeds 50%: (i) men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce; (ii) men make better political leaders than women; (iii) beating one's wife can be justifiable; (iv) children suffer when the mother works for pay.
Country-wide norms: Possible to eradicate corruption	A dummy equal to one if the respondent's estimate of the share of fellow citizens in Turkey who agree that it is possible to eradicate corruption from politics, for example through reducing bribes and increasing transparency of municipal spending, elicited as the number out of 10 in a hypothetical national survey, exceeds 50%.
Survey Interview Conditions	
Influence index	Mean of three binary indicators: (i) presence of others during the interview; (ii) consulting another person while answering; and (iii) being assessed as influenced by others by the enumerator.

Continued on next page

Table A-1 – Variable Definitions (Continues from Previous Page)

Presence of others	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent was not alone during the interview.
Consulted anyone	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent consulted another person while answering.
Influenced by others	A binary indicator equal to one if the enumerator assessed that the respondent's answers were influenced by others.
Hostility scale	Enumerator-reported hostility on a scale from one (friendly) to 3 (hostile).
Party Competence	
Competent in gender equality policies: Opposition	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent believes any opposition party is more competent in implementing gender equality policies.
Competent in gender equality policies: Incumbent	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent believes any incumbent party is more competent in implementing gender equality policies.
Competent in gender equality policies: No difference	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent believes there is no difference between parties in their ability to implement gender equality policies.
Competent in transparency policies: Opposition	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent believes any opposition party is more competent in implementing transparency policies.
Competent in transparency policies: Incumbent	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent believes any incumbent party is more competent in implementing transparency policies.
Competent in transparency policies: No difference	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent believes there is no difference between parties in their ability to implement transparency policies.
Policy Priorities	
Gender equality	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks a gender equality policy among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Transparency	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks a transparency policy among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Inflation and infrastructure	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks policies targeting inflation or improving infrastructure among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Training centers for women	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks the policy of "providing job training centers for women to improve employment opportunities" among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Shelters for domestic violence	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks the policy of "building shelters and justice centers for victims of domestic violence" among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Efficient use of budget	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks the policy of "using municipality funds more efficiently and transparently" among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Reduce corruption	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks the policy of "reducing corruption and improve the provision of public goods; such as, conducting a fair municipal tender process" among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Infrastructure investment	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks the policy of "investing in urban infrastructure projects to create jobs and reduce congestion" among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Combating price gouging	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent ranks the policy of "fighting against price gouging that has been exacerbated by inflation" among their top two preferred municipal policy priorities.
Heterogeneity Covariates	
Woman	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent is female.
Above median age	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent's age is above the sample median.
Less than high school degree	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent has less than a high school degree.
Non-married	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent is not married.
Having a daughter	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent has at least one daughter.
Number of children	The total number of children reported by the respondent.

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Table A-1 – Variable Definitions (Continues from Previous Page)

Non-Turkish native language	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent's native language is not Turkish.
More religious	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent's reported worship frequency is above the sample median.
Below median income	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent's reported income is below the sample median.
Employed	A binary indicator equal to one if the respondent is currently employed or self-employed.

Table A-2: Treatment Group Assignments at Neighborhood Level for the Field Experiments

	Neighborhoods		Registered Voters	
Campaign Type	Kars	İzmir	Kars	İzmir
Control	47	50	15,587	148,067
Gender Equality	22	48	6,956	149,089
Non-Gender Equality	22	48	7,209	156,482
Total	91	146	29,752	453,638

Notes: This table reports the number of neighborhoods and registered voters in the experimental sample for the two field experiments by province and campaign assignment, where registered voter counts are from the 2018 elections for Kars and the 2023 elections for İzmir. Neighborhoods are the unit of randomization.

Table A-3: The Effects of Campaign Treatments on Completed Conversations in the Field

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	The dependent variable is the fraction of households with completed conversations			
	Any		Gender Equality	Transparency
Treatment	0.323***			
	(0.021)			
Gender Equality		0.319***	0.320***	-0.001
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Transparency		0.327***	0.001	0.326***
		(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
F-Stat	241.2	121.0	117.1	163.4
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency		0.580		

Notes: This table presents the first-stage estimates from in the 2024 İzmir field experiment. The dependent variable is the fraction of households with a completed conversation. The estimates are based on the equation (1). Column (1) reports the effect of assignment to either campaign (bundled treatment) on the overall completion rate ("Any"). Column (2) separates the effects of the Gender-equality and Transparency campaigns; Columns (3) and (4) report treatment effects on the fraction of completed conversations delivering the gender-equality and transparency campaign materials, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in 2024 local elections; neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table reports the number of observations, F-statistics, and the p-value testing equality of the gender-equality and transparency completion effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-4: Treatment Effects on Administrative Aggregate Outcomes - Robustness to Different Set of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Opposition Vote Share				Turnout			
A. İzmir 2024 Elections								
Gender Equality	0.010	0.008**	0.009**	0.008**	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Transparency	0.011	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**	-0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.756	0.756	0.756	0.756
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.939	0.851	0.892	0.838	0.585	0.670	0.542	0.326
R-square	0.738	0.808	0.812	0.812	0.178	0.410	0.505	0.527
Adj.R-square	0.737	0.806	0.810	0.810	0.172	0.405	0.499	0.520
B. Kars 2023 Elections								
Gender Equality	0.109*	0.047***	0.049***	0.043**	0.005	-0.002	0.011	0.012
	(0.062)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Youth	-0.001	0.017	0.020	0.019	-0.002	-0.011	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234
Mean	0.378	0.378	0.378	0.378	0.723	0.723	0.723	0.723
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.097	0.213	0.256	0.308	0.741	0.662	0.323	0.248
R-square	0.198	0.852	0.859	0.863	0.269	0.492	0.542	0.581
Adj.R-square	0.135	0.834	0.838	0.839	0.212	0.447	0.471	0.507
C. Pooled Results								
Gender Equality	0.015	0.010***	0.011***	0.010***	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Non-Gender Equality	0.011	0.010**	0.011**	0.010**	-0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383
Mean	0.514	0.514	0.514	0.514	0.753	0.753	0.753	0.753
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.731	0.970	0.940	0.987	0.611	0.711	0.643	0.425
R-square	0.671	0.824	0.828	0.829	0.193	0.422	0.513	0.535
Adj.R-square	0.668	0.821	0.825	0.825	0.185	0.416	0.504	0.525
Sextile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Turnout Parliamentary, Number of Registered Voters			✓	✓			✓	✓
Common Demographics (Education, socioeconomics)				✓				✓

