# Elderly Health and Longevity in The US: Evidence and Implications

Liran Einav and Amy Finkelstein*

June 9, 2026

**Abstract**

Rising elderly life expectancy is a well-known source of fiscal pressure on Social Security and Medicare – but how have declining mortality and morbidity affected the two programs' *relative* finances? Using nearly three decades of Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data (1992-2019), we estimate that these demographic changes raised expected lifetime Social Security spending by over twice as much as expected lifetime Medicare spending: 14% compared to 6%. The slower growth of elderly lifetime health care spending than annuity spending reflects two features of how longevity has increased: the additional 2.4 years of remaining life expectancy were entirely healthy – free of physical or cognitive limitations – while the expected amount of time spent with severe health limitations fell by about 30%, reducing expected lifetime nursing-home and home-health use. We then write down a stylized life-cycle model of a risk-averse retiree facing stochastic mortality and health to illuminate the key forces that affect the optimal allocation of a fixed amount of public funds across Medicare and Social Security.

*Einav: Stanford University and NBER, leinav@stanford.edu; Finkelstein: MIT and NBER, afink@mit.edu. We are grateful to Ro Huang, Ken Lin, and Sam Wolf for exceptional research assistance, to Kate Bundorf, David Cutler, Lee Lockwood, Petra Persson, Jim Poterba, Mark Shepard, and seminar participants at CEPR Ageing and Longevity, Columbia-NYU, Duke, Institute for Fiscal Studies, MIT, NBER Aging, NBER Public Economics, RF Berlin, Singapore Management University, Stanford, Toulouse, and Whistler for helpful comments, and to David Cutler for data access.

# 1 Introduction

Over the last several decades, adult life expectancy has increased considerably in most high-income countries. This has been a major source of improved well-being, but has also created substantial fiscal pressure on the public programs that provide pensions and health insurance to the elderly. In the United States, between 1990 and 2019, real per-capita public pension spending on annuities (Social Security) roughly doubled, while real per-capita public health insurance spending on the elderly (Medicare) quadrupled.[1] By 2024, these two large entitlement programs together accounted for over one third of federal expenditures (CBO 2025). Not surprisingly, therefore, there has been considerable attention to the fiscal pressure on both programs created by demographic trends, as well as discussion of possible entitlement reforms, such as raising the age of benefit eligibility, cutting benefit levels, and/or raising payroll taxes on the working population (e.g., National Research Council 2012; Poterba 2014; Sheiner 2021). Yet, there has been remarkably little attention to how demographic changes have affected the *relative* finances of Social Security and Medicare – let alone how to think about the optimal allocation of public funds across the two programs. This paper begins to fill these gaps.

Social Security and Medicare were created at different times, are administered by different agencies, and have separate budgets – and so are typically analyzed independently. Yet both programs provide social insurance to primarily the same population of the elderly and for the same basic purpose of consumption smoothing over stochastic mortality and health risks. We first show that demographic changes in elderly mortality and morbidity have shifted the relative allocation of spending between the two programs, increasing expected lifetime Social Security spending more than twice as fast as expected lifetime Medicare spending. We then write down and calibrate a stylized dynamic consumption-saving model of a risk-averse retiree facing stochastic mortality and health, which we use to illustrate the economic forces affecting the optimal split of a fixed amount of public funds across these two sources of consumption smoothing.

The backbone of our analysis is almost three decades (1992-2019) of data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Surveys (MCBS). This annual survey covers approximately 10,000 panelists each year in a rotating panel, with each participant followed for 3 to 4 years. It contains detailed individual-level information on 31 health conditions and functional limitations, cross-validated data on overall and category-specific annual health-care spending, and linkages to administrative data on individuals' dates of death through 2019. We focus primarily on changes between the early part of our data (1993) and the later part (2017).

We start in Section 2 by replicating and extending prior findings of increased elderly life expectancy and improved elderly health conditional on age. To do so, we first classify the more granular, 31-dimensional data on health into five coarser (ranked) health states (that is, morbidity categories); this allows us to use the panel element of the MCBS, together with the linked information on subsequent death, in order to track how health evolves over time. Specifically, we estimate year-by-year, age-specific 5-by-6 transition matrices between the five coarse health states (and an absorbing state of

[1] Authors' calculations based on data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey and the Social Security Administration (SSA 2025). Medicare spending includes both Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage spending among those 65 years old and older.

death). We use these transition matrices to analyze, for a given calendar year, the life of a hypothetical 66-year-old who faces the age-specific rates of morbidity and mortality experienced by the cross-section of individuals at different ages.

Between 1993 and 2017, remaining life expectancy for the average 66-year-old increased by 2.4 years, from 17.4 to almost 20 years, increasing expected lifetime Social Security payments by about 14%. Heuristically, this increase in life expectancy can be attributed to some combination of "delayed" aging (individuals remaining healthier for more years) and "prolonged" dying (individuals surviving for more years in an unhealthy state through, say, technological improvements in extending the life of the sick). Strikingly, we find that the health trajectory in the years *immediately preceding* death has remained largely unchanged, and that the 2.4-year increase in remaining life expectancy consists *entirely* of increases in healthy life-years; that is, expected years spent in the healthiest of the five morbidity categories – free of any of the physical or cognitive functional limitations that commonly accrue with advanced age. Moreover, expected time spent in the worst of the five morbidity states, in which individuals have severe physical or cognitive limitations, actually *declined* by 0.6 years (about 30%).

In Section 3 we move beyond prior analysis of health improvements to quantify the implications of reduced mortality and morbidity for changes in expected lifetime health-care spending. To do so, we develop and implement an approach for translating observed improvements in morbidity and mortality into predicted changes for expected lifetime health-care spending for a 66-year-old. Specifically, we use the 31-dimensional granular health measures as inputs to train a random forest algorithm to predict annual spending (both overall and by spending category). We explicitly exclude age from the predictors in order to distinguish the impact of health (which naturally deteriorates with age) on health-care spending from any "direct," residual impact of age, conditional on health. We then fit the residuals from this prediction model to a (proportional) age-specific shifter to capture any residual impact of age on health-care spending. Importantly, we find that conditional on the granular health measures, there is little incremental role for age in predicting health-care spending; this suggests that our health measures are rich enough, and our prediction model flexible enough, to capture the vast majority of the spending-relevant features of individual health.

We use the resultant predictive spending model to analyze how, holding the mapping from health and age to health-care spending fixed, observed changes in age-specific morbidity and mortality transitions have affected expected elderly lifetime health-care spending. This exercise allows us to isolate the impact of changes in morbidity and mortality on lifetime spending, while abstracting from the many changes in the practice and pricing of medicine – due for example to changes in technology and health-care policy – that occurred over the same time period.

The combination of increased life expectancy and improved health conditional on age between 1993 and 2017 results in an increase in lifetime health-care spending per elderly individual of about 6%. Notably, this increase in expected lifetime health-care spending is less than a half of the 14% increase in life expectancy (and hence expected lifetime Social Security spending). An important driver of the slower health-care spending growth is the pronounced decline in time spent in the worst of the five morbidity states; this state is associated with particularly high health-care spending, both overall

and especially for nursing home and home health care. Indeed, because we find that poor health, rather than age, is the key predictor of nursing home and home health care, the net impact of changes in mortality and morbidity is, in fact, to (slightly) *decrease* expected lifetime spending on nursing-home care and home-health care over our sample period, despite the substantial increase in overall remaining life expectancy. We also find that the increase in expected lifetime health-care spending is about five times higher for men than women – reflecting substantially larger declines for women in the time spent in the worst morbidity state – and about three times higher for higher-income individuals than lower-income individuals, primarily due to the substantially larger increases in life expectancy for higher-income individuals.

Taken together, the demographic changes in mortality and morbidity increased lifetime public spending on the average elderly individual between 1993 and 2017 by about 11%, with expected Social Security spending growing more than twice as fast as expected Medicare spending (14% compared to 6%). These increases reflect the "mechanical" impact of demographic changes under passive, status-quo program rules. In the final part of the paper, we sketch a simple dynamic model that allows us to analyze forces that affect the optimal allocation of a given public budget across these two social insurance programs. Specifically, we consider a standard life-cycle consumption model for a risk-averse retiree, who benefits from a fixed Social Security annuity income and government-funded health insurance while facing stochastic mortality and stochastic morbidity-induced medical spending; as is common in these models, we also assume a government-funded guaranteed minimum consumption floor, which approximates Medicaid. We use this model to analyze consumer welfare under alternative budget-neutral policy parameters that re-allocate expected lifetime public spending across Social Security and Medicare.

The model clarifies two advantages of an incremental expected dollar of Medicare coverage relative to Social Security. First, while Social Security annuity payments only help individuals to reduce consumption volatility across states of the world in which they are alive, Medicare coverage also helps reduce consumption volatility across states of differential health realizations, and therefore provides a more complete insurance product. Second, as we showed in Einav and Finkelstein (2026), the optimal public annuity is back-loaded, although current Social Security payments are constant with respect to age. This turns out to create a second advantage for Medicare: because health deteriorates with age, Medicare coverage naturally delivers more resources to older individuals, providing an indirect form of back-loading payments. As a result, the optimum is to allocate the government budget entirely to Medicare until Medicare covers all medical expenses, and only then allocate any remaining funds to Social Security. To arrive at an interior solution, we also allow for moral hazard effects of health insurance. This creates a disadvantage for Medicare relative to Social Security, since it induces inefficient medical spending. We then illustrate via stylized calibrations how the demographic changes we estimate can affect this interior solution.

Our paper contributes to a number of related literatures. The first part of our paper is closely related to a large existing literature, going back almost five decades, that has investigated whether increased elderly life expectancy has meant that the elderly are experiencing additional years in poor or good health (e.g., Gruenberg 1977; Fries 1980; Manton 1982; Fuchs 1984). These studies typically

construct a "health deficit index" (also called a "frailty index") which measures the (unweighted) fraction of a list of aging-related health conditions that an individual has; researchers developing or using a frailty index have emphasized that it is predictive of mortality (Strulik 2023). In general, findings from this literature have indicated improved health conditional on age, both in the US (Freedman et al. 2002, 2013; Cutler et al. 2014; Abeliansky et al. 2020; Cutler et al. 2022) and in other high-income countries (e.g., Abeliansky and Strulik 2019; Utkus and Mitchell 2025), prompting aphorisms such as "70 is the new 60" (National Research Council 2012; Lee 2016).[2] The spirit of our analysis in the first part of the paper is similar, and our findings are generally consistent with this existing body of work. However, since our primary focus is on implications for lifetime health-care spending – rather than mortality – we pay much closer attention to how different health conditions contribute to health-care spending. Therefore, our spending index is richer – and places more weight on "expensive" health conditions that are associated with greater resource utilization – than the commonly-used frailty index approach.

There has been considerably less attention to the quantitative implications of improvements in morbidity and mortality for medical spending, which is our key focus. Qualitatively, it has long been recognized that rising life expectancy will increase the elderly's expected lifetime health-care spending, while improvements in their health conditional on age will move their health-care spending in the opposite direction (Poterba and Summers 1987). Quantitative analyses, however, have been rare.[3] Yet such analyses are essential inputs into both positive and normative analysis of the implications of demographic changes for Medicare and Social Security, as well as for public policy more broadly. For example, our finding that demographic changes have not increased expected lifetime nursing-home or home-health spending stands in stark contrast to the widespread conventional wisdom that rising elderly life expectancy and the increasing prevalence of the "oldest old" will put substantial upward pressure on the use of nursing homes and other long-term care facilities (e.g., Gruber and McGarry 2025), a belief which in turn has motivated substantial policy and academic interest in long-term care.

Finally, our model-based exercise, which studies the optimal allocation of public funds between Social Security and Medicare, is closely connected to an extensive literature in public finance that uses this type of quantitative modeling to study the impact of different public-policy interventions aimed at the elderly. Methodologically, our approach follows the well-established tradition of using calibrated, life-cycle models of individuals facing stochastic mortality and morbidity to model elderly behaviors, such as savings, bequests, and insurance demand (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1999; Scholz et al. 2006; De Nardi et al. 2010; Lockwood 2018). More closely related to our substantive analysis are papers that use calibrated life-cycle models to analyze various social insurance programs, such as Medicaid (e.g., Brown and Finkelstein 2008; De Nardi et al. 2016a), Medicare (e.g., McClellan and

[2]The underlying causes of these improvements in mortality and morbidity are undoubtedly multi-faceted and complex. Nonetheless, estimates suggest that over the 1990-2015 time period, about two-fifths of the increase in life expectancy reflects changes in behavior (such as smoking and diet), and about one-third reflects the development and adoption of new pharmaceutical therapies; only about 13% is attributed to intensive medical treatment for acute diseases (Buxbaum et al. 2020).

[3]An exception is Lubitz et al. (2003) who, in an approach similar in spirit to ours, analyze MCBS data from 1992-1998 on health conditions, health transitions, and health-care spending. They conclude that 70-year-olds in poorer health have similar expected lifetime spending to 70-year-olds in better health, due to the offsetting effects of greater longevity and better health on health-care spending.

Skinner 2006; Khwaja 2010), and Social Security (e.g., French 2005; Van der Klaauw and Wolpin 2008). While many of these papers model multiple social insurance programs, they tend to focus their analysis on the behavioral impact, the value, or the optimal design of one particular program, rather than on the relative value of different programs, which is our focus.

# 2 Data and descriptive patterns in health

## 2.1 Data and key health measures

Below we briefly describe the data and key variables. More details are provided in Appendix A.

**Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.** We use almost three decades of data, from 1992 through 2019, from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).[4] Every year, the MCBS surveys about 10,000 individuals enrolled in Medicare (covering both Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage enrollees), including residents of nursing homes and other long-term care facilities. It operates as a rotating panel with a three-year or four-year period of inclusion. The panel dimension will be crucial for our ability to estimate transition probabilities across health states.

The MCBS essentially consists of two distinct surveys. One is a sample of people who are representative of the population that was enrolled in Medicare from the beginning of the calendar year through their interview date, which is typically in the fall. The second is a sample of people who are representative of Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled for any portion of the survey year.

For our analysis purpose, there are four key components of the data. First, for both surveys, the MCBS collects basic demographic characteristics including age as of January 1 of the survey year, gender, education, and income. Second, both surveys contain a range of health-related survey questions, which we describe in more detail below.[5] Third, the second survey contains detailed information on annual health-care expenditure – overall and by type of care – across all payers. Finally, for the first survey, we have information on the beneficiary's date of death (if any) through 2019; unlike all the other data elements used in our analyses, the linkage to date of death requires access to restricted-use data.

