The Reversal of the Mission: The Influence of Religious Leaders on Sociopolitical Attitudes

Miguel Alquézar-Yus*

August 2026

Click here for the latest version

Abstract

This paper examines how religious leaders shape local religiosity and sociopolitical attitudes. I collect a novel dataset on the universe of Catholic priest assignments to rural Spanish parishes (2000-2019), and exploit the quasi-natural experiment by which foreign-born priests are allocated to parishes in a staggered difference-in-differences design. Foreign-born priests, whom I find more devoted, boost local religiosity, increasing Catholic marriages and fertility while reducing divorces. Politically, they mobilize voters, shift communities toward Catholic-aligned positions, and reduce support for openly xenophobic parties. These effects are driven by their broader community engagement and reinforcement of native in-group cohesion, rather than immigrant assimilation.

Keywords: Catholic Church, Family Formation, Fertility, Missionaries, Political Influence, Religious Revival

JEL Classification: D64, D72, J61, O43, Z12, Z13

*Department of Economics, CUNEF Universidad, Calle de Almansa, 101, 28040 Madrid, Spain miguel.alquezar@cunef.edu. I am indebted to my advisors Michèle Belot and Sule Alan for their continued encouragement and guidance. I wish to thank Sule Alan, Benito Arruñada, Josep Amer-Mestre, Sascha O. Becker, Michèle Belot, Davide Cantoni, Agustín Casas, Elisa Failache, Christian Fons-Rosen, Stefano Gagliarducci, Katharina Hartinger, Daniel Hungerman, Andrea Ichino, Blanka Imre, Alejandro Martínez-Marquina, Andrea Mattozzi, Sebastian Ottinger, Jared Rubin, Marco Tabellini, Rohit Ticku, Guadalupe Tuñón, together with seminar participants at AYEW Spring 2022, ASREC 2022, SMYE 2022, EPSA 2022, FES Conference 2022, 2022 ASREC Europe Conference, SPEIN 2026, BSE Summer Forum 2026, Freie Universität Berlin, and EUI, for their helpful comments. A special thanks goes to the staff at the Spanish Episcopal Conference for their support throughout the process. I also thank Íñigo Ena Sanjuán, Julià Gómez Reig, and Ismael Moreno Martinez for excellent research assistance. Financial support from the Salvador Madariaga-EUI scholarship is gratefully acknowledged. All errors remain my own.

1 Introduction

Religion is an integral part of the lives of many, constituting one of the dominant identity structures. In 2015, 78% of the world's population reported following a denomination (Brown and James, 2019).[1] Religious leaders are the central figure in charge of transmitting their values. These individuals act as intermediaries between their institution and laypeople, providing their supporters with moral teachings, offering advice on practical and spiritual matters, and holding a venerated position within the local community (Richerson and Christiansen, 2013).[2] However, how effectively religious leaders convey their messages, especially in increasingly secular societies, is far from trivial.

Over the past decades, the Western World has challenged that religious predominance. These countries have undergone an extensive secularization process resulting in decreasing social support for religious practices, from 62% in the 1980s to 53% in 2018 (EVS, 2021), and alongside a sharp decline in religious vocations. Consequently, Western Christian churches have resorted to attracting foreign-born religious leaders to overcome the lack of native leaders, which has been coined as "the reversal of the mission". The extent to which these foreign-born priests, characterized by their high devotion and outreach, can transmit their social values is central to understanding religious persistence.

In this paper, I investigate whether the arrival of foreign priests to rural Spanish parishes has shaped local sociopolitical attitudes. Between 2000 and 2019, the Spanish Catholic priesthood suffered a significant compositional change, shifting from entirely native-born to 14% foreign-born. I provide novel evidence that the arrival of these foreign-born priests, whom I find to be more devoted to their cause, has revived local religiosity, measured by an increase in Catholic marriages and fertility, and a reduction in divorces, and influenced political opinions toward conservative parties, away from openly xenophobic positions. Their influence strengthens in-group cohesion among the native population around traditional norms, without fostering assimilation of immigrants. These findings have important implications for policy-making as they highlight that the priesthood composition can shape today's sociopolitical attitudes and demographics.

I conduct rigorous data collection to estimate the influence foreign religious leaders have on their local communities. First, I collect data on the universe of priest appointments to parishes in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019. I extract this information from the diocesan periodical bulletins retrieved from the Spanish Episcopal Conference's internal archives. Second, I use the yearbook of each diocese to obtain detailed information

[1] According to Pew Research Center (2015), the share of the world's population following a denomination is projected to grow by 2050 to 87%.

[2] As of 2018, 62% of the world's population reported complete trust in their religious leaders (GfK Verein, 2018).

on the priests' demographics, including their country of birth, order, age, tenure, and education. I further complement these data with a phone survey, in which I ask priests for their political opinions and work habits. Finally, I merge the previous sets of information with the universe of Spanish parishes to identify those municipalities that had a change of religious leader, allowing me to trace the influence of foreign-born priests on natives' preferences. My final sample includes detailed information on the employment record of 2587 priests working in 4020 different municipalities for the 20 years of study.

I leverage the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of the arrival of foreign-born priests to local Spanish parishes to identify their differential impact on their community. To do this, I use a staggered difference-in-differences approach using the stacking method employed in Cengiz et al. (2019) to ensure that the treatment effects are estimated using only clean comparison units. The specification controls for time-invariant municipality characteristics and seasonal confounders. In this setting, I define a municipality as treated if it had a foreign-born priest in charge of its local parish and a municipality as control if it did not. In my sample, all municipalities have assigned at least one religious leader.

I first document, using own-collected survey data, that foreign-born priests are younger and more missionary-oriented than their native counterparts. Despite this, foreign-born priests are comparable to local priests along other dimensions, including political leanings, including measures of social conservatism and preference for church hierarchy, and work habits, such as their weekly hours and the type of church-related activities they engage in.

I find that foreign-born priests are effective than local priests at convincing people into two of the main pillars of the Catholic Church: marriage and family creation. Only one year after the arrival of a foreign priest, the local community experiences an increase of 0.1 Catholic weddings, corresponding to a 6% increase in the mean number of Catholic weddings held in the sample. As time passes, such influence increases. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, these municipalities have 21% more Catholic weddings than those with a native priest. That increase comes at the expense of civil-only weddings, which decrease by 13%. This influence is particularly pronounced among younger couples, who are more likely persuaded by foreign priests into Catholic marriage. By reaching individuals at this critical life stage, foreign priests appear to encourage an early adoption of traditional, religious family structures. In line with the previous results, six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the community experiences an average increase of 0.65 new births per year, representing a 10% increase in the mean number of births, while at the same time, there is a significant reduction in the number of divorcees in the affected communities (9%). Taken together, these results suggest that foreign-born priests play a significant role in reinforcing Catholic values among the local population, reinforcing a

traditional approach to family formation.

While foreign religious leaders might influence their parishioners back to the church, their leadership could also reach other religiously-relevant outcomes. I therefore turn to local political preferences. I show that the arrival of a foreign priest shifts a community's voting behavior toward more traditionally conservative positions. Six years after arrival, municipalities with a foreign priest cast 1.4% more votes for conservative (i.e., Catholic-aligned) parties, a 3.5% increase relative to the average conservative vote share. This gain comes at the expense of both left-leaning parties, which favor the separation between state and the Catholic Church, and radical-right parties, which are openly hostile toward minorities. Overall, this evidence carries important policy implications, suggesting that foreign religious leaders can act as a deterrent to open support for xenophobic positions.

I examine how local ethnic composition shapes the influence of foreign-born priests. While their political influence is uniform across ethnic composition, their influence on family formation is concentrated in ethnically diverse municipalities, where foreign priests reinforce ethnic boundaries rather than erode them. Individual-level marriage records show Catholic marriage rising among native-born couples and among Latin American-born couples, but not between them, ruling out co-ethnic matching and the contact hypothesis as driving mechanisms. This pattern holds irrespective of whether the priest's own origin matches that of the dominant immigrant group, and equally in municipalities with established Latin American or Maghrebi communities, suggesting that their presence reinforce in-group cohesion among in-groups, rather than fostering real integration across ethnic lines. This mechanism reveals a novel channel through which immigration can shape majority-group norms, not by altering minority behavior, but by reinforcing traditional values among the native population in response to increased diversity.

I further investigate whether foreign priests' influence extends to social values beyond religious practice, focusing on gender roles within the household and on charitable giving. Six years after arrival, traditional Catholic marriages (i.e., households with a male breadwinner and a female homemaker) increase by 56%, dual-earner rise by 28%, and no effect on reversed gender roles marriages. Similarly, a higher diocesan share of foreign-born priests is associated with an increase in donations to the Church and a decline in overall charitable giving, suggesting that the religious revival they generate redirects, rather than expands, prosocial behavior toward Church-affiliated causes. These results indicate that foreign priests' influence extends beyond marriage and fertility to a broader reinforcement of traditional, Church-aligned social values.

I then examine through which channel foreign priests actually reach their parishioners. I find that political effects and shifts in social values travel through different margins of contact. Political influence follows simply from the weekly provision of religious services,

while the latter requires from sustained personal interaction with the foreign priest. Traditional family values accordingly shift only where the foreign priest lives among his parishioners, allowing for denser ties and a broader set of services, and only when the foreign leader is not overloaded with parishes to attend. This makes the channel inherently self-limiting, since the very clergy shortage that pushes dioceses to bring in foreign priests also forces many of them to serve multiple parishes, capping how far their influence can travel.

Finally, I explore which individual traits explain foreign priests' greater effectiveness. I find that neither tenure, age, country of origin, nor seminary of ordination turns out to matter, only membership in a missionary order does. Since missionary orientation is also the characteristic that most reliably separates foreign from native priests in my survey data, this points toward selection on vocational commitment as the underlying driver, rather than cultural familiarity or seniority.

I perform four exercises to assess the validity of my empirical strategy. First, I provide suggestive visual evidence that the parallel trends assumption is not violated. Second, I check whether there are underlying differences between those municipalities that never had a foreign priest and those that had at least one between 2000 and 2019, finding some significant differences across municipalities. Consequently, I replicate the main analysis using a subsample of matched municipalities based on their 2001 Census characteristics, obtaining comparable results. Furthermore, I directly test this at the event level, regressing both the timing of a priest replacement and, conditional on replacement, the origin of the incoming priest on pre-existing municipality characteristics. Replacement timing is not entirely uncorrelated with these characteristics, but the origin of the incoming priest is, supporting the exogeneity of the foreign-versus-native margin I exploit for identification. Third, I test whether the arrival of a foreign-born priest triggered a migration shock, which could alter the local demographic composition, finding no evidence in that respect. These patterns are consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2, according to which the replacement of priests is mainly driven by supply-side factors, such as the availability of newly ordained priests and the death or retirement of incumbent priests. Finally, I address the potential concern that the effects might be driven by strategic placement of foreign-born priests by certain bishops. To mitigate this, I replicate the main analysis while systematically excluding one diocese at a time, finding comparable results. Overall, my robustness checks confirm that my identification strategy is sound and effect estimates are internally valid.

My contribution is twofold. First, I build a very rich dataset containing the universe of Catholic priests' appointments in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019 and complement it with novel archival and survey data on the priests' political opinions and working

habits. Second, I leverage the quasi-natural experiment by which foreign-born religious leaders are allocated to Spanish parishes to identify their influence on their communities. I show that foreign-born religious leaders, whom I find to be more devoted to their cause, revive local religiosity and influence political opinions toward Catholic-aligned positions. They achieve this predominance through deeper engagement with the local community and by reinforcing in-group cohesion, rather than by promoting the assimilation of immigrants. My results support the hypothesis that foreign leaders are influential traditional community builders.

This paper contributes to and builds on four different strands of the literature. First, this work contributes to the literature on leaders' influential behavior determinants, which harks back to Carlyle (1840). Previous research has focused on explaining how leaders' identity characteristics, such as gender (Broockman, 2014; Bhalotra et al., 2018; Ladam et al., 2018; Baskaran and Hessami, 2018), ethnicity (Burgess et al., 2015; Sakong, 2021), religiosity (Bhalotra et al., 2014, 2021), charisma (Assouad, 2020; Wang, 2021), social interactions (Becker et al., 2020; Pulejo, 2024; Lanzara et al., 2024), and political views (Broockman and Butler, 2017; Butler and Hassell, 2018), shape their constituents' preferences and behavior. I focus on an often overlooked authority figure, local religious leaders. Religious leaders differ from those previously studied as they are appointed following a top-down process in which their communities have minimal involvement. Three notable exceptions are Engelberg et al. (2016), which shows that high-performing Methodist pastors are key in explaining church attendance; Tuñón (2026), which shows that left-leaning Brazilian bishops were able to mobilize their network towards economically progressive but socially conservative positions; and Bassi and Rasul (2017), which shows that papal visits influenced the timing of births via religious persuasion. I contribute to the literature by showing that the arrival of more devoted foreign priests increases fertility and Catholic marriages and shifts voting toward conservative positions. Since religious leaders mediate in the transmission of values and the persistence of the local culture, this paper also relates to the literature on cultural transmission (Bisin et al., 2004; Alesina et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2016).

Second, my paper relates to the broader literature on the societal impacts of religiosity, which goes back to Weber (1920). Some recent studies have provided compelling evidence that religious practices have long-lasting implications on individual outcomes and behaviors, such as economic outcomes (Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015; Montero and Yang, 2022; Heldring et al., 2021; Bryan et al., 2021; Drelichman et al., 2021; Hasan et al., 2024), human capital (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Calvi et al., 2020; Squicciarini, 2020), and pro-social behaviors (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Schulz et al., 2019; Buccione, 2024; Sola, 2024; Gagliarducci and Tabellini, 2025). This paper looks at religiosity from

a yet unexplored angle, that one of its local religious leaders. I add to this literature by causally studying how changes in the current composition of the local priesthood can lead to religious awakenings and changes in the parishioner's sociopolitical views.

Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the sociopolitical consequences of immigration. Previous research has provided evidence on how exposure to large inflows of immigrants may led to shifts in voting behavior, triggering a backlash effect (Dustmann et al., 2019; Hangartner et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020), and increasing support for nationalistic parties, particularly among lower-skilled native populations (Mayda et al., 2022; Moriconi et al., 2022). This paper takes a different perspective by focusing on the role of immigrant leaders in shaping host societies' attitudes. Specifically, I study the effects of assigning foreign-born, religiously conservative individuals, in this setting Catholic priests, to leadership positions in local communities. I show that these top-down placements reinforce traditional social norms, while reducing anti-immigration sentiments. The findings highlight a previously overlooked mechanism through which immigration can influence political attitudes in the host community, in the absence of direct labor market or political competition.

Finally, I contribute to the study of the consequences of secularization. Previous literature has found mixed evidence on the relationship between socioeconomic prosperity and a country's secularization (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Lozano, 2017; Cantoni et al., 2018; Andersen and Bentzen, 2022). I contribute to the literature by examining how the "reversal of the mission", a direct consequence of Europe's secularization, helps revive local religiosity, highlighting the important role of supply-side factors in explaining European secularization. Since most foreign religious leaders preaching in Europe share a missionary trait, this paper also relates to the literature on the long-lasting effects of exposure to missionaries (Bai and Kung, 2015; Waldinger, 2017; Valencia Caicedo, 2019; Calvi et al., 2020; Becker and Won, 2024).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Spanish religious background and how dioceses manage their own resources. Section 3 presents and describes the data. Section 4 exposes the empirical strategy followed. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 explores the mechanisms at play. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Institutional Setting

2.1 Spanish Religious Context

In Spain, Catholicism has traditionally been considered a state religion.[3] Despite that, in recent years, a rapid process of secularization has challenged this scenario. Between 2000 and 2019, the share of Spaniards self-identifying as Catholic has decreased from 82% in 2000 to 63% in 2019 (Figure 1a). This decline is even more pronounced when considering practice: by 2019, only 35% of self-identified Catholics, or 22% of the population, attended church regularly (Figure 1b). That drop in religiosity is largest among the younger generations. While in 2000, 25% of young people reported attending church regularly, in 2019, only 6% attend often.

The evolution of the Spanish priesthood has experienced a similar decline. At its peak in 1961, the Spanish Church was composed of more than 35,000 priests, which represented the 10% of all priests worldwide, and ordained 900 new priests annually.[4] This vocational abundance favored the missionary outflow of more than 25,000 individuals, representing, at that time, the 25% of all Spanish clergy (Suárez Fernández et al., 1991). Since then, religious vocations have steadily fallen,[5] with ordinations dropping from 227 in 2001 to 124 in 2019 (Figure 2). To address this shortage, dioceses have turned to attracting foreign-born priests to serve in local parishes, a trend known as the "reversal of the mission" (Ojo, 2007) and documented also in other Western countries, such as Germany (Währisch-Oblau, 2009), the Netherlands (Koning, 2011), the United Kingdom (Woodhead and Catto, 2012; Burgess, 2019), and the United States (Kim, 2015). By 2019, 20% of new seminarians were foreign-born. This situation has created a unique scenario, especially in Spanish rural areas, characterized by their aged population, high religiosity, and strong cultural identity.

2.2 Diocese Management

The Spanish Catholic Church is characterized by a decentralized structure, with all decisions taken at the diocese level. A diocese is an administrative unit, similar in size to a civil province, that manages all the religious activities held in its territory, ranging from the appointment and ordainment of priests to how collected funds are allocated. Each

[3] The Spanish nation-state emerged under the strong influence of the Catholic Church, shaping the country's social, cultural, and political fabric (Suárez Cortina, 2014).

[4] These values have been calculated using the 1956-1965 Pontifical Yearbooks.

[5] Numerous reasons have been stressed for having promoted the decay in religious callings, such as the increasing secularization of the Spanish state, the rigid and antagonistic positioning of the Spanish bishops to church modernization following the II Vatican Council, and the decreasing fertility rates (Menéndez Pidal, 1996).

diocese is guided by a bishop. As of 2019, there are 69 territorial dioceses, coordinated by the Spanish Episcopal Conference, and comprise around 23.000 parishes and 17.000 priests.

Dioceses manage their resources following an autocratic approach. Every diocese has its own seminary where future priests study. The process to become a priest, homogeneous to all dioceses, takes around 8-9 years, and includes the study of Philosophy and Theology and the pastoral training. Upon finishing their studies, priests are ordained by their diocesan bishop, forming a perpetual relationship with the ordaining diocese.[6] These bonds help dioceses maintain a loyal number of vocations in the territory.

Bishops are the actors in charge of allocating priests to their corresponding parishes. The process works as follows. First, preceding religious leaders are moved out of their parish in the event of death, retirement (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 537), or by forza maggiore, always after an extended stay in the parish.[7] When assigning a new priest, bishops consider the parish demographic and religious characteristics and the priest's pastoral and religious attributes.[8] Throughout the process, religious leaders have de facto no power to object to a bishop's decision (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 1748).[9] Once at the parish, priests have complete discretion on their engagement with the local community (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 530).

In the event of missing vocations, dioceses can opt for two different formulas. First, dioceses could choose to aggregate parishes, providing multiple parishes to a unique priest, called "administrator", or many parishes to several priests, called "in solidum". While the former strategy gets used as a temporary solution in finding a permanent priest (Code of Canon Law, 1983, § 539-540), the latter approach has become a prevalent strategy, especially in rural areas. Between 2000 and 2019, 16% of all municipalities in my sample have had at least a priest "in solidum". This approach is mainly used in parishes governed by foreign-born priests (23%) when compared to those led by local priests (10%). In my analysis, I control whether a given municipality has a priest "in solidum" to account for that difference.

Second, bishops could also work on attracting priests from other dioceses to attend

[6] A popular saying among Spanish deacons exemplifies that commitment: "If in God you trust, there will be no regret" (in Spanish, *Si en Dios confías, no hay arrepentimiento).*

[7] Spanish dioceses are requested to promote the continuity of priests in their corresponding parishes for at least six years. See Art. 4 of the C.E.E Official Bulletin - July 1984, inspired in Code of Canon Law (1983), § 522.

[8] Anecdotal evidence from various talks with priests and bishops suggests that the main factors influencing priests' appointments are the parish's demographic characteristics. No noticeable attention is paid to other sociopolitical factors at the local level. In the analysis, I control for population and the number of previous priests appointed to a given parish to account for its desirability.

[9] Qualitative evidence, collected via a phone survey, shows that priests have little saying in their own appointment process.

their local seminaries and preach in their territory. These contacts between demanding dioceses and supplying dioceses are conceived as a long-standing relationship by the two dioceses, nurtured by the historical presence of Spanish missionaries in the offering dioceses. Spanish dioceses leverage these connections to overcome their decreasing native religious calling. In practice, local bishops contact their foreign counterparts asking for vocations. Then, foreign bishops proceed by contacting those religious members in their dioceses interested in becoming missionaries. Finally, these members decide whether to accept the pastoral call and, if so, move to Spain. Upon arrival, they are treated as local priests, having to attend the local seminary if they are not yet ordained and subsequently preaching under their new diocese. Additionally, foreign-born priests once in Spain hold no formal obligations towards their home diocese during their stay. According to Lara (2021), the main reason that motivates foreign-born priests arriving in Spain is to help dioceses in need.

3 Data

This paper uses matched priest-municipality data that spans the period from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2019. I complement this with information from a priest survey and administrative data on municipalities' characteristics. This section describes sources and methods of data collection.

3.1 Priests' Appointments

I construct a novel dataset containing the universe of priest appointments to parishes in rural Spain between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2019. My dataset contains parish-month level information on all 8533 priest appointments that occurred in 4020 municipalities for those 20 years. The final sample includes all those municipalities with a single population center and parish to avoid any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. This sample comprehends 72% of all parishes and 93% of all municipalities of the target dioceses.

This data was collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference's archive (hereafter, SEC). The data gathering worked as follows. First, I use the periodical bulletins published by each diocese (in Spanish, *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico*) and regularly submitted to the SEC. These bulletins, which aim at providing a complete screenshot of the diocese, include information ranging from the events in which the bishop participated to detailed parish-level information. I extract from each monthly bulletin information on the priests' appointment process, including the priests' names, the exact working posi-

tions, the date when those appointments occur, and the parishes they are assigned. Then, I scrape the list of parishes each diocese has from the SEC's website and aggregate it at the municipality level using the catalog of population entities available at the Spanish Statistical Office. Lastly, I merge the dataset containing all priests' appointments with the universe of Spanish parishes to identify which municipalities had a change of religious leader and when that change happened. Table A1 shows the total number of parishes and municipalities each diocese has and those included in my final sample.[10]

3.2 Priests' Characteristics

3.2.1 Priest Demographics

I complement the appointment records with detailed demographic information on priests, extracted from multiple sources within the archives of the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

First, I identify each priest's country of origin and religious order, drawing on diocesan yearbooks, interviews published in national and local newspapers, and publicly available information from personal social media profiles. I use the full name of each priest to accurately identify them from the multiple sources available, having a 1.4% and 5.4% error rate in nationality and religious order coding, respectively, when compared to survey responses. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the priests' nationality. While the average priest is of Spanish origin, 13.3% of the priests in my sample are foreign-born. Among these priests, the largest share comes from Colombia (43%), followed by Mexico (12%). However, their geographic distribution within Spain is far from homogeneous. Figure 3 maps municipalities included in the study, distinguishing those that ever had foreign priests from those that never did, highlighting large spatial heterogeneity linked to the dioceses' native clergy supply. Table A2 quantifies this heterogeneity: for instance, dioceses such as Osma-Soria have never employed foreign priests, while others such as Tarazona, extensively rely upon them. Finally, Table 2 provides the summary statistics on the differences between those municipalities that received at least a foreign priest after January 2000 and those that never received one. For instance, ever-treated municipalities have, on average, fewer young people and singles, fewer temporal workers, and a higher share of immigrants than never treated municipalities.

Second, I collect information on the priests' education using the diocesan periodical bulletins. Specifically, I extract information on all religious ceremonies held at each diocesan seminary between 2000 and 2019. I match the full name of foreign priests with these seminary records to identify whether they studied in Spanish seminaries prior to

[10] A data caveat is that I cannot determine whether a given replacement reflects the death or the retirement of the outgoing priest, since I do not observe his name prior to the transition recorded in my sample.

their assignments. I interpret having studied in a Spanish seminary as a proxy for partial cultural assimilation among foreign-born priests.

Finally, I collect information on the priest's birthdate and ordainment from diocesan yearbook and websites. Using ordainment dates, I construct a measure of priest tenure, given that priest upon ordainment typically assume full responsibilities, often including parish leadership. However, not all dioceses report this information to the SEC. Table A3 shows that reporting dioceses have fewer foreign priests, fewer priests affiliated with religious orders, and more priests educated in local seminaries.

3.2.2 Priest Survey

I conduct a survey on individual priests working at the dioceses under study. This survey aims at understanding which characteristics define the current Spanish priesthood, focusing particularly on identifying differences between foreign-born and local priests across various personal, sociopolitical, and occupational dimensions.

