Does Contact Reduce Conflict? Experimental Evidence from Nigeria*

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Abstract: Can contact between warring groups reduce conflict? We study this question in the context of farmer-herder violence in Nigeria's Middle Belt, conducting a multi-year randomized controlled trial across 286 communities. We examine two forms of contact: inter-dialogues, in which farmers and herders directly discuss the underlying sources of conflict, and health workshops, which induce contact without addressing the conflict. We find mixed results for the inter-dialogues: they strengthen social ties between leaders, create new dispute resolution institutions, and improve farmer cooperation, but also trigger an influx of outside nomadic herders into participating communities, reducing herder cooperation and generating disputes. Over a two-year horizon, the inter-dialogues are associated with a rise in violence. The health workshops undermine inter-group relations through a different mechanism — they worsen stereotypes and reduce empathy, symmetrically reducing cooperation by farmers and herders, while also leading to more economic disputes. Together, our findings suggest that contact interventions can backfire in active conflict settings, and even short-run improvements in cooperation can generate dynamics that ultimately worsen outcomes.

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1 Introduction

Conflict is a fundamental obstacle to human flourishing. One form of conflict rising at particularly notable rates over the past two decades involves violent clashes between farmers and herders throughout Central and West Africa. Farmers and herders have traditionally enjoyed complementary production systems and economic interdependence: cattle eat crop residue after harvest, and their dung fertilizes the fields in turn. Yet the same production activities can generate conflict. Cattle may trample or consume crops before harvest; herbicides and pesticides can harm livestock; and farmers may block the routes that herds need to reach water or grazing land. Resultant disputes can erode the very interdependence that once bound these communities together. And, without positive interactions, farmer-herder relationships can spiral into vicious cycles of violence. What can be done to prevent these adverse outcomes?

The contact hypothesis posits that positive contact between groups in conflict can play a key role in repairing inter-group relations (Allport, 1954). A growing body of experimental evidence supports the idea that structured activities promoting contact can reduce in-group bias and improve attitudes toward the out-group (Scacco and Warren, 2018; Mousa, 2020; Lowe, 2021). However, it is not clear whether contact of this kind can reduce conflict between groups engaged in active violence. Previous studies have found little to no effects on behaviors outside the specific context of the intervention, and most measure outcomes only days or weeks afterward. Indeed, no prior work has directly examined effects on conflict outcomes, which may emerge only over longer time horizons.

Our paper addresses this gap. We conduct a multi-year randomized controlled trial (RCT) across 286 communities that varies contact between farmers and herders in Nigeria's Middle Belt, and examine effects on a range of conflict and cooperation outcomes measured over a year after contact takes place. Our setting enables us to study the impact of contact in the context of an active conflict—where two groups are engaged in direct, ongoing violence with one another.

The nature of the contact we study distinguishes our approach from previous work along several additional dimensions. While most existing work examines contact between ordinary community members, we facilitate contact between leaders, who are likely to play an important role in coordinating cooperation, moderating disputes, and organizing violence. Moreover, while prior work typically brings groups together without asking them to address the conflict directly, we examine two distinct forms of contact: farmer-herder inter-dialogues, in which the two sides directly discuss the underlying sources of conflict; and health workshops, which induce contact through health discussions without addressing the conflict. This design allows us to shed light on whether confronting the sources of conflict directly helps curtail its key drivers. We also measure outcomes over a meaningful period after contact takes place. Our primary data source is an endline survey administered one year after the interventions; we supplement this with high-frequency mobile phone data collection that provides insight into a longer-run window, on average up to two years post-intervention.

We find that the inter-dialogues helped to reconfigure relationships, but with mixed success. Our endline surveys show that this form of contact strengthened social ties between leaders, led to the creation of new dispute resolution institutions, and improved cooperation on the part of farmers. For example, farmers unblocked more cattle routes and posted more signs when spraying crops with herbicides harmful to cattle. At the same time, we observe several signs of relational deterioration. Herders reduced their cooperation, engaging in more illicit grazing. Economic disputes increased—albeit without a rise in violence, at least over the one-year horizon.

One mechanism that may have contributed to this deterioration is that the inter-dialogues, and the subsequent rise in farmer cooperation, made local communities more attractive to outside herders. There are large populations of nomadic herdsmen who move throughout Nigeria, and we observe an influx of these external herdsmen into communities that participated in the inter-dialogues. This influx may have contributed to disputes by straining available resources, introducing herders unfamiliar with local norms, and

providing local herders with plausible deniability for non-compliance. The asymmetry in cooperation that induced this influx may itself reflect structural differences between farming and herding in this context: illicit herder actions such as nighttime grazing are harder to observe and enforce than farmer actions such as unblocking cattle routes. Farming village leaders may therefore have been better positioned to induce compliance among their constituents than herding village leaders were. Results from our mobile phone data collection indicate that the inter-dialogues did not lead to more substantial improvements over time—and if anything may have led to further deterioration. We observe a rise in violence between farmers and herders in the two years following the intervention.

In contrast to the inter-dialogues, the health intervention symmetrically worsened inter-group relations, and did so in ways already apparent in the year following the intervention. The health workshops did not strengthen ties between group leaders or improve dispute resolution. They also led to a deterioration in cooperation by both farmers and herders, and to a rise in disputes—again without inducing an increase in violence, either over the 12-month period or in the longer run. The absence of asymmetric effects on farmer versus herder cooperation, and the lack of an outside herder influx, suggest that the health workshops worsened inter-group relations through a different mechanism. Consistent with this, we observe worse stereotyping and lower empathy among leaders in these communities. This pattern accords with the explanation that contact may backfire and generate ill will when groups engaged in conflict are brought together without any avenue for addressing the underlying sources of tension.

We provide additional evidence to show that our results are unlikely to reflect several alternative explanations. The interventions did not increase economic interactions between farmers and herders, ruling out the possibility that disputes rose simply because the two groups engaged in more joint activity. Effects on herder cooperation do not vary with the relative deprivation of herders, ruling out the idea that herders reduced cooperation in response to their comparative poverty. The effects also do not vary with baseline measures of farmer aggression (proxied by expressions of religious extremism) or farmer

fragmentation (proxied by ethnic fractionalization). This suggests that herders did not reduce cooperation in response to farmer weakness, or upon learning about it through the contact interventions.

Our paper contributes to the literature on intergroup contact in several ways. Our mixed results are consistent with the existing literature, which has produced a range of findings. Several studies document positive effects of contact on inter-group dynamics A number of past studies have found positive effects of contact on inter-group dynamics (e.g., Boisjoly et al., 2006; Rao, 2019; Corno et al., 2022; Bagues and Roth, 2023; Pita Barros, 2025; Majumdar, 2026). Others find null effects (Ditlmann and Samii, 2016; Zhou and Lyall, 2025), and recent work has uncovered negative effects (Enos, 2014; Hangartner et al., 2019; Mousa et al., 2025; Ghosh et al., 2025), consistent with the backlash effects we observe. Reflecting this heterogeneity, a recent meta-analysis (Lowe, 2025) finds smaller aggregate effects that dissipate over time relative to earlier meta-analyses on the topic (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck et al., 2019).

We add important real-world outcomes from an active conflict to the primarily experimental contact literature, including detailed measures of cooperation and multiple measures of violence.[1] Closest to our work is Grady et al. (2023), which also examines the impact of a contact intervention on farmer-herder violence in Nigeria. However, our work differs in three important ways. Grady et al. (2023) analyze an intervention that bundles together grant resources of up to $25,000—which communities spend on infrastructure projects—along with mediation training and community discussion forums on conflict. By contrast, we focus specifically on forums that promote contact without accompanying resource infusions or explicit mediation training. Isolating the contact component may be important, since follow-up work in the same setting shows that mediation training specifically promotes peaceful outcomes (Reardon et al., 2024). Second, their experiment

[1] A notable exception in the broader contact literature is Jha (2013), who shows that medieval Indian trade ports where Hindus and Muslims worked together experienced significantly lower levels of Hindu-Muslim rioting centuries later. This work provides compelling evidence that contact can have lasting effects on inter-group relations over very long time horizons.

covers 15 sites, while we are able to experimentally vary contact across a lager sample of 286 sites. Finally, while their study analyzes attitudes toward security, we go beyond perceptions and measure realized violence outcomes.

Second, we contribute to a growing literature on farmer-herder violence. The existing literature has shed considerable light on the role of economic forces such as climate change (McGuirk and Nunn, 2025; Eberle et al., 2025) and mismatches in development programs (McGuirk and Nunn, 2024; Gehring and Schaudt, 2026) in shaping this conflict. The literature has also examined cultural explanations for high levels of violence (Fouka and Schläpfer, 2022; Le Rossignol and Lowes, 2025), especially the role of a culture of honor among herders—a behavioral adaptation, theorized to emerge among populations reliant on animal herding, under which individuals respond to threats or perceived slights with violence and revenge (Nisbett, 1993; Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen, 1998; Hayes and Lee, 2005; Grosjean, 2014; Cao et al., 2025). Our study identifies an additional problem at the heart of pastoralism. Because many herders are mobile, local improvements can trigger an influx of outside herders that strains available resources and undermines the gains made. Furthermore, herder actions are typically difficult for leaders to monitor, making credible commitments to cooperative behavior hard to sustain.

Third, our findings contribute to the literature on conflict. Here work has highlighted the roles of climate (e.g., Miguel et al., 2004; Hsiang et al., 2013), economic forces (Berman et al., 2011; Besley and Persson, 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Berman et al., 2017), and ethnic and religious divisions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban et al., 2012; Jha, 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016; Ortiz, 2024)— all of which are likely at play in Nigeria's Middle Belt.[2] Our study adds to a body of work on violence-reduction interventions (Blattman et al., 2014; Henn et al., 2025), which has produced mixed results. While some studies find that such interventions simply displace violence to other areas (Blattman et al., 2021), we

[2]A complete review of the conflict literature lies outside the scope of this paper. See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for one such review.

observe the reverse: short-term improvements in cooperation can attract outside actors, leading to increased disputes and an overall worsening of outcomes.

