The Price of Authority: Worker Sorting over Manager Identity

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Abstract

Who workers are willing to work for is an important margin of labor supply, yet little is known about how workers sort across jobs based on whether managers are local or foreign and on their race. We study this form of upward vertical discrimination using a choice experiment embedded in applications for real jobs in Haiti. On average, applicants require no wage premium to work under local or Black supervision. However, we find evidence that applicants with a bachelor's degree and relatively high earnings expectations sort toward the Foreign White manager, with compensating differentials of approximately 7–9 percent of monthly pay of the experimental monthly salary midpoint relative to other applicants.

Keywords: manager identity, compensating differentials, discrimination, authority, worker sorting, localization, field experiment.
JEL Codes: J31, J71, M51, O15, C93.

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1 Introduction

The allocation of authority inside organizations is usually treated as a decision made from above. Yet workers also choose which jobs to pursue, which organizations to join, and whom they are willing to work under (Doerrenberg et al., 2024). If workers are less willing to work under some types of managers, organizations may face a worker-side cost of placing those managers in positions of authority even when they are equally qualified.[1] Moreover, if preferences over managers differ systematically across workers, manager identity may affect not only how many workers an organization attracts, but also which workers it attracts, altering the skill composition of its workforce. This paper asks whether workers sort across otherwise identical jobs based on the race and local–foreign status of their supervisors and what wage differential is required to compensate for these identity-based preferences.

This paper investigates worker sorting over potential manager identity using a choice experiment embedded in real job applications on JobPaw, Haiti's leading online employment platform. Applicants to a real field-enumerator vacancy are randomly assigned to one of three pairwise manager comparisons: a Local Black versus a Foreign White manager, a Local Black versus a Foreign Black manager, or a Foreign Black versus a Foreign White manager. [2] The first comparison varies displayed race and local–foreign status jointly; the second varies local–foreign status among Black managers; and the third varies displayed race among foreign managers. Within each comparison, applicants choose between two manager-linked openings whose job characteristics and manager qualifications are standardized. Across all three comparisons, the wage gap between the two positions is randomized over fifteen values from −\$140 to +\$140, around a \$570 monthly midpoint, allowing us to recover the compensating differential associated with each manager comparison (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Hedegaard and Tyran, 2018).

[1] We use manager broadly to refer to individuals who exercise authority over workers, ranging from an employee supervising an intern to the president of an organization.

[2] We do not include a White Local manager. In the Haitian setting, such a profile would be relatively atypical and could introduce additional cues about ancestry, social class, or foreign affiliation, weakening the credibility of the local-status treatment. We therefore prioritize treatment realism over a fully crossed race-by-local-status design. Accordingly, the experiment identifies the local/foreign contrast among Black managers and the Black/White contrast among foreign managers, rather than unrestricted main effects of race and local status.

A defining feature of the managerial relationship is that workers are not merely deciding whether to work alongside another person, as in horizontal workplace relationships, but whether to accept that person's authority over their work, including their direction and evaluation. Existing evidence shows that identity can shape horizontal workplace interactions (Hjort, 2014) and generate substantial job-specific labor-supply responses when work is associated with particular social groups (Oh, 2023). Managerial authority, however, introduces an additional dimension because managers can influence workers' job assignments, promotions, and subsequent career progression (Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2023; Minni, 2026). This creates potentially opposing channels through which managerial identity can affect workers' valuation of a job. On the one hand, identity-based preferences may generate a force toward in-group managers, consistent with homophily in social relationships and evidence that manager–worker racial matches are associated with employment outcomes (McPherson et al., 2001; Giuliano et al., 2011).

On the other hand, workers may prefer an out-group manager if that identity is perceived to signal greater status, stronger professional networks, or better future opportunities. Consistent with this ambiguity, subordinate responses to otherwise similar leaders can depend not only on leader identity but also on information about leader ability (Ayalew et al., 2021). Thus, the direction of sorting over managerial identity is not obvious ex ante. Whether workers favor in-group or out-group managers, and the wage differential required to offset those preferences, is ultimately an empirical question.

This question is consequential when managerial identity reflects the allocation of authority between local and foreign personnel as well as race. International organizations, NGOs, and multinational firms often operate with local and foreign employees at different levels of the hierarchy, while localization efforts seek to shift greater decision-making authority toward local personnel (Roepstorff, 2020). If workers prefer foreign managers, localization may carry a recruitment cost even without employer discrimination. More importantly, heterogeneous preferences over managers may affect both the cost of reallocating authority and the human-capital composition of the workforce, while also reducing local workers' incentives to invest in managerial skills if they lower the expected returns to promotion-

oriented human-capital investment.

We find little evidence of a worker-side price of local or Black managerial authority. More importantly, the estimates are precise enough to rule out economically large adverse effects. The one-sided 95 percent upper bounds limit any adverse premium to 2.1 percent of monthly pay in Local Black–Foreign White, 0.1 percent in Local Black–Foreign Black, and 1.1 percent in Foreign Black–Foreign White. These bounds are well below the 5 percent benchmark specified in our power analysis.

The aggregate result masks differences in who sorts across managers. Applicants with at least a bachelor's degree and expected earnings above the experimental salary midpoint are 9.3 percentage points less likely than other applicants to choose the Local Black manager over the Foreign White manager at equal pay. They are similarly 9.9 percentage points less likely to choose the Foreign Black manager over the Foreign White manager. In contrast, there is essentially no corresponding shift between the Local Black and Foreign Black managers. In wage terms, the compensating differential for this group shifts toward the Foreign White manager by 9.1 and 6.7 percent of the experimental salary midpoint relative to other applicants in the Foreign white–Foreign Black and Foreign White–Local Black treatments, respectively. The pattern therefore appears in both comparisons in which the Foreign White manager is available, but not when applicants choose between the two Black managers.

Finally, the applicants who exhibit this sorting pattern are also substantially more responsive to relative pay. A $57 increase in one position's wage, equivalent to 10 percent of the experimental salary midpoint, changes their probability of choosing that position by 18.3–20.9 percentage points across the three comparisons. The corresponding response among other applicants is 6.9–9.9 percentage points. The differences are statistically significant in all three comparisons. This distinction is informative: greater responsiveness to wages is present in all three manager comparisons, whereas the equal-pay shift is concentrated in the two comparisons containing the Foreign White manager.

Discrimination can operate at several margins within labor markets. The largest literature

studies vertical downward discrimination, from employers or managers against workers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Neumark, 2018);customer discriminating against workers (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1998); horizontal discrimination, workers discriminating against co-workers (Hedegaard and Tyran, 2018; Hjort, 2014).

Our paper is most closely related to the newer literature on *upward vertical discrimination*: whether workers respond differently to the identity of managers, employers, or others exercising authority over them. Experiments show that subordinates can respond differently to otherwise similar leaders depending on gender through advice-taking, evaluations, backlash, and responses to feedback (Ayalew et al., 2021; Gangadharan et al., 2016; Grossman et al., 2019; Abel, 2024; Abel and Buchman, 2024). Race can also shape worker responses to employers. Doerrenberg et al. (2024) find little evidence that employer race affects workers' initial willingness to undertake an additional online task, but find lower subsequent output for Black employers, driven primarily by White workers. Asad et al. (2023) show that employer race affects the altruism and reciprocity underlying worker effort, although the combined effort response is similar across Black and White employers. Much of this evidence therefore concerns behavior after, or conditional on, a worker–employer relationship having formed.

We study the preceding recruitment margin: whether workers sort across prospective managers before the match is formed. Snellman and Younkin (2021) provide closely related field evidence, showing that real job seekers are less likely to continue applications to firms with Black founders and, conditional on continuing, request higher salaries; the reduction in applications is particularly pronounced among more qualified candidates. Our experiment differs by randomizing the relative wage attached to otherwise identical manager-linked openings. This allows us to estimate not simply whether manager identity changes application behavior, but the *compensating differential* required to offset it. In this respect, we connect upward discrimination to work showing that workers trade compensation for nonwage job attributes (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Hall and Mueller, 2018; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Maestas et al., 2023). Hedegaard and Tyran (2018) price coworker identity directly, while Oh (2023) shows that caste identity affects acceptance of real job

offers even when avoidance is costly. The closest pricing study is Alam et al. (2026), who use compensating differentials to study preferences and beliefs about manager gender. We instead recover the recruitment-stage price of manager identity from choices made within an actual hiring process.

The conventional employment setting is economically important. Many upward-discrimination experiments study short-duration online tasks, gig work, or experimental leadership interactions (Doerrenberg et al., 2024; Asad et al., 2023; Ayalew et al., 2021). Such settings provide clean identification but differ from entering an employment relationship in which the same manager may repeatedly evaluate, direct, and allocate opportunities to a worker. Managers have sizeable effects on productivity and retention (Lazear et al., 2015), and recent personnel evidence shows that they also affect workers' job allocation and subsequent career progression (Minni, 2026). Worker preferences over prospective supervisors may therefore incorporate expected learning, evaluation, advancement, or other future returns that are less salient in one-shot task environments.