**Sample definition.** Since our exercise requires both data on mortality and data on health-care spending, we use the intersection of the people who appear in both MCBS samples described above. We restrict our analysis to Medicare recipients aged 66 and over. These two restrictions produce a sample of 226,647 individual-years, or an average of 8,394 individuals per year. In all of our analyses, we use the survey's individual-level survey weights, adjusted so that the sum of the weights is consistent in each year.[6] For most of our analyses, we compare data from the (pooled) first three years of our

[4]The MCBS has been conducted every year since 1991, with the exception of 2014; our sample covers 1992 through 2019, without 2014.

[5]The MCBS typically administers its questions directly to the individual of interest, but will survey family members if an individual is incapacitated, or facility staff if the individual is a resident of a long-term care facility.

[6]Specifically, as recommended by CMS (2021), we use the survey weights from the sample of individuals who are representative of people who were enrolled in Medicare for any portion of the survey year as weights when analyzing the intersection of the two samples.

sample (1992-1994) to the pooled last three years (2016-2018), and occasionally to the middle three years (2011-2013); throughout we refer to these samples as, respectively, 1993, 2017, and 2012. As a result, a typical "year" of data has about 24,000 individuals in it.

**Health-care spending.** The MCBS collects self-reported health-care spending by category and payer.[7] The MCBS validates the self-reports against administrative data on health-care claims and utilization where feasible, and uses this comparison to adjust its estimates of spending. We collapse all health-care spending data to the person-year level and standardize all expenses to 2024 dollars.[8] For some of our analyses we dis-aggregate spending into specific sub-categories. Specifically, we analyze inpatient hospital care, nursing home, home-health care, prescription drug, and the residual category which we call "outpatient".[9]

**Granular morbidity measures.** The MCBS provides a number of different morbidity measures, including limitations to six Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), limitations to six Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs), five functional limitations, and whether the individual has ever been diagnosed with 14 different diseases. Appendix Table OA.1 lists the full set of 31 ADLs, IADLs, functional limitations, and diseases employed in our analysis, as well as the 2017 sample mean for each of these measures. Throughout the paper, we use $h'_{it}$ to denote this 31-dimensional vector of binary indicators associated with individual $i$ in year $t$.

Limitations to ADLs measure individuals' ability to independently carry out physical tasks that are typically part of everyday life, such as eating, dressing, and bathing. Limitations to IADLs measure individuals' ability to carry out somewhat more complex tasks that may require greater executive functioning skills, such as managing money, shopping, and preparing meals. Each one is a binary measure based on whether the individual reports experiencing any difficulties performing the given task. ADLs and IADLs are common measures of disability across the literature on aging and morbidity (e.g., Freedman et al. 2002; Cutler et al. 2014).[10]

Functional limitations consist of comparatively more difficult physical activities than ADLs that may or may not come up in the course of everyday life, such as lifting ten pounds, raising one's hands above their head, and walking a quarter of a mile. Unlike the binary nature of ADLs and IADLs, the functional limitation questions are asked on a sliding scale ranging from "no difficulty" to complete inability to perform the task; we convert these to binary measures by recoding individuals as having the functional limitation if they report any level of difficulty above the minimum.[11] Finally, the 14 disease measures are binary indicators for whether the individual reports ever having been told by a medical professional that they have a particular condition such as cancer, diabetes, or heart disease.

[7] Spending categories include inpatient, outpatient, physician, long-term care, prescriptions, dental, home health, and hospice care. Payers include Traditional Medicare, Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, private insurers, and self-pay.

[8] Throughout the paper, all dollar values are converted to 2024 US dollars using the CPI-U.

[9] This primarily consists of physician care and outpatient hospital care, but also includes dental and hospice care (which are minuscule in comparison).

[10] More specifically, the literature measures *limitations* to ADLs and IADLs, which are frequently described by the shorthand "ADLs" and "IADLs" with the "limitations to ..." left implicit.

[11] This practice follows the recoding procedure previously used by Cutler et al. (2014).

**Coarser morbidity measures.** For many of our analyses, we employ a coarser set of morbidity measures, categorizing individuals into five ascending (i.e., worsening) "morbidity groups" based on their total number of ADLs and IADLs. Throughout, we denote this coarser measure of health by $h_{it}$, to distinguish it from the more granular $h'_{it}$ measure. The five morbidity groups are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Morbidity group 1 (the healthiest group) consists of individuals with zero limitations across all 12 ADL or IADL measures. About half of the sample is in this lowest morbidity group ($h_{it} = 1$). We divide the remaining population across four (roughly equally-sized) morbidity groups: morbidity group 2 consists of individuals with 1 limitation to ADLs or IADLs; morbidity groups 3 and 4 have, respectively, 2-3 and 4-7 limitations, and the highest morbidity group (morbidity group 5) consists of individuals with 8-12 limitations. The share of individuals in higher morbidity groups increases with age (Appendix Figure OA.1); almost three-quarters of 66-year-old respondents are in morbidity group 1, compared to only 12% of respondents aged 95 or older.

**Transitions across health states.** Our analysis focuses on changes over time in the life of a hypothetical 66-year-old individual who lives their life within the year, experiencing the age-specific annual transition rates across morbidity states (including death) experienced by that year's cross-section of individuals at different ages. This approach is analogous to the construction of a standard period life expectancy table, except that it allows us to also estimate expected years of life spent in different morbidity states.

To construct age-specific transition matrices, we leverage the rotating panel structure of the MCBS; this enables us to observe how individuals transition across morbidity groups at each age. Rather than consider transitions between all $2^{31}$ possible combinations of the more granular health measure $h'_{it}$ which is not practical, we consider health transitions at the level of the coarser morbidity groups measure $h_{it}$. For a given survey year $t$ and a given age $a$, we estimate the one-year transition rates from year $t$'s morbidity group $h \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ to year $t + 1$'s morbidity group or mortality. That is, we construct a series of 5-by-6 transition matrices, in which individuals start at age $a - 1$ in one of five morbidity states, and end in age $a$ in either one of the five morbidity states or in death. We use $Pr^t(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d^t_a(h_{a-1})$ to denote the year-specific and age-specific health transition matrix and mortality risk, respectively.

We estimate a separate 5-by-6 transition matrix for each age, resulting in 34 total transition matrices per year (covering ages of 66 to 99); we assume that all individuals die after age 100 if not already deceased. We estimate these 34 transition matrices separately for each survey year. Changes in these transition matrices over time capture the key demographic changes in mortality and morbidity that are the focus of our analysis. Appendix Tables OA.2 and OA.3 provide some examples of transition matrices from 1993 and 2017 for 66-year-old and for 80-year-old individuals, respectively. We will use these transition matrices to simulate life trajectories for a counterfactual 66-year-old individual experiencing a given year's age-specific transition probabilities.

**Socioeconomic status.** To examine how results vary by socioeconomic status, we classify individuals based on whether they are above or below median annual income (from all sources) for people

of their age, gender, and time period (1993 or 2017). This follows prior work that uses measures of income rank for analyses of heath by socioeconomic status (e.g., Chetty et al. 2016; Hudomiet et al. 2021).[12]

## 2.2 Changes in health and longevity over time

**Changes in morbidity.** Figure 1 displays the average number of ADLs and IADLs (out of a maximum total of 12), separately for 1993, 2012, and 2017. Panel (a) shows the average number of ADLs and IADLs by age while Panel (b) shows them by years prior to death. The time patterns indicate that, consistent with a compression of morbidity, in 2017 individuals remained healthier for longer than in 1993, but continued to experience heightened morbidity in the years leading up to their death.[13]

Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that morbidity conditional on age declined substantially between 1993 and 2017. For example, in 1993, the average 80-year-old individual had difficulty with 2.6 ADLs and IADLs, whereas by 2017 she had difficulty with only 1.6, a decline of 38%. Put differently, a 75-year-old individual in 1993 had, on average, approximately the same number of ADLs and IADLs (1.6) as an 80-year-old individual in 2017, suggesting that "80 is the new 75." These morbidity declines occur at all ages, but are especially pronounced at older ages. They occurred throughout the 1993 to 2017 period (see Appendix Figure OA.4 (a)). Morbidity improvements conditional on age are not limited to ADLs and IADLs; Appendix Figure OA.5 shows that the rate of most of the 31 health conditions in our data declined between 1993 and 2017, including both physical health problems such as difficulty reaching or walking and cognitive health problems such as difficulty in managing money.

In contrast to these improvements in morbidity by age since birth, Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that morbidity by years relative to death has remained quite similar. In particular, the average number of ADLs and IADLs has remained essentially the same in the last two years of life. Even five years before death, they have declined by only about 10%, from 2.57 in 1993 to 2.30 in 2012.

**Changes in remaining life-years.** We use the data on age-specific health transition matrices to calculate expected remaining years in different morbidity states for a hypothetical 66-year-old who experiences the age-specific mortality and morbidity transitions of a given year. Specifically, we draw the morbidity group of an individual of age 66 in a given year based on the empirical distribution of morbidity groups for 66-year-olds that year, and then simulate the individual forward using that year's age-specific transition probabilities across morbidity states until death. We average across 100,000 simulated life trajectories to compute expected remaining life-years and expected remaining life-years in different health states.

[12] A challenge in our setting is that differential survival by socioeconomic status could skew percentiles at older ages. We considered classifying individuals based on education (as in, e.g., Case and Deaton 2015, 2020; Hudomiet et al. 2022) but found this challenging because of the substantial increase in educational attainment across cohorts and time over our study period.

[13] These patterns of how morbidity has changed relative to both years since birth and years prior to death are consistent with prior findings by Cutler et al. (2014) who analyzed the same MCBS data through 2009. In addition, Appendix Figure OA.2 and OA.3 show that the patterns are similar if we instead examine the presence of any ADL or IADL at each age, or the number of ADL and IADLs at each age conditional on having at least one.

Improvements are also visible in these health transitions. For example, in 1993, 69.1% of 66-year-old individuals were in morbidity group 1 (no ADLs or IADLs), and that number had risen to 74.1% by 2017. Moreover, of the 66-year-olds in morbidity group 1, in 1993, 85.9% remained in group 1 at age 67, while by 2017 that number had risen to 89.9% (Appendix Table OA.2). Once again, improvements are even starker at older ages. For example, in 1993, only 42.0% of 80-year-old individuals were in morbidity group 1 compared to 55.7% in 2017. Of those 80-year-olds in morbidity group 1, in 1993 only 75.6% remained in group 1 at age 81, compared to 80.7% in 2017 (Appendix Table OA.3).

Figure 2 shows the results of our simulations. Remaining life expectancy at 66 increased by 2.36 years between 1993 and 2017. This represents a 14% increase, from 17.37 to 19.73 years. Increases in remaining life expectancy occurred throughout the 1993 to 2017 period, but were especially pronounced in the last 10 years of the study period (see Panel (b) of Appendix Figure OA.4).

Strikingly, Figure 2 also indicates that the increase in remaining life expectancy comes entirely from an increase in life-years in morbidity group 1, i.e., years spent without any ADLs or IADLs. Years in this healthiest state increased by 2.49 years, from 9.04 to 11.53 years. In addition, the number of years spent in the highest morbidity group (8-12 ADL or IADLs) declined by 0.58 years (30%), with a roughly corresponding increase of 0.49 years spent in the second lowest morbidity group (a single ADL or IADL).

Figure 3 shows changes in remaining life-years separately by gender and by socioeconomic status. Increases in life expectancy are similar for men (2.5 years) and women (2.4 years), but morbidity improvements are larger for women; most notably, women experience a decline of 0.8 years in the worst morbidity state, while men experience a decline of only 0.3 years in this state. Increases in life expectancy are much higher for above-median income individuals than below-median individuals (2.8 years compared to 2.0 years), with essentially all of the increases for both groups reflecting increases in years in the healthiest morbidity state; this is broadly consistent with prior findings on health improvements across socioeconomic groups (e.g., Case and Deaton 2015, NASEM 2015, Chetty et al. 2016; Case and Deaton 2020; Hudomiet et al. 2021, 2022).

## 3 Implications for health-care spending

In this section we translate the improvements in morbidity and mortality documented in Section 2 into implications for changes in expected lifetime health-care spending for a 66-year-old individual. This is more subtle than the increase in expected lifetime Social Security payments, which is simply proportional to the increase in life expectancy. While increases in life expectancy also increase expected lifetime health-care spending (by adding life-years of positive expected spending), reductions in morbidity conditional on age serve to reduce lifetime per-capita spending, as health-care spending rises with morbidity. In other words, the existence of more people who live to the age of 85 – when spending is higher than at age 75 – drives spending up, but the typical 75-year-old individual is now healthier, which affects spending in the other direction. This motivates our quantitative exercise.

We focus primarily on developing and implementing an approach for translating observed changes in morbidity and mortality into changes in expected *total* lifetime health-care spending for a 66-year-

old. At the end of the section, we translate these estimates into changes in expected lifetime *Medicare* spending for a 66-year-old, based on our empirical estimates of the share of total health-care spending covered by Medicare.

### 3.1 Rising age and improving health: opposing demographic forces

To get a sense of the quantitative nature of each of these forces, we begin by examining how spending varies with age and with health. Figure 4 shows the relationship in 2017 between health-care spending and age (Panel (a)) and the relationship between health-care spending and years to death (Panel (b)); it shows results for overall spending as well as for each type of spending category. Panel (a) shows that health-care spending is increasing and convex in age, with average annual health-care spending rising from about $14,000 at age 66 to about $21,000 at age 80, and about $50,000 for those 95 and older. Average annual nursing-home spending in particular rises sharply with age, from close to zero at age 66 to about $3,000 at age 80 to about $30,000 at ages 95 and older. By contrast, inpatient spending displays much less of an age pattern. Panel (b) shows spending relative to years to death; it shows rapidly increasing spending as death approaches, with nursing home spending in particular rising sharply in the years prior to death.

Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows overall spending by age, separately for each coarse morbidity group. Two striking patterns emerge that will feature prominently in our subsequent mapping of granular morbidity to health-care spending. First, within a coarse morbidity group, overall health-care spending hardly varies with age; this is consistent with Lee (2016), who finds that health-care spending depends much more on time relative to death than on chronological age. Second, spending naturally increases across morbidity groups, but this increase in spending is particularly pronounced between the second-to-worst morbidity group (morbidity group 4, which consists of 4 to 7 limitations to ADLs or IADLs) and the worst morbidity group (morbidity group 5, which consists of 8 to 12 limitations). Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows that this pattern of especially elevated spending for morbidity group 5 relative to morbidity group 4 is particularly pronounced for nursing home spending; as a result, the substantial reductions in the expected number of years spent in morbidity group 5 (see Figure 2) will drive *down* lifetime nursing home spending. The gap in spending, conditional on age, between morbidity group 5 and 4 is less dramatic for other types of spending (Appendix Figure OA.6).

