Peace Derailed: The Effects of Mass Protests on Religious Conflict in South Asia*

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September 2, 2026

Abstract

Constructive inter-ethnic contact—in teams, social movements or political coalitions—is often considered conducive to inter-ethnic peace. Under what conditions does this work, and when can it fail: when can cross-ethnic mobilization lead instead to religious conflict, doing so even in places with long histories of peaceful coexistence? Using novel archival data, we study the effects of the first pro-Independence mass mobilization across religious lines in South Asia (1921–22) on the subsequent breakdown of religious tolerance. We exploit a temporary exogenous shock to local cross-religious mobilization stemming from the 8,000 mile pre-planned tour of the Prince of Wales in 1921–22. We show that protests due to the visit raised the propensity of a district to experience a subsequent religious riot by 87 percent, including in places that never before experienced such violence. Furthermore, in these districts, the hazard of the first breakdown of inter-religious peace in any year rises threefold. We interpret these results as reflecting how mobilizing cross-ethnic coalitions, without also aligning long-term complementary incentives, can actually undermine inter-religious peace.

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*We are grateful to Emmerich Davies and participants at the AEA meetings, AALIMS, Columbia, MIT, Stanford, Yale, and the University of Michigan for comments. Semra Vignaux, Anuka Mohanpuhr, Evan Sing and Yumna Hussain provided outstanding research assistance.

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Understanding how to manage societal divisions and mitigate ethnic and religious conflict successfully continues to be crucial for politics and policymakers around the world. Societies with ethnic divisions often provide fewer public goods, are more prone to violent conflict and grow more slowly, creating the potential for an ethnic growth trap (Easterly and Levine, 1997, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, Blattman and Miguel, 2010, Guarnieri, 2025, Jha, 2025). A promising set of approaches that have been mooted for resolving these challenges includes the development of constructive contact— the building of inter-ethnic teams or political coalitions— that allow individuals from different backgrounds to interact together in a setting where there are mutual gains from joint effort (Lowe, 2021, Mousa, 2020, Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, Weiss, 2021, Paluck, Green and Green, 2019, Ghosh, 2025). While these approaches have been successful at changing attitudes and enhancing cooperation in specific domains, less is known about how these effects scale, and their resilience in the long-term. A growing body of evidence suggests that one set of incentives that has historically provided the basis for long-term tolerance has been when where there has been inter-ethnic or religious complementarities (eg Jha, 2013, 2018, Díaz-Cayeros, Espinosa-Balbuena and Jha, 2022, Díaz-Cayeros and Jha, 2022, Artiles, 2026, Huang, Ma and Valencia Caicedo, 2026, Kok, Lim, Shariat, Siddique and Tsuda, 2026). However, less is known about the scalability and resilience of tolerance in environments where groups are mobilized for constructive contact across ethnic lines in environments that lack robust inter-ethnic complementarities.

In this paper, we measure the effects on religious conflict and tolerance of one of the most important large-scale cross-religious social movements in history, that of the Indian independence movement. Specifically, in this paper we focus upon the first mass mobilization of the movement— the Khilafat/ Non-Cooperation satyagraha— which was also the very first to mobilize civilians from across Hindu, Muslim and other faiths across South Asia in mass coordinated joint protests against British policies and in favor of democratic self-determination.[1] As we document below, between 1918-1922, the Independence movement featured 3,891 political protest events, encompassing both Hindus and Muslims and spread over more than half the districts of the South Asian Subcontinent. Despite active colonial intervention in the media aimed at forestalling coordination, individual protests regularly garnered tens of thousands of participants. Seven million workdays were lost to worker strikes in 1921 alone.

South Asia provides a very useful laboratory to study the effects of inter-ethnic mass

[1]The Revolt of 1857 also spanned religious lines, but was largely focused among soldiers rather than encompassing a mass movement- hence the name by which it was referred to by the colonial authorities: the Sepoy Mutiny.

movements. South Asia served as the setting for one of the pioneering cross-ethnic mass movements in favor of democratic self-determination in world history, with the Independence movement seen as a globally paradigmatic example for demonstrating the effectiveness of non-violent civil disobedience (eg Ackerman and DuVall, 2000, Nepstad, 2015). Comprising a fifth of the world's population, the Indian subcontinent houses one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, but one where are they are locally also minorities. South Asia is also a setting with strong norms of endogamy, particularly across religious lines, making the religious divisions between Hindus and Muslims also ethnic in nature. Yet despite these strong divisions, the communities of South Asia have enjoyed a long history of inter-religious relations, and great local variation both in its religious institutions and the incidence of inter-religious peace and of conflict.

Yet, despite its historic importance, both for the political destiny of a fifth of the world's population, and as an exemplar of a large-scale movement aimed at constructive inter-ethnic contact, accounts of the Indian Independence Movement, and its first and foundational mass movement— Khilafat / Non-Cooperation— have, until now, been almost exclusively based upon qualitative accounts and regional case studies rather than comprehensive quantitative analysis.[2] The challenge of collecting such data is compounded by active propaganda and media manipulation employed by the colonial authorities within the Subcontinent in an attempt to prevent coordination by the movement (see e.g. Kaul (2003)). Rather than rely on a single source, we combine novel archival data from secret fortnightly colonial intelligence reports, British and foreign newspapers, as well as the South Asian English (often pro-colonial) and vernacular (often more pro-nationalist) press, to construct, what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first comprehensive dataset on political protest activity during the Khilafat / Non-Cooperation Movement. We wed these to existing data on pre-Independence Hindu-Muslim riots to capture an observable measure of the failure of inter-religious peace and tolerance collected by Wilkinson, ed (2005).

Naturally measuring the effects of cross-ethnic protests at scale is highly challenging because of the degree to which inter-ethnic mobilization is often driven by local conditions that may also directly drive inter-ethnic peace and conflict. We address this challenge though a novel identification strategy: exploiting a temporary, exogenous shock to local incentives for joint mobilization across ethnic lines: the pre-planned whistle-stop tour of Edward, Prince of Wales, across India in 1921–22. The tour spanned more than four months and logged approximately eight thousand miles, primarily by rail. Importantly, its itinerary was pre-

[2]Canonical accounts include those by Hasan (1979), Minault (1982), Pandey (1990) and more recently Hardiman (2021). See also our companion papers on the subsequent movements (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014) and Bhavnani, Hai and Jha 2020.

planned in 1919, following in a long tradition of royal visits aimed to cement imperial ties, to demonstrate the continuity and stability of the Raj and thank Indians for their loyalty and support in the First World War (Kaul, 2006). As we discuss below, "*it had been agreed that the Prince would not participate in ceremonies of a political nature*" (Kaul, 2003). Instead, the itinerary was largely designed to allow the Prince to not only satisfy certain imperial protocol requirements, rewarding supporters and respecting the hierarchical precedence of particular South Asian rajas and nawabs etc., but also indulge more idiosyncratic interests such as the Prince's passions for polo, tiger hunting and the Kadir Cup, the marquee event on the pig-sticking calendar.

Yet, as we describe below, by the time the Prince arrived in India in November 1921, the political climate had changed, and his empire-building visit had, in the Prince's own words, "'*the unexpected effect*" of bringing Gandhi "*into the open*", providing an ideal opportunity for mass anti-colonial protests instead.[3] Since the Prince would travel with an entourage of British and foreign press correspondents, movement leaders saw the potential it provided to penetrate the veil of colonial propaganda and demonstrate the extent of their opposition to colonial rule. As we show, organizers from the majority- Hindu Indian National Congress, and the Sunni Muslim Khilafat Movement used stops on the Prince's itinerary as focal points for protests that included *hartals* (bazaar closures), demonstrations, boycotts, and civil disobedience campaigns. Thus the Prince's visit generates sharp, exogenous variation in the timing and location of mass cross-ethnic protest activity across Indian districts.

We compare districts that happened to be actually selected for the Prince's pre-planned itinerary to a thousand counterfactual itineraries that could have been selected given the constraints of protocol and sporting event timing he faced in 1921, as well as to those districts actually chosen for the visit of his father, King George V, ten years earlier. We first show that compared to these counterfactual itineraries, those districts treated to a visit by the Prince of Wales (henceforth PoW districts) were 10.5 percentage points more likely to experience a non-violent protest—roughly a 10-fold increase over the base rate of 1 percent. The actual effect of the Prince's itinerary exceeds 99 percent of the effects generated by the 1,000 counterfactual itineraries and spans the range of political protest activity, including strikes, demonstrations etc. These effects are specific to the timing of the Prince's visit–i.e. districts were more likely experience protest activity the specific day that he was present and not in the days or months prior.

In principle, since such coordinated cross-ethnic protests have the properties of constructive contact, one might expect such protests to strengthen and create more durable inter-religious peace. In contrast, if, as we argue, such protests can leave a legacy of organizational

[3] Edward, Duke of Windsor (1951, pg.169) cited in Kaul (2003, pg.237).

capacity but do not, in and of themselves, provide long-term (complementary) incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation, the effect may be to undermine inter-ethnic peace. We therefore estimate the effect of the Prince's visit on inter-religious tolerance as measured by both the incidence of subsequent Hindu-Muslim riots, and the timing of the first failure of religious tolerance. Compared to the counterfactual itineraries, those districts actually visited by the Prince experienced a 17 percentage point *increase* in the probability of a Hindu-Muslim riot in the decade that followed, representing an 87 percent increase over the outcome mean. Similarly, two-stage least squares estimates suggest that those districts that had protests because of the Prince's visit were a very consistent 17 percentage points more likely to have a riot than those that would have had a cross-ethnic protest had they received the Prince. Further, these effect emerge in places that had never experienced religious rioting before. In districts that had never before experienced a religious riot, the hazard ratio of the first failure of religious tolerance increases 2.95 times due to the Prince of Wales visit.

We use a staggered difference-in-differences event study approach (eg De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2024) to confirm that the timing of the Prince's visit leads to a subsequent divergence in the patterns of religious tolerance: the effects on religious violence emerge from 1924 onwards and grow through the rest of the decade. Indeed, as we describe, after the mass protests of the Khilafat/ Non-Cooperation Movement, Hindu-Muslim tolerance in South Asia would never again be the same.

We interpret these findings as consistent with the complementary nature of long-term incentives and organizational capacity in securing inter-ethnic peace. In particular, without the provision of aligned *long-term* incentives, including robust inter-ethnic complementarities in economic or political domains, the mobilization of ethnic groups to organize side by side, even if it provides short-term opportunities for constructive contact, may backfire, and lead to grave inter-ethnic violence instead.

Indeed, we draw on the historical record to document how in the aftermath of the mass movement, prominent Khilafat/Noncooperation leaders took the organizations they had build to protest colonial rule to the domain of religious competition instead. The Hindu Shuddhi and Sangathan and Muslim Tabligh and Tanzim movements would compete with each other for religious converts, using the same networks and techniques that had been built to jointly protest British rule. Thus, a movement that initially appeared to hold great promise for mobilizing Hindus and Muslims alongside one another as allies, instead provided the human and organizational capital that led to sustained religious violence.

Beyond the literature on constructive inter-ethnic and religious contact already mentioned, our paper builds upon and contributes to three important literatures. First, we contribute to a growing literature on the effects of non-violent protest and collective ac-

tion. An influential body of cross-campaign evidence, based mainly upon the experience of twentieth century campaigns, has found that non-violent movements at scale are more highly correlated with the achievement of subsequent political reforms and concessions (eg Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). However, our paper provides direct evidence from one of the most important campaigns in history, to help understand why these correlational relationships may face a selection problem: large-scale non-violent protests, particularly those that span ethnic lines, are also more likely to also turn violent (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014).[4]

Second, we contribute to the literature on social movements and organizational legacy. McAdam (1982) demonstrates that the U.S. Civil Rights movement built on decades of institution-building in Black churches, colleges, and NAACP chapters—organizational infrastructure that persisted and could be redeployed. Tarrow (1998) generalizes this through the concept of "cycles of contention," arguing that mobilizing structures endure after movements demobilize and remain available for subsequent—sometimes very different—mobilization. We add to this literature by documenting a mechanism in which cross-ethnic cooperative mobilization creates organizational capacity that, once the shared purpose dissolves, and absent long-term complementarities, becomes available for inter-ethnic violence. The same networks that enabled Hindu-Muslim cooperation became the infrastructure for Hindu-Muslim conflict.

Third, we contribute to the literature on ethnic conflict literature as applied to the case of Hindu-Muslim violence in South Asia. Wilkinson (2004) shows that electoral incentives shape politicians' willingness to prevent or foment ethnic riots. Brass (2003) and Varshney (2002) point to the role of localized institutionalized riot systems and inter-ethnic civic networks, respectively, leading to certain places to be prone to religious violence or to instead sustain continued religious tolerance. Jha (2013) and Jha (2018) points to historical incentives related to inter-ethnic complementarities in trade or competition in underlying those institutional arrangements, while Jha and Wilkinson (2012) shows that organizational

[4]Our paper also differs from an important and growing literature on the effects of protests in its approach to identification. The dominant identification strategy in this literature uses the coincidence of weather shocks—mainly rainfall— on particular days as an instrument for protest intensity (see Madestam, Shoag, Veuger and Yanagizawa-Drott 2013 on Tea Party rallies; Wasow 2020 on civil rights protest tactics; Klein Teeselink and Melios 2025 on Black Lives Matter protests and the 2020 election; Casanueva 2021 on Spain's 15M Movement). A related approach uses school holidays alongside weather (Huet-Vaughn 2013 on French protest violence). See also Mellon (2025) for a critique. While such rainfall coincidence instruments can be very useful, they identify particular local average treatment effects– the reduction in protest intensity due to people not turning out due to rain. This may not capture compliers who are more committed to a cause, and thus less rain-sensitive. Moreover, such instruments can be harder to justify in places where rainfall is more predictable (due to monsoon weather patterns) as is the case of South Asia. Our identification strategy is distinct and measures a substantively different LATE. Rather than using weather to generate variation in protest intensity at a given set of locations, we exploit a pre-planned itinerary to generate variation in which locations experienced an exogenous shock to the incentive to protest.

capacity borne of World War 2 combat experience led to increased ethnic cleansing of religious minorities during the Partition of South Asia. We complement these works by showing that, absent sustained incentives for inter-ethnic complementarity, the organizational capacity created by one of the most important cross-ethnic non-violent movements in history also became the vehicle for ethnic violence in its aftermath.