Finally, our design connects upward discrimination to the localization efforts agenda (Roepstorff, 2020). Research on expatriate–local hierarchies shows that foreign status and race can become associated with perceived expertise, professional status, and organizational authority (Bian, 2022). Evidence on worker preferences is nevertheless mixed(Syed et al., 2014; Situmorang and Japutra, 2019). Our triangular design contributes to this literature by comparing Local Black, Foreign Black, and Foreign White managerial profiles while experimentally varying relative wages. We do not interpret any resulting sorting as evidence of a generalized preference for White or foreign authority. Rather, the experiment identifies whether the displayed manager-linked employment relationships carry an economically meaningful recruitment-stage price and whether that valuation differs across workers.

2 Experimental Design and Data

2.1 Experimental Setting

The experiment was embedded in applications for genuine entry-level field-enumerator positions on JobPaw, one of Haiti's leading online employment platforms. The positions were for a research data-collection project and were processed through JobPaw's standard recruitment system. Applicants therefore made choices within an actual hiring process rather than in a hypothetical survey.

Three Manager Comparisons. Our design follows Mas and Pallais (2017), adapted to recover the compensating differential associated with supervisor identity. Each applicant was randomly assigned to one of three pairwise comparisons: Local Black versus Foreign White, Local Black versus Foreign Black, or Foreign Black versus Foreign White. The first comparison varies both race and local versus foreign status; the second holds race constant while varying local status; and the third holds foreign status constant while varying race. We therefore estimate three pairwise manager-identity valuations rather than a fully saturated factorial decomposition of race and nationality. Within each comparison, the two manager-linked openings were otherwise identical and were displayed simultaneously in randomized left–right order. Throughout the paper, Manager A denotes the Local Black manager in the first two comparisons and the Foreign Black manager in the third.

Signaling Manager Identity. Manager profiles reported first name, country of origin, education, work experience, language skills, and role in the hiring process. Education, experience, language skills, and job responsibilities were held constant across profiles; the local manager was Haitian and the two foreign managers were American. Identity was further conveyed through standardized silent videos filmed from behind the manager, revealing only the neck and hands; no facial features were visible at any point, and the videos contained no audio, eliminating voice as a channel of identity signaling. All three manager videos followed an identical script, framing, camera angle, and sequence of hand/neck movements, differing only in the content required to display the randomized

verification code. This design limits the scope for idiosyncratic presentation, attractiveness, vocal tone, expressiveness, or mannerisms to differ systematically across the three manager profiles (Doleac and Stein, 2013; Eckel and Petrie, 2011). Each video displayed a verification code that applicants entered before proceeding.

Wage Randomization. Within each comparison, we randomize the wage gap, defined as $\Delta w = w_A - w_B$. Following Mas and Pallais (2017), we randomize the gap directly rather than the individual salaries independently. This ensures that each gap level appears with equal frequency and that the tails of the wage-gap distribution are adequately populated. We use 15 wage-gap levels in steps of \$20 from -140, 140 (see Table A1). Individual salaries are symmetric around a midpoint of \$570 per month, which is consistent with the local market range for field enumerator positions.

2.2 Job Application Process

Figure 1 summarizes the application process. Applicants first viewed the field-enumerator posting on JobPaw, provided basic information, and were randomly assigned to one of the three manager comparisons. They then viewed the two manager profiles and standardized videos and entered the verification code shown in each video. Before observing the randomized salaries, applicants reported the salary they expected to receive under each manager. Applicants were then shown the two randomized salaries simultaneously and selected the manager-linked opening they preferred to apply for.To reduce strategic responses driven by concerns about competition for the more attractive opening, applicants were informed that their stated preference would be used in the hiring process if they advanced to an interview: the organization would seek to honor their preferred assignment, although assignment to the alternative opening could occur if necessary.[3]

[3]Applicants could not return to previous pages during the application process. Our main analysis retains each applicant's first qualifying choice after treatment exposure.




Figure 1: Application flow.

Notes: Application flow and experimental assignment. Applicants first provided basic information, were randomly assigned to one of the three manager-pair comparisons, viewed the manager-linked openings, reported salary expectations, and then selected their preferred opening before submitting the application.

2.3 Data

2.3.1 Main Analysis Sample

Normalizing first name, last name, and email identifies 2,260 unique applicants who received a valid randomized manager comparison. For applicants with multiple records, we retain the earliest verified manager choice observed after randomized salaries were revealed. The resulting primary sample contains 1,736 applicants: 556 in Local Black/Foreign White, 591 in Local Black/Foreign Black, and 589 in Foreign Black/Foreign White. All retained observations passed both manager identity-verification checks and received a valid randomized salary pair. Appendix Table A3 reports application-funnel diagnostics, and Appendix Table A17 reports robustness to alternative rules for repeated applications.

2.3.2 Summary Statistics and Balance

Table 1 reports the primary sample both pooled and separately by randomized manager-comparison arm, with standard deviations in parentheses for every variable. The average applicant is 31 years old, with 5 years of work experience, and about one-half hold at least a bachelor's degree, 43% report prior NGO experience, and roughly 69% live in the Ouest. The table now also reports marital status, language and software skills, field of study, managerial aspirations, job priorities, and clean pre-reveal salary expectations.

Salary expectations are elicited after applicants view the manager profiles and are therefore not baseline balance covariates. For analyses that use these reports, we exclude

Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance Test

	Pooled	Local Black vrs Foreign White	Local Black vrs Foreign Black	Foreign Black vrs Foreign White
Age (years)	31.51 (8.31)	31.32 (7.29)	31.69 (8.65)	31.52 (8.84)
Years of paid work experience	5.33 (5.49)	5.55 (5.70)	5.40 (5.44)	5.04 (5.32)
Manager Aspiration (0–100)	80.83 (24.35)	82.63 (22.75)	80.47 (24.77)	79.50 (25.30)
Female	0.397 (0.490)	0.410 (0.492)	0.398 (0.490)	0.385 (0.487)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.503 (0.500)	0.507 (0.500)	0.508 (0.500)	0.496 (0.500)
Married	0.232 (0.422)	0.230 (0.421)	0.234 (0.423)	0.231 (0.422)
Lives in Ouest	0.690 (0.463)	0.669 (0.471)	0.690 (0.463)	0.710 (0.454)
Prior NGO experience	0.432 (0.496)	0.421 (0.494)	0.470 (0.500)	0.404 (0.491)
Fluent English	0.062 (0.241)	0.059 (0.236)	0.066 (0.248)	0.059 (0.237)
Fluent French	0.652 (0.476)	0.658 (0.475)	0.663 (0.473)	0.635 (0.482)
Statistical-software ability	0.758 (0.428)	0.761 (0.427)	0.761 (0.427)	0.752 (0.432)
Field: Bus/Econ/Law/Admin	0.327 (0.469)	0.336 (0.473)	0.325 (0.469)	0.321 (0.467)
Field: Ag/Eng./Sci	0.294 (0.456)	0.293 (0.456)	0.286 (0.452)	0.304 (0.460)
Field: Ed./Humanities.	0.160 (0.366)	0.153 (0.360)	0.164 (0.371)	0.161 (0.368)
Field: Health/Social Serv.	0.069 (0.253)	0.077 (0.267)	0.080 (0.271)	0.049 (0.217)
Priority: Prof. Advancement	0.713 (0.452)	0.737 (0.440)	0.677 (0.468)	0.727 (0.446)
Priority: Prestige/Status	0.051 (0.219)	0.047 (0.211)	0.049 (0.216)	0.056 (0.230)
Pair-Avg Expected Sal. (clean)	702.1 (524.2)	721.2 (565.9)	694.7 (484.8)	691.6 (522.0)
Expected salary > \$570 (clean)	0.473 (0.499)	0.470 (0.500)	0.469 (0.499)	0.479 (0.500)

Notes: Each cell reports the mean with the standard deviation in parentheses. For binary variables, the mean is the sample share and the parenthetical value is its sample standard deviation. The primary sample contains 1,736 applicants.

observations for which either manager-specific expected salary exceeds \$5,000. Participants likely mistyped given that no enumerator position pays such salary in Haiti; 14 of the 1,736 primary observations meet this rule. This cleaning decision does not alter the randomized manager-choice sample or the primary WTP estimates. The appendix reports the descriptive salary-belief results, unrestricted audit, and alternative upper-tail restrictions. Our randomized test using standardized difference was successful, all values across covariates were under 0.25 (see Table A2).

3 Conceptual Framework for Analysis

3.1 The Price of Manager Identity

Applicant i obtains utility

$$U_{im} = w_{im} + a_i(m) + \varepsilon_{im}, \tag{1}$$

from the opening supervised by manager $m \in \{A, B\}$. The term w_{im} is the wage offered by the position associated with manager m, while $a_i(m)$ captures the applicant-specific nonwage value of the manager-linked employment relationship. This term may reflect manager identity as well as any associated expectations about career opportunities, trust, status, professional networks, or other nonwage features induced by the experimentally varied manager profile.

