Faith, Interrupted:
Names, Family, and Identity After Forced Atheism*

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Job Market Paper

August 30, 2026
Latest version: here

Abstract

Can a state force people to change their identity, or only how they express it? Nation-building reforms have long banned the names, clothing, and languages associated with competing identities in an effort to engineer a common culture. We test the limits of this strategy using Albania's 1967 campaign to criminalize religion and promote a secular "pure Albanian" identity—one of the most radical secularization efforts of the twentieth century. Using a bunching-style design applied to decades of administrative data on names and family links, we find that the campaign sharply changed naming: Christian naming fell by 15 percentage points and Muslim naming by 29 percentage points, while Albanian naming rose by 30 percentage points. Compliance was strongest in more illiterate districts and among religiously homogeneous households, but weaker among religious minorities and in districts that were already more secular before the reform. This suggests that families' responses depended on the local social environment and the perceived costs of preserving religious identity. The effects extended to marriage, particularly among Muslim-background men exposed at young ages, who became more likely to marry across religious backgrounds. Survey data collected decades later reveal the limits of coercion: post-reform cohorts report weaker religious upbringing, but we find no systematic changes in religious belief, religious participation, nationalist values, socialist values, market orientation, or democratic attitudes. Coercive secularization thus reshaped public identity markers and some family choices without producing broad ideological conversion.

Keywords: Culture, identity, religion, nation-building, cultural transmission, names

*We thank Antonio Accetturo, Lars Harhoff Andersen, Jeanet Sindig Bentzen, Gunes Gokmen, Martin Huber, Avital Livny, Andreas Menzel, Cathrin Mohr, Clara Sievert, and Rok Spruk for useful discussions. We also thank seminar participants at CERGE-EI, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, and Lille Economics and Management, as well as conference participants at ASREC 2025 (Copenhagen), ASREC 2026 (California, LA), ESPE 2026 (Helsinki), COMPIE 2026 (Paris), IAAE 2026 (Lisbon), and at the Workshop on Gender and Economics (Luxembourg), for their helpful comments.

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1 Introduction

Why do some countries suppress – or ban – how their citizens dress, speak, or name their children? History offers a range of examples, particularly carried out in countries with ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity. Franco's Spain banned Basque and Catalan names in favor of Castilian ones; several U.S. states banned German language in schools during World War I; Atatürk's Turkey banned the fez and mandated Western-style hats in 1925; and Tokugawa Japan banned Christianity for over two centuries. These nation-building policies rest on the same premise: that states can re-engineer identity by controlling the public markers people are permitted to use, thereby aligning the population with state ideology. Yet despite how often governments have reached for this tool, there is little empirical evidence on whether banning a name, a word, or a language genuinely reshapes culture.

In this paper, we study whether coercive nation-building changes religious identity or instead changes only its public expression. To answer this question, we examine one of the most radical secularization campaigns of the twentieth century: Albania's 1967 Cultural Revolution. The Communist regime sought to eliminate institutions and practices it regarded as incompatible with communist ideology. Subsequently, it closed places of worship, criminalized religious practice, and promoted the replacement of Muslim and Christian names with state-designated secular Albanian names. This setting is particularly unique because the campaign was introduced nationwide, lasted for decades, and unfolded in an unusually isolated society with limited outside cultural influence. Religious identity is especially relevant in this context because it is transmitted within families, shapes intimate choices such as marriage, and can persist even when its public expression is prohibited.

This paper asks three questions. First, to what extent can coercive state policies reshape visible identity markers, such as children's names, and which communities comply or resist? Second, do changes in symbolic markers extend to consequential family choices, including marriage across religious backgrounds? Third, do these policies alter religious beliefs and political values, or do they primarily induce public compliance? These questions speak to a growing literature on cultural change that emphasizes how policies and institutions shape norms, culture, and identity.[1] Existing work documents the effects of incentives, media, and legal reforms on cultural transmission, but we know much less about whether coercive attempts to remake identity can produce durable changes in beliefs rather than changes in observable behavior alone. The abrupt nationwide introduction of Albania's Cultural Revolution on February 7, 1967 provides a rare setting to study this distinction. It allows us to trace how a sharp, state-imposed attack on religion affected naming, marriage, and subsequently reported beliefs, as well as the conditions under which compliance was stronger or weaker.

We begin by studying compliance with the reform through naming patterns, using several decades of administrative records from Albania's 2008 Civil Registry. The Registry provides population-wide information on residents' names, surnames, dates and places of birth, sex, and family links, including spouses, children, and other household members. These data allow us to observe how naming changed across cohorts and locations following the Cultural Revolution. We develop a new name-classification algorithm that combines pattern-based rules, phonological features, and historical sources to assign first names to one of six categories: Christian, Muslim, Albanian, Western, Ideological[2], or Unidentified[3]. We validate this measure by showing that, before the reform, religious name categories closely capture individuals' religious background.

Because the religion ban was introduced nationwide and simultaneously, no location remained untreated and

[1] See Fernández (2025) for a review.

[2] Ideological names are associated with Communist ideology. Although the state did not promote them during the Cultural Revolution, some regime supporters adopted them—often names of Russian origin—to signal ideological affinity. The state neither promoted nor discouraged Western or Ideological names. These categories therefore capture alternative naming choices available to parents who did not choose the state-promoted Albanian names. Within this context, choosing Western names may reflect resistance to the state's nationalist naming project, whereas choosing Ideological names may signal stronger support for the regime.

[3] Unidentified names are all names that the algorithm could not classify. We provide further details in Section 3.

the policy did not generate variation in the timing of exposure across districts. We address this challenge using a bunching-style empirical design (Chetty et al., 2011). Specifically, we measure compliance as the extent to which each district's post-reform naming patterns deviates from the patterns predicted by its own pre-reform trend. We focus on individuals born between 1957 and 1977, a twenty-year window around the Cultural Revolution, which compares cohorts born shortly before and after the reform while limiting the scope for longer-run cultural changes to drive the results.

We next ask whether changes in names extended to a more consequential family decision: marriages, and apply a similar bunching design. Using each spouse's father's name to proxy for religious background, we examine whether the reform changed the probability of marrying within or across religious lines. Finally, we examine whether these behavioral responses reflect a deeper transformation of values. Using the Integrated Values Survey, we construct measures of religiosity and nationalism and test whether exposure to the state's secular, nationalist reform affected these values. We also examine market and democratic orientation, which speak to the Cultural Revolution's broader ambition of creating a "new socialist person". Because the survey does not identify respondents' districts, we cannot use the same district-level bunching design we use to investigate naming patterns and marital sorting. Instead, we exploit differences in exposure across birth cohorts, comparing individuals born before and after 1967.

Our first set of findings shows that the reform substantially reshaped naming, a highly visible marker of religious identity. In the ten years following the 1967 ban, religious naming declined sharply and was replaced with secular Albanian names. Christian naming fell by 15 pp (33% from baseline) and Muslim naming by 29 pp (60%), while Albanian naming rose by 30 pp (62%). Substitution toward Ideological, Western, or Unidentified names was minimal. The reform therefore did not simply reduce religious naming; it shifted parents toward the specific secular Albanian identity promoted by the state.

Compliance, however, was systematically uneven. It was strongest in districts with higher illiteracy rates and among households in which both parents shared the same religious background. By contrast, religious minorities and residents of districts that were already more secular before the reform preserved religious names at significantly higher rates. These patterns are consistent with the role of both information and identity threat. The stronger response in more illiterate districts is consistent with propaganda being more effective where access to alternative sources of information was limited. Religiously homogeneous households may have faced a lower perceived threat to the transmission of religious identity within the family and therefore found public compliance less costly. Conversely, minority families may have viewed religious names as particularly important for preserving a threatened identity. In already more secular districts, religious families may also have been able to retain religious names more discreetly because such choices were less visible within the broader local community. Compliance also differed persistently by religious background, with Muslim fathers complying mores across most dimensions. By contrast, local institutional context—measured by the presence of preserved religious buildings or Communist monuments—has little explanatory power. Instead, the results point to local population composition—prior secularization, minority status, and literacy—as the more important predictor of compliance. Thus, state coercion can rapidly change naming practices, but its reach depends less on the local physical legacy of religion or communism than on the social environment in which families make identity-related choices.

Turning to marriage, we find that the reform changed partner choice among men exposed to the Cultural Revolution at young ages, with the largest effects among Muslim-background men. Among men born after February 1967, the probability of marrying a woman of secular Albanian background rose by 12.5 percentage points, while the probability of marrying a Muslim-background woman fell by 7.6 percentage points. They also became 4.8 percentage points more likely to marry Christian-background women. The same pattern appears among men who were no older than nine when the campaign began: marriage to Albanian-background women rises by 15.3 pp and marriage to Muslim-background women falls by 9.4 pp.

Christian-background men also became more likely to marry Albanian-background women, although the increase was smaller: 7 pp among those born after the reform. Unlike Muslim-background men, they did not become more likely to marry across religious lines; estimated changes in marriage to Christian- and Muslim-background women are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, the reform affected family formation as well as naming, but its effects differed by religious background. We find no comparable shifts among cohorts who were already eighteen when the campaign began, consistent with exposure at impressionable ages being important for subsequent marriage choices.

Finally, the survey evidence shows much weaker effects on religiosity and no evidence of broader ideological conversion. Individuals born after the reform report weaker religious upbringing by 4.4pp. This result is consistent with the regime's success in reducing the religious environment in which children were raised. Yet the reform does not generate comparable changes in contemporaneous religious identity, attendance at religious services, comfort derived from religion, the importance respondents attach to God, or belief in God and the afterlife. The reform likewise has no effect on nationalist, socialist, or democratic values. Thus, the survey evidence distinguishes weaker religious socialization from enduring religious belief, as individuals exposed to the reform report being raised in less religious environments, but do not subsequently report systematically different religious beliefs or broader ideological values.

Taken together, these results point more strongly to behavioral compliance than to broad ideological conversion. The reform sharply changed the public expression of religious identity: parents replaced religious names with secular Albanian names, and some cohorts—particularly Muslim-background men exposed at young ages—also changed their marriage patterns. Individuals born after the reform further report weaker religious upbringing. Yet these changes were uneven across religious communities and local social environments, and they were not accompanied by comparable changes in religious beliefs or identification, nationalism, socialism, or democratic values. More than two decades of state-enforced atheism therefore reshaped how religious identity was expressed and, for some groups, how it shaped family formation, far more than it reshaped subsequently reported beliefs and values.

Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the economics of religion, which studies how religious beliefs, institutions, and practices shape economic behavior and social outcomes (Iannaccone, 1998). Religious norms and values can be highly persistent once established, in part because families and communities transmit them across generations. A large literature documents the relationship between religiosity and education (Sakalli, 2019; S. O. Becker et al., 2024), fertility (McQuillan et al., 2014), and labor market participation (Berman, 2000; Carvalho, 2012; Andersen & Bentzen, 2022). Because organized religion can coordinate beliefs and collective action, Communist regimes often treated it as a political rival and promoted atheism and secularization across Europe and Asia (Barro & McCleary, 2005). This literature distinguishes religiosity as belief from religiosity as belonging. The first includes measures such as belief in God or the afterlife; the second includes participation in religious services, clothing, and other public markers of religious affiliation (Iyer, 2016). We contribute by studying an extreme case of state-led atheism and asking whether it changed the intergenerational transmission of religion or primarily its public expression. By combining administrative data on names and marriage with survey measures of belief and values, we distinguish changes in religious belonging from changes in subsequently reported belief under state pressure.

Second, we contribute to the literature on nation-building and the role of political leaders in coordinating beliefs and shaping collective identities (Acemoglu & Jackson, 2014; Giuliano et al., 2022). Our paper relates to studies of large-scale cultural engineering through language reforms, naming policies, and other symbolic state interventions (Assouad, 2025; Fouka, 2019; Clots-Figueras & Masella, 2013; Murphy & Telhaj, n.d.). In Turkey, Kemalist reforms promoted secularization and the adoption of "pure Turkish" names as part of a broader project of modernization and nation-building (Assouad, 2025; Sakalli, 2019). Albania's 1967 reform went further

by prohibiting religious expression altogether. It therefore offers an unusually stark setting in which to study whether coercive secularization reshapes values or primarily induces behavioral compliance, and to identify the social conditions that limit compliance. The paper closest to ours is Murphy & Telhaj (n.d.), who study the same religion ban and show that the Cultural Revolution changed norms surrounding women's education and labor market participation in Communist Albania. We complement their analysis by examining religious identity directly. We show how the ban affected naming, marriage, and religious socialization, and we test whether these behavioral changes were accompanied by changes in religious and political values.

Third, we contribute to the literature that uses names as measurable markers of identity. Names encode parental preferences, group attachment, and the transmission of identity across generations (Lieberson, 2000; Mateos, 2014; Jurajda & Kovač, 2020). Scholars have used their informational content to study cultural assimilation and identity along several dimensions, including race and ethnicity (Abramitzky et al., 2016; Fouka, 2019; Algan et al., 2021), individualism (Bazzi et al., 2020), and nationalism (Jurajda & Kovač, 2020). More recently, first names have also been used as measures of religious belonging and as proxies for the transmission of religious values. For example, Andersen & Bentzen (2022) find that individuals with religious first names are less likely to become engineers, doctors, or scientists, or to pursue advanced education. We extend this literature by studying names not only as a marker of identity, but also as an outcome of state policy. The nationwide introduction of Albania's secularization campaign allows us to measure how coercion changed parental naming choices and to identify the communities in which compliance was stronger or weaker. We further link changes in names to marriage and survey measures of belief, allowing us to assess whether a state-induced change in this symbolic identity marker was accompanied by broader changes in family behavior and religiosity. In doing so, we show how minority status, literacy, and local social context shape the depth of compliance with state-imposed secularization.

Fourth, we contribute to the literature on cultural change and identity formation. Economics has formalized two main channels through which culture evolves. At the micro level, preferences and identities are transmitted across generations in response to socioeconomic incentives and social interactions (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Bisin & Verdier, 2000; Bisin & Topa, 2003). At the macro level, beliefs evolve in response to environmental, historical, and institutional forces (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2021; Fernández, 2025). A growing body of work documents cultural change following agricultural, technological, and historical shocks that reshape occupational structures and gender roles (Giuliano & Nunn, 2020; A. Becker, 2024; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Gay, 2023). Other work shows how media exposure and information diffusion can generate new beliefs and norms (Ferrara et al., 2012; Jensen & Oster, 2009; Bursztyn et al., 2020). Policy interventions can also redefine socially acceptable behavior and norms, including attitudes toward family, gender roles, and inclusion (Dahl et al., 2014; Kotsadam & Finseraas, 2011; Farré et al., 2023; Aksoy et al., 2020), as well as the functioning and legitimacy of institutions (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2025; Bisin & Topa, 2003). This literature has largely examined cultural change occurring through gradual shifts in economic conditions, information, and social norms. Our paper instead studies an abrupt and coercive attempt to change identity. Albania's Cultural Revolution allows us to distinguish changes in observable identity markers and family behavior—names and marriage—from changes in subsequently reported beliefs and values. We therefore provide evidence on both the extent and the determinants of cultural change under state coercion.

Taken together, our paper provides new evidence on the limits of coercive nation-building. A nationwide campaign can rapidly reshape visible markers of identity and some family choices, but these changes need not translate into a broad transformation of religious beliefs or political values.

Our paper continues as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional features of the Communist regime and the Cultural Revolution; section 3 provides detailed information on the data sources, name-classification algorithm, and outcomes; section 4 details the empirical strategy; while sections 5 and 6 provide the main results and explores the determinants of compliance. In section 7 we conduct our robustness checks, and finally section 8 concludes.

2 Historical background

2.1 Communism in Albania: The Rise to Power

Communist Albania "materialized not from the spark of old arguments over class struggle but in the shadow of war" (Mëhilli, 2017; p. 17). Albania was the only country in interwar Eastern Europe without a Communist party of its own, and the small Communist movement remained largely fragmented and in exile during the 1920s and 1930s (Mëhilli, 2017; pp. 17–18). It was only following the Italian occupation in 1939 that the Communist Party of Albania emerged, with Enver Hoxha among its founding members (Mëhilli, 2017). Organized around the National Liberation Movement, the Communist-led partisans consolidated power during the war, and by the German withdrawal in November 1944 Hoxha's rule was effectively established (Mëhilli, 2017; pp. 20–21).

The December 1945 elections, contested almost entirely by candidates of the Communist-dominated Democratic Front, formalized this new political order. Notably, Albania's religious leaders urged their followers to support the Front, a striking detail given the regime's subsequent assault on religion (Mëhilli, 2017; p. 21). The Communists inherited an overwhelmingly rural and poor country, with estimated illiteracy above 80%, and a majority-Muslim population alongside substantial Orthodox and Catholic minorities (Mëhilli, 2017; p. 6). At the same time, dependence on external support, first from former Yugoslavia and, after 1948, from the former Soviet Union, reinforced the leadership's sense of vulnerability (Mëhilli, 2017; pp. 5–6). Concerns over insecurity, isolation, and ideological purity would subsequently shape domestic policy, including the regime's attack on religion.

2.2 Religion in Albania Before Communism

What religious landscape did the Communist party inherit? Albania's religious geography reflected centuries of political and religious change. Christianity's historical division between Rome and Constantinople produced a predominantly Catholic north and Orthodox south, while Islam became the majority religion following the Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth century (Llukani, 2014). These historical processes produced a remarkably persistent regional pattern, Catholic in the north, Orthodox in the south, and Muslim predominantly in central and eastern Albania, that remained visible in twentieth-century population data and underlies the district-level variation exploited in our analysis (see figures 1b and 2b).

An important historical precedent for our study is the practice of crypto-Christianity (*kriptokristianizëm*) under Ottoman rule. In areas such as Shpat near Elbasan, some communities publicly adopted Muslim identities and names while privately maintaining Christian beliefs, practices, and Christian names. Contemporary accounts describe individuals known, for example, as "Sulejman" in Muslim settings and "Kostandin" within Christian ones (Llukani, 2014; p. 48). This history illustrates that Albanian households had long experience separating publicly observable markers of religious identity from private religious conviction, providing a useful historical parallel to household responses to the communist suppression of religion after 1967.

