Incentives, Information, and Reminders for Bureaucrats: Overcoming Barriers to the Scale Up of an Effective Policy*

Patrick Agte Daniel Morales Christopher Neilson
Sebastián Otero Gautam Rao*

March 26, 2026

Abstract

Scaling up effective policies requires the attention of frontline bureaucrats with many competing responsibilities. Even when policymakers adopt effective programs, implementation may not follow. In a nationwide experiment in the Dominican Republic, we test interventions to increase school principals' implementation of an educational program proven effective in a previous RCT. Only 37% of control schools submitted proof of implementation, compared with over 80% in the original trials. Implementation was no higher among schools that previously participated in the RCT, suggesting that learning costs do not explain non-adoption. We find precise null effects of sharing research evidence, offering financial incentives, or providing implementation assistance. In contrast, additional reminder calls increased implementation by 20 percentage points. A second experiment targeting a different mandated program yields the same pattern: reminders produce large effects, while monitoring messages have smaller effects. Our findings point to limited attention among bureaucrats as a central barrier to scaling policies.

*This project would have not been possible without the support of Julio Valeirón and the research team at IDEICE. We would like to thank the Ministerio de Educación (MINERD) of the Dominican Republic and IDEICE for facilitating joint work between government agencies that produced the data from the Dominican Republic used in this study. All remaining errors are our own. This project was pre-registered under AEA registry ID AEARCTR-0003324 and AEARCTR-0003621. Agte: Stockholm School of Economics (patrick.agte@hhs.se); Morales: Tecnologico de Monterrey, Business School (daniel.morales@tec.mx); Neilson: Yale University and NBER (christopher.neilson@yale.edu); Otero: Columbia University (so2699@columbia.edu); Rao: Berkeley and NBER (grao@berkeley.edu).

1 Introduction

Evidence-based policymaking requires at least three steps: generating evidence on what works, policymakers using such evidence to guide policy choice, and governments successfully implementing the chosen policy. Randomized controlled trials have become standard for the first step, while recent work has studied when and how evidence generation affects policy choice (Hjort et al., 2021; DellaVigna et al., 2024). Yet even when evidence exists and policymakers act on it, implementation can still fail. Execution often depends on thousands of frontline bureaucrats with limited bandwidth and many competing demands, and policy selection at higher levels may not translate into change on the ground (Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017; Vivalt, 2020; List, 2022). This paper studies that last step: what happens after an evidence-based policy is chosen by policymakers.

We examine this problem in the context of a nationwide educational intervention in the Dominican Republic. The program, *Aprendiendo el Valor de la Educación* (AVE), provides students with information on the returns to schooling through classroom videos. Building on evidence that correcting misperceptions about education returns can increase schooling (Jensen, 2010), the initial RCTs—conducted across two rounds in 2015 and 2016 with 1,096 treatment schools—produced positive results: test scores rose by 0.05 standard deviations and dropout rates fell by 3 percentage points (Berry et al., 2019). Encouraged by these results, the Ministry of Education adopted AVE in 2018 and mandated its implementation across all public secondary schools.

The experimental and scaled interventions were in principle identical, but their implementation protocols differed sharply. The initial trial relied on intensive in-person workshops to train and motivate school officials. The nationwide rollout, by contrast, used the standard and much less expensive protocol typically deployed when rolling out new educational programs in the Dominican Republic. Specifically, the ministry informed school principals about the program through emails and follow-up phone calls and instructed them to implement it. This shift provides a setting to examine whether implementation frictions that are negligible in small-scale trials become binding constraints at scale. We partnered with the government during the rollout to implement experimental interventions designed to overcome these barriers.

Implementation during the national rollout is far from universal. Only 37 percent

of control group schools submitted proof of implementation, compared with much higher implementation rates in the original trials (97% and 80%). This incomplete implementation could substantially attenuate the program's aggregate impact. It represents an instance of the voltage effect operating through the extensive margin of implementation rather than diminished treatment efficacy (List, 2022).

What explains this implementation gap? We examine several potential mechanisms. First, fixed costs of learning how to implement the program do not appear to be the main barrier. Implementation is no higher among schools with prior experience—those randomly assigned to treatment in the original RCT. Second, principals do not appear to select into implementation based on perceived benefits. Implementation rates are no higher among principals who report thinking that students undervalue education or would benefit from the program, nor in schools where—based on the original RCTs—the program would be expected to generate larger student gains. Third, we find suggestive evidence that capacity constraints matter: schools with a coordinator or secretary to assist the principal show higher implementation rates. Together, these patterns suggest that non-implementation may stem less from deliberate cost-benefit calculations than from the attentional overload facing principals managing many competing mandates.

To identify which barriers bind most strongly, we randomized $n = 2{,}724$ schools to different interventions designed to increase implementation. Control school principals received detailed instructions via email and two follow-up phone calls, which is the standard government practice. Treatment schools received additional interventions targeting specific frictions: sharing evidence on program effectiveness, offering modest financial incentives, or providing assistance with implementation. We find precise null effects of each of these interventions, consistent with our observational evidence that neither learning costs nor perceived benefits are the primary constraint.

In sharp contrast, simply reminding principals—with no new information, no new incentives, and no new resources—led to a 20 percentage point ($p < 0.001$) increase in implementation as measured by our prespecified primary outcome. A second experiment reinforces this finding: when principals were asked to implement a different mandated program (an anti-bullying campaign), reminders again produced large effects (24 percentage points, $p < 0.001$), while messages emphasizing monitoring had

statistically significant but smaller effects (4.5 percentage points, $p < 0.01$). The evidence points to limited attention among frontline bureaucrats as a central constraint on the scale-up of effective policies. Redirecting that attention may be far more cost-effective than the traditional tools of incentives, assistance, and monitoring.

Our findings contribute to several strands of the literature. First, they speak to work on the voltage effect—the phenomenon that interventions successful in trials often fail at scale (Banerjee et al., 2017; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2017; Bold et al., 2018; List, 2022). While much of this literature focuses on how treatment effects diminish with scale or context, we point to a different channel: incomplete implementation by frontline bureaucrats, with little evidence of selection on expected benefits.

Second, our results inform research on policy adoption and the use of evidence by decision-makers (Hjort et al., 2021; García-Hombrados et al., 2024; DellaVigna et al., 2024). This work has not separated two key steps: selection of an effective policy and its actual implementation. We focus on a setting where high-level policymakers had already chosen a policy proven effective in an RCT they commissioned, yet on-the-ground adoption remained far from complete. Our null effect of sharing research evidence contrasts with Hjort et al. (2021), who find that evidence increases policy adoption by mayors in Brazil. One interpretation is that different barriers bind at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy: mayors may be constrained by lack of information, while school principals face attentional overload rather than informational frictions. Similarly, while DellaVigna et al. (2024) find that organizational inertia predicts adoption of nudge treatments in US cities, we find no effect of prior implementation experience—plausibly because temporary pilot participation does not build the lasting institutional routines needed to overcome such inertia.

Third, our findings relate to a large literature on bureaucrat performance and public sector management in the developing world (see Finan et al. (2017); Pepinsky et al. (2017); Besley et al. (2022) for reviews). The primary lens in this literature is one of principal-agent problems. We instead point to a behavioral friction and show that simple reminders can substantially increase compliance with mandated policies, even when traditional—and more expensive—tools like financial incentives and capacity-building assistance prove ineffective.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institu-

tional setting and AVE program. Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents results. Section 6 discusses implications and Section 7 concludes.

2 Institutional Setting and the AVE Program

The education system in the Dominican Republic consists of six years of primary education and six years of secondary education. Seventy-seven percent of secondary schools are public. Public secondary schools are run by principals appointed by the Ministry of Education. Principals have wide-ranging authority within the school but need to follow the official school curriculum designed by the Ministry of Education. Schools are organized in 122 educational districts.

School quality is low, and dropout is widespread. The Dominican Republic ranked last in international student performance assessments in 2013 and 2015 (UNESCO, 2015; OECD, 2016), and approximately 34 percent of students who take the 8th-grade national exam do not complete high school. One of the factors that contribute to high dropout rates is that students underestimate the returns to schooling (Jensen, 2010).

Motivated by this finding, the Ministry of Education collaborated with academics to create a scalable version of an education information campaign. This partnership produced the "Aprendiendo el Valor de la Educación" (AVE) program, which comprises four 15-minute videos designed to provide secondary school students with information about the potential monetary and non-monetary benefits of education. Earnings information was drawn from nationally representative surveys and presented in a comprehensible manner. For instance, wages are discussed by showing the distribution of wages for 100 representative adults for a given level of schooling. The videos also illustrated how various factors, such as luck and student performance, contribute to the heterogeneity of outcomes. Implementation involved students watching the videos during class and discussing them with their teachers.

The program was evaluated in a randomized field experiment conducted in 2015 and 2016, as outlined by Berry et al. (2019). In the initial round of the study in 2015, the Ministry of Education selected 398 treatment schools to implement the program for 7th and 8th-grade students. School officials from all treated institutions were required to attend a two-day workshop in Santo Domingo, during which they received

physical copies of the videos and detailed instructions for implementation. Subsequently, schools received multiple follow-up phone calls to ensure program adherence.