Define $Y_i = 1$ when applicant i chooses Manager A and $Y_i = 0$ when Manager B is chosen. Applicant i chooses Manager A whenever $w_{iA} + a_i(A) + \varepsilon_{iA} > w_{iB} + a_i(B) + \varepsilon_{iB}$. Let the randomized wage difference be $\Delta w_i = w_{iA} - w_{iB}$ and define the applicant-specific compensating differential for Manager A as $CD_i = [a_i(B) - a_i(A)] + [\varepsilon_{iB} - \varepsilon_{iA}]$. The applicant chooses Manager A if and only if $\Delta w_i > CD_i$. Because Δw_i is randomly assigned, $\Pr(Y_i = 1 \mid \Delta w_i = d) = \Pr(CD_i < d) = F_{CD}(d)$. The experimental choice curve therefore traces the CDF of the latent pairwise compensating-differential distribution. Its median is the wage difference d at which $\Pr(Y_i = 1 \mid \Delta w_i = d) = 0.5$. [4]

3.2 Estimation and Inference

Within each manager-comparison arm p, our primary specification is the linear probability model

$$Y_{ip} = \alpha_p + \beta_p \Delta w_{ip} + \epsilon_{ip}. \tag{2}$$

Because $\Delta w_{ip} = 0$ corresponds to equal wages, α_p is the fitted probability of choosing Manager A at equal pay. The coefficient β_p measures the change in the probability of choosing Manager A associated with a one-dollar increase in A's wage relative to B's.

[4] Because the observed choice is conditional on applicants reaching the pairwise choice stage, the compensating differential should be interpreted as a recruitment-stage valuation. It is not an equilibrium wage differential and does not by itself identify overall labor supply to the organization.

The median compensating differential is the wage difference at which the fitted choice probability equals one-half. Under equation (2), the median compensating differential equals $(0.5 - \alpha_p)/\beta_p$.

We report HC1 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the linear probability model. Because the estimated compensating differential is a ratio of estimated coefficients, we report delta-method standard errors together with Fieller 95 percent confidence intervals (Fieller, 1954). The latter account directly for sampling uncertainty in both the numerator and denominator of the ratio.

Functional-form checks. The linear probability model remains the basis for the primary estimand and inference. For visualization and robustness, we also estimate individual-level logit and probit models and compare the linear specification with saturated wage-gap models. The logit specification provides a smooth and bounded representation of the experimental choice curve. We use it primarily for visualization rather than relying on its parametric tail behavior for identification. The implied median compensating differentials are nearly identical across the linear probability, logit, and probit specifications.

4 Results

4.1 Experimental Demand Curves

Figure 2 plots the relationship between the randomized wage difference and manager choice separately for each comparison. The horizontal axis is $\Delta w = w_A - w_B$, so positive values indicate that the position associated with Manager A pays more than the position associated with Manager B. Open circles report the observed fraction choosing Manager A at each of the fifteen randomized wage differences, and the solid curves are fitted individual-level maximum-likelihood logits.

Applicants respond strongly and monotonically to relative pay in all three comparisons. Moving Manager A from a \$140 wage disadvantage to a \$140 wage advantage raises the fitted probability of choosing A from approximately 22–27 percent to 78–79 percent. A more economically comparable normalization gives the same message: a \$57 increase in




Figure 2: Experimental Demand for Manager-Linked Jobs.

Notes: Applicants chose between two otherwise identical jobs associated with different managers. The scatter points show the fraction of applicants who chose the job associated with Manager A at each randomized monthly wage premium. The wage premium is the wage in Manager A's job minus the wage in Manager B's job, so positive values indicate that Manager A's job pays more. The solid curves are maximum-likelihood logit fits estimated from the individual-level choice data. Manager A is the Local Black manager in panels A and B and the Foreign Black manager in panel C. The horizontal dashed line marks an equal choice share of 0.5, and the vertical dashed line marks equal pay. A fitted curve crossing 0.5 at a wage premium of zero corresponds to a zero median compensating differential between the two manager-linked jobs.

Manager A's wage relative to Manager B, equal to 10 percent of the $570 experimental salary midpoint, raises the probability of choosing Manager A by 12.0 percentage points in Local Black/Foreign White, 10.5 points in Local Black/Foreign Black, and 11.1 points in Foreign Black/Foreign White. Applicants therefore meaningfully trade off compensation against the manager-linked attributes of the openings.

The location of the curves is equally informative. At equal pay, the logit fits imply choice probabilities of 0.509, 0.534, and 0.522 in Local Black/Foreign White, Local Black/Foreign Black, and Foreign Black/Foreign White, respectively. The preregistered linear probability model gives virtually identical estimates of 0.507, 0.530, and 0.519. Thus, the estimated probability of choosing the Local Black manager is approximately 51 percent against the Foreign White manager and 53 percent against the Foreign Black manager, while approximately 52 percent choose the Foreign Black manager against the Foreign White manager. The demand curves therefore cross one-half close to equal wages in every comparison. Section 4.2 translates these crossings into compensating differentials.

4.2 The Price of Managerial Authority

Table 2 reports the preregistered linear probability estimates and translates the experimental choice responses into compensating differentials. The estimated median compensating differential for Manager A is −$3.3 per month in Local Black/Foreign White, −$16.5 in Local Black/Foreign Black, and −$9.9 in Foreign Black/Foreign White. By construction, a positive compensating differential means that Manager A must offer a higher wage than Manager B to attract one-half of applicants, whereas a negative value means that Manager A can offer a lower wage and still attract one-half. None of the three point estimates therefore indicates an adverse average wage premium associated with the displayed Local Black or Foreign Black managerial profile.

The confidence bounds sharpen the interpretation of the near-zero point estimates. In Local Black/Foreign White, the one-sided 95 percent upper bound limits any adverse premium for the Local Black manager relative to the Foreign White manager to $12.2 per month, or 2.1 percent of the $570 salary midpoint. In Local Black/Foreign Black, the corresponding upper bound is only $0.8, or 0.1 percent of the midpoint. Both are well below the prespecified $28.50 benchmark, equal to 5 percent of monthly pay. Consistent with these bounds, the data reject an adverse compensating differential of at least $28.50 in both comparisons involving the Local Black manager. The Foreign Black/Foreign White comparison yields the same qualitative conclusion. The estimated compensating differential for the Foreign Black manager is −$9.9 per month, and the one-sided 95 percent adverse upper bound is $6.5, or 1.1 percent of the salary midpoint. Thus, the results provide little evidence of an economically meaningful aggregate recruitment-stage penalty associated with either local or Black managerial authority in the displayed comparisons.

Taken together, the aggregate evidence rules out an economically large recruitment-stage penalty for the displayed Local Black or Foreign Black managerial profiles. This conclusion does not imply that individual applicants are indifferent to manager identity. A small aggregate compensating differential can coexist with systematic differences in valuations across workers, a possibility we examine in the heterogeneity analysis below.

Table 2: Manager Choice, Price Responsiveness, and Compensating Differentials

	Local Black vrs Foreign White	Local Black vrs Foreign Black	Foreign Black vrs Foreign White
Panel A. Choice and price responsiveness			
Fitted share choosing Manager A at equal pay	0.507	0.530	0.519
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Wage slope, pp per \$100	21.13***	18.44***	19.49***
	(2.12)	(2.14)	(2.21)
Effect of a \$57 relative-wage increase, pp	12.04***	10.51***	11.11***
	(1.21)	(1.22)	(1.26)
Panel B. Compensating differentials			
Compensating differential (\$/month)	**-3.3**	**-16.5**	**-9.9**
Delta-method s.e.	(9.3)	(10.9)	(10.1)
Fieller 95% CI	$[-22.1, 15.2]$	$[-39.7, 4.1]$	$[-30.9, 9.6]$
Preregistered directional inference			
One-sided p: $H_1 : CD > 0$	0.639	0.935	–
Holm-adjusted p within Family 1	1.000	1.000	–
Panel C.Economic-magnitude inference			
One-sided 95% adverse upper bound (\$/month)	12.2	0.8	6.5
as % of \$570	2.1%	0.1%	1.1%
Economic-null p: $H_0 : CD \geq \$28.50$	0.0006	< 0.0001	0.0001
Symmetric TOST p, ±\$28.50	0.005	0.145	0.040
Applicants, Panels A–B	556	591	589

Notes: The equal-pay row reports the fitted probability of choosing Manager A at $\Delta w = 0$. The wage-slope row gives the change in that probability associated with a \$100 increase in Manager A's wage relative to Manager B. The following row rescales the same estimate to a \$57 relative wage increase, equal to 10% of the \$570 experimental salary midpoint. The compensating differential is the relative wage adjustment to Manager A's position at which the fitted probability of choosing A equals one-half. Positive values imply that Manager A must pay more; negative values imply that Manager A can pay less while retaining one-half of applicants.

4.3 Salary Expectations

Before the randomized wages are revealed, applicants report the salary they expect to receive under each manager-linked opening. These expectations are elicited after applicants have viewed the manager profiles and therefore are post-treatment with respect to manager identity, although they precede the randomized wage realization and the subsequent manager choice. We consequently do not treat salary expectations as baseline

covariates. We use them instead as descriptive evidence on whether the displayed manager profiles generate different beliefs about expected pay; a causal mediation interpretation would require additional assumptions.

