Immigration and the political behavior of naturalized and Hispanic Americans *

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Abstract

This paper examines the political behavior of Americans with immigrant background. We assemble voter registration records for over 20 million US-born and foreign-born citizens across three states between 2016 and 2024, and document a rightward shift among voters with immigrant background. During this period, naturalized and US-born Hispanic voters experienced a higher increase in Republican registration than White natives. We show that this pattern is robust to a wide range of demographic, economic, and geographic controls, persists within the same individuals over time, and cannot be explained by changes in income, or age composition. We then examine one factor that contributed to this shift: undocumented Mexican immigration. Combining variation in push shocks across Mexican municipalities with historical migrant networks, we construct predicted inflows of undocumented migrants across US counties. We find that areas experiencing larger undocumented immigration saw greater increases in Republican registration among naturalized and Hispanic voters relative to White natives in the same county and year. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanisms differ across groups of voters: economic competition appears to drive the response among non-Hispanic naturalized voters, while identity and fairness concerns explain the shift among Hispanics, both foreign- and US-born.

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1 Introduction

In 2024, 10% adults eligible to vote in the United States, 25 million people, were born abroad (Ruggles et al., 2025). Despite their growing share of the electorate, we know remarkably little about how these voters behave politically. How do immigrants and their descendants vote, and what do their political preferences look like? Recent evidence from surveys and anecdotal accounts suggests that naturalized and ethnically minority voters have shifted rightward over the past decade, contributing in part to the 2024 electoral outcomes (Frimpong and Sanchez, 2024; Nowrasteh and Chanwong, 2025; Hamel et al., 2025). Despite the explicitly anti-migrant rhetoric of the contemporary Republican Party, many long-settled migrants and minority voters appear to have undergone a conservative shift similar to that observed among US-born white voters. Does this pattern in political attitudes translate to a pattern in political behavior, and if so, why?

In this paper, we examine the political behavior of Americans with immigrant background. We assemble voter registration records for more than 20 million US-born and foreign-born citizens across three states—California, North Carolina, and Nebraska—between 2016 and 2024. The cornerstone of our analysis is the voter file compiled by L2, which covers all registered voters in the United States and is updated biennially. In addition to basic demographic information, these three states record each voter's place of birth, allowing us to identify naturalized Americans. As we document below, these demographic estimates correlate closely with administrative statistics on citizenship and immigration. Because these states also record voters' party affiliations—and because party registration closely tracks county-level electoral outcomes—we can study the evolution of partisan identification at both the county and the individual level. The longitudinal structure of the data further allows us to trace changes in party registration at the person level across election cycles.

We focus on consistent voters—those who appear in at least four of the five elections between 2016 and 2024—to ensure a stable electorate and minimize compositional changes over time. We document that naturalized voters have become increasingly likely to register as Republicans. On average, the share of naturalized voters registered as Republicans increased from about 24% in 2020 to 26.3% in 2024, a 2.3-percentage-point rise. Over the same period, Republican registration among US-born white voters rose from 33% to 34.3%, while the increase among other US-born voters was even smaller. The upward shift among naturalized voters is therefore roughly one percentage point larger than for white natives and twice as large as for other US-born voters. The pattern is especially pronounced in California and reflects reallocation from both Democratic and Independent (or other) affiliations.

Next, we examine whether demographic or economic differences account for these pat-

terns. They do not. The Republican shift among naturalized and Hispanic voters is similar across gender, age, and education groups and persists after controlling for household income. It also does not vary systematically with urbanization or baseline partisanship. If economic, demographic, or residential factors cannot explain this shift, what can? In the second part of the paper, we turn to a factor that has featured prominently in anecdotal and news outlets: undocumented immigration.[1]

Immigration has risen sharply in recent years, driven in part by a surge in undocumented arrivals. Although inflows from Central and South America have increased, Mexico remains the largest single country of origin for recent migrants. In California, roughly 18% of immigrants who arrived within the previous two years were born in Mexico—the highest share of any origin group. The corresponding share is about 15% in Nebraska and North Carolina, again higher than for any other country of origin (Ruggles et al., 2025). A large literature has shown that immigration can fuel support for right-wing parties in both the United States and Europe (Alesina and Tabellini, 2024). Yet most existing studies estimate average effects across the electorate, without separating the responses of immigrants and their descendants from those of native-born voters. As a result, we know little about whether migration inflows affect the political behavior of immigrants themselves and their descendants.

Ex ante, the direction of such effects is ambiguous. On the one hand, a migrant background may foster empathy with newcomers and support for more open migration policies (Dinas et al., 2021; Gihleb et al., 2022). On the other, long-settled immigrants are often the closest substitutes for new arrivals and may experience economic competition (Borjas, 1987; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). They may also have social or psychological incentives to distance themselves from recent migrants—both to preserve relative status and to avoid discrimination—particularly when natives perceive immigration as threatening.

To test these ambiguous predictions, we exploit variation in undocumented Mexican immigration across US counties between 2016 and 2024. The longitudinal structure of the voter file allows us to estimate how changes in local migration inflows translate into within-individual changes in party registration, controlling for voter fixed effects and group-specific partisan trends. Specifically, we ask whether exposure to unauthorized migration increases the likelihood that naturalized and non-White voters register as Republicans, and whether these responses differ relative to US-born white voters—the largest and most politically stable demographic group.

To address potential endogeneity in observed migration flows, we follow Tiburcio and Camarena (2023) in predicting biennial county-level inflows using data from the Mexican

[1]For example, Frimpong and Sanchez (2024) have documented the growing salience of immigration and the rightward drift among long-settled immigrant voters during the 2024 cycle.

Consular system. This dataset records both the Mexican municipality of origin and the US county of residence of cardholders, allowing us to combine pre-existing municipality–county networks (shares) with municipality-level outflows (shifts) driven by local economic and environmental conditions in Mexico. Unlike the American Community Survey (ACS), which provides only national-level inflow estimates, the consular data capture sub-national migration push-shocks and thus generate plausibly exogenous local variation in exposure to unauthorized migration. Further, to account for the possibility that the pre-existing networks are correlated with other confounding factors, we re-center the instrument implementing Borusyak and Hull (2023)'s correction. Namely, we recompute the instrument 1,000 times by interacting the original networks with random municipality-level outflows. We take the average of these simulated instruments and subtract it from the original instrument.

We explore whether the likelihood of Republican registration increases among naturalized and Hispanic voters exposed to unauthorized Mexican migration and whether such increase is larger than that of equally exposed US-born White voters. By controlling for voter fixed effects and group-specific trends, we exploit variation in party registration within individual voters, net of the evolution of their demographic group in their state. This design assumes that, conditional on the set of fixed effects, more exposed naturalized and Hispanic voters were not already on a different partisan trajectory compared to less exposed voters and that the difference in the partisan evolution between naturalized and Hispanic voters and US-born White voters would have remained constant in counties with higher versus lower migration inflows.

By exploiting push factors in Mexican municipalities and implementing the re-centering correction, we rely on variation unrelated to contemporaneous county-level confounders and to original (pre-existing) exposure to migration. We present evidence against group-specific pre-trends: there is no statistical association between current exposure to migration and past Republican registration. Moreover, our main results are robust to controlling for the predicted evolution of key county-level socioeconomic characteristics.

We find that migration inflows differentially increase the likelihood of Republican registration for *both* naturalized Americans and Hispanic Americans during the 2020 and 2024 electoral cycles. That is, they make all foreign-born groups, and Hispanics, whether foreign-born or US-born, more likely to register as Republicans. A 0.05 percentage point increase in unauthorized Mexican migration inflows (the average change during our study period) raises Republican registration by an amount equivalent to 7% of the mean increase among US voters born in Latin America, 2.8% among those born other countries, and 6.1% among US-born Hispanics; the corresponding effect among US-born Whites is less than 1%. Second-generation Hispanic voters experience the largest effects. The results are robust to controlling

for differential trends in a wide set of covariates, including electoral outcomes, economic conditions, and demographic composition, to using a more demanding set of fixed effects, and to clustering standard errors at different levels. Crucially, we find no association between current migration inflows and past party registration, supporting a parallel-trends-type assumption.

Following the literature on the political impacts of migration (Alesina and Tabellini, 2024), we explore different hypotheses that could explain why naturalized Americans and US-born Hispanics, a priori different groups, may increase their likelihood of becoming Republican due to migration inflows. We find evidence supporting two channels affecting naturalized and Hispanic voters differently. The effect for naturalized voters not born in Latin America is concentrated among those with a pre-period below-median household income. Naturalized voters born in Latin America and US-born Hispanics with a below-median household income do not see different responses. In contrast, the response of Hispanic voters, both naturalized and US-born, is stronger in areas were the predicted number of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients was higher, which could indicate an intention to distance themselves. National and ethnic distance do not mediate the response. These mechanisms support the hypotheses formulated by Jones et al. (2019): Hispanics, regardless of their immigration status or their specific country of origin, experience more discrimination if they are closer to the "canonical immigrant", which in our setting is an unauthorized Mexican migration.

This paper contributes to different literatures. It builds on existing studies on the political economy of migration Alesina and Tabellini (2024). In particular, it goes beyond identifying aggregate impacts and examines how different populations react politically to the arrival of newcomers. Similarly, by focusing on older, established migrants, we engage with studies on the redefinition of boundaries between in-group and out-group. (Fouka and Tabellini, 2022; Fouka et al., 2022).

We contribute to documenting and understanding the electoral behavior of minorities, like Hispanics, and especially migrants. Particularly relevant are studies examining the political evolution of Hispanics during the election in which Trump has participated (Fraga et al., 2025). In general, most of these papers use survey, rather than administrative evidence (Pérez and Cobian, 2024). To our knowledge, there are no studies that examine political behavior of naturalized voters at the person-level, tracking them over time. Current studies are correlational, based on survey data or backtrack political behavior of naturalized voters based on their residence (Antman and Duncan, 2024).