Pre-communist censuses nevertheless show considerable persistence in Albania's aggregate religious composition. The 1922 census reported approximately 74% Muslim, 18% Orthodox, and 8% Catholic, while the 1942 census recorded a similar distribution (Llukani, 2014; pp. 342–345). Post-Communism measures based on self-identification are substantially more contested. Most notably, the 2011 census reported only 6.75% Orthodox, a figure strongly disputed by the Orthodox Church (Llukani, 2014; p. 344). This uncertainty provides an additional motivation for our empirical strategy, which relies on pre-1967 data and religiously distinctive names rather than post-transition self-reported religious affiliation.

2.3 Rationale Behind the Attack on Religion

The Communist attack on religion did not begin in 1967. From the early years of the regime, religious communities were progressively deprived of their economic resources, educational role, and institutional autonomy. The 1945 Agrarian Reform Law stripped them of much of their land and revenue-generating property, while Decree-Law No. 253 of May 1946 limited their landholdings to 10 hectares. Religious education was progressively eliminated, and religious seminaries were closed in 1946. Pressure intensified during the 1960s through harassment of clergy, interference with religious ceremonies, and the appropriation of religious buildings. By January 1967, for example, the Orthodox Church had been reduced from roughly 600 registered churches and eight monasteries to only five functioning churches, while its clerical staff had fallen from 194 to 10 (Central State Archive, Autocephalous Orthodox Church file, No. 1367, 1967). Thus, the years preceding 1967 were characterised by a gradual weakening of organised religion rather than genuine tolerance.

The decisive break came with Albania's Cultural and Ideological Revolution of 1966–1967. Inspired by China's Cultural Revolution, the campaign sought to eliminate institutions and practices regarded as incompatible with communist ideology. In his speech of February 6, 1967, "The Further Revolutionising of the Party and State Power," Enver Hoxha called for an intensified struggle against religion. Within months, places of worship were closed, destroyed, or repurposed, clergy were persecuted, and religious property was transferred to the state or agricultural cooperatives. An official report of August 1967 recorded 2,169 affected places of worship, including 740 mosques, 609 Orthodox churches, 158 Catholic churches, and 530 tekkes (CITE).

The regime's objective, however, extended beyond dismantling religious institutions. Hoxha's contemporaneous diary makes explicit that the campaign sought to transform private beliefs and practices as well as public religious life. In April 1967, he described the policy as a "struggle against religion and backward customs," while insisting that it should rely on "political, ideological and persuasive work" rather than administrative measures (Hoxha, 1990). By September, after noting that churches and mosques in Shkodër were being converted into sports halls and exhibition spaces, Hoxha argued that sustained ideological work was necessary to "eradicate religious beliefs and practices from their roots." Significantly, he warned that clergy and committed believers might respond through a form of "silent resistance" (Hoxha, 1990; p.242). The regime therefore recognised a fundamental distinction between observable religious behaviour, which could be directly suppressed, and private conviction, which was considerably harder to control.

This distinction helps explain why the campaign increasingly targeted the everyday symbols and practices through which religious identity could be maintained and transmitted across generations. Personal names were one such marker. Religious names remained publicly observable links to family and religious tradition even when churches, mosques, clergy, and religious education had disappeared. The attempt to replace them with secular and "pure" Albanian names therefore formed part of the broader effort to sever the intergenerational transmission of religious identity and replace it with a unified secular and nationalist conception of "Albanism." Although efforts to promote Albanian names had begun earlier, the campaign intensified after 1967. The government promoted official lists of ideologically acceptable names, and in 1975 a decree required citizens whose names were considered inconsistent with the state's political, ideological, and moral standards to change them. A state-appointed group of linguists subsequently institutionalised this policy through the publication of an official dictionary of Albanian names (Kostallari, 1982).

2.4 The Cultural Revolution

The attack on religion formed part of a broader effort to reshape Albanian social and cultural life. The regime sought not only to dismantle religious institutions but also to replace the rituals and practices through which religion remained embedded in everyday life. A Central Committee directive of May 1967 promoted socialist

holidays in place of religious celebrations and introduced secular alternatives for weddings, funerals, and other family rituals (CITE). Yet internal Party assessments acknowledged that religious practices persisted in adapted forms: households disguised saint's-day celebrations as birthdays, religious expressions survived in everyday speech, and families sometimes circumvented restrictions on religious names. Such evidence indicates that the regime itself recognised the distinction between outward compliance and the persistence of religious identity within the household.

The campaign was progressively institutionalized in law. Albania proclaimed itself an atheist state in 1967, while subsequent measures further restricted religious practices and other forms of behavior considered incompatible with "socialist morality". These principles were later codified in the Constitution, which recognized no religion and committed the state to promoting scientific atheism, while religious practice was formally prohibited. Despite this extensive repression, religious life did not disappear completely. Religious ceremonies continued privately at home, and some clergy secretly performed baptisms and other rites. This persistence provides an important historical counterpart to our empirical finding that private religious belief proved considerably more resistant to state intervention than observable religious behavior (CITE).

2.5 Differences between Muslims and Christians

Although the campaign formally targeted all religions, Albania's religious communities differed substantially in their historical and institutional organization. Catholic and Orthodox communities maintained external ecclesiastical ties to Rome and to Constantinople and Greece, respectively, whereas Sunni Islam and Bektashism were organised more extensively through domestic institutions. The physical organisation of religious life also differed: Bektashism, for example, was concentrated around tekkes, while Christian religious organisation relied more heavily on networks of churches, parishes, and clergy. These differences potentially shaped both exposure to the regime's attack and the capacity of religious communities to preserve their identities after formal religious institutions were dismantled (CITE).

Our empirical analysis therefore examines not only whether the naming campaign affected Muslim and Christian families differently, but also whether responses depended on the local religious environment. This distinction is important because religious identity may become particularly salient when a household belongs to a local minority. As we show below, resistance to the naming campaign was stronger among religious minorities: Christian families living in predominantly Muslim areas were more likely to preserve Christian names, while Muslim families displayed analogous but smaller resistance in predominantly Christian areas. The interaction between religious affiliation and local minority status therefore provides a way to distinguish general responses to state secularization from the role of religion as a marker of group identity.

3 Data and Outcomes

3.1 Data Sources

3.1.1 Administrative Data

Names and family structure. We use the 2008 Civil Registry, digitalized and generated for the first time by the Albanian National Statistics Office (INSTAT, n.d.)[4]. The data offers population-wide demographic information including names, surnames, birth date and birth location, and family structure, including parents, grandparents,

[4]In the same year the database was burned onto CDs and USB sticks and was widely distributed (Xhaferaj et al., 2022). People could access records of nearly four million citizens and residents of Albania. To this day, there are still websites that allow users to download the database, and Youtube tutorials that help people with the download and navigation. To protect individual anonymity, we do not disclose any personal information and all results are aggregated to a higher level.

civil status, and household identifier. Using this data, we estimate the 1967 reform's effect on naming practices and marital sorting.

1945 Population Census. We use the last pre-Communism Population Census generated by the General Archival Directorate in Albania (DPA, 1945). This Census was the last to record religiosity, literacy rates, and other population characteristics with detailed location indicators. The Communist party thereafter changed the way the state recorded the Census in various ways. It stopped recording religious breakdown, and instead focused on measures that reported the industrialization, urbanization, and education of the population. Additionally, it also stopped providing the data on the district level, and instead aggregated the numbers to the regional level. Table A.1 summarizes illiteracy and religion on the national level and table A.2 breaks this information down by district.

3.1.2 Complementary Data

We complement our naming analysis using various district-level data sources described below.

List of preserved religious buildings. Under communism, religious structures held no protected status as *places of worship*. Thus, soon after Hoxha declared his anti-religion campaign February 1967, he called for the destruction, closure, or de-sanctification of all religious buildings throughout the country. Of the 2,169 religious buildings, 216 survived the demolition because they had been *classified as monuments of historical, scientific, or artistic value*, and thereby were brought under state protection. The legal foundation for this protection was Decree No. 586 of 17 March 1948, under which designated monuments entered special protection lists. Authority to compile and approve these lists rested first with the Institute of Sciences and passed, by Council of Ministers Decision No. 130 of 9 April 1955, to the State University of Tirana, which issued successive proclamations—among them Decision No. 6 of 15 January 1963, "On the Proclamation of Cultural Monuments." (Kahreman and Duma 1963). We identify preserved religious buildings as the mosques, churches, monasteries, tekkes, and other sacred structures listed in these protection decrees. Because designation as a cultural monument was the principal lawful mechanism by which a religious building could be spared, these lists offer a near-complete enumeration of the religious structures the state chose to preserve. Table A.3 shows the number of Christian and Muslim buildings preserved by each district.

Albanian Lapidar Survey. A lapidar is a form of commemorative monument, characteristic of Communist Albania, that is typically a stele or marker of concrete or carved stone bearing an inscription and a five-pointed star (see figure A.1 for an example). The overwhelming majority of these monuments commemorate the National Anti-Fascist Liberation War: fallen partisans, specific battles, and military units. Most were planned, built, or restored during the Cultural and Ideological Revolution of the 1960s–1980s, when their erection formed an integral part of state ideology. We use the Albanian Lapidar Survey (The Department of Eagles, 2015), a cross-country survey of all 659 monument locations. For each site, surveyors recorded geographic coordinates and elevation using a handheld GPS unit, along with the monument's type, construction material, accessibility, physical condition, and evidence of repainting, graffiti, destruction, or repurposing; every location was also photographed. From this catalogue, we digitize, for each of the 659 lapidare, the geographic coordinates and elevation, place name, full inscription text, and any supplementary archival notes. Table A.3 shows the concentration of monuments by district.

Beliefs. We use multiple waves from the Integrated Values Survey (henceforth IVS), which combines the European and World Values Survey (Gedeshi et al., 2021; Haerpfer et al., 2021)). This survey contains multiple questions on religiosity and attitudes towards nationalism, socialism, and democracy. We subset the data to individuals born in Albania during 1957–1977 and pick measures that are relevant to the Cultural Revolution. For each category on religiosity, nationalism, socialism, and democratic views, we create summary indices. We

discuss this in more detail in section 4.3.

List of religious and pure Albanian names. To classify the names from the Civil Registry, we use a benchmark of commonly used names in Albania whose origin we know to be pure Albanian, Christian, or Muslim. For pure Albanian names, we use the state-promoted list of 3000 names (Kostallari, 1982) that are considered of Albanian origin because they : (i) are connected to pre-Roman, Illyrian roots (i.e. royalty: Ilir, Teuta, Gent, Agron; or tribes: Enkel, Dardan, Arbër etc), or (ii) reflect virtues, values, or nature (such as Eagle, Flag, Butterfly, Happiness, Trust, Golden, etc). For religious names, we rely on online sources – for Muslim (XhamiaMbret.com 2023), Catholic (Emramodern, 2026), and Orthodox (ForumiShqiptar, 2025) – cross-validated with the authors' own knowledge of the Albanian setting. Since all religions in Albania were introduced through foreign rule, religious names reflect the origin of the empire or influence that brought each religion: Muslim names are of Turkish or Arabic origin and appeared during Ottoman rule, Catholic names are of Italian origin and reflect medieval Venetian and Italian ecclesiastical influence in northern Albania, and Orthodox Christian names are of Greek origin[5], introduced through the Byzantine Empire.[6]. Due to the large overlap, Catholic and Orthodox names are both classified as Christian. Together with the Albanian names above, this forms a benchmark of roughly 4,000 names with known origin, which we call *gazette names* and use to classify the names appearing in the Civil Registry.

3.2 Classification of Names

We develop a novel classification algorithm that assigns names in the Civil Registry to one of six categories: Christian, Muslim, Albanian, Western, Ideological, or Unidentified. Previous studies have classified names as religious when they are shared with major religious figures, such as saints (Andersen & Bentzen, 2022); as Muslim when they follow Arabic naming patterns (Algan et al., 2021; Sakalli, 2019); and as nationalist when they are associated with national war heroes (Jurajda & Kovač, 2020). The Albanian setting allows us to build on these approaches in two ways. First, Albania's main religious traditions draw on distinct linguistic origins—Ottoman-Arabic for Muslim names, Italian and Latin for Catholic names, and Greek for Orthodox names—making name origin an informative marker of religious background. Second, the government's official list of "pure Albanian" names allows us to measure the adoption of the secular nationalist names promoted by the state.

Our aim is to classify more than 50,000 distinct first-name strings in the Civil Registry using a benchmark list of approximately 4,000 names with known origin, which we refer to as *gazette names*. We first standardize all gazette names to account for spaces, punctuation, diacritics, repeated letters, and common spelling variations.[7] This procedure reduces the number of unique gazette names, as shown in Table 1. We clean names in the Civil Registry using the same procedure.

Religion/Group	Frequency of names	Frequency of names after cleaning
Albanian	2372	1689
Christian	1022	967
Muslim	1629	1134

Table 1: Frequency of names with a known origin (gazette names)

Our classification proceeds in four steps. Names that remain unmatched after these steps are assigned to the

[5]It is worth noting that some Greek names, like Odhise (Odysseus), Afërdita (Aphordites), Andromaqi (Andromache) among others, are mythological names unrelated to the Christian Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, within Albania, these names reflect cultural affiliation to the Orthodox community. It is highly unlikely that Greek names with mythological origins would be used by any other community in Albania.

[6]Some names appear both in pure Albanian and Muslim, Catholic, or Orthodox. We deal with overlaps using the following logic: if a name appears in the list of pure Albanian names, it is automatically considered pure Albanian since these names were promoted by the government. If a name overlaps across religions (Muslim vs Catholic/Orthodox), then this name is removed from the list of names with known origin.

[7]For example, we harmonize $y \to u$, $z \to s$, $xh \to x$, ë $\to e$, and ç $\to c$.

residual Unidentified category[8].

Step 1: Exact matching. We match cleaned Civil Registry names to cleaned gazette names on a one-to-one basis.

Step 2: Pattern-based matching. For names that do not match the gazette exactly, we identify group-specific linguistic patterns for Muslim, Christian, and Albanian names:

- *Muslim naming patterns.* Following Sakalli (2019), we identify Arabic, Turkish, and Ottoman patterns, including variants of Muhammad; names beginning with *Abd-* or *Nur-*; and names ending in *-allah*, *-ullah*, *-din*, or *-eddin*. We adapt these patterns to Albanian spelling conventions.

- *Christian naming patterns.* We identify roots of common Catholic and Orthodox names used in Albania and test whether these roots appear within the name. Examples include *Ang-* (e.g., *Angela*, *Angelina*, *Angjelina*, and *Anxhela*[9]), *Aleks-* (e.g., *Aleksander* and *Aleksina*), *Dhim-*, *Gjergj-*, *Liza-*, *Pal-*, *Theo-*, *Stef-*, and *Vasil-*.

- *Albanian naming patterns.* We identify roots of common Albanian names, including *Bes-* (trust), *Dhur-* (gift), *Shqip-* (the Albanian word for Albanian), and *Mir-* (good).

Step 3: Phonetic matching. For names that remain unmatched, we use the *metaphone* function from the R package *phonics* to construct a phonetic code for each name. This step captures names with similar pronunciation but different spellings. For example, *Themo*, *Thimi*, *Thoma*, and *Thimio*—all variants of the root *Theo-*—share the phonetic code 0M. Phonetic matching therefore allows us to identify related names while abstracting from differences in vowels and spelling.

Step 4: Western and Ideological priority rules. We identify Western names data-drivenly as frequent names among the 1967–1987 birth cohorts whose phonetic code does not appear in the gazette. These are international names, typically of French, Italian, or Spanish literary origin, that are neither religious nor traditionally Albanian. We identify 44 such names, including *Brunilda*, *Esmeralda*, *Elvis*, and *Edmond*. Ideological names form a curated set of names associated with Communism, the Soviet Union, and the National Liberation War, including *Vladimir*, *Sovjetik*, *Partizan*, and *Marenglen*, a contraction of Marx–Engels–Lenin. These priority rules override the previous classification, with the Ideological label applied last. Table A.4 lists all Western and Ideological names in our sample.

Unidentified names. Names that remain unmatched after the preceding steps are categorized as Unidentified. This category may include names from any underlying group that the algorithm cannot classify, most often because of unconventional spelling or combinations of two names that are not captured by exact, pattern-based, or phonetic matching. We retain Unidentified names as a separate category and test whether the 1967 reform affected parents' propensity to choose such names under state pressure.

Validation. We validate the classification methodology by testing how accurately it classifies names whose origins are already known. We assess the performance of the pattern-based and phonetic-matching stages, since exact matching assigns the category recorded in the gazette by construction. We split the gazette names into *training* (80%) and *test* (20%) sets. In this exercise, the algorithm classifies 43.8% of names and achieves 75.8% accuracy among the names it classifies. Pattern-based matching is especially accurate for Muslim and Christian names, while phonetic matching performs better for Albanian and Muslim names. The algorithm is therefore deliberately selective: it leaves many names unclassified rather than assigning a category with low confidence. As a robustness check, Section 5.1.1 replicates the main analysis using only names that match the gazette exactly. Section A.4 provides further details on the validation exercise.


[8]For a more detailed explanation of the classification algorithm, refer to section **??**.
[9]The Albanian letter combination *xh* is pronounced similarly to *dj*.

3.3 Do Names Reflect Religiosity?

There is broad consensus in the literature that first names carry informational content about ethnicity, race, religion, and other traits such as individualism and nationalism. We show that our classification algorithm — which differs methodologically from previous studies — produces name-based religiosity measures that correlate closely with actual reported religiosity. Using the 1945 Population Census, we generate the share of reported Christians and Muslims at the district level. Because Albania still had full religious freedom in 1945, and because religious names accounted for more than 60% of all newborns that year (figure 4), the 1945 Census should offer an accurate picture of the country's religious geography just before the arrival of Communism, unaffected by the naming restrictions introduced two decades later.

We first show that the district-level religious breakdown recorded in the 1945 Census closely mirrors the district-level share of religious names, as shown in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1a shows that Christian names were significantly more common in districts that reported a high Christian population share in the 1945 Census (figure 1b). The geographic pattern matches Albania's religious history, with Roman Catholic influence concentrated in the north and Orthodox Greek influence concentrated in the south. Conversely, figure 2 shows the mirror-image pattern for Muslim names and reported Muslim population: a concentration in central and eastern Albania, consistent with the historical geography of Ottoman expansion and the Via Egnatia, the ancient route connecting Albania's Adriatic coast to the Ottoman heartland through central Albania and Macedonia (Fischer and Schmitt, 2022).


