The Economic Consequences of Foreclosure Suspensions in the Great Depression*

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Abstract

We study the effects of foreclosure moratoria on local economies and individuals. During the Great Depression, 25 U.S. states enacted laws temporarily restricting lenders' ability to foreclose on mortgaged farms. Using county-level agricultural data and linked full-count census records in a triple-difference exposure design, we examine the short- and long-run effects of these policies. We find that counties with greater pre-crisis mortgage exposure experienced a persistent 15% increase in the number of farms. Farmers and the children of farm households in more exposed counties were more likely to remain in agriculture and less likely to transition into manufacturing two decades later. Production shifted toward smaller, less capital-intensive farms, reducing farm revenues and values. Agricultural borrowing costs rose by roughly 4%, and more exposed counties reallocated out of agriculture more slowly. Overall, temporary foreclosure relief prevented consolidation during the crisis but generated persistent distortions in land allocation, occupational choice, and local credit markets.

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Foreclosure moratoria, the legal suspension of lenders' ability to seize collateral, are a recurring response to economic crises. From the Great Depression to the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers have repeatedly used moratoria to soften the blow of economic distress.[1] Mortgage debt is widespread, and foreclosure can impose substantial costs on borrowers, neighborhoods, and local economies (Campbell et al., 2011; Ellen et al., 2013; Mian et al., 2015; Diamond et al., 2020). Yet the same intervention may also distort longer-run adjustment. By preventing the transfer of assets to new owners and weakening the enforceability of secured claims, moratoria may raise borrowing costs and slow the reallocation of land and labor that ordinarily follows a crisis.

This tension is economically important well beyond the particular legal form of foreclosure relief. In any debt crisis, policymakers face a basic tradeoff between preventing inefficient liquidation and preserving incentives for repayment, investment, and exit. The former concern is salient when asset markets are illiquid and forced sales depress prices below fundamentals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). The latter is salient when protected incumbents are precisely those whose continued operation is least efficient (Caballero and Hammour, 1996; Acharya et al., 2022). Whether foreclosure moratoria primarily mitigate fire-sale inefficiencies or instead impede efficient reallocation remains an open empirical question. American legal institutions have long recognized this tension: the Constitution's Contracts Clause was drafted in part to limit states' ability to rewrite private credit contracts, even as periods of acute distress repeatedly generated pressure to do exactly that.[2]

The Great Depression offers a particularly useful setting for studying this question. In the farm sector, the boom of the 1910s and early 1920s encouraged heavy borrowing against land as wartime demand and high agricultural prices fueled rapid expansion. When global supply recovered, commodity prices fell, and drought conditions struck, many highly leveraged farmers saw their incomes collapse. Because agriculture still employed roughly one in five Americans, the political pressure to protect farmers was intense (Perkins, 1969). Between 1933 and 1934, twenty-five U.S. states adopted some form of foreclosure moratorium on farm real estate (Alston, 1983). These laws delayed foreclosure, extended redemption periods, or limited deficiency judgments.

Our empirical analysis is guided by a simple economic framework. Farms differ in productivity and are hit by a large negative income shock. In the absence of intervention, the least productive and most indebted farms are most likely to default, exit, or sell land to more productive operators. A foreclosure moratorium prevents some of these exits by suspending creditor remedies. In one case, that intervention may be efficiency-enhancing by saving a farm that is

[1] For example, during the COVID-19 crisis, the federal government imposed an eviction moratorium that also prohibited foreclosure on certain rental properties with federally backed mortgages; Goodman et al. (2020) estimate that roughly 28% of households were covered. Separately, the Department of Agriculture suspended foreclosures on federally backed farm loans (USDA, 2021).

[2] Courts have generally treated state interference with private contracts skeptically, but the Great Depression produced a series of important cases testing the extent to which emergency conditions could justify temporary relief.

fundamentally viable but temporarily unable to meet its debt obligations, and preserving it until refinancing or recovery becomes possible. In the other case, the moratorium keeps a marginal farm in operation that would otherwise have exited, thereby preserving a smaller-scale, less productive farm structure than would have emerged under unconstrained consolidation.

This framework yields three empirical predictions that organize the following analysis. First, moratoria should have their largest direct effects on farms that were ex ante exposed to foreclosure risk. Second, if the policy preserves marginal farms, it should reduce consolidation, raise the persistence of agricultural employment, and lower the capital intensity of surviving operations. Third, if lenders expect weaker creditor protection or face a riskier pool of surviving borrowers, local borrowing costs should rise even after the acute crisis passes. Because farm succession was common, the implications need not be confined to the directly treated generation: protecting farms in the 1930s may also alter farmers' children's occupational choices (Chen et al., 2023; Haws et al., 2025).

To test these predictions, we assemble a county-level panel from the U.S. Agricultural Census, the Decennial Census, the Census of Manufacturers, and historical data on New Deal spending and Dust Bowl severity. We code foreclosure moratoria from contemporaneous USDA reports and the analysis of Alston (1984). At the county level, we observe the number of farms, farmland area, farm values, production patterns, and agricultural mortgage interest rates. In linked full-count census data, we follow adult farmers across censuses to study occupational persistence and movement into manufacturing. We then link children observed on farms in 1930 to their adult outcomes in 1950, allowing us to examine whether Depression-era foreclosure relief altered intergenerational persistence in agriculture.

Credibly estimating these effects, however, requires overcoming two identification challenges. First, States did not adopt moratoria at random. As Alston (1984) emphasizes, the states that intervened were those under the greatest economic and political pressure to do so. In our data, treated counties are more populous, have more and larger farms, and had deeper financial markets before the policy change. A simple comparison of places with and without moratoria would therefore confound the effects of the laws with the conditions that produced them. Second, even within adopting states, the moratoria did not affect all local economies equally. The policy was most consequential where more farms were close to the foreclosure margin ex ante. That margin, in turn, depended on the local distribution of farm mortgage debt before the crisis. Counties in which more farmers had borrowed, with the farm as collateral, contained more farms for which a suspension of creditor remedies could affect survival, ownership, and subsequent production. A credible design, therefore, must account for endogenous state policy adoption and heterogeneity in exposure to the policy within states.

Our design addresses both. We use the county share of farms with mortgage debt in 1930

as our main exposure measure, which proxies for the extensive margin of farms at risk of foreclosure. Our empirical strategy is a triple-difference exposure design that combines cross-state variation in moratorium adoption with cross-county variation in this baseline mortgage exposure. We compare how outcomes change after 1930 across counties with different baseline mortgage exposure in states that did and did not adopt moratoria. County, year, and state-year fixed effects absorb permanent county differences, aggregate shocks, and time-varying state-level confounders. Because treated and untreated counties remain observably different in the cross-section, we further refine this comparison using a border-county specification restricted to 476 neighboring counties with baseline observable characteristics almost fully balanced. We also control directly for county-level New Deal spending (Fishback et al., 2005a) and Dust Bowl erosion (Hornbeck, 2012).

We find strong evidence of the aforementioned tradeoff: the moratoria successfully preserved farm operations during the crisis, but over the longer run, they raised local capital costs, reduced farm consolidation and capital intensity, and slowed structural reallocation out of agriculture. These effects persisted into the next generation.

We present three sets of results. First, the moratoria substantially reduced farm exit by preventing consolidation. Counties in the top quartile of exposure experienced a 15% increase in the number of farms, or roughly 300 additional farms per county, and this effect persists at least through 1960. The increase is entirely due to foregone consolidation, as total farm acreage remains unchanged. Together, average farm size falls, and the average farm in more exposed counties is worth about 20% less. These findings suggest that the policy durably altered the composition of operating farms, rather than merely delaying a temporary dislocation.

Second, the policy slowed the structural reallocation of labor out of agriculture. Using linked census data from 1930 to 1940, we show that in more exposed counties, a larger share of individuals remained in agriculture and a smaller share moved into manufacturing. Extending the linkage to 1950, we find that this effect was persistent and also reflected by the next generation. Moving from the median to the 90th percentile of the county mortgage-share distribution increases the probability that the child of a protected farm household remains tied to the family farm by about 2.5 percentage points. The moratoria thus did not simply preserve farms in place; they also altered the occupational trajectories of the families attached to those farms.

Third, the suspensions changed local credit conditions and production choices. In the counties most exposed to the moratoria, agricultural mortgage interest rates rise by about 4%, or roughly 30 basis points, even though mortgage rates generally declined and converged over the decade. At the same time, farm inputs become less capital-intensive. Protected farms devote more land to crops, capital per acre declines, crop failure becomes more common, and revenues per acre fall. We cannot fully distinguish selection among surviving farms from re-optimization

within farms, and the two likely interact. But the overall pattern is consistent with a common mechanism: by preserving smaller, weaker, and less capitalized farms, the moratoria raised the cost of capital and slowed the productivity-enhancing reallocation of land and labor.

Taken together, these findings show that crisis-era foreclosure protection came with persistent costs. We do not provide a full welfare analysis, and our results do not imply that moratoria were undesirable at every margin. In a period of extreme distress, preventing fire-sale liquidation may have generated important short-run benefits. But the evidence suggests that the legal suspension of foreclosure altered the path of adjustment. By preventing consolidation, raising borrowing costs, and keeping labor in agriculture, the policy impeded the reallocation process that ordinarily underpins recovery and subsequent growth.

Our paper contributes most directly to the literature on foreclosure, bankruptcy, and crisis intervention. Two strands of that literature capture the central policy tradeoff. On the one hand, foreclosure can generate fire-sale externalities and local contagion (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Campbell et al., 2011; Gupta, 2019); on the other hand, weak enforcement and forbearance can preserve inefficient incumbents and distort subsequent adjustment (Acharya et al., 2022). Existing evidence speaks to each margin in isolation. We address both in the context of Depression-era farm moratoria. Relative to the descriptive and institutional analyses of Alston (1983), Alston (1984), and Wheelock (2008), and to the evidence in Rajan and Ramcharan (2016) on the fire-sale consequences of impaired local finance, we show that suspending foreclosure did more than reduce liquidation. In this respect, our findings complement Gabriel et al. (2021), who show that California foreclosure-prevention laws reduced foreclosures during the Great Recession with little effect on new mortgage credit. We show that in a setting featuring productive assets rather than owner-occupied housing, foreclosure relief had durable allocative consequences.

We also contribute to the literature on land markets, agricultural misallocation, and structural change. A large body of work shows that frictions in land allocation can have large effects on productivity and occupational choice (Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2014; Chen et al., 2023; Aragón et al., 2024; Haws et al., 2025). Our contribution is to identify a specific legal mechanism through which such distortions can arise and persist. More broadly, this adds to economic history work on how Depression-era policies shaped rural credit markets, production, and structural change (Kislev and Peterson, 1982; Depew et al., 2013; Hornbeck, 2023; Hausman et al., 2019), by showing that one of the era's major state-level legal interventions had long-run consequences for the allocation of resources in the American economy.

We make two arguments relating to the external validity of our setting. First, the dramatic postwar expansion of U.S. manufacturing, and hence its eventual attractiveness relative to agriculture, was far from obvious to policymakers in the early 1930s. Our finding that the moratoria preserved labor in agriculture and delayed movement into manufacturing should therefore not be

read as an ex ante indictment of the policy. Second, more recent debt interventions are often accompanied by explicit public guarantees or lender compensation. By contrast, the state moratoria we study generally weakened creditor remedies without compensating lenders. That distinction is clearly relevant for the magnitude of any credit-market response. Even so, the paper's central mechanism—that protecting distressed incumbents from exit can slow reallocation and preserve low-productivity structures—extends naturally beyond this particular historical setting.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the historical and legal context of the setting. Section II describes our data sources and outlines the empirical strategy we adopt for the analysis. Section III presents immediate results on farms and farmers. Section IV details results on farm productivity and Section V examines the effects on credit markets before Section VI concludes.

I Historical and Legal Context

I.A Agricultural Distress 1920—1933

The First World War shifted relative prices in favor of American agriculture. European disruption boosted demand for U.S. grain and cotton as average crop prices doubled between 1915 and 1919, and land values rose by more than 50 percent between 1910 and 1920 (Rajan and Ramcharan, 2015). Farmers responded by expanding acreage and buying more machinery. This expansion was financed by mortgages that required interest-only payments during the term and a large balloon payment at maturity. Outstanding farm-mortgage loans peaked in 1924, when the ratio of mortgage debt to value per acre approached 300 percent (Horton et al., 1942).

However, once European supply recovered in 1920, commodity prices collapsed. This transformed the nominally fixed mortgage obligations into a heavy burden (Messer and Rieder, 2025). As farmers faced lower cash flows, repayment for loans issued near the 1919 peak was very difficult. Involuntary transfers of farm real estate rose sharply after 1922, with foreclosure serving as the primary means of involuntary transfer rather than bankruptcy, which was much more expensive (Messer and Rieder, 2025; Wickens, 1936). We plot these trends in Figure 2b.

The agricultural sector was already weak by the time of the Depression, which then multiplied the damage (Bernanke, 1983). The Dust Bowl, starting as early as 1930, imposed a highly uneven environmental shock that lowered yields, values, and population in the worst-affected areas (Hornbeck, 2012). Farm foreclosures reached 96,000 per year between 1921 and 1940, peaking near 200,000 in 1933 (Alston, 1983). States passed foreclosure moratoria between 1933 and 1935.

I.B Design and Operation of the Moratoria

The U.S. legal system, until that point, was firmly against debtor relief. The Contracts Clause (Art. I, §10) was interpreted to prohibit moratorium-style legislation. Chief Justice John Marshall warned that state interference with contracts "destroy[ed] all confidence between man and man" (Poteat, 1938; Prosser, 1934). From the Civil War through the Panic of 1893, state attempts to delay or suspend foreclosures were repeatedly invalidated (Anonymous, 1939). Other tools for debtor relief such as postponing foreclosures, limiting deficiency judgments and extending redemption periods had met the same fate.

The Depression changed the calculus. Between 1929 and 1933, personal income fell by nearly half and unemployment reached 25 percent (Wheelock, 2008). Farm mortgage debt stood at roughly $7.7 billion, equaling a quarter of farm real estate value in 1933 (Hausman et al., 2019). In Minnesota, half the land was mortgaged and prices fell below production costs (Prosser, 1934). Farmers disrupted foreclosure sales and marched on state capitols. From 1933 to 1935, 25 states enacted foreclosure moratoria (Wheelock, 2008). Adopting states were more likely to have higher farm foreclosure rates, a higher percentage of mortgaged farms, and greater reliance on private credit markets (Alston, 1984; Wheelock, 2008). Federally held loans, such as those administered through federal land banks, were less likely to result in foreclosure. After 1933, the FCA became a dominant force while life-insurance companies reduced their exposure to farm mortgages by half (Wall and Cone, 1937).

This distress paved the way for states to adopt the moratoria. Foreclosure procedures varied widely across states. We give a stylized overview in Figure 5. The moratoria added to this baseline by pausing sales or extending redemption and, commonly, by conditioning any stay on payments so the creditor received some compensation during the hiatus. The laws did not permanently re-write debts but instead delegated to courts the power to grant temporary, conditional relief case by case. The most common tools were judicial stays of foreclosure and extensions of statutory redemption periods. In New York, for example, foreclosures on pre-1932 mortgages were suspended for principal-only defaults so long as the borrower kept current on interest and taxes (Wheelock, 2008). Minnesota's 1933 statute authorized courts to extend redemption as late as May 1, 1935, and required use-and-occupancy payments during the extension.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell* (1934) upheld Minnesota's law and emphasized that emergency conditions combined with the temporary and limited nature of relief, fair protection for creditors, and ongoing judicial supervision made the policies legal under the Contracts Clause. In *Blaisdell*, the borrowers were allowed to remain upon paying $40 per month, applied first to taxes and upkeep and then to the debt holder (Prosser, 1934). Crucially, not all such policies survived scrutiny. In *W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh*,[3] the

[3] 295 U.S. 56 (1935)

Supreme Court invalidated Arkansas's 1933 statutes because the law gutted a mortgagee's security for many years which allowed debtors to retain property without paying taxes, interest, or rent and without showing hardship. Finally, the moratoria remained constitutionally valid only as long as the emergency lasted. For instance, in 1938, the state supreme courts in both Nebraska and Mississippi ruled that the emergency had ended and stopped the moratoria (Poteat, 1938).

Consequently, the moratoria prevented foreclosures only at the margin. Courts granted relief only to debtors that had a plausible path to recovery and weren't "hopelessly insolvent" owners who did not have a "reasonable probability" of saving the land (Poteat, 1938). Most statutes came with a requirement of partial repayments which meant that farmers with no hope of survival received no protection.

Although the moratoria preserved farmer occupancy, they did not guarantee retention of legal ownership. The original statutes and judicial opinions clearly distinguished between possession and the final transfer of title. Minnesota's statute left the foreclosure sale valid, meaning the lender became the purchaser and was positioned to obtain full title if redemption failed. The statute simply extended the redemption period which allowed the debtor to retain physical possession during the interval as long as payments were made. The Supreme Court explicitly noted that the statute "does not affect the validity of the sale or the right of a mortgagee-purchaser to title in fee" if redemption ultimately failed.[4] In essence, legal title returned to borrowers only if debts were fully redeemed or refinanced within the statutory window.

