The Price of Exclusion: Regional Institutions and Sovereign Risk in a Currency Union*

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Abstract

What is the value of membership in an integrated financial architecture, and what does a sovereign lose when access to that architecture is withdrawn? We answer this question using the recent coup wave in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which generated rare variation in sovereign access to a shared regional financial architecture while holding constant the common currency, central bank, sovereign debt market, banking system, and equity exchange. We show that markets price access rather than political turnover itself. Sovereigns experiencing access-preserving coups exhibit little durable repricing, whereas exclusion from the regional funding architecture generates a large and persistent sovereign re-entry premium. We interpret this premium as the revealed value of an institutional convenience yield associated with access to a shared investor base and market infrastructure. The effects extend beyond sovereign debt markets: bank equities embedded in the same financial architecture fall sharply at access loss but not at access-preserving coups. We further provide suggestive evidence that exclusion is accompanied by creditor realignment rather than a collapse in foreign participation. Together, the results identify a previously difficult-to-measure financing benefit generated by membership in an integrated financial architecture and show how its loss is capitalized across sovereign debt and bank equity.

Keywords: Sovereign Debt; Currency Union; Market Access; Institutional Convenience Yield; Bank–Sovereign Nexus; Investor Clientele; Sovereign Risk.

JEL Codes: G12, G15, H63, F36, G21.

1 Introduction

Sovereigns borrow within financial architectures that shape who can hold their debt, how liquid that debt is, and the institutions that support its issuance and settlement. These features are valuable to a borrower, but their value is hard to observe, because a sovereign rarely loses access to them while remaining otherwise unchanged. This paper asks: how much is access to an integrated financial architecture worth to a sovereign borrower, and what does a sovereign lose when that access is withdrawn?

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Answering this question is challenging because changes in access are typically accompanied by changes in fundamentals, exchange-rate regimes, or market conditions. We exploit a setting that largely avoids these confounding forces. By a *financial architecture* we mean the interconnected set of institutions, infrastructures, and rules that support sovereign financing — a central bank, a debt-issuance platform, settlement and custody systems, a regulatory and collateral framework, a banking network, and the investor base that operates within them. The term is broader than a single market and broader than any one institution: it is the joint system that determines who may hold a sovereign's debt and on what terms, so that losing access to it is not a single market closing but the withdrawal of an entire funding apparatus. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) organises all of these elements at the regional level: a common currency and central bank (BCEAO), a regional sovereign debt market and auction platform (UMOA-Titres), shared settlement and custody, a regional banking system whose groups operate across every member, and a common equity exchange (BRVM). A recent wave of coups in the region generated rare variation in sovereign access to this shared architecture while leaving the underlying architecture itself intact, allowing us to observe how markets respond when membership becomes uncertain or access is disrupted.

We show that markets price access rather than political turnover itself. Sovereigns experiencing coups that preserve market access exhibit little durable repricing, whereas exclusion from the regional financial architecture generates a large and persistent re-entry premium, which we interpret as the market manifestation of an institutional convenience yield associated with membership. Exclusion is reflected not only in sovereign borrowing costs but also in the composition of sovereign creditors and in the equity valuations of banks embedded in the same regional financial architecture. Together, these results show that the value of architecture membership is capitalised simultaneously in three layers of the same financial system: sovereign debt, investor allocation, and intermediary equity.

The priced event is not the coup but the loss of market access it sometimes triggers. First, a coup that leaves the sovereign's market access intact does not reprice its own three-year curve or its neighbours': the four sanction-free coups (Mali 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso twice in 2022) move neither, and a difference-in-differences against the non-coup members shows no relative widening. What reprices the sovereign is the loss of market access — the sanctions and default some coups trigger — and only when that exclusion is not resolved cooperatively: Niger, excluded for nine months and politically unresolved, re-entered 2.8 percentage points

above a synthetic-control counterfactual built from the non-coup WAEMU members (robust across donor compositions: leave-one-out range [+2.10, +2.95] pp), while Mali, which negotiated its return, did not. This access-loss contrast is identified off the Niger–Mali pair; an issuer-and-quarter fixed-effects panel recovers the same 1.7 pp within-issuer jump (N = 1,382 auctions), and the synthetic-control permutation provides the small-sample inference for the premium. Second, institutional exclusion reshapes the *political composition* of the creditor base. At re-entry, relative to non-coup WAEMU issuers, Niger's foreign demand tilted toward fellow Alliance-of-Sahel-States (AES) creditors — a directional pattern we report as suggestive rather than tested. The full bidder-domicile panel shows the *level* of foreign participation is essentially unchanged — a 69.5% average across Niger's 22 pre-coup auctions versus 66.1% across its 16 post-re-entry auctions, statistically indistinguishable — so what changes is the composition of who holds the debt, not the foreign share itself — a realignment along political lines. The cost of exclusion falls on the excluded issuer rather than diffusing across the union as a uniform repricing onto neighbours. Third, an equity leg using Bank of Africa's separately listed national subsidiaries — a same-group design holding banking franchise, management, and currency fixed — corroborates the pattern: the treated subsidiary's stock falls sharply at access-loss events. BOA Mali declines −17% at its January 2022 sanctions; BOA Niger declines −20% once the event window is anchored to the ECOWAS sanctions date (30 July 2023) rather than the coup four days earlier (significant under randomisation inference), the re-dating following the anticipation protocol when the coup-anchored window understates a confounded event. Both move near zero at sanction-free coups, with one exception (the January 2022 Burkina coup) plausibly pricing sanctions *risk* in the immediate wake of Mali's sanctions. A placebo on an independent set of non-coup political events — five WAEMU elections and three *failed* coup attempts — supports the reading: Niger's access-loss premium lies outside the entire placebo distribution (beyond the largest placebo move of 0.60 percentage points, against a placebo mean of 0.22), so the effect is specific to access loss, not to political turbulence. A first test of the non-CFA channel is consistent: around the Niger event a liquid Nigerian Eurobond did not move (a statistically insignificant −0.11 percentage points), against Niger's own re-entry repricing. Throughout, the institutional-convenience-yield reading — that what is priced is the value of continued access, not the coup — is supported by the placebo and persistence patterns: the premium is specific to access loss, not to political turbulence, and it persists rather than reversing as a transient default-risk or sentiment spike would.

Identifying the price of access requires separating it from the coup that threatens it, and the WAEMU coup wave supplies three sources of variation that do. First, coups differ in whether they sever market access: four were sanction-free, while Mali's January 2022 sanctions and Niger's July 2023 exclusion froze the issuer out of the regional market — a contrast that holds the union, the currency, and the political rupture fixed. Second, Mali's own timeline separates the two in sequence: the same sovereign is observed under coups with access intact (2020, 2021) and, eighteen months later, under access loss (2022), holding issuer fundamentals and market microstructure fixed and so ruling out coup severity as the driver. Third, the two access-loss episodes differ in their resolution — Niger's prolonged and politically unresolved, Mali's negotiated — which is what separates a sizeable re-entry premium from none. Two further contrasts bound the alternatives: an independent placebo of WAEMU elections and *failed* coups, which rupture politics but not access, and a liquid non-CFA neighbour (a Nigerian Eurobond) that shares geography but not the union. Whether the repricing also spills onto non-coup members is a secondary question; in this sample that spillover is limited, so the cost falls on the excluded issuer rather than diffusing across the union, and a fuller cross-union design (Section 3) locates any spillover inside the union versus in the shared external peg. Across the three treated sovereigns the identifying contrast is sharp: Niger's prolonged, uncooperative exclusion carries a large re-entry premium, Mali's negotiated return carries none, and Burkina Faso's two access-preserving coups carry none.

The stakes reach beyond the region. Asset pricing increasingly treats safety, liquidity, and access as priced attributes that open a wedge between a sovereign's yield and its default fundamentals; we show that membership in a shared funding architecture is one such attribute, priced through two independent margins that standard contagion measures do not capture — the terms on which an excluded sovereign re-enters, and the *political identity* of the investors willing to hold its paper, which realigns even as their aggregate share does not. The setting is an unusually clean laboratory for the question: within each CFA union the monetary regime, the currency, and the external anchor are common to all members, so within-union variation in market access is not confounded by the macro and monetary differences that cloud ordinary cross-country sovereign comparisons. It is also the only setting in which the question can be asked at all: the design requires a member to be excluded from a functioning integrated regional market while that market persists, and over 2021–2026 no member of the comparably deep CEMAC union — not Chad through its 2021 transition, not Gabon through its 2023 coup

— was ever cut off from regional issuance (Section 7.11). The single treated sovereign is not a small sample; it is the entire population of the event, which has occurred once. What a coup elsewhere bundles together — regime change, currency risk, and loss of access — the WAEMU lets us hold apart. The setting is also exceptionally rich in what it lets us observe. What makes the WAEMU exceptional is not that it has a financial architecture in the sense defined above, but that it has an unusually *complete* one: most sovereign-debt settings share only one or two of those institutions, whereas the WAEMU jointly organises all of them at the regional level. This completeness is what makes the architecture's value measurable. Because the same membership spans the sovereign's borrowing, the investors who fund it, and the banks listed alongside it, a single exclusion shock can be observed as it is capitalised, at once, in three layers of one architecture: the sovereign's borrowing cost, the allocation of its debt across investors, and the equity valuation of the banks embedded in the regional system — where most sovereign settings reveal only the first.

The paper makes three main contributions. First, it identifies an institutional component of sovereign value: a sovereign borrowing inside a cooperative regional architecture enjoys a funding advantage — an institutional convenience yield in the sense of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Du et al. (2018) — that is withdrawn when its access is threatened, and the Niger–Mali contrast measures that component while holding the union, the currency, and the coup itself fixed. Second, it shows that political shocks are priced through their consequences for access rather than through turnover *per se*: access-preserving coups move neither the sovereign's own curve nor its neighbours', and an independent placebo confirms the effect is specific to access loss, not to political turbulence. Third, it traces the shock into bank equity through a same-group design: Bank of Africa's separately listed national subsidiaries hold banking franchise, management, and currency fixed, so that the differential stock reaction isolates the sovereign-exposure channel. The treated subsidiary falls about -17% (Mali) and -20% (Niger) at access loss and near zero at access-preserving coups, robust to randomisation inference. Because Niger's coup and the ECOWAS sanctions are four days apart on the same security, the design also answers *which* event the market prices: BOA Niger is flat through the coup and falls -20% at the sanctions, locating the repricing at the access-loss anchor rather than the regime change — the same separation the sovereign leg makes across events, here made *within* a single window on a single asset. Our results also suggest a fourth margin, in the political composition of the creditor base. The *level* of foreign participation in Niger's debt was

statistically unchanged at re-entry, but relative to non-coup WAEMU issuers Niger's foreign funding tilted toward fellow Alliance-of-Sahel-States sources — a directional pattern, consistent with political *creditor realignment* at constant foreign participation, that the single-treated-sovereign design cannot establish with confidence. It is a margin the sovereign-contagion and home-bias literatures, which track foreign *shares* rather than their political composition, have not isolated, and we report it as suggestive rather than as a tested result. Together these results trace one exclusion shock across three layers of a single financial architecture — the sovereign's borrowing cost, the allocation of its debt across investors, and the equity of the banks embedded in the regional system — so the paper is less a study of sovereign yields than of how the value of architecture membership is capitalised, simultaneously, across debt, investor holdings, and equity. A compact *access-value* model — a sovereign's funding cost as the equilibrium yield wedge generated when architecture-constrained demand is withdrawn — organises these predictions, deriving the re-entry premium, the creditor realignment, and the bank-equity signature from a single primitive (the qualifying access clientele). A complementary, secondary spillover framework defines an *anchor share* separating union-internal transmission from the shared external peg, which a sister-union (CEMAC) check identifies (Section 7.11) and which a higher-frequency multi-country design could estimate structurally. The mechanism is a general one — it should operate in any currency union whose members borrow on shared terms and can be cut off from them — but it is identified here off a single setting, the WAEMU, whose 2020–2025 coup wave supplies the rare variation in membership access that the question requires; whether the premium generalises to other currency unions is the natural next question rather than something a single union's evidence can settle. Throughout, we adopt an intentionally reduced-form view of access: a single sufficient statistic stands for a sovereign's standing inside the shared architecture, aggregating collateral eligibility, settlement and custody access, and regulatory admissibility rather than separating them. We estimate the value of that access, not the particular institutional mechanism that withdraws it — a deliberate choice that matches the object the data identify.

These results connect four literatures that have not met. Two recent studies examine the same coups: Xiao et al. (2025) document sharp negative abnormal returns and prolonged volatility on the regional exchange treated as one aggregate, and Boungou et al. (2024) show that Francophone-African coups depress French firms' share prices through trade and FDI — but neither separates the reaction of *non-coup* members from the aggregate, nor the equity reac-

tion from the sovereign one, and the metropole channel cannot, by construction, run through a shared central bank. A eurozone strand shows that political shocks in one member reprice the sovereigns of others through the common framework rather than bilateral ties (De Santis, 2019; Li et al., 2013; Bahaj, 2020), while confronting the measurement problem at the centre of any contagion claim — distinguishing genuine transmission from a common shock that merely raises sensitivity to fundamentals (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). We bring that within-union question to a currency-union system where it has not been tested, recast it as the pricing of *access* rather than the diffusion of risk, and trace the conduit through the common-creditor and information-spillover channels of Broner et al. (2006); Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001); Cole et al. (2025).

Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 develops the model and the identification strategy. Section 4 describes the WAEMU events, the equity and sovereign data, and the CEMAC robustness data. Section 5 sets out the event-study, channel, mechanism, and window protocols, with power calculations in Appendix B and model proofs in Appendix A. Section 6 lays out the three-layer architecture design. Section 7 presents the sovereign evidence — the re-entry premium, the creditor realignment, the Mali contrast, the curve and placebo event studies, and the CEMAC cross-union check. Section 8 presents the Bank of Africa same-group event study. Section 9 discusses what is priced, robustness, and identification, and Section 10 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our work connects four strands. The first establishes that political risk is priced in sovereign spreads and equities (Alesina et al., 1996; Bekaert et al., 2014; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013, 2012; Kelly et al., 2016; Julio and Yook, 2012; Baldacci et al., 2011; Belkhir et al., 2019; Soumaré and N'Sougan, 2013), and that coups in particular raise sovereign costs and depreciate currencies (Balima, 2020b,a) — but only for the country in which the risk resides; this domestic benchmark is the one from which our cross-border question departs. Two studies of these same coups are the immediate antecedents: Xiao et al. (2025) treat the regional exchange as one aggregate, and Boungou et al. (2024) trace a metropole trade-and-FDI channel to French firms (the event-study template of Boungou and Yatié 2022); neither separates non-coup members from the aggregate or the equity reaction from the sovereign one, and the metropole channel cannot run through a shared central bank.

A second strand concerns how cross-border co-movement should be identified — genuine contagion versus interdependence (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) — and the channels through which it travels: common creditors and leveraged investors (Kaminsky et al., 2003; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Arellano et al., 2017), portfolio retrenchment toward benchmark weights (Broner et al., 2006), and information spillovers across a shared investor pool (Cole et al., 2025), the closest microfoundation for our reading. A third is the eurozone benchmark, where the same difficulty arises — separating transmission from a common shock that merely raises sensitivity to fundamentals (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Giordano et al., 2013; Mink and de Haan, 2013; Lane, 2012); union bond markets are more fragile and prone to self-fulfilling crises (De Grauwe, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Caporin et al., 2018; Bolton and Jeanne, 2011), and political events in one member reprice the others through the shared framework rather than bilateral ties (De Santis, 2019; Li et al., 2013; Bahaj, 2020). We adapt this foreign-event transmission logic, and the Forbes–Rigobon caution our design is built to meet.

The fourth strand is the asset pricing of safety, liquidity, and access: investors accept lower yields for these attributes beyond default fundamentals (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Du et al., 2018), building on the reputation-and-commitment tradition in sovereign debt (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). Our mechanism is, at its core, a segmented-demand one: a deep architecture-constrained clientele is withdrawn and replaced by a shallow substitute, moving price at near-constant quantity. This places the paper in the demand-based and preferred-habitat tradition of asset pricing (Vayanos and Vila, 2021; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014; Koijen and Yogo, 2019), in which downward-sloping, clientele-specific demand curves let supply or clientele shifts move yields independently of fundamentals; we read exclusion as a shock to the qualifying clientele rather than to the short rate or to default risk. We treat continued access to a shared funding architecture as one such attribute and measure it through the repricing that follows its withdrawal. The cost and terms on which an excluded sovereign regains access connect to the literature on sovereign market access and re-access (Gelos et al., 2011), post-default borrowing costs (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013), and the contrast between negotiated and unilateral restructurings (Asonuma and Trebesch, 2016; Trebesch and Zabel, 2017), whose cooperative-versus-coercive distinction parallels our Niger–Mali contrast; and, since the trigger here is ECOWAS/WAEMU sanctions, to the theory of sanctions and sovereign default (Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla, 2024). A parallel macro literature studies how financial sanctions transmit through the banking sector to aggregate output (Bayer et al., 2026); we work at the opposite

end of the same channel, measuring the asset-price repricing of an excluded sovereign and its banks rather than the macroeconomic damage. Three institutional facts make the WAEMU a suitable laboratory: the common central bank and regional exchange generate large cross-border holdings of government paper (Sy, 2007); the sovereign-bank nexus is pronounced, with pan-African groups linking sovereign repricing to listed bank balance sheets (Feyen and Zuccardi, 2019; Kanga et al., 2021; Acharya et al., 2014; Brunnermeier et al., 2016; Farhi and Tirole, 2018), which the Bank of Africa equity leg exploits; and market-model abnormal returns are estimable on BRVM-listed stocks (Soumaré et al., 2013), while thin secondary sovereign trading (International Monetary Fund, 2016) pushes the primary-market and equity outcomes to the fore. The sister CEMAC union shares the external anchor but runs separate machinery (International Monetary Fund, 2024) — it is the matched comparison for the cross-union check, delivered descriptively in Section 7.11.

3 Framework and Identification

The source of heterogeneity is structural: within the WAEMU, some members experienced coups while others, sharing the same central bank, currency, and regional markets, did not. This common-framework-heterogeneous-units structure lets the common monetary environment be differenced out and the differential repricing attributed to the shock. The sister Central African union (CEMAC), which shares the external anchor but not the internal machinery, enters later as a robustness check on whether the transmission is union-internal or anchor-borne.

The paper is built around the access-loss contrast. Own-country repricing at access-preserving coups is treated as validation, not contribution: that coups can hurt local assets is known. The spine is the distinction between coups that preserve market access and those that destroy it — and, given that distinction, how far the repricing travels onto non-coup members (limited, in this sample) versus how it falls on the excluded sovereign and the banks that hold its debt.