2 Context

Our study is set in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, the most populous country in West Africa. The Middle Belt lies between the Northern region of Nigeria and the South. We focus on three states in the Middle Belt: Benue, Nasarawa, and Plateau. Together the three states have a population of over 13 million and cover an area the size of 91,228 square miles, roughly the size of Portugal or Maine. Similar to many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the region is ethno-linguistically extremely diverse with no dominant group.[3] Geographically and climactically, the Middle Belt signifies a transition zone between the arid North and fertile South of the country. As such it is a fertile place for agriculture, but also a refuge for herders from the North who have been bringing their cattle to graze either seasonally or permanently.

The farmers in the Middle Belt come from various ethno-linguistic groups that are considered "indigenous" to the area. The three most common groups in our sample are the Madda, Tiv, and Eggon. The majority of farmers are Christian (64%) with a sizable Muslim minority (33%). Since these groups are considered indigene to the area, they enjoy rights to the land and other local privileges and in general control local and state-level politics.

Herders in the Middle Belt, on the other hand, are almost exclusively Fulani, an ethnic group common in the North of Nigeria and in the broader Sahel region of West Africa. They are also predominantly Muslim. Thus, in addition to their difference in economic specialization, farmers and herders in the Middle Belt also differ on ethnic and religious grounds. Herders in the region vary in their degree to which they are settled: some are fully settled in one location, some have seasonal settlements, and others are

[3]This is in contrast to other parts of Nigeria that have dominant groups: the Hausa in the North, Igbo in the Southeast, and Yoruba in the Southwest.

fully nomadic. Our implementation partner focuses their intervention on settled herders. Politically, herders are marginalized in local and state-level politics in the Middle Belt. But they enjoy some representation at the national level and in the military (e.g., the president from 2015–2023, Muhammadu Buhari, was Fulani).

There used to be largely peaceful and cooperative interactions between farmers and herders, build on complementarities of activities. Herders would trade milk, meat, and dung, for food and animal feed and cows would eat crop residue in return for fertilizing the fields with dung. However, in the last 20 years such cooperation has largely disappeared and instead tension and violence have increased. Increased conflict is likely due to a variety of reasons from population pressures, climate change (McGuirk and Nunn, 2025; Eberle et al., 2025) , political machinations, lack of strong state institutions that ensure security and dispute resolution, and ethnic/religious tensions.

As a result, there has been increased local isolation of communities with neighboring herders and farmers rarely interacting or cooperating. In our baseline data (2020–2021), we find that over 75% of farmers and herders live in separate villages which are on average 2.2km apart from each other. Only 43% of farmer-herder communities share a common market.[4] The median respondent visits the other group's village only 3 times per year. Most communities don't have functioning dispute resolution mechanisms and disputes between the two groups often turn violent. There is a mix of individual, or family level and community level violence. These include banditry, vigilante groups, local militias, and even Islamist elements influenced by Boko Haram. The lack of interactions, absence of dispute resolution mechanisms, and organized violence has led to escalation and vicious cycles. Over the last ten years it is estimates that 1,000–2,000 yearly deaths in the Middle Belt are due to farmer-herder violence (International Crisis Group, 2017; ACLED, 2022, 2023).

[4]See Table A1 in the Appendix.

3 Description of Interventions

To study if contact can reduce farmer-herder violence and break communities out of vicious cycles, we study two contact interventions: farmer-herder inter-dialogues and health workshops. For both interventions we study contact between farmer-herder community pairs. Farmer and herder community pairs are groups of farmers and settled herders either living within the same village or in neighboring villages that share common resources, such as a water source or market.[5]

3.1 Farmer-Herder Inter-Dialogues

The goal of the farmer-herder inter-dialogue intervention (henceforth inter-dialogues) was threefold. First, building on a contact literature that largely focuses on contact in post-conflict settings, the inter-dialogues aim to encourage contact between groups involved in an active conflict, namely farmers and herders in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Second, since conflict dynamics are likely influenced by local elites, the inter-dialogues specifically target contact between local decision-makers. Third, contact between groups can be of different types. One potentially important dimension of difference is whether the underlying conflict issues between groups are discussed or not. The inter-dialogues promote contact where the underlying issues are being addressed.

The inter-dialogues were implemented by Search For Common Ground (henceforth SFCG), an international non-profit. While the organization is international, the implementation of the intervention was done by Nigerian staff and the local implementing staff at each dialogue always included Fulanis and staff from typical farmer ethnicities. The intervention was designed by SFCG and has been run by the organization for several years prior to our study.

The inter-dialogues unfolded in three steps. First, preparatory meetings were held separately with farmers and herders to lay the groundwork for productive dialogue. In

[5]In 30% of our community pairs farmers and herders live in the same village.

these meetings, both sides identified what they considered the core issues of the conflict, discussed the involved actors, stakeholders, and communities, examined the root causes and interests, and recommended strategies for engagement. Farmers would identify issues such as herders allowing their cattle to graze too close to homes; and shepherd boys falling asleep when they were supposed to be tending to flocks. Herders would raise issues like finding cattle routes blocked and farmers burning their crop residue too soon for their animals to graze. Second, following these initial meetings, both parties were brought together in a daylong forum that included three farmer-herder community pairs in the same LGA[6] These fora were inclusive, featuring key local leaders such as the chairmen of the farmer and herder associations, chiefs, local councilors, as well as women and youth leaders. During the advocacy visits conducted by SFCG, they provided guidance on who should attend the meetings. The community head then nominated leaders and influential community members to participate in the inter-dialogues. Third, SFCG organized follow-up visits to the communities six weeks after the fora to discuss progress in implementing the action plans developed during the workshops.

During these sessions, farmers and herders collectively discussed key challenges and sources of tension within their communities. These typically touched on the themes identified in the separate meetings held by farmers and herders. The discussions aimed to identify the root causes of conflict and explore potential solutions. By the end of the sessions, the participants produced a collective record of their discussions. This record required them to reach a basic agreement on how these challenges were represented, ensuring that both sides had a shared understanding of the issues at hand. They would also produce action plans designed to address the conflict. For example, in some action plans, farmers committed to identifying and unblocking cattle routes; and putting up signs when they used pesticides so herders could steer their cattle clear of eating near these crops. Villages also often agreed to set up an inclusive peace committee and monthly meetings between the communities involved in the dialogues process. Herder commitments

[6]Local Government Area: a Nigerian administrative division akin to districts.

included better monitoring of their shepherd boys and reporting of incidents to the parents of herders involved, encouraging herders to graze on available cattle routes, discouraging their community members to graze at night, and informing herders who came in from outside the community about the norms of seeking permissions to graze on farms.

Panel A in Table A2 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for the inter-dialogue workshops collected by the SFCG implementation staff. Average attendance was 57 per workshop. Since each workshop was attended by three community pairs, this means an average attendance of 19 per community pair, or 9–10 individuals per individual farmer or herder community. About a third of the participants were women.

3.2 Health Workshops

The goal of the health workshops was similar insofar they also target farmer-herders involved in active conflict and contact between leaders. However, the health workshops differ in one important regard, namely that during the contact, the underlying issues are not being addressed.

The health workshops were designed by Dan Meshak Consulting (henceforth DMC), an organization founded by a Nigerian medical doctor. He designed the intervention in collaboration with our research team to ensure the structure and logistics are as similar as possible to the SFCG inter-dialogues. The implementing staff consisted of Nigerian health professionals experienced in community health.

The structure of the health workshop intervention was exactly the same as the inter-dialogue structure. First, DMC established contact with selected communities through advocacy meetings. Then farmers and herders would meet separately. This was followed by the main part of the intervention: a one-day health workshop with both farmers and herders. As with the inter-dialogues, three community pairs from the same LGA took part in one workshop. Finally, DMC conducted follow-up meeting in each community to assess progress on the action plan items.

In contrast to the inter-dialogues, the health workshops did not discuss the underlying

issues between farmers and herders but instead focused on community health issues. The curriculum was developed based on community demand following pilot workshops. The topics discussed were sanitation, child and maternal health, and Covid-19 prevention. During the workshop communities developed action plans to improve community health along these dimensions.

Panel B in Table A2 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for 14 out of the 32 health workshops collected by the implementation staff. Overall they were very similar to the inter-dialogues with an average attendance of 58 (i.e., 10 per community), a third female attendance, and an overall absence of open tension and arguments between farmers and herders.

4 Design and Methods

4.1 Sampling

To determine our sample our partner SFCG identified over 800 potential farmer-herder communities in three states in the Middle Belt of Nigeria: Benue, Nasarawa, and Plateau.[7] Out of this list of potential farmer-herder community pairs we selected groups of 9 per LGA for baseline survey. The full sample included 9 community pairs in Benue, 215 in Nasarawa, and 62 in Plateau.

Following our baseline surveys, we randomized community pairs within LGAs in groups of 3 into control, inter-dialogues, and health workshops. Our randomization protocol used baseline covariates to re-randomizing based on balance tests. The resulting balance table can be seen in Table A3 in the Appendix. A map of our sample and respective treatment assignment can be seen in Figure A1 in the Appendix.

[7]We coordinated with SFCG and several other local and international organizations, such as Mercy Corps, that these communities did not receive farmer-herder interventions in recent years.

4.2 Data

The data for this study comes from a baseline survey, intervention monitoring survey, endline household surveys, endline key informant interview surveys, endline behavioral games, and a high-frequency mobile phone data collection.

Timeline of Study

Baseline surveys were conducted in two batches, first in December 2019 (134 community pairs) and then in December of 2020 (152 community pairs). The inter-dialogue interventions took place from August 2020 until November 2021. Health workshops were conducted from November 2020 until June 2022.