### 3.2 Empirical approach

To map morbidity and mortality to lifetime health-care spending, we combine estimates of age-specific transitions across health states with estimates of a mapping from health states to annual spending. This enables us to construct expected lifetime elderly spending using simulations in the same manner as we constructed life expectancy in Section 2. A practical complication is that we wish to use the granular health information on all 31 possible binary health variables $h'_{it}$ to develop a flexible mapping from health to spending, but, as noted in Section 2, our health transition matrices rely, out of necessity, on a coarser measure of health based on five morbidity groups $h_{it}$. Therefore, in practice we follow a three-step procedure in which we estimate (i) age-specific transitions across the coarser morbidity

groups (and mortality), $Pr_a^t(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^t(h_{a-1})$; (ii) the age-specific distribution of the granular, 31-dimensional health measures for each morbidity group, which we denote by $k_a^t(h'|h)$; and (iii) a mapping from granular health and age to a distribution $G(\cdot)$ of predicted (annual) spending $m$, which we denote by $\tilde{G}_a^t(m|h')$.

In principle, we can allow any of these three components to be time varying. In practice, we choose to allow only two of the three components to be time varying: the age-specific transitions across coarse health states, $Pr_a^t(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^t(h_{a-1})$, and the age-specific distribution of granular health within each coarse health state $k_a^t(h'|h)$. We hold the third component – the mapping from health to spending – constant; i.e., rather than having $G_a^t(m|h') = \tilde{G}_a^t(m|k_a^t(h'|h))$ we do not allow the distribution $\tilde{G}(\cdot)$ to be time varying and instead have $G_a^t(m|h') = \tilde{G}_a(m|k_a^t(h'|h))$. This allows us to focus on how changes in mortality and morbidity affect health-care spending for a time-invariant, stochastic mapping $G(\cdot)$ from morbidity and age to spending. This has the desirable property of focusing on the role of demographics by abstracting from changes in the practice of medicine that may have been driven by technological, economic, or health policy changes.

To construct this mapping from morbidity and age to spending, we use a standard random forest algorithm, with one specific tweak: we initially use the 31 granular health measures but exclude age from the set of predictors, and then allow for an additional, age-specific shifter. We do this to conceptually separate the impacts of health and aging on spending, so that we can focus on how changes in health, conditional on age, influence health-care spending.

Specifically, we first use all 31 of the granular health indicators $h_i'$ – all of the ADLs, IADLs, functional limitations, and disease measures – as inputs to a random forest algorithm, in order to predict annual spending. The resultant predicted spending only reflects variation in spending due to morbidity, not age. Then, to accommodate the fact that, conditional on health, spending may vary with age, we supplement the predictive model to allow for separable, proportional age-specific spending effects by averaging the prediction residuals for each age. Denoting observed annual spending by $y_i$, and the predicted spending from the first step by $\widehat{y_i}$, we define the average, age-specific residual $m_a$ as

$$m_a = \left( \sum_{a_i=a} w_i y_i \right) / \left( \sum_{a_i=a} w_i \widehat{y_i} \right), \tag{1}$$

where $w_i$ are survey weights. Our final prediction is then given by $m_{a_i}\widehat{y_i}$; this is the prediction from the random forest, adjusted for multiplicative age effects. Appendix B describes the procedure in more detail.

We apply this prediction algorithm to different years of the data (in particular, 1993 and 2017) and to both overall annual health-care spending and each component of (annual) spending separately (e.g., nursing-home spending or inpatient spending). Our baseline analysis focuses on spending predicted using 2017 data.[14]

[14]We show below that if we instead analyze spending predicted using the 1993 mapping from health to health-care spending, predicted Medicare spending would exhibit a slight decline due to observed changes in mortality and morbidity (rather than merely a smaller increase than Social Security spending).

**Spending predictions.** Figure 6(a) shows that, as would be expected, predicted health-care spending increases in morbidity group. Moreover, predicted spending is especially high for morbidity group 5 relative to the other groups, consistent with the pattern of actual spending (recall Figure 5). The relationship between morbidity group and average predicted spending will drive our estimates of how expected lifetime spending has changed over time. Importantly, however, the figure also shows that, conditional on morbidity group, there is still considerable variation in predicted spending; this will feature in our model of the value of Medicare insurance coverage in Section 4.

As noted in the Introduction, the typical approach in the literature is to examine changes in a "health deficit" or "frailty" index which measures the fraction of possible aging-related health conditions the individual has (e.g., Abeliansky and Strulik 2019; Abeliansky et al. 2020; Strulik 2023; Russo et al. 2024). Figure 6(b) shows the relationship between predicted spending and the number of different conditions the individual has; this ranges from 0 to 31 in our data and is a version of a "frailty index." It shows that predicted spending is also increasing in the frailty index for most of the distribution. However, that relationship is highly non-linear and, conditional on the frailty index, there is still considerable variation in predicted spending. This motivates our direct investigation of changes in predicted spending.

Several other characteristics of predicted spending match what would be expected based on the observed data. First, as with actual spending, predicted spending, and particularly predicted nursing-home spending, rises in the run-up prior to death (Appendix Figure OA.7). In addition, the age residuals are relatively small in practice (Appendix Figure OA.8); this is consistent with the patterns in Figure 5 and Appendix Figure OA.6 that suggest that, conditional on morbidity, age is hardly associated with overall spending. This suggests that our detailed health measures – and our flexible prediction model that allows for arbitrary interactions among the measures – are able to capture essentially all the spending-relevant features of the individual's health.

### 3.3 Net impacts of demographic changes for health-care spending

Figure 7 shows expected lifetime health-care spending for a 66-year-old individual in 1993 and in 2017. Expected lifetime health-care spending for a 66-year-old increased by $21,700 (5.6%), from $388,900 in 1993 to $410,600 in 2017. Since we are holding the mapping from health to spending fixed, these changes in lifetime healthcare spending reflect the net effect of changes in the underlying distribution of mortality and morbidity. Most of the increase in expected lifetime health-care spending between 1993 and 2017 happened in the last ten years of our study period; Appendix Figure OA.9 indicates that expected lifetime health-care spending was relatively flat between 1993 and about 2006.

The 6% increase in expected lifetime health-care spending between 1993 and 2017 is substantially smaller than the 14% increase in life expectancy over this time period. This is because the substantial improvements in health – in particular, the large decrease in expected life-years spent in morbidity group 5 seen in Figure 2 – result in a much less than proportional increase in lifetime health care spending than life-years. Put differently, if the added life years had been typical years in terms of elderly health, lifetime health-care spending would have grown by 14%, while if the added years were disproportionately unhealthy years it could have grown by even more.

Figure 7 also shows that the change in expected lifetime health-care spending is not uniform across health-care categories. In particular, increases in pharmaceutical and outpatient spending have been the key drivers behind the rise in expected lifetime spending, rising by \$12,500 (18%) and \$16,800 (11%), respectively.[15] By contrast, inpatient spending remains roughly stable, rising by only \$1,000 (2%) while nursing home and home health care spending decline by about \$4,500 and \$2,700 (5% and 18%, respectively). These differential trends in lifetime spending across different types of care are the joint result of the underlying morbidity changes (Figure 2) and the relationship between morbidity and different spending categories (Figure 5). In particular, *healthy* (morbidity groups 1 and 2) years of life have increased, while years spent in morbidity group 5 have decreased, and nursing home and home health spending rise much more rapidly with morbidity than prescription drug or outpatient spending.[16]

All of the preceding analyses have used the 2017 mapping from granular health to health-care spending. While this choice strikes us as natural, it is not inconsequential. For example, if we were instead to use the 1993 mapping from granular health to health-care spending, the observed changes in mortality and morbidity between 1993 and 2017 would generate a slight net *decline* in predicted health-care spending (of about \$6,400) rather than our baseline result of a net increase of \$21,700. This primarily reflects larger predicted declines in nursing home spending and smaller predicted increases in prescription drug and outpatient spending when using the 1993 mapping from health to spending (see Appendix Figure OA.10). The main finding that mortality and morbidity changes between 1993 and 2017 caused expected remaining life-years to grow more than twice as fast as expected remaining lifetime health-care spending would thus look even more pronounced if we were to use the 1993 mapping.

**Heterogeneity by gender and socioeconomic status.** Figure 8 examines variation across demographic groups in the changes in expected lifetime health-care spending shown in Figure 7. The increase in lifetime spending is five times higher for men (an increase of \$48,100, or 15%) than for women (an increase of \$9,500, or 2%). This primarily reflects the much larger decline for women than men in the number of years spent in the worst health state (recall Figure 3), as spending is much higher for people in this highest morbidity group (recall Figure 5(a) and Figure 6(a)). The increase in lifetime health-care spending is also more than three times higher for high-income individuals than for low-income individuals, with an increase of \$35,700 (9%) for above-median-income individuals compared to \$10,900 (3%) for below-median-income individuals. This primarily reflects the much higher increase in life expectancy for higher-income individuals seen in Figure 3.

**Implications for public spending.** Finally, we translate the increase in life expectancy estimated in Figure 2 and the increase in expected lifetime health-care spending estimated in Figure 7 into

[15] Note that changes in predicted spending *only* reflect changes in the morbidity transition matrices from 1993 to 2017. They do not reflect the impacts of technological or policy changes, such as the introduction of Medicare prescription drug coverage (part D) in 2006. This is because, as noted, we use the same, fixed mapping from health to spending (based on 2017 data) to predict lifetime spending given 1993 or 2017 morbidity.

[16] Recall that there is also (potentially time-varying) heterogeneity in predicted spending within each morbidity group (see Figure 6), which also contributes to the results.

changes in expected lifetime Medicare and Social Security spending for the elderly. To assess the implications of changes in morbidity and mortality for overall expected elderly lifetime health-care spending through Medicare, and public pension spending through the Social Security annuity, requires that we calibrate the benefit formulas for both programs. Given the average annual Social Security benefit amount for retired workers in 1993, inflated to 2024 dollars, we assume a $18,000 fixed Social Security payment per year alive. Using the 1993 MCBS data for individuals covered by Traditional Medicare, we estimate that Medicare covers 50% of expected lifetime health-care spending of a 66-year-old; similar values have been found in prior work (De Nardi et al. 2016b; Chulis et al. 1993).[17] Appendix C provides more details behind both calculations.

Figure 9 shows the resulting implications for lifetime public spending. The estimated 2.4 year increase in life expectancy translates into an increase in expected lifetime Social Security payments to a 66-year-old individual of about $42,500 (or about 14%), and the estimated $21,700 increase in expected lifetime health-care spending implies an increase of about $10,800 in lifetime *Medicare* spending (or about 6%). Overall, therefore, the demographic changes imply that – under status quo policies – the average 66-year-old individual experienced an expected increase of about $53,400 in the remaining lifetime public outlays they receive, with about 80% of this increase taking the form of Social Security payments and the remainder coming from Medicare. We now turn to considering the forces that affect the optimal allocation of public spending across these two programs.

# 4 The welfare impact of alternative public spending policies

To assess the factors that affect the relative welfare impacts of (budget neutral) shifts in public funding between Social Security and health-insurance ("Medicare") benefits, we specify and calibrate a standard life-cycle consumption model in which risk-averse elderly individuals choose an optimal inter-temporal consumption path in the presence of stochastic and exogenous health and mortality risks.

We first consider a case with no moral hazard, so that health insurance coverage does not affect total health-care spending. In this case, the optimal allocation is a corner solution; conditional on a given government budget, consumer surplus is maximized by spending the entire budget on Medicare until either the budget runs out or Medicare covers all medical expenses, and then allocating any remaining budget to Social Security. We then extend the model to allow for moral hazard, which leads to a more reasonable interior solution on which one can perform comparative statics.

## 4.1 A stylized model

**Setting and notation.** We consider a population of 66-year-old individuals, each associated with an initial wealth level $w_{66}$ and an initial morbidity level $h_{66}$. We omit individual subscripts to simplify the exposition, but all of these objects can be individual-specific. Their morbidity and mortality

[17] This average Medicare coverage share of 50% masks considerable variation in cost sharing across different types of care. For example, we estimate that in 1993 Medicare covered 0% of prescription drug spending and 7% of nursing home spending, compared to 85% of inpatient spending. We abstract from these differences in our spending estimates here, as well as in the welfare analysis in the next section.

follows an exogenous Markov process, outside of the control of the individual. Once again, we denote by $d_a(h_{a-1})$ the probability that the individual dies at age $a$ when their morbidity level at age $a-1$ was $h_{a-1}$, and we denote by $Pr_a(h_a|h_{a-1})$ the age-specific probability distribution of morbidity at age $a$ given survival to age $a$ and a morbidity level of $h_{a-1}$ at age $a-1$. Health in turn translates into requisite medical spending $m$ drawn from an age-specific distribution that is a function of morbidity, denoted by $G_a(m|h)$. The requisite amount of health-care spending $m$ is non-discretionary and "must" be paid; for now, we assume it is only a function of morbidity, but we will later introduce moral hazard in Section 4.3.

There are three sources of potential transfers to the individual from the government. First, the government pays each individual a Social Security benefit in the form of an annuity – a constant, annual income payment $ss$, conditional on survival. Second, the government provides health insurance ("Medicare"), which we model as a linear coverage policy that covers a fixed proportion $\lambda \in [0,1]$ of $m$. The individual must pay the remaining portion $(1-\lambda)m$ but the government guarantees a consumption floor $\underline{c}$. That is, if the individual's income $ss$ and assets $w_a$ net of their required out-of-pocket medical spending $(1-\lambda)m_a$ produce a maximum feasible consumption level (given the no-borrowing constraint) that is below $\underline{c}$, the government will supplement the individual's income so that their feasible consumption at age $a$ (after having paid their required out-of-pocket medical expenditures) reaches the threshold $\underline{c}$. This third type of government transfer in the form of a consumption floor is typical in this literature (e.g., Scholz et al. 2006; Brown and Finkelstein 2008; De Nardi et al. 2016a); the additional government spending from providing the consumption floor can heuristically be considered Medicaid spending.