The data gathering worked as follows.[11] Before the survey release, I manually collected the personal contact details of all priests present on each diocese's website and diocesan yearbooks. I use all information available on these sources as of April 2022. The sample of potential priests was 1288 priests. The survey release followed a two-stage process. First, phone numbers are contacted based on a random rank.[12] Individuals in the sample were contacted up to five times, at different times and with multiple phone numbers, both from mobile and landline devices. The phone survey was collected from May to June 2022. Then, once the phone survey was over, I sent an email survey with the same questionnaire to all those priests for whom I had their contact details but could not reach via phone call. This online survey took place from early July to mid-August 2022. Weekly reminders were sent throughout the process. A total of 257 individuals completed the survey, of whom 87% did it by phone, resulting in an overall 20% response rate. Table A4 presents, by diocese, the distribution of all priests, potential respondents, and actual respondents, differentiating according to foreign-born status. Table A5 compares respondents and non-respondents, showing that surveyed priests are less likely to belong to religious orders, more likely to have been educated in local seminaries, and tend to be younger and have shorter tenure. However, I find no significant difference in country-of-birth composition between respondents and non-respondents.

The survey is composed of three blocks of questions. The first block collects personal

[11] Each survey required an average of 8.6 minutes to complete. Phone surveys were conducted by the principal investigator, assisted by three research assistants. The survey received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee at the European University Institute (available upon request).

[12] In the event of not finding the person indicated in the phone book but another person, I attempted to obtain updated contact details for the priest in my sample.

characteristics of the priests, including age, year of ordination, nationality, reasons for migrating to Spain, and prior international work experience. The second block incorporates the political views of priests. I elicit individuals' political opinions by using a list of politically relevant and highly polarized statements and asking the participants to state how much they agree or disagree with them. Then, I summarize those scores into two broad categories measuring individuals' social and economic conservatism. Following the approach of L.A. Times Archives (2002), I further identify priests who are reluctant to question papal authority by eliciting their opinions on the moral stances articulated by Popes Francis and Benedict XVI. In the third block, I ask priests about their working habits, including questions on church attendance, hours spend preaching, and the level of local involvement. At the end of the survey, I pose an open question to participants to understand which other challenges they face in their parishes. Qualitative evidence shows little to no local repudiation based on the priest's country of birth.[13] Section C in the Appendix presents the complete questionnaire administered.

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the priests in the sample. In Panel A, we can observe that 13% of the overall sample of priests are foreign-born, 90% are diocesan, and 89% studied in a Spanish seminary. Panel B, based on diocesan yearbook data, reports that the average priest is 63 years old and has 36 years of working experience. Panel C presents the information collected in the survey. About 20% of priests currently serving in Spain have prior missionary experience, varying from short-term placements to extended overseas missions. On average, surveyed priests report slightly positive attitudes towards social and economic conservatism, regularly discuss political issues with parishioners, yet refrain from openly challenging official Church teachings. Furthermore, priests estimate that around 23% of their parishioners regularly attend the Sunday sermon, spending 10 hours a week officiating masses. Priests play a central role in their communities, participating in numerous projects, with special emphasis on social care and family planning activities, and maintaining a good relationship with the local governments.

Comparing foreign-born priests with their Spanish-born counterparts reveals several notable differences. Foreign-born priests are, on average, 13 years younger and significantly more likely to belong to religious orders and to have prior missionary experience. Furthermore, foreign-born priests are more optimistic about the current economic situation both when compared to Spanish-born priests and to the general population.[14] However, there are no significant differences between foreign- and Spanish-born priests

[13]Only one foreign-born priest reported experiencing racism during his first year in Spain. However, his bishop did not reassign him, indicating that bishops may not fully internalize local attitudes when allocating priests to parishes.

[14]Question 19 is also asked in the Spanish monthly political polls collected by Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (CIS). Individuals surveyed as of May 2022 ranked their economic situation to be 3.665, comparable to the valuation of the local priests.

regarding political ideology or professional habits. These patterns align with the evidence discussed in Section 2, underscoring missionary orientation as a defining characteristic of foreign-born priests.

3.3 Outcomes of Interest

3.3.1 Religious Attitudes

I measure social religiosity using one of the couples' most important events, their wedding. Specifically, I use administrative data from the Spanish Statistical Office containing the universe of marriages celebrated between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2019. The dataset provides detailed individual-level sociodemographic information, including each spouse's country of birth, place of residence, educational attainment, labor market status, and the type of wedding ceremony performed. This allows for a precise classification of weddings by their rite: civil-only, Catholic, or non-Catholic religious ceremonies. Figure 4a shows trends over the sample period, documenting the rapid secularization occurring in Spain: the proportion of Catholic weddings fell dramatically from approximately 80% in 2000 to only 20% by 2019.

However, the decision to marry by the Catholic rite might be partially influenced by the inherent traits of the officiating priest. To provide further evidence of foreign priests' role in promoting religiosity, I look at fertility. Fertility is a relevant proxy for religiosity given the long-standing support of the Catholic Church towards family-driven and natalist policies (McKeown, 2014). In fact, according to the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey, practicing Catholics have, on average, 1.33 children, compared to 1.07 for non-practicing Catholics and 0.68 for non-believers. To measure fertility at the municipal level, I use a database provided by the Spanish Statistical Office containing the annual number of births per municipality. Figure 4b displays the distribution of the average number of births per municipality over the sample period time, showing a steady increase prior to the 2008 financial crisis and a marked, sustained decline thereafter. By the end of the observation period, fertility had reached historically low levels.

To further analyze whether foreign priests influence adherence to Catholic values, I examine marital divorces. This metric serves as a useful proxy for social religiosity, given the Catholic Church's historical opposition to divorce. According to the December 2019 Spanish Sociological Barometer, divorce rates vary substantially by religious affiliation: 2.2% among practicing Catholics, 5.4% among non-practicing Catholics, and 5% among non-believers. Specifically, I measure the stock of divorced individuals at the municipal level for each year. This measure is derived from tax declarations obtained from a random sample comprising 10% of the Spanish population, as provided by the Ministry of Finance.

I further complement this measure by examining the annual count of newly initiated divorce cases at the judicial district level. As illustrated in Figure 4c, the number of divorced individuals has increased sixfold over the period under study.

3.3.2 Political Behavior

I construct a panel of municipal-level electoral outcomes using official voting data from all national and European Parliament elections held in Spain between 2000 and 2019. Specifically, my sample contains the national elections held in 2000, March 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016, and April and November 2019, and the European elections held in June 2004, 2009, 2014, and May 2019. This information was retrieved from the Spanish Interior Ministry database and has been aggregated at the municipality level.[15]

I first classify all political parties that ever run for the national or European parliament into two broad categories: right-wing and left-wing parties. To do so, I use the information from official party registries and publicly available online sources. I follow this bipartisan approach as it represents the predominant political culture over the period of analysis. Additionally, this dichotomous categorization exemplifies the support of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, right-wing parties advocate for preserving the status quo, with Catholicism having an active role in society. On the other hand, left-wing parties advocate the real separation between the Spanish state and the Catholic Church. Figure 4d illustrates the evolution of these categories over time. It highlights that the municipalities in my sample are consistently more right-wing leaning. Table A6 in the Appendix details the political parties included in each category.

I then proceed by sub-classifying those parties in the right-wing sphere, differentiating those belonging to the conservative aisle from those on the radical right aisle. While both groups generally support traditionalist values, they diverge in their approaches to minority groups. Conservative parties take a status quo approach, embracing prevalent covert intolerance. In contrast, radical right parties follow an antagonist approach, publicly displaying minority groups as threats to national identity and cultural cohesion (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Figure 4e shows the evolution of these subcategories over time, evidencing the growing electoral relevance of radical right parties over the past decade, often at the expense of conservative parties. Table A7 in the Appendix details the political parties included in each category. Lastly, Figure 4f shows the evolution of the abstention rate throughout the study period.

[15] I exclude regional and local elections to avoid confounding variation arising from municipality-specific candidates or party configurations.

4 Empirical Strategy

To estimate the causal impact of foreign-born priests on local sociopolitical and religious attitudes, I use the following baseline specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta Foreign_{it} + \gamma_i + \omega_t + \Psi X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y identifies the outcome of interest for a municipality i and a year-month t, as described in Section 3. The key independent variable *Foreign* identifies whether a given municipality ever had in the past a foreign-born religious leader. I control for municipality characteristics, X_{it}, such as population, population squared, the number of previous priest appointments, and whether the current priest is sharing his office with other priests (in solidum). As discussed in Section 2, these characteristics are known to used by bishops when deciding the priest-to-parish allocation process, helping mitigate concerns about selection on observables. I include municipality fixed effects, γ_i, which allows me to account for time-invariant variation across municipalities; and year-month fixed effects, ω_t, which mitigate that results are confounded by secularization (e.g., periods in which people have lower religiosity levels may also lead to lower native religious calling, thus a higher propensity of having a foreign religious leader). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Under conventional two-way fixed effects assumptions, β measures the average effect of having a foreign priest in a municipality in a given year-month compared to municipalities with a local priest. However, as recent developments in the estimation of staggered difference-in-differences designs have shown, the average treatment on the treated is a weighted sum of different ATTs, with potentially even negative weights (De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021). To overcome such limitation, I use the stacked difference-in-difference approach proposed by Cengiz et al. (2019).[16] This approach transforms the staggered setting into a series of clean two-by-two group-period comparisons, aligned around each event's timing and using not-yet-treated and never-treated municipalities as controls to improve precision. Formally, I estimate:

$$Y_{i,t}(\mu) = \sum_{\mu} \beta_\mu Foreign_\mu + \gamma_i + \omega_t + \Psi X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \qquad \text{for } \mu \in \{-Q, \ldots, +P\} \tag{2}$$

where i refers to municipality, t to time, and μ to the relative time-to-event. Q and P refer to any arbitrary time window to and since the event, respectively. Outcomes are normalized to $Y_{i,t}(\mu)$ - $Y_{i,t}(-1)$, using the year prior to the arrival of foreign-born priests

[16] For completeness, Section B in the Appendix presents results using alternative estimators developed for staggered designs, obtaining comparable results to those from my main specification.

as comparison baseline.

As in the conventional difference-in-differences framework, the main identification assumption is that both treated and control municipalities would have had a similar outcome in the absence of a foreign priest's arrival. The main concern is whether there exists self-selection into treatment, leading to differential pre-trends between treated and control municipalities. As shown in Section 2, the timing of the treatment should be uncorrelated to the evolution of outcomes over time in treated and untreated municipalities, given that bishops do not strategically select priests based on the municipality's sociopolitical leanings. Furthermore, the top-down nature of the decision prevents parishes from voicing their preferences, thus facilitating priest assignments to be uncorrelated with municipality characteristics.

I conduct four exercises to support the identifying assumption that, absent treatment, control and treated municipalities would have followed similar trends. First, I address the potential concern that the effects may be driven by the strategic replacement of priests, by regressing both the timing of a priest replacement and, conditional on replacement, the origin of the incoming priest on pre-existing municipality characteristics. Tables A8 and A9 show that replacement timing is only partially predicted by some local characteristics, while the origin of the incoming priest is not, supporting the exogeneity of the foreign-native margin. This pattern is consistent with priest replacement being partially driven by poor performance, plausibly linked to the outgoing priest's age, despite that, foreign priests are not strategically selected to replace them. Second, I replicate the same analysis using a matching-on-observables approach, as this method allows me to account for the fact that treated and control municipalities may be structurally different at baseline. I use a propensity score matching algorithm with two neighbors and no replacement on a list of municipality characteristics available in the 2001 Spanish Census. Section D in the Appendix includes a detailed description of the propensity score matching procedure, together with the replication of all baseline results only using the sample of matched municipalities. I find no significant differences between using the full sample and only matched municipalities. Third, I implement a randomization-inference placebo test that examines changes in each outcome variable using only municipalities that have not yet been treated and compare these estimates to the baseline results. This procedure produces 10,000 randomly assigned placebo shocks, corresponding to fictitious arrivals of a foreign priest. Figure A1 in the Appendix compares the significance of the baseline estimates to the resulting distribution of placebo estimates, providing evidence against the concern that the results are driven by pre-existing differential trends among not-yet-treated municipalities. Finally, I provide a leave-one-out analysis to address potential concerns that the effects may be driven by idiosyncratic practices or strategic

behavior within particular dioceses. Figure A2 evidences that no single diocese is driving the results.

A second issue relates to the stable unit treatment value assumption. This assumption implies that the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality does not influence its control municipalities' potential outcomes. In this setting, I would violate this assumption if the arrival of the foreign-born priest would motivate individuals from other parishes to attend the foreign-born priest's masses. To tackle this concern, I use only municipalities with a single population center and parish to avoid any within-municipality self-selection into parishes. However, individuals could still commute between municipalities to attend a foreign priest's mass. This concern is minimized by the Spanish population density structure, which is defined as highly concentrated. That means that individuals are not widely spread over the territory but live only at core population centers built around a parish, making it improbable to commute to another municipality.[17] Similarly, I would violate the SUTVA assumption if the arrival of a foreign priest would influence individuals' decision to migrate to the municipality. I test whether those municipalities with newly arrived foreign priests enjoyed a differential migration pattern. Figure A3 shows that the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality does not influence individuals' migration decisions. Similarly, Tables A10 and A11 in the Appendix show that my main results are not sensitive to the introduction of spatially corrected Conley standard errors.

A third issue concerns any other alternative interpretation of the main variable of interest, *Foreign*. Beyond capturing whether a religious leader is foreign-born, *Foreign* might also proxy for the arrival of any new priest, or for the departure of the outgoing Spanish priest. Figure A4 rules out both alternatives. Only foreign-born successors shift community outcomes, while replacing a priest with another Spanish-born priest is, if anything, detrimental to religious spread, consistent with the priesthood characteristics documented in Section 3. These null results also reject a sharper version of the departure story, that the outgoing Spanish priest, plausibly associated with the country's former authoritarian regime, drives the influence observed regardless of who succeeds him. Spanish priests could nonetheless act as gatekeepers on politically sensitive local decisions, given the Church's historical opposition to left-wing movements (Menéndez Pidal, 1996). Figure A5 speaks against this possibility too, showing no effect of a Spanish priest's departure on the exhumation of Spanish Civil War mass graves, a historically fraught local decision, further suggesting that Spanish priests do not gatekeep sensitive historical matters. I therefore interpret my estimates as capturing the arrival of foreign-born priests specifically, which could be interpreted as a lower-bound effect, given that

[17] In fact, if we were to divide Spanish geography into 1km^2 cells, only 12.5% of these cells would be inhabited, compared with 68% in France and 57% in Italy. These ratios are computed using the 2011 GEOSTAT 1km2 population grid dataset.

the replacement of religious leaders, per se, worsens religious influence. Overall, these robustness checks confirm that my identification strategy is sound and effect estimates are internally valid.

5 Main Results

5.1 Influence on Religiosity

I start by examining whether the appointment of a foreign-born priest to a parish changes local religiosity, measured through three outcomes: the number of Catholic weddings, the number of births, and the number of divorces.[18]

Whether and how foreign priests shape social religiosity is far from trivial. On the one hand, we could expect that the arrival of a foreign priest to a community might deter individuals from following the Church's directives. In fact, the decision to move into and out of a religious group might be more influenced by the need for belonging than believing itself (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). In this case, this would mean that locals, when deciding their type of wedding, might factor in positively having as officiant priest the Spanish one they grew up with. That would result in fewer Catholic weddings in those municipalities led by a foreign priest. On the other hand, foreign priests might be inherently more effective than local priests in conveying Catholic teachings. In fact, foreign priests in my sample are two times more likely to be missionaries than their local counterparts. In this case, this would imply that parishioners would relate to their church more intensely, possibly overcoming the "loss" of their old-standing local priest and resulting in more Catholic celebrations.

Figure 5 displays the evolution of weddings at the local level following the arrival of a foreign religious leader. Important to notice is that weddings, especially in municipalities with few residents, are regarded as a rare event given the demographic dynamics. On average, the municipalities used in the sample have 2.8 weddings per year, but more than 50% of the municipalities do not have any weddings in a given year. Subfigure 5a highlights that the arrival of a foreign-born priest to the municipality leads to an increase in the number of weddings following the Catholic rite. The change in nuptial celebrations after the arrival of a foreign-born priest is explained by the relative availability of churches

[18]For completeness, Figures A6, A7, A8, and A9 in the Appendix show that foreign-born priests do not have a significantly effect on the spending preferences and economic prosperity of their communities. Table A12 shows that the frequency of priest replacements is uncorrelated with municipality baseline characteristics. Tables A13 and A14 show the controls used in the baseline specification are not driving our results. Similarly, Tables A15 and A16 further show comparable results using a truncated version of the staggered difference-in-differences approach that excludes the 15% of treated units exhibiting treatment reversibility in the main specification.

in rural Spain, allowing for the observed short-term effect. Six years after a foreign priest's arrival, treated municipalities have significantly 0.35 more Catholic weddings than those with local priests. That represents a 21% increase in the average number of Catholic weddings. Such an increase comes at the expense of civil-only weddings. Subfigure 5b shows how, six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the municipality holds 0.17 fewer civil-only weddings, representing a 12.7% decrease in the average number of civil-only weddings. Taking both wedding types together, subfigure 5c shows that those municipalities with a foreign-born priest experienced a weakly positive increase in the total number of weddings. Such influence towards Catholic celebrations is particularly pronounced among younger couples, who are more likely persuaded by foreign priests into marriage as shown in Table A17. Importantly, these effects do not extend to non-Catholic rites as shown in subfigure 5d or same-sex marriages, in Table A18. Moreover, these effects appear to be specifically attributable to the presence of foreign-born priests, as their removal leads to a partial reversion in religious adherence as shown in Table A19.

However, marrying by the Catholic rite could still be entirely influenced by the inherent traits of the officiant priest and not so much by local religiosity. To provide further evidence on this matter, I look at local fertility. As explained in Section 3, fertility is a good proxy for social religiosity, given the Catholic Church's strong emphasis on traditional family creation. Figure 6 shows how the number of local births starts growing upon the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality. Six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, the parish experiences an average increase of 0.65 new births per year, representing a 10% increase in the average number of births. While small in magnitude, that figure has an important economic significance for the demographically stagnant rural municipalities present in my sample.

Similarly, the influence of foreign priests on traditional family formation may not only be present in the initial stages of development, but may also have lasting effects on family stability. I test this hypothesis by examining whether the arrival of foreign priests in local communities affects the number of divorcees, using a random sample comprising 10% of the Spanish population. Figure 7 shows how, following the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality, there is a decline in the number of divorcees. Six years post-arrival, the community experiences a reduction of 0.32 divorcees (3.2 divorcees when extrapolated to the entire Spanish population), corresponding a 9% decrease in the average number of divorcees. Similarly, Table 4 shows that having a higher share of foreign-born priests within the judicial area is associated with a lower number of newly initiated divorce cases. This evidence suggests that the decline in the stock of divorcees reflects increased family stability, rather than a reshuffling of divorcees into new partnerships.

Overall, these results show that foreign priests are more effective than their local

counterparts in convincing people into two of the main pillars of the Catholic Church, namely stable marriage formation and family creation. However, whether and how foreign priests influence their parishioners on non-religious matters is still under question.

5.2 Influence on Electoral Outcomes

I next study whether the arrival of a foreign priest changes the voting behavior of its parishioners. As explained in Section 3, I first focus on the right-left dimension as it divides parties into church supporters and detractors, respectively.

Whether and how foreign priests shape local political preferences is far from trivial. On the one hand, one could expect that the arrival of a foreign-born priest would help the community to realize that foreigners can be part of the "local elite" and become a bridge between immigrants and natives in the municipality as theorized in Allport et al. (1954). In such a case, we would observe that those pro-immigration parties, identified more prominently in the sample as left-leaning (Volkens et al., 2021), would benefit from the arrival of a foreign priest. On the other hand, foreign priests might be inherently more religious and charismatic than their local counterparts, which could lead to a higher vote share for right-wing parties, given their Church-friendly positions. A third viable option is that religious leaders no longer have societal relevance, given the increasing secularization shown in Section 2. This would ultimately imply that their demographic attributes would no longer play an active role in shaping natives' political behavior.

Figure 8 displays the political evolution of left and right-leaning parties following the arrival of a foreign priest to the community. Subfigure 8a presents the vote share for left-wing parties and shows how the appointment of a foreign priest slowly changes individual political preferences away from the left. Six years after the arrival of the foreign priest,[19] treated municipalities are 1.4% less likely to vote for left-wing parties, representing a 3.5% decrease in the average voting share for the left. Such decrease is captured by right-wing parties, which see a significant increase in their voting share of 1% (see Figure 8b).

However, such influence towards traditionalist parties might hide a compositional effect in which minority integration could play a role. I subdivide the right aisle into conservative and radical right parties to explore that dimension. Figure 9 shows how parishioners slowly move towards conservative positions and away from radical right ones upon the arrival of a foreign priest. Six years after his arrival, the municipality votes 1.5% more to conservative parties, representing a 3% increase in the average voting share for conservative parties. Contrarily, foreign priests mobilizes their parishioners away from extreme positions, decreasing the vote share to those parties by 0.6%, representing a 23%

[19] Given that the elections are held on average every 18 months, the six years window corresponds to four elections after arrival, including its contemporaneous one.

decrease in the average voting share for radical rights parties.

A secondary channel explaining that electoral shift would be the change in the voters' composition. On the one hand, one could expect that foreign-born priests, given their stronger religious influence in their communities, might move their parishioners to rely more on the Church than the state. Thus, deciding not to participate in the elections. On the other hand, the presence of these priests could have quite the opposite effect, as their influence might increase their communities' cohesion and political positioning. Thus, increasing their voting participation. Figure 10 corroborates the latter argument. It shows that foreign-born religious leaders consistently mobilize their communities into electoral participation.[20]

To interpret the size of these effects, it is useful to place them against the scale of the municipalities under study. These are small, predominantly rural communities with low immigrant shares, one priest per municipality, and comparatively high Catholic practice. Over the period of study, 31% of residents in sample municipalities report attending church at least once a week, compared with 23% in municipalities outside the sample but located in the same provinces, and 15% in Spain overall (CIS, 2000-2019). As shown in Table 2, the average municipality that ever receives a foreign-born priest has 642 residents at baseline, or roughly 200 weekly churchgoers. In this context, effects that look small at the municipality-year level can represent meaningful changes in the behavior of the local churchgoing population.

I therefore compute a back-of-the-envelope exercise, reported in Table A20, that scales the estimated six-year effects under three scenarios in which 25%, 50%, and 100% of Spanish-born priests serving comparable one-priest municipalities are replaced by foreign-born priests. Under the assumptions of no general equilibrium responses, selection changes, or priest-supply constraints, a full replacement of the clergy would imply a 22.9% increase in Catholic weddings, a 13.5% decline in civil-only weddings, a 10.3% increase in births, and a 9.9% decline in the stock of divorcees. The exercise shows that modest local effects can cumulate into sizable aggregate shifts when applied across comparable rural parishes.

Overall, these findings reflect the dual identity of foreign priests, defined by their religiosity and foreignness. The results show that foreign priests effectively shift their parishioners toward positions more closely aligned with Church teachings, politically represented in Spain by conservative parties, while simultaneously distancing them from openly xenophobic positions, typically associated with radical right parties. A key channel through which this influence operates is political mobilization: foreign priests promote

[20]Figure A10 conducts sensitivity analysis following Rambachan and Roth (2023), under relative magnitudes restrictions. Post-treatment deviations from parallel trends would need to be an average of at least 20% larger than the largest pre-treatment deviation to overturn our results.

increased electoral participation among their parishioners, thereby reinforcing democratic engagement along Church-aligned values.

6 Mechanisms

In this section, I investigate four mechanisms that may explain how foreign-born priests shape the sociopolitical attitudes of their communities: (i) their role in consolidating in-group identity rather than fostering immigrant assimilation; (ii) their transmission of conservative social values, (iii) their function as community-embedded leaders; and (iv) the role of their own individual characteristics.

6.1 In-group Cohesion vs. Immigrant Assimilation

Do foreign-born priests serve as agents of immigrant assimilation, bridging newcomers and native communities closer, or do they instead reinforce in-group cohesion among the native majority? These two mechanisms carry important implications for understanding both the nature of religious influence and its broader societal consequences on immigration.[21]

I begin by investigating whether local immigration plays a role in explaining the influence of foreign priests. Using the 2001 Spanish Census, I classify municipalities as above or below the median share of foreign-born residents, distinguishing communities with frequent immigrant exposure from those with little to no contact. Two competing predictions arise. On the one hand, one could expect municipalities with a long tradition of immigration to be more receptive to foreign-born priests as earlier arrivals may have eased the initial contact. Moreover, the immigrant population in these communities might act as the initial stepping stone into the parish, allowing the priest to reach the whole community. On the other hand, natives might not necessarily see foreigners positively, reject the arrival of a foreign priest, and move away from the church. This could happen in high-immigration municipalities, where natives might feel that their culture is challenged, and in low-immigration municipalities, where locals might hold stereotypical prejudices toward foreigners. Figure 11 presents the results.[22] Foreign-born priests are more effective at bringing parishioners back to the church in ethnically diverse munici-

[21] For completeness, Figures A11 and A12 in the Appendix show that foreign priests have no differential influence by the presence of local religious grassroots movements or local education; Figure A13 shows that foreign-born priests are especially effective in bringing people to the church in more demographically vibrant municipalities.

