The Female Labor Supply Constraints of Spousal Jealousy: Experimental Evidence from India

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Abstract

This study presents evidence from two field experiments studying the role of spousal jealousy in constraining married women's employment. In a first experiment ($N = 1,400$), I randomize married women in India to receive a two-week job in either a mixed or women-only workplace. Women randomized to the women-only workplace are 46% more likely to apply for a job (13 percentage points) and 31% more likely to turn up (6 percentage points). A cross-randomized safety treatment suggests that workplace safety is not the main mechanism. Instead, the treatment effects are significantly stronger among women who report having more jealous and controlling husbands. In a second experiment ($N = 210$), I directly test for a spousal jealousy mechanism by measuring whether women are more willing to interact with a male colleague if their husbands can monitor the interaction. I offer women a job that comes with a compulsory online peer support program and give them the option to forgo 20-35% of their salary to guarantee that the peer they are matched with will be a woman as opposed to a man. Fifty-three percent of women pay for the female peer when these remote interactions are one-on-one, but this drops to 34% once their husbands have the option of joining and can therefore monitor the conversations. One-third of households still pay for a female peer even if the mentoring simply involves watching prerecorded videos of the peer, suggesting even the most innocuous interactions are enough to raise jealousy concerns.

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1 Introduction

Women's employment remains strikingly low in many parts of the world. This is particularly true among married women, whose family members often prevent them from working. In India alone, over 200 million married women of working age remain out of the labor market (PLFS, 2024), and more than one third report that they would not be allowed to work (Desai et al., 2012). At the same time, there appears to be little opposition to the *idea* of women working: most men and women in India, as in many countries, express support for women working outside the home (Bursztyn et al., 2023). This contrast raises the possibility that what households oppose is not women's work itself, but rather specific activities *associated* with work. One such activity, common to most jobs, is interacting with male coworkers. In addition to posing potential safety risks, household opposition to such interactions may reflect spousal jealousy.

High levels of spousal jealousy among men, across cultural contexts, have been widely documented in anthropology (Betzig, 1989; Stieglitz et al., 2012), psychology (Daly et al., 1982; Buss et al., 1992; Kupfer and Gul, 2023), and evolutionary biology (Platek and Shackelford, 2006; Trivers, 2017). In economics, recent work argues that female seclusion norms became more entrenched in societies where men historically worked away from home and could not monitor their wives (Becker, 2024). While this existing work highlights the historical origins of such norms, the same psychological mechanisms could constrain women's employment today: husbands may seek to prevent their wives from taking jobs that involve interactions with men, particularly when they cannot monitor these interactions. The economics literature has had little to say about the impact of spousal jealousy on economic outcomes, despite the fact that high levels of spousal jealousy are common in many countries and settings.[1] In Bihar, India, the setting of this study, one in six married women say that their husbands accuse them of being unfaithful.[2] In my experimental sample, 60% of women report that their husbands would be jealous or angry if they interacted with other men at work.

I study whether spousal jealousy lowers women's employment using two complementary field experiments in a natural environment in Patna, India. In the first experiment, I test whether the presence of male coworkers suppresses women's labor supply for a business process outsourcing job and consider four possible mechanisms – spousal jealousy, workplace

[1]For example, in representative samples of married women, the proportion who say their husbands would be angry or jealous if they spoke with other men in Egypt, Kenya, and the Philippines is 74%, 48%, and 19%, respectively. The proportion is 26% in India, and 48% in the state of Bihar (DHS).

[2]Only 0.4% of married women in Bihar say that they had sex with multiple partners in the past 12 months, suggesting husbands' concerns may be unfounded (DHS, 2019-21).

safety, social image concerns, and peer quality (for example, other women may make for more supportive colleagues). I use a second experiment to isolate spousal jealousy as a causal mechanism. I adopt a definition of jealousy that draws from the social psychology literature (White, 1981). I define spousal jealousy as perceived threats to self-esteem, identity, or relationship quality from potential romantic attraction between a spouse and a potential rival.[3]

1. Labor supply experiment: A key empirical challenge for testing whether the presence of men at work lowers women's employment is exogenously varying workplace gender composition while holding beliefs about other employer and job characteristics fixed. To overcome this, I partnered with a private firm willing to offer identical jobs in both a women-only and a mixed-gender office. Surveyors recruited working-age married women via door-to-door sampling (N=1,400). They then elicited women's preferences for working in the women-only and mixed office, using an incentive-compatible mechanism before revealing which workplace participants were randomized to be eligible to work in. The two main outcomes are women's costly choice to apply to each job, and their actual workplace attendance once they were randomly offered one of the jobs.[4]

Offering women-only jobs substantially increased labor supply. Women were 46% (13 percentage points, $p < 0.001$) more likely to apply for a job in the women-only office and 31% (6 percentage points, $p < 0.001$) more likely to attend the workplace training day. To benchmark these effects, I randomized wage offers across participants. Increasing wages by 50% had only a small, statistically insignificant impact on applications and attendance.[5] The elasticities I estimate suggest that the reduction in women's labor supply from having men in the workplace is equivalent to cutting wages by 60%.

I document three pieces of evidence that speak to mechanisms. First, preferences for the women-only office were significantly stronger in households with higher levels of spousal jealousy ($p = 0.03$). I measure spousal jealousy using an index that captures internalized norms against interacting with unrelated men as well as women's perceptions of their husbands'

[3]I adopt a broader definition of jealousy relative to White (1981) by also including identity threats – for example, norms that prescribe married women should not interact with unrelated men – given existing empirical research highlights that restrictive gender norms may have originated from jealousy concerns in the first place. I consider the second-order consequences of spousal jealousy separately (as social image concerns). For example, husbands may feel social pressure to be more "protective" of their spouse, and wives may internalize these concerns or themselves worry about being perceived as unfaithful in the eyes of society.

[4]I measured workplace attendance by tracking whether women attended a required in-person training day. A random subset of participants who completed the training day were offered a job. 83% of women who completed the training day and were made an offer also attended the job.

[5]The results mirror findings from similar settings, where economic incentives alone have had limited success in increasing women's labor supply (Jalota and Ho, 2024; Garlick et al., 2025).

jealousy. The patterns are robust to controlling for a rich set of covariates – including age, education, religion, and caste – fully interacted with the treatment. Of course, this does not rule out that these households are different in other unobservable ways that are correlated with jealousy.

Second, workplace safety concerns do not appear to drive the results. To test for this, I cross-randomized the workplace gender composition with a safety treatment. The safety treatment informed women of the rigorous workplace safety measures, including female security guards, sexual harassment training, and a strict sexual harassment policy.[6] While the safety treatment increased perceived safety of the mixed-gender workplace ($p = 0.01$), it had no impact on application rates ($p = 0.93$). The effects on safety perceptions were not purely mechanical. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I find that the safety treatment significantly improved safety perceptions in the mixed office *relative* to the women-only office ($p = 0.03$) but did not differentially affect labor supply ($p = 0.99$). These findings foreshadow the results from the second experiment, which reinforce the view that safety cannot be the only issue.

Finally, I find that social image concerns are unlikely to be the primary driver of the results. Women in the experiment stated that their family and neighbors would find it more socially acceptable for them to work in the women-only office ($p < 0.001$), thus making it plausible that social image concerns drove their choices. To test this, I exogenously varied how public women's decisions were by cross-randomizing the proportion of households surveyed in a given street. In *low-intensity* streets, surveyors only approached one in every three households, while in *high-intensity* streets, they approached *every* household on the street, making it more likely that participants' neighbors would know whether they attended a given office. The treatment provided a means of varying social image concerns in a natural and subtle manner. In *high-intensity* streets, women were indeed more than twice as likely to report knowing others who had applied for a job ($p < 0.001$). Importantly, follow-up data also verify that the high-intensity treatment did not change norms. In high and low-intensity streets, there was almost no difference in women's perceptions of how acceptable their family and neighbors would find it for them to work in the mixed office relative to the women-only office ($p = 0.86$).

Despite making women's choices more public, the high-intensity treatment did not increase preferences for the women-only office relative to the mixed office. Instead, treatment effects for the women-only workplace were three times *smaller* in the high-intensity streets relative to the low-intensity ones ($p = 0.048$). What drove this pattern? One possible

[6]For ethical reasons, the safety measures were implemented at the office for all participants. What I varied was whether women were informed of these measures before applying for and attending the office.

explanation is that having neighbors working in the same organization could assuage the husband's anxiety about their wife getting involved with a male coworker (she would risk exposure if one of her neighbors notices something). Consistent with this, in a follow-up data collection exercise, participants in the high-intensity streets were significantly more likely to report that their *husbands* would find it acceptable for them to work in the mixed office ($p = 0.09$), but no more likely to believe they would be safer or better supported. The results suggest that spousal constraints *within* the household may be more important than social image constraints *outside* the household.

While the results of the first experiment suggest that spousal jealousy is an important driver of preferences for women-only workplaces, I cannot rule out peer quality as a potential alternative mechanism: women may simply prefer working with other women because they are easier to speak to and more supportive. I therefore conduct a mechanism experiment to isolate spousal jealousy.

2. Mechanism experiment: Surveyors recruited a separate sample of women, but this time offered them a job in the women-only office that also included a mandatory peer support program. If a woman expressed interest, surveyors returned when her husband was also present to explain the peer support program in more detail – a critical design feature given the importance of measuring joint household preferences ($N = 210$). The peer support program connected women with a more experienced colleague at another office who provided them with work and career advice via phone calls, video calls, and WhatsApp messages (all standard modes of communication in Indian workplaces). The interactions occurred online using office devices to minimize physical safety concerns and in private to eliminate social image concerns.

I first present cross-sectional evidence that in the peer support interactions, households remain concerned about the potential for romantic attraction between the wife and other coworkers. To test this, surveyors asked women, in front of their husbands, how they would prefer to be addressed if they were to interact with a male peer in the *one-on-one* peer support program.[7] Sixty-three percent of women chose to be addressed as *didi* (meaning sister) as opposed to their names, with over half of these participants ascribing their preferences to a desire to signal a platonic relationship.[8] This preference to be addressed as *didi* was significantly higher in households that reported higher levels of spousal jealousy ($p = 0.03$). The result suggests that jealousy may even shape subtle aspects of social interactions, such

[7]The question is hypothetical, given that for ethical reasons all women were ultimately assigned a female peer to ensure no potential future spousal conflict.

[8]I include in this category people who state a desire to create a brother-sister relationship, to prevent the peer from getting the wrong idea, or to prevent their husband from being suspicious.

as the language people use, and that concerns about romantic attraction are relevant in the peer support program.

Next, I show that women have a strong preference for female peers even in the absence of physical safety and social image concerns. To measure these preferences, households were allowed to pay a fee between 20-35% of the total wage to guarantee assignment to a *female peer* in the peer support program as opposed to a (presumably male) *standard peer*.[9] In the first arm of the experiment, where women were offered *one-on-one* peer support, over half the households (53%) chose to pay the fee to guarantee having a female peer rather than risk having a male one. This substantial willingness to pay, equivalent to a full day's household income, corroborates the findings from the first experiment: even in the absence of social image and physical safety concerns, preferences for female peers persist.

I use additional treatment arms to separate spousal jealousy from peer quality. This is particularly challenging given treatments that vary spousal jealousy may also affect the quality of the interaction – a similarly-aged peer may make the husband more suspicious but also be easier to relate to for the wife; a more charismatic peer may make the husband feel insecure but be more adept at communicating with the wife. To address this, I draw on the psychological framework of romantic jealousy (White, 1981), which points to two types of jealousy-related costs. The first is a *suspicion cost*, which increases with the perceived probability of relationship threat – for instance, if a partner were to socialize intimately or frequently with someone else. The second is a fixed *distaste cost* that may arise if an interaction violates internalized norms or threatens one's self-esteem – for example, if a partner were to admire a passerby, even if it posed no risk to the relationship. I use two complementary approaches that leverage these different costs to identify jealousy.

The first identification approach exogenously varies *suspicion costs*. I test whether monitoring of the peer interaction by others reduces demand for female peers. Alongside the *one-on-one* arm, I introduce two additional treatment arms. In the *husband* arm, husbands could join the peer support discussions and were sent recordings if they could not attend. In the *group* arm, peer support took place alongside other women from the neighborhood, allowing for social monitoring. Identification requires that any differences in female peer quality (relative to male) across the different peer support programs do not drive choices. I validate this by conducting qualitative interviews with a separate sample of women from the same neighborhoods ($N = 100$). Surveyors asked women why some couples may pay to guarantee a female peer in the *one-on-one* program but not in the *husband* or *group* pro-

[9]The peer support program was mandatory. To ensure no potential future spousal conflict, all participants were surprised with a female peer, even those who do not choose to pay to guarantee having one. Households only learn this at the first peer support session after making their experimental choices.

grams. Consistent with a jealousy interpretation, 77% of participants cited suspicion or fear of adultery, compared to 7% who cited changes in the quality of peer support.

Monitoring significantly reduced demand for a female peer. Relative to the *one-on-one* program, the proportion of households paying to guarantee a female peer fell by 35% in the *husband* program and 42% in the *group* program (19 and 21 percentage points, $p < 0.001$, respectively). The declines were significantly larger in households with higher levels of spousal jealousy ($p = 0.03$). To ensure these patterns do not simply reflect experimenter demand effects, I also measured downstream outcomes, testing whether women actually turn up and pay the fee. I find similar effects: women in the *husband* program were 38% less likely to turn up and pay the fee (14 percentage points, $p = 0.004$).[10]

The second approach tests whether households are still willing to pay for a female peer after eliminating gender differences in peer quality. In the *video* treatment arm, participants watched prerecorded videos of the peer rather than interacting with them directly. In addition to this, participants were informed that the script used in the videos was identical no matter which peer they selected. The design leverages the fact that husbands may still feel jealous if their spouse were to watch videos of another man. Even if this treatment were to eliminate all *suspicion costs* (which it may or may not), *distaste costs* arising from threats to self-esteem or identity will remain. To validate that choosing a female peer in the video arm reflects the husband's jealousy as opposed to other motives, surveyors again asked a separate sample of women why some husbands might prefer their wife to watch a video of a female peer as opposed to a male peer: 84% cite jealousy.

Even with peer quality held constant, one-third of households still chose to pay for a female peer in the *video* program. The result also validates the identification assumption from the first approach. If households valued a female peer because they thought they would offer better support, the *video* program should have eliminated, or at least reduced, preferences for the female peer relative to the *husband* and *group* programs. Instead, take-up in the *video* program (33%) was almost identical to the *husband* (34%) and *group* (32%) programs. The combination of the two identification approaches provides strong evidence that spousal jealousy is an economically important constraint to women's employment.

The experimental results have broad labor market implications. Given women-only workplaces are not highly prevalent and may be costly for firms to provide,[11] women may be

[10] An alternative specification, as specified in my pre-analysis plan, is to consider the effect of the husband program on those who turn up *and* participate in mentoring with a standard peer. This specification yields stronger results, with the husband program increasing the fraction who do so by 63% (25 percentage points, $p < 0.001$).

[11] In India, 9% of manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees have all-female production workers (WBES, 2022).

restricted to working in specific firms or sectors. This may drive a misallocation of labor across sectors, including the home sector (Hsieh et al., 2019). Even conditional on finding work, if these preferences give firms monopsony power over workers, this may allow them to drive down women's wages (Sharma, 2023a). In addition to this, the results from the second experiment also raise the possibility that spousal jealousy may constrain women's lives in ways that extend well beyond employment, for example, who they interact with and the media they consume.

The research speaks to a growing body of papers that highlight how specific job attributes may limit women's employment, such as working outside the home (Ho et al., 2024; Jalota and Ho, 2024), in settings where more men are present (Subramanian, 2020; Batheja, 2020; Sharma, 2023a; Garlick et al., 2025; Kondylis et al., 2025; Majbouri, 2025), or in workplaces where husbands are not present (Tandon, 2025). Many of these activities involve the potential for interactions with men that are unmonitored by husbands. This paper builds on these important findings, highlighting that spousal jealousy may partly underpin them. It also speaks to a related literature on interventions that aim to increase women's employment by targeting barriers within the household (Jayachandran, 2015; Dean and Jayachandran, 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2020; Field et al., 2021; Kala and McKelway, 2025). The study provides the first evidence, to my knowledge, on how women-only workplaces affect job applications and attendance, demonstrating substantial increases in labor supply.

There is an extensive literature in psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology studying romantic jealousy. Much of this work highlights male insecurities about infidelity (Daly et al., 1982; Betzig, 1989; Buss et al., 1992; Trivers, 2017; Kupfer and Gul, 2023) and its connection to domestic violence (Serran and Firestone, 2004; Stieglitz et al., 2012). In economics, this paper relates most closely to a literature on regressive gender norms – particularly those concerning chastity, purity, and propriety (Jayachandran, 2015, 2020; Shofia, 2022; Agte and Bernhardt, 2023; Anderson, 2024; Becker, 2024, 2025). This paper is the first to my knowledge to provide experimental evidence on the impact of spousal jealousy on employment outcomes.

Finally, the paper contributes to a literature on women's safety and its impact on labor market outcomes. Studies document how safety concerns shape women's economic decisions, including educational and labor market decisions (Borker et al., 2021; Siddique, 2018; Buchmann et al., 2024). Much of the existing work focuses on safety concerns commuting to work, while this paper studies safety within the workplace. It also relates to interventions aimed at reducing sexual harassment (Sharma, 2023b; Amaral et al., 2025). Though I do not find evidence that safety measures *within* the workplace increase women's labor supply, I do find that they improve women's beliefs about how safe they would be working in a mixed office.