3.1 A model of access value

We model the value a sovereign derives from membership in an integrated regional financial architecture — its *access value* — as the financing benefit conferred by a wider, architecture-constrained buyer base, observed through the yield wedge that appears when that base is

withdrawn. Membership is valuable because it widens the buyer base; exclusion is costly because it narrows it. The same shock that withdraws these investors raises the yield (a re-entry premium), rotates *who* holds the paper (creditor realignment), and impairs the intermediaries that hold it and trade on the shared exchange (bank equity). All three are comparative statics of one primitive. We read this access value as the microfoundation of the *institutional convenience yield* of the introduction — the funding advantage that membership confers, priced as a yield discount and withdrawn when access is lost. The three terms form one hierarchy and are not competing objects: the institutional convenience yield is the economic object, access value is the mechanism that generates it (a wider architecture-constrained clientele), and the re-entry premium is its observable counterpart (the yield wedge when access is withdrawn). We use each term at the level it names and do not treat them as distinct quantities.

Investors and demand. A sovereign i issues a fixed quantity Q_i of debt. Demand comes from three groups, each increasing in the yield y_i (equivalently, decreasing in price). *Global* investors face no membership requirement: $q_i^g = \alpha_g + \beta_g\, y_i$, with $\beta_g > 0$. *Ordinary architecture-constrained* investors — regional banks, union pension funds, and intermediaries whose mandates or collateral frameworks require the issuer to remain inside the architecture — supply $q_i^a = m_i\,(\alpha_a + \beta_a\, y_i)$, with $\beta_a > 0$ (a downward-sloping, clientele-specific demand curve in the demand-based tradition of Vayanos and Vila, 2021 and Koijen and Yogo, 2019), where $m_i \in [0, 1]$ measures the fraction of the architecture-constrained investor base willing and able to hold sovereign i's debt under prevailing institutional arrangements. A single state variable thus stands in for several underlying channels — collateral eligibility, settlement and custody access, and regulatory admissibility — that sanctions, exclusion, or settlement disruptions all operate through; we treat m_i as a reduced-form sufficient statistic for them rather than modelling each separately. Throughout the model the subscript a tags the *access* clientele; it is unrelated to the asset index a and the market-model loadings $\hat{\alpha}_a, \hat{\beta}_a$ of the event study (Section 5), which are distinct objects. A third, *politically aligned substitute* clientele steps in only when the issuer is excluded from the ordinary perimeter — $q_i^s = s_i\,(\alpha_s + \beta_s\, y_i)$, with $\beta_s > 0$ and substitute share $s_i = \psi\,(1 - m_i)$, $\psi \in (0, 1]$, so $s_i = 0$ at full membership and rises as access is withdrawn. Membership sets $m_i = 1$ (hence $s_i = 0$); exclusion lowers m_i and brings the

substitute in. Market clearing $q_i^g + q_i^a + q_i^s = Q_i$ gives

$$y_i(m_i) = \frac{Q_i - \alpha_g - m_i\,\alpha_a - \psi(1-m_i)\,\alpha_s}{\beta_g + m_i\,\beta_a + \psi(1-m_i)\,\beta_s}. \tag{1}$$

Implicit differentiation gives

$$\frac{\partial y_i}{\partial m_i} = -\,\frac{(\alpha_a + \beta_a y_i) - \psi\,(\alpha_s + \beta_s y_i)}{\beta_g + m_i\beta_a + \psi(1-m_i)\beta_s} \;<\; 0, \tag{2}$$

the denominator being the (positive) slope of total demand in the yield, and the numerator the per-unit demand of the ordinary access clientele net of the substitute demand it displaces. We assume throughout that the ordinary access clientele is a net buyer over the relevant range and is not fully replaced by the substitute:

$$(\alpha_a + \beta_a y_i) \;>\; \psi\,(\alpha_s + \beta_s y_i) \;>\; 0. \tag{3}$$

Condition (3), imposed at the equilibrium $y_i(m_i)$ over the relevant range $m_i \in [m_i^{\text{post}}, 1]$, is sufficient for $\partial y_i/\partial m_i < 0$: raising membership adds deep ordinary-access demand and retires the shallower substitute, so a larger qualifying clientele lowers the required yield and withdrawing it raises the yield. Economically, the substitute clientele is shallower and pricier — it clears the market only at a higher yield — so when it replaces the departing ordinary investors the base both *rotates* in composition and *thins* in effective depth.

Access value and the re-entry premium. Membership in the architecture confers an underlying financing benefit — *access value* — by widening the qualifying buyer base; its observable manifestation is the *re-entry premium*, the yield wedge a sovereign pays when part of that base is withdrawn. Define

$$\mathrm{RP}_i(m_i) \;\equiv\; y_i(m_i) - y_i(1) \;>\; 0 \qquad \text{for } m_i < 1, \tag{4}$$

positive by integrating (2) from m_i to 1 under (3) (Appendix A). The re-entry premium is thus the equilibrium yield wedge generated by the withdrawal of architecture-constrained demand — not a posited yield component but the price impact, through a finite-elasticity buyer base, of replacing a deep ordinary clientele with a shallower substitute. It is the empirical counterpart of access value: a sovereign with high access value (deep architecture-constrained demand) pays

a large premium when excluded. Its magnitude rises with the ordinary clientele's depth (α_a, β_a) relative to global demand (β_g) and the substitute $(\psi\alpha_s, \psi\beta_s)$: the more a sovereign's financing relies on the architecture-constrained clientele, and the shallower its political substitute, the more its access is worth.

The exclusion shock. The membership variable takes two values according to the nature of the political event:

$$m_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{access preserved (the event leaves the funding perimeter intact),} \\ m_i^{\text{post}} < 1 & \text{access disrupted (sanctions, default, exclusion).} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

Coups matter only insofar as they alter m_i. An access-destroying event lowers the qualifying clientele until access is restored; an access-*preserving* coup leaves $m_i = 1$ and so leaves every outcome below unchanged. This single distinction — whether the event withdraws the access clientele — drives all three predictions.

Prediction 1 (sovereign re-entry premium). By (2) the excluded sovereign re-enters at a premium $\Delta y_i = \text{RP}_i(m_i^{\text{post}}) > 0$; an access-preserving coup ($\Delta m_i = 0$) carries none. The premium is larger and longer-lived the deeper and more prolonged the exclusion (the lower and more persistent m_i^{post}), so a brief, cooperatively resolved exclusion reprices little while a prolonged, uncooperative one reprices substantially — the Niger–Mali contrast.

Prediction 2 (creditor realignment). Composition follows from the same clearing condition. As m_i falls, ordinary access demand contracts and substitute demand $\psi(1-m_i)(\alpha_s+\beta_s y_i)$ expands. Because the substitute is shallower (condition (3)), it does not fully replace the departing buyers in depth — which is why the yield rises (P1) — yet it can occupy a comparable *share* of the allotment, so the aggregate foreign share stays close to unchanged while its composition rotates toward the politically aligned source: a loss of depth and a change in creditor identity from the single fall in m_i.

Prediction 3 (intermediary equity). Architecture-constrained investors include banks listed on the architecture's common exchange that hold the sovereign's paper. A first-order (duration) approximation links the sovereign repricing to bond returns, $\Delta P_i/P_i \simeq -D_i\,\Delta y_i$, where D_i is duration. Let H_{bi} denote the *value* of bank b's holdings of sovereign i. Its equity

then changes by

$$\Delta E_b \;=\; -\,H_{bi}\,D_i\,\Delta y_i \;-\; \phi_b\,(1 - m_i^{\text{post}}) \;<\; 0, \tag{6}$$

a mark-to-market loss on its sovereign holdings (first term, since $\Delta y_i > 0$) plus a loss of franchise value to the extent its intermediation rents depend on the issuer's continued membership ($\phi_b \geq 0$, the franchise value lost per unit of membership withdrawn, carrying whatever units render both terms a monetary change in E_b). The decline concentrates in the subsidiary exposed to the excluded sovereign and is absent for siblings with no such exposure — the same-group equity signature. The model does not claim a transmission *sequence* from yield to equity: both respond to the same fall in m_i, with the balance-sheet exposure $H_{bi}D_i$ the economic link between the sovereign and equity layers.

Placebo and persistence. An event that does not touch the access perimeter leaves $m_i = 1$, producing $\Delta y_i = 0$, no recomposition, and $\Delta E_b = 0$ — the placebo null for access-preserving coups, failed coups, and elections. Because the re-entry premium RP_i is a level effect that persists while exclusion stands, it does not mean-revert like a transitory liquidity or sentiment spike; persistence thus separates access-value loss from *transient* shocks, while the Mali contrast and the placebo tests do the work of separating access value from default risk (a higher default probability can also persist, so persistence alone does not distinguish it).

Mapping to the empirical design. The three treated WAEMU sovereigns realise three values of the membership variable. Burkina Faso approximates an access-preserving political shock ($\Delta m_i \approx 0$): its two sanction-free coups leave the funding perimeter largely intact, so the model predicts little or no premium, recomposition, or equity reaction. Mali corresponds to a temporary reduction in m_i followed by cooperative restoration: a short-lived wedge that the model predicts reprices little once access is regained. Niger corresponds to a persistent reduction in m_i — prolonged, uncooperative exclusion — which the model predicts reprices substantially, rotates the creditor base, and impairs the exposed intermediary's equity. The Burkina–Mali–Niger comparison is thus the empirical image of $\Delta m_i \in \{0,\ \text{temporary},\ \text{persistent}\}$.

What the model is and is not. The model is intentionally reduced-form. Its purpose is not to explain why sanctions are imposed, why cooperation restores access, or how sovereign default is determined. It provides a sufficient-statistic representation of a sovereign's access to a shared

financial architecture and studies how changes in that access are capitalized into yields, creditor composition, and intermediary equity. The single primitive m_i deliberately aggregates several distinct institutional channels — collateral eligibility, settlement and custody access, regulatory admissibility, and the sanctions or exclusions that move them — into one object. This is a design choice, not an omission: the paper does not aim to identify which specific mechanism changed, but to estimate the value of access to the architecture regardless of which mechanism changes it. A model that separated these channels would estimate a different, and for our question less useful, object. Concretely, it is a partial-equilibrium clientele-pricing framework, not a structural model of default and portfolio choice: $\alpha, \beta, \psi, \phi_b, D_i$ are demand and exposure primitives, not derived from preferences, and we use it for signs, orderings, and the mapping from one shock to three margins rather than for structural estimation. Access value is identified as a discrete re-entry premium (a shift in m_i), not a continuously estimated yield component. Three scope notes. First, the constant aggregate-foreign-share result requires the substitute clientele to occupy a share comparable to the departing ordinary one while remaining shallower in depth (condition (3)); this is an empirical feature of the politically structured WAEMU case, not a general law. Second, the cooperative-versus-uncooperative distinction enters through the exogenous depth and persistence of m_i^{post} — a cooperative resolution is represented as a shallow, quickly reversed fall in m_i and an uncooperative one as a deep, prolonged fall — rather than being derived from a mechanism in which cooperation restores access; we map it, we do not micro-found it, which is appropriate for a reduced-form clientele model. Third, the cross-union/spillover question — how far a member's exclusion travels to non-coup members and to the sister CFA union — is a separate, bounding exercise taken up descriptively in the cross-union check (Section 7.11), not a core implication of the access-value mechanism.

3.2 Spillover within the same model

The access-value model also delivers the spillover question as a corollary of the same m_i mechanism — this is not a second model, and we treat it as a bounding exercise rather than a core implication: the paper's object is the pricing of exclusion for the excluded sovereign, and the spillover analysis asks only how far, if at all, that exclusion travels to non-coup members. So far a coup affected only the excluded issuer's own membership m_i. But because members of a union share the same architecture, a coup in member j can shave a common amount off the qualifying access clientele of the *other* members: the institutions that failed to prevent it are

the institutions every member relies on. Let a coup in union W lower each non-coup own-union member k's membership by $\tau \geq 0$, $m_k : 1 \to 1 - \tau$, while leaving non-CFA neighbours (who share no architecture) at $m_k = 1$. The sister CFA union, which shares only the external anchor, is shaved by the anchor-borne fraction $\chi\tau$ with $\chi \in [0, 1]$.

Each non-coup member then reprices by the same comparative static that drives the re-entry premium, evaluated at its own clientele shock $\Delta m_k = -\lambda(r(k))\,\tau$, where $r(k) \in \{\text{own}, \text{sister}, \text{non-CFA}\}$ records member k's ring. For expositional simplicity we evaluate the derivative around the full-membership benchmark $m_k = 1$ (where the substitute is absent, $s_k = 0$), so it takes the two-group form $\partial y_k/\partial m_k|_{m_k=1} = -(\alpha_a + \beta_a y_k)/(\beta_g + \beta_a)$, and a first-order expansion gives

$$\Delta y_k \;=\; \frac{\partial y_k}{\partial m_k}\Big|_{m_k=1} \Delta m_k \;=\; \Big[\frac{\alpha_a + \beta_a y_k}{\beta_g + \beta_a}\Big]\,\lambda(r(k))\,\tau, \qquad \lambda(\text{own}) = 1,\ \lambda(\text{sister}) = \chi,\ \lambda(\text{non-CFA}) = 0. \tag{7}$$

This sorts non-coup members into three rings of declining repricing: the coup's own union (Ring 1) carries the full clientele shock τ, the sister CFA union (Ring 2) the anchor-borne fraction $\chi\tau$, and non-CFA neighbours (Ring 3) none. The anchor share is now simply the ratio of the sister-union to own-union spillover, $\chi = \tau_{\text{sister}}/\tau_{\text{own}}$, estimable from the CEMAC check without any separate credibility apparatus. Spillover is thus the *same* mechanism as the re-entry premium — a fall in architecture-constrained demand — applied to non-coup members rather than the excluded issuer.

The spillover is bounded and, here, small. The within-union spillover $\Delta y_k = [\,\cdot\,]\tau$ is governed by how much a neighbour's coup actually erodes a member's own access clientele (τ). If a coup in j does not materially change who will hold member k's debt — because k retains its own access — then $\tau \approx 0$ and the spillover is negligible even though the excluded issuer reprices sharply. The contagion test (9) estimates τ (recovered as its coefficient δ_1; Section 5) against the non-CFA ring (which has $\tau = 0$ by construction and so anchors the level), and the channel test (10) separates this clientele spillover from ordinary economic exposure to the coup country's real activity (Section 3.5). In this sample τ is small: the cost of exclusion falls on the excluded issuer, not on its neighbours. The CEMAC layer ($\chi\tau$) is correspondingly a robustness check on whether even that limited spillover is union-internal or anchor-borne, not a load-bearing contrast. One primitive, m, thus generates the premium, the creditor realignment,

the bank-equity effect, and the (limited) spillover alike.

3.3 The empirical contrasts

The access-value model maps to three primary contrasts, one per layer of the architecture. The *access-loss re-entry contrast* compares the terms on which an excluded sovereign returns against a sovereign whose access was preserved or cooperatively restored — the Niger–Mali–Burkina comparison — and measures the sovereign re-entry premium RP_i. These two roles should not be conflated. Mali is not a counterfactual for Niger in the synthetic-control sense: Niger's counterfactual is the weighted basket of *non-coup* donors (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Guinea-Bissau) that estimates what Niger's yield would have been absent exclusion (Section 7). Mali plays a different role. Both Niger and Mali were *excluded* from the regional market — both received the access-loss treatment — and they differ in the *resolution*: Niger's exclusion was prolonged and politically unresolved, and it re-entered at a large premium, whereas Mali negotiated a cooperative return and re-entered at essentially none. Mali is therefore the cooperative-resolution contrast: it identifies that what is priced is not access loss in itself but access loss that is not cured cooperatively. The synthetic control supplies the *magnitude* of Niger's repricing; the Mali contrast supplies its *interpretation*. The *creditor-realignment contrast* compares the composition of the issuer's primary-auction demand before and after exclusion, at a roughly constant foreign share. The *same-group instrument* compares the coup-country Bank of Africa subsidiary against its non-coup siblings, holding group, management, listing, and currency fixed — the tightest control among the tests, though it does not separate the country's access shock from the subsidiary's own cash-flow exposure to its home economy.

Two further contrasts *bound* how far the shock travels and are organised by the spillover corollary of the same model (Section 3.2; derivations in Appendix A). The *within-union contagion* test asks whether the sovereign yields and equity prices of non-coup WAEMU members move around each coup, holding their own fundamentals fixed; because all members share the monetary environment, their differential reaction is the contagion estimate, with effective sample events × reacting members. The *shared-infrastructure channel* sorts the non-coup, non-exposed assets around each coup into the coup country's own WAEMU union and a set of non-CFA West African neighbours (Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea-Conakry, and others) that are geographically proximate but share neither the euro anchor nor the union's central bank, exchange, and bank balance sheets; the own-union-versus-non-CFA contrast locates any spillover in the

shared infrastructure rather than in geography or trade, though it cannot by itself separate the union's internal machinery from the external anchor — the role of the sister CEMAC union, which data limitations (Section 4) confine to a lower-frequency check. In this sample both spillover contrasts are limited.

3.4 Predictions and tests

The organising contrast is not coup versus no-coup but *access-preserving* versus *access-destroying* ruptures: what reprices a sovereign is the loss of access to the union's cooperative machinery (sanctions, default, exclusion), not political turnover per se (Table 1). Together the access-value model and the complementary spillover framework make a connected set of predictions that the rest of the paper tests. The coup country's own yield and equity should reprice at an access-destroying event and not at an access-preserving one; non-coup members of the same union may reprice through the shared credibility component (within-union spillover), while non-CFA neighbours, which share neither the anchor nor the union's infrastructure, should not; and the sister CFA union, which shares the anchor but not the infrastructure, should reprice only to the extent that transmission runs through the common peg rather than the union's own machinery. At the firm level the repricing should carry a same-group equity signature — the coup country's bank subsidiary falling relative to its siblings — and, where exposure can be sorted, may concentrate in the more exposed names. The creditor base should recompose at re-entry, the reaction should be absent at placebo events (elections and failed coups) and persist in event time, and ECOWAS sanctions should register as a separable dated shock. The access-loss claim is carried by the Niger–Mali re-entry contrast, the placebo, the holder-recomposition result, and the same-group bank-equity signature; the within-union spillover and channel predictions bound how far the repricing travels and are, in this sample, limited; and the anchor and cross-union checks are delivered descriptively from the CEMAC monthly series (Section 7.11), with a structural anchor-share estimate left to higher-frequency data.

3.5 Clientele spillover versus economic exposure

The exposure gradient and the clientele-spillover framing pull in opposite directions, and we treat this as a feature rather than concealing it. If the spillover is concentrated in firms with direct economic exposure to the coup country (e.g., Malian subsidiaries or Sahel revenue), that is evidence for an *economic-exposure channel* — real cash-flow links — which is closer to the

Table 1: The identifying contrast in one view. The three treated WAEMU sovereigns differ in whether a coup severed market access and, where it did, in whether the exclusion was resolved cooperatively. Only the prolonged, uncooperative exclusion (Niger) carries a re-entry premium.