[22] Throughout all heterogeneous effects, I look at the influence six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, as the Spanish Church's policy is to maintain religious leaders in their parishes for at least that duration. The actual average duration in the sample is ten years.

palities. In contrast, when little to no immigration is present in the municipality, foreign priests do not alter the family formation patterns of their parishioners. Their political influence is, however, orthogonal to the ethnic composition of the communities.

This dissociation, with uniform political effects alongside socioreligious effects that vary with local immigration levels, suggests two distinct underlying mechanisms are at work. On the one hand, the political effects are consistent with an institutional voting-cue mechanism. Foreign priests function as a voting cue through majoritarian religious identity (Norris and Inglehart, 2011), operating through the parishioner's own religious identity rather than through exposure to immigration. Consistent with this interpretation, their influence on political outcomes is uniform across low- and high-immigration municipalities, a result that is difficult to reconcile with a contact hypothesis mechanism (Allport et al., 1954), and is interpreted instead as evidence that religious authority functions as a symbolic political institution (Bourdieu, 1991). The socioreligious outcomes, by contrast, are consistent with a supply-side account of religious markets. Communities of immigrant origin represent a latent reservoir of religiosity that a culturally proximate priest can activate. His authority over intimate decisions, such as whether to marry in church, have children, divorce, is recognized because of shared background. Similarly, these foreign-born priests could also be reinforcing native religious belonging in communities in which ethnic diversity might have challenge their status, in line with an in-group norm enforcement story (Putnam, 2007). Both predict that effects should be concentrated in high-immigration municipalities, consistent with Figure 11; they diverge on whose religiosity is being activated. I test this directly in three ways.

First, if the supply-side mechanism operates through cultural matching, effects should be larger where the priest's country of origin aligns with the dominant local immigrant group. I test this by separating foreign priests born in Latin America from those born elsewhere. While Latin Americans share with Spaniards their language and rich cultural, religious, and historical similarities, those priests born elsewhere will likely only share the religious aspect. This fact might help Latin American priests integrate more effectively into the local communities as opposed to those coming from other countries, which could have a deeper influence on the community. Figure 12 rejects this prediction. Foreign-born priests influence their communities similarly regardless of country of birth, suggesting that the results are not driven by an ethnic-matching channel, pointing towards a response driven by the native congregation.

Second, I compare municipalities with established Latin American versus Maghrebi communities, the two largest immigrant subgroups in Spain, amounting to 0.39% and 0.25% of the population in 2001, respectively. While Latin American immigrants are culturally and religiously close to the native population, while Maghrebi immigrants have

historically been portrayed as the "others" (Martin Corrales, 2002), and so should constitute a far weaker reservoir of culturally-matched religious demand. Figure 13 shows that foreign-born priests are, instead, equally effective in municipalities with long-established Latin American and Maghrebi communities alike. This result is difficult to reconcile with a mechanism that operates by activating immigrant religious demand, and instead suggests that foreign-born priests mobilize their native followers toward religion in ethnically diverse parishes without differentially reaching culturally and religiously proximate immigrants.

Third, and most directly, I examine individual-level marriage records for evidence of intermarriage across ethnic lines. I classify each spouse's origin by country of birth, distinguishing Spanish-born, Latin American–born, and other foreign-born individuals, which separates natives, immigrants with close cultural and linguistic ties to the host population, and immigrants from more culturally distant backgrounds. If foreign priests promote assimilation, intermarriage between natives and immigrants should rise following their arrival. If foreign priests instead consolidate separate in-groups, marriage should increase within each group but not across them. As shown in Table 5, six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest there is an increase in Catholic marriages between Spanish-born individuals, and a parallel increase between Latin American-born individuals. In contrast, there is no increase interethnic marriages between these groups. Table 6 further shows that increase in Spanish-born marriages does not vary by province or municipality of origin, suggesting that the effect is national in scope rather than driven by local dynamics.

Taken together, the three tests converge on a single interpretation. Foreign priests reinforce traditional family formation within ethnic groups, both among natives and immigrants, without bridging the two. The evidence therefore favors in-group consolidation over assimilation as the operative socioreligious mechanism, complementing a political channel that operates independently of local demographic composition altogether.

6.2 Reinforcing Tradition or Changing Society?

I then examine whether foreign-born priests act as agents of change or instead reinforce a traditional local status quo along three dimensions, political ideology, social values, and economic need.

I examine whether foreign priests' influence varies with local political history, classifying municipalities as historically conservative or non-conservative based on right- versus left-wing vote shares across national and European elections between 1975 and 1999. Figure 14 shows that political history shapes the priest's influence along both religious and political dimensions. In historically liberal municipalities, stronger effects emerge jointly

across both. Catholic marriages rise, civil marriages fall, births increase, and left-wing vote shares decline as mainstream conservative support grows. This co-movement points to a return-to-church story, through which renewed engagement with religious practice re-aligns political identity with Catholic institutional norms. In historically conservative municipalities, religious effects are more muted, and the distinctive political result is a sharp reduction in support for radical right parties, whose anti-immigration platform stands in direct tension with the authority of a foreign-born priest. Both results suggest a cross-pressure mechanism. Catholics misaligned with Church-endorsed mainstream conservatism, whether by drifting left or toward the radical right, are pulled back when the foreign priest's arrival makes their Catholic identity salient.

While foreign priests encourage traditional family formation, particularly in historically liberal municipalities, such influence may not necessarily translate into broader shifts in social values. To test this hypothesis, I examine two distinct measures of social values: the prevalence of traditional marriages, defined as households with a male breadwinner and a female homemaker, and charitable giving. Table 7 shows that six years after the arrival of a foreign priest, traditional Catholic weddings increase by 56%, dual-earner marriages by 28%, with no effect on marriages with reversed gender roles, suggesting a broader acceptance of traditional gender roles. Turning to charitable behavior, Table 8 shows a positive association between the share of foreign-born priests in a diocese and Church donations, alongside a negative association with overall charitable giving. Consistent with Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2015), these results suggest that the increase in religious engagement, prompted by foreign priests, has led to a shift in charitable giving toward Church-affiliated causes, crowding out secular donations.[23] Overall, these findings suggest that foreign priest's influence their parishioners' social values in ways that reinforce Church-oriented and traditional moral frameworks.

Finally, I examine whether the local economic situation shapes how foreign-born priests interact with their communities, using the 2001 Spanish Census to classify those municipalities as above and below median unemployment. This distinction is crucial as religion could be perceived as a good of last resort, especially valuable in economically distressed communities. Figure 15 shows that foreign-born priests outperform their local counterparts at bringing parishioners to the church in municipalities with higher unemployment, consistent with the Church serving as a social safety net where economic need is greatest.

Taken together, these results provide evidence on both the conditions under which foreign-born priests are most effective and the nature of their influence. Their influ-

[23]For completeness, Tables A21, A22, and A23 in the Appendix show that the presence of foreign priests do not impact sorting in Catholic marriage along educational or socioeconomic lines.

ence is largest in places in which Catholic identity has drifted away from Church norms or in which economic precarity makes the Church's social support most valuable. In both scenarios, foreign priests function as agents of consolidation rather than disruption, pulling parishioners back toward Church-endorsed norms and deepening existing community bonds.

6.3 Preaching the Sermon vs. Living with the Preacher

I then investigate the channel through which foreign priests actually influence their parishioners, using residential proximity as a measure of treatment intensity. This proximity could operate through two channels. Under a broadcast channel, the sermon itself is the persuasive input, as in media persuasion models where content may move audiences independently of their relationship to the source (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). One could expect foreign priests to be more persuasive because of their greater devoutness, conveying their message more effectively during mass. Since mass is a public good accessible to all parishioners, and active Catholic practice is widespread across my sample regions, their influence should not depend on where parishioners live, but on mass attendance. Under a social interaction channel, influence instead operates through actual, repeated interaction, not mere co-presence or a weekly one-off exposure. Foreign priests could simply be better than their Spanish counterparts at building personal relationships with parishioners, with their influence behaving as a club good, concentrated among those with physical access to the priest (Iannaccone, 1992). The two channels are not mutually exclusive, but they yield sharply different predictions about where the effect should be concentrated.

To study this, I define a municipality as a priest's home if it is the most populated parish under his pastoral care, while the remaining municipalities in his jurisdiction are classified as visiting parishes.[24] Figure 16 presents the results. The primary mechanism through which foreign priests influence their parishioners' political views appears to be the mass itself, as there is an absence of evidence in favor of the importance of the maintenance of close personal contact with parishioners. Shared residence matters, however, for the effective provision of club goods. Foreign priests shift social and religious values only when they live in the same municipality as their parishioners, with no influence exert among non-resident foreign priests. In particular, residential proximity to a foreign priest promotes a more traditional approach to family formation, which is, at least in part,

[24] I validate this proxy using information on the exact home locations of priests, scattered across multiple diocesan yearbooks, yielding 502 recorded priest home locations. Of these, 46% of priests live in the most populated municipality they serve and 10% live in a smaller parish under their jurisdiction; the rest reside either in an adjacent municipality where they do not preach (20%) or in the diocese capital, where they hold other diocesan positions (24%).

facilitated through frequent interactions with the religious leader. In the same line, Figure 17 shows that those foreign priests with fewer parishes assigned to them are extra effective at pushing their message, while those overloaded do not change people's life choices. Qualitative evidence from my survey data supports this observation. Priests were more likely to report being predominantly available in their main parish of residence and to provide additional services there upon demand. These services encompassed both social activities, such as organizing sports events, and religious initiatives, such as marriage preparation courses and Bible study groups.

Taken together, these findings suggest that foreign priests' influence operate through two channels. A broadcast channel that shapes political views regardless of residence, while a social interaction channel that reinforces religious values only among those with direct personal contact. However, the broader shortage of priests, which makes it impractical for each priest to reside in close proximity to his own parishioners, limits the extent to which their influence can be fully leveraged. Consequently, this constraint prevents the widespread mobilization of foreign priests' influence, making it unlikely that even their influence can meaningfully reverse ongoing secularization processes.

6.4 Role of Individual Priest's Characteristics

Finally, I explore which of the priests' personal characteristics act as modulators of the influence exerted by foreign-born religious leaders.

I first look at whether the tenure or age of foreign-born priests explains their influence on local religiosity. Figures A14 and A15 show that tenure and age are not significant determinants of a foreign priest's influence when compared to the average Spanish priest, and Figures A16 and A17 show that, within the group of foreign-born priests, longer-tenured and older priests are no more influential than their more recently arrived or younger counterparts, ruling out that experience, in either of these two forms, as the mechanism behind the influence of foreign-born priests.

I next test whether ordination in a Spanish seminary shapes the influence of foreign-born priests. The prediction is ambiguous ex-ante. Spanish training could increase effectiveness by giving foreign priests local theological, cultural and linguistic fluency, easing access to the community, or it could decrease effectiveness through cultural assimilation that dilutes the missionary drive distinguishing foreign from local priests. Figure A18 shows no significant differences in any of the outcomes of interest, suggesting that studying in a Spanish seminary, as opposed to studying in a foreign seminary, is used more as a decoy to attract foreign priests but has no differential impact on their role as religious leaders.

I finally examine the role of order membership. Order priests take vows of poverty,

chastity, and obedience, costlier commitments shown to screen out low-commitment candidates and raise devotion among remainders (Iannaccone, 1994). Order priests, and foreign-born order priests in particular, are therefore plausibly highly selected on stronger religious vocation. Consistent with this, Figure A19 shows that foreign-born order priests are significantly more effective at revitalizing religiosity than Spanish order priests, while foreign-born non-members are not more effective than Spanish non-members. However, religious orders differ widely in charisma, ranging from missionary orders explicitly oriented toward evangelization to contemplative or service-oriented orders with no such mandate. I therefore split order-affiliated foreign priests into missionary and non-missionary orders. Figure A20 shows the effect is driven entirely by missionary orders, with non-missionary order foreign-born members having no differential influence on their parishes when compared to Spanish-born non-missionary order priests.

Overall, I find that tenure, age, and seminary of ordination do not shape the influence of foreign-born priests, while missionary order membership fully accounts for it. This pattern matches the survey evidence discussed in Section 3.2.2, in which missionary order affiliation was one of the key characteristics that reliably distinguished foreign from Spanish priests. These results are consistent with foreign-born priests' influence operating through devotion rather than experience or cultural adaptation, in line with recent sociological evidence on the role of the Ghanaian Adventist Church in the Netherlands (Koning, 2011) and Korean protestants in the United States (Kim, 2015).

7 Conclusion

This paper provides novel evidence on the importance of religious leaders in shaping religious and sociopolitical attitudes. I follow a twofold approach. First, I collect a unique dataset covering the universe of Catholic priest appointments in rural Spain between 2000 and 2019, with detailed information on priests' country of birth, order, age, tenure, and education, complemented by a novel phone survey on priests' political opinions and working habits. Second, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the assignment of foreign-born priests to Spanish parishes to identify their causal effect on local sociopolitical attitudes. I document that foreign-born priests make up 13.3% of the sample, arriving primarily from Latin American countries, and are distinguished from native priests by a missionary vocation.

I find that foreign-born priests are influential traditional community builders. I show that six years after arrival, foreign-born religious leaders boost religious practice in their communities, increasing Catholic marriage by 21% and fertility by 10%, while decreasing civil-only marriages by 12% and the number of divorcees by 9%. Similarly, foreign priests

effectively bring their parishioners' political opinions closer to Catholic-aligned positions, shifting vote shares to conservative parties by 1.5pp, both at the expense of left-leaning and radical-right parties, and by actively mobilizing parishioners into voting.

Further evidence shows that foreign priests reinforce ethnic boundaries rather than erode them. In ethnically diverse municipalities, individual marriage records show Catholic marriage rising among native-born couples and among Latin American-born couples, but not between them. This holds regardless of whether the priest's country of birth matches the dominant immigrant group, and equally in municipalities with established Latin American or Maghrebi communities. That the pattern emerges at the level of individual couples, rather than only in aggregate municipality data, rules out co-ethnic matching between priest and parishioner and contact hypothesis as driving mechanisms. Instead, foreign priests strengthen in-group cohesion rather than facilitating assimilation across groups.

Political and socio-religious effects operate through different margins of contact. Political attitudes respond to the mere provision of weekly religious services, whereas shifts in social values require sustained, personal contact with the religious leader. Effects on traditional family values appear exclusively among foreign priests who reside in the community, where denser social ties and a wider range of services are plausible, and only when the priest is not spread thin across many parishes. This channel is therefore self-limiting, as the clergy shortage that drives dioceses to recruit foreign priests is the same shortage that forces many of them to cover multiple parishes, limiting their own reach.

At the priest level, tenure, age, country of origin, and seminary of ordination do not predict effectiveness. Missionary order membership does. This is in line with survey evidence showing that missionary orientation is the trait most reliably distinguishing foreign from native priests, and points to selection on vocational commitment, rather than cultural proximity or seniority, as the driving factor.

This paper speaks to the broader question of what role religious leaders still play in shaping social values, in a setting where secularization has steadily eroded religion's traditional authority. I show that the arrival of foreign-born priests, driven by missionary commitment, reverses this erosion, pointing to the importance of supply-side factors in European secularization. Yet this revival is not assimilative. The same priests who rebuild religious practice also reinforce, rather than dissolve, the boundary between native and immigrant populations. This carries direct implications for policy-makers who look to religious institutions as a lever for both counteracting secularization and promoting immigrant assimilation, as strengthening a community's traditional religious authority and broadening intergroup contact might not be achievable through the same channel. Overall, the reversal of the mission reveals both the resilience of religious authority as

a force for tradition and its limits as a force for assimilation in an increasingly diverse Europe.

References

Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn, "On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2013, *128* (2), 469–530.

Allport, Gordon Willard, Kenneth Clark, and Thomas Pettigrew, "The Nature of Prejudice," *Addison Wesley Reading, MA*, 1954.

Andersen, Lars Harhoff and Jeanet Bentzen, "In the Name of God! Religiosity and the Transition to Modern Growth," *CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16938*, 2022.

Assouad, Lydia, "Charismatic Leaders and Nation Building," *Working Paper*, 2020.

Bai, Ying and James Kai-sing Kung, "Diffusing Knowledge While Spreading God's Message: Protestantism and Economic Prosperity in China, 1840–1920," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2015, *13* (4), 669–698.

Barro, Robert J. and Rachel M. McCleary, "Religion and Economic Growth across Countries," *American Sociological Review*, 2003, *68* (5), 760–781.

Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Zohal Hessami, "Does the Election of a Female Leader Clear the Way for More Women in Politics?," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2018, *10* (3), 95–121.

Bassi, Vittorio and Imran Rasul, "Persuasion: A Case Study of Papal Influences on Fertility-Related Beliefs and Behavior," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2017, *9* (4), 250–302.

Becker, Sascha O. and Cheongyeon Won, "Conquering Korea for Jesus: Protestant Missionaries, Local Churches, and Literacy in Colonial Korea," *Labour Economics*, 2024, *91*, 102618.

_ **and Ludger Woessmann**, "Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2009, *124* (2), 531–596.

_ **, Yuan Hsiao, Steven Pfaff, and Jared Rubin**, "Multiplex Network Ties and the Spatial Diffusion of Radical Innovations: Martin Luther's Leadership in the Early Reformation," *American Sociological Review*, 2020, *85* (5), 857–894.

Bhalotra, Sonia, Irma Clots-Figueras, and Lakshmi Iyer, "Pathbreakers? Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Participation," *The Economic Journal*, 2018, *128* (613), 1844–1878.

_ , _ , **and** _ , "Religion and Abortion: The Role of Politician Identity," *Journal of Development Economics*, 2021, *153*, 102746.

_ , _ , **Guilhem Cassan, and Lakshmi Iyer**, "Religion, Politician Identity and Development Outcomes: Evidence from India," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 2014, *104*, 4–17.

Bisin, Alberto, Giorgio Topa, and Thierry Verdier, "Religious Intermarriage and Socialization in the United States," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2004, *112* (3), 615–664.

Bottan, Nicolas L. and Ricardo Perez-Truglia, "Losing My Religion: The Effects of Religious Scandals on Religious Participation and Charitable Giving," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2015, *129*, 106–119.

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Harvard University Press, 1991.

Broockman, David E., "Do Female Politicians Empower Women to Vote or Run for Office? A Regression Discontinuity Approach," *Electoral Studies*, 2014, *34*, 190–204.

_ **and Daniel M. Butler**, "The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2017, *61* (1), 208–221.

Brown, Davis and Patrick James, "Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project: Demographics v 2.0 (RCS-Dem 2.0)," *Countries Only*, 2019.

Bryan, Gharad, James J. Choi, and Dean Karlan, "Randomizing Religion: The Impact of Protestant Evangelism on Economic Outcomes," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2021, *136* (1), 293–380.

Buccione, Giulia, "Religious Messaging and Adaptation to Water Scarcity: Evidence from Jordan," *Working Paper*, 2024.

Burgess, Richard, "Megachurches and Reverse Mission," in "Handbook of Christianity: Megachurches," Leiden: Brill, 2019, pp. 243–268.

Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, and Gerard Padró i Miquel, "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," *American Economic Review*, 2015, *105* (6), 1817–51.

Butler, Daniel M. and Hans J.G. Hassell, "On the Limits of Officials' Ability to Change Citizens' Priorities: A Field Experiment in Local Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 2018, *112* (4), 860–873.

Caicedo, Felipe Valencia, "The Mission: Human Capital Transmission, Economic Persistence, and Culture in South America," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2019, *134* (1), 507–556.

Callaway, Brantly and Pedro H. C. Sant'Anna, "Difference-in-Differences with Multiple Time Periods," *Journal of Econometrics*, 2021, *225* (2), 200–230.

Calvi, Rossella, Lauren Hoehn-Velasco, and Federico G. Mantovanelli, "The Protestant Legacy: Missions, Gender, and Human Capital in India," *Journal of Human Resources*, 2020, pp. 0919–10437R2.

Campante, Filipe and David Yanagizawa-Drott, "Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2015, *130* (2), 615–658.

Cantoni, Davide, Jeremiah Dittmar, and Noam Yuchtman, "Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2018, *133* (4), 2037–2096.

Carlyle, Thomas, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History*, James Fraser, 1840.

Cengiz, Doruk, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner, and Ben Zipperer, "The Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2019, *134* (3), 1405–1454.

Chaisemartin, Clément De and Xavier d'Haultfoeuille, "Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects," *American Economic Review*, 2020, *110* (9), 2964–2996.

CIS, "Barómetros Mensuales at the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas," Survey microdata, questionnaires, technical sheets, and tabulations, Banco de Datos del CIS 2000-2019.

Clingingsmith, David, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Michael Kremer, "Estimating the Impact of the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam's Global Gathering," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2009, *124* (3), 1133–1170.

Code of Canon Law, *Codex Iuris Canonici*, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983.

DellaVigna, Stefano and Matthew Gentzkow, "Persuasion: Empirical Evidence," *Annual Review of Economics*, 2010, *2* (1), 643–669.

Drelichman, Mauricio, Jordi Vidal-Robert, and Hans-Joachim Voth, "The Long-Run Effects of Religious Persecution: Evidence from the Spanish Inquisition," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2021, *118* (33), e2022881118.

Dustmann, Christian, Kristine Vasiljeva, and Anna Piil Damm, "Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2019, *86* (5), 2035–2091.

Engelberg, Joseph, Raymond Fisman, Jay C. Hartzell, and Christopher A. Parsons, "Human Capital and the Supply of Religion," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2016, *98* (3), 415–427.

EVS, "EVS Trend File 1981-2017," GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7503 Data file Version 2.0.0, https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13736 2021.

Gagliarducci, Stefano and Marco Tabellini, "Faith and Assimilation: Italian Immigrants in the US," *The Economic Journal*, 2025, *135* (670), 1814–1851.

Gardner, John, Neil Thakral, Linh T. Tô, and Luther Yap, "Two-stage differences in differences," https://jrgcmu.github.io/2sdd_gtty.pdf. 2026. [Online; accessed 30-July-2026].

GfK Verein, "Trust in Professions 2018 - A GfK Verein study," https://www.nim.org/sites/default/files/medien/135/dokumente/2018_-_trust_in_professions_-_englisch.pdf, 2018. [Online; accessed 07-August-2025].

Goodman-Bacon, Andrew, "Difference-in-Differences with Variation in Treatment Timing," *Journal of Econometrics*, 2021.

Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, "Long-Term Persistence," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2016, *14* (6), 1401–1436.

Hangartner, Dominik, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos, and Dimitrios Xefteris, "Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?," *American Political Science Review*, 2019, *113* (2), 442–455.

Hasan, Iftekhar, Stefano Manfredonia, and Felix Noth, "Church Membership and Economic Recovery: Evidence from the 2005 Hurricane Season," *The Economic Journal*, 2024, *134* (664), 3306–3332.

Heckman, James J., Hidehiko Ichimura, and Petra E. Todd, "Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 1997, *64* (4), 605–654.

Heldring, Leander, James A. Robinson, and Sebastian Vollmer, "The Long-Run Impact of the Dissolution of the English Monasteries," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2021, *136* (4), 2093–2145.

Iannaccone, Laurence R., "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and other Collectives," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1992, *100* (2), 271–291.

_ , "Why Strict Churches are Strong," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1994, *99* (5), 1180–1211.

Kim, Rebecca Y., *The Spirit Moves West: Korean Missionaries in America*, Oxford University Press, 2015.

Koning, Daniëlle, "Importing God: The Mission of the Ghanaian Adventist Church and Other Immigrant Churches in the Netherlands," *Journal of Adventist Mission Studies*, 2011, *7* (2), 131–133.

L.A. Times Archives, "How the National Survey Was Taken," https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-oct-20-me-priestmethod20-story.html, 2002. [Online; accessed 30-July-2025].

Ladam, Christina, Jeffrey J. Harden, and Jason H. Windett, "Prominent Role Models: High-Profile Female Politicians and the Emergence of Women as Candidates for Public Office," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2018, *62* (2), 369–381.

Lanzara, Gianandrea, Sara Lazzaroni, Paolo Masella, and Mara P. Squicciarini, "Do Bishops Matter for Politics? Evidence From Italy," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2024, *238*, 105177.

Lara, Carlos, "España Ya Tiene 1.500 Curas Extranjeros Contra la Crisis de Fe: Juan Desde el Congo o Álvaro de Managua," https://www.elespanol.com/reportajes/20211121/espana-extranjeros-crisis-juan-congo-alvaro-managua/628438002_0.html. 2021. [Online; accessed 30-July-2025].

Lozano, Fernando A., "The Rise of Secularism and its Economic Consequences," *IZA World of Labor*, 2017.

Martin Corrales, Eloy, *La Imagen del Magrebí en España: Una Perspectiva Histórica Siglos XVI-XX*, Edicions Bellaterra Barcelona, 2002.

Mayda, Anna Maria, Giovanni Peri, and Walter Steingress, "The Political Impact of Immigration: Evidence from the United States," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2022, *14* (1), 358–389.

