Barriers to Labor Migration for the Rural Poor*

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Abstract

Migration offers access to better income opportunities, yet rural-to-urban migration remains surprisingly low in developing countries, particularly among the rural poor. We investigate this puzzle using a field experiment with job-information and vocational training "plus" interventions, targeting marginalized rural youth for apparel-sector employment. Six- and 18-month follow-ups show substantial and sustained increases in migration, employment, income, and remittances—significantly reducing household poverty—especially when training includes stipends and internships. Reduced job search costs and migration financing appear to drive these outcomes, particularly benefiting males and risk-averse individuals. The internship treatment's high benefit-cost ratio highlights its potential for cost-effective scaling and broader impacts.

JEL Classification: J61, O15, R23.
Keywords: Field Experiment, On-the-job Training, Bangladesh, Garment Industry, Rural, Extreme Poor

*Acknowledgment: We thank Chris Woodruff, Jonathan Morduch, and the participants and numerous seminar participants for their insightful comments and suggestions, as well as Md. Masudur Rahman, Md. Sujan Uddin, Israt Jahan, and Sijia Xu for their excellent research assistance. We are also grateful to South Asian Network for Economic Modelling (SANEM) and Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK) for providing great support for the study's implementation. Financial support from the IZA—GLM—LIC (grant no. C2-RA2-238) and IDRC for this research is also gratefully acknowledged. This study received IRB review from the Singapore Management University (IRB-16-110-A128(1116)) and the trial is registered in AEA (AEARCTR-0016620). All errors are our own.

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1 Introduction

Migration could be an important anti-poverty measure— allowing the unemployed rural poor to spatially reallocate to areas where employment opportunities are promising. Large and persistent rural–urban wage gaps in low-income countries imply sizable private returns to labor migration—particularly to growing manufacturing sector jobs. Migration can also serve as a risk-diversification tool, with remittances potentially providing insurance against financial shocks (Mobarak et al., 2023). However, in many developing countries, rural-to-urban migration to job locations among the poor remains surprisingly limited (Lagakos et al., 2020). This raises first-order questions: why do the poor fail to take advantage of growing urban job opportunities, what are the leading barriers, and does relaxing these barriers increase labor migration and reduce poverty?

Rural youth face many barriers, such as information friction about urban labor markets. Lacking pertinent information—what jobs require and where vacancies are posted—raises search costs and lowers the perceived probability of finding jobs for rural youth. In standard migration and job-search models, this reduces expected returns to moving, raises the reservation threshold, and leads to under-migration relative to the private and social optimum (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Beaman and Magruder, 2012).

However, information friction is only one of the barriers. Jobs, particularly those in the manufacturing sector, require specific skills that are difficult to acquire in rural locations. Access to credit can enable investment in skills with high future returns (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1961), however, poor households face binding credit and savings constraints that impede such investments. Even when the vocational skill training program provided by the public sector is highly subsidized, the opportunity cost of full-time training is substantial, and irregular incomes with limited financial means make it hard to accumulate enough savings for human capital investment. Missing (or incomplete) credit markets for skill acquisition and migration further limit the options for the poor.

Moreover, migration to an urban location itself is risky: inexperience with working norms and demanding factory conditions, and unfamiliarity with urban challenges raise the perceived uncertainty of searching, securing, and sustaining a job. Furthermore, manufacturing sector employment often flows through informal referrals and job networks (Heath, 2011). Youths without networks or financial buffers anticipate a failed job search or early exit. For many poor households, this inexperience and network gaps make the downside risk of migration outweigh even large expected wage gains.

To address these primary obstacles to urban employment, we implement a unique field experiment in northern Bangladesh. The experiment sequentially relaxes key barriers —

specifically, information gaps, skill shortages, credit constraints, and migration risks—faced by rural youth seeking these opportunities. We evaluate the intervention's effects primarily on labor-market outcomes, targeted for apparel sector jobs. We set our experiment in Bangladesh, which is undergoing a rapid structural transformation. While agriculture still employs nearly half of Bangladesh's labor force, roughly three-quarters of the 13 million net new jobs have been created outside of agriculture (WorldBank, 2013). Most of these jobs come from manufacturing—especially the apparel sector—which has expanded rapidly over the past three decades.

A notable feature of the apparel sector is that factories are mostly concentrated in Dhaka and Chittagong, and the majority (85%) of its workers are migrants from other parts of the country.[1] However, the distribution of the migrant workers by source region is rather unbalanced. In particular, northern Bangladesh has the lowest participation rate for workers in the apparel sector in the country. This is particularly puzzling, given that the northern region is among the most poverty-stricken areas in Bangladesh.[2]

For our study, we recruited youth aged 18–35 from moderate- and ultra-poor households in Gaibandha, northern Bangladesh, focusing on those interested in urban employment. At baseline, 98.8% of our sample had never migrated outside their district, despite broad awareness of urban wage opportunities. Among the few with prior migration experience, moves were driven mainly by income prospects (70.4%) or local unemployment (18.5%), yet outcomes were fragile: 43% could obtained only temporary formal-sector jobs. Respondents mentioned migration was costly and risky, financed largely through own savings (48.1%) or informal borrowing (40.7%). While nearly 90% of our sample knew wages, locations, and working hours in the apparel sector, more than half lacked knowledge of factory or urban living conditions. Respondent recognized skills (89%), education (86.5%), and referrals (61%) as key requirements for jobs, yet access to skill pathways was extremely limited: only 16.5% had heard of any vocational/TVET programs and less than 1% had ever enrolled in such programs. Consistent with qualitative evidence, this gap makes migration without prior skills particularly risky, confining workers to low-paid, insecure positions with a high likelihood of early exit.

With this backdrop, we executed our field experiment targeting urban apparel-sector jobs by randomly assigning our sample to one of four treatment arms—along with a control group: (i) a day-long job-related information session (T1, *Information*); (ii) T1 plus a one-month

[1] See paragraph 10 in p.3 of "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit", Report No: 64619-BD, the World Bank available from `http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/958311468206352559/pdf/646190PAD0P1140Official0Use00nly090.pdf`.

[2] As of 2022, the poverty rates were about 8% higher in the north than in the rest of the country (World Bank, 2023)

residential skills training in northern Bangladesh (T2, *Training*); (iii) T2 plus a stipend to cover migration costs and forgone income (T3, *Stipend*); and (iv) T3 plus a one-month paid factory internship in Dhaka (T4, *Internship*). Due to the limited training capacity of the implementing partner, we adopted a phase-in design with equal numbers assigned to each arm per phase, each lasting three months; participants were randomly assigned to phases and notified of their treatment assignment and schedule one month in advance to minimize waiting-time attrition.

The overall take-up rate (first stage) was substantial but declined with intervention intensity. Overall, 66.5% of participants enrolled in their assigned treatment, with 86.8% completing (conditional on take-up). Uptake was highest for T1 and T3 interventions (about 75%) and lowest for the most demanding package combining residential training with stipend and internship (60% uptake, 32% completion), reflecting migration barriers. Gender gaps were pronounced in the internship arm, where women's uptake (46%) and completion (17%) lagged far behind men's. Non-uptake reasons point to binding constraints: men mainly cited alternative income opportunities (high opportunity cost), while women more often reported social barriers, especially spousal opposition.

Using the follow-up data collected six months after the intervention, our ITT estimates show that the training "plus" packaged interventions have significant impacts on employment in the apparel sector. The stipend treatment (T3) increases the employment in the apparel sector by 7.3 percentage points, and the internship treatment (T4) increases it by a further 20.4 percentage points. Thus, we find that approximately a quarter of those receiving the T4 are employed in the desired sector during the 6-month follow-up survey, a rate substantially higher than the control group's mean employment of 3.2% (or any other treatment group).

We document that rural-to-urban migration is an important technology—adequately supported by this packaged intervention, serving as a crucial stepping stone to employment. Relative to the control group's 6% migration rate, both T3 and T4 are higher by 18 and 36 percentage points, respectively, which are strongly statistically significant. Our estimates are consistent with a broader set of outcomes, particularly for T4, including aspiration, months of employment, paid working hours, job retention, income, borrowing, savings and remittances. On average, those employed at the six-month follow-up survey earned 5268 BDT (67 USD) in the month preceding the survey and sent about 36% of their remittances back home to their origin households. We do not find any negative impact of our training program on physical or mental stress-related outcomes. Our estimated short-term employment effect persists even when measured in the second follow-up survey, conducted 18 months after the intervention. We also document a substantial spillover effect on community members of the treated individuals (mostly for T4) through job network support.

Furthermore, we find substantial income impacts (mostly driven by remittances) on the origin rural households, substantially reducing income poverty, mostly for the internship treatment (T4). We observe significant impacts on other household outcomes, including increases in household assets, increased migration for other household members (spillover effect), and growth in urban labor income for the household, predominantly in the T4 treatment group. The benefit-cost ratio for the T4 intervention is estimated to be 8.85, indicating that the program can be scaled up cost-effectively.

To understand the underlying impact mechanism, we observe that risk-averse participants benefit more from the stipend and internship treatments. This suggests that reducing financial risk and providing structured internship opportunities disproportionately alleviates migration and employment barriers for those most sensitive to uncertainty. Furthermore, roughly 42% of interns remained with the same factory at the six-month follow-up, indicating that paid internships significantly reduce initial job-search costs. Moreover, risk-averse participants benefited most from this intervention; they were notably more likely to continue with their initial factory placement.

The findings above reveal two central issues: credit constraints and migration risk. Consistent with seasonal migration study conducted by Bryan et al. (2014), we find risk emerges as a key barrier alongside limited access to finance for regular rural-to-urban migration with sizable economic return. In our most intensive intervention (T4), skill training combined with the stipend relaxes liquidity constraints, while the internship reduces uncertainty about obtaining and sustaining an urban job. Interventions that directly address these risks—through financial support and on-the-job exposure—generate large and statistically significant gains in job search, migration, and apparel-sector employment, with particularly strong effects among risk-averse individuals. Together, these findings suggest that risk, rather than information alone, is a first-order barrier, and that bundling skills with financial and employment insurance is critical for enabling migration among the poor.

Given the strong employment outcomes among our interns, it is evident that firms demand skilled workers; yet labor market frictions sustain a low-equilibrium outcome in which unemployed or underemployed workers coexist with unfilled vacancies (Breza and Kaur, 2025). A natural question is why firms do not invest in training rural unemployed youth to fill this gap—an intervention that could be mutually beneficial and welfare-enhancing. Our focus group discussions with factory owners suggest that retention concerns are central: firms fear that training investments will be appropriated by competing firms if workers switch jobs, leading to high turnover. This poaching risk discourages firm-sponsored training and contributes to persistent skill shortages, a common feature of labor markets in LMICs (Donovan et al., 2023).

This study distinguishes itself from many existing studies on job-training evaluations. First, it focuses on a specific job training program rather than a broader range of training programs, where trainees receive different courses provided by different training bodies. Second, the trainees in our study were drawn from the same area and trained in the same location. Thus, taking the first two points together, the concerns about the heterogeneity in the quality of training programs and sorting into different programs or into the same programs offered in different locations is not relevant for our study. Further, we are also immune to the heterogeneity of local labor market conditions that may be correlated with training quality, because the samples are drawn from a particular part of Bangladesh. Therefore, our experimental setup is ideal for focusing exclusively on the demand factors to analyze the uptake and drop-out behaviors. Moreover, during the time of this intervention, there was no dedicated vocational training center located in our intervention area that could provide such skills to interested participants such that the noncompliance in the control group is unlikely to be an issue.

Third, this paper decomposes the impacts of various "plus" components in the training program—specifically the information, stipend, and internship—on the program uptake, completion, and employment. Isolating these components and measuring the impacts of each component on employment and welfare outcomes has not been done in the existing literature (to the best of our knowledge). Fourth, while our data suffer from some level of attrition, the attrition rate is substantially lower than any comparable experimental studies in the literature.

Our study contributes to the current literature on experimental evaluation of job training programs. Rigorous evidence of vocational training programs in developing countries has been largely limited to Latin American countries. Card et al. (2011), using an experimental dataset from the Dominican Republic, have found a modest impact on wages and little impact on employment. In the same country, Acevedo et al. (2017) conducted another experiment with vocation and soft-skills training along with internship and found that the impact was mostly significant for females, which is consistent with an earlier study by Attanasio et al. (2011) in their training program evaluations for the disadvantaged youth in Colombia. Rigorous evaluations of job training programs are available in Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi. Hicks et al. (2015), in their evaluation of vocational education vouchers for the out-of-school youth in Kenya, find limited evidence that the program increased earnings, although they found that vouchers improved training enrollment and hourly wage earnings. The other two programs, one in Uganda by (Bandiera et al., 2014) and another in Malawi (Cho et al., 2013), focused on self-employment and entrepreneurship and found limited impacts. The only rigorous impact evaluation in Asia is by Maitra and Mani (2017), who offered subsi-

dized vocational education programs for women residing in low-income households in India. They found that the program significantly improved the income and earnings of the females.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the study background, while Section 3 discusses the training program and participant selection. Section 4 documents the experiment design. Section 5 describes the data sources and Section 6 the empirical method. In Sections 7 and 8, we analyze the program uptake and impact, respectively. Finally, Section 9 concludes.

2 Background

Bangladesh has experienced steady economic growth for over two decades, averaging around 6% annually.[3] World Bank assessment shows Bangladesh's national poverty rate has dropped from 48.9% in 2000 to 31.5% in 2010, and further declined to 18.7% by 2022 (World Bank, 2023). A significant contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction comes from the rising manufacturing sector employment in Bangladesh, particularly the RMG sector, which ranks second in export trade volume after China. This sector has become a significant part of Bangladesh's economy, accounting for an estimated 81.29% of export earnings.[4] Employment in the RMG sector expanded from 0.12 million in 1984 to over 4 million by 2014 (Kathuria and Malouche, 2016, pg. 89), and has remained at similarly high levels since Impact Investment Exchange (IIX) (2025). The industry continues to grow, with export performance reaching new highs in recent years (RMG Bangladesh, 2024).