One notable pattern emerges from these maps. Even in districts where Christians (or Muslims) form a majority of the reported population, the share of Christian (or Muslim) names is consistently lower than the reported population share. This tells us two things. First, not every Christian (or Muslim) parent chose an identifiably Christian (or Muslim) name, some names are religiously ambiguous or shared across groups. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, districts with only a small reported Christian (or Muslim) population essentially never show high rates of Christian (or Muslim) naming. In other words, religious naming is not distributed randomly across districts; it systematically tracks the underlying religious character of the local population, even though it does not capture every individual household's religion perfectly.



(a) (b)

Figure 1: Share of Christians using name measure (a) vs their reported religion (b) on the district level

To test this relationship more formally, we look at how popular each name is in Christian-majority versus Muslim-majority districts, following an approach similar toAndersen & Bentzen (2022) and Fryer and Levitt (2004).



(a) (b)

Figure 2: Share of Muslims using name measure (a) vs their reported religion (b) on the district level

We construct a Religion Name Index (RNI) for each name, which captures whether that name is overrepresented among births in Muslim-majority districts relative to Christian-majority districts.

Before building the index, we first classify each district as Christian-majority or Muslim-majority. Rather than using the raw (unweighted) population share — simply whether more than 50% of a district's population is Christian or Muslim — we use a weighted share that compares each district's religious composition to the national average. This distinction matters because Albania's population was predominantly Muslim nationally in 1945. In most districts, Muslims outnumber Christians in absolute terms, even in districts where Christians make up a large share of the district population relative to the national average. An unweighted majority rule would misclassify these Christian-overrepresented districts as Muslim-majority purely because Albania as a whole was majority Muslim, masking real cross-district variation in religious composition. The weighted share corrects for this by constructing a variable not by comparing which group is larger within a district, but whether this group is more or less represented here than it is nationally.

Shkodër, a district in Northern Albania, illustrates why this distinction matters. Shkodër is a district in northern Albania historically associated with the Roman Catholic Church. Yet in the 1945 Census, only 42.6% of Shkodër's population was recorded as Christian (40% of which were Catholic; see tableA.2), against 57.3% Muslim — meaning Shkodër was Muslim-majority in raw population terms. However, because the national Christian share was only about 30% in 1945 (table A.1), Shkodër's 42.6% Christian share is still well above the national average: Christians are overrepresented in Shkodër relative to the rest of the country, even though they are a numerical minority within the district itself. Under an unweighted rule, Shkodër would be labeled Muslim-majority and this overrepresentation would be lost entirely. Under our weighted rule, Shkodër is correctly identified as a Christian-majority district — consistent with its historical role as a center of Albanian Catholicism. For this reason, we examine whether religious names are specifically concentrated in districts that are overrepresented relative to the national average. Specifically, we define the weighted share of Christians as follows:

$$\text{Wgt Share of Christians}_{d,1945} = \frac{\text{No. Christians}_{d,1945}}{\text{Population}_{d,1945}} * \frac{1}{\frac{\text{No. Christians}_{1945}}{\text{Population}_{1945}}} \tag{1}$$

where d represents district. We define a district as a Christian majority if the weighted share is greater than or equal to 1, or equivalently, if its Christian population is overrepresented:

$$\text{Christian-majority}_d = 1 \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{\text{No. Christians}_{d,1945}}{\text{Population}_{d,1945}} \geq \frac{\text{No. Christians}_{1945}}{\text{Population}_{1945}}$$

We use this definition to account for the disproportionate balance of Muslims and Christians in the country. We do the same for the Muslim population.

$$\text{Muslim-majority}_d = 1 \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{\text{No. Muslims}_{d,1945}}{\text{Population}_{d,1945}} \geq \frac{\text{No. Muslims}_{1945}}{\text{Population}_{1945}}$$

We then build the RNI for each name n:

$$\text{RNI}_\text{n} = \frac{\Pr(\text{name}_n \mid \text{Muslim-majority}_d)}{\Pr(\text{name}_n \mid \text{Muslim-majority}_d) + \Pr(\text{name}_n \mid \text{Christian-majority}_d)} \tag{2}$$

This index ranges from 0 to 100. A name used exclusively by parents in Muslim-majority districts scores 100; a name used exclusively by parents in Christian-majority districts scores 0; a name used equally often in both types of districts scores 50. More generally, an RNI of 60 means a child in a Muslim-majority district is 1.5 times as likely to receive that name as a child in a Christian-majority district.

The RNI exercise is designed to answer a specific question: does our name-based religion classifier correspond to an independent, policy-untouched measure of religiosity across districts? Our independent benchmark is the district-level religious composition recorded in the 1945 Census. We compare this benchmark to the average RNI of children born between 1940 and 1950 — a window chosen to give us a larger sample of births, while still falling within the period when religious freedom in Albania remained largely intact.

Table A.5 displays the average RNI per district alongisde the weighted Muslim share. The average RNI varies from 15.69 to 71, so it is never 0 nor 100. This is because each name's RNI is a *national* statistic, not a district one, and there are no districts in Albania that are 100% Muslim or 100% Christian. As a result, the average RNI reported in table A.5 does not tell us how Muslim or Christian that district itself is — it tells us the average, nationally-computed religiosity score of the names parents in that district actually chose. Take district Krume as an example. Even if Krume had a very high Muslim population share, its average RNI reflects how popular each of its newborns' names are across all of Albania, not merely within Krume itself. A district's average RNI can therefore only be as extreme as the national popularity of the names its parents happen to choose allows it to be.

3.4 Intergenerational Transmission of Names

First names are parental choices that can reflect values, preferences, and cultural attachment (Lieberson, 2000). We provide an additional validation of our name measure by examining intergenerational transmission: whether parents with Christian or Muslim names are more likely to give their children names from the same religious category. We focus on the father's name as the primary proxy for religious background in the subsequent analysis because Table 2 shows that the father's name category is a substantially stronger predictor of the child's name category than the mother's.

Table 2 reports linear probability models for children born before the 1967 reform. Having a Christian-named father is associated with a 35.8 percentage-point increase in the probability that a child receives a Christian name, compared with 12.9 percentage points for having a Christian-named mother. District religious composition also predicts naming: a higher Christian share in the 1945 Population Census is associated with a 26.2 percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving a Christian name. A similar pattern holds for Muslim naming. Having a Muslim-named father is associated with a 19.0 percentage-point increase in the probability that a child receives a Muslim name, whereas having a Muslim-named mother is associated with a 5.5 percentage-point increase. A




Figure 3: Correlation between average RNI and 1945 Muslim share per district

higher Muslim share in the district in 1945 is associated with a 22.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving a Muslim name.

These results reveal two patterns. First, the father's name category is more strongly associated with the child's religious name category than the mother's for both Christian and Muslim families. Second, local religious composition also matters. For Christian naming, the association with the father's name category (35.8 percentage points) exceeds that with the district's Christian share (26.2 percentage points). For Muslim naming, by contrast, the association with the district's Muslim share (22.9 percentage points) is larger than that with the father's name category (19.0 percentage points). This pattern is consistent with Muslim naming being relatively more responsive to the surrounding religious environment, whereas Christian naming is more closely tied to paternal transmission within the family.

Figure A.2 maps father-child name-category pairs among children born before the reform. Among children with Muslim-named fathers, 43% received Muslim names, 30% received Albanian names, and 17% received Unidentified names. Among children with Christian-named fathers, 64% received Christian names, 20% received Unidentified names, and 12% received Albanian names. Thus, even before the 1967 reform, Muslim-named fathers were more likely than Christian-named fathers to give their children Albanian names, while Christian-named fathers were more likely to transmit their own religious name category. This pre-existing difference in naming behavior predates the reform and motivates our use of fathers' names as proxies for religious background in the marriage analysis.

4 Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy is motivated by figure 4, which plots the share of newborns receiving each name category over the Communist period, 1945–1990. The figure reveals substantial changes in naming before the 1967 reform. Secular Albanian names became increasingly common, rising from approximately 20% of births in the late 1940s

Table 2: Intergenerational transmission of religion: father vs. mother for children born 1957–1966

	Child Christian (1)	Child Muslim (2)
Constant	0.299	0.158***
	(0.845)	(1.29)
Christian father	0.358***	
	(0.014)	
Christian mother	0.129***	
	(0.007)	
Christian share 1945	0.262***	
	(0.029)	
Birth year	-0.0001	-0.008***
	(0.0004)	(0.0007)
Muslim father		0.190***
		(0.013)
Muslim mother		0.055***
		(0.006)
Muslim share 1945		0.229***
		(0.048)
Observations	538,715	538,715
Adjusted R^2	0.225	0.089

Standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. Linear probability models; coefficients on parental indicators are directly comparable within a column. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

to almost 40% by 1967, while Muslim naming declined from almost 40% to less than 20%. By contrast, Christian naming remained remarkably stable, at approximately 20–25% of births, throughout the two decades before the reform. Unidentified names declined modestly before 1967, but became more common again during the 1970s and 1980s. Western names remained rare before the reform and grew more popular only in subsequent decades.[10]

Two features of these trends are central to our empirical design. First, although name shares were evolving before 1967, they followed smooth pre-reform trajectories; the sharp departures from these trajectories occur only after the Cultural Revolution. We show below that these pre-reform patterns can be modeled at the district level. Second, the reform was enacted nationwide and applied simultaneously to the entire population. There is therefore no untreated group of individuals or districts against which to benchmark its effect, ruling out a standard difference-in-differences design.

We address this challenge with two complementary strategies, each suited to the available outcome data. For naming (section 4.1) and marriage outcomes (section 4.2), we use a bunching-style counterfactual design, in the spirit of Chetty et al. (2011). For each district, quarter, and calendar month, we predict the outcome that would have occurred absent the reform by extrapolating its pre-reform trend. We then compare the observed post-reform outcome with this predicted counterfactual. Our main bunching measure captures the breadth of the response: the share of district–quarter–calendar-month cells in which the observed outcome exceeds its counterfactual prediction. We complement this measure with a continuous percent-deviation outcome that captures the depth of the response.

For beliefs and values (section 4.3), we instead estimate an individual-level birth-cohort specification that allows the relationship between an outcome and birth year to change after 1967. This approach is necessary because the IVS contains approximately 2,000 respondents, records birth year but not birth month, and identifies respondents' region rather than their district of birth.[11] We therefore cannot construct the district–quarter–

[10] Ideological names account for less than 1% of names overall. Figure A.3 presents their use over the 1945–1990 period.

[11] The survey identifies Albania's three broad regions, whereas the bunching design uses variation across 61 districts.

calendar-month cells required for the bunching analysis. Because individuals born in 1967 include some births before the February reform, the birth-year specification should be interpreted as an exposure measure based on birth year rather than an exact date-of-birth discontinuity.




Figure 4: Name frequency by category

4.1 Naming Choices

We use a bunching-style counterfactual design, inspired by (Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven and Waseem 2013; Saez 2010). Rather than comparing treated and untreated districts, we predict the naming distribution that each district would have followed absent the reform by extrapolating its own pre-reform trend. We then compare observed naming shares with these counterfactual predictions. To model the counterfactual distribution for each name category, we estimate a regression on district fixed effects, a district-specific linear trend, and calendar-month fixed effects to control for naming and birth seasonality, using only pre-reform data. While the reform was announced on February 7, 1967, figure 4 indicates that the change in the distribution of each name category was slow and gradual, with the largest changes occurring 2–3 years after the reform. Therefore, we do not use individual birth dates to study discontinuities in the distribution; instead, we bin births into yearly quarters and estimate the regressions on that cell level.

We define T as the number of months elapsed since the reform month, so that $T = 0$ corresponds to February 1967, negative values index pre-reform months, and positive values index post-reform months. Births are grouped into quarterly bins, and we let τ index the resulting quarterly bin, with τ_0 denoting the last pre-reform quarter (November 1966–January 1967). We collapse the data to district-by-quarter-by-calendar-month cells and let T_τ denote the cell-average value of T within bin τ. Our outcome $y^g_{d,\tau,m}$ is the share of newborns given a name in category $g \in G = \{\text{Albanian, Christian, Muslim, Western, Unidentified, Ideological}\}$, born in district d, quarterly bin τ, and calendar month m.

We model the counterfactual distribution of the share of names in each district-bin-month cell using only pre-reform observations, with clustered standard errors on the district level:

$$y^g_{d,\tau,m} = \alpha_d + \delta_d \times T_\tau + \eta_m + \epsilon_{d,\tau,m}, \quad \text{for } \tau \leq \tau_0 \tag{3}$$

The fitted coefficients from this pre-reform regression are evaluated at every τ, including quarters post-reform, giving the predicted counterfactual distribution:

$$\hat{y}^g_{d,\tau,m} = \hat{\alpha}_d + \hat{\delta}_d \times T_\tau + \hat{\eta}_m, \quad \forall \tau$$

Our identification relies on the assumption that, absent the Cultural Revolution, district-specific naming trends would have continued along the paths estimated from pre-reform data. This assumption would be violated if another event occurring around February 1967 differentially changed naming practices across districts. The district fixed effects, district-specific trends, and calendar-month fixed effects allow the counterfactual to account for persistent differences across districts, gradual changes in local naming practices, and seasonal variation in births and naming. Figure 5 provides visual support for the extrapolation: pre-reform naming shares closely follow the fitted district-specific trends, while systematic deviations emerge only after the reform. Appendix figure A.4 presents the corresponding evidence for Ideological, Western, and Unidentified names.

To trace the dynamics of the reform's effect, we estimate an event-study specification on the bunching outcome. We define $\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} = 100 \times \mathbb{1}\left(y^g_{d,\tau,m} > \hat{y}^g_{d,\tau,m}\right)$, an indicator equal to 100 if the actual share of category-g names in cell (d, τ, m) exceeds its extrapolated counterfactual, and to 0 otherwise.

$$\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} = 100 \times \mathbb{1}\left(y^g_{d,\tau,m} > \hat{y}^g_{d,\tau,m}\right)$$

We then estimate equation 4


$$\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T} \setminus \{\tau_0\}} \beta^g_\tau D_\tau + \varepsilon_{d,\tau,m}, \quad \tau \in \mathcal{T} \tag{4}$$

where $D_\tau = \mathbb{1}(\tau_q = \tau)$ is a dummy equal to one if the observation belongs to quarterly bin τ, and zero otherwise. As before, τ_0 denotes the last pre-reform quarter (November 1966–January 1967), which serves as the omitted base category, and $\mathcal{T}$ denotes the full set of quarters spanning birth years 1957–1977. β^g_τ is the coefficient of interest: it measures the percentage-point change, relative to the base quarter τ_0, in the share of district-month cells in quarter τ where the actual share of category-g names exceeds its counterfactual prediction. Because $\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}$ is constructed as an indicator, it captures the *breadth* of the reform's effect — how widespread excess adoption of a name category is across cells — rather than its magnitude. We complement this with the percent-deviation measure $\text{pctBunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}$, which captures the *depth* of the effect, i.e., how large the deviation from the counterfactual is in percentage terms relative to each category's pre-reform mean. We explain this in more detail in our robustness checks in section 5.


We focus on births from 1957 to 1977. This window provides sufficient pre-reform observations to estimate district-specific trends while limiting the influence of more distant social and policy changes. It also keeps the analysis focused on compliance with the 1967 campaign. Over longer horizons, state-promoted names may acquire independent cultural appeal and discouraged names may lose it; these later changes are part of the reform's broader cultural legacy, but they do not necessarily measure the immediate response to state pressure.

Naming within families. The estimates above capture the average change in naming across all parents. We next examine whether the response differed by parental religious background. We proxy a child's religious background using the father's name category, relying on the patrilineal transmission of religious affiliation in Albania and on the strong pre-reform association between fathers' and children's religious name categories.


This approach rests on three assumptions. First, fathers' name categories are strongly associated with the



(a) Christian names



(b) Muslim names



(c) Albanian names

Figure 5: Actual vs. extrapolated counterfactual, by name category. The counterfactual is estimated from a district-specific linear trend fit on pre-1967 data only and extrapolated forward. The vertical dashed line marks the reform date (February 1967).

religious name categories that they transmit to their children. Second, fathers' pre-reform name categories provide an informative proxy for their religious background. Third, the reform directly affected the names assigned to newborns, but not the names of their parents. These assumptions are supported by the data. Section 3.4 documents substantial intergenerational transmission of Christian and Muslim name categories, with transmission particularly strong among Christian fathers. Figures A.11 and A.12 further show that the composition of fathers and parental pairs among children born between 1957 and 1977 remains stable around the reform. This stability is consistent with the reform changing newborn naming choices rather than the composition of parents having children. Under these assumptions, we infer a child's religious background from the father's name category and estimate the bunching design separately by parental background.

We define our original outcome based on the father's and mother's name category. Let $g_f \in \{\text{Muslim},\ \text{Christian}\}$ and $g_m \in \{\text{Muslim},\ \text{Christian}\}$ represent the father's and mother's name category. We define the likelihood of a child having a name in category g with father g_f and mother g_m as

$$y^g_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_m)$$

This implies that the outcome is calculated for different sets of individuals. We repeat the steps described earlier, constructing the counterfactual distribution $\hat{y}^g_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_m)$, and switch from an event study to a pre- and post-framework like in equation 5.

$$\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_m) = \alpha_0 + \beta^g(g_f, g_m)\, \mathbb{1}\left(\tau > \tau_0\right) + \varepsilon_{d,\tau,m}, \quad \tau \in \mathcal{T} \tag{5}$$

4.2 Marriage: Extending the Bunching Estimator to Partner Choices

As a secondary outcome, we investigate the marriage choices of children born around the reform. We specifically focus on men's marriage choices, as they were more likely to have autonomy over their choices than women. Marriage choices are an interesting outcome because they show how much the anti-religion propaganda was internalized not just through public, cheap signals like naming, but through partner preferences. Although the government's objective was to eradicate religious differences, it never explicitly promoted interreligious marriages, although it intervened in the marital institution. The Family Code changed in the early 1960s, and, officially enacted in 1965, eradicated child marriages[12], bride ownership, marital ceremonies in religious institutions. While the family code was updated at the time, people still had autonomy over their marriage choices and we expect to see an internalization of the anti-religion campaign on this dimension too.