McKeown, John, *God's Babies: Natalism and Bible Interpretation in Modern America*, Open Book Publishers, 2014.

Menéndez Pidal, Ramón, *Historia de España, La Época de Franco (1939-1975), Política, Éjército, Iglesia, Economía y Administración*, Espasa Calpe, 1996.

Montero, Eduardo and Dean Yang, "Religious Festivals and Economic Development: Evidence from the Timing of Mexican Saint Day Festivals," *American Economic Review*, 2022, *112* (10), 3176–3214.

Moriconi, Simone, Giovanni Peri, and Riccardo Turati, "Skill of the Immigrants and Vote of the Natives: Immigration and Nationalism in European Elections 2007–2016," *European Economic Review*, 2022, *141*, 103986.

Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Ojo, Matthew, "Reverse Mission," *Encyclopedia of Mission and Missionaries*, 2007, pp. 380–382.

Olivas Osuna, José Javier, "Populismo en España: Fundamentos Teóricos y Relatos Dominantes," *Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales*, 2021, *23* (47), 371–401.

Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050," *Pew Research Center*, 2015.

Pulejo, Massimo, "Religious Mobilization and the Selection of Political Elites: Evidence from Postwar Italy," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2024, *68* (4), 1498–1513.

Putnam, Robert D., "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 2007, *30* (2), 137–174.

Rambachan, Ashesh and Jonathan Roth, "A More Credible Approach to Parallel Trends," *Review of Economic Studies*, 2023, *90* (5), 2555–2591.

Richerson, Peter J. and Morten H. Christiansen, *Cultural Evolution: Society, Technology, Language, and Religion*, Vol. 12, MIT Press, 2013.

Sakong, Jung, "Identifying Taste-Based Discrimination: Effect of Black Electoral Victories on Racial Prejudice and Economic Gaps," *FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. WP-2021-07*, 2021.

Schulz, Jonathan F., Duman Bahrami-Rad, Jonathan P. Beauchamp, and Joseph Henrich, "The Church, Intensive Kinship, and Global Psychological Variation," *Science*, 2019, *366* (6466).

Sola, Daniela, "Brother Votes for Brother: The Effects of Pentecostal Political Influence in Brazil," *Working Paper*, 2024.

Squicciarini, Mara P., "Devotion and Development: Religiosity, Education, and Economic Progress in Nineteenth-century France," *American Economic Review*, 2020, *110* (11), 3454–3491.

Stark, Rodney and William Sims Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation*, University of California Press, 1985.

Suárez Cortina, Manuel, *Entre Cirios y Garrotes: Política y Religión en la España Contemporánea, 1808-1936*, Editorial de la Universidad de Cantabria, 2014.

Suárez Fernández, Luis, Demetrio Ramos Pérez, José Luis Comellas, and José Andrés-Gallego, "Historia General de España y América, La Época de Franco, Ed," *Rialp, Madrid*, 1991.

Sun, Liyang and Sarah Abraham, "Estimating Dynamic Treatment Effects in Event studies with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects," *Journal of Econometrics*, 2021, *225* (2), 175–199.

Tabellini, Marco, "Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from the Age of Mass Migration," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2020, *87* (1), 454–486.

Tuñón, Guadalupe, "When the Church Votes Left: How Progressive Bishops Supported the Workers' Party in Brazil," *American Political Science Review*, 2026, pp. 1–17.

Volkens, Andrea, Tobias Burst, Werner Krause, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieb, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, Bernhard Webels, and Lisa Zehnter, "The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2021a," 2021.

Währisch-Oblau, Claudia, *The Missionary Self-Perception of Pentecostal/Charismatic Church Leaders from the Global South in Europe: Bringing Back the Gospel*, Brill, 2009.

Waldinger, Maria, "The Long-Run Effects of Missionary Orders in Mexico," *Journal of Development Economics*, 2017, *127*, 355–378.

Wang, Tianyi, "Media, Pulpit, and Populist Persuasion: Evidence from Father Coughlin," *American Economic Review*, 2021, *111* (9), 3064–3092.

Weber, Max, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. 1, Mohr, 1920.

Woodhead, Linda and Rebecca Catto, *Religion and Change in Modern Britain*, Routledge London, 2012.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Descriptives - Priests' Country of Birth

Country of Origin	Share	N
Spanish	0.867	2243
Colombian	0.057	150
Other Latin American	0.024	64
Other nationalities	0.022	58
Mexican	0.016	43
Polish	0.011	29
Total	1	2587

Note: The table provides descriptive evidence of the nationality of those priests working in my sample of analysis. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Table 2: Summary Statistics (at baseline)

	Never Foreign-Led	Ever Foreign-Led	p-value
Population	762.422	641.897	0.042
Youth share	0.127	0.122	0.046
Retired share	0.325	0.334	0.041
Uneducated share	0.212	0.212	0.918
Technical education share	0.717	0.719	0.727
Singles share	0.378	0.365	0.000
Divorced share	0.004	0.004	0.123
Immigrants share	0.013	0.019	0.000
Labor participation (Male)	0.575	0.562	0.002
Labor participation (Female)	0.269	0.274	0.231
Unemployed share	0.106	0.100	0.059
Self-employed share	0.298	0.297	0.931
Temporal workers share	0.222	0.213	0.064
Farmers share	0.287	0.281	0.403
Share Right-wing	0.406	0.390	0.001
Grassroot Catholicism	0.074	0.058	0.119

Note: The table provides a comparison of the baseline characteristics between municipalities that had a foreign priest between 2000 and 2019 (ever foreign-led) and those that did not (never foreign-led). The information at the municipal level is extracted from the 2001 Census. The share of votes to right-leaning parties was calculated using all national and European elections held between 1975 and 2000. Grassroot Catholicism identifies whether there existed in 2001 any grassroot Catholic initiative in the municipality.

Table 3: Priests' Characteristics - Foreign vs. Local

		Foreign Priests		Local Priests		
	Baseline	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Panel A: Full Sample Characteristics						
Foreign	0.134					
Religious Order	0.100	0.150	0.358	0.092	0.290	(0.004)
Spanish Educated	0.891	0.223	0.417	1.000	0.000	(0.000)
Observations	2587	346		2241		2587
Panel B: Individual Characteristics (from Annual Directories)						
Age (in years)	63.531	51.250	11.680	64.659	14.645	(0.000)
Tenure (in years)	36.431	20.647	11.757	37.884	15.887	(0.000)
Observations	808	68		740		808
Panel C: Individual Characteristics (from Survey)						
C.1) Missionary Status						
Missionary	0.292	0.667	0.480	0.248	0.433	(0.000)
Missionary (in years)	1.905	4.963	4.701	1.546	4.668	(0.001)
C.2) Political Ideology						
Social Conservative	6.056	6.467	1.854	6.006	1.794	(0.230)
Economic Liberal	5.593	4.720	3.127	5.701	2.306	(0.125)
Church is Right	0.665	0.520	0.510	0.683	0.467	(0.139)
Discuss Political Issues	2.210	2.074	1.072	2.226	0.916	(0.485)
Economic Situation	3.567	2.926	0.958	3.645	0.783	(0.001)
C.3) Working Habits						
Church Attendance (%)	23.706	21.462	21.967	23.975	19.212	(0.581)
Mass Hours (weekly)	9.769	9.704	5.485	9.777	5.167	(0.948)
Family Planning	0.537	0.500	0.508	0.542	0.499	(0.665)
Minorities Integration	0.337	0.375	0.492	0.332	0.472	(0.643)
Social Care	0.667	0.719	0.457	0.660	0.475	(0.499)
Village Participation	0.375	0.438	0.504	0.368	0.483	(0.462)
Num. Activities	2.868	3.074	1.466	2.843	1.815	(0.457)
Parish-Local Council Relation	2.400	2.259	1.347	2.417	1.186	(0.564)
Open Question (length)	133.809	136.519	114.324	133.491	109.194	(0.897)
Observations	257	27		230		257

Note: This table shows the distribution of priests' characteristics as follows: Baseline (Col. 1); Foreign priests (Col. 2-3); Local Priests (Col. 4-5). The p-value of the difference between Foreign and Local priests is reported in Column 6. Missionary is an indicator variable that identifies if a priest has ever worked/is working as missionary (See 6.2 and 7 in Section C). Missionary (in years) measures the cumulative time that an individual has ever worked as missionary. Social Conservative is a weighted sum of Questions 11-16 in Section C. Economic Liberal is a weighted sum of Questions 9 and 10, as exposed in Section C in the Appendix. Both Social Conservative and Economic Liberal have a distribution that go from 0 to 10. Church is Right is an indicator variable that identifies if a priest does not question the Pope's political views (See Questions 17 and 18). Discuss Political Issues corresponds to Question 23 in the survey and measures how much a priest talks with his parishioners about political issues. Economic Situation corresponds to Question 19 and measures how bad the priesthood sees the current economic situation. Church attendance measures the percentage of the priest's parishioners that attend frequently the Sunday mass (See Question 20). Mass Hours is a variable that measures the hours a priest employs directly officiating masses (See Question 21). Family Planning, Minorities Integration, Social Care, and Village Participation are indicator variables that identify if a given priest participates in any related activity (See Question 24). Num Activities is a discrete variable that identifies in how many activities a given priest participates (See Question 24). Parish-Local Council Relation is a discrete variable that identifies the level of disagreement between local council and parish (See Question 25). Open Question is a continuous variable that measures the length of Open Question 26. All other information is self-explanatory.

Table 4: Effect of Foreign Priest Presence on New Divorce Cases
Judicial Area Level

	(1) Divorce Cases	(2) Divorce Cases
Sh. Foreign Priests	-144.2273* (73.0395)	-166.4713*** (60.7250)
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Judicial Area FE	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	2342	2342
Dep. Var. Mean	141.9	141.9

Note: This table analyzes the effect of having a higher share of foreign-born priests on the opening of new divorce cases at the judicial area level. The data was scrapped from the Spanish Justice Ministry website. Regressions include judicial area and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the judicial area level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Marriages by Couple's Country of Birth

	Spanish	Latin	ROW
Spanish	0.307***	.	.
	(0.0661)	.	.
Observations	44827	.	.
Mean Dep. Var	0.902	.	.
Latin	0.0083	0.0048***	.
	(0.0081)	(0.002)	.
Observations	44827	44827	.
Mean Dep. Var	0.0225	0.0041	.
ROW	-0.0048	0.0008	-0.0012
	(0.0098)	(0.0006)	(0.0029)
Observations	44827	44827	44827
Mean Dep. Var	0.0275	0.0011	0.0015

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' country of birth. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. Diagonal entries correspond to couples in which both spouses share the same country of birth, namely Spain, a Latin American country, or any other, while off-diagonal entries capture estimates for couples with different countries of birth. Row refers to Rest of the World. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. For further details on the data, see Section 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Marriage by Share Origin of Birth Within Spain

	Cath. W. Same Province	Cath. W. Diff. Province	Cath. W. Same Municipality	Cath. W. Diff. Municipality
Foreign Priest	0.1831***	0.1238***	0.1617***	0.1450***
	(0.0557)	(0.0300)	(0.0443)	(0.0491)
Observations	44827	44827	44827	44827
Mean Dep. Var	0.605	0.297	0.404	0.498

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' place of birth, whether in the same province or municipality. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. The sample is restricted to Spanish-born individuals only. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. For further details on the data, see Section 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Traditional Marriage Formation

	Traditional W.	Dual-Career W.	Anti-Traditional W.
Foreign Priest	0.1119***	0.3449***	0.00240
	(0.0199)	(0.1321)	(0.0154)
Observations	60229	60229	60229
Mean Dep. Var	0.198	1.206	0.0240


Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' marriage arrangement. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. The sample is restricted to heterosexual marriages. A traditional marriage is defined as one in which the husband is the primary earner and the wife is a homemaker; a dual-career marriage refers to couples in which both spouses are employed; and an antitraditional marriage is one in which the wife is the primary earner and the husband assumes the homemaker role. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. For further details on the data, see Section 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8: Effect of Foreign Priests Presence on Donations - Diocesan Level

	(1) Church	(2) Church	(3) Church	(4) Any	(5) Any	(6) Any
Sh. Foreign Priests	214.45	399.21***	605.46**	-3,447.3440	-2,952.01	-3,943.81**
	(171.99)	(148.61)	(289.67)	(2,121.41)	(2,463.66)	(1,849.09)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diocese FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Bishop FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	345	345	376	376	376
Dep. Var. Mean	245.3	245.3	245.3	3646	3646	3646

Note: This table analyzes the effect of having a higher share of foreign-born priests on donations at the diocesan level, specifically donations to the church and overall charitable contributions. Columns 1-3 examine the impact on church donations, with a particular focus on contributions made during the Pontifical Mission Societies (TPMS) day, also known as Missio. The data for these columns were obtained from the internal records of the Spanish Episcopal Conference. Columns 4-6 assess the effect of a higher share of foreign-born priests on total charitable donations, using information derived from Spanish Income Tax declarations, which include a randomly selected 10% sample of the Spanish population. The variable Any Donation is measured in thousands. Robust standard errors are used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1: Religiosity Evolution (2000-2019)



(a) By Religious Practice

(b) By Church Attendance


Note: The figure reports how self-reported religiosity has evolved over time. I use collapsed information at the yearly level from the monthly public opinion surveys conducted by the Spanish Center of Sociological Research (CIS). Subfigure 1a displays the overall evolution by religious practice, and Subfigure 1b shows the evolution by church attendance, for those individuals reporting following a denomination.

Figure 2: Ordainment Evolution (2001-2019)




Note: The figure displays the number of ordained priests per year in Spanish seminaries. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.

Figure 3: Distribution by Municipalities



Note: The figure displays the relationship of municipalities used in the analysis. The municipalities in dark green represent those in which at any point in time between 2000 and 2019, a foreign priest was present in the municipality. The municipalities in olive green represent all those other municipalities used in the analysis, which never had a foreign priest. Municipalities in light green represent those municipalities not used in the study, as they are composed by several population centers and/or parishes. Own elaboration based on the information collected at the Spanish Episcopal Conference.


Figure 4: Outcome Evolution (2000-2019)




(a) Distribution by Wedding Type




(b) Distribution of Births




(c) Distribution of Divorcees



(d) Right vs. Left




(e) Conservative vs. Radical Right




(f) Abstention Rate

Note: The figure reports how a series of outcomes have evolved over time. Subfigure 4a shows the evolution of the relative share of Catholic, non-Catholic, and civil weddings. Subfigure 4b displays the average number of births per municipality in the sample of study, while Subfigure 4c displays the average number of divorcees. Subfigure 4d shows the evolution of the voting share of right and left-leaning parties, Subfigure 4e displays the evolution of the voting share of conservative and radical right parties, while Subfigure 4f displays the evolution of the abstention rate.


Figure 5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Marriage by Ritual




(a) # Catholic Weddings



(b) # Civil-only Weddings




(c) # All Weddings



(d) # Weddings (Other Denominations)


Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects the probability of getting married, by wedding ritual. Subfigure 5a displays how it affects the total number of Catholic weddings performed, Subfigure 5b studies how it affects the total number of civil-only weddings, Subfigure 5c displays the impact on the overall total number of weddings carried out in a given municipality, and Subfigure 5d whether it affects the wedding probability in other non-catholic denominations. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A24 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Fertility




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of births in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A24 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Divorcees



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of divorcees in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A24 displays numerically this figure.


Figure 8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes - Left vs. Right



(a) Left-wing parties (b) Right-wing parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigures 8a shows how it affects the voting share of left-wing parties and Subfigure 8b displays how it affect the voting share of right-wing parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A25 displays numerically this figure.


Figure 9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes
Conservative vs. Radical Right



(a) Conservative parties (b) Rad. Right parties


Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigures 9a displays how it affect the voting share of conservative parties and Subfigure 9b how it affects the voting share of radical right parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A25 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Voting Absenteeism




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on its electoral participation. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A25 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates the change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, in green, and those with a below median number of foreign-born individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A26 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 12: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, in green, and those who were born anywhere else in the world, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A27 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 13: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration
Latin American vs. Maghrebi




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates the change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, baseline, with an above median number of Latin American individuals, in green, and those with an above median number of Maghrebi individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A28 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 14: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Conservatism




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with a historically conservative voting behavior (i.e., above median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), in green, and those with a historically liberal voting behavior (i.e., below median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), in blue. Municipalities are classified using data on all national and European elections that took place between 1975 and 1999, available at the Spanish Interior Ministry. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A29 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 15: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Unemployment




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median unemployment rate, in green, and those with a below median unemployment rate, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A30 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 16: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Home Location



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who live and preach in a given municipality, in green, and those who only preach there, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A31 displays numerically this figure.

Figure 17: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Workload




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who have been assigned with many parishes (above median), in green, and those who have been assigned with few parishes (below median), in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A32 displays numerically this figure.


Appendix - For Online Publication

A Figures and Tables


Figure A1: Randomization Inference on Not-Yet Treated Municipalities




(a) Catholic Weddings




(b) Civil Weddings




(c) Birth




(d) Divorcees




(e) Conservative



(f) Left




(g) Radical Right



(h) Abstention


Note: This figure reports the randomization-inference distribution of placebo p-values for whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. The sample is restricted to municipalities that have not yet received a foreign-born priest. For each of 10,000 iterations, I randomly assign a fictitious arrival date to each such municipality and re-estimate the stacked difference-in-differences specification of Cengiz et al. (2019), following Equation 2. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The blue histogram shows the distribution, across the 10,000 placebo shocks, of the p-value on the coefficient six years after the fictitious arrival of a foreign priest. The red dashed line marks the p-value obtained from the baseline specification estimated on the actual sample.

Figure A2: Treatment Effects by Leaving a Diocese out at a Time




Note: This figure replicates the main results derived from Equation 2, sequentially omitting one diocese at a time. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. The dioceses are ordered in ascending order based on the proportion of foreign-born priests within the studied dioceses. The represented dioceses include: 1) Osma-Soria, 2) Ávila, 3) Zamora, 4) Palencia, 5) Cuenca, 6) Salamanca, 7) Burgos, 8) Valladolid, 9) Valencia, 10) Ciudad Rodrigo, 11) Toledo, 12) Calahorra y la Calzada - Logroño, 13) Albacete, 14) Coria-Cáceres, 15) Sigüenza-Guadalajara, 16) Ciudad Real, 17) Jaca, 18) Plasencia, 19) Teruel y Albarracín, 20) Segovia, 21) Huesca, 22) Tarazona, 23) Barbastro-Monzón, and 24) Zaragoza. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure A3: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Migration




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the arrival of new incoming population. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A33 displays numerically this figure.


Figure A4: Effect of a New Priest's Arrival vs. New Foreign Priest's Arrival




(a) Catholic Weddings




(b) Civil Weddings




(c) Birth




(d) Divorcees




(e) Conservative



(f) Left




(g) Radical Right



(h) Abstention


Note: This figure reports the dynamic effect of a priest replacement in a series of municipality characteristics, comparing municipalities that received a new foreign-born priest (red) to municipalities that received a new Spanish priest (blue). Each replacement path is estimated independently, using the stacked difference-in-differences specification of Cengiz et al. (2019), following Equation 2. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals. Tables A34 and A35 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Exhuming a Spanish Civil War Mass Grave




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the opening of mass graves from the Spanish civil war (1936-1939). The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A36 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Social Spending




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality shapes preferences toward social projects. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A37 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Business-related Spending




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality shapes preferences toward business-related projects. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A37 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Unemployment Rates




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality leads to changes in unemployment rates. The unemployment rates are measured per capita instead of per working age population due to missing data. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A38 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Contracting Rates




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality promotes the creation of new labor contracts. The contracting rates are measured per capita instead of per working age population due to missing data. The x-axis identifies the number of years since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A38 displays numerically this figure.


Figure A10: Sensitivity Analysis under Relative Magnitudes Restrictions




(a) Outcome: Catholic Weddings




(b) Outcome: Civil Weddings




(c) Outcome: Births




(d) Outcome: Divorcees




(e) Outcome: Sh. Conservative



(f) Outcome: Sh. Left




(g) Outcome: Sh. Radical Right



(h) Outcome: Abstention


Note: The figure reports stacked event-study estimates and HonestDiD sensitivity intervals under the relative-magnitude restriction (Rambachan and Roth, 2023). The benchmark *Original* is the estimated effect six years after foreign-born priest arrival. The parameter M, on the x-axis, bounds post-treatment violations of parallel trends relative to the largest pre-treatment deviation. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Catholic Movements




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities who had registered as of the year 2000 at least a Catholic organization, in green, and those who did not have any organization registered, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from Directory of Religious Entities, provided by the Spanish Ministry of Justice. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A39 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A12: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Uneducatedness




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number in individuals with no formal education, in green, and those with a below median number in individuals with no formal education, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A40 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A13: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Demographic Structure




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of young individuals, in green, and those with a below median number of young individuals, in blue. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A41 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A14: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Tenure




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose tenure is above the median, in green, and those whose tenure is below the median, in blue. Both senior and junior foreign priests are compared to the average Spanish priest. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A42 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A15: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Age




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those foreign priests whose age is above the median, in green, and those whose age is below the median, in blue. Both young and old foreign priests are compared to the average Spanish priest. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A43 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A16: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Tenure




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose tenure is above the median, in green, and those whose tenure is below the median, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A44 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A17: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Age




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests whose age is above the median, in green, and those whose age is below the median, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A45 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A18: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Study




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who studied in a Spanish seminary, in green, and those who did not, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A46 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A19: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Order



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a religious orders, in green, and those who are diocesan, in blue. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A47 displays numerically this figure.

Figure A20: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Order Type
Missionary vs. Non-Missionary Order



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a missionary religious orders, in green, and those who are part of a non-missionary religious order, in blue. Table A48 classifies all religious orders present in the sample. All the results are reported in standardized units. p-values from Wald tests for the equality of two estimates are reported next to each solid vertical line between the two estimates. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2. Table A49 displays numerically this figure.

Table A1: Distribution of Municipalities and Parishes per Diocese

	Municipalities			**Parishes**		
Diocese	Used	Not Used	Total	Used	Not Used	Total
Albacete	61	25	86	61	115	176
Ávila	216	4	220	216	15	231
Barbastro-Monzón	91	10	101	91	34	125
Burgos	328	40	368	328	359	687
Calahorra y La Calzada - Logroño	166	8	174	166	49	215
Ciudad Real	89	13	102	89	48	137
Ciudad Rodrigo	79	3	82	79	11	90
Coria-Cáceres	102	6	108	102	25	127
Cuenca	223	14	237	223	55	278
Huesca	61	11	72	61	45	106
Jaca	54	6	60	54	20	74
Osma-Soria	172	8	180	172	33	205
Palencia	177	13	190	177	53	230
Plasencia	132	10	142	132	32	164
Salamanca	243	13	256	243	53	296
Segovia	206	3	209	206	21	227
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	281	6	287	281	31	312
Tarazona	119	2	121	119	10	129
Teruel y Albarracín	191	3	194	191	14	205
Toledo	210	11	221	210	47	257
Valencia	274	52	326	274	326	600
Valladolid	204	17	221	204	92	296
Zamora	163	6	169	163	33	196
Zaragoza	178	2	180	178	71	249
Total	4020	286	4306	4020	1592	5612

Note: The table displays in Columns 1-3 those municipalities used and not used in the analysis. Column 4-6 display the equivalence in terms of parishes used and not used. I use in the analysis all those municipalities with a single population center and parish (Columns 1 and 4). I do not use those municipalities with multiple population centers or multiple parishes.

Table A2: Distribution of Priests by Country of Birth and Diocese

Diocese	Foreign Priests	Local Priests	Sh. Foreign	Total
Albacete	5	34	0.13	39
Ávila	2	74	0.03	76
Barbastro-Monzón	35	89	0.28	124
Burgos	6	177	0.03	183
Calahorra y La Calzada-Logroño	9	74	0.11	83
Ciudad Real	10	86	0.10	96
Ciudad Rodrigo	2	31	0.06	33
Coria-Cáceres	9	84	0.10	93
Cuenca	5	104	0.05	109
Huesca	12	40	0.23	52
Jaca	5	23	0.18	28
Osma-Soria	0	78	0	78
Palencia	1	92	0.01	93
Plasencia	34	71	0.32	105
Salamanca	3	73	0.04	76
Segovia	10	68	0.13	78
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	7	135	0.05	142
Tarazona	32	50	0.39	82
Teruel y Albarracín	32	65	0.33	97
Toledo	20	257	0.07	277
Valencia	16	264	0.06	280
Valladolid	4	109	0.04	113
Zamora	1	45	0.02	46
Zaragoza	86	118	0.42	204
Total	346	2241	0.13	2587

Note: The table displays in Column 1 the list of dioceses covered in the analysis. Column 2 displays the distribution of foreign-born priests per diocese. Column 3 shows the distribution of Spanish-born priest per diocese. Column 4 presents the share of priest in a given diocese that are foreign-born. Column 5 reports the total number of priests per diocese.

