Strategic Peer Feedback

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Abstract

Peer feedback is widely used in organizations, particularly for complex tasks. How do strategic considerations affect the supply of feedback and its effectiveness? In a laboratory experiment (N=742), we compare independent and reciprocal reviewing of a complex and creative task in a competitive environment. Reciprocity reduces the quantity and quality of comments, consistent with strategic withholding of criticism to avoid retaliation. However, recipients often fail to recognize the usefulness of objectively valuable feedback and incorporate only about half of it. As a result, improvements in feedback quality translate only imperfectly into better performance. Our findings show that reciprocity concerns distort the supply of feedback, while limited uptake constrains performance gains.

Keywords: peer feedback, strategic communication, reciprocity, competition, organizational learning, experiment

JEL: D830, M54, D23, L23

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1. Introduction

Feedback plays a central role in organizations. When performance is multi-dimensional or difficult to observe, organizations rely on peer evaluations to aggregate dispersed information and guide decisions such as promotions, rewards, and task allocation. The importance of communication and information flows for organizational performance is well established (Garicano, 2000), and peer evaluation systems have become increasingly prevalent in modern workplaces, from formal 360-degree reviews to informal feedback platforms (Di Fiore and Souza, 2021). Yet, designing peer feedback regimes that generate useful information is challenging, since feedback is often strategic.

In many environments, evaluations not only inform decisions but also affect the evaluator's own outcomes, either directly through competition for rewards or indirectly through reciprocity in future interactions. This raises concerns about whether peer evaluations elicit honest and informative assessments. A growing literature shows that competition can distort peer feedback: when evaluations affect the allocation of scarce rewards, individuals may inflate their own performance or downgrade others (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010; Hussam, Rigol and Roth, 2022; Balietti, Goldstone and Helbing, 2016). At the same time, another strand of work shows that feedback may be shaped by reciprocity and retaliation concerns when evaluators anticipate future interactions or future evaluations by those they assess (Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels, 2013; Klapper, Piezunka and Dahlander, 2024).

These two strategic forces—competition and reciprocity—are typically studied in isolation. However, in practice, feedback regimes often combine both, for example, when identities are disclosed in the feedback process. This raises a central question: does introducing reciprocity concerns in competitive environments improve or distort feedback? They may reduce feedback quality by inducing reviewers to withhold valuable information, or improve it by limiting excessive downgrading. It is therefore unclear how feedback regimes should balance both forces, to ensure high quality feedback and best performance gains from it. Our paper provides experimental evidence on this question.

In a laboratory experiment, participants (N=742) complete two rounds of poster creation. After the first round, half of the participants ("A-players") provide feedback to the other half ("B-players"). B-players then revise their poster and subsequently provide feedback to an A-player, who then completes the second poster. In the first round, all participants compete in a tournament in which the top posters win a bonus. Top posters are those who receive the fewest remarks. Remarks are thus an inverse measure of a poster's initial quality, introducing scope for competitive strategic behavior in peer reviewing. In the second round, posters are graded on absolute performance, allowing us to measure whether feedback improves outcomes when participants have incentives to incorporate it.

Our key experimental manipulation randomizes the strategic relationship between reviewer and recipient. Under *independent* (perfect-stranger) feedback, A-players review B-players but are later not reviewed by them in return; matching follows a perfect-stranger design. Under *reciprocal* feedback, two participants review each other sequentially: A reviews B, and B reviews A. Whether reviews are independent is announced ex ante, allowing participants to form expectations about whether their feedback may be reciprocated. This manipulation isolates the role of reciprocity concerns in feedback provision, while keeping all other features—task, incentives, timing, and non-disclosure of identities—constant. As a result, we can measure how the presence or absence of reciprocal interaction causally affects feedback quality and learning from it.

This is an important empirical contribution since there is no consensus on which strategic forces—competition or reciprocity—dominate in shaping peer feedback quality. Human-resources experts (N=200), whom we surveyed, have highly heterogeneous priors: roughly half predict that reciprocal feedback is more effective for improving performance in our experiment, while a sizable share believes that independent feedback performs better, and only some expect negligible differences. Consistent with this, organizational practices vary extensively with respect to the key design lever that severs the link between

current and future peer evaluations: anonymity. Major firms such as Google[1] and Netflix[2] use distinct peer-review regimes, ranging from partially or fully anonymous to attributable and reciprocal formats.

We report four main findings. First, reciprocal feedback decreases both the quantity and quality of feedback. Relative to independent reviewing, reciprocity decreases the number of comments that participants (A-players) provide by 15.6% and also lowers the number of "valuable" comments by 12.6%.[3] These latter are actionable suggestions that would improve the recipient's performance if followed. The content of all the remarks a poster received was classified independently by research assistants blind to treatment and to the baseline performance of the recipient.[4] This pattern suggests that reciprocity concerns lead reviewers to withhold valuable information—not simply to avoid unnecessary negative comments but specifically to avoid providing feedback that could be perceived as critical and potentially provoke retaliation.

Second, participants incorporate only a fraction of the useful feedback they receive. On average, B-players implement 54% of the "valuable" comments, with implementation rates strikingly similar across treatments. We find no evidence that this limited uptake is driven by time constraints. Instead, participants' subjective perceptions of feedback quality appear to play a central role. Approximately one-third of subjects report that the feedback is, at best, only "somewhat" helpful, even when its objectively assessed content suggests it could improve their performance. Consistent with this, subjective feedback quality strongly correlates with implementation rates, while its correlation with objective quality is much weaker. This limited adoption mechanically attenuates the overall effect of the treatment on the number of comments incorporated.

Third, although the performance distribution shows substantial learning from the

[1]Trisca, L. (2025), Learn How to Run Employee Performance Reviews Like Google: Mission, Transparency, and Voice, *Deel Blog*, accessed February 17, 2026.

[2]McCord, P. (2024), How Netflix Reinvented HR, Harvard Business Review: 92(1).

[3]We estimate how feedback regimes change feedback using data from A-Players (first in sequence) and their impact on performance using data from B-Players (who only received peer feedback between drafts), as pre-registered.

[4]We denote with "remarks" the filled entry fields during peer review that influence the probability to win the tournament. Our outcome variables "comments" and "valuable comments" are based on what was actually written in the sum of all remarks. Thus, a remark can contain several (valuable) comments.

initial to the final poster, we find no detectable effect of feedback regime on final performance, despite the impacts on feedback provision. Performance on the final poster is statistically indistinguishable across treatments: the point estimate indicates that reciprocal feedback causes a 0.80% reduction in average performance relative to independent reviewing. The confidence interval rules out even relatively small negative or positive effects (more than 4% reduction or more than 2.5% improvement). This null effect is consistent with the limited implementation rate: even though independent feedback increases the availability of high-quality comments, recipients incorporate only part of it, limiting its ability to translate into measurable improvements in performance.

Finally, we find no evidence that the feedback regime affects cooperation. While participants in the independent group perceive the feedback they received as somewhat more aggressive and less friendly, their average contributions in a subsequent public goods game—a standard measure of cooperative behavior—are the same as in the reciprocity group. This suggests that the experience of fully anonymous, competitive peer review process with future interactions ruled out by design did not generate meaningful deterioration in willingness to cooperate, despite slight differences in perceived tone.

In isolating how feedback regimes can balance strategic forces, we complement a growing body of work showing that other elements of the peer review process—such as reviewers' characteristics (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015; Li, 2017) and the disclosure of their identities (Mickeler et al., 2025)—also affect feedback content. Our findings offer several novel insights for designing peer feedback regimes in organizations. Even in competitive environments, independent feedback that precludes the fear of retaliation does not induce outright sabotage and instead leads to more—and more useful—feedback, compared to interdependent feedback. Reciprocity concerns appear to meaningfully distort the supply of high-quality feedback: reviewers withhold valuable suggestions when feedback can be attributed to them and future interactions are expected. Moreover, the absence of treatment effects on cooperation suggests that organizations may be able to adopt fully anonymous and independent feedback regimes without undermining collegiality or team functioning.

Importantly, limited implementation of valuable feedback indicates that the demand side also plays a central role in shaping learning from feedback. Workers may overlook or discount the potential value of peer suggestions, thereby muting the performance effects of improved feedback quality. While prior debates have largely focused on the supply of feedback and the risks posed by competition and reciprocity, our results point to a complementary demand-side challenge: designing regimes that not only elicit high-quality feedback but also help individuals understand, trust, and incorporate peer input.

2. Experimental Design

2.1. Experimental Tasks and Incentives

Our experimental design was preregistered in the AEA registriy (#0007718). It centers on a novel real effort task: designing a recruitment poster for the decision science laboratory of a large university. It is a complex task and performance on it is measured on multiple criteria (see Table 1). A multidimensional real effort task is important to allow for meaningful peer reviewing and potential variation in it. Furthermore, we required a task on which performance can improve in response to feedback. This was confirmed in pre-tests, where feedback was given exogenously. We are interested in performance on this task and in the provision of feedback on it.

We conducted monitored online sessions with participants form the subject pool of the Decision Science Laboratory of ETH Zurich, mostly university students from the ETH Zurich or the University of Zurich.

At the beginning, all subjects create a first poster, with minimal guidance and a 15-minute time limit (Part 1).[5] See Figure B1 in the Online Appendix for an example poster. To discourage participants from seeking online tips for creating such posters, they are informed that a script records metadata on whether and how often they leave the experimental webpage.[6] Then, participants are randomly assigned to the *revise-first* or

[5]They use Quill, a free open-source WYSIWYG editor similar to Google Docs (click here for a demo, accessed May 13, 2025) integrated into our experimental software. This editor generates shareable HTML code for reviewers to view as a formatted poster on their screens.

[6]At the time of data collection in 2021 and 2022, software with conversational large-language-models

review-first group.

In Part 2, half of participants review the poster of a randomly assigned peer (review-first group) while the other half waits for their poster to be reviewed (revise-first group). Subsection 2.2 gives details on the feedback structure.

In Part 3, the revise-first group has 15 minutes to refine their posters using their first drafts and reviewer comments. These final posters serve as the primary outcomes for assessing how feedback influences future performance through learning.

In Part 4, the second reviewing stage takes place, which mirrors the first one except that now the revise-first group reviews the review-first group.

In the final part, all participants play a surprise standard linear public goods game with a perfect stranger. They can allocate any number of tokens from an endowment of 20 tokens to a group project with a marginal-per-capita-return of 0.75 (1 token=CHF 0.20). With this, we assess whether feedback types generate positive or negative spillovers on softer workplace-relevant behaviors, such as the willingness to cooperate with peers. After the game, review-first group members work on their final draft while the revise-first group answers a detailed survey.

Monetary Incentives All participants within a session compete for a bonus of CHF 30 (≈$30 at the time of data collection), awarded to the authors of the top 25% of *first* posters. Winners are those with the lowest number of remarks received during peer review.[7] Thus, number of remarks is presented as an inverse measure of poster quality. This introduces scope for sabotage through peer reviewing (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010).

In addition, participants are paid for their *final* poster's absolute score (0-160 points). This score is based on grading criteria developed with experts, that is, two lab managers with experience in recruiting new participants and one communications expert with experience in design and layouting. Half of the points are given for content and the other

such as chatGPT which could complete the task for a participant had not been widely adopted, yet.

[7]During the initial drafting phase, participants know their bonus depends on another's review but are not told about the later revision opportunity, to discourage seeking external design advice while waiting for feedback.

half for a poster's design and style (see Table 1 for the grading criteria). Depending on the total score, a final poster receives CHF 5, CHF 15, CHF 25 or CHF 35. Each poster was graded by 1-3 RAs in the weeks after a session.[8]

2.2. Feedback Structure

In Parts 2 and 4, reviewers are given 12 minutes to write their feedback. It consists of up to seven numbered entry fields for remarks on the quality of their peer's poster. The seven entry fields have a character limit of 200 each. Typing in an entry field increases the structural remarks count, based on which the competitive bonus will be allocated. While the reviewers are prompted to focus on specific points, the instructions refer to the neutral term "comment". This does not instruct participants to mention only positive or negative aspects. There are, in fact, no explicit restrictions on what reviewers can include other than writing in English and not sending personal information. For this reason, we base our analysis of the feedback on what was actually written across all entry fields — classified independently by three research assistants blind to the research question—and not the entry-field count. These diverge when a peer entered two comments in a single entry field, e.g. the suggestions to change the font size of the title and also to fix a typo in it. With detailed information on what was actually written across all entry fields, we can not only identify the actual number of comments but also the number of valuable ones, defined as those that would improve performance if they were implemented.

