Free Homes and Youth Crime

PRELIMINARY - PLEASE DO NOT CITE[*]

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Abstract

We study the effects of a program that granted housing units to disadvantaged families in Colombia on youth crime. To do so, we leverage the fact that housing receipt for some families was determined via lottery. By combining lottery results with prosecution records for youths aged 9–18 at the time of the lottery, we track their criminal involvement over the following decade. We find that male youths from winning families committed fewer violent and drug-related offenses, generating an estimated three-percent reduction in the social costs of crime. We detect no effects for females. At the same time, male youths from winning families were more likely to incur conspiracy charges—charges that typically signal gang affiliation. Notably, these patterns are driven entirely by large housing developments, suggesting that the scale of a housing project is a critical feature of public housing policy.

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1 Introduction

Social housing projects have long carried a negative stigma—often reflected in derogatory labels such as “ghettos"—particularly when housing is highly concentrated. Such concentration can potentially increase crime among residents through peer and neighborhood effects. These fears have played a central role in motivating policymakers to pursue the deconcentration of social housing, with the aim of avoiding high-crime tipping points. As a result, governments worldwide have dispersed new social housing developments and, in some cases, demolished existing projects to spatially redistribute low-income residents (Haltiwanger et al., 2024).

This paper studies the effect of assignment to free public housing on youth crime in Colombia’s *Programa de Vivienda Gratuita* (“Free Housing Program”), focusing on heterogeneity by project size. The program provided free housing to 100,000 highly disadvantaged families across nearly 200 cities, with projects ranging from fewer than 30 units to more than 4,000. Housing units, valued at roughly US$30,000—about ten years of average recipient wages—were granted at no cost and could not be sold or rented for ten years. Because demand far exceeded supply, roughly 30 percent of units were allocated by lottery, allowing us to causally estimate the effect of winning a unit on youth crime and how it varies with project size.

We find that winning access to a free housing unit reduces overall criminal activity, though the estimated effects are not statistically significant. When we disaggregate by offense type, however, we observe substantial declines in violent crime among lottery winners. In contrast, lottery winners are more likely to commit public-safety offenses, which largely reflect gang affiliation. Given the sharp reduction in violent crime—and its disproportionate social costs (Chalfin and McCrary, 2018)—winning the lottery leads to a statistically and economically meaningful 3 percent reduction in the societal cost of crime.

These headline results mask substantial heterogeneity by housing project size.[1] A distinctive feature of our setting is its nationwide scale: our sample includes 190XX projects across

[1] We find limited heterogeneity based on age of winning the lottery, which stands in contrast to prior research that finds larger gains for younger children (Chetty et al., 2016).

175XX cities in Colombia, with considerable variation in size—from fewer than 30 units to more than 4,000 units. We find that the effects of winning a lottery depend critically on project size. Lottery winners assigned to small housing projects experience large and statistically significant declines in criminal activity, especially violent crime, implying a striking 6XX percent reduction in the social costs of crime. By contrast, no such reductions are observed among winners assigned to large projects; if anything, these individuals exhibit increases in public-safety offenses, which typically signal gang affiliation.

These patterns are consistent with evidence from a phone survey conducted five years after the lotteries. Winners residing in small projects report neighborhood safety and gang presence comparable to those of lottery losers, whereas winners in large projects report feeling less safe and experiencing substantially higher gang presence. Importantly, these differences appear to be driven by the projects themselves rather than pre-existing neighborhood conditions: prior to construction, neighborhoods hosting small and large projects were similar in terms of crime, poverty, and economic activity. Moreover, we find no comparable heterogeneity along other project dimensions where one might expect differences, such as local economic activity or building type (e.g., high-rise versus low-rise). Taken together, these findings suggest that concentrating public housing in a single location negatively affects the criminal behavior of children who grow up there.