In the second round of the study in 2016, the program increased its reach to include students from all secondary school grades (from 7th to 12th grade) across 1,600 schools, of which approximately 700 were assigned to treatment. Due to the larger sample size, the program was implemented in a decentralized manner. The Ministry of Education initially provided the program material to the educational districts, which then organized in-person workshops with local schools to facilitate program implementation. Take-up rates—achieved through intensive in-person engagement—were 97% in the first round and 80% in the second. Intent-to-treat estimates from Berry et al. (2019) reveal that the AVE program increased test scores by 0.05 standard deviations and reduced dropout rates in the following year by 3 percentage points.

Building on these findings, the Ministry of Education decided to expand the AVE program in the 2018-19 academic year. Under the new initiative, every student enrolled in 7th grade or above was required to watch the program's videos within the school setting. To facilitate this, the government designated a specific week, known as AVE week, and incorporated the intervention into the official school calendar, during the week of September 24-28 (see Online Figure B.1).

To scale the program, the government changed the implementation approach. Instead of conducting in-person workshops with principals, the scaled-up version of the program instructed principals to download the necessary materials, including the videos and implementation protocols, from an online platform. These instructions and protocols were directly communicated to principals via phone and email.

3 Experimental design

After the Ministry decided to scale up the program, we partnered with them to experimentally test which interventions could increase implementation by school principals.

3.1 Sample selection

Our sample encompasses all secondary school principals in the Dominican Republic, comprising a total of 4,351 schools across grades 7 to 12. We excluded schools

without secondary school students during the 2017-2018 academic year or those with fewer than five students enrolled in any secondary school grade during the 2016-2017 academic year.[1] We further restricted the sample to the 3,881 schools that participated in either the 8th-grade National Exam in 2016 or the 12th-grade National Exam in 2018, effectively excluding informal schools from our analysis.

In cases where principals supervised multiple schools meeting our sample criteria, one school was randomly selected, and the others were excluded. Among the remaining 3,762 schools, we dropped those for which we did not possess a valid phone number and email address for the principal at the beginning of the intervention. Additionally, schools that were inaccessible during our baseline survey or were utilized for piloting purposes were also excluded. Ultimately, our final sample consisted of 2,724 principals. For a detailed breakdown of the sample selection process, see Table A.1 in Appendix A.

3.2 Implementation protocol

All communications were sent from official Ministry of Education accounts. The first email, sent on August 10th, contained a link to the AVE platform where principals could download the program's videos and implementation protocol, along with a brochure with instructions (see Figure B.2 for an example). A confirmation call repeated these instructions.

Principals were asked to submit a form and a photo of students watching the AVE videos as proof of implementation, with a deadline of October 3rd. Two weeks after AVE week, only 41% of principals had uploaded a photo. A second email was sent on October 11, followed by an additional confirmation call. Figure A.2 shows the full timeline. Since we find no differential treatment effects between the first and second rounds, we focus on final take-up after all communications were sent.

3.3 Treatment arms

We randomized schools into several treatment arms, each targeting a different potential barrier to implementation: "Evidence" (sharing research findings), "Incentive" (financial motivation), "Reminders" (additional follow-up calls), and "Assistance"

[1]Since the final enrollment data for 2017-18 was not available by the start of the survey, we relied on the data from the previous year.

(implementation support). We describe each below.

Evidence Treatment. In the first treatment arm, principals received information about the results of the AVE pilot. Specifically, the email and phone calls script included the following paragraph:

> *It is important to note that a research study, carried out between 2014 and 2016 in 2,500 schools in the Dominican Republic, showed that implementing this campaign significantly improves scores on national tests and decreases dropout rates. The schools that showed the videos increased national test scores by 0.6 points in total. This study shows that if all the schools in the country showed these videos to their students, the number of dropouts in secondary schools would decrease by 6,500 students per year."*

This information was also conveyed through easy-to-read figures in the brochure sent to principals in the evidence group (see Figure B.3). In the redesigned emails, we included these figures in the body of the email.

Incentive Treatment. In a second treatment arm, principals received a financial incentive in the form of a lottery. The first two emails and the call scripts included this extra paragraph:

> *Please note that you have been randomly selected to be one of the directors who can participate in the draw for a Samsung tablet to help you run the school. You will enter this lottery only if you implement the AVE campaign at your school as outlined in the instructions below in this email. One out of 10 people who enter the drawing will win a tablet.*

The value of the tablets was equal to 16% of the average monthly salary of a school principal. This treatment was expected to serve as a monetary benchmark to anchor the effectiveness of other treatment arms.

Reminders Treatment. In a third treatment arm, principals received two additional reminder calls from MINERD. The first reminder call was between September 18th and 21st, after every school in the sample received the standard call. The second reminder call was placed during the AVE week.[2]

[2]Call scripts are shown in Appendix C.

Assistance Treatment. A fourth treatment arm provided principals with additional assistance through a helpline and a link to a website with further resources. Since principals made negligible use of the helpline, we do not report results for this treatment but include an assistance treatment dummy in all regressions.

Randomization was conducted at the school level and stratified by school district. We cross-randomized the four treatments, with the exception that the reminders group never received the financial incentive. We excluded this cell to allocate the sample toward treatment arms with greater statistical power for detecting the main effects of interest. Cross-randomization produced 6 treatment cells, shown in Figure A.1.

4 Data and empirical strategy

We use a combination of administrative and survey data. Administrative data include the school registry, enrollment records, and test scores from the 8th-grade and 12th-grade national exams. We also conducted a baseline phone survey collecting information on principals' beliefs and school characteristics.

Emails were sent through a marketing platform that tracked whether each principal received, opened, and clicked on the email. The email contained links to an online platform where principals registered to download the AVE campaign material; we use this registration data to measure implementation. We also recorded all phone calls made by enumerators. We refer to these email and call data as implementation outcomes.

Principals were instructed to submit a photo via WhatsApp and a form with implementation details via email. We use these outcomes as indicator variables of task completion. We supplement these outcomes with additional information gathered through student questionnaires. Specifically, for schools that participated in the 12th-grade national exam in 2019, we included questions in the national exam asking students whether their school had participated in the AVE campaign during the 2018-2019 academic year.

The primary treatment effects of interest are estimated by calculating the intent-

to-treat (ITT) estimate of take-up via OLS:

$$Y_i = \sum_k \beta^k \cdot T_i^k + X_i'\gamma + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where Y denotes the outcome for principal i, T^k is an indicator for assignment into the treatment arm k, and coefficients β^k are the parameters of interest. The vector X_i includes stratification dummies and baseline covariates selected via the double lasso approach by Belloni et al. (2014) from the covariates listed in Appendix Table A.2.

4.1 Descriptive statistics and balance checks

Table A.2 shows summary statistics and balance across treatment arms. Panel A reports the characteristics of schools and Panel B reports characteristics of principals. The average school in the control group consists of 224 students. Seventy-six percent of the schools in our sample were public and 73% were located in urban areas. Most schools had the necessary infrastructure to easily implement the AVE campaign, including electricity (99%), a projector (77%), and an internet connection (72%). If a school did not have an internet connection, a principal could have downloaded the campaign material in a cybercafe. Thirteen percent of schools share the same building with another sample school.[3] One-third of the sample was part of the treatment group in the previous pilot study of the AVE program. Around half of the principals think that students undervalue education and 83% of them believe that providing information on the benefits of completing schooling would significantly improve test scores and decrease dropout rates. We treat these outcomes with caution since they might suffer from reporting bias. These shares suggest that most principals already perceive the program as beneficial, which is consistent with the null effect of the evidence treatment reported below. The treatment and control groups are largely balanced across school and principal characteristics.

[3]Due to limited infrastructure, some schools operate in a shift system in which one school uses the building in the morning and another school uses the building in the afternoon. Both schools would have separate principals and student bodies.

5 Results

We start by examining implementation outcomes, then show program adoption outcomes by treatment status.

We report treatment effects for various implementation outcomes in Tables A.3 and A.4. We first show that we managed to reach almost all the principals in our sample. Ninety-eight percent of the principals received the initial email and 75% opened it. Ninety-five percent of principals also received the first call, in which we reiterated the information we provided in the email.

Table D.9 reports the treatment effects on program adoption. Our prespecified primary outcome is whether the principal submitted a photo of students participating in the AVE program (column 1). Secondary outcomes include whether the principal downloaded the campaign material (column 2) and submitted the mandatory form (column 3). Column 4 reports a standardized adoption index combining these three measures.

Overall take-up was modest: only 37% of control group schools submitted a photo and 27% submitted the form. Across all outcomes, we observe no significant treatment effects for the evidence or incentive treatments.[4]

The only intervention that managed to improve program adoption is the reminders treatment. The positive treatment effects for the reminders group hold across all outcome definitions, including a 20-percentage-point increase in the share of schools that submitted a photo of students participating in the AVE program (column 1).