Considering that names after the reform were manipulated, we cannot infer a man's religion using his own name. We therefore define a man's religious background from his *father's name*, classifying men again into three categories: $g_f \in \{\text{Muslim},\ \text{Christian},\ \text{Albanian}\}$ (those whose fathers had secular Albanian names). We subsample to men who are married and live in the same household as their wife. The outcome is defined as the wife's religious background, where we again rely on her father's name: e $g_w \in \{\text{Christian, Muslim, Albanian}\}$. We define our outcome as the likelihood of a man with religious background g_f marrying a wife with religious background g_w as:

$$m_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_w)$$

and construct a similar bunching estimator, $\text{Marr.Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}$, as before,

$$\text{Marr.Bunch}_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_w) = 100 \times \mathbb{1}\left(m_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_m) > \hat{m}_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_m)\right)$$

[12]Legal age of marriage for men became 18 and for women 16. For more information, see section 2.X.

and then estimate a pre-and post-framework using equation 6

$$\text{Marr.Bunch}_{d,\tau,m}(g_f, g_w) = \alpha_0 + \beta(g_f, g_w)\,\mathbb{1}\left(\tau > \tau_0\right) + \varepsilon_{d,\tau,m}, \quad \tau \in \mathcal{T} \tag{6}$$

In figure A.5 we show that the extrapolated counterfactual distribution for marriage patterns is not as well-behaved as for names. Since marriages were not directly targeted nor regulated by the government, discontinuities in their distribution are less likely to appear. Rather, shifts in choices are expected to be gradual, driven by taste, religious integration, and a diffusion of social taboos against cross-religious marriages. Another issue is that we cannot assume that only the preferences of men born after February 1967 changed. While naming is an outcome that is only assigned at birth, preferences, norms, and beliefs also likely changed for people within their impressionable age, a threshold for which we cannot directly assume. Marriage choices reflect life-long learned preferences that may have been formed during infancy, childhood, pre-adolescence, or early adulthood.

We investigate the distribution of marriage choices of men born throughout the Communist era from 1945–1985. Figure 6 separates the patterns by men's religious background. The grey vertical lines show men born on February 1967 and the blue vertical lines show men born February 1949 (18 years old on the reform month). As expected, what we see is a gradual diffusion of marital preferences, no discontinuities in the distributions the same way we saw in the naming patterns. Over the 40-year period, Christian men were less likely to marry Christian wives, and more likely to marry Muslim- and Albanian-wives. Similarly, Muslim men became less likely to favor in-group marriages and more likely to marry wives with an Albanian background. It is difficult to pinpoint an exact cutoff from which we can tell that the slope of the distribution changes: for some it changes for those born 4-5 years before the reform, for some it does not change at all.


To tackle this issue, we show the results of the bunching estimator under three different cohorts of men and provide evidence in support of marriage choices formed differently for those born close to the reform than those who were already of legal marriage age at the reform. We use three cohort cutoffs: (i) men born after February 1967, (ii) men born after February 1949, who would have been of legal marriage age after the reform was introduced, and (iii) an arbitrary midpoint, men born after February 1959, who would have been 9 years old at the reform. For each cohort, we construct a separate bunching estimator, generating a counterfactual distribution until the quarter prior to February 1967, February 1959, February 1949 respectively, and use a 20-year window around each cutoff.

4.3 Beliefs: Individual-Level Regression on Survey Data


We test whether the post-1967 name changes correspond to a change in internal attitudes. We use the IVS to capture all the possible values and belief changes that could have potentially been affected by reform. The tricky part is to understand which values intended to replace religiosity. While the Albanian government promoted "pure Albanian" nationalist names, the ideological movement throughout Communism promoted socialist values[13]. Among the pure Albanian names, other names reflecting socialist values were also promoted, such as "Proletar", "Marenglen" (a combination of **Mar**x, **Eng**els, and **Len**in, the three most revolutionary figures of the socialist movement), "Partizan" etc. Therefore, while the list of names that were promoted mainly reflected nationalism, the ideological movement within the Communist regime promoted socialist values like collectivism over individualism, hard work, family, authority, and logic. We therefore investigate what values truly replaced religiosity and investigate measures like nationalism, market orientation, and democratic attitudes.

We first explore whether the ban on religion successfully reduced religiosity. While public displays of religiosity were not allowed, like attending religious services, going to church or the mosque, wearing religious

[13]The Communist party has a history of opposing, persecuting, and killing members of the Nationalist Front during the first years of its governance. We therefore may expect to see nationalist and ideological values as opposing rather than complementary balues.



(a) Muslim background



(b) Christian background

Figure 6: Marriage choices of men by birth year separated by their religious background

clothing, or displaying religious monuments inside the household, the government could not fully control intra-household beliefs. Therefore, any religious values that were transmitted were only via parental attitudes. To measure religiosity, we use the survey questions proposed by Inglehart & Norris (2025) and the indices created by Bentzen (2019), who proposes two summary measures that should capture the overall strength of religiosity: (i) *Strength of Intrinsic Religiosity Scale* (SIRS), a PCA of the measures "Religious person", "Comfort from religion", "Importance of God in life", "Believe in God", and "Believe in Afterlife"; and (ii) *Strength of Religiosity Scale* (SRS) which adds "Attend religious services" to the SIRS index. We look at all these measures individually, and also investigate whether people report being "Raised religiously".

Next, we investigate nationalist values. Our exploration of all the IVS questions lead us to believe that the following five measures are a good fit to capture positive nationalist values: "Proud of nationality", "Important to be born in this country", "Generalized trust", "Member of political party", and "Interest in politics".

The ideological changes during the Communist regime uplifted the socialist and communist ideals and

promoted the "socialist" persona. We therefore also investigate market orientation and democratic attitudes. For market orientation, we use: "Self position on the political scale", "Income equality", "Private vs state ownership", "Government responsibility", "Competition is good or bad". We recode these measures such that higher values indicate left orientation, and create a index of "Left orientation" as a PCA of all five measures. Finally, we explore the democratic attitudes using: "Political system: Having a democratic political system", "In democracy, the economic system runs badly", "Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling", "Democracies aren´t good at maintaining order", "Democracy may have problems but is better". We recode the variables such that higher values indicate stronger democratic values, and similarly create an index of "Democratic orientation".

We estimate equation 7 for years $t \in T = [1957; 1977]$. To control for the overall secularization of younger cohorts, we interact the Post1967 indicator with a linear year trend. The coefficient of interest, β, allows the slope to change after 1967[14]. Therefore, if secularization changed - or, accelerated - after 1967, we would see a significant coefficient. The same logic applies to all other values.

$$\begin{aligned} y_{i,w,r,g,s} = \alpha_1 \text{Post1967}_i + \alpha_2 \text{birth_year}_i + \beta \text{Post1967} \times \text{birth_year}_i \\ + \gamma_w + \delta_r + \eta_g + \kappa_s + \varepsilon_{i,w,r,g,s} \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where $y_{w,r,g,s}$ is one of the outcomes described above, $Post1967_i$ is an indicator of whether a respondent was born on or after 1967, $birth_year_i$ is a continuous variable capturing respondents' birth year, and γ_w, δ_r, η_g, κ_s are fixed effects for wave of survey, region, sex, and study type (WVS/EVS) for each individual i. Table A.6 shows the summary statistics for each of the measures we use for respondents born in Albania during 1957–1977.

5 Main Results

Our main results are summarized in figure 7. The figure shows that the share of both Christian and Muslim names dropped significantly after the reform, while the share of Albanian names rose sharply. Pre-reform coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero throughout (for the majority, for the full quarterly coefficients see table A.10), indicating that deviations from the extrapolated trend emerge only after the reform date — consistent with our identifying assumption that pre-1967 naming trends would otherwise have continued unchanged.

Two additional patterns stand out. First, the effect phases in gradually over a few years rather than jumping discretely at the reform date, consistent with social diffusion rather than immediate enforcement. Second, the decline in Christian names is consistently smaller than the decline in Muslim names — roughly half smaller ten years after the reform (-15.9pp vs. -29.4pp%, Table 3, column 1).

Table 3 decomposes the average treatment effect by the father's own name. Columns 2-4 restrict to households with a Christian father, further split by the mother's name; columns 5-7 do the same for Muslim fathers. Mixed-religious households (column 4 and 6) show the least compliance in religious and Albanian naming, potentially driven by fewer observations or higher pre-reform baseline. In table A.7 we report the same decomposition using percent estimates rather than percentage points. This table confirms that the main bunching estimates, reported in percentage points, do not mask any behavioral responses: both in percent and percentage point terms, Christian naming dropped by one-half less than Muslim naming, and that mixed-religious households complied less.

[14]Birth year is centered around 1966 such that it is 0 in 1966, 1 in 1967, -1 in 1965 and so on.




Figure 7: Bunching estimator under an event-study framework

Table 3: Treatment effect by parent religion

		Christian father			Muslim father		
	(1) All fathers	(2) All	(3) + Christian wife	(4) + Muslim wife	(5) All	(6) + Christian wife	(7) + Muslim wife
Christian names							
Post	-15.892***	-21.385***	-15.876***	-7.996***			
	(2.763)	(2.202)	(2.103)	(1.544)			
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	.	.	.
Muslim names							
Post	-29.375***				-29.734***	-10.604***	-24.412***
	(2.364)				(2.068)	(2.571)	(1.931)
Observations	15112	.	.	.	15112	15112	15112
Albanian names							
Post	30.875***	22.631***	19.074***	8.400***	26.326***	11.959***	23.025***
	(2.079)	(2.495)	(2.557)	(1.727)	(2.052)	(1.593)	(1.937)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. Estimates are percent deviations from each cell's extrapolated pre-1967 trend (two-step procedure). +Christian/Muslim wife denotes the mother's name-religion. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

5.1 Robustness of the Naming Design

In this subsection, we report the sensitivity of the outcome choice and bunching design to the naming results. At first, we test **other alternative outcomes** (section 6.1). We begin with the **percent bunching estimator**, which measures the percent deviation – or *magnitude* as we previously referred to it – instead of the standard indicator bunching outcome. Next, we construct our outcome using only **exact-matched names to rule out measurement error.** One concern could potentially be the false positives in our naming classification. Our

algorithm is high-precision (80%) but low-coverage, with a 46% coverage rate. Both on the precision and coverage, there could possibly be bias in the classification if the algorithm works better for one group over the other. Both tests confirm that our results uphold whether using percent deviation or exactly-matched names, suggesting that our preferred outcome performs well.

Second, we report the **placebo checks w.r.t. cutoff** (section 6.2). We test whether our results could plausibly arise from an arbitrary cutoff in the data than from the 1967 reform specifically. Following the logic of Dellavigna and La Ferrara (2010) and Grembi et al (), we re-estimate our benchmark specification using a series of placebo cutoffs drawn from the pre-February 1967 period. Our falsification checks confirm that using any other pre-reform cutoff leads to insignificant estimates.

Lastly, we test whether our results are driven by group-specific **fertility trends** (section 6.3). One limitation of our data is that it provides a snapshot of individuals and family units as of 2008 and does not track people over time. This may lead to unobserved attrition, migration, or mortality, that may potentially bias our results. Additionally, this data does not allow us to track siblings and families over time, implying that we cannot track fertility on the household level around the reform years. To address these issues, we construct two measures of fertility and show that the population dynamics, as seen via the Civil Registry, are stable within our sample and that sample selection does not appear to be an issue.

5.1.1 Sensitivity to the outcome

Percent bunching estimator. We measure the deviation of the real distribution from its' own counterfactual relative and scale it to each name-category's pre-reform mean. Let

$$\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} = \mathbb{1}\left(y^g_{d,\tau,m} > \hat{y}^g_{d,\tau,m}\right) \in \{0,1\} \tag{8}$$

denote the raw bunching indicator that we used in our main results, equal to one if the actual outcome in cell (d,τ,m) exceeds its extrapolated counterfactual, and zero otherwise. We define the pre-reform baseline bunching rate as

$$\overline{\text{Bunch}}^g = \mathbb{E}\left[\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} \,\middle|\, \tau < \tau_0\right], \tag{9}$$

the average share of pre-reform cells in which the actual outcome exceeds its counterfactual. Our normalized bunching estimator is then

$$\text{PctBunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} = 100 \times \frac{\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} - \overline{\text{Bunch}}^g}{\overline{\text{Bunch}}^g}. \tag{10}$$

$\text{PctBunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}$ expresses the deviation in the bunching indicator as a percent change relative to the pre-reform baseline rate at which category-g names exceeded their extrapolated counterfactual, complementing the percentage-point measure $\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} \times 100$ used elsewhere. Figure A.7 shows the new estimates using the percent bunching estimator. To our comfort, the results are strikingly similar - though larger in size - but display the same behavioral response. The ATE for Albanian names is 61.9%, Christian names -33%, and Muslim names -59.9%.

Exactly-matched names. Next we investigate whether our results are driven by errors in our name classification algorithm by using only names in the Civil Registry that were directly matched to our list of known names. This results in much fewer observations, a couple of thousand per year, but we know the names are 100% correctly assigned to a specific group. Figure A.8 shows that our main results are strikingly similar when using all classified names or only exactly-matched names. This is a comforting sanity check that our classification

algorithm does not categorize names sporadically.

5.1.2 Placebo cutoff test

We re-estimate our benchmark specification using a series of placebo cutoffs drawn from the pre-February 1967 period. For each placebo cutoff τ^p, we construct a placebo post-indicator $\mathbb{1}(T_{bin} \geq \tau^p)$ and estimate

$$\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m} = \alpha_0 + \beta^g_p \, \mathbb{1}(T_{bin} \geq \tau^p) + \varepsilon_{d,\tau,m}, \quad \tau < \tau_0 \tag{11}$$

restricting estimation to quarters strictly prior to the true reform quarter τ_0, excluding observations one year prior to the reform and one year before our sample window (February 1957) to avoid identification off small samples, leaving us with 8 years of quarter placebo cutoffs. This procedure yields a distribution of placebo estimates $\hat{\beta}^g_p$ against which we compare our true benchmark estimate $\hat{\beta}^g$.

For each name category, we present two complementary pieces of evidence. First, following Dellavigna and La Ferrara (2010), we plot the empirical cumulative distribution of the placebo estimates $\hat{\beta}^g_p$ relative to the true bunching estimator $\hat{\beta}^g$ within the distribution. Second, we plot each placebo estimate $\hat{\beta}^g_p$ with its 95% confidence interval across the placebo cutoff dates to visually the size and significance of the placebo estimates across the pre-reform dates. Figure 8 reports both the distribution of the placebo estimates (row 1) and the 95% confidence interval for each name category (row 2). All placebo estimates are significantly smaller in size w.r.t. the true bunching estimator, and very few placebo cutoffs produce statistically significant estimates. These results give us confidence that, our true estimates are unlikely to have risen from a spurious break unrelated to the 1967 reform.


5.1.3 Fertility

We rely on two measures of fertility: (i) total births, and (ii) total births from a Christian or Muslim father collapsed on the district-by-quarter-by-calendar month. To construct religion-specific fertility rates, we count all newborns in each district, quarter, and month who had a Christian and Muslim father. This is the best available proxy for religion-specific fertility using our data. For both measures, we apply the standard bunching estimator and estimate the bunching regression as in equation 4. Figure A.9 reports the bunching estimators for total fertility, Christian fertility, and Muslim fertility. Across our sample window, fertility seems to be stable – with visible seasonality – and does not appear to change in response to the reform. This rules out any doubt that our main results are driven by compositional effects.


5.2 The Determinants of Compliance

In this subsection, we investigate how the treatment effect differs using various measures on the district level. We examine two dimensions of compliance. First, district composition (prior secularization, minority status, and illiteracy) in section 5.2.1 describes the pre-existing characteristics of the population: how secular naming already was (using the five-year mean prior to the reform), the religious mix between Christians and Muslims in 1945, and the adult illiteracy rate in 1945. These demographic traits are drawn from the Civil Registry (prior secularization) and the Population Census from 1945 (for religious decomposition and illiteracy). We show that district composition matters a lot: Christian fathers in already-secularized district complied less, Muslim fathers complied more in highly illiterate districts, while both fathers complied less when living in a district that has a higher opposite-religion share.

Second, local institutional context (religious buildings, Communist monuments, prisons and labor camps) in section 5.2.2 describes the state infrastructure: which structures did the state choose to build or preserve in these districts, and in what frequency. The information on local structures are drawn from various sources




(a) CDF of placebo estimates against true estimate




(b) 95% CI for placebo estimates

(c) Christian names




(d) CDF of placebo estimates against true estimate




(e) 95% CI for placebo estimates

(f) Muslim names



(g) CDF of placebo estimates against true estimate



(h) 95% CI for placebo estimates

(i) Albanian names

Figure 8: Placebo cutoff tests

(Decree, Albanian Lapidar Survey, Kujto.al). We find no – slightly modest – effects of any infrastructure on local compliance.

We estimate equation 12 separately for each name category $g \in G = \{\text{Christian, Muslim, Albanian, Western, Ideological, Unidentified}\}$ and each father-religion sample $g_f \in \{\text{Christian, Muslim}\}$, where $\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}(g_f)$ is the bunching measure for category g and M_d is the district-level moderator of interest. The coefficient of interest, $\beta^g_M(g_f)$, captures how the reform's effect on category g for father group g_f varies with M_d, where the latter is transformed into deciles. We report the interaction terms $\beta^g_M(g_f)$ in figure 9 for all six mediators.

$$\text{Bunch}^g_{d,\tau,m}(g_f) = \alpha_0 + \mathbb{1}(\tau \geq \tau_0) + \beta^g_M(g_f)\,\mathbb{1}(\tau \geq \tau_0) \times M_d + \gamma_M\, M_d + \varepsilon_{d,\tau,m}, \quad \tau \in \mathcal{T} \tag{12}$$

5.2.1 District Composition

Prior secularization. We define prior secularization as the five-year pre-reform mean of the share of Albanian names in each district-quarter-month cell and transform the distribution across districts into deciles (see table A.11 for the summary statistics).

Table A.12 shows that in the least secularized districts, the reform produced a large and immediate substitution away from Christian and Muslim naming, with the response decreasing as prior secularization rises. In districts with no secularization, for Christian fathers (panel A), the share of Christian names fell by 30pp pp, while Albanian names rose by 35.2 pp. For Muslim fathers (panel B), the effect is quantitatively similar: a drop in 28pp for Muslim names and a rise of 29pp in Albanian names. However, the interaction terms confirm that the treatment effects along the prior secularization distribution were not uniform. Figure 9a, Panel A shows that the interaction coefficient $\beta^g_M(g_f)$ moves differently between Christian and Muslim fathers. Each decile of pre-reform secularization is associated with a 1.8pp smaller decrease in Christian naming (and 2.65 pp smaller increase in Albanian naming in table A.12) for Christian fathers and no effect for Muslim fathers, so that moving from the first to the tenth decile roughly halves the treatment effect for Christian fathers relative to Muslim fathers.