In doing so, we also contribute to the historical political economy of colonial India. Much of this literature examines the effects of colonial institutions on economic and political outcomes—the consequences of direct versus indirect rule (Iyer, 2010), colonial land tenure systems Banerjee and Iyer (2005), and the legacies of colonial-era investments in infrastructure (Donaldson, 2018) and human capital (Chaudhary, 2009). Some work examines pre-colonial and colonial-era warfare and its long-run consequences for state capacity and development (Dincecco, Fenske, Menon and Mukherjee, 2022). Our paper follows Suryanarayan (2021) in shifting the focus from colonial institutions to Indian politics. We study the consequences of a political movement—the choices, coalitions, and organizational strategies of Indian political actors—on an important outcome: the breakdown of inter-ethnic peace. In doing so, we contribute to a broader understanding of how the political dynamics of the independence struggle shaped the ethnic polarization that would ultimately lead to Partition.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides the crucial historical context on Hindu-Muslim relations before 1920, the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement, and the Prince of Wales's tour. Section **??** provides our basic conceptual framework. Section 2 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 3 reports our main results, mechanisms and interpretation. Section 4 concludes.

1 Historical Context

As Figures 1 and 2 shows, Hindu-Muslim riots were very rare prior to the Khilafat /Non Cooperation Movement, and relations between the two communities were in fact improving.[5] As Hasan (1979, 314) notes, the period was characterized by a "*climate of communal harmony in which disputes over cow slaughter and music before mosques, which later sparked off violence, were amicably settled.*"

The Khilafat/Non Cooperation movement of 1920–22 was an arguably well-intentioned attempt to cement these gains and build an organization that facilitated constructive inter-ethnic contact. It was the first mass political movement in modern Indian history. The

[5]The Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League was a high point, wherein both parties agreed to jointly push the British for greater self-government.

movement emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, in an attempt to join two distinct mobilizations with very different grievances against the British. Many Sunni Muslims, led by the Ali brothers (Mohamed and Shaukat Ali) were deeply concerned by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and by the threat to the position of the Sultan, who was also regarded the Caliph of Sunni Islam (i.e. head of the *Khilafat*). At the same time, Indian nationalists in the Indian National Congress, under Gandhi's leadership, were aggrieved by British reluctance to grant India greater self-government or swaraj despite the colony's support for Britain and promises made during the Great War.

At a special session of the Congress in September 1920, Congress adopted Gandhi's program of nonviolent noncooperation (Low, 1966, Minault, 1982).[6] By allying with the Khilafat movement, Gandhi recognized an opportunity to further broaden the cross-ethnic nature of the Congress, and in particular to secure greater Muslim participation in the Indian Independence movement (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014). The combined program included the boycott of British institutions (local legislatures, courts, schools and colleges), the wearing of locally produced, including homespun, cloth (swadeshi), and the organization of hartals or shop closures, strikes and civil disobedience using a new and large volunteer corps. The organizational infrastructure for this movement was substantial: local Khilafat committees, Congress provincial, districts, taluk and village committees, volunteer corps and new fundraising networks extended across the subcontinent.

However, despite the attempts to cement a cross-ethnic mass movement, the Khilafat-Congress coalition rested on what Hasan (1979, 185) describes as a fragile foundation: "A number of groups with diverse and often conflicting ends were held together not because they had a common cause to unite for, but because it suited their various interests for the time being." The colonial government's contemporaneous assessment was similar, with a colonial report noting that Muslim leaders "had accepted [nonviolence] merely in order to attain the Hindu support which they considered essential to the success of their agitation" (Bamford, 1925, 190).

As we argue below, this underlying misalignment of incentives would prove consequential once the coalition's shared purpose dissolved.

As noted above and as Figures B1 and 3 show, a key impetus for mobilization in particular locations came from the pre-planned visit of Edward, Prince of Wales, who was slated to

[6]Until this period, the Congress had been a relatively elite body, composed of prominent Indians pushing the British to address their grievances big and small, and lobbying for gradual constitutional reforms that would grant Indians a greater say in their governance. Between 1919–23, that is, in the run up to and during the movement, Gandhi overhauled the Congress, transforming it from an elite debating society to a well-articulated organization with village, town, district, and provincial offices, a broad-based membership open to all, and selecting leaders through the principle of costly self-sacrifice (Krishna, 1966).

conduct a high-profile four-month whistle-stop rail tour of the colony. The tour, traversing 8,000 miles of British and Princely India, was the latest (and as it, proved the last) in a long line of tours by the descendants of Queen Victoria, who had been declared the Empress of India in 1858. It was conceived as a gesture of gratitude for Indian contributions to the Great War (Kaul, 2006), and a chance to cement Imperial ties.

Importantly, the itinerary was pre-planned in 1919, *before* the start of the Khilafat/ Non Cooperation Movement, and was part of a more general itinerary of post-Great War royal visits that would stretch to 1925. While eschewing overt political ceremony, as noted above, the itinerary required respecting strict imperial protocols and traditions. These included visiting arriving through the traditional 'Gateway of India' at Bombay, despite it being a major center for nationalist activity, visiting a set of native rulers with the highest levels of precedence (as measured by the number of *gun salutes* they were entitled) who had not been previously graced by his father, the King in 1911, visiting a quota of regiments with distinguished war-time service, and a number of important municipalities (see Kaul (2006).) We use these overt criteria to construct our counterfactual itineraries below.

Beyond the official requirements of the tour, the Prince's passion for sporting events, including polo tournaments, tiger-hunting and pig-sticking (attempting to lance wild boar from a horse) also shaped the planned itinerary in important ways.[7] For example, as the map of the itinerary in Figure 3 shows, the Prince's itinerary included a visit to the Nepalese border in order to go hunting with the Raja of Nepal. He also returned from Peshawar, on the frontier, to the small town of Gajraula, near Meerut, a distance of 857 km, so as to attend the Kadir Cup, the marquee pig-sticking event of the sporting calendar.

Yet, this empire-building attempt to show-case the continuity of the Raj, would have unanticipated consequences. By the time the Prince arrived in Bombay on November 17, 1921, Khilafat and Congress organizers had identified the tour as a focal point for protest. Gandhi called for a "total boycott" of all functions welcoming the Prince. On the day of his arrival in Bombay, rioting broke out between loyalists returning from the welcome parade and Congress volunteers, leaving over 50 dead and 400 wounded. Later, hartals paralyzed Allahabad, where fewer than 1,000 of a potential 120,000 Indians appeared to greet the Prince. In Calcutta, the erstwhile colonial capital, volunteers brought "normal life" to a standstill (Sapire, 2012). As the Guardian noted that ironically an itinerary planned to showcase Indian loyalty also ended up providing the Independence movement "an occasion to demonstrate its strength." (Kaul, 2003, 235). The Prince himself noted in this memoirs, "how one 'unexpected effect' of the visit was to bring Gandhi 'into the open', though his

[7]The *Star* reported such headlines as "Polo Prince wins India's heart– sporting prowess better than ceremonies. See Kaul (2003, 242).

attacks were 'muffled' by the 'boom of saluting guns, the hum of conversation at the garden parties, or the thunder of horses' hooves on the polo fields'."[8] Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, and we describe below, protests organized by the Khilafat and Congress were 12 times more likely in districts that happened to be visited by the Prince, both compared to counterfactual itineraries, and the itinerary chosen by his father a decade previously.

The pre-planned itinerary was nevertheless closely adhered to.[9] However, the colonial authorities sought to forestall disruption of the visit through repression and the bussing in of groups thought to be more supportive of the regime. Armed by the Rowlatt Acts and other repressive powers that the Congress objected to and that had spurred noncooperation, the British instructed provincial governments that "action on a more drastic and comprehensive scale than has hitherto been attempted is now required" (Low, 1966). Volunteer organizations were proscribed, political meetings prohibited, and approximately 20,000 political prisoners, including leaders such as C.R. Das, Lajpat Rai, and Motlal Nehru, were jailed. Repression was more effective nearer military cantonments and the newer, colonial parts of cities, leaving the native towns and bazaars relatively underpoliced. The Prince was therefore "hardly ever allowed even to drive through the bazaars and native quarters of the cities" (Prince of Wales, n.d.).

The proscription of the volunteer corps during the Prince's visit triggered massive countermobilization. As Minault (1982, 167) documents, Congress and Khilafat leaders defiantly merged all volunteer bodies into a national volunteer corps and enrolled 75,000 new volunteers in the United Provinces alone. "Volunteers paraded openly, picketed bazaars, organized demonstrations against the royal visit, and gladly went to jail in droves" (Minault, 1982, 167). The royal visit thus generated an expansion of the organizational infrastructure of the movement and protests too.

However, despite the successful mobilization in the short-term, they movement came to an abrupt end short while later. On February 4, 1922, a mob at Chauri Chaura in Uttar Pradesh attacked and burned a police station, killing 22 policemen. Gandhi immediately suspended the noncooperation movement and was arrested on March 10. The Prince departed India March 17. The Khilafat movement lingered a while longer but lost its purpose when Kemal Ataturk abolished the Sultanate in November 1922, and declared a Turkish republic in its place.

[8] Edward, Duke of Windsor (1951, pg.169) cited in Kaul (2003, pg.237).

[9] There was one important deviation from the original plan– the Prince's visit to Aligarh Muslim University, as a paired complement to his visit to the Benares Hindu University, was cancelled. Treating Aligarh as treated strengthens the results.

2 Empirical strategy

Our interpretation yields four basic predictions that we take to the data. First, the Prince's visit should be associated with increased Khilafat/Noncooperation activity, since the visit should provide a focal point for protest. The effects should be concentrated during the Prince's physical presence and decay rapidly once he departed, consistent with the visit functioning as a coordination device rather than a persistent stimulus. Second, if the visit intensified a broad organizational effort rather than provoking a narrow type of reaction, it should increase the probability of many different kinds of protest activity—hartals, strikes, civil disobedience, meetings, and resignations—rather than a single type. Third, the Prince's visit should also predict subsequent Hindu-Muslim riots, operating through the organizational capacity that the visit helped build. Fourth, if the mechanism is organizational repurposing rather than the direct provocation of the visit, the effects of Khilafat/Noncooperation on communal violence should emerge with a lag, as the joint Khilafat-Congress front dissolved and communal entrepreneurs took over local organizational capacities.[10]

To examine the effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity and subsequent riots, we proceed in four steps. We first show that a visit by the Prince of Wales prompts greater Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. Second, we also show the reduced-form effect of the Prince's visit on the chances of subsequent riots. Third, we show the effects of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity instrumented by the Prince of Wales' visit on riots. Fourth, we examine the persistence of movement-era organizational capacity and its repurposing for communal ends. Together, these analyses confirm that the movement was indeed spurred by the Prince's visit, and that it subsequently caused riots. We interpret these patterns as reflecting the importance of aligned incentives in ensuring that organizational capabilities are not used by ethnic factions against one another.

Data on Khilafat/Noncooperation were collected from three contemporary sources. The first and most exhaustive data source is a set of weekly intelligence reports sent by British

[10]Our account may be contrasted with alternative explanations for the surge in communal violence in the 1920s. One prominent account emphasizes the colonial policy of divide and rule, wherein the British sought to breed resentments between Hindus and Muslims to prevent them from uniting against the colonial state. A related argument holds that the introduction of separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims and the prospect of responsible government under India's 1919 reforms sharpened communal competition by raising the political stakes of community identity (Hardy, 1972, 201–204). Although these accounts identify factors that may have contributed to the general increase in communal tensions during this period, they do not explain the spatial and temporal variation in riots we document. Divide and rule was a colony-wide policy, and the institutional incentives created by elections and greater self-government simultaneously operated across all the directly ruled parts of the colony. In other words, these factors would predict a general increase in communal violence, not the differential increase observed in districts that experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation movement. We return to these and other possible alternative explanations in the next sections.

Indian officials to the central government, now stored in the India Office Records collection in the British Library. The second source is newspaper coverage of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity, identified by searching ProQuest, Readex Newspaper, and The Times Digital Archive. This yields reports from the Times of India, the Amrit Bazar Patrika, the Associated Press, the Leader, and the Times. The third dataset source is the official report of the Prince of Wales' tour, which includes official and media reports of his reception across India.

For each Khilafat/Noncooperation event from these data sources, we code the date and district of the event, and a variety of indicators that help us describe the event by the actors involved (Khilafat, Congress or both) and the precise activity (strikes, civil disobedience, hartals, prayer meetings, other meetings, and/or registrations, violence and property damage).

The official report of the Prince's tour includes a detailed itinerary for the Prince. During his four-month sojourn to India, the Prince traversed approximately 8,000 miles of the country, starting in Bombay and ending in Karachi. He made 35 stops in his time in India, 22 of which were in British India. Figure 2 displays the Prince's itinerary overlaid with the Indian rail network, with riot locations marked in red. As a placebo, we also code the itinerary of King George V's 1911–12 visit to India. This visit followed a similar structure to the Prince's visit, although it occurred under different political conditions, a decade prior to the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement.

Data on Hindu-Muslim riots were compiled by Wilkinson (2004) from contemporary newspaper reports and official sources. Following Wilkinson, a riot is defined as a violent confrontation between two communally identified groups.

We use these data to construct a district-day panel dataset, summarized in Appendix Table 4, covering the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement period, from September 8, 1920 (the date that the movement was launched) to March 31, 1922 (shortly after the noncooperation movement's official suspension on February 12 and the Prince's departure on March 17), yielding 144,780 district-day observations. Of these, 1% record one or more Khilafat/Noncooperation events.

We employ two estimators to analyze the panel data—the standard two-way fixed effects estimator (TWFE), and the newer heterogeneity-robust estimator due to De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2024). For the former, we model

$$Protest_{dt} = \alpha + \beta PrincePresent_{dt} + \delta_d + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{dt} \tag{1}$$

where $Protest_{dt}$ is an indicator of protests Khilafat/Noncooperation events in district d on day t, $PrincePresent_{dt}$ is a dummy for whether the Prince was present in that district on that day, and d and t are district and date fixed effects. The coefficient β is the estimated

effect of the Prince's presence in that district on the probability of a Khilafat/Noncooperation event.

Since TWFE can produce biased estimates under treatment effect heterogeneity when the treatment is staggered, we also employ the heterogeneity-robust estimator due to De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2024). This estimator accommodates the fact that our treatment is staggered and non-absorbing (that is, it turns off once the Prince departs a district) and provides dynamic effect estimates over time.