Sovereign	Coup	Access lost	Resolution	Re-entry premium
Niger	Yes	Yes	Uncooperative, 9 months	Large (1.3–2.8 pp)
Mali	Yes	Yes	Cooperative, negotiated	None (≈ 0)
Burkina Faso	Yes ($\times 2$)	No	No exclusion	None

Notes. "Access lost" records whether the coup triggered sanctions/default that froze the sovereign out of the regional primary market. Niger's premium is the re-entry repricing measured three ways (Table 4); Mali's cooperatively negotiated return repriced by -0.44 pp (statistically zero); Burkina Faso's two sanction-free coups produced no access loss and no premium. The contrast that identifies the premium is not coup versus no-coup but uncooperative exclusion versus cooperative resolution versus no exclusion.

bilateral trade/FDI story of Boungou et al. (2024) than to a clientele spillover priced across the union. The purest *clientele-spillover* result would be repricing of assets *without* direct economic exposure: non-exposed regional firms and the sovereign debt of non-coup members moving despite no cash-flow link, as their own qualifying access clientele is shaved by the common shock.

We therefore interpret the two outcomes separately and seek both. Exposure-sorted firms repricing indicates an economic-exposure channel; non-exposed regional assets and non-coup sovereigns also repricing (the within-union spillover τ of Section 3.2, on the non-exposed subset) indicates a clientele-spillover channel beyond economic linkage. The most defensible result is the combination: economic exposure explains part of the spillover, but a residual repricing of non-exposed union assets remains — and that residual, surviving the exposure controls and the placebo and persisting in event time, is what the clientele-spillover interpretation rests on. We thus define the clientele-spillover effect empirically as the regional repricing that remains after economic exposure is accounted for, is concentrated in genuine regime-rupture events, and persists. This is the strongest within-union spillover claim the design supports; in this sample, as Section 7 shows, that spillover is limited, so the paper's weight rests on the access-value results — the re-entry premium and the creditor realignment — rather than on this residual.

4 Event Set and Data

4.1 Coup events

We code coups by the Powell–Thyne definition (Powell and Thyne, 2011): an illegal, overt attempt by the military or state elite to unseat the sitting executive, successful if power is held

at least one week. Five WAEMU coups across three members (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) fall in the period in which the regional market functions and constitute the estimable study set; Guinea-Bissau 2025 is listed for completeness but excluded from estimation (no listed equity, no clean counterfactual), and the two CEMAC coups serve only the cross-union robustness check of Section 7.11 (Table 2).

Table 2: Coup events in the two CFA franc unions, 2020–2025 (eight events across six members of two sister currency unions)

Country	Date	Event	Type	Access freeze	Serial
Panel A: WAEMU (BCEAO / BRVM / UMOA-Titres)					
Mali	18 Aug 2020	Keïta ousted (Goïta)	Coup	No	1st
Mali	24 May 2021	"Coup within the coup"	Coup	No	2nd
Mali	9 Jan 2022	ECOWAS/WAEMU sanctions; BCEAO freeze	Sanctions	Yes	—
Mali	28 Jan 2022	First missed coupon	Default	Yes	—
Burkina Faso	24 Jan 2022	Damiba ousts Kaboré	Coup	No	1st
Burkina Faso	30 Sep 2022	Traoré ousts Damiba	Coup	No	2nd
Niger	26 Jul 2023	Bazoum ousted (Tiani)	Coup	Yes[†]	1st
Niger	30 Jul 2023	ECOWAS/WAEMU sanctions; BCEAO freeze	Sanctions	Yes	—
Niger	31 Jul 2023	First missed payment	Default	Yes	—
Guinea-Bissau	26 Nov 2025	Election-eve coup	Coup	n/a	1st
Panel B: CEMAC (BEAC / BVMAC / BEAC titres)					
Chad	20 Apr 2021	Déby military council	Coup	No	1st
Gabon	30 Aug 2023	Post-election rupture	Coup	No	1st

Notes. Coups are coded by the Powell–Thyne definition (Powell and Thyne, 2011): an illegal, overt attempt by the military or state elite to unseat the sitting executive, treated as successful if power is held at least one week. Dates are the coup execution date (not the announcement or subsequent confirmation date). Panel A lists the WAEMU events, which are the study set; Panel B lists the two CEMAC events, used only for the cross-union robustness check (Section 7.11), since the CEMAC sovereign data are monthly (BEAC market statistics) and begin only in August 2021 — after the Chad event — so the usable cross-union event is Gabon 2023, read descriptively rather than in a daily event study. The *Type* column separates the political rupture (Coup) from the financial-exclusion events it sometimes triggers (Sanctions, Default); *Access freeze* records whether the event cut the issuer's access to the regional primary and secondary market, a classification corroborated *ex post* by the secondary-market trading collapse documented in Section 7; *Serial* indexes repeated coups within a country in the window. "n/a" in *Access freeze* marks Guinea-Bissau 2025, which is excluded from estimation (no listed equity and no clean counterfactual); "—" in *Serial* marks the financial-exclusion sub-events (Sanctions, Default), which are not themselves coups. [†]Niger's coup is confounded with the sanctions imposed four days later and the default five days later, so it cannot be classified as a clean no-freeze coup; the falsification weight (Section 7) therefore rests on the Mali and Burkina coups, which were sanction-free. ECOWAS sanctions are treated as a separable dated shock (Section 3). The Chad 2021 transfer is coded as a coup by the Powell–Thyne standard but is borderline and reported with and without; being Sahelian, it shares a security environment with the WAEMU Sahel coups, so the non-Sahel Gabon 2023 event carries the cleaner cross-union test. Sources: the Powell–Thyne coup list (Powell and Thyne, 2025) and contemporaneous reporting.

We populate the comparison groups (Section 3.3) as follows, with membership defined relative to each coup. **Own union (central).** The non-coup WAEMU members: Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Benin, Togo (Guinea-Bissau moves from control to treated with its 2025 event; Benin's December 2025 *failed* coup attempt is both a window-contamination check and a natural placebo).

Non-CFA neighbours (central control). Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea-Conakry, The Gambia, Sierra Leone — geographically proximate, sharing neither the euro anchor nor the union infrastructure. **Sister CFA union (robustness).** The CEMAC members — Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, Gabon, and Chad — matched on the euro peg and French guarantee but on a separate central bank, currency, and regional market; used only for the cross-union robustness check (Section 7.11) at monthly frequency. Placebo events, coded on the same standard: member-country elections, cabinet reshuffles, large protests, and failed coup attempts over the same window.

4.2 Data

This section describes the data underlying the analyses. Table 16 summarises sources, frequency, period, and coverage.

Table 15 defines each variable and its source; Table 3 reports summary statistics.

Table 3: Summary statistics. Sovereign series are weekly (curves) or per-auction; equity series are daily, 2019–2026. Yields in percent; yield changes and spreads in percentage points; returns in percent.

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	p25	Median	p75
Panel A: Sovereign (UMOA-Titres)							
Sovereign yield, 1y (%)	3,072	6.26	1.84	2.33	5.16	5.86	7.32
Sovereign yield, 3y (%)	3,072	6.90	1.40	3.70	5.94	6.52	7.72
Sovereign yield, 5y (%)	3,036	6.63	1.09	4.01	6.09	6.55	7.48
Weekly Δ yield, 3y (pp)	3,064	0.00	0.26	−2.99	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spread vs. CIV, 3y (pp)	3,072	0.51	0.97	−2.41	0.00	0.25	1.08
Panel B: Equity (BRVM), daily							
BOA daily return (%)	7,646	0.05	2.30	−13.93	−0.65	0.00	0.65
Coris/Onatel daily return (%)	3,752	0.01	1.74	−11.22	−0.37	0.00	0.27
BRVM Composite return (%)	1,929	0.05	0.62	−4.40	−0.27	0.00	0.37
BRVM Finance return (%)	1,699	0.05	0.70	−2.84	−0.36	0.00	0.49

Notes. Sovereign yields are weekly zero-coupon curves for the eight WAEMU issuers, December 2018–June 2026. N varies across rows because the sovereign series are weekly (eight issuers $\times$ $\approx$384 weeks), the equity series daily, and the BRVM index series begin only in 2019. Equity returns are daily log returns, 2019–2026; the BOA panel pools the four subsidiaries, and the high share of zero daily returns (26–30%) reflects thin trading, visible in the median of zero. Maximums are omitted for space and are available on request; the BOA volume series (mean 3,848 shares, median 1,536) confirms active but thin trading.

Sovereign market (UMOA-Titres). The regional sovereign data are the official published series of UMOA-Titres (UMOA-Titres, 2026), the WAEMU's joint debt-issuance agency. We use three products. First, the published weekly *zero-coupon and smoothed yield curves* for each of the eight member issuers at the one-, three-, and five-year tenors, 384 weekly observations

per issuer from December 2018 to June 2026, which drive the curve event study (Section 7) and the frozen-window diagnostic. Second, the complete *primary-auction record* (every auction January 2014–June 2026, with weighted-average rates, amounts offered, bid, and retained, and buy-backs flagged), from which we measure the re-entry repricing and the control-differenced premium. Third, the *cross-border bidder-domicile record* compiled from the auction *comptes rendus* (2017–2026), which underlies the creditor-realignment result; bidder domicile is a proxy for, not identical to, the ultimate holder. Secondary-market transaction data are available but structurally thin (International Monetary Fund, 2016), so we use them only to corroborate the access-freeze coding through the trading collapse around exclusions, not for a secondary-yield event study.

Equity market (BRVM). Daily equity prices are retrieved through the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, 2026), the regional exchange for the eight WAEMU members; we record the package version and pull date in the replication materials and treat the package as a citable secondary source, with the official exchange bulletin as the provenance benchmark. For the baseline same-group event study we use the four Bank of Africa subsidiaries that span every event — BOA Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (treated) and BOA Côte d'Ivoire (control) — daily 2019–2026, about 1,910 trading days each with balanced coverage (≈258 days per year). For the access-loss robustness test (Table 12) we add the other non-coup BOA subsidiaries (Benin, Senegal) and a panel of non-BOA regional banks (SGBCI, BICICI, NSIA, Ecobank, Oragroup), all of which trade in essentially every session over 2015–2026. For the within-Burkina test we add Coris Bank and Onatel (Burkina). These are thinly traded: 26–30% of days show no price change, though the longest run of identical closes is eight days, so the names are estimable but the equity estimates are read as corroborative. For benchmarks we surveyed all eighteen BRVM indices (Table 16); only the Composite (2019–2026) and the Finance sector index (2019–2025) have clean daily coverage over the full 2020–2023 event span — the BRVM 30 begins in 2023 and the granular sector indices in 2025 — so those two, with the same-group control, are the three benchmarks used.

Falsification events. The placebo test uses a hand-coded list of WAEMU non-coup political events 2020–2026 — presidential and legislative elections and *failed* coup attempts in member states — dated from electoral commissions, the Powell–Thyne coup list (Powell and Thyne, 2025), and contemporaneous reporting, and tested against the same curve and equity series.

Controls. The control-differenced re-entry premium uses the contemporaneous auction rates of the non-coup members. Where relevant we reference a global emerging-market risk benchmark, the EUR/CFA peg, and commodity prices (gold, cotton, and uranium for Niger) as the confounds the differencing is designed to net out.

Scope of the data and natural extensions. Two of the paper's tests admit sharper future versions with data beyond the present scope. The cross-union anchor check uses the sister union's BEAC "Statistiques mensuelles du marché des valeurs du Trésor," which is available monthly and therefore supports a descriptive read around the Gabon 2023 event rather than the daily event study the WAEMU leg uses; a higher-frequency CEMAC price series would permit a fully estimated cross-union contrast. Similarly, the common-creditor channel is identified here from bidder domicile; holdings-level sources (bank Pillar-3 disclosures, BCEAO Commission Bancaire aggregates, CREPMF/SGI fund filings) would turn that proxy into a direct measurement. Neither is required for the results below, which rest on the daily sovereign, auction, and equity data described above; both are avenues a follow-up can pursue.

5 Empirical Methodology

We use standard event-study methods augmented with stacked-panel and cross-sectional heterogeneity.

5.1 Own-country effects

Following standard event-study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997; Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbell et al., 1997), with frontier-market precedent for short-window studies in thinly traded markets (Afego et al., 2023), cumulative abnormal returns over the window $[\tau_1, \tau_2]$ (with event time normalised so that $t = 0$ is the event date):

$$CAR_a(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \sum_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2} AR_{at}, \qquad AR_{at} = R_{at} - \hat{\alpha}_a - \hat{\beta}_a R_{mt}, \tag{8}$$

where a indexes the asset, R_{mt} is the regional market return (the BRVM Composite), and $(\hat{\alpha}_a, \hat{\beta}_a)$ are market-model parameters (the subscript a here indexes the *asset*; these hatted loadings are distinct from the demand-side parameters α_a, β_a of the access clientele in Section 3.1) estimated over the pre-event window $[\,t_0 - 180,\ t_0 - 31\,]$ — $L = 150$ trading days ending $G = 31$

days before the event, the gap G insulating the estimation window from pre-event leakage, with the window rules of Section 5.7. Because the regional index mechanically contains the coup-affected assets, we also report estimates using a market proxy purged of the coup-country securities. The normal-return benchmark in (8) is asset-class- and union-specific: the BRVM Composite for WAEMU equities, the corresponding Central African (BVMAC) benchmark for CEMAC equities, and, for the sovereign and Eurobond outcomes, benchmark yield-change and emerging-market hard-currency bond-index models in place of the equity market model — so R_{mt} denotes whichever benchmark matches asset a's class and union, not the BRVM Composite throughout. For the sovereign and Eurobond outcomes, R_{at} and R_{mt} in (8) are read as the asset and benchmark yield changes Δy_{at} and Δy_{mt}, so that $AR_{at} = \Delta y_{at} - \hat{\alpha}_a - \hat{\beta}_a \, \Delta y_{mt}$ is an abnormal yield change rather than an abnormal return.

5.2 Contagion and channel

The dependent variable throughout is the market-model abnormal return AR_{eat} from (8), where e indexes events, a assets, and t event time. We estimate two specifications, because the contagion and channel tests require different contrasts.

Contagion. On the *own-union non-coup* sample — Ring 1, the non-coup members of the coup country's own union — we test whether those members reprice after the event:

$$AR_{eat} = \mu_{ea} + \delta_1 \, \mathrm{Post}_t + \pi' X_{at} + \varepsilon_{eat}, \tag{9}$$

where μ_{ea} are event-asset fixed effects, $\mathrm{Post}_t = \mathbf{1}[t > 0]$, and X_{at} are controls (a global emerging-market benchmark, the EUR/CFA rate, and *asset-specific* commodity exposures). Because the left-hand side is already a market-model abnormal return, δ_1 measures the repricing of non-coup members net of their normal-return relationship and the controls. The market-model benchmark R_{mt} in (8) is the regional index, whereas the emerging-market benchmark entering X_{at} is a distinct global factor, so the two do not double-remove the same variation. In the spillover corollary (Section 3.2) this maps cleanly: the event-asset fixed effect μ_{ea} holds the member's time-invariant fundamentals fixed, while the market model and X_{at} net out the global factor and commodity exposure, so δ_1 isolates the common clientele spillover τ — the fall in non-coup members' architecture-constrained demand around the event. "Own fundamentals held fixed" is therefore the statement that contagion is repricing driven by the common clientele shock

rather than by the member's own fundamentals; the maintained assumption is that μ_{ea} and X_{at} exhaust the non-clientele post-event movement, which the placebo is designed to test.

Shared-infrastructure channel. On the full sample (all three rings), we add event-by-time fixed effects and the two ring interactions, with the non-CFA ring (Ring 3) as the omitted base:

$$AR_{eat} = \mu_{ea} + \gamma_{et} + \delta_2 \left(\text{Post}_t \cdot \text{Own}_{ea}\right) + \delta_3 \left(\text{Post}_t \cdot \text{Sister}_{ea}\right) + \pi' X_{at} + \varepsilon_{eat}, \tag{10}$$

where $\text{Own}_{ea} = 1$ if asset a is in the coup country's own CFA union at event e and $\text{Sister}_{ea} = 1$ if it is in the sister CFA union — ring membership is event-specific, since a CEMAC asset is Sister for a WAEMU coup but Own for a CEMAC coup — and X_{at} retains only the *asset-specific* controls (commodity exposures) that γ_{et} cannot absorb because they vary across assets within an event-time cell — a strict subset of the controls in (9), whose global emerging-market and EUR/CFA terms are here absorbed by γ_{et}. The event-by-time fixed effects γ_{et} absorb the global factor common to all three rings — so identification is purely cross-sectional within each event window — while the central contrast δ_2 — the own-union (WAEMU) interaction against the non-CFA base — locates the spillover in the union's shared infrastructure. The Sister (CEMAC) interaction δ_3 is the robustness term: estimated only at the monthly frequency the BEAC data allow, a small δ_3 relative to δ_2 supports union-internal transmission, while δ_3 approaching δ_2 would indicate anchor-borne transmission. Because the CEMAC leg is monthly and sovereign-only, we read it descriptively rather than as a precisely estimated anchor share χ (Section 4). Consistent with the spillover corollary (Section 3.2), we do *not* place an event-by-time fixed effect in the within-union contagion regression (9), where the common post-event jump is the contagion estimate rather than a nuisance. We estimate both (9) and (10) separately on the *exposed* and *non-exposed* subsets, so that on the non-exposed subset the contagion δ_1 and the ring differentials δ_2, δ_3 are net of economic exposure and isolate the clientele-spillover channel rather than conflating it with ordinary economic exposure to the coup country's real activity (Section 3.5).

5.3 Same-group and exposure

A difference-in-differences across BOA subsidiaries (coup-country vs. non-coup, around each event) and the within-Burkina bank-versus-non-bank contrast (the only coup country with multiple listings). The continuous cross-member integration gradient originally envisaged here

is not estimable with the available listings (Section 3) and is not pursued. Because the events are staggered in time, the difference-in-differences uses a stacked, clean-control design (Cengiz et al., 2019) with the heterogeneity-robust estimator of Sun and Abraham (2021), avoiding the negative-weighting pitfalls of two-way fixed effects under treatment-timing variation (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Baker et al., 2022).

5.4 Common-investor mechanism

The three-ring channel identifies the shared infrastructure as a bundle; naming the conduit inside it — whether the spillover travels through common creditors and shared portfolios rather than real economic links — would require holdings-level data beyond the bidder-domicile record used here. The design is a repricing gradient in shared holders, among assets with negligible trade, FDI, or operational exposure to the coup country, at three levels of feasibility: listed banks' pre-coup balance-sheet exposure to the coup country (bank reports, Pillar-3 disclosures, BCEAO Commission Bancaire aggregates); sovereign common-creditor overlap, controlling for trade, FDI, and remittances; and asset-level co-holding from regional fund filings (CREPMF/SGI), with BRVM index co-weight as an observable proxy. A positive gradient holding economic exposure fixed would be the portfolio and common-creditor signature (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Broner et al., 2006; Arellano et al., 2017; Cole et al., 2025). On the sovereign side the mechanism is evidenced through the creditor-realignment result (Section 7.3).