2 Setting

The study took place in Patna, the capital of Bihar – one of India's poorest and most conservative states. Despite women now comprising the majority of Indian college graduates, women's labor market participation remains dramatically lower than men's – 33% compared to 77% (ILO, 2024). Women's employment drops sharply after marriage (Bussolo et al., 2024), with most women reporting that their husbands have more say over their labor market decisions than they do (Desai et al., 2012).

Bihar illustrates the acute challenges facing India's northern states, with urban female employment remaining at just 15% (PLFS, 2024). Husbands' concerns over spousal fidelity and controlling behavior are common: 47% of women in Bihar report that their husbands would be jealous or angry if they spoke with other men, and one-sixth say that their husbands accuse them of unfaithfulness (NFHS, 2021). These jealousy concerns operate alongside serious safety constraints, which represent a major concern for women and a prominent policy priority.

The Indian government has introduced several national and state-level initiatives aimed at increasing women's employment. One of India's biggest government schemes, Mission Shakti, focuses on women's empowerment and safety, with government commitments of $1.8 billion over 5 years. In Bihar, the Jeevika program has provided support to 13 million women in areas such as vocational training and financial literacy. Despite these efforts, significant gender gaps persist.

The empirical setting for this study is the urban services sector. Services now account for over half of India's GDP and have seen rising rates of women's employment. Business process outsourcing organizations (BPOs) in particular have contributed significantly to increased women's employment in India (Jensen, 2012). The part-time contractual work opportunities offered by the firm in this study align closely with local employment patterns. Of the already-employed women in my main sample, half are engaged in part-time work, and most in industries where short-term or piece-rate contracts are common, such as domestic work, tutoring, and tailoring.

Women-only workplaces in India exist but are not exceedingly common. For example, 9% of Indian manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees have all-female production workers (WBES, 2022). These strategies are now being explored in the services sector, including some BPO offices and many major banks. How effective they are at increasing women's labor supply and through which channels they operate remains an open question.

3 Labor Supply Experiment: Design

The main goal of the first experiment is to measure the labor supply impact of providing a women-only workplace as opposed to a mixed-gender one, holding beliefs about other job attributes fixed. In addition to this, I use additional cross-randomized treatments to test: (i) whether safety concerns, and (ii) social image concerns, drive the results. Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design.




Figure 1: Experimental design

3.1 Sampling and recruitment

3.1.1 Recruitment

Surveyors conducted door-to-door sampling in low- and middle-income neighborhoods near the partner's offices in Patna, India.[12] They approached households and requested to speak with married women aged 18-60 who had completed at least fifth grade.[13] Surveyors recruited a maximum of one woman in any given household.[14] Participants completed the survey regardless of whether husbands were present, though husbands were encouraged to participate if available. They systematically documented reasons for non-participation. Among approached households, 41% contained no eligible woman and 24% declined to participate, with an additional 2% dropping out during the survey (Table A.1). The final experimental sample includes all participants who received information about their treatment assignment.

3.1.2 Sample characteristics

Participants ranged in age from 18 to 60, with a mean of 33 years. The median participant had completed tenth grade, and the median household income was 12,000 rupees per month ($600 PPP). A substantial fraction of women perceived high levels of spousal jealousy: 60% agreed or strongly agreed that their husband would be angry or jealous if they spoke with other men at work (Table A.2). Table 1 presents summary and balance statistics for the full sample. The treatment arms were balanced across key covariates in the women-only and mixed-gender treatment groups.

3.1.3 High-intensity sampling treatment

I designed a street-level randomization to test whether social image concerns are driving preferences for the women-only workplace. I randomized the proportion of households surveyed in a given street to create natural and exogenous variation in how public women's labor market choices were. In *high-intensity* streets, surveyors approached every household, thus making it more likely that participants' neighbors may find out about their labor market choices. In *low-intensity* streets, surveyors only approached one in every three households on a street, thus making participants' choices relatively more private.

The design relies on several key assumptions. First, that working in the mixed workplace is indeed likely to attract social disapproval; second, that the high-intensity treatment does

[12] I focus on low- and middle-income households given BPO jobs are less likely to be of interest to high income households

[13] In the early stages of data collection, households were allowed to refer their neighbors to the survey. Thirty-four households were recruited in this manner. This recruitment strategy was later stopped to minimize spillovers.

[14] If there were multiple such women, the surveyor prioritized women whose husbands were currently present, and then the one who was closest to 35 in age.

Table 1: Labor supply experiment balance table.

		Balance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variable	Full sample	Mixed-gender	Women-only	p-value
Age	32.76	32.90	32.62	0.566
Employed	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.350
Ever employed	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.636
Interested in jobs	3.13	3.12	3.13	0.668
Number of children	2.42	2.42	2.43	0.966
Years of marriage	15.28	15.36	15.21	0.791
Finished 10th grade	0.55	0.56	0.54	0.558
Hindu	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.804
Other backward caste	0.73	0.72	0.74	0.419
Jealousy index	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.470
Age of husband	39.67	39.72	39.62	0.938
Husband employed	0.88	0.87	0.89	0.144
Husband finished 10th grade	0.63	0.62	0.64	0.313
F-test: statistic				0.78
F-test: p-value				0.68
Number of observations	1400	701	699	

Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the means for the full sample, mixed-gender and women-only workplaces, respectively. Column (4) shows the p-value for a test of equality between columns (2) and (3). The table displays robust standard errors as well as the test statistic and p-value for an F-test for whether the covariates jointly predict treatment assignment. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

not shift norms; and finally, that the high-intensity treatment makes women's labor market choices more public. I verify these assumptions in a follow-up data collection exercise.

In addition to providing subtle variation in how public women's choices were, the design also served an additional purpose of ensuring external validity. For most job opportunities available in the labor market, women may be less likely to know others who are already working there. Estimating preferences for the women-only workplace in the *low-intensity* streets, where women would be less likely to know others at the organization, allows for a better understanding of how the treatment effects may map to other settings.

The treatment was implemented by manually assigning street IDs to roads on Google Maps before randomizing the streets to be high or low-intensity streets with a 50% probability.[15] Field supervisors used these maps to help identify streets.[16] They then told surveyors

[15]Longer roads were broken up into smaller components, and each component was assigned a unique street ID. No street contained more than 100 households.

[16]Online maps are not always up to date in my setting. Supervisors' assessments were ultimately used to map households to street IDs.

which sampling strategy to use based on whether the street had been randomized to be a high or low-intensity street. In *high-intensity* streets, surveyors also visited households without direct street access, such as upper-floor apartments. To ensure comparability across samples, the high-intensity treatment analysis excludes these non-street-accessible households since they were not surveyed in *low-intensity* streets. This randomization was introduced partway through data collection, resulting in 966 households for the high-intensity treatment analysis rather than the 1400 households in the full sample.

Baseline characteristics are balanced across the sampling intensity treatment arms. Participants in high-intensity streets had slightly fewer children and marginally less educated husbands (Table 2). However, these differences are small in magnitude, and a joint F-test confirms that the full set of covariates does not significantly predict the high-intensity sampling treatment.

Table 2: Labor supply experiment balance table for high- and low-intensity streets

		Balance			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Variable	Full sample	Low spill.	High spill.	p-value	
Age	33.26	33.48	33.19	0.713	
Employed	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.751	
Ever employed	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.924	
Interested in jobs	3.14	3.09	3.15	0.233	
Number of children	2.44	2.58	2.40	0.034	**
Years of marriage	15.70	15.92	15.63	0.729	
Finished 10th grade	0.54	0.59	0.53	0.170	
Hindu	0.98	0.97	0.98	0.733	
Other backward caste	0.76	0.72	0.77	0.230	
Jealousy index	-0.03	0.06	-0.05	0.221	
Age of husband	40.40	40.21	40.46	0.894	
Husband employed	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.881	
Husband finished 10th grade	0.64	0.70	0.62	0.065	*
F-test: statistic				1.38	
F-test: p-value				0.17	
Number of observations	966	215	751		

Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the means for the full sample, low-intensity streets, and high-intensity streets, respectively. Column (4) shows the p-value for a test of equality between columns (2) and (3). Standard errors are clustered at the street-level. The table displays the test statistic and p-value for an F-test for whether the covariates jointly predict treatment assignment.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3.2 Baseline

3.2.1 Demographics

After obtaining informed consent, surveyors collected basic household demographic information from participants and assessed their interest in part-time work. I stratified the workplace randomization based on participants' expressed interest levels and excluded participants with no interest in new employment. Surveyors invited husbands to join the survey if they were present.

3.2.2 Workplace description

Surveyors then informed participants that our partner organization was opening two business process outsourcing (BPO) offices in the area: one mixed-gender and one women-only. They explained that both BPO offices offered identical part-time positions, with the same tasks, management, and amenities. To eliminate any perceived differences in promotion prospects, surveyors highlighted that these were one-time, two-week contracts. Participants and their husbands (if present) received two flyers describing each workplace (Figure A.1). I used four different flyer versions to ensure balance in design elements and demographic characteristics of individuals in the photos (see Appendix C.1 for details). The flyers featured over 20 unique photos distributed across four women-only and mixed-gender versions to ensure no single image drove the treatment effects. I also randomized the wage offers to measure labor supply elasticities and benchmark treatment effects.

3.3 Safety treatments

I randomized participants to one of three safety treatment arms:

1. **Safety treatment:** Participants received detailed information about workplace safety measures. I designed this treatment based on pilot feedback, identifying features that would best address women in my setting's safety concerns about mixed-gender workplaces. Surveyors informed participants that our partner organization prioritized women's safety and does not tolerate any kind of sexual harassment. They then showed participants a flyer highlighting five specific safety measures: reference checks, female security guards, a strict sexual harassment policy, sexual harassment training, and security cameras at the workplace (Figure A.2a).

2. **Placebo control:** This treatment arm seeks to isolate any experimenter demand effects or signal, positive or negative, that comes from discussing safety protocols with the participant. It does so by using generic language commonly used in job descriptions.

Participants only received the general statement that the organization does not tolerate sexual harassment, without details about specific measures (Figure A.2b).

3. **Pure control:** Participants received no information about workplace safety measures or precautions.

To ensure statistical power to test for women-only workplace preferences in the absence of extensive safety measures, I allocated two-thirds of the sample to the pure control group, one-sixth to the placebo control, and one-sixth to the safety treatment. Table A.3 shows balance across the safety treatment arms. A joint F-test shows that the covariates do not predict either of the safety treatments.

3.4 Labor supply preferences

3.4.1 Preference elicitation mechanism

Surveyors explained that there are limited job openings in both offices and that to ensure everyone had an equal opportunity of being assigned to either office, it would be determined by random chance which one they were eligible to work in. Participants received a sealed envelope with their workplace assignment, which they were instructed not to open until the end of the survey. Surveyors emphasized that they would only be able to work in the office they were assigned and that there was no way to change their assignment. For each workplace, participants chose between applying for the job or receiving a small gift.[17] For the median household, applying for the job was equivalent to giving up 13% of their total daily household income. Surveyors explained to participants that their stated preferences would be implemented for whichever workplace appeared in their envelope. To ensure women consider any family constraints when making their choices, they were informed that if they expressed interest in their assigned workplace, they would be contacted along with their husbands to schedule a training. Participants were then told the salary, which was randomized to be between ₹2000 and ₹3000 for the two-week contract ($100 and $150 PPP). Surveyors then elicited preferences for both workplaces, randomizing the order across participants.

3.4.2 Comprehension questions

Participants then answered three comprehension questions to verify they understood the assignment mechanism. The first confirmed they understood their stated preferences would not influence the workplace they were randomized to. The second confirmed their understanding

[17]Participants could choose between one of three gifts – headphones ($2 PPP), a water bottle ($1.5 PPP), or an online cash payment of 50 rupees ($2.5 PPP). Participants were told that only the choice for the workplace they were randomized into would be implemented. They were also shown an example and tested for comprehension.

of how their choices would be implemented. The third confirmed that the mixed workplace had men and women working in it, while the women-only workplace had only women. Participants could re-attempt each question after clarification if they were initially incorrect. Following the comprehension checks, participant could revise their workplace preferences if they desired.[18]

3.5 Mechanism measures

3.5.1 Belief measures

After participants confirmed their choices, surveyors asked them which office they would prefer to work in and, if they had a preference, why. Surveyors recorded their responses and probed if the initial response was vague or unclear.

Following this, surveyors elicited participants' beliefs across several workplace dimensions: (i) perceived safety for women in each workplace;[19] (ii) the proportion of male employees in the mixed workplace; (iii) the quality of the office amenities; and (iv) the organization's sexual harassment track record. Participants also expressed their hypothetical interest in the mixed workplace under varying male employee shares of 30%, 50%, or 70% (randomized across participants).

3.5.2 Spousal jealousy

I measure spousal jealousy using a two-question index administered privately to wives. If surveyors could not speak to the wife in private during the initial visit, a second enumerator returned to collect this data separately. The index comprised of the following questions:

1. **Direct report:** Do you agree or disagree with the following statement "My husband would be angry or jealous if I were interacting with other men at work?"

2. **Internalized norms:** Do you agree or disagree with the following statement – Married women should not spend time with men outside their family?

In my pre-analysis plan, I also included a measure of second-order beliefs and controlling behavior in the jealousy index. I removed these from the index, given they do not directly speak to jealousy concerns internal to the household, but include robustness checks that also use the original index. Surveyors asked participants who in the household decides how money in the house is spent to capture decision-making power in the household.

[18] Given the high levels of comprehension, only 3% of participants elected to do so.

[19] After collecting data from 20% of households, a visual aid was used to help participants provide a score from 0-10 (see Figure A.3)

3.5.3 Spillovers

To test for a first stage for the high-intensity sampling treatment, surveyors asked women how many other study participants they knew and had spoken with.

3.6 Workplace treatment

After collecting belief measures, surveyors revealed participants' workplace assignments and implemented their stated preferences. The main analysis sample included all participants who learned their treatment assignment.

3.7 Labor supply outcomes

3.7.1 Job application

Participants interested in their assigned workplace completed a brief job application form.

3.7.2 Training Day

Job applicants were invited to attend an in-person training day. Prior to training, surveyors contacted participants and their husbands to confirm attendance. When husbands had not been present during the initial survey, surveyors went through the same job description with them and revealed the wife's workplace assignment. Participants received compensation for training attendance, and surveyors conducted reminder visits on the scheduled training day. Some participants arrived with family members, including husbands and children. Young children were allowed to remain in the office during training, while other family members were permitted to sit in a separate waiting area outside the office. The full details of the training day activities are outlined in Appendix C.5

3.7.3 Workplace attendance

A subset of trained participants were offered a job.[20] Although workplace attendance was recorded, I am not powered to analyze this as a primary outcome. Details on activities at the workplace are included in Appendix C.6.

3.8 Follow-up belief elicitation

In a follow-up survey, conducted soon after participants rejected the job or attended the training day, surveyors collected participants' beliefs about the workplaces to understand mechanisms through which high-intensity sampling treatment may impact labor market

[20]In the first experiment, approximately 10% of participants who attended the training day were offered a job. In the second experiment, all participants who completed the second survey were offered a job.

choices. To measure a first-stage for making women's choices more public, surveyors documented whether participants knew or had spoken with other survey participants or job applicants from their street. They then measured beliefs about both workplace types across multiple dimensions: workplace safety, whether their husband would find it socially acceptable to work in a given office, whether their family and neighbors would find it socially acceptable to work in a given office, whether they expected to feel supported and make friends, and their expectation of the male employee share in the mixed office. Following this, surveyors also administered a short information experiment measuring how perceptions would change if more neighbors hypothetically attended the office (for details, see Appendix C.2).

4 Labor Supply Experiment: Results

4.1 Empirical strategy

I estimate the effect of providing a women-only workplace on interest in applying for jobs using the following specification:

$$Y_{iw} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{WomenOnly}_{iw} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{iw} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{iw} is an indicator equal to one if individual i expresses interest in applying for job w, WomenOnly_{iw} is an indicator for the women-only office (as opposed to mixed) and varies within person, and γ_i are individual fixed effects. The coefficient β captures the impact of providing a women-only workplace on job applications. This specification uses robust standard errors.

For the safety treatment analysis, I run the same specification interacted with the safety treatments and cluster standard errors at the individual level.

To test the impact on downstream outcomes, I also measure impacts on training day attendance. I estimate the following specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \delta \cdot \text{WomenOnly}_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i, \tag{2}$$

where Y_i is a binary variable equal to one if individual i attends the training day, and WomenOnly_i is an indicator for whether the participant was randomized to the women-only office and varies between person. The coefficient δ captures the impact of providing a women-only office on workplace attendance. The vector X_i includes controls for baseline stated preferences over job types (indicators for applying to both offices, applying to women-only only and not mixed, applying to mixed and not women-only, and applying to neither);

fixed effects for interest in part-time work; fixed effects for the wage offer; and indicator variables for prior employment history, whether the husband is currently employed, whether the husband was present during the survey, and respondent's age. This specification also uses robust standard errors.

For the safety treatment analysis, I run the same specification fully interacted with the safety treatments and cluster standard errors at the individual level. Similarly, for the high-intensity sampling analysis, I fully interact this specification with the high-intensity treatment but cluster standard errors at the street level.

4.2 Impact of women-only workplace treatment on labor supply

Figure 2 shows the main result of this experiment. Women were 13 percentage points (46%) more likely to apply for a job in the women-only office ($p < 0.001$). These preferences translated into greater workplace attendance. Women randomized to the women-only office were 6 percentage points (31%) more likely to attend an in-person training day ($p < 0.001$).