Next, we investigate whether the treatments affected the timing of the take-up in Figure 1. For this, we examine the date the form and photo were submitted. Most principals sent the material just before the deadline on October 3. Program adoption then starts to flatten out in November, around one month after the initial deadline. The cumulative share of principals who sent the form and photo is very similar between the evidence and control group throughout the entire sample period, while the reminders group shows persistently higher adoption.

[4]The incentive treatment increased early form submission but had no effect on final take-up. One possible explanation is that the lottery may have created the impression that program implementation was voluntary once the deadline had passed.

6 Mechanisms

A potential explanation for the null effect of the evidence treatment is that principals simply did not read or process the information. Two pieces of evidence argue against this. First, the interaction between the reminders and evidence treatments is insignificant (Appendix Table A.10), implying that even principals who were contacted multiple times and had the research findings explained to them did not respond to this information. Second, in a follow-up experiment in which the same principals were mandated to implement an anti-bullying campaign, we randomly varied whether principals were informed that their compliance would be monitored. This message varied based on whether the school had implemented the previous AVE campaign.[5] Table D.8 shows that the monitoring message increased take-up rates, especially among principals who had not previously implemented the AVE campaign. These results indicate that principals do attend to email content and respond to it when it is actionable—they simply do not change behavior in response to evidence about program effectiveness.

We further exploit the heterogeneity in principal and school characteristics to understand why the evidence treatment did not have a larger effect (Table A.9).[6] Column 1 examines heterogeneity by a limited bandwidth index, capturing whether principals face capacity constraints such as lacking a coordinator or secretary. Column 2 uses a net-benefit index based on principals' beliefs about the value of the program and predicted student gains. Column 3 uses a monitoring index. We do not find that the evidence treatment has differential effects along any of these dimensions: all interaction terms are insignificant. We also do not find differential effects for schools that were part of the treatment group in the AVE pilot, suggesting that prior implementation experience does not make principals more responsive to evidence.

An alternative explanation is that principals need a certain level of knowledge to value the research findings. We thus investigate whether we find treatment effects for principals with a post-graduate degree. While we see that this subgroup is more

[5]The experiment also randomized whether the principals received a motivational message and whether principals received any follow-up calls. Appendices D and E provide additional details.

[6]We use the dummy variable for whether the principal uploaded a photo of students participating in the AVE program as our main outcome for the heterogeneity analysis. Appendix Table A.11 shows similar results if we use student reports instead.

likely to adopt the program in general, we do not find that they are more likely to be affected by the evidence treatment. Finally, we examine whether the evidence treatment had no effect because the implementation of the program was mandatory for public schools. However, we also do not find significant effects for private schools or whether principals believe that a penalty for non-compliance is not very likely.

The high take-up rates in the original trials (97% and 80%) were achieved through intensive in-person workshops, which are expensive and difficult to scale. The nation-wide rollout instead relied on standard government communication channels. Our results suggest that in this setting, the binding constraint is not informational—principals do not respond to evidence on program effectiveness—but attentional. Simple reminders that redirect principals' attention to the task at hand are far more effective than providing new information or financial incentives.

7 Conclusion

Scaling up effective policies requires more than selecting the right program—it requires ensuring that frontline bureaucrats actually implement it. Our study shows that even after the Ministry of Education mandated a proven educational program, only 37% of control group schools submitted proof of implementation, a stark contrast to the near-universal compliance achieved through intensive in-person engagement in the original trials. Neither sharing research evidence, offering financial incentives, nor providing implementation assistance increased adoption. In contrast, simple reminder calls produced large gains in implementation, a finding replicated in a second experiment with a different mandated program. These results suggest that limited attention among frontline bureaucrats is a central barrier to scaling effective policies. Redirecting that attention through low-cost reminders may be far more effective than the traditional tools of incentives, training, or information provision.

References

Al-Ubaydli, O., J. A. List, and D. L. Suskind (2017). What Can We Learn from Experiments? Understanding the Threats to the Scalability of Experimental Results. *American Economic Review 107*(5), 282–86.

Banerjee, A., R. Banerji, J. Berry, E. Duflo, H. Kannan, S. Mukerji, M. Shotland, and M. Walton (2017). From proof of concept to scalable policies: Challenges and solutions, with an application. *Journal of Economic Perspectives 31*(4), 73–102.

Belloni, A., V. Chernozhukov, and C. Hansen (2014). Inference on Treatment Effects after Selection among High-Dimensional Controls. *The Review of Economic Studies 81*(2), 608–650.

Berry, J., L. Coffman, D. M. Morales, and N. Christopher (2019). Informing Students about Schooling: A Large-Scale Field Experiment in the Dominican Republic. Working paper, Princeton University. https://christopherneilson.github.io/portfolio-AVE.html.

Besley, T., R. Burgess, A. Khan, and G. Xu (2022). Bureaucracy and development. *Annual Review of Economics 14*(1), 397–424.

Bold, T., M. Kimenyi, G. Mwabu, A. Ng'ang'a, and J. Sandefur (2018). Experimental evidence on scaling up education reforms in kenya. *Journal of Public Economics 168*, 1–20.

DellaVigna, S., W. Kim, and E. Linos (2024). Bottlenecks for evidence adoption. *Journal of Political Economy 132*(8), 2748–2789.

Finan, F., B. Olken, and R. Pande (2017). Chapter 6 - The Personnel Economics of the Developing State. In A. V. Banerjee and E. Duflo (Eds.), *Handbook of Economic Field Experiments*, Volume 2 of *Handbook of Economic Field Experiments*, pp. 467 – 514. North-Holland.

García-Hombrados, J., M. Jansen, Á. Martínez, B. Özcan, P. Rey-Biel, and A. Roldán-Monés (2024). Ideological alignment and evidence-based policy adoption. IZA Working paper.

Hjort, J., D. Moreira, G. Rao, and J. F. Santini (2021). How research affects policy: Experimental evidence from 2,150 Brazilian municipalities. *American Economic Review 111*(5), 1442–80.

Jensen, R. (2010). The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125*(2), 515–548.

List, J. (2022). *The Voltage Effect: How to make good ideas great and great ideas scale*. New York: Currency.

Muralidharan, K. and P. Niehaus (2017, November). Experimentation at scale. *Journal of Economic Perspectives 31*(4), 103–24.


OECD (2016). Pisa 2015 assessment and analytical framework. *PISA*.

Pepinsky, T. B., J. H. Pierskalla, and A. Sacks (2017). Bureaucracy and service delivery. *Annual Review of Political Science 20*, 249–268.

UNESCO (2015). Terce 2013: Tercer estudio regional comparativo y explicativo. *TERCE*.

Vivalt, E. (2020, 09). How much can we generalize from impact evaluations? *Journal of the European Economic Association 18*(6), 3045–3089.

Figure 1: Take-Up Rate Over Time by Treatment



Notes: This figure shows the cumulative share of principals who submitted the form and uploaded a photo of the implementation of the AVE campaign in their school over time. The blue line corresponds to the evidence treatment, the green line to the incentive treatment, the red line to the reminder treatment, the orange line to the assistance treatment, and the black dashed line to the control group.

Table 1: Predictors of AVE Campaign Adoption

		Primary Outcome: Submitted Photo	
	Mean of Predictor in the Control Group	Only Control Group	Full Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Limited Bandwidth Index	-0.000	-0.039	-0.036***
		(0.028)	(0.011)
Principal Has Multiple Positions	0.656	-0.098	-0.031
		(0.061)	(0.024)
School Has No Secretary	0.279	-0.075	-0.109***
		(0.070)	(0.028)
Net-Benefit Index	-0.000	-0.009	0.013
		(0.025)	(0.010)
Believes Extra Info Would Have An Effect	0.826	0.049	0.007
		(0.064)	(0.027)
Above-Median Test Scores	0.440	0.001	0.017
		(0.072)	(0.027)
Treatment Group in AVE Pilot	0.313	-0.042	0.030
		(0.053)	(0.020)
School Has a Coordinator	0.341	-0.091	0.016
		(0.067)	(0.027)
Monitoring Index	-0.000	0.019	0.038***
		(0.025)	(0.009)
School Is Public	0.800	0.105*	0.102***
		(0.059)	(0.022)
Believes Penalty after Non-Compliance is Very Likely	0.537	-0.024	0.032*
		(0.050)	(0.019)
Outcome Mean		0.374	0.407
Observations		380	2,724

Notes: This table examines predictors of AVE campaign adoption. Column (1) shows the mean of the predictor in the control group. In Columns (2) and (3), we regress a dummy for whether the principal uploaded a photo of the AVE campaign adoption on the corresponding predictor. Column (2) is restricted to the control group and Column (3) includes the full sample. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 2: Treatment Effects on AVE Campaign Adoption