Before providing feedback, reviewers learn the exact content grading criteria on which posters will be graded. They also learn that that the poster's design and layout will be evaluated, too. This way, we create shared understanding among reviewers about desirable poster characteristics. This mirrors that in real world workplaces, peers typically understand what good and bad performance at work means when they are reviewing others. The review-first group learns these criteria when they provide feedback and such knowledge likely affects their final poster performance. Therefore, as per our pre-

[8]In the first wave of data collection ($\approx 1/3$ of the data), two RAs independently graded the posters, with a third resolving discrepancies. A poster's score is the average of these three independent evaluations. Subsequent waves relied on a single RA from wave 1, given the high inter-rater correlation in wave 1 ($r = 0.874$) and the time-intensive grading process.

registration, our analysis focuses on the final poster performance of revise-first group members and the feedback that they received (from the review-first group).

Reviewers face the following tradeoff when they give feedback: typing up a detailed review which raises many concerns can lower their peer's chance of winning the bonus for the best first posters. At the same time, this type of review can help to improve their peer's final poster performance and associated earnings. Our treatments test whether the strategic relationship between reviewer and recipient cause a systematic difference in how this tradeoff is resolved.

2.3. Feedback Treatments

Our experimental treatments induce exogenous variation in the strategic relationship between reviewer and recipient. We randomize matching groups of four participants into one of two treatments, stratifying by session. The treatments vary the probability (p) that a reviewer from the review-first group is later on reviewed by their feedback's receiver from the revise-first group. Otherwise, the two treatments are identical, for examples, identities are never revealed.

In the *independent* treatment ($p = 0$), the probability of repeated interaction is zero, as we implement a perfect-stranger matching protocol. In the *reciprocity* treatment ($p = 1$), the probability of repeated interaction is one as feedback is exchanged in pairs. The matching is common knowledge early on, that is, from Part 2 on, allowing participants to form expectations about whether their feedback may be reciprocated

Under the independent treatment, there are no reciprocal concerns when writing feedback. The first reviewer knows that their feedback cannot directly influence the feedback they will later receive, as they are evaluated by an independent third peer. This third peer also understands that they are reviewing someone who did not review them. Consequently, the first reviewer need not consider how their comments in Part 2 might affect the feedback they receive in Part 4. By contrast, in the reciprocity treatment, the second peer can condition their feedback on the one they got and both peers are aware of this. This can influence the first reviewers' feedback strategy.

With these treatments, we test whether the potential for reciprocity or retaliation in peer reviewing changes the content of feedback and, ultimately, its learning value compared to a completely anonymous review process which shuts down such considerations.

This design captures the fundamental conceptual tradeoffs underlying real-world feedback systems. In the independent condition, reviewers have no reason to expect retaliation but also no extrinsic incentive to be helpful, as their peer will not be the one providing feedback to them. Competitive motives in the tournament for the first poster may further encourage strategic or overly critical reviewing. Filling each entry field with a comment, or any text for that matter, regardless of poster quality, can increase the reviewer's own chance of winning the bonus at the expense of little mental effort.

In contrast, reciprocal reviewing introduces dynamic incentives: reviewers may strategically provide higher-quality feedback to elicit better feedback for their own second poster, but they may also withhold pointed or critical comments if they fear retaliation. Understanding which of these strategic forces dominates is an empirical question.

2.4. Procedures

The online experiment was implemented in oTree (Chen, Schonger and Wickens, 2016) and conducted in four waves between summer 2021 and fall 2022. Participants were recruited from the ETH Zurich Decision Science Laboratory subject pool for 20 monitored online sessions of 20–52 participants. Each 1.5-hour session was monitored via Zoom; participants used anonymous IDs with cameras off. The study was conducted in English. Initial instructions were read aloud to establish common knowledge, and detailed part-specific instructions appeared onscreen. Participants completed mandatory comprehension checks before Parts 1, 2, and 4 and could ask clarification questions via Zoom. Average earnings were CHF 44.92 CHF, including a CHF 10 show-up fee, paid by bank transfer after posters were graded.

Table 1: Grading Scheme for Posters

Content (0 or 8 points)	**Design & Style (0–10 points)**
1. Mentions the Decision Science Laboratory	11. Has a catchy title
2. Clarifies that recruitment is for academic or social science research	12. Attracts attention
3. Clarifies that participation is voluntary and non-obligatory	13. Nicely formatted (bold key points, bullet points, legible font size)
4. Leaves contact information	14. Easy to read from a distance
5. Provides info on how to sign up for the subject pool	15. Most important information is immediately visible
6. Mentions possibility to earn extra money	16. Not too wordy; appropriate amount of information
7. Gives an indication of expected payment	17. Content and presentation (fonts, colors) appropriate for university poster
8. Indicates target audience (students)	18. Correct grammar and punctuation
9. Indicates rough time commitment for a study	
10. Mentions participation requirements (e.g., skills, technical needs)	

Notes. This table presents the 18 criteria according to which each poster was graded by research assistants blind to the research question and design. These criteria were developed with experienced professionals (managers of university research labs and a communications expert). For each *content category*, posters either got 0 or 8 points when they contain the information. For each *design & style* category, the graders rated the extent to which the statement applies to the poster on a Likert scale from 0-"does not apply at all" to 10-"definitely applies". Thus, final performance can take values between 0 and 160 points.

3. Results

This section presents the experimental results in three parts. First, we examine how feedback type affects the quantity and quality of peer feedback, focusing on the number of comments and the subset of comments that are implementable and thus have the potential to improve performance. Second, we study how participants respond to feedback, analyzing the implementation of received comments and the resulting effects on final poster performance. Third, we assess whether feedback type influences the workplace environment, using both recipients' subjective perceptions of feedback (e.g., aggressiveness and friendliness) and behavior in a subsequent public goods game that captures willingness to cooperate with others.

3.1. Feedback Quantity and Quality

We begin by examining how feedback type affects the quantity and quality of peer feedback. For this, we rely on the content that the peer feedback contains as classified by

three research assistants blind to the research question. Specifically, the text entered into each entry field during the peer review was classified into 26 categories, with the possibility that several categories apply to it. Online Appendix Table B1 describes the categories and shows a statistic of inter-rater agreement, which is typically at least substantial. The first 18 categories correspond to the poster grading criteria (for example, category 5: text mentions that "no information on how to sign up is given"). The remaining eight categories are assessments like the text "makes an actionable recommendation or "gives positive feedback". The three ratings are combined by taking the median, such that, if the raters disagree on whether or not a category applies, the final value is 0 or 1 based on the majority vote.

Table 2 reports treatment effects on the number of comments in the peer feedback and on their informational content.

Feedback Quantity. Column 1 shows that reciprocal feedback significantly reduces the number of comments relative to independent feedback. The estimated coefficient implies that reviewers in the reciprocal treatment provide 0.88 fewer comments per poster than reviewers in the independent condition, with a 95-% confidence interval of [-1.28, -0.47]. This corresponds to a reduction of 15.6% relative to the independent mean. The outcome variable "number of comments" is the sum of all aspects of the grading criteria that the peer feedback mentioned and, if applicable, how often it was mentioned (for example, the feedback could point out several typos). It also contains all the (additional) comments that were classified as non-helpful for improving the final poster performance, as well as the (additional) positive remarks that were made on a poster.

Feedback Quality. A priori, the reduction in feedback under reciprocity admits two competing interpretations. On the one hand, independent feedback may induce an oversupply of comments driven by competitive motives. Because participants compete in a tournament based on the number of entries they received on the first poster, reviewers in the independent condition may strategically provide excessive or unhelpful comments in order to reduce others' chances of winning. On the other hand, reciprocity concerns may

discourage reviewers from providing feedback that is costly in relational terms—namely, comments that are critical but potentially valuable—out of concern that such feedback may trigger retaliation when roles are reversed later in the experiment.

To distinguish between these interpretations, we examine treatment effects on the number of *valuable* comments. Valuable comments are defined as suggestions that, if followed, would increase the recipient's score on the second-round poster. This classification combines the content of the comment with the recipient's baseline performance on the first poster. A comment is considered valuable if it identifies a potential improvement in any of the 18 dimensions (see Table 1) for which the recipient did not receive full points in the initial draft. If feedback mentions the same aspect multiple times, these repetitions do not increase the count of valuable comments.

Column 2 of Table 2 shows that reciprocal feedback significantly reduces the number of valuable comments relative to independent feedback. The estimated coefficient is -0.55, with a 95-% confidence interval of [-0.89, -0.20], corresponding to a reduction of approximately 12.6% relative to the independent mean. This decline is economically meaningful and statistically significant. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent with reciprocal feedback primarily reducing the invaluable comments, for example, the congratulatory or redundant statements that would not help to improve performance.

The reduction in valuable comments reflects decreases in both content-related and design-related suggestions. It is relevant to look at both dimensions separately because the content criteria are objective (e.g. whether or not information is in a poster) whereas the design criteria are more subjective (e.g. catchiness of the poster title). Moreover, while reviewers knew all the content criteria, they did not know the exact design criteria. Thus, from the reviewer's perspective, content-related suggestions are arguably safer to make and likely require less mental effort. In absolute terms, the decline is similar across the two categories (-0.32 for content and -0.31 for design). However, because design-related comments are less frequent on average, the proportional reduction is substantially larger for design than for content.

These results indicate that reciprocity concerns primarily operate by suppressing the

transmission of useful information. The reduction in overall feedback under reciprocity is driven not by a decline in low-value or strategic comments, but by a selective withdrawal of feedback that has the potential to improve performance. A plausible mechanism is fear of retaliation: reviewers anticipate that critical but informative feedback may be reciprocated when they themselves later receive feedback from the same peer. In contrast, when reciprocity concerns are removed in the independent condition, reviewers provide more feedback overall and, crucially, more feedback with genuine learning value.[9]

Table 2: Quantity and Quality of Peer Feedback Sent

	(1) Comments	(2) Valuable Comments	(3) Valuable Comments: Content	(4) Valuable Comments: Design
Reciprocity	-0.88***	-0.55***	-0.24	-0.31***
	(0.206)	(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.099)
	[-1.28, -0.47]	[-0.89, -0.20]	[-0.56, 0.09]	[-0.50, -0.12]
Control group mean	5.624	4.371	3.421	0.949
Observations	367	367	367	367

Notes. Revise-first participants (N=367). Table presents results from OLS regressions. *Comments* number of comments received in the peer feedback as independently classified by three RAs blind to the research question, *Valuable Comments* specific suggestion that can help the performance of the recipient given her performance on the first draft, *Valuable Comments Content/Design* specific suggestions that can help the performance of the recipient along the content/design dimension. Each regression controls for performance on the first poster and includes session fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses and 95-% CIs in square brackets.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

3.2. Feedback Implementation and Performance

We next examine how recipients respond to the feedback they receive and whether differences in feedback content translate into differences in performance. Table 3 reports treatment effects on three sets of outcomes: the rate at which valuable comments are incorporated into the final poster (Panel A), the number of implemented comments (Panel B), and final poster performance (Panel C). Throughout this section, we focus on outcomes for revise-first participants who only received their peer's feedback as new input

[9] As an additional check, we examine how the number of comments received relates to objective performance on the first poster. In a linear regression of number of comments on first-round performance (0-160 points), an indicator for the reciprocity treatment and their interaction, we find a significant negative correlation between the number of comments received and first-draft scores (coefficient: -0.028, robust SE: 0.008), showing that weaker initial posters attract more feedback. The interaction between first-draft performance and reciprocity is positive (coefficient: 0.007, robust SE: 0.012) but imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant. While only suggestive, this pattern is consistent with reciprocity concerns dampening the responsiveness of feedback to underlying performance.

before working on their final poster.