Figure 2: Impact of women-only workplace on labor supply

Notes: Impact of providing a women-only workplace on choosing to apply for a job (left panel) and turning up at the training day (right panel). The *Mixed-gender* bar plots the proportion of women who applied or turned up for the mixed-gender job, while the *Women-only* bar plots the mixed-gender mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect.

These treatment effects are large in a context where increasing female labor force participation has historically been challenging. Despite being a focus of the Bihar state government and strong economic growth, female labor force participation in urban Bihar remains at 16% compared to over 70% for men (PLFS, 2024). Consistent with this, I find that women are unresponsive to standard economic incentives of offering higher wages. I find similar treatment effects irrespective of the wage offered (Table 3). Labor supply is relatively inelastic with respect to wages. A 1% increase in the wage offer increased job applications by 0.08 percentage points (p = 0.35) and workplace attendance by 0.04 percentage points (p = 0.59). These labor supply elasticity estimates suggest that one would need to offer 2.5 times the wage to achieve the (6 p.p.) increase in labor supply from the women-only workplace treatment.

Husbands were by far the biggest constraint preventing women who applied for the job from attending the workplace. Of those who do not attend the job, 61% were prevented by their husband, and another 7% were prevented by other family members. Other major impediments included having young children to care for (7%), health issues (4%), and time constraints (4%) (Table A.4).

Participants showed a strong understanding of the preference elicitation mechanism, suggesting the results are not driven by comprehension issues. On average, 93% answered the comprehension questions correctly on their first attempt, and 99% after their second attempt (Table A.5).

4.3 Mechanisms

Eighty-six percent of participants stated that they would prefer to work in the women-only office, compared to 5% of participants who said they would prefer the mixed office. Table A.6 shows the reasons participants gave when explaining their preference for the women-only office. In this section, I explore which of these mechanisms is consistent with the data.

4.3.1 Safety treatments

Safety concerns do not appear to drive the results. To begin, the safety treatment improved participants' perceptions of the organization. Table 4 shows that participants randomized to the safety arm thought the organization had a significantly better track record on women's safety (column 1) as well as better workplace amenities (column 2). This also translated into improved safety perceptions of the *mixed-gender* office (column 3, $p = 0.01$).

These improved safety perceptions do not simply reflect experimenter demand effects. The safety treatment had no impact on participants' beliefs about the women-only office ($p = 0.70$). Column 3 of Table 4 runs a difference-in-differences regression to show that

Table 3: Labor supply elasticity and treatment effects by wages.

	Job application					Workplace attendance				
	(1) 4000	(2) 5000	(3) 6000	(4) Pooled	(5) Pooled	(6) 4000	(7) 5000	(8) 6000	(9) Pooled	(10) Pooled
Women-only	0.167***	0.131***	0.094***	1.658***		0.046	0.058*	0.053	-0.126	
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.581)		(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(1.391)	
Log(wages)				0.168*	0.078				0.032	0.044
				(0.087)	(0.084)				(0.110)	(0.082)
Log(wages) × Women-only				-0.180***					0.021	
				(0.068)					(0.164)	
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control mean	0.27	0.27	0.34			0.22	0.20	0.23		
p-value: Wage				0.05	0.35				0.77	0.59
p-value: Wage + Wage × Women-only				1					1	
Observations	706	1454	640	2800	2800	353	727	320	1400	1400

Notes: Columns (1) - (3) show the impact of providing a women-only workplace on job applications. These columns show the results for the participants who were (randomly) offered a salary of 4000, 5000, and 6000 rupees per month, respectively. Column (4) shows the results pooling the data and adding controls for the wage offer (in thousands of rupees) and the wage offer interacted with the women-only treatment dummy. Column (5) only includes a control for the wage offer. Columns (6)-(10) show the same results for workplace attendance. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

the safety treatment significantly improves participants' beliefs about the mixed workplace *relative* to the women-only office ($p = 0.03$). In addition to this, I also find that the placebo treatment arm has no impact on participants' beliefs about either office.

However, turning to labor supply, I find no impact of the safety treatment on women's labor market choices. The safety treatment had no impact on job application rates to the mixed office (column 4, Table 4), nor workplace attendance (column 5, Table 4). Similarly, the difference-in-difference specification that includes all controls from the main specification (in column 6) shows that the safety treatment had no impact on workplace attendance in the mixed office relative to the women-only office. The placebo treatment also had no impact on labor supply.

4.3.2 High-intensity sampling treatment

The high-intensity sampling treatment was designed to test whether social image concerns are the primary driver of women-only workplace preferences. It is plausible that working in the mixed office is stigmatized, and women choose not to work there to avoid the social disapproval of their community. To first establish whether working in the mixed office is stigmatized, surveyors conducted a follow-up data collection exercise. They returned to households and asked them whether their family and neighbors would find it socially acceptable for them to take up work in either office. Women perceived that it would be significantly more stigmatized to work in the mixed office (Table 5 column 2, $p < 0.001$,). Importantly, mixed employment was stigmatized in both high- and low-intensity streets, with no significant difference in the level of stigma (column 3, $p = 0.85$).

The high-intensity treatment made women's labor market choices more public. Women in high-intensity recruitment streets were 17 percentage points more likely to say that they knew other women who applied for a job in one of the offices (column 1, $p < 0.001$). Thus, if social image concerns are a primary drive of labor market choices, the high-intensity treatment should increase preferences for the women-only workplace relative to the mixed workplace.

I find no evidence of this: preferences for the women-only workplace were significantly *smaller* in the *high-intensity* streets, suggesting that social image concerns cannot fully explain women-only workplace preferences (column 5, $p = 0.05$). In the *low-intensity* streets, women assigned to the women-only office were 12 percentage points more likely to turn up for the job (Figure 3, left panel, $p = 0.003$) – strengthening the view that preferences for the women-only workplaces would generalize to other settings where women also know fewer women working at a given firm. The treatment effects fell to 3 percentage points in the *high-intensity* streets (Figure 3, right panel, $p = 0.101$). There was no impact of spillovers on job applications in the initial survey, reflecting the fact that women had not had the

Table 4: Impact of safety treatments on perceptions of workplace safety and labor supply.

	Beliefs			Labor supply		
	(1) Track record	(2) Amenities	(3) Safety	(4) Job interest	(5) Training day	(6) Training day
Placebo control	-0.052	-0.012	0.054	0.064	0.010	-0.032
	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.194)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.033)
Safety treatment	0.096***	0.122**	0.523***	0.003	-0.065	-0.014
	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.197)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.029)
Women-only			2.378***	0.134***	0.044*	0.064***
			(0.081)	(0.011)	(0.026)	(0.018)
Women-only × Placebo control			-0.175	-0.002	-0.008	-0.008
			(0.225)	(0.028)	(0.071)	(0.053)
Women-only × Safety treatment			-0.471**	-0.023	0.082	-0.001
			(0.216)	(0.027)	(0.068)	(0.050)
Control variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Control mean	0.69	3.01	6.07	0.28	0.22	0.22
p-value: Full safety	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.93	0.12	0.63
p-value: Women-only × Full safety			0.03	0.38	0.23	0.99
p-value: Full safety + Women-only × Full safety			0.70	0.62	0.75	0.71
Observations	1400	1400	2796	2800	1400	1400

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the impact of the safety treatment on participants' beliefs about the organization's track record on women's safety and beliefs about the quality of amenities in the offices. Column (3) shows the impact of the safety treatments on participants' beliefs about safety for women in the mixed and women-only offices. Column (4) shows the impact on interest in applying for the mixed and women-only office. Columns (5) and (6) show impacts on training day attendance without and with controls (respectively). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

opportunity to speak with their peers when making their initial application choices.[21]

The results naturally raise the question of what drove the attenuation of treatment effects in the high-intensity streets. Several possible protective mechanisms exist. First, having other women from the neighborhood working at the same organization could provide safety in numbers; second, knowing others working at the same organization could make the work more enjoyable; and finally, having others in the household's social network present at the office could provide husbands with a means of monitoring their wives' interactions and therefore reducing jealousy concerns. To test these hypotheses, surveyors also measured women's beliefs about other aspects of the job during follow-up data collection. Women in high-intensity streets reported that their husbands would find it significantly more socially acceptable for them to attend the mixed-gender office (Table A.7, column 2).[22] The high-intensity sampling treatment had no impact on women's perceptions of workplace safety or expectations of feeling supported at the office, suggesting that protective effects operated specifically through the husband rather than broader community acceptance or other workplace factors.

As a final robustness check, I show that there is no evidence of differential attrition or selection into the experiment across low and high-intensity streets (Table A.10).

Taken together, the results suggest that social image constraints *outside* the household may be less critical in shaping women's labor supply decisions as compared to spousal constraints *within* the household. I extend on these results in the second experiment by testing whether preferences for the women-only coworkers persist even in settings where decisions are entirely private.

4.3.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects

I also study how the treatment effects vary by an index of spousal jealousy.

First, I find that the women-only workplace treatment effects were significantly stronger in households with greater spousal jealousy. Figure 4 presents the results for households, split by above- and below-median jealousy. In households with the above-median spousal jealousy, women in the women-only treatment group were 8 percentage points (44%) more likely to attend the training day ($p < 0.001$) relative to those assigned to the mixed-gender office. In households with below-median spousal jealousy, women in the women-only group were only 4 percentage points (17%) more likely to attend the training day ($p = 0.041$).

[21] In two instances, surveyors mistakenly returned to the same section of a street on different days, using new street IDs and a different sampling intensity. They surveyed different households on each day. The results are robust to dropping these streets.

[22] Surveyors were trained to clarify to participants that they were being asked what the husband viewed as socially acceptable, rather than the husband's perceptions of what others think.




Figure 3: Impact of spillovers on labor supply

Notes: Impact of providing a women-only workplace on turning up at the training day among households randomized to *low-intensity* and *high-intensity* streets. In *low-intensity* streets, surveyors approached one in every three households on the street. In *high-intensity* streets, surveyors approached every household on the street. The *Mixed-gender* bar plots the proportion of women who turned up for a training day in the mixed office, while the *Women-only* bar plots the mixed-gender mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect. Each panel displays the treatment effect p-value.

Table A.8 linearly interacts the jealousy index with the women-only treatment. For households who scored one standard deviation higher on the jealousy index, the impact of the women-only workplace on job applications was 1.5 percentage points larger ($p = 0.09$) and on workplace attendance was 3.4 percentage points larger ($p = 0.03$, Table A.8, column 1).

These results are robust to other specifications. Column 4 includes the original pre-registered jealousy index that also includes a measure of social image concerns (beliefs about the friends' and neighbors' attitudes) and controlling behavior (whether husbands insist on knowing where their wife is going when she leaves the house). I find similar effects using the pre-registered index. In column 5, I control for a measure of decision-making power and also interact this with the women-only workplace treatment to ensure this is not driving the results. I again find similar effects. Column 6 does the same with a measure

Table 5: Impact of spillovers on participants' beliefs and labor supply

	Beliefs			Labor supply	
	(1) Know others who applied	(2) Socially acceptable	(3) Socially acceptable	(4) Job application	(5) Workplace attendance
Panel A: Full sample					
High intensity	0.168***		0.060	0.060	0.036
	(0.037)		(0.096)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Women-only		0.691***	0.705***	0.149***	0.115***
		(0.035)	(0.085)	(0.022)	(0.037)
Women-only × High intensity			-0.017	-0.008	-0.083**
			(0.093)	(0.025)	(0.042)
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No
Additional controls	No	No	No	No	Yes
Control mean	0.12	-0.34	-0.39	0.23	0.16
p-value: Women-only		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
p-value: Women-only × High intensity			0.85	0.76	0.05
Observations	874	1748	1748	1932	966
Panel B: High jealousy sample					
High intensity	0.177***		0.067	0.036	0.091*
	(0.044)		(0.120)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Women-only		0.720***	0.763***	0.142***	0.188***
		(0.054)	(0.131)	(0.037)	(0.052)
Women-only × High intensity			-0.055	0.003	-0.156**
			(0.143)	(0.042)	(0.060)
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No
Additional controls	No	No	No	No	Yes
Control mean	0.11	-0.47	-0.52	0.20	0.09
p-value: Women-only		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
p-value: Women-only × High intensity			0.70	0.93	0.01
Observations	814	814	814	888	444

Notes: Panel A shows results for the full sample, and Panel B shows results for above-median jealousy households. Column (1) shows the impact on a dummy for whether women say they know others who have applied for a job at either office. Columns (2) and (3) shows impacts on the wife's perception of how socially acceptable her family and neighbors would find it for her to work in each office; Column (4) shows interest in applying for a job in each office in the survey; and Columns (5) show workplace attendance using controls from the main specification fully interacted with the high-intensity treatment dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the street-level and shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

of household safety concerns (i.e. how safe the participants rated the two offices); column 7 with demographic controls; and column 8, with all baseline covariates that predict the jealousy index using Lasso. Across all these specifications, I find similar results: preferences for the women-only workplace are strongest in households with the greatest spousal jealousy.

I also find similar patterns for the high-intensity sampling results. Table 5 shows that the

impact of the high-intensity sampling treatment on preferences for the women-only workplace are concentrated in households with above-median jealousy. Looking at other baseline covariates, I find stronger preferences for women-only workplaces among older couples as well as households where husbands are not working (Table A.9).




Figure 4: Impact of women-only workplace by spousal jealousy.

Notes: Impact of providing a women-only workplace on turning up at the training day among households with below median jealousy (left panel), and above-median jealousy (right panel). To measure jealousy, I create an index according to the wife's perception of their husband's jealous tendencies. The *Mixed-gender* bar plots the proportion of women who turned up for a training day in the mixed office, while the *Women-only* bar plots the mixed-gender mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect. Each panel also displays the treatment effect p-values.

4.3.4 Interpretation of mechanisms

The women-only workplace treatment generated substantial increases in labor supply, affecting both job applications and workplace attendance. Participants cite four plausible mechanisms when explaining their preference for the women-only workplace. First, the

women-only workplace may alleviate spousal jealousy by enabling women to work without violating internalized norms or arousing spousal suspicion. Second, it may enhance safety by reducing exposure to sexual harassment or assault. Third, it may reduce the social cost of attending the office. And finally, it may provide higher-quality peers, making it easier to interact with colleagues and to form professional relationships.

The cross-randomized safety treatment provides a direct test of the workplace safety mechanism. While the treatment successfully improved participants' workplace safety perceptions of the mixed-gender workplace, establishing a clear first stage, it produced no measurable impact on labor supply decisions. These results suggest that safety concerns are unlikely to be the primary driver of preferences for women-only workplaces.

The high-intensity sampling results appear to be inconsistent with a social image concerns mechanism. The high-intensity treatment made women's labor market decisions more public, thus increasing the social cost of attending the mixed office. The fact that this treatment *increased* preferences for the mixed workplace relative to the women-only workplace suggests that social image concerns are unlikely to be the primary driver of preferences. Instead, the *high-intensity* treatment generated a *protective effect* of significantly increasing women's beliefs about how acceptable their husbands would find it for them to work at the mixed-gender office. This could plausibly operate through a spousal jealousy mechanism, by providing implicit social monitoring – husbands may perceive lower infidelity risk when neighbors can observe their wives' workplace interactions. These results suggest that spousal jealousy *within* the household may be a more important driver of labor supply decisions as compared to broader social pressure *outside* the household.

The concentration of the treatment effects, both the main impact of the women-only workplace and high-intensity sampling patterns, among households with the most jealous husbands, provides suggestive evidence of a spousal jealousy mechanism.

Taken together, the results from the first experiment show that women have a strong preference for working in a women-only workplace. The treatment effects are large and suggest that the intervention may provide an effective tool for policymakers to increase women's employment and for firms to attract talent. The workplace safety and high-intensity sampling treatments suggest that safety concerns and social image concerns are unlikely to be the main drivers of these preferences, and there is suggestive evidence that spousal jealousy is important. However, the experiment does not isolate spousal jealousy as a causal mechanism, and it remains possible that preferences for the women-only office are driven by perceived differences in peer quality. Understanding the relative importance of these mechanisms is critical for designing more targeted, and potentially cost-effective, interventions.

5 Spousal Mechanism Experiment: Design

The goal of the second experiment is to isolate spousal jealousy as a causal mechanism. I leverage a setting in which women interact remotely and privately with coworkers. I first present cross-sectional evidence that in this setting households still worry about the potential for romantic attraction between coworkers. Next, I measure women's preferences for interacting with female colleagues (as opposed to male colleagues) in this setting, where there are minimal physical safety and social image concerns. Finally, I attempt to separate whether preferences for a female colleague in the experiment are driven by spousal jealousy or perceived differences in peer quality (between male and female colleagues).

Separating these mechanisms is particularly challenging given the difficulty of exogenously varying spousal jealousy while holding the quality or content of an interaction fixed. For example, varying jealousy by providing women with colleagues of a similar age may make husbands more jealous, but also make it easier for participants to relate to their colleague. Having participants engage with a colleague living in another city or country may make the husbands feel less insecure, but may prevent the wife from learning valuable information about local labor markets.