Individuals have per-period CRRA utility from consumption $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}-1}{1-\gamma}$, which is assumed to be invariant to health, and a utility of zero after death (i.e., no bequest motive). The individual faces an annual consumption decision, which they make subject to their budget constraint and a no-borrowing constraint (to eliminate the possibility that the individual can die in debt). Thus, once the individual realizes their requisite total healthcare spending $m_a$, they choose their optimal consumption $c \in [\underline{c}, \max\{\underline{c}, w_a + ss - (1-\lambda)m_a\}]$ in order to maximize

$$V_a(m, w_a, h_a) = \\ max_c \left[ u(c) + \beta(1 - d_{a+1}(h_a)) \sum_{h_{a+1}} \left( Pr_{a+1}(h_{a+1}|h_a) \int_{m'} V_{a+1}(m', w_{a+1}(c), h_{a+1}) dG_{a+1}(m'|h) \right) \right], \tag{2}$$

where $\beta$ is the per-period discount rate, $V_a(m, w_a, h_a)$ is the value function, and wealth evolves according to

$$w_{a+1}(c) = \max\{0, (1+r)(w_a + ss - c_a - (1-\lambda)m_a)\}, \tag{3}$$

where $r$ is the per-period interest rate.

**Measuring welfare.** To assess utility under alternative public policy arrangements, we monetize utility by mapping each policy to the amount individuals would be required to pay or receive at age 66 in order to be indifferent between the alternative policy and the baseline policy. We consider two public policy instruments: the level of the annual Social Security payment $ss$, and the level of the linear (that is, fixed proportion of spending) Medicare coverage $\lambda$. We denote the average age-66 value function of individuals with initial wealth $w_{66}$ under the baseline policy levels $\lambda$ and $ss$ by

$$V_{66}(w_{66}|\lambda, ss) = \sum_{h_{66}} \left( Pr(h_{66}) \int_{m'} V_{66}(m', w_{66}, h_{66}|\lambda, ss) dG_{66}(m'|h) \right). \tag{4}$$

The monetized utility from an alternative policy combination $(\lambda', ss')$ relative to the baseline policy $(\lambda, ss)$ is then given by the willingness to pay $z$, such that the individual is indifferent between paying that amount and remaining with the baseline policy or receiving the alternative policy:

$$V_{66}(w_{66} - z|\lambda, ss) = V_{66}(w_{66}|\lambda', ss'). \tag{5}$$

This approach follows an existing literature that calculates similar measures of willingness to pay for annuities (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1999; Davidoff et al. 2005) and for long-term care insurance (e.g., Brown and Finkelstein 2008). We refer to $z$ as the "wealth equivalent" of policy $(\lambda', ss')$ relative to the baseline policy. A positive (negative) value of $z$ suggests that policy $(\lambda', ss')$ is welfare enhancing (reducing) relative to baseline.

### 4.2 Analysis without moral hazard

Absent moral hazard, the optimal allocation of a given amount of public funds exhibits a corner solution: spending the government budget entirely on Medicare (i.e., increasing $\lambda$) until either the budget runs out or until Medicare covers all expenses (that is, $\lambda = 1$), at which point any remaining public funds are allocated to Social Security. This is because an additional expected dollar of Medicare coverage has two advantages over an additional expected Social Security dollar.

The first source of Medicare advantage goes back to Arrow (1963). The individual faces two sources of risk: mortality and health. Social Security payments address only the first source of risk, helping individuals reduce consumption volatility across states of the world in which they are alive (Yaari 1965). However, Medicare – which of course also only pays out in states of the world in which the individual is alive – also helps reduce consumption volatility *within* the alive states across different realizations of health (and hence medical expenditure) shocks. As a result, it is always optimal for a risk-averse individual to receive the marginal incremental (expected) dollar in the form of Medicare coverage rather than Social Security.

The second advantage of Medicare coverage is more nuanced. It stems from the fact that for a retiree facing stochastic mortality in the (assumed) absence of private annuities markets, the optimal Social Security benefit schedule is back-loaded (i.e., increasing with age); we derive this result and discuss it in more detail in Einav and Finkelstein (2026). However, Social Security payments are (under current policy) constant and do not vary with age. As a result, tying government payments to

health via Medicare coverage provides an indirect way for the government to back-load its payments – since health deteriorates (on average) with age – and get closer to the optimal government payment schedule. This ability of Medicare relative to Social Security to better target payments to higher marginal utility states of the world is, in some sense, a dynamic version of Lieber and Lockwood (2019)'s argument that, relative to cash, in-kind transfers through health insurance can improve the targeting of transfers.

To illustrate this result quantitatively, we calibrate the model and solve for wealth-equivalents for different budget-neutral policy combinations.

**Model calibration and computation.** We briefly describe the model's calibration and implementation; Appendix C provides more details. For the baseline policy parameters, we use $ss = \$18,000$ and $\lambda = 0.5$ (as in Section 3). We set the consumption floor ($\underline{c}$) to \$11,000 (the mean annual payout from Supplemental Security Income in 1993). We assume no discounting ($\beta = 1$) and no interest ($r = 0$) and set the initial wealth to $w_{66} = \$150,000$, roughly the median of total non-annuitized wealth, excluding housing and other real estate, held by individuals aged 65-69 in 2008. We assume $\gamma = 3$.

For the distribution of risks facing the individual, we use the estimates of age-specific transitions across the five morbidity states $h$ (as well as mortality) calculated using the MCBS panel data, as described in Section 2.1. Specifically, we use the estimated transitions from 1993 and 2017 and denote them by $Pr_a^t(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^t(h_{a-1})$, where $t \in \{1993, 2017\}$. The distribution of health-care spending $G_a(m|h)$ is also based on the MCBS data, specifically the distribution of predicted spending for each age-morbidity combination, as described in Section 3.2. Recall that we use a constant mapping from granular health $h'$ to spending $m$ across time periods.[18] We assume that death is certain after age 100, allowing us to solve the model backwards as it means that $V_{100}(m, w_{100}, h_{100}) = 0$ for any value of $(m, w_{100}, h_{100})$.

To determine the expected lifetime government spending $B_t$ for a 66-year-old in year $t$ across all three programs – Medicare, Social Security, and maintaining the consumption floor $\underline{c}$ ("Medicaid") – requires solving for the individual's optimal consumption path, since the amount of government spending on the consumption floor is endogenous to those consumption decisions. We therefore solve the model to compute the expected lifetime government spending for a 66-year-old in 1993 ($B_{1993}$) and in 2017 ($B_{2017}$). In both cases, we use the baseline policy parameters and other calibrated parameters described above. To calculate $B_{1993}$, we solve the model using the health transitions in 1993 (i.e., $Pr^{1993}(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^{1993}(h_{a-1})$); likewise, to calculate $B_{2017}$ we use the 2017 versions of these objects.

Naturally, $B_{2017}$ is higher than $B_{1993}$; this reflects the implications for total public spending of the changes in morbidity and mortality documented in Section 3. We find $B_{1993} = \$562,000$ and

[18] $G_a(m|h)$ is thus approximately time-invariant. Following the discussion in Section 3.2, the mapping of (granular) health to spending $\tilde{G}_a(m|h')$ relies on 2017 spending data and therefore does not change over time in all our analyses below. However, $k_a^t(h'|h)$ – the mapping from the five health states $h$ to the more granular, 31-dimensional health vector $h'$ – varies between 1993 and 2017, so the distribution $G_a^{2017}(m|h) = \tilde{G}_a(m|h')k_a^{2017}(h'|h)$ can vary between 1993 and 2017 due to changes over time in the distribution of granular health at a given age conditional on the morbidity group at that age (i.e., $k_a^t(h'|h)$).

$B_{2017} = \$609,000$. The two main components of the budget – expected lifetime spending on Medicare and Social Security – correspond, by construction, to the estimates already shown in Figure 9. The third component of the budget (which, using the calibrated model, is $\$56,400$ in 1993 and $\$49,400$ in 2017) is driven by the individual's endogenous consumption choices which determined the expected amount of government "Medicaid" spending on maintaining the consumption floor.

We then solve for the wealth-equivalents ($z$ in equation (5)) that would make the individual indifferent between the baseline Medicare and Social Security parameters and alternative policy parameters $(\lambda', ss')$. Our main counterfactuals use the 2017 health transitions $Pr^{2017}(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^{2017}(h_{a-1})$, and estimate $z$ under alternative policy parameters that hold the total government spending fixed at either $B_{1993}$ or $B_{2017}$.

**Results.** We compute the willingness to pay (see equation (5)) for different policy combinations $(\lambda', ss')$ relative to the baseline (i.e., status quo) policy of $(\lambda = 0.5, ss = 18,000)$. We consider policy combinations that give rise to the two budget levels, $B_{1993}$ and $B_{2017}$. As discussed, determining a set of budget-neutral combinations of $\lambda'$ and $ss'$ requires solving the consumer's dynamic optimization problem in equation (2) because the government spending on "Medicaid" (to maintain the guaranteed consumption floor $\underline{c}$) depends on the individual's endogenous consumption choices; all else equal, higher consumption (lower savings) increases expected government Medicaid spending. We solve for these budget levels given the status quo parameters and the year-specific mortality and morbidity health transitions. In all of the other analyses, we focus on the 2017 mortality and morbidity health transitions.

Figure 10 illustrates the key results. Panel (a) presents iso-budget lines (solid) and iso-utility curves (dashed) in the space of the two policy instruments, $\lambda$ (x-axis) and $ss$ (y-axis). The red line collects all the $(\lambda', ss')$ pairs that hold total government spending at the 1993 level $B_{1993}$, assuming that consumers solve their dynamic optimization problem facing the 2017 health transitions $Pr^{2017}(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^{2017}(h_{a-1})$. The blue line collects all the $(\lambda', ss')$ pairs that hold total government spending at the 2017 level $B_{2017}$, again assuming that consumers solve their dynamic optimization problem facing the 2017 mortality and morbidity transitions. Finally, the dashed lines present iso-utility curves under the 2017 mortality and morbidity transitions in the same space, with the utility increasing as one moves up and to the right (as either $\lambda$ and/or $ss$ increase).

The key point to notice here is that both the iso-budget and iso-utility curves are approximately linear, but the iso-utility curves are steeper. As a result, consistent with the economic intuition highlighted, the utility-maximizing allocation of public funds involves putting all the funding into Medicare until Medicare coverage is 100%, and only then allocating any remaining funds (if any) to Social Security. This is shown explicitly in Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 10, which plot the wealth equivalent on the y-axis associated with different (budget neutral) choices of $\lambda$ (Panel (b)) or $ss$ (Panel (c)) on the x-axis. Panel (b) shows that the highest wealth equivalent is obtained at maximum Medicare coverage of $\lambda = 1$. Recall that this figure shows budget-neutral policies, so an increase in $\lambda$ must come with a decrease in Social Security benefits $ss$ to make the choice budget neutral. Panel (c) shows the mirror image of these results by plotting the wealth equivalent of (budget neutral) changes

to the Social Security benefits $ss$.

### 4.3 Analysis with moral hazard

The preceding analysis illustrated the economic forces affecting the value of Medicare compared to Social Security. However, they also produced a corner solution in which the consumer always prefers to maximize the Medicare benefits. Importantly, however, moral hazard suggests a classic source of disadvantage for in-kind transfers such as health insurance when evaluating the welfare properties of in-kind relative to cash transfers (Lieber and Lockwood 2019). We show here that incorporating moral hazard, a realistic feature of health insurance (Einav and Finkelstein 2018), creates an interior solution to the optimal allocation of public funds between Medicare and Social Security; moral hazard introduces a downside of Medicare relative to Social Security since Medicare now induces excessive (and inefficient) health-care spending.

**Incorporating moral hazard into the model.** Moral hazard is typically modeled by considering an individual's utility-maximizing choice between medical and non-medical consumption; individual utility is a function of non-medical consumption and health, medical consumption is an input into health, and insurance coverage reduces the price of that medical consumption (e.g., Einav et al. 2013; De Nardi et al. 2016a). In these models, any counterfactual Medicare coverage that affects the individual's choice of medical spending would therefore also affect the health transition matrices in some way we would need to parameterize and calibrate. However, since our primary goal is to examine how changes in these matrices affect the value of health insurance compared to Social Security, we want to abstract from any direct impacts of health insurance on these health transitions.

Therefore, instead of modeling optimal medical spending as part of the individual's optimal choice, we introduce moral hazard into the model in a "reduced form" way by assuming that increased Medicare coverage leads to greater medical spending without any effect on the individual health transitions. Specifically, we assume that if Medicare covers a share $\lambda$ of total health-care expenditure, then a share $q(\lambda) = \theta\lambda^{\kappa} \in [0, 1)$ of total medical expenditure is wasted, where the parameter $\theta \geq 0$ controls the level of moral hazard and the parameter $\kappa > 1$ controls how fast moral hazard increases with coverage levels. We denote by $m_e$ the efficient amount of health-care spending for a given individual in a given year, i.e., how much the individual would spend with no coverage ($\lambda = 0$), or equivalently with no moral hazard ($q = 0$); in the context of our model, $m_e$ is a function of the individual's morbidity level and spending realization. Under these assumptions, the observed actual spending $m(\lambda)$ can be written as a function of the efficient medical spending and moral hazard: $m(\lambda) = \frac{m_e}{1-q(\lambda)}$. That is, the observed medical spending is the efficient amount of medical spending $m_e$, inflated by a factor that is increasing in the level of moral hazard $q$; the difference between the observed level of spending and the efficient level of spending $m(\lambda) - m_e = q(\lambda)m$ is "wasted."

**Calibrating moral hazard.** We use the same calibration choices as in the previous section but now must also calibrate the moral hazard parameters $\theta$ and $\kappa$. The value of $\theta$ is not very consequential

so we calibrate it to 0.2,[19] but $\kappa$ affects the curvature of moral hazard with respect to insurance coverage, and so has a non-trivial effect on counterfactual results. For our illustrative purposes, we calibrate the value of $\kappa$ to be the value that would have made the baseline policy parameters ($ss = \$18,000, \lambda = 0.5$) optimal under the 1993 demographics. In other words, we calibrate $\kappa$ by finding the value that would make it maximize the wealth equivalent $z$ in equation (5), given the 1993 mortality and morbidity transition patterns and total government spending of $B_{1993}$.[20] This is an obviously heroic assumption. We use it to make our analysis of the impact of demographic change more conceptually straightforward. Specifically, we can ask: if policy choices were optimal in 1993, how would this optimal policy be affected by the subsequent demographic changes?

**Results.** We repeat the exercise in Section 4.2, but now use the calibrated values of $\theta$ and $\kappa$ to account for moral hazard. Naturally, once moral hazard is present, full Medicare coverage is sub-optimal; by design, the calibrated level of moral hazard means that under the 1993 budget and the 1993 transition matrices the wealth equivalent maximizing policy is the baseline policy of $\lambda = 0.5$ and $ss = \$18,000$.