Therefore, we can confidently hypothesize that the policy ought to increase the number of farms at the county level but the implications for ownership structure are ambiguous. Since the laws preserved possession without guaranteeing title, the same farm could appear as owner-operated, lender-owned with the former owner in place, or effectively tenant-operated in the Census. Lender behavior also muddies these categories, as creditors often bought at sale, deferred possession, leased back, or negotiated informal workouts. We expect a clear effect on the count of farms, but the composition among owner-operators, tenants, and manager-operated farms can plausibly move in either direction.

I.C Bridge to the New Deal

Beginning in mid-1933, the federal government intervened directly in farm markets. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) paid farmers to plant fewer acres, which increased farm income by more than 50 percent by 1935. AAA rental and benefit payments accounted for about a quarter of that improvement. The Roosevelt administration also devalued the dollar, which made American crops cheaper for foreign buyers and pushed commodity prices up almost immediately in spring

[4] *Home Building Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell*, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934)

1933. Counties where crop prices rose the most saw faster recovery, and the effect was largest where farmers carried the heaviest debt burden (Hausman et al., 2019).

At the same time, the Farm Credit Administration started to refinance debt. From 1933 to 1939, the Federal Land Banks alone held 48 percent of the total farm mortgage debt, up from a peak of just 9 percent in 1922 (Rose, 2013). The Land Bank Commissioner made roughly 680,000 loans. By March 31, 1940, the FLBs and LBC together had nearly $2.7 billion of farm mortgages outstanding against total farm-mortgage debt of about $12 billion. Although a third of all FCA loans became delinquent, only 7 percent were ultimately foreclosed before 1944 (Rose, 2013).

These efforts by the federal government made the effects of the moratoria persistent. The moratoria acted as a bridge, helping farmers preserve title until prices had rebounded from the 1932 lows and the federal government had refinanced debt.

Finally, we want to emphasize that foreclosure remained the primary channel for distressed land transfers. Between 1930 and 1934, farmer bankruptcies ran at 0.75 per 1,000 farms, while foreclosure rates ranged from 20 to over 35 per 100,000 (Messer and Rieder, 2025). In 1934, only 4,464 farm bankruptcies were recorded nationwide. Foreclosure could be initiated by a single creditor, did not stay collection on other debts, and culminated in a sale if redemption failed. Despite the institutional changes in bankruptcy law, foreclosures remained the primary involuntary method for land reallocation during the Depression (Wickens, 1936).

The Frazier–Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act, passed in 1934, allowed indebted farmers, after bankruptcy had been adjudged, to retain possession for up to five years while paying a court-set "reasonable rental," with the right to repurchase at appraised value over six years at one percent interest. However, this law was unanimously struck down by the Supreme Court.[5]. Congress passed a revised version in 1935 which reduced the moratorium to three years, included a formal declaration of emergency, and allowed public sale under certain conditions with farmer redemption rights. The revised law was upheld.[6] These reforms offered farmers new legal tools but never displaced foreclosure as the main channel for distressed land transfers, especially during the 1930s.

II Data and Empirical Strategy

This section describes the data and research design. We code state foreclosure moratoria, proxy pre-policy exposure using the 1930 county mortgage share, and construct both county-level and individual-level outcomes. We identify causal effects through a triple-difference design—exploiting variation in policy adoption, pre-existing exposure, and time—supplemented by border-

[5] *Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford*, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)

[6] Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).

county comparisons that improve covariate balance. Table 1 displays summary statistics for our primary analysis variables at the county level in 1930.

II.A Variable Construction

Treatment: Foreclosure Policies

Our main treatment is a state-level indicator for whether a state enacted a foreclosure moratorium during the Depression-era rollout of 1933–1934. We follow Alston (1984) and build on a contemporaneous USDA report titled *State Measures for the Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness in the United States, 1933 and 1934* (Olcott and Bercaw, 1934) and the 1936 version of the same report.

The report covers measures aimed at preventing farmers from losing real estate through mortgage foreclosure or tax sale – including sale moratoria, fair-value deficiency rules, extended redemption periods, and tax-sale relief – while explicitly excluding programs that extend new credit. We code each state's law according to these criteria. Using these excerpts, we produce Table 2, which summarizes the key features for each state: year of passage, length of the moratoria, and whether the law included a stay of foreclosures, extended the redemption period, or limited a lender's right to sue farmers for remaining debt after foreclosures. In total, 25 states adopted a moratorium. Our results are robust to alternative codings of three borderline cases, which we discuss in Appendix B, and the full legal texts appear in Appendix C.

Exposure: Farm Mortgage Adoption

We use county-level data on farming activity from Haines et al. (2018), who compile the U.S. Agricultural Census over many years. The data are based on farm-level enumeration, but only the county aggregations are systematically available. We collect data at decennial intervals beginning in 1900, with additional data available every five years from 1925 until we end our sample in 1960. This gives a broadly symmetric 30-year window on either side of the policy change, allowing us to examine pre-trends and longer-term outcomes.

Our exposure measure is the county share of farms with mortgage debt in 1930, which proxies for the extensive margin of farms at risk of foreclosure. The share of farms under mortgage is assessed as the proportion of returns indicating non-zero mortgage debt on farm land or buildings. Strictly speaking, respondents could report mortgage debt on a farm located in a different county, though wording revisions introduced before 1925 made the question more specific to the enumerated property. We therefore treat responses as referring to the farm being counted. Farmers were asked to report both mortgage repayments and debt (in dollars) in 1920, 1930, and 1940, which we use to compute the mortgage interest rate.

We prefer the mortgage share over debt-to-value ratios as the measure of exposure because the denominator of the ratio—land values—was typically assessed at boom-era prices that collapsed sharply during the 1920s. As distressed farms sought refinancing, these ratio measures became volatile over time, making them a noisier proxy for foreclosure exposure than the simpler extensive-margin indicator.

Outcomes

Farms, Farm Values and Farmland Our most direct outcome is the number of farms in a county, also from the U.S. Agricultural Census. Crucial to our analysis is the definition of a farm. From 1925, this definition was standardized as follows: A tract or tracts of land directly farmed by one person (a "farmer"), either alone or with household members and/or hired labor. Each separate tract operated by "tenants, renters, croppers, or managers," even under the same land owner, is counted as a distinct farm. Thus, by definition, the number of farms equals the number of farmers. This definition matters for our measurement: foreclosure transfers legal title but need not interrupt the farm's operation if the new owner retains the same tenant or continues farming directly. Farm counts, therefore, capture the number of distinct operators, but may undercount ownership changes.

A farm must additionally be of at least three acres or produce at least $250 worth of produce. These criteria differed in enumerations prior to 1925, when farms smaller than three acres were counted as long as they required the full-time labor of one farmer. The exclusion of these small, subsistence, or lifestyle farms from the 1925 definition onward resulted in a net reduction in the number of farms. Year-fixed effects capture the national-level decline in farm counts arising from this definitional adjustment. To the extent that this definition change had differential regional impacts, the decrease in farm counts was largest in the Northeast, the region least important for the agricultural crisis and foreclosure policy.

Farmland is defined as all land under the farmer's control, whether or not it is under cultivation, but excluding land under the control of a tenant or cropper. Farm values are collected to include the farmer-reported value of all land and buildings under normal (as opposed to stressed) conditions; importantly, these are not market transaction or foreclosure-sale prices.

Linked Census Outcomes for Adults We use individual-level census microdata from the U.S. Decennial Census, as provided by Ruggles et al. (2024). In particular, we collect data on age, family structure, sector and occupational choices, schooling, and residence (including living on a farm). The linking procedure of Ruggles et al. (2025) connects individuals across censuses to build the Multigenerational Longitudinal Panel, which we study for the censuses from 1910 to 1950. Their method incorporates ancillary genealogical data from the Social Security Adminis-

tration, Ancestry.com, and FamilySearch to enable the linking. Although Ruggles et al. (2025) have substantially improved linkage quality for women, match rates remain lower than for men in this era. We therefore focus on men to minimize attrition bias in our linked sample. We regard this as a conservative choice and recognize that women's labor market and mobility responses may differ.

With this sample, we construct occupational transitions and migration among workers. We define occupational transitions (migration) at the county level as the share of individuals from a given occupation (county) in census $t-1$ who are still in the same occupation (county) in census t. Both occupational-retention and county-retention rates are computed only over individuals successfully linked across census waves.[7]

The census provides several ways to identify farmers: occupational code, industry code, and farm residence. The latter provides the broadest definition, as it captures the adult household of a farmer who may provide farm labor but is not formally counted as employed. Under occupational codes, the census distinguishes between *farm owner*, who may be full or partial owners of the land or tenant farmers, and *farm workers*, who are hired labor on farms but not themselves farmers in the sense of the agricultural census definition discussed above. We use all three definitions, as they capture subtly distinct economic content.

Linked Census Outcomes for Children We focus in particular on the children of farmers to understand the effect of foreclosure policy on farm retention. We take the 1930 census and identify children who live on farms. We link these children to their census returns as adults in 1950.

We restrict this link to children who do not migrate from their county of birth, to clarify that observed differences in outcomes arise from the 1930 county rather than a potentially different 1950 county. Moreover, this restriction helps alleviate concerns about the nature of selective attrition from the linked sample under migration, which is hard to observe. This measurement choice restricts the estimand, such that our child-outcome estimates pertain only to individuals whose adult outcomes remain tied to their childhood county environment.

To assess robustness, we also use an alternative measure of migration. In 1940, the census asked respondents to recall their migration history: in which county did they live five years ago? The variable is commonly used in the migration literature (Derenoncourt, 2022; Hornbeck, 2023). This provides an alternative approach to understanding migration without relying on establishing successful links between censuses, which may be compromised by differential attrition under migration.[8]

[7] Given that our main treatment is at the county level, we lose nothing by collapsing this data to the county level for the regression. We can achieve similar results at the individual level with appropriate weighting and clustering.

[8] The MLP procedure of Ruggles et al. (2025) under-represents lifetime migrants in the linked sample by approximately 15% (4

Other Data

Manufacturing We access county-level data on the number of manufacturing establishments, wage earners, total wages, and value added from the Census of Manufacturers. The data are compiled by Hornbeck (2012) and supplemented with additional years from the ICPSR historical county data series (Haines et al., 2010). Where definitions have changed over time, we harmonize the data in accordance with (Hornbeck and Keskin, 2015).

New Deal and Dustbowl To understand how our policy interacts with other important forces in 1930s agriculture, we use data from Hornbeck (2012) on the extent of dust-bowl erosion (high, medium, and low) in each county and the total expenditure of various New Deal programs, originally collated from the Office of Government Reports in Fishback et al. (2005a).

Geographic Data Schroeder et al. (2025) provides GIS files for US counties in each decade of our sample. We use the method of Eckert et al. (2020) to generate an area-weighted crosswalk from each county-year to a baseline set of 1930 counties, which we use as the consistent unit of analysis. This entails that whenever a county boundary differs from the 1930 definition, we compute the area of intersection with the 1930 county and re-aggregate the data from the altered county back into the 1930 unit in proportion to the overlap.[9]

The majority of county border changes in our sample are concentrated in the West, Southwest, and Texas. We exclude the independent cities of Virginia, Hawaii, and Alaska, as well as U.S. territories, from our analysis.

II.B Empirical Strategy

We aim to identify the effects of foreclosure laws on farmers and county economies over time. Our empirical strategy is based on the idea that moratoria should matter most where more farms were ex ante exposed to foreclosure risk. Since county-level data on foreclosure rates are unavailable, we proxy for that exposure using the 1930 mortgage share. Alston (1983) reports a state-level correlation of 0.65 between foreclosure incidence and the farm mortgage share, supporting our use of the mortgage share as a proxy for pre-policy foreclosure risk. Figure 1 compares the spatial distribution of foreclosure rates in 1932 (at the state level) to mortgage shares (at the county level) in 1930. The overall correlation reported above is striking, while sufficient county-level variation in mortgage rates creates the opportunity to make even tighter within-state comparisons. However, because high-exposure counties in treated states are not randomly located, we

percentage points) relative to the full census.

[9] This assumes a uniform spatial density of the data within the county.

cannot rely on simple treated-versus-untreated comparisons.

Treatment Balance The central challenge in this setting is the non-random assignment of the foreclosure policy across states and, hence, counties, as shown in column 1 of Table 3, which examines balance in the 1930 cross-section. Counties treated by a moratorium have a larger share of farms under mortgage, are larger in population, and are more agricultural. Treated counties have roughly 20% more farms, and those farms are roughly 40% larger in area. These factors align with the political drivers of policy adoption documented by Alston (1984).

In column 2, we include indicator variables for each decile of the mortgage share distribution to assess the validity of comparisons between counties with similar mortgage shares. This approach mechanically captures nearly all differences in the mortgage share exposure, but generally fails to mitigate imbalance in other observables within the 1930 cross-section. Moratoria adoption is an endogenous political choice that reflects the agricultural characteristics of the marginally viable farmer, not only the size of this margin.

Triple Difference Design This empirical problem lends itself to a triple difference design (Gruber, 1994). It nests three sources of variation: (1) variation over time, (2) variation across states induced by the policy changes, and (3) variation across counties in their baseline mortgage shares. Our analysis also uses a rich set of fixed effects, including state–year fixed effects. We expect the largest effects in counties that received the foreclosure moratorium and had the highest share of mortgaged farms in 1930. The standard triple difference estimator is β_0 in the regression:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln(Y_{ct}) =& \beta_0(D_s \times \ln(M_{c,1930}) \times \mathbb{I}_{t>1930}) \\ &+\beta_1(\ln(M_{c,1930}) \times \mathbb{I}_{t>1930}) \\ &+\eta_c + \sigma_t + \chi_{st} + \epsilon_{ct}\end{aligned}$$

where s, c, and t index state, county, and time, respectively. D_s indicates that the state adopts a moratorium law. $\ln(M_{c,1930})$ is the log of the share of farms with mortgages in 1930 in the county. $\mathbb{I}_{t>1930}$ indicates the post-treatment period. In words, β_0 measures whether, after 1930, the within-state gradient of outcomes with respect to baseline mortgage exposure is steeper in moratorium states than in non-moratorium states.

The post-1930 indicator denotes a reduced-form exposure period that begins after 1930. Although the underlying moratoria were temporary, this specification is intended to capture both their immediate effects and any persistent consequences operating through subsequent refinancing, debt restructuring, or farm-support programs. The single post-period indicator is also

practical: census observation years are sparse, and the laws were passed within a tight two-year window (1933–1935), making a more granular rollout design difficult to implement.

We include county, year, and state-year fixed effects. As a result, β_0 is identified from within-state, within-year differences across counties with different baseline mortgage exposure, comparing how that exposure gradient changes after 1930 in moratorium states relative to non-moratorium states. The inclusion of these fixed effects makes the inclusion of D_s, $\ln(M_{c,1930})$, and $\mathbb{I}_{t>1930}$ and other lower-order interactions redundant.

Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for potential observed shocks at the level of treatment assignment.[10] Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area, such that the estimand has the interpretation as the effect on the average unit of agricultural land.

The identifying assumption requires that the relative outcome of high and low-mortgage share counties in the treated states trend in the same way as the relative outcome of high and low-mortgage share counties in the control states in the (counterfactual) absence of treatment (Olden and Møen, 2022). Note that this does not require two sets of parallel trend assumptions, despite the triple difference being interpretable as the difference of two double difference (DD) estimates. The DD parallel trends assumption can be violated, provided that the violation is stable across groups (Ortiz-Villavicencio and Sant'Anna, 2025). We provide evidence consistent with the required stability of these parallel-trend violations below.

Testing Assumptions. We complement the cross-sectional balance analysis with pre-trend tests for the identifying restriction underlying the DDD design, following Lin and Peri (2025). In our setting, this restriction implies two diagnostic implications.

Assumption I: Before foreclosure moratoria are adopted, the treated-minus-control difference must evolve similarly across high- and low-mortgage-share counties.

Assumption II: Before foreclosure moratoria are adopted, the high-minus-low mortgage-share difference must evolve similarly across adopting and non-adopting states.

We analyze the pre-trends corresponding to these restrictions in Figure 6 for two outcomes: log value per farm (Figure 6a) and log number of farms (Figure 6b). Our specification follows the standard TWFE event study specification and is estimated separately for each subgroup (indicated by color). For the dynamic specification, we discretize exposure using a top-decile indicator ($\geq$ 63% mortgage share) to improve visual interpretability and retain power.

The upper figure in each panel corresponds to Assumption I. We plot the time-varying effect of the moratoria treatment for each group. The lower panel corresponds to Assumption II, which tests for the effects of the 1930 mortgage share. Although there are nonzero pre-trends,

[10] Olden and Møen (2022) argue that treatment unit-clustered standard errors are appropriate for triple-difference designs in most applications, while Ortiz-Villavicencio and Sant'Anna (2025) show that efficiency gains are possible using doubly-robust estimators. Our results remain significant at standard levels when we adopt county-level clustering.

the differences between groups are broadly parallel until after the treatment, which reassures us that the identifying restriction is valid.