Endline data collection was conducted in phases to align with the staggered rollout of the interventions. Inter-dialogue and health workshop community pairs were surveyed 9 to 12 months after they have participated in the intervention. Control communities were surveyed concurrently with the inter-dialogue and health workshop communities in their LGA. Since in most LGAs health workshops took place more than 3 months after the inter-dialogues, control communities in such LGAs were surveyed twice: once concurrently with the inter-dialogue communities and a second time concurrently with the health workshop communities. The initial round of surveys commenced in February 2022, with subsequent rounds conducted as the interventions were completed. The final batch of surveys was completed by July 2023. For the high-frequency mobile phone data collection, distribution of the phones and training of respondents started in August 2022 and data collection lasted for 12 months ending in November of 2023.

Data Sources

Household surveys were conducted with eleven respondents per community pair. From the farming community, six respondents were selected. Five random farmers following a random walk s, including a farmer who currently engages in both herding and farming or

has done so in the past. Five respondents were selected from the herding community. The questionnaire asked households about disputes they were involved in over the previous 9 months, conflict events (both individual and communal), economic activities, cooperative behavior, and attitudes towards the other group

Community Key Informants are defined as leaders or influential individuals within the selected villages. This group includes village leaders (i.e., the Chief in farming villages or the Ardo in herding villages); as well as women, youth, religious, and vigilante (security) leaders. In each community pair, six leaders were surveyed, with three representing the herder village and another three representing the farmer village. However, village leaders (Chiefs and Ardos) were consistently sampled across all villages, while the composition of other key informants varied from community to community. Therefore, we focus on village leaders in our analysis below.

During endline data collection, behavioral games (dictator and trust games) were played between six farmers and six herders in each community pair. Half of the sample were randomly selected households and half were the leaders we surveyed. Each individual was anonymously paired with someone from the paired community and played one round of the dictator game and two rounds of the trust game. The dictator game aims to measure out-group generosity. In it the respondent can choose how much money from a fixed amount to allocate between himself and a member of the other group. The trust game measures trust and trustworthiness. One player is given an initial endowment and has the option to send money to the second player. The money sent is multiplied and the second player can choose how much to send back. Such behavioral games offer an alternative way to measure attitudes towards the other groups and are often considered more reliable than survey measures since they involve monetary consequences for the respondents.

We further implemented a high-frequency mobile phone data collection to provide additional measures of economic disputes and conflict events. We distributed two phones to respondents in each community pair, one farmer and one herder. We trained the

respondent in filling out a fortnightly survey on economic disputes, such as cows eating crops, and conflict events, such as deaths and assaults, in the communities. Respondents were instructed to provide information on all economic disputes and conflict events that happened in the community pair in the previous two weeks including who the perpetrator was, where it happened, whether the dispute was resolved and more.

4.3 Estimating Equation

We combine the survey responses above based on our pre-analysis plan into mean effects indices, following (Kling et al., 2007). To do so, we calculate treatment group-wise means and impute missingness by group. Then we standardize by subtracting control means and diving by the standard deviation of the control group. Finally, we generate the mean of the standardized variables to generate the index.

The randomized experimental design of our project means that we can isolate the causal effect of our intervention using simple econometric specifications. To gauge the causal effect of the treatments on endline outcomes, we estimate Intent to Treat (ITT) effects using the following specification:

$$y_{j,i,t} = \beta ID_i + \gamma Health_i + \alpha_S \times \varphi_t + \epsilon_{j,i,t} \tag{1}$$

Here, $y_{j,i,t}$ is the endline outcome of household or leader j, in community pair i surveyed in month t; ID_i is the main treatment indicator, which equals 1 for communities assigned to participate in SFCG's farmer-herder inter-dialogues and 0 otherwise; $Health_i$ is the treatment indicator which equals 1 for communities assigned to participate in the health workshops and 0 otherwise. $\alpha_S \times \varphi_t$ represents LGA stratum fixed effects $\times$ survey month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the community pair level.

5 Results

We now turn to the effects of the interventions.

5.1 Main Results

Effects of the Inter-Dialogues

We begin by examining whether the inter-dialogues succeeded in building relationships between farmer and herder communities. Table 1 presents treatment effects on two summary indices: social networks and institutions & dispute resolution. The inter-dialogues strengthened social ties among leaders—village chiefs and ardos in treatment communities were significantly more likely to know their counterparts and to communicate with them regularly (Column 4; individual indicators in Table A4). We find no corresponding effect among households (Column 1), which is expected given that only a small subset of households attended the workshops directly.

The inter-dialogues also improved institutional infrastructure for managing disputes. Village leaders in treatment communities established more farmer-herder committees, and these committees met more frequently (Table A5, Column 4). Notably, these committees tend to be younger—that is, more recently created—suggesting that the inter-dialogues catalyzed the formation of new institutions rather than merely reinforcing existing ones. Among households, we observe improved dispute resolution: treated households were more likely to attempt to resolve disputes on their own or to contact local village institutions when conflicts arose. While not all individual indicators are statistically significant on their own, the aggregate index is positive and significant for both leaders and households.

We next turn to cooperation, which lies at the heart of farmer-herder relations. In the status quo, each side routinely undertakes actions that harm the other. Farmers block cattle routes, use herbicide without warning, and burn crop residue before herders can let their cattle feed. Herders engage in night-grazing to conceal herd identities, graze without permission, and build unauthorized structures on farming land. Table 2 presents

treatment effects on a cooperation index and its decomposition by the identity of the acting group.

Overall, the inter-dialogues increased cooperation (Column 1), but this aggregate effect masks a stark asymmetry. Farmers in treated communities cooperated substantially more: they unblocked cattle routes, delayed bush-burning to give herders more time, and were more likely to publicly signal herbicide use (Table A7). Herders, by contrast, cooperated *less*: they grazed more frequently without permission and engaged in more night-grazing (Table A8). This divergence is not an artifact of differential reporting—both farmers and herders confirm lower herder cooperation and higher farmer cooperation when surveyed separately (Tables A14–A15).

One potential explanation for the difference in farmer and herder cooperation could be issues of observability for farmer and herder leaders. Due to the nature of the economic activities, farmer leaders might have an easier time ensuring that their side's concessions are implemented: unblocking cattle routes, putting up signs for pesticide use, and delaying bush-burning are all observable actions and leaders can sanction farmers that don't comply. The actions of herders on the other hand are harder to monitor and enforce for herder leaders: night-grazing and grazing without permission are inherently hard to monitor and herder leaders might be hard pressed identifying and thus sanctionning individual herders that fail to comply.

Did the positive changes in social networks, dispute resolution, and farmer cooperation translate into reduced conflict? Table 3 shows that they did not. The inter-dialogues led to a significant increase in economic disputes, as reported by both households and village leaders. Violence, however, was unaffected over the 12-month endline horizon.

Table 4 investigates why herder cooperation fell and disputes rose even as farmer cooperation and dispute resolution improved. A key finding emerges in Panel A: village chiefs and ardos report a significant influx of outside herders into inter-dialogue communities. Mediation analysis (Tables A17–A16) indicates that this influx accounts for 25 to 40 percent of the increase in disputes. Stereotypes and empathy—common targets of contact

interventions—are unaffected by the treatment, ruling out attitudinal deterioration as a channel.

The outside-herder mechanism is further supported by Panel B of Table 4, which disaggregates disputes by the identity of the opposing party. Among households, the increase in disputes is concentrated in conflicts with individuals from other communities. Among village leaders, the largest effects are for disputes with herders from another community and with unknown herders. These patterns are consistent with the interpretation that the inter-dialogues—and the cooperative actions they induced among farmers—made treated communities more attractive to outside herders who were not party to the dialogue process and who may operate under different norms than the settled herders residing in the intervention villages. Anecdotal evidence from our implementing partner suggests that nomadic herders are in regular contact with the settled herders.

We conclude our analysis of the inter-dialogue treatment by examining longer-run effects using the high-frequency mobile phone data, which extends the observation window to approximately two years post-intervention. Panel A of Table 5 shows a continued rise in disputes, though without statistical significance. More concerning, we now observe a significant increase in violence. Panel B reveals that this deterioration is driven by disputes and violent events involving herders from outside the community, mirroring the endline patterns. The long-run increase in violence is consistent with a dynamic in which the cooperative agreements forged through the inter-dialogues gradually unraveled as herders—particularly those from outside—failed to uphold their commitments.

Effects of the Health Workshops

The health workshops provide an alternative treatment condition that isolates the role of directly addressing the conflict during contact. In these workshops, farmer and herder leaders met under identical logistical conditions but discussed community health rather than the sources of their disputes.

The results are uniformly negative. Social ties were unaffected and institutions and

dispute resolution worsened (Columns 2 and 5 of Table 1). Cooperation declined across the board, driven by reduced herder cooperation without the offsetting increase in farmer cooperation observed in the inter-dialogue arm (Table 2). Economic disputes increased significantly among households (Table 3), though—as with the inter-dialogues—violence was unchanged at the 12-month horizon.

The mechanisms behind these negative effects differ from those driving the inter-dialogue results. Table 4 shows no evidence of an outside herder influx in health workshop communities, nor are disputes disproportionately concentrated among conflicts with outsiders. Instead, the health workshops appear to have worsened intergroup attitudes: village chiefs and ardos exhibit increased stereotyping and reduced empathy toward the opposing group. These attitudinal effects suggest that bringing leaders from conflicting groups into contact without providing a framework for addressing their grievances can be counterproductive. Rather than building goodwill, the health workshops appear to have provided an occasion for participants to confirm and reinforce their negative views of each other, leading to a deterioration in both cooperation and conflict outcomes.

In the longer run, disputes and violence trend upward in health workshop communities as well (Column 2 of Table 5), though neither effect achieves statistical significance.

5.2 Additional Analysis

Tables A14–A15 present the main outcome indices separately for farming and herding villages, confirming the general pattern of results.

We then investigate several alternative explanations for our findings. One concern is that the inter-dialogues may have increased interactions between farmers and herders, mechanically generating more opportunities for disputes. Table A20 provides no support for this account: if anything, interactions between the two groups are *lower* in both treatment arms. The increase in disputes thus reflects a genuine deterioration in relations rather than a byproduct of greater economic contact.

A second possibility is that herder poverty constrains their ability to cooperate, causing

them to exploit farmer concessions. Our economic and demographic indicators confirm that herders are significantly poorer than farmers in our sample. However, Table A21 shows that treatment effects do not vary with the relative deprivation of herders, ruling out this explanation.

