Can Religion Bridge Ethnic Divides?

How Pastors in DRC Promote Collective Action Where Chiefs Cannot

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Abstract

Ethnic fragmentation is thought to undermine economic development. In one prominent mechanism, greater free-riding in heterogeneous societies erodes the provision of local public goods. This paper examines whether traditional and religious leaders can sustain cooperation in a voluntary public-works program in an ethnically diverse city in DRC. Residents are randomly assigned to ethnically homogeneous or mixed work teams that either include a chief, a religious leader, or no leader at all. Chiefs raise participation by 4.8 percentage points in homogeneous teams and have no detectable effect in mixed ones; pastors raise participation by 6.3 points in mixed teams and have no detectable effect in homogeneous ones, a 9.6-point reversal in their relative advantage ($p = 0.023$). A cross-randomized disclosure intervention helps identify distinct enforcement strategies. Chiefs are effective only when each resident's own contribution is visible to teammates, consistent with social sanctioning. Pastors, by contrast, are effective only when the team record only reports aggregate contributions, consistent with internal incentives governed by a fear of divine oversight. The paper provides the first experimental evidence on when religious leaders can substitute for customary authority in sustaining voluntary public-goods provision in fragmented societies.

1 Introduction

Ethnically diverse societies have slower economic growth and worse public goods than homogeneous ones (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). One important channel, particularly in Africa, is the failure of voluntary provision: local public goods depend on contributions of labor, money, and materials made outside the formal tax system (Olken and Singhal, 2011). Voluntary contributions are lower in diverse communities because they cannot enforce social sanctions to increase the cost of free-riding (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007). In principle, local leaders could solve this enforcement problem (Ostrom, 1990; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015). But the authority of chiefs — the leaders best placed to do so — is also ethnically bounded (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Baldwin, 2016). Who, then, can bridge ethnic divides?

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Religious leaders are natural candidates. Sub-Saharan Africa is now home to more Christians than any other region of the world, and religious leaders play important social roles — from conflict resolution to job training to service provision. Religious leaders also differ from chiefs in two crucial ways. First, their scope of authority extends beyond the ethnic group (McCauley, 2014), and past work has documented a correlation between moralizing religions and cooperation (Henrich et al., 2010). Second, rather than relying on social sanctions, religious leaders can promote internal incentives (fear of divine punishment) that do not require an audience of peers (Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007). Yet research on whether religious leaders can promote cooperation in divided societies is scarce.

Drawing on a voluntary public-works program in Kananga, Democratic Republic of the Congo, this paper presents experimental evidence that religious leaders can sustain collective action beyond the ethnic limits of customary authority. Ethnic fragmentation does not always harm cooperation; it changes who can sustain it.

In Kananga, and in the DRC more broadly, local public-good provision has a concrete institutional form. Public maintenance is organized through *salongo*, a community-labor institution used to repair roads, clear drainage, remove waste, and protect neighborhoods from erosion. Local chiefs coordinate participation in such activities through customary authority and dense social ties (Balán et al., 2022). Yet the Kamuina Nsapu conflict (2016–2019) recently disrupted this equilibrium by displacing 1.4 million people and killing several thousand. The war drove many villagers into Kananga, where their arrival weakened the link between where people lived and their customary networks, potentially making salongo harder for chiefs to organize (Stearns, 2018; Corps, 2019). Amid this instability in customary authority, Kananga's religious institutions remained strikingly stable and vibrant. Churches are widespread neighborhood institutions whose congregations often cut across origins and customary jurisdictions, and where leaders frame community service as a moral obligation governed by divine oversight and judgment (Kapepula et al., 2022; Ngoma Mavungu et al., 2025). This contrast makes Kananga a natural setting to ask whether religious leaders can sustain cooperation where customary authority is weakened by ethnic mixing.

We partnered with the Kananga City Administration during an effort to encourage greater citizen participation in salongo. As part of this campaign, the City introduced a contribution-tracking system and organized teams of voluntary residents to carry out public maintenance over several weeks. We worked with the City to implement the program and embedded an experiment within it. The main experimental variation randomly assigned teams to include an urban chief, a religious leader, or no leader. Two additional randomized features varied the environment in which these leaders operated. First, teams were composed either of residents from the same ethno-territorial community as the chief or of residents drawn from different origins, allowing us to study leaders' *scope of authority* across social groups. Second, we varied what teammates learned about individual participation.[1] Teams' meeting sheets disclosed either each member's participation or only the team's

[1]Although residents were part of small teams, they could contribute at different times and work sites, leaving teammates with incomplete knowledge of one another's efforts.

aggregate contribution. This variation targeted leaders' *source of enforcement*, separating external incentives through reputation and social sanctions from internal incentives through the fear of divine oversight.

We first test whether leaders' effectiveness depends on the composition of their team. The experiment reveals that changes in ethnic composition affect which leader can mobilize collective action. The presence of a chief in the group increases participation by 4.8 percentage points in homogeneous groups (SE = 2.9, $p = 0.099$) and by 0.7 points (SE = 2.9, $p = 0.800$) in mixed groups. The presence of a pastor produces the opposite pattern, with participation rising by 6.3 points (SE = 2.9, $p = 0.033$) in mixed groups and by 0.8 points (SE = 2.5, $p = 0.742$) in homogeneous groups. The advantage of chiefs over pastors consequently changes by 9.6 percentage points (SE = 4.2, $p = 0.023$) once we move from homogeneous to mixed composition. Similar no-leader participation across team types provides little evidence that baseline cooperation explains the result. This reversal across compositions is consistent with an account in which each leader relies on a different *scope of authority*. Chiefs are effective when team composition aligns with their ethnic authority, while pastors are effective when mixed composition weakens that basis of authority and leaves room for a religious frame of obligation.

We then investigate how public accountability affects leaders' capacity to promote participation. We find that chiefs' positive impacts in homogeneous teams are concentrated when we made individual participation visible — where the group falls within their authority *and* they can judge individual behavior. Under those conditions, chiefs raise participation by 10.0 percentage points (SE = 3.6, $p = 0.006$). Without the disclosure of individual participation, chiefs have no statistically significant effect, even in homogeneous teams, and they remain ineffective in mixed teams regardless of visibility. Pastors display the opposite pattern. In mixed teams, their presence raises contributions only in teams where individual participation has not been disclosed. When compared to teams without a leader under the same mixed-no-disclosure condition, the pastor's presence increases participation by 9.2 percentage points (SE = 4.0, $p = 0.021$). In mixed teams where individual behavior is made public, the same comparison falls toward zero, contrary to what a peer-enforcement account would predict. The lack of a positive response is consistent with pastors working through a universal language that triggers religious self-evaluation, a different *source of enforcement*. After being exposed to the pastor's influence, residents may begin to treat participation as evidence that they have honored a moral obligation before God.

We next examine the evidence behind these interpretations. Do chiefs indeed sustain participation through coethnic social obligations, while pastors do so through religious self-evaluation that cuts across ethnic boundaries? After ruling out several simpler accounts of the effects, including the possibility that leaders exerted different efforts with different teams of participants, we examine three complementary pieces of evidence for this account. First, we study the different topics that teams discuss during meetings. A treatment-blind text classification model groups speeches into three different categories: calls for attendance and better group performance, requests for material support, and appeals linking divine oversight to solidarity and community

work. Unprompted leaders speak substantially more than ordinary participants, and pastors speak more than chiefs. Chiefs emphasize attendance and request material support most of the time, while pastors focus on speeches associating divine rewards with solidarity and community work. We find that their style is stable throughout experimental conditions, and what differs is how much they influence the discussion. Leaders shape the agenda of the meeting, but only in the composition-by-disclosure conditions where leaders would later sustain higher resident participation.

Having shown that pastors invoke divine accountability while chiefs appeal to social obligations during team meetings, we next turn to heterogeneous treatment effects to examine when their appeals work. If the main pattern reflects different scopes of authority, treatment effects should be strongest when leaders possess the traits associated with that form of authority and residents recognize it. We test this using two leader characteristics collected before the intervention. The first is the local embeddedness of the leader, measured by how long he has lived in the neighborhood; the second captures leaders' own conviction that God monitors and morally evaluates individual behavior. Chiefs with longer tenure are substantially more effective in homogeneous groups, while years living in the neighborhood do not strengthen pastor effects. Conversely, pastors with stronger beliefs in divine moral enforcement are more effective in mixed groups without disclosure, while the same beliefs do not predict chiefs' effectiveness. We find similar patterns in how the audience responds. Chiefs become effective in mixed groups among residents who recognize their secular authority or evaluate them favorably, but these traits do not predict responsiveness to pastors. In contrast, pastor effects are concentrated among intrinsically religious residents, and intrinsic religiosity does not predict responsiveness to chiefs. Together, these results show that a leader's scope of authority is bounded by leaders' relevant traits and by who recognizes that form of authority.

We then turn from the scope of authority to its source of enforcement and discuss a third piece of evidence supporting the main interpretation. If chiefs raise the reputational cost of shirking, their effects should be strongest among prior *nonparticipants* when disclosure exposes their lack of contribution. Conversely, if pastors work through internal accountability before God, their effects should depend less on prior participation and extend to already engaged residents. The data align with these predictions. Disclosure allows chiefs to draw prior nonparticipants into salongo, while pastors without disclosure generate similar effects across prior participation types. The decomposition also helps explain why pastors' effects disappear under disclosure. Without disclosure, pastors induce already engaged residents to contribute more; once individual behavior becomes public, disclosure itself raises participation among these residents, and pastors add little beyond the effect of disclosure itself. The aggregate null under disclosure masks substitution between two sources of accountability rather than an inability of pastors to motivate participation.

Lastly, we turn to whether sustained collective action has reshaped social and political attitudes. We investigate three sets of outcomes: identity and general beliefs about cooperation and accountability, opinions about group members, and views about government and other local institutions. Additional participation

produces no common shift in beliefs about social or divine accountability, the salience of religious and social identities, or views of the state and other authorities. The clearest effects arise from how sustained cooperation reshapes attitudes towards others in the group. Residents become more willing to help one another, while their broader assessments of peers remain unchanged. Pastor influence over sustained cooperation also improves the pastor's own standing, whereas chief influence does not. The asymmetry is consistent with their initial positions since chiefs are already established in homogeneous groups, while pastors enter mixed groups without the same preexisting social standing and earn it after successfully sustaining cooperation. Therefore, sustained religious mobilization can leave divided groups more cohesive than before. But the bridge is not neutral: the leaders who build it may emerge with greater authority.

As far as we are aware, this is the first field experiment to show that ethnic fragmentation changes which local leaders can sustain collective action. Chiefs are effective when cooperation is organized within ethnic communities and individual participation is publicly visible. Pastors are effective when cooperation crosses ethnic boundaries and individual participation is less visible. Without a leader, participation is similar across these conditions. Fragmentation, therefore, does not always harm cooperation. It changes which forms of authority can sustain it.

1.1 Related literature

This finding contributes to a large literature documenting lower growth, civic participation, and public-good provision in more fragmented settings (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Glennerster et al., 2013)[2]. Research on governing the commons identifies shared rules, local monitoring, and informal sanctions as foundations of cooperation outside formal enforcement (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990, 2000; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015). These studies argue that fragmentation can reduce cooperation by harming the social ties and shared expectations that sustain informal enforcement. Our results change the focus from whether fragmentation hinders collective action to which institutions can sustain it in fragmented societies. In doing so, it complements research showing that cross-cutting identities can reduce ethnic divisions by shifting the social boundaries around which behavior is organized (Miguel, 2004; Posner, 2004; Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Dunning and Harrison, 2010; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013; Blouin and Mukand, 2019; Bazzi et al., 2019; Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020)[3].

Second, the paper studies how two forms of accountability can sustain cooperation. Social-image models make behavior responsive to how others judge it (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Schram and Charness, 2015; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017), while models of identity

[2]Beyond public-good provision, another strand of research studies how ethnic and religious divisions shape discrimination and productivity within firms and organizations (Hjort, 2014; Marx et al., 2021; Ghosh, 2025).

[3]A related literature tests whether intergroup contact can weaken social divisions (Scacco and Warren, 2018; Rao, 2019; Mousa, 2020; Lowe, 2021; Ghosh et al., 2026). Its findings emphasize that the effects of contact depend on how interaction is structured and often extend only weakly beyond those directly encountered (Lowe, 2025).

and self-image make behavior responsive to what one's actions reveal about oneself (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006, 2011; Dal Bó and Terviö, 2013; Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014; Grossman, 2015; Bénabou and Tirole, 2016). These two channels fit the authorities we study. Traditional authority can make behavior consequential through social observation, while religious authority can also matter when others are not watching. Religious institutions both embed believers in communities that monitor conduct and invoke divine monitoring of private actions (Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2000; Auriol et al., 2020; Johnson, 2005; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Norenzayan, 2013; Purzycki et al., 2016; Lang et al., 2019; Lowes et al., 2026a). Field experiments show that religious authority and messages affect behavior through religious beliefs and social norms, but they do not experimentally separate these channels (Bryan et al., 2021; Buccione, 2023). We do so by cross-randomizing religious and traditional leadership with the disclosure of individual participation, allowing us to test whether the two forms of authority rely differently on public and internal *sources of enforcement*. Our findings support the view that religious authority can sustain cooperation even when others are not watching, while chiefs rely more on social enforcement.

Third, we contribute to research on leadership and informal governance. Existing work studies how leaders coordinate, communicate, set examples, sanction free-riding, and shape expectations (Hermalin, 1998, 2012; Caillaud and Tirole, 2007; Dewan and Myatt, 2008; Bolton et al., 2013; Jack and Recalde, 2015; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015; Antonakis et al., 2022; Bhalotra et al., 2023; Boudreau et al., 2025). Related work examines who becomes a leader and how leader identity shapes political outcomes (Besley, 2005; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Jones and Olken, 2005; Dal Bó et al., 2017), while research on informal governance studies how traditional authorities contribute to public-good provision and state capacity (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Baldwin, 2016; Baldwin et al., 2025; Balán et al., 2022; Henn and Tanutama, 2023; Lowes et al., 2026b). Closely related to our contribution, social identity theories of leadership argue that leaders are more effective when they are perceived as members of the group; yet, accounts are largely correlational or constrained to lab settings (Hogg, 2001; Van Knippenberg and Hogg, 2003; Steffens et al., 2021; Drouvelis and Nosenzo, 2013; Roy and Houser, 2024). We study a field experiment in which we hold the public-good activity and current neighborhood fixed and vary whether participants share the chief's territory of origin. This identifies the reach of authority across social boundaries within a fixed neighborhood, which we call the leader's *scope of authority*. Observed participation reveals that chiefs mobilize within their ethno-territorial constituency, while pastors carry authority across territorial-origin boundaries.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting, and Section 3 the experimental design. Section 4 presents the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 examines leaders' appeals, the audiences they reach, and the changes accompanying mobilization. Section 6 concludes.

2 Context

The Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the world's most populous countries and also one of the poorest. Kananga, the capital of Kasaï-Central Province and the setting for this study, is a city of roughly one to two million inhabitants. It is governed in a low-capacity fiscal environment. Roads are degraded, constant tropical storms cause severe erosion problems, and access to basic urban services such as electricity, piped water, and sanitation is low. The local administration is responsible for many of these services, but the lack of institutional capacity prevents it from doing so. The setting is one of weak fiscal capacity, underprovided public goods, and a heavy reliance on local authorities to mobilize residents directly (Balán et al., 2022).

Salongo, City Governance and Traditional Authority. The principal institution through which this direct mobilization occurs is *salongo*. Under Mobutu, salongo was formalized as obligatory civic labor and became part of a broader effort to mobilize local labor for public works (Callaghy, 1984; Robinson, 2023). Recent evidence shows that households are still regularly asked to contribute salongo to neighborhood upkeeping projects throughout the country, with participation organized by local authorities and sustained through social pressure, civic obligation, and repeated local interaction (van den Boogaard et al., 2026). In Kananga, salongo remains part of everyday life, and many times it is the only solution residents have for waste management, road maintenance, public space cleaning, and, most urgently, anti-erosion works.[4]

Salongo operates through a local governance hierarchy. In statutory terms, the relevant urban unit is the *quartier*. The city is divided into communes, communes into quartiers, and quartiers into avenues and streets. The *chef de quartier* is the formal neighborhood authority responsible for administrative supervision of the population, hygiene, and public sanitation. In practice, state reach relies on two lower layers of authority. The first is the *point-focaux*, or *chef de localité*, which effectively serves as a focal point for the neighborhood chief.[5] *Point-focaux* transmit instructions from the quartier administration, help identify feasible work sites, and organize the maintenance efforts across several avenue chiefs. They are implementation intermediaries. The second is the *chef d'avenue*, or avenue-level notable, who is the household-facing authority. He is closer to residents than the *chef de quartier* and the *point-focal*.

The traditional-leader treatment focuses on the *chef d'avenue*, the level of chief authority that is closest to the resident population. Two features of their status matter for the experiment. The first is their ethno-territorial scope. The chief is better understood as a respected resident whose authority is anchored in a local ethno-territorial social order, so it should be strongest over residents who recognize him as speaking from

[4]The policy relevance of these tasks is visible in the World Bank's Kananga Emergency Urban Resilience Project (World Bank, 2022), which focuses on gully erosion, drainage, and climate-resilient urban planning. Reports emphasize that the constraint is partly organizational since neighborhood erosion-prevention committees have been established across Kananga; yet, community participation remains below target.

[5]The *localité* appeared as a lower subdivision under the 1982 territorial organization (République du Zaïre, 1982), but is absent from the current 2008–2010 framework, which organizes urban communes into quartiers and/or incorporated groupements and lists territoire, quartier, groupement, and village as deconcentrated entities (République Démocratique du Congo, 2008, 2010). In Kananga, the category remains a relevant de facto administrative scale.

within their own origin community. The second is their social source of enforcement. Given chiefs' standing and embeddedness in the local context, we expect their mobilization capacity to operate through reputational channels.[6] The treatment tests whether chiefly authority can make salongo socially binding, and whether its force declines when the mobilized group falls outside their ethnic scope.

Fragmentation. An initial assessment of Kananga's ethnic landscape may wrongly infer a homogeneous environment. The city is largely Tshiluba-speaking, and most residents are linked to the Lulua umbrella identity. However, this broad classification contains important internal divisions. It consolidated from smaller kin, territorial, and chiefly units in the Kasai during the colonial period. Belgian recognition of the Kalamba lineage as Lulua sovereign led to power struggles between central and peripheral clans that remain unresolved (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Stearns, 2018). Because this umbrella identity would flatten most residents into a single group, we define ethno-territorial identity using the five administrative territories of Kasaï-Central (Demba, Dibaya, Dimbelenge, Kazumba, and Luiza), together with Kananga city[7]. The formal administrative units help identify variations in local identity, kin networks, and settlement histories. Given the informal nature of salongo mobilization by local chiefs, whose authority depends on the density of local networks, variations in neighborhood territorial fragmentation should help explain why salongo may have weak support in certain places while succeeding in others.

Descriptive evidence collected in this study corroborates the hypothesis that fragmentation complicates local governance around salongo activities. Using participants' stated territories of origin, we build a fractionalization index for each neighborhood and investigate how it relates to the perceived importance of salongo among local residents. Figure A-1 reveals that fragmentation weakens perceived salongo importance in the neighborhood through two margins: (i) residents from the majority territory in a given neighborhood see salongo as less important the more fragmented the neighborhood is; and (ii) residents from less represented territories see salongo as less important regardless of the neighborhood's fragmentation levels. A key part of our account is that this governance problem is tied to the territorial bounds of *the chef d'avenue's* authority. If traditional leaders indeed rely on an ethno-territorial scope of authority, their standing should be stronger among residents who share these territorial references and weaker among residents from different origins.

Conflict. Beyond historical fragmentation related to the consolidation of several groups under the broader Lulua identity, the Kamuina Nsapu conflict made these internal divisions especially salient. Beginning in 2016 as a dispute over customary authority in Dibaya, the conflict became a regional war after the state's refusal to recognize Jean-Prince Pandi as the successor to the Kamuina Nsapu chiefship. Stearns (2018) interprets

[6] Balán et al. (2022) characterize Kananga city chiefs as local notables nominated by neighborhood elders, typically because they are longstanding and respected residents, and then ratified by the state. They report indefinite and often lifelong tenure, rare deposition, some family transmission of the position, and status as its main return. They also show that chiefs possess household-level information and that this information helps explain their effects on tax compliance.

[7] Appendix Table A-1 locates the leaders' origins and religious denominations within the population from which experimental participants were recruited. Chiefs and pastors come from broadly the same origin territories as ordinary residents.

this episode as an instance of *dédoublement*, a broader strategy through which Congolese authorities weaken customary leaders viewed as sympathetic to the opposition by withholding recognition and supporting rival claimants, while locating this occurrence within the historical divisions of the Lulua umbrella ethnicity.[8] The war not only hardened those divisions due to clashes occurring in rural areas but also created chaos in the city of Kananga, which became a stage for hostilities: several killings took place in the city, while schools, health centers, homes, and public buildings were destroyed. It also became a new home for hundreds of thousands of displaced villagers who were unable or unwilling to return to their villages of origin.[9] Therefore, beyond the destruction and tensions left by the war and all the deaths caused by it, Kananga recently absorbed a violent re-sorting of people from different territories and customary histories (Corps, 2019). Residents who now live on the same street and share a communal task to maintain a drainage channel or to address erosion risk are now more likely to have arrived from different places of origin. The experiment focuses on the resulting mismatch between the chief's administrative neighborhood and the social networks through which his authority becomes relevant.

Religious Environment and Religious Authority. The DRC is overwhelmingly Christian, comprising 95% of the population, and is roughly divided between Catholics and broadly defined Protestants (Pew Research Center, 2011). The religious environment in Kananga roughly corresponds to these numbers, with the caveat that a broad protestant classification hides the rapidly shifting religious landscape where autonomous *Églises du Réveil* are taking over the space previously filled by Catholics and traditional Protestant churches (Kapepula et al., 2022). The gap left by a weak state creates a wide space for churches to mobilize welfare and collective goods. Institutional churches, Catholic and historic Protestant networks, occupy the organizationally dense pole of this field through schools, clinics, development projects, and social assistance.

Challenger denominations perform a more decentralized and entrepreneurial role. They provide support through offerings, prayer cells, mutual aid, emergency lending, pastoral counseling, healing, deliverance, and informal insurance against illness, unemployment, family conflict, and urban risk. This decentralized model relies on local mobilization with few large bureaucratic assets.[10] Appendix Table A-1 locates leaders' religious denominations within the population from which experimental participants were recruited. Religious leaders are concentrated in Pentecostal churches, and the experiment also includes pastors from Neo-Apostolic and Kimbanguist denominations. While chiefs and residents are distributed more broadly across the Christian spectrum, which encompasses Catholics and historic Protestant networks.[11]

[8]The Kamuina Nsapu lineage heads the Bajila Kasanga, the dominant group within the peripheral Lulua clans, which has long contested the Kalamba lineage and the political center around Kananga.

[9]Mercy Corps reports more than 3,300 direct conflict-related deaths and 1.4 million displaced people in 2017; by early 2019, several hundred thousand displaced residents had still not returned because of livelihood collapse, insecurity, and ethnic tensions. The same report notes that more than 400 schools and 200 health centers, along with many government buildings, were damaged or destroyed (Corps, 2019).

[10]On institutional church provision in Congo, especially health and education under weak state capacity, see Seay (2013); Titeca et al. (2013). On healing churches and everyday social support in urban Congo, see Devisch (1996).

[11]Recruitment was open to leaders from all churches. In practice, autonomous revival pastors were the religious leaders most

Importantly, churches are spaces of ethnic mixing, where individuals with different kin networks meet and build a life unrelated to their origins. Baseline data show that more than 90 percent of identifiable congregations include members from multiple origin territories (Appendix Table A-2). Congregants are no more likely to share an origin territory within their churches than would be expected under random allocation within their neighborhood. Within-church pairs are co-territorial in 48.2 percent of cases, compared with 48.8 percent under the no-sorting benchmark. Hence, religious leaders are already leading organizational constituencies that cross the territorial boundaries on which chiefly authority rests.

Therefore, the religious-leader treatment arm focuses on pastors from revival churches in a context where religion is an important institution for ethnic mixing. These leaders provide a contrast to avenue chiefs on the two dimensions central to the design. The first is cross-territorial scope. Pastors address residents through a portable religious frame that cuts across the ethno-territorial identity to which traditional leaders are confined to.[12] The second is a different source of enforcement. Pastors can frame participation as conduct before God rather than performance before their neighbors and local authorities. In Kananga's revival churches, concerns with witchcraft, illness, protection, prosperity, and hidden causality are translated into a Christian vocabulary of sin, blessing, and divine judgment.[13] The treatment asks whether this form of religious authority can sustain cooperation where the chief's ethno-territorial audience is weak.

3 Research Design

In this context of post-war recovery, where neighborhoods have recently integrated a massive wave of displaced residents, Kananga's city administration organized a city-led *salongo* campaign to coordinate basic neighborhood maintenance and incentivize citizens to join community activities. The campaign brought residents together to contribute labor and materials to neighborhood upkeeping tasks and used city evaluation and public recognition to reward performance, a common practice in the region.[14] We partnered with the administration in these efforts and embedded an experiment in the campaign.

consistently available and willing to participate at the neighborhood scale. Mainstream churches were not always represented by a local leader engaged with *salongo* in the relevant neighborhood.

[12] On religious identity as a axis of mobilization that differs from ethno-linguistic identity in Africa, see McCauley (2014). On Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity as a portable religious form, see Robbins (2004). Autonomous revival pastors are especially useful for the argument because their authority is less anchored in the inherited infrastructure, as in Catholic or historic Protestant networks, and more directly tied to local mobilizational capacity.

[13] On Congolese revival Christianity, deliverance, moral diagnosis, and the translation of occult and social anxieties into Christian idioms, see Pype (2012); Tonda (2005).

[14] Comparable civic-work and cleanliness contests elsewhere in the region include Kinshasa's Kin Bopeto, which promised prizes to the cleanest quartier in each commune (Actualite.cd, 2019); Rwanda's Umuganda, which links regular community work to infrastructure, environmental protection, and cleanliness (Rwanda Governance Board, 2017); Lomé's "salubrité challenge des quartiers," which had quartiers submit streets for jury evaluation (Vert Togo, 2019); and Cameroon's "Villes propres" competition, which began in 2019 as a Yaoundé "Quartiers propres" contest (Ministère de l'Habitat et du Développement Urbain, 2022).

3.1 Salongo Campaign

During each five-week implementation wave, local officials organized daily maintenance activities and recorded residents' labor, material, and monetary contributions. Separately, we assigned volunteer residents to teams that varied leader presence, territorial-origin composition, and the disclosure of prior contributions. Contribution tracking began in the week before the first round of team meetings and continued throughout the campaign. At the first meeting, participants met their assigned teammates, received the information specified by their disclosure condition, and learned that the city would publicly recognize highly engaged teams at the end of the campaign. The same teams met again one week later. Participants were asked to use both meetings to coordinate their contributions and encourage one another to participate. All teams faced the same maintenance activities, meeting structure, and recognition rules. The first meeting marks the onset of the randomized treatments.

Neighborhood selection. Before rollout, we identified 50 neighborhoods with active *salongo*, identifiable boundaries, and sufficient scale for team implementation. Fifty neighborhoods met these criteria. We stratified them by commune and by whether the median predicted property value lay above or below the sample median, then randomly assigned one neighborhood in each stratum not to receive the intervention. The remaining 40 neighborhoods entered the intervention rollout. The main estimands compare randomized teams within these intervention neighborhoods.

Recruitment and short baseline. Before each wave, enumerators visited households in participating neighborhoods to introduce the campaign and register adults interested in taking part. This short baseline recorded residents' demographic characteristics, territorial origins, and willingness to contribute, and asked them to refer traditional and religious leaders who were especially committed to making *salongo* succeed. The resulting data defined the resident sampling frame, identified candidate leaders, and supplied the variables used in randomization. The study was planned as ten waves of four neighborhoods. Seven waves were completed under the standard protocol before the Ebola emergency disrupted Wave 8 and prevented the remaining rollout (World Health Organization, 2026). Hence, the main analysis covers 28 neighborhoods, 336 teams, and 1,040 non-repeated residents. Appendix B documents the stopping decision and reports robustness estimates incorporating the disrupted eighth wave.

3.2 Randomization

The assignment proceeded in two stages. First, a screening stage selected participants from the registration sampling frame, oversampling those whose territorial origin matched that of the neighborhood's traditional leader to make the construction of homogeneous teams possible. Second, an assignment stage organized the selected residents into twelve teams of four in each neighborhood, composing a factorial design that crossed

three leader conditions, two territorial-origin compositions, and two disclosure conditions. The design varies these conditions while keeping the neighborhood, campaign, team task, and recognition rules fixed. Figure 1 summarizes these assignments. Appendix C presents the complete algorithm.

3.2.1 Leader Treatment

Each team counted on a fourth participant who would define the leader condition. Enumerators used the recruitment stage leader nominations to identify leaders who were available to join the campaign. They were instructed to select the leader with the most mentions who was willing to participate. In the traditional leader condition (T), the same nominated traditional leader joined four teams in the neighborhood: two homogeneous and two mixed, split across disclosure conditions. The nominated religious leader did the same in the religious leader condition (R). In the no-leader condition (C), a placebo participant joined the team. [15] We keep all non-repeated residents in the analysis sample while we exclude repeated leaders and placebo participants.[16] All fourth participants followed the same meeting protocol. Leaders received no script or special instructions.

Traditional leaders. The traditional leaders in the study are chiefs embedded in Kananga's customary system of territorial governance. Residents identified leaders in their neighborhood whom they regarded as especially committed to making *salongo* succeed, and these referrals formed the recruitment pool. Like the *localité* chiefs studied by Balán et al. (2022), they are established local notables whose responsibilities include organizing communal work, mediating disputes, representing residents, and interacting with the state. Appendix Table A-3 shows that, relative to ordinary residents of the same neighborhood, the chiefs recruited into the study are 22 years older, have about 1.5 additional years of schooling, and have lived on their avenue roughly 13 years longer; they are also overwhelmingly male. Their institutional position is visible in their greater likelihood of holding a senior traditional role, planning *salongo* activities, knowing local authorities, and evaluating the neighborhood chief's contributions to infrastructure, mediation, and representation favorably. Their personal networks are disproportionately composed of people from the same territory, and they score higher than ordinary residents on an aggregate index of standard leadership traits, particularly conscientiousness. Appendix Table A-4 uses surveys administered before the first meeting to show that chiefs are known and recognized as authorities across ethnic lines, but that their broader standing is concentrated among co-ethnics. Residents who share a chief's ethnic origin rate the chief as more motivating, morally exemplary, trustworthy, and hardworking, whereas residents from other origins recognize the chief's formal

[15] Beginning in Wave 3, the same randomly selected placebo participant joined all four no-leader teams, making team size and repeated participation symmetric across the three leader conditions. In Waves 1–2, each no-leader team contained a different fourth ordinary resident.