Our project contributes to several strands of the academic literature, most directly to research on the effects of public housing on crime. Chyn (2018) exploits demolition-induced departures from public housing and shows that children who left public housing were less likely to be arrested as adults. Similarly, Kling et al. (2005) study the Moving to Opportunity experiment, in which housing vouchers were randomly assigned, and find that relocating families from public housing to lower-poverty neighborhoods reduced arrests among both male and female youth. Our paper provides, to our knowledge, the first evidence from the random assignment of public housing on crime in the developing world. While prior work has examined random assignment to public housing in the developing world on various economic

outcomes (Barnhardt et al., 2017; Camacho et al., 2022; Andersen et al., 2023), to our knowledge no economics research has specifically analyzed its effects on criminal outcomes.

Second, our project contributes to a relatively understudied literature on the role of public housing concentration in shaping economic and social outcomes. Although the concentration of public housing has long been discussed in both academic and policy circles, credible empirical evidence remains scarce, with most existing work relying on associational relationships (Fasoro et al., 2025).[2] This gap is striking given a longstanding view that dispersing social housing may reduce overall crime (Yancey, 1971; Newman, 1973). Such concerns motivated some of the most prominent housing policies aimed at deconcentrating poverty, including the Gautreaux program (Rosenbaum, 1995), Moving to Opportunity (Katz et al., 2001; Ludwig et al., 2001), and large-scale public housing demolitions (Jacob, 2004; Chyn, 2018; Haltiwanger et al., 2024). We study this issue by examining how the crime impacts of public housing assignment vary with the size of the housing project to which families are assigned. While this approach does not replicate the ideal experiment of directly randomizing housing concentration, it nonetheless provides informative evidence on how concentration mediates the effects of public housing on crime.

Finally, our project links to a large literature on the impact of neighbourhoods (Bobonis and Finan, 2009; Chetty et al., 2016; Chetty and Hendren, 2018; Deutscher, 2020; Laliberté, 2021; Nakamura et al., 2022). Specifically focusing on neighbourhoods' effects on criminal activity, Ludwig et al. (2001) use data from a randomized housing-mobility experiment in Baltimore and find that relocating families from high- to low-poverty neighbourhoods reduces violent criminal behavior by teens. Similarly, Dustmann et al. (2023) use random assignment of refugees to different municipalities in Denmark and show that youths assigned to high-crime neighbourhoods are more likely to commit crimes. In contrast, Oreopoulos (2003) finds no effect for youths being assigned to high-crime neighbourhoods in Toronto on earnings and social assistance receipt in adulthood. Kling et al. (2005) find that the Moving to Opportunity experiment

[2]For example, a recent meta-analysis concludes that "no studies on diversified housing projects satisfied the inclusion criteria in the current systematic review" (Kim et al., 2022).

in the U.S., which gave vouchers to disadvantaged families to move to better neighborhoods, found that males and females were less likely to be arrested for a violent crime in the first two years after randomization, but over time, males were then more likely to be arrested for property crimes. The authors attribute this to the fact that young males learn about their comparative advantage in committing property crimes in their new neighborhoods.

This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the program. Section 3 provides an overview of the data sources, followed by the empirical strategy in Section 4. The results are then presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

We study the Programa Vivienda Gratuita or "Free Housing" program which was introduced by President Juan Manuel Santos in April 2012. The program built and delivered 100,000 homes to the disadvantaged for free over four years (2012-2015). The only stipulation was that public housing recipients could not sell or sublet their unit for ten years. These 100,000 housing units were constructed throughout 295 public housing developments across 191 municipalities, and usually were two-bedroom apartments in cities or single-story row houses in towns. The size varied widely from dozens of units to full-sized neighbourhoods or apartment complexes with over 4,000 units.