Notes: This table presents the robustness of our results from the field experiment to different sets of controls separately for İzmir (Panel A) and Kars (Panel B) administrative electoral outcomes and of pooled effects across both provinces (Panel C). The results in Panel A and Panel B are estimated based on the equation (1), while the results in Panel C are estimated based on the equation (2). The results are shown for aggregated opposition vote share (Columns 1-4) and turnout (Columns 5-8). Columns 1 and 5 include dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in the previous parliamentary elections, which refer to 2023 for İzmir and 2018 for Kars. Column 2 adds the CHP, İYİ, and DEM party vote shares and remaining opposition parties' vote shares in the previous parliamentary elections to Column 1. Column 6 adds turnout in the previous parliamentary elections to Column 5. Columns 3 and 7 are based on our baseline specification, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in the year of the experiment (2024 for İzmir, 2023 for Kars); neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the previous parliamentary elections; and dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares. Columns 4 and 8 additionally include neighborhood-level administrative demographic controls (share of residents with below-median education and SES Z-score). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, R-square, adjusted R-square. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-5: Treatment Effects on Administrative Party Outcomes - Robustness to Different Set of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	CHP				İYİ				DEM				Rest of Opposition			
A. İzmir 2024 Elections																
Gender Equality	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.010	0.005**	0.006***	0.005**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.006	0.008*	0.009**	0.009*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.891	0.287	0.144	0.114	0.476	0.260	0.156	0.121	0.807	0.372	0.147	0.204	0.786	0.907	0.784	0.700
R-square	0.645	0.866	0.869	0.869	0.208	0.462	0.467	0.473	0.138	0.848	0.850	0.850	0.156	0.179	0.183	0.186
Adj.R-square	0.643	0.865	0.868	0.868	0.203	0.456	0.461	0.466	0.132	0.847	0.848	0.848	0.150	0.171	0.174	0.175
B. Kars 2023 Elections																
Gender Equality	-0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.010	0.013	0.008	0.104*	0.030*	0.031**	0.029*	-0.003	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.061)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Youth	0.005	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.016	0.019	0.020	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.162	0.162	0.162	0.162	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.709	0.814	0.743	0.773	0.758	0.480	0.389	0.497	0.114	0.482	0.507	0.606	0.704	0.870	0.939	0.938
R-square	0.622	0.694	0.699	0.701	0.581	0.637	0.653	0.669	0.391	0.931	0.932	0.934	0.089	0.146	0.312	0.328
Adj.R-square	0.590	0.656	0.651	0.646	0.545	0.591	0.597	0.609	0.340	0.922	0.922	0.922	0.012	0.038	0.202	0.204
C. Pooled Results																
Gender Equality	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.002	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.012	0.005**	0.006***	0.006***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Non-Gender Equality	0.006	0.008*	0.009**	0.009**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266
Mean	0.403	0.403	0.403	0.403	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.884	0.279	0.137	0.109	0.500	0.217	0.122	0.101	0.714	0.327	0.126	0.183	0.813	0.916	0.777	0.704
R-square	0.684	0.879	0.882	0.882	0.403	0.576	0.583	0.591	0.232	0.873	0.874	0.875	0.155	0.179	0.189	0.192
Adj.R-square	0.681	0.877	0.880	0.880	0.398	0.571	0.577	0.584	0.225	0.871	0.872	0.872	0.148	0.169	0.176	0.178
Sextile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Turnout Parliamentary, Number of Registered Voters			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓
Administrative Demographics (Education, SES)				✓				✓				✓				✓

Notes: This table presents the robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on party-level administrative electoral outcomes using alternative sets of control variables. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively, corresponding to the subsequent local and general elections in those years and estimated using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). The outcomes include vote shares of individual opposition parties: the CHP (Columns 1–4), İYİ (Columns 5-8), DEM (Columns 9-12), and the remaining opposition parties' vote share (Columns 13-16). Columns 1, 5, 9, and 13 include dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in the previous parliamentary elections, which refer to 2023 for İzmir and 2018 for Kars. Column 2, 6, 10, and 14 additionally include CHP, İYİ, and DEM party vote shares and remaining opposition parties' vote shares in the previous parliamentary elections. Columns 3, 7, 11, and 15 are based on our baseline specification, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in the year of the experiment (2024 for İzmir, 2023 for Kars); neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the previous parliamentary elections; and dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares. Columns 4, 8, 12, and 16 additionally include neighborhood-level administrative demographic controls (share of residents with below-median education and SES Z-score). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, R-square, and adjusted R-square. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-6: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Completed Conversations on Administrative Electoral Results in the 2024 İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
Gender Equality	0.029**	-0.008	0.008	0.005	0.018***	-0.002
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Transparency	0.031**	0.001	0.029**	-0.003	0.007	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.931	0.530	0.142	0.153	0.136	0.796

Notes: This table presents the effect of completed conversations on administrative electoral outcomes in the 2024 İzmir field experiment. Columns 1-6 report effects on opposition vote share, turnout, CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and the remaining opposition parties—measured at the ballot-box level, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in 2024 local elections; neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the 2SLS coefficients for gender equality and transparency conversations. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-7: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results for the Incumbent Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Incumbent by Party		
	Incumbent	AKP	MHP	Rest of Incumbent
A. İzmir 2024 Elections				
Gender Equality	-0.009**	-0.008**	-0.001	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	
Transparency	-0.010**	-0.009**	-0.001	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	
Mean	0.474	0.432	0.042	
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.892	0.817	0.810	
B. Kars 2023 Elections				
Gender Equality	-0.049***	-0.034	-0.011	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.014)
Youth	-0.020	-0.042*	-0.002	0.018
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Observations	234	117	117	117
Mean	0.622	0.385	0.166	0.043
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.256	0.723	0.733	0.525
C. Pooled Results				
Gender Equality	-0.011***	-0.009**	-0.001	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	
Non-Gender Equality	-0.011**	-0.010**	-0.000	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	
Observations	4,383	4,266	4,266	
Mean	0.486	0.430	0.042	
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.940	0.787	0.663	

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on administrative electoral outcomes for incumbent political blocs using official administrative records. Panels A and B report results from the İzmir and Kars experiments, respectively, estimated using the equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). The outcomes include incumbent bloc vote share in Column (1), and vote shares for incumbent parties: the AKP in Column (2), the MHP in Column (3), and the remaining incumbent parties in Column (4). Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in the year of the experiment (2024 for İzmir 2023 for Kars); neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the previous parliamentary elections, which refer to 2023 for İzmir and 2018 for Kars, as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares in the previous parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-8: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results for Each Election Type

