Men's Beliefs and Women's Ballots*

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Abstract

In many societies, men exert control over women's actions across social, economic, and political domains. We study whether this control extends to voting, where the secret ballot is designed to protect voter autonomy. In a pre-registered field experiment in rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, we provide incentivized evidence that men severely underestimate the alignment between their own vote choices and those of women in their communities. We then show that randomly correcting these misperceptions about vote alignment nearly doubles women's election-day turnout from a low baseline of 14.4 percent. We also show and correct norm misperceptions around whether women should vote, and find that turnout effects are similar in magnitude, suggesting that men's strategic control may play as large a role as norms in shaping women's political participation. Using an incentivized task, we document that correcting alignment and norm misperceptions increases the chance that men allow women to make their own political decisions. Our findings establish that belief-based constraints represent actionable barriers to women's political participation.

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1 Introduction

In many societies around the world, men exert control over women's actions across social, economic, political, and personal domains (Jayachandran and Voena 2026). Women may be expected to seek permission from male relatives before traveling, pursuing higher education, or accepting paid employment. These patterns of control are often sustained not only by formal rules, but also by social norms and intra-household power dynamics that shape women's autonomy in everyday decisions. One such domain is politics. Political participation is a consequential sphere of agency because it determines whose preferences are represented in public policy and, in turn, shapes the allocation of resources and rights within society (Gottlieb et al. 2016; Khan 2017; Bleck and Michelitch 2018; Brule and Gaikwad 2020).

The extension of women's suffrage in the twentieth century marked a major institutional shift, granting women the formal right to vote. Yet suffrage did not necessarily eliminate male control over women's political decisions. For men accustomed to delivering bloc votes to local politicians or acting as intermediaries between the household and the state, women's independent voting could represent a loss of political influence. Politicians, in turn, may have strategically focused mobilization efforts on male household heads, reinforcing patterns in which men control and restrict women's political participation.

In this paper, we test whether men restrict women's political participation because they believe women's votes may diverge from their own. If men expect political disagreement within the household, they may have incentives to monitor, accompany, or discourage women's voting in order to preserve household political influence. By experimentally correcting men's misperceptions about women's political alignment, we test whether belief-driven concerns shape the extent to which men exert control over women's political choices.

We study this question in rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, a socially conservative province where women's political participation remains markedly low despite universal adult suffrage. Women's turnout in many areas has lagged far behind men's, and in some cases has approached the constitutional minimum of ten percent required for electoral validity. Although the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has implemented several targeted initiatives, from voter literacy to mock polling exercises before the elections, to boost female participation, these interventions have largely failed to translate into meaningful turnout gains. The persistent disparity in voting and the limits of institutional efforts targeted at women voters make the setting well-suited to studying how men's power and influence shape women's political participation.

We combine a pre-registered field experiment with surveys to first provide incentivized evidence that men in our sample severely underestimate concordance between the vote choices of men and women in their communities. We then show that randomly correcting these beliefs about vote alignment between men and women nearly doubles the election day turnout of women from their own households. Second, we also show and correct norm misperceptions around whether women *should* vote, and find that the turnout result on correcting the vote alignment misperception is similar in magnitude to correcting beliefs around norms directly. This suggests that men's strategic control may play as large a role as norms in shaping women's political life. Third, using an incentivized task, we show that correcting alignment (and norm) misperceptions increases the chance that men allow women to make their own political decisions, suggesting male control in the household is an important impediment to

women's political participation. Fourth, the treatment effects extend to other women in the household who were not directly treated.

The paper makes three contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on intra-household decision-making and the determinants of women's power within the household (Jayachandran and Voena 2026).[1] A common thread in this work is that men restrict women's autonomy when they anticipate that women, if left to decide freely, would make choices that diverge from men's own preferences. Our focus is on politics, where voting presents a theoretically ambiguous case for this logic. The secret ballot introduces plausible deniability that attenuates the strategic rationale for restricting how women vote, since men cannot verify their voting choices. Yet we show that men can and do control the extensive margin of voting: whether women vote at all. Ours is thus the first evidence on strategic control of preference expression in politics.

Second, we contribute to a growing literature on misperceptions about others (Bursztyn and Yang 2022; La Ferrara and Yanagizawa-Drott 2026).[2] Experimental corrections of these misperceptions generally succeed in updating beliefs, but translating them into behavioral change has proven more difficult, where effects are often small or short-lived. We study voting, where misperceptions about others have received little attention, and show that misperceptions surrounding both preference alignment and community norms shape women's turnout. Our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to show that misperception-corrections move real turnout for women. The persuasion rate of this correction is similar to those in information and media-exposure experiments surveyed in DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010).

Third, we contribute to a growing literature on women's agency and political participation in developing countries (Anderson 2024; Jayachandran 2015). The question of why women's political participation remains so low even where suffrage is universal has been examined through multiple channels: quotas and reserved seats for women (Pande 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Bhavnani 2008), low aspirations and the scarcity of role models (Beaman et al. 2012), weaknesses in the pipeline of female candidates (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Foos and Gilardi 2019), the absence of women's political networks (Giné and Mansuri 2018; Prillaman 2023), and male gatekeeping (Cheema et al. 2023). We provide evidence of an under-examined belief-based explanation: the possibility that women's low participation reflects correctable misperceptions held by the men who control women's access to the ballot. Our results highlight that belief-based constraints represent actionable barriers to women's political agency.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, including baseline belief elicitation, treatment delivery, randomization, endline data collection, and balance. Section 3 presents the main results on men's beliefs, women's voter turnout,

[1] A growing body of experimental evidence documents that men exert control over women's choices across a wide range of domains: labor force participation (Heath and Tan 2020; Lowe and McKelway 2025; Kala and McKelway 2025; Field et al. 2021; Sanin 2025), savings and financial decisions (Ashraf 2009), fertility (Ashraf et al. 2014), and children's human capital investments (Björkman Nyqvist and Jayachandran 2017).

[2] A large body of work documents that people systematically misperceive others' attitudes, characteristics, and behaviors across a range of domains: the composition of immigrant populations (Alesina et al. 2018), income and relative position in the distribution (Cruces et al. 2013), partisan political opinions (Ahler and Sood 2018), health behaviors such as vaccination and compliance with public health protocols (Karing 2021; Allen IV et al. 2023), protest participation (Cantoni et al. 2019), and campaign organization (Hager et al. 2023).

and intra-household political decision-making. Section 4 examines heterogeneous treatment effects by women's empowerment and other baseline characteristics. Section 5 concludes.

2 Experimental design

We implemented our study around the 2024 General Elections in Pakistan which were held on February 8th. The study is conducted in three phases. In the first phase, started on January 18, we collect primary baseline beliefs on vote alignment and norms related to women's voting. This allows us to calculate misalignment in beliefs. In the second phase, that occurred before the elections, we return to respondents and randomize the provision of correct information. Elections occur before the final phase where we measure outcomes. We provide details of these phases of fieldwork below. Figure 2 shows an overview of the design at each phase of the study.

2.1 Baseline Beliefs and their Misperception

We implement this study within 36 villages in north-western Pakistan. Within each village, we implemented a geographic randomization to sample households. For each village, we first identified a central landmark, typically a mosque, a school, or a local organization's office location. We then drew random geo-pins within 190 meters around this landmark and shared the corresponding latitude and longitude with enumerators. At the start of the survey, enumerators loaded the assigned coordinates on their phones and proceeded to the pin location. If the pin fell on a dwelling, the survey was conducted in that household. If it did not, enumerators turned back toward the original landmark and selected the first un-contacted dwelling on the right.

For the baseline survey, we randomly sample 2593 households across 36 villages in District Charsadda and collect beliefs through in-person private surveys with one male and one female respondent per household. Respondents are interviewed separately by enumerators of their respective genders. The specific respondents in the household are identified by asking for the male and female decision-makers.

We measure beliefs on vote alignment and norms as follows:

1. **Beliefs about Vote Alignment:** We ask each respondent how many women they think (out of 10 in the village) vote for the same electoral candidate as men.[3]

   To calculate the magnitude of misbelief, we use the voting records from the 2018 General Elections in District Charsadda. Using voting data from male and female polling stations[4] where only voters of respective genders are allowed to vote, and then calculate the correlation between the ranking of candidates among male and female

[3]The exact question asks: "Out of 10 women, how many women from your village do you think vote for the same candidate/party as the men?" This question is incentivized: respondents are told "Since we'll know the correct answer, if your answer is close to it we'll enter your name in a lottery where we randomly select one person to receive a prize of Rs. 500." Payment for all correct answers was disbursed after the endline.

[4]Using the polling-station data for the 51 settlements in our frame, 28,405 male voters and 18,424 female voters, or 88.2 percent of male voters and 90.8 percent of female voters, voted at polling stations that were not coded as combined. By contrast, 3,790 male voters and 1,879 female voters, or 11.8 percent of male

voters. We find a correlation of 0.96, which we interpret as near perfect alignment between candidate choices of male and female voters. The high correlation between male and female voters' ranking of candidates is also supported by survey evidence on alignment. When asked whether they will vote for the same candidate as men of the household during the baseline survey, only 11% of women reported in negative. Using this information, we set the true number of women (out of 10 women) in the village who vote for the same candidate as men at 10. The difference between this true number and the response of the individual to our question gives us the magnitude of misbelief about vote alignment between the candidate choices of men and women. Figure 1 panel (a) shows the distribution of this wedge where 87 percent of the respondents strongly underestimated the alignment in candidate choice between men and women.

2. **Beliefs about Norms:** The respondents are also asked whether they support women's right to vote or not.[5] Using the answers of male respondents, we calculate how many men out of 10 in the village privately support women's right to vote.

   Next, we ask respondents to predict the number of men (out of 10 men) in the village who support women's right to vote.[6] This second question is used as the individual's belief about norms in the village. The difference between each individual's belief about men in the village and the actual support scaled to 10 gives us the magnitude of misbelief about norms supporting women voting for each individual man and woman in our sample. Figure 1 panel (b) shows the distribution of this wedge, indicating that 73 percent of the respondents in the village are pessimistic about the norms around women's right to vote.

Besides beliefs and demographics, the baseline survey also included questions on women empowerment and household political participation which we use for heterogeneity analysis. In the baseline, women are also asked for reasons for not voting in previous elections. About 37 percent of the women who did not vote report that they were asked not to vote, providing further evidence that men exert control over women's political participation (Figure A3).

2.2 Administering Treatments

Having established that there is considerable misperception in beliefs on vote alignment and norms, we proceed to the second phase of fieldwork where we design an experiment to correct these misbeliefs.