Other specifications. In presenting our results, we use a standard dynamic triple difference to complement our static specification:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln(Y_{ct}) = &\sum_{\tau \neq 1930} \beta_\tau (D_s \times \mathbb{I}_{M_c > p90} \times \mathbb{I}_{t=\tau}) \\ &+ \sum_{\tau \neq 1930} \gamma_\tau (D_s \times \mathbb{I}_{t=\tau}) \\ &+ \sum_{\tau \neq 1930} \theta_\tau (\mathbb{I}_{M_c > p90} \times \mathbb{I}_{t=\tau}) \\ &+ \eta_c + \sigma_t + \chi_{st} + \epsilon_{ct}\end{aligned}$$

As an additional specification, we compare our triple-difference results with a standard double-difference specification estimated in a sample restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution. This has two benefits: allowing for a nonlinear effect of mortgage share in the most exposed counties and making effect sizes easier to interpret.

Improving Comparison Validity The DDD design compares how post-1930 outcomes vary with baseline mortgage exposure in moratorium states relative to the corresponding exposure gradient in non-moratorium states. It is a continuous-exposure policy design: identification comes from differences in post-treatment outcome slopes with respect to pre-treatment exposure, not simply from treated-versus-untreated level differences. Recent work on exposure-based designs emphasizes that such comparisons remain most credible when treated and untreated units have good overlap in baseline characteristics at a given level of exposure, since differencing alone does not ensure support or rule out selection on exposure (Callaway et al., 2024; Borusyak et al., 2025).

Table 3 shows that this concern is empirically substantial in our setting: in the full sample, counties in moratorium and non-moratorium states remain observably different even after flexibly conditioning on mortgage exposure. We therefore complement the baseline DDD with a border-county specification that restricts comparisons to geographically contiguous counties on either side of a treatment border. This restriction targets the same underlying exposure contrast on a more local support.

To demonstrate the utility of these tighter geographic comparisons, column 3 of Table 3 restricts the sample to the 476 counties adjacent to a state border where the treatment status differs. The location of these counties is shown in Figure 3b. Geographic contiguity helps address nearly

all observable imbalances in treatment assignment. Moreover, this contiguity is particularly useful for addressing (potentially unobservable) differences in soil and climatic characteristics that are important for agricultural outcomes. While one could control for some of these characteristics directly, Ortiz-Villavicencio and Sant'Anna (2025) argue that covariate adjustment in DDD designs can alter the identifying comparison in nontrivial ways. Thus, we treat the border restriction as a design-based way to improve comparability rather than relying solely on regression adjustment.

Column 4 of Table 3 adds a set of indicators to the border sample specification for each specific border segment. For example, all counties along the Arizona/New Mexico border are included in a single indicator, so our treatment-control comparison is made within this fine-grained set of counties. There are 46 distinct state-border pairs among the 25 states that have adopted moratoria. This approach further controls the likely unobservable differences, following the minimum wage literature, which extensively uses state-level legislative changes (Allegretto et al., 2017).

The outstanding imbalance is in the agricultural mortgage interest rate. The specification in column 4 indicates that, even in neighboring counties, farmers faced interest rates approximately 3% lower in states that adopted foreclosure policies. This is evidence that, even while other features are held constant, banking conditions were highly local.[11]

We summarize the treatment balance visually in Figure 4. In summary, we find that treated counties are observably different, and conditioning on mortgage-share exposure does not solve the imbalance. We therefore present border-county estimates alongside full-sample DDD estimates throughout, treating geographic contiguity as a design-based robustness check rather than an alternative identification strategy.

III Effects on Farms, Farmers, and their Children

This section discusses how foreclosure moratoria reshaped the allocation of households to farming. Moratoria insulated incumbent farmers in counties experiencing severe mortgage distress. This protection had two immediate consequences. First, it increased the number of operational farms and slowed occupational reallocation away from agriculture. Second, these initial dislocations had significant intergenerational consequences for the children of farmers. This generation was much more likely to stay in agriculture instead of transitioning to manufacturing.

[11] Interstate banking was highly restricted until at least the 1970s (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996).

III.A Number of Farms

We begin by examining the most direct consequence of foreclosure moratoria—the number of farms in a county. Event-study estimates indicate stable pre-trends and a large and sustained increase in farm counts beginning in 1940 (Figure 7a). Given that most moratoria were enacted in 1933, it is plausible that their effects took time to materialize. Additionally, as discussed in Section I.C, New Deal agricultural policies introduced after 1935 likely reinforced and extended these effects, explaining the absence of an immediate impact in 1935.

The event study plots rely on the DDD specification, which estimates whether the rise in farm counts in treated states and in counties that were more exposed ex ante (higher mortgage shares), beyond (i) generic post-1930 changes and (ii) any differential post-1930 changes in high-mortgage places that occurred everywhere. The triple interaction is the key parameter of interest, and including lower-order interactions eliminates policy-only and exposure-only post-treatment trends.

The double-difference (DD) estimator restricts the analysis to counties in the highest quartile of mortgage exposure and directly compare the most severely treated counties with both untreated and less-treated counties. The estimate is 0.137 and is significant at the 1 percent level in the full sample. In the border county specification (DD), it ranges from 0.182 to 0.287 (Table 4). These coefficients imply roughly 15%–30% higher farm counts in the top quartile of mortgaged counties in moratoria states after the policy. For the median county in this top quartile, this would translate to roughly 300 more farms.

The DDD specification utilizes continuous variation in exposure. We estimate a coefficient of 0.231 that is statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 4). Since both the dependent and independent variables are in log form, this coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity. Counties with a 10% higher baseline mortgage share experienced approximately a 2.3% greater increase in farm numbers. The border-county specification yields even larger coefficients (ranging from 0.369 to 0.397).

From 1930 to 1940, the total number of farms in the U.S. declined from 6.3 million to 6.1 million; the trend was one of farmers leaving agriculture. The effects of this policy mitigate the overall decline in the number of farms during this period by approximately 125,000–262,000 in the top quartile of counties.

These results are not driven by any single region. In Table A3, we estimate the triple differences specification while individually excluding Census Bureau Regions (Northeast, Midwest, South Atlantic, South, and West). The coefficient on the number of farms is largely stable across these specifications. The largest deviation from the baseline coefficient occurs when we exclude the South which is characterized by a greater emphasis on cotton and sharecropping and also a

lower reliance on mortgages.

A natural concern with this analysis is that concurrent New Deal programs could drive the observed impact of the moratoria. We control for county level exposure to major New Deal programs—Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) benefit payments and Farm Security Administration (FSA) credit to farms, as well as Works Progress Administration (WPA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and Public Works Administration (PWA) relief and public-works spending—using the county-level series assembled by Fishback et al. (2005b). We fully interact each of these variables with our treatments. This leaves the DDD estimate essentially unchanged (Table 4, Column 5).

We also test the sensitivity of our results to the Dust Bowl using erosion severity data from Hornbeck (2012). By interacting county-level Dust Bowl severity indicators with our treatments, we confirm that our key coefficient remains robust and statistically significant (Table 4, Column 6). Counties experiencing the most severe erosion show a substantial reduction in the number of farms. Counties with medium erosion exhibit no meaningful change. Together, these tests indicate that neither New Deal spending patterns nor Dust Bowl dynamics are driving the farm-count results.

III.B Individual Farmers

The increase in farm counts corresponds directly to an increase in the number of farmers. Using individual-level data from the U.S. Census linked between 1910 and 1940, we find that moratoria significantly slowed the reallocation of labor out of agriculture.

The coefficient of interest for remaining in agriculture by 1940 is 0.04, while the coefficient for transitioning into manufacturing is –0.007 (Table 7). Moving from the median mortgage share (approximately 43%) to the 90th percentile (approximately 63%) corresponds to roughly 0.8 percentage points greater agricultural retention and 0.14 percentage points fewer exits into manufacturing in moratorium states. Border-pair estimates exhibit the same directional effect even though it is less precisely estimated.

These occupational effects are persistent. After linking farmers from 1930 to 1950, we find stronger agricultural retention in Panel A of Table A1. The coefficient for remaining in agriculture increases to 0.058 and remains statistically significant at the 1% level. Moving from the median to the 90th percentile of mortgage share implies approximately 1.1 percentage points greater agricultural retention and 0.36 percentage points fewer exits into manufacturing by 1950.

These results are driven by keeping people in the agricultural sector broadly rather than preserving their specific status as farm owners. The coefficient on the probability of remaining a farm owner is small and not statistically significant (Column 3). The same is true for the county-

level results (Table A2). This is consistent with the institutional design of moratoria. The policy allowed judicial stays and extended redemption periods which lowered the foreclosure threshold and kept leveraged farms in operation even if it didn't preserve ownership. The near-zero effect on owner retention indicates that the policy mainly preserved agricultural employment rather than legal title.

We conduct a placebo test by replicating our empirical design in a period entirely unaffected by the policy. We estimate occupational transitions from 1920 to 1930 and present the results in Panel B of Table A1. The coefficients for remaining in agriculture, continuing farm ownership, and transitioning from agriculture to manufacturing are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. These null findings are consistent across the border-pair specification as well.

III.C Intergenerational Effects of the Moratoria

This section discusses how foreclosure moratoria shaped the economic trajectories of farmers' children. Using individual-level records from the 1950 Census linked to parental occupations in 1930, we ask whether children of farmers in counties with high pre-moratorium mortgage exposure, within moratorium states, followed different adult occupations than otherwise similar children.

We identify children living on farms in 1930, link them to their 1950 census returns, and restrict the sample to non-movers who remained in their childhood county between 1930 and 1950. Our analysis is at the individual level and controls for age, race, and county economic characteristics. The average age of these children is 6 years in 1930 and 26 by 1950.

Children of farmers in high mortgage counties in moratorium states are significantly more likely to be in agriculture in 1950 (Table 8). The triple-interaction coefficient is 0.071 in the parsimonious specification and 0.079 with controls. Both are significant at the 1 percent level. Moving from the median to the 90th percentile of mortgage share raises the probability that a farmer's child works in agriculture by 5%.

This effect is additive to the baseline occupational inheritance among children of farmers. Children of farmers are 39 percentage points more likely to be in agriculture in 1950 and 13 percentage points less likely to be in manufacturing than other children. The triple interaction captures an additional policy-induced tilt toward agriculture beyond baseline intergenerational persistence.

To determine whether the additional farms we observe under moratoria are 1930 farms that remain in family ownership and operation, we follow the approach in Haws et al. (2025) to proxy for farm succession. Our outcome is an indicator variable indicating that a child remains in the same county, is employed in agriculture, and shares common neighbors (defined as shared

census returns within 50 observations) with their linked child return. The results in columns 3 and 4 show that the triple interaction coefficient is around 0.03. Moving from the median to the 90th percentile of the mortgage share distribution in a treated state increases by around 2.5% the probability that a child retains the family farm. These specifications also reveal no effect of farm succession on those who are not the children of farmers, which helps clarify that our measurement captures an inheritance channel.

The moratoria also reduced the entry of farmers' children into manufacturing. The triple interaction is negative and statistically significant in the parsimonious specification (–0.051), but it becomes smaller and statistically insignificant with the inclusion of demographic and economic controls (–0.014). This interpretation is supported by the large, significant coefficient on the interaction between the mortgage share and moratoria in both specifications. By delaying or preventing foreclosures, the policy directly retained marginal farm households and increased the likelihood that farmer children remained in agriculture, including on their family farms.

IV Effects on the Farm Economy

This section examines how foreclosure moratoria affected farm values, farm size, and cropland productivity. The moratoria prevented consolidation which kept farms smaller on average. Per-farm values fell sharply and persistently, driven entirely by this foregone consolidation. Farmers responded to distorted factor prices by expanding cropland, at the expense of pasture, and spreading a diminished capital stock across more acres. This led to a high-labor, low-capital farming model with lower yields per cropland acre. At the same time, the number of manufacturing establishments did not change, but we find suggestive evidence that output per plant fell modestly, consistent with reduced local demand from poorer, smaller farms. Finally, we find small and unstable migration effects.

IV.A Farm Values and Size

The moratoria kept farms smaller. The previous results confirm that the moratoria increased the number of farms significantly while county-level total farmland acres remained fixed. We estimate a treatment elasticity of -0.244 for average farm size (Table 6). Total acres in farmland stays flat throughout our sample which implies that the increase in farm counts translates directly into a decrease in acres per farm. This foregone consolidation is the central mechanism behind the decline in per-farm values.

The triple-difference specification yields a treatment elasticity of 0.107 for the average value of farm land and buildings per farm (Table 5). Moving from the median to the 90th percentile of

mortgage exposure corresponds to a decline of roughly 6–7 percent. The border-pair specification produces an even larger elasticity of -0.236. Double difference estimates, that focus solely on the most exposed counties, imply a roughly 20 percent decline in average farm values following the moratoria. Event study figures confirm no discernible pre-trends and a sharp, persistent fall in value after 1940, remaining persistent through 1960 (Figure 8).

Per-farm land value represents the discounted present value of expected net income from the farm as an operating unit. If markets had fully adjusted after the moratoria through consolidation, refinancing, or reallocation of land to more productive users, then per-farm values should have rebounded. Instead, the persistent decline suggests that the policy durably lowered expected returns on farm operations.

The decline in value per farm is not driven by a reduction in per-acre values. We find that the moratoria led to a slight but persistent *increase* in the average value of farm land and buildings per acre. The triple difference specification yields a positive treatment elasticity of 0.156 for the average value of land and buildings per farmland acre (Table A4, Column 1). This pattern can be captured by the following accounting identity:

$$\log\left(\frac{\text{value}}{\text{farm}}\right) = \log\left(\frac{\text{value}}{\text{acre}}\right) + \log\left(\frac{\text{acres}}{\text{farm}}\right). \tag{1}$$

Because total farmland acres and total value of land and buildings both stay flat, the entire drop in *value per farm* reflects the loss of scale economies due to foregone consolidation.

We posit two explanations for the increase in value per farmland acre. First, the moratoria artificially inflated observed land prices by altering the type of transaction reported in the market. By legally preventing lenders from forcing distress sales, the moratoria effectively removed the left tail of the market's price distribution (Campbell et al., 2011). The remaining observable sales used for appraisal were skewed toward voluntary and non-distressed transactions, mechanically driving up the average observed value per acre.

Second, the land economics literature finds that per-acre prices rise as parcel size falls. One study found that average price per acre of 40-160 acre farms is almost twice as high as per acre prices of farms greater than 640 acres for transactions recorded in 1971 (Brorsen et al., 2015). As farms get smaller, many improvements on the land (house, barn) are lumpy and partly fixed, so dividing by fewer acres raises per-acre value mechanically. This puzzle can also be partially explained by liquidity effects, higher road frontage per unit of area (Tsoodle et al., 2006), and increased potential for non-agricultural or "hobby" farming uses (Sengupta and Osgood, 2003).

IV.B Farm Productivity

We now discuss how the moratoria affected cropland productivity. Faced with higher interest rates and relatively abundant labor, farmers substituted away from capital-intensive production and toward labor-intensive production. The primary margin for this substitution was land allocation. We find that the share of farmland dedicated to cropland increases substantially in response to the moratoria. Our triple-difference specification yields a treatment elasticity of 0.252 (Table A7). For a county moving from the median (43%) to the 90th percentile (63%) of mortgage exposure, this implies a 10 percent increase in the share of farmland being used for crops.

This expansion of cropland came at the expense of capital-intensive uses such as pasture. Hornbeck (2012) finds that more-eroded counties with better access to banking immediately shifted land from cropland to pasture after the Dust Bowl. In contrast, there was no difference in shifting land from wheat to hay. The reduction in capital per acre is also consistent with the large reduction in the capital-labor ratio (Table A5).

Given this endogenous expansion along the cropland margin, examining outcomes *per farmland acre* would be misleading, as that would conflate the intensive margin (productivity on existing land) with the extensive margin (the addition of new, likely lower-quality, land). The correct metric is, therefore, per cropland acre.

We find clear evidence of lower capital intensity per cropland acre. The amount of machinery available per cropland acre decreases significantly (Table A6). Our primary state-year fixed effect specification yields an elasticity of -0.339, significant at the 1 percent level. We also see a reduction in physical capital. The share of farms with tractors decreases with an elasticity of -0.065 (Table A10).

This combination of more land being worked with less capital had predictable negative consequences for output. We find suggestive evidence that the total value of crop sold per cropland acre fell with an elasticity of -0.235 (Table A8). We find stronger evidence that the share of cropland acres actually harvested declined after the policy (Table A9). This decline can be directly attributed to an increase in crop failure or cropland being left idle.[12]

The decline in productivity per cropland acre reflects two complementary channels. Farmers spread their diminished capital stock too thinly over expanded cropland acres, leading to lower yields. And the newly activated cropland was of marginal quality, inherently less productive and more prone to failure.