To examine the effects of the Prince's visit on subsequent riots, we employ a linear probability model in which we model a dummy for whether a district experienced riots after the Noncooperation movement was called off and until 1929 as a function of a dummy for whether the district was visited by the Prince and a standard control set (for robustness, we also use this cross-sectional set up in the previous step; the cross-sectional dataset is summarized in Appendix Table 5). We specifically model

$$Riots_d = \alpha + \beta PrinceVisited_d + \boldsymbol{\gamma}\boldsymbol{X}_d + \delta_s + \varepsilon_d \tag{2}$$

Our preferred specification includes controls for distance to the nearest railroad, previous riots, state fixed effects, and a standard control set composed of the proportion of Muslims and its square, an indicator for Metropolitan cities, an indicator for whether the district had a Congress party organization in 1918 and the number of gun salutes for a state. As a placebo, we estimate the same specification with previous riots as the outcome.

To examine the dynamic effects of the Prince's visit on riots, we also employ a difference-in-differences framework using a balanced district-year panel.

Lastly, we put the previous steps together by instrumenting the number of days with Khilafat/Noncooperation activity using an indicator for whether the Prince visited the district. The exclusion restriction requires that the Prince's visit affect subsequent riots only through its effect on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. We validate this assumption to the extent possible by showing no effect of the visit on pre-visit riots, by showing that districts on the Prince's rail route but not visited by the Prince are not at risk for additional riots, by comparing the effects of the Prince's itinerary to 1,000 counterfactual itineraries, and by showing the absence of a comparable effect of George V's visit a decade earlier.

In our counterfactual analysis, we compare the effects of the route of the Prince of Wales with the effects of 1,000 alternatives that the Prince could have but did not take. To create these counterfactuals, we draw on archival research and our data research to understand how the Prince's route was organized. Based on our understanding, we sample counterfactual itineraries subject to the constraints that each itinerary had to (1) include the four largest cities of the Indian colony—Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras; (2) make 33–37 stops (the

Prince made 35); (3) have 19–23 stops in British India (the Prince made 21) and the balance in Princely India, including 3–5 stops in Rajputana (he made 4); (4) use only districts on the country's rail network; (5) have a total length within ±20% of the actual itinerary's;[11] and (6) must include 7–11 leisure stops (9 of the Prince's stops were spent on sports such as shikar, pig-sticking, and wild-fowl shooting).[12] The actual itinerary satisfies all six constraints.[13] We re-estimate our cross-sectional specifications of the effects of the Prince of Wales on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity and riots using each of the 1,000 counterfactual itineraries in place of the actual itinerary. Comparing the distribution of counterfactual coefficients to the actual estimate provides a randomization-inference p-value.

3 Results

To examine the effects of the Prince of Wales visit on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity and subsequent rioting, we first examine the reduced form effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity and riots, and then estimate the effects of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity as instrumented by the Prince of Wales' visit on riots. Together, these analyses confirm that the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement was indeed spurred by the Prince's itinerary, and that it subsequently caused rioting. We then turn to the mechanism, drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence that the movement built local organizational capacity that persisted beyond the coalition and was repurposed for communal ends.

3.1 The effects of the Prince of Wales on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity

To examine the effects of the Prince of Wales visit on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity, we start by analyzing the district-day panel dataset described above, which reports daily protest activity across India's 248 districts. Protest is a rare event, with 1% of the 144,780 district-days in the dataset experiencing some Khilafat/Noncooperation activity.

[11] We measure the length of an itinerary as the minimum spanning tree connecting its stops, computed from great-circle distances between district centroids.

[12] Since 7 of the 14 Princely stops and 2 of the 21 British India stops were spent on sports, we require 6–8 of the Princely stops and 1–3 of the British-India stops to be drawn from the set of districts that the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* of 1908, published before the tour, identifies as districts with sports facilities (game preserves, shooting-boxes, khedda elephant operations, "affords excellent sport," pig-sticking) or abundant game ("wild duck are extraordinarily plentiful," "wild hog abound").

[13] Within these constraints, British-India districts are sampled in proportion to their populations, and Princely districts in proportion to their gun salutes, reflecting their importance to Britain. Princely stops are drawn from state-capital districts.

In regression 1 of Table 1, we employ a linear probability model to examine the bivariate correlation between a dummy for whether the Prince of Wales was present (the key independent variable) and whether there was a protest (the dependent variable). The regression suggests that the presence of the Prince of Wales increases the chances of a protest by 12.4 percentage points or approximately a twelve-fold increase over the base rate. The inclusion of district fixed effects attenuates the estimated effect of the Prince's visit slightly (regression 2). In regression 3, we include dummies for after the Prince of Wales visit, the Noncooperation movement period, and another that is set to 1 when the Prince of Wales is in India (including these necessitates dropping the date fixed effects). Although the coefficient on the dummy for whether the Prince of Wales was present in the country is small and positive, suggesting heightened political mobilization across the colony in this period, it is an order of magnitude smaller than the effect of the Prince's presence. In addition, the "after" dummy is small and positive, suggesting minimal persistence following the Prince's visit. In regression 4, we reintroduce the date fixed effect and include the dummy for after the Prince of Wales was present. This specification confirms that the presence of the Prince of Wales—rather than his legacy effects—explains Khilafat/Noncooperation mobilization.

In the next three regressions, we examine whether the estimated effects of the Prince's presence on the protest activity are driven by reporting patterns. Recall that we employed three data sources—intelligence reports, newspaper reports, and the tour report—to code protest events. The effects of the treatment are positive across all three data sources (see regressions 5, 6 and 7). The consistent pattern across these sources mitigates concerns that the results are driven by reporting bias in any single source.

Regressions 8–11 restrict the sample to districts that the Prince of Wales visited and examine the lagged effects of the Prince's visit. The contemporaneous effect estimated in regression 8 is close to the full sample estimate. The one day lag (regression 9) is still significant but is less than half the contemporaneous effect. By five and seven days (regressions 10 and 11), the effect is even smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This sharp temporal decay is consistent with our argument that the Prince's visit provided a focal point or coordination device for protest. When the Prince moved on, so did the mobilization.

The results of this panel data analysis are robust to using a count of the number of Khilafat/Noncooperation events as the dependent variable (see the results in Appendix Table 6). The Prince's presence increases the number of Khilafat/Noncooperation events by 0.302 in the specification with district and date fixed effects (regression 2), as compared with the mean of 0.02.

The effect of the Prince of Wales' visit on Khilafat/Noncooperation events is also robust to using a dynamic differences-in-differences estimator due to De Chaisemartin and

d'Haultfoeuille (2024), which is designed for staggered, non-absorbing treatments such as ours. Using the same 144,780 district-day observations, Figure 4 suggests an instantaneous treatment effect of 0.253, a 25.3 percentage point increase in the probability of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity due to the Prince's presence. The effect is no longer significant from the second day on, and the fourteen placebo (lead) estimates are also uniformly small and indistinguishable from zero. The latter confirms the absence of pre-trends in the days before the Prince's arrival.[14]

Further, our results are robust to cross-sectional analyses, where we model a dummy for whether a district experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (see Appendix Table 8) and the number of such events (Appendix Table 9) as the outcome variables.

A last robustness test we present employs the counterfactual exercise we described above. Figure 5 summarizes the results of this exercise, showing the distribution of estimated effects of 1,000 counterfactual itineraries on the cross-sectional probability of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. The counterfactual distribution is centered near zero, even as the estimated effect of the actual itinerary of the Prince of Wales (denoted by a dashed vertical red line) is 0.21, which puts it at the extreme right of the distribution of estimated effects. The effect of the actual itinerary exceeds more than 99 percent of the counterfactual coefficients, which suggests that the estimated effect is unlikely to be due to chance.

What kinds of Khilafat/Noncooperation activities did the Prince's visit spur? We explore this question in Figure 6, where we summarize the estimated effects of the Prince's visit on violent and nonviolent Khilafat/Noncooperation activity, on hartals, strikes, civil disobedience, prayer meetings, meetings and resignations (full results are reported in Appendix Table 10). We also separately estimate the effects of the visit on Congress activity, Khilafat activity and bipartisan activity. Remarkably, the visit increased the probability of all kinds of activity by a substantively and statistically significant 18–37 percentage points. The breadth of this mobilization activity is evidence of organizational capacity building insofar as coordinating this wide variety of activities will have required substantial coordination. This is particularly the case since the British deployed extensive shows of force and repression, which will have made coordination even harder.

We have thus far explored the spatial and temporal variation in Khilafat/Noncooperation protest activity, and have shown that the Prince of Wales' visit to India in 1921–22 was a substantively and statistically significant driver of such protests. These patterns are evident using a daily panel of protest data from multiple sources, and to cross-sectional analyses too.

[14]These results are presented in regression 1 of Appendix Table 7 Regression 2 adds district-specific linear trends. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat these specifications with never-visited districts as controls, whereas regressions 5 and 6 restrict the control districts to ever visited districts. The instantaneous effect is stable across all these specifications.

We now turn to examining the effects of protest activity in the 1920s on subsequent riots.

3.2 The effects of the Prince of Wales on riots

To examine the effects of protest activity on subsequent rioting, we employ a linear probability model. In these regressions, we model a dummy for riots (mean = 0.20) as a function of a dummy for whether the district was visited by the Prince of Wales and a standard control set composed of the pretreatment proportion of Muslims in the district and its square, the district population, dummies for whether the district was in fact a metropolitan city and had Congress party organizations, and the number of gun salutes.

The first regression of Table 2 suggests that a visit by the Prince of Wales caused the probability of the district experiencing riots to more than double from 20 to 46%. The result is robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects (regression 2), to controlling for the distance to the nearest railroad (regression 3), and to controlling for pre-period riots too (regression 4). This is our preferred specification. The negative binomial and Poisson specifications (regressions 5 and 6) model the count of riots and yield similar results.[15] A placebo test of the effects of the Prince's visit on riots from 1850 until the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement fails to suggest any significant effect (regression 7). This confirms that visited districts were not differentially prone to riots. Our results are robust to controlling for a dummy for whether the district was on the route but was not visited by the Prince of Wales, thereby ruling out the possibility that proximity to the railways rather than the visit itself drives the result (regression 8).

Figure 7 presents the results of the counterfactual itinerary analysis as applied to riots. The figure plots the estimated effects of 1,000 counterfactual itineraries on subsequent riots, with the dashed red line depicting the effects of the Prince's actual stops. The estimated effects of the actual route on riots (approximately 0.17) is larger than the effects of 99% of the counterfactual routes. This rules out the possibility that comparably structured routes would have induced similar patterns of riots and confirms that the effect of the Prince of Wales' itinerary is unlikely to be due to chance.

We next employ a difference-in-difference event study analysis to explore when the effects of the Prince's visit on riots become apparent. The specification includes district and year fixed effects and groups years into three-year bins to address the scarcity of riots in pretreatment years.[16] The reference period is 1918 to 1920, the last three years before the start

[15] The two specifications suggest that districts visited by the Prince experienced a 104–129 percent increase in the number of riots. This is consistent with the LPM estimates, which show roughly a doubling of the probability of experiencing any riot.

[16] Without such binning, annual regressions do not yield standard errors.

of the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement. Summarized in the upper panel of Figure 8, this analysis suggests that the effects of the Prince's visit emerges in 1921–23 and becomes large and statistically significant in 1924–26 and 1927–29.

The lower panel reports the results of a similar exercise in response to George V's visit in 1911–12. All the pre- and post-visit coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the political context of the Prince of Wales' tour rather than the fact that a royal visit per se occurred generates the effect on communal violence.

Our OLS estimates treat a district with riots in 1923 the same as a district that experienced riots in 1945. To more fully employ the temporal variation in the data, we model the time from the Prince's departure to the district's first Hindu-Muslim riot. In Figure 9, we plot Kaplan-Meier survivor functions by whether districts were visited by the Prince of Wales. The two curves separate early and remain separate. By 1949, 26% of visited districts remained free of religious violence, versus 73% of unvisited districts. Appendix Table 11 reports Cox proportional hazard estimates of time to riots with controls. The analysis confirms that visited districts were more likely to riot earlier than others.

Did the Prince's visit increase riots in districts that were already riot-prone, or did it cause otherwise peaceful communities to riot? To examine this question, we estimate the heterogeneity in the effects of the Prince's visit by whether districts experienced riots in 1850–1921 (see Appendix Table 12). The results suggest that the effect is driven by districts that had been peaceful. This suggests that the Prince's visit did not activate preexisting grievances that had led to rioting in the past. Rather, it spurred organizing that led to riots in many districts for the first time in 70 years or more.

A last test of the effects of the Prince of Wales' visit exploits the fact that the Congress suspended noncooperation shortly after the violence at Chauri Chaura described previously, even as the Prince continued his preplanned tour of India. Indeed, 13 of the Prince's 35 predetermined stops fell on or after the movement was suspended on February 12. In Appendix Table 13, we separately estimate the effects of the stops that the Prince of Wales made before and after the movement was called off. It suggests that while stops made before and after the suspension were equally likely to prompt movement activity (regressions 1 and 2), only stops made before the movement's suspension increased subsequent riots (regressions 3 and 4). The difference between the estimated effects of stops made before and after February 12 is statistically significant. This is consistent with our account insofar as riots were prompted not from protests per se but from the organizational capacity and inter-ethnic contact that protests spurred.

Our reduced-form analysis has shown that Prince's 1921–22 tour increased the probability of subsequent riots. Our argument, however, posits a specific channel: the Prince's visit

spurred Khilafat/Noncooperation activity, which built organization capacities that were repurposed for communal violence after the cross-communal coalition fell apart. We test this fuller causal chain below.

3.3 The effects of Khilafat/Noncooperation on riots

We now put the previous two analyses together by instrumenting the number of days of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity with an indicator for whether the Prince of Wales visited the district. The exclusion restriction requires that the Prince's visit affects subsequent riots only through its effect on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. We discuss the evidence for this assumption below.