Figure 11 shows the implications for the wealth equivalent maximizing policy *under the 2017 transition matrices*. Panel (a) shows how wealth equivalents (y-axis) vary with the Medicare share (x-axis) for different budget levels, while Panel (b) presents the analogous results for Social Security. Black dots indicate the wealth equivalent maximizing choice of the Medicare coverage and Social Security amount for each budget level under the 2017 transition matrices. Under the passive expansion of the budget from $B_{1993}$ to $B_{2017}$ due to demographic changes, the black dot on the blue lines indicates that the optimal Medicare and Social Security parameters remain essentially unchanged at about $\lambda = 0.5$ and $ss = 18,000$. If instead these programs were not entitlements and public expenditure were capped at its $B_{1993}$ level, black dots on the red line indicate that the optimal policy now involves a non-trivial decline in both Medicare and Social Security benefits, to 35% Medicare coverage and \$14,910 annual Social Security benefit. This lower level of benefits makes individual "poorer," and requires the government to more than double their "Medicaid" benefits (from $\$56,400$ per individual to $\$125,300$), reducing overall Medicare expenditure by 26.2% (from $\$193,700$ to $\$143,000$) and Social Security expenditure by 5.8% (from $\$312,000$ to $\$294,000$).

[19] Results are very similar when we use a broad range of alternative values for $\theta$, as long as $\kappa$ is re-calibrated (as described below) conditional on $\theta$.

[20] Appendix Figure OA.11 illustrates this calibration by showing that at the calibrated value of $\kappa = 6$ the wealth equivalent is maximized at the observed policy ($\lambda = 0.5$). We note that this value of $\kappa = 6$, combined with $\theta = 0.2$, implies an elasticity of health spending $m$ with respect to insurance coverage $\lambda$ of approximately -0.02, which is an order of magnitude lower than the oft-quoted RAND elasticity of -0.2 (Manning et al. 1987; Keeler and Rolph 1988). Put differently, in order to obtain the (obviously heroic) benchmark that the split of public funding in 1993 between Medicare and Social Security was optimal requires a moral hazard elasticity much lower than the "conventional wisdom." One interpretation of this of course is that the 1993 allocation was not in fact optimal. Another is that there are other, unmodeled forces that favor Medicare.

# 5 Conclusions

In this paper we calculate the implications for public spending of increased elderly life expectancy and improved elderly health between 1993 and 2017. Under current program rules for public health insurance and public pensions, these demographic trends increased expected lifetime Social Security spending for a 66-year-old by 14%, more than twice as fast as the 6% increase in expected lifetime Medicare spending for a 66-year-old. Interestingly, despite the increase in life expectancy, expected spending on home health and nursing homes actually declines slightly, due to the substantial decreases in morbidity.

We then write down and calibrate a model that allows us to consider the optimal allocation of public funding between Social Security and Medicare. While these two programs are administered with separate revenue streams and through separate agencies, the model underscores that they are functionally highly related, providing two distinct sources of consumption smoothing for elderly retirees facing stochastic mortality and morbidity. The model clarifies several key economic forces that affect the relative consumer surplus from allocating an incremental expected dollar to Medicare (health insurance) coverage relative to Social Security (longevity insurance via annuities), and allows us to examine via stylized quantitative calibrations how demographic changes can affect this tradeoff. We hope this is a useful first step for further analysis of how public policy regarding not just the *level* of expenditures on social programs but also their relative allocation across programs should respond to major demographic trends.

## References


**Abeliansky, Ana Lucia and Holger Strulik**, "Long-Run Improvements in Human Health: Steady but Unequal," *Journal of the Economics of Ageing*, 2019, *14*, 100189.

**_ , Devin Erel, and Holger Strulik**, "Aging in the USA: Similarities and Disparities Across Time and Space," *Scientific Reports*, 2020, *10*, 14309.

**Arrow, Kenneth J.**, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," *American Economic Review*, 1963, *53* (5), 941–973.

**Brown, Jeffrey R. and Amy Finkelstein**, "The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," *American Economic Review*, 2008, *98* (3), 1083–1102.

**Buxbaum, Jason D., Michael E. Chernew, A. Mark Fendrick, and David M. Cutler**, "Contributions of Public Health, Pharmaceuticals, and Other Medical Care to US Life Expectancy Changes, 1990-2015," *Health Affairs*, 2020, *39* (9), 1546–1556.

**Case, Anne and Angus Deaton**, "Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2015, *112* (49), 15078–15083.

**_ and _** , *Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism*, Princeton University Press, 2020.

**Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services**, "MCBS Advanced Tutorial on Weighting and Variance Estimation," Technical Report 2021.

**Chetty, Raj, Michael Stepner, Sarah Abraham, Shelby Lin, Benjamin Scuderi, Nicholas Turner, Augustin Bergeron, and David Cutler**, "The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014," *JAMA*, 2016, *315* (16), 1750–1766.

**Chulis, George S., Franklin J. Eppig, Mary O. Hogan, Daniel R. Waldo, and Ross H. Arnett**, "Health Insurance and the Elderly: Data from MCBS," *Health Care Financing Review*, 1993, *14* (3), 163–181.

**Congressional Budget Office**, *The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2025-2055*, Congressional Budget Office, 2025.

**Cutler, David, Kaushik Ghosh, and Mary Beth Landrum**, "Evidence for Significant Compression of Morbidity in the Elderly U.S. Population," *Discoveries in the Economics of Aging*, 2014, pp. 21–51.

**Cutler, David M., Kaushik Ghosh, Kassandra L. Messer, Trivellore Raghunathan, Allison B. Rosen, and Susan T. Stewart**, "A Satellite Account for Health in the United States," *American Economic Review*, 2022, *112* (2), 494–533.

**Davidoff, Thomas, Jeffrey R. Brown, and Peter A. Diamond**, "Annuities and Individual Welfare," *American Economic Review*, 2005, *95* (5), 1573–1590.

**der Klaauw, Wilbert Van and Kenneth I. Wolpin**, "Social Security and the Retirement and Savings Behavior of Low-Income Households," *Journal of Econometrics*, 2008, *145* (1-2), 21–42.

**Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein, Stephen P. Ryan, Paul Schrimpf, and Mark R. Cullen**, "Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance," *American Economic Review*, 2013, *103* (1), 178–219.

**_ and _** , "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2018, *16* (4), 957–982.

**_ and _** , "On the Optimality of Deferred Public Annuities," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2026, *256*, 105601.

**Freedman, Vicki A., Brenda C. Spillman, Patti M. Andreski, Jennifer C. Cornman, Eileen M. Crimmins, Ellen Kramarow, James Lubitz, Linda G. Martin, Sharon S. Merkin, Robert F. Schoeni et al.**, "Trends in Late-Life Activity Limitations in the United States: An Update from Five National Surveys," *Demography*, 2013, *50* (2), 661–671.

**Freedman, Vicki, Linda Martin, and Robert Schoeni**, "Recent Trends in Disability and Functioning among Older Adults in the United States: A Systematic Review," *JAMA*, 2002, *288* (24), 3137–3146.

**French, Eric**, "The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and Retirement Behaviour," *Review of Economic Studies*, 2005, *72* (2), 395–427.

**Fries, James F.**, "Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity," *New England Journal of Medicine*, 1980, *303*, 130–135.

**Fuchs, Victor R.**, ""Though Much is Taken"–Reflections on Aging, Health, and Medical Care," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society*, 1984, *64* (2), 143–166.

**Gruber, Jonathan and Kathleen McGarry**, *Long-Term Care around the World*, University of Chicago Press, 2025.

**Gruenberg, Ernest M.**, "The Failures of Success," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society*, 1977, *83* (4), 779–800.

**Hudomiet, Péter, Michael D. Hurd, and Susann Rohwedder**, "Forecasting Mortality Inequalities in the US Based on Trends in Midlife Health," *Journal of Health Economics*, 2021, *80*, 102540.

**_ , _ , and _** , "Trends in Health in Midlife and Late Life," *Journal of Human Capital*, 2022, *16* (1), 133–156.

**Keeler, Emmett B. and John E. Rolph**, "The Demand for Episodes of Treatment in the Health Insurance Experiment," *Journal of Health Economics*, 1988, *7* (4), 337–367.

**Khwaja, Ahmed**, "Estimating Willingness to Pay for Medicare Using a Dynamic Life-Cycle Model of Demand for Health Insurance," *Journal of Econometrics*, 2010, *156* (1), 130–147.

**Lee, Ronald**, "Macroeconomics, Aging, and Growth," in "Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging," Vol. 1, North-Holland, 2016, pp. 59–118.

**Lieber, Ethan M.J. and Lee M. Lockwood**, "Targeting with In-Kind Transfers: Evidence from Medicaid Home Care," *American Economic Review*, 2019, *109* (4), 1461–1485.

**Lockwood, Lee M.**, "Incidental Bequests and the Choice to Self-Insure Late-Life Risks," *American Economic Review*, 2018, *108* (9), 2513–2550.

**Lubitz, James, Liming Cai, Ellen Kramarow, and Harold Lentzner**, "Health, Life Expectancy, and Health Care Spending among the Elderly," *New England Journal of Medicine*, 2003, *349* (11), 1048–1055.

**Manning, Willard G., Joseph P. Newhouse, Naihua Duan, Emmett B. Keeler, and Arleen Leibowitz**, "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," *American Economic Review*, 1987, pp. 251–277.

**Manton, Kenneth G.**, "Changing Concepts of Morbidity and Mortality in the Elderly Population," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society*, 1982, pp. 183–244.

**McClellan, Mark and Jonathan Skinner**, "The Incidence of Medicare," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2006, *90* (1-2), 257–276.

**Mitchell, Olivia S., James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky, and Jeffrey R. Brown**, "New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities," *American Economic Review*, 1999, *89* (5), 1299–1318.

**Nardi, Mariacristina De, Eric French, and John B. Jones**, "Why Do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2010, *118* (1), 39–75.

**_ , _ , and John Bailey Jones**, "Medicaid Insurance in Old Age," *American Economic Review*, 2016, *106* (11), 3480–3520.

**_ , _ , _ , and Jeremy McCauley**, "Medical Spending of the US Elderly," *Fiscal Studies*, 2016, *37* (3-4), 717–747.

**National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine**, *The Growing Gap in Life Expectancy by Income: Implications for Federal Programs and Policy Responses*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2015.

**National Research Council**, *Aging and the Macroeconomy: Long-Term Implications of an Older Population*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2012.

**Poterba, James M.**, "Retirement Security in an Aging Population," *American Economic Review*, 2014, *104* (5), 1–30.

_ **and Lawrence H. Summers**, *Public Policy Implications of Declining Old-Age Mortality*, Brookings Institution Press, 1987.

**Russo, Nicolò, Rory McGee, Mariacristina De Nardi, Margherita Borella, and Ross Abram**, "Midlife Health and Later Life Economic Inequality," *NBER Working Paper 32971*, 2024.

**Scholz, John Karl, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun**, "Are Americans Saving "Optimally" for Retirement?," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, *114* (4), 607–643.

**Sheiner, Louise**, "The Long-Term Impact of Aging on the Federal Budget," in "Fiscal Accountability and Population Aging," Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021, pp. 93–117.


**Social Security Administration**, "Benefits Paid by Type of Beneficiary," Technical Report 2025.

**Strulik, Holger**, "Measuring Ageing," in "The Routledge Handbook of the Economics of Ageing," Routledge, 2023, pp. 455–473.

**Utkus, Stephen P. and Olivia S. Mitchell**, "Extending Healthspans in an Aging World," *NBER Working Paper 33992*, 2025.


**Yaari, Menahem E.**, "Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer," *Review of Economic Studies*, 1965, *32* (2), 137–150.

Figure 1: Trends in Total Number of ADL and IADLs




Notes: Figure displays the mean number of ADLs plus IADLs by age (Panel (a)) and by number of years to death (Panel (b)), where year 0 consists of anywhere from 365 to 0 days before death. We show results separately for the 1992-1994 ("1993") survey cohorts (in red), the 2011-2013 ("2012") survey cohorts (in yellow), and the 2016-2018 ("2017") survey cohorts (in blue). The "2017" survey cohort is not displayed in Panel (b) because our mortality data end in 2019. All ages above 95 are collapsed into a 95+ category. A gray histogram displays the proportion of observations at each age in "2017" (Panel (a)) or each year relative to time-to-death in "2012" (Panel (b)). Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 1992-1994 (N = 26,413), 2011-2013 (N = 23,669), or 2016-2018 (N = 19,917).


Figure 2: Life Expectancy at 66 by Morbidity Group





Notes: Figure displays the life expectancy of the typical 66-year-old, both overall and calculated as the number of years expected to be spent within each morbidity group. Panel (a) displays these statistics in years separately for 1992-1994 ("1993") (in red) and 2016-2018 ("2017") (in blue). Panel (b) displays the difference between these two years. Estimates for each year are calculated using that year's age-66 morbidity group shares and subsequent, age-specific health transition matrices. N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year.

Figure 3: Lifetime Expectancy at 66 by Gender and Socioeconomic Status


(a) Male Life Expectancy





(b) Change in Male Life Expectancy





(c) Female Life Expectancy





(d) Change in Female Life Expectancy





(e) Low-Income Life Expectancy





(f) Change in Low-Income Life Expectancy




(g) High-Income Life Expectancy





(h) Change in High-Income Life Expectancy





Notes: Figure displays the life expectancy (first column) and difference in life expectancy from 1993 to 2017 (second column) for a 66-year-old by gender and socioeconomic status. We define an individual as high- or low-income depending on whether they are above or below median income for their initial age, given their gender and year. Estimates for each year are calculated using that year's gender (or income)-specific age-66 morbidity group shares and subsequent, gender (or income)-and-age-specific health transition matrices. N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year.

Figure 4: Trends in Healthcare Spending by Age and Years to Death





Notes: Figure displays mean spending in 2024 dollars by age (Panel (a)) and by years before death (Panel (b)), where year 0 consists of anywhere from 365 to 0 days before death. We show results by age in Panel (a) for the 2017 cohort and results by years to death in Panel (b) for the 2012 cohort. All ages above 95 are collapsed into a 95+ category. Spending is displayed for all care types (solid black line), and for individual subcategories of care. The care category labeled "Outpatient" includes hospice and dental spending as well as outpatient and physician spending. A gray histogram displays the proportion of observations in each age category in 2016-2018 ("2017") (Panel (a)) or each year-before-death category in 2011-2013 ("2012") (Panel (b)). Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 2016-2018 (Panel (a), N = 19,917) or in 2011-2013 (Panel (b), N = 23,669).