Despite steady economic growth and a low official unemployment rate (around 3.5% as of 2022 (LFS, 2023)), the quality of employment remains a concern. A significant portion of workers in Bangladesh are engaged in the informal sector (including seasonal and part-time employment). This likely understates the extent of unemployment in rural and informal work. The gap between the very low open unemployment rate and much higher informal employment reflects the reliance of the poor on ad-hoc, subsistence activities in the informal sector. As of 2022, about 85% of workers in Bangladesh were employed informally (LFS, 2023), one of the highest informal employment shares in the region, up from roughly 75% in 2000 (ILO, 2013). This heavy predominance of informal, vulnerable jobs means that many "employed" people still lack decent work and earn only meager, irregular incomes. One of the reasons for such a massive reliance on informal jobs is the lack of marketable skills among the workforce (Farole et al., 2017). Unfortunately, the prevalence of vocational training for

[3]World Development Indicators, accessed July 24, 2025.

[4]Export Promotion Bureau (2024). "Pocket Export Statistics 2023-24" https://epb.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/epb.portal.gov.bd/miscellaneous_info/8405d990_9311_41c8_88df_19b340500b6c/2025-01-23-10-23-578dd7519e362c17af98614919255e7f.pdf

skill acquisition is very minimal in Bangladesh; only 1.46% of the population aged 15 and over had it based on the latest Labor Force Survey of Bangladesh (LFS, 2023).

This hidden unemployment situation is even more severe in northern Bangladesh, one of the most disaster-prone areas of the country. Households in this area are highly exposed to seasonal flooding and riverbank erosion and depend heavily on agriculture, making incomes vulnerable to both seasonality and shocks (Khandker and Mahmud, 2012). Each year, the economically marginalized population in this area, who are mostly landless agricultural wage workers, lack regular employment opportunities and become seasonally unemployed, especially between September and November after the planting of the major paddy crop *Aman*. Households also tend to face an increase in the price of staples (such as rice) during these months, making it even more difficult for the poor, who are typically net consumers of staples, to make ends meet (Khandker, 2012). These factors lead to the phenomenon of seasonal famine (Bryan et al., 2014), locally known as *Monga*. As a consequence, the overall poverty rate of North Bangladesh (Rangpur region) is about 8% higher than the rest of the country (World Bank, 2023).

Given the widespread poverty and limited income opportunities, one seemingly rational strategy for the poor in northern Bangladesh would be to migrate out of that region for survival, especially given the rising employment opportunities in the thriving industrial sectors of urban areas, such as the RMG sector. However, the poor are clearly not taking advantage of the new opportunities. The migration rate from northern Bangladesh is significantly lower than that of the rest of the country, as evidenced by various reports and anecdotes (see (BBS, 2015, pg. 50)). Analyzing the nationally representative Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of Bangladesh between 2000 and 2022 (see Figure 1), we document that the overall migration rate to the RMG sector in the Rangpur region by the poor was about 1% in 2000, which increased to 3.76% in 2010 then decreased to 3.43% compared to overall internal migration rate of 9.8% in Bangladesh (Alam and Mamun, 2022).

Surprisingly, hiring in the RMG industry is still mostly informal, despite its scale. Non-management vacancies are typically filled within 7–8 days (12–15 days for managers), usually through gate-side notices, walk-in interviews, and a brief skills test.[5] New entrants without prior skills generally start as "helpers" in the lowest wage tier (Grade-7 of RMG hiring tier) across cutting, sewing, and finishing lines, as reported in Jalil et al. (2016). By contrast, experienced workers can be hired directly as machine operators (Grade-5 or above in RMG hiring tier), effectively bypassing the 1–2 years of on-the-job skill acquisition that helpers would otherwise need.[6]

[5]Factories do not circulate job recruitment information via websites or newspaper postings.

[6]The entry position is equivalent to the "Grade 4" in the current minimum wage structure of Bangladesh (effective since December 2023). The minimum basic wage for this position is 12,500 BDT, while the helper

Although positions are filled quickly—skill gaps remain widespread. Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) estimated that the sector will need an additional 1.5 million skilled workers by the end of the next decade (Rahman and Hossain, 2017). Unfortunately, industry funding for skill training is limited, with the majority of employers expressing no interest in financing RMG-related skills. Jalil et al. (2016) study documents that training helps with skill development and securing employment; however, the majority of the workers stated that they are not aware of any training related to RMG skills.

3 Experiment Design and Participant Selection

3.1 Training Program

The intervention builds on a previous DFID-funded program delivered by an NGO partner, Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK), in a district in northern Bangladesh.[7] This program ran from December 2010 to July 2013, training poor, unskilled youth for sewing-machine operator roles. Using the program funding, GUK established a residential training institute in Gaibandha (a district in northern Bangladesh) with industry experts as trainers. The residential training program contained lessons on sewing and over-lock machine operations, and basics of the ready-made garments production process (along with occupational safety and hazard training). On a typical training day, sessions begin with technical instruction on machine operation and the fundamentals of ready-made garments. The remaining time is devoted to hands-on practice, focusing on correct operating techniques and developing the speed and precision needed to meet industry-standard stitching quality. Upon successful completion of the residential training program, each participant was awarded a training completion certificate issued by the GUK.[8]

3.2 Sample Selection

To avoid contamination and minimize spillovers from the past GUK-garments program, we collected sample participants from all sub-districts of Gaibandha, except Gaibandha Sadar, from which the previous program participants were selected. Our sample was selected

position earns 7500 minimum wage (Sikder, 2025)

[7]This funding scheme is termed as SHIREE (Stimulating Household Improvements Resulting in Economic Empowerment). The particular project mentioned in this study was funded during phase 3 of the Innovation round. For detailed information on this funding scheme, check the following link: `https://www.shiree.org/innovation-round-3/`

[8]By design, completion certificates can reduce information asymmetries. However, RMG recruitment typically relies on "walk-in tests" (Rahman and Hossain, 2017); as a result, certification carries limited weight at the hiring stage.

using community-based targeting (CBT) combined with proxy means testing (PMT). We first conducted participatory rapid appraisals (PRAs) in each village with our implementing partner, GUK, to compile a CBT roster, then administered a short survey (SS) to generate PMT scores and screen candidates by demographics and poverty status. With this, GUK targeted 6 upazilas (sub-districts) and 50 unions (sub-sub-districts) for our study, which covered 231 villages.[9] We then verified poverty markers through household visits and finalized the eligible sample. By design, only one participant was selected per household.[10] With this process, a total of 2,215 households participated in our study.

3.3 RCT Design

We randomly allocated our sample into an experimental 'control" group (with no training-related intervention, a total of 191 individuals) or one of the following four treatment groups with different job-related interventions (a total of 2024 individuals were allocated equally to each treatment group, making 506 individuals for each treatment). Our experiment consisted of the following four treatment groups.

i) Information (T1): Half a day, union-level session on the RMG sector and Dhaka factories, covering information such as the following: Workplace conditions, hours, wages/overtime, urban living, hiring procedures, and required skills; includes a moderated question and answer session conducted by industry experts of GUK. The total cost of the information session was about USD2 per person (including venue cost, moderator cost, administrative cost, logistical cost, as well as cost for a brief packet lunch).[11]

ii) Training (T2): T1 plus a 1-month-long (22 working days) residential training at Gaibandha, covering sewing-machine operations and basic RMG technical skills, followed by a completion certificate. The total cost of this intervention was 100 USD per person.

[9]These sub-distrcits are: Fulchari, Gobendagonj, Polashbari, Sadullahpur, Saghata and Sundargonj. Eligibility was based on the following criteria: Irregular income sources and regularly unemployed, aged between 18 and 30 (this was the industry requirement for the desired hiring age), from moderate-poor or ultra-poor (extreme-poor) households, and willing to change their current occupation. Poverty status was measured based on household conditions, assets, livestock, income-generating activities, and marital status (including widowed or female-headed households). This criterion for targeting ultra-poor individuals was developed in collaboration with our implementing partner, using their poverty classification definition. GUK considers a household to be ultra-poor [moderately poor] if the household matches four [two] of the following six criteria: (1) have less than 10 decimal of land (including agricultural, homestead and fallow), (2) do not have any functional productive asset (like livestock), (3) the house is mainly built with straw and mud with only one room, with no separate arrangement such as bedroom, living room and dining room, (4) does not possess any basic sanitary, water or hygiene amenities (like tube-well and sanitary latrine), (5) does not have any regular source of income and remains regularly unemployed, and (6) the household head is widowed, elderly or a disabled person.

[10]In cases where there was more than one participant eligible for the program from the same household, our survey team randomly selected one participant by lottery.

[11]at the prevailing exchange rate (1 = 78 BDT in mid- 2015)

iii) Training + Stipend (T3). The same as T2 with a financial stipend (3,500 BDT, about 45 USD) to support migration and forgone income. This amount was calculated based on the daily wage rate at the local area, which was 160 BDT per day (about 2 USD). This stipend amount was given in two installments, one at the beginning of the training and the other at the end. Those who discontinued the program after the first installment was ineligible to receive the second installment, but they were not obliged to return the first installment. The total cost of this intervention was 145 USD per person.

iv) Training + Stipend + Paid-Internship (T4): T3 plus one month paid internship in a factory in Dhaka. GUK signed the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with 14 garment factories for intern placement for the training participants.[12] The cost associated with this relocation—mostly for the transportation and initial moving cost—was borne by the participants using the stipend allowance. The total cost of this intervention was 185 USD per person. Please see Figure 2 to get the full RCT design.

Due to the limited training capacity of our implementing partner,[13] we adopted a "phase-in" design with equal numbers of participants per treatment arm in each phase (a total of 4 phases). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the phases, while each phase lasted for three months. To minimize waiting time (and potential attrition) and to allow preparation, we notified each phase-cohort of its treatment assignment and detailed schedule one month before its phase began—ensuring everyone had at least a month to make arrangements. The control sample did not get any notification.

GUK conducted a total of 12 training batches. The detailed design of these training phases is depicted in Table 1. Note that information treatment was conducted in the rural locations, whereas residential training occurred in the training institute of our implementing partner. To track the participants for the follow-up survey, each participant was given a mobile phone connection (SIM card) during the baseline survey and an airtime top-up incentive as a reward for participating in each of the follow-up surveys, as explained in the next section. In all our estimations, we control for the phase-in design.

3.4 Rational Behind RCT Design

The experiment was structured to identify both incremental and combined effects. The impact of information is estimated by $T1 - C$; training by $T2 - T1$; stipend/credit by

[12]Due to their previous intervention success of the training program under SHIREE, many previous factories continue to accept GUK program participants as interns. Moreover, the GUK internship placement office also facilitated the accommodation arrangements for the participants in Dhaka, along with transportation support.

[13]GUK can accommodate and train a maximum of 100 participants at a time.

$T3 - T2$; and paid-internship by $T4 - T3$. Combined effects are obtained from $T3 - C$ (training+stipend) and $T4 - C$ (training+stipend+paid-internship).

Role of Informaiton. Lacking RMG exposure, information on job requirements, and the network may be major obstacles faced by the poor rural youth. Heath and Mobarak (2015) found that the exposure to RMG factories is largely localized in those areas of Bangladesh where the factories are located. Hence, the rural youth of Gaibandha are often uninformed about the job potentials at these factories and the requirements for getting a job there. A phenomenon has also been observed in other settings, such as call center jobs in India (Oster and Steinberg, 2013). If information friction is a leading cause for not pursuing manufacturing sector jobs by the rural poor, then bridging the information gap is a low-cost solution to tackle the issue.

Skills as the binding constraint. The RMG sector faces a widening skills shortfall, particularly for sewing-machine operators (Rahman and Hossain, 2017). Acquiring these skills is costly, and most poor households live near subsistence—with limited schooling, few assets, and seasonal agricultural work—leaving little capacity to self-finance training. Formal saving instruments are scarce, and borrowing is difficult without collateral or networks. Moreover, rural credit markets are imperfect, and loans from formal providers, including microfinance institutions (MFIs), rarely finance vocational training. Although entrants can join the industry without prior training, they typically start as helpers, earning about 40% less than machine operators (Sikder, 2025). Progression from helper to operator often takes several years, and rising urban living costs further erode real take-home pay. To relax these skill-acquisition constraints, our intervention provided fully subsidized, RMG-focused vocational training designed to place graduates at least at the junior-operator level.

Liquidity and migration costs. Skills are only one barrier. Rural youth also face credit and liquidity constraints: they need to manage forgone earnings during training and the upfront costs of migration. Many rural youth are the chief breadwinners for their households; hence, taking a full-time residential training may jeopardize the food security of other household members. Moreover, training and certificates yield little return unless the participants are migrating out of the rural areas to the industrial sites and job locations. However, migration is costly, typically requiring transport plus at least a week of living expenses for job search, which most cannot finance. To ease these constraints, our RCT added a stipend component to selected treatment arms to offset earnings losses and migration expenses in addition to the training program.

Risk and uncertainty of the migration. It is well documented that migration can be risky (Bryan et al., 2014) and the outcome of the migration decision is typically uncertain. Inexperienced individuals without prior exposure to cities or factory workplaces are unsure

about hiring practices, interview processes, workplace norms, and the day-to-day demands of shift work. They also face unfamiliar commuting and living arrangements. These experiential deficits increase the perceived risk of migration and job search success, thereby reducing the likelihood that otherwise qualified youth will relocate and sustain in industrial employment.