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. 2024 İzmir District Mayor Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009*	-0.003	0.002	0.001	0.007***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.012**	0.000	0.010*	-0.001	0.003	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383
Mean	0.522	0.755	0.422	0.029	0.051	0.020
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.617	0.511	0.137	0.435	0.117	0.309
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.019					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.162					
B. 2024 İzmir Metropolitan Mayor Elections						
Gender Equality	0.010***	-0.002	0.004	0.000	0.005**	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Transparency	0.008*	0.001	0.009**	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383
Mean	0.521	0.760	0.413	0.032	0.055	0.021
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.678	0.574	0.331	0.107	0.172	0.641
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.145					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.041					
C. 2024 İzmir Municipal Council Members Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.001	0.004**	0.004**	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.000	0.009**	0.000	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383
Mean	0.535	0.753	0.414	0.033	0.059	0.029
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.868	0.548	0.105	0.107	0.237	0.543
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.205					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.115					
D. 2023 Kars Parliamentary Elections						
Gender Equality	0.046**	0.010	0.006	0.013	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.026	-0.007	0.012	-0.001	0.019	-0.004
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.406	0.719	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.484	0.387	0.743	0.389	0.507	0.939
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.021					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.316					
E. 2023 Kars Presidential Elections						
Gender Equality	0.052***	0.012				
	(0.020)	(0.015)				
Youth	0.015	-0.008				
	(0.024)	(0.014)				
Observations	117	117				
Mean	0.351	0.728				
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.150	0.271				

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on administrative electoral results for each election. Panel A, B, and C report the results for 2024 İzmir district mayor, metropolitan mayor, and municipal council elections, respectively. Panel D and E report the results for 2023 Kars parliamentary and presidential elections. The estimates are based on ITT estimates of (1). The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Column (1), turnout in Column (2), and vote shares for individual opposition parties: the CHP in Column (3), the İYİ Party in Column (4), the DEM Party in Column (5), and the remaining opposition parties in Column (6). Results are based on our baseline specification for the administrative results, which controls for the number of registered voters at each ballot box in the year of the experiment (2024 for İzmir 2023 for Kars); neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the previous parliamentary elections, which refer to 2023 for İzmir and 2018 for Kars, as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote shares in the previous parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable, and the p-value for equality of the gender equality and non-gender campaign treatment coefficients within each column. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-9: Balance Across Treatment Groups in Survey Implementation and Post-Treatment Demographics at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean			p-value
	Control	Gender Equality	Transparency	difference
A. Technical Variables				
Number of attempts	3.40	2.90	3.23	0.28
Number of unanswered door knocks	1.48	1.06	1.36	0.11
Number of attempts with ineligible participants	0.18	0.12	0.20	0.10
Number of rejections	0.75	0.72	0.68	0.85
Survey day of the year	130.18	130.22	129.83	0.93
Survey conducted on a weekend	0.35	0.28	0.26	0.64
Survey conducted in the afternoon	0.31	0.31	0.39	0.44
Survey conducted by female surveyor	0.79	0.78	0.76	0.86
B. Demographics (Post-treatment)				
Woman	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.28
Age	46.19	46.60	46.08	0.92
Marital: Single	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.96
Marital: Married	0.74	0.70	0.72	0.70
Marital: Other	0.10	0.13	0.11	0.44
Has any children	0.81	0.78	0.80	0.60
Number of children	1.92	1.87	1.88	0.91
Number of daughters	0.93	0.94	0.89	0.70
Number of sons	0.99	0.93	0.99	0.66
Education: Less than high school degree	0.53	0.55	0.50	0.52
Non-Turkish native language	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.93
Worship frequency: More than once a week	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.87
Employment: Employed	0.38	0.30	0.36	0.03**
Employment: Unemployed	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.77
Employment: Student	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.77
Employment: Homemaker	0.31	0.34	0.32	0.54
Employment: Retired	0.21	0.24	0.21	0.45
Income: Below median	0.18	0.26	0.18	0.06*

Notes: This table reports balance tests for the endline survey in İzmir. Estimates are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents.Panel A contains technical variables related to survey implementation (e.g., number of attempts, unanswered door knocks, rejections, survey timing, and interviewer gender). Panel B reports post-treatment demographic characteristics of respondents (sex, age, marital status, number of children, education, language spoken at home, the frequency of worship, employment status, and income). Columns (1)–(3) report the mean values for the control, gender equality, and transparency treatment groups, respectively, while Column (4) reports the p-value from a test of equality of means across treatment arms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table A-10: Summary Statistics using İzmir Endline Survey Data for Control Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
					Mean by Gender	
	Observations	Mean	Median	SD	Male	Female
A. Self-reported Voting Preferences						
Opposition vote share	1180	0.59	1.00	0.49	0.59	0.59
AKP	1180	0.22	0.00	0.41	0.22	0.22
CHP	1180	0.54	1.00	0.50	0.53	0.54
İYİ	1180	0.01	0.00	0.12	0.02	0.01
DEM	1180	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.03	0.03
Rest of opposition	1180	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.01
Turnout	1180	0.81	1.00	0.39	0.82	0.81
Prefer not to answer	1180	0.12	0.00	0.32	0.09	0.14
B. Individual Attitudes						
Decrease corruption	1124	0.54	1.00	0.50	0.55	0.52
Gender inequality index	1140	0.32	0.25	0.27	0.38	0.26
Men more right to job	1164	0.41	0.00	0.49	0.49	0.33
Men better leaders	1158	0.29	0.00	0.45	0.37	0.20
Beating wife justifiable	1176	0.03	0.00	0.17	0.04	0.02
Mother works suffer	1173	0.57	1.00	0.50	0.61	0.53
C. Perception of Local Norms						
Decrease corruption	1081	0.51	0.55	0.29	0.52	0.49
Gender inequality index	1083	0.42	0.45	0.18	0.45	0.40
Men more right to job	1134	0.52	0.55	0.26	0.55	0.48
Men better leaders	1113	0.48	0.55	0.26	0.52	0.44
Beating wife justifiable	1148	0.15	0.00	0.22	0.17	0.14
Mother works suffer	1141	0.54	0.55	0.26	0.55	0.54
D. Perception of Country-wide Norms						
Decrease corruption	1100	0.54	0.55	0.25	0.53	0.55
Gender inequality index	1113	0.52	0.50	0.13	0.53	0.51
Men more right to job	1149	0.59	0.55	0.19	0.61	0.58
Men better leaders	1133	0.57	0.55	0.20	0.59	0.56
Beating wife justifiable	1159	0.30	0.35	0.23	0.31	0.29
Mother works suffer	1157	0.60	0.55	0.19	0.61	0.60
E. Party Competence in Policies						
E1. Competent in Gender Equality Policies						
Opposition	1023	0.48	0.00	0.50	0.46	0.49
Incumbent	1023	0.28	0.00	0.45	0.29	0.26
No difference	1023	0.25	0.00	0.43	0.25	0.24
E2. Competent in Transparency Policies						
Opposition	998	0.60	1.00	0.49	0.60	0.60
Incumbent	998	0.24	0.00	0.43	0.25	0.23
No difference	998	0.16	0.00	0.37	0.15	0.17
F. Ranked Top Two Policy Priorities						
Gender equality	1180	0.42	0.00	0.49	0.26	0.58
Transparency	1180	0.63	1.00	0.48	0.73	0.53
Inflation and infrastructure	1180	0.64	1.00	0.48	0.69	0.58