Table A3: Sample Comparison: Birth Data vs. No Birth Data

	Birth Data		No Birth Data		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Foreign	0.084	0.278	0.156	0.363	(0.000)
Order Member	0.047	0.212	0.124	0.330	(0.000)
Spanish Educated	0.948	0.222	0.861	0.346	(0.000)
In Solidum	0.256	0.387	0.199	0.362	(0.000)
Observations	808		1779		2587

Note: This table compares how the sample of priest for which birth data was found (Col. 1 and 2) compares with those for which no birth data was found (Col.3 and 4). The p-value of the difference between both groups is presented in Column 5. Foreign is a dummy variable identifying if the priest was not born in Spain. Order Member is a variable identifying whether a priest is part of a religious order or not. Spanish Educated is a dummy variable identifying whether a given priest studied in a Spanish seminary. In Solidum identifies the share of positions held by a given priest that are shared with other priests (in solidum).

Table A4: Distribution of Priests by Country of Birth and Diocese - Survey Sample

Diocese	All Priests	Potential	Surveyed	Foreign	Local
Albacete	39	0	0	0	0
Ávila	76	47	10	0	10
Barbastro-Monzón	124	48	22	7	15
Burgos	183	38	5	0	5
Calahorra y La Calzada - Logroño	83	48	11	0	11
Ciudad Real	96	85	12	0	12
Ciudad Rodrigo	33	0	0	0	0
Coria-Cáceres	93	56	6	0	6
Cuenca	109	106	21	0	21
Huesca	52	28	11	2	9
Jaca	28	16	5	1	4
Osma-Soria	78	73	18	0	18
Palencia	93	0	0	0	0
Plasencia	105	48	3	0	3
Salamanca	76	57	18	0	18
Segovia	78	73	10	0	10
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	142	141	14	2	12
Tarazona	82	56	9	1	8
Teruel y Albarracín	97	41	14	4	10
Toledo	277	138	20	0	20
Valencia	280	0	0	0	0
Valladolid	113	51	14	0	14
Zamora	46	45	8	0	8
Zaragoza	204	93	26	10	16
Total	2587	1288	257	27	230

Note: The table displays in Column 1 the distribution of all priests per diocese. In Column 2, it shows the distribution of all priests per diocese for which the personal contact information was available. In Column 3, it shows the distribution per diocese of those priests that have been surveyed. In Column 4, it shows the distribution per diocese of foreign-born priests, and in Column 5, it shows the distribution of Spanish-born priests.

Table A5: Sample Comparison: Survey vs. No Survey

	Survey Data		**No Survey Data**		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	p-value
Foreign	0.105	0.307	0.137	0.344	(0.120)
Order Member	0.047	0.211	0.106	0.308	(0.000)
Spanish Educated	0.949	0.220	0.884	0.320	(0.000)
In Solidum	0.305	0.402	0.207	0.366	(0.000)
Observations	257		2330		2587
Age	58.545	13.988	65.864	14.746	(0.000)
Tenure	31.358	15.269	38.802	16.232	(0.000)
Observations	257		550		807

Note: This table compares how the sample of priest for which survey data was collected (Col. 1 and 2) compares with those for which no survey data was collected (Col.3 and 4). The p-value of the difference between both groups is presented in Column 5. Foreign is a dummy variable identifying if the priest was not born in Spain. Order Member is a variable identifying whether a priest is part of a religious order or not. Spanish Educated is a dummy variable identifying whether a given priest studied in a Spanish seminary. In Solidum identifies the share of positions held by a given priest that are shared with other priests (in solidum). All other variables are self-explanatory.

Table A6: Left-Right Political Spectrum

Panel A: Left-wing Parties

AR, CEUS, CHA, EQUO, En Marea, ERC, ERPV, EUPV-EV, FRONT, IU, Los Verdes, Mas Pais, Més Compromís, PCPE, Podemos, PH, POSI, Primavera Europea, PR+, PSOE, PUM+J, Recortes Cero

Panel B: Right-wing Parties

ADÑ, AES, AN, AUN, CDES, Cs, CVA, DN, España 2000, FA, FE, FEdelasJONS, FN, La Falange, MAS, MSR, PADE, PDN, PAR, PFyV, PLD, PP, PPSO, PRGU, UDCA, VOX

Note: The initials for the left-wing parties relate to the following parties. AR: Acción Republicana; CEUS: Coalición por una Europa Solidaria; CHA: Chunta Aragonesista; ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; ERPV: Esquerra Republicana del País Valencià; EUPV-EV: Esquerra Unida del País Valencià; FRONT: Front per País Valencià; IU: Izquierda Unida¡; PCPE: Partido Comunida del Pueblo Español; PH: Partido Humanista; POSI: Partido Obrero Socialista Internacionalista; PR+: Partido Riojano; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PUM+J: Por Un Mundo Más Justo. The initials for the right-wing parties relate to the following parties. ADÑ: ADÑ Identidad Española; AES: Alternativa Española; AN: Alianza Nacional; AUN: Alianza por la Unidad Nacional; CDES: Centro Democrático Español; Cs: Ciudadanos; CVA: Coalición Valenciana; DN: Democracia Nacional; FA: Falange Auténtica; FE: Frente Español; FEdelasJONS: Falange Española de las JONS; FN: Fuerza Nueva; MAS: Movimiento Social Aragonés; MSR: Moviment Social Republicà; PADE: Partido Demócrata Español; PDN: Partido Demócrata Nacional de España; PFyV: Familia y Vida; PLD: Partido Liberal de Derechas; PP: Partido Popular; PPSO: Plataforma del Pueblo Soriano; PRGU: Partido Regionalista de Guadalajara; UDCA: Unidad Castellana

Table A7: Conservative - Radical Right Political Spectrum

Panel A: Conservative Parties

CDES, Cs, PADE, PAR, PDN, PFyV, PLD, PP, PPSO, PRGU, UDCA

Panel B: Radical Right Parties

ADÑ, AES, AN, AUN, CVA, DN, España 2000, FA, FE, FEdelasJONS, FN, La Falange, MAS, MSR, VOX

Note: The initials for the conservative parties relate to the following parties. CDES: Centro Democrático Español; Cs: Ciudadanos; PADE: Partido Demócrata Español; PDN: Partido Demócrata Nacional de España; PFyV: Familia y Vida; PLD: Partido Liberal de Derechas; PP: Partido Popular; PPSO: Plataforma del Pueblo Soriano; PRGU: Partido Regionalista de Guadalajara; UDCA: Unidad Castellana. The initials for the far-right parties refer to the following parties. ADÑ: ADÑ Identidad Española; AES: Alternativa Española; AN: Alianza Nacional; AUN: Alianza por la Unidad Nacional; CVA: Coalición Valenciana; DN: Democracia Nacional; FA: Falange Auténtica; FE: Frente Español; FEdelasJONS: Falange Española de las JONS; FN: Fuerza Nueva; MAS: Movimiento Social Aragonés; MSR: Moviment Social Republicà.

Table A8: Predictors of Priest Replacements

	(1) 1 Months New Priest	(2) 12 Months New Priest	(3) 24 Months New Priest	(4) 36 Months New Priest	(5) 48 Months New Priest
Cath W.	-0.0168	-0.0541	-0.1102**	0.0166	-0.0515
	(0.0554)	(0.0570)	(0.0544)	(0.0612)	(0.0696)
Civil W.	-0.0371	0.0096	0.0217	0.0428	-0.0271
	(0.0598)	(0.0789)	(0.0697)	(0.0770)	(0.0790)
Birth	-0.0567**	-0.0353	-0.0589**	-0.0791***	-0.0649**
	(0.0247)	(0.0249)	(0.0247)	(0.0286)	(0.0303)
Divorcees	0.0341	0.0503*	0.0425	0.0459	0.0265
	(0.0216)	(0.0288)	(0.0285)	(0.0324)	(0.0294)
Social Exp.	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Business Exp.	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Incoming	-0.0013	-0.0052	0.0007	-0.0013	0.0029
	(0.0032)	(0.0038)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)
Population	0.0005	-0.0003	-0.0008	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Conservative	0.0002	0.0019	0.0024*	0.0005	-0.0003
	(0.0015)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)
Left	-0.0020	-0.0034***	-0.0026**	-0.0040***	-0.0023
	(0.0013)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)
Radical Right	0.0035	0.0037	-0.0112	0.0511	0.0724*
	(0.0034)	(0.0259)	(0.0273)	(0.0323)	(0.0401)
Abstention	0.0011	0.0029**	0.0039***	0.0036***	0.0030**
	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0010)	(0.0012)	(0.0013)
Diocese-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	609197	565404	517783	470457	423360
New Priest Mean	0.00897	0.00897	0.00897	0.00897	0.00897

Note: The table tests whether pre-existing municipality characteristics predict whether there is new priest appointed to a municipality. New Priest equals one if there is a new priest is incoming and zero otherwise. Cath W. and Civil W. identify the number of Catholic and civil-only weddings, respectively. Birth measures the total number of births. Divorcees measures the stock of divorced individuals. Social Exp. and Business Exp. measure the municipal social and business expenditures, respectively. Incoming measures total population inflows into the municipality, and Population measures total municipal population. Cons, Left, and Radical Right identify the number of votes for Conservative, Left, and Radical Right parties, respectively. Abstention measures the number of people abstaining in the municipality-election year. All explanatory variables are rescaled in per thousand inhabitants. Columns 1-5 use predictors measured 1, 12, 24, 36, and 48 months before the priest replacement, respectively. All regressions include diocese-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A9: Predictors of Foreign Replacement Conditional on a Priest Vacancy

	(1) 1 Months Foreign Priest	(2) 12 Months Foreign Priest	(3) 24 Months Foreign Priest	(4) 36 Months Foreign Priest	(5) 48 Months Foreign Priest
Cath W.	0.0009	0.0007	-0.0012	0.0022	-0.0016
	(0.0017)	(0.0020)	(0.0023)	(0.0022)	(0.0023)
Civil W.	0.0013	0.0027	0.0021	0.0003	0.0020
	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0024)	(0.0026)	(0.0036)
Birth	-0.0013	-0.0015	-0.0012	-0.0024**	-0.0003
	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0011)
Divorcees	0.0009	0.0006	0.0004	0.0000	-0.0007
	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0010)
Social Exp.	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Business Exp.	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000*	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Incoming	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Population	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Conservative	0.0001	0.0000	0.0001	-0.0000	0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Left	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Radical Right	0.0001	-0.0009	0.0014	0.0014	0.0024
	(0.0003)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0017)
Abstention	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Diocese-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5561	5142	4608	4205	3834
Foreign Priest Mean	0.00145	0.00145	0.00145	0.00145	0.00145

Note: The table tests whether pre-existing municipality characteristics predict whether the new priest that is appointed to a municipality is of foreign origin. The sample is restricted to municipality-months with a priest replacement. Foreign Priest equals one if the incoming priest is foreign-born and zero otherwise. Cath W. and Civil W. identify the number of Catholic and civil-only weddings, respectively. Birth measures the total number of births. Divorcees measures the stock of divorced individuals. Social Exp. and Business Exp. measure the municipal social and business expenditures, respectively. Incoming measures total population inflows into the municipality, and Population measures total municipal population. Cons, Left, and Radical Right identify the number of votes for Conservative, Left, and Radical Right parties, respectively. Abstention measures the number of people abstaining in the municipality-election year. Columns 1-5 use predictors measured 1, 12, 24, 36, and 48 months before the priest replacement, respectively. All regressions include diocese-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Religious Attitudes using Different Spatial Clusterings

	(1) Cath. W. Baseline	(2) Cath. W. 30km	(3) Cath. W. 50km	(4) Civil W. Baseline	(5) Civil W. 30km	(6) Civil W. 50km	(7) Fertility Baseline	(8) Fertility 30km	(9) Fertility 50km	(10) Divorcees Baseline	(11) Divorcees 30km	(12) Divorcees 50km
Pre-treatment												
Years from treatment: -5	-0.0634	-0.0634	-0.0634	-0.0278	-0.0278	-0.0278	-0.000200	-0.000200	-0.000200	-0.0399	-0.0399	-0.0399
	(0.0754)	(0.0741)	(0.0785)	(0.0650)	(0.0617)	(0.0623)	(0.1977)	(0.1887)	(0.1853)	(0.1573)	(0.1687)	(0.1765)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0162	0.0162	0.0162	0.0115	0.0115	0.0115	-0.181	-0.181	-0.181	0.0333	0.0333	0.0333
	(0.0631)	(0.0658)	(0.0666)	(0.0641)	(0.0573)	(0.0592)	(0.1491)	(0.1435)	(0.1427)	(0.1155)	(0.1281)	(0.1279)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0114	0.0114	0.0114	-0.00240	-0.00240	-0.00240	-0.0698	-0.0698	-0.0698	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283
	(0.0476)	(0.0643)	(0.0666)	(0.0549)	(0.0555)	(0.0575)	(0.1394)	(0.1450)	(0.1574)	(0.1040)	(0.1186)	(0.1266)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0406	0.0406	0.0406	-0.00860	-0.00860	-0.00860	0.153	0.153	0.153	-0.00440	-0.00440	-0.00440
	(0.0555)	(0.0577)	(0.0590)	(0.0610)	(0.0571)	(0.0564)	(0.1376)	(0.1403)	(0.1473)	(0.0737)	(0.1037)	(0.0970)
Post-treatment												
Years from treatment: 0	0.0412	0.0412	0.0412	-0.00680	-0.00680	-0.00680	0.0860	0.0860	0.0860	0.108	0.108	0.108
	(0.0494)	(0.0586)	(0.0621)	(0.0593)	(0.0571)	(0.0555)	(0.1500)	(0.1572)	(0.1412)	(0.0869)	(0.1040)	(0.1068)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1076*	0.1076*	0.108	-0.0548	-0.0548	-0.0548	0.3294***	0.3294**	0.3294**	-0.0507	-0.0507	-0.0507
	(0.0560)	(0.0653)	(0.0692)	(0.0579)	(0.0597)	(0.0582)	(0.1401)	(0.1488)	(0.1516)	(0.1019)	(0.1225)	(0.1164)
Years from treatment: 2	0.1833***	0.1833***	0.1833***	-0.1084**	-0.1084**	-0.1084**	0.4819***	0.4819***	0.4819***	-0.2496**	-0.2496*	-0.2496*
	(0.0553)	(0.0637)	(0.0659)	(0.0485)	(0.0546)	(0.0540)	(0.1395)	(0.1456)	(0.1553)	(0.1164)	(0.1326)	(0.1368)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2025***	0.2025***	0.2025***	-0.0425	-0.0425	-0.0425	0.3513***	0.3513***	0.3513***	-0.2632**	-0.2632**	-0.2632**
	(0.0597)	(0.0645)	(0.0670)	(0.0617)	(0.0568)	(0.0538)	(0.1468)	(0.1467)	(0.1491)	(0.1340)	(0.1324)	(0.1247)
Years from treatment: 4	0.2452***	0.2452***	0.2452***	-0.1049*	-0.1049*	-0.1049*	0.6568***	0.6568***	0.6568***	-0.3352***	-0.3352**	-0.3352**
	(0.0892)	(0.0851)	(0.0896)	(0.0581)	(0.0615)	(0.0610)	(0.1727)	(0.1712)	(0.1679)	(0.1430)	(0.1516)	(0.1493)
Years from treatment: 5	0.3555***	0.3555***	0.3555***	-0.1700***	-0.1700***	-0.1700***	0.6553***	0.6553***	0.6553***	-0.3219*	-0.322	-0.322
	(0.1111)	(0.1031)	(0.1111)	(0.0694)	(0.0649)	(0.0641)	(0.1981)	(0.1862)	(0.1950)	(0.1929)	(0.2000)	(0.1996)
Mean Dep. Var.	1.612	1.612	1.612	1.328	1.328	1.328	6.640	6.640	6.640	3.453	3.453	3.453
Observations	71079	71079	71079	71079	71079	71079	71039	71039	71039	57473	57473	57473

Note: This table examines the impact of the arrival of a foreign priest on a municipality's religious behavior, employing different levels of clustering: municipality (baseline), 30km spatial correlation, and 50km spatial correlation. Columns 1-3 present results for the number of Catholic weddings, Columns 4-6 focus on the number of civil-only weddings performed, and Columns 7-9 reports effects on fertility. Lastly, Columns 10-12 looks divorce. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). For further details on the data, refer to Section 3. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, as well as at the 30km and 50km spatial correlation levels, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Attitudes using Different Spatial Clusterings

	(1) Sh. Cons Baseline	(2) Sh. Cons 30km	(3) Sh. Cons 50km	(4) Sh. Left Baseline	(5) Sh. Left 30km	(6) Sh. Left 50km	(7) Sh. Rad Right Baseline	(8) Sh. Rad Right 30km	(9) Sh. Rad Right 50km	(10) Abstention Baseline	(11) Abstention 30km	(12) Abstention 50km
Pre-treatment												
Years from treatment: -5	0.00270	0.00270	0.00270	-0.00650	-0.00650	-0.00650	0.0017***	0.00170	0.00170	-0.00440	-0.00440	-0.00440
	(0.0044)	(0.0059)	(0.0065)	(0.0041)	(0.0057)	(0.0062)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0035)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)
Years from treatment: -4	0.00140	0.00140	0.00140	-0.0060*	-0.00600	-0.00600	0.0018***	0.00180	0.00180	-0.0077**	-0.0077*	-0.0077*
	(0.0038)	(0.0055)	(0.0057)	(0.0034)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.0006)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.00120	-0.00120	-0.00120	-0.00190	-0.00190	-0.00190	0.0020**	0.00200	0.00200	-0.00340	-0.00340	-0.00340
	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0031)	(0.0043)	(0.0048)	(0.001)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0029)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)
Years from treatment: -2	0.00350	0.00350	0.00350	-0.00330	-0.00330	-0.00330	0.0011**	0.00110	0.00110	-0.0060**	-0.0060*	-0.00600
	(0.0029)	(0.0040)	(0.0043)	(0.0026)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0005)	(0.0011)	(0.001)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)
Post-treatment												
Years from treatment: 0	0.0060*	0.00600	0.00600	-0.00330	-0.00330	-0.00330	-0.0024*	-0.0024*	-0.0024*	-0.0071***	-0.0071**	-0.0071*
	(0.0034)	(0.0044)	(0.0046)	(0.0029)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.003)	(0.0035)	(0.0037)
Years from treatment: 1	0.0070**	0.00700	0.00700	-0.0059*	-0.00590	-0.00590	-0.000900	-0.000900	-0.000900	-0.0068***	-0.0068*	-0.00680
	(0.0034)	(0.0043)	(0.0044)	(0.0033)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0029)	(0.0038)	(0.0043)
Years from treatment: 2	0.0125***	0.0125***	0.0125***	-0.0108***	-0.0108***	-0.0108**	-0.0057***	-0.0057***	-0.0057***	-0.0133***	-0.0133***	-0.0133***
	(0.0038)	(0.0051)	(0.0052)	(0.0031)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)	(0.0018)	(0.0033)	(0.0035)	(0.0038)
Years from treatment: 3	0.0159***	0.0159***	0.0159***	-0.0140***	-0.0140***	-0.0140***	-0.0059***	-0.0059***	-0.0059***	-0.0194***	-0.0194***	-0.0194***
	(0.0040)	(0.0052)	(0.0057)	(0.0038)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0018)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0046)
Years from treatment: 4	0.0199***	0.0199***	0.0199***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***	-0.0092***	-0.0092***	-0.0092***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***	-0.0209***
	(0.0041)	(0.0051)	(0.0055)	(0.0043)	(0.0055)	(0.0055)	(0.0024)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0037)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)
Years from treatment: 5	0.0153***	0.0153**	0.0153**	-0.0274***	-0.0274***	-0.0274***	-0.0085***	-0.0085**	-0.0085**	-0.0273***	-0.0273***	-0.0273***
	(0.0049)	(0.0066)	(0.0074)	(0.0051)	(0.0093)	(0.0107)	(0.0034)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0049)	(0.0055)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.0294	0.0294	0.0294	0.282	0.282	0.282
Observations	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568

Note: This table examines the impact of the arrival of a foreign priest on a municipality's political behavior, employing different levels of clustering: municipality (baseline), 30km spatial correlation, and 50km spatial correlation. Columns 1-3 present results for the share of votes received by conservative parties, Columns 4-6 focus on the share of votes for left-leaning parties, and Columns 7-9 analyze the share of votes for radical right parties. Lastly, Columns 10-12 report abstention rates. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). For further details on the data, refer to Section 3. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, as well as at the 30km and 50km spatial correlation levels, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A12: Covariate Test - Number of Priest Appointments

	(1) Population	(2) Youth	(3) Uneducated	(4) Tech. Studies	(5) Divorced	(6) Immigration	(7) Male Part.
Num. Priest Changes	-60.3056	-0.0015	0.0013	-0.0018	-0.0000	0.0003	-0.0023
	(50.0455)	(0.0014)	(0.0019)	(0.0016)	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0028)
Observations	4014	4014	4014	4014	4014	4014	4014
Mean Dep. Var.	739.9	0.126	0.212	0.717	0.00368	0.0146	0.572

	(8) Female Part.	(9) Unemployment	(10) Temporal Work	(11) Farmers	(12) Right-wing	(13) Grassroot Cath.	(14) Franco Honors
Num. Priest Changes	-0.0001	0.0017	-0.0007	0.0023	0.0004	-0.0032	0.0123
	(0.0025)	(0.0012)	(0.0015)	(0.0039)	(0.0014)	(0.0060)	(0.0620)
Observations	4014	4014	4014	4014	4012	4020	4014
Mean Dep. Var.	0.270	0.105	0.221	0.286	0.403	0.0716	1.561

Note: The table tests whether the total number of priests appointments in the sample of study predicts baseline municipality characteristics. See Section D for further details on the construction of the dependent variables. All regressions include diocese fixed effects. Standard error are clustered at the diocesan level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A13: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Religious Outcomes - No Controls

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Total W.	(4) Other W.	(5) Births	(6) Divorcees
Pre-treatment						
Years from treatment: -5	-0.125	0.0555	-0.0710	-0.00190	0.173	0.126
	(0.0790)	(0.0688)	(0.0917)	(0.0057)	(0.2069)	(0.1631)
Years from treatment: -4	-0.0274	0.0728	0.0410	-0.00440	-0.0485	0.166
	(0.0656)	(0.0637)	(0.0887)	(0.0054)	(0.1564)	(0.1292)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.0162	0.0313	0.0142	-0.000900	-0.00520	0.0755
	(0.0491)	(0.0548)	(0.0758)	(0.0043)	(0.1395)	(0.1132)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0263	0.00940	0.0324	-0.00350	0.189	0.0375
	(0.0564)	(0.0601)	(0.0819)	(0.0041)	(0.1366)	(0.0742)
Post-treatment						
Years from treatment: 0	0.0861*	-0.0377	0.0489	0.000400	0.120	-0.0151
	(0.0483)	(0.0593)	(0.0863)	(0.0040)	(0.1518)	(0.0873)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1572***	-0.0926	0.0619	-0.00270	0.3535***	-0.1944*
	(0.0575)	(0.0586)	(0.0837)	(0.0040)	(0.1428)	(0.1093)
Years from treatment: 2	0.2369***	-0.1490***	0.0838	-0.00400	0.5145***	-0.4018***
	(0.0597)	(0.0487)	(0.0707)	(0.0038)	(0.1418)	(0.1259)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2800***	-0.1133*	0.1626**	-0.00400	0.3294**	-0.4801***
	(0.0643)	(0.0627)	(0.0794)	(0.0038)	(0.1523)	(0.1386)
Years from treatment: 4	0.3355***	-0.1880***	0.147	0.000	0.6312***	-0.5952***
	(0.0956)	(0.0608)	(0.0993)	(0.0046)	(0.1777)	(0.1536)
Years from treatment: 5	0.4406***	-0.2449***	0.190	-0.0060*	0.6585***	-0.5440***
	(0.1177)	(0.0702)	(0.1284)	(0.0034)	(0.2046)	(0.2240)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.246	0.823	0.582	0.785	0.172	0.776
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.496	0.368	0.951	0.529	0.571	0.295
Mean Dep. Var.	1.612	1.328	2.946	0.00660	6.640	3.453
Observations	71079	71079	71079	71079	71039	57473

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its religious behaviors. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of weddings following a non-Catholic denomination. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Column 5 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 5 looks on the total number of divorcees. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A14: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes - No Controls