5.5 Placebo and persistence

Specifications (9)–(10) applied to placebo events, where the prediction is a null regional reaction; and the event-time path of the spillover, distinguishing permanent repricing from reversal. Because non-synchronous trading can mechanically induce autocorrelation, the persistence reading is taken from the stale-price-corrected series (Section 9).

5.6 Sanctions as a separable shock

Where ECOWAS sanctions follow a coup as a distinct dated event (Niger 2023), we treat the sanctions date as a separate event in (9)–(10) and report its reaction separately.

5.7 Windows, anticipation, and non-synchronous trading

The window, screening, and correction rules are set out below and follow standard event-study practice.

Windows. For each event with execution date t_0 (Table 2), the *estimation window* is the $L = 150$ trading days ending $G = 31$ days before the event, $[\,t_0 - 180,\ t_0 - 31\,]$, the gap G insulating it from pre-event leakage; the market-model parameters of (8) are estimated there. The *primary event window* is $[-1, +5]$ trading days, with $[-1, +1]$, $[-5, +5]$, and $[0, +10]$ reported, and $[0, +20]$ and $[0, +60]$ for the persistence reading. The *anticipation window* for the leads test is $[-10, -2]$.

Pre-trend and anticipation test. For every event we test the joint null of no pre-event abnormal return and no abnormal turnover over $[-10, -2]$ by wild-cluster bootstrap. Where it is rejected (anticipation; flagged for Niger 2023, Xiao et al., 2025), we (i) re-date the event window from the earliest day of detectable abnormal volume or return rather than from t_0, (ii) report the anticipation-adjusted CAR from that date, and (iii) read the t_0-anchored estimate as a lower bound, since pre-pricing attenuates the event-window move. Turnover is included because anticipation typically appears in volume before price.

Overlapping and serial events. Two countries have serial events (Mali 08/2020 and 05/2021; Burkina Faso 01/2022 and 09/2022), about 170–190 trading days apart, so the second event's 150-day estimation window would otherwise contain the first event's reaction. We apply: (a) *masking* — the second event's estimation window excludes the first event's $[-5, +20]$ window, with L extended backward until 150 clean trading days are recovered; (b) a minimum of 120 clean estimation days, below which the loadings are flagged and the event reported descriptively only; and (c) for the stacked panel, the clean-control design of Cengiz et al. (2019) and Sun and Abraham (2021), whose control pool excludes not-yet- and already-treated units within each event window — the panel analogue of masking. Where a confound is co-timed inside the event window — ECOWAS sanctions after Niger 2023 and the contested election around Guinea-Bissau 2025 — we truncate the coup window at the confound date, treat the confound as a separate dated event, and exclude Guinea-Bissau from the equity tests (no listed equities).

Non-synchronous-trading correction. Thin trading makes a daily "price" a possibly stale quote, which attenuates loadings and abnormal returns toward zero (biasing contagion downward, a conservative direction) and induces spurious positive autocorrelation that can manufacture apparent persistence (contaminating the persistence reading). We apply four corrections. (1) *Liquidity screen*: a security enters the primary sample only if it trades on at least 60% of the estimation-window days and at least once in the event window, with sensitivity reported at $\{40\%, 80\%\}$ and on the full unscreened sample. (2) *Stale-quote flagging*: a daily observation is treated as non-traded when reported volume is zero, distinguishing a non-trading zero return from a genuine one. (3) *Corrected loadings*: betas are estimated by the aggregated-coefficients method of Dimson (1979) with one lead and one lag (two as a robustness), summing the coefficients, with the Scholes and Williams (1977) estimator reported as an alternative. (4) *Trade-filtered returns*: for the least-liquid securities — notably the smaller BOA subsidiaries that the same-group test depends on — we use trade-to-trade returns and scale their variance by the number of intervening non-trading days. The non-synchronicity-corrected, liquidity-screened estimates are *primary*; uncorrected estimates are reported alongside. The persistence reading is taken only from the corrected series, and we first verify that the corrected estimation-window returns carry no residual spurious autocorrelation before interpreting any post-event persistence as economic.

5.8 Inference, power, and multiple testing

Identification leans by design on the within-group and cross-asset dimensions, not on the small cross-country panel, which alone is underpowered. We are explicit that the naive count "effective N = events $\times$ reacting units" overstates the information available: assets within an event are highly correlated — cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns inflates event-study test statistics if unaddressed (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010) — and the estimable WAEMU events — five daily-traded coups across three members, with two serial pairs (Mali, Burkina Faso) in a single 2020–2025 coup wave — are far from independent draws, so the number of independent draws is well below the product. We therefore (i) cluster at the level that respects this dependence — by country, and in robustness by event — and report wild-cluster-bootstrap p-values appropriate for inference with few, and few *treated*, clusters (Cameron et al., 2008; MacKinnon and Webb, 2018), alongside randomisation-inference p-values that permute event dates against the placebo dates (Young, 2019; Conley and Taber, 2011); (ii) report an ex-ante

minimum-detectable-effect (MDE) calculation (Appendix B) that conditions on the within-event cross-asset correlation ρ_a. With the five estimable WAEMU events and a plausible $\rho_a \approx 0.3$, the *level* contagion test (δ_1) is correlation-limited — its MDE does not vanish as the asset cross-section grows — at roughly 2.5–3% in equity cumulative abnormal return and 18–22 basis points in sovereign yield (the ex-ante calculation of Appendix B tabulates the wider event universe; rescaling to the five estimable events inflates each entry by $\sqrt{8/5} \approx 1.26$), so a level null below that band reflects power rather than absence; the *differential* tests (the ring contrast, the same-group DiD, and the exposure gradient) difference out the common event shock and are bounded only by idiosyncratic variance, giving an MDE near 1–1.5% that tightens with the cross-section. This is the precise content of the claim that identifying power comes from the within-group and cross-asset dimensions rather than the small country panel, and it lets a null be read as informative; and (iii) correct for multiple testing across the primary tests — the contagion, channel, and placebo tests — by a family-wise / false-discovery-rate adjustment, labelling the remainder exploratory. Throughout, we report economic magnitudes (basis-point yield moves and percentage CARs) alongside statistical significance.

For the re-entry premium specifically, we separate two questions a reader can conflate: whether the estimate is the right size, and whether one event can carry it. On the first, the premium's magnitude is pinned tightly — the leave-one-donor-out estimate stays within [+2.10, +2.95] pp and the alternative-donor-pool and alternative-outcome specifications within [+2.78, +2.95] pp (Appendix C) — so the estimand is well-identified. The binding limitation is not the size of the effect but the number of realisations of it: one uncooperative exclusion. We therefore bound inference two ways — the synthetic-control permutation and the political-event placebo distribution (Section 7) — rather than resting on a single conventional p-value, and we treat the placebo distribution as the primary inferential basis because, unlike the five-donor permutation, it carries no mechanical floor.

6 Exclusion Across the Financial Architecture

We read the Niger exclusion in three asset classes, each a separate claim on, or position within, the same regional system.

The first layer is the *sovereign debt market*. If access is valuable, an excluded sovereign should re-enter on worse terms once cooperation breaks down; the re-entry premium, identified

off the Niger–Mali contrast and triangulated across three estimators, measures it (Section 7). The second layer is the *investor market*. Exclusion need not change how *much* the world will lend; it may change *who* lends, and along which political lines — the creditor realignment, a recomposition of the creditor base at constant foreign share (Section 7.3). The third layer is the *equity market*. The banks that hold the sovereign's paper are themselves listed on the union's common exchange, so the value of the sovereign's access is carried on their balance sheets and should surface in their equity (Section 8).

These are not three separate studies but three readings of one shock, and that is the sense in which Niger is informative beyond its own borders: it shows how a regional financial network prices the loss of one member's access through every layer it spans.

Figure 1 previews the three layers on a common timeline. The sovereign spread (Panel A) steps up at re-entry; the creditor base rotates toward Alliance-of-Sahel-States sources (Panel B); auction participation does *not* collapse (Panel C), locating the cost in price and composition rather than market depth; and the listed bank's equity (Panel D) declines through the exclusion.

7 Sovereign Evidence: Pricing Access Loss

Before the full three-ring design, we present descriptive evidence from the WAEMU sovereign primary and secondary markets (UMOA-Titres) that motivates the paper's central distinction — between the coup as a political rupture and the loss of market access that only some coups trigger. This section uses the sovereign auction and secondary-transaction data; the bank-equity leg follows in Section 8 and the cross-union CEMAC check in Section 7.11.

7.1 Secondary-market liquidity around the events

Using issuer-level secondary-market transactions, we compare bond-trading activity in the 180 days before and after each event in Table 2. The four coups that did *not* trigger sanctions leave secondary trading essentially unchanged: Mali's 2020 coup (45 versus 47 trades in the pre- and post-windows), Mali's 2021 coup (82 versus 69), and both Burkina Faso coups (flat). The two financial-exclusion events freeze it. Mali's January 2022 sanctions and default collapse bond trading from 79 trades to a single trade, and that lone post-event trade clears at a yield of 8.47% against 4.80% before. Niger's July 2023 coup and sanctions took *secondary*-market bond trading to exactly zero for six months — a separate, shorter window than the nine-month




Figure 1: One shock across three layers of the WAEMU financial architecture, aligned on Niger's exclusion (ECOWAS sanctions 30 July 2023, dashed red; re-entry 26 April 2024, dashed green; exclusion window shaded). *Panel A*: Niger's 3-year sovereign spread over Côte d'Ivoire steps up at re-entry. *Panel B*: the composition of Niger's retained allotment, with the Alliance-of-Sahel-States share (Burkina Faso and Mali) rising relative to other foreign sources around re-entry at a roughly unchanged foreign total. *Panel C*: the number of bidder countries per auction, which does not collapse — the cost of exclusion is not a loss of market depth. *Panel D*: cumulative return on the BRVM-listed BOA Niger subsidiary, normalised to the eve of the coup, which falls through the exclusion. Panels A and D are daily/weekly; Panels B and C are per auction. Sources: UMOA-Titres (Panels A–C); BRVM (Panel D). Panel A is in percentage points (spread over Côte d'Ivoire); Panel B is the politically-aligned (Alliance-of-Sahel-States) share in percent of retained allotment; Panel C is the count of bidder countries per auction; Panel D is cumulative return in percent.

primary-market exclusion (the halt in new issuance) used elsewhere; the secondary market is thinner and revives before primary issuance resumes. The collapse is visible even at annual frequency in the full secondary-transactions record (2014–2026): Mali's secondary trades fall from 66–68 per year in 2020–2021 to 8 in 2022, recovering to 28, 95, and 160 in 2023–2025 as it settles and re-enters (Figure 6).

The contrast is the organising fact of the paper: the market-freezing, repricing event is the loss of access (sanctions/default), not the coup *per se*. Three of the four sanction-free coups (Mali 2020, Mali 2021, Burkina September 2022) are, on this evidence, falsification cases — genuine political ruptures under which the regional sovereign market kept functioning. The fourth, Burkina January 2022, is anomalous: its bank equity did move (Section 8), and we treat it not as a clean falsification but as a probable instance of sanctions-risk pricing in the immediate wake of Mali's sanctions, discussed where the equity evidence is presented.

7.2 The Niger shut-out and re-entry

Niger's primary-market access closed at once. Its last pre-coup auction was on 20 July 2023, six days before the coup; it did not return to the market until 26 April 2024 — a nine-month exclusion spanning three cancelled emissions, and we confirm zero Niger auctions clear in the interval. The repricing at re-entry is sizeable and not an artefact of which re-entry auction is chosen (the robustness is to auction selection within Niger, not to the absence of a control — addressed by the differencing below): averaging the weighted-average rate over Niger's last three pre-coup 364-day bill auctions and its first three post-re-entry bill auctions, we find the rate rises from 7.07% to 8.80%, a *1.73 percentage-point* increase on the same short-tenor instrument (an issuer-and-quarter fixed-effects panel (Table 17) recovers the same within-Niger jump, +1.73 pp, $N = 1{,}382$ auctions, with the small-sample inference for the premium taken from the synthetic-control permutation below), with the post-re-entry rate continuing to climb across the three auctions (8.50%, 8.96%, 8.96%) rather than spiking and reverting.

This raw before-after gap spans nine months over which the regional rate environment itself drifted up, so we difference it against the contemporaneous 364-day-bill auctions of the non-coup members. Over the same interval the non-coup members with matched 364-day-bill auctions in the window saw their bill rate rise by +0.44 percentage points on average (Côte d'Ivoire +0.35, Senegal +0.66, Togo +0.31; Benin placed no matched 364-day bill in the post-re-entry window and so drops from this bill-level control, though it enters the broader peer mean of Figure 2 and

the synthetic-control donor pool), so the regional drift accounts for about a quarter of Niger's move and the *control-differenced re-entry premium is* +1.29 *percentage points* (+1.38 against the deepest control market, Côte d'Ivoire, alone). Niger thus repriced roughly 1.3 pp *more* than its non-coup peers, not merely in step with a rising regional curve. A synthetic-control counterfactual (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010) (Table 8, Figure 4) yields a larger estimate of +2.8 pp, because it accounts for the upward drift in the donor pool over the nine-month exclusion window; the auction-differenced 1.3 pp and the synthetic-control 2.8 pp bracket the plausible range. The nine-month window contains Niger-specific developments — the AES-bloc formation, the ECOWAS-exit announcement, the uranium-and-security situation — but these are consequences of the rupture, not separable confounds to be netted away; the conservative +1.3 percentage points, which removes only the contemporaneous common regional move, is the coup-and-exclusion-specific component. Three independent strategies thus bracket the same object from below and above (Table 4): a control-differenced auction comparison (+1.3 pp, the most conservative, netting only the contemporaneous peer drift), an issuer-and-quarter fixed-effects panel that holds Niger's own time-invariant level fixed and recovers a within-issuer jump of +1.7 pp across 1,382 auctions, and a synthetic-control counterfactual that nets the full donor-pool drift over the exclusion window and gives +2.8 pp. The three estimators are built on different identifying variation — cross-issuer differencing, within-issuer time variation, and a fitted counterfactual — and they converge on a 1.3–2.8 pp premium; this convergence is the central quantitative result. The spread between them is the difference between netting only contemporaneous drift and netting the full exclusion-window drift, not a disagreement about whether Niger repriced.

Table 4: The re-entry premium, three ways. Each row is an independent estimate of Niger's access-loss re-entry premium on the same sovereign, built on different identifying variation. The estimates bracket a 1.3–2.8 percentage-point premium.

Strategy	Premium (pp)	Identifying variation
Control-differenced auctions	+1.3	Niger minus contemporaneous non-coup peers
Issuer × quarter fixed effects	+1.7	Within-Niger jump, $N = 1{,}382$ auctions
Synthetic control	+2.8	Fitted counterfactual, full window drift; LOO $[+2.10, +2.95]$

Notes. The control-differenced estimate nets only the contemporaneous peer drift and is the most conservative; the synthetic control nets the full donor-pool drift accumulated over the nine-month exclusion window and is the largest. The fixed-effects panel holds Niger's own pre-coup level fixed. Inference on the synthetic-control estimate is from the permutation test of Table 8; the panel's standard errors are not used for inference (single treated issuer, single re-entry event).

Re-entry was not a demand boycott but its opposite — at the re-entry auction itself, par-

ticipation surged, with three-year-bond bidders rising from 9 to 35, bids from 16 to 44, and the issue size from 40 to 419 bn CFA francs. (This is the single re-entry auction; averaged across all post-re-entry auctions and differenced against the non-coup peers, participation is statistically indistinguishable from its pre-coup level — the microstructure null of Section 9.1, in which the raw decline in bidders is region-wide rather than Niger-specific. The point here is only that the returning sovereign met strong, not boycotting, demand.)

7.3 Creditor realignment: a recomposition at constant foreign share

The *cross-border composition* of demand shifted, and the distinction between the *level* of foreign demand and its *composition* is the cleaner of the two clientele facts. The level did not change: across Niger's 22 pre-coup auctions the foreign share of the retained allotment averaged 69.5% (standard deviation 27.7%), and across its 16 post-re-entry auctions it averaged 66.1% — a difference indistinguishable from zero (Welch $t = -0.36$, $p = 0.72$). Exclusion did not shrink Niger's foreign investor base; the question is whether it changed the base's political composition.

A simple before-and-after on Niger alone is uninformative here, because the politically aligned share of foreign demand was drifting down union-wide over the sample; we therefore measure the composition shift relative to the non-coup WAEMU issuers facing the same regional trend. In an auction-level difference-in-differences of the Alliance-of-Sahel-States share of foreign allotment on a Niger $\times$ post-re-entry interaction (Table 5), Niger's AES share rises by roughly 11 percentage points relative to the non-coup issuers, who were on a mildly declining path; on the bid side the relative shift is larger. The estimate is economically sizeable and consistently signed across allotments, bids, and issuer fixed effects, but with a single treated sovereign it is not statistically distinguishable from zero under wild-cluster-bootstrap inference (Table 5). We read it as a directional pattern, consistent with political *creditor realignment* at constant foreign participation, rather than as a tested result. That the foreign *share* is unchanged while its political *composition* appears to tilt is a margin distinct from the price premium, and one the sovereign-contagion and home-bias literatures — which track foreign *shares* rather than their political composition — have not isolated.

(Bidder domicile in the auction record is not the ultimate holder, so the cross-border recomposition is a primary-allotment fact, not a custody fact.)

Table 5: Creditor realignment: difference-in-differences of the Alliance-of-Sahel-States (AES) share of foreign allotment. The dependent variable is the AES (Burkina Faso and Mali, excluding the issuer's own country) share of an issuer's foreign retained allotment in an auction, in percent. *Niger* × *post* interacts a Niger indicator with a post-re-entry indicator (auctions on or after 26 April 2024); the sample contrasts pre-coup auctions (before 26 July 2023) with post-re-entry auctions across the non-coup WAEMU issuers (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Guinea-Bissau) and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali are excluded as issuers because the AES-of-foreign share is ill-defined for them. Column (1) uses retained allotments; column (2) uses submitted bids. The corrupted 6 July 2018 mega-auction is dropped.