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for variables collected in the 2024 İzmir endline survey among respondents assigned to the control group. Estimates are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Column (1) reports the number of observations, column (2) the sample mean, column (3) the median, column (4) the standard deviation, and columns (5) and (6) report mean values for male and female respondents in the control group, respectively. Panel A lists self-reported voting preferences, including turnout and support for each party as well as the overall opposition vote share. Panel B reports individual attitudes toward gender norms and corruption. The gender-inequality index is calculated as the average of four binary indicators equal to one if the respondent agrees with statements related to gender norms. Panels C and D report the perceived share of neighbors and fellow citizens, respectively, who agree with these same statements. Panel E reports perceptions of party competence in implementing gender-equality and transparency policies. Panel F reports the share of respondents ranking each policy area - gender equality, transparency, inflation, or infrastructure - among their top two municipal priorities. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-11: Discrepancy between Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results and Self-Reported Voting at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
Gender Equality	-0.115***	-0.080**	-0.119***	0.004	-0.007	0.006
	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Transparency	-0.070**	-0.023	-0.064**	0.003	-0.010	0.001
	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Observations	146	146	146	146	146	146
Dependent mean	0.064	0.061	0.116	-0.015	-0.023	-0.015
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.242	0.080	0.152	0.926	0.798	0.510
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.009					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.085					

Notes: This table compares treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on administrative electoral outcomes with the corresponding effects on self-reported voting outcomes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. The dependent variable in all columns is the difference between the neighborhood-level administrative outcome in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral elections and the mean self-reported outcome among surveyed residents in the same neighborhood, as measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Column 1-6 report the discrepancy in overall opposition vote share, turnout, the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote-share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-12: Treatment Effects on Non-response to Individual Attitudes at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Non-response index	Men has more right to job	Men are better political leaders	Beating wife is justifiable	Child suffer if mother works	Possible to eradicate corruption
Gender Equality	0.009	0.006	0.012	0.009**	0.010	0.018
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.015)
Transparency	-0.004	-0.008	-0.010	0.003	-0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.011	0.013	0.020	0.003	0.009	0.040
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.001	0.013	0.000	0.259	0.042	0.227

Notes: This table presents treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on non-response to individual attitudinal questions in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Column (1) is the share of the four gender-related attitude subcomponents with missing or non-response values. The remaining dependent variables are binary indicators equal to one if the respondent did not answer the corresponding attitudinal question in each column. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, and p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-13: Treatment Effects on Perception of Local and Country-wide Norms at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Gender Inequality Index					Possible to eradicate corruption				
	The share of closest neighbors/citizens who agree or strongly agree with the the statement is at least ...									
	10%	30%	50%	70%	90%	10%	30%	50%	70%	90%
A. Perception of Local Norms										
Gender Equality	0.015	0.011	0.006	0.014	0.016	-0.017	-0.023	-0.052	-0.048	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.032)
Transparency	0.032	0.034	0.049*	0.050**	0.030**	0.003	0.007	0.017	0.068	0.049
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.036)
Observations	3,043	3,043	3,043	3,043	3,043	3,065	3,065	3,065	3,065	3,065
Mean	0.824	0.666	0.492	0.259	0.075	0.929	0.762	0.587	0.317	0.168
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.472	0.373	0.186	0.191	0.310	0.267	0.401	0.183	0.011	0.145
B. Perception of Country-wide Norms										
Gender Equality	0.002	-0.017	-0.020	0.004	0.009	0.002	-0.029	-0.057	-0.030	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.030)
Transparency	0.000	-0.005	0.001	0.035	0.030***	0.001	-0.032	-0.033	0.013	0.023
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.028)
Observations	3,168	3,168	3,168	3,168	3,168	3,147	3,147	3,147	3,147	3,147
Mean	0.954	0.844	0.656	0.311	0.058	0.968	0.862	0.651	0.311	0.133
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.839	0.430	0.311	0.255	0.076	0.968	0.913	0.577	0.359	0.508

Notes: This table presents treatment effects on respondents' perceptions of local and country-wide norms measured in the endline survey in İzmir. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Panel A reports effects on perceptions of local norms and Panel B reports effects on perceptions of country-wide norms. Columns (1)–(5) use the gender inequality index as the outcome, defined as the mean of four binary indicators equal to 1 if the respondent believes that at least the share of neighbors or fellow citizens stated in the column header agree with the corresponding gender inequality statement. Columns (6)–(10) use a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent believes that at least the share of neighbors or fellow citizens stated in the column header agree with the corruption statement. In both sets of columns, thresholds of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 percent are used, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, and p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-14: Treatment Effects on Non-response to Perceptions of Norms at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Non-response index	Men has more right to job	Men are better political leaders	Beating wife is justifiable	Child suffer if mother works	Possible to eradicate corruption
A. Perception of Local Norms						
Gender Equality	0.021	0.022	0.029	0.009	0.025	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Transparency	0.013	0.007	0.017	0.002	0.026	-0.014
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.059	0.061	0.066	0.058	0.053	0.111
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.643	0.433	0.568	0.704	0.957	0.333
B. Perception of Country-wide Norms						
Gender Equality	0.026*	0.017	0.041**	0.020	0.026*	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Transparency	0.007	0.007	0.000	0.002	0.017	-0.016
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.031	0.032	0.039	0.027	0.025	0.069
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.140	0.491	0.010	0.176	0.514	0.031