[16] The fixed placebo participant was selected from the traditional leader's territory. Religious leaders were recruited through religious authority and did not always share the traditional leader's territorial origin. Eleven of the 28 assigned religious leaders differed from the traditional leader. We report a robustness check restricted to the 17 neighborhoods in which the two leaders shared an origin.

authority without evaluating the chief more favorably on these other dimensions. Residents nevertheless expect chiefs from both ethnic cells to participate in *salongo*, with especially strong expectations of their work effort. Chiefs thus enter the experiment as incumbent organizers of the institution whose authority, relationships, and reputations remain centered on territory.

Religious leaders. The religious leaders are local pastors drawn from Kananga's expanding landscape of Pentecostal, charismatic, and independent churches, institutions whose activities frequently extend beyond worship into community organization and public life (Meyer, 2004; Gifford, 2004; McClendon and Riedl, 2015, 2019). They were recruited through the same resident-referral procedure and come from a demographic base similar to that of chiefs. Appendix Table A-3 shows that, relative to ordinary residents, pastors are 13 years older, have about 1.5 additional years of schooling, and have lived on their avenue for roughly 13 years longer; they are overwhelmingly male and even less likely to be female than chiefs. Their distinctive position instead lies in congregational life. Pastors are much more likely to head a congregation, attend Sunday services frequently, contribute to their church, and maintain networks centered on fellow church members. They resemble ordinary residents on standard leadership-personality measures but report more positive and less negative religious coping, with weaker evidence of greater intrinsic religiosity. The institutional boundary is permeable: roughly 40 percent of pastors report holding a traditional role and 29 percent of chiefs report a religious role. Yet the two groups remain differently situated, with chiefs more firmly embedded in customary government and pastors in congregational organization. Appendix Table A-4 shows that this difference also appears in how residents evaluate them. Pastors are known across ethnic lines and are rated as more motivating, morally exemplary, trustworthy, and hardworking even by residents of a different ethnic origin, with similarly favorable assessments among co-ethnics. Residents also expect pastors to participate in *salongo* and contribute financially, although expectations of their work effort are weaker than for chiefs. Pastors therefore enter the experiment with less incumbent responsibility for *salongo* but with favorable standing that extends across the territorial boundaries organizing customary authority.

3.2.2 Cross-randomizations

Team composition. We filled the twelve teams in random order. Each team was first assigned three ordinary residents who participated in only one team. For the six homogeneous teams, all three residents were drawn from the pool that shared the traditional leader's territorial origin. For the six mixed teams, we assigned residents from territories not yet represented in the team, repeating an origin only when no additional territory was available. This procedure ensured that the three ordinary residents in mixed teams came from different territories of origin. Within each leader condition, two teams were homogeneous and two were mixed.

Disclosure. Because residents could contribute at different times and work sites, they did not fully observe their teammates' efforts. We varied the information shown at the meeting to address this incomplete monitoring. Under group disclosure, participants saw only their team's aggregate prior *salongo* contribution. Under individual disclosure, they also saw each member's identifiable contribution record, increasing external reputational incentives. Within every leader-by-composition cell, one team was assigned to each disclosure condition.

3.2.3 Rerandomization and Replacements

For each wave, the assignment program generated 48 complete candidate assignments and retained the one that minimized a prespecified imbalance score across 15 pre-assignment characteristics in the cumulative implemented sample, following Banerjee et al. (2020). Because invitations occurred after assignment, some selected residents were unavailable to attend. These residents were replaced before treatment delivery using randomly ordered reserve lists of respondents from the same territory of origin. Replacements inherited the original resident's team and experimental conditions, and all availability decisions occurred before residents met their teammates or learned their assignments. This protocol produced 231 replacements among the 1,040 analyzed residents.

3.3 Data

Beyond the short registration survey used to construct the experimental assignments, the analysis combines high-frequency administrative records, survey data collected before and after treatment, and recordings of the team meetings.

Administrative data. The administrative records contain daily measures of labor, in-kind contributions such as food or materials, and monetary contributions to salongo. These outcomes were recorded through the digital tracking system created for the campaign. It recorded the locality, date, and activity site; geolocated each salongo location; classified the type of maintenance activity; and collected photographs of the sites before and after work. Labor contributions were measured through check-in and check-out time stamps, along with contributor photographs and ratings of effort. In-kind and monetary contributions were recorded with quantities, estimated values, and photographs of the materials contributed when applicable. The records were linked to registered participants and dates, producing high-frequency, individual-level behavioral data on actual contributions to neighborhood maintenance.

Survey data. We collected survey data at baseline, two midlines, and endline. The baseline survey was administered before meeting invitations and measured participants' demographic and socioeconomic background, territorial origin and migration history, religious practices and beliefs, local social embeddedness,

perceived salongo norms, trust in local authorities, and expectations of social and divine reciprocity. The first midline was conducted around the first team meeting. Right before the team meeting, it measured participants' proximity to each other, shared attributes such as church affiliation or kinship. Immediately after the meeting, it measured meeting impressions and immediate expectations of future peer participation. The second midline took place around the follow-up meeting and measured interactions during the inter-meeting period, including communication among team members, encouragement to contribute, praise for contributors, and sanctioning of free-riders. The endline questionnaire was administered on the week after the recognition ceremony and repeated the main baseline modules.

Meeting recordings. We recorded team meeting discussions with individual consent and transcribed the content to conduct a textual analysis of the leader's mobilization strategy. Because leaders received no script, these recordings show what they endogenously contributed to the discussion. We specifically investigate whether leaders activated the authority channels specified in the design. We also complement dictionary-based measures with a Latent Dirichlet Allocation analysis of leader's rhetoric.

3.4 Implementation Checks

Appendix Table A-5 separates two kinds of balance. The characteristics measured before assignment are similar across experimental arms. Participation during the six days after assignment and before the first meeting is imbalanced. At that point, residents had not learned their assigned leader or reporting rule, so the difference cannot reflect a response to treatment. We nevertheless examine whether it can account for the results in the alternative-explanations subsection. The remaining implementation checks are reassuring. Although 22.2 percent of residents entered through replacement queues, nearly 95 percent of groups still had the territorial composition assigned by the design. Homogeneous groups remained overwhelmingly composed of residents from the chief's territory, while mixed groups drew residents from several territories (Appendix Table A-6). Treatment also reached the intended groups. Residents attended 95.0 percent of first meetings, assigned leaders attended 99.6 percent of treated meetings, and delivery of the meeting instructions and reporting rules was verified in at least 99.4 percent of groups (Appendix Table A-7). Finally, administrative participation is observed for every resident over the same six-day outcome window, and survey follow-up remains high (Appendix Table A-8). Group formation, meeting delivery, and measurement of the main outcome therefore proceeded as planned.

4 Mobilization Experiment

Traditional and religious leaders are notably different from each other and from ordinary citizens, but how do those differing characteristics translate into the capacity to lead a group toward a collective goal? In our

setting, two dimensions of leadership may shape collective action. The first is leaders' (i) scope of authority: whom can a leader legitimately ask to contribute? The second is leader's (ii) source of enforcement: what makes people comply when they do? The experiment isolates these dimensions by varying group composition and the disclosure of individual participation. Group composition reveals the scope of each leader's authority, while disclosure helps distinguish whether that authority works through external or internal incentives.

4.1 Empirical Strategy

Within each neighborhood, we compare groups assigned a traditional or religious leader with groups assigned no leader. Let i index participants, $g(i)$ their accountability group, and $n(i)$ their neighborhood. Variables $T_{g(i)}$ and $R_{g(i)} \in 0, 1$ indicate whether participant i's group was assigned a traditional or religious leader, respectively; no leader is the omitted category. Group composition is $c(i) \in H, M$, where H denotes groups with shared territorial origins and M denotes groups with participants from mixed origins. Finally, $q(i) \in 0, 1$ indicates whether individual participation was disclosed.

The estimation sample contains 1,040 participants in 336 groups across 28 neighborhoods.[17] The outcome Y_i is average *salongo* participation, measured in percentage points, over the six-day administrative window immediately following the first accountability meeting. All specifications control for baseline participation, Y_{i0}, defined as average participation over the six-day window preceding any accountability meeting.[18] Let $e(i) \in \mathcal{E}$ denote the experimental environments relevant to a given specification. Our main analysis estimates:

$$Y_i = \lambda_{n(i),q(i),c(i)} + \rho Y_{i0} + \sum_{e \in \mathcal{E}} \left(\tau_e^T T_{g(i)} + \tau_e^R R_{g(i)}\right) \mathbf{1}\{e(i) = e\} + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i. \tag{1}$$

The neighborhood-by-disclosure-by-composition fixed effects $\lambda_{n(i),q(i),c(i)}$ ensure that each leader group is compared with no-leader groups in the same neighborhood and experimental environment. Hence, for each environment e, τ_e^T, and τ_e^R are the intention-to-treat effects of assignment to a group with a traditional or religious leader, respectively, relative to no leader under the same conditions.

We use two definitions of e throughout the analysis. First, we set $e(i) = c(i)$ and $\mathcal{E} = \{H, M\}$, estimating separate traditional- and religious-leader effects in homogeneous and mixed groups while pooling across disclosure conditions. Within each composition, $\tau_c^T - \tau_c^R$ measures the advantage of traditional over religious leadership. We define the composition gradient, Δ_C, as the change in this relative advantage when moving from mixed to homogeneous groups:

$$\Delta_C = \left(\tau_H^T - \tau_H^R\right) - \left(\tau_M^T - \tau_M^R\right).$$

[17] The sample includes the three ordinary residents assigned to each group and 32 additional ordinary residents who filled the fourth position in no-leader groups during the first two waves. Repeated fourth participants are excluded.

[18] We use a common pre-meeting window to ensure that the baseline measure is not affected by potential spillovers from earlier meetings. As robustness, we also present specifications that control for potential spillover exposure, the construction of which is detailed in Appendix Section D.

Positive values of Δ_C indicate that traditional leadership becomes more effective relative to religious leadership in homogeneous groups, or equivalently that religious leadership gains relative effectiveness as groups become mixed. This is our main reduced-form measure of differences in leaders' scope of authority.

Second, we set $e(i) = (q(i), c(i))$ and $\mathcal{E} = \{(0, H), (1, H), (0, M), (1, M)\}$, producing leader effects in each composition-by-disclosure environment. This specification asks whether the two leaders' effectiveness also depends on the visibility of individual participation. We expected chiefs to be most effective in homogeneous groups with disclosure, where the group falls within their authority and they can evaluate individual behavior. Pastors should rely less on disclosure because their authority can also make participation binding through internal accountability. We therefore define the environment gradient as the difference in the traditional-over-religious advantage between homogeneous groups with disclosure and mixed groups without disclosure:

$$\Delta_E = \left(\tau^T_{1,H} - \tau^R_{1,H}\right) - \left(\tau^T_{0,M} - \tau^R_{0,M}\right)$$

Δ_E measures how much the relative effectiveness of chiefs and pastors changes between homogeneous groups with disclosure and mixed groups without disclosure. These are the two environments in which their scope of authority and sources of enforcement should differ the most.

In the main text, we present the basic specification with the baseline control and fixed effects. Appendix Table A-9 first adds the spillover-exposure control and then fixed indicators for gender and estimated property value. The leader effects and main contrasts are stable across specifications. Standard errors in the main specification are clustered by accountability group, and the main comparisons are robust to alternative clustering.

4.2 Main results: Scope of Authority and Source of Enforcement

Figure 2 presents the results from the paper's main specifications. The left panel shows leader effects by composition, $\tau^L_{c(i)}$, and the right panel shows leader effects by composition and disclosure, $\tau^L_{c(i),q(i)}$. The top row reports leaders' relative effectiveness and the corresponding Δ contrasts. The bottom row reports the implied no-leader participation levels.

4.2.1 Scope of Authority

The left side of Figure 2 shows that leader effectiveness depends on the territorial composition of the group. Assigning an urban chief to a group of participants who share the leader's territorial origin increases participation by 4.8 percentage points (SE 2.9; $p = 0.099$), an 8.5 percent increase over the 56.8 percent no-leader mean. In contrast, the chief's effect in mixed groups is 0.7 points ($p = 0.800$). Pastors display the opposite pattern. The presence of a religious leader increases participation by 6.3 points in mixed groups (SE 2.9; $p = 0.033$), or 10.8 percent relative to the 58.3 percent no-leader mean, and by 0.8 points in homogeneous

groups ($p = 0.742$). The traditional-minus-religious contrast is 4.0 points in homogeneous groups ($p = 0.176$) and -5.6 points in mixed groups ($p = 0.063$); the difference between these gaps is $\widehat{\Delta}_C = 9.6$ percentage points (SE 4.2; $p = 0.023$). Participation is similar across no-leader groups ($p = 0.562$), suggesting that the pattern is not driven by underlying differences between homogeneous and mixed groups.

We interpret these results as consistent with chiefs and pastors having different scopes of authority. Leaders are effective when participants recognize their right to ask them to contribute. Chiefs derive this standing from kinship, ethnic ties, and their customary responsibility for *salongo*. Thus, when chiefs share origins with participants in the group, their presence strengthens pressure to meet a demand that participants already recognize as legitimate. In contrast, chiefs fail in mixed teams because they do not enjoy the same standing to demand contributions from residents of other origins. Pastors derive their authority from a shared Christian worldview that crosses territorial boundaries. Because mixed teams lack a common customary basis for participation, pastors can frame community work as an obligation before God and provide a shared reason to contribute. The same appeal has little impact in homogeneous teams, where *salongo* participation is already recognized as an obligation enforced by the chief. God's judgment matters where the chief is not the recognized enforcer.

Composition changes which leader can sustain collective action. A shared territorial origin places *salongo* within the chief's recognized authority, while mixed origins create room for authority that crosses territorial boundaries. This is our *scope of authority* result. A question that naturally follows is how authority is enforced. What makes participation consequential under each leadership type? Do residents contribute because they expect others to observe and judge their behavior? Or do they comply even when others are not watching because they have internalized the obligation? These are questions about leaders' *source of enforcement*, which we discuss below.

4.2.2 Source of Enforcement

To distinguish between internal and external sources of enforcement, we randomized whether meetings disclosed individual information about peers' contributions. In teams with disclosure, each member's contribution record was public at every meeting, while teams without disclosure saw only the total group contribution. This variation changed how much participants knew about their peers' participation. Disclosure can strengthen external enforcement by making behavior visible to others, but it should not strengthen self-judgment because individuals already observe their own actions.

The right side of Figure 2 shows how leader effects across homogeneous and mixed teams vary under the two disclosure conditions. In homogeneous groups with disclosure, assigning a traditional leader increases participation by 10.0 percentage points ($p = 0.006$), while religious leadership has essentially no effect ($p = 0.997$); the direct traditional-over-religious gap is 9.9 points ($p = 0.014$). In homogeneous groups without disclosure, neither chiefs nor pastors increase participation relative to no leader. Pastors show the opposite

pattern in mixed groups. In mixed groups with disclosure, neither leader has a statistically significant effect. The pastor's effect in mixed groups is concentrated in teams without disclosure. In mixed groups without disclosure, religious leadership raises participation by 9.2 percentage points ($p = 0.021$) relative to no leader. Traditional leaders do not increase participation in this environment ($p = 0.933$). The traditional-minus-religious gap in mixed groups without disclosure is -9.5 points ($p = 0.018$). The cross-environment contrast summarizes how the relative effectiveness of chiefs and pastors changes between these two environments. It equals $\widehat{\Delta}_E = 9.9 - (-9.5) = 19.4$ percentage points (SE 5.7; $p < 0.001$).

These results reinforce the interpretation that religious leaders are weak mobilizers of homogeneous groups and that chiefs are weak mobilizers of mixed groups due to their mismatched scope. They also provide evidence that chiefs and pastors mobilize through distinct enforcement channels. This double reversal is difficult to reconcile with a common social mechanism that simply operates more strongly for one leader than the other. Chiefs in same-origin groups appear to rely on external enforcement, with residents responding to the chief's judgment of their behavior. In contrast, pastors appear to work through internal religious accountability, using a shared Christian framework that leads residents to evaluate their own behavior before God. This is our *source of enforcement* result.

4.2.3 Magnitude and Robustness

The leader effects are robust to alternative outcome windows and are concentrated in labor. We show these patterns in turn, compare their magnitudes with related experiments, and summarize the main robustness checks.

The pattern persists across outcome windows. The main estimates use participation in the week following the teams' first meeting. Appendix Figure A-2 presents four alternative outcome windows, and Appendix Table A-10 follows the same 1,040 participants in each. As a benchmark, the main outcome window has $\widehat{\Delta}_C = 9.6$ points (SE 4.2; $p = 0.023$) and $\widehat{\Delta}_E = 19.4$ points (SE 5.7; $p < 0.001$). The middle period, between the second-meeting cutoff and the final week, has corresponding estimates of 7.7 points (SE 3.9; $p < 0.10$) and 16.6 points (SE 5.1; $p < 0.01$). Using every eligible post-treatment day yields 8.0 points for $\widehat{\Delta}_C$ (SE 3.1; $p < 0.05$) and 16.2 points for $\widehat{\Delta}_E$ (SE 4.2; $p < 0.01$). The same pattern persists across outcome windows. In the last week, measured after the recognition ceremony, the estimates remain 7.5 points (SE 3.5; $p < 0.05$) and 14.0 points (SE 4.9; $p < 0.01$), providing suggestive evidence that the pattern outlasts the recognition incentive.

The response is concentrated in labor. Across alternative outcomes, the effects appear mainly in the core obligation of *salongo*, showing up and working. Across the same 1,040 participants and main outcome window, the Δ_C pattern corresponds to 0.56 additional days of participation, and Δ_E to 1.10 days. Total hours contributed and rated effort also move in the same direction. Adjusted p-values across the four labor

outcomes are at most 0.047 for Δ_C and below 0.004 for Δ_E (Appendix Table A-11), and the asinh-hours specification yields the same conclusion (Appendix Table A-12). In contrast, cash and in-kind contributions show no comparable pattern (Appendix Tables A-13–A-14). Hence, leaders' influence changes the repeated labor obligation at the center of *salongo* and does not produce a general increase in residents' willingness to give private resources.

The effect is comparable to similar interventions. The aligned leader effects are sizable. The 10.0-point chief effect in homogeneous groups with disclosure is 17.8% of the 55.8% no-leader mean, while the 9.2-point pastor effect in mixed groups without disclosure is 15.6% of the 58.9% no-leader mean. These magnitudes are similar to effects found in other experiments on leadership and religion. Jack and Recalde (2015) finds roughly a 20% increase in voluntary public-good contributions when local authorities lead by example in rural Bolivia, while Buccione (2023) finds an 18% reduction in household water consumption from a religiously framed conservation intervention in Jordan. Other experiments find larger effects. Muslim leaders increase minimum group effort by 31% in a coordination game in India (Bhalotra et al., 2023), while information that a union leader would mobilize nearly all group members increases attendance at an additional survey session by 38% among workers in Myanmar (Boudreau et al., 2025). Our effects are of a similar order to those found in related experiments, but arise within an ongoing public-good institution and persist across repeated work sessions.

Robustness to estimation and inference. The main pattern is stable after accounting for exposure to nearby treated groups and adding baseline controls (Appendix Table A-9 and Appendix D). Conditional randomization inference, which repeats the original group-formation procedure across 5,000 assignments while holding the realized sample fixed, yields $p = 0.039$ for Δ_C and $p = 0.003$ for Δ_E (Appendix Table A-15). The main conclusions also hold when allowing errors to be correlated across groups assigned to the same leader. With neighborhood-level clustering, Δ_C remains similar in magnitude but is no longer significant at the 5% level (Appendix Table A-16).

4.3 Alternative Explanations

Before turning to mechanisms, we ask whether the main pattern can be explained by simpler accounts. We find no evidence that it could be explained by differences in no-leader participation, imbalances in pretreatment behavior, leader effort, or the fact that not all pastors share their origins with homogeneous groups.

Differences among groups without a leader does not explain results. One concern is that the pattern reflects unusually high or low participation in particular no-leader groups. Figure 2 and Appendix Table A-9 provide little support for this account. Among groups without a leader, participation is similar across homogeneous and mixed groups ($p = 0.562$) and across the four composition-by-disclosure environments

(joint $p = 0.789$). The differences between chiefs and pastors come from what changes when each leader is present, not from different no-leader baselines.

We rule out treatment anticipation or mean reversion. The pre-assignment characteristics used to form groups are balanced. However, administrative participation, measured after assignment and before the first accountability meeting, differs across the realized cells (Appendix Table A-5). Participants received their invitation to participate in volunteer teams during this week, but had not yet learned about their teammates or the disclosure condition during this period. Nevertheless, two concerns arise: (i) participants may have learned that a leader was assigned to their team before the first meeting, creating anticipation effects, and (ii) even without anticipation, the estimates could be driven by mean reversion in the imbalanced cells.

We address the first concern in Appendix Table A-18, which examines the six daily pretreatment observations. The daily data show no evidence of anticipation before the first meeting. We address the mean reversion concern in Appendix Table A-17, allowing the relationship between pretreatment and subsequent participation to differ across all 12 assignment cells. All estimated coefficients remain essentially the same. Together, these checks show that the imbalance does not explain the leader effects that emerge after the meeting.

Different leader effort does not explain leader effects. A different explanation for the main effects is that leaders exerted more effort in the environments where they succeeded. We test this possibility using outcomes that record interactions with specific people in the group. During the midline surveys administered right before each meeting, we asked whether each participant had interacted with their peers in the week preceding the meeting. We leverage these outcomes to estimate an augmented version of equation (1) that accommodates directed peer-to-peer outcomes.

Let j index the person involved in the interaction, and let $J_{jg} = 1$ indicate when that person is the assigned leader in group g. We estimate the following extended version of equation (1):

$$Y_{ij} = \lambda_{n(i),q(i),c(i)} + \rho Y_{ij0} + \sum_{e \in \mathcal{E}} \Big[\left(\tau_e^T + \kappa_e^T J_{jg}\right) T_{g(i)} + \left(\tau_e^R + \kappa_e^R J_{jg}\right) R_{g(i)} \Big] \mathbf{1}\{e(i) = e\} + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_{ij}. \quad (2)$$

Where Y_{ij} records participant i's reported interaction with person j at the start of the second meeting, and Y_{ij0} records the same interaction before the first meeting, prior to treatment. The coefficient τ_e^L captures the assignment effect for outcomes directed toward an ordinary participant, while $\tau_e^L + \kappa_e^L$ captures the effect for outcomes directed toward the assigned leader. The outreach models estimate this extension separately within each experimental environment and control for respondent pretreatment participation.

Appendix Table A-19 presents results for several types of recorded interactions. Reported contact with

leaders is not greater in the environments where they induce more participation. In homogeneous groups with disclosure, reported contact with the assigned chief is only 0.7 percentage points higher (SE 7.8) than the rates of contact between ordinary members of no-leader groups. In mixed groups with disclosure, where the chief's participation effect is small, reported contact with the assigned chief is 20.3 points higher (SE 8.9) than contact between ordinary members of no-leader groups. Pastors show a similar mismatch. In mixed groups without disclosure, where the participation effect is largest, respondents report nearly the same rate of contact with the assigned pastor as between ordinary members of no-leader groups, a difference of 4.8 percentage points (SE 7.6). Requests, references to consequences, and interactions among ordinary participants show no offsetting pattern. If anything, respondents report more contact with chiefs where their effects on participation are weaker. Differences in observable contact therefore cannot explain where leaders mobilize participation.

Pastors' null in homogeneous groups is not due to ethnic mismatch. Pastors may fail in homogeneous groups because they do not always share the territorial origins that link chiefs to those participants. In this account, pastors would fail to sustain participation in homogeneous groups not because they lack the scope for doing so, but because they are from a different territory. Out of the twenty-eight localities and twenty-eight recruited religious leaders, seventeen share their origins with the chief and the homogeneous groups in the neighborhood, while eleven do not. We leverage these seventeen religious leaders to verify whether our conclusion holds in the restricted sample.

Appendix Table A-20 restricts pastors comparisons to neighborhoods where the assigned chief and pastor have the same territorial relationship with homogeneous-group participants. Pastors with the relevant territorial connection do not become more effective in homogeneous groups, and their effect remains concentrated among groups composed of diverse origins. The pastor result, therefore, reflects the reach of religious leadership across territorial boundaries rather than a mechanical difference in leader origin.

5 Mechanisms

Having ruled out simpler explanations for the experimental pattern, we ask why the same leader has different effects across composition and disclosure conditions. We trace these differences from what leaders say, to who responds, to how participation changes. First, transcripts and interaction records show that chiefs and pastors behave similarly across environments but make different appeals. Chiefs press residents to attend, contribute more hours, and improve group performance, while pastors frame participation in religious terms. Second, we use leader profiles and residents' evaluations to examine the scope of each leader's authority. Third, we investigate each leader's source of enforcement by examining how the effects vary with baseline participation. Finally, we examine effects on beliefs about divine oversight and identity, and whether sustained participation changes how residents view government and local leaders.

5.1 What Leaders Say: Pastors Talk About God, Chiefs About Attendance

Meeting recordings show what leaders and ordinary residents discussed before the treatment changed participation. If leaders sustain collective action through different claims, those differences should appear in their speech. To test this interpretation, we use a standard Latent Dirichlet Allocation model following Blei et al. (2003) to analyze transcripts from the first group meetings. The model groups words that often appear together into latent topics, and is blind to every other aspect of the intervention, including group structure, treatment condition, and leader role. Because our passages are short, we follow the approach of Quinn et al. (2010) and assign each passage to one of three categories. We name the topics only after estimation. Table 1 reports the characteristic words and leader translated passages that help interpret each topic:

Latent topics. The first passages in Table 1 highlight a discourse that creates social pressure around participation. We labeled these as attendance-and-performance speeches. The excerpts display leaders setting clear targets for hours and regular participation, calling out those residents who did not show up and praising groups that meet expectations. This fits the interpretation we developed for the chiefs' source of enforcement, where participation is induced by stronger social accountability over the activity.

The last block of the table establishes a different enforcer. The examples tell volunteers to look to God rather than wages for reward, state that "God rewards each person according to their deeds", and connect collective work to patience, peace, and mutual aid. This language frames participation as a decision subject to divine judgment and calls for solidarity between peers. It is the speech counterpart to the strategy attributed to pastors, whose appeal can bind residents through self-evaluation before God, even when individual contribution records are not disclosed.

The third topic concerns operational constraints. A recurrent topic of discussion was the coordination of who would provide the materials for neighborhood improvement. Some examples concern within-group coordination, where peers would discuss and agree on who would provide the necessary tools for the work to take place. Yet, the passages also show substantial reliance on the centralized provision of these materials, with many examples praising the municipality for providing the tools for the work. Although it may be useful material for program improvement and future research, we interpret this topic as neutral concerning our main goal. The distinction between mobilization strategies comes from the relative emphasis on attendance and performance or on divine reward and solidarity.

Who talks about what, and when? After assigning each passage to its most likely topic, we sum the passage duration to measure how many minutes each speaker spends on attendance and performance, material support, and divine rewards and solidarity. We aggregate the classified passages to the leader-by-meeting level. Figure 3 shows the average of what each leader said and how long they spoke across the four composition-by-disclosure environments. Circles show total leader speaking time. The faded background

columns show the share of speech devoted to each of the three topics.

The figure shows that leaders' discourse is similar across experimental conditions but differs across leader types. Pastors speak for 3.43 minutes on average, compared with 2.55 minutes for chiefs ($p = 0.067$). Aligned with our interpretation, chiefs devote 44.1 percent of their speech to attendance and performance, compared with 26.0 percent among pastors. In contrast, pastors devote 48.3 percent to divine reward and solidarity, compared with 27.4 percent among chiefs. The differences remain significant after multiple testing adjustments ($q = 0.009$), while material-support shares are similar (28.5 vs. 25.7 percent). Within each leader type, speaking time and topic shares are fairly stable across composition and disclosure conditions. All tests of equality in topic shares across environments have $p > 0.30$, while the speaking-time tests have $p = 0.701$ for chiefs and $p = 0.139$ for pastors. Thus, what participants hear differs mainly by leader type, not by the experimental environment.

Although what leaders say is similar across experimental conditions, their influence on the discussion varies. Appendix Figure A-3 shows estimates of Equation (1) using participants' time spent on each topic. Assigning a chief shifts the discussion toward attendance and performance most strongly in homogeneous groups with disclosure, while assigning a pastor shifts the discussion toward divine reward and solidarity most strongly in mixed groups without disclosure. These are also the environments where each leader type most increases participation. The pattern suggests that leaders are most able to steer the discussion toward their characteristic appeals in the same environments where those appeals later change participation. The meetings therefore provide an early sign that these different appeals are working.

5.2 Scope of Authority: Who Can Mobilize Whom?

During meetings, chiefs and pastors make different appeals, and each leader's discourse is fairly stable across experimental conditions. Yet those appeals shape the discussion and eventually sustain higher participation only in some groups. This raises the question: why can the same leader influence some residents but not others? Our key result suggests that this reflects leaders' distinct scopes of authority. Chiefs are effective when they have the recognized authority to demand contributions from the group. Given the customary basis of their position, this authority is strongest among residents who share their ethnic and territorial networks. Pastors, on the other hand, are effective when residents accept their claim that participation is an obligation enforced by God. Their appeals have less force in homogeneous groups, where the chief already holds recognized authority over *salongo*. But what determines the boundaries of each leader's authority? Do leader and respondent characteristics predict where their effects are strongest in ways consistent with this interpretation?

We examine this question from both sides of the relationship. We first ask whether leader effects are stronger for leaders with traits associated with their form of authority. We then ask whether effects are stronger among residents who are more likely to recognize or respond to that authority. For chiefs, this

means characteristics tied to their local embeddedness, residents' evaluations of them, and shared ethnic ties. For pastors, it means characteristics tied to leaders' religious conviction and residents' receptiveness to religious authority. Together, these comparisons help us identify the scope of each leader's authority. We estimate heterogeneity across these characteristics using an extension of the main specification. Let Z_{ig} indicate the higher category of the leader or resident characteristic under study. Retaining the neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects from Equation (1), we estimate

$$Y_i = \lambda_{n(i),q(i),c(i)} + \rho Y_{i0} + \sum_{e\in\mathcal{E}} \eta_e Z_{ig} \mathbf{1}\{e(i)=e\} + \sum_{L\in\{T,R\}} \sum_{e\in\mathcal{E}} \left(\tau_e^L + \gamma_e^L Z_{ig}\right) \mathbf{1}\{L_{g(i)}=L, e(i)=e\} + X_i'\beta + \varepsilon_i. \tag{3}$$

When Z_{ig} is observed in every assignment arm, such as resident characteristics, the η_e terms allow no-leader participation to differ across categories within each environment. When the characteristic exists only for groups assigned a leader, as with leader attributes or ratings of the assigned leader, we interact it only with the relevant leader-by-environment indicators. The main figures include the pretreatment outcome and the design fixed effects. Appendix tables add the 25-meter spillover indicator and fixed gender and estimated property value controls. Because the characteristics themselves were not randomly assigned, these estimates show where leader effects are stronger or weaker, not the causal effect of the characteristic.