Figure 5: Health Care Spending by Morbidity Group Within Age Bins, 2017





Notes: Figure displays mean spending in 2016-2018 ("2017") by morbidity group within five-year age bins, in 2024 dollars. All ages above 95 are collapsed into a 95+ category. Mean spending within an age bin across all morbidity groups is shown by the dotted line; spending by morbidity group is displayed separately for all care types together (Panel (a)) and for nursing home care (Panel (b)); patterns for all care types are shown in Appendix Figure OA.6. Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 2016-2018 (N=19,917).

Figure 6: Predicted Health-Care Spending by Morbidity Group and Number of Conditions Group





Notes: Figure displays a boxplot of predicted spending in 2024 dollars for individuals in a given morbidity group (Panel (a)) or with a given number of conditions (Panel (b)). Predicted spending is calculated using random forests trained on 2016-2018 data. For each boxplot, the line in the box denotes the median, the edges of the box denote the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the lower and upper ends of the line indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles. Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes 226,647 MCBS survey respondents between 1992 and 2019.

Figure 7: Lifetime Health-Care Spending at 66 by Spending Category





Notes: Figure displays the lifetime health-care spending of the typical 66-year-old in 2024 dollars, both overall and within each subcategory of spending. Panel (a) displays these statistics in years separately for 1992-1994 ("1993") (in red) and 2016-2018 ("2017") (in blue). Panel (b) displays the difference between these two years. The category labeled "Outpatient" includes hospice and dental spending as well as outpatient and physician spending. The age-66 morbidity group shares, age-specific morbidity group transitions, and age-specific distribution of granular morbidity measures within the coarse morbidity groups are all allowed to vary by year. The mapping from granular morbidity to predicted spending is held fixed by imposing the mapping generated by random forests trained on "2017" data. N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year.

Figure 8: Lifetime Health-Care Spending at 66 by Gender and Socioeconomic Status




Notes: Figure displays the lifetime health-care spending (first column), and difference in lifetime health-care spending from 1992-1994 ("1993") to 2016-2018 ("2017") (second column) for a 66-year-old in 2024 dollars by gender and socioeconomic status. We define an individual as high- or low-income depending on whether they are above or below median income for their initial age in the data, gender, and pooled years. The category labeled "Outpatient" includes hospice and dental spending as well as outpatient and physician spending. The age-66 morbidity group shares, age-specific morbidity group transitions, and age-specific distribution of granular morbidity measures within the coarse morbidity groups are all allowed to vary by year and demographic group (gender or socioeconomic status). The mapping from granular morbidity to predicted spending is held fixed by imposing the mapping generated by random forests trained on 2016-2018 ("2017") data. N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year.


Figure 9: Lifetime Per-Capita Government Spending at 66





Notes: Figure displays the lifetime government spending on public pensions and public health insurance incurred by the typical 66-year-old. Panel (a) displays these statistics in years separately for 1992-1994 ("1993") (in red) and 2016-2018 ("2017") (in blue). Panel (b) displays the difference between these two years. All spending is in 2024 dollars. Public pensions are set at $17,634 per year in 2024 dollars. Public health insurance is set at 49.3% coverage. The age-66 morbidity group shares, age-specific morbidity group transitions, and age-specific distribution of granular morbidity measures within the coarse morbidity groups are all allowed to vary by year. The mapping from granular morbidity to predicted spending is held fixed by imposing the mapping generated by random forests trained on 2016-2018 ("2017") data. N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year.

Figure 10: Iso-Budget Lines and Wealth Equivalence: No Moral Hazard


(a) Iso-Budget Lines




(b) Wealth Equivalence Across Medicare Policy





(c) Wealth Equivalence Across Social Security Policy





Notes: Figure shows the model results under the assumption of no moral hazard. In Panel (a), the colored lines are plotted for the Medicare and Social Security combinations that, using the 2016-2018 ("2017") morbidity and mortality transitions, produce a budget that equal to the one found at 50% Medicare coverage and $18,000 Social Security in "1993" (i.e., $B_{1993}$, in red) and in "2017" ($B_{2017}$, in blue). The level of the "1993" ("2017") budget is calculated using that year's morbidity-mortality transitions and the status quo policy of 50% Medicare and $18,000 Social Security payments; budget calculations include consumption floor spending. Panels (b) and (c) show the additional wealth that would make an individual indifferent between having 50% Medicare coverage and $18,000 Social Security in "2017" or having the policy combinations that generate the "1993" budget (in red) and the "2017" budget (in blue). In Panel (b), the x-axis represents Medicare coverage, with Social Security adjusted to satisfy the corresponding budget constraint; in Panel (c) the x-axis represents the Social Security policy, with Medicare coverage adjusted to satisfy the corresponding budget constraint. All iso-budget and iso-utility calculations are made for a 66-year-old with $150,000 in wealth facing the "2017" health transitions $Pr^{2017}(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^{2017}(h_{a-1})$. All spending is in 2024 dollars.

Figure 11: Iso-Budget Lines and Wealth Equivalence: with Moral Hazard

(a) Across Medicare Policy




(b) Across Social Security Policy




Notes: Figure shows the model results under an assumed level of moral hazard such that the status quo allocation of 50% Medicare coverage and $18,000 Social Security was optimal given 1992-1994 ("1993") mortality and morbidity. Panels (a) and (b) show the additional wealth that would make an individual indifferent between having 50% Medicare coverage and $18,000 Social Security or having the policy combinations that generate the "1993" budget (i.e., $B_{1993}$, in red) and the "2017" budget (i.e., $B_{2017}$, in blue). In Panel (a), the x-axis represents Medicare coverage, with Social Security adjusted to satisfy the corresponding budget constraint; in Panel (b) the x-axis represents the Social Security policy, with Medicare coverage adjusted to satisfy the corresponding budget constraint. The level of the "1993" ("2017") budget is calculated using that year's morbidity-mortality transitions and the status quo policy of 50% Medicare and $18,000 Social Security payments; budget calculations include consumption floor spending. All iso-budget and iso-utility calculations are made for a 66-year-old with $150,000 in wealth facing the "2017" health transitions $Pr^{2017}(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^{2017}(h_{a-1})$. All spending is in 2024 dollars.

# Online Appendix

## A Data and key measures

### A.1 Data

Every year the MCBS, which is sponsored by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), surveys about 10,000 randomly selected current Medicare beneficiaries. These include residents of nursing homes and other long-term care facilities who are often omitted from other comparable surveys. The MCBS has been conducted annually since 1991, with the exception of 2014. The MCBS has a rotating panel with an inclusion period of three to four years. Some of our analyses will treat the data as a repeated cross-section, while in other we will exploit the panel dimension to estimate transition probabilities across health states.

The MCBS has undergone several evolutions since its inception. Until 2013, it was divided into two distinct surveys: an "Access to Care" survey file that started in 1991 and focused on questions around access to and satisfaction with health care, and a "Cost and Use" file that started in 1992 and focused on utilization and spending. The population of individuals included in the two surveys is similar but not identical: the Access to Care file was designed to be representative of the population that was enrolled in Medicare for the entire survey year in question, while the Cost and Use file is representative of the population enrolled in Medicare for any portion of the survey year.[21] After 2013, the survey was re-designed. It did not take place in 2014, and resumed in 2015 with a "Survey File" (covering similar information to the Access to Care file) and a "Cost Supplement File" (covering similar information to the Cost and Use file). On average from 1992 through 2019, 91% of those interviewed by the Access to Care survey (and its successor) were also interviewed by the Cost and Use survey in that year, and 65% of those interviewed by the Cost and Use survey were also interviewed by the Access to Care survey.

In both surveys, we observe basic demographic characteristics including age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education. In addition, we observe nursing home residence status and answers to a range of health-related survey questions, including activities of daily living (ADLs), instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), functional limitations, and whether an individual has ever been diagnosed with a number of diseases. The MCBS typically asks questions directly to the individual of interest, but will instead survey family members if an individual is incapacitated; in addition, the MCBS surveys facility staff, rather than the individual in question, when the individual is a current resident of a long-term care facility.[22]

Individuals in the MCBS can be linked to the Medicare denominator files, which include their date of death, if any. We have access to this Medicare linkage for death data (through 2019) for individuals in the Access to Care surveys (and its post 2013 successor, the Survey File). In addition, the Cost and Use survey (and post-2013 successor Cost Supplement survey) ask a range of questions on annual health-related expenditures.

[21] Specifically, the "Access to Care" sample limits to those who were continuously enrolled in the MCBS from the first day of the calendar year through the date of their interview, which typically takes place in the fall (CMS 2021b). To the best of our knowledge, individuals are not removed from this sample if their Medicare coverage is terminated after their interview date but prior to the last date of the calendar year. Accordingly, we observe individuals with post-interview deaths within the calendar year for both the "Access to Care" and "Cost and Use" survey.

[22] For an overview on how the MCBS defines facilities and conducts facility interviews, see CMS (2019).

## A.2 Sample selection.

We use 27 years of data from 1992 through 2019. As noted, the MCBS was not conducted in 2014, and we start in 1992 (rather than in 1991) because we want to include individuals who appear in both the Access to Care and Cost and Use Surveys. Since our analysis requires data both on date of death (if any) as well as information on health care spending and its components, we limit our sample each year to the intersection of those interviewed by the Access to Care and Cost and Use surveys.[23] Although the MCBS surveys Medicare recipients of all ages, we restrict our attention to the elderly, specifically, individuals aged 66 and over.[24]

Appendix Figure OA.12 displays the distribution of age, morbidity, and spending for the Access to Care sample, the Cost and Use sample, and our intersection; comfortingly, the intersection sample exhibits highly similar trends to both the Access to Care and Cost and Use samples. We follow the data documentation's recommendation to use the survey weights from the Cost and Use file when analyzing the intersection sample (CMS 2021a).[25] We additionally adjust the weights such that every year's weight is the same.

After all of these restrictions, our analysis sample consists of 226,647 individual-years. On average, our sample size is 8,394 individuals per year. We will often show statistics for specific ages and specific morbidity groups using data pooled across three consecutive survey years – for specific ages and specific morbidity groups. In particular, most of our analyses use data from the first three years of our sample (1992-1994) which we refer to throughout as "1993," or data from the last three years of sample (2016-2018),[26] which we refer to throughout as "2017." To give a sense of sample size, Appendix Table OA.4 shows sample sizes by age and morbidity group for all 19,917 individuals in our 2016-2018 ("2017") data.

## A.3 Key variables

**Granular Morbidity Measures.** We analyze 31 different morbidity measures that are measured maintain relatively consistent wording year-over-year between 1992 and 2019 and do not exhibit economically meaningful discontinuities between survey years that could be suggestive of changes in survey design. In practice, this means we retain all ADL, IADL, and functional limitation measures, and 14 out of the 16 disease measures.[27]

[23] The typical sequence is that individuals are interviewed in Year 1 by the Access survey, and in Years 2-4 by the Access and Cost surveys. Since we limit our analysis to person-years that are in both, we typically observe a given individual for three years.

[24] We limit the sample to ages 66 and older instead of 65 and older as the 65-year-olds interviewed by the MCBS are disproportionately those that qualify for Medicare through a disability, end-stage renal disease (ESRD), or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). This occurs because Access to Care was designed to be representative of the population that was enrolled in Medicare for the entire survey year, and therefore it is not always administered to those who enter Medicare at age 65 through age-based eligibility. This policy changed in 2014, where the sampling frame was expanded to include the age-65 individuals who had previously been missing from the survey. To ensure continuity across the redesign, we also define age as of January 1 on the year the survey was administered. This guarantees that everyone who is considered 66 who qualified through the age pathway will have had at least one year being on Medicare.

[25] We also restrict to individuals with non-missing health information, and those with a unique crosswalk to Medicare data; these restrictions remove only a handful of observations.

[26] To be precise, 2019 is the last year of the sample, but we refer to 2018 as the last year of the sample because estimating health transitions requires information from the subsequent year, making 2019 not fully usable.

[27] The only diseases omitted from our sample are those on the presence of arthritis and depression, both due to differences in wording across years. We also omit self-reported measures of sight and hearing due to similar inconsistencies. We note that, starting in 1997, MCBS respondents residing in SNFs receive a slightly different health questionnaire, where both question wording and potential responses are somewhat different. In the nursing-home-specific surveys, ADLs, IADLs, and functional limitations alike are measured on a sliding scale, ranging from total independence to total dependence rather than asking whether individuals experience any difficulty performing the activity. In this case, we recode response above the lowest disability level as "1", following Cutler et al. (2014). We perform similar transformations

ADLs ask about individuals' ability to independently carry out physical tasks that are typically part of everyday life, including eating, dressing, and bathing. IADLs ask about somewhat more complex tasks that may require greater executive functioning skills, including managing money, shopping, and preparing meals. The MCBS asks about six ADLs and six IADLs, each of which is a binary question on whether individuals experience any difficulties performing the given task.

The MCBS also asks about five "functional limitations." These consist of comparatively more difficult physical activities that may or may not come up in the course of everyday life, including lifting 10 pounds, raising one's hands above their head, and walking 2-3 blocks. Unlike ADLs and IADLs, these questions are asked on a sliding scale ranging from "no difficulty" to complete inability to perform the task; we recode individuals as having the functional limitation if they report any level of difficulty above the minimum.[28] Finally, the MCBS asks whether individuals have ever been diagnosed with 16 different chronic diseases. These are binary questions, and ask individuals whether they have ever been told by a medical professional that they have a particular condition.

**Coarser morbidity measures.** For some of our analyses, we find it useful to categorize individuals into five ascending "morbidity groups" based on the number of ADLs and IADLs currently experienced. ADLs and IADLs as the most typical measure of disability across the literature on aging and morbidity (e.g., Cutler et al. 2014; Freedman et al. 2002). Accordingly, we construct morbidity groups based on total number of ADLs and IADLs present as follows: Group 1 has 0 ADLs/IADLs, Group 2 has 1 ADL/IADL, Group 3 has 2-3 ADLs/IADLs, Group 4 has 4-7 ADLs/IADLs, and Group 5 has 8+ ADLs/IADLs. Individuals can have up to 12 ADLs/IADLs (6 ADLs and 6 IADLs). These groups are defined to create a roughly flat overall distribution of groups between Groups 2-5, though approximately half of all observations are in Group 1.

**Health-care spending.** Our primary measurement of cost is total annual expenses across all payer types (which consist of Medicare (both Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage), Medicaid, a range of private insurers, and self-pay), and all MCBS-reported categories of care (inpatient, outpatient, long-term care, medical provider encounters, prescriptions, dental, home health, and hospice care). Respondents are asked about their health expenditures by category of care (including inpatient, nursing home, and home health care), and payer (including Medicare, Medicaid, and self-pay). The MCBS then validates these self-reported costs against administrative data on claims from Traditional Medicare, as well as on home health care use and nursing home care regardless of payer from the Outcome and Assessment Information Set (OASIS) and Minimum Data Set (MDS) respectively, and uses this comparison to adjust its estimates of expenditures.[29]

We collapse all health spending data to the person-year level and standardize all expenses to 2024 dollars.