Comment Implementation. Panel A of Table 3 shows that participants incorporate only a fraction of the valuable comments they receive. Valuable comments are, by definition, implementable. In the independent group, the mean implementation rate is 0.566, indicating that slightly more than half of the valuable comments are reflected in the final poster. A likely explanation for this limited adoption is that many recipients do not perceive the feedback as particularly useful. Overall, 34% of participants report that the feedback they received was only "a little" or "somewhat" helpful, with no significant differences across treatments. Implementation rates are strongly correlated with this subjective assessment of feedback quality (Spearman $\rho = 0.42, p < 0.001$).[10] By contrast, subjective assessments are only weakly correlated with an objective measure of feedback quality, namely, the number of valuable comments received ($\rho = 0.19, p < 0.001$).[11] Taken together, these patterns suggest that perceived usefulness, rather than objective quality, plays a central role in determining whether feedback is implemented.

Another possible explanation for the low implementation rate is that participants may have lacked sufficient time to process and incorporate the feedback they received. However, two additional analyses suggest that time constraints are unlikely to account for this pattern. Panel A of Appendix Figure A1 examines whether valuable comments that appear further down on the screen—arguably more costly to process under time pressure—are less likely to be implemented; we find no evidence for a systematic decline in the likelihood that at least one valuable comment in an entry field is incorporated, as the entry field's position in the feedback list increases. Panel B of Appendix Figure A1 shows that the share of participants reporting that they would have liked more time to work on their poster does not increase with the number of valuable comments received. Together, these results indicate that limited implementation is unlikely to be driven by time constraints, reinforcing the interpretation that adoption is primarily shaped by recipients' perceptions of feedback usefulness rather than by mechanical limitations.

[10] Participants rated "To what extent was the review that you received helpful on a 4-point scale ranging from 1"little" to "very much".

[11] Online Appendix Figure B2 visualizes these patterns.

Importantly, this implementation rate is not significantly affected by feedback type. The estimated effect of reciprocal feedback on the overall implementation rate is -0.02, with a 95%-CI of [-0.09, 0.05]. The corresponding estimates for content-related and design-related comments are similarly small and statistically insignificant: -0.01 [-0.08, 0.07] for content and -0.07 [-0.21, 0.06] for design.

These results indicate that reciprocity concerns do not affect how selectively recipients adopt feedback, conditional on receiving it. Instead, recipients in both feedback regimes implement roughly the same share of the suggestions that are objectively classified as implementable. Panel B of Table 2 turns to treatment effects on the number of *implemented* comments. Because reciprocal feedback reduces the number of valuable comments received (see Section 3.1), the absence of differences in implementation rates mechanically implies fewer implemented comments under reciprocity. Consistent with this logic, reciprocal feedback reduces the number of implemented comments by 0.28 relative to independent feedback, with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.61, 0.06]. This effect corresponds to an 11 percent reduction relative to the independent mean of 2.49 and is just not statistically significant at conventional levels.

The decline in implemented comments is concentrated in design-related feedback. Reciprocal feedback reduces the number of implemented design comments by 0.22, with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.37, -0.07], relative to a control mean of 0.57. By contrast, the effect on implemented content-related comments is small and imprecisely estimated (-0.06 [-0.37, 0.25], control mean 1.92). These patterns mirror the results in Section 3.1, where reciprocity led to a proportionally larger reduction in design-related implementable comments.

Final poster performance. Panel C of Table 3 examines whether these differences in feedback provision and implementation translate into differences in performance on the final poster. Despite the reductions in both implementable and implemented comments under reciprocal feedback, we find no detectable effect on final poster performance. The estimated effect of reciprocity on total poster score is -0.74 points, with a 95%-CI percent of [-3.77, 2.29], relative to a independent mean of 92.64 points. The point estimate

Table 3: Implementation of Peer Feedback Received and Final Performance

Panel A			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Implementation Rate	Implementation Rate: Content	Implementation Rate: Design
Reciprocity	-0.02	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.067)
	[-0.09, 0.05]	[-0.08, 0.07]	[-0.21, 0.06]
Control group mean	0.566	0.567	0.596
Panel B			
	Implemented Comments	Implemented Comments: Content	Implemented Comments: Design
Reciprocity	-0.28	-0.06	-0.22***
	(0.171)	(0.158)	(0.076)
	[-0.61, 0.06]	[-0.37, 0.25]	[-0.37, -0.07]
Control group mean	2.489	1.921	0.567
Panel C			
	Final Poster: Total points	Final Poster: Content	Final Poster: Design
Reciprocity	-0.74	-0.93	0.19
	(1.541)	(1.347)	(0.729)
	[-3.77, 2.29]	[-3.58, 1.72]	[-1.25, 1.62]
Control group mean	92.64	56.95	35.69
Observations	367	367	367

Notes. Revise-first participants (N=367). Table presents results from OLS regressions. *Implementation Rate* ratio of implemented comments in the final draft to valuable (i.e. implementable) comments received in the peer feedback, *Implemented Comments* number of comments that the recipient implemented in the final poster, *Final Poster* Total points achieved on the final poster (0-160 points). Each regression controls for performance on the first poster and includes session fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses and 95-% CIs in square brackets.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

amounts to a 0.80% reduction in average performance and the confidence interval rules out even modest positive or negative effects, that is, a reduction by more than 4% or improvement by more than 2.5%.

The absence of significant performance effects is consistent across poster components: the objective content score and the more subjective design score. The effect on content scores is -0.93 [-3.58, 1.72], while the effect on design scores is 0.19 [-1.25, 1.62]; neither estimate is statistically significantly different from 0. Thus, although independent feedback increases the supply of valuable comments and the amount of implemented feedback, these differences do not translate into measurable improvements in final output.

Figure 1 complements these results by comparing the full distribution of poster scores across treatments. Panel A shows that both treatment groups experience substantial improvements from the first to the final draft, indicating meaningful scope for learning

over time.[12] At the same time, the distributions of final poster scores are very similar under independent and reciprocal feedback, with no visible differences across most of the distribution. Panel B shows a comparable pattern when separating final scores into content and design components: the distributions largely overlap across treatments, and neither component exhibits systematic shifts under one feedback regime relative to the other.

These findings highlight several implications for the design of peer-feedback systems in organizations. Reciprocity concerns meaningfully distort the supply of feedback in competitive environments: when feedback is attributable and future interactions are expected, reviewers withhold valuable suggestions for improvement. By contrast, independent feedback that precludes fears of retaliation leads to more—and more useful—feedback without inducing outright sabotage. At the same time, our findings on the limited implementation of feedback underscore the importance of the demand side of learning: recipients often overlook or discount potentially valuable peer input, muting the performance effects of improved feedback quality. These results show that feedback systems are highly responsive to incentives and that effective design requires not only eliciting high-quality feedback but also helping individuals interpret, trust, and incorporate it.

3.3. Workplace Environment: Feedback Perception and Cooperation


In the final part of our analysis, we examine whether feedback type affects the workplace environment, focusing on recipients' perceptions of the feedback they received and on their willingness to cooperate with others.

We begin by analyzing subjective perceptions of feedback tone, in addition to the usefulness perception discussed in the previous section. Panel A of Figure 2 reports the effect of reciprocal feedback on several perception measures, expressed in standard deviations of the independent group. Reciprocity significantly reduces the perceived aggressiveness


[12]This scope for learning is reinforced when comparing the average final poster performances of the revise-first group and the review-first groups. Recall that the latter learned the grading criteria between rounds, in addition to receiving peer feedback. Average performance of the review-first group is by 14 points (15%) higher (robust SE: 1.04; estimates from in a linear regression controlling for first-round performance and session fixed effects). Thus, it is implausible that the zero-result of feedback regime on second-round performance in the revise-first group is an artifact of a ceiling effect.

Figure 1: Poster Performance

(a) Poster Scores: First and Final Draft by Treatment



(b) Content, Design & Style Subscores: Final Draft by Treatment



Notes. Revise-first participants (N=367). Each poster was graded by 1-3 RAs on 18 grading criteria. Panel A: Total scores, which can range from 0 to 160 points. Panel B: For ten *content* categories, graders gave either 0 or 8 points depending on whether a poster contained specific information (0-80 points). For eight *design* & style categories, graders rated the extent to which a design or style statement applies to a poster on a Likert scale from 0-"does not apply at all" to 10-"definitely applies"(0-80 points).

of feedback: recipients in the reciprocity treatment rate the comments as less aggressive by approximately 0.4 standard deviations relative to the independent treatment. Reciprocity also increases the perceived friendliness of comments and appreciation of them, with effect sizes of roughly 0.2 standard deviations, although these latter estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels.


We next examine whether feedback type affects cooperative behavior. After completing the feedback and poster tasks, participants played a one-shot public goods game—how many tokens to contribute to a group project—with another participant whom they had not encountered earlier in the experiment. This design ensures that the public goods game captures potential spillover effects of the feedback experience on general cooperative behavior, rather than direct reciprocity or retaliation toward the feedback partner.

As shown in Panel B of Figure 2, average contributions to the group project are similar across treatments. Participants in the independent treatment contribute an average of 12 tokens out of 20 tokens, compared to 12.3 tokens in the reciprocity treatment. The difference is small and statistically insignificant. Overall contribution levels are relatively high for a one-shot public goods game, but they do not vary meaningfully with feedback regime.

These results suggest that while reciprocal feedback is perceived as friendlier and less aggressive, these differences do not translate into changes in cooperative behavior toward others. Thus, removing reciprocity in peer feedback does not appear to worsen the broader work environment, even though it leads to feedback that is perceived as harsher in tone. The absence of spillover effects on cooperation complements our earlier findings: independent feedback increases the quantity and quality of feedback without generating negative externalities in subsequent social interactions.


Figure 2: Feedback Perception and Cooperation

(a) Effect of Reciprocity on Feedback Perceptions



Notes. Revise-first participants (N=367). Dots show point estimates from regressions of the dependent variable (e.g. *spcecific*) on *reciprocity* treatment indicator when also controlling for session FEs. Whiskers show 95%-CIs based on heteroskedasticy-robust standard errors. Effect sizes in terms of standard deviations of the independent group. Outcomes 1)-4) were originally on a Likert scale: 1-"strongly disagree" to 7-"strongly agree". 1) *Specific*: "Overall, the comments I have received were specific." 2) *Aggressive*: "Overall, the comments I have received were written in an aggressive tone." 3) *Friendly*: "Overall, the comments I have received were written in a friendly tone." 4) *Appreciated*: "I appreciate the review that I have received." Outcome 5) *Helpful*, originally on Likert scale 1="a little", 2="some", 3="pretty much", 4="very much": "To what extent was the review that you received helpful for improving your second poster?"

(b) Cooperation Levels by Treatment



Notes. All participants (N=742). Average number of tokens contributed to the group project out of 20. Whiskers show 95%-CIs. Public Goods Game was played with someone not encountered before.

4. Conclusion

Peer feedback is increasingly used in organizations to allocate tasks, bonuses, and promotions. This instrumental role can influence the content of feedback, when evaluating peers act strategically. Competition may induce downward bias, while reciprocity—arising from expected future interactions—can either discipline excessive negativity or distort otherwise informative but critical feedback.

We study experimentally which force dominates by comparing an environment in which only competition can bias feedback to one in which both competition and reciprocity are present. We find that independent evaluations outperform reciprocal ones, generating more informative feedback with a higher learning value. This is notable given the low cost of strategic misreporting in our setting, suggesting limits to purely strategic behavior and potentially reflecting an aversion to lying (Dufwenberg, Görlitz and Gravert, 2025).

Our results point to a clear design implication: severing the link between current and future evaluation—e.g., through full anonymity—improves feedback quality. At the same time, we document that even high-quality feedback is often not implemented. Understanding how to increase the uptake of feedback remains an important direction for future research, as our study highlights that unbiased information alone is not sufficient to improve performance.

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
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A. Appendix A: Tables and Figures


Figure A1: Comment Implementation and Time

(a) Propensity to Implement at Least One Valuable Comment in Entry Field by Screen Position



Notes. *Revise-first* participants with N=1,411 entry fields with at least one valuable comment. Coefficient plot from linear regression predicting propensity to incorporate at least one valuable comment written in an entry field in the final poster based on entry field's screen position (1=top to 7=bottom) with one being the omitted category (mean propensity=0.64). Regression includes session fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the participant-level, whiskers show 95%-CIs.