Our intervention addresses these frictions by embedding a paid, short-duration factory internship following vocational training. The internship provides first-hand experience with urban routines and factory production floors, reduces the variance around expected returns to migration, and lowers job-search costs by facilitating direct factory entry and supervisor interactions. It also provides a credible, employer-observable signal of competence, thereby mitigating the information asymmetries faced by disadvantaged first-time entrants. While internships have been incorporated into other vocational programs (e.g., Jóvenes en Acción in Colombia; Attanasio et al. (2011)), to our knowledge, no prior study has isolated the causal effect of paid internships on migration, employment, and early job success, particularly in a developing-country context.

4 Data and Estimation

4.1 Data

We administered a baseline survey to all 2,215 eligible participants, collecting rich household- and individual-level information and eliciting unincentivized risk preferences.[14] We conducted two phone-based follow-up surveys, 6 and 18 months after the intervention, respectively, on the eligible participants. We also conducted a follow-up survey 12 months after the intervention by visiting the origin households of the participants.

The overall attrition rate across all follow-up surveys is approximately 3.91%, which is significantly lower than comparable studies on ALMPs or vocational training in developing countries. We also found no evidence for systematic attrition in the regression of the attrition indicator on the treatment assignment. The details of the attrition rate for all the surveys and the regression of the attrition indicator are reported in Appendix A4, Table A16 and Table A17 , respectively.

Baseline summary statistics for the sample by treatment status are shown in Table 2, showing observables are well balanced across all the treatment arms. Out of the 19 covariates, only two covariates (food shortage during *monga* and Risk Averse dummy) showed imbalance at the conventional level of significance for the T4 and T1 group, respectively. We also tested the joint significance of all the covariates assigned to a particular treatment group, and the

[14]Baseline survey length was 90 minutes. The SANEM was the survey firm involved in data collection.

null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the conventional significance levels. Overall, we see that the observable variables were balanced across different treatment groups.

Thirty percent of our sample was female, and the average age of our sample participants was about 22 years. None of them received higher education beyond the secondary level; approximately one-third of them are married, and about half belong to ultra-poor households. A large number of these participants were unemployed, lacked professional skills (less than 0.5%, not reported), had a minimal amount of assets, and primarily worked as rural agricultural wage laborers.

4.2 Estimation

We denote the outcome variable of interest measured in the survey round t for an individual i originating from village j and selected for phase p as Y^t_{ijp}. We estimate the Intention-to-treat (ITT) impact of the intervention through the following regression:

$$Y^t_{ijp} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \beta^t_k \, 1\{T_i = k\} + \mathbf{X}'_i\theta + \mu_j + \phi_p + \varepsilon^t_{ijp}, \tag{1}$$

where β^t_k is the main coefficient of interest and captures the "intent-to-treat (ITT)" effect of treatment $k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, or the effect of being assigned to treatment k. $\mathbf{X}'_i\theta$ is a vector of baseline controls,[15] while μ_j and ϕ_p captures village and phase-in design fixed effects, respectively. ε^t_{ihj} is the error term, which is clustered at the village level.

Our survey instruments measure a wide set of outcomes. To address problems of multiple inference, we created broad "families" of outcomes. Within each family, we standardize each outcome to a z-score using the control-group distribution, and compute a family index as the simple (equal-weight) average of these z-scores. We then estimate treatment effects on each family index following Kling et al. (2007) and Anderson (2008). We also calculate q-values, adjusting for the false discovery rate according to the procedure outlined in Benjamini et al. (2006).

For the panel data regression with households, where we have baseline information, we estimate (ITT) effects using an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) specification included as the baseline measure of the outcome Y^0_{ijp} as follows:

[15]These covariates are participants' age, age squared, gender, education (primary, secondary, and higher secondary), marital status, poverty status (ultrapoor), number of kinds in the households, size of the households, whether the program participant is the household head, and food insecurity (year-round), food insecurity (during monga), household land size, current occupation (wage labor, self-employed, farming, trading, unemployed) and religion (muslim)

$$Y_{ijp} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \beta_k \, 1\{T_i = k\} + \mathbf{X}_i'\theta + Y_{ijp}^0 + \mu_j + \phi_p + \varepsilon_{ijp}, \tag{2}$$

To understand the overall impact of treatment-induced migration on employment, job continuation, and overall household condition, we also conducted instrumental variable regressions. This is also a policy-relevant question, at least in our setting, which could answer whether migration could lead to substantial benefits to the participants and their households. Hence, we performed instrumental-variables (IV) regressions, where the indicator variable for migration is taken as an endogenous regressor and instrumented by the set of treatment assignment indicators. The IV estimates correspond to the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) under the monotonicity assumption, which requires that there is no defiers, or those people assigned to a treatment group who did not take up the training but would choose to get a training had they been assigned to the control group. In our experiment, it is reasonable to assume that the monotonicity assumption holds because the treatments were offered for free and there was no other training centers nearby as noted earlier. For the latter reason, it is also reasonable in our setting to assume that there is no always-taker, who would get a training regardless of whether the training is offered. Therefore, we interpret the IV estimates as the average effect of the treatment on the treated (TOT). The IV regressions allow us to identify the effect of migration on the outcome. However, if the treatment affects the outcome through a channel other than migration, the IV estimates will be biased. Therefore, the IV results should be interpreted with caution.

5 Intervention Uptake

We first analyze the intervention uptake behavior of the participants. Excluding controls, program uptake (enrolled among those assigned) was 66.5%, with 86.84% completion among enrollees. For training-related arms (T2 to T4), uptake was 63.8% and completion was 81.8%. Uptake varied by treatment arms (see Figure 3): T1 and T3 were about 75%, whereas T4 was 60% with 32% completion (combining both the training and internship as the treatment assignment), reflecting the dual challenges faced by the participants of residential training and paid internship positions, which required individuals to relocate to the job location temporarily. Considering only the residential component, dropout was 4.55% (T2), 1.98% (T3), and 8.9% (T4), respectively.

Gender patterns largely mirror the overall results across arms, except for T4. Female uptake for the T4 arm is 46% versus 69% for males, and female completion is 17% versus 42% for males (see Figure 4). We asked participants to report the main reason for not taking

up the program and discontinuing the training, which is reported in Figure 5. The leading reason mentioned by the participants was "already managed an income activity" (38.2%), followed by "not interested/afraid to go to Dhaka" (18.3%) and spousal resistance (14.8%). Disaggregating the pattern by gender reveals an interesting divergence, as demonstrated in Figure 6: men primarily reported economic factors (56.7%), whereas women more often cited non-economic constraints, notably spousal opposition (31.0%).

Table 3 estimates uptake determinants separately by arm (columns 1–4 for T1–T4). For T4, uptake is lower among women and those facing lean-season food insecurity, and higher with greater education and among Muslims. For T3, uptake is lower for the married, the less educated, and those with lean-season food insecurity, but higher among individuals with any professional status, the regularly unemployed, and those with year-round food insecurity. Finally, risk aversion is positively associated with uptake in T1 and T4. We also notice that being risk-averse influences uptake decision positively for T1 and T4.

Table 4 reports the uptake regressions: column (1) presents the baseline specification, while columns (2) and (3) are estimated for gender-specific sub-samples. Relative to information-only (T1), both training (T2) and OJT (T4) exhibit lower uptake. In column (5), T2 is 18 percentage points below the T1 uptake rate of 0.76 (76%) ($p < 0.001$). Adding a stipend component increases uptake by 19 percentage points ($p < 0.001$), whereas adding an internship component reduces uptake by 14.6 percentage points overall, with larger declines for women (31.1 percentage points decline in women-only estimate).

We repeated a similar exercise with a subsample of those who were offered any training or training "plus" program to understand the pattern of training completion across different treatment arms (among T2, T3, and T4), reported in Table A18 in Appendix E. Relative to the T2 completion rate of 52%, T3 raises completion by about 20 percentage points, while T4 lowers it by about 6.3 percentage points, entirely driven by females. These gender gaps are consistent with prior evidence that family obligations constrain women's participation in training Cho et al. (2013) and that women are less likely to enroll even conditional on observables Chun and Watanabe (2012).

6 Impact

6.1 Short-Run Impact on Participants

6.1.1 Primary Outcomes: Employment, Job Continuation and Salary

Our primary outcome of interest is employment. We initially used the 6-month follow-up survey to assess the immediate impact of the program on employment success, job retention,

and salary. We created two variations of the tables. In Table 5 the first column represents having any kind of job during the six month follow-up survey. Columns (2), (3), and (4) represent having a job specifically in the RMG or related sector,[16] jobs in any manufacturing sector, or having any full-time job, respectively. Finally, in Column (5), we have the Employment Index created using all the variables reported in Columns (1)-(4). Our estimates show that having a training program combined with a stipend component and a stipend plus internship component significantly increase employment. The Employment Index of T3 participants has increased by 0.46 Standard Deviation (SD) points, which is approximately three times larger (1.25 SD points) than the impact estimated in the T3 treatment arm. Component-specific decomposition, reported at the end of the tables, shows that stipend components contributed about 0.39 SD points to the impact on the employment index (p-value < 0.001), which is 0.79 SD points for the Internship component (p-value < 0.001). Our estimates also show that simply providing the training (T2) or information (T1) has a statistically discernible effect on employment.

In Table 6 we did a similar analysis focusing on job retention outcomes, which covered months of employment (column 1), hours worked last month (column 2), any job-working hours in 6 months (column 3), Weekly Job working hours in 6 months (column 4), and Job Continuation Index combining Columns (1)-(4). As in Table 5, we find a consistent impact of T3 and T4 treatment arms, while the T4 impact magnitude is more than double than that of T3; Information and simple training show a null effect. Our regression shows that the T3 treatment group, on average, was working about 0.5 months more, whereas the T4 treatment group was working 1.2 months more than the control group, with a mean of 0.05 months of employment. Table 7 shows a similar effect where T4 treatment arms participants, on average, earned 8,800BDT more (about 112USD) in the last 6 months compared to the base of about 2,939BDT (about 38USD) — about three times larger. T3 treatment arms also benefited from the job and associated income, earning about 3690BDT more (about 47.30USD). Component-specific analysis also supports these findings: the stipend contributes to 2209 extra earnings (approximately 28.32 USD), while the stipend contributes to 5109 BDT (approximately 65.5 USD).

Our estimates consistently show no detectable effect of the information arm (T1). Given our focus on assessing training and training-plus interventions, we therefore pool Control (C) and T1 as a single baseline category and concentrate on variation across T2 (training only), T3 (training+stipend), and T4 (training+stipend+Intership). The streamlined estimates appear in Tables 8, 9, and 10 and are strictly consistent with the original, fully specified RCT results. To keep the discussion focused, from this point forward we report the streamlined

[16] these include getting a job at a ready-made garments factory, knitting factory, or textile factory

specifications in the main text, while the full RCT specification (with separate Control and T1, following equation 1) is provided in the Appendix for reference.

6.1.2 Remittance

Table 11 reports the remittance-related outcomes. The six-month period sending any remittance (extensive margin) and total remittance (intensive margin), reported in columns (1) and (2), shows a strong positive impact for both T3 and T4 compared to the base. Our estimations are robust even when we use remittance frequency and the immediate last month's recall data of remittance sending records of the participants as reported in columns (3) and (4). In column (5), we create a standardized "remittance index" combining all the variables of columns (1)-(4) and regress it on the treatment indicators and observables. This regression shows that T3 increases the remittance index by 0.43 SD units, and T4 increases by 1.14 SD units, from the base of zero. Both estimates are substantially large and highly statistically significant. The component analysis shows that the internship component itself contributed 2.5 times more to the remittance index than the stipend component (comparing T4-T3 with T3-T2).

6.1.3 Secondary Outcomes: Wellbeing Indicators

Now we focus on the secondary outcomes, the impact of treatments on the participants' overall well-being as measured by financial, job support, physical, and emotional indicators. For the brevity of the analysis, we have reported only the index variables. Detailed regression estimates of all the components of these indices are available upon request.[17]

Let us first focus on the financial well-being indicators, measured through savings and borrowing indexes reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 12. We see a substantial impact in the T3 and T4 treatments on borrowing and savings indicators as measured by the "Borrowing Index." and "Savings Index," respectively. Being in the T4 treatment decreases the borrowing index for participants by 0.26 SD points. Moreover, both the T3 and T4 treatment groups increase the Savings Index by 0.21 SD and 0.16 SD units, respectively, although the difference between the T3 and T4 groups is statistically insignificant.

The second set of estimates is the job support provided by the program participants

[17]Saving index was created with the following variables: total cash savings in the last 6 months, total in-kind savings in the last 6 months, whether the participant has any formal bank account (dummy), and whether the participant has any formal savings account, like fixed deposit or DPS (dummy). Borrowing index was created using the following variables: total amount of borrowing in the last 6 months and dummy variables for the participant having borrowed from any MFI, from any informal moneylender, through his/her social network, like relatives, neighbors, or colleagues, from his/her employer, and from any shopkeeper (i.e. buying on credit).

to their social network. Columns (3)–(6) report "job support" outcomes: (i) whether the participant inspired someone to seek employment; (ii) whether any such contact obtained a job; (iii) the number of persons inspired; and (iv) the number who secured jobs. Across all four measures, the T4 (training + stipend + internship) arm exhibits consistently positive and statistically significant effects relative to the base (Control + T1).

The last set of secondary variables is related to aspiration, physical, and stress-related mental health indices. Our intervention was primarily intended to encourage and help participants to get a job in the industrial sector, especially in the RMG sector. However, one specific concern one might have is the impact of factory working conditions on the physical stress measure, a concern which was raised in the recent work of Blattman and Dercon (2016). We used self-reported physical, family, and non-work-family related stress measures from participants and created the index.[18]

Regression analysis using these indicators—reported in Table 13 did not show any concerning sign, and if anything, our ITT estimates show that the stipend (T3) and OJT (T4) treatments reduce family-related stress, and the migrants are less likely to report any family-related stress in the short run.