5.2.1 Which Leaders Can Exercise Their Authority?

We first ask whether the assigned leader is equipped to exercise the relevant form of authority. Figure 4 reports estimates of Equation (3), while Appendix Tables A-21–A-23 report the adjusted estimates and alternative fixed-effect structures of the main and other relevant heterogeneous effects tests. Standard errors are clustered by randomized group.[19]

Chiefs benefit from local roots; pastors from religious conviction. If chiefs' authority comes from being embedded in local ethnic networks, chiefs who have lived in the neighborhood longer should be better able to sustain participation. Longer residence gives them more knowledge of residents, stronger local ties, and greater standing in the community. These are precisely the kinds of relationships through which chiefs may enforce participation in local collective action. Pastors should depend less on local tenure because their authority does not rely as strongly on neighborhood networks or local standing. Instead, their effectiveness should depend more on how strongly they themselves believe that God monitors and rewards cooperation. We therefore expect pastor effects to be stronger among pastors with stronger beliefs in divine enforcement.

[19] Leader attributes are undefined in no-leader groups, and each split contains only 28 leaders of each type. Under neighborhood-by-environment fixed effects, the lower and higher leader categories can therefore draw their no-leader comparisons from different cells. The appendix tables also report estimates with additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects. This specification retains neighborhood controls while pooling the environment component across neighborhoods.

Figure 4 presents these results. The upper panel shows how chief effects vary with avenue tenure. The left side reports effects for chiefs who have lived on the avenue for less than 26 years, while the right side reports effects for chiefs with longer tenure. In homogeneous groups with disclosure, chiefs with longer tenure raise participation by 19.3 percentage points (SE 4.7), compared with 2.0 points for chiefs with shorter tenure (SE 4.5). The 17.3-point difference is statistically significant (SE 6.5; $p = 0.008$), while the other three chief environments show no comparable heterogeneity. Pastor effects do not increase with avenue tenure (Appendix Tables A-21). This pattern fits our interpretation that chiefs rely on established local networks and standing, while pastors depend on a different scope of authority.

The lower panel turns to pastors' conviction in divine moral enforcement. We combine questions from Lang et al. (2019) on whether God rewards good people and punishes bad people into a single measure and compare pastors above and below its median. In mixed groups without disclosure, pastors with stronger convictions raise participation by 16.6 percentage points (SE 4.8), compared with 2.0 points for pastors with weaker convictions (SE 5.6). The 14.6-point difference is statistically significant (SE 6.9; $p = 0.034$), while the other three pastor environments show no comparable heterogeneity. Chiefs effects also do not significantly vary with chiefs conviction (Appendix Table A-22 reports). This suggests that the reach of religious authority depends on the pastor's own conviction in the divine enforcement behind it, consistent with our interpretation of pastoral scope as rooted in a shared religious framework rather than territorial standing.

Chiefs can draw on religious authority; the reverse does not hold. Some leaders who participated in the campaign were primarily recognized for one role but also held a position in the other institution. Thus, some chiefs also reported serving as pastors, and some pastors reported serving as chiefs. Appendix Table A-23 compares chiefs and pastors who hold positions in both institutions with those who do not. Because the cross-office sample is small (5 chiefs who are pastors and 7 pastors who are chiefs), these results should be interpreted cautiously. Even so, the pattern is striking. Chiefs who are also pastors can mobilize mixed groups without disclosure, much like pastors do, while pastors who are also chiefs do not gain the same ability to mobilize the groups where chiefs are effective. This asymmetry is exactly what we would expect if chiefs' authority is territorially bounded while pastoral authority has a broader scope. A chief who is also a pastor can draw on pastoral authority in mixed groups, but a pastor who is also a chief is not the chief of that jurisdiction and therefore cannot draw on the same customary authority.

5.2.2 Who Falls Within Each Leader's Scope?

Leaders may hold all the necessary conditions to promote collective goals. Nevertheless, if the audience they are trying to convince does not recognize the authority they invoke, leader traits alone will not be enough to induce participation. We study these limits by estimating Equation (3) across resident characteristics that should determine whether each form of authority is recognized. For chiefs, we ask whether effects are stronger

among residents who share their ethnic and territorial ties or view them as legitimate local authorities. For pastors, we ask whether effects are stronger among residents who are more receptive to religious authority. These comparisons show where each leader's authority has force and where it does not.

The second exercise asks whether a leader can reach beyond his usual audience when a resident personally recognizes his standing, belongs to his institutional network, or is receptive to the appeal he makes. Figure 5 highlights the two measures most directly aligned with each leader's authority using the raw fixed-effects specification. Appendix Tables A-24–A-30 report all heterogeneous effects on resident characteristics after adding the 25-meter spillover indicator and controls, as well as robustness to additive fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by group-neighborhood.

Chiefs reach mixed groups when residents recognize their authority. The chief's jurisdiction is not limited mechanically to homogeneous groups. It extends into mixed groups with disclosure when residents relate to the chief in ways that resemble the audience over which customary authority ordinarily operates. Figure 5 shows the clearest result. In the raw fixed-effects regression, the chief raises participation by 16.7 percentage points among residents above the secular-authority cutpoint and by -0.3 points among those below it. The 17.0-point difference is statistically significant (SE 6.6; $p = 0.010$). Among residents who accord the chief greater secular authority, the mixed-group effect approaches the 17.7-point effect observed in homogeneous groups with disclosure. The gender/wealth-adjusted estimates in Appendix Table A-24 are similar.

Territorial and relational ties point in the same direction. Appendix Table A-25 restricts the territory comparison to mixed groups, where territorial membership varies. The chief effect with disclosure is 11.7 points among residents who share his territory and 3.1 points among those who do not. The 8.6-point difference is imprecise (SE 8.4; $p = 0.308$), so this comparison is suggestive rather than conclusive. The opinion index is sharper. Appendix Table A-26 shows a 13.0-point chief effect in mixed groups with disclosure among residents who evaluate him more favorably, compared with -1.0 point among those who do not. The difference is 14.0 points (SE 5.8; $p = 0.016$). These ratings were elicited after group introductions but before discussion, so they describe the relationship at the start of the meeting rather than a randomly assigned resident trait. Taken together, the three comparisons show that a chief can mobilize outside the homogeneous group when residents recognize his standing, share his territorial jurisdiction, or view him favorably. Ethnic composition shifts the prevalence of these relationships; it does not create an absolute boundary around customary authority.

Pastors reach residents through personal faith. The pastor results locate his effective audience among residents for whom religion is personally consequential. Following the Allport and Ross (1967) religious-orientation scale, we distinguish intrinsic religiosity, where faith is internalized as a guide to life, from extrinsic religiosity, where religion serves other personal or social needs. We further separate extrinsic religiosity into personal reliance, such as seeking comfort or support from religion, and social reliance, such as using the

church for social contact. In the raw fixed-effects regression in Figure 5, pastors in mixed groups without disclosure raise participation by 15.6 points among residents above the intrinsic-religiosity cutpoint and by 1.0 point among those below it. The 14.5-point difference is suggestive (SE 8.0; $p = 0.071$); after adding the fixed adjustment set, Appendix Table A-27 reports a 16.3-point difference ($p = 0.040$). Appendix Table A-28 yields an even steeper gradient for personal religious reliance: the pastor effect is 22.7 points in the higher category and -2.9 points in the lower category, a 25.5-point difference (SE 7.4; $p < 0.001$).

The social component of extrinsic religiosity moves in the opposite direction. Appendix Table A-29 shows a 15.5-point pastor effect among residents below the church-as-social-contact cutpoint and a 4.4-point effect among those above it. The high-minus-low difference is -11.1 points (SE 6.5; $p = 0.086$). This reversal is informative. Pastor effects are concentrated among residents for whom religion provides inward guidance or personal reliance, not among those who primarily value church as a source of social contact.

Denominational ties may extend religious authority. Denominational matching offers a final, less precise indication that religious scope can travel through church networks. Appendix Table A-30 estimates a 14.1-point pastor effect in homogeneous groups without disclosure among same-denomination residents, compared with -0.8 points among residents of another denomination. The 15.0-point difference is imprecise (SE 11.7; $p = 0.204$). Only 47 religious-arm respondents share the assigned pastor's denomination, including 13 in this environment. The comparison is therefore inconclusive, but it suggests a possible boundary condition: pastors may reach residents in homogeneous groups when denominational membership places them inside the pastor's church network. Across the seven comparisons, leader scope follows the resident's relationship to the relevant institution. Chiefs reach mixed-group residents who recognize customary standing; pastors reach residents receptive to religious authority, with weaker evidence that denominational networks can extend that reach into homogeneous groups.

5.3 Source of Enforcement: Who Responds When Records Are Revealed?

Having shown where each leader can sustain participation, we now ask what makes residents comply. Here the two accounts make sharply different predictions. If chiefs work through social judgment, disclosure should matter most for residents with weak prior participation. Once a poor record becomes visible, the chief has something concrete to judge and the resident has something to repair. If pastors work through internal religious accountability, there is no reason to expect their effects to be concentrated among prior shirkers; they may instead extend across participation histories. We test these predictions using Equation (3), allowing each leader effect to vary with residents' pretreatment participation in every composition-by-disclosure environment.

Figure 6 shows the results for the two compositions where each leader is effective: chiefs in homogeneous groups and pastors in mixed groups. The top row plots each leader's effect relative to no leader at lower

and higher levels of pretreatment participation. The bottom row shows the corresponding no-leader means. Within each column, we plot both disclosure conditions to show how the pattern changes when individual participation is made visible. Dark lines denote disclosure and faded lines no disclosure. Reading the two lines together helps explain why chiefs lose their effect without disclosure and why pastors lose theirs with disclosure.

Exposed shirkers drive the chief effect. The left column of Figure 6 matches the external-enforcement prediction. With disclosure, chiefs raise participation by 23.5 percentage points among residents with lower pretreatment participation, compared with −4.4 points among those with higher participation. The higher-minus-lower difference is −27.8 points (SE 8.0; $p < 0.001$). Without disclosure, the corresponding effects are −9.3 and 7.9 points, and the 17.2-point difference is only suggestive ($p = 0.064$). Pastors show no comparable gradient by prior participation. The chief pattern is therefore specific to the setting in which weak participation becomes visible. A weak visible record gives the chief something to judge and the resident something to repair, while residents with stronger records have less room to improve. Appendix Table A-31, which adds the gender and estimated property value controls, yields the same reversal.

Unpacking the null: disclosure substitutes for the pastor effect. The right column of Figure 6 helps explain why the aggregate pastor effect in mixed groups disappears under disclosure. Without disclosure, pastors increase participation across pretreatment types, by 6.1 points among residents with weaker prior participation and 9.9 points among those with stronger records. With disclosure, the corresponding effects are 6.7 and −2.3 points. The −9.1-point difference is imprecise ($p = 0.341$), but the no-leader means reveal an important change in the counterfactual. Among residents with stronger pretreatment participation, disclosure raises participation without a pastor from 62.4 to 73.2 percent. Disclosure therefore raises participation precisely among residents for whom the pastor otherwise has a large effect, leaving less room for pastoral influence. The aggregate null under disclosure is thus consistent with substitution rather than the reputational pattern observed for chiefs.

Peer behavior provides a related but weaker version of the same pattern. Appendix Table A-32 splits residents by the pretreatment hours supplied by their other ordinary group members, excluding the respondent and all leaders. In mixed groups with disclosure, the pastor effect is 8.8 points when peers were less active and −2.3 points when they were more active, a difference of −11.0 points ($p = 0.235$). The no-leader means move in the opposite direction. Under disclosure, participation without a pastor is 50.6 percent among residents with less active peers and 66.0 percent among those with more active peers, a 15.4-point gap. Without disclosure, the corresponding gap is only 4.3 points. Thus, when disclosure is combined with more active peers, participation is already higher without the pastor, leaving less room for the pastor to change behavior. The treatment-effect gradient does not differ significantly across disclosure conditions ($p = 0.651$), so we interpret this evidence as suggestive rather than conclusive.

5.4 Beyond Participation: What Else Changes?

After establishing the limits of leaders' authority, we ask whether sustained collective action changed how residents understood their social and political environment. We examine beliefs about cooperation and accountability, the salience of religious and social identities, views of government and other local institutions, and opinions about other members of the group.

More participation does not change beliefs or political attitudes. The first set of outcomes captures beliefs about social and divine accountability and the identities residents consider most important. The second covers government services and accountability, institutional performance, trust in state and non-state actors, and evaluations of the locality chief. Across these outcomes, we find no systematic effects. The belief and identity results do not persist across survey waves, and the baseline–Endline comparisons reveal no common change in views of government or local institutions. Appendix Tables A-33, A-34, and A-37 report the full results. Additional participation therefore changed behavior without broadly changing residents' beliefs, identities, or political attitudes.

Sustained cooperation makes residents more willing to help one another. The clearest changes concern relationships within the group. We compare how residents evaluated ordinary peers and assigned leaders before the first discussion and at the start of the second meeting. The outcome is the standardized change in these evaluations, estimated using Equation (2). Because the initial evaluation is already part of the outcome, we omit the separate Meeting 1 control and the additional controls in X_i; the design fixed effects remain unchanged. Appendix Tables A-35 and A-36 report all six outcomes across the four experimental environments. Figure 7 focuses on the two help measures. It shows separately the environment where each leader increased participation and pools the other three environments.

The effects are sizable where leaders sustain participation. In homogeneous groups with disclosure, assigning a chief increases residents' willingness to help an ordinary participant by 0.20 standard deviations and the help they expect from that participant by 0.27 standard deviations. At the average baseline answers of about 4,600 Congolese francs, these effects correspond to roughly 1,400 francs more willingness to help and 2,700 francs more expected help, or 30 and 59 percent of the baseline means. In mixed groups without disclosure, assigning a pastor increases willingness to help an ordinary participant by 0.35 standard deviations and willingness to help the pastor by 0.34 standard deviations. These effects correspond to about 2,750 and 2,670 francs, or 59 and 58 percent of the baseline means.

Pastors gain support when they sustain cooperation. The pattern is different for peers and leaders. Chief assignment mainly increases the help residents expect from one another, while evaluations of the chief change little. Pastor assignment increases willingness to help both ordinary participants and the pastor himself by about the same amount. Other evaluations of peers do not change systematically. Sustained

cooperation therefore appears to strengthen expected assistance within the group rather than improve opinions of peers more generally.

Pastor assignment also improves the pastor's own standing. Across mixed groups, residents report greater trust in him, while chiefs do not see a comparable improvement in the homogeneous groups where they are effective. This difference fits their initial positions. Chiefs already hold established authority among coethnics, while pastors enter mixed groups without the same standing and can gain it when they successfully sustain cooperation. Religious leaders can therefore leave divided groups more cohesive while also gaining greater trust and support from residents.

6 Conclusion

Can religion bridge ethnic divides? In Kananga, religious leaders mobilize heterogeneous groups because their standing is less tied to shared ethnic-territorial relationships and remains effective when individual contributions are not readily evaluated by peers. Traditional leaders display the opposite pattern and mobilize socially connected constituents, especially when contributions are observable. Religion bridges ethnic divisions here because religious and customary authority differ in both their reach and their means of enforcement. These findings reveal two dimensions of authority. Its *scope* determines whom a leader can mobilize; its *source* determines what makes participation binding—evaluation by others, obligations individuals apply to themselves, or both. Collective action depends on the fit between a leader's reach, the population being mobilized, and the conditions under which participation becomes binding.

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
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Tables and Figures



(a) Leader experiment **(b) Within-leader variation**

Figure 1: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Notes: Each neighborhood contains twelve teams. Panel (a) assigns four teams to a chief, four to a pastor, and four to no leader. Panel (b) divides the four teams in each condition evenly between homogeneous and mixed groups and between individual and group disclosure. The diagram shows the standard four-person team used from Wave 3 onward. The slightly different no-leader roster used in Waves 1–2 is explained in Appendix Tables A-6–A-8. The figure is discussed in Section 3; balance and implementation checks appear in Appendix Tables A-5–A-8.




Figure 2: LEADER EFFECTS ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENTS

Notes: Blue circles and gold triangles show how assigning a chief or pastor changes participation relative to a team with no leader in the same environment. The left side compares mixed and homogeneous groups after pooling the disclosure conditions. The right side shows all four composition-by-disclosure environments. Chiefs raise participation most in homogeneous groups with disclosure, while pastors raise it most in mixed groups without disclosure. Labels marked T–R computes the differences between leader effects. Δ_C summarizes how this leader gap changes with group composition, and Δ_E compares the two environments where the leaders differ most. Open circles in the lower panels show participation without a leader. Thick and thin bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. Estimates adjust for pretreatment participation and compare teams within the same neighborhood, composition, and disclosure condition. The figure is discussed in Section 4.2; Appendix Table A-9 reports the estimates and specification checks.

Table 1: EXAMPLES OF THE THREE SPEECH TOPICS

Topic and typical words	Illustrative leader speech
Attendance and performance *hours, week, absence, percentage, punctuality*	"Last week we completed only a few hours. We should reach five hours per person each day and come regularly." "I call on those who did not work last week to join us so that we can maintain the places where we live." "Everyone was present this week. Next week, let us work with the same commitment to improve our neighborhood."
Requests for material support *tools, sacks, hoes, wheelbarrows, avenues*	"The municipality gave us hoes, machetes, spades, and sacks to improve our environment." "Volunteers brought sacks, and the work is progressing. We still need wheelbarrows, hoes, picks, and more sacks." "We now have the tools, and the people with strength to work are here. We can keep improving the neighborhood."
Divine reward and solidarity *God, bless, reward, united, together*	"Salongo is group work, not one person's work. With God's support, let us have patience, peace, and gentleness." "Volunteers should not expect wages, but look to God, who rewards people according to their work." "A person reaps what they sow; God rewards each person according to their deeds."

Notes: The table shows why we gave the three topics their names. The left column lists words that frequently characterize each topic. The right column gives translated examples of chief and pastor speech that the model placed in that topic, lightly shortened for readability. The topic model formed the categories from word patterns without using leader type or treatment assignment. The table is discussed in Section 5.1. Figure 3 shows how much chiefs and pastors speak and how their speech is divided across the topics; Appendix Figure A-3 shows how leader assignment changes ordinary participants' speech.




Figure 3: CHIEFS STRESS PERFORMANCE; PASTORS STRESS DIVINE REWARD ACROSS ENVIRONMENTS

Notes: Each panel describes what one leader type said during the first recorded meeting. Open circles show average total speaking time. The shaded column behind each circle divides that speech across the three topics, with the printed shares summing to 100 percent. Chiefs devote more of their speech to attendance and performance, while pastors devote more to divine reward and solidarity; these profiles change little across the four environments. Read the percentages as shares of speech, not against the minutes axis. Thick and thin lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals for speaking time. The figure is discussed in Section 5.1. Table 1 gives typical words and translated examples for each topic; Appendix Figure A-3 shows how leader assignment changes ordinary participants' speech.




Figure 4: CHIEF ROOTEDNESS AND PASTOR CONVICTION PREDICT MOBILIZATION

Notes: Every point shows how assigning a leader changes participation relative to no leader in the same environment. The upper row compares chiefs with shorter and longer residence on the avenue. The lower row compares pastors with weaker and stronger beliefs that God rewards good conduct and punishes wrongdoing. The columns divide leaders into similarly sized lower- and higher-scoring groups. The successful chief effect is concentrated among chiefs with deeper local roots, and the successful pastor effect is concentrated among pastors with stronger moral conviction. Each row shows the four composition-by-disclosure environments. Thick and thin lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure is discussed in Section 5.2; Appendix Tables A-21 and A-22 report the subgroup differences and specification checks.




Figure 5: CHIEFS MOBILIZE RESIDENTS WHO RECOGNIZE THEIR AUTHORITY; PASTORS MOBILIZE THE INTRINSICALLY RELIGIOUS

Notes: Every point shows how assigning a leader changes participation relative to no leader in the same environment. The upper row compares residents who grant the chief less or more secular authority. The lower row compares residents whose private conduct is guided less or more strongly by religion. The pattern is relational: chiefs mobilize more where residents recognize their secular standing, and pastors mobilize more where religion already guides personal conduct. Each row shows the four composition-by-disclosure environments. Thick and thin lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure is discussed in Section 5.2; Appendix Tables A-24 and A-27 report the subgroup differences and specification checks.




Figure 6: CHIEFS DRAW IN PRIOR NONPARTICIPANTS UNDER DISCLOSURE; PASTOR EFFECTS SPAN PARTICIPATION HISTORIES

Notes: Read each column from top to bottom. The upper panels show how assigning the leader changes participation for residents with lower and higher pretreatment participation. The lower panels show how often the same types of residents would participate without a leader. The left column reports chiefs in homogeneous groups and the right column pastors in mixed groups; the colors distinguish disclosure conditions. Lower participation means zero or one of the six eligible pre-meeting days, and higher participation means two to six days. With disclosure, the chief effect is concentrated among prior nonparticipants and infrequent participants. Without disclosure, the pastor effect extends across both participation groups. Showing the no-leader means below separates differences in leader influence from differences in residents' usual participation. Thick and thin lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure is discussed in Section 5.3; Appendix Table A-31 reports all environments and specification checks.




Figure 7: SUCCESSFUL MOBILIZATION STRENGTHENS DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE GROUP

Notes: Before the first discussion and again at the start of Meeting 2, residents reported how much they would help a named group member and how much help they expected from that person. The figure shows how leader assignment changes those answers over time. The left panel reports chiefs and the right panel pastors. Within each panel, the right block isolates the environment where that leader raises participation; the left block pools the other three environments. Circles show changes in willingness to help and triangles changes in expected help. The named person is either an ordinary peer or the assigned leader. The more positive changes in the effective environments show that successful mobilization is accompanied by stronger helping relationships within the group. The vertical scale measures change in baseline standard deviations; thick and thin lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure is discussed in Section 5.4; Appendix Tables A-35 and A-36 report all outcomes and environments.

A Supporting Analysis




Figure A-1: Neighborhood ethnic fractionalization and perceived importance of *salongo*

Notes: The sample contains 2,791 recruitment-survey respondents in the 28 nonpilot neighborhoods observed through wave 7. Neighborhood ethnic fractionalization is the leave-one-out territory-based ELF, $1 - \sum_g s_g^2$, computed from all respondents in the frozen wave-7 recruitment roster with nonmissing neighborhood and territory. The outcome is the respondent's perceived importance of *salongo*, standardized once over the full estimation sample. The question reads, "How important do people in your community think it is to participate in Salongo?" Responses use a five-point ordered scale anchored at 1, "They think it is not important at all," and 5, "They think it is very important"; values 2–4 are unlabeled intermediate points. Minority status indicates that the respondent's territory is not the modal territory in the neighborhood. The fitted lines come from one individual-level regression of standardized *salongo* importance on mean-centered ELF, minority status, and their interaction, with no additional controls. Standard errors and the displayed tests are clustered by neighborhood. Points are neighborhood-by-status outcome means; the lines are fitted values from the individual-level model. The level gap is evaluated at mean ELF.

A.1 Context and Leader Characteristics

Table A-1 – LEADER COUNTS AND RECRUITMENT POPULATION SHARES

	Leader counts		Population
	Religious leaders	Traditional leaders	Share (%)
Panel A. Origin territories			
Dibaya	12 (42.9)	14 (50.0)	36.8
Demba	9 (32.1)	7 (25.0)	25.9
Kazumba	2 (7.1)	5 (17.9)	18.2
Dimbelenge	3 (10.7)	1 (3.6)	5.7
Kananga	1 (3.6)	1 (3.6)	5.3
Other / Not Reported	1 (3.6)	0 (0.0)	8.2
Total	28 (100.0)	28 (100.0)	100.0
Panel B. Main denominations			
Pentecostal, autonomous	5 (17.9)	6 (21.4)	22.8
Pentecostal, Branham	3 (10.7)	3 (10.7)	17.7
Catholic	0 (0.0)	4 (14.3)	11.8
Neo-Apostolic	4 (14.3)	4 (14.3)	10.8
Pentecostal, network	4 (14.3)	0 (0.0)	9.1
Kimbanguist	7 (25.0)	2 (7.1)	6.7
Traditional religion	1 (3.6)	1 (3.6)	5.3
Adventist	0 (0.0)	2 (7.1)	4.1
Protestant/Presbyterian	2 (7.1)	2 (7.1)	4.0
Other / not reported	2 (7.1)	4 (14.3)	7.8
Total	28 (100.0)	28 (100.0)	100.0

Notes: Unit of observation is an individual in the full recruitment sample. The sample is restricted to neighborhoods in final assignment waves 1–7. Religious and traditional leader columns report counts, with within-column percentages in parentheses, for unique person-level leaders assigned in the final assignment files using rows with leader_religious or leader_traditional equal to one. Population shares are percentages of recruitment respondents in these neighborhoods with usable neighborhood information ($N = 2,795$). Territory is the respondent's reported origin territory. Denomination uses the coded religion/denomination item rather than the open-text church name. Rows with less than 4 percent of the recruitment population are pooled in Other / not reported.

Table A-2: Territory-of-origin composition of recovered church congregations

	Full recruitment roster		Randomized study sample	
	Exact normalized	Strict fuzzy	Exact normalized	Strict fuzzy
Recovered church clusters	66	71	10	12
Observed congregants in recovered clusters	513	555	67	79
Church clusters spanning multiple origin territories	60	64	10	12
Share of church clusters spanning multiple territories	90.9%	90.1%	100.0%	100.0%
Share of congregants in those church clusters	91.6%	91.4%	100.0%	100.0%
Same-territory pairs within church clusters	48.2%	48.4%	53.2%	55.4%
Expected same-territory pairs under no sorting	48.8%	48.5%	53.6%	55.2%
Observed minus expected same-territory pairs	-0.6%	-0.1%	-0.4%	0.2%
Permutation p-value: positive territorial sorting	0.696	0.570	0.566	0.485

Notes: Following the experimental design, ethnic identity is measured using respondents' reported territory of origin; two respondents are coethnic when their normalized territories match exactly. The analysis uses Christian respondents with a valid territory, neighborhood, and free-text church name in the cumulative waves 1–7 recruitment roster. Church names are linked only within neighborhood-by-denomination blocks. The table retains clusters with at least five observed congregants. The no-sorting benchmark reallocates territories within blocks while preserving recovered church sizes; the one-sided permutation test uses 999 draws. Cluster size is the number observed in recruitment, not total congregation size. Neighborhood blocking can split congregations drawing members from multiple neighborhoods.

Table A-3 – LEADER SELECTION AND INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS

	Observations (1)	Citizen mean (2)	Coeff. on religious leader (3)	Coeff. on traditional leader (4)	p-value of diff., columns 3–4 (5)
Panel A. Demographic and economic selection					
Female	2,681	0.603	**-0.590**	**-0.448**	**0.043**
			[**0.000**]	[**0.000**]	
Age	2,681	34.098	**13.289**	**22.253**	**0.035**
			[**0.000**]	[**0.000**]	
Education (yrs)	2,681	9.531	**1.765**	**1.408**	0.662
			[**0.001**]	[**0.020**]	
Non-clergy salaried job	2,681	0.037	0.033	0.105	0.424
			[0.519]	[0.126]	
Government job	2,681	0.006	0.065	0.030	0.573
			[0.198]	[0.416]	
Log income	1,354	11.558	0.106	**0.417**	0.499
			[0.805]	[**0.007**]	
Kananga tenure	1,298	33.312	**13.644**	**21.930**	0.050
			[**0.000**]	[**0.000**]	
Avenue tenure	1,327	15.032	**12.880**	**12.487**	0.937
			[**0.002**]	[**0.002**]	
Panel B. Institutional embeddedness					
Traditional authority and local embeddedness					
Any traditional role	1,362	0.047	**0.346**	**0.953**	**0.000**
			[**0.001**]	[**0.000**]	
Traditional head role	1,362	0.026	**0.260**	**0.617**	**0.005**
			[**0.006**]	[**0.000**]	
Secrets network: same territory	1,362	0.295	0.073	**0.163**	0.459
			[0.360]	[**0.039**]	
Material network: same territory	1,362	0.425	0.037	**0.134**	0.311
			[0.632]	[**0.043**]	
Planned salongo hours	1,350	16.807	**6.837**	**10.051**	0.296
			[**0.036**]	[**0.000**]	
Religious authority and church embeddedness					
Any religious role	1,362	0.139	**0.862**	0.147	**0.000**
			[**0.000**]	[0.090]	
Religious head role	1,362	0.053	**0.662**	**0.197**	**0.001**
			[**0.000**]	[**0.024**]	
Secrets network: same church	1,362	0.177	0.049	-0.004	0.601
			[0.471]	[0.956]	
Material network: same church	1,362	0.223	0.091	**-0.128**	**0.008**
			[0.126]	[**0.006**]	
Sunday attendance	1,362	3.466	**0.319**	0.176	0.381
			[**0.034**]	[0.113]	
Weekday attendance	1,362	1.590	**0.877**	**1.055**	0.742
			[**0.030**]	[**0.002**]	
Log religious contribution	1,317	6.244	**1.482**	0.882	0.296
			[**0.000**]	[0.089]	
Knowledge of local authorities					
Knows authorities	1,362	0.292	**0.315**	**0.434**	0.087
			[**0.000**]	[**0.000**]	
Knows quartier chief	1,362	0.309	**0.298**	**0.477**	0.057
			[**0.001**]	[**0.000**]	
Knows locality chief	1,362	0.352	**0.256**	**0.470**	0.083
			[**0.008**]	[**0.000**]	
Knows chief phone	1,362	0.071	**0.322**	**0.358**	0.802
			[**0.001**]	[**0.001**]	
Chief help index	1,362	1.499	0.170	**0.705**	0.067
			[0.491]	[**0.003**]	
Panel C. Psychological traits					
Standard psychological measures					
Big Five Inventory (main index)	1,362	-0.005	0.019	**0.226**	0.086
			[0.838]	[**0.025**]	
Extraversion	1,358	3.210	-0.013	0.112	0.346
			[0.884]	[0.298]	
Agreeableness	1,361	3.844	0.030	0.120	0.593
			[0.790]	[0.255]	
Conscientiousness	1,360	3.905	0.023	**0.273**	0.085
			[0.846]	[**0.004**]	
Neuroticism	1,362	2.872	-0.104	-0.175	0.659
			[0.464]	[0.116]	
Openness	1,362	3.192	-0.085	0.058	0.476
			[0.497]	[0.733]	
Emotional intelligence	1,362	4.296	-0.014	0.007	0.803
			[0.870]	[0.936]	
Locus of control	1,362	4.069	-0.140	0.324	0.091
			[0.612]	[0.091]	
Social desirability	1,362	0.560	**0.055**	0.025	0.322
			[**0.022**]	[0.278]	
Religious psychological measures					
Positive RCOPE	1,362	3.794	**0.106**	-0.073	0.073
			[**0.012**]	[0.448]	
Negative RCOPE	1,362	3.540	**-0.605**	-0.162	0.115
			[**0.005**]	[0.249]	
Intrinsic religiosity	1,362	3.326	0.109	0.009	0.297
			[0.077]	[0.888]	
Extrinsic religiosity: personal	1,358	4.416	-0.060	-0.024	0.839
			[0.586]	[0.863]	
Extrinsic religiosity: social	1,362	2.678	-0.320	0.133	0.079
			[0.094]	[0.491]	

Notes: Unit of observation is respondent. Each row reports a separate regression of the listed characteristic on religious-leader and traditional-leader indicators with locality fixed effects; ordinary citizens are the omitted group. Locality-clustered p-values are reported in square brackets. Column 5 reports the p-value for equality of the two leader coefficients. Leaders are coded from selected meeting/panel leader IDs. Demographic job rows use the recruitment survey; the remaining rows use the capped final baseline sample. Network shares code missing network counts as zero and code shares as zero for respondents with a zero-size network.