(b) Number of Valuable Comments and Wanting more Time to Work on Poster




Notes. Share of *Revise-first* participants (N=367) who said that they would have liked more time to work on their poster as a function of how many valuable comments they received.


B. Online Appendix: Tables and Figures

Figure B1: Example Posters

(a) First Poster




(b) Final Poster




Notes. First and final poster from our study participant in the *Revise-first* group.

Figure B2: Subjective Feedback Quality, Implementation and Objective Quality

(a) Subjective Feedback Quality and Implementation



(b) Subjective and Objective Feedback Quality



Notes. Revise-first participants (N=367). Panel A: Bars show rates. *Implementation rate* is the ratio of implemented comments in the final draft to valuable (i.e. implementable) comments received in the peer feedback. *Perception of feedback* is a participants answer to the question "To what extent was the review that you received helpful for improving your second poster?". Panel B: Bars show mean values. *Number of valuable comments* are the specific suggestions a participant received that can improve her final poster performance, given her performance on the first draft. The content of the feedback was independently classified by three RAs blind to the research question and design.

Table B1: Classification of Feedback Content: Categories and Interrater Reliability

Category #	Category Label	Category Description	Krippendorff's α
1	No mention of DeSciL	The comment points out that the poster should mention/does not currently mention the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH.	0.6855
2	No mention of contact info	The comment points out that the poster should leave contact information, for example an e-Mail address or a QR-Code for the lab's website.	0.7886
3	No clarification of academic research	The comment points out that the poster should clarify that recruitment is for academic research or research in the social sciences.	0.8602
4	No clarification of voluntary nature or lack of obligation	The comment points out that the poster should clarify that participation is voluntary and that there is no obligation to sign up for studies.	0.9414
5	No sign-up info	The comment points out that the poster does not provide information on how to sign up to the subject pool.	0.8498
6	No mention of possibility to earn money	The comment points out that the poster should mention/does currently not mention the possibility to earn extra money.	0.7441
7	No indication of size of expected payment	The comment points out that the poster should give an indication of the size of the expected payment.	0.8694
8	No mention of target audience (students)	The comment points out that the poster should mention that the target audience are students.	0.9342
9	No estimate of study time	The comment points out that the poster should indicate a rough estimate of the time commitment for a study.	0.9571
10	No mention of requirements for participation	The comment points out that the poster should mention requirements for participation.	0.9424
11	No catchy title	The comment points out that the title of the poster is not catchy.	0.5123
12	Does not attract attention	The comment points out that the poster does not attract attention.	0.6168
13	Poster has design or formatting flaws	The comment makes recommendations on how to improve the design/formatting of the poster.	0.7644
14	Poster is not easily readable from a distance	The comment points out that readability from a distance can be improved.	0.5707
15	Most important info is not visible	The comment points out that the most important information is not immediately visible.	0.1148
16	Poster is too wordy	The comment points out that the poster has too much information/is too wordy.	0.7313
17	Poster is not appropriate for a university lab recruitment poster	The comment mentions that the poster is not well suited for university lab recruitment.	0.5494
18	Points out typos and grammatical mistakes	The comment points out typos and/or grammatical mistakes.	0.8182
19	Makes actionable recommendation	The comment makes an actionable recommendation.	0.5196
20	No info that is useful to improve performance	The comment provides no useful performance-improving information.	0.2942
21	Positive feedback	The comment provides positive feedback.	0.6492
22	Complete sentence(s)	The comment formulates complete sentence(s).	0.3475
23	Author of the poster is directly addressed (you) or mentioned (the author)	The comment directly addresses or mentions the author.	0.5882
24	Uses I-statement	The comment refers to the reviewer (e.g. "I think...").	0.6718
25	Clarifies that comment is based on known criteria or grading scheme	The comment references grading criteria/scheme.	0.5841
26	Comment points out the low quality of information (factually wrong or vague)	The comment points out low quality information.	0.4343

Notes. Table shows the 26 categories into which three research assistants independently classified the text that study participants entered in an entry field when writing their feedback. Categories 1-18 correspond to the poster grading criteria. Krippendorff's α is a measure of inter-rater agreement. An α of 1 indicates perfect agreement, and a value of 0 implies no more agreement than what would be expected by chance. Typically, values between 0.41–0.60 are interpreted as moderate agreement, values between 0.61-0.80 as substantial agreement and values above 0.81 as almost perfect agreement (see Landis and Koch, 1977).

C. Instructions

This Appendix reproduces the instructions as they were shown to participants.

- Review-first group ("A-Players"): p. 2-30
- Revise-first group ("B-Players"): p. 31-58

Review-first group

Acknowledgement of Informed Consent

You are taking part in a study designed by researchers at the University of Zurich and the Humboldt University of Berlin. The study is part of research aimed at better understanding how people make economic decisions. The following is intended to provide you with information on the procedures involved with the study in which you will participate today.

- You will work on a computer while making decisions that will be described to you before the study starts and over the course of the study.
- You will be paid for your participation. Your exact payment will depend on the choices that you and others make during the study. Your payment will be paid by bank transfer in the coming weeks. For this, the ETH Decision Science Laboratory will collect information on a bank account to which the payment should be transferred at the very end of today's study through a secure online form. The researches in charge of this study will not have access to this information. Your payment information will only be used to process your payment and no record of this information will be kept after it has been processed.
- There is no risk to you produced by participating in this study, beyond any risks you would encounter in performing activities on a computer in everyday life.
- Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation or your data at any time without any penalty. Withdrawing from the study may involve a loss of payment from the study.
- Your data will be kept completely confidential by not recording your name in combination with your data. All records will be identified only by a random ID number.

If you have any question regarding this study, do not hesitate to ask the experimenter who is in the Zoom meeting room. If questions arise at a later stage, please use the contact details below.

I confirm that I understand the above information and that I give my consent to participate in the study and allow the researchers to use the data obtained from my participation.

- ○ **Yes**
- ○ **No**

Contact: ETH Zurich, Decision Science Laboratory, descil@ethz.ch

Click the next button to continue.

Next

Zoom and Password

For this online study, it is required that you are in a quiet environment with a stable internet connection and a computer with an internet browser (no mobile devices).

For this online study, it is also required that you log into a Zoom meeting room.

If you have already joined the Zoom meeting room and were admitted from the waiting room...

....welcome! We will shortly begin with the study. The experimenter will share a password with you through a shared screen on Zoom.

Once you know the password, just enter it into the entry field at the bottom of this page and press next to continue.

If you have already joined the Zoom meeting room and were NOT admitted from the waiting room...

You have to name yourself with a specific anonymous ID in order to be admitted to the Zoom meeting. This anonymous ID is in the e-mail in which you found the link to this page. Leave the Zoom meeting now and name yourself with this anonymous ID when you sign into the Zoom meeting again.

When you named yourself correctly, an Experimenter will admit you to the Zoom room.

If you have not yet joined the Zoom meeting room...

Shortly before the start time of today's session, you have received an e-mail. In this e-mail, you found the link to this page. This e-mail also contains a second link to a Zoom meeting room and specifies an anonymous ID.

Look up that e-mail and sign yourself into the Zoom meeting room using the anonymous ID as your name. **Do not sign into the Zoom room using your full name.**

The experimenter will share a password with you through a shared screen on Zoom. Once you know the password, just enter it into the entry field at the bottom of this page and press next to continue.

Enter the password that was shared by the experimenter via Zoom in the entry field below:

Next

Welcome

This is a study on decision-making.

During the study you are not allowed to use electronic devices or to communicate with other participants. While you participate in this study, you are allowed to only use the programs and functions intended for the study. It is important that you remain in the Zoom room until the end of this study.

If you have a question, please write a message to the host (Experimenter 1) through Zoom chat. An experimenter will then invite you to a breakout room and answer your question privately. If the question is relevant for all participants, we will repeat it loudly and answer it. If you violate these rules, we must exclude you from the study and the payout.

Internet connection and Timers

If your internet connection were to break down during the study, you could pick up the study where you have left it by accessing the link again that you received by e-mail.

Most of the screens have timers on them. The timer is displayed in the upper right corner of your screen. When a timer is up, the program will automatically advance to the next page. **So it is important that you remain seated at your computer throughout the study in order to follow its progress attentively.** Primarily, we have the timers so that the study can continue, even if a participant was not able to reconnect due to a hardware failure.

Initial Instructions

These initial instructions summarize today's study. Throughout the study, you will have access to them for reference. These instructions will be displayed at the very bottom of your screen. Just scroll down if you want to look up information later on in the study.

These initial instructions are read aloud in order for all participants to have the same information. You may read along as you listen to the instructions. Once you have listened to this summary, the computer will guide you through some more instructions that will provide more details on the choices that you will make today.

Over the course of the study, you will repeatedly answer short quizzes on the instructions. This is to ensure that you understand the procedures described in them.

Next

Procedure of Today's Study Session

The study has 5 parts.

You will receive specific instructions for each part before you will make your choices for that part. The instructions on the screen will guide you through the task in each part. If you have a question, please write a message to the host (Experimenter 1) through Zoom chat.

Throughout the study, participants will never directly interact with each other. No personally identifying information about you will be shared with other participants in today's session.

In addition to a 10 CHF participation fee, you will be paid any additional money you accumulate during the study.

The exact amount you get, in addition to the participation fee, will be determined during the study and will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others. You will be paid via bank transfer in the coming weeks. This means that no other participant will see how much money you have earned.

Next

Overview of Part 1 of Today's Study

In Part 1 of today's study, you are asked to create a recruitment poster to recruit new study participants for the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH. The poster should inform people about the Decision Science Laboratory and the possibility to participate in social science studies, like the one you are participating in today. You should write your poster in English.

You will have 15 minutes to work on this task.

Review of Poster

In a later part of the study, you will review the poster of one of the other participants. Your poster will also be reviewed by one of the other participants in today' session.

Reviewers can make comments on the quality of a poster. The reviewers can list up to 7 such comments. Just before they write their comments, reviewers (including you) will find out about clear evaluation criteria on which the quality of a recruitment poster is assessed.

Bonus for Best Posters

There is a bonus paid to reward the best posters, that is, posters in the top 25% of all posters that were created in today's session.

The best posters are those that received the lowest number of comments on their quality from their reviewer. The authors of those posters will receive a bonus payment of 30 CHF. This bonus will be paid in addition to the participation fee. If there are ties, meaning that two or more posters received the same lowest number of comments, the computer will break them randomly.

Here is an **example** to illustrate the bonus payment: When 32 participants take part in a session, 8 participants will receive the bonus for the best posters. The bonus is paid to authors who received the lowest number of comments on the quality of their poster.

Next

First Control Questions and Password

Before we proceed with Part 1 of the study, you will answer a few control questions to check whether you understand the procedures described in these instructions. Once everyone has answered the control questions, we will proceed with Part 1 of the study.

The experimenter will now share a password with you. With this password, you can access the rest of the study.
Enter the password in the entry field below and click the next button to continue to the control question.

Enter the password that was shared by the experimenter via Zoom in the entry field below:

Next

Part 1 Control questions

Please answer the following questions.

What is the bonus (in CHF) that you can earn if your poster is among the best 25 percent of today's session (i.e. those that receive the lowest number of comments on their quality)?

A session of this study has 20 participants. How many participants will receive a bonus that rewards the best posters in this session?

Press the next button to submit your answers.

Next

Part 1: Poster

You are now asked to create a recruitment poster for the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH. You will work in the editor that you see below.

Before you start working, here are four important rules:

1. You have 15 minutes to work on your poster and a little bit of extra time to read these instructions carefully. A timer displays how much time you have left. When the time is up, the computer will automatically advance to the next screen.
2. You are expected to only use the below editor for the design of your poster. You are **not allowed to use any other programs or upload images** that you have on your computer or from other sources. If you want to use images that are displayed on the screen, you can just drag them into the editor.
3. Do not open any other program, browser window or browser tab. For example, you are not allowed to surf the web.
4. Do not switch from this page to a different application.

Note that a script collects meta-data on whether and if how frequently you abandon this page by switching to another window, browser tab or program on your computer.

If you would like to submit your poster before the 15 minutes are up, you can click the submit button to continue. You will not be able to return to this page.