	(1) Right	(2) Left	(3) Conservative	(4) Rad. Right	(5) Abstention
Pre-treatment					
Elections from treatment: -5	0.00520	-0.0074*	0.00330	0.0019***	-0.00380
	(0.0044)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.00410	-0.0071**	0.00230	0.0018***	-0.0071**
	(0.0038)	(0.0034)	(0.0038)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -3	0.00110	-0.00230	-0.00100	0.0020**	-0.00310
	(0.0037)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.001)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: -2	0.00460	-0.00350	0.00370	0.0011**	-0.0059*
	(0.0029)	(0.0027)	(0.0029)	(0.0005)	(0.0031)
Post-treatment					
Elections from treatment: 0	0.00120	-0.000900	0.00310	-0.00200	-0.0088***
	(0.0033)	(0.0029)	(0.0034)	(0.0014)	(0.003)
Elections from treatment: 1	0.00350	-0.00330	0.00370	-0.000200	-0.0087***
	(0.0031)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0013)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.00370	-0.0078***	0.0087**	-0.0049***	-0.0154***
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0038)	(0.0020)	(0.0031)
Elections from treatment: 3	0.0063*	-0.0105***	0.0114***	-0.0049***	-0.0219***
	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0018)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 4	0.00700	-0.0175***	0.0152***	-0.0082***	-0.0236***
	(0.0043)	(0.0043)	(0.0041)	(0.0024)	(0.0037)
Elections from treatment: 5	0.00240	-0.0233***	0.0098**	-0.0073**	-0.0302***
	(0.0049)	(0.0051)	(0.0049)	(0.0034)	(0.0040)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.397	0.224	0.445	0.0270	0.320
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.209	0.0674	0.495	0.00130	0.0546
Mean Dep. Var.	0.569	0.407	0.539	0.0294	0.282
Observations	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Column 1 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties and Column 2 the share of votes to right-leaning parties. Column 3 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, and Column 4 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 5 reports the abstention rates. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A15: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Religious Outcomes
Truncated Sample without Treatment Reversion

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Total W.	(4) Other W.	(5) Births	(6) Divorcees
Pre-treatment						
Years from treatment: -5	-0.0627	-0.0280	-0.0930	-0.00240	0.00480	-0.0434
	(0.0754)	(0.0650)	(0.0925)	(0.0057)	(0.1982)	(0.1536)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0155	0.0103	0.0211	-0.00480	-0.180	0.0297
	(0.0630)	(0.0643)	(0.0891)	(0.0054)	(0.1492)	(0.1133)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0119	-0.00240	0.00820	-0.00110	-0.0680	0.0231
	(0.0476)	(0.0551)	(0.0767)	(0.0043)	(0.1395)	(0.1001)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0410	-0.0113	0.0260	-0.00370	0.154	-0.0186
	(0.0555)	(0.0610)	(0.0821)	(0.0041)	(0.1377)	(0.0722)
Post-treatment						
Years from treatment: 0	0.0412	-0.00630	0.0364	0.00160	0.0854	0.141
	(0.0494)	(0.0593)	(0.0864)	(0.0040)	(0.1501)	(0.0866)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1125*	-0.0559	0.0551	-0.00150	0.3625***	-0.0267
	(0.0588)	(0.0608)	(0.0874)	(0.0041)	(0.1471)	(0.1062)
Years from treatment: 2	0.1949***	-0.1156**	0.0763	-0.00290	0.4620***	-0.198
	(0.0592)	(0.0516)	(0.0753)	(0.0040)	(0.1448)	(0.1269)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2245***	-0.0723	0.1501*	-0.00200	0.3605**	-0.205
	(0.0652)	(0.0680)	(0.0868)	(0.0041)	(0.1606)	(0.1465)
Years from treatment: 4	0.2989***	-0.1133*	0.1863*	0.000700	0.7355***	-0.3946***
	(0.1023)	(0.0627)	(0.1128)	(0.0046)	(0.1724)	(0.1508)
Years from treatment: 5	0.3844***	-0.1800**	0.201	-0.00340	0.7117***	-0.256
	(0.1395)	(0.0777)	(0.1533)	(0.0034)	(0.1993)	(0.2312)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.465	0.985	0.507	0.806	0.105	0.938
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.977	0.865	0.890	0.484	0.866	0.979
Mean Dep. Var.	1.621	1.329	2.957	0.00680	6.658	3.463
Observations	70502	70502	70502	70502	70462	56798

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its religious behaviors. The sample is a truncated version of the main sample, excluding the 15% of treated units exhibiting treatment reversibility. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of weddings following a non-Catholic denomination. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Column 5 looks at the number of weddings performed from other denominations. Column 6 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 6 looks on the total number of divorcees. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A16: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes
Truncated Sample without Treatment Reversion

	(1) Sh. Right	(2) Sh. Left	(3) Sh. Cons	(4) Sh. Rad Right	(5) Abstention
Pre-treatment					
Elections from treatment: -5	0.00240	-0.00460	0.000800	0.0015***	-0.0060*
	(0.0044)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.00270	-0.00480	0.00100	0.0016***	-0.0082**
	(0.0038)	(0.0034)	(0.0038)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -3	0.000400	-0.00110	-0.00160	0.0020*	-0.00400
	(0.0037)	(0.0031)	(0.0037)	(0.0011)	(0.003)
Elections from treatment: -2	0.0055*	-0.00410	0.00440	0.0011*	-0.0063**
	(0.003)	(0.0027)	(0.003)	(0.0006)	(0.0031)
Post-treatment					
Elections from treatment: 0	0.00310	-0.00230	0.0060*	-0.0027**	-0.0070**
	(0.0033)	(0.0029)	(0.0034)	(0.0014)	(0.0031)
Elections from treatment: 1	0.0074**	-0.0068**	0.0087***	-0.00130	-0.0087***
	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0035)	(0.0014)	(0.0031)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.0076**	-0.0111***	0.0126***	-0.0049**	-0.0137***
	(0.0038)	(0.0034)	(0.0041)	(0.0024)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 3	0.0105***	-0.0093**	0.0155***	-0.0049**	-0.0181***
	(0.0044)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)	(0.0023)	(0.0040)
Elections from treatment: 4	0.0156***	-0.0214***	0.0230***	-0.0073***	-0.0203***
	(0.0049)	(0.0048)	(0.0049)	(0.0027)	(0.0043)
Elections from treatment: 5	0.00760	-0.0266***	0.0126**	-0.00510	-0.0291***
	(0.0060)	(0.0057)	(0.0059)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.298	0.384	0.291	0.0786	0.200
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.369	0.197	0.700	0.00490	0.0207
Mean Dep. Var.	0.570	0.406	0.540	0.0291	0.281
Observations	44012	44012	44012	44012	44012

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its religious behaviors. The sample is a truncated version of the main sample, excluding the 15% of treated units exhibiting treatment reversibility. Column 1 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties and Column 2 the share of votes to right-leaning parties. Column 3 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, and Column 4 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 5 reports the abstention rates. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A17: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Weddings by Age

	Until 30	30 to 40	40 to 50	50 to 60	60 on
Foreign Priest	0.2524***	0.0948*	0.00710	0.00340	-0.00240
	(0.0738)	(0.0544)	(0.0091)	(0.0034)	(0.0022)
Observations	71079	71079	71079	71079	71079
Mean Dep. Var	0.975	0.598	0.0315	0.0049	0.0026

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' average age. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. For further details on the data, see Section 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A18: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Marriage
Homosexual vs. Heterosexual Marriages

	Same-sex W.	Hetero Cath. W.	Hetero Civil W.	Total W.
Pre treatment				
Elections from treatment: -5	-0.00140	-0.0632	-0.0276	-0.0935
	(0.0088)	(0.0754)	(0.0637)	(0.0925)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.000500	0.0162	0.0109	0.0230
	(0.0074)	(0.0631)	(0.0639)	(0.0891)
Elections from treatment: -3	-0.000200	0.0114	-0.00240	0.00770
	(0.0077)	(0.0476)	(0.0551)	(0.0766)
Elections from treatment: -2	-0.0118	0.0406	0.00140	0.0284
	(0.0074)	(0.0555)	(0.0601)	(0.0821)
Post-treatment				
Elections from treatment: 0	-0.00230	0.0412	-0.00520	0.0359
	(0.0093)	(0.0494)	(0.0588)	(0.0864)
Elections from treatment: 1	-0.00290	0.1074*	-0.0505	0.0511
	(0.0092)	(0.0560)	(0.0581)	(0.0837)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.000900	0.1829***	-0.1085**	0.0719
	(0.0088)	(0.0553)	(0.0478)	(0.0715)
Elections from treatment: 3	-0.00760	0.2021***	-0.0333	0.1573**
	(0.0081)	(0.0597)	(0.0606)	(0.0797)
Elections from treatment: 4	-0.00880	0.2450***	-0.0984*	0.142
	(0.0083)	(0.0892)	(0.0579)	(0.0997)
Elections from treatment: 5	-0.00350	0.3551***	-0.1627***	0.181
	(0.0104)	(0.1111)	(0.0689)	(0.1274)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.286	0.458	0.984	0.487
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.608	0.980	0.922	0.900
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0302	1.612	1.304	2.946
Observations	54912	71079	71079	71079

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its marital behavior, depending on the gender of the spouses. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of same-sex civil weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of heterosexual Catholic weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of heterosexual Civil-only weddings. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A19: Effect of Replacing a Foreign Priest by a Spanish Priest

	(1) Cath.	(2) Civil	(3) Birth	(4) Divorcees	(5) Cons.	(6) Left	(7) Rad. Right	(8) Abstention
Spanish Priest	-0.173**	0.297***	-0.094	0.518	-0.002	0.006	-0.0025	0.0108***
	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.203)	(0.316)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	5173	5173	5173	5106	4333	4333	4333	4333
Mean Dep. Var.	0.723	1.120	4.707	2.923	0.481	0.435	0.0530	0.289

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a Spanish priest to a municipality, previously led by a foreign-born priest, changes a series of municipality characteristics. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 4 looks on the total number of divorcees. Column 5 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, Column 6 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties, while Column 7 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Finally, Column 8 reports the abstention rates. See Section 3 for further details. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A20: Back-of-the-envelope Magnitudes - Social Religiosity Outcomes

	Six-year effect	Avg. annual count	Scenario counts			Percentage change		
			25%	50%	100%	25%	50%	100%
Catholic weddings	0.36	6,242	357	715	1,429	5.72	11.45	22.90
Civil-only weddings	-0.17	5,056	-171	-342	-683	-3.38	-6.76	-13.52
Births	0.66	25,568	659	1,317	2,634	2.58	5.15	10.30
Stock of Divorcees	-0.32	12,992	-324	-647	-1,294	-2.49	-4.98	-9.96

Note: The table presents the back-of-the-envelope calculations using three different scenarios, namely the replacement of Spanish priests by foreign priests in a 25%, 50%, and 100% of all municipalities, respectively. The first column reports the estimated effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest as shown in Table A24. Average annual counts are computed over in the estimation sample. Scenario counts scale the six-year effect to 25%, 50%, and 100% of those municipalities, being the number of municipalities in the sample of 4020. Percentage changes divide each scenario count by the corresponding average annual count.

Table A21: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Marriages by Couple's Education

	Elementary	Secondary	Tertiary
Elementary	0.00730	.	.
	(0.0055)	.	.
Observations	44827	.	.
Mean Dep. Var	0.0161	.	.
Secondary	0.0196	0.0697**	.
	(0.0148)	(0.0355)	.
Observations	44827	44827	.
Mean Dep. Var	0.0562	0.271	.
Tertiary	-0.00400	0.0764**	0.0381
	(0.0091)	(0.0390)	(0.0311)
Observations	44827	44827	44827
Mean Dep. Var	0.0219	0.268	0.197

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' education. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. Diagonal entries correspond to couples in which both spouses share the same educational status, elementary, secondary, or tertiary, while off-diagonal entries capture estimates for couples with differing educational backgrounds. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. For further details on the data, see Section 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A22: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Marriages by Couple's Socioeconomic Status

	High	Mid	Low
High	0.0232*	.	.
	(0.0136)	.	.
Observations	71079	.	.
Mean Dep. Var	0.0826	.	.
Mid	0.0520***	0.1385***	.
	(0.0216)	(0.0329)	.
Observations	71079	71079	.
Mean Dep. Var	0.172	0.350	.
Low	0.0296***	0.1155***	0.0201
	(0.0102)	(0.0286)	(0.0175)
Observations	71079	71079	71079
Mean Dep. Var	0.0782	0.390	0.159

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' socioeconomic status. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. Diagonal entries correspond to couples in which both spouses share the same socioeconomic status, high, middle, or low, while off-diagonal entries capture estimates for couples with differing socioeconomic backgrounds. Individuals are classified as having high socioeconomic status if their occupation involves managerial responsibilities; as middle status if their work requires specific knowledge, talent, or formal training; and as low status if employed in jobs that do not require specialized expertise. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. For further details on the data, see Section 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A23: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Marriages by Couple's Gender and Socioeconomic Status

	Male High	Male Mid	Male Low
Female High	0.0232*	0.0379**	0.0194**
	(0.0136)	(0.0186)	(0.0088)
Observations	71079	71079	71079
Mean Dep. Var	0.0826	0.121	0.0465
Female Mid	0.0141	0.1385***	0.0151
	(0.0096)	(0.0329)	(0.0121)
Observations	71079	71079	71079
Mean Dep. Var	0.0511	0.350	0.0816
Female Low	0.0102*	0.1004***	0.0201
	(0.0054)	(0.0241)	(0.0175)
Observations	71079	71079	71079
Mean Dep. Var	0.0317	0.309	0.159

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of couples marrying through the Catholic rite, depending on the spouses' socioeconomic status and gender. The reported estimates correspond to the effect six years after the foreign priest's arrival. Individuals are classified as having high socioeconomic status if their occupation involves managerial responsibilities; as middle status if their work requires specific knowledge, talent, or formal training; and as low status if employed in jobs that do not require specialized expertise. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A24: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Marriage, Fertility and Divorcees

	(1) Cath. W.	(2) Civil W.	(3) Total W.	(4) Other W.	(5) Births	(6) Divorcees
Pre-treatment						
Years from treatment: -5	-0.0634	-0.0278	-0.0935	-0.00240	-0.0002	-0.0399
	(0.0754)	(0.0650)	(0.0925)	(0.0057)	(0.1977)	(0.1573)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0162	0.0115	0.0230	-0.00480	-0.181	0.0333
	(0.0631)	(0.0641)	(0.0891)	(0.0054)	(0.1491)	(0.1155)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0114	-0.00240	0.00770	-0.00110	-0.0698	0.0283
	(0.0476)	(0.0549)	(0.0766)	(0.0043)	(0.1394)	(0.1040)
Years from treatment: -2	0.0406	-0.00860	0.0284	-0.00370	0.153	-0.00440
	(0.0555)	(0.0610)	(0.0821)	(0.0041)	(0.1376)	(0.0737)
Post-treatment						
Years from treatment: 0	0.0412	-0.00680	0.0361	0.00160	0.0860	0.108
	(0.0494)	(0.0593)	(0.0864)	(0.0040)	(0.1500)	(0.0869)
Years from treatment: 1	0.1076*	-0.0548	0.0513	-0.00140	0.3294***	-0.0507
	(0.0560)	(0.0579)	(0.0837)	(0.0040)	(0.1401)	(0.1019)
Years from treatment: 2	0.1833***	-0.1084**	0.0723	-0.00240	0.4819***	-0.2496**
	(0.0553)	(0.0485)	(0.0715)	(0.0038)	(0.1395)	(0.1164)
Years from treatment: 3	0.2025***	-0.0425	0.1577**	-0.00220	0.3513***	-0.2632**
	(0.0597)	(0.0617)	(0.0797)	(0.0038)	(0.1468)	(0.1340)
Years from treatment: 4	0.2452***	-0.1049*	0.142	0.00200	0.6568***	-0.3352***
	(0.0892)	(0.0581)	(0.0997)	(0.0046)	(0.1727)	(0.1430)
Years from treatment: 5	0.3555***	-0.1700***	0.182	-0.00380	0.6553***	-0.3219*
	(0.1111)	(0.0694)	(0.1274)	(0.0034)	(0.1981)	(0.1929)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.458	0.985	0.487	0.806	0.106	0.957
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.980	0.882	0.899	0.485	0.853	0.961
Mean Dep. Var.	1.612	1.328	2.946	0.0066	6.640	3.453
Observations	71079	71079	71079	71079	71039	57473

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its religious behaviors. Column 1 uses as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 2 looks at the number of Civil-only weddings. Column 3 looks at the number of weddings following a non-Catholic denomination. Column 4 explores the total number of weddings performed. Column 5 focuses on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 6 looks on the total number of divorcees. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A25: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Political Outcomes

	(1) Right	(2) Left	(3) Conservative	(4) Rad. Right	(5) Abstention
Pre-treatment					
Elections from treatment: -5	0.00460	-0.00650	0.00270	0.0017***	-0.00440
	(0.0044)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -4	0.00310	-0.0060*	0.00140	0.0018***	-0.0077**
	(0.0038)	(0.0034)	(0.0038)	(0.0006)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -3	0.000700	-0.00190	-0.00120	0.0020**	-0.00340
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.001)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: -2	0.00460	-0.00330	0.00350	0.0011**	-0.0060**
	(0.0029)	(0.0026)	(0.0029)	(0.0005)	(0.0031)
Post-treatment					
Elections from treatment: 0	0.00350	-0.00330	0.0060*	-0.0024*	-0.0071***
	(0.0033)	(0.0029)	(0.0034)	(0.0014)	(0.003)
Elections from treatment: 1	0.0060*	-0.0059*	0.0070**	-0.000900	-0.0068***
	(0.0031)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0013)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: 2	0.0068*	-0.0108***	0.0125***	-0.0057***	-0.0133***
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0038)	(0.0020)	(0.0033)
Elections from treatment: 3	0.0099***	-0.0140***	0.0159***	-0.0059***	-0.0194***
	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0040)	(0.0018)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 4	0.0108***	-0.0209***	0.0199***	-0.0092***	-0.0209***
	(0.0044)	(0.0043)	(0.0041)	(0.0024)	(0.0037)
Elections from treatment: 5	0.00680	-0.0274***	0.0153***	-0.0085***	-0.0273***
	(0.0049)	(0.0051)	(0.0049)	(0.0034)	(0.0040)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.441	0.355	0.465	0.033	0.251
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.272	0.112	0.588	0.002	0.037
Mean Dep. Var.	0.569	0.407	0.539	0.0294	0.282
Observations	44568	44568	44568	44568	44568

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Column 1 uses as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties and Column 2 the share of votes to right-leaning parties. Column 3 looks at the share of votes to conservative parties, and Column 4 focuses on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 5 reports the abstention rates. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A26: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.1115***	0.0152*	0.3619***	0.7792***	0.0255*
	(0.0217)	(0.0377)	(0.0092)	(0.1133)	(0.2630)	(0.0154)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0533**	-0.0205*	-0.1717***	-0.3228**	-0.0204*
	(0.0157)	(0.0261)	(0.0125)	(0.0702)	(0.1581)	(0.0124)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Births	0.0348***	0.0566***	0.00380	0.6613***	1.4436***	0.0174
	(0.0104)	(0.0179)	(0.0068)	(0.1999)	(0.4580)	(0.0313)
Observations	74503	37290	37213	74503	37290	37213
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0847***	0.0242	-0.3264*	-1.1998***	0.125
	(0.0179)	(0.0297)	(0.0179)	(0.1957)	(0.4217)	(0.0930)
Observations	58138	29095	29043	58138	29095	29043
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1064***	0.0952**	0.0157***	0.0148***	0.0157***
	(0.0252)	(0.0313)	(0.0414)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0068)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0785***	-0.1083***	-0.0138***	-0.0100***	-0.0171***
	(0.0263)	(0.0313)	(0.0450)	(0.0038)	(0.0040)	(0.0071)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0953***	-0.0952**	-0.0059***	-0.0059***	-0.0057**
	(0.0296)	(0.0368)	(0.0482)	(0.0018)	(0.0023)	(0.0029)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1564***	-0.1791***	-0.0193***	-0.0179***	-0.0205***
	(0.0311)	(0.0379)	(0.0513)	(0.0035)	(0.0044)	(0.0059)
Observations	44764	22400	22364	44764	22400	22364

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, and those with a below median number of foreign-born individuals. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A27: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Origin

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Latam	(3) Non Latam	(4) Baseline	(5) Latam	(6) Non Latam
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0529***	0.0762***	0.3619***	0.2773***	0.4018***
	(0.0217)	(0.0206)	(0.0307)	(0.1133)	(0.1080)	(0.1622)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0283	-0.0408**	-0.1717***	-0.127	-0.1824**
	(0.0157)	(0.0176)	(0.0200)	(0.0702)	(0.0790)	(0.0898)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Births	0.0348***	0.0329***	0.0335**	0.6613***	0.6270***	0.6413**
	(0.0104)	(0.0116)	(0.0154)	(0.1999)	(0.2239)	(0.2960)
Observations	74503	73601	72367	74503	73601	72367
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0174	-0.0529***	-0.3264*	-0.191	-0.5778***
	(0.0179)	(0.0215)	(0.0200)	(0.1957)	(0.2354)	(0.2194)
Observations	58138	57192	56046	58138	57192	56046
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0852***	0.1186***	0.0157***	0.0132***	0.0185***
	(0.0252)	(0.0285)	(0.0317)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0881***	-0.1272***	-0.0138***	-0.0130***	-0.0186***
	(0.0263)	(0.0302)	(0.0328)	(0.0038)	(0.0044)	(0.0048)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0948***	-0.1005***	-0.0059***	-0.0057***	-0.0060***
	(0.0296)	(0.0342)	(0.0361)	(0.0018)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1367***	-0.2246***	-0.0193***	-0.0156***	-0.0258***
	(0.0311)	(0.0348)	(0.0397)	(0.0035)	(0.0040)	(0.0046)
Observations	44764	43928	43024	44764	43928	43024

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates foreign priests by those who were born in Latin America, and those were born anywhere else in the world. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A28: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Immigration
Latin American vs. Maghrebi

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Latam	(3) Maghrebi	(4) Baseline	(5) Latam	(6) Maghrebi
Cath. Weddings	0.1115***	0.1536***	0.1039*	0.7792***	1.2137***	0.9674*
	(0.0377)	(0.0524)	(0.0621)	(0.2630)	(0.4144)	(0.5781)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0533**	-0.0922***	-0.1463***	-0.3228**	-0.6277***	-1.1829***
	(0.0261)	(0.0346)	(0.0526)	(0.1581)	(0.2361)	(0.4257)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Births	0.0566***	0.0733***	0.0679*	1.4436***	2.0871***	2.2815*
	(0.0179)	(0.0250)	(0.0390)	(0.4580)	(0.7124)	(1.3135)
Observations	37290	28379	17514	37290	28379	17514
Divorcees	-0.0847***	-0.0962***	-0.1149*	-1.1998***	-1.5836***	-2.3055*
	(0.0297)	(0.0414)	(0.0672)	(0.4217)	(0.6819)	(1.3489)
Observations	29095	22420	13869	29095	22420	13869
Sh. Cons.	0.1064***	0.1440***	0.1067***	0.0148***	0.0183***	0.0130***
	(0.0313)	(0.0342)	(0.0450)	(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0055)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Sh. Left	-0.0785***	-0.1068***	-0.1119***	-0.0100***	-0.0124***	-0.0124***
	(0.0313)	(0.0342)	(0.0472)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0052)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0953***	-0.1316***	-0.0829*	-0.0059***	-0.0081***	-0.0052*
	(0.0368)	(0.0392)	(0.0441)	(0.0023)	(0.0024)	(0.0027)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660
Abstention Rate	-0.1564***	-0.1169***	-0.1413***	-0.0179***	-0.0136***	-0.0168***
	(0.0379)	(0.0401)	(0.0535)	(0.0044)	(0.0046)	(0.0063)
Observations	22400	17166	10660	22400	17166	10660

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with an above median number of foreign-born individuals, baseline, with an above median number of Latin American individuals (Latam), and those with an above median number of Maghrebi individuals (Maghrebi). Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A29: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Conservatism

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Conservative	(3) Liberal	(4) Baseline	(5) Conservative	(6) Liberal
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0179*	0.1335***	0.3619***	0.0452*	0.9056***
	(0.0217)	(0.0098)	(0.0384)	(0.1133)	(0.0247)	(0.2606)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.00490	-0.0816***	-0.1717***	-0.0114	-0.4715***
	(0.0157)	(0.0142)	(0.0259)	(0.0702)	(0.0326)	(0.1492)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Births	0.0348***	0.0203***	0.0562***	0.6613***	0.1888***	1.3811***
	(0.0104)	(0.0066)	(0.0183)	(0.1999)	(0.0617)	(0.4481)
Observations	74503	37285	37136	74503	37285	37136
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0253*	-0.0612**	-0.3264*	-0.1327*	-0.8718**
	(0.0179)	(0.0138)	(0.0296)	(0.1957)	(0.0727)	(0.4225)
Observations	58138	29003	29059	58138	29003	29059
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0390	0.1386***	0.0157***	0.00570	0.0164***
	(0.0252)	(0.0447)	(0.0276)	(0.0040)	(0.0065)	(0.0033)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0172	-0.1467***	-0.0138***	-0.00220	-0.0163***
	(0.0263)	(0.0439)	(0.0313)	(0.0038)	(0.0057)	(0.0035)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1667***	-0.00570	-0.0059***	-0.0109***	-0.000300
	(0.0296)	(0.0467)	(0.0377)	(0.0018)	(0.0031)	(0.0020)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1184**	-0.2097***	-0.0193***	-0.0135**	-0.0241***
	(0.0311)	(0.0533)	(0.0364)	(0.0035)	(0.0060)	(0.0041)
Observations	44764	22352	22355	44764	22352	22355

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities with a historically conservative voting behavior (i.e., above median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999), and those with a historically liberal voting behavior (i.e., below median vote share for right-wing during the period 1975-1999). Municipalities are classified using data on all national and European elections that took place between 1975 and 1999, available at the Spanish Interior Ministry. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A30: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Unemployment