Regression 1 of Table 3 presents the OLS results, suggesting that additional days of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity are indeed associated with an increase in the probability of subsequent riots. Regression 2 presents the equivalent 2SLS estimate, which is somewhat larger. The first stage F-statistics is 16.6, above the conventional threshold of 10 for a weak instrument. Since the Prince's visit raises the count of Khilafat/Noncooperation days by approximately 24.1 in the first stage, the implied effect of visit-induced protest on the probability of riots is approximately 17 percentage points, which is similar to the reduced form estimates presented in the previous section.

Following the structure of the reduced form analysis in the previous section, regressions 3 through 7 assess the robustness of the 2SLS estimate to the same set of controls and placebo tests. The result is robust to controlling for the distance to the nearest railroad (regression 3) and riots before Khilafat/Noncooperation (regression 4). A placebo test of the effects of Khilafat/Noncooperation days on riots from 1850 until the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement fails to suggest a significant effect (regression 5), confirming that Khilafat/Noncooperation activity does not predict pre-existing riot propensity. Lastly, controlling for a dummy for whether the district was on the route but was not visited by the Prince of Wales also does not change the results (regression 6).

Regressions 7–9 instrument measures of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity constructed using our three data sources—the intelligence reports, the newspaper reports, and the official tour reports. The 2SLS coefficient is statistically and substantively significant in all three cases. Consistent with the fact that the intelligence reports have the most comprehensive coverage, its estimated elasticity is the smallest of the three.

Our 2SLS estimates assume that the Prince's visit affected subsequent riots only through its effect on Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. The most natural threat to the exclusion restriction assumption is that the visit directly prompted Hindu-Muslim riots, for example

through heavy-handed repression or the disruption associated with hosting the royal personage. Several pieces of evidence presented in the previous section weigh against this channel: the absence of an effect of the Prince's visit on pre-movement riots (regression 5), the null results for districts on the Prince's route that he did not visit (regression 6), the fact that the actual itinerary's effect exceeds that of 99 percent of 1,000 counterfactual itineraries (Figure 7), the absence of a comparable effect of George V's visit a decade earlier (lower panel of Figure 8), and the lack of an effect of the Prince of Wales' stops on riots after the movement was called off and organization ceased (Appendix Table 13).

Together, the analyses in the previous sections suggest that the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement was intensified by the Prince of Wales' itinerary and that it subsequently caused rioting.[17] We next turn to exploring the mechanism via which the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement affected subsequent rioting.

3.4 Qualitative Evidence for the Organizational Mechanism

We next consider the channel through which Khilafat/Noncooperation activity led to communal violence. Recall that our interpretation centers on the idea of organizational re-purposing, that is, the idea that the movement built local organizational capacity that, once the cross-communal coalition fractured, was captured by political entrepreneurs and redirected toward communal ends.

Qualitative evidence from this period directly supports our interpretation. The collapse of the movement left behind mobilized energy with no political outlet. Hardy (1972, 198) characterizes the post-movement period as one in which Muslims were politically "all dressed up and nowhere to go." On the Congress side, the suspension of the movement produced a similar vacuum. Minault (1982, 192) observes that "the passions and energies which had responded to religious appeals and the stimulus of the noncooperation program now found new outlets, perhaps inevitably in the form of communal clashes." The Bamford Report, a contemporaneous colonial assessment, noted that once noncooperation was suspended, the Congress movement's "Mohammedan allies were extremely disappointed and almost immediately signs of Hindu-Muslim friction appeared " (Bamford, 1925, 190). The leaders who had revolutionalized the national movement by arousing mass participation now found

[17]The estimated effects of the Prince of Wales' visit, and of Khilafat/Noncooperation events, on riots are larger if we specify the outcome as an indicator for whether the district experienced riots between 1922–49 (see Appendix Tables 14 and 15 and Appendix Figure 10). This is consistent with the view that the organizational legacies of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity had persistent effects on communal violence. However, since the longer window introduces additional confounders (electoral competition, the independence movement's later phases, Partition; arguably, these are all downstream from Khilafat/Noncooperation, and so perhaps they should not be controlled for), we adopt the more conservative 1929 endpoint for the main analysis.

it, "a two-edged sword" (Minault, 1982, 197).

The evidence for organizational continuity between the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement and the communal movements that followed is substantial. The Shuddhi (Hindu reconversion) and Sangathan (Hindu consolidation) movements, and their Muslim counterparts, Tabligh (proselytization) and Tanzim (organization), were "all organized by prominent noncooperators" using the same networks and organizational techniques (Minault, 1982, 192). Swami Shraddhanand, who had led protests against the Rowlatt Act, organized the Shuddhi movement to reconvert Muslims. Lajpat Rai, who was imprisoned during the Prince of Wales' visit, called upon Hindus to "stand together for mutual defense" through Sangathan (Minault, 1982, 194). Rather than against the British, such defense was now against Muslims. On the Muslim side, Saifuddin Kitchlu, a prominent Khilafat leader, "lost no time in plunging into movements for the Tabligh and Tanzim" (Nanda, 2002, 388). Similarly, Maulana Abdul Bari "quickly broke off his connection with his allies of the non-cooperation movement, blamed the riots on the Hindus ... and switched his righteous indignation from the British to the Hindus" (Nanda, 2002, 388). In each case, the same leaders, organizational networks, and mobilization techniques that sustained cross-communal cooperation were redirected toward communal competition.

The repurposing extended beyond individual leaders to the organizational infrastructure itself. The Khilafat and Congress organizations had operated through separate, community-specific volunteer structures at the local level, even as the rhetoric of the movement suggested unification (Freitag, 1989, 229). Many Congress district organizations had evolved out of Hindu communal activities at religious fairs and festivals, and Khilafat organizations drew on Muslim networks and the support of the ulama. This dual structure meant that when the coalition fractured, each community retained its independent mobilization apparatus. The communal movements that followed were, as Freitag (1989, 229–230) argues, not so much of a measure of the disintegration of the broader national effort as a logical outgrowth of the community-specific mobilization that had operated within its framework. The Shuddhi, Sangathan, Tabligh, and Tanzim movements "harnessed the political energies of reformism to create public opinion" and "posed communalism as a distinct, alternative ideology" (Freitag, 1989, 230). Pandey (1990, 233) similarly describes the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement as a "catalyst" that "precipitated those compounds in Indian politics that have been handed down as 'nationalism' and 'communalism."'

The organizational resources built during Khilafat/Noncooperation were subsequently absorbed by communal movements. In August 1923, the Shuddhi campaign was formally incorporated into the program of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, giving it the support of national leaders such as Malaviya and Lajpat Rai (Hasan, 1979, 252). On the Muslim side, the

Bamford Report observed that the Tabligh and Tanzim movements served to absorb existing organizational energy "to the almost total exclusion of the Khilafat movement" (Bamford, 1925, 210). The Shuddhi and Sangathan bodies were generally better organized and had the support of more influential groups than their Muslim counterparts (Hasan, 1979, 250–251), possibly because the Congress district committees they drew on were more developed than the Khilafat committees in many areas.

The consequences of this organizational transfer were visible at the local level, and particularly in districts that the Prince of Wales had visited. In Agra, a district on the Prince's itinerary, the 1923 Shuddhi "campaign to convert Malkana Rajputs had exacerbated communal tensions to the point where Muslims stayed home during Muharram, traditionally a time of intercommunal mingling, fearing trouble" (Minault, 1982, 194–195). In the event, a quarrel over a procession route led to three days of violence, resulting in the military being called in to restore order. In Allahabad, another district the Prince visited, the commissioner reported that the Sangathan movement "has aroused an aggressive spirit, which has spread to the small towns and villages" (Hasan, 1979, 253). Across the United Provinces, 88 communal riots occurred between 1923 and 1927, with 81 killed and 2,301 injured (Hardy, 1972, 204). Freitag (1989, 237) documents that many cities with "no previous tradition of communal unrest" now experienced violence for the first time. Of the cities she identifies, Agra, Delhi, Lucknow, and Allahabad were all on the Prince's itinerary.

The organizational repurposing mechanism was not confined to British India. The Bangalore disturbances of 1928, the first major communal violence in the history of Mysore State, illustrate the transfer of Khilafat/Noncooperation mobilization techniques to communal purposes in the princely states. When a dispute arose over a Ganesha idol in a school, Congress leaders organized a satyagraha directly modeled on noncooperation methods: students sat in batches performing passive resistance, processions were organized through the streets, and when the initial leaders were arrested, second-tier organizers stepped in to sustain the agitation. This organizational resilience, the capacity of a movement to continue functioning after its leaders are removed, is precisely the kind of capacity that the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement had built. The enquiry committee appointed by the Maharaja of Mysore explicitly attributed the disturbances to the influence of political movements in British India, observing that the local satyagraha was "but a reflex of the satyagraha which was in progress on a larger scale in the Bardoli Taluka of the Bombay Presidency" (Visvesvaraya, 1928, 81). What began as passive resistance over a school idol escalated into a riot that left over 130 people injured.

If the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement built local organizational capacity that persisted, that capacity should be observable after the movement ended. Table 16 reports

Poisson pseudo-likelihood regressions of the number of Congress party members in each district in 1929 on the indicator for whether the Prince of Wales visited the districts, conditional on the standard control set, including state fixed effects, the distance to the nearest railroad, and pre-period riots. The estimated coefficient ranges from 0.71–0.87 across specifications, implying that visited districts had approximately twice the number of Congress members as comparable unvisited districts.[18] This effect is likely a lower bound on the organizational capacity that the movement built insofar as it is measured several years after the Shuddhi, Sangathan, Tabligh and Tanzim movements had drawn personnel away from Khilafat/Noncooperation.[19]

Beyond the Congress membership evidence above, several additional quantitative patterns are consistent with our interpretation in ways that alternative mechanisms would not predict. First, the difference-in-differences event study (see the upper panel of Figure 8) shows that the effect of the Prince's visit on riots emerges with a lag, becoming significant in 1924–26 and 1927–29. This delayed onset is consistent with a process in which the organizational capacities built during the movement were gradually captured by communal forces over time. The timing is less consistent with a direct provocation channel, which would predict a contemporaneous effect with the visit.

Second, the organizational capacity mechanism predicts not only more frequent riots in districts visited by the Prince of Wales, but also more intense violence, as the coordination infrastructure that enabled collective action during the movement could be repurposed for more sustained and injurious communal violence. Consistent with this prediction, the Prince's visit is associated with rioting for more days, with more injuries and deaths (see Appendix Table 17). This pattern of intensification is difficult to reconcile with explanations that emphasize communal tensions, which would predict more frequent but not necessarily more organized or sustained violence.

Third, if the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement built organizational capacity that outlived it, such capacity should be visible in later episodes of violence beyond riots. We test this implication using data on Gandhi's two great subsequent mobilizations—the civil disobedience campaign of 1930–32 and the Quit India movement of 1942–43—and terrorism events as well. The OLS analyses in Appendix Table 18 confirm the reduced form effects of the Prince's stops on subsequent violence (the negligible effect on civil disobedience events in general may be explained by the fact that that movement was largely nonviolent), whereas the 2SLS analyses in Appendix Table 19) confirm that this effect runs through Khilafat/Noncooperation.

[18]The estimation sample falls from 402 to 234 districts since the princely states had almost no Congress members and are absorbed by state fixed effects.

[19]Our findings are robust to the counterfactual itinerary analysis—see Appendix Figure 11.

Lastly, to examine whether particular kinds of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity drive the riots results, Appendix Figure 12 and Appendix Table 20 report linear probability regressions of the riot indicator on dummies for each activity type, conditional on the standard control set. We use OLS rather than 2SLS regressions since we have a single instrument and 12 activity types. Therefore, these should be treated as descriptive associations. With that caveat in mind, it is noteworthy that no single tactic drives our findings of the effects of Khilafat/Noncooperation on riots.[20] Also, Congress, Khilafat, and bipartisan activity predict subsequent riots at similar magnitudes.[21]

4 Conclusions

A recurring and troubling pattern marks the politics of diverse societies: groups that cooperate against a common adversary turn on each other once the struggle stalls or ends. In Egypt, secular and Islamist forces that stood together in Tahrir Square were at each other's throats within two years. In post-independence Kenya, the multi-ethnic NARC coalition that ousted Daniel arap Moi in 2002 fractured along ethnic lines, contributing to devastating post-election violence five years later. In the former Yugoslavia, groups that had coexisted for decades under Tito's federal structure mobilized against one another with shocking speed once the federal system dissolved. The specifics—the actors, the institutional context, the forms of violence—differ across these cases. But they prompt a common and underexplored question: when does cooperative cross-ethnic political engagement sow the seeds of subsequent inter-ethnic conflict?

This paper sheds light on this question in an important context: that of South Asia. South Asia's first mass nonviolent movement—the Khilafat/Noncooperation movement of 1920–22—jointly mobilized Hindus and Muslims on an unprecedented scale, but the organizational infrastructure it created persisted after the coalition fractured. It was subsequently repurposed for communal violence, leading to unprecedented Hindu-Muslim riots across the colony.

Using the pre-planned tour of the Prince of Wales as an instrument for mobilization,

[20] The violent activity coefficient (0.14) is somewhat larger than the nonviolent coefficient (0.09), but both are positive and significant, which weighs against the reading that subsequent riots were a continuation of a violent mobilization repertoire and is more consistent with the building of coordination capacity across tactics.

[21] The Congress, Khilafat, and bipartisan coefficients are similar in magnitude (0.082, 0.061, and 0.076, respectively), suggesting that mobilization carried comparable subsequent risk regardless of whether it was led by a single community or jointly organized. This is consistent with our interpretation that the binding feature of the coalition was the misalignment of underlying objectives rather than the specific organization through which mobilization occurred.

we show that visited districts experienced approximately 87 percent more Hindu-Muslim riots, relative to the outcome mean, in the rest of the decade. The effect emerges with a lag, consistent with a process in which organizational capacity was gradually captured by communal entrepreneurs after the movement's cross-communal framework collapsed.

These findings have several implications. For the study of nonviolent resistance, the literature has focused on whether movements achieve their stated objectives and has identified the maintenance of nonviolent discipline as a key challenge (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, Pinckney, 2020). Our results point to a different risk: a movement may remain largely nonviolent while active and yet generate organizational legacies that facilitate subsequent violence, if the coalition rests on temporarily overlapping rather than genuinely shared objectives. The contrast with Gandhi's Civil Disobedience movement of 1930–32 is instructive. That movement, which mobilized around broadly shared economic grievances due to the Great Depression rather than community-specific causes (Bhavnani and Jha, 2014), did not produce a comparable wave of communal violence. This suggests that what matters is whether the coalition's objectives are aligned across groups or merely parallel.