This attenuation can be explained for one of two reasons. The first is a mechanical ceiling effect: districts that had already secularized their naming practices before 1967 simply had less room to move, and the fact that even the most secularized district (44.4% Albanian names at baseline) shows no further adoption after the reform is consistent with convergence toward a common upper bound rather than continued compliance. The second is a behavioral response: residents of already-secularized districts may have faced weaker enforcement, either because local officials treated visible pre-existing secularization as a proxy for political reliability, or because a large share of already-Albanian names in the community made it easier for any individual family to blend in without changing their publicly-observed behavior. Because attenuation is detected only for Christian fathers – who were the local religious minority in most districts – and not for Muslim fathers, we read this as more consistent with a group-specific behavioral channel than with a purely mechanical ceiling that should, all else equal, operate similarly regardless of father's religion.

Minority status. In countries with religious, ethnic, or culture variation, institutionally-led culture changes tend to create tension and dynamics between communities (Fouka, 2019). We investigate this in the context of Albania, a Muslim-majority country, but with significant heterogeneity across districts. Using the 1945 Population Census, we create a measure of how Muslim- or Christian-intense a district was in 1945. Dividing the distribution into deciles, we examine how Christian and Muslim fathers, living in districts with a stronger presence of the opposite religion[15], complied with the naming policy.

Figure 9a, Panel B shows that the status of the religious minority moderates compliance for both Christian and

[15] I.e., how Christian fathers responded across the pre-reform Muslim distribution and how Muslim fathers responded across the pre-reform Christian distribution within the district.

Muslim fathers, with the retention of their own name weakening as fathers of a religion become a smaller share of the local population. The results are detailed in table A.13. For Christian fathers (panel A), each decile increase in the pre-reform Muslim population share is associated with a 2.2 pp smaller decline in Christian naming and a 2.5 pp smaller increase in Albanian naming. Over the full decile range, this shrinks the decline in Christian naming from roughly 31 pp in the least Muslim districts to 11 pp in the most Muslim districts, and shrinks the rise in Albanian naming from roughly 34 pp to roughly 11 pp. Panel B shows a similar but smaller pattern for Muslim fathers. Each decile increase in the local Christian population share is associated with a 1.4 pp smaller decline in Muslim naming, a 1.5 pp smaller increase in Albanian naming. So both religious communities show broad resistance to the reform as their local minority status deepens.

This is a symmetric pattern between the two religious communities: being a minority intensifies identity preservation. Both results support a broader point that adopting Albanian names was not the only margin of resistance in religiously mixed districts, for either community. As Christian or Muslim families became more demographically exposed to the other religion, they held on to their own naming practices and resisted alternative name options more (a drop in Unidentified names for Christian fathers and a drop in Ideological names for Muslim fathers, see table A.13). Separating further by the mother's religion (table A.9) we see that the interaction effects are particularly larger for mixed-religious households when comparing to baseline. These results fit the broader literature on minority backlash to nation-building policies: compliance shrinks on identity markers when that identity feels personally and demographically under pressure.

Illiteracy. Illiteracy in 1945 was exceptionally high, with an average of 42% of adults within a district being illiterate (Table A.1). Figure 9a, Panel C shows that the reform's effect on own-name retention is essentially flat for Christian fathers across the illiteracy distribution, while for Muslim fathers it steepens substantially as illiteracy rises. Table A.14 shows that at the lowest illiteracy decile, Muslim naming falls by roughly 19 pp; at the highest decile, the estimated decline is roughly 38 pp – illiteracy roughly doubles the reform's effect on Muslim naming. For Muslim fathers, illiteracy also amplifies the corresponding rise in Albanian naming (a 1.5 pp larger increase per decile, significant at the 5% level). For Christian fathers, illiteracy does not move the own-name or Albanian-naming responses.

5.2.2 Local Institutional context

Preserved religious buildings. We now turn to the religious buildings that were not destroyed during the Cultural Revolution as a result of being classified as buildings with artistic, historical, and cultural value. The preserved religious buildings were de-sanctified and transformed into *Monuments of Culture* and used for cultural and governmental activities. While the transformation of these buildings into government property and may have conveyed the local commitment to the new, socialist person free of the "backwards customs" (Murphy & Telhaj, n.d.), the preservation of these places of prayer for some religious people – despite them being out of function – may have increased the local salience of religiosity. The expected relationship between the preserved religious buildings and compliance is unknown a priori.


We use the number of preserved Christian and Muslim buildings. Christian buildings include churches, monasteries, cave churches, and iconostasis; while Muslim buildings include mosques, tekkes, open-air prayer grounds (*namazgjahu*), minarets, bathhouses (*hamami*), Islamic schools, Ottoman clock towers, and bazaars (see figure A.6 for a graphical distribution across districts and table A.3 for numbers by district).

Figure 9b, Panel A shows a flat relationship between preserved religious buildings and own-name compliance for both father groups. (see table A.15 for full results). We therefore find no evidence that the survival of religious buildings moderated compliance with the reform for either community.

Number of Communist buildings. We now turn to the number of Communist monuments – *lapidare* – as


a measure of initial support for the Communist regime (see table A.3 for summary statistics). Figure 9b, Panel B shows that there is a slightly upward relationship between non-compliance and the number of lapidare per district; however, table A.16 confirms that none of the interaction coefficients are significant for either father group.

Taken together, our evidence suggests that Christian fathers dodged compliance in already-secularized districts and when their demographic threat (minority status) was higher. Muslim fathers' compliance stayed relatively flatter under both dimensions and was intensified by illiteracy. Combined with the average treatment effects reported in table 3, where the compliance in Christian naming is roughly half the size of that of Muslim naming, our evidence is suggestive of the fact that Christians were more likely to resist on the aggregate, and in districts where they could dodge compliance or where their identity was more at threat. On the other hand, local institutional context plays no role on compliance. Preserved religious buildings and Communist monuments show little to no significant differential effect on compliance for either group, despite both being informative predictors of a district's baseline, pre-reform level of secularization. Our evidence suggests that compliance with coercive cultural policy was shaped less by institutional "pressure" – of the kind that visible religious buildings or monuments might proxy for – than by each community's underlying demographic exposure and, for Muslim fathers specifically, a differential capacity to resist targeted pressure.



Notes: Each panel plots the estimated Post effect on own-religion naming (margins from Post x decile(moderator) interactions), by decile of the row's moderator, for Christian names by Christian fathers and Muslim names by Muslim fathers. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals; standard errors clustered by district. Dashed lines are linear fits across deciles. For minority status, the moderator is the opposite-religion population share: Muslim share (1945) for Christian fathers, Christian share(1945) for Muslim fathers.

(a) District Composition



Notes: Each panel plots the estimated Post effect on own-religion naming (margins from Post x decile(moderator) interactions), by decile of the row's moderator, for Christian names by Christian fathers and Muslim names by Muslim fathers. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals; standard errors clustered by district. Dashed lines are linear fits across deciles. Preserved religious buildings and communist monuments are each binned into deciles of their underlying raw district count.

(b) Local Institutional Context

Figure 9: Treatment effects along various moderators

6 Beyond Naming: Marriage patterns

Turning to marriages, in table 4 we report the bunching estimator using three different cohort cuttofs: those born after the reform (Panel A), those who turned 9 years old on February 1967 (Panel B), and those who tunred 18 years old on the reform date (Panel C).

Starting with Panel C, the effect on those that turned 18 when the reform was enacted. For men of Christian background we see no change in wife choices, while for men of Muslim background we see a weakly significant shift towards wives of Christian background. For these men, marriage preferences were likely stickier and already formed prior to the anti-religion campaign. However, wife choices begin changing for men who were of impressionable age at the reform, or born after. Across Panel A and B, we see that men of Christian background became more likely to marry a wife a secular background (by 7-7.8pp), and less likely to marry within their religion (-3.7pp in Panel B). For men of Muslim background, they become significantly more likely to marry wives of secular background (between 12.4-15.4pp), more likely to marry cross-religiously (by 4.8-7.5pp) and significantly less likely to favor in-group marriages (a drop by 7.6 to 9.4pp). The shift towards secular wives is consistently larger for Muslim men,

Table 4: Bunching estimator: wife's background, by husband's father's religion, across birth-year cutoffs

Wife's background:	Christian	Muslim	Albanian	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Christian background			Muslim background		
Panel A: Born after Feb 1967 (sample: 1957-1977)						
Post	-1.686	-1.600	7.037***	4.834**	-7.633***	12.456***
	(1.442)	(1.511)	(1.917)	(1.911)	(1.706)	(1.676)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Panel B: Born after Feb 1959, age 9 at reform (sample: 1949-1969)						
Post	-3.712**	3.429	7.892***	7.520***	-9.398***	15.338***
	(1.630)	(2.070)	(2.614)	(2.367)	(1.933)	(2.039)
Observations	15065	15065	15065	15065	15065	15065
Panel C: Born after Feb 1949, age 18 at campaign (sample: 1939-1959)						
Post	-0.065	-1.756	2.206	5.813*	-2.328	3.169
	(1.909)	(1.969)	(3.001)	(2.941)	(1.940)	(1.995)
Observations	14299	14299	14299	14299	14299	14299

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are percentage-point changes in the share of district-quarter cells where the actual outcome exceeds its extrapolated counterfactual, computed relative to a prediction window restricted to pre-cutoff cells specific to each panel. Each panel restricts the sample to +/- 10 years around its respective cutoff and estimates Post independently. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

7 Does Compliance Reflect Belief Change? Evidence from Values Surveys

Our last section of analysis investigates answers whether changes in public identity markers resulted in long-term changes in values and beliefs. Table **??** reports the results for public and private religiosity and for the two indices we created. We focus on the coefficients from the row "Born $\geq$ 1967 $\times$ Birth year". Across all measures of religiosity, we find only a decline in the probability of being raised religiosity by 0.044 pp. We find no other evidence of dropped religiosity, at least not strong enough to show in our data. This suggests that the IVS does correctly capture the fall of religious practices for those born after 1967, for which any religious practice was banned. While the ban was on the public practices, people were banned from having displays of religious icons in

their houses, and were consistently under pressure from the state and its' designated "spies" to practice religion even privately in their households. Our results suggest that the 1967 Cultural Revolution had no long-lasting effect on either the expression of religiosity or private held religious beliefs.

Table 5: Religiosity: public participation versus private belief

	Religious person†	Attend services†	Raised religiously‡	Comfort from religion‡	
Panel A: Public religiosity					
Born $\geq$ 1967	-0.066	-0.177	0.012	-0.010	
	(0.041)	(0.190)	(0.092)	(0.052)	
Birth year	0.005	-0.009	0.013	0.004	
	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.007)	
Born $\geq$ 1967 $\times$ Birth year	-0.006	0.004	-0.044***	-0.014	
	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.009)	
Min. value	1	1	0	0	
Max. value	3	8	1	1	
Obs.	2073	2158	474	1421	
	Importance of God†	Believe in God‡	Believe afterlife‡	SIRS†	SRS†
Panel B: Private belief					
Born $\geq$ 1967	-0.331	-0.003	-0.105**	-0.278	-0.355*
	(0.223)	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.202)	(0.213)
Birth year	0.051*	0.004	0.008	0.040	0.040
	(0.030)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Born $\geq$ 1967 $\times$ Birth year	-0.054	-0.003	-0.004	-0.040	-0.036
	(0.038)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Min. value	1	0	0	-4.7	-4.8
Max. value	10	1	1	1.8	2.3
Obs.	2127	2102	1709	1048	1044

Notes: Weighted by survey weights; NUTS2 region, sex, survey wave, and study type absorbed; robust standard errors in parentheses. Birth year is centered around 1966. † higher values imply stronger beliefs; ‡ 1 = Yes. SIRS (Strength of Internal Religiosity Scale): importance of God, religious person, comfort from religion, believe in God, believe in afterlife. SRS (Strength of Religiosity Scale): SIRS + attendance. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Across a broad set of non-religious value domains, we find little evidence that exposure to the 1967 reform reshaped individuals' broader ideological orientations. As shown in table 6, post-reform cohorts do not differ systematically from earlier cohorts in measures of national pride, attachment to birthplace, or generalized trust, suggesting that the suppression of religion did not translate into heightened nationalism or alternative collective identities. Similarly, attitudes toward redistribution, state ownership, government responsibility, competition, and overall left–right orientation remain unchanged, indicating no lasting impact on economic ideology or market orientation. Finally, support for democratic principles and evaluations of democratic performance show no robust cohort differences, with only a small decline in people reporting that democracies are decisive.

Taken together, the IVS evidence indicates that the reform's ideology were not internalized, at least in the long-run. Individuals exposed to the reform report being raised religiously less; however, this is not reflected by a drop in religious identification, participation, or beliefs. At the same time, we observe no corresponding shifts in nationalism, economic ideology, or democratic values. These findings suggest that the reform primarily operated through state-induced compliance in observable behavior - through symbolic naming practices - rather than through deep transformation of private beliefs or broader value systems.

Table 6: Effects of forced atheism on adult values and political attitudes

Panel A: Nationalist values

	Proud of nationality†	Important born this country†	Generalized trust†	Member: political party‡	Interest in politics†
Born $\geq$ 1967	0.052	0.049	-0.014	0.011	0.075
	(0.057)	(0.107)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.081)
Birth year	-0.005	-0.011	0.001	-0.004	-0.022**
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)
Born $\geq$ 1967 $\times$ Birth year	-0.004	0.015	-0.002	0.002	-0.002
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.014)
Min. value	1	1	1	0	1
Max. value	4	4	2	1	4
Obs.	2122	1201	2036	1691	2168

Panel B: Market orientation

	Political scale is left†	Income should be equal†	State ownership†	Govt responsibility†	Competition is bad†	Left orientation†
Born $\geq$ 1967	-0.214	-0.236	0.015	-0.163	-0.117	-0.102
	(0.274)	(0.260)	(0.243)	(0.248)	(0.187)	(0.115)
Birth year	0.051	0.026	-0.031	0.021	0.028	0.013
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.016)
Born $\geq$ 1967 $\times$ Birth year	-0.018	-0.014	0.028	-0.024	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.020)
Min. value	1	1	1	1	1	-2.9
Max. value	10	10	10	10	10	4.5
Obs.	1843	2135	2095	2167	2121	1761

Panel C: Democratic attitudes

	Demo. system is good†	Demo. system is better†	Democracy: econ. runs well†	Democracy: decisive†	Democracies: order†	Democratic orientation†
Born $\geq$ 1967	-0.003	0.001	-0.140*	-0.116	-0.127	-0.348**
	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.166)
Birth year	-0.009	-0.016**	0.013	0.029**	0.007	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Born $\geq$ 1967 $\times$ Birth year	0.012	0.015	0.006	-0.034**	0.010	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.028)
Min. value	1	1	1	1	1	-4.6
Max. value	4	4	4	4	4	2.9
Obs.	2089	1508	1468	1431	1447	1264

Notes: Weighted by survey weights; NUTS2 region, sex, survey wave, and study type absorbed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Birth year is centered around 1966. † higher values imply stronger beliefs; ‡ 1 = Yes. Left orientation (Panel B) and Democratic orientation (Panel C) are PCA indices of the five preceding measures in their respective panels. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

8 Discussion and External Validity

Beyond the economics of identity and culture, our findings speak to the literature on forced assimilation and mandatory integration policies, which examines how states use identity-based mandates to accelerate migrant integration (Fouka, 2020; Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2020; Corekcioglu, 2021; Ferwerda and Finseraas, 2022; Emeriau et al., 2024; Neureiter, 2018; Qian and Tabellini, 2021). This literature identifies immigrant identity as a central mechanism of integration (Berry, 1997; Alba and Nee, 2009; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Luthra et al., 2018; Bisin et al., 2011; Schøyen, 2017; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Casey and Dustmann, 2010). Host countries have frequently placed conditions in response to the immigrants' disintegration – from language requirements, religious dressing, to identity belongingness – to impose host-nationalist values and promote a common culture (GOVING, CARVALHO, Skerdi paper). A recurring finding in this literature is that such mandates can provoke backlash, reinforcing rather than dissolving the very identities they target (Govinf moriconi, FOUKA backlash). Our setting offers a rare opportunity to examine this dynamic under an extreme form of identity mandate – an outright ban, applied to the entire population rather than a migrant subgroup, over a period of decades rather than years. Consistent with this literature's concerns about backlash, we find that compliance with Albania's ban was highly uneven and, for some groups, incomplete even after forty years of continuous enforcement. Our results therefore speak to a broader policy question: whether governments seeking to reshape culture – for a minority population or an entire society – can design identity mandates that produce genuine value change rather than surface compliance alone.

9 Conclusion

This paper examines whether coercive nation-building can change religious identity or only its public expression. We study Albania's 1967 Cultural Revolution, when the Communist regime closed places of worship, criminalized religious practice, and promoted the replacement of Muslim and Christian names with secular Albanian names. We combine administrative data from the Civil Registry, which allow us to observe names and family links across birth cohorts, with survey data on religiosity and political values. This setting allows us to trace the effects of a sharp, nationwide attempt to secularize identity on naming, marriage, and subsequently reported beliefs.

The reform substantially changed naming, but its effects were uneven. In the decade following the ban, Christian naming fell by 15 percentage points and Muslim naming by 29 percentage points, while Albanian naming rose by 30 percentage points. The response was stronger in districts with higher illiteracy and among households in which both parents shared the same religious background. Religious minorities and residents of districts that were already more secular before the reform preserved religious names at higher rates. Muslim fathers also complied more than Christian fathers across most dimensions. These patterns show that the reach of state coercion depended on the local social environment in which families made identity-related choices.

The effects extended beyond names, but not uniformly across religious communities. Muslim-background men exposed to the reform at young ages became substantially more likely to marry Albanian-background women and less likely to marry Muslim-background women; they also became more likely to marry Christian-background women. Christian-background men also shifted toward Albanian-background wives, but did not become more likely to marry across religious lines. By contrast, the survey evidence shows limited effects on beliefs and values. Individuals born after the reform report weaker religious upbringing, but we find no comparable changes in religious identity, belief in God, the importance of God, religious participation, nationalism, socialism, market orientation, or democratic attitudes.