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voters and 9.3 percent of female voters, voted at polling stations coded as combined. Importantly, this does not mean that men and women voted in mixed booths. Polling booths were always gender segregated from the voter's perspective. What we code as a combined polling station simply refers to cases where male and female booths were located within the same school or compound.

[5]The exact question asks: "On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you agree with the statement, "If women want, they have the right to vote"". We code any responses of 4 and above as agreement with the statement.

[6]This question is also incentivized. Respondents are told that if their answer is close to the true village average calculated after the survey, their name will be entered in a lottery of PKR 500 which will be won by one randomly selected person.

2.2.1 Experimental Sample

The distribution of misperception in Figure 1 shows that all respondents are weakly pessimistic about vote alignment between men and women (panel a), and a significant proportion have strong pessimistic beliefs about norms (panel b). The experimental sample, households who can randomly receive belief correction treatments, therefore comprises those where both male and female respondents are strongly pessimistic about other men's support for women voting ($N = 1,582$). This choice of the experimental sample reflects ethical concerns about correcting optimistic norm misbeliefs (comprising those respondents whose beliefs about others support for women voting are higher than the true support in the village) as doing so may depress women's turnout.

This experimental sample is referred to as the strongly pessimistic sample in our Pre-analysis Plan, where we experimentally correct misbeliefs about both alignment and norms.[7] We also pre-registered a belief correction experiment on the remaining norm weakly optimistic sample (N=1,011), where we only correct misbeliefs around vote alignment. Randomization was conducted independently for both experiments. The results from this second experiment are consistent with those we show below, and are presented in Appendix J.

2.2.2 Treatments delivery

Having established belief misperceptions via the baseline, we proceed to the treatment stage of the project. Our survey teams return to the field and find the same male and female respondents in each household who were surveyed at baseline.[8] A new survey is administered to these individuals that includes a module on treatments as well as a post-treatment outcome module. Respondents in the control group are similarly contacted but only receive the post-treatment outcome module.

In treatment households, respondents are first reminded of their baseline responses to the questions about vote alignment between men and women, and also the number of men in the village who support women voting. They are then informed about the true alignment in voting and the true average number of men in the village who support women voting depending on the treatment randomization we discuss below. For each treatment, the information is conveyed visually by showing a number of blank and colored faces on a digital mobile device and verbally explained by the enumerators. We show robustness to enumeration pair fixed effects in Appendix K.3.

2.2.3 Randomization

Treatments are assigned at the household level which means that both male and female respondents receive the same treatment information. However, like the baseline survey, each

[7]We pre-registered our experiment with AEA. We adhere closely to the pre-registration in the analysis that follows. Deviations relate to analysis of extra outcomes that we explicitly note below. These deviations from the pre-analysis plan in detail in Appendix A. Link to pre-registration: `https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12898-1.0`

[8]The recontact rate at the household level is 95.8 percent. The randomization is at the household level and was conducted on the full baseline experimental level. We report ITT estimates below with IV estimates in Appendix K.2.

respondent is treated privately by the enumerator of their respective gender. See Figure 2 for details. Households are randomized between three treatments (Alignment, Norms, or Both) and one control condition.[9] We now describe these treatments.

- **Alignment:** Respondents in this treatment condition are informed about the real alignment in candidate vote choice between male and female voters. As discussed above, the information is scaled to 10, so we inform the treated subjects that 10 out of 10 women vote for the same candidate as men.
- **Norms:** Respondents in this treatment condition are told the average number of men in this community (scaled to 10) who agree with the statement "If women want, they have the right to vote"". As the experimental sample is strongly pessimistic the treatment is always in the direction of other men being more permissive than the respondents initial beliefs.
- **Both:** Households in this condition receive both the alignment and norms treatment.
- **Control:** This group does not receive any treatment information, but is contacted in the same way as the treatment groups.

2.3 Endline data collection

In addition to outcomes collected at the time of the treatment, we return to the field after the election to collect data on the primary pre-registered outcome: whether women in the experimental sample voted in the election or not. Election regulations in Pakistan require that anyone who votes in the election gets an indelible ink mark on their thumbnail. We use this requirement to collect objective information on whether women voted or not.[10] Female members of our survey teams visit the sampled households between one and three days after the election and checked for indelible ink marks on the thumbnails of the main female respondents and other women in the households.[11] Women who do not have this mark are considered to have not voted and are asked for reasons for not voting. Our teams are able to collect the voting outcomes for women in 1552 households, representing 98.1 percent of the experimental sample.

2.4 Balance and Summary Statistics

We sample 1,582 households for experiment 1 and 1,011 households for experiment 2. These households earn on average Rs. 11,366 and Rs. 11,997 per month, respectively. Male respondents have on average 4.54 years of education and female respondents have 1.20 years. We check for balance across eight household level characteristics and fifteen characteristics

[9]The weakly optimistic sample was independently randomized to receive only the Alignment treatment (as discussed above) or a control condition.

[10]Previous work has also used this ink mark to measure turnout (Cheema et al. 2023).

[11]We were able to collect these data for roughly 65 percent of households on day 1. The remaining households were reached on day 2. On day 3, our teams revisited households that had not been found during the first two visits in order to complete the sample as fully as possible.

at the level of female respondents across the two samples separately by testing if treatment assignment is orthogonal to these co-variates. Out of 168 balance tests performed on the sample of experiment 1, we find only 14 to be significant. Appendix sections C and D report the summary statistics and balance tables, respectively. Of the households that were treated, 36 received the wrong treatment due to human error in handling the survey software; this constitutes 1.2 percent of our sample. A further 4 percent of the baseline respondents were not treated and did not answer the post-treatment survey, while 2 percent were unreachable during the endline survey. We report ITT estimates throughout the text, and Table A8 shows that there is no evidence that attrition at endline is caused by treatment. Appendix B provides a detailed breakdown of these numbers in Table A1.

3 Results

3.1 Estimation

We estimate treatment effects by running a regression using the following equations:

$$Y_{ihb} = Alignment_{hb} + Norms_{hb} + Both_{hb} + \eta_b + \varepsilon_{ihb} \tag{1}$$

where Y is the outcome for individual i in household h and randomization block b. η_b is a vector of block fixed effects.

We use heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for most models that look at individual level outcomes and cluster standard errors at the household level in models where outcomes for multiple individuals in a household are analyzed.

3.2 Effects on men's beliefs about female voter turnout

We first study if the information about alignment helps the respondent update their beliefs. Instead of asking the respondents to restate the information that was provided to them, we ask for beliefs about turnout of women voters. We find that as a result of all the treatments the distribution of men's beliefs about turnout significantly shifts rightward. Figure 3 plots the distribution of men's beliefs about turnout for each treatment condition and the control. The figure also reports p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of the equality of the distributions. In all cases, we can reject the null that post treatment administration the distributions of beliefs are similar between the treatment condition and the control condition: the exact p-values are 0.000 for the alignment treatment, 0.046 for the norms treatment, and 0.000 for the combined treatment. This result provides evidence that the treatments help men update their beliefs about women's political actions.

3.3 Effects on female voter turnout

Table 1 presents the effects of the experiment on the main pre-registered outcome: women's voting. This outcome is collected through a post-election survey for the women respondents in the households. The outcome is coded as 1 if the enumerator found indelible ink mark, a proof of voting, on the thumb of the respondent and zero otherwise.

Column 1 reports the effect of the treatments on the likelihood that the main female respondent voted in the election. There are four important results to consider. First, in the status quo, the likelihood of women voting is only 14.4 percent. This rate of voting is slightly above the minimum female turnout requirement of 10%, as set in the constitution. This low turnout rate supports the view that women rarely participate in political activities.

Second, correcting beliefs about the alignment between the candidate choices of men and women increases the likelihood that women vote by 10.9 percentage points. This result suggests that at least some women who would otherwise want to vote cannot because of the misperception that women may vote for candidates that are not favored by men.

Third, correcting the misperception about the norms of women voting also results in a higher turnout of women by 10.2 percentage points. Since restrictive norms are often considered the reason behind women's lack of participation in politics, this result suggests that providing correct information and removing misperception may help relax some of the constraints posed by conservative norms.

Fourth, and last correcting misperception in beliefs about alignment between candidate choice and about norms governing women voting also results in higher turnout (13.1 percentage points). Given the positive effect of the combined treatment on turnout, we test for additive complementarity of correcting beliefs about alignment and social norms but find the two are not additively complementary. We reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on both treatments is the same as the sum of the effects of alignment and norms individual treatments (p−value = 0.017), as shown in the second panel of Table **??**. on non compilance somewhere in this section; from the dellavinagen

Effects on Other Women of the Household: The results discussed above consider the turnout of the main female respondent in each household. Column 2 of Table 1 reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household who were not the main respondent for each household. Our team neither collected their baseline beliefs nor provided them true treatment information. The turn out of other women in households, where the main respondents received correct information about the vote alignment between men and women, increased by 12.3 percentage points. The norms and the both treatments increase the turnout of these other female voters by 4 and 8 percentage points, respectively. These positive effects on these non-treated women in treated households is consistent with our hypothesis that men exert control on women voters due to holding wrong beliefs about how women vote. Once men's beleifs are corrected with true information about the alignment in vote choice, they lift the hold on all women voters of the household.

Persuasion rate. To benchmark the magnitude of our treatment effects, we compute the persuasion rate proposed by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and discussed in DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The persuasion rate measures the fraction of individuals whose behavior could have been changed by the intervention who were in fact moved to act. Formally,

$$f = 100 \times \frac{y_T - y_C}{e_T - e_C} \times \frac{1}{1 - y_0}, \tag{2}$$

where $y_T - y_C$ is the intent-to-treat effect on women's turnout, $e_T - e_C$ is the difference in the share of individuals effectively exposed to the treatment message between the treatment

and control groups, and y_0 is the baseline turnout rate in the control group. The first ratio adjusts the reduced-form effect for the actual exposure differential between treatment and control; the second term rescales the effect as a share of the population at risk of being persuaded—that is, women who were not already voting $(1 - y_0)$. In our setting, the intervention was expected to be delivered to 100% of the treated households and no one from the control. However, some treated households could not be reached on the day of the treatment administration, resulting in a less than 100% rate. The relevant treatments were received by 95.7% of the households in the alignment group, 96.7% of the households in the norms group, and 95.96% of the households in the group receiving both interventions. Appendix B provides a detailed breakdown of the attrition numbers. Using the control-group turnout rate of $y_0 = 0.144$, the persuasion rate, using equation 2, is 13.3% for the treatment correcting beliefs about alignment between men and women, 2.3% for the treatment correcting beliefs about norms, and 15.9% for the combined treatment receiving correct information about both types of beliefs.