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.1111***	0.0370*	0.3619***	0.6226***	0.1776*
	(0.0217)	(0.0399)	(0.0208)	(0.1133)	(0.2243)	(0.0996)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0469*	-0.0295	-0.1717***	-0.2358*	-0.112
	(0.0157)	(0.0261)	(0.0192)	(0.0702)	(0.1310)	(0.0728)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Births	0.0348***	0.0627***	0.0136	0.6613***	1.2941***	0.234
	(0.0104)	(0.0153)	(0.0142)	(0.1999)	(0.3167)	(0.2462)
Observations	74503	37202	37301	74503	37202	37301
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0307	-0.0197	-0.3264*	-0.410	-0.150
	(0.0179)	(0.0337)	(0.0215)	(0.1957)	(0.4499)	(0.1624)
Observations	58138	29073	29065	58138	29073	29065
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1196***	0.0854***	0.0157***	0.0179***	0.0137***
	(0.0252)	(0.0340)	(0.0364)	(0.0040)	(0.0051)	(0.0059)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0838***	-0.1031***	-0.0138***	-0.0119***	-0.0154***
	(0.0263)	(0.0359)	(0.0375)	(0.0038)	(0.0051)	(0.0055)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1076***	-0.0863**	-0.0059***	-0.0065***	-0.0054**
	(0.0296)	(0.0423)	(0.0416)	(0.0018)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.125***	-0.2027***	-0.0193***	-0.0143***	-0.0230***
	(0.0311)	(0.0419)	(0.0449)	(0.0035)	(0.0048)	(0.0051)
Observations	44764	22340	22424	44764	22340	22424

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median unemployment rate, and those with a below median unemployment rate. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A31: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Home Location

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Neighbor + Preaching	(3) Preaching	(4) Baseline	(5) Neighbor + Preaching	(6) Preaching
Cath. Weddings	0.0627***	0.1521***	0.00890	0.3021***	1.0582***	0.0127
	(0.0249)	(0.0644)	(0.0086)	(0.1200)	(0.4485)	(0.0122)
Observations	40511	17029	23482	40511	17029	23482
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0342**	-0.0785**	0.000300	-0.1759**	-0.5649**	0.000600
	(0.0170)	(0.0392)	(0.0116)	(0.0877)	(0.2833)	(0.0273)
Observations	40511	17029	23482	40511	17029	23482
Births	0.0408***	0.0993***	0.0138***	0.8404***	2.8915***	0.0966***
	(0.0115)	(0.0285)	(0.0052)	(0.2371)	(0.8317)	(0.0372)
Observations	40511	17029	23482	40511	17029	23482
Divorcees	-0.0255	-0.0834*	0.0127	-0.308	-1.4000*	0.0746
	(0.0196)	(0.0443)	(0.0126)	(0.2365)	(0.7440)	(0.0741)
Observations	36862	15357	21505	36862	15357	21505
Sh. Cons.	0.0983***	0.1181***	0.0930***	0.0156***	0.0161***	0.0161***
	(0.0270)	(0.0303)	(0.0397)	(0.0043)	(0.0041)	(0.0068)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068
Sh. Left	-0.1133***	-0.0904***	-0.1371***	-0.0168***	-0.0110***	-0.0223***
	(0.0285)	(0.0320)	(0.0425)	(0.0043)	(0.0038)	(0.0068)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1240***	-0.1674***	-0.1071**	-0.0086***	-0.0113***	-0.0074**
	(0.0342)	(0.0469)	(0.0496)	(0.0024)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068
Abstention Rate	-0.1967***	-0.1603***	-0.2205***	-0.0228***	-0.0188***	-0.0251***
	(0.0342)	(0.0427)	(0.0505)	(0.0040)	(0.0049)	(0.0057)
Observations	25601	10533	15068	25601	10533	15068

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests by who reside in the focal municipality, and those who do not. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A32: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Workload

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Many Parishes	(3) Few Parishes	(4) Baseline	(5) Many Parishes	(6) Few Parishes
Cath. Weddings	0.0627***	0.00200	0.1979***	0.3021***	0.00300	1.2581***
	(0.0249)	(0.0138)	(0.0703)	(0.1200)	(0.0198)	(0.4471)
Observations	40511	19265	21246	40511	19265	21246
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0342**	0.00400	-0.0988***	-0.1759**	0.0105	-0.6463***
	(0.0170)	(0.0219)	(0.0309)	(0.0877)	(0.0582)	(0.2026)
Observations	40511	19265	21246	40511	19265	21246
Births	0.0408***	0.0122	0.1124***	0.8404***	0.106	2.9712***
	(0.0115)	(0.0087)	(0.0284)	(0.2371)	(0.0747)	(0.7488)
Observations	40511	19265	21246	40511	19265	21246
Divorcees	-0.0255	0.0157	-0.1246***	-0.308	0.112	-1.8901***
	(0.0196)	(0.0195)	(0.0491)	(0.2365)	(0.1379)	(0.7455)
Observations	36862	18155	18707	36862	18155	18707
Sh. Cons.	0.0983***	0.00130	0.1366***	0.0156***	0.000200	0.0198***
	(0.0270)	(0.0425)	(0.0364)	(0.0043)	(0.0073)	(0.0052)
Observations	25601	12365	13236	25601	12365	13236
Sh. Left	-0.1133***	-0.0564	-0.1168***	-0.0168***	-0.00890	-0.0157***
	(0.0285)	(0.0456)	(0.0395)	(0.0043)	(0.0073)	(0.0052)
Observations	25601	12365	13236	25601	12365	13236
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1240***	-0.1330***	-0.0713	-0.0086***	-0.0098***	-0.00440
	(0.0342)	(0.0546)	(0.0494)	(0.0024)	(0.0041)	(0.0031)
Observations	25601	12365	13236	25601	12365	13236
Abstention Rate	-0.1967***	-0.1852***	-0.1912***	-0.0228***	-0.0209***	-0.0226***
	(0.0342)	(0.0555)	(0.0454)	(0.0040)	(0.0063)	(0.0054)
Observations	25601	12365	13236	25601	12365	13236

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who have been assigned with many parishes (above median), and those who have been assigned with few parishes (below median). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A33: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Migration

	(1) All Inflow Migrants
Pre-treatment	
Years from treatment: -5	-1.484 (2.0204)
Years from treatment: -4	-1.887 (1.5808)
Years from treatment: -3	-0.369 (1.7251)
Years from treatment: -2	-1.6996** (0.7968)
Post-treatment	
Years from treatment: 0	0.779 (0.6802)
Years from treatment: 1	1.192 (1.1347)
Years from treatment: 2	-2.283 (1.9808)
Years from treatment: 3	1.573 (1.3387)
Years from treatment: 4	1.500 (1.4128)
Years from treatment: 5	2.567 (1.6565)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.071
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.306
Mean Dep. Var.	44.03
Observations	63379

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the arrival of new settlers. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. The regression includes municipality and month-year fixed effects, and controls by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A34: Effect of a New Priest's Arrival vs. New Foreign Priest's Arrival Socioreligious Outcomes

	Catholic Weddings		Civil Weddings		Num. Births		Num. Divorcees	
	New Spanish	New Foreign	New Spanish	New Foreign	New Spanish	New Foreign	New Spanish	New Foreign
Pre-treatment								
Years from treatment: -5	0.1800***	-0.0750	-0.1296***	-0.0222	0.140	-0.00930	-0.7189***	-0.0218
	(0.0719)	(0.0755)	(0.0465)	(0.0644)	(0.1367)	(0.1963)	(0.1586)	(0.1529)
Years from treatment: -4	0.1711***	0.00290	-0.0639	0.0156	0.0891	-0.194	-0.3892***	0.0560
	(0.0644)	(0.0632)	(0.0416)	(0.0635)	(0.1212)	(0.1473)	(0.1186)	(0.1137)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0366	-0.00130	-0.0504	0.00300	-0.0500	-0.0820	-0.2106**	0.0359
	(0.0542)	(0.0483)	(0.0355)	(0.0544)	(0.1009)	(0.1377)	(0.0910)	(0.1001)
Years from treatment: -2	-0.0102	0.0278	-0.0137	-0.00600	-0.0320	0.141	-0.0140	-0.0200
	(0.0456)	(0.0555)	(0.0362)	(0.0604)	(0.0861)	(0.1360)	(0.0640)	(0.0713)
Post-treatment								
Years from treatment: 0	-0.1086***	0.0318	0.0710*	-0.00380	-0.0522	0.101	0.2309***	0.121
	(0.0430)	(0.0483)	(0.0364)	(0.0573)	(0.0857)	(0.1464)	(0.0577)	(0.0815)
Years from treatment: 1	-0.0728	0.1093*	0.0738**	-0.0443	-0.108	0.3341***	0.3273***	-0.0272
	(0.0476)	(0.0566)	(0.0368)	(0.0560)	(0.0899)	(0.1366)	(0.0947)	(0.0958)
Years from treatment: 2	-0.1909***	0.1673***	0.0817**	-0.0965**	-0.0932	0.4760***	0.4902***	-0.2206**
	(0.0524)	(0.0553)	(0.0355)	(0.0476)	(0.0965)	(0.1357)	(0.1169)	(0.1084)
Years from treatment: 3	-0.1999***	0.1876***	0.1184***	-0.0425	-0.111	0.3296**	0.5196***	-0.2181*
	(0.0577)	(0.0636)	(0.0417)	(0.0595)	(0.1177)	(0.1425)	(0.1375)	(0.1226)
Years from treatment: 4	-0.2608***	0.2080***	0.1033***	-0.0948*	-0.2304*	0.5953***	0.4677***	-0.2978**
	(0.0619)	(0.0869)	(0.0428)	(0.0564)	(0.1209)	(0.1676)	(0.1553)	(0.1324)
Years from treatment: 5	-0.2879***	0.3179***	0.0781*	-0.1620***	-0.192	0.6036***	0.5512***	-0.3445**
	(0.0663)	(0.1093)	(0.0428)	(0.0670)	(0.1314)	(0.1909)	(0.1686)	(0.1700)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.0217	0.522	0.0649	0.987	0.505	0.101	0	0.881
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.0491	0.820	0.0425	0.958	0.684	0.781	0.000500	0.885
Mean Dep. Var.	1.602	1.612	1.100	1.328	6.030	6.640	3.024	3.461
Observations	48932	71075	48932	71075	48909	71035	44213	57119

Note: The table tests whether the replacement of a Spanish priest, into a new Spanish priest or a Foreign-born priest, shapes local socioreligious outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 use as outcome the number of Catholic weddings carried out in a given municipality. Column 3 and 4 look at the number of Civil-only weddings. Columns 5 and 6 focus on the total number of birth in a given municipality. Column 7 and 8 look on the total number of divorcees. New Local refers to the change of from a Spanish priest to new Spanish priest, and New Foreign to a foreign-born priest. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A35: Effect of a New Priest's Arrival vs. New Foreign Priest's Arrival Political Outcomes

	Sh. Cons		Sh. Left		Sh. Rad Right		Abstention	
	New Spanish	New Foreign	New Spanish	New Foreign	New Spanish	New Foreign	New Spanish	New Foreign
Pre-treatment								
Elections from treatment: -5	-0.0063*	-0.00200	0.00490	-0.00270	0.000900	0.0020***	0.000800	-0.00240
	(0.0035)	(0.0044)	(0.0031)	(0.0041)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0027)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -4	-0.00200	-0.00190	0.00310	-0.00270	0.000200	0.0020***	-0.000600	-0.00480
	(0.0031)	(0.0038)	(0.0027)	(0.0034)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0026)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: -3	-0.00170	-0.00460	0.00240	0.00100	0.000500	0.0022**	0.00140	-0.00100
	(0.0024)	(0.0037)	(0.0020)	(0.0031)	(0.0007)	(0.0011)	(0.0020)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: -2	-0.0037*	0.00130	0.000900	-0.00200	0.000800	0.0014***	0.000400	-0.00330
	(0.0020)	(0.003)	(0.0017)	(0.0027)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0020)	(0.0031)
Post-treatment								
Elections from treatment: 0	-0.00120	0.00380	0.000300	-0.000900	0.000100	-0.0027**	-0.00100	-0.0062**
	(0.0018)	(0.0031)	(0.0016)	(0.0027)	(0.0006)	(0.0013)	(0.0017)	(0.0029)
Elections from treatment: 1	-0.00160	0.000200	-0.000300	-0.00350	0.000100	-0.000200	0.0055***	-0.00240
	(0.0020)	(0.0037)	(0.0018)	(0.0031)	(0.0005)	(0.0017)	(0.0018)	(0.0027)
Elections from treatment: 2	-0.000800	0.0099***	0.000700	-0.0076***	-0.00110	-0.0052***	0	-0.0107***
	(0.0020)	(0.0037)	(0.0019)	(0.0031)	(0.0007)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)	(0.0031)
Elections from treatment: 3	-0.0046*	0.0102***	0.00240	-0.0063*	-0.000200	-0.0062***	0.0044**	-0.0130***
	(0.0024)	(0.0038)	(0.0022)	(0.0037)	(0.0007)	(0.0017)	(0.0020)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 4	-0.000300	0.0153***	-0.000300	-0.0156***	-0.000300	-0.0089***	0.000500	-0.0166***
	(0.0024)	(0.0041)	(0.0023)	(0.0041)	(0.0009)	(0.0022)	(0.0020)	(0.0035)
Elections from treatment: 5	-0.00200	0.0102**	0.00110	-0.0196***	0.000300	-0.0086***	0.000900	-0.0197***
	(0.0027)	(0.0048)	(0.0026)	(0.0049)	(0.0011)	(0.0031)	(0.0023)	(0.0040)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.175	0.401	0.613	0.612	0.284	0.0199	0.941	0.716
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.104	0.552	0.148	0.563	0.222	0.000900	0.783	0.261
Mean Dep. Var.	0.551	0.539	0.406	0.407	0.0173	0.0295	0.290	0.281
Observations	36847	44677	36847	44677	36847	44677	36847	44677

Note: The table tests whether the replacement of a Spanish priest, into a new Spanish priest or a Foreign-born priest, shapes local political outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 look at the share of votes to conservative parties. Column 3 and 4 use as outcome the share of votes to left-leaning parties. Columns 5 and 6 focus on the share of votes to radical right parties. Column 7 and 8 report the abstention rates. New Local refers to the change of from a Spanish priest to new Spanish priest, and New Foreign to a foreign-born priest. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A36: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Exhuming a Spanish Civil War Mass Grave

	(1) Open CW Mass Grave
Pre-treatment	
Years from treatment: -5	0.00110
	(0.0015)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0041*
	(0.0024)
Years from treatment: -3	0.00380
	(0.0024)
Years from treatment: -2	0.00100
	(0.0014)
Post-treatment	
Years from treatment: 0	0.0044*
	(0.0024)
Years from treatment: 1	0.0046*
	(0.0026)
Years from treatment: 2	0.00350
	(0.0023)
Years from treatment: 3	0.00180
	(0.0019)
Years from treatment: 4	0.00380
	(0.0027)
Years from treatment: 5	-0.00020
	(0.0005)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.191
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.0143
Mean Dep. Var.	0.002
Observations	71079

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on the probability of exhuming a Spanish civil war mass grave. Open CW Mass Grave is a dummy variable identifying if any Spanish Civil War mass grave was exhumed in a given year and municipality. Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A37: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Local Budget Allocations

	(1) Social Budget	(2) Business Budget
Pre-treatment		
Years from treatment: -5	-3196	-30157*
	(18294)	(16074)
Years from treatment: -4	514	-16071
	(14468)	(13598)
Years from treatment: -3	4457	-6842
	(11652)	(10292)
Years from treatment: -2	-11825	1219
	(10337)	(10076)
Post-treatment		
Years from treatment: 0	-8493	9768
	(8200)	(9768)
Years from treatment: 1	-17187**	6368
	(8698)	(9327)
Years from treatment: 2	-2814	-4500
	(16284)	(14005)
Years from treatment: 3	-8491	-16704
	(14039)	(18020)
Years from treatment: 4	-9802	-10149
	(13303)	(18867)
Years from treatment: 5	-11834	-9387
	(14544)	(20229)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.554	0.403
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.823	0.209
Mean Dep. Var.	248924	90831
Observations	43008	43008

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects how local budget is spent, differentiating between social (Column 1) and business-related item (Column 2). All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A38: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Local Economic Conditions

	(1) Unemployment	(2) Contracts
Pre-treatment		
Years from treatment: -5	0.0007	0.0017
	(0.001)	(0.0011)
Years from treatment: -4	0.0013	-0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.0011)
Years from treatment: -3	0.0014*	0.0011
	(0.0008)	(0.0014)
Years from treatment: -2	-0.0004	-0.0006
	(0.0007)	(0.0011)
Post-treatment		
Years from treatment: 0	0.0003	-0.0005
	(0.0007)	(0.0012)
Years from treatment: 1	-0.0007	0.0017
	(0.0009)	(0.0015)
Years from treatment: 2	-0.0005	0.0012
	(0.001)	(0.0017)
Years from treatment: 3	-0.003***	0.0014
	(0.0011)	(0.0019)
Years from treatment: 4	-0.0013	0.0004
	(0.0012)	(0.0016)
Years from treatment: 5	-0.0012	-0.0006
	(0.0013)	(0.0017)
Pre-Trend Joint p-value	0.0778	0.1780
Pre-Trend Sum p-value	0.285	0.589
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0507	0.0155
Observations	54876	54876

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influence local economic outcomes. Column 1 looks at the unemployment per capita and Column 2 displays the effect on the number of contracts per capita. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Pre-Trend Joint p-value tests whether all pre-treatment values are jointly equal to zero. Pre-Trend Sum p-value tests whether the sum of all pre-treatment values are different from zero. For further details on the data, see Section 3. Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A39: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Catholic Movements

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Present	(3) Not Present	(4) Baseline	(5) Present	(6) Not Present
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	-0.163	0.0652***	0.3619***	-2.094	0.2296***
	(0.0217)	(0.2587)	(0.0175)	(0.1133)	(3.3269)	(0.0615)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.179	-0.0232*	-0.1717***	-1.902	-0.0751*
	(0.0157)	(0.1733)	(0.0133)	(0.0702)	(1.8372)	(0.0432)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Births	0.0348***	0.1764*	0.0237***	0.6613***	7.9801*	0.3048***
	(0.0104)	(0.0949)	(0.0098)	(0.1999)	(4.2983)	(0.1277)
Observations	74503	5429	69074	74503	5429	69074
Divorcees	-0.0299*	0.294	-0.0335***	-0.3264*	7.535	-0.2675***
	(0.0179)	(0.2630)	(0.0133)	(0.1957)	(6.7385)	(0.1066)
Observations	58138	4301	53837	58138	4301	53837
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.0784	0.1033***	0.0157***	0.00930	0.0164***
	(0.0252)	(0.1283)	(0.0256)	(0.0040)	(0.0153)	(0.0041)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.138	-0.0936***	-0.0138***	-0.0146	-0.0140***
	(0.0263)	(0.1070)	(0.0272)	(0.0038)	(0.0114)	(0.0041)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0215	-0.0995***	-0.0059***	-0.00130	-0.0060***
	(0.0296)	(0.0707)	(0.0309)	(0.0018)	(0.0043)	(0.0019)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1571**	-0.1693***	-0.0193***	-0.0187**	-0.0193***
	(0.0311)	(0.0754)	(0.0326)	(0.0035)	(0.0089)	(0.0037)
Observations	44764	3253	41511	44764	3253	41511

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those municipalities who had registered as of the year 2000 at least a Catholic organization, so-called Present, and those who did not have any organization registered (Not Present). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A40: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Uneducatedness

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Baseline	(5) High	(6) Low
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.0447***	0.0956***	0.3619***	0.2232***	0.5188***
	(0.0217)	(0.0178)	(0.0357)	(0.1133)	(0.0892)	(0.1944)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0458**	-0.0308	-0.1717***	-0.1594**	-0.162
	(0.0157)	(0.0220)	(0.0225)	(0.0702)	(0.0768)	(0.1177)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Births	0.0348***	0.0227**	0.0496***	0.6613***	0.3950**	1.0125***
	(0.0104)	(0.0111)	(0.0176)	(0.1999)	(0.1957)	(0.3621)
Observations	74503	37273	37230	74503	37273	37230
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0274	-0.0348	-0.3264*	-0.245	-0.435
	(0.0179)	(0.0238)	(0.0230)	(0.1957)	(0.2127)	(0.2888)
Observations	58138	29088	29050	58138	29088	29050
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1186***	0.0838***	0.0157***	0.0185***	0.0131***
	(0.0252)	(0.0364)	(0.0355)	(0.0040)	(0.0057)	(0.0055)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.1463***	-0.0423	-0.0138***	-0.0216***	-0.00600
	(0.0263)	(0.0373)	(0.0370)	(0.0038)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.0331	-0.1612***	-0.0059***	-0.00200	-0.0096***
	(0.0296)	(0.0449)	(0.0366)	(0.0018)	(0.0029)	(0.0022)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1934***	-0.1421***	-0.0193***	-0.0220***	-0.0163***
	(0.0311)	(0.0454)	(0.0417)	(0.0035)	(0.0052)	(0.0048)
Observations	44764	22394	22370	44764	22394	22370

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median number of individuals with no formal education, and those with a below median number of individuals with no formal education. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A41: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Local Demographic Structure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Many Youth	(3) Few Youth	(4) Baseline	(5) Many Youth	(6) Few Youth
Cath. Weddings	0.0693***	0.1377***	0.000200	0.3619***	0.9710***	0.000100
	(0.0217)	(0.0425)	(0.0048)	(0.1133)	(0.3007)	(0.0024)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0384***	-0.0819***	0.00160	-0.1717***	-0.4959***	0.000900
	(0.0157)	(0.0297)	(0.0088)	(0.0702)	(0.1805)	(0.0049)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Births	0.0348***	0.0553***	0.0074*	0.6613***	1.4048***	0.0118*
	(0.0104)	(0.0206)	(0.0044)	(0.1999)	(0.5225)	(0.0070)
Observations	74503	37275	37228	74503	37275	37228
Divorcees	-0.0299*	-0.0728**	0.0107	-0.3264*	-1.0700**	0.0258
	(0.0179)	(0.0346)	(0.0081)	(0.1957)	(0.5087)	(0.0196)
Observations	58138	29110	29028	58138	29110	29028
Sh. Cons.	0.1013***	0.1020***	0.0938***	0.0157***	0.0137***	0.0155***
	(0.0252)	(0.0318)	(0.0392)	(0.0040)	(0.0043)	(0.0065)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Sh. Left	-0.0947***	-0.0778***	-0.1044***	-0.0138***	-0.0098***	-0.0164***
	(0.0263)	(0.0331)	(0.0408)	(0.0038)	(0.0041)	(0.0063)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Sh. Rad Right	-0.0958***	-0.1032***	-0.0894*	-0.0059***	-0.0063***	-0.0055*
	(0.0296)	(0.0351)	(0.0480)	(0.0018)	(0.0022)	(0.003)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358
Abstention Rate	-0.1685***	-0.1782***	-0.1547***	-0.0193***	-0.0208***	-0.0174***
	(0.0311)	(0.0350)	(0.0511)	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0057)
Observations	44764	22406	22358	44764	22406	22358

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between municipalities with an above median youth share, and those with a below median youth share. Municipalities are classified using data from the 2001 Spanish Census. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A42: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Tenure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Senior	(3) Junior	(4) Baseline	(5) Senior	(6) Junior
Cath. Weddings	-0.0234	-0.0161	-0.00920	-0.0737	-0.0384	-0.0342
	(0.0265)	(0.0320)	(0.0291)	(0.0833)	(0.0768)	(0.1081)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0491	0.0850*	0.0137	0.167	0.2596*	0.0505
	(0.0377)	(0.0516)	(0.0412)	(0.1277)	(0.1574)	(0.1524)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Births	0.0182	0.0348	-0.00600	0.261	0.425	-0.0973
	(0.0307)	(0.0439)	(0.0252)	(0.4415)	(0.5360)	(0.4095)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Divorcees	0.0339	0.0322	0.0335	0.343	0.275	0.384
	(0.0399)	(0.0436)	(0.0478)	(0.4041)	(0.3716)	(0.5498)
Observations	17270	8617	8653	17270	8617	8653
Sh. Cons.	0.0697	0.0339	0.1203***	0.0115	0.00570	0.0192**
	(0.0450)	(0.0549)	(0.0516)	(0.0074)	(0.0092)	(0.0082)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Left	-0.0275	-0.00290	-0.0738	-0.00410	-0.000500	-0.0111
	(0.0441)	(0.0491)	(0.0571)	(0.0068)	(0.0077)	(0.0086)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2143***	-0.1614***	-0.1826*	-0.0154***	-0.0119***	-0.0129*
	(0.0640)	(0.0675)	(0.0948)	(0.0046)	(0.0049)	(0.0066)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Abstention Rate	-0.1660***	-0.1899***	-0.1103*	-0.0194***	-0.0219***	-0.0131*
	(0.0582)	(0.0692)	(0.0641)	(0.0068)	(0.0080)	(0.0076)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those foreign priests who have a tenure above the median tenure (Senior), and those who have a tenure below the median (Junior), and compare them to the average Spanish priest. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A43: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Foreign Religious Leader's Age