Notes: This table presents treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on non-response to questions about perceived local and country-wide norms in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Panel A reports effects on non-response to questions about local norms and Panel B reports effects on non-response to questions about country-wide norms. In each panel, Column (1) is the share of the four gender-related norm-perception subcomponents with missing or non-response values, and the remaining columns are binary indicators equal to one if the respondent did not answer the corresponding attitudinal question. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, and p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-15: HTE by Respondent Characteristics and Neighborhood Demographics: Voting Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Respondent Characteristics										Neighborhood Demographics			
	Woman	Above median age	Less than high school	Non-married	Having a daughter	Number of children	Non-Turkish native	More religious	Below median income	Employed	Predicted Kurdish population	Opposition vote share	Below median education	SES Z-score
A. Vote for Opposition														
Gender Equality	-0.051	-0.130***	-0.100**	-0.089**	-0.115**	-0.151**	-0.135***	-0.080**	-0.097**	-0.118***	-0.119***	-0.109***	-0.102***	-0.097***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Transparency	-0.049	-0.089***	-0.085**	-0.062**	-0.084**	-0.070	-0.057*	-0.018	-0.058*	-0.076**	-0.056**	-0.062**	-0.058*	-0.053*
	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.109*	0.058	-0.011	-0.071	0.012	0.023	0.186**	-0.023	-0.017	0.041	0.723*	0.061	0.102	0.016
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.023)	(0.082)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.383)	(0.238)	(0.281)	(0.041)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.019	0.072	0.042	0.013	0.040	0.005	-0.016	-0.077	-0.028	0.047	0.391	0.111	0.056	0.004
	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.070)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.283)	(0.238)	(0.250)	(0.030)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.968	0.358	0.776	0.534	0.530	0.127	0.036	0.129	0.398	0.319	0.065	0.185	0.247	0.211
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.002	0.127	0.002	0.010	0.009	0.004	0.456	0.019	0.014	0.131	0.112	0.850	1.000	0.111
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.101	0.711	0.158	0.397	0.219	0.061	0.239	0.014	0.063	0.470	0.246	0.838	0.994	0.309
B. Vote for CHP														
Gender Equality	-0.080*	-0.169***	-0.132**	-0.109***	-0.141**	-0.183***	-0.144***	-0.112**	-0.131***	-0.119**	-0.127***	-0.121***	-0.116***	-0.109***
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Transparency	-0.046	-0.087***	-0.083*	-0.061*	-0.083**	-0.059	-0.063*	-0.012	-0.065*	-0.077**	-0.054*	-0.063**	-0.059*	-0.054*
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.076	0.117**	0.025	-0.043	0.033	0.032	0.156**	0.008	0.020	0.002	0.558*	0.116	0.064	0.013
	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.022)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.315)	(0.282)	(0.305)	(0.048)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.020	0.071	0.043	0.021	0.041	-0.001	0.030	-0.084	-0.009	0.057	0.390	0.270	-0.053	-0.010
	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.273)	(0.259)	(0.270)	(0.034)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.443	0.054	0.367	0.236	0.273	0.024	0.038	0.052	0.124	0.340	0.048	0.075	0.099	0.093
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.002	0.280	0.002	0.018	0.008	0.001	0.830	0.022	0.017	0.014	0.155	0.987	0.865	0.067
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.129	0.745	0.178	0.488	0.265	0.090	0.535	0.011	0.102	0.639	0.225	0.428	0.691	0.211
C. Vote for IYI														
Gender Equality	0.005	0.019*	0.006	0.005	0.013	0.009	0.003	0.013	0.007	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Transparency	0.004	0.007	0.008	0.004	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.006	0.005	-0.004	0.002	0.003	0.004	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.000	-0.034**	-0.003	-0.000	-0.013	-0.002	0.010	-0.015	-0.001	0.007	0.067	0.012	0.001	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.011)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.003	-0.013	-0.011	-0.006	0.008	0.002	-0.002	-0.008	-0.004	0.016	0.000	-0.025	0.033	-0.008
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.007)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.953	0.231	0.850	0.940	0.104	0.331	0.939	0.561	0.808	0.363	0.946	0.862	0.826	0.559
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.582	0.218	0.779	0.597	0.939	0.367	0.105	0.769	0.477	0.386	0.256	0.814	0.940	0.984
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.921	0.638	0.760	0.766	0.511	0.897	0.939	0.812	0.931	0.247	0.942	0.688	0.537	0.456
D. Vote for DEM														
Gender Equality	0.012	0.012	0.014	0.007	0.003	0.015	0.002	0.005	0.019	-0.012	-0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Transparency	-0.010	-0.011	-0.010	-0.007	-0.006	-0.009	0.003	-0.014	0.002	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.022	-0.021	-0.023	-0.023	-0.002	-0.007	0.007	-0.005	-0.034	0.041*	0.133	-0.065	0.053	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.066)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.155)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.008)
Transparency*Covariate	0.005	0.014	0.007	-0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.049	0.015	-0.018	-0.006	0.052	-0.101	0.038	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.094)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.010)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.091	0.223	0.059	0.287	0.440	0.248	0.750	0.218	0.400	0.462	0.616	0.566	0.460	0.739
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.446	0.377	0.391	0.326	0.924	0.566	0.896	0.969	0.249	0.174	0.406	0.240	0.428	0.482
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.707	0.786	0.809	0.605	0.684	0.531	0.348	0.905	0.234	0.348	0.626	0.088	0.610	0.363
E. Vote for Rest of Opposition														
Gender Equality	0.012	0.007	0.012	0.006	0.010	0.008	0.004	0.013	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Transparency	0.002	0.001	-0.000	0.002	0.007	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.009*	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.012	-0.002	-0.011	-0.004	-0.007	-0.002	0.008	-0.012	-0.004	-0.009	-0.051	0.005	-0.024	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.011)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.001	0.000	0.003	-0.001	-0.010	0.001	0.005	-0.000	0.003	-0.020*	-0.049	-0.033	0.039	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.005)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.332	0.577	0.438	0.463	0.841	0.526	0.661	0.476	0.477	0.961	0.523	0.546	0.843	0.617
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.922	0.375	0.808	0.870	0.623	0.502	0.176	0.892	0.377	0.994	0.273	0.904	0.800	0.597
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.874	0.638	0.281	0.973	0.431	0.898	0.148	0.754	0.246	0.118	0.106	0.435	0.234	0.203
F. Turnout														
Gender Equality	-0.029	-0.097***	-0.097***	-0.065*	-0.082*	-0.085*	-0.099***	-0.089**	-0.077**	-0.108***	-0.090***	-0.081***	-0.074***	-0.065**
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Transparency	-0.036	-0.026	-0.047	-0.022	-0.008	-0.018	-0.020	-0.010	-0.007	-0.036	-0.024	-0.022	-0.019	-0.012
	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.105	0.034	0.025	-0.060	-0.003	0.001	0.096	0.028	0.007	0.075	0.370**	-0.148	0.191	0.060**
	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.020)	(0.075)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.166)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.030)
Transparency*Covariate	0.022	0.003	0.042	-0.002	-0.027	-0.005	-0.055	-0.017	-0.037	0.030	0.221	-0.121	0.119	0.025
	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.018)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.163)	(0.234)	(0.198)	(0.025)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.859	0.032	0.213	0.188	0.092	0.171	0.015	0.036	0.043	0.043	0.037	0.042	0.043	0.079
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.005	0.073	0.039	0.007	0.014	0.016	0.959	0.106	0.080	0.438	0.071	0.270	0.591	0.913
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.727	0.466	0.878	0.589	0.225	0.432	0.249	0.448	0.249	0.875	0.229	0.535	0.631	0.789
G. Prefer Not to Answer														
Gender Equality	0.034	0.061	0.051	0.036	0.026	0.052	0.050	0.061*	0.048	0.054	0.048	0.040	0.039	0.023
	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Transparency	0.038	-0.014	0.018	0.003	-0.024	-0.014	-0.004	-0.000	-0.026	0.016	0.006	0.003	0.005	-0.002
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Gender Equality*Covariate	0.016	-0.038	-0.016	0.026	0.027	-0.005	-0.044	-0.040	-0.034	-0.036	-0.229	0.126	-0.077	-0.062**
	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.161)	(0.202)	(0.218)	(0.030)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.059	0.052	-0.016	0.015	0.052	0.012	0.094	-0.000	0.064	-0.020	0.012	0.178	-0.069	-0.016
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.144)	(0.193)	(0.169)	(0.023)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,373	3,370	3,370	3,377	3,228	3,016	3,376	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.880	0.019	0.404	0.289	0.218	0.136	0.069	0.082	0.066	0.243	0.172	0.182	0.204	0.356
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.285	0.440	0.329	0.103	0.107	0.149	0.927	0.586	0.738	0.651	0.218	0.419	0.863	0.343
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.563	0.204	0.965	0.602	0.323	0.933	0.143	0.985	0.285	0.876	0.899	0.343	0.713	0.681