	Index Components			
	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes		
	Submitted Photo	Downloaded Material	Submitted Form	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reminders	0.204***	0.151***	0.131***	0.411***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.042)
Evidence	-0.013	-0.008	-0.030*	-0.043
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.039)
Incentive	0.014	-0.023	0.055**	0.031
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.051)
Assistance	-0.012	-0.034**	-0.020	-0.062*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.036)
Mean of Control Group	0.374	0.687	0.271	0.000
Observations	2724	2724	2724	2724

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the AVE campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 3: Heterogeneity Analysis

	Primary Outcome: Uploaded Photo		
	Limited Bandwidth Index	Net-Benefit Index	Monitoring Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Evidence	-0.004	-0.012	-0.014
	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.019]
Incentive	0.013	0.012	0.013
	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Reminders	0.197***	0.198***	0.205***
	[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Assistance	-0.004	-0.011	-0.014
	[0.021]	[0.018]	[0.018]
Evidence × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.008	-0.001	0.007
	[0.022]	[0.020]	[0.018]
Incentive × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.012	0.032	-0.004
	[0.029]	[0.026]	[0.023]
Reminders × Heterogeneity Var.	0.046*	0.050**	-0.011
	[0.028]	[0.024]	[0.022]
Assistance × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.000	0.003	0.002
	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.017]
Heterogeneity Var.	-0.047**	-0.021	0.035**
	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.018]
Mean of Control Group	0.390	0.374	0.374
Mean of Heterogeneity Var.	-0.025	0.096	-0.031
Observations	2085	2724	2724

Notes: This table shows heterogeneous treatment effects on whether the principal uploaded a photo of the implementation of the AVE campaign in their school. We regress the outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group, the assistance treatment group, the heterogeneity dummy, interactions between the treatment group variables and the heterogeneity dummy, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 4: Treatment Effects on Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption


	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monitoring	0.045***	0.035**	0.062***	0.019	0.100***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Motivation	-0.011	-0.018	-0.004	-0.028	-0.033
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Reminders	0.241***	0.281***	0.178***	0.118***	0.591***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.038)
Mean of Control Group	0.182	0.379	0.215	0.545	0.000
Observations	2724	2724	2724	1588	2724

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the anti-bullying campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the motivation treatment group, the monitoring treatment group, and the reminders treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table D.1 shows the list of potential lasso controls. Columns (1)-(2) show treatment effects for the full sample. The sample is columns (4)-(6) is restricted to schools in which the principal uploaded a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. The sample is columns (7)-(9) is restricted to schools in which the principal did not upload a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Online Appendix


A Implementation Details

Figure A.1: Experimental Design




Notes: This figure shows the experimental design. We cross-randomized schools into 6 different treatment arms based on interactions between the "Evidence", "Reminders" and "Incentive" groups. The "Reminders" treatment is labeled "Intensity" in the figure.

Figure A.2: Implementation Timeline



Notes: This figure shows the timeline of communications sent to principals. Items labeled "(Full Sample)" were sent to all principals. Items labeled "(Intensity)" were sent only to the reminders treatment group.

Figure A.3: Take-Up Rate Over Time by Treatment (Extended Timeline)



Notes: This figure shows the cumulative share of principals who submitted the form and uploaded a photo of the implementation of the AVE campaign in their school over time until Dec 1, 2018. This figure shows the cumulative share of principals who submitted the form and uploaded a photo of the implementation of the AVE campaign in their school over time. The blue line corresponds to the evidence treatment, the green line to the incentive treatment, the red line to the reminder treatment, the orange line to the assistance treatment, and the black dashed line to the control group. The vertical line indicates the date on which we sent the fourth email to all principals who had not implemented the AVE campaign at this point.

Table A.1: Sample Selection

Sample	Description
7,341	Has no students in grades 7-12 in 2018 ($n = 2,990$)
4,351	Has less than five students in grades 7-12 in 2017 ($n = 162$)
4,189	Did not participated in at least one standardized exam between 2016 and 2018 ($n = 301$)
3,888	No contact details ($n = 7$)
3,881	Randomly select one school to drop if principal supervises more than one ($n = 119$)
3,762	Not reached at baseline ($n = 626$)
3,136	Principal has no access to email ($n = 343$)
2,793	Randomly select one school to drop if principals share the same email address ($n = 16$)
2,777	Did not meet criteria 1-3 in the updated administrative data ($n = 9$)
2,768	Part of pilot survey ($n = 44$)
2,724	Final sample

Notes: This table shows the sample selection criteria. Column (1) shows the remaining number of schools and column (2) describes the selection criteria. Out of 7,341 schools in the Dominican Republic in total, 2,724 schools are included in our final sample.

Table A.2: Balance Check

	Control		Evidence		Incentive		Reminders		Assistance		
	Mean	St. D.	Coeff.	St. E.	Coeff.	St. E.	Coeff.	St. E.	Coeff.	St. E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Panel A: School Characteristics											
Has Internet Connection	0.720	[0.449]	-0.010	(0.017)	-0.014	(0.021)	-0.024	(0.019)	-0.018	(0.016)	2,717
Has Projector	0.769	[0.422]	-0.003	(0.017)	0.003	(0.021)	0.006	(0.019)	0.010	(0.016)	2,719
Has Computer Lab	0.562	[0.496]	-0.004	(0.019)	-0.007	(0.024)	0.020	(0.022)	-0.007	(0.018)	2,717
Has Electricity	0.987	[0.113]	0.000	(0.005)	0.000	(0.006)	0.004	(0.005)	0.000	(0.004)	2,719
Students in 7-12th Grade, 2018	223.887	[234.501]	-14.470	(8.948)	-0.047	(11.652)	-0.725	(9.660)	-7.388	(8.345)	2,724
Total PN Score 12th Grade, 2018	73.352	[7.269]	0.044	(0.424)	-0.599	(0.449)	-0.859*	(0.470)	0.090	(0.378)	1,324
Total PN Score 8th Grade, 2016	69.009	[7.363]	0.147	(0.331)	-0.491	(0.392)	-0.107	(0.369)	0.074	(0.301)	1,925
Shares Building with Another Sample School	0.100	[0.300]	-0.002	(0.012)	0.016	(0.016)	0.001	(0.013)	-0.018	(0.011)	2,724
Offers Extended School Day	0.494	[0.500]	-0.022	(0.018)	0.014	(0.022)	-0.004	(0.020)	-0.009	(0.017)	2,724
Located in Urban Area	0.725	[0.447]	-0.020	(0.017)	0.009	(0.022)	-0.026	(0.019)	0.013	(0.016)	2,358
School Is Public	0.763	[0.426]	-0.001	(0.016)	0.010	(0.020)	0.018	(0.018)	-0.023	(0.015)	2,724
Treatment Group in AVE Pilot	0.307	[0.462]	0.006	(0.019)	0.014	(0.024)	0.011	(0.021)	-0.013	(0.018)	2,724
Panel B: Principal Characteristics											
Experience of Principal	19.571	[7.589]	-0.951***	(0.356)	1.000**	(0.458)	0.438	(0.409)	-0.200	(0.336)	1,993
Principal Has Post-Graduate Degree	0.583	[0.493]	0.003	(0.020)	0.001	(0.026)	-0.030	(0.023)	-0.005	(0.019)	2,568
Principal Supervises Multiple Schools	0.087	[0.282]	0.012	(0.012)	-0.011	(0.014)	0.009	(0.014)	-0.013	(0.011)	2,710
Principal Checks Emails Daily	0.593	[0.492]	0.006	(0.020)	-0.039	(0.025)	-0.049**	(0.023)	0.001	(0.019)	2,630
Believes Penalty after Non-Compliance is Very Likely	0.540	[0.499]	-0.006	(0.020)	0.034	(0.025)	0.005	(0.023)	0.014	(0.019)	2,723
Principal's Main Motivation is Professional Success	0.424	[0.495]	-0.003	(0.020)	-0.035	(0.025)	0.023	(0.023)	-0.001	(0.019)	2,723
Believes Extra Info Would Have An Effect	0.850	[0.358]	-0.015	(0.014)	-0.018	(0.019)	0.018	(0.015)	0.006	(0.013)	2,724
Believes Students Undervalue Education	0.499	[0.500]	-0.002	(0.021)	0.039	(0.026)	0.030	(0.024)	-0.008	(0.020)	2,630
Number of Valid Emails	1.349	[0.679]	0.029	(0.027)	-0.038	(0.033)	-0.013	(0.031)	-0.011	(0.025)	2,724

Notes: This table shows balance for baseline covariates. Panel A reports on school-level outcomes and Panel B on principal-level outcomes. Differences in sample sizes across variables reflect missing data. Column (1) reports the control group mean of the dependent variable. Columns (3), (5), and (7) report the difference in the dependent variable from OLS regressions of each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, and stratification dummies. The reminders treatment is labeled "Intensity" in the table.