Taken together, the results point more strongly to behavioral change than to broad ideological conversion. The campaign reshaped a visible marker of identity and, for some groups, a consequential family decision. Yet

these changes were not accompanied by systematic differences in subsequently reported religious beliefs or political values. The evidence therefore suggests that coercive secularization can change how identity is expressed and how it enters family formation without producing a corresponding transformation in conviction.

More broadly, Albania illustrates both the reach and the limits of top-down cultural engineering. Even a nationwide campaign of state-enforced atheism, sustained for more than two decades, did not affect all groups in the same way and did not generate broad changes across the dimensions of identity that the regime sought to transform. These findings underscore the importance of distinguishing public markers, family behavior, and beliefs when evaluating policies intended to reshape culture. Observable compliance should not, by itself, be interpreted as evidence of durable ideological conversion.

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A Appendix

A.1 Tables

Table A.1: Summary statistics across all districts in 1945

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Share Illiterate Adults	61	42.101	7.035	24.518	42.526	54.745
Share Catholic	61	11.047	26.052	0.000	0.211	97.810
Share Orthodox	61	18.903	24.743	0.024	8.685	99.603
Share Muslim	61	70.050	29.904	0.397	80.985	99.948
Population 1945	61	18,550	15,770	411	15,565	95,853

Table A.2: Population Census 1945 characteristics by district

District	Share Illiterate Adults	Share Catholic	Share Orthodox	Share Muslim	Population 1945
Belsh	45.890	0.152	0.400	99.448	5,256
Berat	38.527	0.252	16.511	83.237	29,374
Bulqizë	48.623	0.000	2.819	97.181	22,806
Cërrik	48.708	0.000	1.230	98.770	13,581
Delvinë	38.413	0.029	35.959	64.013	3,504
Devollit	33.591	0.184	15.426	84.391	26,689
Dibër	46.459	0.615	0.686	98.700	37,909
Divjakë	41.966	0.015	58.048	41.937	6,896
Dropull	24.518	0.007	97.659	2.334	14,993
Durrës	28.958	4.101	14.914	80.985	34,920
Elbasan	47.034	0.009	18.039	81.952	33,882
Fier	39.785	0.237	48.900	50.863	31,650
Finiq	32.540	0.225	76.203	23.572	12,010
Fushë Arrëz	51.434	77.903	0.068	22.030	7,390
Gjirokastër	32.347	0.567	29.412	70.021	15,878
Gramsh	45.739	0.005	5.609	94.386	18,542
Himarë	35.878	0.013	58.396	41.591	15,525
Kavajë	49.941	0.089	1.249	98.662	3,362
Kavajë	43.630	0.818	9.999	89.183	20,903
Klos	52.794	0.107	0.245	99.648	9,378
Kolonjës	33.907	0.649	44.789	54.562	18,194
Konispol	38.720	0.027	28.059	71.914	7,420
Korçë	31.618	0.489	43.691	55.820	53,608
Krujë	46.252	24.700	1.336	73.963	23,947
Krumë	53.331	0.017	0.035	99.948	5,764
Kukës	46.475	0.211	0.088	99.701	30,754
Kurbinit	49.878	97.810	0.243	1.946	411
Kuçovë	37.262	2.573	25.107	72.320	10,300
Këlcyrë	42.374	0.016	14.846	85.138	12,569
Lezhë	48.021	89.575	0.082	10.343	15,789
Libohovë	33.824	0.076	66.783	33.141	6,593
Librazhd	50.087	0.074	0.519	99.407	16,182
Lushnjës	42.526	0.074	36.074	63.852	32,361
Maliq	38.545	0.000	12.114	87.886	23,212

Table A.2: 1945 characteristics by district *(continued)*

District	Share Illiterate Adults	Share Catholic	Share Orthodox	Share Muslim	Population 1945
Mallakastrës	46.978	0.013	0.462	99.525	22,934
Malësi e Madhe	48.139	49.145	1.152	49.703	19,182
Mat	50.483	31.543	0.071	68.386	19,662
Memaliaj	41.649	0.428	7.371	92.201	10,053
Mirditës	46.515	91.599	0.080	8.321	21,307
Patos	46.603	0.000	30.297	69.703	2,723
Peqin	45.801	0.084	0.244	99.672	15,565
Pogradec	39.442	0.003	19.220	80.777	30,708
Poliçan	26.567	0.014	7.144	92.842	6,971
Prrenjas	46.310	0.091	0.495	99.413	7,670
Pukë	46.383	76.816	0.442	22.742	13,574
Pustec	36.445	0.000	99.603	0.397	1,007
Përmet	32.318	0.872	52.291	46.837	18,810
Roskovec	33.382	0.000	8.685	91.315	6,839
Rrogozhinë	44.171	2.384	8.947	88.669	9,187
Sarandë	34.899	2.292	54.202	43.506	4,450
Selenicë	40.577	0.569	10.111	89.320	19,336
Shijak	43.666	2.012	2.811	95.176	16,150
Shkodër	40.643	40.063	2.559	57.378	62,439
Skraparit	40.694	0.018	4.887	95.095	21,711
Tepelenë	41.935	0.483	5.649	93.868	13,471
Tiranë (Capital)	35.084	4.539	11.732	83.729	95,853
Topojë	52.377	0.267	0.024	99.709	12,366
Ura Vajgurorë	46.726	0.000	30.411	69.589	9,010
Vau i Dejës	54.745	67.280	0.044	32.676	11,360
Vlorë	38.251	1.755	28.509	69.736	33,902
Vorë	47.787	0.000	0.080	99.920	3,773

Table A.3: By district: Religious buildings classified as cultural monuments and lapidare

District	Christian (total)	Muslim (total)	Total buildings	Lapidare
Korçë	28	3	31	47
Berat	16	14	30	14
Gjirokastër	20	0	21	20
Himarë	15	0	15	17
Dropull	14	0	14	5
Elbasan	7	6	13	19
Finiq	13	0	13	6
Përmet	6	2	8	16
Kolonjës	7	1	8	22
Fier	6	0	6	17
Lushnjës	6	0	6	18
Tiranë Municipally	0	6	6	29
Sarandë	3	1	6	3

Table A.3: By district: Religious buildings classified as cultural monuments and lapidare *(continued)*

District	Christian (total)	Muslim (total)	Total buildings	Lapidare
Libohovë	4	0	4	5
Maliq	4	0	4	33
Pogradec	4	0	4	22
Pustec	3	0	3	1
Lezhë	3	0	3	6
Shkodër	0	2	3	7
Kavajë	1	2	3	6
Vlorë	2	1	3	15
Librazhd	2	0	2	7
Peqin	0	2	2	8
Selenicë	2	0	2	20
Durrës	1	0	1	5
Krujë	1	0	1	12
Mallakastrës	0	0	1	20
Roskovec	1	0	1	3
Kurbinit	1	0	1	3
Mirditës	1	0	1	7
Kuçovë	0	0	0	7
Poliçan	0	0	0	7
Skraparit	0	0	0	19
Ura Vajgurorë	0	0	0	4
Bulqizë	0	0	0	13
Dibër	0	0	0	24
Klos	0	0	0	3
Mat	0	0	0	6
Shijak	0	0	0	2
Belsh	0	0	0	1
Cërrik	0	0	0	3
Gramsh	0	0	0	9
Prrenjas	0	0	0	5
Divjakë	0	0	0	3
Patos	0	0	0	3
Këlcyrë	0	0	0	10
Memaliaj	0	0	0	5
Tepelenë	0	0	0	23
Devollit	0	0	0	28
Krumë	0	0	0	3
Kukës	0	0	0	21
Topojë	0	0	0	17

Table A.3: By district: Religious buildings classified as cultural monuments and lapidare *(continued)*

District	Christian (total)	Muslim (total)	Total buildings	Lapidare
Fushë Arrëz	0	0	0	1
Malësi e Madhe	0	0	0	6
Pukë	0	0	0	8
Vau i Dejës	0	0	0	3
Kavajë	0	0	0	NA
Rrogozhinë	0	0	0	3
Vorë	0	0	0	2
Delvinë	0	0	0	3
Konispol	0	0	0	4
Total	171	40	216	659

Table A.10: Bunching estimator event-study: full coefficients

	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
T_bin=234	-0.820	-4.681	12.960
	(8.201)	(7.572)	(8.013)
T_bin=237	-4.945	-4.969	11.618**
	(4.794)	(4.796)	(4.736)
T_bin=240	-3.073	-5.295	-0.320
	(5.368)	(5.421)	(5.826)
T_bin=243	0.838	-5.854	12.529**
	(4.785)	(5.299)	(4.789)
T_bin=246	1.397	-6.971	12.529**
	(4.108)	(5.398)	(5.663)
T_bin=249	-2.809	-11.211**	14.526***
	(5.533)	(5.405)	(5.374)
T_bin=252	1.685	3.396	-1.767
	(4.885)	(4.967)	(5.427)
T_bin=255	-5.056	3.958	0.481
	(4.702)	(5.534)	(5.650)
T_bin=258	-0.000	-5.593	7.222
	(5.180)	(4.870)	(5.652)
T_bin=261	-6.111	-7.778	3.889

Continued on next page

(continued)

	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
	(5.962)	(5.247)	(6.375)
T_bin=264	-1.955	-10.323*	4.150
	(5.664)	(5.482)	(5.811)
T_bin=267	-4.190	3.644	2.474
	(5.294)	(5.390)	(5.761)
T_bin=270	-3.333	-1.667	6.667
	(5.055)	(5.032)	(5.979)
T_bin=273	-5.249	-9.128	2.526
	(4.939)	(6.374)	(6.457)
T_bin=276	1.667	-0.556	3.333
	(4.382)	(5.809)	(5.600)
T_bin=279	-6.180	3.958	8.346
	(5.655)	(4.945)	(6.312)
T_bin=282	-0.847	-5.895	4.115
	(4.676)	(4.785)	(5.550)
T_bin=285	-1.685	-8.964	10.031
	(6.317)	(6.333)	(6.368)
T_bin=288	5.000	-10.556*	8.889
	(4.864)	(5.395)	(5.450)
T_bin=291	-6.180	0.025	10.031
	(5.036)	(5.377)	(6.346)
T_bin=294	-0.568	-1.654	7.222
	(5.306)	(5.491)	(5.752)
T_bin=297	4.190	-13.116**	10.854**
	(5.531)	(5.788)	(5.370)
T_bin=300	-3.073	-9.205	4.708
	(5.543)	(5.813)	(5.660)
T_bin=303	-9.777*	1.968	6.943
	(5.371)	(5.345)	(6.004)
T_bin=306	-4.190	-8.088	5.267
	(4.751)	(4.962)	(6.166)
T_bin=309	-2.809	-0.537	7.222
	(6.083)	(6.123)	(6.585)
T_bin=312	-7.303	-2.784	6.660
	(5.254)	(5.619)	(6.266)

Continued on next page

(continued)

	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
T_bin=315	-8.192	3.710	8.070
	(5.362)	(5.595)	(5.629)
T_bin=318	-1.397	5.320	-0.878
	(5.260)	(5.740)	(5.633)
T_bin=321	-3.333	-7.222	10.000*
	(5.427)	(5.674)	(5.594)
T_bin=324	-8.427	0.025	5.537
	(5.580)	(4.939)	(5.324)
T_bin=327	-1.955	-4.178	10.854*
	(5.577)	(6.205)	(6.098)
T_bin=330	-9.551*	6.767	6.099
	(5.551)	(4.521)	(6.228)
T_bin=333	5.000	-13.889**	10.000*
	(5.812)	(5.938)	(5.440)
T_bin=336	-6.044	-11.563*	11.068*
	(5.286)	(6.025)	(6.081)
T_bin=339	-1.397	-3.060	8.060
	(5.663)	(4.496)	(5.308)
T_bin=342	-0.000	-10.087*	5.537
	(5.692)	(5.143)	(5.468)
T_bin=345	1.955	-15.909***	10.295*
	(5.133)	(5.665)	(5.767)
T_bin=348	-2.247	-2.784	6.660
	(5.389)	(5.328)	(5.417)
T_bin=351	-1.381	6.894	0.869
	(4.855)	(5.479)	(5.913)
T_bin=354	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
T_bin=357	0.279	-23.731***	24.820***
	(5.584)	(5.172)	(5.496)
T_bin=360	-4.696	-17.416***	21.311***
	(5.629)	(5.760)	(5.445)
T_bin=363	-9.218*	-8.088	14.205**
	(4.948)	(5.492)	(5.501)
T_bin=366	-6.667	-18.889***	21.111***

Continued on next page

(continued)

	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
	(4.958)	(5.046)	(5.814)
T_bin=369	-4.396	-30.794***	29.750***
	(5.997)	(5.512)	(5.024)
T_bin=372	1.913	-26.539***	28.260***
	(5.313)	(5.006)	(5.205)
T_bin=375	-4.190	-14.233***	18.675***
	(4.787)	(4.681)	(5.289)
T_bin=378	-2.247	-19.638***	20.705***
	(5.398)	(4.837)	(5.307)
T_bin=381	-5.249	-37.305***	38.438***
	(5.757)	(5.029)	(5.302)
T_bin=384	-19.945***	-38.015***	44.107***
	(5.463)	(4.294)	(4.903)
T_bin=387	-25.138***	-29.570***	43.963***
	(5.128)	(5.030)	(5.343)
T_bin=390	-22.222***	-35.556***	47.778***
	(5.244)	(4.839)	(5.381)
T_bin=393	-24.863***	-45.118***	49.572***
	(5.870)	(4.389)	(4.872)
T_bin=396	-24.176***	-41.783***	49.530***
	(5.167)	(4.455)	(4.853)
T_bin=399	-29.444***	-39.444***	48.889***
	(5.091)	(4.520)	(5.205)
T_bin=402	-25.281***	-39.301***	49.357***
	(5.122)	(4.409)	(4.869)
T_bin=405	-28.453***	-47.250***	52.250***
	(5.044)	(3.708)	(4.788)
T_bin=408	-25.691***	-44.487***	51.697***
	(5.827)	(3.784)	(4.588)
T_bin=411	-30.769***	-40.684***	50.079***
	(5.057)	(4.270)	(5.042)
T_bin=414	-24.586***	-42.277***	48.382***
	(4.927)	(4.158)	(5.281)
T_bin=417	-29.558***	-46.697***	53.355***
	(5.152)	(4.433)	(4.547)

Continued on next page

(continued)

	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
T_bin=420	-25.691***	-44.487***	51.697***
	(5.019)	(4.061)	(4.723)
T_bin=423	-29.121***	-34.090***	45.684***
	(5.339)	(4.599)	(5.191)
T_bin=426	-21.111***	-35.000***	43.889***
	(5.476)	(4.591)	(5.450)
T_bin=429	-22.678***	-45.118***	47.386***
	(5.811)	(4.491)	(4.757)
T_bin=432	-22.376***	-40.068***	48.382***
	(5.570)	(4.384)	(5.081)
T_bin=435	-27.901***	-32.333***	39.543***
	(5.524)	(5.886)	(5.288)
T_bin=438	-22.778***	-32.222***	39.444***
	(5.018)	(5.132)	(5.280)
T_bin=441	-21.271***	-43.935***	42.305***
	(4.995)	(4.394)	(5.514)
T_bin=444	-20.166***	-38.963***	44.515***
	(5.256)	(4.588)	(5.115)
T_bin=447	-22.928***	-30.675***	37.885***
	(5.302)	(4.876)	(5.512)
T_bin=450	-21.271***	-35.648***	32.913***
	(5.152)	(4.504)	(5.408)
T_bin=453	-17.222***	-45.000***	43.889***
	(6.049)	(4.591)	(4.754)
T_bin=456	-15.193***	-39.515***	40.648***
	(5.254)	(4.642)	(5.412)
T_bin=459	-24.586***	-29.018***	36.228***
	(5.112)	(5.109)	(5.469)
T_bin=462	-26.374***	-28.596***	34.145***
	(5.377)	(5.435)	(5.566)
T_bin=465	-19.061***	-43.935***	39.543***
	(5.585)	(4.248)	(5.997)
T_bin=468	-23.077***	-34.090***	27.552***
	(5.922)	(5.548)	(5.713)
T_bin=471	-21.348***	-18.514***	23.514***

Continued on next page

(continued)

	Christian	Muslim	Albanian
	(5.541)	(5.514)	(6.058)
T_bin=474	-23.077***	-24.200***	26.453***
	(5.093)	(5.923)	(6.292)
T_bin=477	-18.508***	-37.305***	31.808***
	(5.388)	(5.041)	(5.838)
T_bin=480	-11.326*	-35.095***	24.626***
	(5.688)	(4.812)	(6.264)
T_bin=483	-21.667***	-14.444**	17.778***
	(5.279)	(5.889)	(6.031)
T_bin=486	-22.034***	-17.476***	19.087***
	(6.154)	(5.878)	(6.045)
Observations	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.044	0.125	0.134

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Reference category, the last pre-reform quarter (Nov 1966-Jan 1967) is $T_bin = 354$

Table A.4: Most frequent Western and Ideological names in the civil registry

Name	Category	Freq.	Name	Category	Freq.
Edmond	Western	9930	Floreta	Western	818
Alfred	Western	7363	Edvin	Western	804
Elton	Western	6628	Elvana	Western	778
Brunilda	Western	6538	Florida	Western	773
Vladimir	Ideological	6074	Etmond	Western	766
Ervin	Western	5894	Eneida	Western	688
Adelina	Western	5787	Elca	Western	663
Esmeralda	Western	4802	Eriola	Western	646
Ervis	Western	4794	Julinda	Western	612
Armand	Western	3512	Marenglen	Ideological	563
Eglantina	Western	3371	Elvin	Western	548
Irma	Western	3112	Miklovan	Ideological	446
Edison	Western	2561	Partizan	Ideological	164
Elvis	Western	2552	Kongres	Ideological	64
Ornela	Western	2546	Republika	Ideological	40
Mariglen	Ideological	2143	Budjon	Ideological	39
Marsida	Western	1955	Sovjet	Ideological	32
Renato	Western	1824	Dushan	Ideological	32
Armando	Western	1814	Miladin	Ideological	12
Admir	Western	1808	Sovjetike	Ideological	10
Ferdinand	Western	1745	Sovjetik	Ideological	9
Çlirim	Ideological	1473	Lenin	Ideological	8
Ferdinant	Western	1468	Zhdanov	Ideological	7
Jolanda	Western	1327	Buletin	Ideological	7
Elmira	Western	1288	Uljanov	Ideological	6
Edmir	Western	1192	Dimitrov	Ideological	6
Erjola	Western	1183	Asamble	Ideological	6
Elidon	Western	1134	Marks	Ideological	4
Amarildo	Western	1124	Federatë	Ideological	3
Eriselda	Western	1079	Aksion	Ideological	2
Xhuljeta	Western	1054	Stalin	Ideological	1
Ermelinda	Western	1053	Komuniste	Ideological	1
Ergys	Western	1008	Engels	Ideological	1
Evis	Western	864	Tito	Ideological	1

A.2 Figures



(a)



(b)



(c)

Figure A.1: Lapidare. Source: Wikimedia Commons (n.d.)