For the broader study of ethnic conflict, our findings complement existing work on the institutions that sustain inter-ethnic peace. We point to the importance of political mobilization organizations, which differ from other institutions studied in this literature—civic associations (Varshney, 2002) and trade complementarities Jha (2013)—in that their objectives are malleable and can be redirected to violence by political entrepreneurs. The distinction between durable economic complementaries and transient political alignments may help explain why trade-based toleration of the kind that Jha documents proved resilient across centuries, even as the politically constructed cooperation we study proved fragile across years. For coalition-builders in diverse societies, the implication is that the organizational legacy of a movement may matter as much as its immediate objectives, and that coalitions built on temporarily overlapping but fundamentally misaligned interests carry risks that persist long after the coalition dissolves.

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
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Figure 1: The Khilafat Movement and the Birth of Mass Religious Violence in South Asia



Figure 2: The Prince of Wales Tour and Hindu-Muslim Riots Before and After the Khilafat / Non-Cooperation Movement


(a) Hindu-Muslim Riots 1850–1920



(b) Hindu-Muslim Riots 1921–1922




(c) Hindu-Muslim Riots 1922-1949



The route taken by the Prince of Wales is marked in blue. Indian railway lines in 1920 are marked in black. Riots are marked in red.

Figure 3: The Prince of Wales Tour and Protests

(a) Protests Before (July 17-Nov 16 1921) (b) Protests During (Nov 17-Mar 18 22) (c) Protests After (Mar 19-July 18 1922)




The route taken by the Prince of Wales is marked in blue. Indian railway lines in 1920 are marked in black. Protests are marked in red.

Table 1: The effects of the Prince of Wales tour on whether there were Khilafat/Noncooperation activities: LPM TWFE

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Prince of Wales present	0.124***	0.112***	0.106***	0.105***	0.0367***	0.0330*	0.0351**	0.108***			
	(0.00482)	(0.0286)	(0.0291)	(0.0290)	(0.0128)	(0.0173)	(0.0174)	(0.0294)			
After Prince of Wales was present			0.00188	0.00196	0.00317	-0.000669	-0.000185*	-0.00409			
			(0.00481)	(0.00468)	(0.00439)	(0.00105)	(0.0000984)	(0.00773)			
Noncooperation period			-0.00688***								
			(0.00152)								
Prince of Wales in India			0.00364***								
			(0.000822)								
Prince of Wales present 1 day prior									0.0459***		
									(0.0121)		
Prince of Wales present 5 days prior										0.00811	
										(0.00783)	
Prince of Wales present 7 days prior											0.00959
											(0.00790)
District fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Date fixed effects	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	144780	144780	144780	144780	144780	144780	144780	24510	24510	24510	24510
Adjusted R-squared	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08
Outcome mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Data source	All	All	All	All	Intelligence	Newspapers	Tour	All	All	All	All
Districts	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	Prince of Wales	Prince of Wales	Prince of Wales	Prince of Wales


Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district-date experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. Standard errors are clustered by district. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Figure 4: The effects of the Prince of Wales' tour on the probability of subsequent Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (dynamic difference-in-differences)




Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in column 1 of Appendix Table 7.

Figure 5: Counterfactual analyses of the effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on the probability of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity



Notes: The figure displays the point estimate of 1,000 plausible counterfactual itineraries for the Prince of Wales' 1921–22 visit to India. The dashed vertical red line marks the point estimate of the effects of the Prince's actual itinerary from regression 4 of Table 8.

Figure 6: The effects of the Prince of Wales' tour on the probability of types of Khilafat/Noncooperation activities




Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression with the indicated protest type as the outcome. Controls: Muslim population share and its square, log population, metro, Congress organization, railroad distance, gun salutes, pre-Khilafat/Noncooperation riots, and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state. Full results are reported in Appendix Table 10.

Table 2: The Prince of Wales' visit increased the chances that a district experienced riots

	1 Riots after LPM	2 Riots after LPM	3 Riots after LPM	4 Riots after LPM	5 Riots after Neg. binomial	6 Riots after Poisson	7 Riots before LPM	8 Riots after LPM
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.258***	0.221***	0.217***	0.207**	2.289**	2.037**	0.0616	0.201**
	(0.0738)	(0.0810)	(0.0802)	(0.0854)	(0.904)	(0.679)	(0.0939)	(0.0878)
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales								-0.0248
								(0.0473)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.749*	1.029*	1.002*	0.828	136.0	126.8	1.124***	0.829
	(0.376)	(0.542)	(0.548)	(0.594)	(416.6)	(404.6)	(0.405)	(0.600)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-1.037**	-1.159**	-1.131**	-0.903	0.00118**	0.000735*	-1.468***	-0.913
	(0.440)	(0.527)	(0.532)	(0.602)	(0.00399)	(0.00280)	(0.439)	(0.608)
Ln population, 1921	0.0572***	0.0268	0.0286	0.0291	1.782***	1.514***	-0.00359	0.0282
	(0.0185)	(0.0242)	(0.0241)	(0.0256)	(0.398)	(0.200)	(0.0295)	(0.0247)
Metropolitan cities	0.117	0.153	0.126	0.0702	2.186	2.101	0.358	0.0729
	(0.188)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.173)	(1.697)	(1.406)	(0.264)	(0.176)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.176**	0.0462	0.0495	0.0263	0.941	1.071	0.150***	0.0243
	(0.0715)	(0.0595)	(0.0598)	(0.0639)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.0391)	(0.0643)
Number of gun salutes	-0.00579**	-0.00326	-0.00337	-0.00437	3083.5***	2909.7***	0.00642	-0.00425
	(0.00284)	(0.00393)	(0.00457)	(0.00525)	(1617.8)	(1521.7)	(0.00578)	(0.00515)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			0.0151	0.0158	1.197**	1.168	-0.00432	0.0129
			(0.0174)	(0.0172)	(0.101)	(0.114)	(0.0155)	(0.0196)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.155	1.917	1.596		0.156
				(0.100)	(0.896)	(0.626)		(0.0994)
State fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	403	403	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.23	0.31	0.31	0.33			0.13	0.32
Outcome mean	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.44	0.44	0.12	0.20

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced a riot, except for regressions 5 and 6, which employ riot counts and report incidence-rate ratios. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Figure 7: Counterfactual analyses of the effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on subsequent riots



Notes: The figure displays the point estimate of 1,000 plausible counterfactual itineraries for the Prince of Wales' 1921–22 visit to India. The dashed vertical red line marks the point estimate of the effects of the Prince's actual itinerary from regression 4 of Table 2.

Figure 8: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of royal visits on subsequent riots





Figure 9: Time to the first Hindu-Muslim riot after the Prince of Wales' visit



Notes: Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for the time from April 1922 to a district's first Hindu-Muslim riot. Districts with no riot by 1949 are censored.

Table 3: Khilafat/Noncooperation activity increased the chances that a district experienced riots (2SLS)

	1 Riots after OLS	2 Riots after 2SLS	3 Riots after 2SLS	4 Riots after 2SLS	5 Riots before 2SLS	6 Riots after 2SLS	7 Riots after 2SLS	8 Riots after 2SLS	9 Riots after 2SLS
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days	0.0100***	0.0147**	0.0145**	0.0139**	0.00411	0.0135**			
	(0.00177)	(0.00584)	(0.00584)	(0.00598)	(0.00608)	(0.00609)			
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales						-0.0185			
						(0.0468)			
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (intelligence reports)							0.0197**		
							(0.00817)		
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (newspaper reports)								0.0455**	
								(0.0226)	
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (tour report)									0.521
									(0.345)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	1.151**	1.152**	1.132**	0.963*	1.161***	0.961*	0.999**	0.885*	1.181**
	(0.516)	(0.478)	(0.479)	(0.502)	(0.417)	(0.506)	(0.503)	(0.523)	(0.514)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-1.233**	-1.220***	-1.199***	-0.982*	-1.487***	-0.988*	-1.024**	-0.891*	-1.257**
	(0.495)	(0.458)	(0.460)	(0.501)	(0.441)	(0.505)	(0.501)	(0.528)	(0.503)
Ln population, 1921	0.0157	0.00451	0.00394	0.00548	-0.0106	0.00538	-0.000966	0.0211	0.0198
	(0.0215)	(0.0254)	(0.0256)	(0.0263)	(0.0356)	(0.0263)	(0.0286)	(0.0234)	(0.0251)
Metropolitan cities	-1.028***	-1.681*	-1.676**	-1.654*	-0.154	-1.610*	-1.824**	-1.427*	-0.330
	(0.297)	(0.859)	(0.852)	(0.859)	(0.826)	(0.870)	(0.927)	(0.840)	(0.505)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0203	0.00879	0.0142	-0.00611	0.140***	-0.00686	-0.0113	0.00316	0.0146
	(0.0624)	(0.0612)	(0.0613)	(0.0629)	(0.0339)	(0.0626)	(0.0668)	(0.0588)	(0.0553)
Number of gun salutes	0.00123	0.00288	0.00344	0.00223	0.00836	0.00216	0.00309	0.000123	0.000925
	(0.00368)	(0.00445)	(0.00512)	(0.00563)	(0.00676)	(0.00571)	(0.00595)	(0.00524)	(0.00559)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			0.0122	0.0130	-0.00514	0.0109	0.0137	0.0113	0.00419
			(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0142)	(0.0174)	(0.0154)	(0.0151)	(0.0148)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.145*		0.147*	0.147*	0.141	0.0419
				(0.0817)		(0.0819)	(0.0791)	(0.0912)	(0.0999)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	403	403	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.12	0.34	-0.03	-0.04	-0.20
Outcome mean	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.12	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
First stage F-statistic		15.22	15.23	15.18	15.23	14.99	14.13	10.74	4.28

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced a riot. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

5 Additional Figures and Tables

Table 4: Summary statistics for panel dataset

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dummy for Noncooperation/Khilafat activity	139,650	0.01	0.08	0	1
Number of Noncooperation/Khilafat events	139,650	0.01	0.17	0	6
Prince of Wales present	139,650	0.00	0.03	0	1
Prince of Wales present 1 day prior	139,650	0.00	0.03	0	1
Prince of Wales present 5 days prior	139,650	0.00	0.03	0	1
Prince of Wales present 7 days prior	139,650	0.00	0.03	0	1
District visited by Prince of Wales	139,650	0.14	0.35	0	1
After Prince of Wales was present	139,650	0.02	0.13	0	1
Prince of Wales in India	139,650	0.21	0.41	0	1
Noncooperation period	139,650	0.92	0.28	0	1

Table 5: Summary statistics for cross-sectional dataset

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dummy for Khilafat/Noncooperation activity	403	0.54	0.50	0	1
Dummy for Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (intelligence reports)	403	0.53	0.50	0	1
Dummy for Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (newspaper reports)	403	0.15	0.36	0	1
Dummy for Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (tour report)	403	0.03	0.18	0	1
Dummy for violent activity	403	0.24	0.43	0	1
Dummy for nonviolent activity	403	0.53	0.50	0	1
Dummy for hartal	403	0.37	0.48	0	1
Dummy for strike	403	0.31	0.46	0	1
Dummy for civil disobedience	403	0.25	0.43	0	1
Dummy for prayer meetings	403	0.07	0.26	0	1
Dummy for other meetings	403	0.42	0.49	0	1
Dummy for resignations	403	0.13	0.34	0	1
Dummy for Congress activity	403	0.35	0.48	0	1
Dummy for Khilafat activity	403	0.34	0.48	0	1
Dummy for bipartisan activity	403	0.19	0.39	0	1
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days	403	6.39	16.24	0	176
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (intelligence reports)	403	5.49	12.99	0	131
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (newspaper reports)	403	0.96	4.33	0	52
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (tour report)	403	0.05	0.34	0	3
Dummy for riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1929	403	0.20	0.40	0	1
No. of riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1929	403	0.44	1.19	0	10
Dummy for riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1949	403	0.31	0.46	0	1
No. of riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1949	403	1.19	3.69	0	38
Ln 1+days of riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1929	403	0.19	0.52	0	4
Ln 1+injured in riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1929	403	0.65	1.51	0	7
Ln 1+killed in riots after Khilafat/Noncooperation until 1929	403	0.21	0.71	0	5
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	403	0.12	0.32	0	1
District visited by the Prince of Wales	403	0.09	0.28	0	1
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales	403	0.27	0.44	0	1
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	398	0.66	1.29	0	5
District visited by George V in 1911-12	403	0.03	0.16	0	1
Prop. Muslim, 1921	403	0.19	0.24	0	1
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	403	0.09	0.20	0	1
Ln population, 1921	403	12.79	1.39	8	17
Metropolitan cities	403	0.01	0.10	0	1
District with Congress organization, 1918	403	0.29	0.45	0	1
Number of gun salutes	403	4.80	7.58	0	21

Table 6: The effects of the Prince of Wales tour on the number of Khilafat/Noncooperation activities: OLS TWFE

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Prince of Wales present	0.354***	0.321***	0.304***	0.302***	0.0915*	0.0857*	0.0910*	0.310***			
	(0.0149)	(0.0963)	(0.0990)	(0.0982)	(0.0480)	(0.0480)	(0.0485)	(0.100)			
After Prince of Wales was present			0.00835	0.00810	0.0116	-0.00288	-0.000427	-0.00328			
			(0.0166)	(0.0161)	(0.0145)	(0.00319)	(0.000275)	(0.0256)			
Noncooperation period			-0.0192***								
			(0.00490)								
Prince of Wales in India			0.00771***								
			(0.00238)								
Prince of Wales present 1 day prior									0.102**		
									(0.0380)		
Prince of Wales present 5 days prior										0.0131	
										(0.0194)	
Prince of Wales present 7 days prior											0.0213
											(0.0186)
District fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Date fixed effects	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	144780	144780	144780	144780	144780	144780	144780	24510	24510	24510	24510
Adjusted R-squared	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Outcome mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Data source	All	All	All	All	Intelligence	Newspapers	Tour	All	All	All	All
Districts	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	Prince of Wales	Prince of Wales	Prince of Wales	Prince of Wales