Table A-4 – SOCIAL PROXIMITY AND PERCEIVED AUTHORITY

Outcome	N	Non-leader		Traditional leader		Religious leader	
		Different ethnicity mean	Same-ethnicity premium	Different ethnicity	Same ethnicity	Different ethnicity	Same ethnicity
Panel A. Initial Social Cohesion and Pre-Existing Ties							
Know							
Know other person	2,894	2.938	**0.131**	**0.383**	**0.466**	**0.294**	**0.491**
			[0.042]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Pre-existing ties							
Same church	2,894	0.024	0.019	0.003	0.039	0.036	0.041
			[0.061]	[0.882]	[0.071]	[0.056]	[0.064]
Same groupement	2,894	0.000	**0.057**	-0.003	**0.087**	-0.001	**0.048**
			[0.000]	[0.402]	[0.000]	[0.831]	[0.005]
Same village	2,894	0.000	**0.046**	-0.003	**0.060**	0.001	**0.048**
			[0.000]	[0.321]	[0.002]	[0.760]	[0.005]
Close family	2,894	0.010	0.013	-0.002	0.024	0.002	0.013
			[0.076]	[0.806]	[0.176]	[0.799]	[0.323]
Extended family	2,894	0.017	0.020	0.008	**0.050**	0.001	0.033
			[0.060]	[0.608]	[0.024]	[0.924]	[0.093]
Reciprocity							
Mutual sickness support	2,894	1.157	**0.168**	**0.309**	**0.310**	0.163	**0.242**
			[0.042]	[0.005]	[0.001]	[0.111]	[0.038]
Willing to help them	2,894	1.268	**0.168**	0.179	**0.241**	0.103	0.141
			[0.033]	[0.077]	[0.017]	[0.304]	[0.209]
Expected help from them	2,894	1.056	0.168	**0.438**	**0.379**	0.224	**0.343**
			[0.094]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.058]	[0.011]
Panel B. Opinions and Authority							
Motivates respondent	2,894	4.041	0.112	0.173	**0.393**	**0.239**	**0.329**
			[0.057]	[0.051]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Moral example	2,894	4.119	**0.160**	0.167	**0.352**	**0.243**	**0.293**
			[0.005]	[0.056]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Trustworthy	2,894	3.845	0.091	0.118	**0.344**	**0.254**	**0.321**
			[0.138]	[0.158]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Hardworking	2,894	4.043	0.046	0.119	**0.340**	**0.301**	**0.268**
			[0.415]	[0.215]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Seen as authority	2,894	3.586	0.084	**0.212**	**0.253**	0.117	**0.210**
			[0.134]	[0.002]	[0.000]	[0.092]	[0.016]
Panel C. Participation and Material Expectations							
Trust they will join	2,894	3.160	0.098	**0.224**	**0.330**	**0.240**	**0.246**
			[0.067]	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.004]
Expected money contribution	2,485	0.109	-0.054	**1.056**	**0.698**	**0.939**	**1.209**
			[0.807]	[0.002]	[0.014]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Expected work days	2,691	3.253	0.071	**0.485**	**0.580**	0.271	0.349
			[0.537]	[0.002]	[0.000]	[0.055]	[0.059]

Notes: Unit of observation is a respondent–referenced participant dyad. The omitted group is a non-leader respondent evaluating a non-leader participant from a different ethnicity. The first data column reports that comparison-group mean; all other columns report differences relative to it. p-values are in square brackets below coefficient estimates. Bold coefficients have $p < 0.05$. All regressions include neighborhood fixed effects and selected respondent-side controls.

A.2 Implementation Checks

Table A-5: ASSIGNMENT BALANCE AND PRETREATMENT PARTICIPATION

	No leader				Leader − no leader, within environment								
Characteristic	$M0$ mean	$M1 - M0$	$H0 - M0$	$H1 - M0$	$T - M0$	$R - M0$	$T - M1$	$R - M1$	$T - H0$	$R - H0$	$T - H1$	$R - H1$	N
Panel A. Characteristics used in rerandomization													
Female	0.565	-0.043	-0.033	-0.022	-0.027	0.021	0.076	-0.007	-0.006	0.017	0.007	-0.005	1,040
	(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.065)	(0.072)	
Predicted property value (USD per cubic meter)	2444.612	-167.307	-75.311	113.918	26.979	-214.419	64.212	624.430	120.720	324.920	-293.164	-290.367	968
	(280.312)	(313.857)	(317.962)	(377.632)	(350.713)	(278.422)	(375.699)	(403.680)	(332.820)	(517.079)	(438.059)	(433.837)	
Community role	0.783	-0.011	0.000	0.054	0.038	0.002	-0.046	-0.058	-0.010	-0.022	-0.040	-0.076	1,040
	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.054)	
Age	34.554	-1.185	-0.293	-0.815	-0.354	-0.711	1.105	0.081	0.499	2.464	1.581	-0.193	1,040
	(1.770)	(1.877)	(1.956)	(2.006)	(2.334)	(2.238)	(2.100)	(1.794)	(2.069)	(1.760)	(2.163)	(1.771)	
Education (years)	9.511	0.130	-0.130	0.402	0.638	0.007	-0.135	0.532	0.352	0.507	-0.157	-0.538	1,040
	(0.353)	(0.480)	(0.494)	(0.514)	(0.556)	(0.506)	(0.491)	(0.445)	(0.457)	(0.462)	(0.482)	(0.455)	
Government job	0.000	0.011	0.011	-0.000	0.012	-0.000	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	0.001	0.012	-0.000	1,040
	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.003)	
Salaried job	0.043	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.006	-0.018	-0.006	0.030	0.006	0.053	0.006	0.030	1,040
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.034)	
Mission church	0.174	-0.011	0.022	0.054	-0.005	-0.005	-0.018	-0.006	0.057	0.009	-0.059	0.024	1,040
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.064)	
Revival church	0.489	0.033	0.098	-0.033	-0.024	0.107	0.003	-0.021	-0.075	-0.098	-0.016	0.008	1,040
	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.062)	
Reported prior salongo participation	0.034	-0.134	-0.098	0.048	0.113	-0.165	0.019	0.217	0.161	-0.031	-0.247**	0.099	1,040
	(0.067)	(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.155)	(0.126)	(0.119)	(0.172)	
Salongo contribution index	0.145	-0.224	-0.319**	-0.032	-0.053	-0.112	0.174	0.088	0.233	0.252*	-0.225*	-0.226	1,040
	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.136)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.171)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.141)	
Biometric support index	0.040	-0.075	0.033	0.111	0.028	0.112	0.120	0.121	-0.107	0.047	-0.268*	-0.040	1,040
	(0.120)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.142)	(0.132)	(0.122)	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.144)	
Household size	8.380	-0.815	-1.130*	-0.228	-0.200	-1.212**	0.020	1.305**	0.394	0.835	1.028*	0.349	1,040
	(0.447)	(0.552)	(0.575)	(0.546)	(0.857)	(0.574)	(0.551)	(0.521)	(0.528)	(0.632)	(0.557)	(0.634)	
Adult share	0.426	0.041	0.027	0.002	0.039	0.025	-0.056	-0.033	0.028	0.018	0.003	0.032	1,039
	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.028)	
Distance to centroid (m)	233.250	-1.463	1.625	-7.836	-4.202	5.058	-5.825	-18.727	-15.452	-1.795	5.550	7.423	1,033
	(31.416)	(15.191)	(14.124)	(13.777)	(15.463)	(15.604)	(14.104)	(14.445)	(12.589)	(12.635)	(12.018)	(13.108)	
Panel B. Additional baseline-survey characteristics													
Demographic and economic characteristics													
Log income	11.474	-0.162	0.243	-0.020	0.008	0.183	0.277	0.209	-0.209	-0.366*	0.411	0.370	1,024
	(0.207)	(0.262)	(0.181)	(0.258)	(0.244)	(0.186)	(0.283)	(0.272)	(0.209)	(0.194)	(0.250)	(0.248)	
Kananga tenure	34.174	-2.673	-0.957	-1.068	-0.658	-1.348	1.909	1.003	0.641	2.859	2.097	-0.995	1,032
	(1.747)	(1.991)	(2.033)	(2.149)	(2.410)	(2.187)	(2.192)	(1.939)	(2.286)	(1.778)	(2.320)	(1.978)	
Avenue tenure	17.272	-3.351*	1.168	-1.778	-0.400	-2.469	2.079	1.358	-5.445***	-3.081	1.596	-0.589	1,012
	(1.690)	(1.791)	(2.177)	(2.224)	(2.131)	(1.785)	(1.733)	(1.873)	(2.064)	(2.242)	(2.029)	(2.172)	

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Assignment Balance and Pretreatment Participation (continued)

	No leader				Leader − no leader, within environment								
Characteristic	$M0$ mean	$M1$ $-M0$	$H0$ $-M0$	$H1$ $-M0$	T $M0$	R $M0$	T $M1$	R $M1$	T $H0$	R $H0$	T $H1$	R $H1$	N
Traditional authority and local embeddedness													
Any traditional role	0.098	-0.042	-0.043	-0.053	-0.037	-0.050	-0.043	0.052	0.019	0.030	-0.008	-0.019	1,032
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.026)	
Traditional head role	0.065	-0.043	-0.043	-0.043	-0.016	-0.064**	-0.009	0.038	-0.009	0.027	-0.009	-0.021	1,032
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.016)	
Secrets network: same territory	0.286	-0.065	0.075	0.079	-0.069	-0.053	-0.014	-0.003	0.053	-0.028	0.020	-0.033	1,032
	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.062)	
Material network: same territory	0.383	-0.101	0.148***	0.176***	-0.074	-0.014	0.077	0.036	0.097*	-0.034	-0.058	0.012	1,032
	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.070)	
Planned salongo hours	17.293	0.224	-1.174	-0.203	-0.554	-0.812	1.282	-0.365	0.697	0.184	1.279	-1.201	1,022
	(1.704)	(1.706)	(1.391)	(1.588)	(1.873)	(1.688)	(2.358)	(1.987)	(1.623)	(1.403)	(1.632)	(1.651)	
Religious authority and church embeddedness													
Any religious role	0.391	-0.007	0.033	-0.062	-0.042	-0.022	-0.120*	-0.015	0.001	-0.078	0.059	0.081	1,032
	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.071)	
Religious head role	0.098	-0.043	-0.043	-0.043	-0.025	-0.062*	-0.055**	-0.007	0.019	0.017	-0.018	0.005	1,032
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.037)	
Secrets network: same church	0.202	-0.021	-0.042	-0.010	-0.067	-0.031	-0.047	0.036	0.012	0.030	0.030	-0.035	1,032
	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.049)	
Material network: same church	0.213	0.012	-0.019	0.006	-0.043	0.006	0.009	0.031	0.069	0.038	-0.011	0.033	1,032
	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.045)	
Sunday attendance	3.467	-0.031	-0.152	-0.097	-0.079	0.178	-0.061	0.209	0.003	0.235	0.231	0.282**	1,032
	(0.087)	(0.144)	(0.148)	(0.136)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.162)	(0.145)	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.151)	(0.135)	
Weekday attendance	1.967	-0.286	-0.413**	-0.198	-0.450*	-0.222	-0.183	0.040	-0.067	0.060	-0.210	-0.079	1,032
	(0.187)	(0.211)	(0.171)	(0.224)	(0.240)	(0.218)	(0.236)	(0.215)	(0.211)	(0.167)	(0.271)	(0.237)	
Log religious contribution	6.365	-0.283	0.023	0.000	-0.046	-0.056	-0.225	0.165	0.132	-0.190	-0.006	0.319	999
	(0.307)	(0.417)	(0.370)	(0.350)	(0.437)	(0.347)	(0.495)	(0.456)	(0.354)	(0.393)	(0.415)	(0.348)	
Knowledge of local authorities													
Knows authorities	0.312	0.019	-0.004	-0.044	-0.015	-0.028	-0.048	0.005	0.016	-0.017	0.035	0.000	1,032
	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.038)	
Knows quartier chief	0.304	0.015	0.043	0.004	0.001	-0.033	0.005	-0.001	-0.016	-0.017	0.042	-0.022	1,032
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.052)	
Knows locality chief	0.359	0.026	0.011	-0.084	-0.041	0.040	-0.033	0.026	-0.023	-0.019	0.053	0.059	1,032
	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.057)	
Knows chief phone	0.076	-0.021	0.011	-0.032	-0.014	-0.038	0.044	0.091**	-0.012	-0.037	0.019	0.067*	1,032
	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.039)	
Chief help index	1.446	0.264	-0.029	0.018	0.064	0.103	-0.090	-0.327*	0.317*	0.029	-0.138	0.089	1,032
	(0.152)	(0.174)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.161)	(0.194)	(0.172)	(0.170)	(0.160)	(0.174)	(0.190)	

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Assignment Balance and Pretreatment Participation (continued)

	No leader				Leader − no leader, within environment								
Characteristic	$M0$ mean	$M1$ $-M0$	$H0$ $-M0$	$H1$ $-M0$	T $M0$	R $M0$	T $M1$	R $M1$	T $H0$	R $H0$	T $H1$	R $H1$	N
Standard psychological measures													
Big Five Inventory (main index)	0.068	-0.040	-0.109	-0.114	-0.115*	-0.051	-0.047	0.009	0.031	0.114	0.037	0.027	1,032
	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.073)	
Extraversion	3.261	-0.063	-0.053	-0.047	-0.004	-0.047	0.005	-0.014	0.033	0.006	-0.052	-0.035	1,031
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.088)	
Agreeableness	3.957	-0.066	-0.114	-0.176*	-0.263***	-0.012	-0.073	0.000	-0.085	0.054	0.145	0.125	1,032
	(0.064)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.116)	(0.094)	
Conscientiousness	3.957	0.039	-0.076	-0.099	-0.079	-0.203*	-0.128	0.014	0.014	0.040	0.165*	0.014	1,030
	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.097)	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.096)	
Neuroticism	2.924	0.005	-0.027	-0.039	-0.033	-0.138	-0.176*	-0.220**	-0.068	-0.135	0.139	-0.004	1,032
	(0.062)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.102)	(0.110)	
Openness	3.266	-0.027	-0.152	-0.099	-0.084	-0.030	-0.145	-0.199*	0.077	0.170	0.013	-0.007	1,032
	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.098)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.126)	(0.090)	(0.095)	
Emotional intelligence	4.353	-0.064	-0.071	0.028	-0.129*	-0.076	-0.017	0.001	-0.013	0.066	-0.116*	-0.044	1,032
	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.066)	
Locus of control	4.065	-0.083	-0.163	0.191	0.008	0.149	0.238	-0.125	0.082	0.217	-0.246	0.045	1,032
	(0.144)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.186)	(0.182)	(0.179)	(0.204)	(0.182)	(0.185)	
Social desirability	0.574	-0.009	-0.028	-0.031	-0.015	-0.043*	-0.000	0.020	0.016	0.031*	0.046**	0.020	1,032
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.019)	
Religious psychological measures													
Positive RCOPE	3.850	-0.025	-0.087	-0.080	-0.087	-0.032	-0.000	0.012	0.049	-0.071	0.032	0.089	1,032
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.065)	
Negative RCOPE	3.391	0.203**	0.220***	0.140	0.121	0.203**	-0.090	-0.012	-0.093	-0.140	-0.083	0.030	1,032
	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.095)	
Intrinsic religiosity	3.376	-0.046	-0.036	-0.046	-0.034	-0.002	0.005	0.002	-0.078*	-0.023	0.027	-0.053	1,032
	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.045)	
Extrinsic religiosity: personal	4.446	0.026	-0.043	0.136*	-0.188**	-0.019	-0.040	-0.092	-0.036	-0.035	-0.101	-0.179**	1,030
	(0.060)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.086)	
Extrinsic religiosity: social	2.743	-0.139	0.022	-0.157	-0.193	-0.069	0.056	-0.081	-0.111	-0.206	0.166	0.075	1,032
	(0.118)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.148)	(0.150)	
Panel C. Post-assignment, pre-intervention participation													
Participation rate over six common pre-treatment days	0.404	-0.069*	-0.029	-0.009	-0.126***	-0.073**	0.002	0.040	-0.022	0.018	-0.085**	-0.068*	1,040
	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.040)	

Notes: This table checks whether the randomized groups contained similar residents before the first meeting. Panel A covers the characteristics used to form the groups, Panel B adds measures from the baseline survey, and Panel C reports administrative participation measured after assignment but before residents learned their treatment. The first column is the average for no-leader residents in mixed groups without disclosure ($M0$). The next three columns compare the other no-leader environments with that group. The final eight columns compare chief and pastor assignments with no leader in the same environment. M and H mean mixed and homogeneous groups; 0 and 1 mean group and individual disclosure. Comparisons are made within neighborhood, and standard errors in parentheses allow for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 3; Figure 1 summarizes the design. Stars use unadjusted two-sided p-values. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A-6 – ROSTER FORMATION, REPLACEMENTS, AND COMPOSITION FIDELITY

Leader	Composition	Disclosure	Assigned residents	Replacement share	Mean territories	Final chief-territory share	Composition fidelity
No leader	Mixed	Without disclosure	92	21.7	3.04	22.8	96.4
		With disclosure	92	18.5	3.07	22.8	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	92	17.4	1.07	97.8	92.9
		With disclosure	92	22.8	1.07	97.8	92.6
Traditional	Mixed	Without disclosure	84	26.2	2.61	23.8	96.4
		With disclosure	84	27.4	2.82	28.6	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	84	21.4	1.07	96.4	92.9
		With disclosure	84	25.0	1.11	95.2	89.3
Religious	Mixed	Without disclosure	84	29.8	2.79	26.2	96.4
		With disclosure	84	21.4	2.82	26.2	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	84	15.5	1.07	97.6	92.9
		With disclosure	84	20.2	1.18	94.0	85.7
Total			1,040	22.2	1.98	60.7	94.6

Notes: This table checks whether the planned groups were formed as intended. "Replacement share" is the percentage of residents whose final roster entry differs from the original assignment. "Mean territories" counts the territorial origins represented among ordinary residents. "Final chief-territory share" is the percentage from the chief's territory. Composition is correct when every observed resident in a homogeneous group comes from that territory and a mixed group contains at least two territories. Territory is observed for 335 of 336 groups; all shares are percentages. No-leader cells contain 92 residents rather than 84 because Waves 1–2 used a different fourth ordinary resident in each no-leader team, and those residents remain in the analysis sample. From Wave 3 onward, one person filled that role in all four no-leader teams and was excluded from the analysis, just like the repeated chief and pastor. The table is discussed in Section 3; Figure 1 shows where these groups enter the experiment.

Table A-7 – TREATMENT DELIVERY AT THE ACCOUNTABILITY MEETINGS

Leader	Composition	Disclosure	Assigned residents	Resident attendance	Realized group size	Full-group share	Leader attendance	M1 announcement verified	M2 record verified
No leader	Mixed	Without disclosure	92	95.7	3.82	82.1	–	96.4	100.0
		With disclosure	92	95.7	3.75	75.0	–	100.0	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	92	97.8	3.82	85.7	–	100.0	100.0
		With disclosure	92	91.3	3.64	64.3	–	100.0	100.0
Traditional	Mixed	Without disclosure	84	94.0	3.82	85.7	100.0	100.0	100.0
		With disclosure	84	96.4	3.86	85.7	96.4	96.4	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	84	92.9	3.79	78.6	100.0	100.0	100.0
		With disclosure	84	94.0	3.82	82.1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Religious	Mixed	Without disclosure	84	95.2	3.86	89.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
		With disclosure	84	96.4	3.89	89.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	84	96.4	3.89	89.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
		With disclosure	84	94.0	3.82	82.1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total			1,040	95.0	3.82	82.4	99.6	99.4	100.0

Notes: This table checks whether residents, leaders, and information arrived at the meetings as planned. Resident attendance refers to ordinary residents on the analysis roster. Realized group size counts everyone scheduled for the team, including the leader or no-leader participant; "full group" means that all four attended. Leader attendance verifies that the assigned chief or pastor was present. The last two columns verify that the assigned information was announced at Meeting 1 and that the team's performance record was shown at Meeting 2. Assignment alone does not count as delivery. Attendance and verification are percentages; group size is a count. No-leader cells contain 92 residents rather than 84 because Waves 1–2 used a different fourth ordinary resident in each no-leader team, and those residents remain in the analysis sample. From Wave 3 onward, the same person filled that role in all four teams and was excluded, like the repeated leaders. The table is discussed in Section 3; Figure 1 shows the experimental cells.

Table A-8 – ADMINISTRATIVE, SURVEY, AND AUDIO COVERAGE

Leader	Composition	Disclosure	Assigned residents	Baseline survey	Meeting 1 usable	Meeting 2 usable	Endline survey	Audio recorded	Administrative outcome
No leader	Mixed	Without disclosure	92	100.0	95.7	93.5	88.0	89.3	100.0
		With disclosure	92	98.9	95.7	90.2	95.7	57.1	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	92	100.0	97.8	94.6	93.5	78.6	100.0
		With disclosure	92	98.9	91.3	92.4	97.8	64.3	100.0
Traditional	Mixed	Without disclosure	84	100.0	94.0	92.9	94.0	92.9	100.0
		With disclosure	84	98.8	96.4	90.5	92.9	60.7	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	84	98.8	92.9	85.7	94.0	89.3	100.0
		With disclosure	84	98.8	94.0	92.9	97.6	60.7	100.0
Religious	Mixed	Without disclosure	84	100.0	95.2	89.3	85.7	89.3	100.0
		With disclosure	84	100.0	96.4	94.0	95.2	64.3	100.0
	Homogeneous	Without disclosure	84	100.0	96.4	90.5	96.4	100.0	100.0
		With disclosure	84	98.8	94.0	86.9	86.9	50.0	100.0
Total			1,040	99.4	95.0	91.2	93.2	74.7	100.0

Notes: This table shows the share of residents or groups with usable data from each source. The survey columns count usable resident interviews; Meeting 1 and Meeting 2 exclude forms that recorded the resident as unavailable. Audio is the share of randomized groups with a verified recording. Administrative coverage means that the resident has the participation outcome used in the main results. Every covered resident contributes the same six-day window after Meeting 1 through the day of Meeting 2. All entries are percentages. No-leader cells contain 92 residents rather than 84 because Waves 1–2 used a different fourth ordinary resident in each no-leader team, and those residents remain in the analysis sample. From Wave 3 onward, the same person filled that role in all four teams and was excluded, like the repeated leaders. The table is discussed in Section 3; Figure 1 shows the experimental cells.

A.3 Main Estimates

Table A-9 – LEADER EFFECTS ON SALONGO PARTICIPATION

	Leader by composition				Environment specific		
	FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth		FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed	0.72	0.68	0.55	Without disclosure	-0.29	-0.31	0.18
	(2.86)	(2.86)	(2.72)		(3.48)	(3.48)	(3.39)
				With disclosure	1.75	1.67	0.94
					(4.53)	(4.52)	(4.24)
Homogeneous	4.82*	4.88*	4.93*	Without disclosure	-0.31	-0.34	-0.18
	(2.91)	(2.90)	(2.91)		(4.46)	(4.45)	(4.47)
				With disclosure	9.95***	10.13***	10.06***
					(3.63)	(3.63)	(3.63)
Religious leader							
Mixed	6.29**	6.28**	6.33**	Without disclosure	9.18**	9.16**	9.10**
	(2.94)	(2.95)	(2.85)		(3.97)	(3.98)	(3.93)
				With disclosure	3.41	3.40	3.56
					(4.30)	(4.32)	(4.09)
Homogeneous	0.83	0.83	0.83	Without disclosure	1.66	1.67	1.59
	(2.52)	(2.52)	(2.53)		(3.81)	(3.80)	(3.80)
				With disclosure	0.01	-0.01	0.08
					(3.27)	(3.26)	(3.32)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts							
Mixed: T − R	-5.57*	-5.60*	-5.77**	Mixed, with: T − R	-1.66	-1.73	-2.61
	(2.98)	(3.00)	(2.89)		(4.40)	(4.41)	(4.06)
				Mixed, without: T − R	-9.47**	-9.47**	-8.92**
					(3.98)	(4.01)	(4.08)
Homogeneous: T − R	3.98	4.05	4.10	Homogeneous, with: T − R	9.94**	10.13**	9.98**
	(2.94)	(2.92)	(2.98)		(4.03)	(4.00)	(4.05)
				Homogeneous, without: T − R	-1.97	-2.01	-1.77
					(4.13)	(4.12)	(4.26)
Δ_C: composition gradient	9.55**	9.65**	9.87**	Δ_E: H, with − M, without	19.41***	19.60***	18.90***
	(4.20)	(4.20)	(4.16)		(5.67)	(5.69)	(5.78)
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics							
Mixed	58.33	58.33	58.33	Without disclosure	58.88	58.88	58.88
	(1.99)	(1.99)	(1.89)		(2.46)	(2.44)	(2.27)
				With disclosure	57.79	57.79	57.79
					(3.14)	(3.14)	(3.01)
Homogeneous	56.79	56.79	56.79	Without disclosure	57.79	57.79	57.79
	(1.76)	(1.76)	(1.75)		(2.91)	(2.91)	(2.85)
				With disclosure	55.80	55.80	55.80
					(1.96)	(1.98)	(2.00)
Wald: all no-leader cells equal	p = 0.562	p = 0.562	p = 0.549		p = 0.789	p = 0.790	p = 0.777
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040	1,040
Group-neighborhood clusters	336	336	336		336	336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28	28		28	28	28
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretreatment participation control	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
25m spillover control	No	Yes	Yes		No	Yes	Yes
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	No	No	Yes		No	No	Yes

Notes: This table is the numerical companion to Figure 2. The outcome is each resident's average participation over the six eligible days after Meeting 1 through the day of Meeting 2, reported in percentage points. Panel A compares each leader assignment with no leader in the same environment. Panel B compares chiefs with pastors and then summarizes how that gap changes with composition (Δ_C) and between homogeneous groups with disclosure and mixed groups without disclosure (Δ_E). Panel C shows participation without a leader, making it possible to check whether the comparison groups started from similar levels. The first set of columns reports the preferred estimates. The second adds nearby treatment exposure, and the third also adds gender and wealth-group controls. Every specification adjusts for pretreatment participation and compares residents within the same neighborhood, composition, and disclosure condition. Standard errors in parentheses allow for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 4.2. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.3.1 Alternative Post-Outcome Windows

The main outcome averages participation over six administrative days strictly after the first meeting through and including the second-meeting day. Figure A-2 maps this window and the timing alternatives onto the implementation timeline. Table A-10 reports estimates for the main window, the intervening middle period, the final week of each wave, and all eligible post-treatment periods. Every specification uses the same respondent sample, fixed effects, pretreatment participation control, and clustering level.




Figure A-2: Outcome windows used in the timing robustness analysis.