6.2 Long-Term impact on Participants

During the 18-month follow-up survey, we made inquiries about participants' employment status to verify whether the treatment effect is persistent even at the 18-month period, after the initial intervention. It could also be the case that individuals who initially migrated may have returned to their home villages due to issues like tough working conditions, homesickness, not getting accustomed to the urban lifestyle, sickness, or family obligations.

Table 14 reports intent-to-treat estimates for the same set of employment outcomes used at six months in Table 8. Effects remain positive but attenuate in magnitude: the Employment Index (column (5) of Table 14) increases by 0.40 SD points for the stipend arm (T4), which is strongly statistically significant. T3 arm is also showing a positive impact of 0.13 SD points; however, the statistical significance is weak and does not survive the false discovery rate. Decomposition analysis reveals that the internship components make significant, independent contributions to the Employment Index at 18 months, indicating that workplace exposure continues to alleviate non-skill constraints to sustained employment.

[18] Asked using a self-reported survey questionnaire. Responses were measured on a Likert scale, which was later converted into a dummy (1 if the reported response is within the range of "likely" or "more likely") and then standardized to create the index. Details of the index construction are given in Figure A1 in Appendix E.

6.3 Impact on Household

6.3.1 Household Socio-Economic Status

We collected detailed household information during the 12-month panel data survey. Our dataset included information on overall household income from various sources, household expenditure, food consumption, savings, borrowing, household conditions, the total amount of assets (both productive and non-productive), and overall vulnerability indicators. We first generated a "family" of similar variables under each category and then created the standardized index. For brevity, we only reported the index in Table 15.[19] Overall, our estimates show that our treatment mainly had no impact on any outcome measures except for the household asset index [reported in column (2), where the OJT treatment significantly increased the household asset index by 0.15 SD units compared with the base group (C+T1).

6.3.2 Poverty Status

In Table 16, we report the poverty measures of the participants and households using the 12-month survey. Our outcome variable of interest is the poverty status based on the local income poverty measures and takes the value of 1 if the per-person per-day poverty measure is below the poverty threshold.[20] In column (5), we report the income poverty of our study participants based on the reported overall income of the households (including remittances received) for the last 12 months after intervention. Column (1) shows that per capita income for the household has increased significantly for the T3 and T4 groups; however, we do not see any impact on consumption, food, and non-food consumption.

Now focusing on poverty, our estimate shows that our participants who have been randomly assigned to the stipend (T3) and OJT (T4) treatment groups have managed to reduce their income poverty significantly. Compared to the base group mean of 53% poverty, the poverty rate has significantly reduced by 8 percentage points for the T3 group and 12 percentage points for the T4 group, holding everything else constant.

6.3.3 Remittances

One important contributing factor to the reduction of poverty and increase in income is remittances. To understand and measure the impact of treatment intervention on remit-

[19] Details of this index generation process are given in Figure A1 of the Appendix E.

[20] We use an international poverty line of 1.9 USD per day per capita converted to Bangladeshi taka for the year 2015 on the purchasing power parity basis. Using the 2015 PPP conversion factor for Bangladesh, which is 27.97, the international poverty line at 2015 prices was 53.39 BDT per person per day, which was used for the poverty estimates in Table 16. For reference, please note that the international poverty threshold converted to PPP equivalent was 48.66 taka per person per day during the baseline in 2013.

tances, we asked households about remittances over the last 12 months in the panel survey. Table 17 reports the regression of remittances. In columns (1), (2), and (3), we regressed the number of months households received remittances, frequency of remittances, and total remittances, respectively. We found that the stipend (T3) and OJT (T4) treatment groups have sent remittances more regularly than the rest. Compared with the base, the months of remittance T3 and T4 were 0.43 and about 1 month more than the base of 0.43 months.

However, component-specific impact based on these estimates shows that adding the stipend (S) component with training weekly contributes to the remittance frequency (T3-T2 is 0.22 with a p-value of 0.09), whereas the internship component substantially contributes (T4-T3 is 0.54 with a p-value of 0.00). The total remitted amount, as reported in column (3) in Table 17, is also higher for the T4 group (2972 BDT or 38.10 USD higher).

6.3.4 Intrahousehold Spillovers

One interesting aspect of the consequences of skills training is its impact on other immediate household members. Because migration is risky due to the uncertainty of job prospects at the migration destination, having an immediate family member in the destination can substantially reduce the risk. To explore this front further, we run regressions for the participants' family members who have also migrated out of the village within the last 12 months after the intervention. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 17 present the regression estimates, which provide evidence of substantial intrahousehold spillover of the treatment effect. Our treatment interventions, especially for the OJT (T4) group, increased migration of other family members to urban locations. Column (5) captures the wage income of the other migrated family members, which is also substantially higher than that of the base group.

7 Anatomy of the Impacts

7.1 Mechanism

Migration. One important aspect of our intervention is the impact of rural-to-urban migration, which serves as a key mechanism. Table 18 reports the impact of treatment on migration, which clearly shows that both T3 and T4 treatment induced substantially more migration compared to the base of 5.5% migration as reported in Column 2.

Risk Aversion. Table **??** reveals a clear interaction between risk preferences and treatment intensity. Information and basic skill training interventions mainly increase job search among those participants who are not risk-averse, indicating that information or skills alone are insufficient to overcome perceived downside risk. These patterns suggest that risk, rather

than lack of information per se, is a first-order barrier, and that bundling skills with financial and employment insurance is particularly effective for individuals most sensitive to uncertainty.

Job Search Cost. Table 19 shows that those who were originally placed in the internship factory most likely remain in those factories. Table 19 shows that those of our sample who are currently in the RMG and Textile sector are the T4 interns, which shows how the internship component plays an instrumental role in reducing the job search cost in the apparel sector.

especially the amount sent by OJT (T4) group during *monga*, a mean amount of 793 BDT (about 10.2 USD), which is substantially larger than the amount sent by other treatment groups during the same season. This finding confirms the role of migration as an insurance in the form of remittance during local shocks faced by the household, as found by Bryan et al. (2014).

7.2 Treatment Saturation Analysis

In Table 22, we measure the village-level treatment density by measuring the number of different treatment participants in each village as a ratio of the total sample in the village and regressed individual migration and employment outcomes on these treatment density variables. The first regression results reported in column (1) shows that having a participant of similar treatment in one's village increases the migration likelihood significantly, which shows the risk-sharing practice by the individuals. Migrating together with other participants in the village who got similar treatment entails some additional risk-sharing benefits; individuals can share their social and job networks, which can potentially reduce the uncertainty of the migration outcomes. Also, participants can share the cost of migration by splitting the accommodation and living costs, making migration decision less risky. Column (1) shows that larger the ratio of similar treatment participants in the village, the likelihood of migration is significantly higher for the participant compared with the base, which is the ratio of control participants to the total sample in the village. The impact is substantial even at the 18-months survey reported in column (2) in the table. Noticeably, for all the regressions reported in Table 13, the OJT ration to the total sample participants in the village has the most sizable, economically significant and persistent impact even at the 18-months period.

7.3 Cost-Benifit Analysis

In Table 21 we provide a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the two training variations, T3 and T4, separately. Since the average age of treatment individuals was around 22 years at

baseline, we assume that their working life is another 44 years and apply a discount rate of 5

According to this analysis, the benefit-cost ratio for T4 training is estimated to be 8.85, indicating that the program can be scaled up cost-effectively.

8 Conclusion

Segmentation between skills/training programs and the labor markets prevents matching of industry demands with an appropriate supply of workers, especially among the youth who are poor and disadvantaged. Finding ways to help shift large numbers of workers from inefficient informal sector to productive wage work in the formal sector is critically important for many developing countries with a sizable informal sector. However, public vocation training programs have largely been ineffective to solve this problem, because there are other barriers to labor migration and employment than the skill shortage, which has been the primary (and often exclusive) focus of most existing training programs.

In our rigorous RCT study, we found evidence that simply providing skills training is inadequate. This is because it typically suffers from a low uptake rate and is ineffective in improving employability, job continuation, and households' socioeconomic conditions. We show that vocational training would attract more disadvantageous participants when it is combined with the stipend component to cover the forgone income and financial support for migration and job search. We found that adding an apprentice component, in the form of a short-term, paid on-the-job training, can really help the poor to migrate and secure a job. These impacts persist even 18 months after the intervention. The OJT provides with the participants a firsthand experience to get exposure in the factory environment and urban living, simultaneously helping the employers to judge the skills of the participants and to reduce the information asymmetry between the prospective employers and employees.

We consistently find that females face noneconomic social barriers in taking up and completing the training program. Patriarchal norms on women's role in the family as the primary caregiver could be one reason for these findings. Social norms are particularly relevant for women in poor households, because it will be costly to violate such norms, which often engage in the informal risk-sharing network within the village (Townsend (1994), Udry (1994)). Moreover, religious norms could potentially create strong barriers for women to work outside their village (Kabeer (2000); Salway et al. (2003); Kabeer and Mahmud (2004)). This barrier is strongly linked with the *purdah* practice observed in Muslim-majority countries. *Purdah* demands gender seclusion, both at home and outside, especially at the workplace. Breaching *purdah* could become a social taboo, not only for the migrated women outside

their village, but for the entire family, especially in rural areas. Working in the RMG factories (even during the internship) under a mixed gender work environment naturally requires some contacts with male colleagues, which could have negative consequences for the female program participants in their home villages in terms of social status, reputation, and marriage market outcomes (Kabeer, 2000). These traditional and religious norms create a strong barrier to labor market participation for women, even when the households suffer from extreme poverty (Amin, 1997), which warrants targeted policy attention.

Our study is one of the few that find a substantial impact of training on employment, albeit only when combined with a stipend and an OJT program. There are two aspects of the results which need to be highlighted here. First, migration has a monetary cost, and credit constraint can have an impact. However, we also see that risk is another key constraint on migration. In our intervention setting, stipend reduces the credit constraints-related monetary cost; whereas the OJT reduces the risk. These findings demonstrate that stipends and OJT could help overcome frictions in this spatial gap, which has an important lesson for the policymakers. Our findings suggest that the efficacy of the vocational training program can be improved by combining OJT and financial stipend components, especially if the program targets disadvantageous youth of the developing countries.

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
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Figure 1: Participation in the RMG sector from Rangpur region (using upper poverty line)



	2000	2005	2010	2022
Non-poor	1.40%	1.44%	2.60%	1.68%
Poor	1.04%	1.49%	3.76%	3.43%

Figure 2: Trial Design




Figure 3: Intervention uptake and completion




Figure 4: Intervention uptake and completion by Gender




Figure 5: Reasons for not taking-up the treatment assignment




Figure 6: Reasons for not taking up the treatment assignment (by gender)




Table 1: Project timeline and RCT Stratified Phase-in Design

Baseline: September to November 2013										
Phase	**Training Batch**	**Treatment Name**	**Start**	**End**	**Total sample assigned**	**Offer**	**Uptake**	**6 months participant follow-up**	**12 months household panel**	**18 months participant follow-up**
1	0	Information (T1)	15 Dec, 2013	25 Dec, 2013	518	114	100	Jun-14	Dec-14	Jun-15
	1	Training (T2)	04 Nov, 2013	25 Nov, 2013		114	70	May-14	Nov-14	May-15
	2	Stipend (T3)	01 Dec, 2013	22 Dec, 2013		114	87	Jun-14	Dec-14	Jun-15
	3	Internship (T4)	01 Jan, 2014	30 Jan, 2014		114	62	Jul-14	Jan-15	Jul-15
2	0	Information (T1)	15 Mar, 2014	25 Mar, 2014	579	130	100	Sep-14	Mar-15	Sep-15
	4	Training (T2)	08 Feb, 2014	01 Mar, 2014		130	74	Aug-14	Feb-15	Aug-15
	5	Stipend (T3)	06 Mar, 2014	31 Mar, 2014		130	100	Sep-14	Mar-15	Sep-15
	6	Internship (T4)	03 Apr, 2014	30 Apr, 2014		130	78	Oct-14	Apr-15	Oct-15
3	0	Information (T1)	15 Jun, 2014	25 Jun, 2014	570	135	85	Dec-14	Jun-15	Dec-15
	7	Training (T2)	11 May, 2014	01 Jun, 2014		135	61	Nov-14	May-15	Nov-15
	8	Stipend (T3)	07 Jun, 2014	28 Jun, 2014		135	100	Dec-14	Jun-15	Dec-15
	9	Internship (T4)	05 July, 2014	08 Aug, 2014		135	62	Jan-15	Jul-15	Jan-16
4	0	Information (T1)	18 Oct, 2014	25 Oct, 2014	548	127	93	Mar-15	Sep-15	Mar-16
	10	Training (T2)	12 Aug, 2014	02 Sep, 2014		127	60	Feb-15	Aug-15	Feb-16
	11	Stipend (T3)	11 Sep, 2014	08 Oct, 2014		127	80	Mar-15	Sep-15	Mar-16
	12	Internship (T4)	16 Oct, 2014	06 Nov, 2014		127	56	Apr-15	Oct-15	Apr-16

Table 2: Summary Statistics by Treatment Assignment (Baseline)