I address these challenges by turning to a psychological framework of spousal jealousy (White, 1981). The framework points to two costs associated with jealousy. First, *suspicion costs* that vary with the probability of an interaction damaging a marital relationship, and second, *distaste costs* resulting from threats to self-image or identity (that do not depend on the probability of relationship damage).

$$\text{Jealousy costs} = \underbrace{\text{Fixed-cost}}_{\text{Distaste}} + \underbrace{\gamma Pr(\text{Relationship damage})}_{\text{Suspicion}}$$

I use two identification approaches that exploit both these costs in order to separate spousal jealousy from peer quality mechanisms. The first approach seeks to exogenously vary *suspicion costs* by testing whether monitoring reduces household preferences for women to interact with other women. If husbands know that other people will be present during the interaction, this may reduce their beliefs about the probability that this will damage the marriage, and thus lower spousal jealousy. The second approach aims to completely shut down differences in peer quality between female and male peers, and exploits the fact that this can be done without eliminating jealousy (given *distaste costs* may remain even if there is no threat to the relationship). While both approaches have their own limitations, together they build a compelling case that spousal jealousy is an important driver of household preferences. Figure 5 summarizes the experimental design.




Figure 5: Mechanism experiment design

5.1 Sampling and Recruitment

5.1.1 Recruitment

Like the first experiment, surveyors conducted door-to-door sampling in low- and middle-income neighborhoods near the partner's offices in Patna. To minimize spillovers, surveyors approached one in every two households on each street and made sure to conduct the surveys within participants' homes. They systematically documented households they spoke with and any reasons for non-participation. The final experimental sample included all participants who received their treatment assignment during the second survey visit.

5.1.2 Sampling

After approaching a house, surveyors asked to speak with a married woman aged 18-60 who had completed at least fifth grade. They verified that husbands also resided in Patna, were aged 18-60, and had completed fifth grade.[23]

5.1.3 Sample characteristics

The average age of women in the sample was 32, and the average age of husbands was 38. The median participant had completed 10th grade, and the median household income was 15,000 rupees per month ($750 per month PPP). Table 6 shows sample characteristics and balance. An F-test shows that the baseline covariates do not jointly predict treatment

[23]If there were multiple such women, the surveyor would prioritize any whose husband was currently present, and then the one who was closest to 35.

assignment. Similar to the first experiment, women in the sample also perceive that their husbands display a high degree of spousal jealousy – 57% agree or strongly agree that their husband would be angry or jealous if they spoke with other men at work (Table A.11).

Table 6: Mechanism experiment balance table.

		Balance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variable	Full sample	One-on-one	Husband	p-value
Age	32.14	31.96	32.50	0.652
Employed	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.711
Ever employed	0.41	0.40	0.42	0.835
Interested in jobs	3.21	3.17	3.24	0.349
Number of children	2.43	2.40	2.46	0.770
Years of marriage	14.57	14.28	14.94	0.611
Finished 10th grade	0.66	0.65	0.66	0.888
Hindu	0.96	0.94	0.97	0.349
Other backward caste	0.62	0.64	0.60	0.539
Jealousy index	-0.00	-0.08	0.05	0.362
Husband's age	37.49	37.22	37.94	0.583
Husband finished 10th grade	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.877
Husband employed	0.90	0.88	0.91	0.450
F-test: statistic				0.36
F-test: p-value				0.98
Number of observations	210	104	98	

Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the means for the full sample, one-on-one program, and husband program, respectively. Column (4) shows the p-value for a test of equality between columns (2) and (3). The F-statistic and p-value test whether the covariates jointly predict treatment assignment. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.1.4 Sample selection

Similar to the first experiment, participants predominantly drop out of either the second survey or do not attend the job because their husband prevents them from doing so (Table A.12). After collecting labor supply outcomes, surveyors revisited households that were either in the final sample or dropped out during the final survey and collected additional data on spousal jealousy. Households that drop out during the survey have significantly higher levels of spousal jealousy compared to those in the final sample. This suggests that spousal jealousy constraining women's employment may be even stronger among those participants who cannot access the labor market at all (Table A.13).

5.2 Baseline

5.2.1 Demographics

After obtaining informed consent, surveyors collected demographic information from wives, including work history and education. They assessed participants' interest in part-time employment and ended the survey for those reporting no interest in new job opportunities. Surveyors also gathered demographic information about husbands, including their age, work history, and education.

5.2.2 Job description

Surveyors then informed participants of the women-only BPO office that our partner organization is opening and that they are looking to hire women on a part-time basis. They then showed participants the workplace flyer and described the position, emphasizing that this was a one-time, two-week opportunity. Surveyors briefly explained that the job includes a peer support program in which they will speak with a peer from a different office who will provide them with career advice. Finally, they revealed the compensation structure: a salary of either ₹1,200 ($60 PPP) or ₹1,500 ($75 PPP), randomized across participants, plus a fixed travel allowance of ₹500 ($25 PPP) for five days of work.[24]

5.2.3 Job application

Surveyors then asked participants whether they wished to apply for the position and peer support program. Interested participants completed a brief application form, after which surveyors scheduled a return visit to conduct the second survey with both spouses present.

5.3 Peer support preference elicitation

The survey team returned to households for the second survey if both the husband and wife consented to participate. Surveyors ensured that only the husband and wife were present for the survey,[25] re-explained the job to the couple, and confirmed that the wife is still interested in the job.

5.3.1 Peer support program

Surveyors then provided detailed information about the peer support program to both spouses. They explained that participants will be matched with a slightly more experienced peer from another office who will provide career guidance through phone calls, video

[24]The first 25% of recruited households were only told about the travel allowance at the end of the second survey.

[25]In a handful of cases, other family members, typically important decision-makers in the household, such as the mother- or father-in-law, refused to leave, in which case surveyors conducted the survey with them present.

calls, and WhatsApp messages using office devices.[26] Surveyors then briefly explain the four different peer support programs.

The programs are designed to vary the extent to which husbands can monitor their wives' interactions with the peer, and whether or not peer quality is held constant (across male and female peers). The four programs are the:

1. **One-on-one program**: In this program, participants spoke directly with their peer without others present. These interactions were unmonitored.

2. **Husband program:** This program introduced direct monitoring by the husband. Participants were told that, in order to allow husbands to support their wives' professional development, in this program, they would be given the option to join conversations with the peer. If unable to join, husbands would be sent recordings of the conversations.

3. **Group program:** This program introduced social monitoring from other women in the neighborhood. All discussions between the wife and the peer happened alongside other women from the neighborhood. The program may minimize spousal jealousy in two respects. First, it provides husbands with a means of monitoring interactions via other women in the neighborhood, and second, it may reduce the risk (in the husband's mind) of romantic interactions taking place between the wife and the peer.

4. **Video program:** This program introduced a form of monitoring from the firm: participants would watch prerecorded videos of their peer that were screened ahead of time to ensure the best possible support. It also ensured there would be no differences in the perceived quality of interaction between female and male peers: participants were told that the script used in the videos would be the same irrespective of the peer's gender. If peer quality is driving preferences for a female peer, this treatment should eliminate those preferences. Some husbands may continue to feel jealous if their wife were to watch a video of a male peer, and some wives may view it as a violation of norms.

5.3.2 Program randomization

Surveyors then explained the randomization process to participants. Due to limited program capacity, assignment to the programs would occur by chance. Participants received sealed envelopes containing their program assignments, which would be opened at the survey's

[26]This was done to minimize fear of safety and harassment. To minimize any potential risk of future spousal conflict the the program was implemented by assigning a female peer to all participants, including those who did not pay to guarantee having one. To implement this without deception, surveyors always referred to the two peers as the female peer and the standard peer (as opposed to the male peer).

conclusion. I allocated most participants to the one-on-one program (47.5%) and husband program (47.5%) to ensure adequate power for comparing attendance outcomes between these primary treatment arms and stratified by the wife's employment history and tenth-grade completion status. The remaining participants were randomized to the group program (2.5%) and video program (2.5%).

5.3.3 Fee to guarantee a female peer

Surveyors then explained that our partner organization did not have many female staff working in their other office available to provide peer support. They explained that a fee would be charged to anyone wanting to guarantee having a female peer. Those paying the fee would have it deducted from their salary, while those who chose not to pay the fee would receive the full salary and a *standard* peer (who could be a man). Participants were informed that if they chose the standard peer they would be paired with one of the employees from our partner's other office, most of whom were men. I randomized fee size across participants to be either ₹400 ($20 PPP) or ₹600 ($30 PPP), representing 20-35% of the total compensation. Surveyors then outlined the process to participants: detailed program explanations followed by elicitation of willingness to pay for a female peer in each program. Participants received a brief example demonstrating how preferences would be elicited. For ethical reasons, to ensure no potential future spousal conflict, when the job and programs were implemented, all participants were assigned to a female peer, even if they did not pay for one.[27] This was not revealed to participants until they attended their first peer support program session.

5.3.4 Preference elicitation

Surveyors then reviewed each of the four programs individually. For each program, they provided detailed explanations and showed participants flyers depicting both the standard and female peers (Figure A.4). To ensure that results were not driven by the mentors' appearance, I created eight flyer versions with male and female mentors balanced across demographic characteristics (see Appendix C.3 for details). I randomized participants to one of the flyer versions, conditioning on their age to ensure that the peer who appears in the flyer is a similar age to them – those 40 or above were randomized to one of four flyer versions with older peer photos, and those below 40 to one of four flyer versions with younger peer photos. Following each program explanation, surveyors asked comprehension questions to verify participants understood key features of the programs. Participants then stated their mentor preference for each program. This procedure was repeated across all four programs, randomly reversing the order in which surveyors elicited preferences for half the

[27] I avoided deception by ensuring that statements about the standard peer were factually correct and by ensuring surveyors never referred to the standard as the male peer.

participants.

5.3.5 Comprehension

Participants then answered two additional comprehension questions. The first confirmed that they understood their stated preferences would not influence their program allocation, and the second confirmed that they understood how their choices would be implemented. For a subset of participants, surveyors also ensured they understood the peer support sessions would be conducted in private, and that nobody working at their office would be told which peer they selected. Participants could then revise their experimental decisions if they chose to. Once choices were finalized, surveyors recorded how the household came to their decisions: with discussion between the spouses, by the wife alone, or by the husband alone.

5.4 Mechanism measures

5.4.1 Platonic language

After making their choices, participants were asked how they would like to be addressed if they were (hypothetically) assigned a standard peer in the one-on-one program. They were offered three options: (i) their name (e.g. Rashmi); (ii) their name with the suffix "ji", a marker of respect (e.g Rashmi-ji); or (iii) "didi", meaning sister. In my pre-analysis plan, I hypothesized that preferences for "didi" would be particularly strong in households with higher spousal jealousy and driven by a desire to signal a platonic relationship between wife and peer.

5.4.2 Independent decision-making experiment

Appendix C.4, outlines the methods and results of a supplementary experiment testing whether women exhibit different gender preferences when their husbands are not present.

5.4.3 Spousal jealousy

I measured spousal jealousy using the same two-question index from the first experiment.

5.4.4 Willingness-to-pay

To measure willingness-to-pay across a broader price range, participants were asked which peer they would select for each program if the fee were hypothetically ₹400 ($20 USD) higher. This question was only posed to participants who had selected a female peer at the original price, under the assumption that those unwilling to pay the fee at the lower price would not pay the fee at the higher one.

5.4.5 First stage and spillovers

I then measured participants' expectations that the standard peer could be a man. To document spillovers, surveyors asked participants whether they had spoken with any other

study participants, and if so, what they discussed.

5.5 Peer support program assignment

Surveyors then scheduled participants' start dates before opening the envelope to reveal which program they were assigned to.

5.6 Labor supply outcomes

I tracked participants' workplace attendance and participation in the peer support program. At the workplace, participants answered additional questions, including their social interactions within the past week (see Appendix C.6).

5.7 Out-of-sample validation exercise

To validate that spousal jealousy was the causal mechanism in the experiment, surveyors conducted additional qualitative interviews with a separate sample of married women recruited in the same manner. These participants received explanations of the job and peer support programs, then answered open-ended questions about why couples might accept a male peer in the *husband*, *group*, and *video* programs but not in the *one-on-one* program. Surveyors probed or repeated the question if they initially gave a vague or unclear response. Participants were also asked why some husbands might want their wives to pay for a female peer even in the *video* program where no direct interaction occurs. I used a separate sample to minimize social desirability bias and discomfort from participants rationalizing their own choices.

6 Mechanism Experiment: Results

6.1 Empirical strategy

I first test whether households are more likely to select a female peer in the treatment groups that reduce spousal jealousy (the "husband", "group", and "video" programs), relative to the control group (the "one-on-one" program). I estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Husband}_{ip} + \beta_2 \text{Group}_{ip} + \beta_3 \text{Video}_{ip} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{ip} \tag{3}$$

where Y_{ip} is a binary variable equal to one if individual i in program p selects a female peer. $Husband_{ip}$, $Group_{ip}$, and $Video_{ip}$ are indicator variables equal to one if the decision

corresponds to the respective program. The omitted category is the *one-on-one* program. γ_i denotes individual fixed effects. I use robust standard errors.

I then test whether the treatment allocation affects downstream outcomes, specifically turning up at the job and incurring the fee to guarantee a female peer, or turning up at the job with a standard peer. In this specification, I am only powered to compare outcomes in the *husband* and *one-on-one* programs, and restrict the analysis accordingly. I estimate the following specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Husband}_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{4}$$

where Y_i is a binary variable equal to one if individual i attends the workplace on the first day with their chosen peer (female or standard). Husband_i is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual was randomized into the "husband" treatment program. The vector X_i includes fixed effects fully interacting in-survey peer preferences in both the *husband* and *one-on-one* program; fixed effects for the mentoring fee level; and an indicator for whether the participant has ever worked. I use robust standard errors.

6.2 Concerns for romantic interactions

I first provide cross-sectional evidence that the experiment provides a setting in which households are concerned about the potential for romantic interaction between coworkers. To do this, surveyors asked participants, in front of their husbands, how they prefer to be addressed if they were paired with a male peer in the *one-on-one* program. Approximately two-thirds of the sample reported that they would prefer to be addressed as "didi" (sister) as opposed to their name if they were (hypothetically) paired with a male peer in the *one-on-one* program. The majority of these participants reasoned that this would help to foster a platonic relationship with the peer – stating that it would help to create a brother-sister relationship, would prevent the peer from getting the wrong idea, or prevent their husband from being suspicious (Figure A.5). As hypothesized in my pre-analysis plan, this preference to use platonic language when speaking to a male coworker is significantly stronger in households with greater spousal jealousy ($p = 0.028$).

6.3 Preferences for a female peer

Turning to the experimental results, I find that in the *one-on-one* program, where husbands cannot observe their wives' interactions, 53 percent of households gave up between 20% and 35% of their wages to guarantee having a female peer. Given these interactions occur in private and remotely, they suggest that constraints beyond social image concerns and physical safety concerns drive household preferences for female peers. The high proportion




Figure 6: Demand for a female peer across peer support programs

Notes: Proportion of households willing to pay for a female peer across peer support programs. The left panel shows decisions made during the survey, while the right panel shows the proportion who turn up for the job and incur the fee to guarantee a female peer. The fee to guarantee a female peer varies between 27% and 50% of the salary. The *One-on-one* bar plots the proportion of households that pay the fee to guarantee a female peer, while the other bars plot the *One-on-one* mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect.

of households willing to pay the fee is striking, particularly given the fee is roughly equivalent to a full day of total income for the median household. These preferences are also highly inelastic. At a fee of $20 PPP, 55% choose to pay the fee, compared to 52% when the fee is $30 PPP (Table A.14). These results suggest that economic incentives are unlikely to be an effective tool in overcoming barriers to female-male workplace interactions.

6.4 Experimental tests for jealousy

I use additional treatment arms to test whether preferences for a female peer are driven by spousal jealousy (as opposed to peer quality).

6.4.1 Approach 1: Experimentally varying suspicion costs

I begin by introducing two additional treatment arms that aim to exogenously vary *suspicion costs* by having interactions with the peer be monitored. In the psychological framework of spousal jealousy, these treatments aim to reduce the level of jealousy the husband feels by reducing his beliefs that the interaction could be a threat to the marital relationship. In the *husband* program, the husband can directly monitor interactions between their wife and the peer. And in the *group* program, other women are also present for all interactions, which may serve as a means of social monitoring and address the husband's insecurities about what might be discussed if the wife and peer are alone.

This identification approach assumes that the introduction of monitoring in the *husband* and *group* program may lower demand for a female peer through a jealousy mechanism. I designed an out-of-sample validation exercise to verify that this was the case. Surveyors conducted supplementary qualitative interviews with a separate sample of women, selected using identical sampling procedures. Over 80% of participants attributed choosing a female peer in the *one-on-one* program but a male peer in the *husband* or *group* program to spousal jealousy (Figure A.6), and in most cases, to the suspicion or fear of an affair (as opposed to self-image or identity costs).

The fraction of households willing to pay the fee declined by 36% in the husband program (19 p.p., $p < 0.001$) and 40% in the group program (21 p.p., $p < 0.001$, Figure 6). Treatment effects are largest in households where husbands expressed the greatest jealousy. In households that scored in the highest tercile on the jealousy index, 67% chose to pay for the female peer in the *one-on-one* program compared to 38% in the *husband* and *group* programs ($p < 0.001$). Similar to the first experiment, these patterns are robust to using alternative indices, or adding controls for other variables fully interacted with the treatment (see Table A.15). The treatment effects are also slightly larger among women who have never worked before and non-Dalit women (Table A.16).

The effects are unlikely to reflect comprehension issues or demand effects. First, participants on average answered over 95% of the comprehension questions correctly on their first attempt (Table A.18). Secondly, the fee to guarantee a female peer was highly costly. Finally, I find similar effects for attendance outcomes. In the *one-on-one* program, 42% of households attended the job and incurred the fee to guarantee a female peer, compared to 29% in the *husband* program ($p = 0.001$).