Figure A.2: Intergenerational transmission of names from father to child for children born before 1967

A.3 Detailed methodology (written by Claude)

We assign each first name in the Civil Registry to one of seven categories: Muslim, Christian, secular Albanian, Western, ideological, ambiguous, and unidentified. The procedure combines a reference "gazzette" of names with known origin, a set of morphological rules, and phonetic matching, applied in a fixed priority order so that more reliable evidence always dominates. Below we describe the detailed procedure.

Normalization. Albanian first names appear in many orthographic and inflectional variants — definite and indefinite forms, dialectal spellings, diacritics, and gemination — so we first reduce every name to a canonical stem. Our normalization first lowercases the name, collapses repeated letters, strips spaces, hyphens, quotation marks, parenthetical material, and non-alphabetic characters, and harmonizes graphemes that are interchangeable in Albanian orthography or phonetically equivalent (for example ç ⇒c, ë⇒e, the digraph xh→x, and the near-equivalent pairs y/u, z/s, j/i, removed h). The result is a consonantal stem that is invariant to the spelling and dialect differences that would otherwise split a single name across many surface forms.

Phonetic encoding. To group names that are pronounced alike but written differently, we compute a phonetic key for each normalized stem using the Metaphone package in R, modified so that sounds specific to Albanian — those written x (from xh), c, and the cluster ks — are preserved in the key rather than collapsed, which the unmodified algorithm would do.

Reference gazette. We assemble a dictionary of names with established origin from several sources: published lists of Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox names, supplemented with administrative name lists by religion. Catholic (Latin- and Italian-rooted) and Orthodox (Greek-rooted) names are pooled into a single Christian category, augmented with the Albanian Christian saints documented by Elsie (2000). Secular Albanian names are taken from the official state register of roughly three thousand Albanian-origin names (Kostallari, 1982), which collects pre-Roman and Illyrian roots and names derived from nature and civic virtues. Every gazette entry is normalized and phonetically encoded as above. We resolve cross-category overlaps explicitly: names shared by the Christian




Figure A.3: Frequency of ideological names

and Muslim lists are treated as ambiguous and excluded, and names shared between either religious list and the official Albanian register are retained as Albanian, since names on that register were officially promoted by the state. For each phonetic key we record the number of distinct categories it maps to, and only keys associated with a single category are later eligible for phonetic matching. Morphological rules. For names absent from the gazetteer, we apply category-specific rules encoded as patterns over the normalized, transliterated stem. The Muslim rules capture Arabic, Turkish, and Ottoman morphology — variants of Muhammad, the affixes -ullah/-allah ("of God"), Abd- ("servant of"), -din/-eddin ("of the faith"), and the root Nur- ("light") — following Sakalli (2019). The Christian rules capture Latin/Italian and Greek roots and saints' names, and the Albanian rules capture Illyrian and pre-Roman roots together with the Albanian lexicon of light, freedom, nature, and nationhood. After cleaning up all the names, table A.18 shows the distribution of the benchmark names we use.


Table A.18: Number of names with a confirmed religion

Religion	Number
Albanian names	1,689
Christian names	967
Muslim names	1,134


Classification cascade. We then classify each unique name in four steps, taking the first that applies:

1. **Exact match:** If the name matches a gazetteer entry, we assign its recorded category.
2. **Rule match** Otherwise we apply the three sets of morphological rules; if exactly one set fires, we assign that category, and if more than one fires we record the name as ambiguous.
3. **Phonetic match:** For names still unassigned, we match the phonetic key to gazetteer keys that are uniquely associated with a single category.
4. **Unidentified:** Names that survive all three steps — consistent with idiosyncratic or creative naming — are labeled unidentified.


We retain the step that produced each assignment as a classification source, which lets us gauge how much of the classification rests on exact evidence versus rule- or sound-based inference. Western and ideological names.



(a) Ideological names




(b) Western names




(c) Unidentified names

Figure A.4: Actual vs. extrapolated counterfactual, by name category. The counterfactual is estimated from a district-specific linear trend fit on pre-1967 data only and extrapolated forward. The vertical dashed line marks the reform date (February 1967).



(a) Christian wife (b) Muslim wife (c) Albanian wife


Panel A: Men with Christian background



(d) Christian wife (e) Muslim wife (f) Albanian wife

Panel B: Men with Muslim background

Figure A.5: Actual vs. extrapolated counterfactual, by name category. The counterfactual is estimated from a district-specific linear trend fit on pre-1967 data only and extrapolated forward. The vertical dashed line marks the reform date (February 1967).



(a) Muslim buildings (b) Christian buildings

Figure A.6: Distribution of preserved religious buildings by district




Figure A.7: Treatment effects using percent bunching estimator

Two categories are assigned on top of this cascade. *Western (international)* names are identified data-drivenly as the most frequent names among the 1967–1987 birth cohorts whose phonetic key does not appear in the gazetteer — common modern names, typically of French or Spanish literary origin, that are neither religious nor




Figure A.8: Treatment effects using bunching only exactly matched names




Figure A.9: Treatment effects on population fertility

traditionally Albanian. Examples are: Edmond, Brunilda, Esmeralda, Ema. *Ideological names* are a curated set referring to communism, the Soviet Union, and the wartime movement (for example Vladimir, Stalin, Partizan, and Marenglen, a contraction of Marx–Engels–Lenin). Both overrides take precedence over the cascade result, with the ideological label applied last.

Application. We run this procedure on every distinct first name appearing in the registry and attach the resulting category to each family member — the individual, mother, father, and paternal and maternal grandparents — which forms the basis for the naming-share outcomes and the within-family transmission analysis. We validate the classification externally against district-level religious composition in the 1945 Population Census [see Section X]

A.4 Validation of classification methodology

We assign a religious category to each first name using a three-step cascade: (i) an exact match against a gazetteer of religiously labeled Albanian names; (ii) for unmatched names, rule-based pattern indicators for Muslim, Christian, and secular-Albanian names; and (iii) for names still unmatched, a phonetic match to gazetteer names whose phonetic code maps unambiguously to a single religion. Names classified as Western-secular and ideological lists are assigned to those categories by dictionary and are not evaluated here. Because this classification algorithm produces our outcome, name group, we assess its' reliability.

We follow a standard approach for validating a classification algortihm. First, we hold out a random 20% of the gazetteer (test), stratified by religion, and treat the remaining 80% (train) as the only reference the classifier may use. The held-out names are therefore unavailable to the exact and phonetic steps, so the exercise measures the performance rather than recall of memorized labels. We run the full algorithm for each name in the *train* data. Throughout we distinguish coverage—the share of names the classifier is willing to label—from accuracy—the share of labeled names that are correct—because the procedure abstains on names it cannot confidently place.

From the *train* data, we essentially only test the performance of step 2 and step 3: pattern- and phonetic-based matching. Step 1, exact matching, performs well by definition. This implies that a smaller coverage of names in the *train* will be assigned a religion and will be considered unidentified. Overall, 43.8% of *train* names are classified, with an 75.8 % overall accuracy. Table A.19 reports accuracy by true religion and matching method. Pattern matching is highly reliable for Christian (95%) and Muslim (86%) names and weaker for secular-Albanian names (63%), reflecting the greater heterogeneity of that category. Phonetic matching performs well for Muslim (82%) and Albanian (76%) names but markedly worse for Christian names (53%), where similar phonetic codes are more often shared across religions. Cell sizes are modest (40–87 names), so these rates carry sampling noise, but the pattern is consistent across the two steps being complementary: pattern matching is the more precise tier, while phonetic matching extends coverage at some cost to precision, concentrated among Christian names.

To confirm that this accuracy does not simply track the religious composition of the sample, we compare the algorithm against a naive benchmark that assigns every name the modal (most frequent) religion. In the *train* sample, 44.6% of names are secular-Albanian, 29.9% Muslim, and 25.5% Christian, so a rule that always predicts the modal (Albanian) class attains 44.6% accuracy but, by construction, identifies no Muslim or Christian names. Our classification instead distinguishes the three groups, recovering Muslim names at 42% recall and Christian names—the hardest minority—at 34% recall, against the benchmark's zero. This recall is limited primarily by abstention rather than by error: when the algorithm does commit to a name it is usually correct (95% for Christian names through the pattern tier), but it declines to label more than half of them. **The procedure is therefore best understood as a high-precision, selective classifier rather than a high-coverage one.** If abstentions are counted as errors, its unconditional accuracy (33.2%) falls below the base rate, which is the expected price of abstaining on ambiguous names.b

The coverage figure below describe the *train* gazetteer names, which are by construction the hardest cases. In the full register, where names are matched against the complete gazetteer, 38.6% of names are resolved by exact match, 13.0% by pattern, and 19.2% by phonetic matching, while 22.5% remain unidentified and a further 6.7% are assigned to the Western-secular or ideological categories by dictionary.. Crucially for our design, this classification mix is not constant across birth cohorts. Relative to names born before 1967, names born afterward are substantially less likely to be matched on a religious pattern (22.1% to 11.2%) and far more likely to carry a Western-secular name (0.9% to 7.2%) or to remain unidentified (20.6% to 22.8%). We interpret this shift as substantive rather than mechanical: the post-1967 decline in religiously legible names is precisely the secularization of naming that the policy induced, and the rise in Western and unidentified names is itself a manifestation of the outcome we study rather than a deterioration of the classifier.




Figure A.10: Caption

This same shift nonetheless implies that religion is assigned to post-1967 names through a slightly different mixture of steps, leaning more on the phonetic tier, which we have shown to be the less precise. Classification error therefore enters our outcome as measurement error that could in principle correlate with treatment. Were this error orthogonal to the policy, it would merely attenuate our estimates and leave them conservative; the threat to identification is error that is differential around 1967. However, we use unidentified names as an outcome itself. Unidentified names are, in itself, a response to the reform: people could create new names.

We address this by re-estimating our main specification on the subsample of exactly-matched names, for which the assigned religion is a direct gazetteer lookup rather than an inference and whose share is stable across the cutoff. We report those results in our robustness checks section.

Three limitations remain. The gazetteer may imperfectly represent the names in our register, particularly for the youngest cohorts; some names are genuinely shared across religions, for which any single-label assignment is necessarily approximate; and the Western and ideological categories—which account for a non-trivial and growing share of post-1967 names—are dictionary-based and are not validated in the exercise above.

A.5 Random




Figure A.11: Composition of Muslim and Christian fathers for children born 1957–1977




Figure A.12: Composition of father-mother pairs for children born 1957–1977

A.6 Alternaive specification: Interrupted Time Series

We instead adopt an interrupted time series (ITS) design, implemented as an event study with district-specific linear pre-trends. The identifying variation comes not from a cross-sectional comparison between treated and untreated units, but from comparing each district's actual post-reform naming behavior to a counterfactual trajectory extrapolated from that same district's own pre-reform trend.

Let i index individuals, d index district of birth, and T denote the running variable, the individual's month of birth recentered around February 1967 (negative before the reform, zero at the reform date, positive afterward). Let T_{bin} denote T grouped into quarterly bins. For each name category $g \in \{\text{Christian, Muslim, Albanian, Western, Ideological, Unident}$ we normalize the outcome by its pre-reform mean, $\bar{y}_g$, so that estimated coefficients are directly interpretable as a percentage of the pre-reform baseline:

$$\tilde{y}^g_{i,d,T} = \frac{y^g_{i,d,T}}{\bar{y}_g}.$$

where

$$\bar{y}_g = \frac{1}{\text{nmbr. district-month obs.}} \sum_{\text{Feb 1957}}^{\text{Jan 1966}} y^g_{d,\tau}$$

We estimate equation (13) separately for each name category g, where τ_0 denotes the last pre-reform quarterly bin, chosen as the omitted reference category, and $m(i)$ denotes the calendar month of birth (1–12). We choose to model the naming behavior using a parametric event study, which is guided by the patterns we see in the data (Dobkin et al, 2016, AER). We impose linear pre-trends, assuming that the linearity would continue in absence of the reform, and control for naming seasonality based on the month-of-birth. The primary advantage of the parametric event study is that it allows us to visually (and flexibly) assess the pattern of outcomes relative to the reform date.

$$\tilde{y}^g_{i,d,T} = \alpha_d + \delta_d \times T + \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T} \setminus \{\tau_0\}} \beta^g_\tau \, \mathbb{1}(T_{bin} = \tau) + \eta_m(i) + \gamma_{m(i)} \times \mathbb{1}(T_{bin} \geq \tau) + \varepsilon_{i,d,T}, \tag{13}$$

Coefficient interpretation. α_d denotes the district fixed effects, absorbing baseline differences in naming patterns across districts. $\delta_d \times T$ allows for district-specific linear pre-trends. Because the event-study dummies β^g_τ are fully saturated across the post-reform period, δ_d is effectively identified from pre-reform variation alone, and represents the counterfactual trajectory each district would have followed absent the reform. In figure **??** we show that modeling the naming choices using $\alpha_d + \delta_d \times T$ correctly captures the counterfactual trajectory. β^g_τ are the coefficients of interest. Each β^g_τ measures the percentage deviation of name category g from its district-specific extrapolated pre-trend at relative time τ. Because a separate coefficient is estimated for every bin, the specification imposes no functional-form restriction on the shape of the post-reform response, allowing for immediate level shifts, gradual diffusion, and partial reversion, all of which we observe empirically across name categories. $\eta_m(i)$ represents the calendar month-of-birth fixed effects, absorbing seasonal naming patterns (e.g., religious-holiday-linked births). We allow for the seasonality in names to change after the reform by imposing $\gamma_{m(i)} \times \mathbb{1}(T_{bin} \geq \tau)$, because naming around religious holidays was not permitted anymore, thus changing that seasonality. Finally, $\varepsilon_{i,d,T}$ is the error term, clustered at the district level to allow for arbitrary within-district serial correlation.

The validity of this design rests on the following assumptions: **(i) counterfactual trend continuation:** absent the reform, each district's naming outcomes would have continued along the linear trend estimated from its pre-February 1967 data. We assess this assumption by testing for nonlinearity in the pre-period (comparing linear, quadratic, and spline fits) and by verifying stability of estimated pre-trends across sub-samples of the pre-reform period; **(ii) no anticipation:** The timing of the reform is independent to name choices, implying

individuals did not adjust naming behavior in anticipation of the reform prior to its implementation. We test this by examining whether the event-study coefficients in the quarters immediately preceding the reform already deviate from zero, and by re-estimating placebo cutoffs shortly before the true reform date using only pre-reform data; **(iii) no contemporaneous confounders:** no other shock coincident with February 1967 independently affected naming behavior nationwide. Because this assumption cannot be directly tested absent a control group, we assess it indirectly through placebo outcomes unrelated to religious naming and through placebo cutoff dates at arbitrary points in the historical time series, and we discuss the broader historical context of the reform explicitly; **(iv) no differential sample selection.** The composition of registered births is assumed stable across the reform date, ruling out differential migration, fertility, or registration behavior by religious group. We test this using total birth counts (rather than name shares) as an outcome in the same event-study specification; **(v) adequate linear fit across districts.** district-specific pre-trends are assumed approximately linear over the estimation window. We assess this district-by-district using goodness-of-fit statistics from within-district pre-period regressions; **(vi) no manipulation of the running variable:** birth registration timing is assumed not to be manipulated around the cutoff date. We test for discontinuities in the density of births around February 1967 using a McCrary-style density test.

Alternative outcomes. Our main outcome is the likelihood that an individual born around the reform as a name category g normalized by its pre-reform mean, $\overline{y}_g$. We apply this normalization such that the estimated coefficients are expressed in percent changes. In our robustness checks, we use two alternative outcomes: **(i) raw, non-normalized** likelihood that a child has a name category g; **(ii) only exact-matched names** to rule out measurement error.A potential concern could be the false positives in our naming classification. Our algorithm is high-precision (80%) but low-coverage, with a 46% coverage rate. However, our classification may introduce bias if the algorithm works better for one group of names than the other. In appendix section XX we find that the pattern-based matching works best for Christian and Muslim names, but not as well for Albanian names (95.1%, 86%, and 62.5% respectively). On the other hand, the phonetic-based matching performs much better for Albanian and Muslim names, while for Christian names not so as well (75.9%, 81.7%, and 53.1% respectively). Therefore, we show our results only for the exactly-matched names to test whether our estimation correctly captures the change in our names controlling for classification errors.