Our persuasion rates are in line with DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) who survey 24 estimates across studies of consumers, voters, donors, and investors, reporting a median persuasion rate of 7.95% overall and 11.5% among voter persuasion studies. Our estimates of 12.3–15.9% fall above the voter-study median but within the range documented in this literature. The slightly high rates reflect two features of our setting: the intervention targets a specific and actionable belief, men's misperceptions about vote alignment and community norms, and the baseline rate of the target behavior is low, leaving correspondingly more room for persuasion.

3.4 Effects on Independence of Women's Political Decisions

The change in women voter turnout after the households were treated is likely driven by changes in men's control over women's decision making. In this section, we provide evidence that the treatments changed attitudes of men towards women's participation in political activities right after the administration of treatment. In the post-treatment survey, we measure willingness of men to let women take a political decision. Male respondents are informed that we plan to hold a political gathering (called *jalsa*) for women at a future date. As part of this activity, we may visit the female respondents and ask them to divide a pot of money (Rs. 500) such that they can donate some or none of the money to help organize this gathering and keep the balance for themselves. The men are asked if they would let the women make a decision about donating money to the organization of this gathering or would they like to make this decision *for* the women right then. These questions are asked a number of different ways where in two scenarios the location of the event is made salient (either at the venue associated with the party of men's support or at a venue associated with another party), and in one scenario the location is not made salient. All respondents, are asked about all scenarios though the order is randomized.

Column 2 of Table 1 reports the effects of treatments on whether men allow women to make political decisions. In the status-quo, about 38.3 percent of men are willing to let the women make their own decisions. As a result of the alignment treatment, there is an increase of 4.6 percentage points in the likelihood of men allowing women political decision making. The effect is similarly large (4.8 percentage point) for households in the norms treatment.

However, the effect is positive but non-significant for households receiving both treatments.

The result of this analysis suggests that the alignment and the norms treatment enabled more men to feel comfortable allowing women to make their own political decisions. Importantly, this result directly measures the behavior of male respondents as these responses were collected during the post treatment survey when the male and female respondents had not had a chance to talk.

3.5 Robustness of Main Results

The results reported in Table 1 are robust to the addition of control variables. Appendix Table A33 reproduces the effects on women voting by controlling for household, male, female, and all baseline characteristics. The results are also robust to instrumenting the treatment received with the treatment assigned during randomization (Appendix K.2); to the addition of enumerator pair fixed effects (Appendix K.3); and to limiting the sample to households that received the correct treatment and answered the endline survey (Appendix A47). The full set of robustness tables is presented in the online appendix K.1.

3.6 Discussion

Taken together, the patterns point to belief-based constraints, rather than immutable preferences or hard enforcement, as a central barrier to women's participation. Information about alignment appears to loosen a private justification for restricting women's votes: if men expect divergence, they have a reason to withhold permission or to insist on accompaniment, hence, learning that alignment is common reduces the perceived risk of discord resulting in increased participation of women in elections. Further, information about correct community norms plays an important role by lowering the anticipated social cost of letting women vote: when families overestimate opposition in the village, they may fear sanctions or reputational loss; learning that support is widespread re-frames turnout as acceptable and safe. The results imply that women's political participation can respond quickly to low-cost and politically neutral interventions that make local realities common knowledge, with potential for scale wherever intrahousehold mistrust and pluralistic ignorance depress women's agency. Lastly, the design of the experiment plausibly rules out contact or messaging, without information about local realities, as the driver of the results by ensuring that even the control households are contacted with the same frequency as the treatment households.

4 Heterogeneity analysis

We collected detailed data on households and individuals to study if there are heterogeneous effects of the treatment. In this section, we present analysis from pre-registered and exploratory heterogeneity tests.

4.1 Pre-registered Heterogeneity

We pre-registered to test heterogeneity on the baseline characteristics of the households. These include baseline empowerment of women, whether the household is politically active, the number of unmarried girls in the household, and women's stated misalignment with men. We do not find the effects to be heterogeneous based on any of the pre-registered baseline characteristics. The analysis is reported in Table A10 in the online appendix.

4.2 Exploratory Heterogeneity

We explored heterogeneity along two other dimensions that were not pre-registered. First, we test if there are heterogeneous effects of the treatment by the pessimism of male respondents. Men are considered less pessimistic if the difference between their belief and the actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater than the sample-village median wedge. Table A15 reports this analysis. We find that households where men are less pessimistic about social norms, respond more to the treatment correcting beliefs about alignment. Similarly, households where men are less pessimistic about the alignment are more responsive to the norms treatment. The strongest heterogeneity is observed when men are less pessimistic along both dimensions.

Second, we test for heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. Table A16 reports that the effects are larger in households where women correctly guess men's preferences but not in households where men correctly guess women's preferences. These results can be interpreted to suggest that the response to the treatments depends on the beliefs that respondents hold at baseline.

Taken together, these exploratory results underscore the importance of men's beliefs and preferences to women's political participation. These results also highlight that the treatment is more effective for households where men's beliefs are closer to the truth.

5 Conclusion


This paper asks whether correcting misperceptions can expand women's electoral participation in a setting where formal rights exist but practice is constrained by social norms and intra-household gatekeeping. We elicit beliefs about (i) the alignment of women's and men's vote choices and (ii) community norms regarding women's right to vote, and we provide brief, factual, non-partisan information targeted at those misperceptions immediately before the election. The evidence indicates that belief correction can move behavior: accurate information about alignment loosens a private rationale for restricting women's votes, and accurate information about permissive community norms lowers the anticipated social cost of allowing women to vote. The limited incremental value of combining both messages points to a single salient participation hurdle for many households: clearing either the fear of losing out in politics or the fear of disapproval in the community is often enough to unlock participation that is driven by misbeliefs but not by rigid preferences. The effects are not limited to the main respondents: turnout increases for other women in the households, and treated women are less likely to report staying home or having no companion as reasons for not voting.

The broader implication is that women's political participation is not only a function of material costs, legal rules, or electoral logistics; it is also shaped by what households *believe* about one another and about their neighbors. Belief correction is attractive from a policy perspective precisely because it is neutral, scalable, and respectful of autonomy: it supplies credible information and lets households update. Where pluralistic ignorance and intrahousehold mistrust depress women's agency, such interventions can be deployed alongside institutional reforms-for example, enforcement of voting rights, improvements in polling access and privacy, and party-level commitments to non-interference-to close persistent participation gaps. Because the messages are short and easy to localize, they are well suited to civic campaigns, civil society efforts, and election administration toolkits that seek to expand access without mobilizing for any candidate.

At the same time, the study has limitations. First, we measure outcomes around a single election. We cannot speak to persistence: belief updates may attenuate or compound with repeated exposure, and the equilibrium response of parties, families, and communities could strengthen or offset the initial gains. Second, our primary behavioral measure is turnout, verified by ink-mark inspection; while this mitigates self-report bias, it does not capture downstream political voice (e.g., contacting officials, attending meetings, or standing for office) that would constitute deeper empowerment. The spillover results, however, indicate that the effects extend to other women in the households, not only the main respondents.

In sum, the findings are consistent with a simple but powerful idea: when households hold pessimistic views about intrahousehold agreement and community acceptance, women's participation is suppressed by expectations rather than by law. Making the local reality common knowledge can relax those belief constraints and expand women's political agency. The approach is modest in tools and scope, yet it offers a pragmatic path for policy and practice to support inclusion while preserving neutrality in contentious electoral environments.

6 Tables and Figures



(a) Misperception of Alignment

(b) Misperception of Norms

Figure 1: **Wedge in beliefs at baseline** Each panel shows the distribution of the wedge in beliefs. Panel 1a represents the difference in beliefs about alignment i.e. the difference between responses to *"Out of 10 women, how many women from your village do you think vote for the same candidate/party as the men?"* and the actual average of 10. Panel 1b represents the difference between responses to the question *"If woman chooses, she has the right to vote" Out of 10 typical men in your village, how many would agree to this statement?* and the actual average support among men in the village community, calculated using men's response to the question *"If woman chooses, she has the right to vote" How much do you agree with this statement?"*.




Figure 2: **Experiment Design**




Figure 3: **Change in men's beliefs** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about female voter turnout, measured in the post-treatment survey. Dotted bars represent beliefs of the control group and solid bars represent the beliefs of the treated group. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for each treatment arm with the control group
.

Table 1: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness

	Female voter turnout			Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1
	Individual turnout		Household turnout	
	Main woman	Other women	Everyone voted	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alignment	0.109	0.123	0.104	0.046
	(0.028)	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.025]	[0.000]	[0.044]
Norms	0.102	0.040	0.099	0.048
	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.425]	[0.000]	[0.034]
Both	0.131	0.080	0.126	0.033
	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.104]	[0.000]	[0.141]
Control mean	0.144	0.166	0.144	0.349
# Observations	1552	783	1552	4545
# Households	1552	586	1552	1515
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)				
Alignment = Norms	0.666	0.264	0.666	0.856
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.021	0.215	0.023	0.024

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. Columns 1-3 represent effects on female voter turnout. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Column 3 use household turnout as the dependent variable, with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. In Column 4, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 4 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

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A Links and Deviations from Pre-analysis Plan

We closely follow the registered pre-analysis plan (PAP) - this section provides details of this along with minor deviations where applicable.

A.1 Experiment Design

The full experiment design is presented in Figure A1.




Figure A1: **Experiment Design**

A.2 Experiment and sample

We present results from both subsamples outlined in the PAP - households that were strongly pessimistic at baseline (Experiment 1) and households in which at least one member was not strongly pessimistic at baseline (Experiment 2). We registered that we would implement the project in 40 settlements and try to reach 2500-4000 respondents. Due to the short time span of the experiment, we completed the project in 36 villages reaching a total of 2,593 households.

A.3 Outcomes

We present results for all primary and secondary outcomes registered in the PAP.

Primary Outcome: Our primary outcome is female voter turnout. In Table **??** and all heterogeneity analysis, we present results for the main female respondent's turnout. We also

examine intra-household spillovers in Table **??**, where turnout for all female members of the household is considered.

Secondary Outcomes: We have two secondary outcomes, measured in a post treatment survey. *Beliefs about turnout,* We present changes in men's beliefs about turnout in Figure 3. We additionally present changes in men's beliefs about community support for women voting in Figure A4. *Household decision making,* We present results on men's permissiveness regarding women's political decision making in Table **??**.

Exploratory Mechanisms: We discussed four exploratory mechanisms in the pre-analysis plan and conducted heterogeneity analysis using all four - politically active families (Table A11), unmarried girls (Table A12), women's stated misalignment with men (Table A13), women empowerment score (Table **??**).