Finally, we contribute to the growing body of studies using the voter file. Among others, it has been used to analyze the relative importance of location vs personal characteristics

in turnout and party affiliation (Cantoni and Pons, 2022), the effect of voting laws on party registration and turnout (Cantoni and Pons, 2021), and the evolution of partisan segregation in the US (Brown et al., 2025). We are the first, to our knowledge, to identify foreign-born voters and track their behavior. Moreover, we are among the first to exploit within address information and reconstruct families to study political behavior. As others have pointed out and we confirm, party registration is predictive of local-level vote shares, providing a lower-bound estimate of electoral behavior. Therefore, the effects we document are an underestimation of rightward shifts.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the voter file and the construction of the demographic and partisan identity variables. We show that the demographic and partisan estimates from the voter file correlate with other official datasets. Section 3 presents the descriptive analysis documenting the increase in the Republican partisanship among naturalized migrants. Section 4 describes the migration instrument, estimating equation, and identifying assumptions. The main results and robustness checks are described in Section 5. Section 6 describes the mechanisms tested, distinguishing between economic and non-economic explanations affecting different populations. Section 7 concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Naturalized and Hispanic Americans

Federal elections in the US are administered by states rather than by a national institution. When citizens register or re-register to vote, state governments record key information about them, which is processed and released months after each electoral cycle. Several private companies or vendors then collect, systematize, and analyze this voter-level information from all state governments. The resulting aggregated dataset is known as the voter file. We use L2's voter file, which provides information for every general election year from 2014 through 2024. Some of the variables included come directly from state governments — for example, date of birth and address — while others are modeled or inferred by L2 for commercial purposes — such as income, ethnicity and marital status.

Only California, North Carolina, and Nebraska consistently record the place of birth for most registered voters. However, the quality and coverage of the variable vary substantially across states and over time. Between 2016 and 2024, roughly 89% of registered voters in California had non-missing place of birth information, compared with about 85% in North Carolina and 50% in Nebraska. Moreover, a sizable share of non-missing entries contain only generic categories rather than specific countries. For example, nearly 13% of non-missing records in California simply list "foreign-born". In North Carolina, all the voters with non-

missing information either contain the abbreviation of a US state (e.g. NC, CA, and NE) or OC — presumably denoting "overseas/out of the country." Among those who do report country of origin, a small share, around 0.5%, show contradictory information over time (e.g. listed as "US" in 2016 and "Mexico" in 2024). We classify as naturalized Americans those voters whose place of birth is a foreign country or "foreign-born" in California and Nebraska, or "OC" in North Carolina. Because L2 does not systematize place of birth information, we clean and harmonize the variable ourselves.

A voter's ethnicity is modeled based on their last name and area of residence. L2 includes 141 possible ethnicity values. Unlike place of birth, missingness is low with fewer than 0.5% lacking an ethnicity entry, though some are coded as "unknown". Although modeled, there is evidence that this variable correlates well with alternative ethnicity estimates commonly used in the literature (Fraga, 2018; Pew Research Center, 2018). It allows us to study ethnically distinct groups among both naturalized and US-born voters. We use the combination of ethnicity and nativity to classify voters in North Carolina. Because the state does not record specific foreign countries of birth, we rely on ethnicity to infer region of birth. For instance, we assume that naturalized Hispanic voters in North Carolina were born in Latin America.

We use L2's state-specific household identifiers to proxy second-generation Americans. The main challenge is that not every person who shares an address or lives in the same L2 household with a naturalized voter is necessarily related to them. To address this, we develop a set of rules to identify familial relationships using a combination of L2's marital status, age, and sex-at-birth variables, which have wide coverage. We classify as a naturalized voter's spouse or partner a household member whose marital status is "married" or "non-traditional," provided that the naturalized voter has the same status. When multiple household members meet these criteria, we pair those closest in age.[2] We classify as a naturalized voter's child any household member who shares the naturalized voter's last name (or the spouse's or likely partner's last name) and is at least 18 years younger.[3] Following the same logic, we identify grandchildren using a 50-year age gap. It is important to note that this classification yields a lower-bound of second generation migrant voters, since it omits children of naturalized voters who never resided with their parents during our period of study.

[2] "Non-traditional" relationships are defined as non-marital heterosexual two-person relationships, as L2 excludes same-sex and non-coupled partnerships. US-born voters living with naturalized voters in relationships that do not conform with this algorithm are classified as siblings or roommates. While imperfect, this rule only serves to identify second-generation Americans.

[3] A similar rule could identify parents, but this would be rare, since parents would generally be U.S.-born and children foreign-born.

Using the place of birth, ethnicity, and inferred familial relationships, we construct five groups. The baseline category consists of voters who were born in the US, have a modeled ethnicity of White, and do not share an address with a naturalized voter. We then divide all non-naturalized voters into those whose ethnicity is Hispanic and those whose ethnicity is not Hispanic ("Other"). These groups include US-born voters, voters who live with naturalized migrants in any capacity, and voters with missing place of birth. For simplicity, we refer to these categories as "US-born Hispanic" and "US-born Other." Finally, we group naturalized voters into those whose place of birth is in Latin American and the Caribbean and those whose place of birth is not in Latin American and the Caribbean ("Other").[4] For consistency, we refer to these two groups as "Naturalized Hispanic" and "Naturalized Other". As Table A2 indicates, the number of naturalized voters, as well as White and Hispanic voters, correlate strongly with estimates from other official sources.

To avoid capturing the effect of compositional changes in the electorate, we focus on consistent voters — those who appear in at least four of the five elections between 2016 and 2024. This restriction reduces our sample by roughly 10%, but it allows us to measure the evolution of partisanship within a stable set of voters.

Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for the main sample. The dataset includes 3.1 million naturalized voters, around 13.5% of the total sample. Together, naturalized voters represent on average nearly 4% of consistent registered voters in counties across California, Nebraska and North Carolina. One third of all naturalized voters are Hispanic. US-born White voters who do not live with a naturalized voter constitute 42% of the sample.

2.2 Party affiliation

Partisan affiliation is reported for all states except fifteen. Voters can update their party identification by re-registering to vote with their Secretary of State or when they change addresses, up until between 15 days and 25 days before an election, depending on the state. The raw variable in the voter file takes up to 70 values. We collapse this into Democrat, Republican and Independent/Other/Unknown[5]. On average, around 4% of voters change party affiliation between election cycles. During our study period, 11% of naturalized voters switched to or from Republican at least once — compared with 15% of US-born Whites, and 13% of Non-White US-born voters.

Shifts in party affiliation likely understate electoral changes. Updating one's party registrations signals a more durable political commitment. Party registration is strongly correlated with county-level electoral outcomes, both in levels and in changes. Table A3 presents

[4]For North Carolina, we classify foreign-born voters using ethnicity alone, separating Hispanic from non-Hispanic.

[5]Since 2018, among consistent voters, fewer than 0.3 percent register as "Unknown."

the correlation in changes and Table A4 in Appendix A.6 in levels. Specifically, Columns 5 (6) show that, between 2016 and 2024, each additional Republican registrant in a county is associated with 1.78 (1.47) additional Republican votes in House elections and 1.78 (3.09) additional Republican votes in Presidential elections among all registered voters (among those who voted). In other words, changes in party registration capture only about half of the corresponding electoral shift.

3 Descriptive analysis

Beyond journalistic and survey evidence, there are no systematic studies of the political behavior of naturalized voters in the United States. In this section, we describe how party registration has evolved for different groups of voters and explore if the patterns can be explained by geographic, socioeconomic, or demographic characteristics.

Figure 1 presents the evolution in the mean Republican registration for each group of voters in California, North Carolina and Nebraska. On average, naturalized Hispanics have consistently become more Republican. They were over 4 percentage points more likely to be Republicans in 2024, compared to 2016. The same pattern holds for Other Naturalized voters and US-born Hispanics in California. Other US-born voters saw only modest increases, and White US-born voters saw a decrease of 1.5 percentage points. As Appendix A.4 shows, the evolution of naturalized Hispanics and other naturalized voters is consistent in all three states, whereas there is some heterogeneity for the other groups.

The evolution of this aggregated behavior may be confounded by other variables. For example, Naturalized voters may disproportionately live in areas with higher unemployment where Republican candidates campaigned more intensely. Naturalized voters are on average younger, so the patterns observed could be driven by a general cohort effect. Therefore, we estimate the evolution of Republican registration at the individual-level with the following equation,

$$Republican_{icsgt} = \beta_{gt} + \alpha_g + \delta_t + \mathbf{X} + \epsilon_{icsgt} \tag{1}$$

where i is individual, c is county, s is state, g is a demographic group of voters, and t is year. $\mathbf{X}$ represents an increasing set of geographic, socioeconomic, and demographic controls included to test whether these variables account for the observed effect. The baseline model, equivalent to figure 1, does not include any control. The standard errors are clustered at the individual-level.

Table 1 presents the results of twelve different models. The point estimates correspond to each of the β coefficients; namely, the change in Republican registration for the corresponding




Figure 1: Evolution of partisan registration by group

group, relative to that group's value in 2016. We focus on the 2020 and 2024 elections. Table A6 in Appendix A.4 presents the results for the full sample. Columns 2 and 3, which control by state and county fixed effects respectively, explore if geographic sorting could explain the aggregated evolution. The trends are robust to these geographic controls: on average, even within the same county, naturalized voters and Hispanic voters have become more Republican. The one exception are US-born Hispanics in 2020, which saw a small decline in Republican registration, but geographic distribution does not seem to explain the change.

Columns 4-6 include county-level socioeconomic controls to identify if the evolution of partisanship could reflect a differential exposure to worse labor market conditions or higher crime. For our groups of interest, the pattern is robust to controlling for the unemployment rate (column 4), the log of employment in the sectors of trade, manufacturing, and education and health (column 5), the main sectors of employment of naturalized citizens in these states (Ruggles et al., 2025), and the rate of violent crime (column 6). The rightward shift of naturalized voters and Hispanic voters does not seem to be fully accounted by their socioeconomic environment.