A third alternative is that the interventions revealed information about the other side's aggressiveness or resolve, allowing herders to strategically exploit perceived farmer leniency. Table A22 tests this by interacting treatment indicators with baseline measures of farmer aggression (expressed through religious extremism) and farmer ethnic fractionalization. Neither interaction is significant, suggesting that herders do not calibrate their cooperation to the perceived weakness or division among farmers.

We find no treatment effects on economic outcomes, economic exchange, or on trust and generosity as measured by incentivized behavioral games (Table A18). Similarly, the relative numerical strength of farmers and herders within a community pair—measured by the absolute difference in their population shares—does not moderate any of our results (Table A19).

Finally, we conduct a series of robustness checks. Our results are unchanged when we include baseline controls (Table A23) and when we use alternative samples of key informants, including the full set of village leaders (Table A24) and the restricted sample of village chiefs and ardos only (Table A25). The consistency of results across specifications reinforces our confidence in the findings.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we investigate whether contact between warring groups can improve relations and reduce conflict. We provide the first experimental evidence of how two types of contact between groups engaged in active violence impact conflict outcomes. Our study focuses on farmers and settled herders in Nigeria's Middle Belt, who are locked in conflict with frequent loss of life and property. Using an RCT across 286 community pairs, we assess the

effects of two contact interventions: inter-dialogues, in which farmers and herders directly discuss the sources of conflict, and health workshops, in which they discuss health issues without addressing the underlying conflict.

The inter-dialogues partially reconfigure relationships, but with mixed success. They strengthen social ties between group leaders, lead to the creation of new farmer-herder committees, improve dispute resolution, and boost cooperative actions by farmers. However, these gains are offset by a deterioration on the herder side. Herders reduce their cooperation, engaging in more illicit grazing. Crucially, the rise in farmer cooperation attracts an influx of outside nomadic herders into inter-dialogue communities. In the medium run, disputes are concentrated among conflicts with herders from outside the community — consistent with this influx mechanism. In the longer run, our high-frequency mobile phone data reveal that this deterioration deepens: disputes with outside herders continue to rise, and violence between farmers and herders from outside the community increases significantly over the two years following the intervention.

The health workshops worsen inter-group relations through a different mechanism. They induce worse stereotyping and lower empathy among leaders, and lead to a symmetric deterioration in cooperation by both farmers and herders, along with a rise in economic disputes. Importantly, however, the health workshops do not trigger a herder influx or a concentration of disputes with outside herders over the one-year horizon, and they do not generate the same violent backlash as the inter-dialogues in the longer run. This suggests that the pathway to violence likely runs through the outside herder influx triggered by the inter-dialogues — and the cooperative actions by farmers that attracted it.

Together, these findings caution against optimism about the power of contact to resolve active conflict. Even when contact succeeds in improving cooperation in the short run, it can set in motion dynamics that ultimately worsen outcomes — particularly when third parties, like nomadic herdsmen, have the potential to unravel cooperative gains. Addressing the sources of conflict directly may be necessary but is not sufficient: durable

peace may also require mechanisms to manage the behavior of external actors.

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7 Paper Tables

Table 1: Social Ties and Institutions

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Social Networks Index	−0.003	−0.012	3,915	0.126*	−0.059	708
	(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.070)	(0.078)	
Institutions & Dispute Resolution Index	0.060***	−0.026***	3,934	0.075**	−0.082***	707
	(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.030)	(0.024)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 2: Cooperation

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Cooperation Index	0.021*	−0.039**	3,938	0.008	−0.028	708
	(0.012)	(0.016)		(0.031)	(0.032)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.099***	−0.011	3,938	0.103**	−0.033	708
	(0.023)	(0.028)		(0.049)	(0.057)	
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	−0.089***	−0.061*	3,937	−0.095	−0.119	707
	(0.033)	(0.031)		(0.084)	(0.089)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 3: Disputes and Violence

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Dispute Index	0.072*	0.155***	3,938	0.243***	0.051	708
	(0.041)	(0.053)		(0.085)	(0.093)	
Violence Index	0.008	−0.026	3,938	−0.097	0.022	708
	(0.030)	(0.034)		(0.075)	(0.032)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 4: Mechanisms

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Panel A: Indices						
Influx Index	–	–	–	0.211**	0.076	708
				(0.096)	(0.080)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.067**	−0.033	3,938	−0.107**	−0.029	708
	(0.031)	(0.030)		(0.045)	(0.075)	
Stereotypes Index	0.021	0.015	3,938	0.002	0.059*	708
	(0.016)	(0.019)		(0.032)	(0.031)	
Empathy Index	−0.014	0.056	3,938	−0.054	−0.119**	708
	(0.026)	(0.036)		(0.046)	(0.060)	
Panel B: Number of Disputes						
With herders from the same village	–	–	–	0.180*	0.022	708
				(0.106)	(0.114)	
With herders from another community	–	–	–	0.189*	0.057	708
				(0.115)	(0.126)	
With unknown herders	–	–	–	0.244*	0.033	708
				(0.130)	(0.145)	
With someone from the same village	0.025	0.182***	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.060)	(0.051)				
With someone from the neighboring village	0.091**	−0.061	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.044)	(0.053)				
With someone from another community	0.217***	0.146**	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.068)	(0.061)				
With someone unknown	−0.024	0.028	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.062)	(0.053)				

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables in Panel A are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. All outcomes in Panel B are standardized as well using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 5: Long-Run Effects from high-frequency mobile phone data collection

	Mobile Phone Respondents		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N
Panel A: Indices			
Disputes Index	0.077	0.046	15,253
	(0.054)	(0.035)	
Farmer-Herder Violence Index	0.082*	0.029	15,253
	(0.048)	(0.022)	
Panel B: By Perpetrators			
Disputes with herders in the community	0.087	0.064	15,253
	(0.061)	(0.050)	
Disputes with a herder from outside the community	0.154*	0.069	15,253
	(0.079)	(0.049)	
Farmer-Herder violent events with herders from the community	0.059	0.007	15,253
	(0.048)	(0.029)	
Farmer-Herder violent events with herders from outside the community	0.107*	0.027	15,253
	(0.058)	(0.032)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables in Panel A are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. All outcomes in Panel B are standardized as well using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, column (1) shows the coefficient and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; column (2) shows the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) shows the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA and Biweekly Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix for:


"Does Contact Reduce Conflict? Experimental Evidence from Nigeria"

Oeindrila Dube **Soeren J. Henn** **James A. Robinson**

January 2026


A Additional Figures

Figure A1: Map of sample localities and eligible towns



Notes: This map shows the location of the 286 community pairs which made up our sample localities across the 3 states of Benue Nasarawa, and Plateau. Treatment assignment is indicated through color and shape: green squares for inter-dialogue, blue triangles for health workshops, and red circles for control communities.

Figure A2: Study Timeline: Data Collection and Interventions



Notes: This map shows the location of the 286 community pairs which made up our sample localities across the 3 states of Benue Nasarawa, and Plateau. Treatment assignment is indicated through color and shape: green squares for inter-dialogue, blue triangles for health workshops, and red circles for control communities.

B Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Farmer-Herder interactions as reported by households at baseline

	(1) Observations	(2) Mean	(3) Median	(4) SD	(5) Min	(6) Max
No. farmer friends	3122	12.210	5.00	24.183	0.00	200
No. herder friends	3065	9.071	5.00	15.588	0.00	100
No. weddings attended in neighboring village	2843	4.277	2.00	19.636	0.00	1000
No. funerals attended in neighboring village	2858	3.925	2.00	6.270	0.00	70
Used animal traction	3209	0.063	0.00	0.243	0.00	1
Farmers: Crop sold to someone from the paired village	3275	0.027	0.00	0.161	0.00	1
Farmers: Obtained free dung from herder	402	0.368	0.00	0.483	0.00	1
Farmers: Share of dung bartered with herder	147	0.367	0.00	0.484	0.00	1
Common market exists in community	3271	0.432	0.00	0.495	0.00	1
Farmers: Farm grazed by others	3275	0.017	0.00	0.131	0.00	1
Herders: No. plots used for herding	3128	0.453	0.00	1.029	0.00	10

Table A2: Workshop participation and interactions

	(1) Observations	(2) Mean	(3) Median	(4) SD	(5) Min	(6) Max
Panel A: Inter-dialogue Workshop						
No. of communities in the workshop	31	3.00	3	0.26	2	4
Number of Participants:						
Total Participants	31	56.71	58	9.64	37	77
Male Participants	31	38.58	38	8.45	20	61
Female Participants	31	18.13	18	4.78	10	27
Tension and Arguments:						
Any tense moments	31	0.13	0	0.34	0	1
Any verbal arguments	31	0.13	0	0.34	0	1
Any physical fights	31	0.00	0	0.00	0	0
Anyone left in anger	31	0.00	0	0.00	0	0
Overal tension (Scale 1-3)	31	0.13	0	0.34	0	1
Talking in the workshop (Binary):						
Leader	31	0.90	1	0.30	0	1
Herders	31	0.90	1	0.30	0	1
Women	31	0.52	1	0.51	0	1
Youth	31	0.81	1	0.40	0	1
Extent to which attendees talk (Scale 1-4):						
Leader	28	3.00	3	0.00	3	3
Herders	28	3.00	3	0.00	3	3
Women	28	2.57	3	0.50	2	3
Youth	28	2.93	3	0.38	2	4
Panel B: Health Workshop						
No. of communities in the workshop	14	3.00	3	0.00	3	3
Number of Participants:						
Total Participants	14	57.71	60	8.26	30	63
Male Participants	14	36.93	38	5.69	22	46
Female Participants	14	20.79	22	5.24	8	29
Tension and Arguments:						
Tense moments	14	0.14	0	0.36	0	1
Verbal arguments	14	0.14	0	0.36	0	1
Physical fights	14	0.00	0	0.00	0	0
Participant left in anger	14	0.00	0	0.00	0	0
Overall a little tension	14	0.14	0	0.36	0	1
Talking in the workshop (Binary):						
Leader	14	0.21	0	0.43	0	1
Herders	14	0.29	0	0.47	0	1
Women	14	0.14	0	0.36	0	1
Youth	14	0.86	1	0.36	0	1
Extent to which attendees talk (Scale 1-4):						
Leader	14	2.21	2	0.43	2	3
Herders	14	2.43	2	0.65	2	4
Women	14	2.29	2	0.61	2	4
Youth	14	3.64	4	0.74	2	4