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on self-reported voting outcomes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Estimates are based on equation (3), weighted by the ratio of registered voters to survey respondents per neighborhood. Each column reports estimates from a separate regression interacting the two treatment indicators with a different respondent characteristic or neighborhood demographic: being a woman (1), above median age (2), having less than a high school degree (3), being non-married (4), having a daughter (5), number of children (6), speaking a non-Turkish native language (7), above median religiosity (8), below median income (9), being employed (10), demeaned predicted Kurdish population share (11), demeaned 2023 opposition vote share (12), demeaned share of neighborhood residents with below-median education (13), and neighborhood SES Z-score (14). Panels A–G report results for overall opposition vote share, CHP, İYİ, DEM, remaining opposition parties' vote share, turnout, and the fraction of respondents preferring not to disclose their vote choice, respectively. The means of the dependent variable for the control group are 0.586, 0.538, 0.014, 0.029, 0.006, 0.814, and 0.120 for Panels A–G, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table reports the number of observations and three sets of p-values: for equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects, for whether the sum of the gender-equality main effect and its interaction with the covariate equals zero, and the same for the transparency treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-16: HTE by Respondent Characteristics and Neighborhood Demographics: Attitudes and Norms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Respondent Characteristics										Neighborhood Demographics			
	Woman	Above median age	Less than high school	Non-married	Having a daughter	Number of children	Non-Turkish native	More religious	Below median income	Employed	Predicted Kurdish population	Opposition vote share	Below median education	SES Z-score
A. Gender Inequality Index (Individual Attitudes)														
Gender Equality	0.061**	0.080***	0.074***	0.087***	0.041	0.062*	0.063**	0.062**	0.056*	0.066***	0.068***	0.064***	0.065***	0.056**
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Transparency	0.005	0.040**	0.045*	0.058**	0.019	0.027	0.037*	0.026	0.039	0.043*	0.029	0.026	0.026	0.024
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Gender Equality*Covariate	0.018	-0.030	-0.012	-0.061	0.045	0.004	0.045	0.008	0.026	0.012	0.112	0.216	-0.066	-0.004
	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.213)	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.022)
Transparency*Covariate	0.053	-0.029	-0.022	-0.099**	0.021	0.002	-0.039	0.012	-0.021	-0.033	0.151	0.187	-0.108	0.006
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.153)	(0.164)	(0.149)	(0.018)
Observations	3,250	3,247	3,250	3,246	3,244	3,244	3,249	3,113	2,900	3,248	3,250	3,250	3,250	3,250
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.059	0.080	0.267	0.218	0.362	0.265	0.281	0.234	0.548	0.311	0.098	0.071	0.068	0.115
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.003	0.102	0.014	0.407	0.001	0.009	0.003	0.013	0.007	0.021	0.394	0.091	0.994	0.132
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.022	0.702	0.295	0.170	0.091	0.147	0.944	0.132	0.501	0.754	0.239	0.184	0.605	0.336
B. Corruption (Individual Attitudes)														
Gender Equality	-0.059	-0.032	-0.031	-0.013	-0.020	0.071	-0.006	-0.015	-0.026	0.001	-0.018	-0.013	-0.011	0.007
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Transparency	-0.053	-0.024	-0.065	-0.016	-0.002	0.030	-0.018	-0.010	-0.051	-0.025	-0.024	-0.022	-0.033	-0.023
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Gender Equality*Covariate	0.087	0.028	0.028	0.003	0.004	-0.047**	-0.061	-0.014	-0.016	-0.053	0.222	-0.095	0.091	0.042
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.266)	(0.313)	(0.321)	(0.046)
Transparency*Covariate	0.050	-0.019	0.081	-0.042	-0.043	-0.031	-0.069	-0.037	0.063	-0.008	0.071	-0.229	-0.051	-0.013
	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.261)	(0.308)	(0.263)	(0.039)
Observations	3,215	3,212	3,215	3,210	3,207	3,207	3,214	3,074	2,870	3,213	3,215	3,215	3,215	3,215
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.894	0.869	0.497	0.956	0.715	0.446	0.771	0.940	0.628	0.476	0.877	0.823	0.536	0.370
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.549	0.930	0.932	0.845	0.660	0.589	0.256	0.501	0.382	0.391	0.428	0.737	0.801	0.427
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.955	0.353	0.704	0.352	0.248	0.978	0.243	0.304	0.815	0.535	0.856	0.406	0.763	0.572
C. Gender Inequality Index (Local Norms)														
Gender Equality	-0.014	0.009	0.057	0.002	0.034	0.022	0.010	-0.009	0.021	0.002	0.012	-0.003	-0.021	-0.010
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Transparency	0.021	0.029	0.066	0.058**	0.027	0.041	0.062**	0.023	0.045	0.096***	0.049*	0.039	0.022	0.039
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Gender Equality*Covariate	0.042	-0.004	-0.094**	0.015	-0.045	-0.008	-0.011	0.020	-0.034	0.016	-0.360*	0.399*	-0.543***	-0.042
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.061)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.208)	(0.214)	(0.196)	(0.028)
Transparency*Covariate	0.055*	0.052	-0.028	-0.034	0.038	0.005	-0.082	0.042	-0.001	-0.122***	-0.309**	0.375*	-0.522***	-0.012
	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.155)	(0.196)	(0.151)	(0.033)
Observations	3,043	3,041	3,043	3,040	3,037	3,037	3,042	2,916	2,723	3,041	3,043	3,043	3,043	3,043
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.323	0.610	0.826	0.072	0.859	0.678	0.133	0.474	0.534	0.003	0.272	0.158	0.113	0.081
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.367	0.901	0.266	0.641	0.739	0.643	0.980	0.742	0.754	0.634	0.083	0.073	0.005	0.268
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.013	0.014	0.125	0.638	0.016	0.174	0.618	0.014	0.264	0.524	0.080	0.034	0.002	0.561
D. Corruption (Local Norms)														
Gender Equality	-0.098*	0.001	0.001	-0.065	0.002	0.018	-0.063	-0.042	-0.014	-0.055	-0.057	-0.057	-0.068	-0.025
	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.053)
Transparency	-0.025	0.013	-0.003	0.027	-0.006	-0.001	0.023	0.015	0.004	0.016	0.016	0.011	-0.007	0.038
	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Gender Equality*Covariate	0.093	-0.125**	-0.100	0.047	-0.090	-0.038*	0.080	-0.032	-0.112*	0.007	0.216	0.191	-0.325	0.037
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.058)	(0.021)	(0.114)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.452)	(0.344)	(0.353)	(0.050)
Transparency*Covariate	0.087*	0.011	0.048	-0.034	0.047	0.011	-0.041	0.008	0.033	0.003	0.052	0.221	-0.385	0.024
	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.047)	(0.019)	(0.092)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.342)	(0.329)	(0.269)	(0.045)
Observations	3,065	3,063	3,065	3,062	3,059	3,059	3,064	2,934	2,740	3,063	3,065	3,065	3,065	3,065
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.219	0.821	0.944	0.110	0.880	0.727	0.140	0.394	0.767	0.220	0.183	0.193	0.229	0.209
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.931	0.061	0.095	0.794	0.147	0.644	0.869	0.242	0.060	0.461	0.726	0.703	0.276	0.889
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.229	0.721	0.412	0.926	0.453	0.824	0.831	0.692	0.485	0.757	0.844	0.459	0.172	0.460
E. Gender Inequality Index (Country-wide Norms)														
Gender Equality	-0.027	-0.001	0.021	-0.029	-0.025	-0.017	-0.023	-0.025	0.008	-0.044**	-0.018	-0.026	-0.036*	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Transparency	0.003	0.002	0.032	-0.004	-0.013	-0.006	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.022	0.001	-0.009	-0.016	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Gender Equality*Covariate	0.016	-0.045	-0.076**	0.034	0.009	-0.001	0.027	0.006	-0.054	0.071*	-0.103	0.273*	-0.333**	0.011
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.183)	(0.145)	(0.133)	(0.019)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.002	-0.002	-0.060*	0.019	0.026	0.004	-0.012	-0.009	-0.014	-0.054	-0.027	0.385***	-0.296**	-0.019
	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.172)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.021)
Observations	3,168	3,166	3,168	3,165	3,162	3,162	3,167	3,035	2,834	3,166	3,168	3,168	3,168	3,168
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.229	0.907	0.680	0.243	0.673	0.704	0.216	0.378	0.902	0.001	0.361	0.399	0.349	0.494
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.662	0.060	0.034	0.899	0.489	0.390	0.938	0.466	0.075	0.459	0.515	0.085	0.011	0.883
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.966	0.999	0.197	0.716	0.570	0.947	0.808	0.795	0.676	0.320	0.882	0.002	0.017	0.470
F. Corruption (Country-wide Norms)														
Gender Equality	-0.055	-0.061	-0.068	-0.060	-0.073	-0.053	-0.071*	-0.057	-0.061	-0.053	-0.066*	-0.058	-0.058	-0.017
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Transparency	-0.005	-0.026	-0.035	-0.015	-0.051	-0.066	-0.031	-0.013	-0.038	-0.046	-0.031	-0.040	-0.056	-0.015
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.004	0.004	0.021	0.013	0.025	-0.002	0.103	-0.000	-0.018	-0.019	0.465	0.085	-0.028	0.048
	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.022)	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.293)	(0.304)	(0.299)	(0.048)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.059	-0.024	0.007	-0.069	0.029	0.017	-0.022	-0.031	0.003	0.032	0.083	0.222	-0.363	-0.008
	(0.055)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.092)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.070)	(0.236)	(0.320)	(0.268)	(0.045)
Observations	3,147	3,145	3,147	3,144	3,141	3,141	3,146	3,013	2,817	3,145	3,147	3,147	3,147	3,147
Gender Equality=Transparency p-value	0.323	0.482	0.563	0.255	0.722	0.838	0.363	0.463	0.687	0.873	0.418	0.647	0.965	0.953
Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate p-value	0.183	0.263	0.289	0.426	0.252	0.220	0.659	0.183	0.147	0.234	0.161	0.931	0.779	0.676
Transparency+Transparency × Covariate p-value	0.162	0.409	0.530	0.171	0.631	0.329	0.534	0.329	0.533	0.816	0.814	0.558	0.144	0.760