Columns 7-9 include individual-level demographic controls, obtained from the voter file, to investigate if the differential evolution in partisanship reflects a different demographic composition between groups. The results are qualitatively stable if controlling, progressively

for age (column 7) and gender at birth (column 8). However, the coefficients tend to decrease. Moreover, modeled household income (column 9) seems to mediate the change for naturalized Hispanics in 2020. This is, there is suggestive evidence that the increase in Republican registration can be partially attributed to differences in observed demographic characteristics between groups, especially in 2020.

The models of columns 1-9 capture average changes in Republican registration for each of the different groups of voters —or average changes for groups within a county and gender when including fixed effects. They identify the evolution of the group. The model of column 10 captures average changes in individual voters' registration for different groups. Including person fixed effects allows us to explore if the personal evolution of partisanship differs between voters of different demographic groups. Except for US-born Hispanics in 2020, the pattern observed for groups is similar to the within-person change: the average naturalized and US-born Hispanic voter has increase their likelihood of being a registered Republican.

Column 11 controls for all the variables considered in columns 2-9, including the person fixed effects. For our groups of interest, the inclusion of all the fixed effects does not substantively change the coefficients. This indicates that the average within voter changes seem to be consistent within geographies, different socioeconomic contexts, and demographic changes. Finally, column 12 includes all the controls and restricts the sample only to consistent voters, to avoid compositional effects. The results are virtually unchanged, suggesting that the patterns are not driven by changes in the pool of voters, for example, newer generations, potentially more likely to switch to Republican.

4 Unauthorized Mexican migration and older immigrant's political behavior

4.1 Instrument

We explore whether changes in local migration inflows help explain the rise in Republican registration among naturalized Americans. We focus on Mexican migration. Despite an increase in inflows from Central and South America, Mexico remained the primary country of origin for recent migrants in all three states between 2016 and 2024. Based on estimates from the American Community Survey (Ruggles et al., 2025),[6] an average of 17% of migrants who had been in the United States for fewer than two years were Mexican — 17% in California and 15% in Nebraska and North Carolina.

We focus on migration *flows* rather than *stocks* for two reasons. First, although the

[6]We use the ACS 2016, 2018, 2021 (due to known issues with 2020), 2022, and 2024.

Table 1: Evolution of Republican registration by groups

	Republican registration											
Controls:	None	Geographic		Socioeconomic			Demographic			Person	All	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
						2020						
Naturalized												
Hispanic	0.008***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	0.011***	0.004***	0.001***	0.001***	-0.002***	0.009***	0.015***	0.015***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Other	0.015***	0.015***	0.013***	0.014***	0.020***	0.013***	0.011***	0.011***	0.007***	0.020***	0.026***	0.026***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
US-born												
Hispanic	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.005***	-0.011***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.011***	0.007***	0.013***	0.014***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Other	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.011***	-0.009***	-0.003***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.011***	-0.003***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
White	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.007***	-0.011***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.017***	0.004***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
						2024						
Naturalized												
Hispanic	0.042***	0.042***	0.041***	0.043***	0.066***	0.076***	0.028***	0.028***	0.024***	0.038***	0.043***	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Other	0.034***	0.034***	0.029***	0.034***	0.060***	0.073***	0.023***	0.023***	0.018***	0.043***	0.050***	0.051***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
US-born												
Hispanic	0.026***	0.025***	0.021***	0.026***	0.046***	0.056***	0.024***	0.023***	0.019***	0.042***	0.047***	0.048***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Other	0.005***	0.005***	0.001***	0.006***	0.030***	0.041***	0.007***	0.006***	0.001***	0.009***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
White	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.017***	-0.011***	0.007***	0.017***	-0.017***	-0.018***	-0.023***	0.011***	0.014***	0.013***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Obs.	142798414	142798414	142798411	142798414	142345595	142345595	142694927	142694927	139199197	136013521	131934040	102625617
R^2	0.04161	0.05550	0.09811	0.04161	0.05510	0.05838	0.05527	0.05779	0.05834	0.88525	0.88566	0.87433

*Column 1 does not include any control. Columns 2 and 3 include geographic fixed effects. Column 2 has state fixed effects, and column 3 county fixed effects. Columns 4-6 include county-level controls. Column 4 controls for the unemployment rate. Column 5 also controls for the log of annual employment in sectors of trade, manufacturing, and education and health. Column 6 progressively controls for the rate of violent crime. Columns 7 to 9 include individual-level demographic controls. Column 7 controls for voters' age. Column 8 also included gender at birth fixed effects. Column 9 includes modeled household income as a control as well. Column 10 controls for individual fixed effects. Column 11 uses all the controls in models 2 to 10. Column 12 includes all the controls and restricts the sample only to voters who appear at least 4 times in the 5 elections between 2026 and 2024. Sources: L2, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Local Area Unemployment Statistics and Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; Jacob Kaplan's Concatenated Files: Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest (Return A), 1960-2024. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.*

number of foreign-born residents in the US has increased since 2000, there has been no discrete migration shock during our study period. Migrants have arrived to counties across the country at a steady pace; what varies is the rate of such inflows. Second, relying on the evolution of migrant stocks would risk conflating new arrivals with the very population we aim to study — established migrants. While citizenship status distinguishes naturalized from non-naturalized individuals, it does not allow us to determine whether their co-resident family members are citizens as well, making stocks a less suitable measure for our purposes.

Migration inflows are correlated with political and economic conditions, which themselves affect political behavior. We therefore predict local inflows using migrant networks and exogenous shocks. Following the literature that uses the presence of immigrant enclaves to construct instruments for migration (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010) our instrument predicts inflows of unauthorized Mexican migration using the Mexican consular data, as in Tiburcio and Camarena (2023). The Mexican government issues identification cards to Mexican nationals through more than fifty consulates across the US. To obtain a card, individuals must schedule an appointment and present proof of Mexican origin and US residence. Although any Mexican national may apply, these cards are especially valuable for individuals who cannot otherwise easily obtain US-issued identification — primarily unauthorized migrants — yet require an ID for activities like opening a bank account (Mathema, 2015).[7]

We use the most disaggregated version of the dataset (2002-2020), which includes, among others, each cardholder's US county of residence, Mexican municipality of origin, and card renewal history. We construct a shift-share instrument by combining initial US county-Mexican municipality networks (shares) with predicted biennial waves of migrants by Mexican municipality (shifts). The shares are defined as the number of unique new cards issued in each county-municipality pair during 2002-2006. Following Sequeira et al. (2020), the shifts are estimated in a zero-stage regression (equation 2), that predicts new cards per Mexican municipality in each two-year period using a rich set of municipality time-varying variables, X_{mt}, including temperature, precipitation, population, homicides, and different causes of death.

$$PredictedMigrants_{mt} = \alpha_0 + \mathbf{X}_{mt} + \xi_{mt} \tag{2}$$

The instrument for county c, in state s and year t, given by equation 3, is constructed by interacting the US county-Mexican municipality shares with the biennial Mexican municipality predictions. We normalize this by adult county population on 2010. Importantly, since the consular data for 2021-24 is the aggregated new cards per Mexican municipality-year,

[7] Tiburcio and Camarena (2023) and Caballero et al. (2018) show that the estimates derived from the consular data correlate well with other estimates of the unauthorized Mexican population.

we cannot check for a first stage. However, as Tiburcio and Camarena (2023) show, the first stage for the 2007-2020 period with a similar instrument is strong.[8]

$$Z_{cst} = \frac{1}{P_{cst}} \sum_{o} Sh_{mcs,2002-06} \widehat{PredictedMigrants}_{mt} \tag{3}$$

The identification assumption behind a shift–share design in a panel setting such as ours is that changes in either the shares or the shifts must be orthogonal to changes in any unobserved factor that also affects changes in partisanship (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Borusyak et al., 2022). Even if the shocks generating emigration from Mexican municipalities are exogenous, the way these shocks are allocated across U.S. counties through migrant networks may not be random. Some counties systematically receive larger inflows — because they are closer to the border, larger, or have historical ties — and these same counties may experience different underlying changes in economic or social conditions that correlate with partisan evolution.[9]

To address this concern, we implement the re-centering correction proposed by Borusyak and Hull (2023). The idea is to simulate a series of counterfactual shock allocations, re-compute the instrument under each of these simulated assignments, and then subtract from the realized instrument the mean counterfactual instrument. This procedure removes the component of the instrument that arises from systematic exposure — which appears in all counterfactual simulations — and retains only the variation driven by the exogenous shifters.

Practically, we generate 1,000 counterfactual instruments by interacting the original county-level shares with shocks that are randomly reassigned across Mexican municipalities. Each simulation preserves the empirical distribution of municipality-level shocks but breaks their link to the original network structure. We then compute the average counterfactual instrument, μ, and subtract it from the realized instrument. The resulting "re-centered" instrument isolates the exogenous variation in immigrant inflows.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the un-centered instrument (Panel 1) and the re-centered instrument (Panel 2). We report these statistics both in levels (column 1) and in absolute changes (columns 2–4), and for the three temporal subsamples used in the remainder of the paper: the full 2016–2024 period (column 2); the three elections in which Trump was either in office or on the ballot (column 3); and the three elections in which Biden was either in office or competing (column 4).

Using the instrument described above, we examine whether naturalized and ethnically minority voters who are exposed to larger migration inflows become more likely to register as

[8]The coefficient for the first-stage regression is 1.338 and the corresponding F-statistic is 625.

[9]For example, border or large counties may be differentially exposed to the opioid epidemic, which is predictive of growing Republican support (Arteaga and Barone, 2025).

Table 2: Summary statistics of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration 2016-2024

	Levels	Changes (absolute)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2016-2024	2016-2024	2016-2020	2020-2024
Unaut Mex mig	0.424	0.028	0.032	0.023
	(0.228)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.023)
Unaut Mex mig (re-centered)	-0.818	0.096	0.144	0.049
	(0.543)	(0.092)	(0.102)	(0.044)
Unique counties	251	251	251	251
Observations	1255	1004	502	502

Estimates weighted by county population.