The units themselves tended to be high-quality and located in desirable areas to avoid endemic problems in Colombia's previous public housing programs whereby subsidized housing was located on peripheral land or in regions with high flood risks (Gilbert, 2014). As a result, take-up of public housing assignment was near-universal (Camacho et al., 2022) and because units could neither be sold or rented almost all households lived in their units up until at least 2022 (when units could legally be sold). Three disadvantaged groups of individuals were eligible for the program: (i) victims of natural disasters, (ii) internally displaced persons (usually due to armed conflict), and (iii) the 'extreme poor.' As each project neared completion, housing

units were assigned according to priority tier until all units were occupied. (See Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2014) for technical program details.) Crucial to our proposed study, if there were more applicants than units within a priority tier, a lottery would be held to determine the recipients. Approximately 70% of recipients were directly assigned to housing, while 30% were assigned via lottery.

The lotteries to determine public housing recipients were run by the Department of Social Prosperity and to ensure fairness beneficiaries were invited to attend the draw alongside several public officials. The draws were then conducted at a suitable site (e.g., a soccer stadium). To determine public housing recipients, potential recipients came up one-at-a-time to pull a number from a physical urn; this number would then determine whether they "won" or "lost" the lottery. If a recipient did not physically attend either lottery, one of the public officials drew from the urn at the end of the draw for them.

3 Empirical Strategy and Data

3.1 Empirical Strategy

Because some applicants were assigned housing through lotteries, we estimate the causal effect of receiving a unit on youth crime by comparing lottery winners and losers within the same lottery by including lottery fixed effects.[3] Since a few municipalities had multiple projects, applicants could apply more than once, increasing their chance of winning. We therefore follow Ketel et al. (2016) and classify applicants based on the outcome of their first lottery; those who later reapplied and won are still classified as losers, though such cases are rare.

We therefore estimate:

$$crime_i = \alpha + \beta D_i + \delta X_i + LC_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

[3]Some projects held multiple lotteries as units became vacant (e.g., following the death of a recipient), so each lottery is uniquely identified by project, eligibility group, priority tier, and lottery date.

where $crime_i$ is an indicator that child i has committed a crime, D_i equals one if the family won its first lottery, X_i are pre-lottery covariates, and LC_i are lottery fixed effects. The parameter of interest, β, measures the effect of winning housing on crime. Given high compliance with first lottery assignments, β can be interpreted as the causal effect of receiving a unit. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the municipality and family level.

3.2 Data

We restrict our sample to individuals who were between 9 and 18 years old at the time of the lottery. The upper bound ensures that individuals over 18, who are less likely to move with their families into the new housing units, are excluded. The lower bound is chosen so that individuals are old enough to plausibly face criminal prosecution. While prosecutions have no formal minimum age and criminal records can, in principle, exist for younger children, very few young minors (e.g., under 14) are actually prosecuted. Given that our data extend to 2024 and the lotteries were conducted between 2012 and 2015, the youngest individuals in our sample will be 18 years old by the end of our observation period, allowing sufficient time for criminal records to appear.

Public Housing Application Data: The key data underlying our proposed project are the universe of public housing applications under Colombia's "Free Housing" program. These data were obtained from the Departamento Nacional de Planeación, the technical advisory body to the President of Colombia. The data contain public housing applications made by the household head. We then linked the household head to other family members in their household using Colombia's Census of the Poor (known as the "SISBEN") using name and national identification number. We match 94% of household heads to the Census data.

SISBEN: The SISBEN or the "Census of the Poor" is a census of Colombia's low-income population which captures the wealth of individuals for means tested social programs. The data

are collected door-to-door by surveyors and include rich demographic and socioeconomic information of all household members including sex, age, date of birth, education, marital status, occupation, income, household size, dwelling characteristics, and indicators of household wealth (e.g., has a fridge). The 2010 wave of the SISBEN covers roughly 28.5 million people, corresponding to 62 percent of the population. Since the SISBEN specifically targets poor households, however, the coverage rate for public housing recipients – our sample of interest – is near-universal.