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on attitudes and perceived norms measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Estimates are based on equation (3), weighted by the ratio of registered voters to survey respondents per neighborhood. Each column reports estimates from a separate regression interacting the two treatment indicators with a different respondent characteristic or neighborhood demographic: being a woman (1), above median age (2), having less than a high school degree (3), being non-married (4), having a daughter (5), number of children (6), speaking a non-Turkish native language (7), above median religiosity (8), below median income (9), being employed (10), demeaned predicted Kurdish population share (11), demeaned 2023 opposition vote share (12), demeaned share of neighborhood residents with below-median education (13), and neighborhood SES Z-score (14). Panels A, C, and E report results for the gender inequality index based on individual attitudes, perceived local norms, and perceived country-wide norms, respectively. Panels B, D, and F report results for views on corruption eradication based on individual attitudes, perceived local norms, and perceived country-wide norms, respectively. The gender inequality index is the average of four binary indicators equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with a gender inequality statement (Panel A), or if the respondent's estimate of the share of closest neighbors (Panel C) or fellow citizens in Turkey (Panel E) who agree with the statement exceeds 50%. The corruption outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the corruption statement (Panel B), or if the respondent's estimate of the share of closest neighbors (Panel D) or fellow citizens in Turkey (Panel F) who agree exceeds 50%. The means of the dependent variable for the control group are 0.320, 0.537, 0.492, 0.587, 0.656, and 0.651 for Panels A–F, respectively. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table reports the number of observations and three sets of p-values: for equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects, for whether the sum of the gender-equality main effect and its interaction with the covariate equals zero, and the same for the transparency treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-17: Robustness of the Results on Individual Attitudes at İzmir Endline Survey to Different Weight Schemes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Index Subcomponents				
	Gender Inequality Index	Men has more right to job	Men are better political leaders	Beating wife is justifiable	Child suffer if mother works	Possible to eradicate corruption
A. Population Weights						
Gender Equality	0.069***	0.096***	0.092***	0.005	0.071*	-0.016
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.030	0.034	0.022	0.012	0.036	-0.028
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.320	0.407	0.286	0.029	0.571	0.537
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.079	0.060	0.051	0.385	0.350	0.743
B. Gender Weights						
Gender Equality	0.068***	0.092***	0.097***	0.005	0.070*	-0.022
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Transparency	0.033*	0.035	0.028	0.012	0.041	-0.037
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.320	0.411	0.283	0.031	0.567	0.546
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.110	0.091	0.050	0.434	0.451	0.698
C. Age Weights						
Gender Equality	0.069***	0.092***	0.095***	0.006	0.072*	-0.019
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Transparency	0.033*	0.042	0.027	0.015*	0.037	-0.040
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.317	0.404	0.279	0.030	0.565	0.545
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.100	0.145	0.048	0.343	0.348	0.584
D. Education Weights						
Gender Equality	0.061***	0.089**	0.078**	0.006	0.064	-0.015
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.029	0.036	0.021	0.015	0.039	-0.045
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.009)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.329	0.417	0.295	0.030	0.583	0.551
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.144	0.128	0.116	0.329	0.489	0.447