Description of Task:

Create a recruitment poster for the Decision Science Laboratory of the ETH that could, in principle, be hung at the ETH and the UZH. The poster should inform people about the Decision Science Laboratory and the possibility to participate in social science studies, like the one you are taking part in today. It should motivate individuals to sign up to a pool of people who want to be informed by the Decision Science Laboratory when they recruit participants for future academic studies, without any obligation to actually participate.

A poster is typically designed for an A4 paper size. The default size of the editor that you see below corresponds to the size of an A4 paper.

Move your cursor to the top left corner of the editor—where the first line starts—to begin typing in it.

ETH_Logo UZH_Logo

Address Decision Science Laboratory:

Building IFW, Floor A, Room 25-29, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich

descil@ethz.ch

www.uast.uzh.ch (URL of the registration page)


Arial
14
Submit Poster

Instructions for Part 2

Everyone will review the poster of another participant at some point in time during today's study.

In Part 2, half of the participants (Group A) will review the poster of one of the other participants (Group B). At a later stage, the participants who are in Group B will review the poster of another participant from Group A. The computer randomly decides whether you are in Group A or Group B. While the timing of the reviews differs across groups, the reviewing task is exactly the same. Below is a description of this task.

- You will have 12 minutes to complete your review.
- Your review should have the following format: a numbered list of comments on the quality of the poster you are reviewing. You can write up to 7 comments.
- Your comments should focus on specific points that you can include in the numbered list. You have to enter each point that you want to comment on in a new entry field with a character limit of 200.
- Your comments will be used to determine whether the person you review qualifies for the bonus of 30 CHF for the best posters, that is, posters in the top 25 % of all posters that were created in today's session. The best posters are those that received the lowest number of comments from their reviewer. After today's session a research assistant will verify that each numbered item has indeed only one actual comment on the quality of a poster.

Except for the following restrictions, you can type whatever you want in your comments:

Restrictions on what you write

1. Please write in English.
2. Please do not send any personal information (for example, writing about your age or field of study).

On the next screen, you can see whether you were randomly assigned to write a review now in Part 2 or at a later stage.
Please click the next button to continue.

Next

These are the instructions for the reciprocity treatment.

Instructions for Part 2 (continued)

The computer randomly assigned you to write a review now.

Over the course of the study, each participant will review the poster of another participant and receive comments on the quality of his or her poster from another participant. At the beginning of today's study, the computer randomly matched the reviewers and posters to be reviewed. You can see the outcome of that matching on your screen. Please take a moment to look at it.

Outcome of the Reviewer Matching

Part 2 (now) and Part 3

A computer randomly assigned you to review the poster written by another participant now in **Part 2**. You can make a list of comments on the quality of that poster. Once the reviewing time is up, this participant will see your comments on his or her screen. In Part 2, nobody will review your work.

In **Part 3** of the study, the author of the poster that you are reviewing now will be asked again to create a second and final recruitment poster. In this part, you will answer a detailed survey.

Part 4 and Part 5

For **Part 4**, this participant was randomly assigned to then review your poster. This participant is the **same person** as the author of the poster that you are reviewing now in Part 2. This participant can make a list of comments on the quality of your poster. When reviewing your poster, s/he will be aware that you previously reviewed his/her poster. Once the reviewing time is up, you will see your reviewer's comments on your screen.

In **Part 5** of the study, you will be asked again to create a second and final recruitment poster.

Grading of the Final Poster

After today's study, a research assistant will assign one of four grades to this second and final poster that each participant will have submitted by the end of today's study.

The four grades are: satisfactory, good, very good or excellent.

To determine your grade, the research assistant assesses how your second and final poster complies with a set of clear evaluation criteria. The research assistant grades every poster independently of all the other posters. So all that matters for you grade is to what extent ***your*** final poster complies with the set of clear evaluation criteria.

The grade for the second and final poster will be converted to pay according to the following rates:

- Excellent, 35 CHF
- Very Good, 25 CHF
- Good, 15 CHF
- Satisfactory, 5 CHF

The research assistant will not know the identity of anyone and will not be able to connect your identity to any choices that are made today.

Bonus for the Best First Drafts and Pay for the Final Poster

The bonus payment for the best first drafts of the poster and the grading and pay for the second and final poster are in no way linked.

The bonus is paid to the authors who received the lowest number of comments from one of the other study participants on the quality of their first poster from Part 1.

The payment for the second and final poster depends on the grade that the research assistant assigns.

Some participants will work on their second and final poster in Part 3. You will will work on your second and final poster in Part 5.

You will next answer a few control questions to test whether you understand the procedures described in theses instructions.
Press the next button to continue.

Next

These are the instructions for the reciprocity treatment.

Part 2 Control Questions 1/2

Please indicate for each statement whether it is true or false.

Below, you see the instructions from the previous two screens in case you need to look up information.

Every participant will receive comments on the quality of his or her poster.

- True
- False

Only half of the participants will review the poster of another participant.

- True
- False

The number of comments that another participant makes on you poster determines whether you will qualify for the bonus of 30 CHF. This bonus rewards the authors who submitted the best first drafts of the posters in Part 1.

- True
- False

The author of the poster that you review won't read your comments before working on the second and final draft of the poster.

- True
- False

For the next two questions, please select one of the two answer options.

If you give a higher number of comments, will this increase or decrease the chance that the person you review will get the bonus for the best first drafts of the poster (from Part 1)?

- Increase
- Decrease

If you give a higher number of comments, do you think that this will increase or decrease the grade that the person you review can expect for his second and final draft of the poster (from Part 3)?

- Increase
- Decrease

Press the next button to submit your answers.

Next

Part 2 Control Questions 2/2

Please indicate for each statement whether it is true or false.

Below, you see the instructions from the previous two screens in case you need to look up information.

The author of the poster that you review in Part 2 is the same as the participant who will review your poster in Part 4.

- True
- False

The participant who will review your poster in Part 4 knows that you have reviewed his/her poster in Part 2.

- True
- False

Every participant's final draft of the poster will be graded for pay after today's session.

- True
- False

How much money will you get for your final draft of the poster, if it receives the grade 'very good' when it is graded for pay after today's session?

Press the next button to submit your answers.

Next

These are the instructions for the reciprocity treatment.

Part 2 Review

Everyone has answered all control questions correctly.

Below, at the bottom of the page, you see the poster written by another participant. This is the **same** participant who will review your poster in Part 4. When writing the comments on the quality of your poster in Part 4, the participant who reviews you work will know that s/he is reviewing the work of the **same** person who reviewed his/her poster.

You have 12 minutes to review the poster. If you haven't submitted your review by the end of the 12 minutes, it will be submitted automatically.

The participant who you review will read your comments on the quality of the poster after the 12 minutes for the review are up. This participant can use your comments when this participant works on the second and final draft of the poster in Part 3. This final poster will be graded for pay after today's session.

The grading scheme is fixed and consists of points given in different categories. Points are converted to pay at a fixed rate. As a reviewer, you now see some of these categories. This is to give you an idea about what a poster is graded on, as you review one and write comments on its quality. Each of the below sentences corresponds to one category:

Grading Scheme

- The poster mentions the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH.
- The poster leaves contact information.
- The poster clarifies that recruitment is for academic research in the social sciences.
- The poster clarifies that participation is voluntary and that there is no obligation to sign up for studies.
- The poster provides info on how to sign up to the subject pool.
- The poster mentions the possibility to earn extra money.
- The poster gives an indication of the size of the expected payment.
- The poster indicates that the target audience for registration in the subject pool are students from the ETH and the UZH.
- The poster indicates a rough estimate of the time commitment for a study.
- The poster mentions requirements for participation (skills, technical requirements for online studies).

The points that are given in these categories amount to 50% of the total points that a poster can obtain. The other 50% of points are given for how the content is presented, that is, for the layout and design.

Your comments can reduce the likelihood that the participant who you review obtains the bonus payment of 30 CHF for the best first drafts of the poster (drafts from Part 1).

The participant you are reviewing now will review you in Part 4.

Here is a reminder of the format that your review should have.

Format of the Review

- Your review should be a numbered list of comments on the quality of the poster (up to 7).
- Your comments should focus on specific points that you can include in the numbered list.
- You have to enter each point that you want to comment on in a new entry field. In each entry field, you can type up to 200 characters.
- Please write in English and do not send any personal information (for example, writing about your age or field of study).

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Poster for Review



Submit Review

Comments

Participants who received a review have 2 minutes now to read the comments that they have received. After the 2 minutes, the computer will automatically advance to Part 3.

Part 3 Survey

Participants who already had their work reviewed are now working on their final draft of the poster. This will take 15 minutes after which we will proceed with Part 4 of the study.

You are now asked to fill in a survey.

Once you submit your answers, you will be placed into a waiting room. You will leave this waiting rooom at the latest when the 15 minutes during which others create their final poster now are up.

You will create your final poster in Part 5 of today's study.

Please remain at your computer and attentive to the continuation of this study. Thank you for your patience!

Answer first a few demographic questions about you.

What is your gender?

- male
- female
- other

What is your age?

What is your highest level of education? :

- High School (e.g Matura, Abitur)
- Bachelor (or equivalent)
- Master (or equivalent)
- Vocational Training
- Other

In which city do you live?

In which country did you live growing up?

What is your occupation?

What are your typical monthly earnings?

Next, we would like to you answer a few questions about the choices that you have made in today's study up to now.

Think back to when you were reviewing the poster of another participant.

Would you have liked to have more time to create the poster?

- Yes
- No

How did you decide which points to include when you reviewed the poster of one of the other participants?

Do you think that the participant whom you reviewed would have like to receive more or less comments on the quality of his or her poster?

- More
- Less
- None of the above

What do you think the main effect of the review you wrote for the poster of another participant is?

In your opinion, what did the other participant think when s/he read your review?

Do you think the review you provided to the other participant will help her/him to improve the performance in the second poster?

- Yes
- No

Would you have liked to have more time when you reviewed the poster of another participant?

- Yes
- No

Do you think that the poster that you reviewed in Part 2 will influence your second and final poster?

Lastly, we would like you to answer a few questions about yourself. There are no right or wrong answers. Please read through the questions carefully and consider which answer is right for you.

How competitive do you consider yourself to be?

Please choose a value on the scale below, where the value 0 means "not competitive at all" and the value 10 means "very competitive".

0-not competitive at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-very competitive

In general, how willing are you to take risks?

Please choses a value on the scale below, where the value 0 means you are “completely unwilling to take risks” and 10 means you are “very willing to take risks”.

0-completely unwilling to take risks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10-very willing to take risks

Click the next button to continue to submit your answers.

Next

Part 4 Review

Now in Part 4, another participant is reviewing your poster. S/he has 12 minutes to complete this task.


The person reviewing your poster now is the **same** participant whose poster you reviewed in part 2. S/he knows that s/he is reviewing the work of the **same** person who reviewed his/her poster.

You will see the comments when your reviewer has completed the task or right after the 12 minutes for the review are up. If you want, you can then use the comments when you work on your second and final draft of the poster in Part 5.

You can take a short break now and play the game "2048". Please remain seated and at your computer since the study will continue for you soon. The computer will automatically advance to the next screen.

Here is a brief description of the 2048 tile game:

You can move the tiles with the arrow keys on your keyboard. When you start the game, there will be two "tiles" on the grid, each displaying the number 2 or 4. You hit the arrow keys on your keyboard to move the tiles around — and also to generate new tiles, which will also be valued at 2 or 4. When two equal tiles collide, they combine to give you one greater tile that displays their sum. The objective is to reach 2048 before the board fills up. The best way to understand how to play the 2048 game is to try it out. Please click somewhere in the window displaying the game to select it as your active window. Then you can move the tiles with the arrow keys on your keyboard.



Comments

Below, you see the comments on the quality of your poster. The reviewer knew that you would create a final poster in Part 5 at the time that s/he was reviewing your first draft.

You have 2 minutes to look at the comments. When the time is up, the computer will automatically advance to Part 5. You can also press next to proceed.

If you just see a number followed by the word "None" it means that your reviewer has left an entry field empty and hast not entered a comment in it.

1. None
2. None
3. None
4. None
5. None
6. None
7. None

Next

Part 5: Contribution Decision

Before we proceed with Part 5 of today's study, you are asked to make a decision.

For this decision, you were randomly matched with another participant in today's study. This participant is labeled "your match" in the following instructions.