The fall in productivity per cropland acre, combined with flat total farmland acres and

[12] In the Agricultural Census, total cropland is the sum of acres harvested, failed, and idle. Beginning in 1950, the reported columns for failed and idle cropland appear to be data errors, reporting all zeros. Harvested cropland, however, remains complete. We therefore use "cropland failure" for 1925-1945 and "harvested share" (which moves inversely to failure and idleness) as a consistent measure throughout the sample (1925-1960).

flat total crop output, implies that farmers were cultivating a much larger but less productive cropland base just to produce the same total output. The moratoria locked in a high-labor, low-capital, low-yield farming model, cementing the inefficiency that ultimately drove the permanent decline in per-farm asset values.

IV.C Manufacturing

We measure manufacturing outcomes using the historical Censuses of Manufacturing, which report the number of establishments, wage earners, total wages, and value added. We present the manufacturing results using two standardized indices that capture the extensive and intensive margins since the underlying variables are noisy and strongly correlated. Each index is the first principal component of the underlying variables, scaled to have a mean of 0 and unit standard deviation for the pre-moratorium period. The underlying regressions for each component are similar to the index results (reported in the appendix).

The median county in 1930 had 17 manufacturing establishments employing 247 workers, paying $206,000 in wages, and generating $519,000 in value added. The bottom quartile had 6 or fewer establishments; the top decile had 90 or more. Seventeen percent of counties had no manufacturing. Among counties with at least one establishment, the median plant employed about 18 workers and paid roughly $1,020 per worker.

We find a clear null on the extensive margin. In the preferred triple difference specification, the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero (Table A11). Event study estimates indicate no systematic divergence between high-mortgage counties in moratorium states and their comparison counties, and no evidence of pre-trends (Figure 10). The moratoria do not measurably change the number of manufacturing establishments, employment, payroll, or total value added in treated counties.

For the intensive margin index, we find suggestive evidence that the moratoria had a negative impact. In the full county sample, the triple difference coefficient is negative and statistically significant from 1920 to 1947. Moving from the median-exposure county to the top decile of pre-moratorium farm mortgage exposure is associated with an intensive margin index 0.05 standard deviations lower than that of otherwise similar counties, almost a decade after the moratoria expired (Table A13). The results are less strong when we extend the sample to 1957 (Table A12). The individual regressions indicate 5% fewer workers per plant, 6% lower payroll per plant, and 5% lower value added per plant, while wages per worker remain flat.

The event study for the intensive margin index shows the same pattern (Figure 10). Before the moratoria, treated and comparison counties moved in parallel. After implementation, the treated coefficients fall below zero and remain moderately negative through 1947. When we

restrict the sample to border counties, the estimated coefficients shrink and become imprecise. By 1958, the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, we treat the intensive margin evidence as suggestive. The moratoria may have temporarily weakened manufacturing activity within existing plants in counties with high mortgage exposure, but there is no sign of a large or permanent manufacturing collapse.

These patterns are consistent with the moratoria primarily distorting the agricultural sector and affecting manufacturing indirectly through reduced local demand for manufactured goods. Earlier results show that high-exposure counties remain characterized by smaller, less capitalized farms and lower land values, implying a persistent decline in demand for farm implements and locally purchased consumer durables. When per-farm wealth falls and credit is tight, rural households reduce purchases of locally produced durables and inputs, just as foreclosure-driven wealth losses depressed consumption during the Great Recession (Mian et al., 2015). Models of irreversible and lumpy investment show that when demand falls, firms optimally delay or forgo large, discrete capital upgrades even if they remain in operation, precisely the kind of intensive-margin response that our data capture (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Cooper and Haltiwanger 2006).

Classic development economics treated agricultural progress as a precondition for industrialization (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). Matsuyama (1992) challenges this view, arguing that comparative advantage and market integration can pull resources toward agriculture and away from manufacturing. Asher et al. (2022) find that large irrigation-driven productivity gains in India generate persistent increases in agricultural outcomes but do not translate into commensurate long-run increases in nonfarm employment, with structural transformation occurring largely through the growth of regional towns. In a setting very similar to ours, Hornbeck and Keskin (2015) finds that technology enabling access to the Ogallala aquifer raised agricultural revenue but produced no long-run expansion in manufacturing, because higher farm income bids up local factor prices and crowds out non-agricultural activity.

Our results line up with that logic but in the opposite direction. The moratoria operate as a negative agricultural shock that reduces farm wealth, so the demand channel points toward weaker local manufacturing, while the cost channel points toward lower wages and land costs that could attract tradable manufacturing. Consistent with Hornbeck and Keskin (2015), we find essentially no response in manufacturing establishment counts, which suggests that these forces may roughly offset on the extensive margin.

IV.D Migration

Foreclosure relief may change migration incentives in opposing ways. Suspending foreclosure can reduce distress migration by preventing displacement. But once the farm is saved, relief can

loosen constraints and increase the option to leave agriculture by preserving housing wealth and reducing the immediate threat of eviction.

Contrary to popular imaginations of this era, there was little net migration during the Great Depression. Net movement away from farms averaged about 630,000 per year in the 1920s but fell to roughly 195,000 per year between 1930 and 1935 and even reversed in 1932, when about 325,000 more people moved *to* farms than left them (Bernert, 1944; Wilse-Samson and Boone, 2021).

Table 12 reports DDD estimates using two migration measures. *Linked Migration (1930–1940)* measures whether an individual linked between the 1930 and 1940 censuses lives in a different county in 1940. *Migration (1935–1940)* uses the 1940 census "county of residence in 1935" question. A key advantage of the 1935–1940 measure is that it does not mechanically depend on the linkage procedure for migration status (Wilse-Samson and Boone, 2021).

The results are modest. Moving from the median to the 90th percentile of mortgage exposure in moratoria states reduces the linked 1930–1940 migration rate by about 0.28 percentage points and the 1935–1940 rate by about 0.82 percentage points. These results are not stable across specifications. In the border-county comparisons (cols. (3) and (6)), the interaction flips sign and becomes imprecise. The evidence suggests that foreclosure moratoria do not generate large or robust changes in county-to-county migration, consistent with the broader Depression-era pattern documented by Wilse-Samson and Boone (2021).

V Effects on Credit Markets

The moratoria had a significant effect on local credit markets. Rural credit markets during this period were highly local due to both physical barriers and regulatory constraints. Most farmers did not own cars, and telephones were rare, so repeated in-person interaction with a lender was effectively a prerequisite for obtaining and maintaining credit (Rajan and Ramcharan, 2016). The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 explicitly limited national banks' ability to originate real-estate loans across district borders, and although the McFadden Act of 1927 modestly relaxed these constraints, interstate branching remained largely prohibited (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). State banks operated under similar de facto geographic limits. Following Rajan and Ramcharan (2016), we take "the banks within a county and in physically proximate counties" to be the relevant local market.

Within this locally segmented market, the foreclosure moratoria raised the cost of credit. Our baseline estimates in Table 11 indicate that by 1940, farm mortgage interest rates in the most-exposed counties were about 30 basis points higher than in unexposed counties. This is roughly a 4 percent increase relative to the sample mean interest rate of around 7.5 percent. The

effect is robust to flexibly controlling for the Dust Bowl and New Deal spending.

The estimate is economically meaningful, especially when set against the dramatic convergence in farm interest rates between 1930 and 1940. County-level rates were highly dispersed in 1930, but by 1940 had mostly converged (Figure A1). Using the 1930 cross-sectional dispersion as a baseline, our estimates imply that foreclosure suspensions account for roughly 30 percent of the remaining gap in county-level interest rates in 1940.

We consider three channels through which a temporary suspension of foreclosures could have translated into persistently higher borrowing costs. First, moratoria might have weakened local banks' balance sheets, either by preventing them from foreclosing on delinquent borrowers or by triggering depositor runs (Mitchener and Richardson, 2024) and producing a classic credit crunch (Correia et al., 2026). However, this mechanism has little support in the data. Rates of bank failure in the late 1930s are strikingly similar across moratoria and non-moratoria states (see Figure A2). Moreover, the creation of the FDIC in 1933 and subsequent recapitalization programs had largely stabilized the banking system by the middle of the decade.

Second, the moratoria likely raised risk premia by weakening creditor rights. A large literature shows that stronger legal protection for creditors lowers borrowing costs and increases credit supply (La Porta et al., 1997). The moratoria were an extreme, highly salient case of the state overriding private contracts and suspending enforcement of secured claims. Even though the moratoria were temporary, a lender might rationally revise their beliefs about such policies being enacted again in future downturns. Rational lenders respond to this institutional risk by charging higher interest rates, particularly on long-maturity loans like farm mortgages that are exposed to multiple business cycles. The fact that higher rates are concentrated in counties and states that actually suspended foreclosures, rather than in neighboring areas facing similar macroeconomic shocks but no legal intervention, is consistent with a creditor-rights risk-premium channel.

Third, the moratoria induced negative selection in farming. As shown in Section III and Section IV, counties where the moratoria had the most bite experienced an increase in smaller, less valuable, and less productive farms. When lenders resume foreclosure and refinancing activity after the moratoria expire, the pool of incumbent borrowers is tilted toward riskier farms relative to non-moratorium states. If lenders update their beliefs about the average default risk of borrowers based on this composition, they will optimally raise interest rates on new and renewed loans. This mechanism is reminiscent of classic adverse selection models in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The persistence of elevated rates in moratoria counties—even after controlling for observable farm characteristics—supports such a negative-selection story.

In summary, we find that foreclosure moratoria left a clear imprint on local credit markets, raising farm borrowing costs substantially. Our results explain a sizable share of the residual cross-county dispersion in interest rates by 1940, not through continued bank distress but through

higher risk premia and adverse selection in the pool of surviving farms.

VI Conclusion

Foreclosure moratoria are a recurring policy response to economic crises. The Great Depression offers a unique opportunity to study what happens when governments actually deploy these tools at scale. We exploit cross-state variation in whether moratoria were adopted and within-state variation in the extent of exposure of counties to mortgage distress, using a triple-difference design supplemented by a state-border empirical strategy.

We show that the moratoria worked, at least in the narrow sense that they kept farms in operation. Counties where the policy had the most bite saw a persistent 15-30% rise in farm counts and a corresponding fall in average farm size. The linked census evidence corroborates this account. We find that farmers in high-exposure treated counties were more likely to stay in agriculture and less likely to move into manufacturing. Their children followed suit. A generation later, the sons of protected farmers were still disproportionately working the family plot.

We also show that preserving farms came at a cost. Moratoria pushed up local borrowing costs, likely reflecting both weakened creditor protections and a riskier pool of surviving borrowers. The remaining farms were smaller, more labor-intensive, and less productive. Cropland expanded onto marginal acres, capital per acre declined, crop failures increased, and per-acre revenues declined. Per-farm values dropped and stayed down. We find no evidence that manufacturing collapsed on the extensive margin, although there is suggestive evidence that existing plants operated at lower intensity, consistent with weaker local demand and slower labor reallocation.

Two key limitations of our paper point to directions for future work. First, while our data provide evidence consistent with selection on surviving operators, they cannot fully disentangle selection from post-crisis re-optimization within farms. Second, a complete welfare analysis would require quantifying short-run insurance benefits and potential spillovers (e.g., avoided fire-sale losses and community stabilization) against the long-run distortions we document.

Our results speak to a fundamental tension in crisis-era policymaking. Temporary suspensions of creditor rights can provide valuable breathing room during periods of acute distress, but such interventions entail substantial costs. We cannot speak to overall welfare, but our evidence demonstrates that the long-run costs of foreclosure moratoria—in terms of misallocation, reduced productivity, and slower structural change—were substantial and persistent. Policymakers considering similar interventions should weigh these trade-offs carefully, recognizing that short-run protection may generate long-run distortions that outlast the crisis itself.

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
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
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Figure 1: Geography of the Foreclosure Crisis




(a) Share of farms with a mortgage in 1930




(b) Farm foreclosure rates in 1932

Notes: The upper panel maps the county-level share of farms under mortgage in 1930, as reported in the United States Census of Agriculture (Haines et al., 2018). Missing counties reflect unavailable county-level mortgage data. The lower panel maps state-level farm foreclosure rates in 1932 from Stauber (1933).

Figure 2: Timeline of the Foreclosure Crisis




(a) Share of farms under mortgage by region




(b) Share of farms under involuntary transfer

Notes: The upper panel plots the regional share of farms under mortgage using Agricultural Census data (Haines et al., 2018). The lower panel plots the share of farms under involuntary transfer using the Works Progress Administration sample constructed by Messer and Rieder (2025).

Figure 3: Geography of the Foreclosure Moratoria




(a) States adopting foreclosure moratorium laws



(b) Counties in the border sample and their mortgage share ($N = 476$)


Notes: The upper panel indicates states that adopted foreclosure moratoria, based on Alston (1984). The lower panel shows the border sample, defined as counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. The shading denotes quartiles of the county share of farms under mortgage in 1930.

Figure 4: Covariate Balance under Moratorium Treatment




Notes: This figure compares baseline covariate differences between counties in moratorium and non-moratorium states across three samples. *Full Sample* reports unconditional differences in 1930 characteristics. *Mortgage Decile* adds fixed effects for deciles of the 1930 county mortgage share. *Border Sample* restricts the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which treatment status differs.


Figure 5: The Process of Mortgage Foreclosure and Moratorium




Notes: The diagram illustrates the mortgage-foreclosure process and the points at which moratorium laws intervene. Yellow nodes denote decision points. Green nodes denote pathways created by moratorium laws. The three types of green nodes correspond to the legal categories summarized in Table 2. The diagram summarizes the discussion in Section I.B.


Figure 6: Pre-trends in Triple-Difference Estimation





(a) Log average farm value







(b) Log number of farms

Notes: This figure reports event-study estimates used as pre-trend diagnostics for the triple-difference design, as described in Section II.B. The left panel uses log average farm value as the outcome; the right panel uses log number of farms. Each subplot reports separate event-study estimates by subgroup: high- versus low-mortgage-share counties (top) and moratorium versus non-moratorium states (bottom). Data are from Haines et al. (2018).

Figure 7: Triple-Difference Event Studies for Farm Outcomes




(a) Log number of farms




(b) Log average farm value

Notes: Observations are county-years. The upper panel plots event-study estimates for the log number of farms in a county. The lower panel plots event-study estimates for the log average value of farm land and buildings per farm, in current dollars. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. Each coefficient corresponds to the interaction between moratorium status and an indicator for counties in the top decile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Figure 8: Triple-Difference Event Studies for Farm Outcomes II




(a) Log crop revenue per acre of cropland



(b) Log total farm value


Notes: Observations are county-years. The upper panel plots event-study estimates for log crop revenue per acre of cropland. The lower panel plots event-study estimates for the log total value of farm land and buildings in a county. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. Each coefficient corresponds to the interaction between moratorium status and an indicator for counties in the top decile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Figure 9: Moratoria and the Interest Rate




Notes: Observations are counties in the border-pair sample. The horizontal axis is the county share of farms under mortgage in 1930. The vertical axis is the percentage change in the farm mortgage interest rate between 1920 and 1940, as reported in the Agricultural Census. Data are grouped into 50 equally sized bins. Local polynomial estimates are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Figure 10: Triple-Difference Event Studies for Manufacturing Outcomes



(a) Extensive-margin index



(b) Intensive-margin index

Notes: Observations are county-years. The upper panel plots event-study estimates for the manufacturing extensive-margin index. The lower panel plots event-study estimates for the manufacturing intensive-margin index. The indices are constructed from county-level manufacturing outcomes described in the text. Each coefficient corresponds to the interaction between moratorium status and an indicator for counties in the top decile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 1: County Summary Statistics in 1930

	N	mean	s.d	min	p50	p90	max
Foreclosure Moratoria	3,085	0.58	0.49	0	1	1	1
Number of Farms (log)	3,085	7.30	0.98	0	7.50	8.24	9.68
Owner-Operated Farms Share	3,082	0.61	0.20	0.03	0.64	0.87	1
Share of Farms Mortgaged	3,083	0.42	0.16	0	0.43	0.63	0.95
Average Farm Size (log)	3,083	5.01	0.97	0.81	4.78	6.44	11.03
Value of Machinery per Acre (log)	3,083	1.03	0.92	-6.34	1.02	2.09	6.55
Value of Land and Buildings (log)	3,083	16.07	1.08	9.39	16.15	17.36	19.99
Number of National Banks	3,085	2.36	3.83	0	1	6.00	61
Mortgage Interest Rate (%)	3,066	6.48	0.69	2.88	6.38	7.39	10
Population (log)	3,085	9.82	1.04	4.38	9.78	11.04	15.20
Farm Population Share	3,045	0.46	0.25	0	0.51	0.77	0.99
Farmer Age	3,085	46.49	1.92	41	46.26	49.12	58.50
Farmer Share White	3,085	0.90	0.18	0.14	0.99	1	1
Ratio Farm Workers to Owners	3,085	0.50	0.54	0.04	0.43	0.74	24
Pr[Stay Farm Owner] (1930-1940)	3,085	0.47	0.12	0	0.49	0.59	0.77
Pr[Stay in Agriculture] (1930-1940)	3,085	0.69	0.13	0	0.72	0.81	0.90
Pr[Transition Ag. to Manuf.] (1930-1940)	3,085	0.06	0.04	0	0.05	0.12	0.50

Notes: Observations are counties in 1930, unless otherwise indicated. Summary statistics are unweighted. Data are from Alston (1984), Haines et al. (2010), Haines et al. (2018), Pawel Janas (2024), and Ruggles et al. (2024, 2025).