Changing the prediction year. Another concern could be that the prediction goes until 1966, one year prior, and there may have been anticipation of the reform. To rule out any anticipation effects, we change the cutoff to 1960, extrapolate to all years until 1977

Table A.5: Average RNI per district compared to the real religious composition of 1945

	District	Avg. RNI	Weighted Muslim share	Muslim share	Muslim majority	Christian majority
1	Mirdite	15.69	0.11	8.32	FALSE	TRUE
2	Finiq	16.78	0.32	23.57	FALSE	TRUE
3	Lezhe	16.99	0.14	10.34	FALSE	TRUE
4	Dropull	17.12	0.03	2.33	FALSE	TRUE
5	Pustec	17.30	0.01	0.40	FALSE	TRUE
6	Puke	22.29	0.31	22.74	FALSE	TRUE
7	Fushe Arrez	23.83	0.30	22.03	FALSE	TRUE
8	Sarande	24.84	0.60	43.51	FALSE	TRUE
9	Vau Dejes	25.29	0.45	32.68	FALSE	TRUE
10	Malesi e Madhe	28.57	0.68	49.70	FALSE	TRUE
11	Himare	29.40	0.57	41.59	FALSE	TRUE
12	Libohove	30.85	0.45	33.14	FALSE	TRUE
13	Gjirokaster	33.31	0.96	70.02	FALSE	TRUE
14	Delvine	35.35	0.88	64.01	FALSE	TRUE
15	Divjake	36.77	0.58	41.94	FALSE	TRUE
16	Shkoder	36.89	0.79	57.38	FALSE	TRUE
17	Permet	38.49	0.64	46.84	FALSE	TRUE
18	Konispol	39.48	0.99	71.91	FALSE	TRUE
19	Kolonje	39.96	0.75	54.56	FALSE	TRUE
20	Vlore	40.67	0.96	69.74	FALSE	TRUE
21	Korce	41.69	0.77	55.82	FALSE	TRUE
22	Kurbin	42.09	0.03	1.95	FALSE	TRUE
23	Fier	42.72	0.70	50.86	FALSE	TRUE
24	Lushnje	45.70	0.88	63.85	FALSE	TRUE
25	Patos	47.69	0.96	69.70	FALSE	TRUE
26	Roskovec	50.52	1.25	91.31	TRUE	FALSE
27	Ura Vajgurore	51.23	0.95	69.59	FALSE	TRUE
28	Berat	52.65	1.14	83.24	TRUE	FALSE
29	Kucove	52.86	0.99	72.32	FALSE	TRUE
30	Selenice	53.03	1.22	89.32	TRUE	FALSE
31	Maliq	54.09	1.21	87.89	TRUE	FALSE
32	Devoll	54.28	1.16	84.39	TRUE	FALSE
33	Kelcyre	54.84	1.17	85.14	TRUE	FALSE
34	Tepelene	56.30	1.29	93.87	TRUE	FALSE
35	Kruje	56.70	1.01	73.96	TRUE	FALSE
36	Mat	58.34	0.94	68.39	FALSE	TRUE
37	Tropoje	58.58	1.37	99.71	TRUE	FALSE
38	Pogradec	59.23	1.11	80.78	TRUE	FALSE
39	Mallakaster	59.30	1.36	99.52	TRUE	FALSE
40	Memaliaj	59.67	1.26	92.20	TRUE	FALSE
41	Polican	60.03	1.27	92.84	TRUE	FALSE
42	Skrapar	61.52	1.30	95.09	TRUE	FALSE
43	Kavaje	62.64	1.22	89.18	TRUE	FALSE
44	Tirana Municipally	62.70	1.15	83.73	TRUE	FALSE
45	Elbasan	63.28	1.12	81.95	TRUE	FALSE
46	Gramsh	63.88	1.29	94.39	TRUE	FALSE
47	Durres	64.23	1.11	80.99	TRUE	FALSE
48	Cerrik	64.52	1.35	98.77	TRUE	FALSE
49	Rrogozhine	65.79	1.22	88.67	TRUE	FALSE
50	Prrenjas	67.57	1.36	99.41	TRUE	FALSE
51	Belsh	67.69	1.36	99.45	TRUE	FALSE
52	Kukes	68.10	1.37	99.70	TRUE	FALSE
53	Shijak	68.19	1.31	95.18	TRUE	FALSE
54	Klos	68.24	1.37	99.65	TRUE	FALSE
55	Bulqize	68.32	1.33	97.18	TRUE	FALSE
56	Peqin	68.36	1.37	99.67	TRUE	FALSE
57	Librazhd	68.57	1.36	99.41	TRUE	FALSE
58	Diber	69.95	1.35	98.70	TRUE	FALSE
59	Kamez	70.37	1.35	98.66	TRUE	FALSE
60	Vore	71.54	1.37	99.92	TRUE	FALSE
61	Krume	71.60	1.37	99.95	TRUE	FALSE

Table A.6: Summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Panel A: Religiosity					
Religious person†	2.67	0.53	1	3	2074
Attend religious services†	3.87	2.14	1	8	2160
Raised religiously‡	0.40	0.49	0	1	476
Comfort from religion‡	0.59	0.49	0	1	1423
How important is God in your life†	7.51	2.81	1	10	2129
Believe in God‡	0.95	0.23	0	1	2103
Believe in life after death‡	0.27	0.44	0	1	1710
Panel B: Nationalism and politics					
Proud of nationality†	3.53	0.67	1	4	2124
Important to be born in this country†	3.12	0.90	1	4	1201
Generalized trust†	1.15	0.36	1	2	2038
Member: political party‡	0.09	0.29	0	1	1691
Interest in politics†	2.11	0.96	1	4	2170
Panel C: Market orientation					
Political scale is left†	5.70	2.79	1	10	1845
Income should be equal†	5.49	2.85	1	10	2136
State ownership†	4.01	2.71	1	10	2097
Govt responsibility†	5.60	2.94	1	10	2169
Competition is bad†	2.99	2.19	1	10	2123
Panel D: Democratic attitudes					
Demo. system is good†	3.66	0.58	1	4	2091
Demo. system is better†	3.49	0.59	1	4	1509
Decomracy: econ. system runs well†	2.81	0.75	1	4	1470
Decomracy: decisive†	2.70	0.84	1	4	1433
Democracies: order†	2.78	0.83	1	4	1449
Panel E: Indices					
SRS†	-0.17	1.76	-4.84	2.26	1045
SIRS†	-0.16	1.69	-4.67	1.75	1049

Notes: Sample restricted to Albanian respondents in the Integrated Values Survey born between 1957–1977. † higher values imply stronger beliefs; ‡ implies 1 = Yes.

Table A.7: Treatment effects by parent religion expressed as percent deviation from pre-reform mean

		Christian father			Muslim father		
	(1) All fathers	(2) All	(3) + Christian wife	(4) + Muslim wife	(5) All	(6) + Christian wife	(7) + Muslim wife
Christian names							
Post	-33.013***	-36.431***	-24.325***	-10.038***			
	(5.739)	(3.751)	(3.222)	(1.938)			
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	.	.	.
Muslim names							
Post	-59.883***				-57.486***	-17.461***	-46.681***
	(4.819)				(3.999)	(4.234)	(3.692)
Observations	15112	.	.	.	15112	15112	15112
Albanian names							
Post	61.860***	43.593***	34.900***	11.273***	50.380***	19.375***	43.631***
	(4.164)	(4.806)	(4.679)	(2.317)	(3.927)	(2.580)	(3.670)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. Estimates are percent deviations from each cell's extrapolated pre-1967 trend (two-step procedure). +Christian/Muslim wife denotes the mother's name-religion. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.8: Treatment effects by pre-reform majority-religion distribution separated by mother's religion

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the Muslim distribution				
	Share of Christian names		Share of Albanian names	
	(1) + Christian Mother	(2) + Muslim Mother	(3) + Christian Mother	(4) + Muslim Mother
Post	-25.365***	-14.264***	36.542***	19.957***
	(4.591)	(3.282)	(3.773)	(3.570)
Muslim decile 1945	3.539***	1.270***	3.448***	3.085***
	(0.494)	(0.471)	(0.611)	(0.574)
Post × Muslim decile 1945	1.755***	1.153***	-3.171***	-2.093***
	(0.614)	(0.415)	(0.652)	(0.484)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.121	0.032	0.067	0.044
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the Christian distribution				
	Share of Muslim names		Share of Albanian names	
	(1) + Christian Mother	(2) + Muslim Mother	(3) + Christian Mother	(4) + Muslim Mother
Post	-20.317***	-30.177***	14.695***	28.836***
	(4.088)	(3.604)	(2.648)	(3.142)
Christian decile 1945	1.450**	1.087**	1.959***	1.127**
	(0.588)	(0.433)	(0.509)	(0.456)
Post × Christian decile 1945	1.797***	1.065**	-0.521	-1.088**
	(0.628)	(0.513)	(0.368)	(0.529)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.041	0.077	0.031	0.060

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.9: Treatment effects by pre-reform majority-religion distribution separated by mother's religion

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the Muslim distribution				
	Share of Christian names		Share of Albanian names	
	(1) + Christian Mother	(2) + Muslim Mother	(3) + Christian Mother	(4) + Muslim Mother
Post	-25.365***	-14.264***	36.542***	19.957***
	(4.591)	(3.282)	(3.773)	(3.570)
Muslim decile 1945	3.539***	1.270***	3.448***	3.085***
	(0.494)	(0.471)	(0.611)	(0.574)
Post × Muslim decile 1945	1.755***	1.153***	-3.171***	-2.093***
	(0.614)	(0.415)	(0.652)	(0.484)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.121	0.032	0.067	0.044
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the Christian distribution				
	Share of Muslim names		Share of Albanian names	
	(1) + Christian Mother	(2) + Muslim Mother	(3) + Christian Mother	(4) + Muslim Mother
Post	-20.317***	-30.177***	14.695***	28.836***
	(4.088)	(3.604)	(2.648)	(3.142)
Christian decile 1945	1.450**	1.087**	1.959***	1.127**
	(0.588)	(0.433)	(0.509)	(0.456)
Post × Christian decile 1945	1.797***	1.065**	-0.521	-1.088**
	(0.628)	(0.513)	(0.368)	(0.529)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.041	0.077	0.031	0.060

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.11: Summary statistics of prior secularization

	N	Mean	SD	10th percentile	Median	90th percentile
Prior secularization	15364	30.05603	9.742459	15.51974	31.74294	40.59406

Table A.12: Treatment effects along the prior secularization distribution

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the prior secularization distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Christian	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-29.910***	35.254***	-3.148	7.128	13.730*
	(3.894)	(4.272)	(4.370)	(5.947)	(7.295)
Prior secularization	0.962*	1.549***	0.560	1.724*	-0.514
	(0.512)	(0.577)	(0.560)	(0.925)	(1.093)
Post × Prior secularization	1.797**	-2.657***	0.585	-1.214	-0.423
	(0.698)	(0.675)	(0.725)	(1.079)	(1.345)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.061	0.061	0.003	0.006	0.016
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the prior secularization distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Muslim	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-28.836***	29.015***	-13.230***	7.294	6.680
	(3.835)	(4.025)	(4.791)	(6.229)	(4.812)
Prior secularization	-0.695*	-0.626	-0.706*	-0.307	-0.888
	(0.351)	(0.404)	(0.402)	(0.847)	(0.853)
Post × Prior secularization	-0.190	-0.567	2.158***	0.969	0.627
	(0.711)	(0.711)	(0.731)	(1.074)	(0.814)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.099	0.080	0.005	0.016	0.012

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.13: Treatment effects by pre-reform majority-religion distribution

Panel A: Christian fathers along the Muslim distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Christian	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-33.529***	36.412***	6.737	6.000	17.497**
	(3.620)	(3.702)	(4.421)	(5.459)	(7.243)
Muslim decile 1945	2.078***	2.138***	1.569***	2.883***	2.722***
	(0.435)	(0.500)	(0.484)	(0.801)	(0.946)
Post × Muslim decile 1945	2.231***	-2.505***	-1.290**	-0.831	-1.038
	(0.549)	(0.683)	(0.597)	(0.905)	(1.041)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.099	0.066	0.005	0.030	0.038
Panel B: Muslim fathers along the Christian distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Muslim	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-37.480***	34.312***	-8.198	16.155***	20.502***
	(3.232)	(3.484)	(4.947)	(5.004)	(4.772)
Christian decile 1945	0.606*	0.630*	0.532	0.695	0.702
	(0.326)	(0.374)	(0.368)	(0.764)	(0.754)
Post × Christian decile 1945	1.437***	-1.489***	0.967	-0.797	-2.020***
	(0.506)	(0.526)	(0.757)	(0.923)	(0.667)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.108	0.079	0.007	0.016	0.016

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percentage points. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.14: Treatment effects along the pre-reform illiteracy distribution

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the illiteracy distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Christian	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-22.270***	19.578***	7.828*	-0.043	24.069**
	(3.834)	(5.032)	(4.231)	(6.192)	(9.674)
Illiterate decile 1945	1.294**	1.613***	1.598***	2.033**	3.598***
	(0.527)	(0.558)	(0.486)	(0.931)	(0.969)
Post × Illiterate decile 1945	0.140	0.503	-1.392*	0.222	-2.103*
	(0.674)	(0.898)	(0.766)	(0.942)	(1.245)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.052	0.069	0.004	0.018	0.041
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the illiteracy distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Muslim	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-16.954***	17.311***	7.387*	7.155	12.013*
	(5.593)	(4.574)	(4.410)	(6.582)	(6.708)
Illiterate decile 1945	-0.133	-0.457	-0.733**	-1.341	0.501
	(0.308)	(0.375)	(0.326)	(0.820)	(0.783)
Post × Illiterate decile 1945	-2.151***	1.521**	-1.741**	0.807	-0.399
	(0.722)	(0.693)	(0.786)	(1.103)	(0.845)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.107	0.079	0.013	0.019	0.011

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.15: Treatment effects along the distribution of preserved religious buildings

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the Christian buildings distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Christian	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-20.508***	21.911***	-2.307	-0.146	7.541
	(3.181)	(3.671)	(3.455)	(3.987)	(6.029)
Nmbr. Christian buildings preserved	-1.148***	-1.083***	-0.780**	-0.974	-2.288***
	(0.362)	(0.406)	(0.376)	(0.714)	(0.783)
Post × Nmbr. Christian buildings preserved	-0.220	0.187	0.495	0.385	1.073
	(0.575)	(0.668)	(0.598)	(0.718)	(1.093)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.054	0.060	0.001	0.003	0.031
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the Muslim buildings distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Muslim	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-30.355***	24.692***	-1.870	11.643***	12.399***
	(2.581)	(2.698)	(3.387)	(4.190)	(3.717)
Nmbr. Muslim buildings preserved	-0.153	-0.216	-0.096	0.533	-0.075
	(0.181)	(0.221)	(0.280)	(0.623)	(0.682)
Post × Nmbr. Muslim buildings preserved	0.270	0.713	-0.486	0.113	-1.197*
	(0.768)	(0.609)	(0.618)	(0.932)	(0.682)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.096	0.077	0.001	0.016	0.013

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.16: Treatment effects along the Communist monuments distribution

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the Communist monuments distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Christian	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-23.633***	24.894***	-2.705	2.972	10.060
	(3.733)	(4.126)	(4.138)	(4.811)	(6.786)
Nmbr. Communist monuments	-1.130**	-0.950*	-1.319***	-1.601*	-2.927***
	(0.479)	(0.532)	(0.461)	(0.932)	(0.969)
Post × Nmbr. Communist monuments	0.523	-0.520	0.619	-0.413	0.440
	(0.714)	(0.853)	(0.836)	(0.858)	(1.561)
Observations	14860	14860	14860	14860	14860
Adj. R^2	0.049	0.061	0.003	0.011	0.039
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the Communist monuments distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Muslim	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-31.309***	24.183***	-4.274	11.984**	6.195
	(3.579)	(3.653)	(4.377)	(5.816)	(4.507)
Nmbr. Communist monuments	-0.768**	-0.337	-0.150	1.080	-0.495
	(0.304)	(0.339)	(0.346)	(0.697)	(0.772)
Post × Nmbr. Communist monuments	0.446	0.561	0.270	0.052	0.881
	(0.876)	(0.742)	(0.829)	(1.118)	(1.229)
Observations	14860	14860	14860	14860	14860
Adj. R^2	0.096	0.077	0.001	0.020	0.011

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.17: Treatment effects along the distribution of prisons or camps

Panel A: Christian fathers, along the Christian buildings distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Christian	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-18.625***	21.632***	-2.331	1.254	12.428**
	(2.502)	(3.145)	(2.906)	(3.415)	(4.844)
Nmbr. Prisons or Camps	-0.182	0.633	0.589	2.360*	-0.334
	(0.773)	(0.747)	(0.745)	(1.336)	(1.436)
Post=1 × (first) n_prisoncamps	-1.930*	0.704	1.374	0.093	-0.493
	(1.005)	(1.350)	(1.281)	(1.113)	(1.903)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.049	0.056	0.003	0.009	0.015
Panel B: Muslim fathers, along the Muslim buildings distribution					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Muslim	Albanian	Unidentified	Western	Ideological
Post	-29.291***	25.062***	-3.057	10.874***	12.046***
	(2.670)	(2.712)	(3.237)	(3.749)	(3.708)
Nmbr. Prisons or Camps	-0.412	-0.452	-0.409	0.289	-0.147
	(0.362)	(0.430)	(0.498)	(1.289)	(1.124)
Post × Nmbr. Prisons or Camps	-0.313	0.879	0.049	0.715	-1.668
	(1.125)	(0.934)	(1.159)	(1.346)	(1.577)
Observations	15112	15112	15112	15112	15112
Adj. R^2	0.097	0.076	0.001	0.016	0.013

Notes: Standard errors clustered by district. Estimates are in percent. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.19: Out-of-sample accuracy by religion and matching method

	Pattern		Phonetic	
Religion	N	Accuracy	N	Accuracy
Albanian	40	62.5%	87	75.9%
Christian	41	95.1%	49	53.1%
Muslim	43	86.0%	71	81.7%

District	Average RNI	Majority religion from Pop. Census 1945
1	68.61	muslim
2	55.72	muslim
3	68.73	muslim
4	68.24	muslim
5	27.73	christian
6	55.40	muslim
7	71.66	muslim
8	34.85	christian
9	18.92	christian
10	66.03	muslim
11	66.29	muslim
12	38.45	christian
13	18.97	christian
14	17.13	christian
15	33.64	christian
16	65.08	muslim
17	27.14	christian
18	71.17	muslim
19	70.02	muslim
20	61.25	muslim
21	66.07	muslim
22	40.75	christian
23	47.02	christian
24	38.94	christian
25	60.72	muslim
26	72.41	muslim
27	50.51	christian
28	68.38	muslim
29	41.04	christian
30	15.90	christian
31	30.60	christian
32	70.28	muslim
33	41.37	christian
34	26.03	christian
35	56.42	muslim
36	60.52	muslim
37	54.85	christian
38	62.10	muslim
39	16.28	christian
40	44.46	christian
41	68.35	muslim
42	38.68	christian
43	61.34	muslim
44	62.10	muslim
45	72.26	muslim
46	22.75	christian
47	24.52	christian
48	50.72	muslim
49	72.71	muslim
50	29.08	christian
51	60.10	muslim
52	71.47	muslim
53	36.39	christian
54	65.58	muslim
55	58.61	muslim
56	66.70	muslim
57	59.43	muslim
58	46.84	christian
59	22.61	christian
60	37.98	christian
61	68.63	muslim

Table A.20: Average Religion Name Index per district relative to the majority population in the district