Criminal Records: We match all youths that meet our age restrictions to prosecution records. Prosecution records in Colombia are publicly-available online for 20 out of 33 judicial districts in Colombia (which cover the most populous regions).[4] Our data collection procedure thereby follows that of Arteaga (2023) and involves taking each youth in our data and entering their national identification number into every judicial website.

Household Survey: We also use a household survey specifically designed to study the impacts of the public housing program among a representative sample of lottery participants (Camacho et al., 2021). The survey was conducted by the *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* between August 6 and September 6, 2020, and administered by telephone to individuals who participated in housing lotteries across 40 projects. The response rate was 89 percent, yielding 2,563 completed surveys, including 1,264 lottery winners and 1,299 lottery losers. This survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of winning the lottery on households' perceptions of their neighborhoods—such as perceived gang activity—and to assess how these perceptions vary with the size of the housing project to which applicants were assigned.

[4]For example, criminal records for Bogota, the largest judicial district in Colombia, are available at https://procesos.ramajudicial.gov.co/jepms/bogotajepms/conectar.asp.

4 Results

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for both the lottery winners and losers and checks for covariate balance among among our main analysis sample. Of note is that all covariates were measured before the lottery. Columns (2) and (3) show treatment and control means of pre-lottery household head characteristics, dwelling attributes, measures of household wealth, and the head's labor market outcomes. Differences between the treatment and control children accounting for lottery fixed effects are shown in column (4), with the p-value from a formal test of equality being reported in column (4) and with p-value Romano-Wolf using a stepdown procedure on column (5). Reassuringly, the table shows that there are few statistically significant differences between lottery winners and losers. Only four characteristics are statistically different across lottery winners and losers: (i) "head's age at lottery" (a difference of 0.11 years or 40 days); (ii) "household size" (a difference of 0.1); (iii)"access to water" (a difference of 1.3 percentage points); and (iv) household income, XXXXXX. Since we are testing balance for twenty characteristics, it is expected that some covariates will not be statistically balanced and a joint hypothesis test cannot reject the null that all differences between lottery winners and losers are zero. Moreover, the joint test for statistical significance shown at the bottom of the table, suggests that, overall, treatment and control groups are statistically identical.

Table 2 reports our results. Our analysis finds no statistically significant effect of winning the housing lottery on overall crime rates, suggesting that access to housing alone does not broadly alter individuals' likelihood of engaging in criminal activity. However, disaggregating the results by crime category reveals meaningful heterogeneity. Specifically, we observe that lottery winners are 0.2 percentage points less likely to commit violent crimes and 0.1 percentage points less likely to be involved in drug-related offenses, both of which are statistically significant reductions. Importantly, the decline in violent crimes is particularly meaningful, as the vast majority of the societal costs associated with crime are driven by violent offenses (Chalfin and McCrary, 2018).

Conversely, we find a statistically significant 0.2 percentage point increase in public secu-

rity crimes among lottery winners. This category, however, is heavily concentrated—75% of these offenses are classified as "conspiracy," which typically corresponds to gang affiliation. (Illegal possession of a weapon constitutes the vast majority of the remaining crimes in this category.) While this increase may appear counterintuitive, it could reflect greater law enforcement surveillance in certain areas or shifts in individuals' social networks following relocation.

Figure A.2 reveals relatively little heterogeneity in treatment effects by age at the time of the lottery. Figure 1 further breaks this down across the four crime categories. Across most crime categories, the effects of winning the housing lottery appear fairly consistent regardless of whether individuals were younger or older when they entered. The notable exception is drug-related offenses, where the reductions are concentrated among older youths, particularly those aged 17 and 18 at the time of the lottery. This suggests that the protective effects of improved housing conditions on drug-related behavior may be more pronounced for individuals who are closer to adulthood and potentially more exposed to high-risk environments. For other types of crime, however, the similar impacts across age groups indicate that housing stability exerts a broadly uniform influence.