Table 3: Pre-Reveal Minimum Salary Expectations: Plausible Reports

Arm	N	Manager A	Manager B	B − A	s.e.	p
Local Black/Foreign White	549	714.1	728.3	+14.1*	(7.3)	0.055
Local Black/Foreign Black	589	690.5	698.9	+8.4	(5.4)	0.119
Foreign Black/Foreign White	584	695.2	688.0	-7.2	(6.2)	0.245
Across-arm equality of pair-average expected salary: $p = 0.610$						

Notes: In Local Black/Foreign White, B − A is Foreign White minus Local Black; in Local Black/Foreign Black it is Foreign Black minus Local Black; and in Foreign Black/Foreign White it is Foreign White minus Foreign Black. The p-value in each arm tests whether mean B − A equals zero. The final row reports the HC1-robust joint test that pair-average expected salary is equal across the three randomized manager-comparison arms. * $p < 0.10$.

Salary expectations are broadly similar across the randomized manager comparisons. The average of the two manager-specific salary expectations does not differ significantly across the three comparison arms (joint $p = 0.610$). Within comparisons, applicants report an expected salary approximately \$14.1 higher under the White American manager-linked opening than under the Black Haitian opening in Local Black/Foreign White (two-sided $p = 0.055$). The corresponding within-person differences are \$8.4 higher under the Black American opening than under the Black Haitian opening in the Local Black/Foreign Black ($p = 0.119$) and \$7.2 lower under the White American opening than under the Foreign Black opening in Foreign Black/Foreign White ($p = 0.245$). Thus, although the Local Black/Foreign White difference is suggestive, none of the three within-comparison differences is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and the magnitudes are small relative to the experimental salary midpoint. Overall, the salary-expectation data provide little evidence that systematic differences in expected pay across the displayed manager profiles account for the revealed manager-choice patterns.

4.4 Heterogeneity in Worker Sorting

Average compensating differentials need not characterize the workers who sort most strongly across jobs. The labor literature documents substantial heterogeneity in non-

wage job values and shows that such heterogeneity is central to worker–firm sorting (Hall and Mueller, 2018; Lamadon et al., 2022). Valuations of working conditions also vary across the wage distribution and by education (Maestas et al., 2023), while preferences over workplace attributes are related to human-capital investment and subsequent job choices (Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). Because supervisors can affect worker productivity, retention, and careers (Lazear et al., 2015), workers with stronger credentials or higher earnings expectations may value the manager-linked component of a job differently. We therefore investigate whether the aggregate near-zero WTP conceals systematic sorting among applicants with stronger labor-market credentials and higher earnings expectations.

We focus on applicants who jointly have at least a bachelor's degree and expected monthly earnings above the \$570 experimental midpoint.[5] We refer to these applicants as the high-credential/high-expectation group and compare them with all other applicants using group-specific intercepts and wage slopes.[6]

For each arm, Table 4 reports the fitted probability of choosing Manager A at equal pay, the implied compensating differential, and responsiveness to the randomized relative wage. Positive WTP means that Manager A must pay more to attract half of applicants. Thus, in Local Black/Foreign White and Foreign Black/Foreign White, a positive group difference in WTP corresponds to a relative shift toward the Foreign White manager.

[5]The analysis plan prespecified heterogeneity by education and several other applicant characteristics, but not this joint bachelor/high-expected-salary subgroup. We therefore interpret the analysis in this section as exploratory. The complete set of prespecified heterogeneity analyses is reported in Appendix.

[6]Because expected salary is elicited after applicants view the manager profiles, this classification is not a pretreatment characteristic and cannot identify a causal mechanism. Its role is descriptive: it asks whether the aggregate average conceals a coherent pattern of sorting across the three independently randomized manager comparisons.

Table 4: Worker Sorting by minimum Bachelor's degree and Earnings Expectations

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Panel A. Choice at equal pay			
Equal-pay choice share, other / focal group (%)	53.6 / 44.3	52.8 / 55.3	55.3 / 45.4
Equal-pay difference, focal − other (pp)	-9.3	+2.5	-9.9
95% CI	$[-17.3, -1.3]$	$[-5.0, 9.9]$	$[-17.9, -2.0]$
p-value	0.023	0.518	0.014
Panel B. Compensating differentials			
Compensating differential / focal group ($/mon)	-20.7 / +17.5	-23.6 / -14.5	-37.2 / +14.4
Difference in compensating differential ($/mon)	+38.1	+9.1	+51.6
95% CI	$[3.2, 73.1]$	$[-35.1, 53.4]$	$[9.9, 93.3]$
p-value	0.033	0.685	0.015
Panel C. Wage responsiveness			
$57 wage effect, other / focal group (pp)	9.9 / 18.7	6.9 / 20.9	8.2 / 18.3
Difference in wage responsiveness (pp)	+8.8	+14.0	+10.1
p-value	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001
Applicants	549	589	584

Notes: The $57 wage effect is the percentage-point change in the probability of choosing Manager A associated with a $57 increase in Manager A's wage relative to Manager B, equal to 10% of the $570 experimental salary midpoint. Confidence intervals are 95%. Inference uses HC1 robust standard errors and delta-method inference for the compensating differentials. Salary-based analyses exclude observations for which either manager-specific expected salary exceeds $5,000. The analysis is exploratory. Covariate-adjusted estimates are reported in Appendix.

The equal-pay results reveal a common pattern in the two comparisons involving the Foreign White manager. In Local Black/Foreign White, the high-credential/high-expectation group is 9.3 percentage points less likely than other applicants to choose the Local Black manager at equal pay ($p = 0.023$). In Foreign Black/Foreign White, the corresponding difference is 9.9 percentage points ($p = 0.014$). By contrast, there is no detectable difference in Local Black/Foreign Black, where the equal-pay gap is only 2.5 percentage points ($p = 0.518$). Thus, the subgroup shift appears in both comparisons in which the displayed Foreign White manager is available, but not in the comparison between the Local Black and Foreign Black managers.

The compensating differentials put the magnitude of this sorting in monetary terms.

Relative to other applicants, the high-credential/high-expectation group exhibits a $38 per month shift toward the Foreign White rather than Local Black manager and a $52 per month shift toward the Foreign White rather than Foreign Black manager. Both contrasts are statistically significant at the 5% level. The corresponding difference in Local Black/Foreign Black is only $9 per month and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Covariate adjustment produces a similar qualitative pattern, as reported in the appendix.

The subgroup also responds substantially more strongly to the randomized wage differential. A 10% increase in Manager A's midpoint salary relative raises the probability of choosing that manager by 18.3–20.9 percentage points among high-credential/high-expectation applicants, compared with only 6.9–9.9 percentage points among other applicants. The differences in price responsiveness range from 8.8 to 14.0 percentage points and are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ in all three arms. These applicants therefore respond roughly two to three times as strongly to relative compensation as other applicants. As also shown in Figure 3, participants with high credentials have a steeper demand curve across all treatments. [7]




Figure 3: Demand curves by credentials and earnings expectations.

Notes: Open circles and navy curves show observed choice shares and fitted logit demand for other applicants. Filled diamonds and orange curves show the corresponding choice shares and fitted demand for applicants with a bachelor's degree or higher and expected salary above $570. The horizontal dashed line marks equal choice, $\Pr(A) = 0.5$, and the vertical dashed line marks equal pay, $\Delta w = 0$.

[7] Separate bachelor-only, salary-only, managerial-aspiration, and additional demographic heterogeneity analyses are reported in the appendix for transparency. The formal bachelor-by-high-salary interaction remains an appendix sensitivity because it asks whether the joint pattern exceeds the sum of the two component associations—a different, more restrictive estimand than the high-credential/high-expectation-group versus others comparison.

4.5 Sorting by Pre-Profile Labor-Market Strength

A concern with the preceding heterogeneity analysis is that expected earnings, although elicited before the randomized salary offers are revealed, are measured after applicants observe the manager profiles. To assess whether the same sorting pattern appears using only predetermined information, We construct an exploratory pre-profile labor-market-strength index, following related work that summarizes multiple baseline worker characteristics into measures of ability or employability (Groh et al., 2015; Van den Berg et al., 2025; Abadie et al., 2018). For example, Groh et al. (2015) show that multidimensional measures of worker skills and ability have predictive power for subsequent employment and earnings.

The index combines eight pre-profile measures capturing human capital, job-relevant skills, and labor-market attachment: educational attainment, years of work experience, English proficiency, French proficiency, statistical-software proficiency, prior international-firm experience, prior NGO experience, and prior formal employment. Each component is standardized, and the index is their equal-weighted mean. Applicants above the pooled median are classified as having higher baseline labor-market strength. The construction is outcome-blind: no manager assignment, expected salary, randomized wage, or manager-choice outcome enters the index or its weights. Because the index was not preregistered, we treat this analysis as exploratory.