Additional Mechanisms: We explored two other mechanisms that were not pre-registered through additional heterogeneity analysis - pessimism of male respondents (Table A15) and knowledge of preferences of other members of HH (Table A16)

A.4 Analysis

We did not pre-register how we would deal with non-compliance and attrition from the sample. As non-compliance is not high, we report ITT estimates throughout the text so we adhere to the experimental design. In addition, we show that there is no evidence that attrition at endline is caused by treatment so we analyze the observed sample as is.

We present five versions of each model - (i) without controls and with controls for (ii) household, (iii) female, (iv) male, and (v) all baseline characteristics that are not balanced at baseline. For the main experiment, the household control is monthly income, male control is a binary indicator of whether the respondent voted in 2018, and the female controls are belief about village female voter turnout, own support for women working, belief about support for women working amongst village women, and years of education.

B Data appendix

We have two types of missingness in our sample. First, due to non-compliance - those who received a treatment different from the one assigned to them - and second, due to attrition -those who drop out of the survey at either the post-treatment survey or endline survey step.

Regarding non-compliance - of those were treated, 36 households received the wrong treatment (this constitutes 1.2% of our sample) due to human error in handling the survey software. The treatment was administered over 12 days and all non-compliant households received the treatment on the same day. We account for these non-compliant households by presenting an ITT analysis, by dropping non-compliant households in Appendix A47, and by instrumenting the treatment received with the treatment assigned during randomization

in Appendix A45.

Regarding attrition - these households are ones that we were unable to reach for the treatment or endline survey. 4% of the baseline respondents were not treated and did not answer the post-survey treatment while 2% of the baseline respondents were unreachable during the endline survey. As we present an ITT analysis, households that did not receive treatment but completed the endline survey are included in our main analysis. As before, we drop these households along with non-compliant households in Appendix A47.

The sample evolution for the full sample is outlined in Figure A1 and a detailed breakdown for the experimental sample is in Appendix A1

Table A1: Treatment Assignment vs. Treatment Received

		Treatment Received					Endline Survey	
		Alignment	Norms	Both	Control	None	Completed	Not Completed
Treatment Assigned	Alignment	377	0	1	1	17	390	5
	Norms	3	377	0	2	13	389	7
	Both	1	1	377	2	16	390	7
	Control	1	2	1	369	21	383	11
						1582	**1552**	

C Summary Statistics

Table A2: Summary stats (Household)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
HH size	1582	7.09	2	25	2.75
Monthly income	1502	11366.18	0	25000	8854.01
Own motorcycle	1582	0.61	0	1	0.49
Own vehicle	1581	0.06	0	1	0.25
Organize pol event	1579	0.07	0	1	0.25
Ran for office	1575	0.01	0	1	0.09
Highest yrs of education	1582	5.83	0	20	4.76
N	1582				

Table A3: Summary stats (Male respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	1577	0.96	0	1	0.20
Voted in 2021	1579	0.96	0	1	0.21
Expected female turnout in 2024	1581	6.99	1	10	1.82
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1582	6.90	2	10	1.90
Will vote in 2024	1580	0.91	0	1	0.28
Support women voting	1582	0.90	0	1	0.30
Support women of HH voting	1582	0.90	0	1	0.30
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1582	6.88	1	9	1.99
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1582	6.91	2	10	1.89
Belief about alignment in village	1582	7.44	2	10	1.91
Support women working	1523	0.56	0	1	0.50
Belief about male support for women working in village	1576	6.74	1	10	1.95
Belief about female support for women working in village	1579	6.67	1	10	2.11
Know election validity rules	1423	0.56	0	1	0.50
Know President	1506	0.25	0	1	0.44
Years of education	1582	4.54	0	20	4.57
N	1582				

Table A4: Summary stats (Female respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	1528	0.66	0	1	0.47
Voted in 2021	1551	0.66	0	1	0.47
Expected female turnout in 2024	1573	7.86	1	10	1.84
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1575	7.73	1	10	1.90
Will vote in 2024	1391	0.72	0	1	0.45
Support women voting	1582	0.79	0	1	0.41
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1582	7.14	1	9	1.77
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1578	7.31	1	10	1.93
Will vote same as men	1582	0.89	0	1	0.32
Belief about alignment in village	1582	7.48	1	10	1.97
Support women working	1486	0.46	0	1	0.50
Belief about male support for women working in village	1581	7.18	1	10	1.93
Belief about female support for women working in village	1581	7.19	1	10	1.96
Know election validity rules	1195	0.67	0	1	0.47
Know President	1222	0.10	0	1	0.30
Years of education	1582	1.20	0	16	3.09
N	1582				

D Balance

Table A5: Balance - household

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
HH size	8.321	8.373	8.298	8.275	0.959	0.779	0.902	0.801	1582
Monthly income	17598.727	17535.727	16379.980	16618.900	0.062	0.913	0.032	0.085	1502
Monthly income (cat)	4.372	4.380	4.222	4.227	0.052	0.914	0.050	0.063	1502
Own motorcycle	0.655	0.597	0.663	0.650	0.146	0.066	0.802	0.871	1582
Own vehicle	0.049	0.072	0.065	0.047	0.406	0.197	0.374	0.872	1581
Political org	0.084	0.094	0.101	0.088	0.771	0.560	0.321	0.807	1579
Run for office	0.016	0.013	0.021	0.018	0.683	0.653	0.488	0.723	1575
HH highest education	6.091	6.673	6.401	6.302	0.317	0.065	0.329	0.498	1582

Notes: This table reports balance in household baseline characteristics across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the household characteristic on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages of the household characteristic for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported.

Table A6: Balance - men

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.972	0.998	0.972	0.959	0.010	0.029	1.000	0.364	1577
Voted in 2021	0.954	0.946	0.944	0.956	0.807	0.593	0.484	0.892	1579
Belief: Village female turnout	6.992	6.907	6.900	7.034	0.356	0.363	0.320	0.628	1581
Will vote 2024	0.999	1.002	0.985	1.014	0.405	0.850	0.409	0.364	1580
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.999	0.994	0.990	1.016	0.269	0.719	0.538	0.206	1582
Belief: Support women of HH voting (own)	0.998	0.998	0.989	1.015	0.356	0.997	0.535	0.249	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	6.948	7.008	6.927	7.017	0.708	0.521	0.822	0.447	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	7.004	6.884	6.894	7.018	0.323	0.209	0.247	0.877	1582
Belief: Alignment (village)	8.596	8.550	8.530	8.624	0.709	0.611	0.465	0.753	1582
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.970	0.964	0.961	0.975	0.966	0.831	0.755	0.866	1523
Belief: Support women working (village men)	6.967	6.906	6.997	7.031	0.631	0.537	0.763	0.521	1576
Belief: Support women working (village women)	6.887	6.873	6.902	6.971	0.801	0.901	0.886	0.425	1579
Know election validity	0.067	0.095	0.057	0.041	0.263	0.313	0.724	0.372	1423
Know President	0.355	0.357	0.353	0.347	0.987	0.945	0.954	0.779	1506
Years of education	4.638	5.086	4.697	4.712	0.448	0.139	0.847	0.805	1582

Notes: This table reports balance in men's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of men's response on the treatment group indicator. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported.

Table A7: Balance - women

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.879	0.870	0.854	0.871	0.875	0.772	0.419	0.791	1528
Voted in 2021	0.871	0.832	0.833	0.843	0.520	0.186	0.203	0.362	1551
Belief: Village female turnout	8.839	8.783	9.002	8.843	0.019	0.487	0.038	0.961	1573
Will vote 2024	0.850	0.846	0.838	0.841	0.951	0.868	0.588	0.703	1391
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.973	0.944	1.007	1.042	0.000	0.201	0.125	0.001	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	8.182	8.208	8.220	8.190	0.964	0.743	0.638	0.923	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	8.577	8.564	8.641	8.585	0.835	0.893	0.476	0.928	1578
Belief: Alignment (own)	0.937	0.937	0.945	0.949	0.825	0.969	0.637	0.465	1582
Belief: Alignment (village)	8.938	8.828	8.966	8.969	0.304	0.207	0.755	0.727	1582
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.804	0.809	0.830	0.847	0.530	0.879	0.418	0.191	1486
Belief: Support women working (village men)	8.391	8.420	8.409	8.413	0.992	0.759	0.849	0.813	1581
Belief: Support women working (village women)	8.482	8.367	8.480	8.604	0.084	0.242	0.987	0.193	1581
Know election validity	0.731	0.751	0.744	0.709	0.438	0.493	0.681	0.454	1195
Know President	-0.004	0.014	0.000	0.036	0.278	0.408	0.848	0.074	1222
Years of education	1.500	1.632	1.814	2.220	0.009	0.488	0.119	0.001	1582

Notes: This table reports balance in women's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of women's response on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported.

Table A8: Balance - missing responses

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
Treated ==1	0.947	0.968	0.958	0.960	0.557	0.152	0.464	0.392	1582
						[0.163]	[0.405]	[0.305]	
Rapid survey ==1	0.985	0.998	0.992	0.992	0.597	0.170	0.471	0.485	1582
						[0.248]	[0.520]	[0.586]	

Notes: This table reports balance in dropouts across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the dropout indicator on the treatment group indicators. The first row is an indicator of whether respondents who completed the baseline survey received the treatment; the second row is an indicator of whether baseline respondents also completed the post-treatment survey. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets for the pairwise tests.

E Appendix Figures




Figure A2: **Gender Gap in Turnout Around the World** Each bar in this figure represents the percentage point difference between the female and male voter turnout using data from Wave 7 (2017-2023) of the World Values Survey. Participants were asked "Do you vote in national elections" - those who responded "Always" were counted as voters, while those who responded "Usually", "Never", "No answer", or "Don't know" were considered non-voters.




Figure A3: **Reasons for not voting at baseline** This figure represents the proportion of female respondents who reported the respective reasons for not voting in each election.

F Main Secondary Outcomes

F.1 Beliefs about norms




Figure A4: **Change in men's beliefs** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about community support for women voting, measured in the post-treatment survey. Dotted bars represent beliefs of the control group and solid bars represent the beliefs of the treated group. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for each treatment arm with the control group.

F.2 Household decision making

Table A9 reports the effects on men's permissiveness separately by whether the location of the political gathering was mentioned. The effects are similar whether or not the location is made salient.