Table A3: Balance Table for Households

	(1) Control	(2) ID	(3) Health	(2)-(1) Difference	(3)-(1) Difference
Thatched roof	0.396	0.437	0.400	0.040	0.004
	(0.489)	(0.496)	(0.496)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Subjective wealth	2.041	2.015	2.036	−0.026	−0.006
	(0.342)	(0.379)	(0.379)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Access to electricity	0.147	0.098	0.160	−0.048*	0.013
	(0.354)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.025)	(0.029)
No. household members	9.726	9.468	9.634	−0.268	−0.084
	(6.094)	(5.939)	(5.939)	(0.316)	(0.305)
Children in household	4.380	4.294	4.214	−0.097	−0.166
	(3.350)	(3.175)	(3.175)	(0.163)	(0.160)
Household head age	41.652	41.339	42.868	−0.337	1.247
	(12.991)	(13.331)	(13.331)	(0.691)	(0.773)
Household head: primary education	0.560	0.529	0.550	−0.031	−0.010
	(0.497)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Household head: secondary education	0.377	0.343	0.350	−0.035	−0.028
	(0.485)	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Household head: above secondary education	0.090	0.083	0.089	−0.007	−0.000
	(0.286)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Household involved in dispute	0.514	0.521	0.498	0.007	−0.016
	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.021)	(0.021)
No. cattle owned	11.705	11.921	12.250	0.201	0.533
	(25.942)	(25.217)	(25.217)	(1.037)	(1.079)
No. other livestock owned	17.116	18.397	16.648	1.245	−0.476
	(23.440)	(25.122)	(25.122)	(1.103)	(0.954)
Value of harvested crops	8.788	8.563	8.734	−0.234	−0.055
	(6.277)	(6.316)	(6.316)	(0.247)	(0.219)
Herder not require permission to graze	0.504	0.508	0.475	0.005	−0.028
	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Cash spent on assets(IHS)	8.300	8.026	8.223	−0.282	−0.086
	(5.129)	(5.147)	(5.147)	(0.225)	(0.218)
Prefer living with same religion	0.692	0.671	0.681	−0.020	−0.010
	(0.462)	(0.470)	(0.470)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Disapprove child marrying outside religion	0.677	0.655	0.672	−0.021	−0.004
	(0.468)	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Unsafe to walk in own village	0.082	0.063	0.074	−0.019	−0.008
	(0.274)	(0.244)	(0.244)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Unsafe to go to neighboring village	0.144	0.126	0.140	−0.017	−0.003
	(0.351)	(0.332)	(0.332)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unsafe to walk in own village at night	0.217	0.191	0.210	−0.026	−0.008
	(0.412)	(0.394)	(0.394)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Unsafe for women in neighboring village	0.189	0.186	0.203	−0.004	0.014
	(0.392)	(0.389)	(0.389)	(0.020)	(0.019)

Table Balance Table for Households *(contd.)*

	(1) Control	(2) ID	(3) Health	(2)-(1) Difference	(3)-(1) Difference
Herder Stereotypes Index	−0.004	0.009	−0.006	0.013	−0.002
	(0.591)	(0.595)	(0.595)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Borrowed money last year	0.268	0.231	0.216	−0.036*	−0.053**
	(0.443)	(0.422)	(0.422)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Lent money last year	0.298	0.258	0.278	−0.039*	−0.021
	(0.457)	(0.438)	(0.438)	(0.020)	(0.022)
F-test of joint significance (p-val)				0.184	0.575
Number of observations	1090	1087	1087	2177	2177

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. In a given row, columns (1), (2), and (3) show the mean and standard deviation of the variables for control, inter-dialogue, and health treatment arms; column (4) shows the coefficient and standard error on the pairwise t-test for that variable between inter-dialogue and control arm; and column (5) shows the coefficient and standard error on the pairwise t-test for that variable between health and control arm. The bottom panel shows the p-value from the F-test of joint significance, the number of observations in that sample. The subjective wealth measure was reported by the surveyor on the household's condition relative to the respondent's village. All regressions include LGA fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the community level shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

C Individual Components of each Index

Table A4: Underlying Indicators for Social Networks Index

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Social Networks Index	−0.003	−0.012	3,915	0.126*	−0.059	708
	(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.070)	(0.078)	
Indicators:						
Knows neighboring village head	−0.003	−0.009	2,449	0.043*	−0.011	708
	(0.010)	(0.011)		(0.025)	(0.028)	
Frequency talking to neighboring village head	0.005	0.043	2,449	0.140*	−0.009	708
	(0.049)	(0.054)		(0.078)	(0.092)	
Cordial with neighboring village head	–	–	–	0.021	−0.049	663
				(0.043)	(0.045)	
No. farmers known	−14.194	2.209	3,782	–	–	–
	(12.712)	(14.769)				
No. herders known	−4.531	−0.252	3,789	–	–	–
	(9.524)	(9.513)				
No. farmer friends	−1.807	0.797	3,776	–	–	–
	(1.921)	(1.415)				
No. herder friends	−1.331	0.109	3,745	–	–	–
	(1.293)	(1.323)				
No. weddings attended in neighboring village	0.122	−0.073	3,355	–	–	–
	(0.480)	(0.328)				
No. funerals attended in neighboring village	1.015**	−0.568*	3,354	–	–	–
	(0.483)	(0.315)				

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A5: Underlying Indicators for Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index	0.060***	−0.026***	3,934	0.075**	−0.082***	707
	(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.030)	(0.024)	
Indicators:						
Farmer-Herder committees exist	–	–	–	0.043	−0.130**	707
				(0.053)	(0.061)	
No. committees	–	–	–	0.034	−0.150**	706
				(0.064)	(0.066)	
Committee age(inverted, months)	–	–	–	46.482**	4.595	387
				(19.269)	(22.529)	
No. committee meetings (year)	–	–	–	2.983	0.334	387
				(5.174)	(1.980)	
No. committee meetings (last month)	–	–	–	0.144	−0.096	390
				(0.163)	(0.154)	
Did committee solve disputes?	–	–	–	−0.000	0.114**	408
				(0.047)	(0.057)	
No. disputes resolved	–	–	–	−0.934	2.550**	399
				(1.150)	(1.215)	
No. disputes mediated by KII	–	–	–	−1.649	0.667	498
				(2.641)	(1.616)	
Mediated violent events (binary)	–	–	–	0.136	−0.500	29
				(0.218)	(0.449)	
Resolved violent event on their own	–	–	–	−0.017	0.500	29
				(0.179)	(0.449)	
Contacted village institutions	–	–	–	0.034	−1.000	29
				(0.000)	(0.000)	
No. events where parties were contacted	–	–	–	−3.576	−0.500	29
				(3.823)	(0.449)	
Household will go to committee for dispute resolution	−0.001	−0.001	3,934	–	–	–
	(0.003)	(0.002)				

Table A5: Underlying Indicators for Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index (contd.)

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index	0.060***	−0.026***	3,934	0.075**	−0.082***	707
	(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.030)	(0.024)	
Indicators:						
Tried to resolve dispute	0.077**	0.037	1,845	–	–	–
	(0.032)	(0.040)				
Tried to resolve on their own	0.059*	0.002	994	–	–	–
	(0.033)	(0.041)				
Contacted village institutions for dispute resolution	0.021	−0.039	994	–	–	–
	(0.036)	(0.041)				
Household went to committee for dispute resolution	0.010	−0.005	994	–	–	–
	(0.008)	(0.011)				
Satisfied with resolution	0.025	−0.033	994	–	–	–
	(0.019)	(0.033)				
Contacted anyone to report conflict	−0.005	0.147	328	–	–	–
	(0.057)	(0.099)				
Contacted village institutions for conflict resolution	0.136*	−0.240**	233	–	–	–
	(0.071)	(0.115)				
Household went to committee for conflict resolution	−0.025	0.026	233	–	–	–
	(0.019)	(0.028)				
Dispute Resolution and Institutions Index	0.020	−0.021	3,934	–	–	–
	(0.023)	(0.026)				

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A6: Cooperation Index and Underlying Indicators for Cooperation

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Cooperation Index	0.021*	−0.039**	3,938	0.008	−0.028	708
	(0.012)	(0.016)		(0.031)	(0.032)	
Indicators:						
New routes unblocked	0.073***	−0.016	3,861	0.070	0.012	705
	(0.020)	(0.022)		(0.044)	(0.052)	
No. new routes unblocked	0.107**	−0.037	3,861	0.300**	−0.116	673
	(0.053)	(0.055)		(0.136)	(0.097)	
Routes not blocked by farmland	0.054**	0.000	3,911	0.023	0.037	708
	(0.021)	(0.024)		(0.043)	(0.045)	
No. routes not blocked by farmland	0.227	0.042	3,872	−0.054	0.125	701
	(0.142)	(0.209)		(0.327)	(0.384)	
Farmers indicate using herbicide	0.004	−0.044**	3,928	0.109**	−0.071	707
	(0.020)	(0.022)		(0.046)	(0.048)	
Night grazing in community (negative)	−0.033	−0.017	3,899	−0.109***	0.014	704
	(0.022)	(0.025)		(0.040)	(0.043)	
Herders: Household did night grazing (negative)	−0.009	−0.001	1,993	−0.031	−0.002	701
	(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.022)	(0.010)	
Days after harvest to burn bush	4.818**	2.859	3,605	−1.046	−1.843	634
	(2.108)	(2.317)		(3.907)	(4.510)	
Sufficient time before bush burning	0.027	−0.019	3,554	−0.017	−0.008	633
	(0.020)	(0.025)		(0.040)	(0.054)	
Frequency permission sought by herders	−0.074	−0.053	3,925	–	–	–
	(0.052)	(0.048)				
Herders: Frequency permission received	0.152*	0.026	1,127	–	–	–
	(0.087)	(0.090)				
Farmers: No. times permission sought	−0.117	−0.326**	3,168	–	–	–
	(0.167)	(0.147)				
Common market exists in community	0.009	−0.041	3,938	−0.062	−0.070	707
	(0.043)	(0.052)		(0.053)	(0.066)	

Table A6: Cooperation Index and Underlying Indicators for Cooperation (contd.)