Table 3 presents the effects of winning the housing lottery on households' perceptions of their neighborhoods. The first row reports estimates pooling across all projects. On average, winning the lottery increases overall neighborhood satisfaction, but has no statistically significant effect on perceived neighborhood safety or on reported gang presence. These results suggest that, in the aggregate, access to public housing improves households' subjective assessments of their living conditions without clear average changes in local safety or gang activity.

The second row of Table 3 reveals substantial heterogeneity by project size. Among lottery winners assigned to large housing projects, perceived neighborhood safety declines and reported gang presence increases in a statistically significant way. By contrast, winners assigned to smaller projects experience higher perceived safety and lower reported gang presence. This pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that large, highly concentrated housing developments are more likely to generate gang-related problems, yielding the increased crime

for gang-related crimes among lottery winners who went to large projects.

5 Conclusion

This paper studies the effects of assignment to free public housing on youth crime in Colombia, with a particular focus on how these effects vary with the size of the housing project. Leveraging random assignment through housing lotteries, we provide causal evidence that access to public housing reduces violent criminal behavior among youth, leading to meaningful reductions in the social costs of crime. At the same time, we document increases in public-safety offenses—largely associated with gang activity—underscoring that the impacts of housing assistance are multidimensional and depend on the environments in which beneficiaries are placed.

A central contribution of our analysis is to show that these average effects mask substantial heterogeneity by project size. Youth assigned to small housing projects experience large and statistically significant declines in overall and violent crime, whereas those assigned to large projects do not. If anything, assignment to large projects is associated with increased public-safety offenses and worse perceived neighborhood conditions. Survey evidence collected several years after assignment reinforces this pattern: beneficiaries in small projects report levels of neighborhood safety and gang presence comparable to those of non-beneficiaries, while those in large projects report markedly worse conditions. Importantly, these differences are not driven by pre-existing neighborhood characteristics or other observable project features, pointing to housing concentration itself as a key mechanism shaping criminal behavior.

Taken together, our findings offer new evidence on a longstanding policy debate surrounding the concentration of social housing. While our setting does not allow us to experimentally manipulate housing concentration directly, the heterogeneity induced by variation in project size provides informative evidence on how concentration mediates the effects of public housing on youth outcomes. The results suggest that providing housing assistance need not exac-

erbate crime—and may substantially reduce its most socially costly forms—when housing is delivered in smaller, less concentrated developments. For policymakers, these findings highlight that the design and scale of public housing projects are first-order considerations, with important implications for crime, neighborhood quality, and the long-run trajectories of disadvantaged youth.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Test

	Overall mean (1)	Treated (2)	Control (3)	Difference (4)	Test of Equality (5)	Test of Equality (RW) (6)
Panel A: Demographics						
HH head age	36.10	36.28	36.00	-0.108	0.500	0.6139
				(0.160)		
HH head is female	.677	.686	.672	0.014*	0.053	0.0495
				(0.007)		
HH head is single	.183	.198	.174	0.008	0.164	0.1485
				(0.006)		
HH head illiterate	.105	.105	.105	-0.002	0.696	0.6436
				(0.005)		
HH size	5.71	5.63	5.76	-0.103**	0.014	0.0099
				(0.042)		
Panel B: Housing conditions						
Durable floor	.755	.749	.759	-0.004	0.517	0.8614
				(0.006)		
Private toilet	.643	.645	.641	-0.001	0.898	0.9604
				(0.007)		
Persons per room	2.64	2.62	2.65	-0.016	0.556	0.8614
				(0.027)		
Access to: Electricity	.945	.938	.949	0.001	0.872	0.9604
				(0.003)		
Water	.782	.757	.797	0.013**	0.021	0.0297
				(0.006)		
Natural gas	.353	.285	.394	0.007	0.214	0.3168
				(0.006)		
Panel C: Asset accumulation						
Household owns: Fridge	.386	.389	.384	-0.003	0.717	0.9802
				(0.007)		
Washing machine	.095	.096	.094	-0.002	0.670	0.9802
				(0.004)		
Computer	.013	.015	.012	-0.000	0.810	0.9802
				(0.002)		
Motorcycle	.03	.031	.03	-0.001	0.746	0.9802
				(0.003)		
Assets index	0	.009	-.005	-0.003	0.647	0.9802
				(0.008)		