Table 2: State Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation (1933–1934)

State	Year	Length (Months)	Foreclosure Stay	Redemption Extension	Deficiency Regulation
Arizona	1933	24	Yes	No	Yes
California	1933	45	Yes	Yes	Yes
Delaware	1933	14	Yes	No	No
Idaho	1933	48	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iowa	1933	49	Yes	Yes	Yes
Illinois	1933	24	Yes	No	No
Kansas	1933	46	No	Yes	Yes
Louisiana	1934	21	Yes	No	Yes
Michigan	1933	45	Yes	Yes	Yes
Minnesota	1933	46	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mississippi	1934	13	Yes	No	Yes
Montana	1933	24	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nebraska	1933	48	Yes	No	Yes
New Hampshire	1933	48	Yes	Yes	No
New York	1933	46	Yes	No	Yes
North Carolina	1933	24	Yes	No	Yes
North Dakota	1933	52	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ohio	1933	47	Yes	No	No
Oklahoma	1933	24	Yes	No	No
Pennsylvania	1933	46	Yes	No	Yes
South Carolina	1933	53	Yes	No	Yes
South Dakota	1933	48	Yes	Yes	Yes
Texas	1933	18	Yes	No	Yes
Vermont	1933	48	Yes	Yes	No
Wisconsin	1933	49	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table summarizes state foreclosure-relief laws discussed in Section I. *Year* is the year the law took effect. *Length* is the approximate duration of relief, including extensions. *Foreclosure Stay* indicates laws allowing postponement of foreclosure proceedings. *Redemption Extension* indicates laws extending the period during which property could be redeemed after sale. *Deficiency Regulation* indicates laws limiting lenders' ability to pursue deficiency judgments after foreclosure.

Table 3: Balance of Treated Counties in 1930

	(1) Full Sample	(2) + Mortgage Decile	(3) + Border Sample	(4) + Border Pair FE
Share of Farms Mortgaged	0.372***	0.00107	0.00996	-0.0000371
	(0.0269)	(0.0175)	(0.0148)	(0.0201)
Total Population	0.117***	0.202***	-0.163	-0.125
	(0.0376)	(0.0412)	(0.101)	(0.0967)
Number of National Banks	0.304***	0.259***	0.0929	0.0839
	(0.0263)	(0.0298)	(0.0765)	(0.0860)
Mortgage Interest Rate	-0.0507***	-0.0368***	-0.0323***	-0.0326***
	(0.00366)	(0.00377)	(0.00937)	(0.0104)
Number of Farms	0.195***	0.169***	-0.0368	0.0282
	(0.0376)	(0.0373)	(0.0850)	(0.109)
Owner-Operated Farms Share	-0.0561***	-0.0252	-0.0455	-0.0572*
	(0.0159)	(0.0172)	(0.0430)	(0.0300)
Average Farm Size	0.428***	0.162***	0.0829	-0.00769
	(0.0339)	(0.0356)	(0.0865)	(0.0675)
Value of Machinery per Acre	0.347***	0.222***	0.0558	0.0903
	(0.0325)	(0.0345)	(0.0825)	(0.0804)
Value of Land and Buildings	0.766***	0.418***	0.0683	0.0815
	(0.0376)	(0.0339)	(0.0745)	(0.0954)
Livestock Value per Acre	0.115***	0.0904***	-0.0434	-0.0134
	(0.0214)	(0.0223)	(0.0481)	(0.0393)
Crop Value per Acre	0.110**	0.0346	-0.0942	0.0133
	(0.0546)	(0.0521)	(0.107)	(0.0984)
Proportion Treated	0.58	0.58	0.52	0.52
Obs	3,089	3,089	476	476
Pairs				46

Notes: Observations are counties in 1930. Each coefficient is from a regression of the indicated baseline characteristic on an indicator for whether the county is in a state that adopted a foreclosure moratorium (Alston, 1984). Unless otherwise noted, outcomes are in logs. *Mortgage Decile* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for deciles of the 1930 farm mortgage share. *Border Sample* restricts the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust in columns 1–3 and clustered at the border-pair level in column 4.

Table 4: Effects of Moratoria on Number of Farms

	Outcome: Log of Number of Farms								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	0.251***		0.311***	0.417***	0.242***	0.251***	0.133***	0.295***	0.182*
	(0.049)		(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.050)	(0.077)	(0.031)	(0.102)	(0.098)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.230***	0.355***	0.258**	0.392***	0.231***	0.264***			
	(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.061)	(0.060)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.88	0.90	0.87	0.89	0.88	0.88	0.85	0.81	0.84
Obs	33,689	33,689	5,677	5,189	33,689	33,689	8,425	1,147	1,039
Counties	3,089	3,089	523	478	3,089	3,089	768	105	95
Outcome mean	2,148	2,148	2,058	2,108	2,148	2,148	1,868	1,708	1,755
Outcome SD	1,561	1,561	1,737	1,799	1,561	1,561	1,589	1,905	2,053

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the log number of farms in a county. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 5: Effects of Moratoria on Farm Values

	Outcome: Log of Value per Farm ($/farm)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.232***		-0.223*	-0.289***	-0.218***	-0.371***	-0.187***	-0.114	-0.106
	(0.046)		(0.115)	(0.095)	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.042)	(0.098)	(0.085)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.167***	-0.107**	-0.153	-0.236***	-0.148***	-0.240***			
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.040)	(0.067)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.93	0.95	0.90	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.87	0.84	0.86
Obs	33,645	33,645	5,677	5,189	33,645	33,645	8,425	1,147	1,039
Counties	3,088	3,088	523	478	3,088	3,088	768	105	95
Outcome mean	12,393	12,393	11,875	12,093	12,393	12,393	16,778	14,949	15,333
Outcome SD	14,313	14,313	14,562	15,248	14,313	14,313	13,519	7,919	8,374

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the log average value of farm land and buildings per farm. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 6: Effects of Moratoria on Farm Size

	Outcome: Log of Average Farm Size								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.375***		-0.485***	-0.385***	-0.367***	-0.448***	-0.245***	-0.311***	-0.253***
	(0.073)		(0.159)	(0.106)	(0.075)	(0.132)	(0.038)	(0.104)	(0.087)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.323***	-0.244***	-0.417**	-0.312***	-0.307***	-0.481***			
	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.164)	(0.102)	(0.085)	(0.102)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.93	0.96	0.93	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.90	0.87	0.88
Obs	33,647	33,647	5,677	5,189	33,647	33,647	8,425	1,147	1,039
Counties	3,088	3,088	523	478	3,088	3,088	768	105	95
Outcome mean	783	783	1,236	1,296	783	783	783	934	929
Outcome SD	2,949	2,949	4,645	4,895	2,949	2,949	1,487	1,314	1,415

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is log average farm size in a county. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment; for example, all counties along the Arizona–New Mexico border are assigned to one border-pair fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 7: Effects of Moratoria on Occupational Transitions, 1930–1940

	Stay in Ag.		Stay Owner		Ag. to Manuf.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.040***	0.039**	0.005	0.003	-0.007***	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Moratoria	0.058***	0.040**	0.028**	0.017	-0.012***	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.007)
% Mortgage	0.037***	0.004	0.039***	0.009	-0.002	-0.010*
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Demographic Controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Economic Controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Outcome Mean	0.71	0.69	0.49	0.47	0.06	0.06
Outcome SD	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.03	0.03
Sample	All	Border	All	Border	All	Border
Obs	2,333	476	2,333	476	2,333	476
Adjusted R^2	0.33	0.02	0.27	0.00	0.42	0.04
p50-p90 effect (%)	3.08	1.70	1.72	0.46	-0.37	-0.58

Notes: Observations are counties. Data are from Ruggles et al. (2024, 2025) and Haines et al. (2010). County-level means are constructed from the linked IPUMS full-count sample. The sample is restricted to men active in the labor force in both 1930 and 1940 who worked in agriculture in 1930. Demographic controls are age, age squared, and an indicator for White. Economic controls are the logs of the number of farms and the number of manufacturing establishments in 1930. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 8: Effects of Moratoria on the Children of Farmers in 1950

	Agriculture		Operate Family Farm		Manufacturing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Moratoria × Farmer's Child × % Mortgage	0.071***	0.079***	0.034***	0.030**	-0.051**	-0.014
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.033)
Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.027***	-0.005	0.004**	-0.002	-0.050**	-0.076**
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.033)
Moratoria × Farmer's Child	0.074***	0.061**	0.022*	0.008	-0.062**	-0.020
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Farmer's Child × % Mortgage	0.054***	0.072***	0.030***	0.043***	-0.029**	-0.080***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Moratoria	0.023***	0.009	0.003*	0.004	-0.035	-0.074*
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.038)
% Mortgage	-0.001	0.011	-0.001	-0.001	0.043***	0.079***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Farmer's Child	0.390***	0.368***	0.158***	0.166***	-0.130***	-0.136***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Economic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.11	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.30	0.30
Outcome SD	0.31	0.31	0.18	0.18	0.46	0.46
Sample	All	All	All	All	All	All
Obs	186,857	161,506	186,857	161,506	186,857	161,506
Adjusted R^2	0.23	0.24	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.02
p50-p90 effect (%)	5.52	5.73	2.40	2.55	-3.05	-3.19

Notes: Observations are adult individuals observed in the 1950 Census and linked to their parents' 1930 Census returns. Data are from Ruggles et al. (2024, 2025) and Haines et al. (2010). Treatment is assigned using the county of residence in 1930, when the individual was a child (mean age 6). The sample is restricted to nonmigrants between 1930 and 1950. Demographic controls are age, age squared, and an indicator for White. Economic controls are the logs of the number of farms and the number of manufacturing establishments in 1930. Standard errors are clustered at the childhood-county level.

Table 9: Effects of Moratoria on Land Usage

	(1) % Farm Cropland	(2) % Idle Cropland	(3) % Failed Cropland	(4) % Harvested Cropland
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.303***	0.397***	1.072***	-0.138***
	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.173)	(0.034)
Post=1 × % Mortgage	-0.033	0.130***	-0.153**	0.095***
	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.025)
Post=1 × Moratoria	0.268***	0.800***	1.391***	-0.124***
	(0.060)	(0.119)	(0.162)	(0.032)
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	All	All	All	All
Period	1925-1959	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.94	0.73	0.42	0.34
Obs	24,514	15,288	15,265	24,509
Counties	3,077	3,071	3,073	3,076
Outcome mean	0.42	0.12	0.04	0.84
Outcome SD	0.22	0.10	0.06	0.12

Notes: Observations are county-years. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. Specifications follow the paper's baseline triple-difference design. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 cropland area.

Table 10: Effects of Moratoria on Agricultural Outcomes

	(1) Capital/Acre	(2) Capital/Labor	(3) Crop Yield	(4) Animal Yield
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.338***	-0.209***	-0.234**	0.088
	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.106)	(0.072)
Post=1 × % Mortgage	-0.001	-0.012	0.288***	0.067
	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.064)	(0.051)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.359***	-0.243***	-0.237**	0.094
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.096)	(0.061)
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample	All	All	All	All
Period	1925-1945	1930-1945	1925-1959	1925-1954
Adjusted R^2	0.85	0.93	0.60	0.90
Obs	12,268	8,688	21,418	18,382
Counties	3,072	2,925	3,066	3,066
Outcome mean	13	509	20	14
Outcome SD	53	18,151	18	14

Notes: Observations are county-years. Outcomes are expressed per acre of cropland. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. Specifications follow the paper's baseline triple-difference design. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 11: Effects of Moratoria on Interest Rates

	Outcome: Mortgage Interest Rate (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.022	0.606***	0.606***	0.546***	0.701***	0.346	0.318**	0.319**
	(0.097)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.189)	(0.178)	(0.358)	(0.137)	(0.147)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.012	0.513***	0.513***	0.475**	0.613***	0.230		
	(0.113)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.202)	(0.173)	(0.383)		
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border segment × Post FE				✓				✓
New Deal controls					✓			
Dust Bowl controls						✓		
Border counties		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓
Period	1920-1940	1920-1940	1920-1940	1920-1940	1920-1940	1920-1940	1920-1940	1920-1940
Adjusted R^2	0.76	0.67	0.67	0.72	0.67	0.68	0.76	0.72
Obs	9,199	1,560	1,560	1,423	1,560	1,560	314	280
Counties	3,072	521	521	476	521	521	105	95
Outcome mean	6.47	6.57	6.57	6.56	6.57	6.57	6.49	6.45
Outcome SD	0.66	0.70	0.70	0.71	0.70	0.70	0.59	0.59

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the average interest rate paid by farmers on mortgage debt. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses in 1920 and 1940. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment; for example, all counties along the Arizona–New Mexico border are assigned to one border-pair fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table 12: Effects of Moratoria on Migration

	Linked Migration (1930-1940)			Migration (1935-1940)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.020	-0.014	0.072*	-0.038*	-0.041***	0.045
	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.055)
Moratoria	-0.020	-0.032***	0.077**	-0.043**	-0.062***	0.031
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.051)
% Mortgage	0.066***	0.061***	0.059***	0.072***	0.063***	0.060**
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.026)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Economic Controls	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Outcome Mean	0.23	0.20	0.23	0.28	0.25	0.29
Outcome SD	0.10	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.14
Sample	All	All	Border	All	All	Border
Obs	3,083	2,331	474	3,083	2,331	474
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.42	0.20	0.05	0.27	0.08

Notes: Observations are counties. *Linked Migration (1930–1940)* measures migration using the linked sample between the 1930 and 1940 Censuses (Ruggles et al., 2025). *Migration (1935–1940)* uses the five-year migration question in the 1940 Census (Ruggles et al., 2024). Demographic controls are age, age squared, and an indicator for White. Economic controls are the logs of the number of farms and the number of manufacturing establishments in 1930. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Appendix for

The Economic Consequences of Foreclosure Suspensions in the Great Depression

Pranjal Drall
Ewan Rawcliffe

For Online Publication

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
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
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Figure A1: Variation in Farm Mortgage Interest Rates (1930–1940)




(a) Farm mortgage interest rates in 1930



(b) Farm mortgage interest rates in 1940

Notes: The maps show county-level farm mortgage interest rates in 1930 (upper panel) and 1940 (lower panel). A common color scale is used in both panels to highlight the substantial convergence in interest rates over the decade. Data are from Haines et al. (2018).

Figure A2: Bank Failure Rates



Notes: This figure plots bank failure rates over time in moratorium and non-moratorium states. Data are from Correia et al. (2026).

Table A1: Effects of Moratoria on Occupational Transitions, Other Years

	Stay in Ag.		Stay Owner		Ag. to Manuf.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	***Linked Censuses:* 1930 to 1950**					
Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.058***	0.036*	0.014	0.015	-0.018***	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.016)
Moratoria	0.061***	0.034*	0.019*	0.028	-0.022***	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.014)
% Mortgage	0.025***	-0.004	0.027***	0.004	-0.006**	-0.017*
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Outcome Mean	0.56	0.54	0.36	0.35	0.10	0.10
Outcome SD	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.06
Sample	All	Border	All	Border	All	Border
Obs	2,333	476	2,333	476	2,333	476
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.01	0.32	0.01	0.45	0.04
	***Linked Censuses:* 1920 to 1930**					
Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.003	0.016	-0.007	0.014	0.002	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Moratoria	0.025**	0.020	0.012	0.034	-0.006*	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.003)	(0.011)
% Mortgage	-0.013**	-0.034***	-0.020***	-0.030**	-0.004**	-0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Demographic Controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Economic Controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Outcome Mean	0.70	0.68	0.50	0.49	0.06	0.07
Outcome SD	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.03	0.03
Sample	All	Border	All	Border	All	Border
Obs	2,763	472	2,763	472	2,763	472
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.05	0.25	0.02	0.40	0.02

Notes: Observations are counties. Data are from Ruggles et al. (2024), Ruggles et al. (2025), and Haines et al. (2010). County-level means are constructed from the linked IPUMS full-count sample. The sample is restricted to men active in the labor force in both the baseline and endline years who worked in agriculture in the baseline year. Demographic controls are age, age squared, and an indicator for White. Economic controls are the logs of the number of farms and the number of manufacturing establishments in the baseline year. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Regressions are weighted by farmland area in the baseline year.