Table A9: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
	No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.039	0.049	0.046
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.104]	[0.035]	[0.044]
Norms	0.045	0.049	0.048
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.051]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Both	0.032	0.034	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
	[0.177]	[0.145]	[0.141]
Control mean	0.346	0.350	0.349
# Observations	1515	3030	4545
# Households	1515	1515	1515
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.823	0.800	0.856
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.040	0.022	0.024

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 1 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 2 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 3 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G Pre-registered Heterogeneity

Table A10: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pre-registered baseline characteristics

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Politically active families	Unmarried girls	Women's stated misalignment with men	Women empowerment score
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alignment	0.049	0.140	0.086	0.109
	(0.110)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.028)
	[0.668]	[0.034]	[0.332]	[0.000]
Norms	0.119	0.063	0.052	0.102
	(0.113)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.028)
	[0.307]	[0.326]	[0.517]	[0.000]
Both	0.068	0.081	0.210	0.132
	(0.112)	(0.063)	(0.090)	(0.029)
	[0.547]	[0.190]	[0.021]	[0.000]
Heterogeneity variable × Alignment	0.065	-0.040	0.026	0.019
	(0.114)	(0.072)	(0.095)	(0.028)
	[0.581]	[0.592]	[0.788]	[0.513]
Heterogeneity variable × Norms	-0.019	0.049	0.056	0.041
	(0.117)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.026)
	[0.868]	[0.497]	[0.510]	[0.127]
Heterogeneity variable × Both	0.068	0.064	-0.087	0.042
	(0.116)	(0.071)	(0.095)	(0.030)
	[0.560]	[0.361]	[0.373]	[0.157]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1551	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1551	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)				
Alignment = Norms	0.301	0.583	0.424	0.666
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.363	0.201	0.560	0.114
Linear Restrictions: Heterogeneity variable × Treatment (exact p-values)				
Alignment = Norms	0.243	0.499	0.413	0.343
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.682	0.660	0.241	0.704

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the pre-registered baseline characteristics. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by political involvement of the household, with 'no political involvement' being a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Column 2 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 3 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Column 4 reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 4, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G.1 Politically Active Families

In the baseline, we ask male respondents if (i) their family has run a political campaign for a candidate in the past, and (ii) anyone from their family has contested elections. We label the family as politically active if the answer to any of the questions is yes. The heterogeneity variable takes the value 1 if the family never organised a political campaign or ran for office, and 0 if it engaged in at least one activity. The interactions between the treatments and this indicator are non-significant in all cases (Table A11).

Table A11: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.049
	(0.110)
	[0.668]
Norms	0.119
	(0.113)
	[0.307]
Both	0.068
	(0.112)
	[0.547]
No political involvement × Alignment	0.065
	(0.114)
	[0.581]
No political involvement × Norms	-0.019
	(0.117)
	[0.868]
No political involvement × Both	0.068
	(0.116)
	[0.560]
Control mean	0.144
# Observations	1551
# Households	1551
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.301
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.363
Linear Restrictions: No political involvement × Treatment (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.243
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.682

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G.2 Unmarried Girls

We collect information about the number and proportion of unmarried girls in the family. We define 'No unmarried' as 1 if there are 0 unmarried girls in the household, 0 otherwise; 'More unmarried' as 1 if there are more unmarried girls in the household than the sample-village median, 0 otherwise; and 'Greater prop unmarried' as 1 if the proportion of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median, 0 otherwise. The interactions between the treatments and each of these definitions are non-significant (Table A12).

Table A12: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.140	0.102	0.102
	(0.065)	(0.032)	(0.031)
	[0.034]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Norms	0.063	0.116	0.114
	(0.063)	(0.031)	(0.031)
	[0.326]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Both	0.081	0.143	0.148
	(0.063)	(0.032)	(0.032)
	[0.190]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.040	0.038	0.037
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.074)
	[0.592]	[0.611]	[0.625]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.049	-0.069	-0.063
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.073)
	[0.497]	[0.345]	[0.399]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.064	-0.056	-0.079
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
	[0.361]	[0.428]	[0.265]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.583	0.984	0.986
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.201	0.078	0.131
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.499	0.480	0.487
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.660	0.727	0.642

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G.3 Women's stated misalignment with men

We collect women's responses about whether they will not consider voting for the same candidate as men. We define 'Some or all men' as 1 if women report that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household at baseline and 0 otherwise. 'All men' is a more restrictive version of this. The interactions are mostly non-significant, though the interaction between the norms treatment and alignment with all men of the household is positive (12.6 percentage points, exact p-value 0.029; Table A13).

Table A13: Ink mark voting by voting alignment

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men (1)	All men (2)
Alignment	0.086	0.028
	(0.090)	(0.059)
	[0.332]	[0.621]
Norms	0.052	0.007
	(0.079)	(0.056)
	[0.517]	[0.899]
Both	0.210	0.123
	(0.090)	(0.061)
	[0.021]	[0.053]
Voting alignment × Alignment	0.026	0.107
	(0.095)	(0.067)
	[0.788]	[0.112]
Voting alignment × Norms	0.056	0.126
	(0.084)	(0.065)
	[0.510]	[0.053]
Voting alignment × Both	-0.087	0.013
	(0.095)	(0.069)
	[0.373]	[0.855]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.424	0.373
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.560	0.460
Linear Restrictions: Voting alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.413	0.607
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.241	0.044

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Column 2 uses a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

H Non-preregistered Results

H.1 Effects on reported constraints to voting

Table A14 reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting. The treatments reduce the likelihood that women report staying home (by 7.3 to 10.4 percentage points) and having no companion (by 5.5 to 7.9 percentage points) as reasons for not voting. The norms and the both treatments also reduce the likelihood that women report that voting is useless.

Table A14: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.073	-0.055	0.030	-0.008	-0.016	-0.014	0.002
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.006)
	[0.018]	[0.008]	[0.034]	[0.336]	[0.330]	[0.125]	[0.972]
Norms	-0.057	-0.055	0.023	-0.005	-0.005	-0.021	0.000
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[0.068]	[0.008]	[0.089]	[0.469]	[0.755]	[0.020]	[0.934]
Both	-0.104	-0.079	0.014	-0.004	0.009	-0.024	-0.000
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.293]	[0.666]	[0.653]	[0.008]	[0.921]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.518	0.999	0.511	0.501	0.577	0.729	0.669
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.456	0.256	0.027	0.180	0.475	0.216	0.748

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

I Mechanisms

I.1 Pessimism of male respondents

Men are considered less pessimistic if the difference between their belief and the actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater than the sample-village median wedge. Table A15 reports that the effects are larger for households where men are less pessimistic: when pessimism is defined over both beliefs, the interactions are significant for all three treatments (16.5, 13.6, and 12.8 percentage points for the alignment, norms, and both treatments, respectively).

Table A15: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.076	0.096	0.082
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.031)
	[0.028]	[0.008]	[0.008]
Norms	0.083	0.054	0.079
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.031)
	[0.014]	[0.135]	[0.013]
Both	0.120	0.132	0.110
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.032)
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.131	0.035	0.165
	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.076)
	[0.043]	[0.557]	[0.027]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.074	0.136	0.136
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.071)
	[0.243]	[0.024]	[0.071]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.047	-0.002	0.128
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.072)
	[0.474]	[0.968]	[0.092]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.965	0.556	0.703
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.540	0.577	0.186
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.593	0.552	0.644
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.054	0.407	0.055

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

I.2 Knowledge of preferences of other members of HH

Table A16 reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. The effects are larger in households where women correctly guess men's preferences: the interactions are 19.4, 18.6, and 15.3 percentage points for the alignment, norms, and both treatments, respectively. Whether men correctly guess women's preferences does not yield a similar pattern.

Table A16: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.021	-0.060
	(0.071)	(0.085)
	[0.778]	[0.484]
Norms	0.058	-0.060
	(0.067)	(0.083)
	[0.384]	[0.467]
Both	0.107	-0.003
	(0.077)	(0.086)
	[0.151]	[0.971]
Know preference × Alignment	0.109	0.194
	(0.077)	(0.090)
	[0.163]	[0.034]
Know preference × Norms	0.056	0.186
	(0.074)	(0.088)
	[0.440]	[0.031]
Know preference × Both	0.032	0.153
	(0.083)	(0.092)
	[0.695]	[0.100]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.307	0.984
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.536	0.361
Linear Restrictions: Know preference × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.326	0.671
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.109	0.103

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also asked them "We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men's guesses about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J Optimistic Sample Results

This section reports results for the second experiment on the norm weakly optimistic sample (N=1,011), which was independently randomized to receive only the alignment treatment or a control condition.

J.1 Summary statistics

Table A17: Summary stats (Household)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
HH size	1011	6.92	2	26	2.85
Monthly income	934	11997.86	0	25000	9204.01
Own motorcycle	1008	0.69	0	1	0.46
Own vehicle	1010	0.10	0	1	0.30
Organize pol event	1005	0.06	0	1	0.25
Ran for office	1005	0.03	0	1	0.17
Highest yrs of education	1011	7.93	0	20	4.39
N	1011				

Table A18: Summary stats (Male respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	1005	0.93	0	1	0.25
Voted in 2021	1005	0.92	0	1	0.27
Expected female turnout in 2024	1003	7.33	1	10	1.90
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1006	7.17	1	10	2.02
Will vote in 2024	1004	0.89	0	1	0.31
Support women voting	1011	0.85	0	1	0.36
Support women of HH voting	1011	0.85	0	1	0.36
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1005	7.40	1	10	1.98
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1005	7.21	1	10	1.99
Belief about alignment in village	1005	7.43	1	10	1.98
Support women working	922	0.66	0	1	0.48
Belief about male support for women working in village	991	7.01	1	10	2.10
Belief about female support for women working in village	995	6.86	1	10	2.31
Know election validity rules	854	0.46	0	1	0.50
Know President	951	0.34	0	1	0.47
Years of education	1011	6.64	0	16	4.43
N	1011				

Table A19: Summary stats (Female respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	972	0.62	0	1	0.49
Voted in 2021	999	0.66	0	1	0.47
Expected female turnout in 2024	999	8.06	1	10	2.05
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1001	8.12	1	10	2.25
Will vote in 2024	927	0.75	0	1	0.43
Support women voting	1011	0.83	0	1	0.38
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1002	8.03	1	10	2.20
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1002	7.97	1	10	2.21
Will vote same as men	1011	0.83	0	1	0.37
Belief about alignment in village	1002	7.61	1	10	2.20
Support women working	943	0.64	0	1	0.48
Belief about male support for women working in village	1003	7.63	1	10	2.20
Belief about female support for women working in village	1004	7.84	1	10	2.27
Know election validity rules	577	0.71	0	1	0.46
Know President	564	0.03	0	1	0.17
Years of education	1011	1.54	0	20	3.50
N	1011				

J.2 Balance tables

Table A20: Balance - household

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
HH size	7.855	8.293	0.011	1011
Monthly income	21499.900	21833.432	0.416	934
Monthly income (cat)	4.741	4.815	0.198	934
Own motorcycle	0.793	0.829	0.173	1008
Own vehicle	0.012	0.025	0.472	1010
Political org	0.028	0.047	0.185	1005
Run for office	0.003	-0.003	0.520	1005
HH highest education	7.792	7.801	0.973	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in household characteristics across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the household characteristic on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and B contain the estimated averages of the household characteristic for each treatment group.