Table A.3: Differences in Number of Emails Sent and Opened by Treatment

	1st Email		2nd Email		1st Redesigned Email		2nd Redesigned Email	
	Sent (1)	Opened (2)	Sent (3)	Opened (4)	Sent (5)	Opened (6)	Sent (7)	Opened (8)
Evidence	-0.000	0.030*	-0.000	0.032*	-0.001	0.027	-0.005	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.022)
Incentive	-0.003	-0.019	-0.003	0.005	-0.003	-0.041*	-0.002	-0.035
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.028)
Reminders	-0.013*	0.007	-0.013*	0.064***	-0.001	0.010	-0.006	0.037
	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.025)
Assistance	0.001	-0.023	0.001	-0.023	0.002	-0.044**	0.008	-0.039*
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.021)
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Non-Adopters	Non-Adopters
Mean of Control Group	0.982	0.750	0.982	0.687	0.982	0.692	0.976	0.616
Observations	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2021	2021

Notes: This table shows differences in the emails sent and opened by treatment arm. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.4: Differences in Number of Calls Received by Treatment

	1st Call (1)	2nd Call (2)	3rd Call (3)	4th Call (4)	5th Call (5)
Evidence	-0.017*	0.004	-0.011*	-0.021**	-0.043*
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Incentive	-0.008	0.001	0.002	-0.023*	0.059**
	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.027)
Reminders	0.004	0.942***	0.877***	-0.034***	-0.162***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.027)
Assistance	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.021)
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Non-Adopters	Non-Adopters
Mean of Control Group	0.955	0.000	0.000	0.952	0.626
Observations	2724	2724	2724	2021	2021

Notes: This table shows differences in calls received by treatment arm. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.5: Effect of AVE Pilot Assignment on AVE Campaign Adoption

	2015 + 2016 AVE Pilot Sample					Only 2016 AVE Pilot Sample				
	Submitted Photo (1)	Downloaded Material (2)	Submitted Form (3)	Student Reports (4)	Adoption Index (5)	Submitted Photo (6)	Downloaded Material (7)	Submitted Form (8)	Student Reports (9)	Adoption Index (10)
Treatment Group in AVE Pilot	0.177***	0.050	0.116*	-0.328**	0.241*	-0.008	0.000	-0.038	0.059	0.008
	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.062)
Outcome Mean	0.567	0.756	0.480	0.824	0.038	0.610	0.779	0.497	0.726	0.114
Observations	275	275	275	34	275	1096	1096	1096	573	1096

Notes: XXX

Table A.6: Multiple Hypothesis Correction

	Index Components			
	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes		
	Submitted Photo	Downloaded Material	Submitted Form	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intensity	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Evidence	0.705	0.480	0.069	0.220
Incentive	0.705	0.299	0.024	0.378
Assistance	0.705	0.069	0.134	0.157

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the AVE campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reminders treatment is labeled "Intensity" in the table.

Table A.7: Treatment Effects on AVE Campaign Adoption by Dec 1

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Downloaded Material	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Reminders	0.165***	0.100***	0.120***	0.057**	0.293***
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.042)
Evidence	0.009	-0.018	-0.012	0.003	-0.021
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.039)
Incentive	-0.033	-0.043*	-0.003	-0.077***	-0.113**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.051)
Assistance	-0.027	-0.032**	-0.026	-0.016	-0.066*
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Mean of Control Group	0.553	0.763	0.450	0.617	0.000
Observations	2724	2724	2724	1588	2724

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the AVE campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.8: Effects of All Treatment Cells on AVE Campaign Adoption

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Evidence	0.020	-0.001	-0.038	0.020	0.002
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.071)
Incentive	-0.075	-0.019	-0.031	-0.159***	-0.145
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.102)
Reminders	0.181***	0.127***	0.128***	0.075	0.361***
	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.079)
Assistance	-0.020	0.004	-0.033	-0.038	-0.035
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.070)
Evidence + Incentive	-0.038	-0.055	-0.003	-0.042	-0.115
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.102)
Evidence + Reminders	0.172***	0.093***	0.115***	0.035	0.256***
	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.082)
Evidence + Assistance	-0.039	-0.055*	-0.033	-0.014	-0.099
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.072)
Incentive + Assistance	-0.021	-0.097**	-0.009	-0.009	-0.155
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.105)
Reminders + Assistance	0.105**	0.057	0.054	0.057	0.179**
	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.088)
Evidence + Incentive + Assistance	-0.035	-0.049	-0.073	-0.143**	-0.163
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.100)
Evidence + Reminders + Assistance	0.164***	0.071*	0.081*	0.040	0.247***
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.088)
Mean of Control Group	0.553	0.763	0.450	0.617	0.000
Observations	2724	2724	2724	1588	2724

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the AVE campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.9: Heterogeneity Analysis by Index Components

	Primary Outcome: Uploaded Photo							
	Limited Bandwidth Index Components		Net-Benefit Index Components				Monitoring Index Components	
	Director Has Multiple Positions	Director Has No Secretary	Believes Info Would Have Effect	Above-Median Test Scores	Treat Group in AVE Pilot	Has Coordinator	Public School	Believes Penalty is Very Likely
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Evidence	0.012	-0.002	-0.003	0.024	-0.023	-0.013	-0.027	-0.016
	[0.038]	[0.030]	[0.050]	[0.039]	[0.023]	[0.031]	[0.037]	[0.028]
Incentive	-0.005	0.061	0.008	-0.001	0.012	-0.005	0.026	0.012
	[0.050]	[0.038]	[0.061]	[0.050]	[0.029]	[0.039]	[0.049]	[0.036]
Reminders	0.108**	0.210***	0.177***	0.123***	0.185***	0.152***	0.219***	0.216***
	[0.046]	[0.034]	[0.063]	[0.044]	[0.027]	[0.036]	[0.046]	[0.033]
Assistance	0.010	-0.048*	-0.030	-0.027	-0.006	-0.018	-0.019	-0.013
	[0.037]	[0.028]	[0.049]	[0.037]	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.037]	[0.027]
Evidence × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.015	-0.027	-0.010	-0.014	0.034	-0.002	0.018	0.006
	[0.046]	[0.057]	[0.053]	[0.054]	[0.040]	[0.053]	[0.043]	[0.037]
Incentive × Heterogeneity Var.	0.029	-0.062	0.006	0.057	0.007	0.182**	-0.017	0.001
	[0.061]	[0.077]	[0.067]	[0.069]	[0.052]	[0.072]	[0.056]	[0.049]
Reminders × Heterogeneity Var.	0.149***	-0.029	0.031	0.062	0.061	0.175***	-0.018	-0.022
	[0.056]	[0.069]	[0.068]	[0.064]	[0.048]	[0.065]	[0.053]	[0.045]
Assistance × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.032	0.080	0.021	0.053	-0.020	-0.037	0.009	0.001
	[0.046]	[0.056]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.039]	[0.053]	[0.042]	[0.037]
Heterogeneity Var.	-0.065	-0.129**	-0.009	0.011	-0.050	-0.053	0.092**	0.026
	[0.044]	[0.052]	[0.049]	[0.054]	[0.039]	[0.051]	[0.043]	[0.036]
Mean of Control Group	0.391	0.372	0.374	0.370	0.374	0.372	0.374	0.374
Mean of Heterogeneity Var.	0.663	0.250	0.862	0.500	0.323	0.324	0.766	0.553
Observations	1994	1526	2724	1324	2724	1526	2724	2723

Notes: This table shows heterogeneous treatment effects on whether the principal uploaded a photo of the implementation of the AVE campaign in their school. We regress the outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group, the assistance treatment group, the heterogeneity dummy, interactions between the treatment group variables and the heterogeneity dummy, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.10: Treatment Effects on AVE Campaign Adoption with Treatment Interactions

	Before Follow-Up Calls			After Follow-Up Calls			
	Downloaded Material (1)	Submitted Photo (2)	Submitted Form (3)	Downloaded Material (4)	Submitted Photo (5)	Submitted Form (6)	Student Reports (7)
Evidence	-0.021	-0.026	-0.033	-0.018	0.001	-0.019	0.031
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.030]
Incentive	-0.041	0.009	0.049	-0.062	-0.035	-0.006	-0.025
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.032]
Intensity	0.157	0.175	0.134	0.129	0.167	0.126	0.080
	[0.033]	[0.037]	[0.036]	[0.032]	[0.035]	[0.037]	[0.052]
Intensity × Evidence	0.027	0.054	0.008	0.007	0.017	0.020	-0.030
	[0.039]	[0.042]	[0.041]	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.042]	[0.056]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full
Mean of Control Group	0.608	0.374	0.271	0.661	0.553	0.450	0.531
Observations	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	1310

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the AVE campaign, including interactions between treatment arms. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, their interactions, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reminders treatment is labeled "Intensity" in the table.