The pre-profile index reproduces the cross-arm sorting pattern (Table A8). Higher-strength applicants are 7.2 percentage points less likely to choose the Local Black manager in Local Black/Foreign White ($p = 0.071$) and 8.6 points less likely to choose the Foreign Black manager in Foreign Black/Foreign White ($p = 0.031$), while the difference in Local Black/Foreign Black is smaller and insignificant (-3.6 points, $p = 0.372$). Pooling the two comparisons containing the Foreign White manager, higher-strength applicants are 7.9 percentage points more likely to choose that manager at equal pay (95% CI [2.4, 13.4], $p = 0.005$). Thus, the sorting pattern is not driven by post-profile earnings expectations or by a single index construction.

4.6 Robustness and Design Diagnostics

The principal WTP conclusion is insensitive to restricting the analysis to completed applications, alternative repeated-application rules, support restrictions, functional form, and exclusion of applicants with implausible salary-expectation reports. Table 5 retains a compact summary in the main text, while Appendix Table A17 reports the complete sample-size, WTP, standard-error, and significance results. The preferred covariate-adjusted main regressions are reported in Appendix Table A4; randomization balance across manager-comparison arms is reported in Appendix Table A2; Appendix Table A3 reports application-funnel and randomized-assignment diagnostics; and Appendix Table A6 shows that the descriptive salary-expectation conclusions are not driven by the particular upper-tail restriction.

Table 5: Compensating Differentials Across Robustness Specifications

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Primary specification	-3.3	-16.5	-9.9
Completed applications	-7.1	-13.0	-12.5
First valid application	-3.6	-17.6	-10.7
No prior wage reveal	-3.1	-15.4	-9.6
Email-only deduplication	-4.6	-17.0	-11.6
Single choice record	+0.4	-18.9	-1.9
All choice submissions	-6.6	-12.6	-5.1
Clean expectation sample	-4.1	-16.3	-11.0
Exclude equal-wage cell	-9.5	-20.9	-8.8
Large wage gaps, $\|\Delta w\| \geq 80$	+4.4	-21.9	-11.4
Logit	-3.7	-17.4	-10.3
Probit	-3.4	-17.4	-10.3

Notes: Each cell reports the estimated compensating differential for Manager A in dollars per month. The primary specification uses applicants' first verified manager choice after wage revelation. Standard errors for the all-choice-submissions specification are clustered by applicant; other linear probability specifications use HC1 robust standard errors. Appendix Table A17 reports observations, equal-pay choice shares, wage slopes, compensating differentials, standard errors, and p-values for each specification.

The appendix reports the robustness of the sorting result to a labor-market-strength index constructed entirely from pre-profile covariates (Table A8), the full controlled focal-

subgroup regression (Table A7), separate education and salary-expectation specifications (Tables A9 and A10), manager-aspiration specifications (Tables A11 and A16), and the stricter bachelor-by-high-salary interaction specification (Table A12). The broader exploratory moderator family is reported in Appendix Tables A13, A14, and A15. These checks do not convert the focal heterogeneity into a confirmatory result; they make clear which parts of the pattern are stable across definitions and specifications.

5 Discussion

The aggregate estimates place a useful bound on a worker-side constraint to the allocation of authority. In this hiring market, the displayed Local Black and Foreign Black managers do not require an economically meaningful wage premium to attract applicants. This result helps locate where discrimination from below may operate. Existing studies show that manager or employer identity can affect advice-taking, evaluations, responses to feedback, and effort after a relationship has formed (Ayalew et al., 2021; Abel, 2024; Abel and Buchman, 2024; Doerrenberg et al., 2024). Our results show that such post-match responses need not be accompanied by a substantial barrier to entering the relationship. Recruitment-stage sorting and post-match behavior are therefore distinct margins of upward discrimination.

The heterogeneity results point to a different organizational consequence. A near-zero average compensating differential does not imply that manager identity is irrelevant for matching. Applicants with stronger labor-market characteristics sort toward the displayed Foreign White manager when that profile is available, and the qualitative pattern persists when labor-market strength is measured entirely from pre-profile characteristics. Manager identity can therefore operate as a nonwage job attribute whose valuation differs across workers (Hall and Mueller, 2018; Lamadon et al., 2022; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). An organization may face little average recruitment cost from assigning a particular manager yet still attract systematically different workers across managers. Manager identity may consequently affect the composition of teams even when it has little effect on aggregate labor supply.

This compositional margin is particularly relevant for localization. Our aggregate estimates imply that shifting supervisory authority toward the displayed local manager need not require a broad wage subsidy to overcome worker resistance. Yet if workers with stronger labor-market prospects sort disproportionately toward foreign managerial profiles, local and foreign managers may draw from different applicant pools. Such sorting could affect team human capital and, ultimately, observed managerial performance even when managers themselves are equally productive. More broadly, anticipated differences in access to high-quality workers could alter the returns to investments that prepare local workers for supervisory positions. These longer-run effects are not identified by our experiment, but they illustrate why compositional sorting can matter even when the average price of local authority is close to zero.

The cross-arm pattern also cautions against interpreting the heterogeneity as a generic preference for foreign or out-group authority. The shift appears when the displayed Foreign White manager is available, but not between the Local Black and Foreign Black managers. Because each race–nationality category is represented by a single male manager profile, we cannot distinguish race, nationality, perceived status, networks, or other profile-induced attributes. The narrower conclusion is that worker demand imposes little average recruitment penalty on the displayed local or Black managerial authority, while managerial identity may still shape *who works under whom*. Distinguishing the average price of authority from the composition of workers willing to accept it is therefore central to understanding worker-side constraints on organizational hierarchy.

6 Conclusion

We study whether worker preferences place a price on managerial authority using a choice experiment embedded in applications for real jobs in Haiti. Randomized relative wages allow us to recover compensating differentials across Local Black, Foreign Black, and Foreign White manager-linked openings. The aggregate estimates are close to zero, and the confidence bounds rule out economically large recruitment penalties for the displayed local or Black managers. Thus, worker demand does not appear to create a broad wage

cost of assigning these managers authority at the recruitment margin studied here.

The absence of an average penalty, however, does not imply an absence of sorting. Applicants with stronger labor-market characteristics disproportionately sort toward the displayed Foreign White manager when that profile is available, a pattern that is also visible using an index constructed solely from pre-profile characteristics. Manager identity may therefore affect workforce composition even when it has little effect on aggregate recruitment. More broadly, understanding how identity shapes organizational authority requires distinguishing the price needed to attract workers from the types of workers who sort into particular managerial relationships.

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A Figures



Figure A1: Foreign Black vs. Local Black (from left to right)




Figure A2: Foreign White vs. Foreign Black (from left to right)



Figure A3: Foreign White vs. Local Black (from left to right)

Table A1: Wage Gap Levels Within Each Comparison

Gap Level	**Manager A Salary (USD)**	**Manager B Salary (USD)**	Δw (USD)
1	500	640	−140
2	510	630	−120
3	520	620	−100
4	530	610	−80
5	540	600	−60
6	550	590	−40
7	560	580	−20
8	570	570	0
9	580	560	+20
10	590	550	+40
11	600	540	+60
12	610	530	+80
13	620	520	+100
14	630	510	+120
15	640	500	+140

Note: Positive Δw means Manager A pays more than Manager B. Each gap level is equally likely within each comparison. Salaries span \$500–640 per month. \$ = USD.

Table A2: Full Pairwise Balance Across Randomized Manager-Comparison Arms

	Arm means			Pairwise normalized differences			
	LB/FW	LB/FB	FB/FW	LB/FW–LB/FB	LB/FW–FB/FW	LB/FB–FB/FW	Max. |Δ|
Age (years)	31.32	31.69	31.52	-0.047	-0.025	+0.020	0.047
Female	0.410	0.398	0.385	+0.025	+0.050	+0.025	0.050
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.507	0.508	0.496	-0.001	+0.023	+0.024	0.024
Some college	0.392	0.404	0.392	-0.025	-0.000	+0.025	0.025
Bachelor degree	0.444	0.453	0.436	-0.019	+0.016	+0.034	0.034
Master or higher	0.054	0.047	0.056	+0.030	-0.009	-0.039	0.039
Doctorate	0.009	0.007	0.003	+0.025	+0.071	+0.047	0.071
Other education	0.045	0.047	0.053	-0.011	-0.036	-0.024	0.036
Married	0.230	0.234	0.231	-0.008	-0.002	+0.006	0.008
Cohabiting	0.128	0.139	0.136	-0.032	-0.024	+0.008	0.032
Separated	0.027	0.039	0.031	-0.067	-0.021	+0.046	0.067
Widowed	0.011	0.008	0.012	+0.024	-0.010	-0.034	0.034
Divorced	0.011	0.007	0.005	+0.043	+0.064	+0.022	0.064
Lives in Ouest	0.669	0.690	0.710	-0.046	-0.088	-0.042	0.088
Years of paid work experience	5.55	5.40	5.04	+0.027	+0.094	+0.068	0.094
Worked Haitian private firm	0.491	0.464	0.448	+0.055	+0.086	+0.031	0.086
Worked international firm	0.090	0.083	0.087	+0.025	+0.012	-0.013	0.025
Prior NGO experience	0.421	0.470	0.404	-0.100	+0.034	+0.134	0.134
Worked government/public sector	0.518	0.536	0.486	-0.037	+0.065	+0.102	0.102
Self-employed	0.261	0.272	0.277	-0.026	-0.036	-0.010	0.036
Never formally employed	0.085	0.071	0.115	+0.050	-0.103	-0.153	0.153
Fluent English	0.059	0.066	0.059	-0.027	-0.000	+0.027	0.027
Fluent French	0.658	0.663	0.635	-0.011	+0.049	+0.059	0.059
Statistical-software ability	0.761	0.761	0.752	-0.001	+0.020	+0.022	0.022
Software response missing	0.005	0.015	0.010	-0.097	-0.054	+0.045	0.097
Manager aspiration probability (0–100)	82.63	80.47	79.50	+0.091	+0.130	+0.039	0.130
Field: business/econ/law/admin	0.336	0.325	0.321	+0.024	+0.033	+0.009	0.033
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	0.293	0.286	0.304	+0.016	-0.023	-0.039	0.039
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	0.153	0.164	0.161	-0.031	-0.023	+0.008	0.031
Field: health/social services	0.077	0.080	0.049	-0.008	+0.116	+0.124	0.124
Field: other	0.140	0.146	0.165	-0.015	-0.068	-0.053	0.068
Top priority: professional advancement	0.737	0.677	0.727	+0.133	+0.024	-0.109	0.133
Top priority: prestige/status	0.047	0.049	0.056	-0.011	-0.042	-0.031	0.042
Top priority: supervisor trust/fairness	0.216	0.274	0.217	-0.136	-0.004	+0.132	0.136