**Mortality.** We obtain surveyed individual's death dates by linking the MCBS to the Medicare Master Beneficiary Summary File, which has death dates (if any) for all Medicare enrollees, including those enrolled in Medicare Advantage. We say an individual transitions from a given morbidity state into death if the death date is within a calendar year of their last interview date with morbidity state information.[30]

for other variables with changing formats between the non-nursing home and nursing home health questionnaires.

[28] This follows the same recoding procedure as previously adopted by Cutler et al. (2014).

[29] For the validation, they observe claim-level data for all Traditional Medicare expenses, and comparatively more aggregated data for all non-Medicare expenses (typically at the encounter, stay, or person-year level, depending on the type of care).

[30] In the rare circumstance that the death date is before the last interview date, we recode the death date as after the last interview date if it is less that 90 days before the last interview date. If the death date is more than 90 days before

We define interviews to be "0" years to death if the interview happened anywhere from 365 to 0 days before death. Note that it is possible that multiple interviews from one individual can occur within a 365 day window.

### A.4 Transition matrix creation

As discussed in Section 2, we construct age- and year-specific transition matrices by leveraging the rotating panel structure of the MCBS.[31] Each age- and year-specific transition matrix is a 5 x 6 matrix corresponding to the five possible coarse morbidity states in year $t$ and the 6 possible coarse morbidity states (or death) in year $t+1$.

Note that in year $t+1$ we observe morbidity status only for those who are alive and are interviewed by the MCBS. In contrast, we observe mortality outcomes for everyone who die in year $t+1$. To account for this difference, we scale down the number of people who died in $t+1$ by the probability of being interviewed if one were alive in $t+1$. We do so conditional on year $t$ morbidity group, before calculating the mortality rate within each starting morbidity group, to account for the possibility that individuals of different morbidity are associated with different probabilities of remaining on the MCBS panel.[32]

We endeavor to estimate transition matrices within each year for each age and morbidity group separately. However, in practice, certain combinations of age and morbidity group are associated with very few individuals who are available to inform the transition matrix proportions. For example, only a small number of 95-year-olds are in morbidity group 1. Moreover, unless these individuals either have an interview at age 96 or die, they provide no information for the transition matrix. We make two adjustments to our base approach to account for this "data sparsity." First, as noted already, for all of our analyses we pool data across three starting years to increase sample size. Second, where data remains sufficiently sparse, we further pool across ages. Specifically, for a given age $a$ and morbidity group $m$, if the number of transitions[33] that we observe is less than 15, we also add the transitions from morbidity group $m$ at ages $a-1$ and $a+1$ to inform the transition probabilities in the row for morbidity group $m$ in age $a$'s transition matrix.[34] If after pooling we still have no transitions to another morbidity group, we will continue pooling the surrounding ages until there is at least one transition to another morbidity group.

## B Mapping from health and age to health-care spending

We use a random forest algorithm to allow for flexible interactions in the mapping from our 31 granular morbidity measures to health-care spending. We predict either total annual health-care spending in

the last interview date, we assume that the death date is erroneous and assume the individual has not died.

[31] In practice, for sample size reasons, each year's transition matrices are estimated using data from the previous and following year as well (in other words, the transition matrix for, say, 73-year-olds in 1993 is estimated by examining the morbidity transitions for 73-year-olds interviewed by the MCBS in 1992, 1993, and 1994, and who are also interviewed the following year). Each transition matrix therefore represents a 3-year moving average.

[32] To give a concrete example, suppose that at age 80 there are 100 people who start in morbidity group 1. Say that at age 81, 9 of these people end up in morbidity group 1, 9 end up in morbidity group 2, 9 end up in morbidity group 3, 9 end up in morbidity group 4, and 9 end up in morbidity group 5. Say that there are 45 people of these people who are alive but are not interviewed at age 81. Finally, say that there are 10 people who are dead at age 81. The probability of being interviewed if the individual is alive at 81 is $\frac{45}{90} = 0.5$. That means that the number of people who would have been interviewed if they were alive is $10 \cdot 0.5 = 5$. That row of the transition matrix would use the $45 + 5 = 50$ as the denominator, with 9 people going to each morbidity group and 5 dying. That row's values would therefore be $[0.18, 0.18, 0.18, 0.18, 0.18, 0.1]$.

[33] The number of transitions includes both transitions to another morbidity group and transitions to death, with transitions to death scaled down by the probability of being interviewed if alive as described earlier in the section.

[34] For the edge ages 66 and 99, we simply pool the two nearest available ages. Thus if morbidity group $m$ needed pooling for age 66, we would add transitions from individuals starting in morbidity group $m$ at age 67 and age 68.

2024 dollars (aggregated across all providers and for all utilization types) or a specific type of health care spending (such as, e.g., nursing home spending or outpatient spending). We train our baseline prediction model on 2016-2018 ("2017") data, but also show how results are affected by training the model on 1992-1994 ("1993") data.

For each spending outcome, we create 200 trees; each tree sub-samples from our full sample, with replacement, until arriving at a sample equal to our full sample size. To determine the minimum node size and the number of predictors considered at each branch, we create distinct random forests from a two-dimensional grid of these hyper-parameters, employing 10-fold cross-validation for each random forest, and choose the set of hyper-parameters with the lowest out-of-sample root mean square error (RMSE).

When first generating random forests, we include all ADLs, IADLs, functional limitations, and diseases as predictors, but exclude age. Once these initial predictions are generated, we incorporate a proportional age-specific shifter. As a result, the effects of morbidity status and age on spending are multiplicatively separable from one another.

To incorporate this proportional age-specific shifter, we first define a multiplier $m_a$ as the weighted average actual spending of individuals of age $a$ divided by the weighted average predicted spending of individuals of age $a$:

$$m_a = \frac{\sum_{i,t:\alpha(i,t)=a} w_i y_{it}}{\sum_{i,t:\alpha(i,t)=a} w_i \hat{y}_{it}} \tag{6}$$

where $\alpha(i,t)$ is defined to be the age of individual $i$ in year $t$ and $w_i$ are the survey weights. We then take this multiplier and apply it to the original random forest spending predictions:

$$\hat{\hat{y}}_{it} = \hat{y}_{it} \cdot m_{\alpha(i,t)} \tag{7}$$

where $\hat{\hat{y}}_{it}$ is predicted spending from the random forest after applying the proportional age-specific shifter.

Appendix Figures OA.8 and OA.13 provide some descriptions of the resultant prediction algorithm for total health-care spending, trained on the 2017 data. Appendix Figure OA.8 plots the age multiplier fixed effects $m_a$. Consistent with observed patterns in Figure 5, age is hardly predictive of health-care spending once accounting for morbidity; the age-specific multipliers are all close to 1 and display no systematic pattern with respect to age. Appendix Figure OA.13 displays the variable importance of each of the 31 granular morbidity measures.

# C Model calibrations and computations

## C.1 Calibration

**Baseline policy parameters.** We set the baseline Medicare policy level $\lambda$ to 50%, which is based on the 49.3% estimate of the share of total health expenditures covered by Medicare in the MCBS data in 1992-1994 ("1993"). We analyze individual-years in which individuals were between 66 and 100 years old and since we only see Traditional Medicare expenses, we further restrict to individual-years in which the individual is not enrolled in an HMO. We estimate an average Medicare coverage share by dividing the sum of all Traditional Medicare expenses by the sum of total expenses. Similar values have been found by De Nardi et al. (2016) and Chulis et al. (1993).

We set the baseline Social Security annuity payment $ss$ to \$18,000, which is based on the \$17,634 value derived from the average annual Social Security benefit amount for retired workers from 1993

after cost of living adjustments, inflated to 2024 dollars (SSA 2025a).

For the consumption floor $\underline{c}$, we follow Brown and Finkelstein (2008) who use the level of SSI benefits to approximate a consumption floor. We set the baseline consumption floor to \$11,000, which is based on the \$11,342 value derived from the maximum annual Federal SSI payment amounts for an eligible individual in 1993 after cost of living adjustments, inflated to 2024 dollars (SSA 2025b).

**Other calibrated parameters.** We set baseline wealth $w_{66}$ to be \$150,000. This is the median total non-annuitized wealth, excluding housing and other real estate, held by individuals aged 65-69 in 2008 (see Table 9 in Poterba (2014)) inflated to 2024 dollars. For risk aversion, we follow Einav et al. (2010) and the references therein and set $\gamma = 3$.

**Smoothed medical spending distribution.** The distribution of health-care spending $G_a(m|h)$ comes from the distribution of predicted spending for each age-morbidity combination. For computational purposes, we smooth this predicted spending distribution by running the following regression for each morbidity group $h \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$:

$$\log y_i = \beta_{0,h(i)} + \beta_{1,h(i)} \left(\text{age}_i - 66\right) + \varepsilon_{i,h(i)}, \qquad \varepsilon_{i,h(i)} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{h(i)}) \tag{8}$$

where $y_{ih}$ is predicted spending from the random forest, adjusted for multiplicative age effects, for individual $i$ in morbidity group $h$. We subtract age by 66 so that the intercept is more interpretable.

Using this regression, we obtain an estimated distribution $N(\hat{\mu}_{ah}, \hat{\sigma}^2_h)$ for each age–morbidity combination $(a, h)$. We create bins of $< \log(500), \log(500) - \log(1500), \log(1500) - \log(2500), ...$ and find the probabilities for each bin according to the normal distribution $N(\hat{\mu}_{ah}, \hat{\sigma}^2_h)$. We then map the bins back to levels (i.e., $< 500, 500 - 1500, 1500 - 2500, ...$) and preserve the probabilities we calculated for each bin. In the model, an individual will get hit by the "center point" of each of these bins (i.e., $0, 1000, 2000, ...$) with the respective probability. Finally, we truncate the distributions at \$160,000 by cutting off the probability mass beyond that point and re-normalize so that the whole distribution still sums to one.[35]

## C.2 Calculating Budget-neutral policy combinations and wealth equivalents

Our main counterfactuals use the 2017 morbidity, mortality, and spending distributions, and estimate wealth equivalents $z$ under alternative policy parameters $(\lambda', ss')$ that hold total government spending fixed at either $B_{1993}$ or $B_{2017}$. This requires that we first *find* these budget-neutral policy regimes. To do so, we solve the model to find the possible sets of policy parameters $(\lambda', ss')$ that, given 2017 morbidity, mortality, and spending distributions, *as well as* the individual's optimal consumption choices, yield the total government spending amount $B_{1993}$ or $B_{2017}$. We do this using a grid of possible policy combinations – given by $(\lambda', ss')$ – and linearly interpolate the overall government spending between the grid points. We use the same interpolation procedure to find the expected lifetime utility at each budget-neutral policy regimes, which in turn are used to calculate $z$.

[35] The actual maximum predicted spending is around \$144,200.

## Appendix References


**Brown, Jeffrey R. and Amy Finkelstein**, "The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," *American Economic Review*, 2008, *98* (3), 1083–1102.

**Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services**, "MCBS Advanced Tutorial on Using Community and Facility Data," Technical Report 2019.

_ , "MCBS Advanced Tutorial on Weighting and Variance Estimation," Technical Report 2021.

_ , "Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS): Frequently Asked Questions," Technical Report 2021.

**Chulis, George S., Franklin J. Eppig, Mary O. Hogan, Daniel R. Waldo, and Ross H. Arnett**, "Health Insurance and the Elderly: Data from MCBS," *Health Care Financing Review*, 1993, *14* (3), 163–181.

**Cutler, David, Kaushik Ghosh, and Mary Beth Landrum**, "Evidence for Significant Compression of Morbidity in the Elderly U.S. Population," *Discoveries in the Economics of Aging*, 2014, pp. 21–51.

**Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein, and Paul Schrimpf**, "Optimal Mandates and The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from The U.K. Annuity Market," *Econometrica*, 2010, *78*, 1031–1092.

**Freedman, Vicki, Linda Martin, and Robert Schoeni**, "Recent Trends in Disability and Functioning among Older Adults in the United States: A Systematic Review," *JAMA*, 2002, *288* (24), 3137–3146.


**Nardi, Mariacristina De, Eric French, John Bailey Jones, and Jeremy McCauley**, "Medical Spending of the US Elderly," *Fiscal Studies*, 2016, *37* (3-4), 717–747.

**Poterba, James M.**, "Retirement Security in an Aging Population," *American Economic Review*, 2014, *104* (5), 1–30.

**Social Security Administration**, "Benefits Paid by Type of Beneficiary," Technical Report 2025.

_ , "SSI Federal Payment Amounts," Technical Report 2025.


Figure OA.1: Morbidity Group Distribution by Age, 2017





Notes: Figure displays the proportion of individuals 66+ in each of five morbidity groups in 2016-2018 ("2017"), by age. All ages above 95 are collapsed into a 95+ category. Standard survey weights are used. N = 19,917.

Figure OA.2: Trends in ADLs and IADLs by Age

(a) Any ADL or IADL





(b) Mean No. of Total ADLs and IADLs (Conditional on Any)





Notes: Figure displays, for each age, the presence of any ADL or IADL (Panel (a)), and the mean number of total ADLs and IADLs conditional on having at least one (Panel (b)), separately for the 1992-1994 ("1993") survey cohorts (in red), the 2011-2013 ("2012") survey cohorts (in yellow), and the 2016-2018 ("2017") survey cohorts (in blue). All ages above 95 are collapsed into a 95+ category. Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 1992-1994 (N = 26,413), 2011-2013 (N = 23,669), or 2016-2018 (N = 19,917).

Figure OA.3: Trends in ADLs and IADLs by Years to Death

(a) Any ADL or IADL





(b) Mean No. of Total ADLs and IADLs (Conditional on Any)




Notes: Figure displays, for years to death ranging from 0 to 5, the presence of any ADL or IADL (Panel (a)), and the mean number of total ADLs and IADLs conditional on having at least one (Panel (b)), separately for the 1992-1994 ("1993") survey cohorts (in red) and the 2011-2013 ("2012") survey cohorts (in yellow). The 2011-2013 ("2012"), rather than 2016-2018 ("2017"), survey cohorts are used for the post-period so that deaths within five years can be observed without censoring for all respondents. Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 1992-1994 (N = 26,413) and in 2011-2013 (N = 23,669).