Variables	**Control Mean**	**Beta coefficient of the balance test (OLS)**							
		(T1 - C)	**S.E.**	**(T2 - C)**	**S.E.**	**(T3 - C)**	**S.E.**	**(T4 - C)**	**S.E.**
Age	22.27	0.471	(0.643)	0.197	(0.559)	-0.232	(0.689)	-0.102	(0.605)
Sex (Female ==1)	0.30	0.117	(0.110)	0.021	(0.093)	0.038	(0.106)	0.054	(0.098)
Education: Primary	0.10	0.034	(0.062)	-0.025	(0.054)	0.039	(0.053)	0.054	(0.066)
Education: Secondary	0.47	-0.076	(0.090)	-0.039	(0.085)	-0.081	(0.093)	-0.063	(0.097)
Education: Higher Secondary	0.00	0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.011	(0.010)	-0.001	(0.001)
Married	0.32	0.071	(0.085)	0.020	(0.062)	-0.043	(0.080)	-0.041	(0.064)
Belongs to a Ultra-poor household	0.52	-0.095	(0.087)	-0.062	(0.084)	-0.014	(0.072)	-0.084	(0.083)
No of Children in the household	0.43	0.182	(0.161)	0.152	(0.117)	0.057	(0.134)	0.041	(0.111)
Size of the household	3.99	0.041	(0.235)	-0.029	(0.212)	0.238	(0.212)	0.132	(0.177)
Participant is the head of household	0.21	-0.037	(0.064)	0.020	(0.059)	-0.070	(0.067)	-0.061	(0.053)
Food-shortage in Monga	0.37	0.093	(0.067)	0.024	(0.060)	0.097	(0.060)	0.089*	(0.053)
Size of Landholings (in decimals)	2.26	-0.240	(0.195)	-0.291	(0.197)	-0.173	(0.224)	-0.152	(0.174)
Profession: Wage Employment	0.17	0.023	(0.087)	0.044	(0.080)	-0.037	(0.065)	-0.036	(0.057)
Profession: Self-employment	0.04	-0.011	(0.027)	-0.010	(0.022)	0.004	(0.032)	0.023	(0.029)
Profession: Farming	0.04	-0.022	(0.041)	-0.024	(0.045)	0.016	(0.046)	-0.037	(0.044)
Profession: Small business	0.03	0.014	(0.020)	0.016	(0.017)	0.012	(0.016)	-0.016	(0.023)
Unemployed (dummy)	0.71	0.022	(0.097)	0.004	(0.083)	0.033	(0.086)	0.074	(0.068)
Religion is Muslim (dummy)	0.93	-0.029	(0.032)	-0.015	(0.019)	-0.055	(0.043)	-0.013	(0.023)
Risk Averse (dummy)	0.73	0.099*	(0.059)	0.050	(0.083)	0.009	(0.085)	0.061	(0.072)
P-value of F-test of joint significance		0.61		0.34		0.34		0.74	
Observation		697		697		697		697	

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All regressions controlled for village and phase fixed effects with clustered standard errors at the village level. Regressions were done comparing each treatment with the control sample. The F-test has been conducted, having a particular treatment variable regressed against all the covariates. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here, T1 is information, T2 is T1 plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend, and T4 is T3 plus paid-internship component.

Table 3: Determinants of Uptake Decision

Dependent Variable: Treatment Uptake	(1) T1 sample (Information)	(2) T2 sample (T1 + Training)	(3) T3 sample (T3 + Stipend)	(4) T4 sample (T3 + Internship)
Age	0.089	-0.000	-0.028	-0.157*
	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.082)
Age Squared	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex (Female = 1)	-0.061	-0.123	0.116*	-0.284***
	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.067)	(0.090)
Education: Primary	-0.036	-0.106	-0.131*	0.101
	(0.062)	(0.109)	(0.071)	(0.113)
Education: Secondary	0.079	0.077	-0.028	-0.066
	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Education: Higher Secondary	-0.129	0.248	-0.279	1.049***
	(0.397)	(0.183)	(0.228)	(0.143)
Married	0.014	-0.110	-0.149*	0.017
	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.098)
Belongs to a Ultra-poor household	0.069	-0.087	-0.024	-0.034
	(0.054)	(0.077)	(0.060)	(0.069)
No of Children in the household	-0.040	-0.048	-0.000	0.038
	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.068)
Size of the household	-0.003	0.012	0.003	-0.007
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Participant is the head of household	-0.042	-0.061	-0.013	-0.147
	(0.106)	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.137)
Food-insecurity (all year)	0.081	-0.038	0.541***	0.183
	(0.100)	(0.214)	(0.199)	(0.115)
Food-insecurity (Lean Season)	-0.059	0.091	-0.543***	-0.295**
	(0.088)	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.132)
Size of Landholings (in decimals)	0.010	-0.041	0.020	0.001
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.035)
Profession: Wage Employment	0.068	-0.436*	1.110***	-0.046
	(0.296)	(0.263)	(0.130)	(0.306)
Profession: Self-employment	0.033	-0.107	1.142***	-0.066
	(0.341)	(0.292)	(0.212)	(0.311)
Profession: Farming	0.054	-0.234	0.895***	0.162
	(0.328)	(0.307)	(0.179)	(0.322)
Profession:Small business	-0.033	-0.028	1.183***	-0.152
	(0.361)	(0.343)	(0.271)	(0.422)
Regularly Unemployed (dummy)	0.141	-0.248	1.169***	-0.092
	(0.284)	(0.259)	(0.101)	(0.316)
Religion is Muslim (dummy)	-0.006	-0.038	-0.078	0.248**
	(0.144)	(0.212)	(0.099)	(0.107)
Risk-averse (dummy)	0.134**	0.084	0.110*	-0.008
	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.106)
Control for Village and Phase	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	506	506	506	506
R-squared	0.488	0.482	0.508	0.485

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Figures in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the village level. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training, OJT (internship)

Table 4: Treatment uptake decision of participants

Dependent Variable: **Treatment Uptake (dummy)**	(1) All Sample	(2) Male Only	(3) Female Only
(T1) [Information]	0.759***	0.758***	0.725***
	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.069)
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.580***	0.597***	0.508***
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.074)
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.765***	0.771***	0.754***
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.072)
(T4) [T3 + Intership]	0.619***	0.709***	0.443***
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.068)
Observations	2,215	1,361	854
R-squared	0.322	0.384	0.395
Mean of the control group	0	0	0
P-value for joint significance	0	0	0
Skill-Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	-0.180	-0.161	-0.217
Skill Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.000	0.003	0.000
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.186	0.175	0.247
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.000	0.001	0.000
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	-0.146	-0.062	-0.311
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.133	0.000
Control for Phase, Observables and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Figures in the parenthesis are standard errors clustered at the village level. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship)

Table 5: Full Treatment Effects on Employment measured at 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	At any point within 6-months after intervention				
	(1) Any Job	(2) Jobs at RMG	(3) Job at Manufacturing	(4) Any full-time job	(5) Employment Index
(T1) [Information]	-0.009	-0.023	-0.006	-0.016	-0.070
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.140)
	[0.761]	[0.406]	[0.842]	[0.583]	[0.619]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.013	0.007	0.019	0.018	0.069
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.120)
	[0.624]	[0.781]	[0.460]	[0.441]	[0.562]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.102	0.073	0.104	0.096	0.463
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.134)
	[0.001]***	[0.008]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.001]***
	{0.002}***	{0.017}**	{0.002}***	{0.002}***	{0.002}***
(T4) [T3 + Internship]	0.281	0.204	0.275	0.259	1.257
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.153)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.002}***	{0.017}**	{0.002}***	{0.002}***	{0.002}***
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.059	0.032	0.048	0.059	0.000
R-squared	0.231	0.210	0.228	0.226	0.234
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.023	0.030	0.024	0.034	0.139
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.338	0.088	0.258	0.084	0.146
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.089	0.066	0.085	0.078	0.394
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.001	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.001
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.179	0.131	0.171	0.162	0.794
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table 6: Full Treatment Effects on Job-Retention Outcomes: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Months of Employment	(2) Hours worked last month	(3) Any wage-work hours: last 6 months	(4) Weekly wage-work hours: last 6 months	(5) Job Continuation Index
(T1) [Information]	0.155	-0.077	0.013	1.145	0.059
	(0.179)	(0.353)	(0.040)	(1.605)	(0.134)
	[0.386]	[0.828]	[0.753]	[0.476]	[0.660]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.235	-0.028	0.019	2.219	0.109
	(0.154)	(0.321)	(0.036)	(1.364)	(0.117)
	[0.128]	[0.931]	[0.597]	[0.105]	[0.352]
	{0.733}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{0.733}	{1.000}
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.489	0.314	0.124	4.351	0.328
	(0.149)	(0.291)	(0.036)	(1.313)	(0.111)
	[0.001]***	[0.282]	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.004]***
	{0.005}***	{0.643}	{0.005}***	{0.005}***	{0.010}**
(T4) [T3 + Internship]	1.208	1.608	0.274	11.783	0.888
	(0.163)	(0.347)	(0.037)	(1.552)	(0.125)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.005}***	{0.643}	{0.005}***	{0.005}***	{0.010}**
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.059	0.032	0.048	0.059	0.000
R-squared	0.218	0.203	0.222	0.222	0.225
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.079	0.049	0.006	1.074	0.050
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.593	0.835	0.829	0.411	0.624
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.254	0.342	0.105	2.132	0.219
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.045	0.123	0.000	0.059	0.012
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.719	1.294	0.150	7.432	0.561
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table 7: Full Treatment Effects on Income-Related measures: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Any Income	(2) Any Income last month	(3) Total Earning (6-month)	(4) Last Month's Earning	(5) Income Index
(T1) [Information]	0.020	-0.001	595.112	37.741	0.036
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(1,206.558)	(220.566)	(0.117)
	[0.632]	[0.989]	[0.622]	[0.864]	[0.759]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.026	-0.010	1,481.102	-27.420	0.043
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(1,029.846)	(216.353)	(0.106)
	[0.479]	[0.780]	[0.152]	[0.899]	[0.685]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.130	0.035	3,690.834	460.321	0.298
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(1,028.276)	(242.058)	(0.107)
	[0.001]***	[0.336]	[0.000]***	[0.058]*	[0.006]***
	{0.003}***	{0.767}	{0.003}***	{0.167}	{0.022}**
(T4) [T3 + Internship]	0.280	0.138	8,800.296	1,122.042	0.739
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(1,182.361)	(252.049)	(0.114)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.003}***	{0.767}	{0.003}***	{0.167}	{0.022}**
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.107	0.091	2,939.364	545.460	0.000
R-squared	0.222	0.188	0.237	0.189	0.222
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.006	-0.010	885.990	-65.161	0.007
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.824	0.701	0.370	0.686	0.934
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.104	0.045	2,209.732	487.741	0.255
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.000	0.047	0.018	0.025	0.003
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.149	0.103	5,109.461	661.720	0.440
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table 8: Treatment Effects on Employment measured at 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	At any point within 6-months after intervention				
	(1) Any Job	(2) Jobs at RMG	(3) Job at Manufacturing	(4) Any full-time job	(5) Employment Index
(T) [Skill training]	0.021	0.027	0.024	0.032	0.118
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.078)
	[0.324]	[0.100]	[0.232]	[0.072]*	[0.132]
	{0.740}	{0.503}	{0.662}	{0.503}	{0.503}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.110	0.093	0.109	0.110	0.474
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.093)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.289	0.224	0.280	0.272	1.194
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.101)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.077	0.043	0.067	0.061	-0.000
R-squared	0.231	0.209	0.228	0.226	0.234
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.089	0.066	0.085	0.078	0.356
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.001	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.001
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.179	0.131	0.171	0.162	0.720
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observable, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 9: Treatment Effects on Work-related variables: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Months of Employment	(2) Hours worked last month	(3) Any wage-work hours: last 6 months	(4) Weekly wage-work hours: last 6 months	(5) Job Continuation Index
(T) [Skill training]	0.101	0.038	0.008	1.236	0.046
	(0.136)	(0.217)	(0.026)	(1.190)	(0.077)
	[0.456]	[0.861]	[0.759]	[0.300]	[0.548]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.355	0.379	0.113	3.365	0.230
	(0.117)	(0.221)	(0.028)	(1.077)	(0.072)
	[0.003]***	[0.087]*	[0.000]***	[0.002]***	[0.002]***
	{0.008}***	{0.199}	{0.001}***	{0.008}***	{0.008}***
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	1.075	1.673	0.263	10.802	0.694
	(0.139)	(0.268)	(0.028)	(1.346)	(0.083)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.077	0.043	0.067	0.061	-0.000
R-squared	0.218	0.203	0.222	0.222	0.225
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.254	0.341	0.105	2.128	0.183
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.045	0.124	0.000	0.060	0.011
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.720	1.294	0.150	7.437	0.465
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 10: Treatment Effects on Income-related variables: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Any Income	(2) Any Income last month	(3) Total Income	(4) Last Month's Income	(5) Income Index
(T) [Skill training]	0.009	-0.010	970.192	-59.765	0.013
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(899.193)	(151.340)	(0.074)
	[0.727]	[0.680]	[0.282]	[0.693]	[0.858]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.114	0.035	3,177.892	428.112	0.245
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(835.908)	(213.611)	(0.078)
	[0.000]***	[0.127]	[0.000]***	[0.046]**	[0.002]***
	{0.001}***	{0.289}	{0.001}***	{0.132}	{0.007}***
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.263	0.139	8,289.514	1,089.602	0.649
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(1,030.113)	(208.364)	(0.087)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.077	0.043	0.067	0.061	-0.000
R-squared	0.222	0.188	0.237	0.189	0.222
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.104	0.045	2,207.700	487.877	0.231
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.000	0.047	0.019	0.025	0.003
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.149	0.103	5,111.622	661.490	0.404
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 11: Treatment Effects on Remittance measured at 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	At any point within 6-months after intervention				
	(1) Any Remittance	(2) Total Remittance	(3) Remittance Frequency	(4) Remittance Last Month	(5) Remittance Index
(T) [Skill training]	0.030	547.661	0.140	0.028	0.209
	(0.016)	(217.942)	(0.061)	(0.015)	(0.089)
	[0.066]*	[0.013]**	[0.022]**	[0.058]*	[0.020]**
	{0.150}	{0.085}*	{0.085}*	{0.150}	{0.085}*
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.084	1,024.237	0.238	0.062	0.431
	(0.019)	(250.694)	(0.059)	(0.016)	(0.095)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.229	2,242.984	0.731	0.167	1.137
	(0.023)	(261.665)	(0.084)	(0.023)	(0.123)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.049	340.976	0.129	0.034	0.000
R-squared	0.228	0.204	0.217	0.212	0.226
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.054	476.576	0.098	0.034	0.222
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.012	0.165	0.166	0.078	0.061
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.145	1,218.747	0.493	0.105	0.706
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 12: Treatment Effects on Secondary Outcomes: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Borrowing	Savings	Job Support:			
	Index	Index	Inspired for job	Got a job	No. inspired for job	No. got a job
(T) [Skill training]	-0.146	0.019	0.000	0.002	0.009	0.011
	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.013)
	[0.050]**	[0.779]	[0.962]	[0.760]	[0.531]	[0.414]
	{0.732}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	-0.041	0.214	0.017	0.012	0.024	0.017
	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)
	[0.559]	[0.004]***	[0.071]*	[0.131]	[0.075]*	[0.154]
	{1.000}	{0.059}*	{0.369}	{0.454}	{0.369}	{0.454}
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	-0.266	0.161	0.023	0.017	0.032	0.026
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)
	[0.000]***	[0.020]**	[0.017]**	[0.034]**	[0.016]**	[0.028]**
	{0.005}***	{0.072}*	{0.072}*	{0.084}*	{0.072}*	{0.083}*
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.007
R-squared	0.170	0.199	0.176	0.178	0.285	0.301
P-value for joint significance	0.002	0.015	0.027	0.119	0.099	0.142
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.106	0.196	0.016	0.010	0.015	0.007
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.202	0.013	0.111	0.249	0.378	0.663
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	-0.225	-0.053	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.008
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.002	0.441	0.589	0.649	0.558	0.555
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table, we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on outcome variable of interest. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. Q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). The control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed the original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 13: Treatment Effects on Aspiration and Stress: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Aspiration Index	(2) Health Index Index	(3) Work-related physical stress Index	(4) Work-related mental stress Index	(5) Family-related stress Index	(6) Non-work related stress Index
(T) [Skill training]	0.012	0.091	-0.103	0.064	-0.043	0.105
	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.077)
	[0.877]	[0.178]	[0.204]	[0.371]	[0.532]	[0.175]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.243	-0.041	-0.096	-0.157	-0.135	0.124
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.079)
	[0.001]***	[0.563]	[0.102]	[0.012]**	[0.026]**	[0.117]
	{0.017}**	{1.000}	{0.345}	{0.087}*	{0.125}	{0.345}
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.249	0.073	-0.022	0.078	-0.127	0.076
	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.080)
	[0.001]***	[0.295]	[0.770]	[0.274]	[0.075]*	[0.340]
	{0.021}**	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{0.549}	{1.000}
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.211	0.190	0.193	0.175	0.208	0.199
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.104	0.185	0.003	0.109	0.370
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.231	-0.132	0.007	-0.221	-0.092	0.019
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.002	0.032	0.926	0.002	0.148	0.824
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.006	0.114	0.074	0.236	0.008	-0.048
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.935	0.076	0.240	0.002	0.890	0.529
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table, we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcome variable of interest. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. Q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). The control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed the original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 14: Treatment Effects on Employment measured at 18-month follow-up (ITT)