Notes: LB denotes Local Black, FW Foreign White, and FB Foreign Black. The first three columns report arm-specific means. Pairwise normalized differences are differences in means divided by the square root of the average within-arm variances.

B Attrition, Verification, and Repeated Applications

The full-sample randomization diagnostics show no evidence that manager arm, randomized wage gap, or display side systematically predict passage through the verification, salary-reveal, manager-choice, or downstream completion stages. Table A3 reports the corresponding application-funnel tests. These tests address differential selection with respect to randomized assignments; they do not imply that missingness is unrelated to applicant characteristics.

Table A3: Application Funnel and Randomized-Assignment Tests

Outcome	N	Arm p	Wage-gap p	Display p	Joint p
Pass identity verification	2,260	0.980	0.911	0.833	0.999
Reach salary reveal	2,260	0.979	0.921	0.907	0.999
Choice observed on first valid application	2,260	0.995	0.871	0.634	0.992
Eventually included in primary choice sample	2,260	0.973	0.871	0.626	0.988
Finish first valid application	2,260	0.773	0.698	0.689	0.929

Notes: Each row reports tests from a separate LPM on manager-comparison indicators, randomized $A - B$ wage gap. The final column jointly tests all randomized variables. These tests address differential selection with respect to randomized assignment; they do not establish that missingness is completely at random.

Repeated-attempt analyses cluster inference at the applicant level when multiple choice records are retained. Only 11 of the 1,736 primary applicants had previously reached a randomized wage reveal; excluding those applicants yields WTP of −\$3.1, −\$15.4, and −\$9.6. Using email alone as a more aggressive duplicate key gives WTP of −\$4.6, −\$17.0, and −\$11.6, while restricting to applicants with exactly one observed choice gives +\$0.4, −\$18.9, and −\$1.9. The full set of alternative sample definitions, including the PAP-aligned completed-application sample and all-choice-submission specification, appears in Appendix Table A17.

C Full Covariate-Adjusted Main Results

Table A4: Full Covariate-Adjusted Main Regressions

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Constant	+0.695***	+0.489***	+0.584***
	(0.169)	(0.127)	(0.136)
Wage gap, per $100	+0.208***	+0.183***	+0.194***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age (10 years)	-0.055	+0.005	-0.027
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Female	-0.073*	-0.050	+0.014
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Bachelor's degree or higher	-0.062	-0.022	-0.070*
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Married	+0.028	+0.043	+0.027
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Lives in Ouest	+0.037	+0.102**	-0.121***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Work experience (5 years)	+0.010	-0.035*	-0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Fluent English	-0.076	+0.021	-0.159*
	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.089)
Fluent French	-0.059	+0.063	+0.047
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Statistical-software ability	-0.054	-0.042	+0.021
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Software response missing	-0.016	+0.019	-0.063
	(0.251)	(0.181)	(0.209)
Prior NGO experience	+0.043	-0.016	+0.006
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Manager aspiration (10 pp)	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Field: business/econ/law/admin	+0.048	-0.078	-0.043
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	+0.033	-0.025	-0.017
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.065)
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	-0.065	-0.023	+0.014
	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Field: health/social services	-0.067	-0.030	-0.002
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.100)
Job priority: advancement	+0.083*	-0.033	+0.069
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Job priority: prestige/status	-0.043	+0.029	-0.031
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.095)
Observations	556	591	589

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for choosing Manager A. Coefficients on wage-gap terms are scaled to a $100 change; age is scaled to 10 years, work experience to 5 years, and manager aspiration to 10 percentage points. HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

D Additional Main-Result and WTP Analyses

The appendix next reports the preregistered race–nationality component comparisons, a descriptive pooled Local Black estimate, and the parametric logit summary underlying the smooth demand curves. These results follow the order of the main results section and are not used to replace the preregistered pairwise LPM estimates.

Table A5: Race–Nationality Component Comparisons

Quantity	Estimate	s.e.	p	Holm-adjusted p
$\text{WTP}_{LocalBl/ForeignBl} - \text{WTP}_{ForeignBl/ForeignWh}$	-6.6	14.8	0.672^a	0.672
Additivity residual R	+23.1	17.5	0.187^b	0.374

Notes: The first row tests whether the nationality component exceeds the race component; [a]the displayed value is the one-sided large-sample p-value implied by the reported estimate and standard error. The second row tests $R = \text{WTP}_{LocalBlack/ForeignWhite} - \text{WTP}_{LocalBlack/ForeignBlack} - \text{WTP}_{ForeignBlack/ForeignWhite} = 0$; [b]the p-value is two-sided. Holm adjustment is applied across these two planned comparisons. The analysis plan specified a 500-rep joint bootstrap; the final submission should report those exact bootstrap values if they differ from the current large-sample calculations.

E Salary-Expectation Robustness

Table A6: Salary-Expectation Robustness to Upper-Tail Restrictions

	Expected A	Expected B	B − A (s.e.), p
Both manager-specific expectations $\leq \$5,000$			
Local Black/Foreign White ($N = 549$)	714.1	728.3	+14.1 (7.3), $p = 0.055$
Local Black/Foreign Black ($N = 589$)	690.5	698.9	+8.4 (5.4), $p = 0.119$
Foreign Black/Foreign White ($N = 584$)	695.2	688.0	-7.2 (6.2), $p = 0.245$
Both manager-specific expectations $\leq \$2,000$			
Local Black/Foreign White ($N = 531$)	647.0	653.1	+6.1 (4.9), $p = 0.216$
Local Black/Foreign Black ($N = 580$)	657.4	663.7	+6.3 (5.2), $p = 0.223$
Foreign Black/Foreign White ($N = 572$)	642.2	643.6	+1.4 (4.3), $p = 0.744$
Both manager-specific expectations $\leq \$1,500$			
Local Black/Foreign White ($N = 513$)	608.6	611.1	+2.5 (4.1), $p = 0.535$
Local Black/Foreign Black ($N = 560$)	614.1	621.6	+7.4 (4.7), $p = 0.113$
Foreign Black/Foreign White ($N = 551$)	596.1	597.5	+1.4 (4.0), $p = 0.730$
Both manager-specific expectations $\leq \$1,000$			
Local Black/Foreign White ($N = 462$)	532.1	531.9	-0.2 (3.0), $p = 0.950$
Local Black/Foreign Black ($N = 512$)	548.0	555.2	+7.2 (2.8), $p = 0.009$
Foreign Black/Foreign White ($N = 504$)	532.8	529.9	-3.0 (3.0), $p = 0.326$

Notes: The preferred salary-belief analysis uses the \$5,000 cap because larger reports are implausible in the job context. Lower caps are sensitivity checks rather than alternative preferred samples. The unrestricted all-report means are reported in the replication audit because a handful of coding/entry errors make them economically uninformative.

F Heterogeneity and Sorting Robustness

The tables in this section follow the heterogeneity discussion in the main text. We first report the full controlled specification for the focal BA+/high-expectation group, followed by the pre-profile labor-market-strength robustness. We then report the separate education, expected-salary, and manager-aspiration specifications and the stricter fully interacted bachelor-by-high-salary sensitivity test. All heterogeneity analyses remain exploratory.