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Cooperation Index	0.021*	−0.039**	3,938	0.008	−0.028	708
	(0.012)	(0.016)		(0.031)	(0.032)	
Indicators:						
Age of market (years)	3.946	−3.933	1,263	−7.021	−0.185	240
	(2.823)	(2.773)		(5.149)	(5.145)	
Was there a market in past?	0.049*	0.006	2,168	0.119*	0.067	380
	(0.027)	(0.021)		(0.062)	(0.045)	
Used common market	−0.015	0.002	1,922	–	–	–
	(0.010)	(0.036)				
Shared farming in community	−0.001	−0.008	3,931	−0.016	−0.005	705
	(0.010)	(0.012)		(0.028)	(0.033)	
Household did shared farming	−0.010	−0.004	3,931	−0.005	0.029	705
	(0.008)	(0.010)		(0.021)	(0.026)	
Farmers: Farm grazed	−0.060***	−0.024	3,165	–	–	–
	(0.019)	(0.023)				
Farmers: Farm grazed by others	−0.062***	−0.049*	3,165	–	–	–
	(0.024)	(0.026)				
Farmers: Share of land grazed	−0.036	−0.058**	3,152	–	–	–
	(0.025)	(0.023)				
Household did shared farming	−0.063**	−0.041	2,026	–	–	–
	(0.031)	(0.032)				
Herders: Had a herding agreement	0.015	0.059	1,262	–	–	–
	(0.030)	(0.042)				
Herders: Have right to graze	0.001	0.073	357	–	–	–
	(0.071)	(0.065)				

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A7: Cooperation Index and Underlying Indicators for Farmer Cooperation

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Cooperation Index: Farmer actions	0.099***	−0.011	3,938	0.103**	−0.033	708
	(0.023)	(0.028)		(0.049)	(0.057)	
Indicators:						
New routes unblocked	0.073***	−0.016	3,861	0.070	0.012	705
	(0.020)	(0.022)		(0.044)	(0.052)	
No. new routes unblocked	0.107**	−0.037	3,861	0.300**	−0.116	673
	(0.053)	(0.055)		(0.136)	(0.097)	
Routes not blocked by farmland	0.054**	0.000	3,911	0.023	0.037	708
	(0.021)	(0.024)		(0.043)	(0.045)	
No. routes not blocked by farmland	0.227	0.042	3,872	−0.054	0.125	701
	(0.142)	(0.209)		(0.327)	(0.384)	
Farmers indicate using herbicide	0.004	−0.044**	3,928	0.109**	−0.071	707
	(0.020)	(0.022)		(0.046)	(0.048)	
Days after harvest to burn bush	4.818**	2.859	3,605	−1.046	−1.843	634
	(2.108)	(2.317)		(3.907)	(4.510)	
Sufficient time before bush burning	0.027	−0.019	3,554	−0.017	−0.008	633
	(0.020)	(0.025)		(0.040)	(0.054)	
Herders: Frequency permission received	0.152*	0.026	1,127	–	–	–
	(0.087)	(0.090)				

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A8: Cooperation Index and Underlying Indicators for Herder Cooperation

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Cooperation Index: Herder actions	−0.089***	−0.061*	3,937	−0.095	−0.119	707
	(0.033)	(0.031)		(0.084)	(0.089)	
Indicators:						
Night grazing in community (negative)	−0.033	−0.017	3,899	−0.109***	0.014	704
	(0.022)	(0.025)		(0.040)	(0.043)	
Herders: Household did night grazing (negative)	−0.009	−0.001	1,993	−0.031	−0.002	701
	(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.022)	(0.010)	
Herders: Household did night grazing (negative)	−0.063**	−0.041	2,026	–	–	–
	(0.031)	(0.032)				
Frequency permission sought by herders	−0.074	−0.053	3,925	–	–	–
	(0.052)	(0.048)				
Farmers: No. times permission sought	−0.117	−0.326**	3,168	–	–	–
	(0.167)	(0.147)				
Illegal structures built (negative)	–	–	–	0.015	−0.029	704
				(0.016)	(0.023)	
No. illegal structures built (negative)	–	–	–	−0.007	−0.081	704
				(0.051)	(0.052)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A9: Underlying Indicators for Dispute Index

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Disputes Index	0.072*	0.155***	3,938	0.243***	0.051	708
	(0.041)	(0.053)		(0.085)	(0.093)	
Indicators:						
Involved in disputes	0.012	0.091***	3,938	0.121***	0.030	708
	(0.021)	(0.029)		(0.046)	(0.054)	
No. disputes	0.268***	0.213*	3,938	6.708**	1.147	708
	(0.101)	(0.111)		(3.095)	(3.230)	
Value lost in disputes (IHS)	0.186	0.566***	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.139)	(0.184)				

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A10: Underlying Indicators for Violence Index

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Violence Index	0.008	−0.026	3,938	−0.097	0.022	708
	(0.030)	(0.034)		(0.075)	(0.032)	
Indicators:						
Disputes turned violent	−0.005	−0.004	3,938	−0.021	0.013	708
	(0.006)	(0.003)		(0.024)	(0.018)	
Experienced Farmer-Herder conflict (Binary)	0.011	−0.003	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.015)	(0.013)				
No. Farmer-Herder conflicts	0.051	0.027	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.041)	(0.045)				
Reprisal Farmer-Herder conflict (Binary)	−0.003	−0.003	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.004)	(0.003)				
Household involved in community violence	−0.000	−0.004	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.003)	(0.008)				
Community level violence	0.001	−0.023	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.014)	(0.018)				
No. violent events	–	–	–	−0.057	0.033	708
				(0.054)	(0.044)	
No. people died in violent events	–	–	–	−0.936	−0.039	708
				(0.684)	(0.032)	
No. women assaulted	–	–	–	−0.074	−0.002	708
				(0.079)	(0.002)	
No. villagers killed	–	–	–	−0.447	−0.013	692
				(0.591)	(0.018)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A11: Underlying Indicators for Influx Index

	Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N
Herder Influx Index	0.211**	0.076	708
	(0.096)	(0.080)	
Indicators:			
Herders: Influx of herders from nearby villages (last year)	0.081	0.061	351
	(0.062)	(0.065)	
Herders: Stranger Fulanis came through	0.199***	−0.026	351
	(0.062)	(0.067)	
Increase in herders from other district (3 months)	0.095**	−0.011	708
	(0.048)	(0.043)	
No. herders from other districts	1.954	2.558*	703
	(2.434)	(1.508)	
Herders: Guided stranger Fulani on Farmer-Herder interactions	0.002	0.033	81
	(0.087)	(0.148)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, column (1) shows the coefficient and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; column (2) shows the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) shows the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A12: Underlying Indicators for Stereotypes and Discrimination Index

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	0.021	0.015	3,938	0.002	0.059*	708
	(0.016)	(0.019)		(0.032)	(0.031)	
Indicators:						
There's overlap in Fulani and Boko Haram	−0.022	−0.042	3,650	0.028	0.111	655
	(0.044)	(0.048)		(0.086)	(0.098)	
Settlers shouldn't have same rights as indigene	0.042	0.141***	3,933	−0.119	0.053	708
	(0.042)	(0.050)		(0.088)	(0.103)	
Herders value baby calf more than human	−0.026	−0.025	3,917	−0.055	0.146*	705
	(0.034)	(0.041)		(0.077)	(0.081)	
Herders won't help a woman giving birth but will help cow	−0.035	−0.001	3,893	−0.072	0.107	697
	(0.038)	(0.044)		(0.085)	(0.080)	
How capable are [Farmers/Herders]? (negative)	0.935	1.669	3,936	5.770**	2.061	708
	(1.430)	(1.583)		(2.843)	(2.778)	
How violent are [Farmers/Herders]?	0.325	0.273	3,936	0.344	1.849	708
	(1.805)	(1.755)		(3.240)	(3.451)	
How friendly are [Farmers/Herders]? (negative)	0.872	−2.602	3,937	6.489**	2.420	708
	(1.363)	(1.735)		(2.913)	(2.623)	
How successful are [Farmers/Herders] (negative)	0.014	0.051*	3,938	−0.037	0.098**	708
	(0.029)	(0.027)		(0.046)	(0.049)	
Resources going to [Farmers/ Herders] take away from me	−0.013	−0.057	3,906	−0.143	−0.111	705
	(0.040)	(0.052)		(0.097)	(0.117)	
Non-natives shouldn't have same rights as indigenes	0.036	0.143***	3,924	−0.029	−0.040	704
	(0.043)	(0.051)		(0.085)	(0.095)	
Fulani shouldn't be treated same as everyone	0.107***	−0.017	3,932	0.143**	0.031	707
	(0.037)	(0.045)		(0.071)	(0.092)	
Indigene deserve special role in society	−0.045	0.042	3,936	−0.227**	−0.170*	707
	(0.034)	(0.039)		(0.098)	(0.096)	
Settlers shouldn't have right to run for office?	−0.014	−0.002	3,938	0.030	0.026	708
	(0.020)	(0.021)		(0.042)	(0.038)	

Table A12: Underlying Indicators for Stereotypes and Discrimination Index (contd.)