Given approximately 10% of participants do not attend the workplace, another way to analyze the results is to measure the fraction of participants who attend peer support after choosing a standard peer (as outlined in my main specification in my pre-analysis plan). This analysis yields even stronger results. The husband program increased the proportion of

Table 7: Impact of program type on peer selection.

	Paid fee for female peer		Attended with female peer		Attended with standard peer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Husband	-0.190***	-0.190***	-0.086	-0.135***	0.208***	0.251***
	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.068)	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.037)
Group	-0.214***	-0.214***				
	(0.047)	(0.030)				
Video	-0.205***	-0.205***				
	(0.047)	(0.032)				
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control mean	0.53	0.53	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.40
p-value: Husband	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00
Observations	840	840	202	202	202	202

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the impacts of the peer support program on willingness to forgo 20-35% of the salary to be guaranteed a female peer in peer support as measured in the survey. Columns (3) and (4) show the treatment effect of the husband program on paying to guarantee a female peer *and* turning up at the job and peer support program. Columns (5) and (6) show the treatment effect of the husband program on selecting a standard peer *and* turning up at the job and peer support program. The *one-on-one* program is the omitted category in all regressions. Column (2) includes individual fixed effects. Columns (4) and (6) include controls as outlined in my main specification. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

households selecting and attending peer support with a standard peer by 60% (25 percentage points, $p < 0.001$). These stronger treatment effects reflect the fact that the *husband* program had overall labor supply effects, irrespective of the peer participants chose. Those randomized to the *husband* program are 12 percentage points more likely to attend the workplace ($p = 0.01$, column 1, Table A.17). Similar to the high-intensity sampling results from the labor supply experiment, monitoring appears to be a substitute for having female peers. For those who selected a female peer in the husband program (irrespective of their eventual treatment assignment), there was no impact of the husband program on labor supply ($p = 0.40$, column 3, Table A.17). Having the husband present is not useful if the interaction is between two women. On the other hand, there was a 15 percentage point increase in labor supply if the household selected a male peer in the husband program ($p = 0.004$, Table A.17).

The husband and group treatment arms build a compelling case that spousal jealousy is an important driver of preferences for female peers. Monitoring significantly lowers the fraction of households that choose a female peer, and the effects are concentrated in the most jealous households. Though the out-of-sample manipulation check suggests that household motives center around the husband's suspicion, it remains possible that participants simply believe that the female peer will offer better advice and that the quality of the support provided may diminish if other people are present. The second identification approach helps

to address this concern.

6.4.2 Approach 2: Eliminating differences in peer quality

The second identification strategy tries to eliminate all potential differences in the quality of advice provided by male or female peers. To do this, I included an additional *video* treatment arm in which participants watched a prerecorded video of the peer rather than interacting with them directly. It involved an element of monitoring, given participants were informed the script had been checked to ensure high-quality advice, while also holding peer quality fixed across male and female peers, given all peers read from the same script. The approach leverages the fact that even if it is the case that this treatment eliminates any possible threat to the marital relationship (which it may or may not do), identity-related jealousy costs will remain. Having the wife watch videos of a male peer working in another office may damage the husband's ego, or violate internalized norms held by the wife that married women should not interact with unrelated men. The design does not seek to ensure that the treatment eliminates the husband's suspicion and perceptions of a threat to the relationship. A jealous husband could still have (likely imagined) fears that watching videos of a male peer would lead their wives to stray from the marriage.

I again validate this strategy using a separate sample of participants, asking them why some husbands might prefer their wife to watch a video of a female peer as opposed to a male peer – 84% cite jealousy. Approximately half of these participants cited suspicion-related concerns (e.g. suspicion that it could lead to an affair), and half cited distaste-related concerns (e.g. the husband feeling insecure, having his ego threatened, or feeling that such behavior is not proper).

I find that a third of households (33%) still choose to pay for a female peer in the *video* program, despite the fact that peer quality is held fixed. The results from this treatment arm again point to spousal jealousy being a constraint on women's labor market choices (though I explore other possible explanations in the following section). This result also helps to address concerns from the first approach. In particular, if households were selecting a female peer in the first three treatment arms due to perceptions of peer quality, then willingness to pay for a female peer should have declined in this arm relative to the *husband* and *group* arms. However, take-up in the *video* arm is statistically indistinguishable from the *husband* (34%) and *group* (32%) treatment arms, suggesting that peer quality is unlikely to explain the results.




Figure 7: Impact of peer support program by spousal jealousy

Notes: Proportion of households willing to pay for a female peer across peer support programs among households with low jealousy husbands (left panel), moderate jealousy husbands (center), and high jealousy husbands (right panel). To measure jealousy, I create an index according to the wife's perception of their husband's jealous tendencies and split the sample into terciles. The fee to guarantee a female peer varies between 20% and 35% of the salary. The *One-on-one* bar plots the proportion of households who pay the fee to guarantee a female peer, while the other bars plots the *One-on-one* mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the mean.

6.5 Competing explanations

6.5.1 Social image concerns

The experimental design tries to eliminate social image concerns that may influence participants' decisions. For example, the husband and wife might worry that their neighbors may gossip if the wife were speaking privately with a man in the peer support program. The design sought to achieve this by ensuring all peer interactions and choices made by the couple occurred in private. To provide additional evidence against this mechanism, I conducted a robustness check with a subset of participants (N = 49). After participants made their initial choices, surveyors explicitly informed them that their program selections were confidential, that peer discussions occurred in private, and that no one else in the office would be told their choices. Surveyors verified their comprehension through an additional question: 94% answered correctly on their first attempt, and 100% by their second attempt (Table A.18). Making the privacy of the peer support discussions more salient produced almost no behavioral response: only 4% of participants chose to change their choices after

hearing this information.[28]

6.5.2 Internalized norms and spousal jealousy

I adopt a broad definition of spousal jealousy that includes perceived threats to identity (for the husband or wife) in addition to threats to self-esteem and relationship quality. In particular, these internalized norms may include the husband's or wife's concern that it is not proper for married women to speak with unrelated men. This raises the question as to whether identity concerns or internalized norms may be sufficient to fully describe the results in the experiments.

Some notion of jealousy and instrumental concerns about threats to relationship quality is needed to fully explain the results. In particular, the reduction in willingness to pay for female peers under monitoring conditions (husband, group, and video programs) cannot be fully explained by internalized norms as typically conceptualized in the literature. Internalized norms, for example, purity norms, are typically defined as prohibiting women from interacting with unrelated men (regardless of the context) – under such norms, monitoring should not affect women's willingness to interact with male peers. The qualitative evidence supports this distinction: when asked to explain the treatment effects, nearly all out-of-sample respondents cite jealousy – that husbands would be suspicious or worry about an affair as opposed to concerns that this violates internalized norms. If one were to define internalized norms more specifically as prohibiting *private* interactions with unrelated men, this would generate the same predictions as the experiment. However, such a definition would be inconsistent with how women in this setting think about and describe these patterns of behavior.

6.5.3 Alternative explanations for the video treatment

While I cannot experimentally test why a substantial fraction of households pay for a female peer in the *video* program, I rule out several alternative explanations. First, comprehension issues are unlikely to explain the results. Participants demonstrate excellent understanding of the programs, with the vast majority correctly answering questions that:(i) no one in the office would be told their choices; (ii) th4e video scripts were the same irrespective of the peer; and (iii) there would be no direct communication with the peer (Table A.18). Moreover, participants are responsive to the husband and group treatments, confirming they understand that their selections can vary across programs.

Second, the responses do not reflect a demand for consistency with preceding choices. The order in which surveyors elicited program preferences was randomized. Thirty-six percent

[28]Only one of the participants who changed their choices such that they would pay for a female peer in the *one-on-one* program but not in the other programs.

still choose a female peer when the video program appeared first (compared to 30% when presented last). Third, the results are unlikely to reflect husbands' desire to reduce the wife's income as an assertion of power. Participants were not responsive to wage offers and were no more likely to take up the job if they received a lower salary.

A final possible explanation is that preferences for a female peer in the video arm reflect a taste-based preference, unrelated to spousal suspicion or distaste costs. For example, if women simply prefer the appearance of other women, or find a man's voice displeasing to listen to. If this were the case, these preferences would need to be extremely strongly held. Households forgo the equivalent of a full day of household income for the wife to watch videos of the male peer, and it would need to be the case that both the husband and wife agree that this taste-based preference warrants such a large fraction of household expenditure. In addition to this, preferences for watching a female peer are stronger in households where husbands have more decision-making power. Surveyors recorded how couples made their choices – whether the wife decided independently, whether the couple decided together, or whether the husband decided independently. In households where the wife decided independently, only 18% chose to pay the fee for the female peer in the *video* program, compared to 52% in households where the husband decided (Figure A.7). Finally, in the independent decision-making experiment (see Appendix C.4), I find that women make significantly different choices with respect to whether they select videos featuring men as opposed to women, when making decisions in private as opposed to with their husband present. This suggests that women's choices are determined in part by a need to send the correct signals to their husbands.

7 Conclusion

This paper investigates an understudied barrier to women's labor market participation: spousal jealousy. Drawing on two large field experiments in urban India, I show that women are significantly more likely to take up employment when jobs limit interaction with male colleagues. Consistent with a mechanism of spousal jealousy, women are more willing to interact with men when their husbands can monitor their interactions directly or via social networks. These effects are most pronounced in households with the greatest spousal jealousy.

The results have several important implications. First, they have implications for labor market efficiency. Implementing a women-only workplace may be costly for firms, and as such, these workplaces are not exceedingly common in many countries. In India, approximately 8.5% of manufacturing firms with 20 or more workers have all-women production

employees. Given that many women exhibit strong preferences for women-only workplaces, they may be restricted to working in select firms or industries. This may result in misallocation of labor across firms and sectors, including the home sector (Hsieh et al., 2019). Even if women do find work opportunities, if these preferences give firms monopsony power over workers, this may allow firms to drive down women's wages (Sharma, 2023a).

Secondly, the results may help us to understand the mechanisms driving other important empirical findings in the literature, for example, women's aversion to working outside the home (Ho et al., 2024; Jalota and Ho, 2024), mixed-gender transportation (Garlick et al., 2025), and working in firms where husbands are not present (Tandon, 2025). All of these activities involve the potential for unmonitored interactions between women and men outside of their family.

Finally, the results open new avenues of research. For example, understanding how spousal jealousy affects women's selection into gendered occupations or how it affects social network formation and access to economic information. While this project takes spousal jealousy as a given and studies workplace interventions that work around it, future work should explore psychological interventions that target jealousy directly: helping husbands to address their insecurities or building trust between spouses may help couples move to more cooperative equilibria that allow more women to enter the labor market.

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A Supplementary figures




Figure A.1: Women-only and mixed-gender flyers

Notes: Participants were randomized to receive one of four versions of mixed-gender and women-only flyers. Panels (a) and (b) show two of these versions. Within each version, the two flyers have distinct appearances to help participants distinguish between the offices. However, I balance this across participants by having a corresponding version in which the flyer design and photos are reversed, as shown in panels (a) and (b).

(a)

Creating a safe workplace for women

Our organization takes women's safety very seriously. We are committed to fostering, cultivating, and preserving a culture of diversity, equity and inclusion. We do not tolerate any kind of mistreatment or sexual exploitation of women, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

We have implemented the following measures to ensure women's safety:



1. **Security cameras** are installed at the workplace.



2. Our organization hires **female security guards** to ensure a safe workplace environment for women.



3. All employees are subject to a **strict sexual harassment policy.** Any employees found to be violating the policy will be fired immediately.



4. Before hiring any new employees for our workplace, **we call the individual's previous employer or personal references** to check they have no history of behaving inappropriately towards women.



5. All new employees must complete a sexual harassment training on acceptable workplace behaviour.

(b)

Creating a safe workplace for women


We are committed to fostering, cultivating, and preserving a culture of diversity, equity and inclusion. We do not tolerate any kind of mistreatment or harassment of women, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

Figure A.2: Flyers for the (a) safety treatment and (b) placebo control groups.




Figure A.3: Score chart for eliciting safety beliefs

(a)



(b)



(continued on next page)




Figure A.4: Peer support program flyers.

Notes: Panel (a) shows the *one-on-one* program; panel (b) the *husband* program; panel (c) the *group* program; and panel (d) the *video* program for one of the eight sets of flyers.




Figure A.5: Preferences for being addressed by a male peer in the one-on-one program

Notes: Panel (a) shows how women prefer to be addressed by a male peer in the *one-on-one* program. Surveyors offered participants three options – to be addressed by their name, their name with the honorific suffix *ji*, or by *didi*, meaning sister. The order in which surveyors read the options to participants was randomized. Panel (b) plots the proportion of women who prefer to be addressed as *didi* against the index of spousal jealousy. The plot displays the binned means with a linear regression.




Figure A.6: Qualitative responses for manipulation check

Notes: Proportion of households who provide a given reason for open-ended questions about why couples might prefer a female peer in the *one-on-one* program, but switch to a male peer in the *husband* or *group* programs. Surveyors probe if they initially give a vague response. They then transcribed and categorized the responses into one of the categories above.




Figure A.7: Impact of peer support program by decision-maker

Notes: Proportion of households willing to pay for a female peer across peer support programs among households where the wife made decisions independently (left panel), where the husband and wife made choices together (center), and where the husband made decisions independently without the wife's objection (right panel). When eliciting preferences from participants, surveyors directed questions at the wife but gave the couple time to discuss. To ensure the natural decision-making process of the household was captured, surveyors recorded the response of whichever partner chose to answer, and recorded the manner in which they decided. A household is recorded as having decided together if both the husband and wife gave some input into the decision-making process, either by discussing or making one of the choices. The figure displays decisions made during the survey. The fee to guarantee a female peer varies between 20% and 35% of the salary. The *One-on-one* bar plots the proportion of households that pay the fee to guarantee a female peer, while the other bars plot the *One-on-one* mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect.

B Supplementary tables

Table A.1: Selection of participants into the experiment.

	Number	Percent (%)
No eligible participant		
No married woman aged 18-60	787	19.5
Married woman aged 18-60 hadn't finished 5th grade	573	14.2
Not all interested in part-time work	130	3.2
Declined before establishing if there was an eligible participant	178	4.4
Declined to participate		
Eligible woman turned down survey	699	17.4
Family member declined		
Husband	100	2.5
In-law	34	0.8
Child	31	0.8
Other	5	0.1
Unsure	13	0.3
Dropped out during demographics	27	0.7
Dropped out after demographics	51	1.3
Final sample	1400	34.8
Total	4028	100.0

Notes: The table displays all households where someone was present when surveyors visited the house.

Table A.2: Measures of spousal jealousy, related norms, insecurity and seclusion.

	(%)
Jealousy index	
Husband angry or jealous if interacted with men at work	60.2
Unacceptable to spend time with unrelated men	70.4
Majority of closest friends and family agree it is unacceptable	56.8
Husband insists on knowing where they go	27.6
Observations	1399

Notes: Each row shows the proportion of participants who exhibit a given behavior or belief.

Table A.3: Labor supply experiment safety treatment balance table.

	Group means			Balance: p-values		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	Pure control	Placebo control	Safety treatment	(1) vs (2)	(1) vs (3)	(2) vs (3)
Age	32.93	32.53	31.95	0.589	0.185	0.548
Employed	0.11	0.14	0.07	0.128	0.158	0.025 **
Ever employed	0.23	0.27	0.20	0.290	0.389	0.144
Interested in jobs	3.14	3.10	3.06	0.393	0.108	0.563
Number of children	2.44	2.36	2.41	0.403	0.762	0.685
Years of marriage	15.37	15.54	14.48	0.840	0.287	0.333
Finished 10th grade	0.55	0.51	0.60	0.332	0.188	0.081 *
Hindu	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.578	0.806	0.814
Other backward caste	0.73	0.69	0.74	0.207	0.936	0.307
Jealousy index	0.02	-0.15	0.03	0.035 **	0.956	0.099 *
Age of husband	40.49	37.27	37.03	0.076 *	0.080 *	0.921
Husband employed	0.88	0.90	0.85	0.591	0.299	0.229
Husband finished 10th grade	0.62	0.65	0.65	0.420	0.397	0.973
F-test: statistic				1.03	0.84	0.54
F-test: p-value				0.43	0.62	0.89
Number of observatons	1056	173	171			

Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the means for the pure control, placebo control, and safety treatment groups, respectively. Column (4), (5), and (6) shows the p-value for a test of equality between groups using robust standard errors. The test statistic and p-value for an F-test for whether the covariates jointly predict treatment assignment are shown below. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4: Reasons participants who applied for job didn't come to the training day.

	Mixed-gender		Women-only		Full sample	
	Number	Percent (%)	Number	Percent (%)	Number	Percent (%)
Wife no longer interested						
Not interested in the job	3	5.5	2	2.2	5	3.4
The participant doesn't have time	3	5.5	3	3.2	6	4.1
Has young kids	5	9.1	6	6.5	11	7.4
Other family commitments	1	1.8	4	4.3	5	3.4
Health issues	3	5.5	4	4.3	7	4.7
No reason given	1	1.8	5	5.4	6	4.1
Wife prevented						
By husband	33	60.0	57	61.3	90	60.8
By in-laws	1	1.8	2	2.2	3	2.0
By children	1	1.8	1	1.1	2	1.4
By other family/not specified	0	0.0	5	5.4	5	3.4
Other	4	7.3	4	4.3	8	5.4
Total	55	100.0	93	100.0	148	100.0

Notes: Each row displays the reason participants who initially applied for a job provided for not attending the training day. Surveyors coded the participant as being prevented by a family member if the participant told them this, if that family member turned down the job and prevented the surveyor from speaking to the participant, or if the husband (rather than the wife) told the surveyor the participant cannot do the job for any reason.