Table A7: Full Controlled Heterogeneity: BA+ and Expected Salary Above $570

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Constant	+0.734***	+0.485***	+0.535***
	(0.172)	(0.131)	(0.134)
Wage gap, per $100	+0.169***	+0.119***	+0.142***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)
BA+ and expected salary > $570	-0.084*	+0.038	-0.108**
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)
Wage gap × Focal group, per $100	+0.162***	+0.245***	+0.182***
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Age (10 years)	-0.057	+0.007	-0.022
	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Female	-0.081*	-0.033	+0.009
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Married	+0.033	+0.038	+0.009
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Lives in Ouest	+0.030	+0.099**	-0.111**
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Work experience (5 years)	+0.014	-0.032	-0.006
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Fluent English	-0.072	+0.028	-0.137
	(0.079)	(0.071)	(0.090)
Fluent French	-0.061	+0.062	+0.045
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Statistical-software ability	-0.051	-0.057	+0.010
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Software response missing	+0.015	-0.008	-0.122
	(0.263)	(0.168)	(0.200)
Prior NGO experience	+0.042	-0.021	+0.029
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Manager aspiration (10 pp)	-0.004	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Field: business/econ/law/admin	+0.032	-0.079	-0.027
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	+0.008	-0.036	-0.009
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	-0.082	-0.026	+0.017
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Field: health/social services	-0.092	-0.051	-0.005
	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.101)
Job priority: advancement	+0.061	-0.037	+0.086*
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Job priority: prestige/status	-0.062	+0.003	+0.014
	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.095)
Observations	549	589	584

Notes: This is the preferred controlled specification corresponding to main-text Panel C. Coefficients on wage-gap terms are scaled to a $100 change; age is scaled to 10 years, work experience to 5 years, and manager aspiration to 10 percentage points. HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Robustness: Sorting by Pre-Profile Labor-Market Strength

	Local Black/ Foreign White	Local Black/ Foreign Black	Foreign Black/ Foreign White
Panel A. Choice at equal pay			
Equal-pay choice, low / high baseline strength (%)	54.4 / 47.1	54.0 / 50.4	55.3 / 46.7
Equal-pay difference, high minus low (pp)	-7.2 [-15.1, +0.6]	-3.6 [-11.4, +4.3]	-8.6 [-16.4, -0.8]
p-value	0.071	0.372	0.031
Panel B. Compensating differentials			
Compensating differential, low / high ($/month)	-22.6 / +11.6	-39.0 / -1.6	-32.5 / +13.5
Difference in compensating differential ($/month)	+34.2 [-3.3, +71.8]	+37.4 [-29.1, +103.9]	+46.0 [+2.6, +89.4]
p-value	0.074	0.271	0.038
Panel C. Responsiveness to randomized relative wages			
Effect of a $57 relative-wage increase, low / high (pp)	11.0 / 14.1	5.9 / 15.7	9.3 / 14.0
Difference in price responsiveness (pp)	+3.1 [-1.7, +7.8]	+9.9 [+5.1, +14.7]	+4.7 [-0.3, +9.7]
p-value	0.204	<0.001	0.065
Observations	528	554	553

Notes: This robustness analysis constructs a labor-market-strength index using eight components are standard education rank, years of work experience, English proficiency, French proficiency, statistical-software proficiency, prior international-firm experience, prior NGO experience, and an indicator for ever having been formally employed. Each component is standardized in the pooled complete-index sample, and the index is the equally weighted mean of the eight standardized components, $L_i = \frac{1}{8}\sum_{j=1}^{8}(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j)/s_j$. High baseline strength is defined mechanically as $\mathbf{1}\{L_i > \text{Median}(L)\}$. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals. Inference uses HC1 robust standard errors and delta-method inference for compensating differentials. This analysis is exploratory.

Table A9: Full Controlled Heterogeneity: Bachelor's Degree or Higher

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Constant	+0.686***	+0.474***	+0.564***
	(0.170)	(0.126)	(0.135)
Wage gap, per $100	+0.161***	+0.135***	+0.148***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Bachelor's degree or higher	-0.064	-0.025	-0.071*
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Wage gap × Bachelor+, per $100	+0.089**	+0.104**	+0.093**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Age (10 years)	-0.057	+0.009	-0.023
	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Female	-0.073*	-0.044	+0.013
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Married	+0.033	+0.038	+0.023
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Lives in Ouest	+0.042	+0.098**	-0.114***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Work experience (5 years)	+0.010	-0.033	-0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Fluent English	-0.075	+0.026	-0.155*
	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.090)
Fluent French	-0.056	+0.063	+0.048
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Statistical-software ability	-0.047	-0.042	+0.015
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Software response missing	+0.015	+0.000	-0.076
	(0.261)	(0.182)	(0.223)
Prior NGO experience	+0.048	-0.015	+0.008
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Manager aspiration (10 pp)	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Field: business/econ/law/admin	+0.051	-0.074	-0.039
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	+0.038	-0.019	-0.010
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	-0.059	-0.019	+0.022
	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Field: health/social services	-0.063	-0.024	+0.001
	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.103)
Job priority: advancement	+0.080	-0.033	+0.076
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Job priority: prestige/status	-0.055	+0.015	-0.016
	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.095)
Observations	556	591	589

Notes: HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Full Controlled Heterogeneity: Expected Salary Above $570

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Constant	+0.776***	+0.497***	+0.559***
	(0.166)	(0.127)	(0.133)
Wage gap, per $100	+0.133***	+0.068**	+0.087***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Expected salary > $570	-0.057	+0.039	-0.041
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Wage gap × High salary, per $100	+0.169***	+0.243***	+0.231***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Age (10 years)	-0.054	-0.004	-0.024
	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Female	-0.074*	-0.042	+0.021
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Married	+0.012	+0.054	-0.002
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Lives in Ouest	+0.030	+0.102**	-0.106**
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Work experience (5 years)	+0.019	-0.033	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Fluent English	-0.064	+0.037	-0.135
	(0.079)	(0.070)	(0.089)
Fluent French	-0.066	+0.072*	+0.035
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Statistical-software ability	-0.063	-0.067	+0.001
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Software response missing	-0.027	-0.001	-0.094
	(0.241)	(0.155)	(0.185)
Prior NGO experience	+0.028	-0.023	+0.012
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Manager aspiration (10 pp)	-0.006	-0.001	+0.001
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Field: business/econ/law/admin	+0.023	-0.080	-0.055
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.058)
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	-0.003	-0.041	-0.048
	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.062)
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	-0.095	-0.037	-0.007
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.067)
Field: health/social services	-0.107	-0.053	-0.040
	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.100)
Job priority: advancement	+0.054	-0.037	+0.078
	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Job priority: prestige/status	-0.060	+0.023	+0.000
	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.095)
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Observations	549	589	584

Notes: Age is scaled to 10 years, work experience to 5 years, and manager aspiration to 10 percentage points. HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Full Controlled Heterogeneity: Manager Aspiration Above 50 Percent

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Constant	+0.706***	+0.508***	+0.616***
	(0.167)	(0.122)	(0.130)
Wage gap, per $100	+0.252***	+0.089	+0.188***
	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.062)
Manager aspiration > 50	-0.048	-0.043	-0.055
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Wage gap × aspiration > 50, per $100	-0.048	+0.107	+0.007
	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.067)
Age (10 years)	-0.055	+0.002	-0.027
	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Female	-0.072	-0.051	+0.013
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Bachelor's degree or higher	-0.061	-0.021	-0.067
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Married	+0.026	+0.047	+0.024
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Lives in Ouest	+0.037	+0.102**	-0.124***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Work experience (5 years)	+0.010	-0.034	-0.011
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Fluent English	-0.075	+0.024	-0.158*
	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.090)
Fluent French	-0.058	+0.065	+0.048
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Statistical-software ability	-0.053	-0.041	+0.027
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Software response missing	-0.015	+0.025	-0.058
	(0.260)	(0.182)	(0.211)
Prior NGO experience	+0.043	-0.018	+0.003
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Field: business/econ/law/admin	+0.048	-0.068	-0.038
	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	+0.034	-0.015	-0.012
	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	-0.069	-0.020	+0.018
	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Field: health/social services	-0.067	-0.032	+0.006
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.100)
Job priority: advancement	+0.083*	-0.031	+0.068
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Job priority: prestige/status	-0.044	+0.032	-0.038
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.095)
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Observations	556	591	589

Notes: The moderator equals one when the applicant reports a probability strictly above 50 percent of becoming a manager within five years; 50 and below are the reference group. Coefficients on wage-gap terms are scaled to a $100 change; age to 10 years and work experience to 5 years. HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

Table A12: Full Four-Group Controlled Interaction: Bachelor Status and Expected Salary