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Old	(3) Young	(4) Baseline	(5) Old	(6) Young
Cath. Weddings	-0.0241	0.00930	-0.0337	-0.0754	0.0298	-0.104
	(0.0265)	(0.0329)	(0.0284)	(0.0832)	(0.1048)	(0.0874)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0496	0.0659	0.0357	0.168	0.240	0.112
	(0.0377)	(0.0518)	(0.0421)	(0.1275)	(0.1888)	(0.1316)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Births	0.0178	0.0401	-0.00660	0.257	0.623	-0.0886
	(0.0307)	(0.0465)	(0.0244)	(0.4411)	(0.7210)	(0.3237)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Divorcees	0.0342	0.00730	0.0570	0.347	0.0820	0.505
	(0.0399)	(0.0450)	(0.0454)	(0.4036)	(0.5069)	(0.4020)
Observations	17298	8516	8782	17298	8516	8782
Sh. Cons.	0.0714	0.0648	0.0800	0.0116	0.0104	0.0132
	(0.0450)	(0.0562)	(0.0516)	(0.0074)	(0.0089)	(0.0086)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Left	-0.0296	-0.0118	-0.0540	-0.00440	-0.00180	-0.00830
	(0.0441)	(0.0535)	(0.0515)	(0.0068)	(0.0081)	(0.0080)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2144***	-0.1665***	-0.1691*	-0.0154***	-0.0115***	-0.0126*
	(0.0640)	(0.0667)	(0.0895)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0066)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Abstention Rate	-0.1682***	-0.1093*	-0.1897***	-0.0197***	-0.0129	-0.0219***
	(0.0582)	(0.0666)	(0.0671)	(0.0068)	(0.0078)	(0.0077)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those foreign priests who are above the median age (Old), and those that are below the median age (Young), and compare them to the average Spanish priest. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A44: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Tenure

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Senior	(3) Junior	(4) Baseline	(5) Senior	(6) Junior
Cath. Weddings	-0.0234	-0.0241	-0.0303	-0.0737	-0.0577	-0.113
	(0.0265)	(0.0727)	(0.0272)	(0.0833)	(0.1744)	(0.1008)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0491	0.118	0.0482	0.167	0.360	0.178
	(0.0377)	(0.1403)	(0.0447)	(0.1277)	(0.4282)	(0.1650)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Births	0.0182	0.268	-0.0285	0.261	3.265	-0.464
	(0.0307)	(0.1993)	(0.0220)	(0.4415)	(2.4323)	(0.3580)
Observations	18696	9299	9397	18696	9299	9397
Divorcees	0.0339	-0.146	0.1046*	0.343	-1.243	1.2015*
	(0.0399)	(0.0908)	(0.0588)	(0.4041)	(0.7730)	(0.6758)
Observations	17270	8617	8653	17270	8617	8653
Sh. Cons.	0.0697	0.107	0.1159*	0.0115	0.0178	0.0185*
	(0.0450)	(0.0803)	(0.0608)	(0.0074)	(0.0133)	(0.0097)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Left	-0.0275	-0.0687	-0.0781	-0.00410	-0.0107	-0.0118
	(0.0441)	(0.0777)	(0.0636)	(0.0068)	(0.0120)	(0.0096)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2143***	-0.2689**	-0.1764*	-0.0154***	-0.0197**	-0.0124*
	(0.0640)	(0.1220)	(0.0947)	(0.0046)	(0.0089)	(0.0066)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059
Abstention Rate	-0.1660***	-0.149	-0.1792***	-0.0194***	-0.0172	-0.0211***
	(0.0582)	(0.1180)	(0.0755)	(0.0068)	(0.0136)	(0.0088)
Observations	11938	5879	6059	11938	5879	6059

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who have a tenure above the median tenure (Senior), and those who have a tenure below the median (Junior). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A45: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Age

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Old	(3) Young	(4) Baseline	(5) Old	(6) Young
Cath. Weddings	-0.0241	-0.0125	-0.0130	-0.0754	-0.0399	-0.0399
	(0.0265)	(0.0645)	(0.0295)	(0.0832)	(0.2055)	(0.0908)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Civil-Only Weddings	0.0496	0.104	0.0135	0.168	0.378	0.0421
	(0.0377)	(0.0904)	(0.0454)	(0.1275)	(0.3285)	(0.1424)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Births	0.0178	0.165	-0.0265	0.257	2.555	-0.351
	(0.0307)	(0.1150)	(0.0240)	(0.4411)	(1.7811)	(0.3161)
Observations	18724	9233	9491	18724	9233	9491
Divorcees	0.0342	-0.0970	0.0665	0.347	-1.090	0.589
	(0.0399)	(0.0688)	(0.0601)	(0.4036)	(0.7742)	(0.5317)
Observations	17298	8516	8782	17298	8516	8782
Sh. Cons.	0.0714	0.0872	0.1234*	0.0116	0.0140	0.0205*
	(0.0450)	(0.0883)	(0.0728)	(0.0074)	(0.0142)	(0.0120)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Left	-0.0296	-0.0318	-0.1513***	-0.00440	-0.00480	-0.0233***
	(0.0441)	(0.0807)	(0.0625)	(0.0068)	(0.0122)	(0.0097)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Sh. Rad Right	-0.2144***	-0.178	-0.156	-0.0154***	-0.0124	-0.0115
	(0.0640)	(0.1237)	(0.0966)	(0.0046)	(0.0086)	(0.0071)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219
Abstention Rate	-0.1682***	-0.00660	-0.1861**	-0.0197***	-0.000800	-0.0215**
	(0.0582)	(0.1055)	(0.0908)	(0.0068)	(0.0125)	(0.0104)
Observations	11962	5743	6219	11962	5743	6219

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are above the median age (Old), and those that are below the median age (Young). Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A46: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Country of Study

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Spanish E.	(3) No Spanish E.	(4) Baseline	(5) Spanish E.	(6) No Spanish E.
Cath. Weddings	0.0769***	0.0744**	0.0710***	0.4018***	0.4061**	0.3856***
	(0.0227)	(0.0364)	(0.0197)	(0.1185)	(0.1994)	(0.1071)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0406***	-0.0115	-0.0476***	-0.1808***	-0.0540	-0.2199***
	(0.0164)	(0.0241)	(0.0164)	(0.0731)	(0.1123)	(0.0762)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Births	0.0430***	0.0419***	0.0419***	0.8158***	0.8361***	0.8253***
	(0.0109)	(0.0176)	(0.0116)	(0.2091)	(0.3517)	(0.2308)
Observations	74503	63838	64971	74503	63838	64971
Divorcees	-0.0255	-0.0443*	-0.0201	-0.278	-0.4756*	-0.213
	(0.0186)	(0.0239)	(0.0201)	(0.2026)	(0.2565)	(0.2132)
Observations	58138	49345	50506	58138	49345	50506
Sh. Cons.	0.1244***	0.1057***	0.1289***	0.0195***	0.0164***	0.0200***
	(0.0263)	(0.0348)	(0.0285)	(0.0041)	(0.0054)	(0.0044)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Sh. Left	-0.1111***	-0.1000***	-0.1317***	-0.0164***	-0.0146***	-0.0192***
	(0.0274)	(0.0362)	(0.0296)	(0.0040)	(0.0052)	(0.0043)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1160***	-0.1431***	-0.1023***	-0.0071***	-0.0088***	-0.0063***
	(0.0307)	(0.0463)	(0.0305)	(0.0019)	(0.0029)	(0.0019)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704
Abstention Rate	-0.1424***	-0.1724***	-0.1292***	-0.0164***	-0.0197***	-0.0148***
	(0.0324)	(0.0439)	(0.0344)	(0.0037)	(0.0051)	(0.0040)
Observations	44764	37946	38704	44764	37946	38704

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who studies in a Spanish seminary, and those who did not. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A47: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Order

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Baseline	(2) Religious Order	(3) Diocesan	(4) Baseline	(5) Religious Order	(6) Diocesan
Cath. Weddings	0.0627***	0.4675***	0.0329	0.3021***	2.2204***	0.159
	(0.0249)	(0.1576)	(0.0212)	(0.1200)	(0.7481)	(0.1027)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.0342**	-0.1763***	-0.0212	-0.1759**	-0.6812***	-0.112
	(0.0170)	(0.0559)	(0.0186)	(0.0877)	(0.2159)	(0.0974)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Births	0.0408***	0.1172***	0.0361***	0.8404***	2.0713***	0.7481***
	(0.0115)	(0.0467)	(0.0120)	(0.2371)	(0.8245)	(0.2511)
Observations	40511	2776	37735	40511	2776	37735
Divorcees	-0.0255	0.00740	-0.0282	-0.308	0.0601	-0.346
	(0.0196)	(0.0680)	(0.0217)	(0.2365)	(0.5534)	(0.2666)
Observations	36862	2487	34375	36862	2487	34375
Sh. Cons.	0.0983***	-0.196	0.1164***	0.0156***	-0.0324	0.0185***
	(0.0270)	(0.1209)	(0.0282)	(0.0043)	(0.0200)	(0.0044)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Sh. Left	-0.1133***	0.0788	-0.1120***	-0.0168***	0.0124	-0.0166***
	(0.0285)	(0.1402)	(0.0292)	(0.0043)	(0.0220)	(0.0043)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Sh. Rad Right	-0.1240***	0.0489	-0.1588***	-0.0086***	0.00330	-0.0109***
	(0.0342)	(0.1330)	(0.0357)	(0.0024)	(0.0091)	(0.0024)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804
Abstention Rate	-0.1967***	-0.4427***	-0.1911***	-0.0228***	-0.0505***	-0.0221***
	(0.0342)	(0.1492)	(0.0355)	(0.0040)	(0.0171)	(0.0041)
Observations	25602	1798	23804	25602	1798	23804

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a religious orders, and those who are diocesan. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A48: Missionary vs. Non-Missionary Orders Classification

Panel A: Missionary Orders

ADSIS, C.M., C.M.F., C.O.R.C., C.P., C.PP.S., C.S.Sp., C.SS.R., C.V.M.D., Comunidad de Misioneros Serviam, Cruzados de Cristo Rey, E.D.M.P., HHNSSC, Hogar de la Madre, I.M.C., I.V.E., Laicos Misioneros Combonianos, Lumen Dei, M. Afr., M.C.C.J., M.N.M., M.S.C., M.S.P., M.SS.CC., MSpS, Misionero de Betania, Misionero de la Misericordia, Misioneros Javerianos de Yarumal, Misioneros S.P.T.M., Misioneros Scalabrinianos, Misioneros de Mariannhill, N.C.W., O. de M., O.A.R., O.F.M. Cap., O.F.M. Conv., O.F.S., O.M.I., O.P., O.R.S.A., O.S.A., O.S.M., O.SS.T., Obra de la Iglesia, Padres Barnabitas, S.C.I., S.J., S.V.D., SS.CC., Sociedad Misionera Cristo Rey, T.O.R., Verbum Dei.

Panel B: Non-Missionary Orders

C.S.J., Discípulos de los Corazones de Jesús y María, F.D.P., F.M.I., F.S.C., Instituto Religioso de los Hermanos de la Sagrada Familia, L.C., M.D., M.I., Mercedarios de la Caridad, Hermanos y Hermanas de Bethlehem, O.Carm., O.C.D., O.C.S.O., O.Cart., O.M., O.S.B., O.S.J., Opus Dei, S.D.B., S.M., S.O.D., Sch.P., Servi Trinitatis, T.C.

Note: The initials for the missionary orders relate to the following orders. ADSIS: Proyecto Adsis / Fraternidad Adsis; C.M.: Congregación de la Misión; C.M.F.: Misioneros Claretianos; C.O.R.C.: Obreros del Reino de Cristo; C.P.: Congregación de la Pasión; C.PP.S.: Misioneros de la Preciosísima Sangre; C.S.Sp.: Congregación del Espíritu Santo; C.SS.R.: Congregación del Santísimo Redentor; C.V.M.D.: Cooperadores de la Verdad de la Madre de Dios; E.D.M.P.: Esclavos de María y de los Pobres; HHNSSC: Hermandad de Hijos de Ntra. Señora del Sagrado Corazón; I.M.C.: Misioneros de la Consolata; I.V.E.: Instituto del Verbo Encarnado; M. Afr.: Misioneros de África / Padres Blancos; M.C.C.J.: Misioneros Combonianos del Corazón de Jesús; M.N.M.: Misioneros de la Natividad de María; M.S.C.: Misioneros del Sagrado Corazón; M.S.P.: Misioneros Servidores de la Palabra; M.SS.CC.: Misioneros de los Sagrados Corazones de Jesús y María; MSpS: Misioneros del Espíritu Santo; N.C.W.: Camino Neocatecumenal; O. de M.: Orden de la Merced; O.A.R.: Agustinos Recoletos; O.F.M. Cap.: Orden de los Frailes Menores Capuchinos; O.F.M. Conv.: Orden de los Frailes Menores Conventuales; O.F.S.: Orden Franciscana Seglar; O.M.I.: Oblatos de María Inmaculada; O.P.: Orden de Predicadores; O.R.S.A.: Agustinos Recoletos; O.S.A.: Orden de San Agustín; O.S.M.: Siervos de María / Servitas; O.SS.T.: Trinitarios; S.C.I.: Sacerdotes del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús / Dehonianos; S.J.: Compañía de Jesús; S.V.D.: Sociedad del Verbo Divino; SS.CC.: Congregación de los Sagrados Corazones de Jesús y de María; T.O.R.: Franciscanos Tercera Orden Regular. The initials for the non-missionary orders refer to the following orders. C.S.J.: Congregación de San José - Josefinos de Murialdo; F.D.P.: Pequeña Obra de la Divina Providencia / Orioninos; F.M.I.: Hijos de María Inmaculada (Pavonianos); F.S.C.: Hermanos de las Escuelas Cristianas; L.C.: Legionarios de Cristo; M.D.: Madres de Desamparados y San José de la Montaña; M.I.: Ministros de los Enfermos / Camilos; O. Carm.: Carmelitas; O.C.D.: Carmelitas Descalzos; O.C.S.O.: Clero diocesano misionero; O.Cart.: Cartujos; O.M.: Orden de los Mínimos; O.S.B.: Benedictinos; O.S.J.: Oblatos de San José; S.D.B.: Salesianos de Don Bosco; S.M.: Compañía de María; S.O.D.: Hermandad de Sacerdotes Operarios Diocesanos del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús; Sch.P.: Escolapios; T.C.: Terciarios Capuchinos de Nuestra Señora de los Dolores.

Table A49: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival by Religious Leader's Order Type
Missionary vs. Non-Missionary Order

	Standardized			Non-Standardized		
	(1) Order	(2) Missionary Order	(3) Non-Missionary Order	(4) Order	(5) Missionary Order	(6) Non-Missionary Order
Cath. Weddings	0.3813***	0.4661***	0.0313	1.8111***	2.3870***	0.0920
	(0.1076)	(0.1303)	(0.0531)	(0.5108)	(0.6672)	(0.1563)
Observations	2776	2108	825	2776	2108	825
Civil-Only Weddings	-0.1277***	-0.1978***	-0.0947	-0.4934***	-0.8183***	-0.246
	(0.0507)	(0.0575)	(0.0647)	(0.1961)	(0.2375)	(0.1680)
Observations	2776	2108	825	2776	2108	825
Births	0.1216***	0.1773***	-0.0703**	2.1489***	3.3807***	-0.7824**
	(0.0351)	(0.0447)	(0.0322)	(0.6201)	(0.8514)	(0.3574)
Observations	2776	2108	825	2776	2108	825
Divorcees	-0.000700	-0.0195	0.0502	-0.00540	-0.177	0.204
	(0.0625)	(0.0527)	(0.0384)	(0.5085)	(0.4790)	(0.1555)
Observations	2487	1842	794	2487	1842	794
Sh. Cons.	-0.196	-0.2671**	-0.201	-0.0324	-0.0439**	-0.0340
	(0.1209)	(0.1340)	(0.2353)	(0.0200)	(0.0219)	(0.0397)
Observations	1798	1372	545	1798	1372	545
Sh. Left	0.0788	0.100	0.295	0.0124	0.0159	0.0450
	(0.1402)	(0.1560)	(0.2124)	(0.0220)	(0.0248)	(0.0324)
Observations	1798	1372	545	1798	1372	545
Sh. Rad Right	0.0489	0.217	-0.286	0.00330	0.0155	-0.0197
	(0.1330)	(0.1554)	(0.5827)	(0.0091)	(0.0111)	(0.0399)
Observations	1798	1372	545	1798	1372	545
Abstention Rate	-0.4427***	-0.5457***	0.0342	-0.0505***	-0.0631***	0.00380
	(0.1492)	(0.1749)	(0.2962)	(0.0171)	(0.0203)	(0.0324)
Observations	1798	1372	545	1798	1372	545

Note: The table tests whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality motivates a change in a series of municipality characteristics. It presents the effect six years after the arrival of a foreign-born priest. See Section 3 for further details. It differentiates between those priests who are part of a missionary religious order, and those who are part of a non-missionary religious order. Columns 1-3 report the effects in Standard Deviations, and Columns 4-6 display them not standardized. All regressions include municipality and month-year fixed effects, and control by population, squared population, number of previous priest changes, and whether the priest shares his office (i.e., in solidum). Standard error are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

B Alternative Difference-in-Difference Estimators

In this section, I look at the influence that foreign religious leaders have on their communities, using alternative estimation methods. For each main outcome, I provide the results obtained using the approaches proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020); Sun and Abraham (2021); Gardner et al. (2026); Cengiz et al. (2019), together with the canonical two-way fixed effect model. All figures report the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B1: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Catholic Weddings - Alt. Estimators




Figure B2: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Civil-only Weddings
Alt. Estimators




Figure B3: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Total Weddings
Alt. Estimators




Figure B4: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Other Weddings
Alt. Estimators




Figure B5: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Fertility - Alt. Estimators




Figure B6: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Divorcees - Alt. Estimators




Figure B7: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Left-wing Votes - Alt. Estimators




Figure B8: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Right-wing Votes
Alt. Estimators




Figure B9: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Conservative Votes - Alt. Estimators




Figure B10: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Radical Right Votes - Alt. Estimators





Figure B11: Effect of a Foreign Priest's Arrival on Voting Abstention - Alt. Estimators



C Priests' Survey - List of Questions

In this section, I outline the questions used in the survey administered to those priests for which I could access their contact details. For each question, I detail the statement, together with the options provided to the interviewee. The same questions were used in both phone and email surveys. The questions were asked in Spanish (available upon request), and followed the ordering shown below:

1) In which diocese are you currently living?

2) How old are you?

3) When were you ordained priest?

4) In which seminary did you study to become a priest?

5) Are you a diocesan priest or are you a member of a religious order?

- Diocesan priest
- Member of a religious order (Please specify)

6) In which country were you born?

6.1) (If not born in Spain) How long have you been living in Spain?

6.2) (If not born in Spain) Which one was your main motivation for coming to Spain?

- Work as missionary
- Study
- Express petition by a Spanish bishop
- Other (Please specify)

7) Have you ever worked as priest abroad? (Please specify each project and country).

7.1) (If you worked abroad) How long have you worked as a priest abroad?

8) How do you identify yourself?

- White
- Mestizo

- Indigenous
- Black
- Other (Please specify)

Mark from 0 to 10, how much do you agree with the following statements (0=Nothing, 10=Completely):

9) Nationalizing strategic industries is necessary to protect citizenry

10) Those who become rich, do so always by exploiting the work of the many

11) In Spain, there exist real equality between man and woman

12) We need to look at what unites us instead of dwelling on the past

13) Immigrants receive more social protection than nationals

14) Minorities should adapt their customs and traditions to the Spanish ones

15) The new lifestyles are contributing to today's social rupture

16) Spain would have far less problems if more emphasis would be set in traditional families

For the next two questions, choose one of the following three options:

17) In your opinion, how are Pope Francisco's views on moral issues?

- Conservative
- About right
- Liberal

18) In your opinion, how were Pope Benedict XVI's views on moral issues?

- Conservative
- About right
- Liberal

19) According to your own experience, how would you describe today's Spanish economic situation?

- Very good
- Good
- Regular
- Bad
- Very bad

20) Which percentage of your parishioners attends frequently the Sunday sermon?

21) How many hours per week do you spend officiating masses?

22) How many hours per week do you spend in direct contact with your parishioners (but not in masses)?

23) How frequently do you discuss current sociopolitical events with your parishioners?

- Always
- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

24) In which other projects/activities, not directly linked to your priestly work, do you participate in?

- Helping with the integration of foreign families
- Helping in the local Caritas/Food Bank
- Participating in sport-related activities
- Preparing new events, such as talks
- Nothing (Only for the interviewer)
- Other (Please specify)

25) How frequently do you collaborate with the local administration in the promotion of religious activities? (e.g., the mass, catechism, religious pilgrimages, etc.)

- Always

- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

26) Have you found any new challenge at your parishes? Which ones? (Open question).

D Propensity Score Matching

In this section, I use a matching-on-observables approach, in the tradition of Heckman et al. (1997), to account for the fact that treated and control municipalities may be structurally different at baseline. Using this method, I implicitly assume that unobservable characteristics are time-invariant, being eliminated with the introduction of municipality fixed effects.


I use a propensity score matching algorithm (PSM) with two neighbors and no replacement on a list of municipality characteristics available at the 2001 Spanish Census. The variables used to matched those municipalities that ever had a foreign priest with their corresponding controls are: population, share of young people, share of retirees, share of people with no formal diploma, share of people with technical education, share of singles, share of divorcees, share of immigrants, unemployment rate, self-employment rate, share of temporal workers, share of farmers, and male and female labor force participation. Table D1 shows the covariate means in control and treatment groups after matching, as well as the p-value of the mean difference between treatment and control groups. For reference, Table 2 shows the mean comparison when no propensity score matching is used.

Table D1: Summary Statistics (at baseline) - Matched sample

	Never Foreign-Led	Ever Foreign-Led	p-value
Population	720.267	640.358	0.221
Youth share	0.124	0.122	0.367
Uneducated share	0.208	0.213	0.552
Technical education share	0.725	0.719	0.487
Divorced share	0.004	0.004	0.196
Immigrants share	0.015	0.018	0.043
Labor participation (Male)	0.566	0.561	0.390
Labor participation (Female)	0.275	0.274	0.869
Unemployed share	0.103	0.100	0.458
Temporal workers share	0.216	0.214	0.717
Farmers share	0.283	0.282	0.873
Share Right-wing parties	0.391	0.390	0.919
Grass-root Catholicism	0.055	0.057	0.854
% Francoist Streets	1.254	1.304	0.802


Note: The table provides a comparison of the baseline characteristics between municipalities that had a foreign priest between 2000 and 2019 (ever foreign-led) and those that did not (never foreign-led). The control group is composed by matched municipalities. I use a propensity score matching, with 2 neighbours, no replacement and a caliper of 0.1. The information at the municipal level is extracted from the 2001 Census. The share of votes to right-leaning parties was calculated using all national and European elections held between 1975 and 2000. Grassroot Catholicism identifies whether there existed in 2001 any grassroot Catholic initiative in the municipality. The percentage of Francoist streets is calculated using the 2001 Spanish Street Map Census.

Figure D1: Kernel Densities - Common Support




Using the previously explained matching method, Figure D2 reproduces the main findings from Figure 5, Figure D3 those from Figure 6, Figure D5 those from Figure 8, and Figure D6 those from Figure 9. I find no significant difference between using only matched municipalities when compared to using the full sample.


Figure D2: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on religious outcomes
Matched sample




(a) # Catholic weddings



(b) # Civil-only weddings




(c) # Weddings



(d) # Weddings (Other Denominations)


Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects the probability of getting married, by wedding ritual. Subfigure D2a displays how it affects Catholic weddings, subfigure D2b shows how it affects civil-only weddings, subfigure D2c whether it affects the total number of weddings carried out, and subfigure D2d whether it affects the wedding probability in other denominations. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D3: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on fertility - Matched sample




Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of births in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D4: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on divorcees - Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality influences the number of divorcees in the municipality. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.


Figure D5: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes
Left vs. Right - Matched sample



(a) Left-wing parties (b) Right-wing parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigure D5a displays how it affect the voting share of right-wing parties and subfigure D5b how it affects the voting share of left-wing parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.


Figure D6: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on political outcomes
Conservative vs. Rad. Right - Matched sample



(a) Conservative parties (b) Rad. Right parties

Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality affects its voting behavior. Subfigure D6a displays how it affect the voting share of conservative parties and subfigure D6b how it affects the voting share of radical right parties. The x-axis identifies the number of national and European elections since the arrival of a foreign priest. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.

Figure D7: Effect of a foreign priest's arrival on voting absenteeism - Matched sample



Note: This figure shows whether the arrival of a foreign priest to a municipality has an effect on its electoral participation. All coefficients, 90% (shaded bar) and 95% (upper and lower spikes) confidence intervals are obtained from Equation 2.