Table A2: Effects of Moratoria on Farm Ownership Structure

	Triple Difference			Double Difference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.036	0.063	0.087			
	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.064)			
Post=1 × % Mortgage	-0.044***	-0.074***	0.014			
	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.025)			
Moratoria	-0.105***			-0.014**		
	(0.006)			(0.006)		
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.039	0.075	0.085	0.013	0.076	0.040
	(0.025)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.013)	(0.057)	(0.042)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Pair × Post FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample	All	Border	Border	Q4	Q4+Border	Q4+Border
Period	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.69	0.61	0.62	0.52	0.42	0.40
Obs	33,646	5,675	5,187	8,432	1,144	1,036
Counties	3,088	523	478	769	105	95

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the log share of farms operated by owners in a county. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment; for example, all counties along the Arizona–New Mexico border are assigned to one border-pair fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A3: Effects of Moratoria on Agriculture by Leaveout Region

	(1) Value	(2) Farms	(3) Farm Size	(4) Owner Share	(5) Tractors	(6) Capital/Labor	(7) Crop Prod.	(8) Animal Prod.
				***Baseline:* All Regions**				
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.167***	0.230***	-0.323***	-0.036	0.000	-0.209***	0.057	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.081)	(0.030)	(0.001)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.078)
Adjusted R^2	0.93	0.88	0.93	0.69	0.75	0.93	0.82	0.73
Obs	33,648	33,692	33,650	33,646	18,402	8,686	27,598	27,496
Counties	3,088	3,089	3,088	3,088	3,076	2,924	3,086	3,085
				***Excluded Region:* Northeast**				
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.184***	0.227***	-0.347***	-0.036	0.001	-0.237***	0.053	0.075
	(0.038)	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.031)	(0.001)	(0.050)	(0.105)	(0.079)
Adjusted R^2	0.93	0.88	0.93	0.68	0.75	0.93	0.82	0.72
Obs	31,275	31,316	31,274	31,271	17,106	8,108	25,654	25,552
Counties	2,872	2,873	2,872	2,872	2,860	2,709	2,870	2,869
				***Excluded Region:* Midwest**				
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.165***	0.250***	-0.424***	0.018	0.001*	-0.107*	0.231**	0.099
	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.082)	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.063)	(0.104)	(0.085)
Adjusted R^2	0.94	0.87	0.93	0.67	0.75	0.92	0.83	0.64
Obs	22,050	22,094	22,052	22,048	12,070	5,560	18,102	18,011
Counties	2,031	2,032	2,031	2,031	2,020	1,882	2,030	2,029
				***Excluded Region:* South Atlantic**				
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.112***	0.234***	-0.314***	-0.021	0.000	-0.166***	0.121	0.022
	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.079)	(0.033)	(0.000)	(0.053)	(0.105)	(0.084)
Adjusted R^2	0.92	0.88	0.93	0.68	0.77	0.93	0.82	0.74
Obs	29,253	29,257	29,257	29,252	16,037	7,591	24,010	23,908
Counties	2,675	2,675	2,675	2,675	2,674	2,559	2,674	2,674
				***Excluded Region:* South**				
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.139**	0.120***	-0.073	-0.089***	-0.002***	-0.250***	-0.236	-0.005
	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.101)	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.058)	(0.150)	(0.148)
Adjusted R^2	0.90	0.88	0.93	0.84	0.77	0.94	0.81	0.71
Obs	22,771	22,815	22,773	22,773	12,444	5,827	18,661	18,605
Counties	2,095	2,096	2,095	2,095	2,083	1,971	2,093	2,092
				***Excluded Region:* West**				
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.115***	0.284***	-0.295***	-0.098***	0.000	-0.335***	0.014	-0.098
	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.084)	(0.035)	(0.001)	(0.039)	(0.108)	(0.063)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.93	0.89	0.94	0.67	0.75	0.94	0.81	0.82
Obs	29,250	29,293	29,251	29,247	15,954	7,661	23,970	23,914
Counties	2,680	2,681	2,680	2,680	2,668	2,576	2,678	2,677

Notes: Observations are county-years. Each panel re-estimates the baseline triple-difference specification while excluding the indicated U.S. Census Bureau region. Outcomes are in logs. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses in 1920 and 1940. Lower-order interactions are included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A4: Effects of Moratoria on Farmland Value

	Outcome: Log of Value per Farmland Acre ($/acre)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	0.143**		0.263***	0.096	0.149**	0.077	0.058	0.197**	0.148***
	(0.056)		(0.099)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.037)	(0.080)	(0.051)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.156**	0.137**	0.264**	0.076	0.159**	0.241***			
	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.104)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.086)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959	1900-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.92	0.95	0.93	0.94	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.92
Obs	33,643	33,643	5,677	5,189	33,643	33,643	8,425	1,147	1,039
Counties	3,088	3,088	523	478	3,088	3,088	768	105	95
Outcome mean	49	49	43	44	49	49	50	39	42
Outcome SD	53	53	52	53	53	53	61	54	57

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is log farmland value per acre. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A5: Effects of Moratoria on Capital/Labor Ratio

	Outcome: Log of Capital/Labor Ratio ($/worker)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.243***		-0.187	-0.133	-0.244***	-0.320***	-0.141***	-0.113	-0.141
	(0.046)		(0.142)	(0.201)	(0.049)	(0.085)	(0.034)	(0.150)	(0.157)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.209***	-0.129*	-0.193	-0.135	-0.202***	-0.214***			
	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.119)	(0.186)	(0.052)	(0.075)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945	1930-1945
Adjusted R^2	0.93	0.95	0.88	0.87	0.93	0.93	0.80	0.62	0.52
Obs	8,688	8,688	1,466	1,333	8,688	8,688	2,153	293	262
Counties	2,925	2,925	496	452	2,925	2,925	725	99	90
Outcome mean	509	509	2,253	2,508	509	509	1,154	6,563	8,016
Outcome SD	18,151	18,151	44,924	47,585	18,151	18,151	29,423	78,034	86,570

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the log capital-labor ratio in agriculture. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A6: Effects of Moratoria on Capital per Cropland Acre

	Outcome: Log of Value of Machinery per Cropland Acre ($/acre)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.360***		-0.143*	-0.270***	-0.363***	-0.439***	-0.172***	-0.143*	-0.165***
	(0.048)		(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.030)	(0.072)	(0.058)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.339***	-0.339***	-0.134*	-0.278***	-0.347***	-0.392***			
	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.065)	(0.055)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945	1925-1945
Adjusted R^2	0.85	0.87	0.91	0.93	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.81	0.86
Obs	12,272	12,272	2,078	1,898	12,272	12,272	3,067	416	376
Counties	3,073	3,073	520	475	3,073	3,073	767	104	94
Outcome mean	12.88	12.88	17.70	18.74	12.88	12.88	14.39	7.01	7.37
Outcome SD	53.36	53.36	79.33	83.66	53.36	53.36	63.92	4.91	5.23

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is log capital per acre of cropland. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A7: Effects of Moratoria on Cropland Share of Farmland

	Outcome: % of Farm in Cropland								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	0.267***		0.332***	0.047	0.276***	0.388**	0.111**	0.192**	0.093**
	(0.085)		(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.148)	(0.051)	(0.085)	(0.044)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	0.302***	0.252***	0.277***	-0.044	0.316***	0.423***			
	(0.092)	(0.059)	(0.085)	(0.152)	(0.097)	(0.106)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.94	0.94	0.91	0.91	0.94	0.94	0.97	0.93	0.93
Obs	24,522	24,522	4,153	3,793	24,522	24,522	6,139	836	756
Counties	48	48	523	478	48	48	36	105	95
Outcome mean	0.42	0.42	0.36	0.37	0.42	0.42	0.48	0.38	0.39
Outcome SD	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.23

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the share of farmland in cropland. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A8: Effects of Moratoria on Crop Yields

	Outcome: Log of Crop Value per Cropland Acre ($/acre)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.238**		0.218*	-0.077	-0.224**	-0.424**	-0.306***	0.243**	0.254***
	(0.096)		(0.128)	(0.160)	(0.100)	(0.174)	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.093)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.235**	-0.122	-0.021	-0.357*	-0.204*	-0.351**			
	(0.106)	(0.166)	(0.128)	(0.186)	(0.113)	(0.160)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.60	0.71	0.68	0.72	0.60	0.61	0.65	0.73	0.72
Obs	21,425	21,425	3,627	3,312	21,425	21,425	5,370	732	662
Counties	3,067	3,067	521	476	3,067	3,067	768	105	95
Outcome mean	20.12	20.12	20.89	21.46	20.12	20.12	17.11	17.82	19.25
Outcome SD	17.85	17.85	16.60	17.10	17.85	17.85	21.39	21.65	23.26

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is crop output per acre of cropland. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A9: Effects of Moratoria on Harvested Cropland

	Outcome: % Harvested Cropland								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.124*		-0.020	-0.121	-0.124*	-0.148*	-0.042	0.039	0.061
	(0.068)		(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.051)	(0.044)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.138**	-0.070**	-0.098	-0.227**	-0.140**	-0.166***			
	(0.052)	(0.028)	(0.065)	(0.098)	(0.053)	(0.062)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.34	0.57	0.31	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.37	0.38
Obs	24,517	24,517	4,151	3,791	24,517	24,517	6,138	835	755
Counties	48	48	523	478	48	48	36	105	95
Outcome mean	0.84	0.84	0.81	0.81	0.84	0.84	0.87	0.83	0.84
Outcome SD	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.10	0.10

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the share of cropland that is harvested. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A10: Effects of Moratoria on Share of Farms with Tractors

	Outcome: Share of Farms with Tractors								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.013		-0.073**	-0.054*	-0.018	-0.064***	-0.006	-0.068***	-0.049*
	(0.024)		(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.066**	-0.065***	-0.071**	-0.053*	-0.068**	-0.110***			
	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.027)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓							
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959	1925-1959
Adjusted R^2	0.91	0.94	0.90	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.89	0.89
Obs	21,459	21,459	3,635	3,320	21,459	21,459	5,369	735	665
Counties	3,075	3,075	521	476	3,075	3,075	767	105	95
Outcome mean	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.31	0.28	0.28
Outcome SD	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the share of farms using tractors. Data are from the Agricultural Censuses, 1900–1960. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A11: Effects of Moratoria on Extensive Margin

	Outcome: Manufacturing Index Extensive Margin (z-score)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	0.019		-0.014	0.018			0.048	-0.000	0.045
	(0.071)		(0.039)	(0.065)			(0.105)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.041	0.028	-0.014	0.048	0.146*	-0.073			
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.094)	(0.079)	(0.048)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓			✓	✓			
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958
Adjusted R^2	0.60	0.61	0.90	0.90	0.69	0.61	0.49	0.93	0.93
Obs	24,597	24,597	4,163	3,803	24,597	24,597	6,135	840	760
Counties	3,088	3,088	523	478	3,088	3,088	767	105	95
Outcome mean	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0	-0	-0
Outcome SD	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the manufacturing extensive-margin principal-component index. Manufacturing data are from the Census of Manufactures and related historical county compilations. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A12: Effects of Moratoria on Intensive Margin

	Outcome: Manufacturing Index Intensive Margin (z-score)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.238***		0.010	-0.185			-0.108	-0.074	-0.173
	(0.076)		(0.174)	(0.182)			(0.078)	(0.158)	(0.169)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.192***	-0.203*	-0.043	-0.177	-0.196*	-0.171			
	(0.073)	(0.110)	(0.149)	(0.161)	(0.113)	(0.143)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓			✓	✓			
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958	1920-1958
Adjusted R^2	0.82	0.84	0.79	0.80	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.79	0.81
Obs	19,443	19,443	3,268	2,996	19,443	19,443	4,261	542	492
Counties	2,901	2,901	486	442	2,901	2,901	663	86	77
Outcome mean	-0	-0	-0	0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0
Outcome SD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the manufacturing intensive-margin principal-component index. Manufacturing data are from the Census of Manufactures and related historical county compilations. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

Table A13: Effects of Moratoria on Intensive Margin (1920–1947)

	Outcome: Manufacturing Index Intensive Margin (z-score)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post=1 × Moratoria	-0.313***		-0.080	-0.287			-0.173**	-0.124	-0.270
	(0.080)		(0.187)	(0.200)			(0.073)	(0.149)	(0.171)
Post=1 × Moratoria × % Mortgage	-0.265***	-0.229**	-0.134	-0.265	-0.226**	-0.212			
	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.167)	(0.181)	(0.112)	(0.149)			
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
State × Year FE		✓			✓	✓			
Border segment × Post FE				✓					✓
New Deal controls					✓				
Dust Bowl controls						✓			
Border counties			✓	✓				✓	✓
High % mortgage counties							✓	✓	✓
Period	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945	1920-1945
Adjusted R^2	0.83	0.84	0.79	0.81	0.84	0.84	0.81	0.80	0.79
Obs	14,081	14,081	2,364	2,167	14,081	14,081	3,090	393	358
Counties	2,799	2,799	471	428	2,799	2,799	630	82	73
Outcome mean	-0	-0	-0	0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0
Outcome SD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: Observations are county-years. The outcome is the manufacturing intensive-margin principal-component index. Manufacturing data span 1920–1947 and are from the Census of Manufactures and related historical county compilations. In the triple-difference specifications, the treatment effect is interacted with the county share of mortgaged farms in 1930. In the double-difference specifications, the sample is restricted to counties in the top quartile of the 1930 mortgage-share distribution (*Q4*). Columns marked *Border* restrict the sample to counties adjacent to a state border across which moratorium status differs. *Border Pair FE* indicates specifications that include fixed effects for each border segment. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions are weighted by 1930 farmland area.

B Data Appendix

Here, we describe our treatment of three borderline coding choices for our treatment variable.

Although we follow Alston (1984), three statutes sit at the boundary of what can be considered a moratorium law. Arkansas briefly postponed foreclosure filings under Act 21 of 1933, but its stronger 1935 measure, which abolished deficiency judgments, was struck down. Maryland's 1933 law restricted certain foreclosures unless a quarter of the holders' total bond value consented. This was initially invalidated but eventually restored. We reason that consent from a quarter of bondholders is not a significant barrier. Oregon's 1933 joint resolution only advised courts to delay sales, leaving its legal force uncertain. We code these as untreated in the baseline, but our results are qualitatively invariant to coding them as treated.

Illinois, by contrast, clearly enacted a moratorium, but it was not included in the report because the law had expired by the time the report was published. It is listed in the report as "Moratorium period provided by legislation in this State has now expired." House Bill 507 (1933), however, authorized courts to stay foreclosures on pre-June 1933 mortgages and allowed the governor or insurance commissioner to halt proceedings on insurance-held loans. The law expired in mid-1935, but was real and binding for two years. Therefore, we follow Alston (1984) and include it.[1]

[1]Charles Bunn, "The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria," 1 *U. Chi. L. Rev.* 495 (1933). J. Douglass Poteat, "State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor During the Depression," 5 *Law & Contemp. Probs.* 517 (1938).

C Foreclosure Laws Appendix

In this Appendix, we reproduce the relevant excerpts of state laws. Following Alston (1984), these data are from a contemporaneous USDA report titled *State Measures for the Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness in the United States, 1933 and 1934* (Olcott and Bercaw, 1934) and its 1936 version.

Alabama

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment Legal actions, pending or instituted before October 1, 1939, for recovery of debts secured by any mortgage or lien on real estate, must be stayed until mortgage or lien is foreclosed. Debtor may set off fair market value of the security. (Laws of 1935, H.B. 422, effective June 24, 1935.)

Constitutionality upheld in Mutual Building & Loan Assn. v. Moore, Adm'r. (Ala. Sup. Ct., June 11, 1935.)

Arizona

Laws Prohibiting Foreclosures In pending or future real estate mortgage foreclosure suits, the court may order a two-year continuance unless good cause to the contrary is shown. (Chapter 29, Laws of 1933. Approved and Effective March 4, 1933).

Laws Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment No deficiency judgment may be given plaintiff in foreclosure suit unless it is proved that, at the time the note and mortgage were executed, the value of the property was in excess of the amount remaining due on the note. (Chapter 88, Laws of 1933. Approved March 18, Effective June 13, 1933).

Arkansas

Laws Postponing Defendant's Answer in Foreclosure Proceedings Answers in suits to foreclose mortgages, deeds of trust, or pledges, executed prior to January 1, 1933, shall not be due until three months after service of summons on defendant or by warning order. In fixing date of sale and confirming sale, court shall consider the condition of debtor, economic conditions, and the fair price of the property. Provisions of Act do not apply to mortgages, deeds of trust, or other liens executed subsequent to January, 1933. (Act No. 21, Laws of 1933, Approved and effective, February 9, 1933, as amended by Act No. 49, Laws of 1935. Approved and Effective February 16, 1935).

Laws Abolishing Deficiency Judgments Deficiency judgments abolished by requiring mortgagee to bid amount of loan plus interest and cost (or fair value of the property if the value was more than the loan) in foreclosure proceedings. (Act No. 57, Laws of 1935, effective February 25, 1935).