	At any point within 18-months after intervention				
	(1) Any Job	(2) Jobs at RMG	(3) Job at Manufacturing	(4) Any full-time job	(5) Employment Index
(T) [Skill training]	0.004	0.007	0.011	0.009	0.040
	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.079)
	[0.904]	[0.572]	[0.491]	[0.792]	[0.611]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.009	0.028	0.046	-0.003	0.134
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.075)
	[0.754]	[0.059]*	[0.012]**	[0.910]	[0.074]*
	{1.000}	{0.281}	{0.139}	{1.000}	{0.281}
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.095	0.060	0.088	0.104	0.398
	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.075)
	[0.001]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.002}***	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.001}***	{0.000}***
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.308	0.027	0.040	0.296	0.000
R-squared	0.330	0.152	0.182	0.322	0.240
P-value for joint significance	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.005	0.021	0.036	-0.012	0.094
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.865	0.231	0.048	0.677	0.255
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.086	0.032	0.041	0.107	0.264
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.004	0.074	0.077	0.000	0.003
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 15: Treatment Effects on origin household secondary outcomes: 12-month follow-up (ITT-ANCOVA)

	(1) Illness Z-Index	(2) Asset Z-index	(3) Livestock Z-index	(4) Housing Z-index	(5) Savings Z-index	(6) Borrowing Z-index
(T) [Skill training]	-0.071	0.090	0.079	0.063	0.050	0.022
	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.103)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.051)
	[0.241]	[0.173]	[0.443]	[0.270]	[0.397]	[0.658]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	-0.039	0.188	0.067	0.096	-0.046	0.016
	(0.061)	(0.104)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.069)
	[0.519]	[0.073]*	[0.270]	[0.062]*	[0.455]	[0.820]
	{1.000}	{0.533}	{1.000}	{0.533}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	-0.156	0.155	0.098	0.076	-0.005	-0.059
	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.060)
	[0.049]**	[0.022]**	[0.161]	[0.217]	[0.932]	[0.325]
	{0.364}	{0.329}	{0.787}	{0.796}	{1.000}	{0.954}
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120
Control Mean	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
R-squared	0.182	0.431	0.335	0.329	0.274	0.257
P-value for joint significance	0.263	0.048	0.506	0.298	0.579	0.558
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.031	0.098	-0.012	0.034	-0.095	-0.007
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.660	0.372	0.883	0.563	0.163	0.923
Internship effect: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	-0.117	-0.034	0.031	-0.020	0.041	-0.075
Internship: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.187	0.778	0.650	0.726	0.519	0.254
Outcome at Baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) ANCOVA estimates of the origin household secondary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 16: Treatment Effects on Origin Household income, consumption and poverty: 12-month follow-up (ITT-ANCOVA)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Household Per-capita daily measure in (BDT)					
	Total income	Total consumption	Food consumption	Non-food consumption	Income poverty	Consumption poverty
(T) [Skill training]	2.718	-1.621	-0.669	-0.099	-0.044	0.010
	(4.586)	(2.037)	(1.003)	(0.316)	(0.031)	(0.012)
	[0.554]	[0.427]	[0.506]	[0.754]	[0.155]	[0.379]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	8.811	1.814	0.646	0.203	-0.081	-0.005
	(4.258)	(2.049)	(1.031)	(0.346)	(0.032)	(0.013)
	[0.040]**	[0.377]	[0.532]	[0.559]	[0.011]**	[0.698]
	{0.292}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{0.161}	{1.000}
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	9.821	-1.255	-0.686	-0.024	-0.121	-0.004
	(4.440)	(2.028)	(1.010)	(0.315)	(0.035)	(0.014)
	[0.028]**	[0.537]	[0.497]	[0.940]	[0.001]***	[0.772]
	{0.206}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{0.008}***	{1.000}
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120
Control Mean	66.436	66.615	27.452	8.182	0.537	0.964
R-squared	0.269	0.343	0.330	0.302	0.301	0.171
P-value for joint significance	0.030	0.160	0.330	0.712	0.004	0.456
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	6.094	3.436	1.315	0.302	-0.036	-0.015
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.087	0.034	0.087	0.264	0.283	0.220
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	1.010	-3.069	-1.332	-0.226	-0.040	0.001
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.770	0.069	0.110	0.405	0.249	0.943
Outcome at Baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table, we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) ANCOVA estimates of the origin household income, consumption, and poverty outcomes. We use the local poverty line of 53.40 BDT (per day per person). All the income variables used for poverty analysis are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in round brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. Q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). The control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group, where we clubbed the original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 17: Treatment Effects on urban labor income and remittance flow (in BDT): 12-month follow-up (ITT-ANCOVA)

	(1) Months of remittance	(2) Frequency of remittance	(3) Total remittance	(4) Dummy: Any Urban labor Income	(5) Total Urban labor income
(T) [Skill training]	0.208	0.217	799.526	0.025	2,497.313
	(0.127)	(0.128)	(671.841)	(0.021)	(2,128.911)
	[0.101]	[0.092]*	[0.235]	[0.233]	[0.242]
	{0.553}	{0.553}	{0.553}	{0.553}	{0.553}
(T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.432	0.437	2,768.919	0.032	2,797.057
	(0.132)	(0.133)	(1,024.247)	(0.017)	(1,856.570)
	[0.001]***	[0.001]***	[0.007]***	[0.059]*	[0.133]
	{0.007}***	{0.007}***	{0.028}**	{0.169}	{0.304}
(T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.974	1.025	2,971.970	0.049	4,901.315
	(0.145)	(0.150)	(773.231)	(0.020)	(2,177.326)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.014]**	[0.025]**
	{0.000}***	{0.000}***	{0.001}***	{0.040}**	{0.058}*
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120
Control Mean	0.428	0.433	2,200.363	0.094	10,123.440
R-squared	0.227	0.226	0.174	0.186	0.196
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.051	0.131
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.224	0.220	1,969.394	0.006	299.743
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.093	0.096	0.026	0.785	0.899
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.542	0.588	203.051	0.018	2,104.258
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.001	0.001	0.810	0.434	0.368
Outcome at Baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table, we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) ANCOVA estimates of the origin household urban labor income and remittance-related outcomes. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in round brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. Q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). The control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group, where we clubbed the original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 18: Treatment Effects on Migration measured at 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Ever Migrated after intervention	(2) Currently Migrant	(3) Migration: Dhaka	(4) Migration: Dhaka/Chittagong	(5) Migration: Outside Rangpur
(T1) [Information]	0.016	-0.028	-0.009	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
	[0.647]	[0.289]	[0.736]	[0.510]	[0.554]
	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.069	-0.006	0.008	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.042]**	[0.795]	[0.722]	[0.972]	[0.978]
	{0.481}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}	{1.000}
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.182	0.042	0.069	0.066	0.067
	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.000]***	[0.080]*	[0.005]***	[0.006]***	[0.006]***
	{0.000}***	{0.183}	{0.017}**	{0.017}**	{0.017}**
(T4) [T3 + Internship]	0.366	0.134	0.189	0.188	0.196
	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***	[0.000]***
	{0.000}***	{0.183}	{0.017}**	{0.017}**	{0.017}**
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.064	0.053	0.052	0.063	0.068
R-squared	0.275	0.172	0.189	0.201	0.203
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.053	0.022	0.017	0.017	0.015
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.038	0.208	0.368	0.404	0.459
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.113	0.049	0.060	0.067	0.068
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.000	0.015	0.013	0.007	0.006
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.184	0.092	0.120	0.122	0.129
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table, we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parentheses clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group, where we clubbed the original control group and the information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table 19: Job Placement by treatment status

Treatment	Job Employment Sector (in percentage)					
	RMG	**Textile**	**Other Factory**	**Service**	**Others**	**Total**
Control (C)	2.31	4.35	0	11.11	0	2.96
Information (T1)	8.85	14.49	16.67	11.11	42.86	11.02
Training (T2)	14.23	13.04	16.67	16.67	0	13.98
Stipend (T3)	25	21.74	27.78	16.67	42.86	24.46
OJT (T4)	49.62	46.38	38.89	44.44	14.29	47.58
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 20: Heterogeneity Analysis with Risk Preference

	(1) Search of RMG job after intervention	(2) Ever migrated after intervention	(3) Currently migrant	(4) Employed in RMG sector
Control × Risk-averse=1	-0.00579	-0.00579	0.0430	0.00163
	(0.0729)	(0.0729)	(0.0490)	(0.0549)
Information (T1) × Risk-averse=0	0.00983	0.00983	-0.0228	-0.0204
	(0.0362)	(0.0362)	(0.0236)	(0.0230)
Information (T1) × Risk-averse=1	0.0240	0.0240	0.00813	-0.0136
	(0.0443)	(0.0443)	(0.0347)	(0.0306)
Training (T2) × Risk-averse=0	0.0815**	0.0815**	0.00202	-0.000152
	(0.0385)	(0.0385)	(0.0222)	(0.0240)
Training (T2) × Risk-averse=1	0.0416	0.0416	0.00929	0.0279
	(0.0427)	(0.0427)	(0.0334)	(0.0322)
Stipend (T3) × Risk-averse=0	0.171***	0.171***	0.0529*	0.0616**
	(0.0387)	(0.0387)	(0.0270)	(0.0254)
Stipend (T3) × Risk-averse=1	0.211***	0.211***	0.0603*	0.0912**
	(0.0492)	(0.0492)	(0.0361)	(0.0387)
OJT (T4) × Risk-averse=0	0.347***	0.347***	0.123***	0.168***
	(0.0476)	(0.0476)	(0.0315)	(0.0307)
OJT (T4) × Risk-averse=1	0.424***	0.424***	0.214***	0.278***
	(0.0583)	(0.0583)	(0.0499)	(0.0591)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Clustered Standard errors at the village level is in the parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 21: Cost-Benefit Analysis

	Cost benefit Items	**Training & stipend (T3)**	**Training, stipend & internship (T4)**
1	ITT effect on earnings after 6 months (BDT/per month)	481.73	1151.99
2	ITT effect on earnings after 18 months (BDT/per month)	205.40	1112.70
3	Rate of change in earning (in an year)	-0.57	-0.03
4	Rate of change in earning (in an year) [Rounded]	-0.57	-0.03
5	Number of treatment individuals in the sample	506.00	506.00
6	Number of take-up individual	377.00	303.00
7	Total benefit (BDT) in the first year of the working life after the intervention (row 1*12*row 5)	2925064.56	6994883.28
8	Discounted benefits (BDT) for 38 years (benefits for the 2nd and following years are assumed to be declining at the rate reported in row 4) plus a discount rate of 10%	8863829.80	53536044.30
9	Opportunity cost of joining the training	1617.83	1617.83
10	Total opportunity cost (Row 9* Row 6* 2 (or 3) for T3 (T4).	1219843.82	1470607.47
11	Benefit minus opportunity costs (BDT) [row 8 minus row10]	7643985.98	52065436.83
12	Costs per Individual (including administrative cost 25%)	15225.00	19425.00
13	Total Cost	5739825.00	5885775.00
	Benefit-cost ratio	**1.33**	**8.85**