	(1) Allotments	(2) Bids
Niger × post	+11.5	+19.3
	[0.39]	[0.33]
Post (regional trend)	−3.4	−6.9
Niger (pre-period level)	+7.1	+5.8
Issuers (clusters)	6	6
Auctions	397	400

Notes. Coefficients in percentage points. Wild-cluster-bootstrap p-values (Rademacher weights, null imposed, $B = 1{,}999$; Cameron et al., 2008) in brackets below the interaction coefficient. With only six issuers (clusters) and a single treated unit, the design has limited power: the Niger × post estimate is economically large and consistently signed across columns and under issuer fixed effects, but is not statistically distinguishable from zero. We report it as a directional pattern, not a tested effect. The wild-cluster-bootstrap p-values are reported only for the *Niger* × *post* interaction, the object of inference; the *Post* and *Niger* rows are descriptive level terms. The bid sample (column 2) contains three more auctions than the allotment sample (400 vs. 397) because a few auctions record submitted bids but no retained allotment. Bidder domicile proxies for, but is not identical to, the ultimate holder. Source: UMOA-Titres auction *comptes rendus*.




Figure 2: Weighted-average rate on 364-day Treasury bills, Niger versus Mali, 2020–2025. Both issuers' rates rose with the regional environment; the paper isolates the re-entry repricing by averaging matched auctions (Niger +1.73 percentage points raw before-after, +1.29 once differenced against non-coup peers; Mali ≈ 0). Shaded: the market-exclusion windows (Mali 2022; Niger 2023–24), during which neither issuer placed paper. Source: UMOA-Titres auction record; rates in percent.




Figure 3: Month-by-month Niger 364-day bill rate versus non-coup peer mean (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo), 2020–2026. Panel A: levels. Panel B: Niger minus peer (differenced), with the pre-coup mean of 0.83 pp shown as a dashed reference. The differenced rate rises to 2–4 pp post-re-entry, persisting above the pre-coup baseline. Shaded: market-exclusion window. Dotted verticals: coup (26 Jul 2023), AES formation (16 Sep 2023), ECOWAS exit (28 Jan 2024), re-entry (26 Apr 2024). Source: UMOA-Titres auction record; rates in percent.




Figure 4: Synthetic-control counterfactual for Niger's 3-year zero-coupon yield. The synthetic Niger is a constrained weighted average of non-coup WAEMU donors (BEN: 0.607, CIV: 0.369, GNB: 0.024) fitted to Niger's pre-coup yield path (January 2019 – July 2023). Niger's actual yield diverges sharply at re-entry (26 April 2024), with a post-re-entry gap of +2.78 pp (Table 8). During the exclusion window (shaded) Niger's curve is carried forward and excluded from the gap estimate. Only the actual and synthetic Niger series are plotted; donor-placebo gaps are not shown, and the permutation inference is reported in Table 8. Source: UMOA-Titres published zero-coupon curves.

7.4 The cooperative-return contrast: Mali

The same exercise for Mali yields an essentially null result, and the contrast is itself the finding (Figure 2). Mali was excluded from 9 January 2022 (ECOWAS/WAEMU sanctions, BCEAO account freeze) until sanctions were lifted in early July and it re-entered on 9 August 2022 with special "résilience" recovery bonds. Averaging over the nearest three 364-day bill auctions on each side, Mali's rate moves from 3.44% to 3.47% — a *0.03 pp* change, economically zero. The single-pair comparison that an unguarded reading would report (the December 2021 trough of 2.49% against the 3.47% re-entry) overstates a move that disappears once the declining pre-event trend is averaged in. Differencing against the same non-coup controls sharpens the contrast rather than softening it: over Mali's window the non-coup members' bill rate rose +0.48 percentage points, so Mali's control-differenced re-entry change is −0.44 percentage points — Mali re-entered *below* the regional trend, the opposite of a stress premium. The asymmetry is therefore not merely "Niger moved and Mali did not" but "Niger repriced about 1.3 percentage points above its peers while Mali repriced about 0.4 below them." The Niger–Mali asymmetry is unlikely to be pure noise, though with one prolonged exclusion against one negotiated return

it cannot be statistically distinguished from it: Niger's exclusion was longer (nine versus seven months), unresolved through the union's ordinary channel, and concurrent with the AES bloc's formation and the ECOWAS-exit announcement, whereas Mali's was shorter and ended through a negotiated transition timetable. The sovereign that ruptured the regional political order paid a sizeable re-entry premium; the one that negotiated its way back did not. Access loss is necessary but not sufficient for repricing: what the market prices is access loss that is *not* expected to be cured cooperatively.

Within-Mali timing: holding the issuer fixed. The sharpest objection to the access-loss reading is selection into sanctions — that the sanctioned ruptures are simply the more severe coups, so "access loss" proxies for coup magnitude. The cleanest answer holds the issuer fixed and uses Mali's own timeline, where a coup and a later access-loss event occur on the same sovereign. We read this off the primary market rather than the secondary curve, because during the exclusion itself the published secondary curve is carried forward and cannot be differenced (Section 7.6); the auction record, by contrast, prices the sovereign whenever it actually issues. Around Mali's two sanction-free coups (August 2020, May 2021) its issuance continued and its control-differenced auction rate barely moved. At Mali's access-loss event (the January 2022 sanctions and BCEAO freeze) issuance halted outright, and when Mali re-entered after a negotiated, cooperative return its control-differenced re-entry rate was a near-null (-0.44 percentage points; Section 7) — the same issuer did not pay a durable premium even at its own access-loss event, because that exclusion was resolved cooperatively. The contrast that does carry a premium is therefore not coup-versus-access-loss within Mali but *cooperative versus uncooperative* exclusion across the Niger–Mali pair: Niger, excluded longer and unresolved, re-entered $+1.29$ percentage points above its peers, while Mali did not. Because the issuer's fundamentals, commodity profile, and security environment are held fixed within Mali, this rules out coup magnitude as the driver of Mali's own (null) repricing; the cross-country Niger–Mali contrast then supplies the identification of *uncooperative* exclusion as the priced object.

7.5 The exclusion and its terms in the African Debt Database

We extend the analysis using the African Debt Database (Manger et al., 2025), an instrument-level census of African sovereign debt assembled from primary auction reports and prospectuses, whose May 2026 release carries harmonised WAEMU (XOF) issuance — amounts, rates, and

maturities — through April 2026. It lets us characterise the access-loss episode and its terms directly at the instrument level.

The exclusion is visible as an outright halt in primary issuance: Niger places no XOF security for 281 days, from its last pre-coup operation on 20 July 2023 to re-entry on 26 April 2024, with a comparable seven-month halt for Mali in 2022. Loss of market access is thus an observed cessation of issuance, sharpening the secondary-market evidence of Section 7 with a direct primary-market counterpart.

The terms on which the excluded sovereigns return quantify the repricing on the instruments themselves. Niger's one-year XOF bill rate rises from 7.58% before the coup to 9.37% at re-entry, a 1.78-percentage-point increase (the levels differ slightly from those in Section 7, which uses a narrower auction window; the ≈ 1.8 pp *change* is common to both), while Mali's moves from 3.57% to 3.60% — the same sharp Niger repricing and flat Mali re-entry the auction analysis identifies, now measured across the full instrument census. The excluded issuers also return at shorter maturities: Niger's mean issuance maturity falls from 1.9 to 1.2 years and Mali's from 5.7 to 3.2 years, and the share of bills in Niger's XOF issuance rises from 56% before the coup to 77% at re-entry. These maturity and instrument shifts are real in levels but are *not* Niger-specific: the same compression appears across the non-coup members over the 2023–24 regional funding squeeze, so the differenced effect against peers is small (about 0.8 months net of the roughly 7-month region-wide shortening; Section 9.1). We therefore read the rate, not the maturity, as the exclusion-specific cost; the shortening is the common funding cycle a returning Niger re-entered, not a penalty it bore alone.

Taken together with the allotment evidence of Section 7, the instrument census completes a single intermediation narrative of the exclusion. Access is first lost — an outright halt in primary issuance (281 days for Niger) — and then restored only on a higher rate and, as the auction records show, to a creditor base whose political composition has shifted toward Alliance-of-Sahel-States sources at a roughly unchanged foreign share (Section 7.3). (The accompanying maturity shortening is common to the region's funding cycle rather than specific to Niger; Section 9.1.) The disruption thus operates through the financing relationship itself — whether the sovereign can issue, at what tenor, and to whom — rather than through a broad repricing of neighbouring sovereigns. This is the sense in which the cost of exclusion is intermediation-borne: it falls on the affected issuer's own access to the regional funding market and on the composition of the investors willing to hold its paper, not on the union at large.

A final pattern situates these single-issuer episodes in the wider divergence the spread panel shows (Figure 5). The three Alliance-of-Sahel-States issuers (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) and the coastal members part company in primary cost over the coup era: the gap between their average one-year bill rates widens from about 0.5–0.8 percentage points in 2021–2022 to 1.8 in 2023, 1.9 in 2024, and 2.3 in 2025. The Alliance-of-Sahel-States issuers' borrowing costs thus diverged durably from the coastal members' over the coup era — a persistent gap rather than a transient event-window blip, widening over the years they spent outside the region's cooperative political order.

7.6 Frozen-window curves are not prices

A natural objection is that we should read the repricing off the published UMOA-Titres yield curve during each exclusion rather than off re-entry auctions. We cannot, and we verify why. During an issuer's exclusion the agency continues to publish a curve, but with no auctions and no secondary trades it has no fresh inputs, so the curve is carried forward. Over Mali's 31-week sanctions window the 3-year zero-coupon curve is constant at exactly 5.94% — it does not move at all; over Niger's 39-week window it is flat in 37 of 39 weeks with a mean absolute week-to-week change of 0.06 basis points — six-hundredths of a basis point, a rounding artefact, not a price move (Figure 7). The frozen-window curve is therefore an interpolation, not a price, and any event-study differencing it would difference a flat line. This is precisely why the sovereign repricing evidence rests on the re-entry auction yields above, which are cleared, traded prices.

7.7 Curve event study: sanction-free coups

We estimate the response of the 3-year zero-coupon curve around each event, comparing mean yields in the thirteen weeks before and after (the curve is weekly). For the four *sanction-free* coups — the falsification set, where the issuer kept market access — the treated sovereign's own yield does not widen (Table 6): Mali 2020 (−0.09 pp), Mali 2021 (+0.01 pp), Burkina September 2022 (0.00 pp), and Burkina January 2022 (−1.07 pp). Three of the four are within ±0.1 pp of zero; the fourth is a *decline*, the opposite sign to a coup risk premium, reflecting the broadly easing regional-rate environment of early 2022 rather than a credibility shock. Differencing the treated change against the contemporaneous average change of the non-coup members (which nets out the common regional movement) leaves no relative widening on any of the four. A political rupture that leaves market access intact does not, on this evidence,

reprice the sovereign's own curve — the falsification the design requires; the sanction-free coups pass without a spread response, while the Alliance-of-Sahel-States issuers drift apart from the coastal members over the coup era (Figure 5).

Table 6: Event study on the 3-year zero-coupon curve: change in mean yield, 13 weeks before versus after (percentage points)

Country	Date	Type	Treated Δ	Non-coup Δ	Diff-in-diff
Mali	18 Aug 2020	coup, no freeze	−0.09	−0.17	+0.08
Mali	24 May 2021	coup, no freeze	+0.01	0.00	+0.01
Burkina Faso	24 Jan 2022	coup, no freeze	−1.07	−0.47	−0.61
Burkina Faso	30 Sep 2022	coup, no freeze	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mali	9 Jan 2022	access loss†	—	−0.47	—
Niger	26 Jul 2023	access loss†	—	+0.25	—

Notes. Change in the mean 3-year zero-coupon yield in the ±13-week windows around each event (13 weekly observations per side; the curve is weekly). "Treated Δ" is the coup country's own yield change; "Non-coup Δ" is the average change across the non-coup WAEMU members (excluding the Côte d'Ivoire benchmark); "Diff-in-diff" is their difference. Each cell is a single pre-versus-post mean difference rather than a regression coefficient, so no standard error, t-statistic, or significance star is reported; formal few-event inference (wild-cluster bootstrap and randomisation) is carried by the panel specifications of Section 5. †For the two access-loss events the treated curve is carried forward during exclusion (Section 7), so the treated change is not a price and is omitted; the treated repricing for these events is measured at re-entry from auction yields instead (Niger +1.73 pp; Mali ≈ 0).

7.8 Placebo: ordinary political events

The sanction-free coups already serve as one falsification, but they are the same events that anchor the main contrast, so on their own they leave the credibility reading partly circular. We therefore test an *independent* set of WAEMU political events that are not coups in the estimation set: five presidential and legislative elections (Côte d'Ivoire 2020 and 2021, Benin 2021, Senegal 2024, Togo 2024) and three *failed* coup attempts (Guinea-Bissau February 2022 and December 2023, Benin December 2025). Failed coups are the demanding case: they are genuine attempts to seize power that did not trigger sanctions or default, so if the priced event is access loss rather than political rupture, they should not move the curve. For each event we compute the same ±13-week own-curve change, differenced against the contemporaneous change in the non-coup members.

Table 7 reports the results. The differenced moves cluster near zero — a mean absolute difference-in-differences of 0.22 percentage points across the eight events, against the +1.3-percentage-point control-differenced premium that the Niger access loss produced. The elections are essentially flat ($|\text{DiD}| \leq 0.20$). The failed coups, the harder test, are also quiet: the two




Figure 5: Three-year sovereign spreads over Côte d'Ivoire, 2019–2026. The Alliance-of-Sahel-States issuers (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) are drawn as labelled black lines; the coastal members (Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Togo) are the grey lines. Dashed verticals mark the sanction-free coups, which pass without a spread response; the two market-exclusion windows are shaded, during which the treated issuer's curve is carried forward (Section 7). The Alliance-of-Sahel-States issuers drift apart from the coastal members over the coup era. Source: UMOA-Titres; spreads in percentage points.

Guinea-Bissau attempts move the curve +0.60 and +0.49 percentage points and the Benin attempt +0.20, all well below the access-loss premium and partly reflecting Guinea-Bissau's thin curve (excluding Guinea-Bissau, the mean absolute difference-in-differences falls to about 0.11). A genuine attempted overthrow that leaves market access intact does not reprice the sovereign; the loss of cooperative access does. This is the evidence the institutional-convenience-yield reading needed that the sanction-free coups alone could not supply, since they double as the treatment arm.

The premium lies outside the placebo distribution. Rather than only compare means, we ask where the access-loss repricing falls in the placebo distribution of the same family of differenced moves. The treatment value is the auction-based re-entry premium, since Niger's secondary curve is itself carried forward during the exclusion and cannot be differenced (Section 7.6); the placebo events, which involve no exclusion, are measured on their control-differenced ±13-week curve change. Niger's auction-based re-entry premium of 1.29 pp lies outside the entire political-event placebo distribution — beyond the largest placebo move (0.60 pp) and well above the placebo mean of 0.22 pp. This is the paper's primary infer-

ential statement: the access-loss repricing is larger than every placebo move generated by the same family of political events, so it is not ordinary political-event noise. The Niger-versus-Mali gap (1.73 pp = 1.29 − (−0.44), the differenced gap — numerically equal to, but conceptually distinct from, Niger's raw before–after move of 1.73 pp) likewise exceeds every pairwise difference among the placebos. The synthetic-control counterfactual (Table 8) corroborates this with a larger, formally estimated gap of +2.8 pp that accounts for the upward drift in the donor pool over the nine-month exclusion window. What that design pins down tightly is the *magnitude*: the gap is the largest of any unit in the donor pool, and the leave-one-out range is a narrow [+2.10, +2.95] pp, robust to the donor pool and the outcome definition (Appendix C). What it cannot deliver is a conventionally small permutation p-value — with five donor placebos the one-sided gap-permutation floor is 1/6 ($p = 0.167$), which Niger attains, ranking first of six. This is the honest shape of the evidence: a single treated realization whose effect size is estimated precisely and whose magnitude lies outside the entire placebo distribution, but whose permutation p is bounded by the number of available controls rather than by the strength of the effect. We therefore rest the significance claim on the placebo distribution and the effect-size robustness, and report the permutation p as corroboration subject to that floor.

7.9 Spillover to non-coup curves

The within-union spillover prediction is that non-coup members' yields move when a fellow member is shocked. In the sovereign curve, that signal is weak. Around the two access-loss events — the events that did reprice the treated sovereign — the average 3-year yield of the non-coup members changes by only −0.47 pp (Mali, January 2022) and +0.25 pp (Niger, July 2023): small, opposite in sign, and not a systematic widening. Around the sanction-free coups the non-coup change is smaller still (mean absolute 0.16 pp). The reading is direct: an access-loss event in one member does not consistently raise the *yields* of non-coup members. Where the event is visible in the sovereign data is not in neighbours' yield levels but in two other margins — the treated sovereign's own re-entry cost, and the cross-border recomposition of its demand. This scopes the sovereign-side contribution: the transmission documented here on the sovereign leg is a repricing-and-reallocation of the *treated* issuer, not a strong yield contagion onto non-coup curves; whether a within-union contagion appears in equities (the spillover test on the BRVM) is left to the equity leg, which the present data cannot yet test.

Table 7: Placebo test: own 3-year curve change (±13 weeks, differenced against non-coup members) around WAEMU non-coup political events. Percentage points.

Event	Type	Treated Δ	Non-coup Δ	DiD
Côte d'Ivoire, Oct 2020	election	−0.06	−0.26	+0.20
Côte d'Ivoire, Mar 2021	election	−0.12	−0.05	−0.06
Benin, Apr 2021	election	0.00	−0.01	+0.01
Senegal, Mar 2024	election	+0.19	+0.25	−0.06
Togo, Apr 2024	election	+0.03	+0.18	−0.14
Guinea-Bissau, Feb 2022	failed coup	−0.04	−0.64	+0.60
Guinea-Bissau, Dec 2023	failed coup	+0.86	+0.37	+0.49
Benin, Dec 2025	failed coup	+0.24	+0.04	+0.20
Mean $\lvert DiD \rvert$				0.22
Mean $\lvert DiD \rvert$*, excl. Guinea-Bissau*				0.11

Notes. Each cell is a single pre-versus-post mean difference of weekly 3-year zero-coupon yields, not a regression coefficient, so no standard error is reported, consistent with Table 6. Election dates from national electoral commissions; failed-coup dates from contemporaneous reporting and the Powell–Thyne list (Powell and Thyne, 2025). For comparison, the Niger access-loss re-entry premium, differenced the same way, is +1.29 percentage points (Section 7). On the equity side the placebo is limited to the listed BOA names: the one clean test (BOA Côte d'Ivoire around the March 2021 legislative election) shows no abnormal return (+1.4%, $t = 0.22$), while the October 2020 presidential window coincides with the post-COVID market recovery and is not informative; the one failed coup with a listed national bank, Benin December 2025, now provides the cleanest equity placebo of all: BOA Benin's abnormal return around the 7 December 2025 failed coup — a political rupture that cut no market access and triggered no sanctions — is indistinguishable from zero (+0.4%, $t = 0.08$), against the −17% and −20% declines at the two genuine access-loss events (Table 19).

Table 8: Synthetic-control counterfactual for Niger's 3-year zero-coupon yield. Weights chosen to minimise mean squared prediction error in the pre-coup period (January 2019 – July 2023). Outcome: weekly zero-coupon yield in percent.