This Act held unconstitutional, as violation of United States Constitution, article I - section 10, and Constitution of Arkansas, Article 2 - section 17, in Adams v. Spillyard, 83 S.W. (2d) 686.

California

Laws Postponing Foreclosures Until January 1, 1934, sales under a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust or decree of foreclosure of real property, improved with a single family dwelling, in cases where default in payment of principal only exists, are prohibited. (Chapter 263, Laws of 1933, Effective May 9, 1933, Chapter 1057, Laws of 1933, Effective August 29, 1933).

Until February 1, 1935, sales under certain mortgages and deeds of trust, except mining property and the foreclosure of vendee's interest under certain contracts of purchase, for default in payment of principal only, are prohibited. The statute of limitation on such obligations is extended. Permits avoidance of sale or foreclosure and postpones sales for default of installment payments until after effective date, February 1, 1935, and prevents actions against guarantor's obligations and the enforcement of security which is affected by the act. (Chapter 3, Session Laws of 1934, Approved September 15, 1934).

This Act was construed in Tsempton and Company (C.T.) v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, California, 80 Cal. App. Div. 951.

Until September 1, 1935, in the foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust, the court may provide that the sale of the property shall not be held until on or after a date which court considers just and equitable, but in no event later than September 1, 1935. Statute of limitation extended. (Assembly Bill No. 23, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective about February 1, 1935).

Petition for Postponement of Sale Mortgagor or trustor under certain deeds of trust may, within 90 days after notice of default, or within 30 days after July 21, 1935, but not later than January 1, 1937, petition for postponement of sale. Court may postpone sale not later than February 1, 1937. Redemption period may be extended to February 1, 1937. (Chap. 348, Laws of 1935, Effective June 21, 1935, Repeals Chap. 1, Laws of 1934, Effective September 15, 1934, and Chap. 7, Laws of 1935, Effective January 31, 1935.)

In re Favier (Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California, July 31, 1935) held unconstitutional Chap. 348 insofar as it applied to a postponement of sale under chattel mortgage, but upheld the provisions relating to real property.

Bank of America v Pierson (Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Calif., 1935) upheld constitutionality of c. 348, Laws of 1935.

Laws Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment Deficiency Judgments after foreclosures limited to the amount by which the debt exceeds the fair market value of the property. No deficiency judgment when the mortgage or deed of trust was given as security for all or portion of the purchase price of the property to which such mortgage or deed of trust applies. Until thirty days after Approval and Effective date of this Act, no sale or decree of foreclosure. There period of redemption has not expired, same may be extended until September 1, 1935. This Act does not apply to mortgages executed subsequent to the effective date of the act. (Chapter 793, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective August 21, 1933).

This act held unconstitutional in Bennett v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, et al, on February 27, 1935, 40 Pacific Reporter, 2d Series 80 - Advance Sheet, as impairing obligation of contracts.

Colorado

There is no mortgage moratorium law in this State.

Connecticut

No mortgage moratorium laws were passed during the emergency period in this State, probably because foreclosure provisions of the statute of the State provide that the court has the right to set the time within which the defendant must pay or be barred. Such provisions, of course, give the court the discretion to extend the period of redemption, which is provided for by the current legislation in other States.

Delaware

Law Extending Time for Execution Process Execution process may be stayed for six months when application has been made to the Home Owners' Loan Corporation for refunding of the mortgage. (Chapter 28, Second Special Session, 1933, Approved December 18, 1933, Expired March 1, 1935).

District of Columbia

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in the District.

Florida

No emergency legislation in aid of mortgage debtors has been passed by this State.

The Supreme Court of this State has held, in a recent case: "In the absence of mortgage moratorium statute, courts are without authority to extend redemption period in foreclosure proceedings and to stay such proceedings during periods of economic depression." – Morris v. White, 160 So. 516.

Georgia

As foreclosure laws are lenient on mortgagor, providing for a long period in which mortgagor may pay before decree given and as mortgagor may redeem at any time within ten years from last recognition by mortgagee of right of redemption, the Legislature of this State evidently determined that no emergency mortgage moratorium legislation was necessary.

Idaho

Law Suspending Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosures Until December 31, 1934, the Governor was authorized to declare legal holidays limited to certain businesses and activities for one or more

periods not to exceed more than sixty days each. (Chapter 104, Session Laws of 1933, Approved March 2, 1933.)

On July 18, 1934, the Governor of the State issued proclamation effective midnight of that date until September 15, 1934, declaring a legal holiday with respect to foreclosure of mortgages upon real estate and foreclosure or cancellation of contracts for the sale of real estate. The District Courts and judges were empowered and authorized to suspend any or all proceedings of the above nature upon application of any defendant in any such action. This proclamation of the Governor suspending real estate mortgage foreclosures was held unconstitutional in Alliance Trust Company v Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285.

Court may extend action for foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate until March 1, 1937. Execution of deed to property already sold at sheriff's sale may be prevented until March 1, 1937. This act not applicable to mortgages pledged to secure payment of public debt or deposit of public funds. (Chapter 36, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective February 20, 1935.)

Law Extending Redemption Period Court empowered to extend time for redemption from sales under execution until March 1, 1937. (Chapter 36, more specifically cited above.)

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment No deficiency judgment may be entered in any amount greater than the difference between the mortgage indebtedness, plus the cost of foreclosure and sale and the reasonable value of the property. (Chapter 150, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 15, 1933.)

Illinois

From 1936 Report Moratorium period provided by legislation in this State has now expired.

Law Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings In actions to foreclose mortgages executed prior to June 15, 1933, the court could stay proceedings or postpone sale upon a showing that proceeding would be unjust or inequitable in light of the economic emergency. (Laws of 1933, H.B. 507, p. 649; expired June 30, 1935.)

Executive Stay Authority The Governor or the Commissioner of Insurance was authorized to stay foreclosures or extend time for payment for institutions under their supervision. (Smith–Hurd Rev. Stat. 1933, ch. 73, §582.)

Indiana

Evidently no emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State. However, present foreclosure laws are rather liberal to mortgagor.

Unless a mortgage contains an express covenant for payment of the money secured, or there is a separate bond, or note, or other agreement to pay the sum due, the remedy of the mortgagee is limited to the property mortgaged.

Iowa

Laws Continuing Foreclosure Suits Actions for the foreclosure of mortgages and deeds of trust on real estate may be continued until March 1, 1935 upon application of the owner, unless at a hearing good cause is shown to the contrary. (Chapter 182, Session Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective February 9, 1933, Expires March 1, 1935).

This Act held constitutional in Craig v. Waggoner, 256 N.W. 285; construed in Reed v. Snow, 254 N.W. 800; McDonald v. Ferring, 256 N.W. 719.

Court may order continuance until March 1, 1937, in pending or future suits for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages or deeds of trust, unless good cause to the contrary is shown. All applications made with court under Act of 1933, Chapter 182, are considered refiled under this Act. This Act does not apply to mortgages on real estate the real estate has acquired subsequent to such date, unless a continuance has been granted under Acts of 1933, Chapter 182. (H.F. No. 34, Session Laws of 1935, Approved February 4, 1935, Effective February 8, 1935).

First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Loizeaux et al., Iowa Dist. Ct., Dubuque County, November, 1935, held this Law unconstitutional, the economic emergency no longer existing, and the continuance of actions being a violation of the Constitutional provision prohibiting impairment of contracts.

Any actions on land contracts executed prior to January 1, 1934, wherein the vendor has retained legal title, may be suspended until March 1, 1937, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. Within thirty days after service of notice of forfeiture, a suspension of proceedings may be obtained against the vendor until March 1, 1937, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. (S.B. No. 59, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective February 20, 1935, Expires March 1, 1937).

Law Extending Redemption Period In foreclosure suits where the redemption period has not expired, the court may order, unless good cause is shown to the contrary, that no sheriff's deed shall be issued until March 1, 1935. In the meantime the owners may redeem the property and are entitled to the possession thereof. (Chapter 179, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 18, 1933, Expired March 1, 1935).

This Act held constitutional in Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordham, 217 Iowa 1319, 253 N.W. 701, on the ground that the state has a right to legislate for the welfare of its people in times of economic emergency. Decided on basis of Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, January 8, 1933. Also held constitutional in Connecticut Chain Life Insurance Company v. Roth, 254 N.W. 913. Construed in Hawkeye Life Insurance Company v. Ogg, 254 N.W. 847, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Kramer, 253 N.W. 809; Futah v. Connecticut Mutual, Fagin, Illinois State Bank of Quincy, Ill. for use and benefit of Emerson v. Emerson, 255 N.W. 283.

In any action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage or a deed of trust commenced prior to March 1, 1935, and in which a decree has been or may hereafter be entered, but the redemption period has not expired, the court may order that no sheriff's deed shall be issued until March 1, 1937, in the meantime the owner or owners may redeem such property and are entitled to possession thereof. The provisions of this Act apply only to mortgages or deeds

of trust executed prior to March 1, 1934, except in cases where the period of redemption has been extended by court order. (H.F. No. 84, Session Laws of 1935, Approved February 6, 1935, Effective February 8, 1935).

None of the provisions of Chapters 179 and 182, Laws of 1933, shall apply to mortgages made on or after January 1, 1934. (S.B. 357, First Special Session Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 12, 1934).

Laws Relating to Judgments Judgments rendered hereafter on promissory obligations secured by mortgage or deed of trust, but without foreclosure, are non-renewable, and are void after 2 years - except for purposes of set-off. Judgments rendered heretofore or pending are not without effect after 2 years from passage of this act, except as a set-off. (Laws of 1933, S.S. 176, approved April 28, 1933, effective on publication).

Law Prohibiting Mortgage Foreclosures In mortgage foreclosure proceedings, courts of equity are declared to have power to refuse confirmation where bid is inadequate or the sale is in any way unfair. Court may fix price at which property is to be bid in a sale is to be confirmed. (Chapter 218, Laws of 1933, Effective March 7, 1933).

This Act held unconstitutional by United States District Court in Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank of Kansas City v. Dewey, 8 F. Supp. 678, and construed in Prudential Insurance Company v. Bieber 140 Kansas 579.

Kansas

Law Extending the Period of Redemption By joint resolution No. 18, a moratorium was declared on all periods of redemptions from judicial sales for six months after March 4, 1933. The Governor was given power to extend moratorium for six more months if he deemed it necessary for the preservation of the public peace, safety, etc. (Chapter 232, Laws of 1933, Approved March 20, 1933, Effective March 21, 1933).

This act was held unconstitutional in Lingervolt v. Hievonums, District Court, Labette County, July 29, 1933, Oakland State Bank v. Bollin, 40 P. (2d) 437. Construed in Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dewey, 8 F. Supp. 678. The moratorium as extended by the Governor for an additional six months was also held unconstitutional by the Wyandotte District Court in McDonouell v. Canavan on October 20, 1933.

The period for redemption on real estate may be extended for such additional time as the court shall deem it just and equitable, but in no event beyond March 1, 1935. (Chapter 3, Second Special Session, 1934. Approved March 2, 1934, effective March 3, 1934.)

The period of redemption, as extended under Chapter 3, Special Session Laws of 1934, may be further extended until January 15, 1937. Provisions of this Act do not apply to a purchase price mortgage where less than one third of the purchase price has been paid, nor to any real estate where the same is not occupied in good faith. Nor in cases where the court has found that the premises have been abandoned by the owner. Nor to an owner who has acquired title since March 4, 1933. (H.B. 299, Laws of 1935, Approved February 28, 1935, Effective March 1, 1935).

Postponement of Right to Deficiency Judgment Until March 1, 1935, no deficiency judgment shall be enforced unless a period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of this Act, has expired. (Chapter 3, Second Special Session 1934, Approved March 2, 1934, Effective March 3, 1934).

Prior to January 15, 1937, no deficiency judgment shall be enforced until the period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended by this Act, has expired. (H.B. 299, more specifically cited above).

Kentucky

No emergency moratorium laws have been passed by this State.

Louisiana

Law Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings District court is given authority to postpone foreclosure sales on petition of the mortgagor or owner in possession until the second Monday in May, 1936. Mortgagor may be directed to pay rental or income value of land for the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, etc. This act applies only to mortgages made prior to passage of this Act. (Act No. 159, Laws of 1934, Approved July 13, 1934, Effective August 1, 1934).

This Act was construed in Newman v. Reems, 158 So. 13; Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York v. Borden, 159 So. 394. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Morris, 159 So. 388, it was held that this moratorium statute was not "an unreasonable exercise of the State's police power in view of the economic emergency –."

Law Providing for the Abolition of Deficiency Judgments Right to deficiency judgments is abolished where creditor avails himself of the remedy of appraisement. This act applies only to obligations arising after this Act becomes effective. (Act No. 28, Laws of 1934, Approved July 12, 1934, Effective August 1, 1934).

General Moratorium on All Debts The Debt Moratorium Commissioner (State Bank Commissioner) has authority under such rules and regulations as she may prescribe, to suspend all laws relative to the enforcement of all debt, public or private, except debts owed to the state and to the United States, and to suspend all laws authorized for the reduction of such debt to judgment and the enforcement thereof or any period of time as curing same. No extension shall be granted for any period after the adjournment of the regular session of the Legislature of the State for three months, but creditor may apply with the Commissioner for hearing to determine whether payment of debt should be suspended. The Commissioner may approve any composition to which the creditor and debtor agree. (H.B. No. 2, Laws of 1934, Approved November 21, 1934, Effective December 6, 1934).

The above law, H.B. No. 2 - 1934, authorizing Debt Moratorium Commissioner to suspend certain debtors' obligations, on application, until expiration date of act, was continued. (Laws of 1936, H.B. No. 300, approved June 22, 1936, expires 20 days after 1938 regular session adjourns.

Maine

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been passed by this State.

Maryland

Laws Restricting Power of Sale and Foreclosure Proceedings In all cases submitted to either the Circuit Courts or Baltimore City Courts for the passage of a decree as provided in Section 720 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland (1924), no decree shall hereafter be passed during the period of emergency unless an application has been answered in by the record holders of not less than 25% of the entire mortgage debt. (Chap. 56, Session Laws of 1933, Approved December 15, 1933, Expired June 1, 1935.)

This Act declared unconstitutional in U. S. Mortgage Company v. Matthews, 173 A. 903, July 6, 1934 but reversed in 55 S. Ct. (Md.) 168, December 3, 1934.

In all mortgages of real estate and/or leasehold property, wherein there is inserted a clause authorizing the mortgagee or any other person to be named therein to sell the mortgaged premises, such power of sale shall not be exercised during the period of the emergency except by and with the consent of the record holders of not less than 25% of the entire unpaid principal debt secured by the mortgage sought to be foreclosed.

(Chapter 57, Session Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective December 15, 1933, Expired June 1, 1934.)

Massachusetts

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation was enacted by the Legislature of this State. This was probably due to the liberal redemption provisions made for mortgagors under the present legislation, i.e., a mortgagor may after breach of condition, redeem the land mortgaged, unless the mortgagee or person claiming or holding under him has obtained possession of the land and has continued that possession for three years, or unless the land had been sold pursuant to the power of sale contained in the mortgage.

Michigan

Law Postponing Foreclosure of a Mortgage Pending or future actions for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages or deeds of trust or for the specific performance of land contracts may be continued until not later than March 1, 1937, upon good cause shown. Foreclosure by advertisement may be continued where equity of redemption has not expired. Foreclosure by advertisement may be brought into Court for continuance. (No. 98, Acts of 1933, Approved and Effective June 2, 1933, Expired March 1, 1935, as amended by No. 20, Acts of 1934, Approved and Effective March 28, 1934; No. 3, Acts of 1935, Approved and Effective February 26, 1935; Expires March 1, 1937; and as further amended by No. 152, Acts of 1935 and No. 158, Acts of 1935, Effective June 4, 1935.)

This act hold constitutional and not one impairing the obligation of contracts in Russell v. Battle Creek Lumber Company, Michigan S. Ct., January 30, 1934, 252 N.W. 561, 265 Michigan 649. The court decided the case on the authority of Home Building and Loan Association v Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231. This act was construed in Youngs v Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit, (1934) 265 N.W. 481, 265 Michigan 631; Daugherty v Reading, 254 N.W. 913, 264 Michigan 214; Undine v Van Ommen, 252 N.W. 482, 265 Michigan 673; Backer v Detroit Savings Bank, 257 N.W. 823; Virginia Joint Stock Land Bank v Hudson, 254 N.W. 234; Michigan Trust Co. v Rose, 259 N.W. 878.

Law Extending Redemption Period The redemption period may be extended in mortgages already foreclosed. (This is a part of Acts more specifically set forth above.)

In all actions now pending for the forfeiture, foreclosure, or specific performance of an executory contract for the purchase of real estate in which a writ of restitution has not been issued as to all actions hereinafter commenced by a court of chancery, the court may extend the time in which the right of redemption may be exercised until March 1, 1937. (Act No. 5, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective February 25, 1935, Expires March 1, 1937.)