Republicans. Our analysis focuses on consistent voters whom we follow over time, accounting for individual-invariant characteristics. We further account for group-specific partisan trends within each state to ensure that identification does not rely on differential evolutions across demographic groups. Formally, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{igcst} = \alpha_i + \iota * age_{it} + \lambda_{gts} + \beta_g * (Z_{cst} - \mu_{cst}) + \epsilon_{igcst} \tag{4}$$

where i indexes registered voters, g indexes demographic groups (Naturalized Hispanic, Naturalized Other, US-born Hispanic, US-born Other, and US-born White), and c, s and t index counties, states, and years, respectively. Y is an indicator for Republican registration. We include an individual fixed effect α_i and control for age, which varies within-individual over time and may influence partisanship. λ_{gts} absorbs all group–state–year–specific shifts in partisanship, ensuring that identification comes from within-individual changes relative to their group's trend in that state-year. Our coefficients of interest are denoted by β_g, and capture the effect of (re-centered) migration inflows on Republican identity by migrant group.

4.2 Identifying assumptions

Our design exploits variation in partisan registration within individual voters, net of group–state trends. We further compare these within-voter changes among naturalized and ethnically minority Americans to those among US-born Whites. This structure implies two identifying assumptions. First, conditional on group-specific partisan trends in each state, naturalized and minority voters exposed to higher migration inflows would have experienced the same change in Republican registration as those exposed to lower inflows. Second, to identify the effect of migration on naturalized and minority voters over and above its effect on US-born Whites, we assume that the difference in partisan evolution between naturalized/minority

voters and US-born Whites — the baseline category — would have been similar in counties with higher versus lower migration inflows.

Our instrument uses time-varying Mexican–municipality variables to predict migrant outflows from Mexico, generating shifters that are exogenous to group-specific changes in Republican registration (Borusyak et al., 2022, 2025). Through re-centering, we address the fact that these exogenous shocks may not be randomly allocated across U.S. counties. This adjustment ensures that predicted unauthorized migration is orthogonal to county-level characteristics that might otherwise influence the evolution of partisanship. In addition, we present two further pieces of evidence supporting our identification assumptions. First, we show that current migration inflows are unrelated to past Republican registration across groups; there is no indication of (group-specific) pre-trends. Second, we demonstrate robustness to controlling for the predicted evolution of key county-level socioeconomic characteristics.

5 Results

5.1 Main results

Have inflows of newer migrants shifted established migrants rightward? Table 3 reports the results. Throughout the paper, each specification is presented in two columns: the first shows the total effect of migration inflows for each group, and the second, shown in italics, reports the differential effect relative to the baseline group, US-born Whites. Columns 1 and 2 pool all five federal elections between 2016 and 2024. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to the 2016-2020 elections, and columns 5 and 6 to the 2020-2024 elections. As noted earlier, we include 2020 in both sub-samples to allow each to cover three electoral cycles within a single presidential administration.

Columns 1 and 2 show that exposure to unauthorized Mexican migration increases Republican registration among US-born Hispanics. This holds for both the total effect for the group and the differential effect relative to US-born Whites. Although all other groups also respond to unauthorized migration with a stronger Republican shift than US-born Whites, there is no statistically significant total effect for any group other than US-born Hispanics.

These patterns mask important heterogeneity across presidential periods. During the 2016, 2018, and 2020 elections, unauthorized migration has no significant total effect on Republican registration for any group. However, relative to US-born Whites, voters with migrant backgrounds — both Hispanic and naturalized non-Hispanic — exhibit a stronger move toward Republican identification. This pattern shifts during the Biden presidency. In the 2020–2024 period, unauthorized Mexican migration increases the likelihood of Republican

registration for voters in every demographic group, and the differential effect relative to US-born Whites is larger for all of them. The groups most affected are naturalized Hispanics and US-born Hispanics.

Table 3: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration					
Period	All		2016-2020		2020-2024	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables						
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0052	*0.0137***	0.0020	*0.0095**	0.0128***	*0.0101****
	(0.0036)	*(0.0058)*	(0.0029)	*(0.0051)*	(0.0030)	*(0.0033)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0100	*0.0186***	0.0073	*0.0147***	0.0088*	*0.0061*
	(0.0067)	*(0.0082)*	(0.0054)	*(0.0069)*	(0.0050)	*(0.0055)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0080***	*0.0166****	0.0024	*0.0099***	0.0146***	*0.0118***
	(0.0028)	*(0.0049)*	(0.0022)	*(0.0045)*	(0.0045)	*(0.0048)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	-0.0028	*0.0057**	-0.0048	*0.0027*	0.0068***	*0.0041*
	(0.0031)	*(0.0034)*	(0.0031)	*(0.0031)*	(0.0028)	*(0.0034)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	-0.0085*		-0.0075		0.0027*	
	(0.0044)		(0.0046)		(0.0016)	
Unaut Mex mig		*-0.0085**		*-0.0075*		*0.0027**
		(0.0044)		*(0.0046)*		*(0.0016)*
Observations	105,127,652	*105,127,652*	62,581,487	*62,581,487*	64,403,101	*64,403,101*
R^2	0.87373	*0.87373*	0.92163	*0.92163*	0.93093	*0.93093*
Within R^2	2.77×10^{-5}	2.77×10^{-5}	1.96×10^{-5}	1.96×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

A 0.05–percentage-point increase in predicted Mexican inflows — the mean absolute change in the instrument during this period (Column 4 of Panel B, Table 2) — raises the probability of Republican registration by 0.06 percentage points (0.05×0.0128) for naturalized Hispanics, other naturalized voters, and US-born Hispanics. As in Table A5, these effects represent 7.4% of the average shift from Independent/Other or Democrat to Republican registration for naturalized Hispanics during 2020–2024, 6.1% for US-born Hispanics, 2.8% for other US-born and naturalized voters, and only 0.7% for US-born Whites.

One interpretation of these findings is that immigration played a more central role in Republican messaging and campaign strategy during the 2020–2024 period, producing a broader rightward shift across all groups. Yet in both political periods, voters with migrant backgrounds — and Hispanic voters in particular — respond more strongly to unauthorized migration than US-born Whites.

An increase in Republican registration, on its own, does not necessarily indicate a rightward shift. If Democratic registration also rose, the pattern could instead reflect ideological polarization or improved partisan sorting. However, Tables A7 and A8 show that inflows of unauthorized Mexican migration reduce the likelihood of registering as Democratic or as

Independent/Other. For naturalized Hispanics and US-born Hispanics, the decline in Democratic registration is statistically significant and very similar in magnitude to the increase in Republican registration.

5.2 Robustness checks

We provide evidence that naturalized and minority-background voters exposed to higher migration inflows were not on a different pre-existing trajectory than those exposed to lower inflows. Table A9 shows that current migration inflows do not predict past party registration. Because we lack pre-period data prior to 2014, we conduct this test within our main sample and include 2014 — excluded from the primary analysis due to data-quality issues. Specifically, we regress Republican registration in 2016–2020 on migration inflows in 2020–2024, and Republican registration in 2014–2018 on migration inflows in 2020–2024. Despite the short temporal distance between these periods, there is no statistical relationship between changes in migration inflows and earlier changes in Republican registration. Moreover, for our key populations, the coefficients are near zero or even negative, particularly with the six-year lag.

The re-centered instrument adjusts for the non-random exposure of counties to emigration shocks from Mexico. To further show that counties more exposed to these shocks were not on systematically different political or socioeconomic trajectories that could confound changes in partisanship, we allow counties to follow differential trends based on key covariates. Specifically, we interact year indicators with baseline Republican vote share, Hispanic population, foreign-born population, unemployment, poverty, and median household income. Table A10 shows that our results remain robust when accounting for these heterogeneous county trends.

We conduct several additional sensitivity tests. Our results remain unchanged when excluding the 0.5% observations with conflicting information on place of birth (Table A11), when using a more demanding set of fixed effects — county trends or county-group trends (Table A13) —, and when clustering the standard errors at the county-year, county-group-year or individual levels (Table A12). The estimated effects are also similar when analyzing each state separately (Table A14).

6 Mechanisms

Why would established migrants respond to unauthorized migration by shifting toward a conservative party with an explicitly anti-migrant platform? This section examines the mechanisms behind this response. We begin with the observation that the strongest Republican shift in response to Mexican inflows occurs among Hispanic voters — both naturalized

and US-born (Table 4). While much of the literature on the political effects of immigration finds stronger backlash against culturally distant migrants (Tabellini, 2020), the pattern is reversed among migrant-background voters. Similar dynamics appear in other contexts, such as reactions to co-ethnic migration in parts of Africa (Adida, 2014).

We consider two possible explanations for this result. First, cultural similarity may heighten economic competition — for example, through greater substitutability in skills or overlapping labor markets between unauthorized immigrants and naturalized or US-born Hispanics. Second, cultural similarity may increase established immigrants' incentives to distance themselves from new arrivals in order to protect their social standing.

6.1 Economic channels

We first examine whether the response of Hispanic voters is driven by concerns about the negative economic impact that unauthorized migration may have on their group. In a context of occupational specialization, unauthorized Mexican migrants may be less likely to compete with other immigrant groups but may affect labor markets — such as construction or certain services — in which Hispanics are overrepresented. Substitutability in skills may also generate competition, potentially exerting more downward pressure on Hispanic workers' incomes than on those of other groups (Hanson, 2009; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Clemens and Hunt, 2019).

To evaluate this mechanism empirically, we use household income information from L2. Like other voter-file vendors, L2 models household income, and there is evidence that these estimates correlate with true income and with administrative records (Pew Research Center, 2018).[10] We use this variable to test whether exposure to unauthorized migration differentially affects the evolution of household income across voter groups.

Table 4 shows no evidence of negative income effects. Although the estimates are imprecise, they are positive for all groups and differentially larger for the groups of primary interest. This suggests that migration itself does not lead to measurable declines—or increases—in household income. This finding aligns with the broader literature on the economic impacts of migration (Blau and Mackie, 2017; Clemens et al., 2018; Monras, 2020; Clemens, 2022).