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district-date experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 7: The effects of the Prince of Wales' tour on the probability of subsequent Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (dynamic difference-in-differences)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Effect_1	0.288***	0.286***	0.288***	0.287***	0.308***	0.220**
	(0.0894)	(0.0950)	(0.0897)	(0.0958)	(0.0978)	(0.0930)
Effect_2	0.107	0.103	0.108	0.106	0.0869	-0.0331
	(0.0661)	(0.109)	(0.0663)	(0.110)	(0.0680)	(0.149)
Effect_3	0.0477	0.0422	0.0478	0.0445	0.0270	-0.0917
	(0.0499)	(0.134)	(0.0499)	(0.135)	(0.0467)	(0.164)
Effect_4	-0.00227	-0.00953	-0.00245	-0.00680	0.000950	-0.157
	(0.0375)	(0.166)	(0.0377)	(0.167)	(0.0429)	(0.199)
Effect_5	-0.0275	-0.0363	-0.0268	-0.0322	-0.0490	0.0739
	(0.0249)	(0.200)	(0.0249)	(0.202)	(0.0347)	(0.240)
Effect_6	-0.0278	-0.0379	-0.0273	-0.0339	-0.0443	-0.0740
	(0.0244)	(0.236)	(0.0247)	(0.238)	(0.0311)	(0.240)
Effect_7	-0.00312	-0.0148	-0.00272	-0.0103	-0.00844	-0.0789
	(0.0379)	(0.274)	(0.0379)	(0.276)	(0.0442)	(0.279)
Effect_8	-0.0320	-0.0453	-0.0320	-0.0407	-0.0332	-0.0854
	(0.0252)	(0.309)	(0.0255)	(0.312)	(0.0247)	(0.314)
Effect_9	0.00345	-0.0114	0.00327	-0.00653	0.00170	-0.0475
	(0.0376)	(0.346)	(0.0378)	(0.350)	(0.0418)	(0.351)
Effect_10	-0.0242	-0.0405	-0.0244	-0.0352	-0.0327	-0.0872
	(0.0246)	(0.382)	(0.0249)	(0.385)	(0.0270)	(0.403)
Effect_11	-0.0266	-0.0443	-0.0260	-0.0380	-0.0445	-0.126
	(0.0244)	(0.418)	(0.0247)	(0.422)	(0.0302)	(0.437)
Effect_12	-0.0321	-0.0510	-0.0320	-0.0450	-0.0697	-0.113
	(0.0252)	(0.454)	(0.0254)	(0.459)	(0.0426)	(0.474)
Effect_13	-0.0290	-0.0493	-0.0287	-0.0429	-0.0694	-0.110
	(0.0248)	(0.491)	(0.0249)	(0.496)	(0.0437)	(0.514)
Effect_14	-0.00125	-0.0230	-0.00136	-0.0166	-0.0310	-0.0754
	(0.0373)	(0.528)	(0.0374)	(0.533)	(0.0249)	(0.565)
Placebo_1	-0.00177	-0.000839	-0.00109	0.000680	-0.00498	-0.0830
	(0.0365)	(0.0670)	(0.0368)	(0.0675)	(0.0397)	(0.105)
Placebo_2	-0.00274	0.0328	-0.00286	0.0340	-0.0406	-0.0921
	(0.0381)	(0.0954)	(0.0382)	(0.0962)	(0.0269)	(0.148)
Placebo_3	-0.0382	0.0163	-0.0373	0.0195	-0.0633*	-0.166
	(0.0255)	(0.131)	(0.0256)	(0.132)	(0.0338)	(0.187)
Placebo_4	-0.0234	-0.0400	-0.0238	-0.0363	-0.0247	-0.227
	(0.0245)	(0.173)	(0.0247)	(0.174)	(0.0244)	(0.234)
Placebo_5	0.0311	-0.0628	0.0309	-0.0593	0.00634	0.0659
	(0.0475)	(0.205)	(0.0476)	(0.207)	(0.0422)	(0.239)
Placebo_6	0.0522	-0.00786	0.0528	-0.00395	0.0351	-0.0347
	(0.0378)	(0.241)	(0.0380)	(0.243)	(0.0444)	(0.251)
Placebo_7	-0.00428	-0.0179	-0.00367	-0.0125	-0.0102	-0.0604
	(0.0380)	(0.278)	(0.0383)	(0.280)	(0.0419)	(0.287)
Placebo_8	0.00424	-0.00372	0.00381	0.00190	0.0114	-0.0571
	(0.0374)	(0.314)	(0.0375)	(0.317)	(0.0410)	(0.322)
Placebo_9	-0.0115	-0.0186	-0.0117	-0.0131	0.00210	-0.0624
	(0.0379)	(0.350)	(0.0380)	(0.353)	(0.0429)	(0.360)
Placebo_10	0.00185	-0.0156	0.00218	-0.00952	0.00191	-0.0306
	(0.0365)	(0.386)	(0.0369)	(0.390)	(0.0376)	(0.409)
Placebo_11	-0.00244	-0.0111	-0.00245	-0.00517	-0.0397	-0.0266
	(0.0355)	(0.422)	(0.0357)	(0.427)	(0.0289)	(0.447)
Placebo_12	-0.00820	-0.0199	-0.00789	-0.0135	-0.0404	-0.0295
	(0.0367)	(0.459)	(0.0370)	(0.464)	(0.0276)	(0.483)
Placebo_13	-0.000765	-0.0132	-0.000680	-0.00612	-0.0329	-0.0604
	(0.0364)	(0.495)	(0.0367)	(0.500)	(0.0236)	(0.522)
Placebo_14	-0.00879	-0.0223	-0.00912	-0.0151	0.00438	-0.0650
	(0.0381)	(0.532)	(0.0386)	(0.537)	(0.0370)	(0.574)
Av_tot_eff	0.0816		0.0828		0.0139	
	(0.124)		(0.125)		(0.118)	
District fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Date fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District-specific linear trends	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Control districts	All	All	Never treated	Never treated	Ever treated	Ever treated

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district-date experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 8: The Prince of Wales visit increased the chances that a district experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (LPM)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.245***	0.187**	0.188**	0.185**	0.190**	0.308***	0.241**	0.185**	0.176**
	(0.0820)	(0.0804)	(0.0820)	(0.0813)	(0.0808)	(0.0933)	(0.102)	(0.0823)	(0.0814)
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales								-0.00172	
								(0.0376)	
District visited by George V in 1911-12									0.139
									(0.121)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.113	-0.529	-0.562	-0.608	-0.581	0.217	-0.215	-0.608	-0.577
	(0.516)	(0.557)	(0.553)	(0.579)	(0.585)	(0.262)	(0.167)	(0.580)	(0.573)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-0.0624	0.420	0.456	0.516	0.498	-0.541	0.142	0.515	0.489
	(0.561)	(0.734)	(0.732)	(0.772)	(0.781)	(0.358)	(0.193)	(0.776)	(0.769)
Ln population, 1921	0.171***	0.106***	0.117***	0.117***	0.102***	0.0468	0.000473	0.117***	0.114***
	(0.0164)	(0.0247)	(0.0274)	(0.0273)	(0.0275)	(0.0393)	(0.00952)	(0.0278)	(0.0307)
Metropolitan cities	0.0148	0.0273	0.0382	0.0236	0.00626	0.314***	0.364	0.0238	-0.0555
	(0.0813)	(0.0979)	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.312)	(0.111)	(0.130)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0477	0.0900	0.0807	0.0746	0.0763	0.00181	0.0127	0.0745	0.0737
	(0.0457)	(0.0619)	(0.0639)	(0.0586)	(0.0581)	(0.0588)	(0.0322)	(0.0573)	(0.0589)
Number of gun salutes	-0.0166***	-0.00164	-0.00554	-0.00580	-0.00337	-0.0122	-0.00369*	-0.00579	-0.00561
	(0.00333)	(0.00834)	(0.00949)	(0.00956)	(0.00940)	(0.00777)	(0.00215)	(0.00959)	(0.00959)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			-0.00185	-0.00167	-0.000528	0.0151	0.0104	-0.00187	-0.00410
			(0.0147)	(0.0145)	(0.0144)	(0.0115)	(0.00959)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.0409	0.0532	0.0108	0.0660	0.0410	0.0377
				(0.0855)	(0.0807)	(0.0675)	(0.0425)	(0.0859)	(0.0841)
State fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	403	403	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.38	0.43	0.42	0.42	0.44	0.21	0.26	0.42	0.42
Outcome mean	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.53	0.15	0.03	0.54	0.54
Data source	All	All	All	All	Intelligence	Newspapers	Tour	All	All

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced Khilafat/Noncooperation activity. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 9: The Prince of Wales visit increased days of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity (OLS)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
District visited by the Prince of Wales	14.92***	15.06***	15.01***	14.96***	10.54***	4.561***	0.398**	14.84***	14.04***
	(3.624)	(3.862)	(3.845)	(3.841)	(2.805)	(1.392)	(0.193)	(3.832)	(3.095)
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales								-0.465	
								(0.702)	
District visited by George V in 1911-12									13.88*
									(7.933)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	4.310	-8.406	-8.967	-9.745	-8.703	-1.241	-0.678*	-9.733	-6.692
	(7.807)	(11.80)	(11.91)	(12.43)	(11.00)	(2.284)	(0.402)	(12.52)	(12.23)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-5.517	4.112	4.692	5.708	6.113	-0.277	0.679	5.531	3.047
	(9.185)	(13.08)	(13.17)	(13.73)	(11.61)	(2.806)	(0.446)	(14.06)	(13.69)
Ln population, 1921	1.970***	1.518*	1.703*	1.705*	1.529*	0.176	0.0179	1.688*	1.397
	(0.528)	(0.878)	(0.905)	(0.913)	(0.786)	(0.197)	(0.0196)	(0.919)	(1.032)
Metropolitan cities	107.0***	124.9***	124.6***	124.4***	96.29***	32.93***	0.768	124.4***	116.5***
	(18.87)	(11.41)	(11.83)	(11.72)	(7.102)	(7.969)	(0.800)	(11.68)	(11.31)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.359	2.549	2.444	2.341	1.913	0.510	0.0226	2.302	2.255
	(1.598)	(1.924)	(1.863)	(1.979)	(1.762)	(0.464)	(0.0581)	(1.997)	(1.962)
Number of gun salutes	-0.356***	-0.418**	-0.472**	-0.476**	-0.379**	-0.0988**	-0.0102*	-0.474**	-0.457**
	(0.0626)	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.159)	(0.0447)	(0.00532)	(0.191)	(0.192)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			0.199	0.202	0.105	0.0991	0.0222	0.149	-0.0396
			(0.342)	(0.340)	(0.251)	(0.123)	(0.0221)	(0.341)	(0.245)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.692	0.422	0.307	0.217**	0.716	0.373
				(1.508)	(1.389)	(0.492)	(0.105)	(1.505)	(1.509)
State fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	403	403	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.70	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.66	0.22	0.76	0.77
Outcome mean	6.39	6.39	6.43	6.43	5.53	0.95	0.06	6.43	6.43
Data source	All	All	All	All	Intelligence	Newspapers	Tour	All	All

Notes: The dependent variable measures the days of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity experienced by each district. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 10: The effects of the Prince of Wales' tour on the probability of types of Khilafat/Noncooperation activities

	1 Any NC/K activity	2 Violent	3 Nonviolent	4 Hartal	5 Strike	6 Civil disob.	7 Prayer meeting	8 Meeting	9 Resignation	10 Congress	11 Khilafat	12 Bipartisan
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.185**	0.282***	0.192**	0.319***	0.375***	0.262***	0.298***	0.287**	0.186**	0.246**	0.272**	0.186**
	(0.0813)	(0.0770)	(0.0839)	(0.0861)	(0.0822)	(0.0793)	(0.0782)	(0.113)	(0.0848)	(0.0927)	(0.102)	(0.0851)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	-0.608	-0.492	-0.496	-0.942**	-1.160**	-0.0407	0.219	0.243	0.281	-0.560	0.151	-0.0464
	(0.579)	(0.826)	(0.564)	(0.432)	(0.501)	(0.704)	(0.225)	(0.543)	(0.291)	(0.881)	(0.442)	(0.623)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	0.516	0.607	0.373	1.052**	1.279**	-0.172	-0.301	-0.391	0.121	0.339	-0.215	0.0249
	(0.772)	(0.975)	(0.749)	(0.477)	(0.511)	(1.038)	(0.257)	(0.817)	(0.271)	(1.299)	(0.674)	(0.906)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	0.0409	0.00283	0.0404	0.130*	0.0852	0.0214	-0.0773*	-0.0422	0.0705	0.138*	0.0700	0.00731
	(0.0855)	(0.0665)	(0.0829)	(0.0725)	(0.0924)	(0.0753)	(0.0410)	(0.0691)	(0.0500)	(0.0708)	(0.0939)	(0.101)
Ln population, 1921	0.117***	0.0645**	0.106***	0.0713*	0.101**	0.0568**	0.00487	0.0945***	0.0240	0.0942**	0.0899***	0.109***
	(0.0273)	(0.0244)	(0.0284)	(0.0383)	(0.0436)	(0.0251)	(0.0203)	(0.0338)	(0.0237)	(0.0394)	(0.0285)	(0.0369)
Metropolitan cities	0.0236	0.209*	0.0246	-0.0705	0.111	0.246**	0.358	0.134	0.538***	0.128	0.150	0.550***
	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.149)	(0.206)	(0.0985)	(0.337)	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.0935)	(0.104)	(0.112)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0746	0.127	0.0767	0.207***	0.167*	0.141**	-0.000774	0.0465	0.0864	0.0131	0.106	0.0965*
	(0.0586)	(0.0878)	(0.0583)	(0.0658)	(0.0887)	(0.0575)	(0.0385)	(0.0825)	(0.0803)	(0.0569)	(0.0688)	(0.0496)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	-0.00167	0.0233	-0.0108	0.00758	-0.00964	0.0219	-0.00134	-0.00266	-0.00748	0.0153	0.00389	-0.00284
	(0.0145)	(0.0160)	(0.0122)	(0.0134)	(0.0183)	(0.0140)	(0.00602)	(0.0160)	(0.00985)	(0.0133)	(0.0183)	(0.0118)
Number of gun salutes	-0.00580	-0.0149***	-0.00356	-0.0108	-0.0150	-0.0125**	-0.00501	-0.0112	-0.00964*	-0.0193**	-0.0163**	-0.0275***
	(0.00956)	(0.00542)	(0.00936)	(0.00916)	(0.0102)	(0.00577)	(0.00433)	(0.0102)	(0.00494)	(0.00909)	(0.00753)	(0.00856)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.42	0.25	0.44	0.40	0.32	0.27	0.24	0.34	0.19	0.35	0.37	0.26
Outcome mean	0.54	0.24	0.53	0.37	0.31	0.25	0.07	0.42	0.14	0.35	0.35	0.19