You have **not** previously interacted with your match. You have **not** written a review for your match. Your match has **not** written a review for you.

You and your match each received 20 tokens for this decision. You must decide how many tokens to contribute to a joint group project between you and your match and how many tokens to keep for yourself. You can contribute any number between 0 and 20 tokens and keep any remaining tokens for yourself.

At the very end of today's study you will see the total amount of tokens contributed to the group project. You will also see how many CHF you have earned from this decision. 1 token is paid out as 20 Rappen.

Income

Your income from this decision consists of the number of tokens you kept for yourself plus 0.75 the number of tokens contributed to the group project. That is:

(20 - your contribution to the project) + 0.75 x (total contributions to the project) tokens

This is because the project produces 1.5 tokens for each token contributed, and you and your match receive the same return from the group project (1.5/2 = 0.75). Your contribution to the group project therefore also raises the income of your match. On the other hand, you earn an income for each token that your match contributed to the group project.

Here are two examples.

> Example 1. If the sum of the two contribution to the group project is 32 tokens, then you and your match each receive 32 × 0.75 = 24 tokens or 4.80 CHF from the group project. Plus, each group member receives the amount s/he kept for him- or herself.
>
> Example 2. If the sum of the two contributions to the group project is 6 tokens, you and your match each receive an income of 6 x 0.75 = 4.5 tokens or 0.90 CHF from the group project. Plus, each group member receives the amount s/he kept for him- or herself

For each token that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 token or 20 Rappen. For each token contributed to the group project, your income from the project rises by 1 x 0.75=0.75 tokens or 15 Rappen. The income of the other group members also rises by 0.75 tokens or 15 Rappen, since the project produces 1.5 tokens for each token that is contributed.

Contribution

Number of tokens to contribute to the group project (enter any number from 0 to 20):

After entering your contribution to the group project, please press the next button to proceed.

Once you have done this your decision can no longer be revised.

Next

Part 5: Final Draft of Poster

Now in the final Part 5, you are asked again to create a recruitment poster to recruit new study participants for the Decisions Science Laboratory at the ETH. Below, the first draft of your recruitment poster is reproduced. You can build on this if you want. You can also design a completely new poster, if you want, and delete the content that is displayed below.

In the next few days, a research assistant will assign a grade to this final poster. The grade will be converted to pay according to the following rates:

- Excellent, 35 CHF
- Very good, 25 CHF
- Good, 15 CHF
- Satisfactory, 5 CHF

You will work in the editor that you see below.

Here is a reminder of four important rules:

1. You have 15 minutes to work on your poster and a little bit of extra time to read these instructions carefully. A timer displays how much time you have left. When the time is up, the computer will automatically advance to the next screen.
2. You are expected to only use the below editor for the design of your poster. You are **not allowed to use any other programs or upload images** that you have on your computer or from other sources. If you want to use images that are displayed on the screen, you can just drag them into the editor.
3. Do not open any other program, browser window or browser tab. For example, you are not allowed to surf the web.
4. Do not switch from this page to a different application.

Note that a script collects meta-data on whether and if how frequently you abandon this page by switching to another window, browser tab or program on your computer.

If you would like to submit your poster before the 15 minutes are up, you can click the submit button to continue. You will not be able to return to this page.

Description of Task:

As a reminder, your task is to create a recruitment poster for the Decision Science Laboratory of the ETH that could, in principle, be hung at the ETH and the UZH. The poster should inform people about the Decision Science Laboratory and the possibility to participate in social science studies, like the one you are taking part in today. It should motivate individuals to sign up to a pool of people who want to be informed by the Decision Science Laboratory when they recruit participants for future academic studies, without any obligation to actually participate.

A poster is typically designed for an A4 paper size. The default size of the editor that you see below corresponds to the size of an A4 paper.

Comments on Your First Draft:

1. None

2. None

3. None

4. None

5. None

6. None

7. None

ETH_Logo UZH_Logo

Address Decision Science Laboratory:

Building IFW, Floor A, Room 25-29, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich

descil@ethz.ch

www.uast.uzh.ch (URL of the registration page)

Arial 14



Submit Poster

Part 5 Survey

In this final survey, you are asked to answer a few last questions on your decision and the decision of others in today's study. By doing so, you have the chance to increase your earnings from today's study. Once you have submitted your answers, you have reached the end of today's study.

First, please answer a few questions about the posters that you have created and the review that you have received.

Do you think that you have improved your performance between the first and the second poster?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

How many comments did you end up incorporating in the draft of your final poster?

○ 0 ○ 1 ○ 2 ○ 3 ○ 4 ○ 5 ○ 6 ○ 7

To what extent was the review that you have received helpful for improving your second poster?

○ a little ○ some ○ pretty much ○ very much

How likely, do you think, is it that you are going to get the bonus for your first draft of the poster?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0- "It is impossible that I will get the bonus" to 10- "It is sure that I will get the bonus":

○ 0-impossible ○ 1 ○ 2 ○ 3 ○ 4 ○ 5 ○ 6 ○ 7 ○ 8 ○ 9 ○ 10-sure

Did your chance of winning the bonus affect your motivation when you worked on your second draft of the poster?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Cannot tell

If you answered the previous question with yes, please just very briefly descibe how your motivation was affected.

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements on a scale from 1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree.

	strongly disagree	disagree	somewhat disagree	neither agree nor disagree	somewhat agree	agree	strongly agree
Overall, the comments that I have received were specific.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I appreciate the review that I have recieved.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Overall, the comments that I have received were written in an aggressive tone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Overall, the comments that I have received were written in a friendly tone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Lastly, please take a moment to think about your contribution decision. In this part of the survey, you can increase your earnings from today's study.

You and another participant in today's session, labeled, "your match", have just decided on how many tokens to contribute to a group project.

Please guess how many tokens your match has actually contributed to the group project.

If your guess is sufficiently close, you will be paid an additional 1 CHF. Your guess is sufficiently close if you guess the exact number of tokens that your match has contributed plus or minus 2 tokens.

I think that my match has contributed the following number of tokens to the group project:

Now, we would like you to consider two possible scenarios regarding the contribution of your match. There is no right or wrong answer here. Please indicate how you would behave in each of the two scenarios.

1. Assume that you found out that your match has contributed **5 tokens** to the group project.

Would you then like to change your own contribution to the group project?

- Yes, I would like to increase my contribution.
- Yes, I would like to decrease my contribution.
- No, I would not like to change my contribution.

2. Assume that you found out that your match has contributed **15 tokens** to the group project.

Would you then like to change your own contribution to the group project?

- Yes, I would like to increase my contribution.
- Yes, I would like to decrease my contribution.
- No, I would not like to change my contribution.

Do you have any other comments?

Click the next button to continue to submit your answers.

Next

Overview of Your Payment

You have reached the end of the study and here is an overview of your earnings.

- You will receive a 10 CHF participation fee.

Earnings for Your Posters

- You may receive a bonus of 30 CHF for your first draft of the poster, if your poster ends up in the top 25% of first drafts.
- Your second and final draft of your poster will be graded for pay, and, depending on this grade, you will receive an additional: 5 CHF, 15 CHF, 25 CHF or 35 CHF.

Outcome of the Contribution Decision

10 tokens were contributed to the group project.

- Your total earnings from this decision are, therefore: 4.50 CHF
- You receive an additional 1 CHF for your guess of your match's contribution to the group project.

Click the next button to continue.

Next

Ending

You will be paid directly by the ETH Decision Science Laboratory. Please proceed to a secure online form by clicking the next button. This online form is administered by the ETH Decisions Science Laboratory. It is important that you fill it in correctly, for your payment to be processed.

Note that the information on your bank account and your identity will be destroyed once the transfer has been made. No personally identifying information will be stored with the data on the choices that you have made in today's study.

Thank you for participating in today's study!

You can now leave the Zoom meeting.

Next

Revise-first group

Acknowledgement of Informed Consent

You are taking part in a study designed by researchers at the University of Zurich and the Humboldt University of Berlin. The study is part of research aimed at better understanding how people make economic decisions. The following is intended to provide you with information on the procedures involved with the study in which you will participate today.

- You will work on a computer while making decisions that will be described to you before the study starts and over the course of the study.
- You will be paid for your participation. Your exact payment will depend on the choices that you and others make during the study. Your payment will be paid by bank transfer in the coming weeks. For this, the ETH Decision Science Laboratory will collect information on a bank account to which the payment should be transferred at the very end of today's study through a secure online form. The researches in charge of this study will not have access to this information. Your payment information will only be used to process your payment and no record of this information will be kept after it has been processed.
- There is no risk to you produced by participating in this study, beyond any risks you would encounter in performing activities on a computer in everyday life.
- Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation or your data at any time without any penalty. Withdrawing from the study may involve a loss of payment from the study.
- Your data will be kept completely confidential by not recording your name in combination with your data. All records will be identified only by a random ID number.

If you have any question regarding this study, do not hesitate to ask the experimenter who is in the Zoom meeting room. If questions arise at a later stage, please use the contact details below.

I confirm that I understand the above information and that I give my consent to participate in the study and allow the researchers to use the data obtained from my participation.

- ○ **Yes**
- ○ **No**

Contact: ETH Zurich, Decision Science Laboratory, descil@ethz.ch

Click the next button to continue.

Next

Zoom and Password

For this online study, it is required that you are in a quiet environment with a stable internet connection and a computer with an internet browser (no mobile devices).

For this online study, it is also required that you log into a Zoom meeting room.

If you have already joined the Zoom meeting room and were admitted from the waiting room...

....welcome! We will shortly begin with the study. The experimenter will share a password with you through a shared screen on Zoom.

Once you know the password, just enter it into the entry field at the bottom of this page and press next to continue.

If you have already joined the Zoom meeting room and were NOT admitted from the waiting room...

You have to name yourself with a specific anonymous ID in order to be admitted to the Zoom meeting. This anonymous ID is in the e-mail in which you found the link to this page. Leave the Zoom meeting now and name yourself with this anonymous ID when you sign into the Zoom meeting again.

When you named yourself correctly, an Experimenter will admit you to the Zoom room.

If you have not yet joined the Zoom meeting room...

Shortly before the start time of today's session, you have received an e-mail. In this e-mail, you found the link to this page. This e-mail also contains a second link to a Zoom meeting room and specifies an anonymous ID.

Look up that e-mail and sign yourself into the Zoom meeting room using the anonymous ID as your name. **Do not sign into the Zoom room using your full name.**

The experimenter will share a password with you through a shared screen on Zoom. Once you know the password, just enter it into the entry field at the bottom of this page and press next to continue.

Enter the password that was shared by the experimenter via Zoom in the entry field below:

Next

Welcome

This is a study on decision-making.

During the study you are not allowed to use electronic devices or to communicate with other participants. While you participate in this study, you are allowed to only use the programs and functions intended for the study. It is important that you remain in the Zoom room until the end of this study.

If you have a question, please write a message to the host (Experimenter 1) through Zoom chat. An experimenter will then invite you to a breakout room and answer your question privately. If the question is relevant for all participants, we will repeat it loudly and answer it. If you violate these rules, we must exclude you from the study and the payout.

Internet connection and Timers

If your internet connection were to break down during the study, you could pick up the study where you have left it by accessing the link again that you received by e-mail.

Most of the screens have timers on them. The timer is displayed in the upper right corner of your screen. When a timer is up, the program will automatically advance to the next page. **So it is important that you remain seated at your computer throughout the study in order to follow its progress attentively.** Primarily, we have the timers so that the study can continue, even if a participant was not able to reconnect due to a hardware failure.

Initial Instructions

These initial instructions summarize today's study. Throughout the study, you will have access to them for reference. These instructions will be displayed at the very bottom of your screen. Just scroll down if you want to look up information later on in the study.

These initial instructions are read aloud in order for all participants to have the same information. You may read along as you listen to the instructions. Once you have listened to this summary, the computer will guide you through some more instructions that will provide more details on the choices that you will make today.

Over the course of the study, you will repeatedly answer short quizzes on the instructions. This is to ensure that you understand the procedures described in them.

Next

Procedure of Today's Study Session

The study has 5 parts.

You will receive specific instructions for each part before you will make your choices for that part. The instructions on the screen will guide you through the task in each part. If you have a question, please write a message to the host (Experimenter 1) through Zoom chat.