As a further test, we classify voters by whether their 2018 household income — measured in the cycle prior to the period in which political effects are concentrated — falls above or below the state median. If partisan shifts were driven by economic pressures, we would expect stronger responses among lower-income voters, particularly naturalized and US-born Hispanics. Table 5 presents the results. For nearly all groups, the estimated effects are

[10] For example, according to U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), median household income in 2018 was $77{,}300 in California$, $61{,}400$ in Nebraska, and $57{,}200 in North Carolina. In our sample, the corresponding medians were 85,270, 73,000, and 68,000.$

Table 4: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on modeled (log) household income

Dependent Variable:	Household Income (log)	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*
Variables		
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0255	*0.0198*
	(0.0257)	*(0.0208)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0363	*0.0305***
	(0.0244)	*(0.0151)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0238	*0.0181*
	(0.0195)	*(0.0144)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0056	*-0.0001*
	(0.0220)	*(0.0116)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0057	
	(0.0149)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0057*
		(0.0149)
Observations	63,103,370	*63,103,370*
R^2	0.72875	*0.72875*
Within R^2	1.02×10^{-5}	1.02×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Household income is provided by L2. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

imprecise and statistically indistinguishable between below- and above-median households. The only exception is voters born abroad but outside Latin America: for this group, the Republican shift is concentrated among those below the median, though the magnitude matches the effect estimated for the group as a whole. The same pattern appears for the baseline group, US-born Whites. Moreover, only for these two groups are the below–above median differences themselves statistically significant.

Overall, though there is suggestive evidence linking the rightward shift among non-Hispanic naturalized voters to economic factors, we find no evidence that household income mediates the impact of unauthorized migration for Hispanics, either naturalized or US-born.

6.2 Social channels

A second set of explanations for the stronger backlash among Hispanic voters relates to social mechanisms. Hispanic voters may have incentives to distance themselves from culturally similar newcomers. If individuals prefer to identify with high-status social groups (Shayo, 2009), and if unauthorized migration has become increasingly politicized — accompanied by rising negative attitudes toward immigrants, as reflected in the Republican shift across all groups in the 2020–2024 period —then unauthorized migrants constitute a low-status group with whom established Hispanics may not wish to be conflated. Shifting toward the Republican Party and its more restrictive immigration platform may serve as a signal of this distancing.

Table 5: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by median 2018 household income

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration			
Effect	Total		Differential	
Household income in 2018:	Below median	Above median	*Below median*	*Above median*
Variables				
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0352	0.0026	*-0.0072*	*0.0034*
	(0.0267)	(0.0226)	*(0.0223)*	*(0.0158)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0809***	0.0089	*0.0384**	*0.0098*
	(0.0220)	(0.0249)	*(0.0216)*	*(0.0143)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0346	0.0110	*-0.0079*	*0.0118*
	(0.0215)	(0.0159)	*(0.0161)*	*(0.0102)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0269	-0.0002	*-0.0156*	*0.0006*
	(0.0214)	(0.0199)	*(0.0109)*	*(0.0114)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0425**	-0.0008		
	(0.0169)	(0.0162)		
Unauthorized Mex mig			*0.0425***	*-0.0008*
			(0.0169)	*(0.0162)*
Observations	25,244,780	37,858,590	*25,244,780*	*37,858,590*
R^2	0.67423	0.70670	*0.67423*	*0.70670*
Within R^2	4.44×10^{-5}	3.49×10^{-6}	4.44×10^{-5}	3.49×10^{-6}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 are the total effect. Columns 3 and 4 the differential effect. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Beyond a pure status-based mechanism, Jones et al. (2019) find that Spanish-speaking "canonical" immigrants are particularly likely to perceive discrimination. Distancing from an immigrant identity may therefore also be a protective response against such treatment (Fouka et al., 2022; Adida and Robinson, 2023), especially in a context of heightened politicization of immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment.

To provide suggestive evidence for these status and distancing-related channels, we examine the role of Temporary Protected Status (TPS). TPS expansion was one of the major developments in immigration policy during the 2020–2024 period. TPS grants migrants from selected countries who are already in the United States without regular status a temporary work authorization and permission to remain. Beneficiaries are nationals of countries facing humanitarian or environmental crises that make return unsafe. The number of TPS recipients increased from roughly 400,000 in 2020 to nearly 1.3 million in 2025, with about half of this growth driven by the surge in Venezuelan beneficiaries—the largest group.

Our hypothesis is that Hispanics living in areas where the presence of new Hispanic migrants — especially TPS recipients — is more salient may attempt to reduce the prominence of a migrant/Hispanic identity and distance themselves from these newcomers. Consequently, Hispanics in these areas may respond more strongly to the arrival of unauthorized Mexican migrants.

The Department of Homeland Security provides data on TPS recipients by state and

nationality, but not by state–nationality or county–nationality. We therefore predict TPS recipients at the country–county level using country–county networks from the 2006–2010 ACS five-year sample, under the assumption that the distribution of TPS recipients resembles the existing distribution of compatriots. Although we cannot evaluate the accuracy of our predictions at the county level, we can do so at the state level. On average, the initial shares overestimate TPS recipients in California (by a factor of 1.5) and underestimate them in Nebraska and North Carolina (by factors of 0.67 and 0.71). Accordingly, we reweight the shares by the relative over- or underestimation for each state. We then divide counties according to whether their predicted change in TPS recipients between 2020 and 2024 lies above or below the 75th percentile.[11]

Table A19 presents the results of this analysis. Inflows of unauthorized Mexican migration increase Republican registration among US-born and naturalized Hispanic voters living in counties with larger increases in TPS recipients. For both groups, the average effects are essentially concentrated in these more TPS-exposed counties. The same pattern emerges when dividing counties solely by changes in Venezuelan TPS recipients (Table A18). Moreover, although imprecisely estimated, the response of Venezuelan naturalized voters is directionally consistent with this pattern (Table A19).[12]

Table 6: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by predicted TPS

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration			
Effect	Total		Differential	
Household income in 2018:	Below p(75)	Above p(75)	*Below p(75)*	*Above p(75)*
Variables				
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0140***	0.0056	*0.0124****	*0.0053*
	(0.0039)	(0.0064)	*(0.0044)*	*(0.0070)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0091	0.0033	*0.0075*	*0.0030*
	(0.0072)	(0.0052)	*(0.0070)*	*(0.0044)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0176***	0.0012	*0.0160****	*0.0010*
	(0.0058)	(0.0049)	*(0.0058)*	*(0.0065)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0059	0.0023	*0.0043*	*0.0021*
	(0.0039)	(0.0051)	*(0.0042)*	*(0.0050)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0016	0.0002		
	(0.0025)	(0.0036)		
Unauthorized Mex mig			*0.0016*	*0.0002*
			(0.0025)	*(0.0036)*
Observations	39,963,097	23,670,770	*39,963,097*	*23,670,770*
R^2	0.92939	0.94015	*0.92939*	*0.94015*
Within R^2	2.61×10^{-5}	7.46×10^{-7}	2.61×10^{-5}	7.46×10^{-7}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 are the total effect. Columns 3 and 4 the differential effect. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

[11] We use the 75th percentile because the distribution of changes is highly skewed; using the median would produce samples of very different sizes.

[12] North Carolina is excluded from this analysis.

7 Conclusion

How do established migrants and their descendants respond politically to the arrival of newer migrants? We use voter-file data to study the evolution of party identification among naturalized voters and ethnically minority voters in California, Nebraska, and North Carolina—states in which place of birth is recorded—between 2016 and 2024. We focus on the effect of recent migration from Mexico, the primary country of origin for new arrivals. Leveraging the geographic granularity of the Mexican consular dataset, we predict biennial county-level inflows of unauthorized migrants using historic Mexican municipality–U.S. county networks (shares) and time-varying Mexican municipality push factors, including temperature, precipitation, population, homicides, and specific causes of death (shifters).

By following individuals over time, we estimate how unauthorized Mexican migration affects the likelihood of Republican registration across voter subgroups. We find that migration increased the probability of Republican registration among naturalized voters and U.S.-born Hispanic voters in the 2020–2024 elections. A mean change in our instrument raises this probability by 0.06 percentage points for naturalized Hispanics, 0.04 percentage points for other naturalized voters, and 0.07 percentage points for U.S.-born Hispanics—compared to 0.01 percentage points for U.S.-born Whites. In terms of magnitudes, these effects represent 7.5% of the shift toward Republican registration among naturalized Hispanics, 2.8% among other naturalized voters, and 6% among U.S.-born Hispanics during this period.

We then examine mechanisms underlying these heterogeneous responses. We find strongest effects among Hispanic voters, which cannot be explained by an economic competition channel: unauthorized Mexican migration does not lead in changes in household income and is not disproportionally concentrated among low-income individuals who may compete more with unauthorized arrivals. Instead, the evidence points to a social mechanism. The Republican response is particularly strong in areas experiencing larger increases in Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients. Our interpretation is that, because unauthorized Mexican migrant and Hispanic identities are intertwined, Hispanics in these areas may seek to distance themselves from newcomers.

This paper advances the literature by documenting the political effects of migration on distinct subpopulations. We provide the first evidence using administrative data on the electoral behavior of naturalized (older) migrants. We also offer the first large-scale analysis of how migration shapes the evolution of partisanship among naturalized migrants and other minority groups.

Finally, the impacts on party registration are likely a lower-bound estimate of the true rightward shift. In our setting, at the county level, each additional person switching regis-

tration to Republican corresponds to an average increase of 1.7 Republican votes.

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A Appendix

A.1 Summary statistics

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

	Naturalized Hispanic	Naturalized Other	US-born Hispanic	US-born Other	US-born White
Observations	5,535,502	9,574,326	16,921,752	28,267,782	44,870,159
Voters	1,157,468	2,001,998	3,639,370	6,475,025	9,699,169
Age	55.72	55.87	41.62	48.90	53.43
	(14.30)	(15.64)	(16.83)	(18.27)	(17.53)
Female	0.56	0.52	0.54	0.53	0.52
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Household income	84,611.50	122,830.20	86,879.94	101,818.81	106,846.28
	(51,138.25)	(66,290.37)	(52,587.56)	(63,799.77)	(63,067.25)

Standard deviations in parenthesis.