Table A-10 – ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE POST-OUTCOME WINDOWS

	Leader by composition					Environment specific			
	Main window	Middle period	Final week	All post		Main window	Middle period	Final week	All post
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader									
Traditional leader									
Mixed	0.72	-0.59	-0.45	-0.29	Without disclosure	-0.29	0.82	-0.35	0.08
	(2.86)	(2.51)	(2.44)	(2.04)		(3.48)	(3.60)	(3.58)	(2.99)
					With disclosure	1.75	-1.98	-0.51	-0.64
						(4.53)	(3.50)	(3.35)	(2.80)
Homogeneous	4.82*	0.90	-0.40	1.27	Without disclosure	-0.31	-4.60	-7.89*	-4.80
	(2.91)	(3.03)	(2.66)	(2.39)		(4.46)	(4.44)	(4.17)	(3.69)
					With disclosure	9.95***	6.43	7.13**	7.36***
						(3.63)	(3.96)	(2.91)	(2.80)
Religious leader									
Mixed	6.29**	5.93**	4.41*	5.21**	Without disclosure	9.18**	9.61**	5.59	7.76**
	(2.94)	(2.67)	(2.54)	(2.19)		(3.97)	(3.81)	(3.97)	(3.20)
					With disclosure	3.41	2.25	3.22	2.66
						(4.30)	(3.69)	(3.20)	(2.96)
Homogeneous	0.83	-0.27	-3.05	-1.20	Without disclosure	1.66	0.89	-5.18	-1.20
	(2.52)	(2.59)	(2.37)	(2.03)		(3.81)	(3.61)	(3.59)	(3.00)
					With disclosure	0.01	-1.41	-0.90	-1.18
						(3.27)	(3.63)	(2.92)	(2.60)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts									
Mixed: T − R	-5.57*	-6.52**	-4.85*	-5.50**	Mixed, with: T − R	-1.66	-4.24	-3.74	-3.30
	(2.98)	(2.72)	(2.54)	(2.19)		(4.40)	(3.98)	(3.28)	(3.01)
					Mixed, without: T − R	-9.47**	-8.78**	-5.94	-7.69**
						(3.98)	(3.68)	(3.88)	(3.15)
Homogeneous: T − R	3.98	1.17	2.66	2.47	Homogeneous, with: T − R	9.94**	7.84**	8.03***	8.54***
	(2.94)	(2.82)	(2.42)	(2.22)		(4.03)	(3.58)	(2.96)	(2.75)
					Homogeneous, without: T − R	-1.97	-5.48	-2.71	-3.60
						(4.13)	(4.15)	(3.65)	(3.25)
Δ_C: composition gradient	9.55**	7.69*	7.51**	7.97**	Δ_E: H, with − M, without	19.41***	16.62***	13.97***	16.23***
	(4.20)	(3.92)	(3.52)	(3.12)		(5.67)	(5.14)	(4.88)	(4.18)
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics									
Mixed	58.33	42.81	26.63	39.65	Without disclosure	58.88	42.38	27.64	39.90
	(1.99)	(1.73)	(1.70)	(1.43)		(2.46)	(2.60)	(2.49)	(2.11)
					With disclosure	57.79	43.24	25.62	39.40
						(3.14)	(2.23)	(2.30)	(1.93)
Homogeneous	56.79	43.86	27.95	40.30	Without disclosure	57.79	45.53	32.45	42.75
	(1.76)	(1.96)	(1.81)	(1.55)		(2.91)	(2.71)	(2.89)	(2.40)
					With disclosure	55.80	42.18	23.45	37.85
						(1.96)	(2.82)	(2.01)	(1.89)
Wald: all no-leader cells equal	p = 0.562	p = 0.689	p = 0.594	p = 0.757		p = 0.789	p = 0.812	p = 0.075	p = 0.457
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Group-neighborhood clusters	336	336	336	336		336	336	336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28	28	28		28	28	28	28
Post periods: mean	6.0	9.5	7.0	22.5		6.0	9.5	7.0	22.5
Post periods: range	6–6	7–12	7–7	20–25		6–6	7–12	7–7	20–25
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretreatment participation control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25m spillover control	No	No	No	No		No	No	No	No
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	No	No	No	No		No	No	No	No

Notes: All columns control for pretreatment participation and include neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. The main window averages participation strictly after the assigned first meeting through and including the assigned second-meeting day. The middle period runs from the assigned second-meeting cutoff through the day before the final week; the final week covers $T-6$ through T, where T is the terminal panel day. The all-post window uses every non-treatment day after the assigned first meeting. Panel A compares each leader assignment to no leader within the relevant fixed-effect cell. Panel B reports traditional-minus-religious contrasts and the composition and environment gradients. Panel C reports model-implied no-leader reference means and equality tests. Panel B and Panel C inference uses the clustered delta method. Standard errors are clustered one-way at the group-neighborhood level. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-11 – LABOR CONTRIBUTION OUTCOMES IN THE FIRST POST-MEETING WINDOW

	Leader by composition					Environment specific			
	Participation rate	Attendance days	Total hours	Total effort		Participation rate	Attendance days	Total hours	Total effort
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader									
Traditional leader									
Mixed	0.007	0.060	-0.284	-0.080	Without disclosure	-0.003	0.021	-0.544	-0.146
	(0.029)	(0.172)	(0.651)	(0.562)		(0.035)	(0.215)	(0.876)	(0.706)
					With disclosure	0.017	0.100	-0.023	-0.012
						(0.045)	(0.270)	(0.962)	(0.881)
Homogeneous	0.048*	0.250	1.171*	0.975*	Without disclosure	-0.003	-0.051	0.298	0.080
	(0.029)	(0.170)	(0.652)	(0.567)		(0.045)	(0.256)	(0.921)	(0.850)
					With disclosure	0.100***	0.552**	2.044**	1.872**
						(0.036)	(0.219)	(0.913)	(0.734)
Religious leader									
Mixed	0.063**	0.394**	0.911	1.108*	Without disclosure	0.092**	0.585**	1.729*	1.506**
	(0.029)	(0.178)	(0.697)	(0.578)		(0.040)	(0.242)	(0.961)	(0.763)
					With disclosure	0.034	0.203	0.094	0.710
						(0.043)	(0.259)	(1.000)	(0.869)
Homogeneous	0.008	0.026	-0.075	0.028	Without disclosure	0.017	0.032	0.009	-0.148
	(0.025)	(0.149)	(0.599)	(0.520)		(0.038)	(0.222)	(0.850)	(0.754)
					With disclosure	0.000	0.020	-0.159	0.205
						(0.033)	(0.197)	(0.841)	(0.712)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts									
Mixed: T − R	-0.056*	-0.334*	-1.195*	-1.188**	Mixed, without: T − R	-0.095**	-0.564**	-2.273**	-1.652**
	(0.030)	(0.180)	(0.689)	(0.588)		(0.040)	(0.244)	(0.940)	(0.802)
	[Holm p = 0.188]	[Holm p = 0.188]	[Holm p = 0.188]	[Holm p = 0.177]		[Holm p = 0.064]	[Holm p = 0.064]	[Holm p = 0.064]	[Holm p = 0.064]
					Mixed, with: T − R	-0.017	-0.103	-0.117	-0.723
						(0.044)	(0.262)	(0.989)	(0.860)
						[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]
Homogeneous: T − R	0.040	0.224	1.246*	0.946	Homogeneous, without: T − R	-0.020	-0.082	0.289	0.227
	(0.029)	(0.170)	(0.645)	(0.580)		(0.041)	(0.239)	(0.853)	(0.829)
	[Holm p = 0.352]	[Holm p = 0.352]	[Holm p = 0.216]	[Holm p = 0.312]		[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]
					Homogeneous, with: T − R	0.099**	0.532**	2.203**	1.666**
						(0.040)	(0.237)	(0.953)	(0.804)
						[Holm p = 0.056]	[Holm p = 0.064]	[Holm p = 0.064]	[Holm p = 0.064]
Δ_C	0.096**	0.558**	2.441**	2.134**	Δ_E	0.194***	1.096***	4.476***	3.318***
	(0.042)	(0.249)	(0.946)	(0.827)		(0.057)	(0.341)	(1.342)	(1.137)
	[Holm p = 0.047]	[Holm p = 0.047]	[Holm p = 0.041]	[Holm p = 0.041]		[Holm p = 0.003]	[Holm p = 0.003]	[Holm p = 0.003]	[Holm p = 0.004]
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics									
Mixed	0.583	3.446	13.210	11.334	Without disclosure	0.589	3.478	13.438	11.571
	(0.020)	(0.120)	(0.465)	(0.390)		(0.025)	(0.150)	(0.624)	(0.470)
					With disclosure	0.578	3.413	12.983	11.098
						(0.031)	(0.188)	(0.689)	(0.625)
Homogeneous	0.568	3.364	12.703	10.872	Without disclosure	0.578	3.457	12.877	11.272
	(0.018)	(0.105)	(0.431)	(0.357)		(0.029)	(0.170)	(0.650)	(0.549)
					With disclosure	0.558	3.272	12.529	10.473
						(0.020)	(0.123)	(0.565)	(0.452)
Wald: homogeneous = mixed	p = 0.562	p = 0.610	p = 0.423	p = 0.383	Wald: four cells equal	p = 0.789	p = 0.699	p = 0.758	p = 0.389
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Group-neighborhood clusters	336	336	336	336		336	336	336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28	28	28		28	28	28	28
Matched pretreatment outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Outcomes aggregate the frozen six-day main-outcome window, strictly after Meeting 1 through and including the Meeting 2 day; the Meeting 1 day is excluded. Panel A compares each leader assignment with no leader. Panel B reports direct traditional-minus-religious contrasts, Δ_C, and Δ_E. Parentheses contain group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors; bracketed values are Holm-adjusted p-values across the displayed outcome family for the same contrast. Panel C reports model-implied no-leader means and equality tests. Models include the matched pre-treatment outcome and neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Participation is the daily rate; attendance is the number of labor days; hours and effort are window totals, with nonattendance coded zero. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-12 – LABOR CONTRIBUTION OUTCOME ROBUSTNESS

	Leader by composition		Environment specific
	Asinh total hours		Asinh total hours
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader			
Traditional leader			
Mixed	-0.002	Without disclosure	-0.018
	(0.119)		(0.164)
		With disclosure	0.014
			(0.172)
Homogeneous	0.192*	Without disclosure	-0.032
	(0.108)		(0.157)
		With disclosure	0.416***
			(0.145)
Religious leader			
Mixed	0.179	Without disclosure	0.313**
	(0.116)		(0.159)
		With disclosure	0.044
			(0.169)
Homogeneous	0.043	Without disclosure	0.031
	(0.095)		(0.140)
		With disclosure	0.055
			(0.125)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts			
Mixed: T − R	-0.181	Mixed, without: T − R	-0.331*
	(0.122)		(0.172)
	[Holm p = 0.140]		[Holm p = 0.055]
		Mixed, with: T − R	-0.030
			(0.171)
			[Holm p = 0.862]
Homogeneous: T − R	0.149	Homogeneous, without: T − R	-0.062
	(0.109)		(0.152)
	[Holm p = 0.174]		[Holm p = 0.683]
		Homogeneous, with: T − R	0.361**
			(0.152)
			[Holm p = 0.018]
Δ_C	0.330**	Δ_E	0.692***
	(0.164)		(0.230)
	[Holm p = 0.046]		[Holm p = 0.003]
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics			
Mixed	2.669	Without disclosure	2.683
	(0.080)		(0.106)
		With disclosure	2.654
			(0.120)
Homogeneous	2.594	Without disclosure	2.622
	(0.065)		(0.102)
		With disclosure	2.565
			(0.079)
Wald: homogeneous = mixed	p = 0.468	Wald: four cells equal	p = 0.822
Observations	1,040		1,040
Group-neighborhood clusters	336		336
Neighborhoods	28		28
Matched pretreatment outcome control	Yes		Yes
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes		Yes

Notes: Outcomes aggregate the frozen six-day main-outcome window, strictly after Meeting 1 through and including the Meeting 2 day; the Meeting 1 day is excluded. Panel A compares each leader assignment with no leader. Panel B reports direct traditional-minus-religious contrasts, Δ_C, and Δ_E. Parentheses contain group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors; bracketed values are Holm-adjusted p-values across the displayed outcome family for the same contrast. Panel C reports model-implied no-leader means and equality tests. Models include the matched pre-treatment outcome and neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Asinh hours retains zero-valued windows, preserving the full frozen analysis sample. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-13 – CASH AND IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FIRST POST-MEETING WINDOW

	Leader by composition					Environment specific			
	Any cash contribution	Cash total	Any in-kind contribution	In-kind value		Any cash contribution	Cash total	Any in-kind contribution	In-kind value
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader									
Traditional leader									
Mixed	0.030*	14.971	-0.005	-53.318	Without disclosure	0.014	31.786	-0.074*	-258.738**
	(0.017)	(27.229)	(0.032)	(101.388)		(0.022)	(44.980)	(0.041)	(127.396)
					With disclosure	0.046*	-1.842	0.065	149.692
						(0.025)	(30.774)	(0.047)	(154.389)
Homogeneous	0.013	-1.271	0.007	-1131.884*	Without disclosure	0.012	6.736	-0.001	-404.699*
	(0.014)	(14.186)	(0.040)	(677.600)		(0.018)	(8.137)	(0.058)	(216.039)
					With disclosure	0.013	-9.239	0.015	-1861.438
						(0.020)	(27.015)	(0.054)	(1332.055)
Religious leader									
Mixed	0.006	-7.053	0.053	-6.317	Without disclosure	0.002	5.595	-0.011	-96.757
	(0.016)	(20.885)	(0.034)	(99.060)		(0.026)	(29.524)	(0.039)	(138.257)
					With disclosure	0.010	-19.699	0.117**	81.611
						(0.020)	(29.577)	(0.054)	(140.508)
Homogeneous	0.001	-13.396	0.001	-957.190	Without disclosure	0.012	3.165	0.067	-0.268
	(0.013)	(13.200)	(0.041)	(684.773)		(0.020)	(8.133)	(0.059)	(237.941)
					With disclosure	-0.010	-29.877	-0.065	-1919.618
						(0.018)	(24.873)	(0.055)	(1336.608)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts									
Mixed: T − R	0.024	22.024	-0.058	-47.001	Mixed, without: T − R	0.012	26.190	-0.064	-161.981
	(0.020)	(27.104)	(0.037)	(112.707)		(0.031)	(48.356)	(0.046)	(122.633)
	[Holm p = 0.702]	[Holm p = 0.834]	[Holm p = 0.481]	[Holm p = 0.834]		[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 0.666]	[Holm p = 0.666]
					Mixed, with: T − R	0.036	17.857	-0.052	68.082
						(0.025)	(24.618)	(0.057)	(187.360)
						[Holm p = 0.647]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]
Homogeneous: T − R	0.012	12.125	0.007	-174.694	Homogeneous, without: T − R	-0.000	3.571	-0.067	-404.431*
	(0.013)	(11.360)	(0.043)	(486.568)		(0.017)	(6.854)	(0.062)	(208.376)
	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]		[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 0.830]	[Holm p = 0.212]
					Homogeneous, with: T − R	0.023	20.638	0.081	58.181
						(0.020)	(21.559)	(0.058)	(940.972)
						[Holm p = 0.735]	[Holm p = 0.735]	[Holm p = 0.647]	[Holm p = 0.951]
Δ_C	-0.012	-9.898	0.064	-127.693	Δ_E	0.011	-5.552	0.144*	220.161
	(0.024)	(29.392)	(0.057)	(499.382)		(0.037)	(52.956)	(0.074)	(948.659)
	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]		[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 1.000]	[Holm p = 0.203]	[Holm p = 1.000]
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics									
Mixed	0.022	38.315	0.266	543.478	Without disclosure	0.033	38.587	0.293	572.826
	(0.009)	(15.616)	(0.021)	(61.742)		(0.010)	(17.678)	(0.025)	(100.143)
					With disclosure	0.011	38.043	0.239	514.130
						(0.014)	(25.631)	(0.031)	(67.275)
Homogeneous	0.016	21.739	0.288	1619.022	Without disclosure	0.011	5.435	0.261	747.826
	(0.010)	(11.417)	(0.026)	(611.892)		(0.014)	(6.318)	(0.037)	(172.380)
					With disclosure	0.022	38.043	0.315	2490.217
						(0.013)	(21.843)	(0.037)	(1201.373)
Wald: homogeneous = mixed	p = 0.679	p = 0.392	p = 0.513	p = 0.080	Wald: four cells equal	p = 0.526	p = 0.122	p = 0.354	p = 0.236
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Group-neighborhood clusters	336	336	336	336		336	336	336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28	28	28		28	28	28	28
Matched pretreatment outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Outcomes aggregate the frozen six-day main-outcome window, strictly after Meeting 1 through and including the Meeting 2 day; the Meeting 1 day is excluded. Panel A compares each leader assignment with no leader. Panel B reports direct traditional-minus-religious contrasts, Δ_C, and Δ_E. Parentheses contain group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors; bracketed values are Holm-adjusted p-values across the displayed outcome family for the same contrast. Panel C reports model-implied no-leader means and equality tests. Models include the matched pre-treatment outcome and neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Cash and in-kind extensive margins are window indicators; amounts are window totals in Congolese francs (CDF). The source-level identity combined material value = cash + in-kind is validated before estimation. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-14 – CASH AND IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION ROBUSTNESS

	Leader by composition			Environment specific	
	Asinh cash total	Asinh in-kind value		Asinh cash total	Asinh in-kind value
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader					
Traditional leader					
Mixed	0.221*	-0.067	Without disclosure	0.137	-0.653**
	(0.125)	(0.248)		(0.173)	(0.318)
			With disclosure	0.305*	0.518
				(0.182)	(0.366)
Homogeneous	0.086	-0.059	Without disclosure	0.087	-0.180
	(0.097)	(0.316)		(0.119)	(0.459)
			With disclosure	0.084	0.061
				(0.150)	(0.428)
Religious leader					
Mixed	0.046	0.419	Without disclosure	0.034	-0.112
	(0.115)	(0.266)		(0.178)	(0.300)
			With disclosure	0.059	0.950**
				(0.148)	(0.427)
Homogeneous	-0.005	-0.051	Without disclosure	0.076	0.486
	(0.094)	(0.329)		(0.133)	(0.472)
			With disclosure	-0.086	-0.588
				(0.131)	(0.441)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts					
Mixed: T − R	0.175	-0.486*	Mixed, without: T − R	0.103	-0.540
	(0.147)	(0.288)		(0.232)	(0.347)
	[Holm p = 0.235]	[Holm p = 0.185]		[Holm p = 0.658]	[Holm p = 0.241]
			Mixed, with: T − R	0.247	-0.432
				(0.182)	(0.455)
				[Holm p = 0.350]	[Holm p = 0.350]
Homogeneous: T − R	0.090	-0.009	Homogeneous, without: T − R	0.011	-0.666
	(0.091)	(0.339)		(0.111)	(0.492)
	[Holm p = 0.641]	[Holm p = 0.980]		[Holm p = 0.922]	[Holm p = 0.353]
			Homogeneous, with: T − R	0.170	0.649
				(0.144)	(0.449)
				[Holm p = 0.299]	[Holm p = 0.299]
Δ_C	-0.084	0.477	Δ_E	0.067	1.189**
	(0.173)	(0.445)		(0.273)	(0.568)
	[Holm p = 0.626]	[Holm p = 0.567]		[Holm p = 0.805]	[Holm p = 0.074]
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics					
Mixed	0.161	2.122	Without disclosure	0.225	2.334
	(0.063)	(0.160)		(0.068)	(0.194)
			With disclosure	0.096	1.909
				(0.108)	(0.235)
Homogeneous	0.122	2.327	Without disclosure	0.075	2.123
	(0.069)	(0.211)		(0.096)	(0.296)
			With disclosure	0.170	2.531
				(0.099)	(0.299)
Wald: homogeneous = mixed	p = 0.682	p = 0.437	Wald: four cells equal	p = 0.558	p = 0.349
Observations	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040
Group-neighborhood clusters	336	336		336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28		28	28
Matched pretreatment outcome control	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes

Notes: Outcomes aggregate the frozen six-day main-outcome window, strictly after Meeting 1 through and including the Meeting 2 day; the Meeting 1 day is excluded. Panel A compares each leader assignment with no leader. Panel B reports direct traditional-minus-religious contrasts, Δ_C, and Δ_E. Parentheses contain group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors; bracketed values are Holm-adjusted p-values across the displayed outcome family for the same contrast. Panel C reports model-implied no-leader means and equality tests. Models include the matched pre-treatment outcome and neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Inverse-hyperbolic-sine specifications retain zero-valued windows. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-15 – RANDOMIZATION INFERENCE FOR MAIN LEADER EFFECTS

	Leader by composition				Environment specific		
	Estimate	Clustered SE	RI p		Estimate	Clustered SE	RI p
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed	0.72	(2.86)	0.817	Without disclosure	-0.29	(3.48)	0.951
				With disclosure	1.75	(4.53)	0.696
Homogeneous	4.82*	(2.91)	0.118	Without disclosure	-0.31	(4.46)	0.943
				With disclosure	9.95***	(3.63)	0.028
Religious leader							
Mixed	6.29**	(2.94)	0.046	Without disclosure	9.18**	(3.97)	0.038
				With disclosure	3.41	(4.30)	0.447
Homogeneous	0.83	(2.52)	0.788	Without disclosure	1.66	(3.81)	0.703
				With disclosure	0.01	(3.27)	0.998
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts							
Mixed: T − R	-5.57*	(2.98)	0.089	Mixed, with: T − R	-1.66	(4.40)	0.724
				Mixed, without: T − R	-9.47**	(3.98)	0.043
Homogeneous: T − R	3.98	(2.94)	0.227	Homogeneous, with: T − R	9.94**	(4.03)	0.033
				Homogeneous, without: T − R	-1.97	(4.13)	0.654
Δ_C: composition gradient	9.55**	(4.20)	0.039	Δ_E: H, with − M, without	19.41***	(5.67)	0.003
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics							
Mixed	58.33	(1.99)		Without disclosure	58.88	(2.46)	
				With disclosure	57.79	(3.14)	
Homogeneous	56.79	(1.76)		Without disclosure	57.79	(2.91)	
				With disclosure	55.80	(1.96)	
Wald: all no-leader cells equal	p = 0.562				p = 0.789		
Observations	1,040				1,040		
Group-neighborhood clusters	336				336		
Neighborhoods	28				28		
NQC fixed effects	Yes				Yes		
Pretreatment participation control	Yes				Yes		
Formation-stage permutations	5,000				5,000		

Notes: The table follows the specification and row structure of the paper's main results table. The outcome is average post-first-meeting salongo participation, in percentage points. All models include the six-day pretreatment participation control and neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Panel A compares each leader assignment with no leader in the same fixed-effect cell. Panel B reports the same leader contrasts as the main table; Δ_C is the difference between the Traditional and Religious composition gradients, and Δ_E is the Traditional-minus-Religious contrast in homogeneous groups with disclosure minus the same contrast in mixed groups without disclosure. Panel C reports model-implied no-leader reference means and clustered delta-method tests that the displayed no-leader means are equal. Standard errors are clustered one-way at the group–neighborhood level. RI p-values are two-sided and come from 5,000 conditional replays of the realized participants through the group-formation stage. The replay preserves wave-specific group sizes, randomized filling order, composition and fallback rules, gender × wealth pattern targets, mixed-group territory diversity, and treatment coding; it does not replay respondent sampling or the original balance-selection stage. The replay seed is 20260731. Stars use clustered asymptotic inference: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-16 – ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE CLUSTERING ASSUMPTIONS

	Leader by composition				Environment specific		
	Group	Leader cluster	Neighborhood		Group	Leader cluster	Neighborhood
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed	0.72	0.72	0.72	Without disclosure	-0.29	-0.29	-0.29
	(2.86)	(3.15)	(3.74)		(3.48)	(3.46)	(3.65)
				With disclosure	1.75	1.75	1.75
					(4.53)	(4.55)	(5.48)
Homogeneous	4.82*	4.82	4.82	Without disclosure	-0.31	-0.31	-0.31
	(2.91)	(2.99)	(3.37)		(4.46)	(4.48)	(5.60)
				With disclosure	9.95***	9.95***	9.95**
					(3.63)	(3.65)	(4.22)
Religious leader							
Mixed	6.29**	6.29**	6.29*	Without disclosure	9.18**	9.18**	9.18*
	(2.94)	(3.06)	(3.62)		(3.97)	(3.97)	(4.82)
				With disclosure	3.41	3.41	3.41
					(4.30)	(4.31)	(5.09)
Homogeneous	0.83	0.83	0.83	Without disclosure	1.66	1.66	1.66
	(2.52)	(2.78)	(2.92)		(3.81)	(3.82)	(4.15)
				With disclosure	0.01	0.01	0.01
					(3.27)	(3.31)	(3.48)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts							
Mixed: T − R	-5.57*	-5.57*	-5.57	Mixed, with: T − R	-1.66	-1.66	-1.66
	(2.98)	(3.11)	(3.50)		(4.40)	(4.42)	(4.95)
				Mixed, without: T − R	-9.47**	-9.47**	-9.47*
					(3.98)	(4.00)	(4.76)
Homogeneous: T − R	3.98	3.98	3.98	Homogeneous, with: T − R	9.94**	9.94**	9.94*
	(2.94)	(3.36)	(4.21)		(4.03)	(4.04)	(5.06)
				Homogeneous, without: T − R	-1.97	-1.97	-1.97
					(4.13)	(4.14)	(4.67)
Δ_C: composition gradient	9.55**	9.55**	9.55	Δ_E: H, with − M, without	19.41***	19.41***	19.41**
	(4.20)	(4.63)	(5.67)		(5.67)	(6.00)	(7.56)
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics							
Mixed	58.33	58.33	58.33	Without disclosure	58.88	58.88	58.88
	(1.99)	(2.19)	(2.21)		(2.46)	(2.47)	(2.50)
				With disclosure	57.79	57.79	57.79
					(3.14)	(3.15)	(3.19)
Homogeneous	56.79	56.79	56.79	Without disclosure	57.79	57.79	57.79
	(1.76)	(1.61)	(1.63)		(2.91)	(2.92)	(2.96)
				With disclosure	55.80	55.80	55.80
					(1.96)	(1.97)	(1.99)
Wald: all no-leader cells equal	p = 0.562	p = 0.546	p = 0.551		p = 0.789	p = 0.733	p = 0.740
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040	1,040
Clusters	336	84	28		336	84	28
Neighborhoods	28	28	28		28	28	28
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretreatment participation control	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table reproduces the main-table sample, outcomes, neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects, pretreatment participation control, leader-effect definitions, contrasts, and no-leader diagnostics. Columns differ only in the one-way clustering level. Group clusters are the 336 experimental group–neighborhood cells. Leader-group clusters are the 84 neighborhood-wave × leader-arm cells, each containing the four groups assigned to traditional, religious, or no leader. Neighborhood clustering uses 28 neighborhood-wave assignments. Panel B and Panel C inference uses the clustered delta method. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-17 – BASELINE IMBALANCE AND TREATMENT-SPECIFIC BASELINE ADJUSTMENT

	Leader by composition				Environment specific		
	FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth		FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed	0.73	0.68	0.47	Without disclosure	-0.20	-0.23	0.09
	(2.82)	(2.83)	(2.69)		(3.47)	(3.47)	(3.42)
				With disclosure	1.56	1.49	0.78
					(4.40)	(4.39)	(4.11)
Homogeneous	4.13	4.20	4.38	Without disclosure	-0.50	-0.53	-0.34
	(2.83)	(2.83)	(2.85)		(4.50)	(4.49)	(4.53)
				With disclosure	8.87***	9.06***	9.22***
					(3.26)	(3.27)	(3.32)
Religious leader							
Mixed	6.01**	6.00**	6.00**	Without disclosure	8.74**	8.72**	8.58**
	(2.93)	(2.94)	(2.84)		(3.98)	(3.99)	(3.93)
				With disclosure	3.29	3.28	3.43
					(4.29)	(4.32)	(4.08)
Homogeneous	1.10	1.10	1.17	Without disclosure	1.39	1.39	1.42
	(2.57)	(2.57)	(2.58)		(3.93)	(3.92)	(3.93)
				With disclosure	0.84	0.83	0.95
					(3.26)	(3.26)	(3.29)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts							
Mixed: T − R	-5.29*	-5.32*	-5.53*	Mixed, with: T − R	-1.73	-1.79	-2.65
	(2.94)	(2.96)	(2.86)		(4.36)	(4.38)	(4.04)
				Mixed, without: T − R	-8.95**	-8.95**	-8.49**
					(3.88)	(3.90)	(4.02)
Homogeneous: T − R	3.03	3.11	3.21	Homogeneous, with: T − R	8.02**	8.23**	8.26**
	(2.85)	(2.85)	(2.92)		(3.73)	(3.72)	(3.78)
				Homogeneous, without: T − R	-1.89	-1.92	-1.76
					(4.18)	(4.16)	(4.33)
Δ_C: composition gradient	8.32**	8.43**	8.74**	Δ_E: H, with − M, without	16.97***	17.18***	16.75***
	(4.10)	(4.11)	(4.10)		(5.39)	(5.42)	(5.53)
Panel C. No-leader reference means and diagnostics							
Mixed	58.33	58.33	58.33	Without disclosure	58.88	58.88	58.88
	(1.98)	(1.97)	(1.86)		(2.45)	(2.44)	(2.26)
				With disclosure	57.79	57.79	57.79
					(3.11)	(3.11)	(2.97)
Homogeneous	56.79	56.79	56.79	Without disclosure	57.79	57.79	57.79
	(1.73)	(1.73)	(1.72)		(2.91)	(2.91)	(2.85)
				With disclosure	55.80	55.80	55.80
					(1.84)	(1.84)	(1.88)
Wald: all no-leader cells equal	p = 0.557	p = 0.557	p = 0.543		p = 0.770	p = 0.770	p = 0.756
Panel D. Joint tests							
All composition coefficients zero	0.135	0.133	0.106	All environment coefficients zero	0.062	0.059	0.067
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040		1,040	1,040	1,040
Group–neighborhood clusters	336	336	336		336	336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28	28		28	28	28
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Assignment-cell baseline slopes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
25m spillover control	No	Yes	Yes		No	Yes	Yes
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	No	No	Yes		No	No	Yes

Notes: The unit is a collapsed respondent–treatment-cell observation; the outcome is average post-first-meeting salongo participation in percentage points. All specifications include neighborhood × information × composition fixed effects and globally centered pretreatment participation interacted with all 12 assignment cells. Panels A–D report, respectively, leader effects, leader contrasts, model-implied no-leader means and equality tests, and joint tests of the displayed leader effects. $\Delta_C = (\tau_H^T - \tau_M^T) - (\tau_H^R - \tau_M^R)$ and $\Delta_E = (\tau_{HI}^T - \tau_{MN}^T) - (\tau_{HI}^R - \tau_{MN}^R)$. Spillover columns add 25m exposure; gender/wealth columns additionally include fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. Inference uses the clustered delta method with one-way clustering at the group–neighborhood level. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-18 – PRETREATMENT DYNAMICS

	All six pretreatment days			Excluding day 1		
Panel A. Linear trends						
	Estimate	Standard error	p-value	Estimate	Standard error	p-value
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-1.83	(1.32)	0.165	-1.29	(1.60)	0.421
Mixed, with disclosure	0.83	(1.26)	0.510	0.10	(1.40)	0.945
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.84	(1.35)	0.533	-0.00	(1.91)	0.999
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-2.12	(1.06)	0.047	-1.73	(1.27)	0.175
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	1.20	(1.21)	0.321	1.33	(1.58)	0.400
Mixed, with disclosure	1.00	(1.15)	0.385	0.69	(1.30)	0.596
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-2.75	(1.41)	0.052	-2.03	(1.81)	0.263
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-1.68	(1.10)	0.126	-1.49	(1.59)	0.349
Panel B. Early versus late pretreatment						
	Estimate	Standard error	p-value	Estimate	Standard error	p-value
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-3.13	(4.19)	0.456	-0.72	(4.31)	0.868
Mixed, with disclosure	2.47	(4.06)	0.543	0.83	(4.09)	0.839
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-2.20	(4.79)	0.647	-0.29	(5.52)	0.958
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-6.25	(3.53)	0.078	-4.51	(3.99)	0.260
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	2.83	(3.79)	0.457	2.26	(4.11)	0.583
Mixed, with disclosure	1.28	(3.80)	0.736	-0.16	(3.77)	0.967
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-6.96	(4.71)	0.141	-4.06	(5.00)	0.418
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-2.68	(4.25)	0.529	-0.94	(5.08)	0.854
Panel C. Saturated day-specific paths						
	F	Restrictions	p-value	F	Restrictions	p-value
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	2.97	5	0.012	3.39	4	0.010
Mixed, with disclosure	0.51	5	0.768	0.50	4	0.737
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.47	5	0.801	0.20	4	0.936
Homogeneous, with disclosure	1.83	5	0.106	1.76	4	0.137
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	1.56	5	0.170	1.94	4	0.104
Mixed, with disclosure	0.42	5	0.832	0.34	4	0.850
Homogeneous, without disclosure	2.72	5	0.020	2.17	4	0.072
Homogeneous, with disclosure	1.29	5	0.270	1.35	4	0.253
Respondents		1,040			1,040	
Group–neighborhood clusters		336			336	
Neighborhoods		28			28	

Notes: Panels A and B report percentage-point estimates, clustered standard errors, and p-values for each of the eight leader-by-information-by-composition paths. Panel A estimates the change in the leader-minus-no-leader gap per campaign day. Panel B compares days 1–3 with days 4–6 in the full window and days 2–3 with days 4–6 after excluding day 1. Panel C is a joint multi-coefficient test and therefore reports the F statistic, number of restrictions, and p-value rather than a single estimate and standard error. It tests the unrestricted day-specific coefficients for each path, using campaign day 6 as the omitted normalization period. All regressions include respondent fixed effects and neighborhood × information × composition × campaign-day fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered one-way by assigned group within neighborhood.