Table 22: Spillover effects

VARIABLES	(1) **Worked outside after 6 months**	(2) **Worked outside after 18 months**	(3) **Worked in RMG after 6 months**	(4) **Worked in RMG after 18 months**	(5) **Employment status after 6 months**	(6) **Employment status after 18 months**
Ratio of "Info (T1)" to total sample in the village	0.129	0.045	0.071	-0.056	0.082	0.048
	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.072)
Ratio of "Training (T2)" to total sample in the village	0.148	0.160	0.108	0.123	0.118*	0.136
	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.084)
Ratio of "Stipend (T3)" to total sample in the village	0.233***	0.220**	0.085	0.057	0.065	0.137*
	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.077)
Ratio of "OJT (T4)" to total sample in the village	0.276***	0.185**	0.162**	0.145**	0.253***	0.223***
	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.085)
Observations	2,215	2,215	2,215	2,215	2,215	2,215
R-squared	0.045	0.167	0.029	0.043	0.022	0.025
Control Mean	0.154	0.410	0.0641	0.0641	0.0385	0.0897
P-value for joint significance	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00
Info effect: (I) = T1 - C (beta)	0.13	0.04	0.07	-0.06	0.08	0.05
Info effect: (I) = T1 - C (p-value)	0.12	0.63	0.23	0.35	0.14	0.50
Job-Training effect: (J) = T2 - T1 (beta)	0.02	0.12	0.04	0.18	0.04	0.09
Job-Training effect: (J) = T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.88	0.40	0.71	0.06	0.69	0.43
Cash effect: (C) = T3 - T2 (beta)	0.08	0.06	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05	0.00
Cash effect: (C) = T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.52	0.67	0.83	0.53	0.59	0.99
Apprenticeship: (A) = T4 - T3 (beta)	0.04	-0.04	0.08	0.09	0.19	0.09
Apprenticeship: (A) = T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.73	0.79	0.41	0.36	0.04	0.46
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Appendix A: LATE Estimates

In this section, we present equivalent local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates to the ITT regressions presented in the main text. To obtain the LATE estimates, we instrument take-up of each intervention treatment with the treatment assignment, as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = a_0 + a_1.U(T)_i + a_2.U(T+S)_i + a_3.U(T+S+I)_i + \phi_{xi} + \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad \text{(A1)}$$

$$U(T)_{ij} = b_0 + b_1.(T)_i + b_2.(T+S)_i + b_3.(T+S+I)_i + +b_{xi} + \pi_j + \eta_{ij} \quad \text{(A2)}$$

$$U(T+S)_{ij} = c_0 + c_1.(T)_i + c_2.(T+S)_i + c_3.(T+S+I)_i + c_{xi} + \beta_j + \omega_{ij} \quad \text{(A3)}$$

$$U(T+S+I)_{ij} = d_0 + d_1.(T)_i + d_2.(T+S)_i + d_3.(T+S+I)_i + d_{xi} + \gamma_j + \kappa_{ij} \quad \text{(A4)}$$

Table A1: Treatment Effects on Employment measured at 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	At any point within 6-months after intervention				
	(1) Any Job	(2) Jobs at RMG	(3) Job at Manufacturing	(4) Any full-time job	(5) Employment Index
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	0.035	0.046*	0.040	0.055*	0.200
	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.132)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.148***	0.125***	0.146***	0.148***	0.637***
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.111)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.481***	0.372***	0.465***	0.452***	1.984***
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.146)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.299	0.257	0.293	0.285	0.301
Control Mean	0.077	0.043	0.067	0.061	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.113	0.079	0.107	0.093	0.437
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.003	0.017	0.005	0.004	0.004
Internship effect: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.333	0.247	0.319	0.304	1.346
Internship: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A2: Treatment Effects on Work-related variables: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Months of Employment	(2) Hours worked last month	(3) Any wage-work hours: last 6 months	(4) Weekly wage-work hours: last 6 months	(5) Work Index
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	0.172	0.053	0.012	2.113	0.076
	(0.229)	(0.366)	(0.044)	(2.013)	(0.130)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.478***	0.513*	0.152***	4.538***	0.309***
	(0.144)	(0.272)	(0.034)	(1.318)	(0.087)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	1.786***	2.783***	0.437***	17.960***	1.154***
	(0.211)	(0.408)	(0.042)	(2.042)	(0.126)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.220	0.213	0.246	0.231	0.237
Control Mean	0.641	1.062	0.148	5.510	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.307	0.460	0.140	2.425	0.233
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.126	0.164	0.000	0.171	0.038
Internship effect: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	1.308	2.270	0.286	13.423	0.845
Internship: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Table A3: Treatment Effects on Salary-related variables: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Any Income	(2) Any Income last month	(3) Total Salary	(4) Last Month's Salary	(5) Salary Index
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	0.014	-0.019	1662.143	-115.811	0.018
	(0.044)	(0.040)	(1514.336)	(254.297)	(0.125)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.152***	0.048*	4276.147***	574.389**	0.329***
	(0.034)	(0.029)	(1020.856)	(263.225)	(0.095)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.437***	0.230***	13778.395***	1809.733***	1.078***
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(1578.898)	(319.833)	(0.133)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.245	0.191	0.236	0.192	0.230
Control Mean	0.146	0.111	3,852.121	688.685	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.138	0.066	2,614.004	690.199	0.311
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.000	0.053	0.069	0.020	0.007
Internship effect: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.284	0.182	9,502.248	1,235.344	0.749
Internship: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Table A4: Treatment Effects on Secondary variables: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) borrowing Index	(2) Savings Index	(3) Expenditure: Last month	(4) Spillover: Inspired for job	(5) Spillover: Got a job	(6) Spillover: No. inspired for job	(7) Spillover: No. got a job
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	-0.259**	0.033	-1764.003***	0.000	0.003	0.016	0.019
	(0.124)	(0.111)	(586.101)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	-0.056	0.286***	278.836	0.022*	0.017	0.032*	0.023
	(0.087)	(0.092)	(510.255)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	-0.442***	0.267**	248.326	0.038***	0.028**	0.052***	0.042**
	(0.116)	(0.108)	(677.471)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.153	0.199	0.214	0.182	0.182	0.288	0.303
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	6,831.254	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.007
P-value for joint significance	0.001	0.006	0.005	0.011	0.073	0.055	0.087
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.203	0.254	2,042.839	0.022	0.013	0.017	0.004
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.103	0.024	0.001	0.133	0.304	0.519	0.851
Internship effect: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	-0.387	-0.020	-30.510	0.015	0.011	0.020	0.019
Internship: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.000	0.841	0.969	0.339	0.406	0.282	0.332
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Table A5: Treatment Effects on Aspiration and Stress: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Aspiration Index	(2) Health Index Index	(3) Work-related physical stress Index	(4) Work-related mental stress Index	(5) Family-related stress Index	(6) Non-work related stress Index
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	0.020	0.161	-0.184	0.112	-0.076	0.187
	(0.126)	(0.113)	(0.136)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.129)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.325***	-0.054	-0.129*	-0.209***	-0.181**	0.167*
	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.100)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.412***	0.123	-0.036	0.132	-0.211*	0.126
	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.126)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.223	0.189	0.193	0.176	0.205	0.200
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.071	0.132	0.001	0.074	0.316
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.305	-0.215	0.055	-0.321	-0.104	-0.021
Stipend effect: (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.006	0.019	0.640	0.002	0.290	0.870
Internship effect: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.087	0.177	0.093	0.341	-0.030	-0.040
Internship: (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.378	0.054	0.328	0.002	0.740	0.713
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Table A6: Treatment Effects on urban labor income and remittance flow (in BDT): 12-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Dummy: Any Urban labor Income	(2) Total Urban labor income	(3) Months of remittance	(4) Frequency of remittance	(5) Total remittance
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	0.045	4437.990	0.367*	0.382*	1419.854
	(0.036)	(3569.186)	(0.214)	(0.217)	(1137.295)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	0.043**	3774.271	0.584***	0.591***	3717.424***
	(0.021)	(2319.319)	(0.165)	(0.167)	(1285.510)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	0.082***	8157.181**	1.621***	1.706***	4932.805***
	(0.031)	(3456.350)	(0.229)	(0.238)	(1226.848)
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120
R^2	0.186	0.195	0.236	0.236	0.170
Control Mean	0.094	10,123.440	0.428	0.433	2,200.363
P-value for joint significance	0.031	0.096	0.000	0.000	0.000
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	-0.002	-663.719	0.217	0.209	2,297.570
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.947	0.856	0.279	0.295	0.049
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	0.040	4,382.910	1.037	1.115	1,215.381
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.232	0.202	0.000	0.000	0.281
Outcome at Baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Table A7: Treatment Effects on Origin Household income, consumption and poverty: 12-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Household Per-capita daily measure in (BDT)					
	Total income	Total consumption	Food consumption	Non-food consumption	Income poverty	Consumption poverty
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	4.821	-2.876	-1.186	-0.176	-0.079	0.018
	(7.690)	(3.415)	(1.680)	(0.529)	(0.053)	(0.020)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	11.832**	2.406	0.854	0.270	-0.109***	-0.007
	(5.191)	(2.544)	(1.283)	(0.431)	(0.039)	(0.017)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	16.298**	-2.117	-1.154	-0.042	-0.200***	-0.007
	(7.020)	(3.164)	(1.569)	(0.492)	(0.056)	(0.022)
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120
R^2	0.266	0.341	0.329	0.302	0.288	0.170
Control Mean	66.436	66.615	27.452	8.182	0.537	0.964
P-value for joint significance	0.014	0.112	0.263	0.666	0.002	0.391
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	7.011	5.283	2.040	0.445	-0.030	-0.025
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.221	0.032	0.079	0.263	0.565	0.162
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	4.466	-4.523	-2.008	-0.311	-0.092	0.000
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.397	0.063	0.091	0.414	0.074	0.995
Outcome at Baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Table A8: Treatment Effects on origin household secondary outcomes: 12-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Illness Z-Index	(2) Asset Z-index	(3) Livestock Z-index	(4) Housing Z-index	(5) Savings Z-index	(6) Borrowing Z-index
Take-up (T) [Skill training]	-0.125	0.162	0.141	0.112	0.089	0.041
	(0.100)	(0.110)	(0.172)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.084)
Take-up (T+S) [Skill training with Stipend]	-0.054	0.253*	0.090	0.129**	-0.060	0.021
	(0.076)	(0.131)	(0.075)	(0.063)	(0.076)	(0.087)
Take-up (T+S+I) [Skill training, stipend plus internship]	-0.260**	0.257**	0.164	0.126	-0.007	-0.099
	(0.127)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.097)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Observations	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120	2120
R^2	0.179	0.427	0.331	0.326	0.276	0.259
Control Mean	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.223	0.028	0.441	0.225	0.514	0.497
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (beta coef.)	0.072	0.092	-0.050	0.017	-0.149	-0.020
Stipend effect (S): (T+S)-(T) (p-value)	0.501	0.536	0.716	0.846	0.134	0.835
Internship effect (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (beta coef.)	-0.206	0.004	0.073	-0.003	0.053	-0.120
Internship (I): (T+S+I)-(T+S) (p-value)	0.119	0.981	0.461	0.969	0.548	0.188
Outcome at Baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Observables, Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Appendix B: ITT Estimates with RCT assignments

Table A9: Full Treatment Effects on Secondary measures: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) borrowing Index	(2) Savings Index	(3) Expenditure: Last month	(4) Spillover: Inspired for job	(5) Spillover: Got a job	(6) Spillover: No. inspired for job	(7) Spillover: No. got a job
(T1) [Information]	0.104	0.192	627.466	0.025*	0.019	0.032**	0.026*
	(0.108)	(0.142)	(582.281)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	-0.068	0.171	-450.035	0.022	0.018	0.037*	0.033*
	(0.115)	(0.142)	(599.146)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.019)
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.055	0.410***	750.653	0.038***	0.029**	0.052***	0.039**
	(0.111)	(0.154)	(618.278)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.016)
(T4) [T3 + Internship]	-0.188	0.339**	689.857	0.044***	0.033**	0.059***	0.047**
	(0.123)	(0.157)	(600.900)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	0.000	-0.000	6,979.497	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.169	0.197	0.217	0.177	0.178	0.285	0.301
P-value for joint significance	0.002	0.020	0.009	0.023	0.154	0.046	0.119
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	-0.172	-0.021	-1,077.501	-0.003	-0.001	0.004	0.007
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.036	0.781	0.002	0.681	0.920	0.759	0.580
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.123	0.239	1,200.687	0.016	0.010	0.015	0.007
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.161	0.006	0.004	0.112	0.250	0.379	0.663
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	-0.243	-0.071	-60.796	0.006	0.004	0.007	0.008
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.001	0.350	0.911	0.599	0.657	0.570	0.564
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table A10: Full treatment Effects on Aspiration and Stress: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Aspiration Index	(2) Health Index Index	(3) Work-related physical stress Index	(4) Work-related mental stress Index	(5) Family-related stress Index	(6) Non-work related stress Index
(T1) [Information]	0.436**	-0.038	-0.171	-0.129	-0.321**	0.141
	(0.177)	(0.113)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.149)	(0.155)
(T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.395**	0.057	-0.246*	-0.047	-0.321**	0.227
	(0.173)	(0.107)	(0.141)	(0.132)	(0.157)	(0.147)
(T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.630***	-0.074	-0.239*	-0.268**	-0.415***	0.246
	(0.168)	(0.116)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.151)	(0.150)
(T4) [T3 + Internship]	0.630***	0.040	-0.167	-0.032	-0.402***	0.198
	(0.169)	(0.113)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
Control Mean	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.217	0.190	0.194	0.175	0.211	0.199
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.184	0.205	0.004	0.048	0.362
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	-0.041	0.096	-0.075	0.081	0.001	0.086
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.607	0.183	0.343	0.266	0.992	0.300
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.235	-0.131	0.007	-0.221	-0.094	0.019
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.002	0.032	0.923	0.002	0.144	0.825
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.000	0.115	0.072	0.236	0.012	-0.049
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.999	0.073	0.241	0.002	0.837	0.526
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.1$.