Notes: The dependent variables are indicators for types of Khilafat/Noncooperation activities. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 11: The Prince of Wales' visit accelerated the breakdown of communal peace (Cox proportional hazards)

	1	2	3	4
District visited by the Prince of Wales	3.945***	2.717***	1.937***	2.946***
	(0.895)	(0.601)	(0.366)	(0.632)
Prop. Muslim, 1921		163.2**	724.3**	1410.7*
		(324.2)	(2344.5)	(6115.5)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921		0.000528***	0.000169**	0.000229*
		(0.00153)	(0.000580)	(0.000993)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation		1.498	1.633	
		(0.413)	(0.512)	
Ln population, 1921		1.745***	1.680***	1.700*
		(0.224)	(0.322)	(0.519)
Metropolitan cities		1.541	1.900	1.08e-17***
		(0.822)	(1.725)	(1.19e-17)
District with Congress organization, 1918		1.862*	0.917	1.055
		(0.647)	(0.210)	(0.229)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km		0.895	1.027	1.062
		(0.0929)	(0.100)	(0.0994)
Number of gun salutes		0.995	1.053	1.012
		(0.0166)	(0.146)	(0.127)
State strata	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	403	398	398	351
Failures (first riots)	125	125	125	93
Sample	All	All	All	No prior riots

Notes: Coefficients are hazard ratios. Failure is a Hindu-Muslim riot after April 1922. Districts with no riot by December 1949 are censored. Regressions 3 and 4 stratify the baseline hazard by state. Regression 4 restricts the sample to districts with no riot between 1850 and 1921. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 12: The effect of the Prince of Wales' visit on riots is concentrated in districts with no prior history of communal violence

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Riots until 1929			Riots until 1949		
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.344***	-0.114	0.317***	0.424***	0.303	0.407***
	(0.0759)	(0.289)	(0.0780)	(0.0755)	(0.178)	(0.0737)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation			0.234**			0.200**
			(0.0930)			(0.0808)
PoW visit X riots before Khilfat/Noncooperation			-0.538***			-0.453**
			(0.161)			(0.182)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.676	2.446	0.767	1.063*	2.090	1.018*
	(0.541)	(2.218)	(0.597)	(0.556)	(1.350)	(0.592)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-0.669	-1.944	-0.822	-1.360**	-2.460*	-1.453**
	(0.601)	(1.952)	(0.604)	(0.569)	(1.218)	(0.602)
Ln population, 1921	0.0262	-0.0630	0.0248	0.0724	0.0660	0.0741*
	(0.0284)	(0.115)	(0.0253)	(0.0471)	(0.101)	(0.0422)
Metropolitan cities	-0.379***	0.562	0.275	-0.422***	0.232	0.0387
	(0.106)	(0.371)	(0.320)	(0.113)	(0.245)	(0.236)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0315	-0.296	0.0294	0.0913	-0.405**	0.0611
	(0.0599)	(0.224)	(0.0637)	(0.0752)	(0.168)	(0.0730)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	0.0244*	-0.0504	0.0155	0.00528	-0.148	-0.00428
	(0.0141)	(0.144)	(0.0174)	(0.0179)	(0.0876)	(0.0172)
Number of gun salutes	-0.00447		-0.00520	-0.00604		-0.00646
	(0.00573)		(0.00512)	(0.00848)		(0.00740)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	351	47	398	351	47	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.32	0.04	0.35	0.34	0.25	0.37
Outcome mean	0.16	0.53	0.20	0.26	0.68	0.31
Sample	No prior riots	Prior riots	All	No prior riots	Prior riots	All

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced a riot, until 1929 in regressions 1–3 and until 1949 in regressions 4–6. Regressions 1 and 4 restrict the sample to districts without prior riots. Regressions 2 and 5 to districts with prior riots. Regressions 3 and 6 estimate the interaction on all districts. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Stops made before the movement's suspension accelerated the breakdown of communal peace (Cox proportional hazards)

	1 Any Khilafat/ Noncooperation	2 Khilafat/ Noncooperation days	3 Riots until 1929	4 Riots until 1949
Prince of Wales visit before Noncooperation was suspended	0.195 (0.129)	15.98*** (5.786)	0.369*** (0.107)	0.415*** (0.110)
Prince of Wales visit after Noncooperation was suspended	0.170*** (0.0627)	13.34*** (4.460)	-0.0489 (0.0943)	0.156 (0.105)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	-0.604 (0.589)	-9.330 (12.49)	0.894 (0.599)	1.110* (0.598)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	0.514 (0.777)	5.550 (13.79)	-0.928 (0.597)	-1.537** (0.602)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	0.0417 (0.0859)	0.776 (1.495)	0.168* (0.0878)	0.143* (0.0774)
Ln population, 1921	0.117*** (0.0266)	1.667* (0.896)	0.0230 (0.0252)	0.0739* (0.0436)
Metropolitan cities	0.0140 (0.147)	123.4*** (12.57)	-0.0902 (0.187)	-0.233 (0.159)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0744 (0.0592)	2.316 (1.968)	0.0225 (0.0643)	0.0561 (0.0728)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	-0.00181 (0.0146)	0.188 (0.331)	0.0135 (0.0171)	-0.00544 (0.0169)
Number of gun salutes	-0.00580 (0.00954)	-0.476** (0.191)	-0.00429 (0.00524)	-0.00571 (0.00744)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.42	0.76	0.34	0.37
Outcome mean	0.54	6.43	0.20	0.31
p-value, before = after	0.865	0.724	0.005	0.089


Notes: Coefficients are hazard ratios. Failure is a Hindu-Muslim riot after April 1922. Districts with no riot by December 1949 are censored. The baseline hazard is stratified by state. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: The Prince of Wales' visit increased the chances that a district experienced riots between 1922–49

	1 Riots after LPM	2 Riots after LPM	3 Riots after LPM	4 Riots after LPM	5 Riots after Neg. binomial	6 Riots after Poisson	7 Riots before LPM	8 Riots after LPM
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.366***	0.324***	0.323***	0.315***	2.804***	2.415***	0.0616	0.296***
	(0.0716)	(0.0752)	(0.0759)	(0.0794)	(0.756)	(0.468)	(0.0939)	(0.0801)
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales								-0.0707*
								(0.0354)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	1.205***	1.246**	1.220**	1.069*	69.37	42.24	1.124***	1.071*
	(0.391)	(0.557)	(0.552)	(0.585)	(199.7)	(145.1)	(0.405)	(0.600)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-1.580***	-1.745***	-1.719***	-1.522**	0.00121**	0.00113	-1.468***	-1.548**
	(0.443)	(0.549)	(0.544)	(0.597)	(0.00398)	(0.00498)	(0.439)	(0.611)
Ln population, 1921	0.0877***	0.0748*	0.0772*	0.0777*	2.331***	2.136***	-0.00359	0.0751*
	(0.0249)	(0.0393)	(0.0419)	(0.0432)	(0.484)	(0.261)	(0.0295)	(0.0428)
Metropolitan cities	-0.127	-0.0835	-0.0854	-0.133	3.329*	4.540***	0.358	-0.126
	(0.163)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.131)	(2.073)	(1.599)	(0.264)	(0.129)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.186**	0.0710	0.0786	0.0585	1.117	1.245	0.150***	0.0526
	(0.0810)	(0.0708)	(0.0716)	(0.0720)	(0.248)	(0.237)	(0.0391)	(0.0724)
Number of gun salutes	-0.00233	-0.00331	-0.00490	-0.00577	0.943	0.992	0.00642	-0.00542
	(0.00333)	(0.00689)	(0.00740)	(0.00762)	(0.103)	(0.133)	(0.00578)	(0.00762)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			-0.00462	-0.00404	1.038	1.037	-0.00432	-0.0122
			(0.0173)	(0.0170)	(0.0749)	(0.0670)	(0.0155)	(0.0167)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.134	2.308**	1.730		0.138
				(0.0861)	(0.823)	(0.662)		(0.0842)
State fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	403	403	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.28	0.35	0.36	0.36			0.13	0.36
Outcome mean	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	1.21	1.21	0.12	0.31

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced a riot between 1922–49, except for regressions 5 and 6, which employ riot counts and report incidence-rate ratios. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Figure 10: Counterfactual analyses of the effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on subsequent riots between 1922–49



Notes: The figure displays the point estimate of 1,000 plausible counterfactual itineraries for the Prince of Wales' 1921–22 visit to India. The dashed vertical red line marks the point estimate of the effects of the Prince's actual itinerary from regression 4 of Table 14.

Table 15: Khilafat/Noncooperation activity increased the chances that a district experienced riots between 1922–49 (2SLS)

	1 Riots after OLS	2 Riots after 2SLS	3 Riots after 2SLS	4 Riots after 2SLS	5 Riots before 2SLS	6 Riots after 2SLS	7 Riots after 2SLS	8 Riots after 2SLS	9 Riots after 2SLS
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days	0.0111***	0.0215***	0.0216***	0.0211***	0.00411	0.0199***			
	(0.00202)	(0.00615)	(0.00618)	(0.00624)	(0.00608)	(0.00622)			
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales						-0.0614*			
						(0.0358)			
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (intelligence reports)							0.0299***		
							(0.00924)		
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (newspaper reports)								0.0691***	
								(0.0220)	
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days (tour report)									0.792*
									(0.416)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	1.424**	1.427**	1.413**	1.274**	1.161***	1.265**	1.329**	1.155**	1.606***
	(0.584)	(0.559)	(0.557)	(0.582)	(0.417)	(0.586)	(0.606)	(0.555)	(0.573)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-1.864***	-1.833***	-1.820***	-1.642***	-1.487***	-1.659***	-1.704***	-1.502***	-2.059***
	(0.583)	(0.553)	(0.552)	(0.594)	(0.441)	(0.593)	(0.615)	(0.571)	(0.594)
Ln population, 1921	0.0670	0.0421	0.0405	0.0418	-0.0106	0.0415	0.0320	0.0656	0.0636
	(0.0432)	(0.0433)	(0.0462)	(0.0467)	(0.0356)	(0.0456)	(0.0498)	(0.0433)	(0.0462)
Metropolitan cities	-1.320***	-2.767***	-2.772***	-2.753***	-0.154	-2.607***	-3.011***	-2.409***	-0.742
	(0.303)	(0.874)	(0.880)	(0.878)	(0.826)	(0.872)	(1.012)	(0.879)	(0.762)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0417	0.0163	0.0259	0.00921	0.140***	0.00671	0.00133	0.0233	0.0406
	(0.0762)	(0.0791)	(0.0791)	(0.0782)	(0.0339)	(0.0775)	(0.0833)	(0.0748)	(0.0660)
Number of gun salutes	0.00202	0.00567	0.00526	0.00426	0.00836	0.00403	0.00557	0.00106	0.00228
	(0.00752)	(0.00760)	(0.00844)	(0.00863)	(0.00676)	(0.00843)	(0.00922)	(0.00784)	(0.00840)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			-0.00891	-0.00830	-0.00514	-0.0151	-0.00717	-0.0109	-0.0216
			(0.0152)	(0.0151)	(0.0142)	(0.0157)	(0.0153)	(0.0156)	(0.0181)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.120*		0.124*	0.122*	0.113	-0.0375
				(0.0718)		(0.0707)	(0.0691)	(0.0879)	(0.113)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	403	403	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.37	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.12	0.35	-0.08	-0.04	-0.36
Outcome mean	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.12	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31
First stage F-statistic		15.22	15.23	15.18	15.23	14.99	14.13	10.74	4.28


Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced a riot between 1922–49. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 16: Effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on the number of Congress party members, 1929

	1	2	3	4	5
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.876***	0.718***	0.737***	0.738***	0.708***
	(0.169)	(0.123)	(0.167)	(0.176)	(0.180)
District on route, but not visited by the Prince of Wales					-0.138
					(0.157)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.321	0.469	0.516	0.245	0.131
	(1.774)	(1.376)	(1.486)	(1.531)	(1.584)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-1.576	-1.807	-1.834	-1.476	-1.408
	(2.115)	(1.457)	(1.551)	(1.573)	(1.647)
Ln population, 1921	0.997***	0.735***	0.721***	0.733***	0.730***
	(0.176)	(0.219)	(0.214)	(0.219)	(0.216)
Metropolitan cities	0.811**	0.998**	0.999**	0.937**	0.942**
	(0.354)	(0.426)	(0.428)	(0.423)	(0.433)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0650	0.171	0.184	0.154	0.143
	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.174)	(0.202)	(0.197)
Number of gun salutes	-0.328***				
	(0.0633)				
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km			-0.0295	-0.0275	-0.0410
			(0.0724)	(0.0715)	(0.0712)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation				0.132	0.133
				(0.170)	(0.157)
State fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	402	236	234	234	234
Adjusted R-squared					
Outcome mean	945.88	1602.91	1613.02	1613.02	1613.02

Notes: The dependent variable is a count of the number of Congress party members in 1929. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Figure 11: Counterfactual analyses of the effects of the Prince of Wales' visit on Congress membership in 1929



Notes: The figure displays the point estimate of 1,000 plausible counterfactual itineraries for the Prince of Wales' 1921–22 visit to India. The dashed vertical red line marks the point estimate of the effects of the Prince's actual itinerary from regression 4 of Appendix Table 16.