	Niger
Donor weights	BEN: 0.607, CIV: 0.369, GNB: 0.024
Pre-period MSPE (pp^2)	0.687
Post-re-entry gap	+2.78 pp
Gap rank in donor pool	1 of 6
Gap-permutation p (one-sided)	0.167
MSPE-ratio permutation p	0.333
LOO gap range	[+2.10, +2.95] pp

Notes. Donor pool: non-coup WAEMU members (BEN, CIV, SEN, TGO, GNB). Weights constrained to $[0, 1]$ and summing to one (SLSQP). Post-re-entry gap is Niger's mean actual yield minus the synthetic counterfactual from 26 April 2024 onward. We report two permutation tests, each placing every donor as a pseudo-treated unit in turn with Niger in the denominator (Abadie et al., 2010). The *gap-permutation* p (primary) is the share of units with a post-re-entry gap at least as large as Niger's: the gap is the estimand and the hypothesis is directional, so this one-sided test is the appropriate one; Niger's +2.78 pp gap is the largest of the six units, giving $p = 1/6 = 0.167$, the minimum attainable with five donors. This floor reflects the number of available controls, not fragility of the estimate: the leave-one-donor-out range is a narrow [+2.10, +2.95] pp (Appendix C), so the magnitude is well-identified while the permutation p is bounded below by the donor count. We read significance primarily from the political-event placebo distribution (Section 7), which carries no such floor, and report the permutation p as corroboration. The *MSPE-ratio* p is the share with a post/pre variance ratio at least as large as Niger's; it is 0.333 because Guinea-Bissau — a small, thinly traded market with a poor pre-period fit — posts a high variance ratio on a *smaller* gap (+2.22 pp), an artefact the ratio statistic admits and the gap test does not. With five donors the permutation floor is 1/6, so neither test can fall below 0.167; significance for the premium rests primarily on the control-differenced placebo distribution (the +1.29 pp premium lies beyond every political-event placebo), with the synthetic control corroborating magnitude. LOO gap range shows sensitivity to donor composition (leave-one-donor-out); it is a robustness check, not a significance test. During the exclusion window (26 July 2023 – 25 April 2024) Niger's curve is carried forward and excluded from the gap estimate. The pre-period MSPE of 0.687 pp^2 corresponds to a root-MSPE of 0.83 pp (the statistic reported in Appendix Table 14).

7.10 The non-CFA channel: Nigerian Eurobonds

The design's central contrast asks whether the shock that reprices a WAEMU sovereign reaches a geographically close neighbour that shares neither the currency union nor its regional market. We test it directly using Nigeria, the largest non-CFA West African sovereign, around the Niger access-loss event, taking a liquid benchmark Nigerian US-dollar Eurobond (daily closing yields from the Debt Management Office, 2023) and measuring its cumulative yield change over the same $[-1, +5]$ trading-day window used for the WAEMU curve, with inference from the permutation distribution of the same statistic over all non-event windows in 2023.

The non-CFA neighbour does not move. Around the 26 July 2023 Niger coup and the sanctions and default that followed within days, the Nigerian Eurobond yield changed by -0.11 percentage points over $[-1, +5]$ — the wrong sign for stress, at the 17th percentile of the absolute window-change distribution, and far from significant ($p = 0.83$); the null is robust across windows from $[-1, +1]$ to $[0, +20]$ (all $|\Delta| \leq 0.41$pp, $p \geq 0.30$). The contrast with the treated WAEMU sovereign is stark: Niger's own debt repriced about $+1.3$ percentage points at re-entry (Section 7), while the non-CFA neighbour's hard-currency yield was unmoved by the same event. This is the dissociation the channel hypothesis predicts — the access-loss shock repriced the sovereign that lost cooperative access, not a neighbour outside the union — and it provides direct evidence on the non-CFA contrast rather than an inference from the within-union null alone.

We read this as supporting, not settling, the shared-infrastructure channel. It rests on one non-CFA country, one benchmark bond, and the single Niger event; Nigeria's Eurobonds are also driven heavily by oil and naira dynamics, so a null partly reflects that Nigeria follows its own factors — which cuts toward, not against, "no transmission," but means the clean test still wants Ghana, the full Nigerian curve, and the remaining events. The complete channel test across non-CFA neighbours remains the next stage; what we add here is that where we can now look, the shock does not cross the union's edge.

7.11 The cross-union check: CEMAC

The non-CFA contrast locates the shock outside the currency union; the sister CFA union locates it relative to the *shared external anchor*. The Central African union (CEMAC) shares the euro peg and French Treasury guarantee with the WAEMU but runs a separate central bank, currency, and regional market. If WAEMU's access-loss repricing travelled through the

common anchor (a large χ), CEMAC sovereigns should reprice around the Niger event; if it is union-internal (a small χ), they should not. We read the CEMAC monthly weighted-average bill (BTA) cost of funds from the BEAC market bulletins (Table 9).

CEMAC does not reprice at the Niger event. Its bill cost of funds had been rising on a steady global-rate trend of about +0.75 percentage points per year through 2021–2023; in the Niger event window (June to September 2023) the CEMAC average changed by −0.20 percentage points against a trend-implied +0.19, so there is no excess movement at the event — if anything a slight decline. Gabon, the CEMAC member that had its *own* coup five weeks after Niger's, is the mirror test: an access-preserving coup (no sanctions, no exclusion) inside the sister union. Its bill cost moved by −0.02 percentage points over the same window, again no repricing. Both contrast with Niger's own +2.8 percentage-point re-entry premium, measured when its exclusion ended in April 2024 (Niger's curve being frozen during the exclusion window itself; Section 7). The reading is consistent across the two cross-union angles — a WAEMU access-loss event does not transmit to CEMAC, and a CEMAC access-preserving coup does not reprice CEMAC — and both point the same way as the within-WAEMU evidence: what reprices is the loss of access to a union's own cooperative machinery, not a shock carried across the shared anchor. The anchor share χ is small: the cost of exclusion stays inside the union whose institutions are invoked and does not travel across the shared peg to the sister union.

Why the experiment runs only here, and why $N = 1$ is the design. The single treated sovereign is not a shortcoming of the study; it is the entire population of the event the study requires. The experiment needs a precise and rare configuration: a sovereign *excluded* from a deep, integrated, well-functioning regional market while that market continues to operate for every other member — so that the loss of access can be observed against an otherwise-unchanged architecture. That configuration has occurred exactly once. The Eurozone has never excluded a member from its bond market. CEMAC, the only other comparable monetary union, runs a regional securities market as deep as the WAEMU's — BEAC-organised Treasury auctions since 2011, outstanding stock rising from 3,323 billion FCFA in January 2021 to 9,451 billion in January 2026, with an active secondary segment (Table 10) — yet across the same period *no* CEMAC sovereign was ever excluded from it. Every member issued continuously, including the two whose politics were most disrupted: Chad's outstanding stock grew through its 2021 leadership transition and external-debt restructuring (from 331 to 1,150 billion FCFA), and

Table 9: Cross-union evidence: CEMAC sovereign cost of funds around the WAEMU access-loss event and the CEMAC own-union coup. Monthly weighted-average bill (BTA) cost of funds (%), from the BEAC *Statistiques mensuelles du marché des valeurs du Trésor de la CEMAC*. Niger's exclusion (30 July 2023) is the treated WAEMU event; Gabon's coup (30 August 2023) is an access-preserving coup in the sister union.

	Pre-trend (annual)		Around the events (monthly)			
	jun-21	jun-23	aug-23	sep-23	nov-23	dec-23
CEMAC average	4.99	6.49	6.24	6.29	6.48	6.62
Gabon	4.79	6.32	6.18	6.30	6.54	6.83
Congo	6.15	6.51	6.51	6.47	6.77	6.65
Cameroon	1.98	4.67	5.40	5.67	5.96	6.48
Chad	6.44	6.79	7.07	7.06	6.83	6.85
Memo: Niger (WAEMU, treated)	+2.8 pp re-entry premium, measured at re-entry (Apr 2024), not in this					

Notes. Source: BEAC monthly Treasury-market bulletins (issues N°26, N°29, N°32), Section I-B-1. The CEMAC average is the BEAC-published union-wide weighted-average BTA rate; the per-country rows show the members reported in each bulletin (not all six are reported every month), so the average need not equal the simple mean of the listed rows. CEMAC's bill cost rose on a steady $\approx +0.75$ pp/year global-cycle trend through 2021–2023; in the Niger event window (jun-23 $\rightarrow$ sep-23) the CEMAC average changed by -0.20 pp, against a trend-implied $+0.19$ pp, i.e. no excess movement at the event. Gabon's own access-preserving coup likewise produced no repricing (-0.02 pp, jun-23 $\rightarrow$ sep-23). Both contrast with Niger's $+2.8$ pp own re-entry premium, which is measured at re-entry (April 2024) rather than within this window, since Niger's curve was frozen through the exclusion.

Gabon's grew through its August 2023 coup. Both retained full access throughout. Outside the CFA zone, sovereigns borrow through fragmented international issues, not a shared architecture whose withdrawal can be cleanly observed. The treatment this paper studies — exclusion from a functioning common market — simply did not happen anywhere else. Niger is therefore not a sample of one drawn from many possible cases; it is the one case that exists. A design with more treated units is not unavailable for want of effort or data: it does not exist, because the world has produced exactly one such event. We study it in full.

7.12 Implications for the design

Two design points follow. First, the coup/access-loss distinction is not a nuance but the main effect: any specification that pools the sanction-free coups with the sanctions/default events will average a near-zero response with a large one and recover a muted, misleading "coup effect." The event table's *Type* and *Access freeze* tags are therefore estimation inputs, not annotation. Second, the two unions' events are not symmetric in what they identify. Mali separates the channels in *time* — its 2020 and 2021 coups (no freeze) precede its 2022 sanctions and default (freeze) by roughly eighteen months, so the same sovereign is observed under a political rupture with access intact and, later, under access loss, holding issuer fixed effects, investor base, and

Table 10: CEMAC sovereign Treasury securities outstanding, by country, January of each year (billions of FCFA). Source: BEAC monthly *Statistiques mensuelles du marché des valeurs du Trésor de la CEMAC*, bulletin no. 54 (January 2026), back-series. Every member issued continuously throughout 2021–2026; none was excluded from the regional market. Chad's stock grew through its 2021 political transition, and Gabon's through its August 2023 coup — neither lost access.

Country	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Cameroon	838	1 214	1 284	1 426	1 660	1 831
Central African Rep.	25	57	97	192	282	398
Congo	754	1 020	1 418	2 244	2 678	2 791
Gabon	843	1 225	1 313	1 492	1 659	2 887
Equatorial Guinea	532	627	526	260	363	394
Chad	331	565	677	794	976	1 150
Total	**3 323**	**4 708**	**5 315**	**6 408**	**7 492**	**9 451**

market microstructure constant. Niger *confounds* them: coup on 26 July, sanctions on 30 July, default on 31 July, all inside a single auction cycle. The clean separation of "coup *per se*" from "loss of market access" is thus carried by the within-Mali sequence and the sanction-free Burkina coups, with Niger furnishing the sharpest *access-loss* vignette rather than a clean coup contrast. The Niger versus Mali re-entry contrast (Section 7) refines the priced object further: access loss alone is necessary but not sufficient: Niger, whose exclusion was prolonged and politically unresolved, re-entered 2.8 pp above the synthetic counterfactual (1.3 pp against the simpler peer average), while Mali, whose exclusion was shorter and ended through a negotiated transition, did not. What the market prices is access loss that is not expected to be cured cooperatively — a membership-value, not merely transient-liquidity, reading.

8 Bank Equity: A Same-Group Event Study

The sovereign results point to non-cooperative loss of market access, not the coup. We now ask whether the same shock is priced in a second layer of the regional architecture: the equity of the banks that fund and hold the affected sovereign's debt and are themselves listed on the union's common exchange. This tests whether exclusion is capitalised not only in the sovereign's own borrowing cost but in equity claims on the financial intermediaries embedded in the same system, using a same-group design that holds banking franchise, management, and currency fixed. The two layers are not merely co-located: a national subsidiary holds its home sovereign's paper, so the value of the sovereign's access is carried on the bank's balance sheet, and home-sovereign

exposure is an established channel through which sovereign distress reaches bank valuations (Becker and Ivashina, 2018). We do not claim to estimate a transmission sequence from the sovereign repricing to the equity repricing — both are responses to the same exclusion — but the balance-sheet exposure is the economic link that makes the bank's equity the natural second place to look for the price of access.

Data and design. Bank of Africa (BOA), a pan-West-African group, lists separately incorporated national subsidiaries on the BRVM: BOA Mali, BOA Niger and BOA Burkina Faso (in coup countries) alongside BOA Côte d'Ivoire (non-coup control in the baseline). The BOA Benin and BOA Senegal subsidiaries, together with a panel of non-BOA regional banks, enter the access-loss robustness test of Table 12. Daily prices 2019–2026 are retrieved through the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM), the regional WAEMU exchange (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, 2026); coverage is balanced across subsidiaries (1,905–1,921 trading days each, ≈258 per year) and complete over every event window (≈125 observations in each ±90-day window). These are thinly traded names: 26–30% of trading days show no price change and the longest run of identical closes is eight days, so the equity estimates are less precisely measured than the sovereign leg; we report a nonparametric sign test alongside the parametric statistic and read economic magnitude alongside significance.

We estimate a market-model event study. For each event the treated subsidiary's return is regressed on a same-group control over an estimation window of trading days $[-180, -31]$, and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are accumulated over the event window $[-1, +5]$ trading days. We use two controls: BOA Côte d'Ivoire (a single non-coup subsidiary of the same group and currency) and an equal-weight basket of the non-event BOA subsidiaries. Significance is assessed with the standard event-study t-statistic ($\text{CAR}/(\sigma\sqrt{n})$, with n the number of event-window trading days and σ the estimation-window daily abnormal-return standard deviation) and a binomial sign test on the daily abnormal returns.

Results. Table 11 reports the CARs. The contrast mirrors the sovereign finding. The cleanest version of the result is the double-difference of Table 12, which we foreground because it controls for the two most natural alternative explanations at once: at each access-loss event the treated subsidiary is compared both to its own non-coup BOA siblings (holding the banking group fixed) and to a panel of unrelated regional banks (holding the sector fixed), and it underperforms *both* — by 15 and 19 percentage points at Mali, and by 26 and 22 at Niger. Because the siblings and

the unrelated banks do not move, the decline is neither a group artefact nor a sector selloff but specific to the bank whose sovereign lost access. The two *access-loss* events reprice the treated bank sharply downward. BOA Mali falls 17.1% around the January 2022 sanctions ($t = -2.32$; one of seven abnormal returns positive). BOA Niger falls 7.6% on the coup-anchored window ($t = -1.57$; a market-model estimate, against -7.3% on the same-group control of Table 11), but this understates the reaction: the coup (26 July 2023) preceded the ECOWAS sanctions (30 July) by four days, and the share price moved on the sanctions, not the coup. Re-dating the window to the sanctions date — the anticipation protocol of Section 5.7 — gives a CAR of -20.4% ($t = -4.22$; randomisation $p < 0.001$; Table 18). The coup-anchored figure is the lower bound that protocol anticipates; the sanctions-anchored figure is the event-aligned estimate. This two-anchor split is not merely a windowing technicality; it is itself a clean test of the paper's central claim. The coup and the sanctions are four days apart on the same security, so the question of *which* of the two the market prices has a direct answer: BOA Niger's stock is flat through the coup (-7.6%, insignificant, much of it bleeding in only after the sanctions) and falls -20% at the sanctions. The price moves at the access-loss anchor, not the coup anchor — the same separation the sovereign leg makes across events, here made *within* a single four-day window on a single asset. Two axes meet at Mali's January 2022 event, and they are consistent rather than in tension: the equity leg captures the immediate effect of losing access — BOA Mali's -17% at the sanctions date — while the sovereign leg reads the durable re-entry premium once access is restored, which for Mali was a cooperative, near-null return (-0.44 pp). The bank prices the rupture; the sovereign curve prices the terms of the cure. The equity signature therefore sorts on access-loss versus access-preserving (the immediate effect), while the sovereign re-entry premium sorts on uncooperative versus cooperative resolution (the durable cost). The four *sanction-free* coups average roughly zero (+0.3%). Three of them — Mali 2020 (+0.6%), Mali 2021 (+4.1%), and Burkina September 2022 (+7.8%) — are all statistically indistinguishable from zero; the fourth, Burkina January 2022 (-11.2%), is the exception examined below, and it is the inclusion of that one negative case that pulls the four-event mean down from +4.2% (the three clean coups) to +0.3%. The pattern is stable across both control specifications.

Benchmark robustness. The CARs above use a same-group control (BOA Côte d'Ivoire). To confirm the result is not an artefact of that choice, we re-estimate the market model against

Table 11: Bank of Africa same-group event study: cumulative abnormal returns around each event, market model estimated on trading days $[-180, -31]$, CAR over $[-1, +5]$.

Subsidiary	Event	Type	CAR (%)	t	sign p
BOA Mali	Aug 2020	coup, no freeze	+0.6	0.07	1.00
BOA Mali	May 2021	coup, no freeze	+4.1	0.56	1.00
BOA Mali	Jan 2022	access loss	−17.1	−2.32	0.12
BOA Burkina	Jan 2022	coup, no freeze	−11.2	−2.23	0.02
BOA Burkina	Sep 2022	coup, no freeze	+7.8	1.55	0.45
BOA Niger	Jul 2023	access loss (coup anchor)	−7.3	−1.51	0.45
BOA Niger	Jul 2023	access loss (sanctions anchor)	−20.4	−4.22	—
Mean, access-loss events (sanctions-anchored Niger)			−18.8	—	—
Mean, access-loss events (coup-anchored Niger)			−12.2	—	—
Mean, sanction-free coups			+0.3	—	—

Notes. The seven rows are the equity study's event-windows: the five WAEMU coups of Table 2 (four sanction-free, with Niger's coinciding with its access loss and shown under both the coup and sanctions anchors) plus Mali's separately dated January 2022 sanctions event. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR, %) over the event window $[-1, +5]$ (seven trading days, $n = 7$), market model estimated over the $[-180, -31]$ estimation window (150 trading days). Control is BOA Côte d'Ivoire; results are materially identical using an equal-weight basket of non-event BOA subsidiaries. "t" is the event-study statistic $\text{CAR}/(\sigma\sqrt{n})$, with σ the estimation-window daily abnormal-return standard deviation; "sign p" is the two-sided binomial sign-test p-value on the seven daily abnormal returns. No significance stars are applied; both statistics are reported so the parametric and nonparametric readings can be compared directly. The two *Mean* rows are unweighted averages of the listed CARs, with no inference computed on the means. Market-model betas among these subsidiaries are small (0.0–0.2), reflecting thin non-synchronous trading, so the CAR is close to the raw cumulative return and the market-model adjustment is minor; the CARs reported here are uncorrected, and as a robustness check the paper's non-synchronous-trading corrections (Dimson, 1979; Scholes and Williams, 1977) apply. Randomisation-inference p-values (2,000 placebo dates per stock; Section 8) are: Mali January 2022 $p = 0.05$, Niger $p = 0.15$, Burkina January 2022 $p = 0.04$, Burkina September 2022 $p = 0.09$, and the two sanction-free Mali coups $p = 0.59$ and 0.48. These randomisation CARs are market-model estimates, so they differ slightly from the same-group-control point CARs above (e.g. Niger −7.6% vs. −7.3%, Mali −17.0% vs. −17.1%). These randomisation CARs are re-estimated on each stock's own clean trading days (excluding a 30-day band around real events) rather than on the fixed $[-180, -31]$ window, so they differ by at most 0.4 pp from the BRVM-Composite columns of Tables 12/20 across every event — Niger −7.6% vs. −7.6%, Burkina January −10.8% vs. −10.9%, Burkina September +7.9% vs. +7.6%, and Mali −17.0% vs. −17.4%. This is a re-estimation difference, not a benchmark inconsistency, and leaves the headline readings unchanged. The sign-test p is not computed for the re-dated Niger sanctions anchor, shown as "—".