Table A.5: Participant comprehension in the labor supply experiment.

	(1) On 1^{st} attempt Correct (%)	(2) By 2^{nd} attempt Correct (%)
Choices don't affect treatment assignment	86.6	97.7
Office implementation	94.6	98.9
Gender composition of offices	96.9	99.5
Observations	1400	1400

Notes: Column (1) shows the proportion of participants who answered each comprehension question correctly on their first attempt. If participants answer incorrectly initially, surveyors re-explained the relevant section to them, and then ask them again. Column (2) shows the proportion who answered correctly by their second attempt. *Choices don't affect treatment assignment* checks participants understand their assigned workplace has already been fixed and will not be impacted by their choices. *Office implementation* tests whether participants understand how their choices will affect whether or not they will apply for the job or receive a gift. *Gender composition of offices* asks whether there will be men working in the mixed office or women-only office. Which of the offices was asked about was randomized.

Table A.6: Reasons participants prefer the women-only office to the mixed office.

	Percentage of respondents
Workplace safety	34.4
Jealousy and impropriety	20.1
Peer quality (support, communication, productivity)	47.5
Social image concerns	4.8
No reason specified	19.7
Observations	1196

Notes: Each row shows the percentage of participants who provided a given reason for preferring to work in the women-only office as compared to the mixed office. If participants mentioned they feel more comfortable or that their family would prefer it, surveyors probed by asking why and then categorized their response.

Table A.7: Impact of spillovers on participants' beliefs and labor supply

	Beliefs					Labor supply		
	(1) Safety	(2) Husband	(3) Social image	(4) Peer quality	(5) Men	(6) Application	(7) Attendance	(8) Attendance
Panel A: Full sample								
Women-only	1.069***	0.916***	0.705***	0.703***	-0.002	0.149***	0.115***	0.110***
	(0.084)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.036)
High intensity	0.104	0.172*	0.060	-0.037	-0.003	0.060	0.036	0.032
	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.089)	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Women-only × High intensity	-0.095	-0.183*	-0.017	0.048	0.005	-0.008	-0.083**	-0.078*
	(0.095)	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.104)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Additional controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.59	-0.52	-0.39	-0.35	0.50	0.23	0.16	0.16
Observations	1748	1748	1748	1748	870	1932	966	966
Panel B: High jealousy sample								
Women-only	1.300***	1.096***	0.763***	0.715***	0.011	0.142***	0.188***	0.171***
	(0.127)	(0.141)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.049)
High intensity	0.154	0.204	0.067	-0.079	0.022	0.036	0.091*	0.082*
	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Women-only × High intensity	-0.209	-0.248	-0.055	0.030	-0.010	0.003	-0.156**	-0.136**
	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Individual FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Additional controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.71	-0.73	-0.52	-0.35	0.49	0.20	0.09	0.09
Observations	814	814	814	814	405	888	444	444

Notes: Panel A shows results for the full sample, and Panel B shows results for above-median jealousy households. Column (1) shows impacts on perceptions of workplace safety for women; Column (2), the wife's perception of how socially acceptable her husband would find it for her to work in each office; Column (3), the wife's perception of how socially acceptable family and neighbors would find it for her to work in each office; Column (4), how likely the wife thinks she would be to make friends in each office; Column (5) the wife's estimate of the proportion of men working in the mixed office; and Column (6), interest in applying for a job in each office in the survey. Columns (7) and (8) show workplace attendance using controls from the main specification fully interacted with the high-intensity dummy. Column (8) also adds controls for the number of children and the husband's education again interacted with the high-intensity dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the street-level and shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.8: Heterogeneous treatment effects by measures of spousal jealousy.

	Main index	Individual measures		Robustness checks				
	(1) Jealousy index	(2) Jealous	(3) Identity	(4) Original	(5) DM power	(6) Safety	(7) Demo.	(8) Lasso
Panel A: Job application								
Women-only	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Jealousy	-0.057***	-0.040***	-0.048***	-0.058***	-0.057***	-0.054***	-0.061***	-0.058***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Women-only × Jealousy	0.015*	0.022**	0.000	0.018**	0.015*	0.014	0.016*	0.016*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Control variables	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: Jealousy	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
p-value: Women-only × Jealousy	0.09	0.02	0.98	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.07
Observations	2798	2798	2798	2798	2798	2794	2798	2794
Panel B: Workplace attendance								
Women-only	0.064***	0.063***	0.065***	0.064***	0.064***	0.064***	0.065***	0.064***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Jealousy	-0.027***	-0.025**	-0.017*	-0.020**	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.032***	-0.030***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Women-only × Jealousy	0.034**	0.009	0.045***	0.030*	0.034**	0.035**	0.038**	0.038**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: Jealousy	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
p-value: Women-only × Jealousy	0.03	0.58	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
Observations	1399	1399	1399	1399	1399	1397	1399	1397

Notes: Panel A shows heterogeneous treatment effects on job applications using different measures of spousal jealousy. I regress job applications on a dummy for the women-only workplace, a spousal jealousy measure, and the interaction of the two. Columns (1)-(3) show the results using different measures of spousal jealousy. All spousal jealousy measures are standardized to have a mean of 0, a standard deviation of 1, and coded such that higher values indicate greater spousal jealousy. Column (1) shows the results using the main measure of spousal jealousy. Columns (2)-(3) show the results using the individual components of the spousal jealousy measure. In column (2), participants were asked "My husband would feel angry or jealous if I were interacting with other men at the workplace?"; and in column (3), "In your opinion, is it acceptable for married women to spend time with men outside their family?" (reverse coded). Columns (4)-(8) show additional robustness checks. Column (4) uses the original pre-registered jealousy index, which includes two additional measures: the fraction of close friends and family that would find it unacceptable for married women to spend time with men outside the family, and "When you leave the house, how often does your husband insist on knowing where you are going?". Column (5) includes a control for decision-making power and decision-making power fully interacted with the treatment. I measure this based on who decides how money in the household is spent. Column (6) does so using controls for age, education, caste, and religion; column (7) does so using controls for women's safety concerns (i.e. how safe the participants rated the two offices); and column (8) does so using Lasso-selected baseline covariates that predict the spousal jealousy index in the labor supply experiment. Panel B shows the same results for attending the workplace using the main specification in the paper. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.9: Labor supply experiment treatment heterogeneity

	Application						Training day					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Group	N	Control	β	SE	p-val		N	Control	β	SE	p-val	
Full sample	2800	0.29	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	1400	0.21	0.06	0.02	0.000	***
Safety treatments												
Pure control	2112	0.28	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	1056	0.22	0.06	0.02	0.000	***
Placebo control	346	0.34	0.13	0.03	0.000	***	173	0.23	0.07	0.05	0.214	
Safety treatment	342	0.28	0.11	0.02	0.000	***	171	0.15	0.07	0.05	0.119	
Jealousy index												
Low jealousy	1502	0.32	0.12	0.01	0.000	***	751	0.24	0.04	0.02	0.041	**
High jealousy	1296	0.24	0.14	0.01	0.000	***	648	0.18	0.09	0.02	0.000	***
Safety concerns index												
Low safety concerns	1402	0.33	0.11	0.01	0.000	***	701	0.24	0.06	0.02	0.009	***
High safety concerns	1394	0.25	0.15	0.01	0.000	***	697	0.18	0.07	0.02	0.001	***
Religion												
Hindu	2676	0.28	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	1338	0.21	0.06	0.02	0.000	***
Muslim	122	0.33	0.11	0.04	0.007	***	61	0.29	0.08	0.06	0.223	
Caste												
General caste	270	0.27	0.09	0.03	0.001	***	135	0.20	-0.02	0.05	0.774	
Other backward caste	2040	0.27	0.14	0.01	0.000	***	1020	0.19	0.08	0.02	0.000	***
Scheduled caste or tribe	362	0.40	0.13	0.02	0.000	***	181	0.30	0.02	0.05	0.627	
Education												
Below tenth grade	1260	0.29	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	630	0.22	0.06	0.02	0.013	**
Completed tenth grade	1540	0.29	0.14	0.01	0.000	***	770	0.20	0.06	0.02	0.002	***
Age												
18-29	1120	0.29	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	560	0.18	0.04	0.03	0.159	
30-39	1024	0.29	0.12	0.02	0.000	***	512	0.24	0.08	0.02	0.002	***
40-60	656	0.27	0.15	0.02	0.000	***	328	0.22	0.10	0.03	0.003	***
Years of marriage												
Below median	1364	0.29	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	682	0.19	0.05	0.02	0.045	**
Median or above	1436	0.28	0.14	0.01	0.000	***	718	0.23	0.08	0.02	0.000	***
Children												
No children	126	0.29	0.17	0.05	0.001	***	63	0.13	0.02	0.11	0.836	
Has children	2674	0.29	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	1337	0.21	0.07	0.02	0.000	***
Employment history												
Never worked	2140	0.25	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	1070	0.16	0.08	0.02	0.000	***
Currently or previously worked	660	0.39	0.14	0.02	0.000	***	330	0.36	0.03	0.04	0.350	
Husband present during survey												
Not present	2146	0.28	0.12	0.01	0.000	***	1073	0.20	0.06	0.02	0.001	***
Present	654	0.31	0.16	0.02	0.000	***	327	0.25	0.09	0.03	0.006	***
Husband's employment												
Husband not working	336	0.26	0.18	0.03	0.000	***	168	0.17	0.17	0.05	0.000	***
Husband working	2464	0.29	0.12	0.01	0.000	***	1232	0.22	0.05	0.02	0.003	***
Household income												
Below median	1214	0.30	0.13	0.01	0.000	***	607	0.21	0.07	0.02	0.006	***
Median or above	1342	0.28	0.14	0.01	0.000	***	671	0.21	0.06	0.02	0.008	***

Notes: Each row presents the treatment effects for interest in applying for the mixed and women-only workplace during the survey (columns (1) - (5)) and for training day attendance (columns (6)- (10)) using my main specifications. *Safety treatments* shows the results for the three safety experimental arms. *Jealousy index* shows the results using terciles of my pre-specified jealousy index. *Safety concerns index* shows results for terciles based on how safe participants rated both offices. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.10: Summary of selection into sample and attrition.

	Dep var: Data collected (=1)				
	(1) Women-only	(2) Safety	(3) Salary	(4) Spill.	(5) Spill. Beliefs
Women-only	0.000				
	(.)				
Safety treatment		0.005			
		(0.012)			
Placebo control		0.005			
		(0.012)			
Salary 125			0.011		
			(0.009)		
Salary 150			-0.008		
			(0.013)		
High intensity				0.034	0.004
				(0.040)	(0.027)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No
Control mean	1.00	0.97	0.98	0.43	0.90
Num. clusters	1400	1438	1430	176	193
Observations	1400	1438	1430	1460	966

Notes: All columns regress a dummy for whether outcome data were collected on the various experimental treatments. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is equal to one if labor supply outcome measures were collected for a given observation. In column (5), the dependent variable is equal to one if outcome measures were collected in the follow-up data collection exercise measuring the impact of spillovers on participants' beliefs about the offices. Column (1) includes all participants who were told their treatment assignment to the mixed or women-only workplace. Column (2) includes all participants who were told (or not told) about the safety measures at the workplace. Column (3) includes all participants who were told the salary for the job. Column (4) documents selection into the experiment for the *high-intensity* and *low-intensity* streets. It includes all households where an eligible woman may have been present. Column (5) includes all participants from the main sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level in columns (1)-(3) and at the street level in columns (4) and (5) and shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.11: Measures of spousal jealousy, norms, insecurity, and seclusion.

	(%)
Jealousy index	
Husband angry or jealous if interacted with men at work	56.7
Unacceptable to spend time with unrelated men	56.2
Majority of closest friends and family agree it is unacceptable	62.9
Husband insists on knowing where they go	30.5
Norms	
Practices purdah	70.2
Always apply sindoor when leaving the house	91.3
Insecure husband	
Husband gets angry when people disagree with him	58.6
Seclusion	
No conversations with unrelated women in last week	25.7
No conversations with unrelated men in last week	56.4
Observations	210

Notes: Each row shows the proportion of participants who exhibit a given behavior or belief.

Table A.12: Reasons participants who applied for a job didn't complete the second survey or start the job.

	Before 2nd survey		During second survey		After second survey		Total	
	Number	Percent (%)	Number	Percent (%)	Number	Percent (%)	Number	Percent (%)
Wife no longer interested								
Not interested in job	36	8.0	34	19.0	1	4.3	71	10.9
Not interested in peer support	0	0.0	5	2.8	0	0.0	5	0.8
The participant doesn't have time	6	1.3	1	0.6	0	0.0	7	1.1
Has young kids or pregnant	7	1.6	3	1.7	0	0.0	10	1.5
Other family commitments	3	0.7	1	0.6	0	0.0	4	0.6
Health issues	7	1.6	4	2.2	0	0.0	11	1.7
No reason given	10	2.2	13	7.3	0	0.0	23	3.5
Wife prevented								
By husband	245	54.6	89	49.7	10	43.5	344	52.8
By in-laws	4	0.9	2	1.1	6	26.1	12	1.8
By children	2	0.4	3	1.7	3	13.0	8	1.2
By other family/not specified	3	0.7	1	0.6	0	0.0	4	0.6
Scheduling issues								
Uncontactable	36	8.0	2	1.1	3	13.0	41	6.3
Couldn't schedule a survey with the couple	82	18.3	18	10.1	0	0.0	100	15.4
Other	8	1.8	3	1.7	0	0.0	11	1.7
Total	449	100.0	179	100.0	23	100.0	651	100.0

Notes: Each row displays the reason participants who initially applied for a job provided for not attending the training day. Participants were coded as being prevented by a family member if the participant mentioned this, if that family member turned down the job and prevented the surveyor from speaking to the participant, or if the husband (as opposed to the wife) told the surveyor the participant could do the job for any reason.

Table A.13: Selection into the mechanism experiment.

Variable	(1) Dropped out	(2) In-sample	(3) p-value	
Jealousy index	0.18	-0.15	0.002	***
Jealous	0.11	-0.09	0.059	*
Norms	0.14	-0.12	0.014	**
Second order beliefs	0.09	-0.08	0.124	
Controlling behavior	0.11	-0.09	0.065	*
Number of observatons	159	190		

Notes: Each row shows the group mean for a given spousal jealousy measure. All measures are standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1, and coded such that higher values indicate greater spousal jealousy. *Jealousy index* shows the pre-registered measure of spousal jealousy. For *jealousy*, surveyors asked "My husband would feel angry or jealous if I was interacting with other men at the workplace?"; for *norms*, "In your opinion, is it acceptable for married women to spend time with men outside their family?" (reverse coded); for *second-order beliefs*, the fraction of close friends and family that would disagree with the previous statement; and for *controlling behavior*, "When you leave the house, how often does your husband insist on knowing where you are going?". Column (1) shows the group mean for participants who declined the job after a surveyor visited their house for the second survey. Column (2) shows the mean for participants in the final sample. Column (3) shows the p-value comparing the group means using robust standard errors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.14: Impact of program type on peer selection and attendance by size of fee needed to guarantee a female peer.

	Paid fee for female peer				Attended with female peer		Attended with standard peer	
	(1) $20 fee	(2) $30 fee	(3) $40 fee	(4) $50 fee	(5) $20 fee	(6) $30 fee	(7) $20 fee	(8) $30 fee
Husband	-0.175***	-0.204***	-0.134***	-0.133***	-0.083	-0.176***	0.177***	0.309***
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Group	-0.206***	-0.221***	-0.144***	-0.159***				
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.037)				
Video	-0.247***	-0.168***	-0.175***	-0.159***				
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.038)				
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.55	0.52	0.43	0.42	0.49	0.37	0.40	0.41
p-value: Husband	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
Observations	388	452	388	452	93	109	93	109

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the impacts of the peer support program on willingness to forgo $20 PPP and $30 PPP to guarantee a female peer as measured in the survey. Columns (3) and (4) show the same results when participants were asked what they would hypothetically do if the fee were $20 PPP higher. Columns (5) and (6) show the treatment effect of the husband program on paying to guarantee a female peer *and* turning up at the job and peer support program for $20 and $30 fees, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) show the treatment effect of the husband program on selecting a standard peer *and* turning up at the job and peer support program for $20 and $30 fees, respectively. The *one-on-one* program is the omitted category in all regressions. Columns (1)-(4) include individual fixed effects, and columns (4)-(8) include controls as outlined in the main specification. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.15: Heterogeneous treatment effects by measures of spousal jealousy.