Table A21: Balance - men

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.999	1.001	0.918	1005
Voted in 2021	0.979	0.983	0.826	1005
Belief: Village female turnout	8.833	8.612	0.011	1003
Will vote 2024	0.954	0.972	0.352	1004
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.994	1.006	0.573	1011
Belief: Support women of HH voting (own)	0.998	1.002	0.856	1011
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	8.946	8.758	0.041	1005
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	8.714	8.582	0.154	1005
Belief: Alignment (village)	8.898	8.732	0.061	1005
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.909	0.909	0.990	922
Belief: Support women working (village men)	8.896	8.733	0.089	991
Belief: Support women working (village women)	8.775	8.670	0.315	995
Know election validity	0.033	0.056	0.250	854
Know President	0.674	0.660	0.552	951
Years of education	6.836	6.868	0.905	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in men's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of men's response on the treatment group indicator. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and B contain the estimated averages for each treatment group.

Table A22: Balance - women

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.939	0.978	0.139	972
Voted in 2021	0.912	0.940	0.288	999
Belief: Village female turnout	9.246	9.273	0.747	999
Will vote 2024	0.976	0.983	0.782	927
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.985	1.015	0.131	1011
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	9.781	9.885	0.253	1002
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	9.072	9.113	0.674	1002
Belief: Alignment (own)	0.992	1.008	0.406	1011
Belief: Alignment (village)	9.193	9.288	0.338	1002
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.886	0.877	0.716	943
Belief: Support women working (village men)	9.251	9.305	0.575	1003
Belief: Support women working (village women)	9.004	9.070	0.513	1004
Know election validity	0.618	0.662	0.175	577
Know President	0.032	0.012	0.109	564
Years of education	1.188	1.108	0.710	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in women's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of women's response on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and B contain the estimated averages for each treatment group.

Table A23: Balance - missing responses (exp2)

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
Treated ==1	1.000	1.000	0.977 [0.858]	1011
Rapid survey ==1	0.993	1.007	0.111 [0.074]	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in dropouts across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the dropout indicator on the treatment group indicators. The first row is an indicator of whether respondents who completed the baseline survey received the treatment; the second row is an indicator of whether baseline respondents also completed the post-treatment survey. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.3 Primary outcome: female voter turnout

Correcting beliefs about the alignment between the candidate choices of men and women increases the likelihood that women vote by 9.4 percentage points over a control mean of 15.4 percent (Table A24). This result is consistent with the effects for the strongly pessimistic

sample reported in the main text. The effects on men's permissiveness, however, are negative and non-significant in this sample.

Table A24: Effects on turnout of female voters in 2024 and men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings

	Woman Voted = 1	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
		No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alignment	0.094	-0.036	-0.025	-0.029
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)
	[0.000]	[0.127]	[0.275]	[0.204]
Control mean	0.154	0.400	0.392	0.395
# Observations	985	980	1962	2943
# Households	985	980	981	981

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes for the second experiment - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Columns 2 to 4, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 3 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 4 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.4 Primary outcome: intra-household spillovers

The spillover results are consistent with those of experiment 1: the alignment treatment increases the turnout of all eligible female voters in the household by 9.7 percentage points, the turnout of the other women by 10.8 percentage points, and the likelihood that everyone in the household voted by 9.2 percentage points (Table A25).

Table A25: Intra-HH spillover effects

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.097	0.108	0.092
	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.025)
	[0.001]	[0.008]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.145	0.128	0.154
# Observations	1553	565	985
# Households	985	395	985

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.5 Secondary outcome: beliefs about turnout

The distribution of men's beliefs about female voter turnout shifts rightward relative to the control group (exact p-value 0.003, Figure A5).




Figure A5: **Change in men's beliefs (exp 2)** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about female voter turnout, measured in the post-treatment survey. Dotted bars represent beliefs of the control group and solid bars represent the beliefs of the treated group. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for the treatment arm with the control group.

J.6 Additional outcome: beliefs about norms

The distribution of men's beliefs about community support for women voting also shifts rightward relative to the control group (exact p-value 0.000, Figure A6), though this sample received only the alignment treatment.




Figure A6: **Change in men's beliefs (exp 2)** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about community support for women voting, measured in the post-treatment survey. Dotted bars represent beliefs of the control group and solid bars represent the beliefs of the treated group. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for the treatment arm with the control group.

J.7 Additional outcome: constraints to voting

The alignment treatment reduces the likelihood that women report staying home as the reason for not voting by 7.5 percentage points and having no companion by 3.2 percentage points (Table A26).




Figure A7: **Reasons for not voting at baseline** This figure represents the proportion of female respondents who reported the respective reasons for not voting in each election.

Table A26: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.075	-0.032	0.002	-0.007	0.019	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	[0.006]	[0.047]	[0.874]	[0.151]	[0.069]	[0.458]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985	985	985	985	985	985
# Households	985	985	985	985	985	985	985

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.8 Heterogeneity analysis: women empowerment score

Table A27: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score (1)	Empowered acc to M (2)	Empowerment Score (3)
Alignment	0.096	0.112	0.094
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.025)
	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	-0.005	-0.078	-0.008
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.026)
	[0.928]	[0.171]	[0.744]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985	985
# Households	985	985	985

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.9 Heterogeneity analysis - politically active families

Table A28: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.013
	(0.085)
	[0.885]
No political involvement × Alignment	0.087
	(0.089)
	[0.349]
Control mean	0.154
# Observations	981
# Households	981

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.10 Heterogeneity analysis - unmarried girls

Table A29: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.036	0.105	0.105
	(0.069)	(0.027)	(0.027)
	[0.603]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	0.068	-0.078	-0.081
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
	[0.361]	[0.305]	[0.281]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985	985
# Households	985	985	985

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.11 Heterogeneity analysis - pessimism of male respondents

Table A30: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.091	0.116	0.114
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)
	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.016	-0.079	-0.109
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.065)
	[0.784]	[0.168]	[0.096]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	979	979	978
# Households	979	979	978

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.12 Heterogeneity analysis - knowledge of preferences of other members of HH

Table A31: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.104	0.139
	(0.069)	(0.066)
	[0.130]	[0.034]
Know preference × Alignment	-0.010	-0.052
	(0.075)	(0.072)
	[0.898]	[0.475]
Control mean	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985
# Households	985	985

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also asked them "We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men's guesses about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K Robustness Checks

K.1 Robustness to additional controls

Table A32: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pre-registered baseline characteristics

	Outcome: Woman Voted = 1															
	Politically active families				Unmarried girls				Women's stated misalignment with men				Women empowerment score			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Alignment	0.051	0.064	0.056	0.061	0.140	0.144	0.119	0.119	0.086	0.061	0.087	0.061	0.109	0.116	0.098	0.103
	(0.110)	(0.142)	(0.112)	(0.143)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)
	[0.652]	[0.652]	[0.632]	[0.671]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.074]	[0.084]	[0.336]	[0.524]	[0.331]	[0.529]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Norms	0.118	0.226	0.118	0.222	0.064	0.076	0.061	0.074	0.042	0.018	0.058	0.015	0.101	0.104	0.092	0.092
	(0.114)	(0.153)	(0.114)	(0.153)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.312]	[0.176]	[0.313]	[0.185]	[0.324]	[0.254]	[0.363]	[0.283]	[0.596]	[0.823]	[0.478]	[0.860]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Both	0.074	0.015	0.067	0.016	0.082	0.094	0.086	0.101	0.216	0.247	0.212	0.254	0.134	0.135	0.128	0.134
	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.113)	(0.133)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
	[0.510]	[0.914]	[0.552]	[0.906]	[0.187]	[0.138]	[0.175]	[0.126]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.015]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Heterogeneity variable × Alignment	0.062	0.052	0.045	0.042	-0.039	-0.037	-0.026	-0.021	0.026	0.060	0.013	0.047	0.018	0.019	0.019	0.016
	(0.113)	(0.145)	(0.116)	(0.147)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)
	[0.592]	[0.714]	[0.708]	[0.773]	[0.598]	[0.627]	[0.737]	[0.794]	[0.777]	[0.554]	[0.891]	[0.645]	[0.532]	[0.525]	[0.540]	[0.606]
Heterogeneity variable × Norms	-0.019	-0.132	-0.027	-0.138	0.047	0.034	0.042	0.024	0.066	0.094	0.041	0.087	0.041	0.024	0.032	0.008
	(0.117)	(0.156)	(0.118)	(0.157)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)
	[0.870]	[0.433]	[0.816]	[0.413]	[0.521]	[0.638]	[0.566]	[0.749]	[0.443]	[0.298]	[0.637]	[0.349]	[0.137]	[0.403]	[0.288]	[0.811]
Heterogeneity variable × Both	0.064	0.124	0.065	0.121	0.066	0.051	0.053	0.039	-0.091	-0.126	-0.093	-0.135	0.042	0.030	0.042	0.029
	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.103)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)
	[0.583]	[0.364]	[0.575]	[0.381]	[0.343]	[0.478]	[0.467]	[0.597]	[0.360]	[0.243]	[0.345]	[0.214]	[0.156]	[0.331]	[0.155]	[0.360]
Control mean	0.144	0.145	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1449	1474	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1449	1474	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)																
Alignment = Norms	0.312	0.254	0.323	0.279	0.610	0.308	0.602	0.366	0.349	0.326	0.457	0.314	0.665	0.663	0.665	0.659
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.384	0.259	0.339	0.270	0.211	0.350	0.317	0.426	0.532	0.468	0.566	0.454	0.253	0.336	0.147	0.441
Linear Restrictions: Heterogeneity variable × Treatment (exact p-values)																
Alignment = Norms	0.246	0.190	0.265	0.197	0.520	0.205	0.543	0.514	0.331	0.404	0.540	0.360	0.386	0.870	0.702	0.433
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.692	0.403	0.593	0.391	0.625	0.681	0.751	0.766	0.220	0.169	0.276	0.182	0.735	0.763	0.862	0.659
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the pre-registered baseline characteristics. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by political involvement of the household, with 'no political involvement' being a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Column 2 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 3 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Column 4 reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 4, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each