Throughout the study, participants will never directly interact with each other. No personally identifying information about you will be shared with other participants in today's session.

In addition to a 10 CHF participation fee, you will be paid any additional money you accumulate during the study.

The exact amount you get, in addition to the participation fee, will be determined during the study and will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others. You will be paid via bank transfer in the coming weeks. This means that no other participant will see how much money you have earned.

Next

Overview of Part 1 of Today's Study

In Part 1 of today's study, you are asked to create a recruitment poster to recruit new study participants for the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH. The poster should inform people about the Decision Science Laboratory and the possibility to participate in social science studies, like the one you are participating in today. You should write your poster in English.

You will have 15 minutes to work on this task.

Review of Poster

In a later part of the study, you will review the poster of one of the other participants. Your poster will also be reviewed by one of the other participants in today' session.

Reviewers can make comments on the quality of a poster. The reviewers can list up to 7 such comments. Just before they write their comments, reviewers (including you) will find out about clear evaluation criteria on which the quality of a recruitment poster is assessed.

Bonus for Best Posters

There is a bonus paid to reward the best posters, that is, posters in the top 25% of all posters that were created in today's session.

The best posters are those that received the lowest number of comments on their quality from their reviewer. The authors of those posters will receive a bonus payment of 30 CHF. This bonus will be paid in addition to the participation fee. If there are ties, meaning that two or more posters received the same lowest number of comments, the computer will break them randomly.

Here is an **example** to illustrate the bonus payment: When 32 participants take part in a session, 8 participants will receive the bonus for the best posters. The bonus is paid to authors who received the lowest number of comments on the quality of their poster.

Next

First Control Questions and Password

Before we proceed with Part 1 of the study, you will answer a few control questions to check whether you understand the procedures described in these instructions. Once everyone has answered the control questions, we will proceed with Part 1 of the study.

The experimenter will now share a password with you. With this password, you can access the rest of the study.
Enter the password in the entry field below and click the next button to continue to the control question.

Enter the password that was shared by the experimenter via Zoom in the entry field below:

Next

Part 1 Control questions

Please answer the following questions.

What is the bonus (in CHF) that you can earn if your poster is among the best 25 percent of today's session (i.e. those that receive the lowest number of comments on their quality)?

A session of this study has 20 participants. How many participants will receive a bonus that rewards the best posters in this session?

Press the next button to submit your answers.

Next

Part 1: Poster

You are now asked to create a recruitment poster for the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH. You will work in the editor that you see below.

Before you start working, here are four important rules:

1. You have 15 minutes to work on your poster and a little bit of extra time to read these instructions carefully. A timer displays how much time you have left. When the time is up, the computer will automatically advance to the next screen.
2. You are expected to only use the below editor for the design of your poster. You are **not allowed to use any other programs or upload images** that you have on your computer or from other sources. If you want to use images that are displayed on the screen, you can just drag them into the editor.
3. Do not open any other program, browser window or browser tab. For example, you are not allowed to surf the web.
4. Do not switch from this page to a different application.

Note that a script collects meta-data on whether and if how frequently you abandon this page by switching to another window, browser tab or program on your computer.

If you would like to submit your poster before the 15 minutes are up, you can click the submit button to continue. You will not be able to return to this page.

Description of Task:

Create a recruitment poster for the Decision Science Laboratory of the ETH that could, in principle, be hung at the ETH and the UZH. The poster should inform people about the Decision Science Laboratory and the possibility to participate in social science studies, like the one you are taking part in today. It should motivate individuals to sign up to a pool of people who want to be informed by the Decision Science Laboratory when they recruit participants for future academic studies, without any obligation to actually participate.

A poster is typically designed for an A4 paper size. The default size of the editor that you see below corresponds to the size of an A4 paper.

Move your cursor to the top left corner of the editor—where the first line starts—to begin typing in it.

ETH_Logo UZH_Logo

Address Decision Science Laboratory:

Building IFW, Floor A, Room 25-29, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich

descil@ethz.ch

www.uast.uzh.ch (URL of the registration page)


Arial
14
Submit Poster

Instructions for Part 2

Everyone will review the poster of another participant at some point in time during today's study.

In Part 2, half of the participants (Group A) will review the poster of one of the other participants (Group B). At a later stage, the participants who are in Group B will review the poster of another participant from Group A. The computer randomly decides whether you are in Group A or Group B. While the timing of the reviews differs across groups, the reviewing task is exactly the same. Below is a description of this task.

- You will have 12 minutes to complete your review.
- Your review should have the following format: a numbered list of comments on the quality of the poster you are reviewing. You can write up to 7 comments.
- Your comments should focus on specific points that you can include in the numbered list. You have to enter each point that you want to comment on in a new entry field with a character limit of 200.
- Your comments will be used to determine whether the person you review qualifies for the bonus of 30 CHF for the best posters, that is, posters in the top 25 % of all posters that were created in today's session. The best posters are those that received the lowest number of comments from their reviewer. After today's session a research assistant will verify that each numbered item has indeed only one actual comment on the quality of a poster.

Except for the following restrictions, you can type whatever you want in your comments:

Restrictions on what you write

1. Please write in English.
2. Please do not send any personal information (for example, writing about your age or field of study).

On the next screen, you can see whether you were randomly assigned to write a review now in Part 2 or at a later stage.
Please click the next button to continue.

Next

Instructions for Part 2 (continued)

The computer randomly assigned a participant to review your poster now in Part 2. The computer randomly assigned you to write a review at a later stage of the study. Over the course of the study, each participant will review the poster of another participant.

You will next answer a few control questions to test whether you understand the procedures described in the instructions for Part 2.

Please click the next button to continue to the control questions.

Next

Part 2 Control Questions

Please indicate for each statement whether it is true or false.

Below, you see the instructions from the previous two screens in case you need to look up information.

Every participant will receive comments on the quality of his or her poster.

- True
- False

Only half of the participants will review the poster of another participant.

- True
- False

The number of comments that another participant makes on your poster determines whether you will qualify for the bonus of 30 CHF. This bonus rewards the authors who submitted the best posters.

- True
- False

Press the next button to submit your answers.

Next

Part 2 Review

Everyone has answered all control questions correctly.


Another participant is now reviewing your poster.

You can take a short break now and play the game “2048”. Please remain seated and at your computer since the study will continue for you soon. The computer will automatically advance to the next screen.

Here is a brief description of the 2048 tile game:

You can move the tiles with the arrow keys on your keyboard. When you start the game, there will be two “tiles” on the grid, each displaying the number 2 or 4. You hit the arrow keys on your keyboard to move the tiles around — and also to generate new tiles, which will also be valued at 2 or 4. When two equal tiles collide, they combine to give you one greater tile that displays their sum. The objective is to reach 2048 before the board fills up.

The best way to understand how to play the 2048 game is to try it out. Please click somewhere in the window displaying the game to select it as your active window. Then you can move the tiles with the arrow keys on your keyboard.



These are the instructions for the reciprocity treatment.

Overview of Parts 2-5 of Today's Study

We now describe the remaining parts of today's study.

Part 2 (now)

In a few seconds, you will see the list of comments that another participant wrote about the quality of your poster. You will have 2 minutes to look at them.

Part 3

In Part 3, you will be asked again to create a second and final recruitment poster.

Part 4

In Part 4, you are asked to review the poster that another participant created at the beginning of today's study, that is, in Part 1. This is the **same** participant who just reviewed your poster in Part 2

Part 5

In Part 5 of the study, all the participants who have their work reviewed in Part 4 will be asked again to create a second and final recruitment poster.

Grading of the Final Poster

After today's study, a research assistant will assign one of four grades to this second and final poster that each participant will have submitted by the end of today's study.

The four grades are: satisfactory, good, very good or excellent.

To determine your grade, the research assistant assesses how your second and final poster complies with a set of clear evaluation criteria. The research assistant grades every poster independently of all the other posters. So all that matters for you grade is to what extent ***your*** final poster complies with the set of clear evaluation criteria.

The grade for the second and final poster will be converted to pay according to the following rates:

- Excellent, 35 CHF
- Very Good, 25 CHF
- Good, 15 CHF
- Satisfactory, 5 CHF

The research assistant will not know the identity of anyone and will not be able to connect your identity to any choices that are made today.

Bonus for the Best First Drafts and Pay for the Final Poster

The bonus payment for the best first drafts of the poster and the grading and pay for the second and final poster are in no way linked.

The bonus is paid to the authors who received the lowest number of comments from one of the other study participants on the quality of their first poster from Part 1.

The payment for the second and final poster depends on the grade that the research assistant assigns.

Some participants will work on their second and final poster in Part 3. You will will work on your second and final poster in Part 5.

Click the next button to continue to the comments for your first draft of the poster.

Next

Comments

Below, you see the comments on the quality of your poster. Note that the reviewer knew that you would cerate a final poster in Part 3 at the time that s/he was reviewing your first draft.

You have 2 minutes to look at the comments. When the time is up, the computer will automatically advance to Part 3.

If you just see a number followed by the word “None” it means that your reviewer has left an entry field empty and hast not entered a comment in it.

1. None
2. None
3. None
4. None
5. None
6. None
7. None

Part 3: Final Draft of Poster

Now in Part 3, you are asked again to create a recruitment poster to recruit new study participants for the Decisiosn Science Laboratory at the ETH. Below, the first draft of your poster is reproduced. You can build on this if you want. You can also design a completely new poster, if you want, and delete the content that is displayed below.

In the next few days, a research assistant will assign a grade to this final poster. The grade will be converted to pay according to the following rates:

- Excellent, 35 CHF
- Very good, 25 CHF
- Good, 15 CHF
- Satisfactory, 5 CHF

You will work in the editor that you see below.

Here is a reminder of four important rules:

1. You have 15 minutes to work on your poster and a little bit of extra time to read these instructions carefully. A timer displays how much time you have left. When the time is up, the computer will automatically advance to the next screen.
2. You are expected to only use the below editor for the design of your poster. You are **not allowed to use any other programs or upload images** that you have on your computer or from other sources. If you want to use images that are displayed on the screen, you can just drag them into the editor.
3. Do not open any other program, browser window or browser tab. For example, you are not allowed to surf the web.
4. Do not switch from this page to a different application.

Note that a script collects meta-data on whether and if how frequently you abandon this page by switching to another window, browser tab or program on your computer.

If you would like to submit your poster before the 15 minutes are up, you can click the submit button to continue. You will not be able to return to this page.

Description of Task:

As a reminder, your task is to create a recruitment poster for the Decision Science Laboratory of the ETH that could, in principle, be hung at the ETH and the UZH. The poster should inform people about the Decision Science Laboratory and the possibility to participate in social science studies, like the one you are taking part in today. It should motivate individuals to sign up to a pool of people who want to be informed by the Decision Science Laboratory when they recruit participants for future academic studies, without any obligation to actually participate.

A poster is typically designed for an A4 paper size. The default size of the editor that you see below corresponds to the size of an A4 paper.

A poster is typically designed for an A4 paper size. The default size of the editor that you see below corresponds to the size of an A4 paper.

Comments on Your First Draft:

1. None
2. None
3. None
4. None
5. None
6. None
7. None


ETH_Logo UZH_Logo

Address Decision Science Laboratory:

Building IFW, Floor A, Room 25-29, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich

descil@ethz.ch

www.uast.uzh.ch (URL of the registration page)


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ETH zürich
Universität Zürich[UZH]
Submit Poster

Overview of Parts 2-5 of Today's Study

We now describe the remaining parts of today's study.

Part 2 (now)

In a few seconds, you will see the list of comments that another participant wrote about the quality of your poster. You will have 2 minutes to look at them.

Part 3

In Part 3, you will be asked again to create a second and final recruitment poster.

Part 4

In Part 4, you are asked to review the poster that another participant created at the beginning of today's study, that is, in Part 1. This is the **same** participant who just reviewed your poster in Part 2

Part 5

In Part 5 of the study, all the participants who have their work reviewed in Part 4 will be asked again to create a second and final recruitment poster.

Grading of the Final Poster

After today's study, a research assistant will assign one of four grades to this second and final poster that each participant will have submitted by the end of today's study.

The four grades are: satisfactory, good, very good or excellent.