Table A-19: Mechanisms: Person-Directed Interactions and Consequences

	Environment-specific effects									
	Any interaction		Salongo topic		Asked by person		Person: social		Person: divine	
	Non-leader	Leader	Non-leader	Leader	Non-leader	Leader	Non-leader	Leader	Non-leader	Leader
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader, by environment										
Traditional leader										
Mixed, no info	-0.026	0.102$^{\cdot}$	-0.064	0.049	-0.023	-0.036	-0.004	-0.002	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.077)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Mixed, info	0.013	0.203**	0.026	0.171**	-0.030	0.116$^{\cdot}$	0.015	0.025	-0.018	0.016
	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.043)	(0.071)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.045)
Homogeneous, no info	-0.043	0.130*	-0.052	0.037	-0.049$^{\cdot}$	0.011	-0.005	0.004	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Homogeneous, info	-0.068	0.007	-0.002	0.050	-0.044	0.034	0.013	0.008	-0.016	0.012
	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Religious leader										
Mixed, no info	-0.036	0.048	0.005	0.108	-0.019	0.040	-0.011	0.010	0.015	0.017
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Mixed, info	0.121$^{\cdot}$	0.055	0.115$^{\cdot}$	0.059	-0.017	-0.026	0.008	-0.004	-0.026	-0.031
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Homogeneous, no info	-0.025	0.072	-0.078	0.031	-0.032	0.042	-0.005	0.030	0.006	0.022
	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Homogeneous, info	-0.103$^{\cdot}$	0.073	-0.055	0.109	-0.027	0.028	0.001	0.008	-0.023	0.014
	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Panel B. No-leader environment reference means and diagnostics										
No leader, mixed, no info	0.392		0.302		0.101		0.018		0.025	
	(0.050)		(0.047)		(0.025)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
No leader, mixed, info	0.312		0.256		0.104		0.004		0.044	
	(0.057)		(0.049)		(0.037)		(0.004)		(0.020)	
No leader, homogeneous, no info	0.352		0.295		0.094		0.011		0.018	
	(0.043)		(0.038)		(0.022)		(0.008)		(0.009)	
No leader, homogeneous, info	0.390		0.268		0.102		0.006		0.029	
	(0.048)		(0.037)		(0.029)		(0.005)		(0.019)	
Wald: four no-leader cells equal	p = 0.682		p = 0.874		p = 0.994		p = 0.512		p = 0.670	
Observations	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844	2,844
Groups	336	336	336	336	336	336	336	336	336	336
Neighborhoods	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Baseline participation control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The sample excludes respondent-leaders; each observation is a non-leader respondent evaluating a referenced person. Only composition-by-information environment estimates are shown. Within each outcome block, the non-leader column reports the leader-assignment effect for participant-to-participant dyads; the leader column reports the total effect for participant-to-leader dyads. All effects are relative to dyads in no-leader groups in the same environment. Panel B reports no-leader environment means and an equality test. All regressions control for respondent i's average observed *salongo* participation before the first accountability meeting held in the neighborhood. Standard errors are clustered by randomized group within neighborhood. Significance: $^{\cdot}$ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-20 – LEADER EFFECTS UNDER THE RELIGIOUS-LEADER TERRITORY RESTRICTION

	Main specification			Additive-FE robustness		
	FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth	FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-0.36	-0.38	0.04	-0.25	-0.26	0.22
	(3.27)	(3.26)	(3.18)	(4.23)	(4.24)	(4.10)
Mixed, with disclosure	1.67	1.57	0.85	1.84	1.77	1.03
	(4.33)	(4.31)	(4.07)	(5.24)	(5.23)	(5.00)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.24	-0.28	-0.13	-0.46	-0.48	-0.37
	(4.42)	(4.40)	(4.41)	(4.82)	(4.81)	(4.80)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	9.83***	10.08***	9.99***	9.94**	10.12**	10.05**
	(3.61)	(3.60)	(3.61)	(4.06)	(4.08)	(4.14)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	9.56*	9.52*	8.82*	12.58**	12.53**	11.59**
	(4.93)	(4.90)	(4.99)	(5.01)	(5.00)	(5.08)
Mixed, with disclosure	10.53**	10.73**	10.01**	7.32	7.36	7.17
	(5.04)	(5.04)	(4.93)	(4.79)	(4.80)	(4.75)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.50	-0.45	-1.38	1.29	1.35	0.86
	(4.75)	(4.73)	(4.82)	(5.17)	(5.17)	(5.37)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-2.35	-2.55	-1.17	-3.84	-3.89	-3.14
	(4.59)	(4.54)	(4.68)	(5.09)	(5.04)	(5.12)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts						
Mixed, with disclosure: T − R	-8.86*	-9.17*	-9.16**	-5.47	-5.59	-6.14
	(4.85)	(4.85)	(4.53)	(5.03)	(5.02)	(4.74)
Mixed, without disclosure: T − R	-9.93**	-9.90**	-8.78*	-12.82***	-12.79***	-11.37**
	(4.89)	(4.89)	(5.11)	(4.92)	(4.92)	(5.12)
Homogeneous, with disclosure: T − R	12.18**	12.63**	11.15**	13.78**	14.01**	13.20**
	(5.41)	(5.35)	(5.48)	(5.46)	(5.43)	(5.50)
Homogeneous, without disclosure: T − R	0.26	0.17	1.25	-1.75	-1.84	-1.23
	(5.03)	(5.01)	(5.11)	(5.61)	(5.60)	(5.69)
Δ_E: H, with − M, without	22.11***	22.54***	19.94***	26.60***	26.80***	24.57***
	(7.31)	(7.28)	(7.53)	(7.23)	(7.23)	(7.40)
Panel C. Implied fixed-effect counterfactuals						
Traditional-leader support						
Mixed, without disclosure	55.60	55.48	55.33	55.55	55.46	55.24
	(2.31)	(2.27)	(2.13)	(3.06)	(3.04)	(2.86)
Mixed, with disclosure	57.69	57.75	57.97	57.54	57.58	57.82
	(3.07)	(3.06)	(2.99)	(3.46)	(3.46)	(3.43)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.54	55.62	55.66	55.76	55.81	55.88
	(2.98)	(2.97)	(2.96)	(2.98)	(2.99)	(3.06)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	52.94	52.82	52.88	52.87	52.79	52.83
	(1.88)	(1.89)	(1.89)	(2.53)	(2.53)	(2.61)
Wald: four counterfactuals equal	p = 0.561	p = 0.535	p = 0.515	p = 0.720	p = 0.703	p = 0.694
Religious-leader support						
Mixed, without disclosure	58.10	58.01	57.78	55.07	55.03	55.03
	(2.75)	(2.69)	(2.54)	(3.19)	(3.17)	(3.00)
Mixed, with disclosure	53.86	53.82	54.79	57.06	57.14	57.60
	(3.78)	(3.77)	(3.76)	(3.68)	(3.68)	(3.67)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	57.09	57.25	57.94	55.28	55.38	55.67
	(3.27)	(3.27)	(3.29)	(3.13)	(3.14)	(3.22)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	50.90	50.97	50.63	52.40	52.35	52.61
	(2.12)	(2.11)	(2.16)	(2.66)	(2.65)	(2.71)
Wald: four counterfactuals equal	p = 0.151	p = 0.151	p = 0.109	p = 0.720	p = 0.703	p = 0.694
Observations	908	908	908	908	908	908
Group-neighborhood clusters	292	292	292	292	292	292
Neighborhoods	28	28	28	28	28	28
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Neighborhood + disclosure × composition FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretreatment participation control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25m spillover control	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The sample and outcome match the current Table A-20; only religious-leader observations in localities where the assigned religious and traditional leaders have different territories are excluded. Columns 1–3 use neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects; columns 4–6 use additive neighborhood and disclosure × composition fixed effects. Panel C averages only the fixed-effect component over the treated observations supporting each leader-by-environment coefficient, with non-treatment controls at their estimation-sample means. All models include the pretreatment outcome; columns 2 and 5 add the 25m spillover control, and columns 3 and 6 add gender and wealth strata. Standard errors cluster by group-neighborhood. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.




Figure A-3: LEADER ASSIGNMENT AND ORDINARY PARTICIPANTS' SPEECH

Notes: Each point shows how assigning a chief or pastor changes ordinary participants' speaking time relative to a no-leader group in the same environment. The four panels report total speaking time and time spent on each topic. Positive values mean that participants speak longer under the assigned leader. The T–R labels compare chief and pastor assignments directly. The topic pattern follows the leaders' own speech: chief groups place relatively more emphasis on attendance and performance, while pastor groups place relatively more emphasis on divine reward and solidarity. Silent participants count as zero speaking time. Lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure is discussed in Section 5.1; Main Figure 3 and Table 1 describe the leaders' speech.

Table A-21: LEADER EFFECTS BY ASSIGNED-LEADER AVENUE TENURE

	Preferred specification				Additive-FE robustness		
	Higher	Lower	Difference		Higher	Lower	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	-4.56	4.33	-8.89	Mixed, without disclosure	-2.40	3.00	-5.39
	(4.88)	(4.39)	(6.24)		(5.14)	(5.21)	(6.20)
Mixed, with disclosure	5.65	-3.08	8.73	Mixed, with disclosure	4.50	-2.01	6.51
	(4.77)	(5.94)	(6.93)		(5.89)	(6.81)	(7.64)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	1.40	-1.52	2.92	Homogeneous, without disclosure	1.21	-1.67	2.88
	(7.28)	(4.42)	(7.85)		(7.21)	(4.93)	(7.73)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	19.18***	2.29	16.90**	Homogeneous, with disclosure	18.66***	2.93	15.72***
	(4.67)	(4.65)	(6.56)		(4.87)	(4.83)	(6.03)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	7.14	11.08**	-3.94	Mixed, without disclosure	7.35	11.37**	-4.01
	(5.16)	(5.46)	(7.17)		(5.74)	(5.71)	(7.14)
Mixed, with disclosure	6.92	0.22	6.71	Mixed, with disclosure	4.63	2.53	2.10
	(5.25)	(5.43)	(6.91)		(5.20)	(5.77)	(6.16)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-5.43	8.63*	-14.05**	Homogeneous, without disclosure	-3.49	6.31	-9.80
	(5.26)	(4.56)	(6.34)		(5.33)	(5.06)	(6.14)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-4.24	4.51	-8.75	Homogeneous, with disclosure	-3.99	4.36	-8.35
	(4.67)	(4.31)	(6.31)		(5.10)	(5.06)	(6.38)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	56.46	54.16	2.31	Mixed, without disclosure	54.36	55.57	-1.21
	(3.16)	(3.01)	(3.91)		(3.27)	(3.00)	(2.15)
Mixed, with disclosure	55.91	59.35	-3.44	Mixed, with disclosure	57.09	58.30	-1.21
	(3.32)	(3.89)	(4.05)		(3.55)	(3.81)	(2.15)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	54.86	56.13	-1.27	Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.07	56.28	-1.21
	(4.37)	(2.76)	(3.99)		(3.37)	(3.13)	(2.15)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	51.26	53.87	-2.60	Homogeneous, with disclosure	51.97	53.18	-1.21
	(2.08)	(2.67)	(3.15)		(2.81)	(2.81)	(2.15)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	58.55	51.90	6.65*	Mixed, without disclosure	58.37	51.64	6.73***
	(2.96)	(2.91)	(3.42)		(3.04)	(3.25)	(2.26)
Mixed, with disclosure	58.81	56.71	2.10	Mixed, with disclosure	61.10	54.37	6.73***
	(3.68)	(3.67)	(4.18)		(3.78)	(3.63)	(2.26)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	60.97	50.11	10.86**	Homogeneous, without disclosure	59.08	52.35	6.73***
	(3.77)	(3.73)	(4.50)		(3.29)	(3.24)	(2.26)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	56.26	49.06	7.20**	Homogeneous, with disclosure	55.98	49.25	6.73***
	(2.83)	(2.11)	(3.39)		(2.94)	(2.72)	(2.26)
Observations	1,040				1,040		
Group-neighborhood clusters	336				336		
Lower / higher leaders (chiefs; pastors)	15 / 13; 14 / 14				15 / 13; 14 / 14		
Fixed effects	Neighborhood × environment				Neighborhood + environment		
Pretreatment participation control	Yes				Yes		
25m spillover control	Yes				Yes		
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	Yes				Yes		

Notes: This table asks whether leaders with deeper local roots mobilize more participation. "Avenue tenure" is the number of years the assigned leader has lived on the avenue. Chiefs are divided at 26 years and pastors at 27 years, producing similarly sized groups within each leader type. Panel A reports the leader effect for the higher- and lower-tenure groups and their difference in each of the four experimental environments. Panel B shows the participation predicted without a leader for the residents used in each comparison; similar values help rule out different no-leader baselines as the source of the subgroup pattern. The left and right blocks use two alternative ways of comparing residents across neighborhoods and environments. Both adjust for pretreatment participation, nearby treatment exposure, gender, and wealth group. Effects are percentage points, with standard errors in parentheses allowing for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 5.2; Figure 4 highlights the chief-tenure result. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-22: LEADER EFFECTS BY ASSIGNED-LEADER RELIGIOUS CONVICTION

	Preferred specification				Additive-FE robustness		
	Higher	Lower	Difference		Higher	Lower	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	-2.95	3.50	-6.45	Mixed, without disclosure	-2.89	3.87	-6.75
	(4.82)	(4.05)	(6.00)		(5.42)	(5.03)	(6.26)
Mixed, with disclosure	-1.05	3.05	-4.10	Mixed, with disclosure	1.47	0.65	0.82
	(5.35)	(5.72)	(7.24)		(6.65)	(5.92)	(7.57)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.01	-0.39	0.39	Homogeneous, without disclosure	-2.49	1.92	-4.41
	(7.10)	(4.52)	(7.86)		(6.94)	(5.33)	(7.79)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	6.20	14.11***	-7.91	Homogeneous, with disclosure	6.57	13.95***	-7.38
	(5.53)	(4.25)	(6.84)		(5.24)	(5.11)	(6.47)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	17.27***	1.14	16.13**	Mixed, without disclosure	17.60***	1.14	16.46**
	(4.73)	(5.46)	(6.86)		(4.89)	(5.79)	(6.50)
Mixed, with disclosure	7.08	0.14	6.94	Mixed, with disclosure	3.66	3.62	0.03
	(5.18)	(5.70)	(7.14)		(5.90)	(5.16)	(6.34)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	1.92	1.25	0.67	Homogeneous, without disclosure	4.46	-1.54	6.00
	(5.12)	(5.00)	(6.67)		(5.42)	(5.19)	(6.37)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	5.54	-5.21	10.76*	Homogeneous, with disclosure	6.17	-5.71	11.88*
	(5.08)	(3.89)	(6.27)		(5.07)	(5.01)	(6.28)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	56.81	53.38	3.43	Mixed, without disclosure	56.89	53.05	3.84*
	(3.01)	(3.01)	(3.82)		(3.07)	(3.26)	(2.16)
Mixed, with disclosure	62.04	53.40	8.64**	Mixed, with disclosure	59.60	55.76	3.84*
	(3.31)	(3.99)	(4.21)		(3.62)	(3.64)	(2.16)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.04	56.11	-1.07	Homogeneous, without disclosure	57.59	53.75	3.84*
	(3.98)	(2.86)	(3.86)		(3.43)	(3.00)	(2.16)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	54.80	50.43	4.37	Homogeneous, with disclosure	54.49	50.65	3.84*
	(2.81)	(2.26)	(3.28)		(3.00)	(2.72)	(2.16)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	49.31	60.89	-11.58***	Mixed, without disclosure	49.06	60.88	-11.82***
	(2.86)	(2.88)	(3.35)		(3.24)	(3.15)	(2.29)
Mixed, with disclosure	48.29	67.14	-18.85***	Mixed, with disclosure	51.77	63.59	-11.82***
	(3.73)	(3.61)	(4.22)		(3.64)	(3.67)	(2.29)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	52.30	58.85	-6.56	Homogeneous, without disclosure	49.76	61.58	-11.82***
	(3.12)	(4.09)	(4.44)		(2.99)	(3.48)	(2.29)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	47.25	57.99	-10.75***	Homogeneous, with disclosure	46.66	58.48	-11.82***
	(2.94)	(2.24)	(3.48)		(2.88)	(2.89)	(2.29)
Observations	1,040				1,040		
Group-neighborhood clusters	336				336		
Lower / higher leaders, each type	14 / 14				14 / 14		
Fixed effects	Neighborhood × environment				Neighborhood + environment		
Pretreatment participation control	Yes				Yes		
25m spillover control	Yes				Yes		
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	Yes				Yes		

Notes: This table asks whether leaders with stronger beliefs in divine reward and punishment mobilize more participation. The conviction measure combines the leader's baseline beliefs that God rewards good behavior and punishes improper behavior. Chiefs and pastors are each divided into two groups of 14 leaders. Panel A reports the leader effect for the higher- and lower-conviction groups and their difference in each experimental environment. Panel B shows the participation predicted without a leader for the residents used in each comparison; similar values help rule out different no-leader baselines as the source of the subgroup pattern. The left and right blocks use two alternative ways of comparing residents across neighborhoods and environments. Both adjust for pretreatment participation, nearby treatment exposure, gender, and wealth group. Effects are percentage points, with standard errors in parentheses allowing for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 5.2; Figure 4 highlights the pastor-conviction result. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-23: INSTITUTIONAL ROLES: LEADER HEADS BOTH INSTITUTIONS

	Preferred specification				Additive-FE robustness		
	Heads both	Not both	Difference		Heads both	Not both	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	17.59***	-3.62	21.21***	Mixed, without disclosure	11.29*	-1.95	13.24**
	(6.05)	(3.76)	(6.82)		(6.03)	(4.50)	(6.53)
Mixed, with disclosure	-1.60	1.47	-3.06	Mixed, with disclosure	-4.38	2.16	-6.54
	(8.49)	(4.67)	(9.34)		(11.01)	(5.36)	(11.36)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-7.34	1.40	-8.74	Homogeneous, without disclosure	-4.35	0.51	-4.86
	(5.68)	(5.12)	(7.07)		(5.08)	(5.34)	(6.19)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	2.70	11.70***	-9.00	Homogeneous, with disclosure	9.02	10.40**	-1.38
	(6.60)	(4.11)	(7.60)		(5.93)	(4.53)	(6.65)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	7.97	9.45**	-1.48	Mixed, without disclosure	8.26	9.65**	-1.39
	(8.39)	(4.25)	(9.14)		(8.28)	(4.74)	(8.75)
Mixed, with disclosure	8.82	1.83	6.99	Mixed, with disclosure	4.79	3.19	1.60
	(7.65)	(4.50)	(8.46)		(6.18)	(5.04)	(6.36)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	3.39	1.01	2.38	Homogeneous, without disclosure	2.40	1.07	1.33
	(5.71)	(4.36)	(6.54)		(6.91)	(4.62)	(7.23)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-9.76***	3.31	-13.08**	Homogeneous, with disclosure	-4.77	1.78	-6.55
	(3.57)	(4.00)	(5.17)		(4.30)	(4.74)	(5.51)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	48.29	56.76	-8.47	Mixed, without disclosure	54.56	55.16	-0.60
	(5.35)	(2.60)	(5.59)		(3.44)	(3.04)	(2.65)
Mixed, with disclosure	54.35	58.52	-4.17	Mixed, with disclosure	57.24	57.85	-0.60
	(4.57)	(3.32)	(4.98)		(3.84)	(3.65)	(2.65)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	58.23	54.96	3.27	Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.24	55.84	-0.60
	(4.01)	(3.12)	(4.03)		(3.81)	(3.05)	(2.65)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	58.51	51.43	7.09	Homogeneous, with disclosure	52.16	52.77	-0.60
	(4.26)	(2.14)	(4.48)		(3.32)	(2.69)	(2.65)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	58.26	54.22	4.04	Mixed, without disclosure	57.80	54.13	3.68
	(3.43)	(2.45)	(3.49)		(3.44)	(3.04)	(2.55)
Mixed, with disclosure	56.64	58.15	-1.51	Mixed, with disclosure	60.50	56.82	3.68
	(5.21)	(3.21)	(5.45)		(4.16)	(3.55)	(2.55)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	57.54	54.92	2.63	Homogeneous, without disclosure	58.50	54.82	3.68
	(4.67)	(3.05)	(4.72)		(3.67)	(3.08)	(2.55)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	60.36	50.17	10.19***	Homogeneous, with disclosure	55.41	51.73	3.68
	(2.51)	(2.21)	(2.99)		(3.14)	(2.73)	(2.55)
Observations	1,040				1,040		
Group-neighborhood clusters	336				336		
Traditional leaders: not both / heads both	23 / 5				23 / 5		
Religious leaders: not both / heads both	21 / 7				21 / 7		
Fixed effects	Neighborhood × environment				Neighborhood + environment		
Pretreatment participation control	Yes				Yes		
25m spillover control	Yes				Yes		
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	Yes				Yes		

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Columns report the effect when the assigned leader heads both institutions, the effect when the assigned leader does not head both institutions, and their first-minus-second treatment-effect difference. Both blocks estimate all four composition-by-disclosure environments. The left block uses neighborhood-by-environment fixed effects; the right robustness block uses additive neighborhood and environment fixed effects. Head roles use the paper's institutional taxonomy: avenue or customary chief for traditional leadership and pastor or priest for religious leadership. Other nonzero titles are classified as not head. Panel B reports each specification's fixed-effect component averaged over the actual treated observations supporting each displayed category coefficient. Its Difference column tests whether those category-specific implied counterfactuals differ; covariate and treatment components are set to zero in this diagnostic. Traditional- and religious-leader rows come from parallel leader-specific regressions because each profile characteristic applies to its corresponding assigned leader type. Both regressions include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-24: SECULAR AUTHORITY OF THE ASSIGNED LEADER

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	2.08	2.00	-0.08	2.01	4.84	2.83
	(5.21)	(7.89)	(10.64)	(5.64)	(7.48)	(9.59)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.87	14.51**	15.38**	-0.32	11.22*	11.54*
	(4.63)	(5.91)	(6.53)	(5.41)	(6.72)	(6.84)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.77	1.72	3.49	-0.34	5.27	5.61
	(5.47)	(5.88)	(6.82)	(5.60)	(5.84)	(6.45)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	10.75**	17.62***	6.87	10.64*	17.77***	7.13
	(4.98)	(5.32)	(7.19)	(5.50)	(4.96)	(6.80)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	10.00**	11.96**	1.96	11.89**	11.72**	-0.17
	(4.56)	(5.56)	(6.00)	(4.84)	(5.84)	(5.95)
Mixed, with disclosure	4.63	7.55	2.91	4.91	3.29	-1.62
	(4.62)	(5.16)	(5.60)	(4.99)	(5.27)	(5.07)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	3.30	2.71	-0.59	3.31	4.13	0.82
	(4.90)	(5.76)	(7.72)	(5.11)	(5.91)	(6.88)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	3.96	1.47	-2.49	1.89	3.83	1.94
	(4.91)	(4.46)	(7.04)	(5.31)	(5.10)	(6.86)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	53.53	59.78	6.25*	53.70	57.12	3.43**
	(2.64)	(3.19)	(3.21)	(3.15)	(3.23)	(1.70)
Mixed, with disclosure	55.29	58.19	2.90	54.91	61.32	6.41***
	(3.07)	(3.81)	(2.98)	(3.41)	(3.64)	(1.59)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	56.96	60.74	3.79*	55.59	57.12	1.54
	(3.15)	(2.79)	(2.05)	(3.16)	(3.12)	(1.18)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	51.75	54.75	3.00	51.89	54.69	2.80**
	(1.82)	(1.99)	(2.01)	(2.42)	(2.52)	(1.17)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	55.79	56.13	0.34	54.03	56.37	2.34*
	(2.49)	(2.84)	(2.14)	(3.08)	(3.14)	(1.22)
Mixed, with disclosure	57.03	53.46	-3.58	56.76	57.71	0.95
	(3.03)	(3.33)	(2.22)	(3.40)	(3.57)	(1.40)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.57	57.20	1.62	55.58	55.62	0.04
	(3.09)	(3.30)	(2.63)	(3.16)	(3.22)	(1.29)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	49.71	55.89	6.18***	51.76	53.61	1.85
	(1.87)	(2.10)	(2.25)	(2.35)	(2.64)	(1.37)
Observations		970			970	
Group-neighborhood clusters		324			324	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		93 / 71			93 / 71	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		99 / 74			99 / 74	

Notes: This table asks whether chiefs mobilize residents who grant them greater secular authority. The rating comes from the resident's first-meeting evaluation of the assigned chief and is divided into similarly sized lower- and higher-rating groups. Panel A reports the leader effect for each group and the higher-minus-lower difference in all four environments. Panel B shows the participation predicted without a leader for the residents used in each comparison; these are model-based comparison levels rather than raw means. The preferred and robustness blocks use two alternative ways of comparing residents across neighborhoods and environments. Both use the full sample and adjust for pretreatment participation, nearby treatment exposure, gender, and wealth group. Effects are percentage points, with standard errors in parentheses allowing for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 5.2; Figure 5 highlights this chief-authority result. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-25: RESPONDENT SHARES TERRITORY WITH THE ASSIGNED LEADER

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	3.86	-2.85	-6.72	4.42	-1.43	-5.85
	(3.72)	(9.08)	(9.52)	(4.26)	(9.61)	(9.57)
Mixed, with disclosure	3.11	11.67	8.56	2.36	9.59	7.24
	(4.61)	(7.60)	(8.38)	(5.92)	(6.78)	(7.83)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Homogeneous, with disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	10.99**	10.69	-0.29	11.72**	11.85*	0.13
	(4.81)	(7.05)	(8.42)	(5.16)	(6.86)	(7.96)
Mixed, with disclosure	3.68	10.95	7.27	2.74	8.68	5.93
	(4.47)	(7.73)	(8.64)	(4.89)	(7.83)	(8.43)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Homogeneous, with disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	55.51	54.79	-0.72	55.05	53.55	-1.50
	(2.42)	(3.01)	(2.07)	(3.02)	(3.25)	(1.31)
Mixed, with disclosure	56.92	55.22	-1.70	57.65	57.42	-0.23
	(2.97)	(3.63)	(1.88)	(3.39)	(3.56)	(1.08)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Homogeneous, with disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	55.82	55.62	-0.21	55.05	54.78	-0.27
	(2.59)	(2.51)	(1.71)	(3.01)	(3.06)	(1.00)
Mixed, with disclosure	55.88	55.53	-0.35	56.84	57.74	0.90
	(2.90)	(3.58)	(2.14)	(3.38)	(3.52)	(1.04)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Homogeneous, with disclosure	–	–	–	–	–	–
Observations		1,005			1,005	
Group-neighborhood clusters		329			329	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		107 / 31			107 / 31	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		109 / 36			109 / 36	

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Each block reports the low-group effect, high-group effect, and high-minus-low difference from one interacted regression containing all eight leader-by-environment effects. The preferred block uses neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects. The robustness block uses additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects on the identical sample. The moderator equals one when a non-leader respondent shares territory with the assigned leader; following the audited design, it varies only in mixed leader groups. The moderator uses the first-meeting dyad battery and equals one when a non-leader respondent shares territory with the referenced assigned leader. It is allowed to vary only in mixed leader groups, following the previously audited design. Both blocks come from the same binary-interaction regression; the sample is not split. Panel B reports the fixed-effect component averaged over the actual treated observations supporting each subgroup coefficient. All covariate and treatment components are set to zero, so these are diagnostics of the implied no-leader comparisons rather than raw no-leader means. All specifications include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-26: OPINION OF THE ASSIGNED LEADER

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-1.08	7.16	8.24	-0.33	9.03	9.35
	(5.63)	(6.47)	(9.35)	(6.07)	(5.95)	(8.23)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.96	13.03**	13.99**	-1.38	12.01**	13.39**
	(4.93)	(5.15)	(5.78)	(5.61)	(5.95)	(6.03)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.47	3.57	5.04	-0.84	5.40	6.24
	(6.47)	(5.79)	(8.03)	(6.84)	(5.55)	(7.87)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	10.29*	15.95***	5.66	10.52	15.76***	5.23
	(6.04)	(5.09)	(8.22)	(6.55)	(5.00)	(7.91)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	5.37	15.80***	10.44	8.28	15.59***	7.31
	(5.40)	(5.14)	(6.84)	(5.75)	(5.28)	(6.35)
Mixed, with disclosure	8.00*	2.10	-5.90	8.54*	-0.10	-8.64
	(4.48)	(5.61)	(6.11)	(5.12)	(5.24)	(5.62)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	3.13	5.42	2.29	0.76	7.08	6.32
	(5.90)	(5.09)	(8.13)	(5.87)	(5.38)	(6.99)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	4.86	1.76	-3.10	3.31	2.82	-0.49
	(6.25)	(4.05)	(7.95)	(6.39)	(4.57)	(7.53)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	54.99	55.75	0.76	55.74	53.95	-1.79
	(2.48)	(3.20)	(3.07)	(3.17)	(3.30)	(1.54)
Mixed, with disclosure	55.75	59.86	4.11	55.17	60.83	5.66***
	(2.68)	(3.65)	(2.58)	(3.32)	(3.51)	(1.41)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.08	56.29	1.21	56.33	54.51	-1.81
	(3.44)	(2.78)	(2.34)	(3.36)	(3.24)	(1.22)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	51.58	53.62	2.04	51.20	53.83	2.63**
	(2.15)	(1.77)	(2.25)	(2.37)	(2.44)	(1.21)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	56.79	53.75	-3.04	56.14	54.01	-2.13*
	(2.47)	(2.64)	(2.07)	(3.19)	(3.21)	(1.28)
Mixed, with disclosure	59.48	54.77	-4.70**	58.03	56.87	-1.16
	(2.99)	(3.05)	(1.95)	(3.31)	(3.49)	(1.27)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	53.90	57.63	3.73	55.42	55.91	0.49
	(3.49)	(3.02)	(2.74)	(3.34)	(3.28)	(1.15)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	49.68	55.70	6.02**	50.72	54.57	3.85***
	(2.14)	(1.83)	(2.38)	(2.35)	(2.50)	(1.30)
Observations		1,040			1,040	
Group-neighborhood clusters		336			336	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		97 / 80			97 / 80	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		95 / 90			95 / 90	