Appendix C: LATE Estimates with RCT assignments

In this section, we present equivalent local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates to the main ITT regressions. To obtain the LATE estimates, we instrument take-up of each intervention treatment with the original RCT based treatment assignment, as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = a_0 + a_1.U(T1)_i + a_2.U(T2)_i + a_3.U(T3)_i + a_4.U(T4)_i + \phi_{xi} + \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad \text{(A5)}$$

$$U(T1)_{ij} = b_0 + b_1.T1_i + b_2.T2_i + b_3.T3_i + b_4.T4_i + b_{xi} + \pi_j + \eta_{ij} \quad \text{(A6)}$$

$$U(T2)_{ij} = c_0 + c_1.T1_i + c_2.T2_i + c_3.T3_i + c_4.T4_i + c_{xi} + \beta_j + \omega_{ij} \quad \text{(A7)}$$

$$U(T3)_{ij} = d_0 + d_1.T1_i + d_2.T2_i + d_3.T3_i + d_4.T4_i + d_{xi} + \gamma_j + \kappa_{ij} \quad \text{(A8)}$$

$$U(T4)_{ij} = g_0 + g_1.T1_i + g_2.T2_i + g_3.T3_i + g_4.T4_i + g_{xi} + \delta_j + \theta_{ij} \quad \text{(A9)}$$

Table A11: Treatment Effects on Employment measured at 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	At any point within 6-months after intervention				
	(1) Any Job	(2) Jobs at RMG	(3) Job at Manufacturing	(4) Any full-time job	(5) Employment Index
Take-up (T1) [Information]	-0.021	-0.037	-0.016	-0.029	-0.131
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.175)
Take-up (T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.011	0.004	0.021	0.022	0.070
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.205)
Take-up (T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.130***	0.093***	0.133***	0.123***	0.591***
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.169)
Take-up (T4) [T3 + Internship]	0.459***	0.333***	0.448***	0.422***	2.050***
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.231)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.299	0.257	0.293	0.285	0.300
Control Mean	0.059	0.032	0.048	0.059	-0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.032	0.040	0.038	0.051	0.201
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.352	0.129	0.240	0.075	0.151
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.119	0.090	0.111	0.101	0.521
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.002	0.008	0.003	0.002	0.002
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.328	0.240	0.316	0.299	1.459
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table A12: Treatment Effects on Work Measures: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Months of Employment	(2) Hours worked last month	(3) Any wage-work hours: last 6 months	(4) Weekly wage-work hours: last 6 months	(5) Work Index
Take-up (T1) [Information]	0.170	-0.152	0.009	1.167	0.052
	(0.230)	(0.446)	(0.053)	(2.057)	(0.173)
Take-up (T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.366	-0.121	0.022	3.443	0.155
	(0.272)	(0.549)	(0.064)	(2.404)	(0.206)
Take-up (T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.623***	0.383	0.159***	5.534***	0.417***
	(0.196)	(0.375)	(0.048)	(1.711)	(0.147)
Take-up (T4) [T3 + Internship]	1.965***	2.622***	0.446***	19.189***	1.447***
	(0.258)	(0.545)	(0.061)	(2.442)	(0.200)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.213	0.215	0.245	0.227	0.235
Control Mean	0.417	0.845	0.112	3.615	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.196	0.031	0.013	2.276	0.104
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.374	0.929	0.755	0.237	0.491
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.258	0.504	0.137	2.091	0.261
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.198	0.161	0.001	0.243	0.062
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	1.342	2.239	0.287	13.655	1.030
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table A13: Treatment Effects on Salary Measures: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) Any Income	(2) Any Income last month	(3) Total Salary	(4) Last Month's Salary	(5) Salary Index
Take-up (T1) [Information]	0.018	-0.005	525.088	15.181	0.025
	(0.054)	(0.048)	(1536.880)	(282.123)	(0.152)
Take-up (T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.034	-0.024	2260.815	-98.503	0.045
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(1791.346)	(371.945)	(0.189)
Take-up (T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.168***	0.043	4724.619***	587.354*	0.380***
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(1323.223)	(309.925)	(0.141)
Take-up (T4) [T3 + Internship]	0.455***	0.225***	14331.345***	1825.719***	1.202***
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(1844.521)	(390.710)	(0.183)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.243	0.192	0.233	0.192	0.229
Control Mean	0.107	0.091	2,939.364	545.460	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.017	-0.019	1,735.727	-113.683	0.020
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.700	0.622	0.229	0.650	0.882
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.133	0.068	2,463.804	685.857	0.336
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.001	0.062	0.086	0.028	0.010
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.288	0.181	9,606.726	1,238.365	0.822
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: In this table we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group. "C" denotes "Control" and T1-T4 denote treatment 1-4, respectively. Here T1 is information, T2 is information plus skill training, T3 is T2 plus stipend and T4 is T3 plus on-the-job training (internship).

Table A14: Full treatment Effects on Secondary variables: 6-month follow-up (LATE)

	(1) borrowing Index	(2) Savings Index	(3) Expenditure: Last month	(4) Spillover: Inspired for job	(5) Spillover: Got a job	(6) Spillover: No. inspired for job	(7) Spillover: No. got a job
Take-up (T1) [Information]	0.143	0.246	809.674	0.032**	0.024*	0.041**	0.033**
	(0.135)	(0.174)	(707.095)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Take-up (T2) [T1 + Skill training]	-0.114	0.291	-840.864	0.037*	0.031	0.063**	0.056*
	(0.192)	(0.234)	(988.503)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Take-up (T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.076	0.538***	970.370	0.050***	0.037**	0.068***	0.051***
	(0.139)	(0.189)	(758.615)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Take-up (T4) [T3 + Internship]	-0.310	0.547**	1100.964	0.071***	0.053**	0.096***	0.077***
	(0.191)	(0.241)	(899.716)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.164	0.187	0.216	0.175	0.175	0.284	0.299
Control Mean	0.000	-0.000	6,979.497	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.009	0.004	0.006	0.085	0.012	0.052
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	-0.257	0.045	-1,650.537	0.005	0.007	0.021	0.024
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.048	0.720	0.005	0.697	0.543	0.371	0.294
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.190	0.247	1,811.234	0.013	0.006	0.005	-0.005
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.164	0.062	0.005	0.407	0.652	0.862	0.839
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	-0.386	0.010	130.594	0.022	0.016	0.028	0.025
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.001	0.938	0.868	0.202	0.277	0.171	0.235
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: we report the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the separated treatments on primary outcomes, obtained by 2SLS process. Below each coefficient, we report a standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. We denote statistical significance using ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group.

Table A15: Full treatment Effects on Aspiration and Stress: 6-month follow-up (ITT)

	(1) Aspiration Index	(2) Health Index Index	(3) Work-related physical stress Index	(4) Work-related mental stress Index	(5) Family-related stress Index	(6) Non-work related stress Index
Take-up (T1) [Information]	0.561**	-0.052	-0.223	-0.170	-0.416**	0.182
	(0.220)	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.184)	(0.190)
Take-up (T2) [T1 + Skill training]	0.677**	0.101	-0.431*	-0.083	-0.554**	0.397
	(0.280)	(0.175)	(0.229)	(0.215)	(0.259)	(0.242)
Take-up (T3) [T2 + Stipend]	0.822***	-0.099	-0.314**	-0.355**	-0.542***	0.324*
	(0.209)	(0.143)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.187)	(0.186)
Take-up (T4) [T3 + Internship]	1.018***	0.068	-0.270	-0.048	-0.650***	0.320
	(0.253)	(0.171)	(0.204)	(0.213)	(0.234)	(0.237)
Observations	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142	2142
R^2	0.201	0.189	0.183	0.169	0.166	0.192
Control Mean	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
P-value for joint significance	0.000	0.138	0.138	0.001	0.028	0.306
Training effect: T2 - T1 (beta coef.)	0.115	0.153	-0.208	0.087	-0.138	0.215
Training effect: T2 - T1 (p-value)	0.377	0.168	0.125	0.465	0.282	0.097
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (beta coef.)	0.145	-0.199	0.117	-0.272	0.012	-0.073
Stipend effect: T3 - T2 (p-value)	0.261	0.033	0.349	0.016	0.918	0.597
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (beta coef.)	0.196	0.167	0.044	0.307	-0.108	-0.004
Internship effect: T4 - T3 (p-value)	0.079	0.074	0.653	0.011	0.287	0.976
Outcome at Baseline	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control for Phase and Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In this table we report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the individual treatment on primary outcomes, obtained by least squares estimation. Below each coefficient, we report a standard error in parenthesis clustered at the village level, a p-value in square brackets, and a q-value in curly braces. q-values are obtained using the sharpened procedure of Benjamini et al., (2006). Control mean is the mean for the outcome variable in the control group where we clubbed original control group and information treatment. We denote significance using *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, ** p < 0.1.

Appendix D: Survey Attrition

Table A16: Status of Attrition across survey rounds

Treatments	**6 months follow-up**	**12 months panel**	**18 months follow-up**
Control (C)	2.09	2.62	3.66
Information (T1)	3.36	2.76	5.73
Training (T2)	2.57	1.98	6.32
Training + Stipend (T3)	2.17	2.17	7.31
Training + Stipend + Internship (T4)	3.95	3.56	6.32
Overall	**2.93**	**2.62**	**6.19**

Table A17: Test for Systematic Attrition

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	**Attrition during 6-month follow-up (participant)**	**Attrition during 12-month panel survey (HH)**	**Attrition during 18-month follow-up (participant)**
Information (T1)	0.018	-0.012	0.029
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.032)
Training (T2)	0.013	-0.004	0.026
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.031)
Stipend (T3)	0.009	-0.013	0.040
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.034)
OJT (T4)	0.025	-0.001	0.030
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.032)
Observations	2,215	2,215	2,215
R-squared	0.147	0.185	0.163
Mean of the control group	2.09	2.62	3.66
P-value for joint significance	0.63	0.33	0.78
Control for Phase	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for observables	Yes	Yes	Yes

Appendix E: Other Tables

Table A18: Program Completion analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable:	**Sample without control and information group**				
Training Completion (dummy)	**Sample with both gender**			**Male**	**Female**
Stipend (T3)	0.204***	0.171***	0.193***	0.191***	0.275***
	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.062)
Internship (T4)	-0.003	0.072	0.003	0.075	-0.127**
	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Female	-0.080*	-0.045	-0.081*		
	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.045)		
Risk-averse	0.058	0.055	0.051	0.073	0.052
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.067)
Stipend (T3) * Female		0.088			
		(0.072)			
Internship (T4) * Female		-0.185***			
		(0.071)			
Stipend (T4) * Risk-Averse			0.042		
			(0.074)		
Stipend (T4) * Risk-Averse			-0.028		
			(0.092)		
Observations	1,518	1,518	1,518	919	599
R-squared	0.274	0.285	0.275	0.323	0.422
Mean of the T2 group	0.524	0.524	0.524	0.542	0.495
P-value for joint significance	0.00	0.005	0.000	0.004	0.000
Control for Phase, Observables and Village Fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Figure A1: Details about the Index formation

Name of The Index	Variables Included in the Index
Work Physical Strees Index	I have experienced physical stress during the last seven days, My physical stress has worsened over the last six months
Family Stress Index	I have experienced some mental stress for reasons connected to my family, My family-related mentall stress due to work has worsened over the last six months.
Non-work Stress	I have experienced some mental stress for reasons not connected with my work or family. My mental stress for reasons not connected to work or family has worsened over the last six months.
HH Borrowing Index	(sum) borrowing amount from MFI, (sum) borrowing amount from commercial banks, (sum) borrowing amount from local grocery shops, (sum) borrowing amount from relatives, (sum) borrowing amount from neighbours/friends.
HH Savings Index	Dummy for any positive amount savings, HH total savings at home (lock box, piggy bank), HH total savings with NGO/MFI, HH's total savings (Jewelery and cash) , HH's total outstanding lending in the last 1 year, Sum of current savings in the bank, Financial Inclusion (dummy if the HH has any access to formal financial means, including bank, post office, MFI)
HH Housing Condition	Better house(dummy if HH dweling is made with corrugated iron or brick), Better flooring (dummy if HH floor condition is brick or cemented), One+ room (dummy if HH has more than one room), Separate Kithchen (dummy if HH has a seperate kithchen), Separate toilet (dummy if HH has a seperate toilet of their own), Better latrine (dummy if HH use sanitary latrine), Electricity (dummy if connected with national grid or solar)
HH Asset Index	Total productive assets owned by the HH in a year, HH's asset consumption in last year, total livestock asset holding by the HH, Dwelling size, Dwelling owned by the HH (dummy), own holding(decimal) cultivated land (decimal), HH total land
HH Livestock Index	No. of Cows/Ox/Buffelo, No. of Goats/Sheeps. No. of Chicken/Ducks/Hens.
Health Index	Number of ill members in the HH, dummy if HH head was ill, number of ill members under 5 in the HH, number of ill members aged greater than 65 in the HH
HH Vulnerability Index	HH face food-shortage all year (dummy), HH take less than three meals a day during monga (dummy), HH takes only one meal a day during monga.