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	0.021	0.015	3,938	0.002	0.059*	708
	(0.016)	(0.019)		(0.032)	(0.031)	
Indicators:						
Settlers herders shouldn't have right to get government jobs	−0.014	−0.014	3,938	0.018	0.009	708
	(0.016)	(0.019)		(0.035)	(0.023)	
Settlers shouldn't have same tuition as indigenes	−0.006	−0.000	3,938	0.016	0.024	708
	(0.014)	(0.019)		(0.031)	(0.025)	
Muslims and Christians should not be equal	0.147***	−0.080	3,930	0.254***	0.210**	706
	(0.035)	(0.050)		(0.072)	(0.086)	
Family member married a [Muslim/Christian] (negative)	0.012	0.007	3,927	−0.006	0.005	700
	(0.012)	(0.015)		(0.027)	(0.032)	
Don't approve child's marriage to a [Muslim/Christian]	0.031	0.002	3,925	−0.240**	0.180	700
	(0.060)	(0.082)		(0.121)	(0.144)	
Family member married a [Farmer/Herder](negative)	0.024*	0.022	3,931	−0.022	0.001	708
	(0.013)	(0.015)		(0.033)	(0.031)	
No. family member married to [Farmers/Herders](negative)	0.045	0.036	3,929	0.012	−0.013	708
	(0.034)	(0.046)		(0.084)	(0.055)	
Don't approve child's wedding to a [Farmer/Herder]	−0.001	0.033	3,929	−0.214**	0.139	708
	(0.059)	(0.075)		(0.105)	(0.144)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A13: Underlying Indicators for Empathy Index

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Empathy Index	−0.014	0.056	3,938	−0.054	−0.119**	708
	(0.026)	(0.036)		(0.046)	(0.060)	
Indicators:						
Seeing [Farmers/Herders] eat good meal makes me feel good	−1.961*	1.031	3,937	−2.463	−4.905**	708
	(1.183)	(1.335)		(2.511)	(2.334)	
Seeing [Farmers/Herders] stub toe makes me feel bad	1.786	6.529***	3,938	−3.431	−0.235	708
	(1.401)	(2.041)		(3.509)	(3.419)	
I feel pity if [Farmers/ Herders] are treated unfairly	−0.095	0.042	3,935	−0.026	−0.294**	708
	(0.063)	(0.065)		(0.135)	(0.142)	
I'm interested in how [Farmers/ Herders] feel	−0.232***	0.059	3,013	0.010	0.020	555
	(0.070)	(0.070)		(0.150)	(0.161)	
It upsets me to see [Farmers/ Herders] treated disrespectfully	0.187***	0.045	3,934	0.150*	−0.097	708
	(0.060)	(0.061)		(0.088)	(0.087)	
I want to help [Farmers/Herders] when I see them upset	0.004	−0.027	3,176	−0.185*	−0.098	556
	(0.064)	(0.060)		(0.097)	(0.092)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables in the top row are mean effect indices, measured in standard deviation units. Outcome variables in subsequent rows are composite indicators comprising the index. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

D Results by village

Table A14: Main Outcomes for Farming and Herding Households

	Farming Respondents			Herding Respondents		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Social Networks Index	−0.004	−0.018	2,155	−0.007	−0.008	1,760
	(0.026)	(0.025)		(0.038)	(0.036)	
Institutions & Dispute Resolution Index	0.052***	−0.021**	2,167	0.069***	−0.033***	1,767
	(0.013)	(0.010)		(0.009)	(0.011)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.120***	0.001	2,168	0.073**	−0.025	1,770
	(0.030)	(0.039)		(0.031)	(0.033)	
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	−0.090**	−0.042	2,167	−0.090**	−0.096**	1,770
	(0.044)	(0.041)		(0.038)	(0.038)	
Dispute Index	0.084	0.213***	2,168	0.067	0.097*	1,770
	(0.063)	(0.078)		(0.043)	(0.054)	
Violence Index	−0.009	−0.041	2,168	0.029	−0.004	1,770
	(0.049)	(0.052)		(0.029)	(0.034)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.067*	−0.049	2,168	−0.067	−0.015	1,770
	(0.040)	(0.036)		(0.043)	(0.048)	
Stereotypes & Discrimination Index	0.015	0.026	2,168	0.036**	0.012	1,770
	(0.022)	(0.027)		(0.018)	(0.021)	
Empathy Index	−0.040	0.043	2,168	0.019	0.065*	1,770
	(0.039)	(0.052)		(0.025)	(0.036)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for farming respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for herding respondents. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A15: Main Outcomes for Farming and Herding Leaders

	Village Chief			Village Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Social Networks Index	0.024	−0.057	353	0.226**	−0.059	351
	(0.102)	(0.115)		(0.097)	(0.110)	
Institutions & Dispute Resolution Index	0.121***	−0.078**	353	0.028	−0.083***	350
	(0.038)	(0.031)		(0.039)	(0.032)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.081	−0.092	353	0.125*	0.032	351
	(0.069)	(0.071)		(0.072)	(0.074)	
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	−0.022	−0.275	353	−0.179**	0.032	350
	(0.152)	(0.177)		(0.087)	(0.035)	
Dispute Index	0.292**	0.119	353	0.199**	−0.032	351
	(0.117)	(0.137)		(0.100)	(0.107)	
Violence Index	−0.155	0.073	353	−0.038	−0.030	351
	(0.146)	(0.053)		(0.042)	(0.037)	
Influx Index	0.146	0.121	353	0.276***	0.030	351
	(0.152)	(0.125)		(0.102)	(0.090)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.127*	−0.030	353	−0.086	−0.037	351
	(0.071)	(0.068)		(0.064)	(0.144)	
Stereotypes & Discrimination Index	0.019	0.059	353	−0.013	0.058	351
	(0.049)	(0.053)		(0.041)	(0.038)	
Empathy Index	−0.020	−0.191**	353	−0.090	−0.053	351
	(0.068)	(0.096)		(0.057)	(0.070)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for the farming leader; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for the herding leader. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

E Mediation Analysis

Table A16: Leader Survey: Mediation Analysis using the Influx Index as a mediator

	Indirect effect/ Mediated effect		Direct effect of treatment		Total effect on outcome	
	(1) Inter-dialogue	(2) Health	(3) Inter-dialogue	(4) Health	(5) Inter-dialogue	(6) Health
Cooperation Index	-0.00505	-0.00181	0.0127	-0.0261	0.00760	-0.0279
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.0133*	0.00476	0.0895*	-0.0375	0.103**	-0.0327
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.055)
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	-0.0463**	-0.0172	-0.0487	-0.102	-0.0950	-0.119
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.087)
Disputes Index	0.0418**	0.0150	0.202**	0.0361	0.243***	0.0511
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.090)

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(2) present the natural indirect effect of the treatment on the outcome through the mediator(influx). Columns (2)–(3) present the natural direct effect of the treatment on the outcome without the effect of the mediator. Lastly, columns (5)–(6) present the combined effect of the direct and the indirect effect. Each individual regression has LGA × Batch fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the community level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and p-values in squared brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A17: Household Survey: Mediation Analysis using the Influx Index as a mediator

	Indirect effect/ Mediated effect		Direct effect of treatment		Total effect on outcome	
	(1) Inter-dialogue	(2) Health	(3) Inter-dialogue	(4) Health	(5) Inter-dialogue	(6) Health
Cooperation Index	0.00235	0.000671	0.0183	-0.0392**	0.0206*	-0.0386**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Cooperation Index: Farmer actions	0.00915*	0.00261	0.0889***	-0.0134	0.0981***	-0.0108
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.028)
Cooperation Index: Herder actions	-0.0149**	-0.00425	-0.0719**	-0.0563*	-0.0867***	-0.0605**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Disputes Index	0.0150*	0.00427	0.0566	0.151***	0.0715*	0.155***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.053)
Violence Index	0.00443	0.00127	0.00339	-0.0268	0.00782	-0.0256
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.034)

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(2) present the natural indirect effect of the treatment on the outcome through the mediator(influx). Columns (2)–(3) present the natural direct effect of the treatment on the outcome without the effect of the mediator. Lastly, columns (5)–(6) present the combined effect of the direct and the indirect effect. Each individual regression has LGA × Batch fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the community level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and p-values in squared brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

F Mechanisms and Alternate Accounts

Table A18: Mechanisms: Trust and Generosity

	Households			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Panel A: Indices						
Economic Exchange Index	−0.010	−0.009	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.013)	(0.012)				
Economic Exchange Index: Generalized	−0.026	−0.012	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.022)	(0.022)				
Economic Exchange Index: Farmer-Herder	−0.003	0.012	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.015)	(0.015)				
Economic Indicators Index	−0.009	0.025	3,938	–	–	–
	(0.016)	(0.019)				
Panel B: Behavioral Games						
Generosity (from Dictator Game)	−0.016	−0.046	2,342	−0.010	−0.052	594
	(0.083)	(0.089)		(0.113)	(0.130)	
Trustworthiness (Round 2 of Trust Game)	−0.073	−0.099	2,342	−0.119	−0.013	594
	(0.115)	(0.080)		(0.137)	(0.104)	
Trust (Round 1 of Trust Game)	−0.013	0.118	2,342	0.054	−0.058	594
	(0.090)	(0.093)		(0.121)	(0.117)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Panel A presents the economic indicators and exchange as recorded in the endline survey and Panel B shows the outcomes from behavioral games where respondents were paired with individuals from the neighboring village. All outcome variables in Panel A are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. All outcome variables in Panel B are also standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (4) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; columns (2) and (5) show the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) and (6) show the number of observations in each regression. Each individual regression has LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A19: Household Survey: Heterogeneous effects by relative strength