Table A.11: Heterogeneity Analysis Using Student Reports

	Outcome: Student Report													
Heterogeneity Var.:	Info Would Have Effect	Students Undervalue Edu.	Treat. Group in AVE Pilot	Post-Graduate Degree	Public School	Penalty is Very Likely	Internal Resistance Is Main Barrier	Above-Median Salary	Has Secretary	Has Coordinator	Has Secretary or Coordinator	Belief Index	Multiple Public Positions	Above-Median Test Scores
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Evidence	-0.018	0.012	0.009	0.002	0.004	0.012	0.021	0.032	0.027	0.045**	0.007	0.010	0.053	0.021
	[0.028]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.022]	[0.039]	[0.019]	[0.041]	[0.015]	[0.034]	[0.015]
Incentive	0.010	-0.031	-0.046***	-0.027	-0.057**	-0.026	-0.037**	-0.037	-0.044	-0.035	-0.043	-0.026	-0.018	-0.041**
	[0.037]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.025]	[0.028]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.028]	[0.047]	[0.023]	[0.051]	[0.019]	[0.041]	[0.018]
Reminders	0.007	0.061***	0.035**	0.032	0.056**	0.028	0.030*	-0.006	-0.043	-0.008	-0.056	0.050***	-0.006	0.037**
	[0.036]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.021]	[0.027]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.026]	[0.047]	[0.024]	[0.057]	[0.018]	[0.039]	[0.017]
Assistance	-0.007	0.001	-0.016	-0.037**	-0.018	-0.015	-0.026*	-0.067***	-0.003	-0.008	0.001	0.002	-0.081**	-0.032**
	[0.029]	[0.016]	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.021]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.021]	[0.037]	[0.020]	[0.041]	[0.015]	[0.032]	[0.014]
Evidence × Heterogeneity Var.	0.039	0.010	0.021	0.025	0.019	0.005	-0.017	-0.006	-0.001	-0.041	0.022	0.014	-0.016	0.000
	[0.031]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.025]	[0.041]	[0.026]	[0.043]	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.022]
Incentive × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.052	-0.003	0.046	-0.002	0.037	-0.018	0.011	0.036	0.019	0.018	0.018	-0.016	0.000	0.028
	[0.040]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.033]	[0.050]	[0.031]	[0.054]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.027]
Reminders × Heterogeneity Var.	0.030	-0.044*	-0.006	0.003	-0.037	0.009	0.009	0.047	0.052	0.025	0.064	-0.034	0.014	-0.014
	[0.039]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.030]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.030]	[0.051]	[0.033]	[0.060]	[0.026]	[0.022]	[0.026]
Assistance × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.011	-0.035	-0.004	0.031	0.004	-0.001	0.025	0.076***	-0.001	0.005	-0.006	-0.039*	0.036*	0.035
	[0.031]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.025]	[0.039]	[0.027]	[0.043]	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.021]
Heterogeneity Var.	-0.014	0.013	0.023	-0.020	0.161***	0.037*	0.013	-0.061**	-0.009	-0.026	-0.019	0.010	0.009	-0.066***
	[0.028]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.024]	[0.043]	[0.025]	[0.045]	[0.021]	[0.019]	[0.021]
Mean of Control Group	0.538	0.542	0.538	0.543	0.538	0.538	0.538	0.598	0.588	0.588	0.588	0.538	0.598	0.522
Mean of Heterogeneity Var.	0.862	0.513	0.323	0.558	0.766	0.553	0.365	0.323	0.750	0.324	0.788	0.459	1.709	0.500
Observations	1588	1529	1588	1467	1588	1588	1588	970	734	734	734	1588	970	1313

Notes: This table shows heterogeneous treatment effects using student reports as the outcome. We regress the outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group, the assistance treatment group, the heterogeneity dummy, interactions between the treatment group variables and the heterogeneity dummy, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

B Additional Material for AVE Campaign

Figure B.1: Official Academic Calendar



Notes: This figure shows the official academic calendar for the 2018-2019 school year in the Dominican Republic. The calendar states that the AVE campaign should be implemented between September 24 and 28.

Figure B.2: Intervention Brochure for Control Group



Notes: This figure shows the brochure that was attached to the first email for the control group.

Figure B.3: Intervention Brochure for Evidence Treatment Group



Notes: This figure shows the brochure that was attached to the first email for the evidence group.

C Call Scripts for the AVE Campaign

1st Call (Full Sample)

Everyone:

Hello, my name is XXX and I am calling on behalf of the Ministry of Education to give you an important message. Do you have a couple of minutes?

Are you currently in charge of the school XXX with Center Code XXX?

We are calling to remind you about the delivery of an email regarding the informational campaign Learning the Value of Education in the Dominican Republic (AVE-RD) on behalf of MINERD and IDEICE.

I first need to verify some of your information and information about your school. Are you XXX?

This email was sent by the Ministry of Education and IDEICE on behalf of Minerva Perez, Director of the Directorate of Guidance and Psychology, on Sunday, September 9, and contains relevant information so that your school can implement the campaign.

I wanted to notify you that we sent the email to the following accounts: XXX

Have you been able to see this email?

As mentioned, this campaign consists of a series of four videos in telenovela format, which you must show to secondary school students in your school between September 25 and September 28, as established in the MINERD 2018-2019 school calendar.

These videos provide information about the economic, social, and personal benefits of finishing school.

Evidence Treatment Arm:

We would like to tell you that a study conducted in 2,500 schools in the Dominican Republic showed that there are proven benefits of implementing this campaign in your educational center.

Schools that showed these videos significantly improved their national exam scores by 0.6 points in total, and reduced their school dropout rates.

This study concludes that if all schools in the country showed these videos, the number of secondary school dropouts would decrease by 6,500 students per year.

Would you like me to repeat the information?

Incentive Treatment Arm:

If you implement the AVE-RD campaign in your school, you will have the opportunity to win a 7-inch Samsung tablet to help you manage your educational center. One out of every 10 people who participate in the raffle will win a tablet.

You will be able to participate in this raffle only if you implement the campaign in your school as established in the instructions in the email we sent you.

Would you like me to repeat the information?

Everyone:

In the same email, you must download a Brochure and an Instruction Guide, which appear as download buttons at the end of the email. It is very important that you download both files and review them carefully.

Note that both download buttons are at the end of the email.

We appreciate your cooperation and trust that the implementation of this program will be a success thanks to your efforts.

2nd Call (Only Reminders Group)

Everyone:

Hello, my name is XXX and I am calling on behalf of the Ministry of Education to give you an important message. Do you have a couple of minutes?

Are you currently in charge of the school XXX with Center Code XXX?

We are calling to remind you about the delivery of an email regarding the informational campaign Learning the Value of Education in the Dominican Republic (AVE-RD) on behalf of MINERD and IDEICE.

I first need to verify some of your information and information about your school. Are you XXX?

This email titled "School Calendar 2018-2019: AVE-RD Week" contains relevant information so that your school can implement the campaign.

This campaign consists of videos that provide information about the benefits of finishing school. These videos should be shown to secondary school students in your school between 25 and 28 September, as established in MINERD's 2018-2019 school

calendar.

If you would like, we can resend this email to you. Would you like me to resend it?

Evidence Treatment Arm:

We would like to tell you that a study conducted in 2,500 schools in the Dominican Republic showed that there are proven benefits of implementing this campaign in your educational center.

Schools that showed these videos significantly improved their national exam scores by 0.6 points in total, and reduced their school dropout rates.

This study concludes that if all schools in the country showed these videos, the number of secondary school dropouts would decrease by 6,500 students per year.

Would you like me to repeat the information?

Incentive Treatment Arm:

If you implement the AVE-RD campaign in your school, you will have the opportunity to win a 7-inch Samsung tablet to help you manage your educational center. One out of every 10 people who participate in the raffle will win a tablet.

You will be able to participate in this raffle only if you implement the campaign in your school as established in the instructions in the email we sent you.

Would you like me to repeat the information?

Everyone:

In the same email, you must download a Brochure and an Instruction Guide, which appear as download buttons at the end of the email. It is very important that you download both files and review them carefully.

Note that both download buttons are at the end of the email.

We appreciate your cooperation and trust that the implementation of this program will be a success thanks to your efforts.

3rd Call (Only Reminders Group)

Hello, my name is XXX and I am calling on behalf of the Ministry of Education to give you an important message. Do you have a couple of minutes?

Are you currently in charge of the school XXX with Center Code XXX?

We are calling to remind you about the delivery of several emails regarding the informational campaign Learning the Value of Education in the Dominican Republic (AVE-RD) on behalf of MINERD and IDEICE.

I first need to verify some of your information and information about your school. Are you XXX?

These emails contain relevant information so that your school can implement the campaign. This campaign consists of videos that provide information about the benefits of finishing school. These videos should be shown to secondary school students in your school starting on 25 September, as established in the MINERD 2018-2019 school calendar.

If you would like, we can resend this email to you. Would you like me to resend it? Please remember that you must send a WhatsApp message to the number XXX with photos of the video showings.

You must also complete the implementation form and send it to XXX. This form will be downloaded together with the videos.