	Main index	Individual measures		Robustness checks			
	(1) Jealousy index	(2) Jealous	(3) Int. Norms	(4) Original	(5) DM power	(6) Demo.	(7) Lasso
Panel A: Paid for female peer							
Pooled treatment	-0.203***	-0.203***	-0.203***	-0.203***	-0.203***	-0.203***	-0.203***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Jealousy measure	0.080**	0.087**	0.033	0.085**	0.082**	0.075**	0.083**
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Pooled treatment × Jealousy measure	-0.060**	-0.048*	-0.041	-0.055**	-0.060**	-0.061**	-0.063**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Control variables	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: Jealousy measure	0.02	0.01	0.34	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
p-value: Any treatment × Jealousy measure	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02
Observations	840	840	840	840	840	840	840
Panel B: Attended with standard peer							
Husband	0.254***	0.251***	0.253***	0.252***	0.255***	0.254***	0.239***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Jealousy measure	-0.063*	-0.048	-0.045	-0.050	-0.063*	-0.056	-0.031
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Husband × Jealousy measure	0.110**	0.099***	0.067*	0.104**	0.111**	0.103**	0.077*
	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: Jealousy measure	0.09	0.11	0.18	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.41
p-value: Husband × Jealousy measure	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.09
Observations	202	202	202	202	202	202	202

Notes: Panel A shows heterogeneous treatment effects for paying for a female peer using different measures of spousal jealousy. The treatment variable pools the *husband*, *group*, and *video* programs, and compares them to the *one-on-one* program. I regress choosing a female peer on a dummy for the pooled treatment, a spousal jealousy measure, and the interaction of the two. Columns (1)-(3) show the results using different measures of spousal jealousy. All spousal jealousy measures are standardized to have a mean of 0, a standard deviation of 1, and coded such that higher values indicate greater spousal jealousy. Column (1) shows the results using the main measure of spousal jealousy. Columns (2)-(3) show the results using the individual components of the spousal jealousy measure. In column (2), participants were asked "My husband would feel angry or jealous if I were interacting with other men at the workplace?"; and in column (3), "In your opinion, is it acceptable for married women to spend time with men outside their family?" (reverse coded). Columns (4)-(7) show additional robustness checks. Column (4) uses the original pre-registered jealousy index, which includes two additional measures: the fraction of close friends and family that would find it unacceptable for married women to spend time with men outside the family, and "When you leave the house, how often does your husband insist on knowing where you are going?". Column (5) includes a control for decision-making power and decision-making power fully interacted with the treatment. I measure this based on who decides how money in the household is spent. Column (6) does so using controls for age, education, caste, and religion; and column (7) does so using Lasso-selected baseline covariates that predict the spousal jealousy index in the labor supply experiment. Panel B shows the same results for attending the workplace and peer support with a standard peer using the main specification in the paper. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.16: Spousal jealousy treatment heterogeneity

	Paid fee for female peer						Attended with female peer						Attended with standard peer					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	
Group	N	Control	β	SE	p-val		N	Control	β	SE	p-val		N	Control	β	SE	p-val	
Full sample	840	0.53	-0.20	0.03	0.000	***	202	0.42	-0.13	0.04	0.001	***	202	0.40	0.25	0.04	0.000	***
Jealousy index																		
Low jealousy	320	0.49	-0.16	0.04	0.000	***	79	0.42	-0.08	0.07	0.241		79	0.44	0.15	0.06	0.012	**
Moderate jealousy	348	0.48	-0.18	0.04	0.000	***	81	0.34	-0.16	0.06	0.012	**	81	0.50	0.23	0.06	0.000	***
High jealousy	172	0.72	-0.33	0.06	0.000	***	42	0.57	-0.21	0.08	0.016	**	42	0.14	0.45	0.09	0.000	***
Religion																		
Hindu	804	0.53	-0.21	0.03	0.000	***	193	0.40	-0.14	0.04	0.001	***	193	0.42	0.26	0.04	0.000	***
Muslim	36	0.67	-0.11	0.08	0.195		9	0.83	0.00	0.00	.		9	0.17	0.00	0.00	.	
Caste																		
General caste	144	0.53	-0.24	0.06	0.000	***	33	0.43	-0.11	0.10	0.306		33	0.43	0.21	0.09	0.028	**
Other backward caste	520	0.52	-0.23	0.03	0.000	***	126	0.36	-0.11	0.06	0.069	*	126	0.42	0.30	0.05	0.000	***
Scheduled caste or tribe	140	0.54	-0.10	0.07	0.147		34	0.53	-0.23	0.11	0.046	**	34	0.41	0.09	0.06	0.181	
Education																		
Below tenth grade	288	0.68	-0.12	0.04	0.003	***	69	0.53	-0.14	0.08	0.074	*	69	0.31	0.22	0.06	0.000	***
Completed tenth grade	552	0.46	-0.24	0.03	0.000	***	133	0.37	-0.13	0.05	0.007	***	133	0.46	0.27	0.05	0.000	***
Age																		
18-29	336	0.54	-0.19	0.04	0.000	***	80	0.39	-0.11	0.06	0.097	*	80	0.41	0.27	0.06	0.000	***
30-39	320	0.53	-0.20	0.04	0.000	***	77	0.46	-0.09	0.05	0.075	*	77	0.41	0.21	0.06	0.001	***
40-60	184	0.54	-0.24	0.06	0.000	***	45	0.43	-0.27	0.11	0.017	**	45	0.38	0.29	0.09	0.003	***
Years of marriage																		
Below median	408	0.51	-0.19	0.04	0.000	***	98	0.38	-0.11	0.06	0.061	*	98	0.44	0.25	0.05	0.000	***
Median or above	432	0.56	-0.22	0.04	0.000	***	104	0.46	-0.21	0.06	0.001	***	104	0.37	0.28	0.05	0.000	***
Children																		
No children	40	0.50	-0.23	0.12	0.055	*	10	0.33	-0.20	0.23	0.438		10	0.33	0.70	0.31	0.089	*
Has children	800	0.54	-0.20	0.03	0.000	***	192	0.43	-0.13	0.04	0.002	***	192	0.41	0.24	0.04	0.000	***
Employment history																		
Never worked	496	0.61	-0.25	0.04	0.000	***	119	0.40	-0.15	0.06	0.013	**	119	0.35	0.30	0.05	0.000	***
Currently or previously worked	344	0.42	-0.14	0.04	0.001	***	83	0.45	-0.13	0.05	0.005	***	83	0.48	0.19	0.05	0.000	***
Husband's employment																		
Husband not working	88	0.41	-0.20	0.09	0.024	**	22	0.38	-0.20	0.13	0.137		22	0.38	0.28	0.16	0.103	
Husband working	752	0.55	-0.20	0.03	0.000	***	180	0.43	-0.12	0.04	0.005	***	180	0.41	0.24	0.04	0.000	***
Household income																		
Below median	312	0.56	-0.17	0.04	0.000	***	77	0.50	-0.10	0.06	0.112		77	0.38	0.19	0.06	0.002	***
Median or above	420	0.53	-0.24	0.04	0.000	***	98	0.41	-0.13	0.06	0.050	**	98	0.41	0.27	0.06	0.000	***

Notes: Each row present the treatment effects for choosing to pay for a female peer in the survey (columns (1) - (5)), attending the workplace after choosing a female peer (columns (6)- (10)) and attending the workplace after choosing a standard peer using my main specifications (columns (11)- (15)). The control columns show the mean in the *one-on-one* program. In columns (1) - (5), the treatment group shows the pooled mean for the *husband*, *group*, and *video* programs. In columns (6) - (15), the treatment group is the *husband* program. The *Jealousy index* row shows the results using terciles of a pre-specified jealousy index. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.17: Impact of husband treatment on labor supply and productivity.

	Labor supply			Productivity		
	(1) Pooled	(2) Male Peer	(3) Female Peer	(4) Calls	(5) Surveys	(6) Data Entry
Husband	0.116***	0.148***	0.063	-0.685	-0.029	-0.142
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.075)	(0.701)	(0.058)	(0.136)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.83	0.80	0.88	11.02	0.30	0.66
p-value: Husband	0.01	0.00	0.40	0.33	0.62	0.30
Observations	202	133	69	833	833	833

Notes: Column (1) shows the impact of being randomized into the husband program on attending the workplace (relative to those randomized into the one-on-one program). Column (2) and Column (3) restrict to participants who selected a standard and female peer in the *husband* program, respectively. Because these choices are made before learning one's treatment assignment, the coefficient in these regressions has a causal interpretation. Columns (1)-(3) include fixed effects from the main specification and use robust standard errors. Columns (4)-(6) show the impact of being randomized into the *husband* program on the number of phone calls made, surveys completed, and data entry tasks completed each day at the office. Given participants randomized into the *husband* program are more likely to attend, the coefficient in these regressions captures both a selection and treatment effect. Columns (4)-(6) include fixed effects for each of the 5 days of work and cluster standard errors at the individual level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.18: Participant comprehension for mechanism experiment

	On 1^{st} attempt Correct (%)	By 2^{nd} attempt Correct (%)
Program comprehension		
One-on-one program: standard peer	98.6	100.0
One-on-one program: female peer	99.5	100.0
Husband program: standard peer	100.0	100.0
Husband program: female peer	100.0	100.0
Group program: standard peer	96.2	100.0
Group program: female peer	99.5	100.0
Video program: standard peer	99.5	100.0
Video program: female peer	99.5	100.0
Video program: no communication	92.6	100.0
Video program: same script	88.2	99.0
Mechanism comprehension		
Choices don't affect treatment assignment	94.3	100.0
Choices are private	93.9	100.0
Peer implementation	100.0	100.0
Salary implementation	100.0	100.0
Observations	210	210

Notes: Column (1) shows the proportion of participants who answered each comprehension question correctly on their first attempt. If participants answered incorrectly initially, surveyors re-explained the relevant section to them, and then asked them again. Column (2) shows the proportion who answered correctly by their second attempt. For each of the programs, surveyors asked participants who would be involved in the peer support program discussions if they chose the standard peer and if they chose the female peer. These results are shown in the first eight rows (e.g. *one-on-one program: standard peer*). In *Video program: no communication*, surveyors asked participants whether there will be any speaking between the participant and the peer if they are randomized to the video program. In *Video program: same script*, surveyors asked participants whether the content of the video script will be the same irrespective of which peer they are paired with. Whether surveyors asked *Video program: no communication* or *Video program: same script* to a participant was randomized. *Choices don't affect treatment assignment* checks participants understand their assigned program has already been fixed and will not be impacted by their choices. *Choices are private* checks that participants understand that no one in the office will be told which peer they selected for any of the programs. Surveyors asked this to a subset of participants. *Peer implementation* and *salary implementation* test whether the participants understand how their choices will affect the peer and salary they receive. Surveyors alternated whether they directed each question to the husband or wife, randomizing who they asked first.

C Supplementary methods

C.1 Workplace flyer balance

Photos and models for the workplace flyers were carefully selected to ensure balance across observable characteristics among women-only and mixed office flyers. This ensured that any differences in outcomes between the mixed-gender and women-only offices could be attributed to the gender of co-workers as opposed to other factors. Models were chosen who were similar in age, education, and household income. For each workplace, there were four different flyer versions, each containing three photos. The overall pool of individuals was demographically balanced across all flyers and photos (Table A.19). For each women-only photo, there was a corresponding mixed photo, which substituted some of the women for men. The models also maintained similar expressions across the mixed and women-only photos, and where necessary, individuals were added or removed using photo-editing software to ensure balance in terms of demographics and emotional tone.

Table A.19: Demographic characteristics of workplace flyers

	Mixed-Gender Flyers			Women-Only Flyers		
(1) Flyer Version	(2) Age	(3) College Educated	(4) Income	(5) Age	(6) College Educated	(7) Income
1	25.3	0.69	12,490	24.0	0.75	9,444
2	24.5	0.78	7,986	24.0	0.82	8,555
3	25.1	0.85	7,569	25.9	0.95	12,500
4	22.5	0.72	8,375	21.8	0.78	10,555
All	24.3	0.76	9,105	23.9	0.83	10,263

Notes: Column (1) identifies the flyer version. Columns (2)-(7) shows the demographics characteristics of the models in each flyer. Columns (2)-(4) show the averages for the mixed-gender flyers, while columns (5)-(7) show the averages for the women-only flyers. Columns (2) and (4) show the average age; columns (3) and (6) show the proportion of models with a college education; and columns (4) and (7) show average household income. The final row labeled "All" averages across the four versions.

C.2 Supplementary information experiment

An information experiment was embedded into the follow-up survey that measured the impact of the high-intensity sampling treatment on participants' beliefs. After collecting their beliefs for the first time, surveyors asked participants to imagine they knew more women

working at each workplace. They then re-elicited participants' beliefs about each workplace under this hypothetical scenario.

In Table A.20 shows the results. Women believed that the women-only workplace (relative to the mixed-gender workplace) would be safer, that their husbands would find it more acceptable, their family and neighbors would find it more acceptable, and that they would feel more supported. They also stated that these differences would be significantly smaller if other neighbors were also attending the office.

Table A.20: Impact of hypothetical information treatment on workplace perceptions

	Beliefs			
	(1) Safety	(2) Husband	(3) Social image	(4) Peer quality
Women-only	0.998***	0.786***	0.701***	0.741***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)
More neighbors	0.062*	0.074**	0.056*	0.061*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Women-only × More neighbors	-0.129***	-0.158***	-0.115**	-0.133***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.049)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.50	-0.39	-0.35	-0.37
p-value: Women-only × More neighbors	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
Observations	3986	3984	3984	3984

Notes: Participants were asked to imagine they knew one or three more women working in the mixed or women-only workplace and then measured their beliefs on various aspects of the two offices. Column (1) shows impacts on perceptions of workplace safety for women. Column (2), the wife's perception of how socially acceptable her husband would find it for her to work in each office. Column (3), the wife's perception of how socially acceptable family and neighbors would find it for her to work in each office. Column (4), how likely the wife thinks she would be to make friends in each office. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.3 Peer support flyer balance

Photos and models for the peer-support flyers were selected to ensure balance across observable characteristics among the male and female peers (Table A.21). First, models were chosen who were similar in age, education, household income, and caste.

Next, I conducted an online photo-rating exercise. In this exercise, I recruited 200 Indian participants using an online data collection platform (100 male and 100 female). Each

respondent rated approximately 50 photos featuring 30 different peers (some peers appeared in multiple photos). Respondents were shown photos of each peer individually and were asked to rate them on the following perceived attributes: age, level of education, warmth of expression, and attractiveness. Warmth and attractiveness were evaluated using Likert scales.

I then created eight unique flyer versions - four flyers with older peers (aged 35 or above) and four flyers with younger peers (aged under 35). I selected the peers such that the male and female peers were collectively balanced across the actual demographic characteristics as well as the perceptions of the online sample. Two pairs of peers (one older and one younger) appeared twice, though different photos of husbands or neighbors were used in these flyers.

Table A.21: Flyer balance table for standard and female peers.

	Standard Peer								**Female Peer**							
	Actual				Perceived				Actual				Perceived			
(1) Flyer Version	(2) Age	(3) College	(4) HH Income	(5) General Caste	(6) Age	(7) College	(8) Warmth	(9) Attractiveness	(10) Age	(11) College	(12) HH Income	(13) General Caste	(14) Age	(15) College	(16) Warmth	(17) Attractiveness
1					51.3	0.33	-0.13	-0.24					44.5	0.35	-0.02	-0.09
2					43.1	0.57	-0.03	-0.09					40.2	0.57	0.04	0.13
3					43.1	0.57	-0.03	-0.09					40.2	0.57	0.04	0.13
4					44.3	0.50	-0.05	0.27					39.8	0.42	-0.06	0.22
5					33.2	0.82	0.22	0.33					33.5	0.80	0.03	0.22
6					37.4	0.71	-0.07	0.00					35.3	0.51	0.05	0.37
7					37.4	0.71	-0.07	0.00					35.3	0.51	0.05	0.37
8					36.5	0.78	0.11	0.19					38.5	0.27	-0.05	-0.15
All	34.1	0.63	28,750	0.38	40.8	0.62	-0.01	0.02	33.6	0.63	35,000	0.38	38.4	0.50	0.01	0.15

Notes: Column (1) identifies the flyer version. Columns (2)-(17) shows the demographics characteristics of the models in each flyer. Columns (2)-(9) show the characteristics the male models (or standard peers). Columns (2) shows their age; column (3) whether they are college educated; column (4) their household income; column (5) whether they are general caste. Columns (6)-(9) show characteristics as perceived by the online sample: age in years, whether they are college educated, warmth (standardized), and attractiveness (standardized). Columns (10)-(17) show the same attributes for the female models. I only include the average across all flyers for the models' true demographics to avoid publishing PII.

C.4 Independent decision-making experiment

Before collecting spousal jealousy measures, I embedded a supplementary experiment testing whether private decision-making would increase women's willingness to interact with male colleagues. Participants chose between two professional development videos to be shown at work. I randomized which video featured a male versus female presenter, providing a measure of gender preferences while holding content constant. I then tested whether these preferences change when the wife's choices are observed by the husband, randomizing whether the choice was made privately or in the husband's presence.




Figure A.8: Choice of training video by husband's presence

Notes: Proportion of women who choose to watch a training video of a man (as opposed to a woman) by whether or not the decision was made in the presence of their husband. The *private* bar plots the proportion of women who choose to watch a video of a male peer when asked in privacy, while the *public* bar plots the *private* mean plus the treatment effect using my main specification. The error bar shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect.

Figure A.8 displays the results from this experiment. When asked in front of their husbands, 38 percent of women chose a training video featuring a male colleague working at another office, significantly less than the 50 percent benchmark if women had no gender

preference. The proportion dropped to 26% when women are asked in private ($p = 0.08$). The results suggest that simply asking women to make labor market choices without their husband's presence will not increase their propensity to take on work that involve interacting with men. Such a strategy may instead further deter women. The results are consistent with women not wanting to choose interacting with a male colleague if they fear their husband finding out about, or feel guilty about, making such a choice in private.