Table 12: Access-loss equity event study with two control panels. For each access-loss event, the treated Bank of Africa subsidiary's $[-1, +5]$ CAR is compared against (a) the mean CAR of its non-coup BOA siblings (same-group control) and (b) the mean CAR of non-BOA regional banks (sector control). Market model on the BRVM Composite, estimation window $[-180, -31]$.

Event	Treated CAR (%)	BOA-sibling mean (%)	Diff (pp)	Regional-bank mean (%)	Diff (pp)
Mali	−17.4	−2.1	−15.3	1.9	−19.3
Niger	−20.4	5.4	−25.8	1.5	−21.9

Notes. Treated subsidiary: BOA Mali (Jan 2022), BOA Niger (Jul 2023, sanctions anchor). *BOA-sibling* control: the non-coup Bank of Africa subsidiaries trading at the event (BOA Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Senegal), holding banking group, management, and currency fixed. *Regional-bank* control: non-BOA banks listed on the BRVM (SGBCI, BICICI, NSIA, Ecobank, Oragroup), testing whether the decline is BOA-specific or sector-wide. Diff is treated minus control-mean CAR. Both control panels use the full liquid price history (2015–2026); BOA Benin's series is de-duplicated to its continuous listing line. Inference on the treated CARs is reported in Table 11 and the randomisation-inference paragraph (Mali $p = 0.05$; Niger $p < 0.001$ at the sanctions anchor); the differences shown here are point contrasts.

two BRVM indices. Of the exchange's eighteen published indices, only two have clean daily coverage spanning the 2020–2023 event windows: the BRVM Composite (2019–2026) and the BRVM Finance sector index (2019–2025); the BRVM 30 begins only in 2023 and the granular sector indices only in 2025, so neither can benchmark the earlier events. The result is stable across all three benchmarks (Table 20): the access-loss events average −12.2% (same-group control), −12.5% (Composite), and −12.0% (Finance index), and the sanction-free coups average +0.3%, +1.0%, and +1.3% respectively. Each individual event's CAR and t-statistic moves by less than one percentage point across benchmarks. The same-group and market-model specifications agree because, as noted, these subsidiaries co-move little with the broad market (small betas), so the benchmark choice does little work — which is itself reassuring.

Randomisation inference. The t-statistics above are parametric and, with six thinly traded events, optimistic. We therefore re-test each CAR by randomisation inference: for each subsidiary we recompute the market-model CAR at 2,000 placebo dates drawn from that stock's own clean trading days (excluding a 30-day band around any real event), and report the share of placebo CARs at least as large in absolute value as the actual. The picture is honest and uneven. The Mali access-loss CAR survives (market-model −17.0%, $p = 0.05$; the same-group estimate is −17.4%, Table 12); the two sanction-free Mali coups are firmly null ($p = 0.59$, 0.48), as the falsification requires; and the Burkina January 2022 reaction is in fact the most robust single event (−10.8%, $p = 0.04$) — the contrary case is statistically real, not noise. The Niger access-loss CAR is insignificant on the coup-anchored window (−7.6%, $p = 0.15$) but becomes

large and significant once re-dated to the sanctions date (−20.4%, randomisation $p < 0.001$; Table 18): BOA Niger's price did not move on the 26 July coup but fell steeply after the 30 July ECOWAS sanctions, so the coup-anchored window straddles a flat pre-period and misses the reaction. One result does *not* survive: the positive Burkina September CAR (+7.8%, $p = 0.09$) carries the wrong sign for a stress event and reads as idiosyncratic. The implication is that the access-loss equity effect holds for both treated subsidiaries once each is aligned to the date its own access was actually cut — Mali at its sanctions, Niger at its sanctions — and is corroborated by an event study with two control panels (Table 12), in which the treated subsidiary underperforms both the mean of its non-coup BOA siblings (by 15 pp at Mali, 26 pp at Niger) and the mean of unrelated non-BOA regional banks (by 19 pp and 22 pp). That the decline survives against the regional-bank panel as well as the BOA siblings rules out two readings at once: it is neither a BOA-group artefact, since the other regional banks do not move, nor a sector-wide bank selloff, since the BOA siblings do not move — the effect is specific to the subsidiary whose sovereign lost market access. Second, the Burkina January 2022 exception is robust and must be confronted rather than absorbed; we return to it next.

An exception. One sanction-free coup does move the treated bank: BOA Burkina falls 11.2% around the January 2022 Burkina coup ($t = -2.23$; zero of seven abnormal returns positive, sign $p = 0.02$). We do not absorb this into the clean story. One reading is that the event priced *sanctions risk* rather than the coup as such: Mali had been placed under ECOWAS/WAEMU sanctions only fifteen days earlier (9 January 2022), so a second Sahelian coup on 24 January plausibly raised the market's assessed probability that Burkina would face the same treatment — a probability that did not, in the event, materialise. Under that reading the equity market priced *expected* access loss, which is consistent with, rather than contrary to, the central thesis; but with five estimable events and one contrary case we flag it as an open question rather than claim it resolved.

Bank versus non-bank: a within-Burkina test. Burkina Faso is the only coup country with more than one listed firm, which lets us ask whether the January 2022 reaction was a financial-exposure shock or a generic country shock. We add two further Burkina-domiciled securities — Coris Bank (a domestic bank) and Onatel (a telecom) — and run the same market-model event study against the BOA Côte d'Ivoire control over $[-1, +5]$ trading days. The split is clean along exposure lines (Table 21): both banks fall — BOA Burkina −11.2% ($t = -2.23$)

and Coris −4.6% ($t = -1.32$) — while the telecom does not (Onatel +0.7%, $t = 0.15$), tracking the control. The raw cumulative returns tell the same story: BOA Burkina −8.8%, Coris −3.9%, Onatel +1.2%, against the control's +1.8%. The Burkina coup repriced the banks — the firms that hold the sovereign's paper and would bear an exclusion — and left the telecom untouched, which is the signature of a sovereign/bank-exposure channel rather than a blanket increase in Burkinabè country risk, and is consistent with the sanctions-risk reading above.

Reading. The equity leg corroborates the sovereign leg through an independent instrument: a coup that leaves market access intact does not reliably reprice the group's national bank, whereas the loss of market access does, in the same direction and at the same events that move the sovereign. The small event set, the thin trading, and the Burkina exception mean we read this as supporting evidence for the access-loss interpretation, not as a free-standing identified estimate.

9 Robustness and Identification

9.1 What is priced?

A coup bundles several things a market might price — the political rupture itself, the sanctions and default it can trigger, the elevated near-term insolvency risk, and the loss of liquidity and access that follows exclusion. Because the WAEMU coup wave varies these separately, each candidate can be ruled in or out against the evidence, and only one survives as the consistent reading.

Not the coup. Burkina Faso's two sanction-free coups (January and September 2022) severed no market access and carry no re-entry premium and no curve reaction (Section 7.7); the four sanction-free coups across Mali and Burkina move neither the issuer's own curve nor its neighbours'. A coup that leaves access intact is not priced.

Not sanctions severity. The within-Mali sequence is the decisive control: the same issuer pays no durable premium at its sanction-free coups and none at its own cooperatively resolved access-loss re-entry, yet Niger pays a sizeable one at its prolonged, uncooperative exclusion. Holding the issuer fixed rules out coup or sanctions magnitude as the driver — if severity priced the premium, Mali's own ruptures would carry one — and disposes of the selection concern that sanctioned ruptures are merely the more severe ones: the comparison does not require Mali and

Niger to be equally severe, only that Mali reveal what its own market charges across its own coups, which is nothing durable until exclusion is uncooperative.

Not default risk alone. The sharpest competing reading is ordinary default-risk repricing: a nine-month exclusion plausibly raised Niger's default probability, and a higher default premium and a withdrawn access value both predict a higher re-entry yield. Three features separate them. First, the Mali contrast holds default risk roughly fixed and still produces no premium: Mali's exclusion was also a distress episode that raised its default probability, yet it returned at essentially its pre-exclusion cost once the exclusion was resolved cooperatively — what differs is not the existence of default risk during exclusion but whether the exclusion was cured cooperatively, an access-and-membership distinction rather than a solvency one. Second, the premium persists rather than decaying: a default-risk spike mean-reverts as the realised path resolves the uncertainty, whereas a withdrawn membership value is a level write-down, and the differenced Niger–peer rate sits two-to-four points above its pre-coup baseline through the post-re-entry sample rather than converging back (Figure 3). Third, default risk does not predict the creditor-realignment result: a higher default probability raises the yield every investor demands but does not rotate the political identity of who holds the paper at constant foreign share. The premium is an access effect, not a relabelled default premium.

Not liquidity or market depth. Exclusion did not single Niger out on auction depth, participation, or funding horizon: differenced against the non-coup members, the declines in bidders (-0.7), maturity (-0.8 months), and short-term share are region-wide, reflecting the 2023–24 funding squeeze rather than Niger's exclusion (the microstructure null below). The cost is in the price and the creditor base, not in a broad deterioration of market depth.

Access value. What survives is the value of continued access to the regional architecture: the premium appears only at access loss, not at the placebo political events; it is specific to *uncooperative* exclusion, the Niger–Mali contrast holding the rupture fixed; it persists rather than reversing; and it travels with a political recomposition of the creditor base that a pure-risk account does not predict. Because access is measured through a discrete withdrawal rather than a continuous spread, the object is the re-entry premium itself, not a continuously estimated convenience yield: the premium is the price of uncooperative exclusion from the architecture, and the alternative readings — sanctions severity, default risk, liquidity — each fail at least one of the four facts it satisfies.

The non-CFA comparison and the anchor. The own-union-versus-non-CFA contrast locates the spillover in the union and its anchor jointly: Ghana, Nigeria, and the other non-CFA neighbours differ from CFA members not only in monetary regime but in capital controls, liquidity, investor base, and commodity exposure, so the contrast is a bound rather than an exact control. We condition on observable liquidity and macro differences and add a regional-security control, but the clean separation of the union's internal machinery from the shared external anchor is what the sister CEMAC union would supply — and at monthly frequency it can only corroborate, not estimate, that split. Even a sharp CEMAC reaction could not separate the internal infrastructure from a common cross-union investor base, since pan-African groups and emerging-market funds hold both unions; we therefore read any CEMAC reaction as an upper bound on the non-internal layer and rest the central claim on the within-union evidence. A coding confound runs the same way — the Sahelian Chad 2021 transfer could share a security shock with the WAEMU Sahel coups — so we lean on the non-Sahel Gabon 2023 event for the cross-union check and treat a pan-CFA policy shift as a stated scope condition rather than anchor transmission.

Small sample, thin trading, and anticipation. Five estimable WAEMU events across three countries, clustered in a single 2020–2025 coup wave with two serial pairs, are not independent draws, so identifying power comes from the within-group and cross-asset dimensions rather than the treated cross-section, and inference is made robust to the few, dependent clusters (Section 5). Thin trading is an inferential threat, not merely a feasibility one: non-synchronous prices attenuate measured co-movement toward zero — so the contagion estimates are a lower bound — while the induced autocorrelation can manufacture apparent persistence. The stale-price corrections of Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977), the liquidity screen, and trade-filtered returns address this, and the persistence reading is taken only from the corrected series (Section 5.7). Anticipation cuts the same way: coups are often anticipated, and the muted Niger reaction is itself read as anticipation (Xiao et al., 2025), so partial pre-pricing makes the event-window estimates lower bounds; the leads test and window re-dating handle it. Two events carry co-timed confounds — ECOWAS sanctions after Niger 2023, treated as a separable dated shock, and the contested, equity-less Guinea-Bissau 2025 episode, excluded from estimation.

The microstructure null in detail. The liquidity rule-out above rests on differencing each margin against the non-coup WAEMU members over the same calendar window. Bidders per Niger auction fell from 10.7 before exclusion to 6.0 after re-entry, but the non-coup members fell almost identically over the same period, leaving a difference-in-differences of only -0.7 bidders; average issuance maturity shortened by 7.7 months for Niger against 7.0 for the peers (a -0.8-month differential); and the short-term issuance share moved no more for Niger than for the union as a whole. The 2023–24 regional funding squeeze thinned every member's primary market, so Niger re-entered a thinner market without being singled out on these margins.

Complementary outcomes. Two further outcomes speak to the same question by a different route. Liquid WAEMU Eurobond spreads (Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Benin) are a hard-currency parallel, but as instruments held by a global investor base they track global-investor sentiment rather than the union-internal channel this paper isolates, so the local-market and equity legs are the appropriate tests for the union-infrastructure claim and the Eurobonds are a complement rather than a substitute. The common-creditor conduit is evidenced directly through the creditor-realignment result (Section 7.3).

10 Conclusion

This paper asks what membership in an integrated regional financial architecture is worth, and answers by observing what a sovereign loses when its access is withdrawn. The coup itself is not the priced event: within the WAEMU, coups that leave the sovereign's market access intact move neither its own debt curve nor its neighbours'. What the market prices is the loss of access to the union's cooperative financial machinery — the sanctions, default, and exclusion that some coups trigger — and only when that exclusion is not cured cooperatively. Niger, whose exclusion was prolonged and politically unresolved, re-entered 2.8 percentage points above a synthetic-control counterfactual (1.3 pp against the simpler non-coup-peer average); Mali, which negotiated its return, did not reprice. The contrast between uncooperative and cooperative exclusion is what the evidence supports. The contribution is to put a price on membership: what a sovereign loses, in borrowing cost and in the political identity of who holds its debt, when its access to a shared regional financial architecture becomes uncertain. The second of these is the more novel, though we report it as suggestive rather than tested: the level of Niger's foreign participation held steady, while its composition appears to have tilted toward Alliance-

of-Sahel-States sources relative to non-coup peers — a directional creditor realignment that yield- and foreign-share-based measures do not capture, but which the single treated episode cannot establish with confidence. Because re-entry follows the exclusion by nine months, the premium is a level change rather than a high-frequency abnormal return. The synthetic control nets out the common regional drift over that interval; the residual premium is Niger's own re-entry cost, and the contrast with Mali's cooperative, near-null return identifies it as the cost of *uncooperative* exclusion rather than of the rupture itself. The commodity-price and AES–ECOWAS developments specific to Niger are themselves consequences of that exclusion, not separable confounds to be netted away. An equity leg built on Bank of Africa's separately listed national subsidiaries corroborates the pattern: the treated bank's stock falls at access-loss events — sharply and robustly to randomisation inference for Mali — but not at sanction-free coups. The within-union footprint is real but narrow — a repricing and reallocation of the excluded sovereign's own claims, and of the group bank that holds them, rather than a broad yield contagion onto non-coup neighbours.

The stakes follow from where the line falls. Belonging to a monetary union did not, in this sample, make a member import its neighbours' coup risk through its sovereign curve; the detectable curve-level spillover is bounded in the low tens of basis points (Appendix B). What the union pooled was narrower: the cost fell on the sovereign that lost cooperative access and on its group-affiliated bank — an intermediation-localised repricing rather than a union-wide one. The shared framework neither socialised the member's political risk across the union nor insulated the excluded issuer. The descriptive cross-union check points the same way — CEMAC's sovereign cost of funds did not move at Niger's exclusion, and a CEMAC own access-preserving coup (Gabon) did not reprice CEMAC — so the shock does not appear to cross to the sister union through the shared anchor; whether a within-union yield contagion appears at higher frequency or in equities beyond the BOA group remains open.

Three extensions would sharpen the design further. A higher-frequency CEMAC price series would turn the cross-union anchor test — here read from the BEAC monthly bulletins (Section 7.11) — into a precisely estimated coefficient, locating any spillover inside the union versus in the shared peg. Holdings-level data on which banks and funds carry which members' paper would turn the common-investor conduit from a bidder-domicile proxy into a direct measurement. And intraday prices around the coup timestamps would tighten the windows where anticipation blurs the daily ones.

A Derivations for the access-value model

This appendix derives the comparative statics of Section 3.1 and the spillover ring decomposition of Section 3.2.

Equilibrium yield, sign, and the re-entry premium. With the three demand blocks of Section 3.1 and substitute share $s_i = \psi(1 - m_i)$, market clearing $q_i^g + q_i^a + q_i^s = Q_i$ is linear in y_i and solves to (1). Write $N(m_i) = Q_i - \alpha_g - m_i\alpha_a - \psi(1 - m_i)\alpha_s$ and $S(m_i) = \beta_g + m_i\beta_a + \psi(1 - m_i)\beta_s > 0$ (the demand-slope denominator, distinct from the duration D_i of (6)), so $y_i = N/S$ with $N' = -(\alpha_a - \psi\alpha_s)$ and $S' = \beta_a - \psi\beta_s$. Then

$$\frac{\partial y_i}{\partial m_i} = \frac{N'S - NS'}{S^2} = \frac{N' - y_i S'}{S} = -\frac{(\alpha_a + \beta_a y_i) - \psi(\alpha_s + \beta_s y_i)}{S}, \tag{11}$$

which is (2). Under the regularity condition (3) the numerator bracket is positive, so $\partial y_i/\partial m_i < 0$; integrating from m_i to 1 gives the re-entry premium $\mathrm{RP}_i(m_i) = y_i(m_i) - y_i(1) > 0$ for $m_i < 1$. Its magnitude is increasing in the ordinary clientele's depth (α_a, β_a) and decreasing in the substitute's $(\psi\alpha_s, \psi\beta_s)$, since both enter the numerator bracket with the stated signs. □

Spillover ring decomposition (eq. 7). A coup in member j lowers each non-coup member k's membership by $\Delta m_k = -\lambda(r(k))\,\tau$, with $\lambda(\text{own}) = 1$, $\lambda(\text{sister}) = \chi$, $\lambda(\text{non-CFA}) = 0$. For a non-coup member the politically aligned substitute does not activate (it is specific to the *excluded* issuer), so its own block has $s_k = 0$ and the membership derivative reduces to the two-group form $\partial y_k/\partial m_k = -(\alpha_a + \beta_a y_k)/(\beta_g + \beta_a)$. A first-order expansion then gives, since $\Delta m_k = -\lambda(r(k))\tau$ and $\partial y_k/\partial m_k|_{m_k=1} = -(\alpha_a + \beta_a y_k)/(\beta_g + \beta_a)$,

$$\Delta y_k = \frac{\partial y_k}{\partial m_k}\Big|_{m_k=1} \Delta m_k = \Big[\frac{\alpha_a + \beta_a y_k}{\beta_g + \beta_a}\Big]\,\lambda(r(k))\,\tau, \tag{12}$$

which is (7). The ordering $\Delta y_{\text{own}} > \Delta y_{\text{sister}} = \chi\,\Delta y_{\text{own}} > \Delta y_{\text{non-CFA}} = 0$ follows from $0 \le \chi \le 1$, and the anchor share is the ratio $\chi = \Delta y_{\text{sister}}/\Delta y_{\text{own}}$, identified from the sister-union-versus-own-union spillover without any separate credibility apparatus. □

B Minimum-detectable-effect calculation

We derive the MDEs summarised in Section 5, Inference.