K.1.1 Primary outcome: Female voter turnout

Table A33: Effects on Women's Turnout

	Woman Voted = 1											
	Individual turnout								Household turnout			
	Main woman				Other women				Everyone voted			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Alignment	0.109	0.115	0.098	0.102	0.125	0.103	0.121	0.094	0.104	0.110	0.093	0.097
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.024]	[0.073]	[0.033]	[0.100]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Norms	0.101	0.102	0.094	0.092	0.041	0.015	0.049	0.019	0.098	0.099	0.091	0.089
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.413]	[0.791]	[0.344]	[0.748]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.004]
Both	0.134	0.133	0.128	0.131	0.087	0.058	0.091	0.073	0.129	0.127	0.123	0.126
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.078]	[0.262]	[0.074]	[0.174]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.168	0.179	0.172	0.186	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1450	1475	1372	783	635	747	601	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1450	1475	1372	586	510	558	484	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.665	0.661	0.666	0.659	0.264	0.222	0.277	0.221	0.666	0.663	0.666	0.662
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.034	0.333	0.095	0.288	0.278	0.340	0.256	0.449	0.035	0.333	0.099	0.294
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on female voter turnout. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. Columns 1–4 report individual turnout for the main woman respondent, Columns 5–8 individual turnout for other women in the household, and Columns 9–12 household turnout, i.e. whether everyone in the household voted. Within each set, the four columns correspond to different sets of baseline controls, as indicated at the foot of the table. We include block fixed effects in all models. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.2 Secondary outcome: household decision making

Table A34: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1											
	No loc				Loc				All rounds			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Alignment	0.039	0.044	0.051	0.056	0.049	0.055	0.062	0.067	0.046	0.051	0.058	0.063
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
	[0.103]	[0.072]	[0.039]	[0.030]	[0.035]	[0.019]	[0.011]	[0.007]	[0.044]	[0.025]	[0.014]	[0.008]
Norms	0.046	0.050	0.048	0.055	0.049	0.054	0.053	0.059	0.048	0.053	0.051	0.057
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.048]	[0.038]	[0.049]	[0.030]	[0.034]	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.015]	[0.033]	[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.016]
Both	0.030	0.050	0.040	0.057	0.033	0.053	0.043	0.061	0.032	0.052	0.042	0.059
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.203]	[0.037]	[0.101]	[0.023]	[0.167]	[0.025]	[0.083]	[0.016]	[0.164]	[0.023]	[0.080]	[0.015]
Control mean	0.347	0.357	0.354	0.367	0.351	0.361	0.358	0.372	0.349	0.360	0.357	0.370
# Observations	1511	1422	1438	1344	3022	2844	2876	2688	4533	4266	4314	4032
# Households	1511	1422	1438	1344	1511	1422	1438	1344	1511	1422	1438	1344
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.869	0.952	0.654	0.662	0.954	0.665	0.619	0.639	0.937	0.995	0.634	0.650
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.062	0.340	0.024	0.208	0.044	0.306	0.013	0.185	0.044	0.310	0.014	0.186
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Columns 1–4 report results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Columns 5–8 present results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Columns 9–12 report combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.3 Additional outcome: Effects on reported constraints to voting

Table A35: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (HH controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No companion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.066	-0.062	0.034	-0.002	-0.013	-0.014	0.002
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.006)
	[0.040]	[0.004]	[0.021]	[0.943]	[0.429]	[0.153]	[0.985]
Norms	-0.048	-0.058	0.024	-0.000	0.001	-0.022	0.000
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.006)
	[0.136]	[0.009]	[0.084]	[0.892]	[0.942]	[0.022]	[0.960]
Both	-0.105	-0.083	0.016	0.001	0.014	-0.025	-0.000
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.240]	[0.762]	[0.401]	[0.013]	[0.708]
Control mean	0.738	0.179	0.033	0.008	0.074	0.033	0.006
# Observations	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.467	0.658	0.459	0.694	0.551	0.708	0.678
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.610	0.167	0.024	0.646	0.565	0.226	0.741

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A36: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (Male controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.073	-0.053	0.028	-0.008	-0.016	-0.014	0.002
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.006)
	[0.018]	[0.012]	[0.041]	[0.349]	[0.331]	[0.125]	[0.957]
Norms	-0.056	-0.053	0.022	-0.006	-0.005	-0.021	0.000
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.074]	[0.010]	[0.103]	[0.337]	[0.753]	[0.020]	[0.981]
Both	-0.105	-0.077	0.013	-0.004	0.007	-0.024	-0.000
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.327]	[0.715]	[0.734]	[0.013]	[0.959]
Control mean	0.743	0.168	0.031	0.013	0.094	0.031	0.005
# Observations	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548
# Households	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.492	0.949	0.520	0.545	0.561	0.728	0.653
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.484	0.283	0.056	0.199	0.433	0.221	0.761

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A37: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (Female controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.081	-0.065	0.027	-0.009	-0.022	-0.012	0.005
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.005)
	[0.011]	[0.002]	[0.055]	[0.172]	[0.196]	[0.242]	[0.595]
Norms	-0.056	-0.064	0.022	-0.006	-0.007	-0.020	0.003
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.086]	[0.003]	[0.104]	[0.395]	[0.668]	[0.025]	[0.313]
Both	-0.113	-0.078	0.012	-0.005	0.007	-0.021	0.002
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.004)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.352]	[0.531]	[0.716]	[0.039]	[0.984]
Control mean	0.744	0.175	0.028	0.014	0.100	0.031	0.003
# Observations	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.410	0.666	0.557	0.445	0.560	0.646	0.517
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.809	0.337	0.273	0.358	0.261	0.526	0.365

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A38: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (All controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.071	-0.068	0.028	-0.003	-0.019	-0.012	0.005
	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.006)
	[0.029]	[0.003]	[0.056]	[0.743]	[0.277]	[0.254]	[0.609]
Norms	-0.045	-0.066	0.022	-0.001	0.000	-0.022	0.004
	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.184]	[0.004]	[0.116]	[0.815]	[0.997]	[0.025]	[0.337]
Both	-0.114	-0.079	0.012	0.001	0.011	-0.022	0.002
	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.004)
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.361]	[0.888]	[0.539]	[0.042]	[0.980]
Control mean	0.737	0.183	0.029	0.009	0.080	0.032	0.003
# Observations	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.359	0.665	0.537	0.660	0.537	0.641	0.618
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.832	0.191	0.197	0.523	0.379	0.383	0.351

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.4 Heterogeneity analysis: Women empowerment score

Table A39: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score				Empowered acc to M				Empowerment Score			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Alignment	0.087	0.091	0.082	0.086	0.095	0.096	0.081	0.082	0.109	0.116	0.098	0.103
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)
	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Norms	0.076	0.085	0.082	0.090	0.075	0.082	0.064	0.068	0.101	0.104	0.092	0.092
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.016]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.027]	[0.021]	[0.073]	[0.064]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Both	0.127	0.128	0.127	0.131	0.115	0.117	0.103	0.108	0.134	0.135	0.128	0.134
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	0.116	0.128	0.096	0.109	0.053	0.076	0.061	0.080	0.018	0.019	0.019	0.016
	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)
	[0.123]	[0.112]	[0.232]	[0.218]	[0.410]	[0.273]	[0.347]	[0.265]	[0.532]	[0.525]	[0.540]	[0.606]
Empowerment × Norms	0.118	0.085	0.064	0.012	0.090	0.081	0.103	0.094	0.041	0.024	0.032	0.008
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)
	[0.094]	[0.252]	[0.400]	[0.876]	[0.160]	[0.235]	[0.114]	[0.178]	[0.137]	[0.403]	[0.288]	[0.811]
Empowerment × Both	0.019	0.007	-0.008	-0.014	0.065	0.062	0.088	0.093	0.042	0.030	0.042	0.029
	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)
	[0.798]	[0.925]	[0.912]	[0.871]	[0.307]	[0.357]	[0.175]	[0.187]	[0.156]	[0.331]	[0.155]	[0.360]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.636	0.658	0.999	0.994	0.562	0.621	0.534	0.579	0.665	0.663	0.665	0.659
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.414	0.273	0.406	0.335	0.396	0.235	0.286	0.313	0.253	0.336	0.147	0.441
Linear Restrictions: Empowerment × Treatment (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.738	0.458	0.443	0.231	0.544	0.944	0.655	0.895	0.386	0.870	0.702	0.433
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.371	0.394	0.436	0.523	0.194	0.429	0.317	0.502	0.735	0.763	0.862	0.659
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Columns 1–4, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Columns 5–8, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score – based on men's responses – is greater than the sample-village median. In Columns 9–12, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Within each set, the four columns correspond to different sets of baseline controls, as indicated at the foot of the table. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each – in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.5 Heterogeneity analysis: Politically Active Families

Table A40: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alignment	0.051	0.064	0.056	0.061
	(0.110)	(0.142)	(0.112)	(0.143)
	[0.652]	[0.652]	[0.632]	[0.671]
Norms	0.118	0.226	0.118	0.222
	(0.114)	(0.153)	(0.114)	(0.153)
	[0.312]	[0.176]	[0.313]	[0.185]
Both	0.074	0.015	0.067	0.016
	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.113)	(0.133)
	[0.510]	[0.914]	[0.552]	[0.906]
No political involvement × Alignment	0.062	0.052	0.045	0.042
	(0.113)	(0.145)	(0.116)	(0.147)
	[0.592]	[0.714]	[0.708]	[0.773]
No political involvement × Norms	-0.019	-0.132	-0.027	-0.138
	(0.117)	(0.156)	(0.118)	(0.157)
	[0.870]	[0.433]	[0.816]	[0.413]
No political involvement × Both	0.064	0.124	0.065	0.121
	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.117)	(0.137)
	[0.583]	[0.364]	[0.575]	[0.381]
Control mean	0.144	0.145	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1449	1474	1372
# Households	1548	1449	1474	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)				
Alignment = Norms	0.312	0.254	0.323	0.279
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.384	0.259	0.339	0.270
Linear Restrictions: No political involvement × Treatment (exact p-values)				
Alignment = Norms	0.246	0.190	0.265	0.197
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.692	0.403	0.593	0.391
Male controls	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.6 Heterogeneity analysis: Unmarried Girls