C.5 Training day activities

Participants attended a two-hour training session designed to familiarize them with the job requirements. Upon arrival, participants were requested to provide their informed consent, followed by training on conducting phone surveys, where participants learned to administer consent, engage respondents, deliver questions, and record responses, with supervised practice sessions involving mock interviews. They did not make any phone calls on their first day. The training day concluded with payment of the promised compensation. Only female employees were present for the training day, so the training was held in the same physical office for both mixed-gender and women-only participants to hold commuting and time costs fixed across treatment arms. Participants were not aware that the training would be held in the same office (which we verified in follow-up data collection). In a follow-up data collection, with a subsample of participants, we confirmed that almost all participants (95%) thought that the gender composition of the training day (mixed or women-only) would reflect the same as the office they were randomized into. Those who received a job completed it in the office they were randomized into.

C.6 Workplace activities

Participants worked for a period of two weeks at the workplace to which they were randomly assigned. On the first day, they provided informed consent and completed a set of mandatory training modules, including sessions on Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) and research ethics, in compliance with IRB guidelines. Participants in the mechanism experiment also attended peer support sessions conducted over video calls, phone calls, or WhatsApp. Each participant only took part in the peer support program assigned to them. All peer support sessions were conducted in private.

Following the initial onboarding, participants received training on administering phone surveys and performing data entry tasks. For the remainder of their two-week contract, participants carried out daily calling and data entry responsibilities, with clearly defined performance targets. All participants completed a workplace well-being survey, capturing

measures of perceived safety and overall satisfaction with the work environment. Participants in the mechanism experiment also participated in 2–3 additional peer support sessions.

Participants received their travel allowance on the first day of work, and their final salary was paid upon successful completion of the two-week tenure. Participants in the labor supply experiment completed 10 days of work, while those in the mechanism experiment completed 5 days of work. If participants dropped out before completing all of their assigned days of work, they were paid on a pro-rata basis.

D Women-Only Experiment: Survey Instrument

age_consent
How old are you?

married
Are you married?
- Yes, I am married
- No, I am not married

education
What level of education have you completed?

name
What is your name?

husb_name
Ask Husband: What is your name?
Ask Wife (if Husband is not present): What is your husband's name?

number_of_children
How many children do you have?

married_years
How many years have you been married for?

employed
Do you currently have any job?
- Yes
- No

ever_employed

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the wife reported that she was not currently working.

Have you ever had a job?

- Yes
- No

last_job

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the wife reported that she had previously worked.

What was your last job?

fulltime

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the wife reported that she was currently working.

Do you do full-time or part-time work?

- Full-time
- Part-time

occupation

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the wife reported that she was currently working.

What is your occupation?

wife_salary

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the wife reported that she was currently working.

What is your current monthly income? (in rupees)

interested

How interested would you be in new part-time work opportunities outside the home? Very interested, interested, a little interested, or not at all interested?

- Very interested
- Interested
- A little interested
- Not at all interested

religion

What is your religion?

- Hindu
- Muslim
- Christian
- Other

caste

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent reported that their religion is Hindu.

What is your caste category? General, OBC, SC/ST, or do you refuse to respond?

- General
- OBC
- SC/ST
- Refused to respond

hh_income

What is your household's total monthly income? (in rupees)

Display Logic: The survey moved forward from here only if the respondent did not say that she is not at all interested in new part-time work opportunities outside the home in the "interested" question above. Otherwise, the survey ended here.

h_present

Is your husband currently present?

- Yes
- No

h_join

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent reported that her husband was currently present at home.

[*If husband is not there, ask wife:*] Can you please ask your husband to join us for a few minutes?

[*If husband is there, ask husband:*] Can you please join us for a few minutes? It won't take much time

Yes, the husband joined
No, the husband refused to join

h_employed

[*If husband did not join, ask wife:*] Does your husband currently have any job?
[*If husband is there, ask husband*:] Do you currently have any job?

Yes
No

h_occupation

[*If husband did not join, ask wife*:] What is your occupation?
[*If husband is there, ask husband*:] What is education level has your husband completed?

h_age

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the husband joined the study.

How old are you?

h_education

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the husband joined the study.

What level of education have you completed?

disclaimer

In the next section of the survey, you will be told about real job opportunities for women. Like all other questions in the survey, we may use your answers here for research purposes. However, please remember these are real job opportunities so please take your time to think about these decisions carefully.

job_intro 1

We are opening two separate BPO offices in Danapur. We are hiring women who are interested in working in these BPO offices on a part-time basis. You would be performing tasks including conducting phone surveys and performing data entry.

One office is a mixed-gender office. The other office is a women-only office, where everyone working in the office is a woman -- the staff, the supervisors, the trainers, and the managers are all women. This is strictly a two-week employment opportunity. There will be no other opportunities to take up a job at either office after this survey has concluded.

Both offices are operated by Sunai Consultancy and involve the exact same work and basic facilities. Sunai Consultancy has been working in Patna for over 18 years and is led by Mr. Pranav Chaudhary.

note_hand_flyers
Here are the two offices:

Randomization: We randomized the order of "note_mixed" and "note_women_only" with equal probability. We keep this order fixed for any given participant.

note_mixed
This is the mixed-gender BPO office. [*Read the flyer to the participant.*]

note_women_only
This is the women-only BPO office [*Read the flyer to the participant.*]

no_difference
The only difference between these two offices is that this one has men and women working in the office and this one has only women working in the office.

Randomization: We randomized the assignment to one of three group: "full_safety" (12.5%), "signal_safety" (12.5%), or no safety (75%). Existence of alternative conditions were concealed from the participants.

signal_safety
This flyer is from the same organization:
Creating a safe workplace for women
We are committed to fostering, cultivating, and preserving a culture of diversity, equity and inclusion. We do not tolerate any kind of mistreatment or harassment of women, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

full_safety

This flyer is from the same organization:

Creating a safe workplace for women

Our organization takes women's safety very seriously. We are committed to fostering, cultivating, and preserving a culture of diversity, equity and inclusion. We do not tolerate any kind of mistreatment or sexual exploitation of women, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

We have implemented the following measures to ensure women's safety:

1. Security cameras are installed at the workplace.
2. Our organization hires female security guards to ensure a safe workplace environment for women.
3. All employees are subject to a strict sexual harassment policy. Any employees found to be violating the policy will be fired immediately.
4. Before hiring any new employees our organization calls the individual's previous workplace or personal references to check they have no history of behaving inappropriately towards women.
5. All new employees must complete a sexual harassment training on acceptable

note_difference

There are limited openings in both offices, so to ensure everyone gets an equal opportunity we are deciding by chance which office you can apply to. Not everyone who applies to the job will get one but we are planning to offer roughly 70 jobs in the Danapur area.

note_envelope1

1. This envelope is for you. Please don't open it yet.
2. In this envelope is the flyer for the BPO office that you have been assigned to.
3. You will only be able to apply for a job in the office mentioned in this envelope. You will not be able to take a job in the other office.
4. There is no way for you, me or anyone else to change the offer that is in the envelope.

note_envelope2

1. Before you open the envelope, we will ask you for each of the two jobs whether you would prefer to apply for the job or receive one of these extra gifts (point to the gift card).
2. You can make the same choice for both offices, or you can make different choices for the two offices - it's entirely up to you.

note_envelope3
After you choose your choice, we will open the envelope and apply whatever you have chosen for that BPO office. Let me explain all this with an example --

In a minute, I will ask you whether you would like to apply for the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] job or receive an extra gift. Let's say you tell me that you would like to apply for the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] job. Then, if the envelope contains the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] flyer, you will get to apply for the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] job and you won't receive the gift.

On the other hand, if you said that you would prefer to take the extra gift instead of applying for the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] job. Then if the envelope contains the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] flyer, you will get an extra gift and you will not be able to apply for the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] job.

We will do the same thing for the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*].
Remember, the office you received is the one in the envelope and cannot be changed.

note_envelope4
The salary for the job is [4000/5000/6000 – *randomized*] INR per month, or [2000/2500/3000 – *randomized*] INR for two weeks.

husband_scheduling
Please note that if you indicate you are interested in applying for any of the jobs, and that office paper(flyer) is in the envelope, we will try to call you and your husband when we schedule or remind you of the training day. We will discuss the job and training day with you both in detail and answer any questions you have.

Randomization: We randomized the order of "job_wo" and "job_mi" with equal probability. We keep this order fixed for any given participant.

first_office
First, I'm going to ask you about what you would like to do if the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] office flyer is in the envelope. And then straight afterwards, I'm going to ask you the same question about the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] office.

job_wo

Would you prefer to apply for a job in the women-only office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] or to take a gift?

I prefer to apply for the women-only office job

I prefer the gift

second_office

I just asked you about the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] office. Now I'm going to ask you about what you would like to do if the [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] office flyer is in the envelope.

job_mi

Would you prefer to apply for a job in the mixed-gender office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] or to take a gift?

I prefer to apply for the mixed-gender office job

I prefer the gift

note_comprehension

We just asked you about your preferences for both jobs, now we will ask you some questions to make sure you understand everything before we finalize your choices.

comp_choices_aff

Will the offices or gifts you select change which of the two BPO offices we have assigned to you, or is it already fixed and written in this envelope?

Yes, my choices will affect which office I have been assigned to

No, the office I have been assigned to is already fixed and in the envelope

Note: If incorrect, surveyor re-explains and repeats question

Note: If incorrect again, surveyor re-explains and moves on

Randomization: We randomized the assignment to either "comp_mi" or "comp_wo" with equal probability.

comp_mi

You said you prefer [gift/job in the mixed-gender office – *depending on participant's choice*] over [gift/job in the mixed-gender office – *depending on participant's choice*]. If the

mixed gender flyer is in the envelope, will you get: (i) the gift, or (ii) the opportunity to apply for the mixed-gender job

The gift
The opportunity to apply for the job
Neither the gift nor the opportunity to apply for the job
The gift and the opportunity to apply for the job

Note: If incorrect, surveyor re-explains and repeats question
Note: If incorrect again, surveyor re-explains and moves on

comp_wo

You said you prefer [gift/job in the women-only office – *depending on participant's choice*] over [gift/job in the women-only office – *depending on participant's choice*]. If the women-only flyer is in the envelope, will you get: (i) the gift, or (ii) the opportunity to apply for the women-only job

The gift
The opportunity to apply for the job
Neither the gift nor the opportunity to apply for the job
The gift and the opportunity to apply for the job

Note: If incorrect, surveyor re-explains and repeats question
Note: If incorrect again, surveyor re-explains and moves on

comp_gender

Will there be men working in this [women-only/mixed-gender – *randomized*] BPO office?

Yes, there will be men working this BPO office
No, there will not be men working this BPO office

Note: If incorrect, surveyor re-explains and repeats question
Note: If incorrect again, surveyor re-explains and moves on

job_change

Now that you understand how this works. Would you like to change your choices for either of the two jobs in any way, or are you happy to keep the same choices? Please think carefully as we will treat your decision here as final.

I would like to proceed with my current choices
I would like to change my choices

Note: If the participant decides to change their choices, surveyor repeats the choice questions for both the offices.

job_prefer

If both jobs have the same salary, and you had to choose, would you prefer a job in the mixed-gender BPO office or the women-only BPO office?

Prefer women only
Prefer mixed gender
Don't have a preference

job_prefer_why

Why do you prefer the [women-only/mixed-gender – *conditioned on which office they preferred*] office?

job_prefer_reason_h

Display logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent cited that her husband or family would not allow or approve of her working there.

Why would your husband/family not like you to work in the mixed workplace?

Randomization: We randomized the order of "safety_belief_wo" and "safety_belief_mi" with equal probability. We keep this order fixed for any given participant.

safety_belief_wo

How safe do you think it is for women to work in the women-only BPO office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*]?

By safe we mean that women would not be subject to inappropriate behavior in the office.

Please provide a score from 0-10, where:

- 0 to 3 means it is extremely unsafe for women
- 3 to 5 means it is unsafe for women
- 5 to 7 means it is safe for women
- 7 to 10 means it is extremely safe for women

So how safe do you think it is for women to work in the women-only BPO office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*]?

safety_belief_mi

How safe do you think it is for women to work in the mixed-gender BPO office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*]*?*
By safe we mean that women would not be subject to inappropriate behavior in the office. Please provide a score from 0-10, where:

- 0 to 3 means it is extremely unsafe for women
- 3 to 5 means it is unsafe for women
- 5 to 7 means it is safe for women
- 7 to 10 means it is extremely safe for women

So how safe do you think it is for women to work in the mixed-gender BPO office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*]?

hypo_intro

I am now going to ask you four hypothetical questions, for which you need to give your best guess. You won't be receiving any additional gifts for these questions.

number_of_men

If there is a team of 10 employees working in the mixed gender BPO [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*], how many in the team do you think will be men and how many will be women?

Randomization: We randomized the assignment to one of three group: "interested_310" (33%), "interested_510" (33%), or interested_710 (33%). Existence of alternative conditions were concealed from the participants.

interested_310

Suppose 3 out of 10 employees working in the mixed gender BPO office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] are men. Would you be interested in applying for the job or would you prefer the gift?

I would prefer to apply for the job
I would prefer take the small gift

interested_510

Suppose 5 out of 10 employees working in the mixed gender BPO office [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] are men. Would you be interested in applying for the job or would you prefer the gift

I would prefer to apply for the job

I would prefer take the small gift

interested_710

Suppose 7 out of 10 employees working in the mixed gender call center [with these safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] are men. Would you be interested in applying for the job or would you prefer the gift?

I would prefer to apply for the job
I would prefer take the small gift

amenities

Now think about both the offices [with the safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] we told you about. What do you think the quality of the facilities in this office will be like? In particular, the chairs, tables, and computers.

Very good
Good
Okay
Bad
Very bad

safety_past

Again think about both the [with the safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*] we told you about. Do you think sexual harassment has been a problem at this company in the past?

Yes
No

jealousy_money_spent

Who decides how money in your household will be used?

Mainly you
Mainly your husband
We decide together
Other

jealousy_situations

When you leave the house, how often does your husband insists on knowing where you are

going? Never, rarely, often, almost always?

- Never
- Rarely
- Often
- Almost always

jealousy_beliefs

In your opinion, is it acceptable for married women to spend time with men outside their family? Is it very acceptable, acceptable, not acceptable, not at all acceptable?

- Very acceptable
- Acceptable
- Not acceptable
- Not at all acceptable

jealousy_second_ord

Think about the 10 people who are closest to you in your life. Of these 10 closest friends and family, how many would say it is acceptable for married women to spend time with men outside their family, and how many would say it is not acceptable?

note_jealousy_second

So [*Answer 1 from previous question*] of your closest friends and family would say it is acceptable for married women to spend time with men outside their family, and [*Answer 2 from previous question*] would say it is not acceptable.

jealousy_men_comfort

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"My husband would feel angry or jealous if I was interacting with other men at the workplace?"
Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

reason_not_work

Display logic: This question was displayed only if the wife reported that she was not currently employed.

Why are you currently not working?

Randomization: We randomized the order of "acceptable_wo" and "acceptable_mi" with equal probability. We keep this order fixed for any given participant.

acceptable_wo

How socially acceptable would your husband think it is if you were to work in the women-only BPO office [with the safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*]? Would your husband think it is very socially acceptable, socially acceptable, not socially acceptable, not all socially acceptable

- Very socially acceptable
- Socially acceptable
- Not socially acceptable
- Not at all socially acceptable

acceptable_mi

How socially acceptable would your husband think it is if you were to work in the mixed gender BPO office [with the safety measures – *if randomized to signal safety or full safety*]? Would your husband think it is very socially acceptable, socially acceptable, not socially acceptable, not all socially acceptable

- Very socially acceptable
- Socially acceptable
- Not socially acceptable
- Not at all socially acceptable

know_anyone

Do you know of anyone else who participated or is currently participating in this survey? Just so you know, your answer to this question will not affect whether you receive the gift or are eligible for the job.

- Yes
- No

know_how_many

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent reported knowing someone else who has participated or is currently participating in the survey.
How many people do you know who have participated in this survey?

Note: All the questions below until "open_envelope" are repeated for each person that the participant knows to have completed the survey.

net_name
Can you tell me the full name of person?

net_how_know
How do you know them?
- Neighbour
- Relative
- Friend
- Other

net_spoke_to
Did you speak to them about the survey?
- Yes
- No

net_yes_jobs
Do you know whether they said yes to the jobs or gifts?
- Yes
- No

net_yes_jobs_spec
Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent reported knowing that the the choices of the person they knew who had completed the survey with us
What did they choose between the jobs and gifts?
- Yes to both jobs
- Yes to women only and no to mixed
- Yes to mixed and no to women only
- No to both

net_envelope

Do you know what office they were assigned to in the envelope?

Yes

No

net_envelope_spec

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent reported knowing what was inside the envelope assigned to the person they knew who had completed the survey with us.

What office were they assigned to in the envelope

Women-only

Mixed

open_envelope

Please open the envelope to reveal the call center you have been assigned to

note_application

As we mentioned earlier, given that you are interested in applying for the job, could you please fill out this short form which asks about your work history and motivations for applying?

call_center_confirm

Thank you for completing the job application form.

As a reminder, your salary for the job is [4000/5000/6000 – *randomized*] per month. You will be paid for each day you attend at the end of the two-week period. You will receive [200/250/300 – *randomized*] INR for each day you attend. If you attend every day for the full two weeks you will receive [2000/2500/3000 – *randomized*] INR.

comfortable_husband

As I mentioned earlier, we would like to call your husband later and talk with him about this survey. We will provide him with all the details of the job you applied for and the office

you are assigned to. We will also discuss the time and location for the training day with him. Would it be okay with you if we call your husband?

Yes

No

confirm_uncomfort

Display Logic: This question was displayed only if the respondent did not consent to having her husband contacted about the survey.

We unfortunately cannot proceed with the job if you are not comfortable with us contacting you and your husband.

Yes, they would not like to participate with the job.