Figure OA.4: Yearly Trends in Number of ADLs and IADLs and in Life Expectancy





Notes: Figure displays, by 3-year moving average, the mean, age-adjusted number of ADLs and IADLs (Panel (a)) and life expectancy by morbidity group and overall (Panel (b)). Each year's life expectancy is derived using corresponding pooled transition matrices. Standard survey weights are used; in addition, the sample in Panel (a) is re-weighted such that the age distribution in all years matches the age distribution in 1999-2001. Data points 2013-2015 are not shown since there is no 2014 MCBS survey and three years of data must inform each data point. N = 226,647 individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS between 1992 and 2019 for Panel (a). N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year for Panel (b).

Figure OA.5: Trends in Morbidity Measures (Age-Adjusted), 1993 and 2017





Notes: Figure displays the age-adjusted share of individuals with each ADL, IADL, functional limitation, or disease in 1992-1994 ("1993") and in 2016-2018 ("2017"). Standard survey weights are used; in addition, the sample is re-weighted such that the age distribution in all years matches the age distribution in 1999-2001. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 1992-1994 (N = 26,413) or 2016-2018 (N = 19,917).

Figure OA.6: Health Care Spending by Morbidity Group Within Age Bins, 2017





Notes: Figure displays mean spending in 2016-2018 ("2017") by morbidity group within five-year age bins, in 2024 dollars. All ages above 95 are collapsed into a 95+ category. Mean spending within an age bin across all morbidity groups is shown by the dotted line; spending by morbidity group is displayed separately for all care types together (Panel (a)) and for individual subcategories of care (Panels (b) through (f)); the care category labeled "Outpatient" includes hospice and dental spending as well as outpatient and physician spending. Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 2016-2018 (N=19,917).

Figure OA.7: Predicted Health-Care Spending by Years to Death, 2012





Notes: Figure displays mean predicted spending in 2011-2013 ("2012") (reported in 2024 dollars) by number of years to death, where year 0 consists of anywhere from 365 to 0 days before death. Spending is displayed for all care types (in solid black), and for individual subcategories of care. The care category labeled "Outpatient spending" includes hospice and dental spending as well as outpatient and physician spending. Predictions are made using random forests as discussed in Appendix Section B, trained on 2016-2018 ("2017") data. The sample includes 23,669 individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 2011-2013.

Figure OA.8: Random Forest Age Fixed Effects




Notes: Figure displays, for a given age, the multiplicative fixed effect applied to predictions of total annual spending for that age. Predicted spending is calculated using random forests trained on 2017 data, wherein a multiplicative age effect is added after the fitting of random forests per the methodology described in Section 3.2. Standard survey weights are used. N = 226,647 MCBS survey respondents between 1992 and 2019.


Figure OA.9: Predicted Lifetime Health-Care Spending at Age 66, 1993-2017





Notes: Figure displays, by 3-year moving average, predicted lifetime health-care spending for a 66-year-old in typical health in 2024 dollars from 1993 to 2017. The age-66 morbidity group shares, age-specific morbidity group transitions, and the age-specific distribution of granular morbidity within the coarse morbidity groups are all allowed to vary by year. The mapping from granular morbidity to predicted spending is held fixed by imposing the mapping generated by random forests trained on 2016-2018 ("2017") data. Spending is displayed for all care types (in solid black), and for individual subcategories of care. The care category labeled "Outpatient" includes hospice and dental spending as well as outpatient and physician spending. Predictions are made using random forests as discussed in Appendix Section B, and are calibrated using 2016-2018 ("2017") data. Data points 2013-2015 are not shown since there is no 2014 MCBS survey and three years of data must inform each data point. $N = 100,000$ simulated observations for each year.

Figure OA.10: Lifetime Health-Care Spending at 66: Random Forest Trained on 2017 vs. 1993 Data


(a) Random Forests Trained on 2017 Data





(b) Random Forests Trained on 1993 Data




(c) Changes in Lifetime Spending, 1993-2017





(d) Changes in Lifetime Spending, 1993-2017





Notes: Figure displays the lifetime health-care spending of the typical 66-year-old in 2024 dollars, both overall and within each subcategory of spending. Panel (a) reports predictions generated using random forests trained on 2016-2018 ("2017") data, while Panel (b) reports predictions generated using random forests trained on 1992-1994 ("1993") data. In each panel, estimates are shown separately for "1993" (red) and "2017" (blue), using the morbidity and mortality transition matrices corresponding to each year. Panels (c) and (d) display the difference in lifetime spending between "1993" and "2017." All spending is in 2024 dollars. N = 100,000 simulated observations for each year.

Figure OA.11: Wealth Equivalent for Budget-Neutral Policies in 1993





Notes: The y-axis displays the wealth equivalent (relative to the baseline policy regime) of different combinations of budget neutral policy regimes, defined on the x-axis by the proportion of medical expenses $\lambda$ covered by Medicare. All wealth equivalents are calculated assuming the 1992-1994 ("1993") budget $B_{1993}$, the "1993" health transitions $Pr^{1993}(h_a|h_{a-1})$ and $d_a^{1993}(h_{a-1})$, a 66-year-old in typical health with \$150,000 in wealth, and calibrated moral hazard parameters $\kappa = 6$ and $\theta = 0.2$; these moral hazard parameters were chosen so that the baseline policy regime (denoted by the vertical red line) would be the policy regime that maximized the wealth equivalent. All spending is in 2024 dollars.

Figure OA.12: Yearly Summary Statistics by MCBS Subsample




Notes: Figure displays, by 3-year moving average, summary statistics for three distinct subsamples of the MCBS: the Access to Care sample, weighted with Access to Care weights (grey dotted line); the Cost and Use sample, weighted with Cost and Use weights (black dotted line); and the intersection between the two that forms our primary subsample, weighted with Cost and Use weights (grey solid line). Yearly means are shown for each sample for age (Panel (a)), total number of ADL/IADLs (Panel (b)), and total per-capita health spending (Panel (c)). The sample includes 348,743 individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS for either the Access to Care or the Cost and Use sample between 1992 and 2019. The MCBS survey does not exist for 2014, so (3-year moving average) is missing for 2013-2015.

Figure OA.13: Random Forest Variable Importance of Predictors




Notes: Figure displays, for a given variable used as a predictor for random forests, the variable's importance when used to predict total annual spending. The variable importance term corresponds to the reduction in MSE from the inclusion of that variable; variable importance measures in this figure are normalized to sum to 1 across all predictors. Predicted spending is calculated using random forests trained on 2016-2018 ("2017") data, wherein a multiplicative age effect is added after the fitting of random forests per the methodology described in Section 3.2. Standard survey weights are used. The sample includes 226,647 MCBS survey respondents between 1992 and 2019.

Table OA.1: Summary Statistics of Morbidity Measures, 2017

| Condition | Prop. | Condition | Prop. |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADLs | | Diseases | |
| (difficulty with...) | | (ever diagnosed with...): | |
| Bathing | 0.10 | Cancer | 0.38 |
| Moving from bed/chair | 0.11 | Alzheimer's | 0.06 |
| Eating | 0.03 | Parkinson's | 0.02 |
| Dressing | 0.08 | Asthma/COPD | 0.19 |
| Walking around house | 0.21 | Heart attack | 0.11 |
| Using toilet | 0.09 | Heart disease | 0.15 |
| IADLs | | Stroke | 0.10 |
| (difficulty with...) | | Broken hip | 0.03 |
| Using telephone | 0.06 | Diabetes | 0.34 |
| Light housework | 0.11 | Hypertension | 0.66 |
| Heavy housework | 0.28 | Cataract | 0.39 |
| Making meal | 0.10 | Mental disability | 0.01 |
| Shopping | 0.12 | Osteoporosis | 0.19 |
| Managing money | 0.09 | Paralysis/loss of limb | 0.03 |
| Functional limitations | | | |
| (difficulty with...): | | | |
| Stooping/crouching | 0.69 | | |
| Lifting 10 pounds | 0.33 | | |
| Reaching arms above shoulder | 0.25 | | |
| Writing | 0.24 | | |
| Walking 2-3 blocks | 0.41 | | |

Notes: Table displays, for all ADLs, IADLs, functional limitations, and diseases which are used as predictors for spending in random forests, the incidence of that predictor across our full sample. Standard survey weights are used. N = 19,917 individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 2016-2018 ("2017").

Table OA.2: Sample Transition Matrices, Age 66

| | Prop. Obs. | Ending group: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Death |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | A. 1993 | | | | | |
| Starting group: | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 0.691 | 0.859 | 0.086 | 0.037 | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| 2 | 0.128 | 0.417 | 0.306 | 0.216 | 0.031 | 0.007 | 0.022 |
| 3 | 0.095 | 0.190 | 0.237 | 0.348 | 0.142 | 0.056 | 0.027 |
| 4 | 0.056 | 0.030 | 0.145 | 0.200 | 0.440 | 0.113 | 0.071 |
| 5 | 0.031 | 0.039 | 0.000 | 0.028 | 0.092 | 0.657 | 0.183 |
| | | B. 2017 | | | | | |
| Starting group: | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 0.741 | 0.899 | 0.067 | 0.026 | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| 2 | 0.102 | 0.369 | 0.291 | 0.245 | 0.040 | 0.014 | 0.040 |
| 3 | 0.089 | 0.148 | 0.270 | 0.445 | 0.095 | 0.000 | 0.042 |
| 4 | 0.044 | 0.155 | 0.029 | 0.247 | 0.462 | 0.070 | 0.037 |
| 5 | 0.024 | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.209 | 0.688 | 0.078 |

Notes: The column of this table labeled "Prop. Obs." displays the breakdown of morbidity groups for those aged 66, separately in 1992-1994 ("1993") (Panel A) and 2016-2018 ("2017") (Panel B). Remaining columns display aggregate five-by-six transition matrices for those aged 66 in each of the three years, displaying the raw transition matrix for each age and year. Transition matrices are generated using the procedure outlined in Section 2.2. The sample includes individuals aged 66 surveyed by the MCBS in 1992-1994 (N = 1,784) or in 2016-2018 (N = 606).

Table OA.3: Sample Transition Matrices, Age 80

| | Prop. Obs. | Ending group: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Death |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | A. 1993 | | | | | |
| Starting group: | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 0.420 | 0.756 | 0.103 | 0.073 | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.029 |
| 2 | 0.153 | 0.380 | 0.274 | 0.148 | 0.128 | 0.047 | 0.022 |
| 3 | 0.158 | 0.153 | 0.172 | 0.385 | 0.171 | 0.071 | 0.048 |
| 4 | 0.140 | 0.027 | 0.075 | 0.205 | 0.357 | 0.199 | 0.136 |
| 5 | 0.129 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.022 | 0.139 | 0.576 | 0.249 |
| | | B. 2017 | | | | | |
| Starting group: | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 0.557 | 0.807 | 0.103 | 0.046 | 0.012 | 0.005 | 0.027 |
| 2 | 0.159 | 0.320 | 0.353 | 0.185 | 0.094 | 0.014 | 0.034 |
| 3 | 0.131 | 0.104 | 0.248 | 0.294 | 0.238 | 0.048 | 0.068 |
| 4 | 0.084 | 0.033 | 0.064 | 0.157 | 0.366 | 0.281 | 0.098 |
| 5 | 0.069 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.051 | 0.162 | 0.588 | 0.200 |

Notes: The column of this table labeled "Prop. Obs." displays the breakdown of morbidity groups for those aged 80, separately in 1992-1994 ("1993") (Panel A) and 2016-2018 ("2017") (Panel B). Remaining columns display aggregate five-by-six transition matrices for those aged 80 in each of the three years, displaying the raw transition matrix for each age and year. Transition matrices are generated using the procedure outlined in Section 2.2. The sample includes individuals aged 80 surveyed by the MCBS in 1992-1994 (N = 1,131) or in 2016-2018 (N = 845).

Table OA.4: Sample Size by Age and Morbidity Group, 2017

| Age | Overall | Morbidity Group: | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 66 | 606 | 408 | 71 | 66 | 43 | 18 |
| 67 | 826 | 583 | 95 | 71 | 53 | 24 |
| 68 | 1,025 | 746 | 123 | 71 | 62 | 23 |
| 69 | 997 | 734 | 104 | 68 | 59 | 32 |
| 70 | 926 | 658 | 105 | 70 | 62 | 31 |
| 71 | 818 | 587 | 80 | 73 | 47 | 31 |
| 72 | 745 | 514 | 97 | 63 | 48 | 23 |
| 73 | 691 | 456 | 79 | 73 | 50 | 33 |
| 74 | 670 | 436 | 87 | 69 | 40 | 38 |
| 75 | 791 | 466 | 127 | 80 | 68 | 50 |
| 76 | 864 | 519 | 127 | 96 | 68 | 54 |
| 77 | 855 | 479 | 132 | 94 | 83 | 67 |
| 78 | 794 | 458 | 127 | 87 | 64 | 58 |
| 79 | 741 | 420 | 103 | 89 | 74 | 55 |
| 80 | 845 | 464 | 128 | 108 | 75 | 70 |
| 81 | 840 | 421 | 128 | 121 | 88 | 82 |
| 82 | 839 | 415 | 112 | 114 | 93 | 105 |
| 83 | 778 | 356 | 140 | 105 | 89 | 88 |
| 84 | 774 | 319 | 136 | 120 | 100 | 99 |
| 85 | 721 | 295 | 114 | 110 | 103 | 99 |
| 86 | 610 | 201 | 95 | 109 | 91 | 114 |
| 87 | 523 | 174 | 69 | 69 | 91 | 120 |
| 88 | 448 | 129 | 62 | 62 | 89 | 106 |
| 89 | 413 | 120 | 66 | 51 | 72 | 104 |
| 90 | 358 | 79 | 55 | 45 | 78 | 101 |
| 91 | 317 | 75 | 36 | 36 | 65 | 105 |
| 92 | 270 | 41 | 40 | 38 | 58 | 93 |
| 93 | 213 | 36 | 23 | 33 | 42 | 79 |
| 94 | 178 | 26 | 13 | 25 | 37 | 77 |
| 95 | 124 | 14 | 11 | 12 | 24 | 63 |
| 96 | 93 | 9 | 6 | 13 | 14 | 51 |
| 97 | 80 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 14 | 42 |
| 98 | 47 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 24 |
| 99 | 33 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 20 |
| 100+ | 64 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 11 | 39 |
| Overall | 19,917 | 10,656 | 2,707 | 2,263 | 2,073 | 2,218 |

Notes: Table displays, for each cell of age and morbidity level, the total number of MCBS observations in that cell between 2016 and 2018 (disregarding survey weights). All ages over 100 are collapsed into a single category. N = 19,917 individuals aged 66+ surveyed by the MCBS in 2016-2018.