To determine your grade, the research assistant assesses how your second and final poster complies with a set of clear evaluation criteria. The research assistant grades every poster independently of all the other posters. So all that matters for you grade is to what extent ***your*** final poster complies with the set of clear evaluation criteria.

The grade for the second and final poster will be converted to pay according to the following rates:

- Excellent, 35 CHF
- Very Good, 25 CHF
- Good, 15 CHF
- Satisfactory, 5 CHF

The research assistant will not know the identity of anyone and will not be able to connect your identity to any choices that are made today.

Bonus for the Best First Drafts and Pay for the Final Poster

The bonus payment for the best first drafts of the poster and the grading and pay for the second and final poster are in no way linked.

The bonus is paid to the authors who received the lowest number of comments from one of the other study participants on the quality of their first poster from Part 1.

The payment for the second and final poster depends on the grade that the research assistant assigns.

Some participants will work on their second and final poster in Part 3. You will will work on your second and final poster in Part 5.

Click the next button to continue to the comments for your first draft of the poster.

Next

These are the instructions for the reciprocity treatment.

Instructions for Part 4

Now in Part 4, you are asked to review the poster that another participant created at the beginning of today's study, that is, in Part 1. This is the **same** participant who reviewed your poster from Part 1. Your reviewer knew, when writing the comments on the quality of your poster, that you will also write a review for him or her.

In Part 5 of the study, the author of the poster that you are reviewing now will be asked again to design a second and final recruitment poster. This participant will read your comments before working on the second and final draft of the poster. This participant can use your comments when this participant works on the second and final draft of the poster in Part 5. This poster will be graded for pay after today's session.

The grade for the second and final draft of the poster will be converted to pay according to the following rates:

- Excellent, 35 CHF
- Very Good, 25 CHF
- Good, 15 CHF
- Satisfactory, 5 CHF

You will next answer a few control questions to test whether you understand the procedures described in theses instructions.
Click the next button to continue to the control questions.

Next

Part 4 Control Questions

Please indicate for each statement whether it is true or false.

Below, you see the instructions from the previous screen in case you need to look up information.

The author of the poster you will review now is the same as the participant who has reviewed your poster in Part 2.

- True
- False

The participant who has reviewed your poster in Part 2 knows that you will review his/her poster in Part 4.

- True
- False

The author of the poster that you review won't read your comments before working on the second and final draft of the poster.

- True
- False

Every participant's final draft of the poster will be graded for pay after today's session.

- True
- False

For the next two questions, please select one of the two answer options.

If you give a higher number of comments, will this increase or decrease the chance that the person you review will get the bonus for the best first drafts of the poster (from Part 1)?

- Increase
- Decrease

If you give a higher number of comments, do you think that this will increase or decrease the grade that the person you review can expect for his second and final draft of the poster (from Part 5)?

- Increase
- Decrease

How much money will you get for your final draft of the poster, if it receives the grade 'very good' when it is graded for pay after today's session?

Press the next button to submit your answers.

Next

These are the instructions for the reciprocity treatment.

Part 4 Review

Below, at the bottom of the page, you see the poster written by another participant. This is the **same** participant who reviewed your poster in Part 4.

You have 12 minutes to review the poster. If you haven't submitted your review by the end of the 12 minutes, it will be submitted automatically.

The participant who you review will read your comments on the quality of the poster after the 12 minutes for the review are up. This participant can use your comments when this participant works on the second and final draft of the poster in Part 5. This final poster will be graded for pay after today's session.

The grading scheme is fixed and consists of points given in different categories. Points are converted to pay at a fixed rate. As a reviewer, you now see some of these categories. This is to give you an idea about what a poster is graded on, as you review one and write comments on its quality. Each of the below sentences corresponds to one category:

Grading Scheme

- The poster mentions the Decision Science Laboratory at the ETH.
- The poster leaves contact information.
- The poster clarifies that recruitment is for academic research in the social sciences.
- The poster clarifies that participation is voluntary and that there is no obligation to sign up for studies.
- The poster provides info on how to sign up to the subject pool.
- The poster mentions the possibility to earn extra money.
- The poster gives an indication of the size of the expected payment.
- The poster indicates that the target audience for registration in the subject pool are students from the ETH and the UZH.
- The poster indicates a rough estimate of the time commitment for a study.
- The poster mentions requirements for participation (skills, technical requirements for online studies).

The points that are given in these categories amount to 50% of the total points that a poster can obtain. The other 50% of points are given for how the content is presented, that is, for the layout and design.

Your comments can reduce the likelihood that the participant who you review obtains the bonus payment of 30 CHF for the best first drafts of the poster (drafts from Part 1).

The participant you are reviewing now has reviewed you in Part 2.

Here is a reminder of the format that your review should have.

Format of the Review

- Your review should be a numbered list of comments on the quality of the poster (up to 7).
- Your comments should focus on specific points that you can include in the numbered list.
- You have to enter each point that you want to comment on in a new entry field. In each entry field, you can type up to 200 characters.
- Please write in English and do not send any personal information (for example, writing about your age or field of study).

1.

2.

3.


4.

5.

6.

7.

Poster for Review



Submit Review

Comments

Participants who were just reviewed have 2 minutes now to read the comments that they have received. After the 2 minutes, the computer will automatically advance to Part 5.

Next

Part 5: Contribution Decision

Before we proceed with Part 5 of today's study, you are asked to make a decision.

For this decision, you were randomly matched with another participant in today's study. This participant is labeled "your match" in the following instructions.

You have **not** previously interacted with your match. You have **not** written a review for your match. Your match has **not** written a review for you.

You and your match each received 20 tokens for this decision. You must decide how many tokens to contribute to a joint group project between you and your match and how many tokens to keep for yourself. You can contribute any number between 0 and 20 tokens and keep any remaining tokens for yourself.

At the very end of today's study you will see the total amount of tokens contributed to the group project. You will also see how many CHF you have earned from this decision. 1 token is paid out as 20 Rappen.

Income

Your income from this decision consists of the number of tokens you kept for yourself plus 0.75 the number of tokens contributed to the group project. That is:

(20 - your contribution to the project) + 0.75 x (total contributions to the project) tokens

This is because the project produces 1.5 tokens for each token contributed, and you and your match receive the same return from the group project (1.5/2 = 0.75). Your contribution to the group project therefore also raises the income of your match. On the other hand, you earn an income for each token that your match contributed to the group project.

Here are two examples.

Example 1. If the sum of the two contribution to the group project is 32 tokens, then you and your match each receive 32 × 0.75 = 24 tokens or 4.80 CHF from the group project. Plus, each group member receives the amount s/he kept for him- or herself.

Example 2. If the sum of the two contributions to the group project is 6 tokens, you and your match each receive an income of 6 x 0.75 = 4.5 tokens or 0.90 CHF from the group project. Plus, each group member receives the amount s/he kept for him- or herself

For each token that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 token or 20 Rappen. For each token contributed to the group project, your income from the project rises by 1 x 0.75=0.75 tokens or 15 Rappen. The income of the other group members also rises by 0.75 tokens or 15 Rappen, since the project produces 1.5 tokens for each token that is contributed.

Contribution

Number of tokens to contribute to the group project (enter any number from 0 to 20):

After entering your contribution to the group project, please press the next button to proceed.

Once you have done this your decision can no longer be revised.

Next

Part 5 Survey

Participants who just had their work reviewed are now working on their final draft of the poster. You are now asked to fill in a detailed survey.

Answer first a few demographic questions about you.

What is your gender?

- male
- female
- other

What is your age?

What is your highest level of education? :

- High School (e.g Matura, Abitur)
- Bachelor (or equivalent)
- Master (or equivalent)
- Vocational Training
- Other

In which city do you live?

In which country did you live growing up?

What is your occupation?

What are your typical monthly earnings?

Next, we would like to you answer a few questions about the choices that you have made in today's study.

Think back to when you were reviewing the poster of another participant.

How did you decide which points to include when you reviewed the poster of one of the other participants?

Do you think that the participant whom you reviewed would have like to receive more or less comments on the quality of his or her poster?

- More
- Less
- None of the above

What do you think the main effect of the review you wrote for the poster of another participant is?

In your opinion, what did the other participant think when s/he read your review?

Would you have liked to have more time when you reviewed the poster of another participant?

- Yes
- No

Next, please answer a few questions about the posters that you have created and the review that you have received.

Do you think that you have improved your performance between the first and the second poster?

- Yes
- No

How many comments did you end up incorporating in the draft of your final poster?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

To what extent was the review that you have received helpful for improving your second poster?

a little some pretty much very much

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements on a scale from 1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree.

	strongly disagree	disagree	somewhat disagree	neither agree nor disagree	somewhat agree	agree	strongly agree
Overall, the comments that I have received were specific.							
I appreciate the review that I have recieved.							
Overall, the comments that I have received were written in an aggressive tone.							
Overall, the comments that I have received were written in a friendly tone.							

How likely, do you think, is it that you are going to get the bonus for your first draft of the poster?

Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0- "It is impossible that I will get the bonus" to 10- "It is sure that I will get the bonus":

0-impossible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-sure

Did your chance of winning the bonus affect your motivation when you worked on your second draft of the poster?

- Yes
- No
- Cannot tell

If you answered the previous question with yes, please just very briefly descibe how your motivation was affected.

Would you have liked to have more time to create the poster?

- Yes
- No

Did you expect that you would have to draft a second and final poster before the instructions had informed you about this?

- Yes
- No

Overall, did you find the instructions easy to understand?

- Yes
- No

Now, please take a moment to think about your contribution decision. In this part of the survey, you can increase your earnings from today's study.

You and another participant in today's session, labeled, "your match", have just decided on how many tokens to contribute to a group project.

Pease guess how many tokens your match has actually contributed to the group project.

If your guess is sufficiently close, you will be paid an additional 1 CHF. Your guess is sufficiently close if you guess the exact number of tokens that your match has contributed plus or minus 2 tokens.

I think that my match has contributed the following number of tokens to the group project:

Now, we would like you to consider two possible scenarios regarding the contribution of your match. There is no right or wrong answer here. Please indicate how you would behave in each of the two scenarios.

1. Assume that you found out that your match has contributed 5 tokens to the group project.

Would you then like to change your own contribution to the group project?

- Yes, I would like to increase my contribution.
- Yes, I would like to decrease my contribution.
- No, I would not like to change my contribution.

2. Assume that you found out that your match has contributed 15 tokens to the group project.

Would you then like to change your own contribution to the group project?

- Yes, I would like to increase my contribution.
- Yes, I would like to decrease my contribution.
- No, I would not like to change my contribution.

Lastly, we would like you to answer a few questions about yourself. There are no right or wrong answers. Please read through the questions carefully and consider which answer is right for you.

How competitive do you consider yourself to be?

Please choose a value on the scale below, where the value 0 means "not competitive at all" and the value 10 means "very competitive".

0-not competitive at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-very competitive

In general, how willing are you to take risks?

Please choses a value on the scale below, where the value 0 means you are "completely unwilling to take risks" and 10 means you are "very willing to take risks".

0-completely unwilling to take risks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10-very willing to take risks

Do you have any other comments?

Click the next button to continue to submit your answers.

Next

Overview of Your Payment

You have reached the end of the study and here is an overview of your earnings.

- You will receive a 10 CHF participation fee.

Earnings for Your Posters

- You may receive a bonus of 30 CHF for your first draft of the poster, if your poster ends up in the top 25% of first drafts.
- Your second and final draft of your poster will be graded for pay, and, depending on this grade, you will receive an additional: 5 CHF, 15 CHF, 25 CHF or 35 CHF.

Outcome of the Contribution Decision

10 tokens were contributed to the group project.

- Your total earnings from this decision are, therefore: 4.50 CHF
- You receive an additional 1 CHF for your guess of your match's contribution to the group project.

Click the next button to continue.

Next

Ending

You will be paid directly by the ETH Decision Science Laboratory. Please proceed to a secure online form by clicking the next button. This online form is administered by the ETH Decisions Science Laboratory. It is important that you fill it in correctly, for your payment to be processed.

Note that the information on your bank account and your identity will be destroyed once the transfer has been made. No personally identifying information will be stored with the data on the choices that you have made in today's study.

Thank you for participating in today's study!

You can now leave the Zoom meeting.

Next