Table 17: The effects of the Prince of Wales' tour on riot severity

	1 Ln 1+riot days OLS	2 Ln 1+injured OLS	3 Ln 1+killed OLS
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.257**	0.862**	0.435*
	(0.118)	(0.372)	(0.240)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.332	3.529	0.290
	(0.674)	(2.692)	(0.910)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-0.565	-3.843	-0.419
	(0.653)	(2.620)	(0.777)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	0.231**	0.531	0.141
	(0.108)	(0.337)	(0.115)
Ln population, 1921	0.0843**	0.157	0.0750
	(0.0383)	(0.0955)	(0.0625)
Metropolitan cities	1.947*	2.654*	2.720*
	(0.983)	(1.557)	(1.408)
District with Congress organization, 1918	-0.00597	0.223	0.0700
	(0.0839)	(0.235)	(0.129)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	0.0131	0.0210	0.00451
	(0.0242)	(0.0638)	(0.0300)
Number of gun salutes	-0.0150*	-0.0291	-0.0160
	(0.00746)	(0.0198)	(0.0115)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y
Observations	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.35	0.32	0.27
Outcome mean	0.19	0.66	0.21

Notes: Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

Table 18: The Prince of Wales' visit increased subsequent violence beyond riots (OLS)

	1 Any Civil Disobedience 1929-32 OLS	2 Violent Civil Disobedience 1929-32 OLS	3 Any Quit India 1942-43 OLS	4 Violent Quit India 1942-43 OLS	5 Any terrorism 1922-36 OLS	6 Ln terrorism 1922-36 OLS
District visited by the Prince of Wales	0.0918	0.930***	0.170**	0.958***	0.228***	0.586***
	(0.0623)	(0.158)	(0.0777)	(0.298)	(0.0688)	(0.175)
No. of terrorism events, 1917-21					0.00246	0.163***
					(0.0104)	(0.0175)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.641	-2.517*	0.821	-1.975	0.122	0.989
	(0.758)	(1.346)	(0.769)	(1.549)	(0.566)	(0.843)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-0.853	2.232	-1.142	1.366	-0.328	-1.102
	(0.799)	(1.488)	(0.749)	(1.630)	(0.690)	(1.020)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	0.0195	0.139	-0.0175	0.184	0.0808	0.0409
	(0.0254)	(0.122)	(0.0533)	(0.167)	(0.0716)	(0.130)
Ln population, 1921	0.121**	0.471***	0.0721*	0.606***	-0.00792	0.0712
	(0.0548)	(0.116)	(0.0382)	(0.148)	(0.0318)	(0.0549)
Metropolitan cities	-0.0419	0.730***	-0.164*	0.294	-0.196	0.336
	(0.0885)	(0.228)	(0.0853)	(0.731)	(0.206)	(0.561)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0160	0.269*	0.00929	0.172	0.229***	0.338***
	(0.0636)	(0.144)	(0.0281)	(0.113)	(0.0714)	(0.101)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	0.0372***	0.0214	0.00869	-0.0231	0.00868	0.0284
	(0.0118)	(0.0496)	(0.0141)	(0.0399)	(0.0184)	(0.0263)
Number of gun salutes					-0.00160	-0.0222*
					(0.00590)	(0.0112)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	196	196	209	209	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.09	0.41	0.32	0.68	0.38	0.56
Outcome mean	0.90	1.09	0.81	2.06	0.25	0.38
Outcome period						


Notes: Regressions 5 and 6 control for the number of terrorism events recorded between 1917 and 1921. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 19: Khilafat/Noncooperation activity increased the subsequent violence beyond riots (2SLS)

	1 Any Civil Disobedience 1929-32 2SLS	2 Violent Civil Disobedience 1929-32 2SLS	3 Any Quit India 1942-43 2SLS	4 Violent Quit India 1942-43 2SLS	5 Any terrorism 1922-36 2SLS	6 Ln terrorism 1922-36 2SLS
No. of Khilafat/Noncooperation days	0.00424	0.0429***	0.00752**	0.0425***	0.0153***	0.0392***
	(0.00281)	(0.0133)	(0.00328)	(0.00992)	(0.00306)	(0.0102)
No. of terrorism events, 1917-21					0.00524	0.170***
					(0.00911)	(0.0139)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.703	-1.888**	0.939	-1.310	0.278	1.389*
	(0.700)	(0.946)	(0.640)	(1.373)	(0.445)	(0.710)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-0.883	1.926**	-1.209**	0.988	-0.422	-1.342*
	(0.719)	(0.941)	(0.605)	(1.672)	(0.525)	(0.727)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	0.0172	0.116	-0.0228	0.154	0.0706	0.0149
	(0.0241)	(0.119)	(0.0502)	(0.128)	(0.0560)	(0.0973)
Ln population, 1921	0.100*	0.257*	0.0362	0.403***	-0.0346	0.00285
	(0.0574)	(0.134)	(0.0369)	(0.0952)	(0.0270)	(0.0400)
Metropolitan cities	-0.547	-4.381**	-1.053**	-4.731***	-2.097***	-4.537***
	(0.404)	(1.958)	(0.474)	(1.341)	(0.507)	(1.526)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0103	0.211*	-0.000648	0.116	0.193***	0.244**
	(0.0563)	(0.118)	(0.0202)	(0.115)	(0.0669)	(0.106)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	0.0367***	0.0166	0.00852	-0.0241	0.00565	0.0206
	(0.0101)	(0.0343)	(0.0121)	(0.0285)	(0.0155)	(0.0230)
Number of gun salutes					0.00578	-0.00330
					(0.00518)	(0.00774)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	196	196	209	209	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.09	0.40	0.33	0.70	0.42	0.62
Outcome mean	0.90	1.09	0.81	2.06	0.25	0.38
First stage F-statistic	14.08	14.08	18.31	18.31	15.11	15.11

Notes: Khilafat/Noncooperation days are instrumented by an indicator for whether the Prince of Wales visited the district. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 12: Effects of different kinds of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity on riots (OLS)



Notes: The figure plots the estimated effects of different kinds of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity on subsequent riots as reported in Table 20.

Table 20: Effects of different kinds of Khilafat/Noncooperation activity on riots (OLS)

	1 Any NC/K activity	2 Violent	3 Nonviolent	4 Hartal	5 Strike	6 Civil disob.	7 Prayer meeting	8 Meeting	9 Resignation	10 Congress	11 Khilafat	12 Bipartisan
Dummy for Khilafat/Noncooperation activity	0.0973**	0.151***	0.0852**	0.101*	0.158**	0.0631	0.184**	0.134***	0.204***	0.0915*	0.0868*	0.0839
	(0.0414)	(0.0489)	(0.0411)	(0.0565)	(0.0588)	(0.0540)	(0.0779)	(0.0331)	(0.0637)	(0.0473)	(0.0482)	(0.0505)
Prop. Muslim, 1921	0.978*	0.981*	0.962*	1.007*	1.082*	0.922	0.861	0.876	0.852	0.968*	0.903	0.924
	(0.563)	(0.528)	(0.566)	(0.581)	(0.568)	(0.556)	(0.568)	(0.558)	(0.560)	(0.561)	(0.557)	(0.570)
Prop. Muslim squared, 1921	-1.028*	-1.059*	-1.010*	-1.078*	-1.163*	-0.967*	-0.908	-0.917	-0.994*	-1.007*	-0.957*	-0.981*
	(0.560)	(0.526)	(0.564)	(0.582)	(0.577)	(0.546)	(0.561)	(0.548)	(0.569)	(0.556)	(0.548)	(0.561)
Ln population, 1921	0.0291	0.0294	0.0316	0.0325	0.0221	0.0371	0.0374	0.0266	0.0344	0.0317	0.0324	0.0316
	(0.0238)	(0.0237)	(0.0231)	(0.0223)	(0.0188)	(0.0239)	(0.0262)	(0.0231)	(0.0232)	(0.0221)	(0.0236)	(0.0203)
Metropolitan cities	0.250*	0.197	0.252*	0.246*	0.195	0.238*	0.151	0.215*	0.123	0.236*	0.234*	0.209*
	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.128)	(0.164)	(0.124)	(0.109)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.121)
District with Congress organization, 1918	0.0165	0.00486	0.0172	0.00300	-0.00207	0.0148	0.0244	0.0178	0.00633	0.0226	0.0146	0.0156
	(0.0659)	(0.0688)	(0.0661)	(0.0665)	(0.0684)	(0.0665)	(0.0681)	(0.0633)	(0.0686)	(0.0670)	(0.0644)	(0.0679)
Number of gun salutes	-0.00308	-0.00150	-0.00334	-0.00261	-0.00145	-0.00285	-0.00287	-0.00223	-0.00175	-0.00190	-0.00226	-0.00133
	(0.00520)	(0.00506)	(0.00521)	(0.00513)	(0.00475)	(0.00525)	(0.00566)	(0.00492)	(0.00504)	(0.00485)	(0.00517)	(0.00448)
Ln 1+distance to the nearest railroad, km	0.0178	0.0139	0.0186	0.0168	0.0188	0.0163	0.0175	0.0178	0.0190	0.0162	0.0173	0.0179
	(0.0181)	(0.0182)	(0.0184)	(0.0182)	(0.0169)	(0.0185)	(0.0183)	(0.0180)	(0.0169)	(0.0188)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
Dummy for riots from 1850 until Khilafat/Noncooperation	0.160*	0.162*	0.160*	0.150	0.148	0.162*	0.176*	0.168*	0.148	0.151	0.157	0.163*
	(0.0945)	(0.0927)	(0.0942)	(0.0912)	(0.0885)	(0.0955)	(0.0939)	(0.0969)	(0.0932)	(0.0926)	(0.0952)	(0.0942)
State fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R-squared	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.31
Outcome mean	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a district experienced a riot between 1922–29. Standard errors are clustered by state. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. See text for details.

A Data Appendix

Data on events were collected from a variety of contemporary sources spanning from 1918 through 1922. The dataset contains information on the "event-district" level (if the same event spans multiple districts, it will be entered multiple times). [22] Each observation contains a summary of the event, paraphrased from the original source [23], and information on date and location (province and district) where the event took place. A variety of indicators were encoded with information about the event, such as event type (protest, meeting, strike, hartal, resignation, non-cooperation event), acting group (khilafat, home rule, workers, congress) and its size, information on event escalation (violence, property damage, gunfire, lathi charge, teargas), and event fallout (arrests, number injured/dead in protest, number injured/dead in target group). Information about the make up of the group and what may have incited the event was included, such as religious affiliation (largely Hindu or Muslim), protest leaders present or occurred during a visit from the Prince of Wales, whether the event followed an information shock, and whether intimidation from protest leaders (such as pressure to close shops during a general hartal) took place. Additional relevant information about the event includes if the event was thwarted or if there was a citizen response, an attempt to apprehend event participants.

The dataset comprises 3,891 discretely recorded events spanning January 1918 to December 1922 (see Figure B1). Only 9.0% of events fall in 1918 and 6.6% in 1919, rising to 24.1% in 1921 and 47.5% in 1922, with activity peaking in February 1922 (394 events). The most common event types were protests (48.0%, the large majority of them nonviolent), meetings (32.3%), hartals (29.7%), explicit non-cooperation events (27.9%), and strikes (24.1%), with resignations (3.5%) comparatively rare. Acting groups were dominated by Khilafat organizations (25.0% of events) and Congress (13.5% of coded events), with workers and students each appearing in roughly 4%. Violence of any kind was recorded in 14.0% of events, property damage in 4.6% (railway property specifically in 6.7%). Gunfire was recorded only in 2.7% events, lathi charges in 0.5%. Arrests were recorded in 158 events, while 63 protesters were killed and 581 injured across the events for which casualties were reported (although there were several times arrests/deaths/injuries were noted without an exact number, these are noted in the data). Protest leaders were named in 24.0% of events, intimidation (e.g., pressure to close shops during a hartal) in 7.0%. Religious affiliation was coded for 402 events, of which 90.0% involved Muslim participants, 36.6% Hindu participants, and 29.9% both. Several of these finer indicators (leaders, group size, religious affiliation, information shocks) are populated for only a minority of events and should be read as conditional on being recorded rather than as rates of occurence of these phenomena. The Prince of Wales' tour, , which we use as an indicator for meida presence was present for 2.9% of entries.

[22] As the coverage was conducted across a variety of sources, multiple sources may report on the same event. This is addressed in the larger dataset we use for our analysis, but not in the raw dataset.

[23] Links to the original source are included for comparison




Figure B1: Number of recorded events per month, January 1918–December 1922 (N = 3,891). Event frequency rises sharply over the period, tracking the mobilization of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements. Peak: February 1922 (394 events)

A.1 Intelligence Reports

Event information collected from secret intelligence reports make up the majority of the event dataset. All event reports were downloaded from the National Archives of India, with the exception of the following fortnightly periods, for which no report was obtained: the second half of May 1919; the second half of March 1920; both halves of April 1920; the first half of February 1921; and both halves of August 1921. Events were manually coded into the dataset by a research fellow. While information on date and district is available for most entries, when an event entry was no specific about date, the send date of the event report was entered, so all entries are at least accurate to the nearest two weeks. When information on specific districts was not available, the district variable was left blank, but the reports are at (roughly) the province level, so some location information is still available. For some entries, location information is even more granular than the district (eg. meetings at the beach or Gokhale hall): the most detailed information on place is the "location" variable.

The intelligence reports are the most likely of any source to record disorder: 14.5% of intelligence-sourced events involve violence (versus 8.3% in newspaper-sourced events), and they account for nearly all recorded instances of gunfire (2.9%), property and railway damage, lathi charges, intimidation (8.1%), and arrests. They also cover the widest range of event types: protests (48%), meetings (33%), hartals (29%). This is likely reflective of the nature of the source: since the intelligence reports were internal to the British government, and had no outside audience, they do not have the same propangistic function of the other sources.

A.2 Newspaper Reports

Information on newspaper reports was collected by searching "khilafat" into ProQuest, Readex Newsbank, and The Times Digital Archive, corresponding to newspaper reports from The Times of India, the Amrita Bazaar Patrika, the Associated Press, the Leader, and the London Times. The data is more specific on both time and district, but less detailed about events overall.

Newspaper coverage skews toward large, visible episodes of collective action rather than disorder: relative to the intelligence reports, newspaper-sourced events are significantly more likely to be protests (57% vs. 48%) and hartals (37% vs. 29%) and more often explicitly Khilafat-branded (40% vs. 24%), but only about half as likely to involve violence (8.3% vs. 14.5%), with arrests, casualties, and intimidation rarely reported.

A.3 Tour Data

Data on the Prince of Wales's tour within India from the Newspapers listed above, as well as https://archive.org/details/dli.csl.8100/mode/2up, which compiles additional press reports about the Prince of Wales tour.

The tour-sourced events are defined by their relationship to the royal visit rather than by event type: they are dominated by hartals (10%) and non-cooperation actions (15%) timed to the Prince of Wales's movements, with very few meetings or strikes and almost no coded information on arrests, casualties, or violence.