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on individual attitudes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey using alternative survey weighting schemes. Estimates are ITT effects based on equation (3). Panel A applies population weights based on the ratio of registered voters to survey respondents within neighborhoods. Panels B, C, and D reweight survey respondents within each neighborhood to match the actual neighborhood-level distribution of gender, age (below 50 vs. 50 or older), and education (share with at least a high school degree), respectively. All weights are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Column (1) reports treatment effects on the overall gender-inequality index. Columns (2)–(6) report treatment effects on the individual level agreement with the statement given in each column. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-18: Interview Conditions Under Which İzmir Endline Survey Was Conducted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Index Subcomponents			
	Influence index	Presence of others	Consulted anyone	Influenced by others	Hostility scale
Gender Equality	0.016	0.028	0.002	0.017	0.082**
	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.040)
Transparency	-0.013	-0.012	-0.018	-0.008	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.033)
Observations	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377
Mean	0.149	0.341	0.057	0.048	1.309
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.047	0.233	0.075	0.057	0.057

Notes: This table reports treatment effects of assignment to the gender equality and transparency campaigns on interview conditions observed during the 2024 İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Column (1) reports effects on an influence index defined as the mean of the three binary indicators reported in Columns (2)–(4). Columns (2), (3), and (4) equal one if the interview was conducted under the condition stated in the respective column header. Column (5) reports effects on a hostility scale recorded by the interviewer (1 = friendly, 2 = neutral, 3 = hostile). Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, and p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-19: Treatment Effects on Self-Reported Voting for the Incumbent Parties at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Incumbent by Party	
	Incumbent	AKP	Rest of Incumbent
Gender Equality	0.022	0.022	0.001
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.003)
Transparency	0.031	0.025	0.006*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.004)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.224	0.221	0.004
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.739	0.910	0.157

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on self-reported voting outcomes for incumbent political blocs. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Column 1 reports effects on the self-reported vote share of incumbent parties; column 2 and 3 reports vote shares for the major incumbent party (AKP) and the remaining incumbent parties. Results are based on our baseline specification for the survey results, which controls for neighborhood-level the CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, turnout, and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary and 2024 local elections; as well as dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in 2023 parliamentary elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The table also reports The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-20: Robustness of the Results on Main Survey Outcomes at İzmir Endline Survey to Different Set of Controls

	Full sample				Sample with non-missing imbalanced demographic controls				Sample with non-missing all demographic questions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Opposition Vote Share												
Gender Equality	-0.087**	-0.099***	-0.108***	-0.101***	-0.112***	-0.103***	-0.107***	-0.099***	-0.110***	-0.099***	-0.098***	-0.095***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Transparency	-0.061**	-0.060**	-0.059**	-0.057**	-0.070**	-0.067**	-0.069**	-0.066**	-0.071**	-0.068**	-0.064**	-0.064**
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,014	3,014	3,014	3,014	2,882	2,882	2,882	2,882
Mean	0.586	0.586	0.586	0.586	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.604	0.604	0.604	0.604
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.523	0.308	0.178	0.217	0.248	0.319	0.296	0.363	0.279	0.370	0.298	0.337
B. Individual Attitudes: Gender Inequality Index												
Gender Equality	0.070***	0.066***	0.069***	0.058***	0.074***	0.061***	0.071***	0.058***	0.079***	0.065***	0.071***	0.063***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Transparency	0.028	0.030	0.030	0.025	0.033*	0.028	0.032*	0.027	0.035*	0.031	0.032*	0.029*
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Observations	3,250	3,250	3,250	3,250	2,898	2,898	2,898	2,898	2,779	2,779	2,779	2,779
Mean	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.316	0.316	0.316	0.316	0.318	0.318	0.318	0.318
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.063	0.099	0.079	0.109	0.072	0.117	0.084	0.133	0.069	0.115	0.046	0.069
C.Individual Attitudes: Possible to eradicate corruption												
Gender Equality	-0.020	-0.028	-0.016	-0.002	-0.032	-0.020	-0.035	-0.023	-0.035	-0.022	-0.033	-0.020
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Transparency	-0.031	-0.027	-0.028	-0.020	-0.027	-0.020	-0.027	-0.021	-0.023	-0.016	-0.023	-0.017
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Observations	3,215	3,215	3,215	3,215	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,745	2,745	2,745	2,745
Mean	0.537	0.537	0.537	0.537	0.541	0.541	0.541	0.541	0.548	0.548	0.548	0.548
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.778	0.994	0.743	0.636	0.887	0.994	0.841	0.960	0.771	0.894	0.791	0.933
Sextile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition 23		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Turnout 23, Registered Voters 23 & 24			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Administrative Demographics: Education, SES				✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Imbalanced Controls							✓	✓			✓	✓
All Other Endline Demographics											✓	✓

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on main survey outcomes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. The estimates are based on the equation (3) and are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Panels report results separately for opposition vote share (Panel A), the gender-inequality index for individual attitudes (Panel B), and the individual belief that corruption can be eradicated from local politics (Panel C). All columns include dummies for districts and sextiles of opposition vote share in the 2023 parliamentary elections. Columns 2, 6, and 10 additionally include neighborhood-level CHP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares from the 2023 parliamentary elections. Columns 3, 7, and 11 further add turnout and registered voters from the 2023 parliamentary elections and registered voters from the 2024 local elections. Columns 4, 8, and 12 add neighborhood-level administrative demographic controls (share of residents with below-median education and SES Z-score). Column 7 additionally includes imbalanced demographic controls, and Column 8 includes both administrative and imbalanced demographic controls. Column 11 additionally includes imbalanced demographic controls and all other endline demographics, and Column 12 includes all control sets in this table. Columns 1–4 use the full sample; Columns 5–8 are restricted to observations with non-missing imbalanced demographic controls; and Columns 9–12 are restricted to observations with non-missing responses to all demographic questions. The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.

Table A-21: Representativeness of Survey Vote Shares Relative to Administrative Results in Control Neighborhoods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	AKP (Incumbent)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
Admin share	0.912***	0.786*	0.664**	1.053***	2.126**	0.480***	-0.342
	(0.315)	(0.437)	(0.303)	(0.278)	(0.869)	(0.137)	(0.300)
Constant	0.219*	0.217	0.316***	-0.120	-0.028**	0.009	0.011*
	(0.124)	(0.344)	(0.105)	(0.088)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Dependent mean	0.573	0.805	0.523	0.228	0.015	0.028	0.006
R-squared	0.180	0.085	0.147	0.196	0.372	0.272	0.009

Notes: This table presents the results of neighborhood-level regressions of the survey share on the corresponding administrative share in the control group. The estimates are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents. Columns 1-7 report the results separately for overall opposition vote share, turnout, the CHP, AKP, İYİ, DEM, and remaining opposition parties' vote shares, respectively. The table reports the number of observations, the mean of dependent variable for the control group, and R-squared. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. For more details on variables and measurement, see Appendix Table A-1.