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Each block reports the low-group effect, high-group effect, and high-minus-low difference from one interacted regression containing all eight leader-by-environment effects. The preferred block uses neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects. The robustness block uses additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects on the identical sample. The moderator is the existing standardized index of motivation, moral-example, trustworthiness, and hardworking ratings of the assigned real leader. Leader proximity is the respondent's opinion index for the assigned real leader (standardized motivation, moral-example, trustworthiness, and hardworking ratings), using only structural dyad Panel B; placebo leaders are excluded. The measure comes from the first-meeting dyad battery administered after group introduction and before discussion. Leader-arm respondents without an observed leader rating remain in the full sample through eight missing-rating-by-leader-environment interactions. Panel B reports the fixed-effect component averaged over the actual treated observations supporting each subgroup coefficient. All covariate and treatment components are set to zero, so these are diagnostics of the implied no-leader comparisons rather than raw no-leader means. All specifications include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-27: INTRINSIC RELIGIOSITY

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-2.44	1.54	3.98	-0.97	0.88	1.86
	(5.44)	(4.64)	(7.50)	(5.56)	(5.70)	(7.38)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.78	0.36	1.14	1.41	-1.13	-2.53
	(6.10)	(5.73)	(8.06)	(7.14)	(5.98)	(8.00)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.34	-1.51	-1.17	0.08	-1.83	-1.91
	(5.73)	(5.81)	(7.34)	(6.15)	(5.67)	(7.24)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	11.15**	6.94	-4.21	14.56***	4.39	-10.17
	(5.27)	(5.50)	(8.06)	(5.29)	(5.49)	(7.39)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-0.14	16.12***	16.26**	0.85	15.76***	14.91**
	(6.09)	(5.01)	(7.87)	(6.30)	(5.11)	(7.41)
Mixed, with disclosure	-3.08	9.01	12.10	-2.10	8.71	10.81
	(5.69)	(6.49)	(8.91)	(6.13)	(6.29)	(8.26)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.01	3.78	4.79	-1.16	3.42	4.57
	(6.14)	(4.49)	(7.39)	(5.86)	(4.82)	(6.47)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-3.89	3.78	7.67	-2.48	2.50	4.98
	(4.70)	(4.42)	(6.31)	(5.19)	(4.90)	(6.24)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	57.31	58.67	1.36	55.86	57.17	1.31
	(3.34)	(3.38)	(2.39)	(3.56)	(3.53)	(1.43)
Mixed, with disclosure	60.86	61.71	0.85	58.77	60.85	2.08**
	(3.49)	(3.91)	(1.98)	(3.79)	(3.91)	(0.89)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	57.67	59.27	1.60	57.24	57.33	0.08
	(3.43)	(3.61)	(2.04)	(3.47)	(3.58)	(1.17)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	57.53	54.33	-3.20*	54.24	54.60	0.36
	(3.04)	(3.05)	(1.87)	(3.24)	(3.25)	(1.10)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	59.00	57.09	-1.91	58.04	55.19	-2.85***
	(3.22)	(3.26)	(1.63)	(3.48)	(3.53)	(1.01)
Mixed, with disclosure	60.72	61.18	0.46	59.71	59.24	-0.47
	(3.56)	(3.88)	(2.15)	(3.83)	(3.88)	(1.01)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.04	60.83	5.79***	55.28	58.84	3.56***
	(3.81)	(3.24)	(2.08)	(3.59)	(3.44)	(1.03)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	56.05	55.07	-0.98	54.67	54.01	-0.66
	(2.83)	(3.36)	(2.14)	(3.17)	(3.37)	(1.29)
Observations		1,034			1,034	
Group-neighborhood clusters		336			336	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		98 / 93			98 / 93	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		97 / 99			97 / 99	

Notes: This table asks whether pastors mobilize residents whose private conduct is more strongly guided by religion. Intrinsic religiosity is the average of five standard survey items, with at least three answers required, and residents are divided into similarly sized lower- and higher-scoring groups. Panel A reports the leader effect for each group and the higher-minus-lower difference in all four environments. Panel B shows the participation predicted without a leader for the residents used in each comparison; these are model-based comparison levels rather than raw means. The preferred and robustness blocks use two alternative ways of comparing residents across neighborhoods and environments. Both use the same sample and adjust for pretreatment participation, nearby treatment exposure, gender, and wealth group. Effects are percentage points, with standard errors in parentheses allowing for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 5.2; Figure 5 highlights the pastor-religiosity result. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-28: EXTRINSIC-PERSONAL RELIGIOSITY: PERSONAL RELIANCE

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-2.43	2.19	4.62	-2.71	3.33	6.05
	(4.31)	(5.12)	(6.63)	(5.01)	(5.79)	(6.55)
Mixed, with disclosure	2.40	-2.67	-5.07	1.05	-0.94	-1.99
	(6.08)	(6.00)	(8.38)	(7.02)	(6.45)	(8.53)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.44	1.39	2.83	-2.11	1.91	4.02
	(5.60)	(6.10)	(7.43)	(5.89)	(5.72)	(6.84)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	6.71	10.76**	4.04	7.83	9.96**	2.13
	(6.02)	(4.72)	(8.03)	(6.29)	(4.99)	(7.94)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-2.88	22.65***	25.54***	-2.68	22.80***	25.48***
	(5.13)	(5.38)	(7.36)	(5.82)	(5.18)	(7.13)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.71	7.61	8.32	-0.23	7.21	7.45
	(5.89)	(5.58)	(7.99)	(6.02)	(5.78)	(7.35)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	4.27	-1.47	-5.74	2.38	0.43	-1.95
	(5.80)	(5.16)	(7.88)	(5.89)	(5.37)	(7.40)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	2.26	-1.83	-4.08	0.48	-0.52	-1.00
	(5.23)	(4.45)	(7.03)	(5.27)	(4.95)	(6.36)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	55.45	59.82	4.37**	55.78	59.59	3.81***
	(2.62)	(3.04)	(2.04)	(3.28)	(3.43)	(1.27)
Mixed, with disclosure	55.69	66.41	10.72***	57.11	65.34	8.23***
	(3.66)	(3.70)	(2.71)	(3.88)	(4.00)	(1.43)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	58.00	56.89	-1.11	58.67	57.10	-1.57
	(3.69)	(3.35)	(2.41)	(3.46)	(3.49)	(1.26)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	55.79	55.83	0.04	54.76	57.40	2.63**
	(3.21)	(3.04)	(1.92)	(3.23)	(3.19)	(1.28)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	58.01	56.23	-1.78	57.83	56.87	-0.96
	(2.83)	(2.66)	(1.78)	(3.31)	(3.34)	(1.12)
Mixed, with disclosure	60.92	59.74	-1.19	60.45	60.87	0.42
	(3.66)	(3.53)	(2.37)	(3.93)	(3.89)	(1.19)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	54.24	61.80	7.57***	56.09	60.63	4.54***
	(3.52)	(3.44)	(1.87)	(3.45)	(3.43)	(0.87)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	52.47	58.34	5.87***	54.28	57.76	3.48***
	(3.37)	(2.95)	(2.09)	(3.22)	(3.17)	(1.18)
Observations		1,032			1,032	
Group-neighborhood clusters		336			336	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		97 / 83			97 / 83	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		101 / 97			101 / 97	

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Each block reports the low-group effect, high-group effect, and high-minus-low difference from one interacted regression containing all eight leader-by-environment effects. The preferred block uses neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects. The robustness block uses additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects on the identical sample. The moderator is the extrinsic-personal component of the I/E battery, measuring personal religious comfort and reliance. Low denotes values at or below 4; high denotes values above 4. Panel B reports the fixed-effect component averaged over the actual treated observations supporting each subgroup coefficient. All covariate and treatment components are set to zero, so these are diagnostics of the implied no-leader comparisons rather than raw no-leader means. All specifications include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. The intrinsic and extrinsic orientation terminology follows Allport and Ross (1967), Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5(4):432–443, doi:10.1037/h0021212. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-29: EXTRINSIC-SOCIAL RELIGIOSITY: CHURCH AS SOCIAL CONTACT

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-0.51	0.43	0.94	-0.35	0.74	1.09
	(5.52)	(5.67)	(8.93)	(5.93)	(6.07)	(8.46)
Mixed, with disclosure	-2.55	2.45	5.01	-2.57	2.87	5.44
	(5.90)	(5.39)	(7.29)	(5.69)	(6.95)	(7.56)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-3.20	2.54	5.74	-2.92	1.99	4.91
	(5.53)	(6.30)	(7.74)	(5.55)	(6.62)	(7.71)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	4.58	13.19**	8.61	4.08	13.95**	9.87
	(5.04)	(5.69)	(8.17)	(5.14)	(5.73)	(7.48)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	15.53***	4.39	-11.14*	15.87***	4.51	-11.37*
	(4.82)	(5.05)	(6.47)	(4.75)	(5.37)	(5.78)
Mixed, with disclosure	5.80	0.15	-5.66	4.19	2.34	-1.85
	(5.17)	(5.80)	(7.22)	(5.63)	(5.96)	(6.93)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.05	3.18	3.13	0.19	2.58	2.39
	(4.31)	(6.70)	(8.04)	(4.69)	(6.44)	(7.24)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	1.35	-1.02	-2.37	1.39	-1.16	-2.55
	(3.92)	(5.30)	(6.60)	(4.81)	(5.67)	(6.89)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	56.10	55.89	-0.21	56.02	55.89	-0.14
	(3.09)	(3.37)	(2.66)	(3.44)	(3.50)	(1.32)
Mixed, with disclosure	57.54	60.91	3.38	57.54	60.76	3.22***
	(3.99)	(3.67)	(2.76)	(3.99)	(3.88)	(1.23)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	58.22	55.05	-3.17	57.97	55.82	-2.15*
	(3.45)	(3.59)	(2.86)	(3.41)	(3.39)	(1.30)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	57.39	51.07	-6.32***	57.80	50.70	-7.11***
	(2.48)	(2.68)	(1.63)	(3.05)	(3.01)	(1.19)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	57.29	55.08	-2.21	56.96	55.25	-1.71
	(3.18)	(3.13)	(2.31)	(3.52)	(3.45)	(1.44)
Mixed, with disclosure	58.19	59.97	1.79	59.79	58.03	-1.75
	(3.60)	(3.94)	(2.49)	(3.93)	(3.92)	(1.21)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	55.66	57.63	1.97	55.55	58.40	2.85**
	(3.08)	(4.00)	(2.90)	(3.30)	(3.51)	(1.28)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	53.40	53.74	0.35	53.31	54.19	0.89
	(2.61)	(2.78)	(2.11)	(2.99)	(3.10)	(1.30)
Observations		1,034			1,034	
Group-neighborhood clusters		336			336	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		92 / 91			92 / 91	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		90 / 89			90 / 89	

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Each block reports the low-group effect, high-group effect, and high-minus-low difference from one interacted regression containing all eight leader-by-environment effects. The preferred block uses neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects. The robustness block uses additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects on the identical sample. The moderator is the extrinsic-social component of the I/E battery, measuring church participation as social contact. Low denotes values at or below 2.33; high denotes values above 2.33. Panel B reports the fixed-effect component averaged over the actual treated observations supporting each subgroup coefficient. All covariate and treatment components are set to zero, so these are diagnostics of the implied no-leader comparisons rather than raw no-leader means. All specifications include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. The intrinsic and extrinsic orientation terminology follows Allport and Ross (1967), Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5(4):432–443, doi:10.1037/h0021212. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-30: SAME DENOMINATION AS THE ASSIGNED PASTOR

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE			Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Low	High	Difference	Low	High	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	2.21	-8.14	-10.35	1.23	-2.42	-3.65
	(3.82)	(10.26)	(11.58)	(4.66)	(10.15)	(11.03)
Mixed, with disclosure	0.20	-2.54	-2.75	0.71	-6.19	-6.90
	(4.64)	(11.22)	(12.21)	(5.53)	(7.35)	(8.60)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.27	6.70	7.97	-1.91	8.58	10.49
	(4.75)	(10.55)	(10.94)	(5.11)	(9.68)	(10.12)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	8.42*	15.17	6.75	8.81*	13.88	5.07
	(4.31)	(13.23)	(15.04)	(4.66)	(11.62)	(13.14)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	10.26**	0.08	-10.17	9.13**	9.40	0.27
	(3.99)	(7.84)	(7.92)	(4.42)	(8.40)	(7.71)
Mixed, with disclosure	5.59	-12.00	-17.59	5.25	-8.25	-13.49
	(4.20)	(14.41)	(14.90)	(4.95)	(11.63)	(12.27)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.82	14.13	14.95	-1.16	14.51	15.66
	(4.20)	(10.67)	(11.74)	(4.58)	(10.37)	(11.07)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-1.33	9.35	10.69	-1.20	8.19	9.39
	(3.77)	(9.08)	(10.28)	(4.45)	(8.64)	(9.63)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals from fixed effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	54.65	59.37	4.72**	55.69	53.96	-1.73
	(2.16)	(3.14)	(2.27)	(2.84)	(3.12)	(1.21)
Mixed, with disclosure	59.18	56.34	-2.84	58.69	60.06	1.37
	(3.08)	(5.83)	(4.91)	(3.65)	(4.18)	(2.22)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	56.09	56.11	0.02	56.75	54.39	-2.36
	(3.03)	(3.62)	(3.24)	(3.12)	(3.41)	(1.67)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	53.49	54.71	1.22	53.15	56.21	3.07**
	(2.17)	(2.70)	(2.50)	(2.67)	(2.90)	(1.50)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	55.82	55.12	-0.70	56.98	46.07	-10.92***
	(2.21)	(4.18)	(3.69)	(2.84)	(3.44)	(1.80)
Mixed, with disclosure	57.49	66.23	8.74**	57.82	62.64	4.82***
	(3.20)	(4.12)	(3.67)	(3.67)	(3.82)	(1.74)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	56.78	54.41	-2.37	57.05	54.40	-2.66*
	(2.95)	(3.78)	(2.87)	(3.12)	(3.33)	(1.35)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	53.00	55.61	2.61	52.89	56.90	4.02***
	(2.19)	(2.38)	(2.09)	(2.67)	(2.79)	(1.31)
Observations		1,032			1,032	
Group-neighborhood clusters		336			336	
Traditional-leader groups containing low / high respondents		111 / 39			111 / 39	
Religious-leader groups containing low / high respondents		112 / 42			112 / 42	

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Each block reports the low-group effect, high-group effect, and high-minus-low difference from one interacted regression containing all eight leader-by-environment effects. The preferred block uses neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects. The robustness block uses additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects on the identical sample. The moderator equals one when the respondent reports the same denomination as the locality's assigned religious leader and is defined for all experimental arms. The moderator equals one when the respondent reports the same denomination as the locality's assigned religious leader and is defined for all arms using the previously audited pastor-denomination match. Panel B reports the fixed-effect component averaged over the actual treated observations supporting each subgroup coefficient. All covariate and treatment components are set to zero, so these are diagnostics of the implied no-leader comparisons rather than raw no-leader means. All specifications include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. The intrinsic and extrinsic orientation terminology follows Allport and Ross (1967), Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5(4):432–443, doi:10.1037/h0021212. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-31: LEADER EFFECTS BY RESPONDENT PRETREATMENT PARTICIPATION: BALANCE-MAXIMIZING SPLIT

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE				Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Lower	Higher	Difference		Lower	Higher	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	-6.32	6.13	12.45	Mixed, without disclosure	-5.94	5.67	11.61
	(5.97)	(5.75)	(9.50)		(6.57)	(5.60)	(9.01)
Mixed, with disclosure	7.82	-6.94	-14.76	Mixed, with disclosure	8.12	-7.34	-15.46
	(7.08)	(5.52)	(9.89)		(8.55)	(5.08)	(10.15)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-7.06	6.27	13.33	Homogeneous, without disclosure	-8.46	7.34	15.80*
	(7.50)	(5.48)	(9.32)		(7.82)	(5.32)	(9.14)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	22.00***	-2.47	-24.47***	Homogeneous, with disclosure	22.12***	-1.26	-23.37***
	(6.40)	(3.92)	(8.11)		(6.67)	(4.37)	(8.15)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	4.98	10.81*	5.83	Mixed, without disclosure	5.58	10.51*	4.94
	(6.18)	(5.80)	(9.01)		(6.22)	(5.86)	(8.36)
Mixed, with disclosure	6.74	-1.93	-8.67	Mixed, with disclosure	3.66	1.65	-2.00
	(7.13)	(4.66)	(8.90)		(7.35)	(4.76)	(8.48)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.73	5.61	7.34	Homogeneous, without disclosure	-3.92	7.27	11.20
	(7.32)	(5.14)	(9.97)		(7.72)	(4.88)	(9.60)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.12	2.29	2.17	Homogeneous, with disclosure	2.90	0.08	-2.82
	(5.37)	(4.43)	(7.06)		(5.80)	(4.70)	(7.03)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	50.21	62.94	12.73	Mixed, without disclosure	50.23	63.07	12.84*
	(4.62)	(4.47)	(7.73)		(4.75)	(4.32)	(6.97)
Mixed, with disclosure	46.08	71.11	25.02***	Mixed, with disclosure	46.18	71.03	24.85***
	(4.92)	(4.26)	(7.21)		(5.79)	(3.99)	(7.16)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	45.56	64.99	19.43**	Homogeneous, without disclosure	47.37	63.55	16.19**
	(5.57)	(4.17)	(7.67)		(5.71)	(3.96)	(7.31)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	35.44	70.11	34.67***	Homogeneous, with disclosure	35.74	68.54	32.80***
	(4.54)	(3.00)	(6.43)		(4.57)	(3.37)	(6.19)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	50.43	61.28	10.86	Mixed, without disclosure	50.22	61.27	11.05
	(4.58)	(4.46)	(7.74)		(4.77)	(4.28)	(6.97)
Mixed, with disclosure	43.43	72.95	29.52***	Mixed, with disclosure	46.91	69.03	22.12***
	(4.90)	(3.87)	(6.75)		(5.75)	(3.80)	(6.92)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	46.11	64.24	18.13**	Homogeneous, without disclosure	48.66	62.19	13.53*
	(5.77)	(4.16)	(7.93)		(5.78)	(3.97)	(7.41)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	39.12	65.08	25.97***	Homogeneous, with disclosure	36.71	66.90	30.19***
	(4.29)	(3.20)	(6.25)		(4.49)	(3.34)	(6.03)
Observations	1,040				1,040		
Group-neighborhood clusters	336				336		
Respondents: lower / higher	514 / 526				514 / 526		
Traditional-leader groups containing lower / higher respondents	90 / 80				90 / 80		
Religious-leader groups containing lower / higher respondents	93 / 95				93 / 95		
No-leader groups containing lower / higher respondents	87 / 89				87 / 89		
Moderator × environment controls	Yes				Yes		

Notes: This table asks whether leaders affect prior nonparticipants and frequent participants differently. Pretreatment participation is measured during the common week before any meeting. "Lower" means participation on zero or one of the six eligible days; "higher" means two to six days. Panel A reports the leader effect for both groups and their difference in every experimental environment. Panel B shows how often the same types of residents would participate without a leader, which separates differences in leader influence from residents' usual participation. The preferred and robustness blocks use two alternative ways of comparing residents across neighborhoods and environments. Both use the same 1,040 residents and adjust for pretreatment participation, nearby treatment exposure, gender, and wealth group. Effects are percentage points, with standard errors in parentheses allowing for residents assigned to the same group. The table is discussed in Section 5.3; Figure 6 highlights chiefs in homogeneous groups and pastors in mixed groups. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-32: LEADER EFFECTS BY OTHER GROUP MEMBERS' PRETREATMENT PARTICIPATION: BALANCE-MAXIMIZING SPLIT

	Preferred: neighborhood × environment FE				Robustness: neighborhood + environment FE		
	Lower	Higher	Difference		Lower	Higher	Difference
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	-1.29	1.57	2.86	Mixed, without disclosure	-1.21	3.27	4.48
	(4.90)	(5.47)	(7.49)		(5.78)	(6.06)	(8.37)
Mixed, with disclosure	2.67	-0.64	-3.31	Mixed, with disclosure	5.28	-3.77	-9.05
	(6.27)	(6.49)	(9.56)		(7.73)	(6.60)	(10.36)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-1.36	3.69	5.04	Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.72	4.12	4.84
	(9.77)	(5.57)	(11.78)		(8.99)	(5.57)	(10.94)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	15.79***	3.57	-12.22*	Homogeneous, with disclosure	17.83***	5.18	-12.65
	(5.67)	(3.78)	(6.97)		(5.73)	(4.95)	(7.90)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	11.39**	6.12	-5.27	Mixed, without disclosure	11.87**	6.05	-5.82
	(5.50)	(6.19)	(8.61)		(5.86)	(6.76)	(8.97)
Mixed, with disclosure	8.76	-2.27	-11.03	Mixed, with disclosure	6.07	0.80	-5.27
	(5.99)	(6.36)	(9.27)		(6.12)	(7.02)	(9.51)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.01	3.49	3.51	Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.57	3.37	2.80
	(8.35)	(5.06)	(10.39)		(7.88)	(5.53)	(9.79)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	4.36	-3.21	-7.58	Homogeneous, with disclosure	8.63*	-5.38	-14.01*
	(5.33)	(5.12)	(7.93)		(5.05)	(6.10)	(8.27)
Panel B. Implied no-leader counterfactuals							
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	52.70	61.45	8.75	Mixed, without disclosure	52.85	59.60	6.76
	(3.55)	(3.62)	(5.35)		(4.36)	(4.09)	(6.08)
Mixed, with disclosure	55.36	60.18	4.82	Mixed, with disclosure	52.93	63.14	10.21
	(4.68)	(5.11)	(7.76)		(4.60)	(5.56)	(7.38)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	48.44	62.74	14.30	Homogeneous, without disclosure	47.92	62.18	14.27*
	(7.76)	(3.37)	(8.91)		(7.17)	(3.37)	(8.21)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	43.46	64.15	20.70***	Homogeneous, with disclosure	41.66	62.36	20.70***
	(4.01)	(2.63)	(5.29)		(3.50)	(3.64)	(5.69)
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	53.40	57.67	4.27	Mixed, without disclosure	52.93	57.78	4.85
	(3.48)	(3.30)	(5.02)		(4.35)	(3.95)	(5.93)
Mixed, with disclosure	50.57	65.99	15.42**	Mixed, with disclosure	53.33	62.82	9.49
	(4.52)	(4.57)	(6.87)		(4.58)	(5.49)	(7.25)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	47.75	61.05	13.29	Homogeneous, without disclosure	47.18	61.11	13.93*
	(7.58)	(3.36)	(8.89)		(7.11)	(3.30)	(8.12)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	45.22	59.07	13.85**	Homogeneous, with disclosure	40.98	61.26	20.28***
	(3.91)	(3.03)	(5.71)		(3.47)	(3.65)	(5.72)
Observations	1,040				1,040		
Group-neighborhood clusters	336				336		
Respondents: lower / higher	520 / 520				520 / 520		
Traditional-leader groups containing lower / higher respondents	80 / 57				80 / 57		
Religious-leader groups containing lower / higher respondents	86 / 76				86 / 76		
No-leader groups containing lower / higher respondents	68 / 74				68 / 74		
Moderator × environment controls	Yes				Yes		

Notes: Entries are percentage-point effects on average post-first-meeting salongo participation; group-neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Each block reports lower, higher, and higher-minus-lower estimates from one interacted regression containing all eight leader-by-environment effects. The preferred block uses neighborhood-by-composition-by-disclosure fixed effects; the robustness block uses additive neighborhood and composition-by-disclosure fixed effects on the identical sample. In both blocks, the moderator is also interacted with each of the four composition-by-disclosure environments. Peer participation is the total pretreatment hours supplied by every other ordinary group member during the common week before any experimental meeting. It excludes the respondent and all actual or placebo leaders after group-person-day de-duplication. The full-sample balance-maximizing ordered cutoff is 11.59 hours: lower is at or below the cutoff and higher is above it (520 respondents in each group). Panel B reports coefficient-specific implied no-leader predictions from the same regression. For each leader-by-environment row and moderator group, it averages the fixed-effect and environment-specific moderator components over the actual treated observations supporting that coefficient, while setting centered covariates and all treatment components to zero. Its Difference column tests whether those subgroup-specific implied counterfactuals differ. All specifications include the ANCOVA pretreatment outcome, the 25m spillover indicator, and fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls. The sample is not split for estimation. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-33 – LEADER EFFECTS ON COOPERATION NORMS AND DIVINE MONITORING BELIEFS

Panel A. Evolution in the two environments where leaders increased participation

	Traditional leader: homogeneous, with disclosure				Religious leader: mixed, without disclosure			
Outcome	Meeting 1	Meeting 2	Endline	Pooled	Meeting 1	Meeting 2	Endline	Pooled
Active participants are well regarded	0.01	-0.11	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.10	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Refusers face negative consequences from neighbors	-0.58***	-0.01	0.13	-0.15	-0.08	-0.09	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Contributing is a moral obligation	-0.09	-0.11	0.01	-0.06	-0.09	-0.00	0.04	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)
God rewards community support	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.09	-0.05	0.02	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)
God punishes neglect of community obligations	-0.14	-0.09	-0.15	-0.13	-0.21	-0.05	-0.06	-0.11
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Family p-value	0.000	0.739	0.717	0.710	0.539	1.000	1.000	1.000

Panel B. Pooled effects in every leader environment

Traditional leader	Well regarded	Neighbor sanctions	Moral obligation	God rewards	God punishes	Family p-value
Mixed, without disclosure	0.04	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04	-0.13	0.763
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	
Mixed, with disclosure	0.14*	0.24**	0.12**	0.08	0.21**	0.121
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.04	-0.02	0.05	-0.05	0.02	1.000
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-0.03	-0.15	-0.06	0.00	-0.13	0.710
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-0.06	-0.08	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11	1.000
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.06	0.12	0.04	-0.03	0.13	1.000
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.12)	
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.07	0.04	0.10	0.00	0.07	0.707
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.01	-0.09	0.00	0.02	-0.02	1.000
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)	

Notes: The five cooperation-norm outcomes range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Non-substantive responses are coded missing. Each estimate is relative to no leader in the same composition-by-disclosure environment. Meeting 1 is elicited immediately after the first accountability meeting, Meeting 2 at the second meeting, and Endline after the recognition period. Wave-specific regressions control for the same outcome's baseline response, gender, and assignment wealth stratum and absorb neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Pooled regressions stack the three surveys, absorb survey-wave × neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects, and allow the baseline-response, gender, and wealth-stratum slopes to vary by wave. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by group-neighborhood using the main paper's finite-sample correction. Family p-values apply the Bonferroni minimum-p test across the five displayed outcomes within each leader-environment and survey wave. Depending on item availability and don't-know responses, observations range from 983 at Meeting 1, 943–947 at Meeting 2, 965 at Endline, and 2891–2895 in pooled regressions. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (unadjusted).

Table A-34 – LEADER EFFECTS ON IDENTITY SALIENCE

Panel A. Evolution in the two environments where leaders increased participation

	Traditional leader: homogeneous, with disclosure				Religious leader: mixed, without disclosure			
Identity rank	Meeting 1	Meeting 2	Endline	Pooled	Meeting 1	Meeting 2	Endline	Pooled
Congolese	0.45*	0.20	0.05	0.23	-0.09	-0.26	0.06	-0.10
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Kasaien	0.09	-0.20	0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.18	0.21	0.15
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.15)
Christian	0.02	0.44**	-0.05	0.13	0.28	0.28	0.59**	0.38*
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.20)
Own territory	0.26	-0.05	0.45***	0.23*	-0.12	-0.15	-0.25	-0.17
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Own denomination	-0.31	-0.26	-0.14	-0.23	-0.27	-0.30	-0.20	-0.26*
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Own tribe	-0.49*	-0.12	-0.34	-0.32*	0.13	0.25	-0.42*	-0.01
	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.16)
Family p-value	0.354	0.274	0.045	0.487	1.000	0.870	0.140	0.331

Panel B. Pooled effects in every leader environment

	Congolese	Kasaien	Christian	Own territory	Own denomination	Own tribe	Family p-value
Traditional leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	0.00	0.14	-0.11	-0.21	0.11	0.07	0.872
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	
Mixed, with disclosure	0.17	0.20	-0.19	-0.02	-0.31**	0.16	0.258
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.13)	
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.11	-0.05	0.07	-0.03	-0.19	0.13	1.000
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.23	-0.03	0.13	0.23*	-0.23	-0.32*	0.487
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.18)	
Religious leader							
Mixed, without disclosure	-0.10	0.15	0.38*	-0.17	-0.26*	-0.01	0.331
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.05	-0.11	-0.02	0.18	0.02	-0.03	1.000
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.06	0.04	0.15	-0.21*	-0.33**	0.25**	0.208
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.12)	
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.07	0.10	0.30	0.06	-0.19	-0.34**	0.242
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	

Notes: Outcomes are reverse-coded salience ranks from a forced ranking of six identities; higher values indicate greater salience. Each estimate is relative to no leader in the same composition-by-disclosure environment. Meeting 1 is elicited immediately after the first accountability meeting, Meeting 2 at the second meeting, and Endline after the recognition period. Wave-specific regressions control for the same identity's baseline rank, gender, and assignment wealth stratum and absorb neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. Pooled regressions stack the three surveys, absorb survey-wave × neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects, and allow the baseline-rank, gender, and wealth-stratum slopes to vary by wave. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by group-neighborhood using the main paper's finite-sample correction. Family p-values apply the Bonferroni minimum-p test across the six ranks within the displayed leader-environment and survey wave; the ranks sum mechanically to 21, so no aggregate identity index is reported. Observations are 983 at Meeting 1, 947 at Meeting 2, 961 at Endline, and 2,891 in the pooled regressions. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (unadjusted).