Table A41: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls				More unmarried				Greater prop unmarried			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Alignment	0.140	0.144	0.119	0.119	0.102	0.108	0.094	0.099	0.102	0.109	0.094	0.100
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.074]	[0.084]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Norms	0.064	0.076	0.061	0.074	0.114	0.113	0.107	0.102	0.113	0.112	0.105	0.101
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)
	[0.324]	[0.254]	[0.363]	[0.283]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.003]
Both	0.082	0.094	0.086	0.101	0.145	0.142	0.137	0.138	0.150	0.147	0.142	0.143
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)
	[0.187]	[0.138]	[0.175]	[0.126]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.039	-0.037	-0.026	-0.021	0.037	0.035	0.023	0.016	0.037	0.034	0.023	0.015
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.079)
	[0.598]	[0.627]	[0.737]	[0.794]	[0.616]	[0.649]	[0.761]	[0.830]	[0.629]	[0.670]	[0.772]	[0.843]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.047	0.034	0.042	0.024	-0.067	-0.054	-0.063	-0.046	-0.061	-0.048	-0.057	-0.039
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.079)
	[0.521]	[0.638]	[0.566]	[0.749]	[0.363]	[0.465]	[0.405]	[0.555]	[0.420]	[0.536]	[0.462]	[0.633]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.066	0.051	0.053	0.039	-0.058	-0.043	-0.045	-0.030	-0.081	-0.067	-0.069	-0.056
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.076)
	[0.343]	[0.478]	[0.467]	[0.597]	[0.413]	[0.559]	[0.542]	[0.686]	[0.254]	[0.364]	[0.349]	[0.466]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.610	0.308	0.602	0.366	0.992	0.999	0.985	0.999	0.994	0.999	0.989	1.000
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.211	0.350	0.317	0.426	0.126	0.299	0.142	0.195	0.187	0.334	0.218	0.265
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.520	0.205	0.543	0.514	0.498	0.183	0.522	0.341	0.511	0.220	0.533	0.570
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.625	0.681	0.751	0.766	0.667	0.787	0.902	0.973	0.594	0.681	0.750	0.781
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Columns 1–4 report heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Columns 5–8 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Columns 9–12 are similar to Columns 5–8 but use the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.7 Heterogeneity analysis: Women's stated misalignment with men

Table A42: Ink mark voting by voting alignment

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men				All men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Alignment	0.086	0.061	0.087	0.061	0.029	0.019	0.028	0.019
	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.062)
	[0.336]	[0.524]	[0.331]	[0.529]	[0.611]	[0.759]	[0.622]	[0.754]
Norms	0.042	0.018	0.058	0.015	0.003	0.008	0.011	0.008
	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.062)
	[0.596]	[0.823]	[0.478]	[0.860]	[0.964]	[0.897]	[0.854]	[0.902]
Both	0.216	0.247	0.212	0.254	0.130	0.134	0.125	0.141
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.066)
	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.015]	[0.042]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.041]
Voting alignment × Alignment	0.026	0.060	0.013	0.047	0.106	0.125	0.094	0.110
	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.072)
	[0.777]	[0.554]	[0.891]	[0.645]	[0.112]	[0.082]	[0.163]	[0.124]
Voting alignment × Norms	0.066	0.094	0.041	0.087	0.131	0.123	0.113	0.112
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.071)
	[0.443]	[0.298]	[0.637]	[0.349]	[0.043]	[0.080]	[0.090]	[0.117]
Voting alignment × Both	-0.091	-0.126	-0.093	-0.135	0.007	-0.001	0.007	-0.012
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.103)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.074)
	[0.360]	[0.243]	[0.345]	[0.214]	[0.922]	[0.993]	[0.925]	[0.875]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)								
Alignment = Norms	0.349	0.326	0.457	0.314	0.316	0.495	0.401	0.487
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.532	0.468	0.566	0.454	0.426	0.483	0.462	0.439
Linear Restrictions: Voting alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)								
Alignment = Norms	0.331	0.404	0.540	0.360	0.556	0.690	0.621	0.840
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.220	0.169	0.276	0.182	0.035	0.160	0.053	0.082
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Columns 1–4 report heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Columns 5–8 use a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.8 Heterogeneity analysis: Pessimism of male respondents

Table A43: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms				Alignment				Both			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Alignment	0.076	0.086	0.074	0.083	0.097	0.102	0.095	0.099	0.082	0.087	0.081	0.084
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)
	[0.027]	[0.018]	[0.033]	[0.023]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Norms	0.082	0.092	0.077	0.084	0.051	0.060	0.052	0.055	0.078	0.085	0.073	0.077
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)
	[0.016]	[0.009]	[0.028]	[0.023]	[0.151]	[0.116]	[0.150]	[0.148]	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.022]	[0.021]
Both	0.122	0.121	0.117	0.120	0.135	0.136	0.131	0.136	0.113	0.111	0.107	0.110
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.034)
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.129	0.113	0.103	0.082	0.034	0.032	0.007	0.005	0.164	0.161	0.129	0.122
	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.084)
	[0.046]	[0.088]	[0.126]	[0.243]	[0.562]	[0.604]	[0.895]	[0.939]	[0.028]	[0.035]	[0.115]	[0.141]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.074	0.042	0.073	0.037	0.138	0.114	0.132	0.109	0.136	0.099	0.154	0.105
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.082)
	[0.243]	[0.503]	[0.275]	[0.597]	[0.022]	[0.061]	[0.040]	[0.094]	[0.072]	[0.181]	[0.069]	[0.212]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.046	0.045	0.048	0.048	-0.004	-0.010	-0.011	-0.015	0.124	0.119	0.151	0.142
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.080)
	[0.484]	[0.503]	[0.497]	[0.504]	[0.952]	[0.863]	[0.859]	[0.814]	[0.103]	[0.115]	[0.079]	[0.099]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.983	0.988	0.993	0.997	0.312	0.328	0.314	0.320	0.660	0.663	0.645	0.647
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.679	0.505	0.526	0.584	0.615	0.606	0.596	0.645	0.267	0.417	0.226	0.482
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)												
Alignment = Norms	0.635	0.563	0.747	0.511	0.263	0.267	0.302	0.224	0.691	0.696	0.624	0.787
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.055	0.124	0.073	0.235	0.403	0.407	0.418	0.433	0.053	0.122	0.090	0.245
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Columns 1–4), alignment (Columns 5–8), and both beliefs (Columns 9–12). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.9 Heterogeneity analysis: Knowledge of preferences of other members of HH

Table A44: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref				W know M's pref			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Alignment	0.021	0.039	0.021	0.038	-0.058	-0.053	-0.061	-0.054
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)
	[0.774]	[0.594]	[0.781]	[0.605]	[0.496]	[0.539]	[0.474]	[0.532]
Norms	0.060	0.072	0.061	0.077	-0.058	-0.049	-0.062	-0.050
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.087)
	[0.373]	[0.289]	[0.363]	[0.259]	[0.482]	[0.566]	[0.454]	[0.562]
Both	0.114	0.121	0.114	0.130	0.006	0.008	0.009	0.028
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.091)
	[0.129]	[0.118]	[0.129]	[0.097]	[0.945]	[0.926]	[0.918]	[0.764]
Know preference × Alignment	0.109	0.094	0.097	0.080	0.192	0.195	0.185	0.183
	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.093)
	[0.165]	[0.240]	[0.221]	[0.321]	[0.036]	[0.037]	[0.043]	[0.051]
Know preference × Norms	0.052	0.039	0.042	0.019	0.182	0.174	0.181	0.165
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.093)
	[0.473]	[0.591]	[0.559]	[0.786]	[0.035]	[0.058]	[0.040]	[0.075]
Know preference × Both	0.027	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.145	0.144	0.137	0.120
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.096)
	[0.737]	[0.843]	[0.795]	[0.968]	[0.125]	[0.135]	[0.153]	[0.218]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150	0.144	0.144	0.149	0.150
# Observations	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
# Households	1548	1450	1475	1372	1548	1450	1475	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)								
Alignment = Norms	0.302	0.435	0.295	0.351	0.956	0.955	0.944	0.952
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.527	0.916	0.530	0.684	0.355	0.268	0.319	0.243
Linear Restrictions: Know preference × Treatment (exact p-values)								
Alignment = Norms	0.312	0.313	0.306	0.277	0.660	0.939	0.671	0.830
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.115	0.156	0.146	0.218	0.109	0.070	0.080	0.059
Male controls	✓			✓	✓			✓
Female controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
HH controls			✓	✓			✓	✓

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also asked them "We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men's guesses about women's preferences match women's preferences (Columns 1–4) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Columns 5–8). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations

K.2 IV results

We instrument the received treatment with the assigned treatment in Appendix A45. The estimates for women's turnout are 11.6, 10.7, and 13.9 percentage points for the alignment, norms, and both treatments, respectively, similar in magnitude to the ITT estimates reported in the main text.

Table A45: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness

	Woman Voted = 1 (1)	Man Allows HH Woman to Make Political Decision = 1 (2)
Alignment	0.116	0.046
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Norms	0.107	0.049
	(0.029)	(0.023)
Both	0.139	0.034
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Control mean	0.144	0.383
F-stat	4384.9	9395.0
# Observations	1552	4545
# Households	1552	1515
Linear Restrictions (p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.794	0.785
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.055	0.111

Notes: This table reports treatment effects from the instrumental variable analysis on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The treatment received by the household is instrumented with the treatment assigned to the household. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.3 Enumeration pair fixed effects

Each household was assigned a single male and female enumerator - we define the combination of the two as an enumerator pair. We test robustness of main results to the addition of enumerator pair fixed effects in Appendix A46. The effects on women's turnout are 10.9, 10.1, and 13.2 percentage points, similar to the main results.

Table A46: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness

	Woman Voted = 1 (1)	Man Allows HH Woman to Make Political Decision = 1 (2)
Alignment	0.109	0.018
	(0.029)	(0.013)
	[0.000]	[0.178]
Norms	0.101	0.015
	(0.029)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.313]
Both	0.132	0.031
	(0.029)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.030]
Control mean	0.144	0.383
# Observations	1548	4545
# Households	1548	1515
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.349	0.784
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.021	0.949

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block and enumerator-pair fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block, round, and enumerator-pair fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.4 Limiting sample to compliant households

In Appendix A47, we only include households that received the correct treatment and answered the endline survey. The effects on women's turnout are 10.9, 10.1, and 12.4 percentage

points, similar to the main results.

Table A47: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness - non-missing throughout

	Woman Voted = 1	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1
	(1)	(2)
Alignment	0.109	0.041
	(0.030)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.078]
Norms	0.101	0.049
	(0.029)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.033]
Both	0.124	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.198]
Control mean	0.150	0.383
# Observations	1472	4458
# Households	1472	1486
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.367	0.877
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.006	0.029

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.