A.2 Additional Data validation

Table A2: Correlation between estimated number of registered voters and population estimates in CA, NC and NE (2016-24)

	Total	White	Hispanic	Other
A. Adult population (US Census estimates)				
Total registered voters	1.40*** (0.00)	1.73*** (0.01)	1.67*** (0.00)	0.91*** (0.00)
Observations	1255	1255	1255	1255
Dep. Var., Mean	2172086	762714	866537	542835
Ind. Var., Mean	113784	45589	25306	42888
B. Voting Age Population (ACS 5)				
Total registered voters	1.16*** (0.00)	1.66*** (0.01)	1.22*** (0.00)	0.80*** (0.00)
Observations	502	502	502	502
Dep. Var., Mean	1845199	715799	638711	490689
Ind. Var., Mean	114856	44754	26043	44059
C. Naturalized Citizens (ACS)				
Total registered voters	1.69*** (0.01)		1.65*** (0.01)	1.70*** (0.02)
Observations	281		281	281
Dep. Var., Mean	565534		228456	337078
Ind. Var., Mean	67417		24549	42868
C. Naturalized Citizens (ACS 5)				
Total registered voters	1.69*** (0.02)		1.65*** (0.01)	1.70*** (0.03)
Observations	112		112	112
Dep. Var., Mean	556591		224651	331940
Ind. Var., Mean	68051		24821	43230

Standard errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations weighted by total registered voters. Stars indicate *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01.

Table A3: Correlation between changes in party registration and changes electoral support at the county-level in CA, NC and NE (2016-24)

	Total votes		Democratic votes		Republican votes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. House elections					
Total registered voters	0.55*** (0.03)		0.12*** (0.04)		1.78*** (0.27)	
Total registered voters who voted		0.85*** (0.01)		1.03*** (0.01)		1.47*** (0.01)
Observations	1255	1255	1255	1255	1255	1255
	B. Presidential elections					
Total registered voters	0.56*** (0.05)		0.53*** (0.02)		1.78*** (0.37)	
Total registered voters voted		0.96*** (0.00)		1.20*** (0.00)		3.09*** (0.32)
Observations	753	753	753	753	753	753

Robust standard errors. Estimations weighted by total county registered voters. Stars *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01.

Table A4: Correlation between party registration electoral support at the county-level in CA, NC and NE (2016-24)

	Total votes		Democratic votes		Republican votes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. House elections					
Total registered voters	0.57***		0.74***		0.83***	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.03)	
Total registered voters who voted		0.93***		1.14***		1.21***
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Observations	1255	1255	1255	1255	1255	1255
	B. Presidential elections					
Total registered voters	0.69***		0.92***		1.05***	
	(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Total registered voters who voted		1.01***		1.26***		1.41***
		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.05)
Observations	753	753	753	753	753	753


Robust standard errors. Estimations weighted by total county registered voters. Stars *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01.


A.3 Changers to Republican registration by group

Table A5: Voters who changed to Republican

Group	Year	Total voters	Voters who switched	Share
Naturalized Hispanic	2016	1,046,248	-	
Naturalized Hispanic	2018	1,120,317	8,351	0.75%
Naturalized Hispanic	2020	1,144,171	13,872	1.21%
Naturalized Hispanic	2022	1,141,931	8,162	0.71%
Naturalized Hispanic	2024	1,082,835	8,305	0.77%
Naturalized Other	2016	1,790,194	-	
Naturalized Other	2018	1,926,484	25,959	1.35%
Naturalized Other	2020	1,979,668	36,665	1.85%
Naturalized Other	2022	1,977,285	29,288	1.48%
Naturalized Other	2024	1,900,695	28,702	1.51%
US-born Hispanic	2016	3,026,794	-	
US-born Hispanic	2018	3,461,158	36,912	1.07%
US-born Hispanic	2020	3,546,882	57,769	1.63%
US-born Hispanic	2022	3,529,897	37,763	1.07%
US-born Hispanic	2024	3,357,021	33,091	0.99%
US-born Other	2016	5,116,080	-	
US-born Other	2018	5,665,399	57,014	1.01%
US-born Other	2020	5,855,989	86,678	1.48%
US-born Other	2022	5,807,521	63,030	1.09%
US-born Other	2024	5,822,793	56,964	0.98%
US-born White	2016	8,532,351	-	
US-born White	2018	9,045,818	151,285	1.67%
US-born White	2020	9,343,571	201,511	2.16%
US-born White	2022	9,331,244	158,876	1.70%
US-born White	2024	8,617,175	122,935	1.43%

A.4 Evolution of partisan registration




Evolution of Democratic registration share
Percentage point change
share of registered Democratic voters
2
0
-2
-4
-6
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
Year
Naturalized Hispanic
Naturalized Other
US-born Hispanic
US-born Other
US-born White



Evolution of Independent/Other registration share
Percentage point change
share of registered Independent/Other voters
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
Year
Naturalized Hispanic
Naturalized Other
US-born Hispanic
US-born Other
US-born White

Table A6: Evolution of Republican registration by groups

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration											
Controls:	None	Geographic		Socioeconomic			Demographic			Person	All	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
2018 ×Naturalized Hispanic	-0.0071***	-0.0070***	-0.0072***	-0.0063***	0.0035***	0.0121***	-0.0109***	-0.0109***	-0.0121***	-0.0036***	-0.0044***	-0.0045***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
2018 ×Naturalized Other	-0.0135***	-0.0135***	-0.0141***	-0.0128***	-0.0032***	0.0040***	-0.0161***	-0.0161***	-0.0177***	-0.0069***	-0.0074***	-0.0077***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
2018 ×US-born Hispanic	-0.0162***	-0.0162***	-0.0170***	-0.0154***	-0.0058***	0.0025***	-0.0169***	-0.0170***	-0.0181***	-0.0064***	-0.0071***	-0.0071***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(8.91×10^{-5})	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
2018 ×US-born Other	-0.0143***	-0.0157***	-0.0156***	-0.0136***	-0.0031***	0.0036***	-0.0143***	-0.0143***	-0.0157***	-0.0087***	-0.0097***	-0.0102***
	(9.66×10^{-5})	(9.58×10^{-5})	(9.46×10^{-5})	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(9.59×10^{-5})	(9.58×10^{-5})	(0.0001)	(6.73×10^{-5})	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
2018 ×US-born White	-0.0147***	-0.0142***	-0.0146***	-0.0140***	-0.0052***	0.0012***	-0.0169***	-0.0170***	-0.0181***	-0.0062***	-0.0074***	-0.0075***
	(8.46×10^{-5})	(8.44×10^{-5})	(8.37×10^{-5})	(9.86×10^{-5})	(9.91×10^{-5})	(9.97×10^{-5})	(8.4×10^{-5})	(8.39×10^{-5})	(8.77×10^{-5})	(5.9×10^{-5})	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
2020 ×Naturalized Hispanic	0.0077***	0.0077***	0.0071***	0.0069***	0.0109***	0.0042***	0.0008***	0.0008***	-0.0019***	0.0087***	0.0145***	0.0149***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
2020 ×Naturalized Other	0.0151***	0.0152***	0.0131***	0.0143***	0.0198***	0.0125***	0.0111***	0.0111***	0.0066***	0.0197***	0.0259***	0.0263***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
2020 ×US-born Hispanic	-0.0072***	-0.0073***	-0.0095***	-0.0079***	-0.0048***	-0.0110***	-0.0071***	-0.0076***	-0.0105***	0.0074***	0.0130***	0.0137***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
2020 ×US-born Other	-0.0088***	-0.0098***	-0.0108***	-0.0094***	-0.0029***	-0.0056***	-0.0062***	-0.0066***	-0.0106***	-0.0029***	0.0012***	0.0014***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(9.19×10^{-5})	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
2020 ×US-born White	-0.0103***	-0.0103***	-0.0122***	-0.0107***	-0.0074***	-0.0112***	-0.0122***	-0.0124***	-0.0166***	0.0037***	0.0073***	0.0074***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(8.74×10^{-5})	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
2022 ×Naturalized Hispanic	0.0162***	0.0161***	0.0152***	0.0163***	0.0265***	0.0037***	0.0052***	0.0051***	0.0018***	0.0166***	0.0190***	0.0188***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
2022 ×Naturalized Other	0.0169***	0.0170***	0.0139***	0.0168***	0.0295***	0.0076***	0.0092***	0.0090***	0.0040***	0.0250***	0.0287***	0.0291***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
2022 ×US-born Hispanic	-0.0010***	-0.0012***	-0.0046***	-0.0009***	0.0072***	-0.0151***	-0.0024***	-0.0032***	-0.0065***	0.0171***	0.0192***	0.0189***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
2022 ×US-born Other	-0.0087***	-0.0097***	-0.0125***	-0.0085***	0.0033***	-0.0078***	-0.0065***	-0.0070***	-0.0120***	-0.0009***	0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
2022 ×US-born White	-0.0160***	-0.0171***	-0.0200***	-0.0157***	-0.0090***	-0.0192***	-0.0206***	-0.0208***	-0.0257***	0.0016***	0.0021***	0.0016***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
2024 ×Naturalized Hispanic	0.0424***	0.0423***	0.0408***	0.0430***	0.0662***	0.0763***	0.0277***	0.0275***	0.0241***	0.0380***	0.0435***	0.0439***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)
2024 ×Naturalized Other	0.0339***	0.0341***	0.0294***	0.0343***	0.0599***	0.0733***	0.0233***	0.0231***	0.0184***	0.0433***	0.0502***	0.0510***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)
2024 ×US-born Hispanic	0.0256***	0.0253***	0.0207***	0.0262***	0.0465***	0.0561***	0.0238***	0.0226***	0.0193***	0.0416***	0.0467***	0.0475***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)
2024 ×US-born Other	0.0052***	0.0053***	0.0009***	0.0058***	0.0299***	0.0409***	0.0067***	0.0058***	0.0010***	0.0090***	0.0125***	0.0121***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
2024 ×US-born White	-0.0121***	-0.0134***	-0.0171***	-0.0114***	0.0068***	0.0166***	-0.0174***	-0.0179***	-0.0231***	0.0106***	0.0136***	0.0131***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Observations	142,798,414	142,798,414	142,798,411	142,798,414	142,345,595	142,345,595	142,694,927	142,694,927	139,199,197	136,013,521	131,934,040	102,625,617
R^2	0.04161	0.05550	0.09811	0.04161	0.05510	0.05838	0.05527	0.05779	0.05834	0.88525	0.88566	0.87433