Table A-35 – ENDPOINT CHANGES IN OPINIONS ABOUT ORDINARY PEERS

	Inspires respondent	Moral example	Enforcement authority	Trusts responsibility	Would help target	Expected help from target
Panel A. Leader effects by composition						
Traditional leader						
Mixed	0.04	0.11	0.09	0.14	0.12	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Homogeneous	0.14	0.08	0.04	-0.09	0.01	0.11
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Religious leader						
Mixed	0.20*	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.24**	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Homogeneous	0.05	0.08	0.09	-0.07	0.05	-0.00
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Panel B. Environment-specific leader effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	0.14	0.27	0.14	0.08	0.18	0.13
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.07	-0.06	0.04	0.20	0.04	-0.10
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.10	0.05	0.07	-0.16	-0.21	-0.11
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.17	0.10	0.01	-0.02	0.21**	0.32**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	0.25	0.06	0.16	0.20	0.43**	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Mixed, with disclosure	0.15	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.06	-0.04
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.13	0.11	0.12	-0.11	-0.02	-0.13
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-0.04	0.05	0.06	-0.03	0.11	0.13
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Respondent–target pairs	2,632	2,631	2,633	2,633	2,633	2,633
Ordinary-target pairs	2,071	2,071	2,072	2,072	2,072	2,072
Assigned-leader-target pairs	561	560	561	561	561	561
Respondents	885	885	885	885	885	885
Group-neighborhood clusters	323	323	323	323	323	323
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome control	No	No	No	No	No	No

Notes: This table shows how residents' opinions of ordinary teammates changed between the start of Meeting 1, before any discussion, and the start of Meeting 2. Each outcome is the later answer minus the earlier answer for the same respondent and teammate, expressed in baseline standard deviations. Expected-help amounts are transformed before the change is calculated. Panel A pools the disclosure conditions and compares mixed with homogeneous groups. Panel B reports all four environments. Every effect is relative to opinions of ordinary teammates in no-leader groups under the same experimental conditions. The companion Table A-36 uses the same model to report changes in opinions of assigned leaders. Standard errors in parentheses allow for people evaluated within the same randomized group. The table is discussed in Section 5.4; Figure 7 highlights the two help outcomes. Stars use Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values across the six ordinary-peer outcomes for each treatment comparison: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-36 – ENDPOINT CHANGES IN OPINIONS ABOUT ASSIGNED LEADERS

	Inspires respondent	Moral example	Enforcement authority	Trusts responsibility	Would help target	Expected help from target
Panel A. Leader effects by composition						
Traditional leader						
Mixed	0.05	0.02	-0.02	0.19	0.08	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Homogeneous	0.03	-0.02	-0.04	0.12	0.16	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Religious leader						
Mixed	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.23*	0.32***	0.17
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Homogeneous	0.11	0.00	0.08	0.16	0.04	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Panel B. Environment-specific leader effects						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	0.18	0.09	0.03	0.32	0.28	0.12
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.09	-0.05	-0.09	0.06	-0.14	0.01
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.15	-0.04	0.13	0.14	0.18	-0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	-0.08	-0.01	-0.19	0.11	0.15	0.16
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	0.15	0.10	0.14	0.22	0.42**	0.21
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Mixed, with disclosure	-0.01	0.06	0.03	0.24	0.22	0.14
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	0.16	0.05	0.14	0.03	-0.06	-0.10
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.06	-0.04	0.01	0.29	0.15	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Respondent–target pairs	2,632	2,631	2,633	2,633	2,633	2,633
Ordinary-target pairs	2,071	2,071	2,072	2,072	2,072	2,072
Assigned-leader-target pairs	561	560	561	561	561	561
Respondents	885	885	885	885	885	885
Group-neighborhood clusters	323	323	323	323	323	323
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome control	No	No	No	No	No	No

Notes: This table shows how residents' opinions of their assigned chief or pastor changed between the start of Meeting 1, before any discussion, and the start of Meeting 2. Each outcome is the later answer minus the earlier answer for the same respondent and leader, expressed in baseline standard deviations. Expected-help amounts are transformed before the change is calculated. Panel A pools the disclosure conditions and compares mixed with homogeneous groups. Panel B reports all four environments. Every effect is measured relative to opinions of ordinary teammates in no-leader groups under the same experimental conditions. The companion Table A-35 uses the same model to report changes in opinions of ordinary teammates. Standard errors in parentheses allow for people evaluated within the same randomized group. The table is discussed in Section 5.4; Figure 7 highlights the two help outcomes. Stars use Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values across the six assigned-leader outcomes for each treatment comparison: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-37 – GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL OUTCOMES: COMPRESSED INFERENCE

		Minimum adjusted q in mobilizing environment		Rejections at $q < 0.10$	
Outcome family	Outcomes	Chief: H, disclosure	Pastor: M, no disclosure	All leader effects	All contrasts
Government service performance	5	0.858	0.858	0/60	0/40
Government accountability and knowledge	4	0.849	0.608	0/48	0/32
Performance: public and community authorities	4	0.901	0.901	0/48	0/32
Performance: other authorities	4	0.638	0.638	0/48	0/32
Expected assistance from the locality chief	3	0.812	0.686	0/36	0/24
Local chief service performance	5	0.561	0.999	0/60	0/40
Local chief accountability and capture	2	0.664	0.664	0/24	0/16
Trust in public and local authorities	5	0.304	0.304	0/60	0/40
Trust in religious and civil-society actors	4	0.641	0.641	0/48	0/32
All governance families	36	0.304	0.304	0/432	0/288

Notes: The table compresses 36 baseline–endline outcomes in nine families. Every underlying ANCOVA controls for the corresponding baseline outcome, gender, and wealth stratum and absorbs neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the randomized group–neighborhood level using the main-paper finite-sample correction. The table reports the smallest Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted q-value within each mobilizing treatment cell and outcome family. Adjustment is performed separately within each thematic outcome family for all leader effects and all treatment-effect contrasts; it is never pooled across the nine families or across effects and contrasts. The last two columns report adjusted rejections divided by tests across all leader effects and all treatment-effect contrasts, respectively. The audited battery excludes predetermined chief ties, mechanically complementary diversion allocations, and nominal provider categories that do not form ordered outcomes. Appeal frequency is recoded monotonically, institutional-performance items are oriented so higher values indicate better performance, and refusals on name-knowledge items are treated as missing. No estimate in the 720-test audited battery survives adjustment at $q < 0.10$.

B Fieldwork continuation after Wave 8

On Friday, May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared a Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak after laboratory confirmation in Ituri Province; on May 17, the World Health Organization (WHO) determined that the event constituted a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Wave 8 was underway when the outbreak happened. Waves 9 and 10 were scheduled for the upcoming months of June, July, and August and would have required the repeated convening of new groups for collective work and program meetings. The institutional response to the outbreak underscored the risks of initiating such activities. WHO recommended considering the postponement of mass gatherings; UN staff in Bunia were instructed to work from home and avoid physical contact and crowded areas; the U.S. Department of State temporarily suspended all visa services at its embassy in Kinshasa; and the African Development Bank introduced remote participation for its Annual Meetings in neighboring Congo while explicitly monitoring risks from the outbreak, despite no confirmed or suspected cases in the host country. Initiating additional waves under these conditions was unwarranted and posed severe ethical risks. We therefore decided to stop the study on May 30, 2026, interrupting the implementation of the upcoming cohorts.[20] The emergency overlapped Wave 8 implementation. At the time of the declaration, Wave 8 was only 30.4 percent complete.

For those reasons, the paper's main sample uses Waves 1–7. Companion estimates reported in this appendix add disrupted Wave 8 observations. The appendix proceeds in three steps. Section B.1 compares predetermined characteristics of early- and late-wave neighborhoods. Section B.2 reassesses power under the planned ten-wave design and the seven waves completed before the declaration. Section B.3 reports matched Waves 1–7 and Waves 1–8 estimates, outcome-window checks, and one-wave-deletion diagnostics.

B.1 Predetermined neighborhood characteristics

The ten-wave rollout order was randomly assigned before implementation. Table B-38 compares property values, building size and counts, and commune composition for neighborhoods assigned to Waves 1–7 and Waves 8–10.

None of the 12 characteristic-specific tests rejects at the 5 percent level. The exact max-statistic test across all 12 characteristics yields $p = 0.787$. The available predetermined characteristics therefore provide no evidence of systematic differences between early- and late-wave neighborhoods. The balance assessment has limited power to establish equivalence, and unmeasured cohort differences remain possible. Within each realized neighborhood, treatment remains randomized, and the specifications absorb neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects.

B.2 Power under ten planned waves and seven pre-declaration waves

Figure B-4 reassesses expected precision for the planned ten-wave design and for Waves 1–7, the sample completed before the national declaration. The calibration data come from the municipal field pilot conducted before July 1, 2025, well before the current experiment. The sample contains 251 participants from four pilot neighborhoods with a six-day baseline week followed by a separate six-day outcome week. Ngdilayi, an earlier pilot neighborhood, is excluded because its calendar lacks this consecutive-week structure. The preregistration set a minimum detectable effect (MDE) of 0.20 outcome standard deviations and planned 40 neighborhoods and 480 groups. The reassessment keeps that effect-size threshold and applies the group sizes used in each wave: no-leader groups contain four ordinary participants in Waves 1–2 and three thereafter, while traditional- and religious-leader groups contain three ordinary participants in every wave. The seven-wave design therefore has 1,040 participant observations in 336 groups, and the ten-wave design has 1,472 observations in 480 groups. Every simulation estimates the paper's model with neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects and baseline participation; standard errors are clustered by group within neighborhood.

At the preregistered MDE of 0.20 outcome standard deviations (7.95 percentage points), power for the T_H and R_M leader effects ranges from 0.902 to 0.902 under ten waves and from 0.791 to 0.793 under seven waves. For the T_{H1} and R_{M0} effects, the corresponding ranges are 0.646 to 0.647 and 0.514 to 0.518. Power for the composition contrast Δ_C is 0.620 under ten waves and 0.478 under seven waves. Power for the environment contrast Δ_E is 0.364 and 0.276 under the two designs. Across the four leader effects and two delta contrasts, moving from ten to seven waves raises simulated standard errors by 17–19 percent. The ten-wave plan would


[20] WHO, Disease Outbreak News, May 16, 2026; WHO, PHEIC statement, May 17, 2026; Associated Press, May 18, 2026; U.S. Department of State, May 18, 2026; African Development Bank, May 21, 2026; and WHO, Disease Outbreak News, July 3, 2026.

Table B-38 – PREDETERMINED NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS BY PLANNED WAVE

	Waves 1–7	Waves 8–10	Difference	Std. diff.	RI p
Mean predicted property value (USD)	2612.09	2183.94	-428.15	-0.47	0.358
Median predicted property value (USD)	1359.32	1165.25	-194.07	-0.66	0.187
Mean building area	39.70	38.13	-1.57	-0.34	0.518
Median building area	34.59	33.50	-1.09	-0.35	0.496
Total built area	19261.66	18624.36	-637.30	-0.12	0.810
Number of main properties	313.86	322.00	8.14	0.15	0.769
Number of buildings	484.82	473.17	-11.65	-0.12	0.803
Commune: Kananga (share)	0.11	0.25	0.14	0.50	0.429
Commune: Katoka (share)	0.21	0.08	-0.13	-0.39	0.500
Commune: Lukonga (share)	0.36	0.42	0.06	0.13	1.000
Commune: Ndesha (share)	0.07	0.08	0.01	0.06	1.000
Commune: Nganza (share)	0.25	0.17	-0.08	-0.20	0.868
Joint max-statistic test			Maximum |standardized difference| = 0.66		0.787

Notes: The sample contains the 40 treated neighborhoods assigned ex ante to ten rollout waves: 28 neighborhoods in Waves 1–7 and 12 in Waves 8–10. Each row reports the early-wave mean, late-wave mean, their difference (late minus early), the difference standardized by the across-pair standard deviation, and a two-sided exact randomization-inference p-value. Wave assignment occurred at the neighborhood-pair level. The randomization distribution exhausts all 15,015 assignments that place two of six placebo pairs and four of fourteen non-placebo pairs in Waves 8–10. Commune rows are neighborhood shares. The final row reports the randomization p-value for the maximum absolute standardized difference across all 12 predetermined characteristics.

have improved precision. Power at the 0.20-SD effect size would remain below 80 percent for T_{H1}, R_{M0}, Δ_C, and Δ_E. The seven-wave curves correspond to the Waves 1–7 main analysis; Section B.3 reports the same estimands after adding all Wave 8 observations. Gold bars show the magnitudes of the Waves 1–7 estimates for scale.



Dotted line: preregistered MDE benchmark (0.20 SD); gold bars: magnitudes of the labeled Waves 1–7 estimates

Figure B-4 – POWER FOR LEADER EFFECTS AND THE PAPER'S COMPOSITION AND ENVIRONMENT CONTRASTS

Notes: T_H is the traditional-leader effect in homogeneous groups, and R_M is the religious-leader effect in mixed groups. T_{H1} is the traditional-leader effect in homogeneous groups under disclosure, and R_{M0} is the religious-leader effect in mixed groups without disclosure. The four panels report power for (1) T_H and R_M, (2) $\Delta_C = (\tau^T_H - \tau^T_M) - (\tau^R_H - \tau^R_M)$, (3) T_{H1} and R_{M0}, and (4) $\Delta_E = (\tau^T_{HI} - \tau^T_{MN}) - (\tau^R_{HI} - \tau^R_{MN})$. Panels 1 and 3 plot the lower-power curve across their two stated cells; Panels 2 and 4 use the full clustered covariance matrix for the stated linear contrast. The bottom axis reports standardized effects; the top axis translates them into participation percentage points using the outcome standard deviation from the municipal field pilot. The horizontal dotted line marks 80% power, and the vertical dotted line marks the preregistered 0.20-standard-deviation MDE benchmark (7.95 percentage points). Gold bars mark the magnitudes of the Waves 1–7 T_H and R_M estimates in Panel 1, Δ_C in Panel 2, T_{H1} and R_{M0} in Panel 3, and Δ_E in Panel 4. The ten- and seven-wave SEs are, respectively, 0.061–0.061 SD (2.42–2.43 percentage points) and 0.072–0.072 SD (2.85–2.86 percentage points) for T_H and R_M; 0.088–0.088 SD (3.51–3.51 percentage points) and 0.105–0.105 SD (4.17–4.17 percentage points) for Δ_C; 0.086–0.086 SD (3.41–3.41 percentage points) and 0.101–0.101 SD (4.00–4.02 percentage points) for T_{H1} and R_{M0}; and 0.124–0.124 SD (4.94–4.94 percentage points) and 0.148–0.148 SD (5.86–5.86 percentage points) for Δ_E. The outcome and pretreatment covariate are separate consecutive six-day participation weeks drawn from the municipal field pilot conducted before July 1, 2025. The simulation applies the group sizes implemented in the randomization scripts and uses 1,000 bootstrap designs; the largest Monte Carlo standard error among the reported power calculations is 0.003. Every simulated ANCOVA absorbs neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects, identifies leader effects within the corresponding fixed-effect cell, and controls for baseline-week participation. Standard errors cluster by group within neighborhood using the paper's small-sample correction.

B.3 Comparison of Waves 1–7 and Waves 1–8

Table B-39 – ENVIRONMENT-SPECIFIC ESTIMATES IN WAVES 1–7 AND WAVES 1–8

	Waves 1–7			Waves 1–8		
	FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth	FE only	+ Spillover	+ Gender/wealth
Panel A. Leader effects relative to no leader						
Traditional leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	-0.29	-0.31	0.18	0.45	0.45	1.12
	(3.48)	(3.48)	(3.39)	(3.39)	(3.39)	(3.28)
Mixed, with disclosure	1.75	1.67	0.94	5.53	5.35	5.06
	(4.53)	(4.52)	(4.24)	(4.32)	(4.32)	(4.16)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	-0.31	-0.34	-0.18	-3.47	-3.65	-3.92
	(4.46)	(4.45)	(4.47)	(4.43)	(4.44)	(4.55)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	9.95***	10.13***	10.06***	7.63**	7.89**	7.86**
	(3.63)	(3.63)	(3.63)	(3.73)	(3.72)	(3.64)
Religious leader						
Mixed, without disclosure	9.18**	9.16**	9.10**	6.80*	6.88*	7.01*
	(3.97)	(3.98)	(3.93)	(3.78)	(3.79)	(3.72)
Mixed, with disclosure	3.41	3.40	3.56	5.57	5.51	5.64
	(4.30)	(4.32)	(4.09)	(4.01)	(4.04)	(3.88)
Homogeneous, without disclosure	1.66	1.67	1.59	3.29	3.21	3.17
	(3.81)	(3.80)	(3.80)	(3.75)	(3.74)	(3.80)
Homogeneous, with disclosure	0.01	-0.01	0.08	-0.72	-0.72	-0.78
	(3.27)	(3.26)	(3.32)	(3.13)	(3.13)	(3.13)
Panel B. Treatment-effect contrasts						
Mixed, with: T − R	-1.66	-1.73	-2.61	-0.04	-0.16	-0.58
	(4.40)	(4.41)	(4.06)	(4.15)	(4.17)	(3.96)
Mixed, without: T − R	-9.47**	-9.47**	-8.92**	-6.34*	-6.43*	-5.90
	(3.98)	(4.01)	(4.08)	(3.84)	(3.87)	(3.92)
Homogeneous, with: T − R	9.94**	10.13**	9.98**	8.35**	8.60**	8.64**
	(4.03)	(4.00)	(4.05)	(3.98)	(3.96)	(3.93)
Homogeneous, without: T − R	-1.97	-2.01	-1.77	-6.77	-6.86	-7.09
	(4.13)	(4.12)	(4.26)	(4.30)	(4.28)	(4.48)
Δ_E: H, with − M, without	19.41***	19.60***	18.90***	14.69***	15.04***	14.54***
	(5.67)	(5.69)	(5.78)	(5.55)	(5.56)	(5.58)
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,184	1,184	1,184
Group-neighborhood clusters	336	336	336	384	384	384
Neighborhoods	28	28	28	32	32	32
Neighborhood × disclosure × composition FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretreatment participation control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25m spillover control	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Gender and wealth-stratum controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: This table reproduces Panels A and B of the environment-specific half of the main table for Waves 1–7 and the pooled Waves 1–8 sample. The unit is a collapsed respondent–treatment-cell observation; the outcome is average salongo participation on six eligible days strictly after Meeting 1 through the Meeting 2 day, in percentage points. Panel A reports leader effects relative to no leader; Panel B reports traditional-minus-religious contrasts and Δ_E. All columns include the ANCOVA pretreatment-participation control and neighborhood × disclosure × composition fixed effects. The spillover columns add the 25m exposure indicator. The columns labeled + Gender/wealth add fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls in both wave windows. Standard errors are clustered by group within neighborhood. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B-39 compares Waves 1–7 with all eight collected waves while holding the estimator fixed. The columns labeled + Gender/wealth use fixed gender and wealth-stratum controls in both samples. The Waves 1–8 columns retain the complete scheduled Wave 8 six-day outcome window, including Friday, May 15, and Saturday, May 16.

Across the three specifications, Δ_E is 18.90–19.60 percentage points in Waves 1–7 and 14.54–15.04 percentage points in Waves 1–8 (SE 5.55–5.58; p-values 0.007–0.010). Adding Wave 8 therefore reduces the point estimate by roughly 4.6–4.8 percentage points. The Waves 1–8 estimate remains positive, and its confidence interval excludes zero in every specification. The two component leader effects retain their signs. The traditional-leader effect in homogeneous groups under disclosure, T_{H1}, is 7.63–7.89 percentage points (p-values 0.031–0.041). The religious-leader effect in mixed groups without disclosure, R_{M0}, is 6.80–7.01 percentage points (p-values 0.060–0.073).

C Randomization and Team-Construction Protocol

This appendix describes how residents were assigned to accountability teams. The implementation was conducted in waves, with four study neighborhoods entering the team experiment in each wave. Within each neighborhood, the procedure formed twelve four-person teams. These twelve teams filled the complete $3 \times 2 \times 2$ factorial design: three leader conditions (traditional leader, religious leader, or no leader), two composition conditions (homogeneous or mixed), and two information conditions (individual disclosure or no individual disclosure). The procedure can be summarized in six steps: construct the eligible roster; sample residents within sex-by-wealth strata; form homogeneous and mixed teams; select one assignment using the prespecified rerandomization rule; attach the information and scheduling assignments; and replace unavailable residents according to pre-generated queues. All random choices were generated by code and stored with the wave-specific assignment files.

C.1 Stage 1: Eligible rosters and fixed participants

The assignment was run separately by wave using the recruitment roster that had been completed before that wave's cutoff date. The roster was restricted to consenting residents with the records required for field implementation. Individuals identified as other religious or traditional leaders were excluded from the ordinary-resident pool, preventing the nominal no-leader condition from inadvertently containing another recruited leader.

Each neighborhood had one traditional leader and one religious leader identified before team assignment. These individuals were held fixed and inserted into the teams assigned to their respective leader condition. Beginning in Wave 3, the program also randomly selected one ordinary resident from the traditional leader's territorial origin to occupy the fourth seat in the no-leader teams. We refer to this person as the fixed placebo participant. The placebo participant had no leadership role; using the same person across the no-leader environments made team size and the number of repeated participants symmetric across leader conditions.

C.2 Stage 2: Sampling ordinary residents

Within each neighborhood, ordinary residents were divided into four sampling strata defined by sex and predicted housing wealth: female–lower wealth, female–higher wealth, male–lower wealth, and male–higher wealth. Higher and lower wealth were defined relative to the sex-specific median within the neighborhood; residents with missing property values entered the lower-wealth stratum.

The program constructed separate candidate pools for homogeneous and mixed teams. The homogeneous pool prioritized residents whose administrative territory of origin matched that of the traditional leader. The mixed pool was drawn from the remaining eligible residents and distributed across territories. The program sampled up to 24 residents for each composition pool. Eighteen from each pool were used in the twelve accountability teams; the remaining sampled residents were not assigned to these teams.

The initial wave targeted equal representation of the four sex-by-wealth strata. In subsequent waves, the quotas were adjusted using the cumulative distribution of assignments in completed waves: an overrepresented stratum received fewer positions in the next wave and an underrepresented stratum received more. The adjusted totals were then distributed across the four neighborhoods entering that wave, with each neighborhood receiving the same total number of positions.

When a requested sex-by-wealth cell did not contain enough eligible residents, the program used a fixed priority order: first the opposite sex within the same wealth category, then the same sex in the other wealth category, and finally any remaining eligible resident in the relevant composition pool. These fallbacks preserved team size while keeping the assignment as close as possible to the target margins.

C.3 Stage 3: Forming homogeneous and mixed teams

The twelve group identifiers encoded the factorial cells shown in Table C-40. The order in which group identifiers were filled was randomized. Each group received three ordinary residents. The appropriate traditional leader, religious leader, or fixed placebo participant was then added as the fourth member.

Table C-40: Mapping from group identifiers to experimental cells

Group identifiers	Composition	Fourth team member	Individual disclosure
1, 2	Homogeneous	Fixed placebo participant	No, Yes
3, 4	Homogeneous	Traditional leader	No, Yes
5, 6	Homogeneous	Religious leader	No, Yes
7, 8	Mixed	Fixed placebo participant	No, Yes
9, 10	Mixed	Traditional leader	No, Yes
11, 12	Mixed	Religious leader	No, Yes

Notes: Within each row, the odd-numbered group received no individual disclosure and the even-numbered group received individual disclosure. In Waves 1–2, no fixed placebo participant was used; the no-leader teams instead contained four independently sampled ordinary residents.

Homogeneous teams. The program filled groups 1–6 from the pool associated with the traditional leader's territorial origin. It assigned residents to teams in randomized group order and one position at a time, which prevented any group identifier from systematically receiving the first available residents. When a territorial-origin or sampling-stratum constraint was binding, the program used the prespecified fallback order described above to preserve team size.

Mixed teams. The program filled groups 7–12 in randomized group order and one position at a time. For every new position, it first selected from territories not already represented in that team. If no such resident remained, it selected from the remaining eligible mixed-team pool. This round-robin rule maximized territorial diversity subject to the available roster while preserving the sex-by-wealth targets.

Repeated participants. The traditional leader appeared in four teams in the same neighborhood: two homogeneous and two mixed, split evenly across information conditions. The religious leader and, from Wave 3 onward, the fixed placebo participant were used in the same way. Leaders participated as ordinary team members and received no script or formal power. The estimation sample excludes the traditional leader, religious leader, and fixed placebo participant.

C.4 Stage 4: Cumulative rerandomization

Respondent sampling and team formation contained random choices. The program therefore generated multiple complete candidate assignments and retained the candidate selected by the prespecified rule documented in Appendix A. We considered 48 candidate assignments per wave and evaluated each candidate jointly with the assignments already implemented in earlier waves[21]. No candidate was selected by visual inspection or by reference to treatment effects. The selected seed, assignment roster, and ordered replacement queues were archived.

[21] We followed Banerjee et al. (2020), which advocates for the minimum between 100 and the number of randomized units (4 neighborhoods × 12 groups per neighborhood = 48 treatment assignments). Wave 1 used 100 candidates and selected seed 58.

C.5 Stage 5: Information and time slots

The two group identifiers within every leader-by-composition cell were assigned opposite information conditions. Odd-numbered groups received the status-quo information regime, in which individual contributions were not disclosed; even-numbered groups received individual disclosure. Random allocation across group identifiers produced one team in each information condition for every leader-by-composition cell in every neighborhood.

Finally, the twelve group identifiers were mapped without replacement to the twelve available weekday-by-daypart meeting slots. A group identifier had the same slot across the four neighborhoods in a given wave. In the second half of fieldwork, the slot ordering mirrored the first-half ordering, reversing both day and daypart so that leader and information cells were not systematically concentrated in earlier or later slots.

C.6 Stage 6: Unavailable residents and replacements

Before field implementation, all eligible residents not selected for the initial roster received a random replacement order within neighborhood and territorial-origin category. If a selected ordinary resident was unavailable, the program assigned the first available person in the corresponding queue, prioritizing the same neighborhood and territorial-origin category before relaxing the match within neighborhood. For mixed teams, the fallback continued to prioritize residents outside the traditional leader's territorial origin. Replacement residents inherited the unavailable resident's group, experimental condition, and meeting slot. Leader replacements were handled separately and preserved leader type.

C.7 Implementation refinements across waves

The assignment logic was stable across the main sample, with two implementation refinements:

1. In Waves 1–2, no-leader teams contained four independently sampled ordinary residents. Beginning in Wave 3, one fixed placebo participant occupied the fourth seat in all four no-leader teams in a neighborhood, leaving three non-repeated residents in every experimental team.
2. Beginning in Wave 3, the sampling quotas explicitly offset cumulative sex-by-wealth differences across group identifiers from completed waves. Candidate assignments had already been evaluated cumulatively beginning in Wave 2.

These changes standardized the fourth team position and improved cumulative balance. They did not alter the mapping between group identifiers and the leader, composition, or information treatments.

C.8 Pseudocode

Input: eligible recruitment roster for four neighborhoods in wave w; fixed traditional and religious leaders; pretreatment covariates; assignments from waves $1, \ldots, w-1$.

For each neighborhood:
- identify the traditional leader's territorial origin;
- select the fixed placebo participant when $w \geq 3$;
- divide ordinary residents into sex $\times$ wealth strata;
- create candidate pools for homogeneous and mixed teams;
- set stratum quotas, offsetting cumulative imbalances from earlier waves.

For candidate seed $s = 1, \ldots, S_w$**:**
- sample residents within composition pools and strata;
- generate complementary three-person stratum patterns across neighborhoods;
- randomly order homogeneous group identifiers 1-6;
- fill each homogeneous team slot-by-slot, prioritizing the leader's origin;
- randomly order mixed group identifiers 7-12;
- fill each mixed team slot-by-slot, prioritizing a new territory;
- add the traditional leader to groups 3, 4, 9, and 10;
- add the religious leader to groups 5, 6, 11, and 12;
- add the placebo participant to groups 1, 2, 7, and 8 when $w \geq 3$;
- append the candidate to completed-wave assignments;
- score candidate s using the prespecified rule in Appendix A.

```
Select the seed with the lowest prespecified assignment score.
Assign no disclosure to odd group identifiers and individual disclosure to even group
identifiers.
Attach the wave's without-replacement time-slot permutation.
Export the assignment roster, seed, assignment diagnostics, and ordered replacement
queues.
```

$S_1 = 100$ and $S_w = 48$ for $w = 2, \ldots, 7$.

D Spillover Exposure and Radius Robustness

Because accountability groups are spatially intermingled within neighborhoods, a participant's behavior could respond to treatment received by nearby households assigned to other groups. The randomized contrasts could then partly reflect the surrounding treatment environment. We address this concern by measuring cross-group proximity at the end of the rollout, adding that measure to the main specification, and checking alternative radii.

The analysis holds fixed the main sample of 1,040 participants in 336 assigned groups across 28 neighborhoods, the outcome, the pretreatment participation control, the design fixed effects, and group-level clustering. Exposure is a realized geographic measure, so its coefficient is an associational diagnostic rather than a randomized indirect effect.

Terminal exposure. Let d_{ij} denote the distance between respondents i and j and G_i respondent i's assigned accountability group. For radius r, terminal exposure on the wave's final treatment date is

$$E_i(r) = \mathbf{1}\left\{ \sum_{j \neq i} \mathbf{1}\{d_{ij} \leq r\} \mathbf{1}\{G_j \neq G_i\} > 0 \right\}. \tag{4}$$

The sum runs over study households in respondent i's wave, all of whose groups have been treated by that date. Thus, a respondent is exposed when at least one household from another accountability group lies within the chosen radius. Nearby members of the respondent's own group are excluded because their treatment is part of the respondent's assigned intervention rather than a spillover.

Figure D-5 illustrates the 25-meter definition in neighborhoods near the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of terminal exposure. Some households appear inside a gold buffer but remain classified as unexposed because the nearby treated household belongs to the same assigned group.




Figure D-5: TERMINAL SPILLOVER EXPOSURE IN THREE NEIGHBORHOODS

Notes: The panels show the mechanically selected neighborhoods nearest the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of neighborhood-level 25-meter exposure. All panels are measured on the final treatment date. Gold disks are 25-meter buffers around treated study households. Filled points are main-sample respondents with at least one treated out-of-group household within 25 meters; white points are unexposed. Crosses mark religious leaders and diamonds traditional leaders. The registry TIFF is shown translucently. A respondent inside a buffer remains unexposed when the nearby household belongs to the respondent's own assigned group.

Radius choice and additive adjustment. Panel A of Figure D-6 shows the identifying-support tradeoff. At 25 meters, 483 of 1,040 participants are exposed, or 46.4 percent of the sample; at 30 meters the share is 55.4 percent. The 25-meter cutoff is therefore the stored grid point closest to an even split, selected without using outcomes. Exposure rises to 79.4 percent at 50 meters and 89.4 percent at 70 meters, leaving progressively fewer unexposed respondents.

For each radius, Panel B adds $E_i(r)$ to the main specification while holding the sample and remaining specification fixed. The randomized contrasts change little: across 10–70 meters, Δ_C ranges from 9.27 to 9.75 percentage points and Δ_E from 18.99 to 20.01 percentage points. At 25 meters, the exposure coefficient is 1.65 percentage points (SE 2.09) in the composition model and 1.81 (SE 2.09) in the environment model. The exposure measure is therefore not strongly associated with participation, and controlling for it does not account for the paper's main treatment contrasts.




Figure D-6: EXPOSURE SUPPORT AND MAIN CONTRASTS ACROSS RADII

Notes: Panel A reports the terminal exposed share in the fixed Waves 1–7 main-regression sample. The horizontal dashed line marks 50 percent. Panel B reports Δ_C and Δ_E after adding the radius-specific exposure indicator to the raw fixed-effects specification; shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by assigned group within neighborhood. The dashed horizontal line in Panel B is the corresponding estimate without an exposure control. The gold vertical line marks 25 meters, and every contrast panel includes zero.