	Household Respondents					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ID	Health	ID X Difference in Farmer-Herder share	Health X Difference in Farmer-Herder share	Difference in Farmer-Herder share	N
Social Networks Index	−0.052	−0.034	0.111	0.056	−0.079	3,791
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.048)	
Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index	0.063***	−0.042***	−0.016	0.042	−0.013	3,811
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.015)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer actions	0.130***	0.010	−0.069	−0.082	0.050	3,814
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.058)	
Cooperation Index: Herder actions	−0.108**	−0.028	0.019	−0.049	−0.028	3,813
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.065)	
Disputes Index	0.083	0.127*	−0.042	0.043	−0.040	3,814
	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.088)	
Violence Index	−0.058	−0.116**	0.143	0.218**	−0.137**	3,814
	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.063)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.071	−0.061	−0.008	0.064	0.039	3,814
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.061)	
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	0.061**	−0.014	−0.092	0.062	0.010	3,814
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.040)	
Empathy Index	−0.011	0.138**	−0.013	−0.205*	0.061	3,814
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.088)	(0.104)	(0.064)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. The variable on absolute share is defined as one minus the absolute difference between the share of herding households and the share of farming households as reported by the village leaders. A 1 reflects equal share of leaders, and 0 reflects that all villagers are either farmers or herders. Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of inter-dialogue, and health arms respectively; columns (3) and (4) show the interaction of the respective treatment arms with the absolute share measure; column (5) shows the coefficient on the absolute share measure; and column (6) shows the number of observations in each regression. Each individual regression has LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A20: Household Survey: Farmer-Herder Interactions

	Household Respondents			
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) Control Mean	(4) N
Farmers: Share of land grazed	−0.036	−0.058**	0.454	3,152
	(0.025)	(0.023)		
Farmers: Farm grazed by others	−0.062***	−0.049*	0.615	3,165
	(0.024)	(0.026)		
Herders: No. plots used for herding	−1.433*	−1.005	5.439	1,742
	(0.748)	(1.223)		

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Outcome variables are not measured in standard deviation units. In a given row, column (1) shows the coefficient and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; column (2) shows the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) shows the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A21: Household Survey: Heterogeneous effects by relative deprivation

	Household Respondents					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ID	Health	ID X Baseline difference in thatched roof	Health X Baseline difference in thatched roof	Baseline difference in thatched roof	N
Social Networks Index	−0.005	0.011	0.011	−0.038	0.067	3,572
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.056)	
Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index	0.073***	−0.030*	−0.026	0.005	−0.022	3,593
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.028)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer actions	0.101***	0.025	−0.020	−0.048	−0.021	3,595
	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.054)	
Cooperation Index: Herder actions	−0.042	−0.017	−0.050	−0.063	0.064	3,594
	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.067)	
Disputes Index	0.070	0.207**	−0.034	−0.084	−0.043	3,595
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.102)	
Violence Index	0.083	−0.026	−0.107	0.006	−0.084	3,595
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.073)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.044	−0.003	−0.048	−0.060	−0.075	3,595
	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.079)	(0.062)	
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	−0.003	−0.006	0.034	0.032	−0.017	3,595
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.037)	
Empathy Index	0.030	0.164***	−0.046	−0.170**	−0.097	3,595
	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.060)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. The variable on relative deprivation is defined as the difference between the share of herding households that have a thatched roof and the share of farming households that have a thatched roof at baseline. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of inter-dialogue, and health arms respectively; columns (3) and (4) show the interaction of the respective treatment arms with the relative deprivation measure; column (5) shows the coefficient on the relative deprivation measure; and column (6) shows the number of observations in each regression. Each individual regression has LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A22: Household Survey: Heterogeneous effects by Farmer Aggression

	Households					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ID	Health	ID X Farmer Aggression	Health X Farmer Aggression	Farmer Aggression	N
Panel A: Farmer Ethnic Fractionalization						
Social Networks Index	0.041	0.025	−0.087	−0.074	0.130**	3,915
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.063)	
Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index	0.073***	−0.027**	−0.033	0.007	0.016	3,934
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.018)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer actions	0.085**	−0.019	0.047	0.023	0.007	3,938
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.063)	
Cooperation Index: Herder actions	−0.072	−0.020	−0.021	−0.093	0.084	3,937
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.117)	(0.088)	(0.058)	
Disputes Index	0.106	0.166**	−0.126	−0.044	−0.059	3,938
	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.091)	
Violence Index	0.051	−0.047	−0.123	0.063	0.020	3,938
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.074)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.049	−0.044	−0.057	0.030	−0.005	3,938
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.062)	
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	0.025	−0.006	−0.021	0.053	−0.024	3,938
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.040)	
Empathy Index	−0.034	0.031	0.025	0.047	−0.096	3,938
	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.077)	
Panel B: Farmer Aggression at Baseline						
Social Networks Index	0.001	−0.012	0.048	0.041	−0.024	3,583
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.021)	
Institutions and Dispute Resolution Index	0.059***	−0.026***	−0.010	0.011	−0.007	3,604
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.008)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer actions	0.088***	0.004	−0.000	0.055	0.009	3,606
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.021)	

Table A22: Household Survey: Heterogeneous effects by Farmer Aggression(contd.)

	Household Respondents					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ID	Health	ID X Farmer Aggression	Health X Farmer Aggression	Farmer Aggression	N
Panel B: Farmer Aggression at Baseline						
Cooperation Index: Herder actions	−0.081**	−0.056*	0.022	0.030	−0.003	3,605
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.025)	
Disputes Index	0.057	0.160***	0.048	0.104*	−0.054	3,606
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.034)	
Violence Index	0.019	−0.013	0.012	0.080*	−0.036	3,606
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.032)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.070**	−0.042	0.021	−0.023	0.028	3,606
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.024)	
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	0.023	0.016	0.014	−0.004	0.004	3,606
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.014)	
Empathy Index	0.001	0.052	0.002	0.032	−0.019	3,606
	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.026)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. Panel A presents the interaction effect with Reynol-Qureol measure of ethnic fractionalisation and Panel B shows the interaction effect using farmer aggression at baseline. The farmer aggression measure is calculated as a mean effect index of the extreme religious values held by farming households of that community in the baseline survey. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of inter-dialogue, and health arms respectively; columns (3) and (4) show the interaction of the respective treatment arms with the farmer fractionalisation/aggression measure; column (5) shows the coefficient on the absolute share measure; and column (6) shows the number of observations in each regression. Each individual regression has LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A23: Robustness to baseline controls

	Household Survey			Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N	(4) ID	(5) Health	(6) N
Social Networks Index	−0.008	−0.016	3,915	0.115	−0.065	708
	(0.023)	(0.022)		(0.072)	(0.079)	
Institutions & Dispute Resolution Index	0.062***	−0.025***	3,934	0.076**	−0.082***	707
	(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.030)	(0.024)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.098***	−0.009	3,938	0.081*	−0.044	708
	(0.022)	(0.028)		(0.049)	(0.055)	
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	−0.090***	−0.055*	3,937	−0.080	−0.095	707
	(0.032)	(0.031)		(0.083)	(0.087)	
Dispute Index	0.071*	0.159***	3,938	0.240***	0.076	708
	(0.040)	(0.053)		(0.087)	(0.092)	
Violence Index	0.009	−0.022	3,938	−0.117	0.017	708
	(0.031)	(0.034)		(0.081)	(0.034)	
Influx Index	–	–	–	0.219**	0.031	549
				(0.094)	(0.085)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.069**	−0.032	3,938	−0.107**	−0.029	708
	(0.031)	(0.031)		(0.045)	(0.075)	
Stereotypes & Discrimination Index	0.025	0.013	3,938	0.002	0.059*	708
	(0.016)	(0.019)		(0.032)	(0.031)	
Empathy Index	−0.014	0.056	3,938	−0.054	−0.119**	708
	(0.026)	(0.036)		(0.046)	(0.060)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. Each regression includes controls for the baseline level of the dependent variable. In a given row, columns (1)–(3) denote a regression of outcomes for household respondents; and columns (4)–(6) denote a regression of outcomes for village leaders. Columns (1) and (2) present the effect of inter-dialogue, and health arms respectively; columns (3) and (4) show the interaction of the respective treatment arms with the absolute share measure; column (5) shows the coefficient on the absolute share measure; and column (6) shows the number of observations in each regression. Each individual regression has LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A24: Robustness to all village leaders

	All Village Leaders		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N
Social Networks Index	0.126***	−0.014	2,145
	(0.045)	(0.055)	
Dispute Resolution and Institutions Index	0.131***	−0.014	2,141
	(0.020)	(0.018)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.064*	−0.065**	2,145
	(0.033)	(0.031)	
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	−0.095*	0.030	2,143
	(0.050)	(0.051)	
Disputes Index	0.220***	0.107*	2,145
	(0.055)	(0.058)	
Violence Index	−0.026	−0.066**	2,142
	(0.038)	(0.031)	
Herder Influx Index	0.178***	−0.005	2,145
	(0.065)	(0.051)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.121***	−0.062	2,145
	(0.033)	(0.043)	
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	−0.013	0.017	2,145
	(0.021)	(0.022)	
Empathy Index	−0.022	−0.056	2,144
	(0.029)	(0.042)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, column (1) shows the coefficient and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; column (2) shows the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) shows the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A25: Robustness to only Village Chief/Ardo

	Village Chief/Ardo		
	(1) ID	(2) Health	(3) N
Social Networks Index	0.154**	−0.067	591
	(0.076)	(0.082)	
Dispute Resolution and Institutions Index	0.109***	−0.048*	590
	(0.034)	(0.027)	
Cooperation Index: Farmer Actions	0.092*	−0.078	591
	(0.050)	(0.070)	
Cooperation Index: Herder Actions	−0.037	−0.098	590
	(0.099)	(0.115)	
Disputes Index	0.246***	0.025	591
	(0.090)	(0.103)	
Violence Index	−0.121	0.006	591
	(0.084)	(0.041)	
Herder Influx Index	0.148	−0.027	591
	(0.097)	(0.083)	
Extreme Religious Views Index	−0.114**	0.111	591
	(0.057)	(0.093)	
Stereotypes and Discrimination Index	−0.013	0.077**	591
	(0.037)	(0.038)	
Empathy Index	0.001	−0.158**	591
	(0.052)	(0.072)	

Notes: Each row represents a different outcome variable. All outcome variables are mean effect indices, standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. In a given row, column (1) shows the coefficient and standard errors on the coefficient for the Inter-dialogue arm; column (2) shows the coefficients and standard errors on the coefficient for the Health arm; and columns (3) shows the number of observations in each regression. All regressions include LGA × Survey Batch Fixed Effects. Standard errors clustered on community shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.