Column 1 does not include any control. Columns 2 and 3 include geographic fixed effects. Column 2 has state fixed effects, and column 3 county fixed effects. Columns 4-6 include county-level controls. Column 4 controls for the unemployment rate. Column 5 also controls for the log of annual employment in sectors of trade, manufacturing, and education and health. Column 6 progressively controls for the rate of violent crime. Columns 7 to 9 include individual-level demographic controls. Column 7 controls for voters' age. Column 8 also included gender at birth fixed effects. Column 9 includes modeled household income as a control as well. Column 10 controls for individual fixed effects. Column 11 uses all the controls in models 2 to 10. Column 12 includes all the controls and restricts the sample only to voters who appear at least 4 times in the 5 elections between 2026 and 2024.
Sources: L2, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Local Area Unemployment Statistics and Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; Jacob Kaplan's Concatenated Files: Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest (Return A), 1960-2024. Standard errors clustered at the individual-level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

A.5 Effects on Democratic and Independent/Other registration

Table A7: Effect of inflows of Mexican migration on Democratic registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration					
Period	All		2016-2020		2020-2024	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables						
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	-0.0169**	*-0.0210***	-0.0179**	*-0.0189***	-0.0093*	*-0.0078*
	(0.0074)	*(0.0080)*	(0.0079)	*(0.0086)*	(0.0052)	*(0.0078)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	-0.0122	*-0.0163*	-0.0124	*-0.0133*	-0.0030	*-0.0016*
	(0.0082)	*(0.0103)*	(0.0082)	*(0.0095)*	(0.0046)	*(0.0081)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	-0.0082*	*-0.0123***	-0.0050	*-0.0059*	-0.0111**	*-0.0097*
	(0.0046)	*(0.0060)*	(0.0046)	*(0.0058)*	(0.0048)	*(0.0085)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0034	*-0.0007*	0.0089	*0.0080*	-0.0060	*-0.0046*
	(0.0107)	*(0.0134)*	(0.0102)	*(0.0119)*	(0.0112)	*(0.0164)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0041		0.0009		-0.0015	
	(0.0053)		(0.0051)		(0.0057)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0041*		*0.0009*		*-0.0015*
		(0.0053)		*(0.0051)*		*(0.0057)*
Observations	105,127,652	*105,127,652*	62,581,487	*62,581,487*	64,403,101	*64,403,101*
R^2	0.85674	*0.85674*	0.90522	*0.90522*	0.92436	*0.92436*
Within R^2	2.06×10^{-5}	2.06×10^{-5}	2.44×10^{-5}	2.44×10^{-5}	1.06×10^{-5}	1.06×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A8: Effect of inflows of Mexican migration on Independent/Other registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration					
Period	All		2016-2020		2020-2024	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables						
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0117	*0.0073*	0.0159**	*0.0094*	-0.0035	*-0.0023*
	(0.0076)	*(0.0071)*	(0.0080)	*(0.0076)*	(0.0043)	*(0.0058)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0022	*-0.0022*	0.0051	*-0.0014*	-0.0058	*-0.0046*
	(0.0037)	*(0.0044)*	(0.0056)	*(0.0059)*	(0.0044)	*(0.0043)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0002	*-0.0043*	0.0026	*-0.0040*	-0.0034	*-0.0021*
	(0.0042)	*(0.0042)*	(0.0047)	*(0.0045)*	(0.0025)	*(0.0044)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	-0.0006	*-0.0050*	-0.0041	*-0.0107*	-0.0008	*0.0005*
	(0.0091)	*(0.0112)*	(0.0094)	*(0.0105)*	(0.0088)	*(0.0132)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0044		0.0065**		-0.0013	
	(0.0034)		(0.0033)		(0.0047)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0044*		*0.0065***		*-0.0013*
		(0.0034)		*(0.0033)*		*(0.0047)*
Observations	105,127,652	*105,127,652*	62,581,487	*62,581,487*	64,403,101	*64,403,101*
R^2	0.79900	*0.79900*	0.87008	*0.87008*	0.88635	*0.88635*
Within R^2	9.35×10^{-6}	9.35×10^{-6}	1.94×10^{-5}	1.94×10^{-5}	1.96×10^{-6}	1.96×10^{-6}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

A.6 Robustness checks

Table A9: Association between inflows of Mexican migration and past Republican registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration, lagged	
	4 year-lag	6 year-lag
Variables		
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0002	-0.0037
	(0.0025)	(0.0043)
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0038	-0.0044
	(0.0072)	(0.0039)
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	-0.0018	-0.0014
	(0.0021)	(0.0033)
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornOther	-0.0036	-0.0035*
	(0.0027)	(0.0020)
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornWhite	-0.0120***	-0.0072**
	(0.0042)	(0.0028)
Observations	60,722,921	51,163,815
R^2	0.92300	0.94509
Within R^2	2.13×10^{-5}	9.97×10^{-6}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A10: Effect of inflows of Mexican migration on Republican registration controlling for evolution of key covariates

Dependent Variable:	Republican Registration			
Model	Baseline		Differential pre-trend	
Effect	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0128***	*0.0101****	0.0092***	*0.0061***
	(0.0030)	*(0.0033)*	(0.0030)	*(0.0029)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0088*	*0.0061*	0.0054	*0.0023*
	(0.0050)	*(0.0055)*	(0.0040)	*(0.0050)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0146***	*0.0118***	0.0118***	*0.0087***
	(0.0045)	*(0.0048)*	(0.0029)	*(0.0039)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0068**	*0.0041*	0.0056**	*0.0026*
	(0.0028)	*(0.0034)*	(0.0024)	*(0.0032)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0027*		0.0030	
	(0.0016)		(0.0024)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0027**		*0.0030*
		(0.0016)		*(0.0024)*
Observations	64,403,101	*64,403,101*	64,403,101	*64,403,101*
R^2	0.93093	*0.93093*	0.93096	*0.93096*
Within R^2	2.28×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}	0.00041	*0.00041*

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4, additionally, control by the interaction of year dummies with 2005 county values of median household income, and number of people unemployed, in poverty, Hispanic, Black and White; as well as vote share for the Republican Party in 2006 and foreign born population in 2010. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A11: Effect of inflows of Mexican migration on Republican registration, excluding people with contradicting birth place

Dependent Variable:	Republican Registration			
Model	Baseline		Differential pre-trend	
Effect	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables				
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0128***	*0.0101****	0.0128***	*0.0101****
	(0.0030)	*(0.0033)*	(0.0030)	*(0.0033)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0088*	*0.0061*	0.0088*	*0.0062*
	(0.0050)	*(0.0055)*	(0.0050)	*(0.0055)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0146***	*0.0118***	0.0145***	*0.0118***
	(0.0045)	*(0.0048)*	(0.0045)	*(0.0048)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0068**	*0.0041*	0.0069**	*0.0043*
	(0.0028)	*(0.0034)*	(0.0028)	*(0.0034)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0027*		0.0027	
	(0.0016)		(0.0016)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0027**		*0.0027*
		(0.0016)		*(0.0016)*
Observations	64,403,101	*64,403,101*	63,919,917	*63,919,917*
R^2	0.93093	*0.93093*	0.93114	*0.93114*
Within R^2	2.28×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}	2.3×10^{-5}	2.3×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects.Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A12: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration clustering the standard errors at different levels

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration			
	Total			
Model:	(Baseline, county)	(County-year)	(County-year-group)	(Individual)
Variables				
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0128***	0.0128**	0.0128**	0.0128***
	(0.0030)	(0.0054)	(0.0053)	(0.0021)
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0088*	0.0088**	0.0088**	0.0088***
	(0.0050)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0016)
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0146***	0.0146**	0.0146**	0.0146***
	(0.0045)	(0.0060)	(0.0062)	(0.0009)
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0068**	0.0068***	0.0068***	0.0068***
	(0.0028)	(0.0020)	(0.0021)	(0.0007)
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0027*	0.0027	0.0027*	0.0027***
	(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0015)	(0.0006)
Observations	64,403,101	64,403,101	64,403,101	64,403,101
R^2	0.93093	0.93093	0.93093	0.93093
Within R^2	2.28×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}	2.28×10^{-5}

*Estimations control by individual, and election year-county-group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A13: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration with different fixed effects

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration Differential		
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
Unaut Mex mig	0.0027*		
	(0.0016)		
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0101***	0.0562***	0.0085***
	(0.0033)	(0.0077)	(0.0029)
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0061	0.0460***	0.0080
	(0.0055)	(0.0113)	(0.0057)
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0118**	0.0497***	0.0131***
	(0.0048)	(0.0073)	(0.0042)
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0041	0.0218***	0.0065*
	(0.0034)	(0.0026)	(0.0036)
Fixed-effects			
Election year-groups-state	Yes		
Individual id	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election year-county		Yes	Yes
Election year-groups			Yes
Observations	64,403,101	64,403,101	64,403,101
R^2	0.93093	0.93093	0.93098
Within R^2	2.28×10^{-5}	0.00035	1.15×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A14: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by state