Table 1: (...continued)

	Overall mean (1)	Treated (2)	Control (3)	Difference (4)	Test of Equality (5)	Test of Equality (RW) (6)
Panel D: Labor market outcomes (Household Head)						
Working	.491	.492	.491	-0.004	0.641	0.7525
				(0.008)		
Looking for a job	.044	.046	.043	0.000	0.884	0.8020
				(0.003)		
Does household chores	.359	.362	.358	0.004	0.562	0.7525
				(0.007)		
Total income	341,192	343,640	339,723	0.092*	0.080	0.0693
(Colombian pesos, $2010)				(0.053)		
Joint Significance Test						
F-test statistic				1.15		
p-value				0.2935		

Note: This table reports means for lottery winners ("treated") and losers ("control") along with treated-control differences in pre-lottery characteristics for the households of applicants who applied for public housing in Colombia (Phase I) and whose housing assignment was determined via lottery. The pre-lottery characteristics come from the SISBEN III and were collected in 2009-10. The sample is restricted to households with children who were 18 or younger at the time of their first lottery application and were 18 or older in 2025. Column (5) reports the p-value of a hypothesis test on whether the difference between the treatment and control group is zero. The hypothesis test is implemented by regressing the covariate on a public housing offer for a child's first lottery application, controlling for lottery, time and municipality fixed effects. Column (6) tests for equality using the Romano-Wolf stepdown procedure. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the municipality and family level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Impact of Winning Lottery on Crime Outcomes (Men Only)

Committed:	Societal Cost of Crime (1)	Any Crime (2)	By Crime Category: Violent Crimes (3)	Drug Crimes (4)	Property Crimes (5)	Public Safety Crimes (6)
Panel A. All Projects						
Won Lottery (%)	3.44*	-0.43*	-0.19**	-0.11*	0.03	0.16*
	(2.20)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Control Mean	$73,055	2.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.8%	0.4%
Observations	37,916	37,916	37,916	37,916	37,916	37,916
Panel B. Small Projects Only						
Won Lottery (%)	XX	-0.56**	-0.43***	-0.21*	0.07	0.02
	(2.20)	(0.29)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.13)
Control Mean	XX	2.1%	0.5%	0.4%	0.7%	0.4%
Observations	18,847	18,847	18,847	18,847	18,847	18,847
Panel C. Big Projects Only						
Won Lottery (%)	XX	0.08	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.26*
	(2.20)	(0.30)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.14)
Control Mean	XX	2.3%	0.4%	0.3%	1.0%	0.4%
Observations	19,069	19,069	19,069	19,069	19,069	19,069


Note: This table reports the effect of winning a housing lottery on the probability one commits a crime. Sample includes boys aged 9-18 at the time of the housing lottery. Housing lotteries were run from 2012-2015 and our crime data cover up to 2024. All regressions include lottery fixed effects to ensure that only individuals in the same lottery are being compared. We also include controls for a child's gender, age at first lottery, whether a family lived in urban/rural area, household size, along with characteristics of the household head including age at birth, marital status, employment status and education (all measured pre-lottery in 2009-10). Standard errors are clustered at the family level. ***,** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 3: Impact of Winning Lottery on Survey Responses About Safety

	Gang Presence (1)	Neighborhood Satisfaction (2)	Neighborhood Safety (3)	Reliance on Police (4)
Panel A. All Projects				
Won Lottery (%)	-0.043	0.131***	0.047	0.068
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Won Lottery × Big Project	0.188***	-0.129**	-0.177***	-0.082
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.060)
Control Mean	0.271	0.687	0.580	0.531
Observations	2,560	2,560	2,560	2,560