	Local Black vs. Foreign White	Local Black vs. Foreign Black	Foreign Black vs. Foreign White
Constant	+0.744***	+0.505***	+0.524***
	(0.171)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Wage gap, per $100	+0.102**	+0.064	+0.049
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Bachelor's degree or higher	-0.043	-0.033	-0.002
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Expected salary > $570	-0.038	+0.020	+0.027
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Wage gap × Bachelor+, per $100	+0.062	+0.013	+0.089
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)
Wage gap × High salary, per $100	+0.154**	+0.183***	+0.252***
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.064)
Bachelor+ × High salary	-0.028	+0.053	-0.123
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Wage gap × Bachelor+ × High salary, per $100	+0.013	+0.105	-0.065
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.089)
Age (10 years)	-0.053	-0.001	-0.024
	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Female	-0.078*	-0.037	+0.008
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Married	+0.019	+0.045	+0.008
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Lives in Ouest	+0.030	+0.098**	-0.101**
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Work experience (5 years)	+0.019	-0.031	-0.004
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Fluent English	-0.071	+0.036	-0.131
	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.089)
Fluent French	-0.058	+0.072*	+0.041
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Statistical-software ability	-0.053	-0.066	-0.001
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Software response missing	-0.019	-0.008	-0.119
	(0.245)	(0.154)	(0.204)
Prior NGO experience	+0.041	-0.025	+0.024
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Manager aspiration (10 pp)	-0.004	-0.001	+0.003
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Field: business/econ/law/admin	+0.035	-0.077	-0.047
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.058)
Field: agriculture/engineering/science	+0.016	-0.037	-0.029
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.063)
Field: education/humanities/social sciences	-0.077	-0.033	+0.010
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.067)
Field: health/social services	-0.089	-0.055	-0.023
	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.102)
Job priority: advancement	+0.058	-0.041	+0.086*
	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Job priority: prestige/status	-0.074	+0.012	+0.008
	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.093)
Observations	549	589	584

Notes: The sample excludes either manager-specific salary expectation above $5,000. The model includes the full bachelor-by-high-salary-by-wage interaction. Coefficients on wage-gap terms are scaled to a $100 change; age is scaled to 10 years, work experience to 5 years, and manager aspiration to 10 percentage points. HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A13: Additional Binary Heterogeneity: Preferred Controlled Results, Local Black/Foreign White

Moderator	Equal-pay ref. (%)	Equal-pay higher (%)	Difference pp (p)	WTP ref.	WTP higher	WTP contrast (p)
Female	53.7	46.5	-7.2 (0.105)	-20.8	+13.4	+34.2 (0.106)
Married	50.0	52.9	+2.9 (0.593)	-0.2	-12.6	-12.4 (0.609)
Lives in Ouest	48.4	51.9	+3.6 (0.422)	+7.0	-9.9	-16.9 (0.412)
Prior NGO experience	48.9	53.2	+4.3 (0.353)	+5.3	-15.1	-20.4 (0.366)
Fluent English	51.2	43.2	-8.0 (0.312)	-5.7	+25.2	+30.8 (0.322)
Fluent French	54.4	48.6	-5.8 (0.186)	-27.8	+6.0	+33.8 (0.190)
Statistical-software ability	54.8	49.4	-5.4 (0.263)	-22.5	+2.8	+25.3 (0.272)
Professional advancement top priority	44.1	53.1	+9.0 (0.050)	+34.9	-14.0	-48.9 (0.077)
Prestige/status top priority	51.2	40.4	-10.8 (0.237)	-5.8	+43.1	+48.9 (0.261)

Notes: For every binary moderator, the model estimates a group-specific equal-pay intercept and wage slope. "Higher" is the category named in the first column (e.g., female = 1, married = 1, Ouest = 1). The WTP contrast is the higher group minus the reference group.

Table A14: Additional Binary Heterogeneity: Preferred Controlled Results, Local Black/Foreign Black

Moderator	Equal-pay ref. (%)	Equal-pay higher (%)	Difference pp (p)	WTP ref.	WTP higher	WTP contrast (p)
Female	55.1	49.8	-5.3 (0.210)	-31.7	+1.0	+32.8 (0.168)
Married	51.9	56.7	+4.7 (0.363)	-12.0	-26.4	-14.3 (0.557)
Lives in Ouest	46.1	56.2	+10.1 (0.023)	+19.4	-35.7	-55.1 (0.024)
Prior NGO experience	54.0	52.1	-1.9 (0.655)	-29.6	-8.9	+20.7 (0.429)
Fluent English	52.9	57.2	+4.3 (0.535)	-16.3	-27.2	-10.9 (0.692)
Fluent French	49.1	55.1	+6.0 (0.173)	+6.8	-24.5	-31.3 (0.291)
Statistical-software ability	57.2	52.1	-5.1 (0.283)	-66.2	-10.1	+56.1 (0.289)
Professional advancement top priority	55.4	51.8	-3.7 (0.395)	-41.2	-8.5	+32.7 (0.309)
Prestige/status top priority	52.8	58.7	+5.9 (0.537)	-14.8	-141.5	-126.6 (0.718)

Notes: For every binary moderator, the model estimates a group-specific equal-pay intercept and wage slope. "Higher" is the category named in the first column (e.g., female = 1, married = 1, Ouest = 1). The WTP contrast is the higher group minus the reference group.

Table A15: Additional Binary Heterogeneity: Preferred Controlled Results, Foreign Black/Foreign White

Moderator	Equal-pay ref. (%)	Equal-pay higher (%)	Difference pp (p)	WTP ref.	WTP higher	WTP contrast (p)
Female	51.5	52.5	+1.0 (0.809)	-9.0	-10.4	-1.4 (0.947)
Married	51.3	54.5	+3.2 (0.544)	-7.2	-19.7	-12.6 (0.606)
Lives in Ouest	60.5	48.4	-12.1 (0.006)	-52.7	+8.3	+61.0 (0.017)
Prior NGO experience	51.8	52.2	+0.4 (0.928)	-10.7	-9.2	+1.5 (0.945)
Fluent English	52.9	37.3	-15.6 (0.073)	-14.1	+178.9	+193.0 (0.447)
Fluent French	48.9	53.6	+4.7 (0.263)	+6.1	-17.8	-23.9 (0.297)
Statistical-software ability	50.3	52.5	+2.1 (0.642)	-1.6	-12.9	-11.3 (0.628)
Professional advancement top priority	46.7	54.0	+7.4 (0.092)	+20.1	-19.6	-39.6 (0.119)
Prestige/status top priority	52.4	41.5	-11.0 (0.230)	-12.3	+114.6	+126.8 (0.595)

Notes: For every binary moderator, the model estimates a group-specific equal-pay intercept and wage slope. "Higher" is the category named in the first column (e.g., female = 1, married = 1, Ouest = 1). The WTP contrast is the higher group minus the reference group.

G Continuous Heterogeneity by Manager Aspiration

The main text uses the author-specified split of greater than 50 percent versus 50 percent or below. As a complementary appendix specification, this section uses the original 0–100 measure continuously. The moderator is divided by 10, so the coefficients below correspond to a 10-percentage-point increase in managerial aspirations.

Table A16: Continuous Heterogeneity by Expected Probability of Becoming a Manager

	Local Black/Foreign White	Local Black/Foreign Black	Foreign Black/Foreign White
Equal-pay gradient, no controls (pp)	-0.36	-0.30	-0.21
p-value	0.680	0.718	0.788
Equal-pay gradient, preferred controls (pp)	-0.53	-0.32	-0.23
p-value	0.553	0.698	0.764
Change in response to +$100 wage gap (pp)	+0.82	+2.09	+0.91
p-value	0.387	0.027	0.309

Notes: Controlled regressions include the preferred baseline/design controls with manager aspiration itself removed from the auxiliary control list. The wage-response row reports how the effect of a $100 increase in Manager A's wage changes when aspiration rises by 10 percentage points. HC1 robust inference. This analysis is exploratory.

H Full Robustness Results

Table A17: Full Robustness Results: WTP, Robust Standard Error, and Observations

Specification	Local Black/Foreign White	Local Black/Foreign Black	Foreign Black/Foreign White
Primary first choice	-3.3 (9.3); 556	-16.5 (10.9); 591	-9.9 (10.1); 589
Completed applications	-7.1 (10.0); 508	-13.0 (11.0); 545	-12.5 (10.2); 540
All choice submissions	-6.6 (7.4); 716	-12.6 (8.4); 764	-5.1 (8.8); 742
Single choice record	+0.4 (10.0); 436	-18.9 (14.6); 461	-1.9 (13.5); 447
Choice on first valid application	-3.6 (9.7); 543	-17.6 (11.5); 567	-10.7 (10.1); 566
No prior wage reveal	-3.1 (9.4); 553	-15.4 (10.7); 586	-9.6 (10.1); 586
Email-only deduplication	-4.6 (9.5); 547	-17.0 (11.1); 587	-11.6 (10.3); 580
Last observed choice	-3.9 (7.8); 561	-10.7 (10.2); 599	+2.8 (11.3); 576
Exclude equal-wage cell	-9.5 (9.6); 517	-20.9 (11.3); 558	-8.8 (10.4); 547
Large gaps $\lvert\Delta w\rvert \geq 80$	+4.4 (12.5); 306	-21.9 (15.7); 331	-11.4 (14.4); 313
Clean salary-expectation sample	-4.1 (9.1); 549	-16.3 (10.9); 589	-11.0 (10.2); 584
Logit	-3.7 (9.9); 556	-17.4 (11.2); 591	-10.3 (10.5); 589
Probit	-3.4 (9.8); 556	-17.4 (11.2); 591	-10.3 (10.5); 589

Notes: Cells report WTP in dollars per month (robust s.e.); N. LPM single-record specifications use HC1 robust inference. The all-choice-submission specification clusters by applicant. Logit and probit rows report the implied median WTP. The clean salary-expectation sample only changes the sample and does not condition the choice regression on expected salary.