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration					
Period	California		Nebraska		North Carolina	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables						
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0125***	*0.0095****	0.0571	*0.0776*	0.0441*	*0.0419*
	(0.0031)	*(0.0034)*	(0.0558)	*(0.0505)*	(0.0256)	*(0.0263)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0088*	*0.0058*	0.0140	*0.0345*	0.0130	*0.0109*
	(0.0051)	*(0.0057)*	(0.0296)	*(0.0344)*	(0.0125)	*(0.0131)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0143***	*0.0113***	0.0136	*0.0341****	0.0387***	*0.0365****
	(0.0046)	*(0.0049)*	(0.0167)	*(0.0121)*	(0.0084)	*(0.0087)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0059*	*0.0029*	0.0164**	*0.0369****	0.0168*	*0.0147*
	(0.0032)	*(0.0038)*	(0.0070)	*(0.0123)*	(0.0093)	*(0.0099)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0030*		-0.0205		0.0021	
	(0.0017)		(0.0126)		(0.0050)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0030**		*-0.0205*		*0.0021*
		(0.0017)		*(0.0126)*		*(0.0050)*
Observations	46,681,983	*46,681,983*	2,839,954	*2,839,954*	14,881,164	*14,881,164*
R^2	0.91989	*0.91989*	0.94810	*0.94810*	0.95297	*0.95297*
Within R^2	2.62×10^{-5}	2.62×10^{-5}	4.63×10^{-5}	4.63×10^{-5}	1.88×10^{-5}	1.88×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

A.7 Additional analysis

Table A15: Effect of inflows of unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*
Variables		
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0154^{***}	*0.0126^{***}*
	(0.0033)	*(0.0036)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedMexican	0.0111^{***}	*0.0083^{*}*
	(0.0039)	*(0.0043)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0088^{*}	*0.0060*
	(0.0051)	*(0.0056)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0143^{***}	*0.0115^{**}*
	(0.0046)	*(0.0049)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0062^{**}	*0.0034*
	(0.0030)	*(0.0037)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0028	
	(0.0017)	
Unaut Mex mig		*0.0028*
		(0.0017)
Observations	49,521,937	*49,521,937*
R^2	0.92342	*0.92342*
Within R^2	2.54×10^{-5}	2.54×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A16: Effect of inflows of predicted migration from the rest of the world on Republican registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration					
Period	All		2016-2020		2020-2024	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables						
Rest of the world recent × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0082***	*-0.0055****	0.0064**	*-0.0151**	0.0047***	*0.0019*
	(0.0018)	*(0.0020)*	(0.0029)	*(0.0082)*	(0.0014)	*(0.0013)*
Rest of the world recent × NaturalizedOther	0.0029	*-0.0108****	0.0102**	*-0.0112*	-0.0014	*-0.0042**
	(0.0037)	*(0.0032)*	(0.0047)	*(0.0092)*	(0.0027)	*(0.0022)*
Rest of the world recent × US-bornHispanic	0.0154***	*0.0017*	0.0081	*-0.0133***	0.0093***	*0.0065****
	(0.0026)	*(0.0018)*	(0.0051)	*(0.0065)*	(0.0018)	*(0.0015)*
Rest of the world recent × US-bornOther	0.0107***	*-0.0030*	0.0103*	*-0.0111**	0.0049***	*0.0021*
	(0.0013)	*(0.0021)*	(0.0056)	*(0.0057)*	(0.0012)	*(0.0013)*
Rest of the world recent × US-bornWhite	0.0137***		0.0214**		0.0028**	
	(0.0028)		(0.0106)		(0.0013)	
Rest of the world recent		*0.0137****		*0.0214***		*0.0028***
		(0.0028)		*(0.0106)*		*(0.0013)*
Fit statistics						
Observations	105,127,652	*105,127,652*	62,581,487	*62,581,487*	64,403,101	*64,403,101*
R^2	0.87375	*0.87375*	0.92163	*0.92163*	0.93093	*0.93093*
Within R^2	0.00018	*0.00018*	9.17×10^{-5}	9.17×10^{-5}	6.71×10^{-5}	6.71×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A17: Effect of inflows of unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration					
Period	All		2016-2020		2020-2024	
Effect:	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*	Total	*Differential*
Variables						
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0052	*0.0138***	0.0020	*0.0095**	0.0128***	*0.0100****
	(0.0036)	*(0.0058)*	(0.0029)	*(0.0051)*	(0.0030)	*(0.0033)*
Unaut Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0100	*0.0186***	0.0073	*0.0148***	0.0088*	*0.0061*
	(0.0067)	*(0.0082)*	(0.0054)	*(0.0069)*	(0.0050)	*(0.0055)*
Unaut Mex mig × SecondgenerationHispanic	0.0137***	*0.0223****	0.0047	*0.0123***	0.0213***	*0.0185****
	(0.0047)	*(0.0067)*	(0.0040)	*(0.0060)*	(0.0061)	*(0.0064)*
Unaut Mex mig × SecondgenerationOther	0.0010	*0.0096**	-0.0001	*0.0074*	0.0036	*0.0008*
	(0.0036)	*(0.0054)*	(0.0034)	*(0.0053)*	(0.0031)	*(0.0036)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0071***	*0.0157****	0.0020	*0.0096***	0.0134***	*0.0106***
	(0.0026)	*(0.0047)*	(0.0021)	*(0.0044)*	(0.0042)	*(0.0045)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornOther	-0.0033	*0.0053*	-0.0054	*0.0022*	0.0072**	*0.0044*
	(0.0031)	*(0.0033)*	(0.0033)	*(0.0030)*	(0.0028)	*(0.0034)*
Unaut Mex mig × US-bornWhite	-0.0086*		-0.0075		0.0028*	
	(0.0044)		(0.0046)		(0.0016)	
Unaut Mex mig		*-0.0086**		*-0.0075*		*0.0028**
		(0.0044)		*(0.0046)*		*(0.0016)*
Observations	105,127,652	*105,127,652*	62,581,487	*62,581,487*	64,403,101	*64,403,101*
R^2	0.87374	*0.87374*	0.92163	*0.92163*	0.93093	*0.93093*
Within R^2	2.85×10^{-5}	2.85×10^{-5}	2×10^{-5}	2×10^{-5}	2.35×10^{-5}	2.35×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

A.8 Heterogeneity by other TPS changes

Table A18: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by predicted (Venezuelan) TPS

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration			
Effect	Total		Differential	
Household income in 2018:	Below p(75)	Above p(75)	*Below p(75)*	*Above p(75)*
Variables				
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0041	0.0154**	*0.0015*	*0.0140***
	(0.0032)	(0.0061)	*(0.0040)*	*(0.0061)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	-0.0021	0.0070	*-0.0047*	*0.0060*
	(0.0037)	(0.0050)	*(0.0040)*	*(0.0051)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0032	0.0196***	*0.0006*	*0.0182****
	(0.0024)	(0.0065)	*(0.0030)*	*(0.0060)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0041	0.0069	*0.0015*	*0.0056*
	(0.0032)	(0.0044)	*(0.0036)*	*(0.0049)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0026	0.0010		
	(0.0021)	(0.0032)		
Unauthorized Mex mig			*0.0026*	*0.0015*
			(0.0021)	*(0.0031)*
Observations	24,936,504	38,728,865	*24,936,504*	*38,728,865*
R^2	0.94093	0.92613	*0.94093*	*0.92613*
Within R^2	2.31×10^{-6}	2.3×10^{-5}	2.31×10^{-6}	2.31×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 are the total effect. Columns 3 and 4 the differential effect. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A19: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by predicted (Venezuelan) TPS

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration			
Effect	Total		Differential	
Household income in 2018:	Below p(75)	Above p(75)	*Below p(75)*	*Above p(75)*
Variables				
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedHispanic	0.0035	0.0152**	*0.0010*	*0.0143***
	(0.0031)	(0.0056)	*(0.0041)*	*(0.0059)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	-0.0019	0.0099	*-0.0044*	*0.0089*
	(0.0038)	(0.0080)	*(0.0042)*	*(0.0086)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedVenezuela	-0.0052	0.0516	*-0.0077*	*0.0507*
	(0.0150)	(0.0324)	*(0.0155)*	*(0.0329)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0021	0.0196***	*-0.0004*	*0.0187****
	(0.0023)	(0.0066)	*(0.0029)*	*(0.0065)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornOther	0.0016	0.0065	*-0.0009*	*0.0056*
	(0.0025)	(0.0046)	*(0.0031)*	*(0.0053)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornWhite	0.0025	0.0009		
	(0.0022)	(0.0033)		
Unauthorized Mex mig			*0.0025*	*0.0009*
			(0.0022)	*(0.0033)*
Observations	15,387,789	33,599,089	*15,387,789*	*33,599,089*
R^2	0.93210	0.91988	*0.93210*	*0.91988*
Within R^2	1.36×10^{-6}	2.52×10^{-5}	1.37×10^{-6}	2.52×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 are the total effect. Columns 3 and 4 the differential effect. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table A20: Effect of inflows of predicted unauthorized Mexican migration on Republican registration, by predicted (Afghan) TPS

Dependent Variable:	Republican registration			
Effect	Total		Differential	
Household income in 2018:	Below p(75)	Above p(75)	*Below p(75)*	*Above p(75)*
Variables				
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedAfghan	-0.2043*	-0.0176	*-0.2039**	*-0.0215*
	(0.1183)	(0.0142)	*(0.1172)*	*(0.0141)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × NaturalizedOther	0.0094	0.0121**	*0.0098*	*0.0081*
	(0.0131)	(0.0045)	*(0.0112)*	*(0.0050)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornHispanic	0.0112	0.0174***	*0.0116*	*0.0134***
	(0.0101)	(0.0052)	*(0.0086)*	*(0.0055)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornOther	-0.0010	0.0068*	*-0.0006*	*0.0028*
	(0.0047)	(0.0034)	*(0.0021)*	*(0.0041)*
Unauthorized Mex mig × US-bornWhite	-0.0004	0.0040*		
	(0.0043)	(0.0020)		
Unauthorized Mex mig			*-0.0004*	*0.0040**
			(0.0043)	*(0.0020)*
Observations	4,442,919	44,872,770	*4,442,919*	*44,872,770*
R^2	0.93888	0.92061	*0.93888*	*0.92061*
Within R^2	6.72×10^{-6}	3.13×10^{-5}	6.72×10^{-6}	3.13×10^{-5}

*Standard-errors clustered at the county-level. Estimations control by individual, and election year by state by group fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 are the total effect. Columns 3 and 4 the differential effect. Stars indicate: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*