We appreciate your cooperation and trust that the implementation of this program will be a success thanks to your efforts

D Additional Results for Anti-Bullying Campaign

Here is the content of the messages we randomized in the follow-up experiment:

- Motivation
  - All principals: *The school climate is an important factor that promotes learning. The school climate is something that can be managed, and the "Declaration for Peace" can contribute to this end. Be part of the solution and let's help together to reduce bullying and bad treatment at school.*
- Monitoring
  - For principals who implemented the AVE campaign: *According to our records, your school successfully implemented the Learning the Value of Education campaign (AVE-RD). We thank you for your participation, and we urge you to also participate in the "Declaration for Peace". Again we will be monitoring compliance with this instruction, to ensure that this campaign is implemented properly.*
  - For principals who did not implement the AVE campaign: *According to our records, your school did not satisfactorily implement the previous campaign Learning the Value of Education (AVE-RD). We urge you to participate in the "Declaration for Peace" on this occasion. Again we will be monitoring compliance with this instruction, to ensure that this campaign is implemented properly.*

A third intervention arm received additional reminders. While other principals were only contacted via email, the reminders treatment group received two additional calls from a call center. All three intervention arms were perfectly cross-randomized.

Table D.1: Balance Check

	Control		Motivation		Monitoring		Intensity		
	Mean	St. D.	Coeff.	St. E.	Coeff.	St. E.	Coeff.	St. E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: School Characteristics									
Has Internet Connection	0.738	[0.440]	-0.004	(0.017)	0.013	(0.017)	0.000	(0.017)	2,717
Has Projector	0.753	[0.432]	0.014	(0.016)	-0.001	(0.016)	-0.007	(0.016)	2,719
Has Computer Lab	0.558	[0.497]	0.008	(0.019)	-0.005	(0.019)	0.014	(0.019)	2,717
Has Electricity	0.994	[0.077]	-0.007	(0.004)	0.006	(0.004)	-0.006	(0.004)	2,719
Students in 7-12th Grade, 2018	188.632	[186.571]	-8.408	(8.458)	8.693	(8.472)	-7.335	(8.466)	2,724
Total PN Score 12th Grade, 2018	72.931	[7.263]	0.722	(0.396)	-0.502	(0.393)	0.340	(0.396)	1,324
Total PN Score 8th Grade, 2016	69.418	[7.422]	-0.105	(0.337)	-0.098	(0.336)	0.183	(0.335)	1,925
Shares Building with Another Sample School	0.079	[0.271]	0.012	(0.011)	0.005	(0.011)	0.002	(0.011)	2,724
Offers Extended School Day	0.409	[0.492]	0.012	(0.019)	0.026	(0.019)	0.015	(0.019)	2,724
Located in Urban Area	0.737	[0.441]	-0.018	(0.019)	-0.013	(0.019)	-0.008	(0.019)	2,358
School Is Public	0.732	[0.443]	0.012	(0.016)	-0.013	(0.016)	-0.003	(0.016)	2,724
Treatment Group in AVE Pilot	0.332	[0.472]	0.026	(0.018)	-0.022	(0.018)	-0.014	(0.018)	2,724
Panel B: Principal Characteristics									
Experience of Principal	19.183	[8.045]	0.295	(0.333)	0.063	(0.334)	-0.471	(0.334)	2,111
Principal Has Post-Graduate Degree	0.550	[0.498]	-0.019	(0.020)	-0.017	(0.020)	-0.010	(0.020)	2,568
Principal Supervises Multiple Schools	0.083	[0.276]	-0.007	(0.011)	0.007	(0.011)	0.011	(0.011)	2,710
Principal Checks Emails Daily	0.592	[0.492]	0.023	(0.019)	-0.016	(0.019)	0.005	(0.019)	2,630
Believes Penalty after Non-Compliance is Very Likely	0.560	[0.497]	-0.002	(0.019)	0.028	(0.019)	0.003	(0.019)	2,723
Principal's Main Motivation is Professional Success	0.447	[0.498]	-0.007	(0.019)	0.022	(0.019)	-0.011	(0.019)	2,723
Believes Extra Info Would Have An Effect	0.868	[0.339]	-0.012	(0.013)	-0.010	(0.013)	0.013	(0.013)	2,724
Believes Students Undervalue Education	0.531	[0.500]	-0.023	(0.019)	-0.023	(0.019)	0.019	(0.019)	2,630
Number of Valid Emails	1.347	[0.698]	-0.004	(0.026)	-0.025	(0.026)	0.039	(0.026)	2,724

Notes: This table shows balance for baseline covariates. Panel A reports on school-level outcomes and Panel B on principal-level outcomes. Differences in sample sizes across variables reflect missing data. Column (1) reports the control group mean of the dependent variable. Columns (3), (5), and (7) report the difference in the dependent variable from OLS regressions of each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the motivation treatment group, the monitoring treatment group, and the reminders treatment group, and stratification dummies. The reminders treatment is labeled "Intensity" in the table.

Table D.2: Effect of AVE Treatments on Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
AVE Treatment: Evidence	0.011	-0.007	-0.003	0.045*	0.020
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.042)
AVE Treatment: Incentive	-0.010	-0.031	-0.012	-0.022	-0.057
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.053)
AVE Treatment: Reminders	-0.018	0.010	-0.041*	0.020	-0.026
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.047)
AVE Treatment: Assistance	-0.004	-0.022	-0.010	-0.034	-0.038
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.040)
Outcome Mean	0.182	0.379	0.215	0.545	0.000
Observations	2724	2724	2724	1588	2724

Notes: XXX

Table D.3: Effect of AVE Treatments on Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption in Control Group

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
AVE Treatment: Evidence	0.058	0.051	-0.025	0.069	0.123
	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.087)	(0.117)
AVE Treatment: Incentive	-0.010	-0.155**	-0.095	0.076	-0.244
	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.101)	(0.159)
AVE Treatment: Reminders	-0.130***	-0.045	-0.130***	-0.176*	-0.283**
	(0.045)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.093)	(0.127)
AVE Treatment: Assistance	0.082*	-0.035	0.029	0.005	0.017
	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.108)
Outcome Mean	0.182	0.379	0.215	0.545	0.000
Observations	340	340	340	187	340

Notes: XXX

Table D.4: Predictors of Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption in Control Group

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Believes Extra Info Would Have An Effect	0.009	-0.031	-0.021	-0.063	-0.037
	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.110)	(0.158)
Believes Students Undervalue Education	-0.005	0.033	0.013	0.044	0.093
	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.076)	(0.111)
Above-Median Test Scores	0.109	0.241***	0.231***	0.081	0.436***
	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.161)
School Is Public	0.002	0.065	0.057	0.189*	0.293*
	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.101)	(0.164)
Treatment Group in AVE Pilot	0.026	0.068	0.012	0.164*	0.162
	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.130)
Believes Penalty after Non-Compliance is Very Likely	-0.006	0.062	-0.011	0.086	0.117
	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.072)	(0.110)
Has Projector	0.067	0.150**	0.081	0.052	0.268**
	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.085)	(0.125)
School Has a Secretary	0.031	0.055	0.127**	0.005	0.210
	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.135)	(0.158)
School Has a Coordinator	-0.069	-0.043	-0.131**	-0.030	-0.239
	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.059)	(0.129)	(0.155)
AVE Treatment: Evidence	-0.011	0.043	-0.016	0.108	0.071
	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.076)	(0.108)
AVE Treatment: Incentive	-0.024	-0.112*	-0.014	-0.051	-0.184
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.145)
AVE Treatment: Reminders	-0.127***	0.003	-0.075	-0.119	-0.191
	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.052)	(0.087)	(0.127)
AVE Treatment: Assistance	0.041	-0.075	-0.001	-0.025	-0.085
	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.076)	(0.111)
Outcome Mean	0.182	0.379	0.215	0.545	0.000
Observations	340	340	340	187	340

Notes: XXX

Table D.5: Multiple Hypothesis Correction for Anti-Bullying Campaign

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monitoring	0.009	0.040	0.001	0.352	0.006
Motivation	0.207	0.105	0.381	0.253	0.142
Intensity	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the AVE campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the evidence treatment group, the incentive treatment group, the reminders treatment group and the assistance treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table A.2 shows the list of potential lasso controls. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The reminders treatment is labeled "Intensity" in the table.