Note: This table reports the effects of winning the housing lottery on households' perceptions of their neighborhoods. Outcomes include overall neighborhood satisfaction, perceived neighborhood safety, and perceived gang presence. All coefficients are estimated using lottery fixed effects and compare lottery winners to lottery losers within the same lottery. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the housing project level. The first row pools all housing projects, while the second row allows the effects to vary by project size; "large projects" are defined as projects above the median number of housing units. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. ***,** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Figure 1: Impact of Winning the Lottery on Crime by Type and Age




Notes: The figure plots heterogeneity of the program's impact on crime by the child's age at lottery for four categories of crime: drug crimes, violent crimes, property crimes, and public security crimes. To do so, we split our sample by the given demographic and estimate our main regression given by equation (1). Lottery fixed effects and controls for a child's gender, age at first lottery, whether a family lived in urban/rural area, household size, along with characteristics of the household head including age at birth, marital status, employment status and education (all measured pre-lottery in 2009-10) are included. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the family level.

Figure A.1: Distribution of Projects by Number of Housing Units



Notes: The figure plots a histogram of housing projects in our sample by number of units.

Figure A.2: Heterogeneity by Age at Lottery



Notes: The figure plots heterogeneity of the program's impact on crime by the child's age at lottery. To do so, we split our sample by the given demographic and estimate our main regression given by equation (1). Lottery fixed effects and controls for a child's gender, age at first lottery, whether a family lived in urban/rural area, household size, along with characteristics of the household head including age at birth, marital status, employment status and education (all measured pre-lottery in 2009-10) are included. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the family level.

Table A.1: Crime Classifications

Crime Category	# of Crimes	% of Category
Category 1: Violent Crimes	X	-
Homicide:		54.3%
Personal Injuries		32.6%
Attempted Murder		12.3%
Other:[1]		0.8%
Category 2: Drug Crimes	X	-
Drug trafficking:		99.4%
Other:[2]		0.6%
Category 3: Property Crimes	X	-
Robbery/Theft:		88.7%
Extortion:		8.6%
Fraud:		1.3%
Other:[3]		1.4%
Category 4: Public Safety Crimes	X	-
Conspiracy:		72.0%
Criminal Possession of a Weapon:		28.0%
Uncategorized	X	-
XX:		88.7%
Other:[4]		1.4%

[1] These include
[2] These include
[3] These include
[4] These include

Table A.2: Classification of Crimes into Four Categories

Drug	**Violent**	**Property**	**Public Safety**
Drug Trafficking	Attempted Homicide	Counterfeiting Currency	Bribery
	Domestic Violence	Embezzlement	Child Abandonment
	Extortion	Forgery of Documents	Conspiracy
	Forced Displacement	Forgery of Seals and Official Effects	Concealment Crime
	Homicide	Fraud	Crimes Against Natural Resources
	Illegal Possession of Weapons	Money Laundering	Failing to Pay Child Support
	Kidnapping	Procedural Fraud	Malfeasance
	Personal Injuries	Receiving Stolen Goods	Prison Escape
	Procuring/Pimping	Theft	Slander and Libel
	Robbery	Vandalism	Smuggling
	Sexual Abuse		
	Sexual Exploitation		

Table A.3: Impact of Winning Lottery on Crime Outcomes (Women Only)

Committed:	Societal Cost of Crime (1)	Any Crime (2)	By Crime Category: Violent Crimes (3)	Drug Crimes (4)	Property Crimes (5)	Public Safety Crimes (6)
Panel A. All Projects						
Won Lottery (%)	XX	-0.07	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	-0.01
	(2.20)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.44)
Control Mean	XX	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Observations	35,466	35,466	35,466	35,466	35,466	35,466

Note: This table replicates Table 2 but among women. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. ***,** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.