Variance components. Write the post-event abnormal return of asset a in event e as

$$AR_{ea} = \delta + u_e + \varepsilon_{ea}, \qquad u_e \sim (0, \sigma_b^2) \text{ i.i.d. across events}, \quad \varepsilon_{ea} \sim (0, \sigma_w^2) \text{ i.i.d.}, \tag{13}$$

where u_e is a common within-event (coup-wave) shock and ε_{ea} is idiosyncratic. The within-event cross-asset correlation is $\rho_a = \sigma_b^2/\omega^2$ (not the anchor share χ of Section 3.2), with $\omega^2 = \sigma_b^2 + \sigma_w^2$ the variance of one abnormal return — the correlation Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) show inflates event-study statistics.

Level test (contagion). The contagion estimator $\hat{\delta}_1$ is the grand mean of AR_{ea} over E events of N assets each. With independent events,

$$\mathrm{Var}(\hat{\delta}_1) = \frac{\sigma_b^2}{E} + \frac{\sigma_w^2}{EN} = \frac{\omega^2}{E}\Big[\rho_a + \frac{1-\rho_a}{N}\Big], \tag{14}$$

a design effect of $1 + (N-1)\rho_a$ relative to EN independent draws. As $N \to \infty$ the variance tends to $\sigma_b^2/E = \rho_a\omega^2/E > 0$: the level test is *correlation-limited*. For a two-sided test of size α and power $1-\kappa$,

$$\mathrm{MDE}_{\text{level}} = (z_{1-\alpha/2} + z_{1-\kappa})\,\omega\sqrt{\frac{\rho_a + (1-\rho_a)/N}{E}} \xrightarrow[N\to\infty]{} (z_{1-\alpha/2} + z_{1-\kappa})\,\omega\sqrt{\rho_a/E}. \tag{15}$$

Differential tests (ring contrast, same-group DiD, exposure gradient). The ring contrasts (the own-union interaction δ_2 against the omitted non-CFA base, and the sister differential $\delta_2 - \delta_3$), the BOA same-group DiD, and the exposure gradient compare assets *within* the same event, so the common shock u_e differences out and only $\sigma_w^2 = (1-\rho_a)\omega^2$ enters; the variance form below is written for the two-group contrast and applies to δ_2 against the base up to the group-size factor. For a contrast between two groups of $N/2$ assets within each of E events,

$$\mathrm{Var}(\widehat{\delta_2 - \delta_3}) = \frac{4\sigma_w^2}{EN}, \qquad \mathrm{MDE}_{\text{diff}} = (z_{1-\alpha/2} + z_{1-\kappa})\,\sigma_w\sqrt{\frac{4}{EN}}, \tag{16}$$

which vanishes as $N \to \infty$ and carries no correlation floor — the formal content of the claim that power comes from the within-group/cross-asset dimension.

Cross-event dependence. The events are not fully independent (two serial pairs; one coup wave). Replacing E by $E_{\text{eff}} = E/[1 + (E-1)\rho_e]$ for a cross-event correlation ρ_e — or conser-

vatively $E_{\text{eff}} \approx 6$ — inflates all MDEs by $\sqrt{E/E_{\text{eff}}} \approx 1.15$; we report both. Because the Gaussian z approximation is optimistic at this cluster count, the reported p-values are wild-cluster-bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008; MacKinnon and Webb, 2018) and randomisation-inference (Young, 2019) based.

Calibration. Table 13 sets $z_{.975} + z_{.80} = 2.80$ and uses illustrative frontier magnitudes — equity-CAR $\omega \approx 4\%$ over a five-day window, sovereign cumulative abnormal yield $\omega \approx 25$ bp — across $\rho_a \in \{0.2, 0.3, 0.4\}$. The level tests can detect spillovers of about 2–2.5% (equity) and 14–17 bp (sovereign) at the tabulated $E = 8$; rescaled to the five estimable WAEMU events, the level-test band widens to about 2.5–3% (equity) and 18–22 bp (sovereign). The differential tests reach $\sim 1\%$ and tighten with the cross-section. Because the own-country coup CARs are large (several percent; Xiao et al., 2025), plausible neighbour spillovers lie inside the differential-test detectable range, while a *level* null below the band is a power result, not evidence of no contagion.

Table 13: Illustrative *ex-ante design* minimum detectable effects (two-sided $\alpha = 0.05$, power 0.80, $E = 8$, the full two-union event universe; the estimable WAEMU set is five events, which inflates every entry by $\sqrt{8/5} \approx 1.26$)

		Within-event correlation ρ_a		
Test (estimand)	N	0.2	0.3	0.4
Level (contagion), equity CAR ($\omega = 4\%$)	20	1.94%	2.29%	2.60%
Level (contagion), sovereign ($\omega = 25$ bp)	7	13.9 bp	15.7 bp	17.2 bp
Differential, equity	20	1.58%	1.48%	1.37%
Differential, equity	40	1.12%	1.05%	0.97%

Notes. Entries are $\text{MDE}_{\text{level}}$ from (15) and MDE_{diff} from (16), in the units of the outcome (equity cumulative abnormal return in %, sovereign cumulative abnormal yield in basis points). N is the number of reacting assets per event. The level test does not improve past its ρ_a-determined floor as N grows; the differential test does. Cross-event dependence ($E_{\text{eff}} \approx 6$) scales every entry by ≈ 1.15. Values of ω and ρ_a are illustrative ex-ante design inputs; this table reports the *design* power of the tests, while the realised inference in the main text rests on randomisation inference and the wild-cluster bootstrap rather than these Gaussian approximations.

C Synthetic-control robustness

The re-entry premium of Section 7 is robust to the donor pool and to the outcome definition. Table 14 reports the baseline gap re-estimated under leave-one-donor-out, alternative donor pools, and an alternative outcome (the spread over Côte d'Ivoire in place of the level yield). Across every specification the gap stays in a narrow band around the +2.8 pp baseline: the

leave-one-out range is [+2.10, +2.95] pp, the alternative pools span [+2.78, +2.95] pp, and the spread-based outcome gives +2.95 pp. The premium does not hinge on any single donor — in particular not on Côte d'Ivoire, the largest — and is not an artefact of the level-yield specification.

Table 14: Synthetic-control robustness: Niger re-entry premium under alternative donor pools and outcomes. The baseline donor pool is the non-coup WAEMU members (BEN, CIV, SEN, TGO, GNB); weights minimise pre-coup mean squared prediction error; the gap is Niger's mean actual yield minus the synthetic counterfactual from 26 April 2024 onward.

Specification	Re-entry gap (pp)
Baseline (all five donors)	+2.78
Leave-one-donor-out:	
drop Benin	+2.10
drop Côte d'Ivoire	+2.95
drop Senegal	+2.78
drop Togo	+2.78
drop Guinea-Bissau	+2.85
Alternative donor pools:	
exclude Côte d'Ivoire (largest)	+2.95
exclude Senegal	+2.78
non-AES donors (BEN, CIV, SEN, TGO)	+2.85
two largest only (BEN, CIV)	+2.85
Alternative outcome:	
spread over Côte d'Ivoire (vs. level yield)	+2.95

Notes. Baseline weights: Benin 0.607, Côte d'Ivoire 0.369, Guinea-Bissau 0.024 (pre-period RMSPE 0.83 pp). The leave-one-out range [+2.10, +2.95] and the pooled range [+2.78, +2.95] bracket the plausible estimate. The spread outcome uses the four non-CIV donors, since CIV is the spread base.

D Online Appendix: Supplementary Tables and Figures

The following tables and figures provide supporting and robustness material referenced in the main text.

Table 15: Variable definitions and sources.

Variable	Definition	Source
Panel A: Sovereign (UMOA-Titres)		
Sovereign yield (1/3/5y)	Published weekly zero-coupon yield of a member's sovereign curve at the one-, three-, and five-year tenor, in percent.	UMOA-Titres
Δ yield, 3y	Week-over-week change in the three-year zero-coupon yield, in percentage points; the event-study outcome.	UMOA-Titres
Spread vs. CIV, 3y	Three-year yield of a member minus the three-year yield of Côte d'Ivoire (the union benchmark), in percentage points.	UMOA-Titres
Re-entry premium	Weighted-average rate of the first post-exclusion 12-month bill auctions minus the last pre-exclusion auctions, in percentage points; differenced against non-coup members.	UMOA-Titres
Foreign allotment share	Share of an auction's retained amount allotted to bidders domiciled outside the issuing country (domicile is a proxy for ultimate holder).	UMOA-Titres comptes rendus
Panel B: Equity (BRVM)		
BOA daily return	Daily log return on a listed Bank of Africa national subsidiary (Mali, Niger, Burkina, Côte d'Ivoire), in percent.	BRVM
Coris / Onatel return	Daily log return on the other two listed Burkinabè firms (Coris Bank; Onatel, a telecom), in percent.	BRVM
BRVM Composite return	Daily log return on the BRVM Composite index, in percent; broad-market benchmark.	BRVM
BRVM Finance return	Daily log return on the BRVM Finance sector index, in percent; sector benchmark.	BRVM
CAR$[-1,+5]$	Cumulative abnormal return over the seven-trading-day event window from a market model estimated on $[-180,-31]$, in percent.	Own calc. (BRVM)

Notes. The estimation and event windows underlying the CAR are defined in Section 5.7; the BOA return panel pools the listed national subsidiaries (Section 8).

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Table 16: Data sources, frequency, period, and coverage.

Series	Source	Frequency	Period	Use / coverage
Sovereign yield curves (1/3/5y, 8 issuers)	UMOA-Titres (UMOA-Titres, 2026)	weekly	Dec 2018–Jun 2026	Curve event study, frozen-window diagnostic
Primary auctions (rates, amounts)	UMOA-Titres (official)	per auction	Jan 2014–Jun 2026	Re-entry premium, control-differencing
Bidder-domicile record	UMOA-Titres comptes rendus	per auction	2017–2026	Holder recomposition (domicile ≠ holder)
BOA subsidiaries (ML, NE, BF, CI)	BRVM (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, 2026)	daily	2019–2026	Same-group event study; ≈1,910 days each
Coris, Onatel (BF)	BRVM	daily	2019–2026	Within-Burkina bank-vs-nonbank test
BRVM Composite; Finance index	BRVM	daily	2019–2026; 2019–2025	Benchmark robustness (only 2 of 18 indices span events)
Placebo events	Electoral commissions; Powell and Thyne (2025)	event dates	2020–2026	Falsification
Nigeria Eurobond (benchmark)	DMO Nigeria	daily	2023	Non-CFA channel test, Niger event
CEMAC sovereign (BEAC)	BEAC bulletins	monthly	Aug 2021–	Cross-union check

Notes. All series listed are used in the analyses reported here. In the bidder-domicile record, domicile ≠ holder: bidder domicile is a proxy for, not identical to, the ultimate holder of an allotment.




Figure 6: Mali secondary-market trade count by year, 2014–2026. Trading collapses in 2022 (highlighted), the year of the sanctions and default that cut Mali's market access, and recovers as the sovereign settles and re-enters. The collapse corroborates the access-freeze classification of Table 2 from the trading side, independently of the yield evidence. Source: UMOA-Titres secondary-market transaction record.




Figure 7: Mali's published three-year zero-coupon yield is constant at 5.94% through the 2022 exclusion window (shaded) — carried forward with no auctions or trades to price it — then resumes moving once market access returns. The frozen-window curve is interpolation, not a price. Source: UMOA-Titres published zero-coupon curve.

Table 17: Issuer-fixed-effects auction-rate panel. Dependent variable: weighted-average issuance rate (%). Issuer and quarter fixed effects included. The panel recovers the within-Niger re-entry premium as a point estimate; small-sample inference is taken from the synthetic-control permutation test (Table 8).

	(1)
ln(maturity)	+0.489
	(0.027)
Niger × Post-re-entry	+1.733
	(0.105)
Mali × Access-loss period	omitted
	(no auctions in window)
Observations	1,382
Issuer FE	Yes
Quarter FE	Yes

Notes. All UMOA-Titres new issuances 2014–2026 (buy-backs excluded). Niger × Post-re-entry is an indicator for Niger auctions from 26 April 2024 onward; its coefficient is the within-issuer, within-quarter re-entry premium and corroborates the synthetic-control estimate of Table 8. Mali × Access-loss is omitted: Mali issued no new debt between 9 January 2022 and its 9 August 2022 re-entry (market freeze), so the indicator is all-zeros and the coefficient is unidentified. Figures in parentheses are classical (homoskedastic) standard errors; because identification rests on a single treated issuer and a single re-entry event, inference on the premium is drawn from the synthetic-control permutation test (Table 8) rather than from these standard errors, and no significance stars are attached.

Table 18: BOA Niger (BOAN) cumulative abnormal return around the July 2023 coup, two event-date anchors. The coup ($t_0 = 26$ Jul 2023) and ECOWAS sanctions ($t_0 = 30$ Jul 2023) are four days apart; the protocol re-dates the event window to the sanctions date when anticipation is detected. Market model estimated on $[-180, -31]$ trading days. RI p-value from 2,000 placebo-date draws (sanctions anchor).

Anchor	Window	CAR (%)	t-stat
Coup (26 Jul 2023)	$[-1, +5]$	-7.6%	-1.57
Coup (26 Jul 2023)	$[0, +20]$	-21.3%	-2.55
Sanctions (30 Jul 2023)	$[-1, +5]$	-20.4%	-4.22
Sanctions (30 Jul 2023)	$[0, +20]$	-19.5%	-2.34

Notes. BOAN = BOA Niger listed on the BRVM. Abnormal returns from a market model on the BRVM Composite. The sanctions anchor follows the protocol of Section 5.7: where the confound (sanctions) is co-timed inside the event window, the window is re-dated to the confound date. RI p-value (sanctions anchor, $[-1, +5]$): 0.000 (share of 2,000 placebo-date CARs $\leq$ the treatment CAR). The coup-anchor CAR here (-7.6%, market model) is the market-model counterpart of the -7.3% same-group-control figure in Table 11; the sanctions-anchor CAR captures the post-sanctions decline.

Table 19: Equity falsification: a failed coup with no market exclusion versus the access-loss events. BOA Benin's listed-bank CAR around the 7 December 2025 failed coup (foiled within hours; no ECOWAS sanctions, no loss of market access) is set against the treated access-loss CARs. Market model on the BRVM Composite, estimation window $[-180, -31]$.

Event	Type	CAR $[-1, +5]$ (%)	t
Benin (Dec 2025)	Failed coup, no exclusion	$+0.4$	$+0.08$
Mali (Jan 2022)	Access loss (sanctions)	-17.4	-2.37
Niger (Jul 2023)	Access loss (sanctions)	-20.4	-4.22

Notes. The Benin event is a failed military takeover (7 December 2025) reversed within hours, with no sovereign exclusion, sanctions, or default; the listed national bank (BOA Benin) shows no material abnormal return, in contrast to the sharp declines of the treated subsidiaries at genuine access-loss events. This corroborates the paper's central distinction: listed-bank equity reprices at loss of market access, not at political turbulence per se. The $[-1, +5]$ window matches the access-loss events; the longer $[-1, +10]$ read is -4.7% ($t = -0.68$), also insignificant.

Table 20: Bank of Africa event-study CARs (%) under three benchmarks: same-group control (BOA Côte d'Ivoire), BRVM Composite, and BRVM Finance index. Market model, estimation $[-180, -31]$, CAR over $[-1, +5]$ trading days.

Event	Type	vs BOA CIV	vs Composite	vs Finance
Mali, Aug 2020	coup	+0.6	+3.6	+3.6
Mali, May 2021	coup	+4.1	+3.9	+3.5
Mali, Jan 2022	access loss	−17.1	−17.4	−16.6
Burkina, Jan 2022	coup	−11.2	−10.9	−10.0
Burkina, Sep 2022	coup	+7.8	+7.6	+8.0
Niger, Jul 2023	access loss	−7.3	−7.6	−7.4
Mean, access-loss		−12.2	−12.5	−12.0
Mean, sanction-free coups		+0.3	+1.0	+1.3

Notes. CARs in percent. Benchmark indices from the BRVM (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, 2026); the Composite and Finance index are the only two of the exchange's eighteen indices with clean daily coverage over the full 2020–2023 event span. Point CARs only; per-event inference (the t- and sign-test statistics) is reported in Table 11. "vs BOA CIV" uses the same-group control (BOA Côte d'Ivoire); the *Mean* rows are unweighted averages, with no inference computed on them. Niger's CAR here is coup-anchored across all three benchmark columns for like-with-like comparability; on the sanctions anchor that the event-alignment argument privileges (Table 18) Niger is −20.4% and the access-loss mean is −18.8%.

Table 21: Within-Burkina equity reaction to the 24 January 2022 coup: market-model CAR vs BOA Côte d'Ivoire, $[-1, +5]$ trading days.

Firm	Type	CAR (%)	raw cum. (%)	t
BOA Burkina	bank	−11.2	−8.8	−2.23
Coris Bank	bank	−4.6	−3.9	−1.32
Onatel	telecom	+0.7	+1.2	0.15
BOA Côte d'Ivoire	control	—	+1.8	—

Notes. Daily prices 2019–2026 from the BRVM (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, 2026). Market model estimated on trading days $[-180, -31]$, CAR over $[-1, +5]$. "raw cum." is the cumulative log return over the event window with no market-model adjustment. The control row (BOA Côte d'Ivoire) reports only its raw cumulative return, with no CAR or t defined for the benchmark itself. Both banks reprice negatively; the telecom does not.

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