Table D.6: Effects on Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption by Treatment Cell

	Primary Outcome	Secondary Outcomes			
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Motivation	0.026	-0.030	-0.003	-0.016	-0.014
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.071)
Monitoring	0.043	0.065*	0.054*	0.013	0.125*
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.075)
Reminders	0.318***	0.342***	0.190***	0.142***	0.692***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.068)
Motivation + Monitoring	0.100***	0.071**	0.063**	-0.006	0.132*
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.074)
Motivation + Reminders	0.217***	0.290***	0.158***	0.060	0.548***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.071)
Monitoring + Reminders	0.310***	0.302***	0.231***	0.127***	0.670***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.072)
Monitoring + Motivation + Reminders	0.286***	0.307***	0.244***	0.129***	0.697***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.073)
Mean of Control Group	0.182	0.379	0.215	0.545	0.000
Observations	2724	2724	2724	1588	2724

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the anti-bullying campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the motivation treatment group, the monitoring treatment group, and the reminders treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table D.1 shows the list of potential lasso controls. Columns (1)-(2) show treatment effects for the full sample. The sample is columns (4)-(6) is restricted to schools in which the principal uploaded a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. The sample is columns (7)-(9) is restricted to schools in which the principal did not upload a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table D.7: Treatment Effects on Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption by AVE Campaign Adoption

	Implemented AVE					Did Not Implement AVE				
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Monitoring	-0.009	0.023	0.002	-0.028	-0.019	0.103***	0.043*	0.127***	0.070**	0.217***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.053)
Motivation	0.003	-0.005	0.011	-0.025	0.013	-0.026	-0.037	-0.021	-0.029	-0.084
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.053)
Reminders	0.280***	0.319***	0.209***	0.138***	0.691***	0.195***	0.237***	0.139***	0.092**	0.475***
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.055)
Mean of Control Group	0.298	0.506	0.337	0.667	0.352	0.056	0.241	0.080	0.390	-0.386
Observations	1426	1426	1426	835	1426	1298	1298	1298	753	1298

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the anti-bullying campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the motivation treatment group, the monitoring treatment group, and the reminders treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table D.1 shows the list of potential lasso controls. Columns (1)-(2) show treatment effects for the full sample. The sample is columns (4)-(6) is restricted to schools in which the principal uploaded a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. The sample is columns (7)-(9) is restricted to schools in which the principal did not upload a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table D.8: Effects on Anti-Bullying Campaign Adoption by AVE Campaign Adoptions and Treatment Cell

	Implemented AVE					Did Not Implement AVE				
	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)	Submitted Photo	Clicked on Declaration	Submitted Form	Student Share $\geq 50\%$	Adoption Index (in Std)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Motivation	0.010	-0.030	-0.015	-0.013	-0.012	0.046	-0.024	0.015	-0.023	0.006
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.109)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.071)	(0.090)
Monitoring	-0.041	0.004	-0.042	-0.022	-0.072	0.138***	0.115**	0.160***	0.051	0.323***
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.109)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.072)	(0.101)
Reminders	0.360***	0.375***	0.240***	0.155***	0.796***	0.272***	0.294***	0.138***	0.119	0.570***
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.093)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.074)	(0.099)
Motivation + Monitoring	0.090*	0.087*	0.040	-0.025	0.096	0.113***	0.039	0.089**	0.016	0.142
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.112)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.071)	(0.095)
Motivation + Reminders	0.267***	0.310***	0.172***	0.127**	0.642***	0.166***	0.247***	0.143***	-0.009	0.401***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.100)	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.074)	(0.099)
Monitoring + Reminders	0.291***	0.327***	0.175***	0.138**	0.638***	0.331***	0.269***	0.290***	0.121*	0.686***
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.099)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.071)	(0.107)
Monitoring + Motivation + Reminders	0.261***	0.328***	0.229***	0.076	0.691***	0.315***	0.267***	0.263***	0.181**	0.684***
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.101)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.072)	(0.106)
Mean of Control Group	0.298	0.506	0.337	0.667	0.352	0.056	0.241	0.080	0.390	-0.386
Observations	1426	1426	1426	835	1426	1298	1298	1298	753	1298

Notes: This table shows the treatment effects on different adoption measures of the anti-bullying campaign. We regress each outcome on indicator variables for assignments to the motivation treatment group, the monitoring treatment group, and the reminders treatment group, stratification dummies, and baseline controls selected by LASSO. Online Appendix Table D.1 shows the list of potential lasso controls. Columns (1)-(2) show treatment effects for the full sample. The sample is columns (4)-(6) is restricted to schools in which the principal uploaded a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. The sample is columns (7)-(9) is restricted to schools in which the principal did not upload a photo of the AVE campaign at their school. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table D.9: Heterogeneity Analysis for Anti-Bullying Campaign

	Outcome: Submitted Photo										
		AVE Treatments				Costs of Non-Compliance		Implementation Costs			
Heterogeneity Var.:	Implemented AVE	AVE: Evidence	AVE: Incentive	AVE: Reminders	AVE: Assistance	Public School	Believes Penalty is Very Likely	Placebo: Treat Group in AVE Pilot	Has Projector	Has Secretary	Has Coordinator
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Motivation	-0.027	-0.034	-0.002	-0.023	0.007	-0.041	-0.032	-0.017	0.027	0.008	0.012
	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.035]	[0.025]	[0.021]	[0.035]	[0.046]	[0.028]
Monitoring	0.103***	0.057**	0.045**	0.055***	0.025	0.089**	0.038	0.049**	0.009	-0.002	0.041
	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.035]	[0.025]	[0.021]	[0.034]	[0.046]	[0.028]
Reminders	0.189***	0.235***	0.248***	0.249***	0.260***	0.251***	0.223***	0.236***	0.301***	0.227***	0.235***
	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.025]	[0.021]	[0.035]	[0.045]	[0.028]
Motivation × Heterogeneity Var.	0.030	0.046	-0.051	0.046	-0.036	0.038	0.036	0.016	-0.050	-0.024	-0.069
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.043]	[0.039]	[0.034]	[0.040]	[0.034]	[0.037]	[0.040]	[0.053]	[0.049]
Monitoring × Heterogeneity Var.	-0.112***	-0.024	-0.004	-0.042	0.039	-0.057	0.012	-0.013	0.044	0.064	0.011
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.043]	[0.039]	[0.034]	[0.040]	[0.034]	[0.037]	[0.040]	[0.053]	[0.049]
Reminders × Heterogeneity Var.	0.099***	0.012	-0.038	-0.032	-0.038	-0.011	0.031	0.015	-0.078**	0.008	-0.010
	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.043]	[0.039]	[0.034]	[0.041]	[0.034]	[0.037]	[0.040]	[0.052]	[0.050]
Mean of Control Group	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.183	0.182	0.182	0.193	0.193
Mean of Heterogeneity Var.	0.523	0.499	0.186	0.251	0.500	0.766	0.553	0.323	0.767	0.750	0.324
Observations	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2724	2723	2724	2719	1526	1526

Notes: XXX

E Call Scripts for the Anti-Bullying Campaign

1st and 2nd Reminders Call

Everyone:

Hello, my name is XXX and I am calling on behalf of the Ministry of Education to give you an important message. Do you have a couple of minutes? Are you currently in charge of the school XXX with Center Code XXX?

We are calling to notify you about the delivery of an email regarding the Culture of Peace and Declaration of Good Treatment campaign sent on November 8. I first need to verify some of your information and information about your school. Are you XXX?

This email was sent by the Ministry of Education and IDEICE on behalf of Minerva Perez, Director of the Directorate of Guidance and Psychology, on Thursday, November 8, and contains relevant information so that your school can implement the campaign.

I wanted to notify you that we sent the email to the following accounts: XXX

Have you been able to see this email?

The MINERD 2018-2019 school calendar establishes the month of November as the month of good treatment in schools. For this reason, MINERD, through the Directorate of Guidance and Psychology, is promoting the Culture of Peace and the Declaration of Good Treatment campaign. This campaign consists of all classrooms collaboratively creating a mural or bulletin board related to good treatment on November 23, and reading and signing the "Declaration for Good Treatment."

Monitoring - Implemented AVE Campaign:

According to our records, your educational center successfully implemented the Learning the Value of Education (AVE-RD) campaign.

We appreciate your participation, and we encourage you to also participate in the "Declaration for Good Treatment." MINERD and IDEICE will again monitor compliance with this instruction to ensure that this campaign is properly implemented.

Monitoring - Did Not Implement AVE Campaign:

According to our records, your educational center did not successfully implement

the previous campaign Learning the Value of Education (AVE-RD).

We encourage you to participate in the "Declaration for Good Treatment" this time. MINERD and IDEICE will again monitor compliance with this instruction to ensure that this campaign is properly implemented.

Motivation:

School climate is an important factor that promotes learning.

Moreover, school climate is something that can be managed, and the "Declaration for Good Treatment" can contribute to this goal.

We invite you to be part of the solution so that together we can help reduce bullying and improve treatment in schools.

Everyone:

To comply with this instruction, you must follow the steps below:

First: Download the "Declaration for Good Treatment" that you will find in the email and print one copy for each student. If you cannot print one for each student, print one per classroom.

Step 2: Download the Implementation Guide that you will find in the email and follow the instructions to carry out the campaign on November 23 in all secondary classrooms.

Step 3: Document compliance with the declaration by sending photos via WhatsApp on November 23 as indicated in the guide (one photo per classroom), and complete an implementation form that you must send to XXX before November 30.

On the webpage for the month of good treatment, which is included in the email we sent you, you will find summarized instructions, additional materials on the application protocols for the Culture of Peace, and contact information should you have any questions about the activities related to the campaign.

Please review the email we sent and download the attached files using the download buttons as soon as you have a moment. It is very important that you download both files and review them carefully.

We appreciate your cooperation, and we trust that the implementation of this program will be a success thanks to your efforts.