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgments No deficiency judgments entered after January 1, 1933, may be enforced until March 1, 1937. The court may determine fair rental terms. (This provision is a part of Acts more specifically set forth above.)

Law Giving Court Right to Set Price at Which Land is Sold at Foreclosure The court may fix and determine the minimum price at which the real property may be sold under foreclosure proceedings. (No. 229, Acts of 1933, Approved and Effective July 5, 1933.)

Minnesota

Law Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings Court may postpone actions heretofore commenced for foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate. In case mortgage has been foreclosed, the court may order a resale if the sale price is unreasonable and inadequate. The court may postpone the enforcement of judgment by execution sale. No extension or postponement may be granted under this act until March 1, 1937. This act does not apply to any mortgage held by the United States or any of its agencies, nor to any mortgage pledged to secure a public debt or to secure payment of deposits of public money. (H.F. No. 431, Session Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 17, 1935.)

Provisions of the above act extended until March 1, 1937 (Chap. 47, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 15, 1935).

Law Extending Period of Redemption Where real estate has been foreclosed or where sale is ordered in real estate proceedings instituted prior to two years after this Act, the period of redemption may be extended for such additional time as the court may deem just and equitable, but in no event beyond May 1, 1935. Court may order the mortgagor to pay all or part of the income where sale price appears unreasonably low. (Chapter 339, Session Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective April 18, 1933, Expires May 1, 1935).

This act was held constitutional in Blaisdell, et al., v. Home Building and Loan Association (Minn., July 7, 1933), 249 N.W. 334. The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court was upheld

in the Supreme Court of the United States in a decision handed down January 8, 1933, 54 S. Ct. 231, 290 U.S. 398. The decisions in both courts were rested upon the following argument: While it was conceded that the statute impaired the obligations of the mortgage contract, the existence of the economic emergency justified the Legislature's use of its police power to relieve the people from the devastating effects of that emergency.

In Grace v. Lichtscheidl (Minn., July 7, 1933), 249 N.W. 672, it was held that, if the law is valid so as to permit extension of period of redemption from mortgage foreclosure sales of homesteads, it should also be valid to permit extension of period of redemption from mortgage foreclosure sales of property not homestead of mortgagor. This Act was further construed in Anderson v. Hill (April 20, 1934), 254 N.W. 585; Young v. Cross Lake Land Company, 255 N.W. 812; Young v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, 256 N.W. 906; Mosse v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, 259 N.W. 19.

The provisions of the above act were extended to March 1, 1937 (Chapter 47, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 15, 1935).

Laws Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment Prior to May 1, 1935, no action shall be maintained on a deficiency judgment until the period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under this act, has expired. (Chapter 339, more specifically set forth above.)

Prior to March 1, 1937, no action may be maintained for a deficiency judgment until the period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of this act, has expired. (H.F. No. 431, more specifically set forth above.)

Actions on deficiency judgments are barred to not later than March 1, 1937. (Chapter 47, Laws of 1935. Approved and Effective March 15, 1935.)

Mississippi

Law Postponing Foreclosure of Mortgage Mortgagor may enjoin proceeding to foreclose mortgage, provided he shows that he has sought to refinance his mortgage through some Federal agency. In suits to foreclose mortgages and deeds of trust executed after March 4, 1933, the court shall fix an "upset" price and shall direct the mortgagor to pay all or a portion of the rental value of the premises to the mortgagee during the one to two years after which the property may be sold. (H.B. 270, Laws of 1934, Approved and Effective April 4, 1934, Expired May 1, 1935.)

Held constitutional in Wilson Banking Co. et al. v. Colvard, Miss. Sup. Ct., April 22, 1935. Held inapplicable to Federal Land Bank on Federal agency theory, Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Tatum, et al., Miss. Sup. Ct., November 25, 1935.

Foreclosure procedure for mortgages executed before March 4, 1933, established. (S.B. 84, Laws of 1935.)

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment Prior to May 1, 1935, no action may be maintained for a deficiency judgment until the period of time extension allowed in any proceeding begun under this act shall have expired. (Chapter 274, Laws of 1934, Approved and Effective April 4, 1934, Expired May 1, 1935).

Deficiency judgment suits prohibited before March 1, 1936. (S.B. 84, Laws of 1936, Effective May 1, 1936, Expires May 1, 1938.)

Missouri

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been passed in this State. Probably this is due to the fact that the provisions for foreclosure and redemption of property in this State are rather lenient to the mortgagor.

Montana

Law to Postpone Foreclosure Proceedings Mortgage-owner may make application with court for an order staying all proceedings in pending or future mortgage foreclosure actions. Court given authority to stay such proceedings for a period not to extend beyond March 1, 1935. (Chapter 116, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 14, 1933.)

Law Extending Period of Redemption Court may extend period of redemption for such additional time as it may deem just and equitable but in no event beyond March 1, 1937. This Act applies only to mortgages upon real property and in which the period of redemption has not yet expired and in pending and future proceedings. This act does not apply to mortgages made after the approval of the Act. Nor do provisions of the Act apply to any mortgage which is held by the United States or an agency or instrument thereof or securing a public debt or the deposit of public funds. (Chapter 122, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 13, 1935).

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment Deficiency judgments are abolished in all actions for foreclosure of mortgages for balance of purchase price of real property. (H.B. 16, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective February 6, 1935.)

Nebraska

Law Prohibiting and Postponing Foreclosure Courts may stay foreclosure proceedings of mortgages on real estate, unless good cause is shown to the contrary, until the first day of March 1935, or so long as the act is in effect. (Chapter 65, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 2, 1933, Expires March 1, 1935). This law was construed in Gaster v Tugegy, 243 N.W. 506.

The provisions of the above Act were extended until March 1, 1937. In addition, tax sale foreclosures and actions on notes secured by real estate were also stayed, within the discretion of the court, until March 1, 1937. Provisions of the Act do not apply to any mortgage, deed of trust, land sale contract, or secured note to be issued subsequent to March 1, 1934. (H.B. 1, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective February 27, 1935, Amending and Repealing Sections 20-21, 159 and 20-21, 161, C. S. Supp. 1933; Expires midnight March 1, 1937).

Law Abolishing Deficiency Judgments Deficiency judgments are abolished in mortgage foreclosure actions. (Chapter 41, Session Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective April 26, 1933. Also, cited as H.B. 10 and as Sec. 20-2141, C.S. Supp. Nebraska.)

Nevada

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State probably because there is a one-year redemption period for property sold under foreclosure of mortgage in this State.

New Hampshire

Law Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings The court may suspend an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate or it may suspend for a reasonable period sales in foreclosure action. (Chapter 161, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective June 15, 1933. Expires within four years unless the Governor proclaims the emergency ended; as amended by H.B. No. 56, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective February 7, 1935.)

Law Extending Period of Redemption The court may extend the redemption period in proceedings to foreclose a mortgage on real estate for a reasonable time. (See Statute citations above.)

New Jersey

Law Providing for Sale at Fair Market Value of Property Fair market value in sale on property in mortgage foreclosure actions required. Mortgagor, when sued on a deficiency judgment, may raise issue of the fair market value. (Chapter 82, Laws of 1933, Approved and effective March 29, 1933.)

This statute was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of this State in Vanderbilt v. Brunton Plane Company (N. J. November 20, 1933) 111 V.L.J. 596, on the ground that the statutory setting of a fair market value, "standing alone, is a self-contradiction, restrictive of free auction of an otherwise collectible debt, was such a restriction and limitation upon the mortgagee's right of recovery on a bond as to be an impairment of pre-existing contract and therefore in conflict with article 1, Section 10, Subdivision 1, Federal Constitution and Article 4, Section 7, Paragraph 3, New Jersey Constitution, prohibiting passage of law impairing obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when contract was made.

New Mexico

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State. However, by the laws of 1931, Chapter 149, Page 250, Senate Bill 83, junior lien holders and the mortgagor are given a right of redemption, but this right has existed in New Mexico prior to 1931.

New York

Law Prohibiting Foreclosure Proceedings No action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate solely on account of default in payment of principal and no action on any bond secured

by such mortgage shall be brought before July 1, 1937. This Act applies to participation mortgages and mortgage bonds. All pending actions are dismissed. (Chapter 793, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective August 26, 1933, as extended by Chapter 278 (Act No. 263), Laws of 1934, Approved and Effective April 23, 1934, by Chapter 1, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective January 18, 1935, and as further extended by Chapter 86, Laws of 1936, Effective March 6, 1936.)

This act was held constitutional as not impairing obligation of contract in McCarty et al v. Prudence Bonds Corporation. (N. Y. S. Ct., Special Term, September 20, 1933), 266 N. Y. S. 629-C 733. This act was also construed in Cole v. Miller (1934) 268 N. Y. S. 443; 150 Misc. 32; Bank of Babylon v. F. E. Summers Coal and Lumber Company, 268 N. Y. S. 46, 149 Misc. 617; Laporte v. Nevins Company, 268 N. Y. S. 91, Joseph E. Marx Company v. Hatton, 269 N. Y. S. 210; Sherwin v. Jonas, 269 N.Y.S. 101, 150 Misc. 242, Rev. (City Court) 267 N. Y. S. 759, 149 Misc. 481; Manufacturers' National Bank of Troy v. Toole, 274 N. Y. S. 158; Klinke v. Samuels, 150 M. 24, 264 Rev. N. Y. 244, Rev. 268 N. Y. S. 551, 240 App. Div. 1008, Resettled 269 N. Y. S. 912; Ersee v. Central Trust Co. of Rochester, 158 Misc. 397; Westchester Trust Company v. Fox 276 N. Y. S. 335.

Where the principal of mortgages shall become due, prior to July 1, 1934, it shall become payable six months after the expiration of the emergency period. The principal of mortgages becoming due between July 1, 1934, and July 1, 1935, becomes payable one year after the expiration of the emergency period. Actions for the principal of mortgage bonds are likewise suspended. (Chapter 357, Laws of 1934, Approved and Effective May 7, 1934.)

Laws Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgments Deficiency Judgments after foreclosure shall be granted only on motion, and if no motion is made within ninety days after confirmation of the sale, such sale shall be in full satisfaction of the debt. Deficiency judgments shall be based upon the fair and reasonable market value of the said mortgaged premises at highest of the mortgaged premises during period of emergency, which extends to July 1, 1935. (Chapter 794, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective August 28, 1933, as extended by Act No. 270, Laws of 1934, Approved and Effective April 23, 1934, as extended by Chapter 2, Laws of 1935, Approved January 18, 1935, as amended by Chapter 268, Laws of 1935, Effective April 1, 1935, and as further extended by Chapter 87, Laws of 1936, Effective March 6, 1936.)

The period of emergency provided for by the above legislation was extended until July 1, 1938, by Chapter 277, Laws of 1934 and further extended to July 1, 1936, by Chapter 8, Laws of 1935.

This act was interpreted in Railroad Co-op. Building and Loan Association v. Boston Building, Inc., et al (N.Y. Supm. Ct., Special Term, Nov. 3, 1933), 267 N.Y.S. 204, in which it was held that retro-active law which bonds to take away or impair rights vested under existing laws or valid contracts or which creates new obligation or attaches new disability to transactions already passed, is invalid as to sales made prior to Act, but not during period of act.

This act was also construed in Weisel v. Hagdahl Realty Company, 271 N.Y.S. 629; Russell v. Wolf, 271 N.Y.S. 639; Monaghan v. May, 273, N.Y.S. 476; New York Life Insurance Company v. H. & J. Guttag Corporation, 192 N.E. 481, 265 N.Y. 232, Rev. 272, N.Y.S. 724, 242 app.

Div. 620; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Rosenfield, 274 N.Y.S. 531; Farmers' and Mechanics' Savings Bank of City of Lockport v. Eagle Building Company, 276 N.Y.S. 246; Kramer v. Relgny Realty Company, 276, N.Y.S. 641.

North Carolina

Law Continuing Foreclosure Actions Court may continue foreclosure actions on mortgages and deeds of trust for one year. This power exists only for two years and only in specified counties of the State. (H.B. No. 1438, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective May 13, 1933, S.B. No. 135, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective February 28, 1933, act for two years; H.B. 1297, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective April 28, 1933, and H.B. 1199, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective May 12, 1933.)

Law Abolishing or Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgments Deficiency judgments abolished in foreclosures and sales under power of sale in purchase money mortgages and deeds of trust. (Chapter 36, Laws of 1933; Approved and Effective February 6, 1933.)

Ordinary deficiency judgments are to be determined by the reasonable value of the real estate and the mortgagee may prove such reasonable value by way of defense. (Chapter 275, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective April 18, 1933.)

Law Guaranteeing Sale of Property at Fair Price in Foreclosure Proceedings The court may order a resale before confirmation in an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate. (Chapter 275, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective April 18, 1933.)

This Act was construed in Hopkins v. Swain, 174 S.E. 409, 206 North Carolina 439; Whitner v. Chase, 174 S.E. 223, 206 North Carolina 336.

North Dakota

Laws Prohibiting or Postponing Foreclosure Actions On March 20, 1934, the Governor issued a proclamation making it unlawful to oust an owner from his farm home lest mortgage foreclosure might cut all the owner on an opportunity to secure the benefits of Federal legislation. (Provided for by Chapter 157, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective February 21, 1933, Expires at end of two years.)

On April 3, 1935, the acting Governor of the State issued the following proclamation, to be effective until revoked: "Until this Proclamation is revoked or modified, no judicial, executive, or administrative officer of this State, or of any of its subdivisions, shall maintain or begin any proceeding or sign any order or other document of any kind which has for its purpose, or which tends to promote, the transfer of change of ownership, title to, equities in, or possession of real or personal property, contrary to the wishes and needs of the owner or possessor of such property or of rights or equities therein. Providing, that such proceeding may be entertained or order or other document signed upon satisfactory showing first made to such office, that such owner or possessor has the legal right and has been given reasonable opportunity to avail himself of the remedies provided under the terms of Senate Bill No. 32, known as the legal moratorium, as recently approved, or under the terms of the Frazier-Lemke Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, and has freely and voluntarily waived

the benefits of such remedies, or has unreasonably refused to avail himself thereof. Any person injured or feeling aggrieved by the operations or provisions of this Proclamation is authorized to file his petition for relief at the Governor's office."

Foreclosure by Advertisement Abolished Foreclosure of real estate mortgages by advertisement are abolished except on mortgages held by the State or by the University. (Chapter 158, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 4, 1933)

Hearings are required prior to the confirmation of sales in foreclosure proceedings, and courts given power to extend terms of the mortgage and postpone foreclosure proceedings. (S.B. 23, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 9, 1935.)

Laws Extending Redemption Period The period within which a mortgagor or judgment debtor may redeem from a mortgage foreclosure or execution sale of real estate, but for which a deed has not been issued, is extended for a period of two years from February 21, 1933. (Chapter 157, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective February 21, 1933)

Redemption period is extended to not later than July 1, 1937. (S.B. 23, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 9, 1935). In State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein (N.D. Sup. Ct., June 12, 1933), 249 N.W. 118, it was held that the statute (Chapter 157, Laws of 1933) extending period of redemption from real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is "impairment of obligation of contract" as to mortgages existing at time of enactment of statute. Also deprives holder of mortgage executed prior to passage of statute of property without due process. (Constitution, U.S., Section 10) Statute extending period of redemption from real estate mortgage foreclosure sale, which statute by its own terms expires in two years, is held valid governing mortgage executed and foreclosed during period of its operation.

Laws Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment In actions for the foreclosure of mortgages, the court shall have no power to render a deficiency judgment. (Chapter 155, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 7, 1933, Expires at the end of two years. Repealed by S.B. 23, Session Laws of 1935, Approved March 9, 1935)

Ohio

Law Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings Proceedings to foreclose a mortgage or enforce a specific lien may be postponed not later than April 1, 1937. This Act applies only to mortgages executed prior to May 18, 1933. (H.B. 23, Enacted October, 1935, Effective February 4, 1935, Amending Section 11588 of the General Code as amended by H.B. 144, December 12, 1934; and repealing; Sections 11, 388 of the General Code as amended by S.B. 219, May 15, 1935, and H.B. 144, December 12, 1934.)

Oklahoma

Laws Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings In pending or future actions for foreclosure of mortgages or other liens upon real estate, defendant shall not be required to answer until the expiration of nine months from service of summons or if answer has been filed, no trial shall be held for nine months. (Chapter 16, S. B. No. 76, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 7, 1933, Expires at end of two years.)

This Act was held unconstitutional as it affects actions pending at its effective date State ex rel. Osage County Savings and Loan Association v. Worten, 29 P. (2d) 1.

For two years after the approval of this Act, the court is vested with discretion of granting a continuance in all actions to foreclose mortgages or deeds of trust. (Same Statutory citations given above.)

This provision of the Act was held constitutional as it allows judicial discretion in the granting of continuances; but it is unconstitutional in an arbitrary and capricious extension of time for nine months in all cases. State ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield, 29 P. (2d) 24, rehearing denied, 29 P. (2d) 24.

Oregon

Law Postponing Foreclosure Decree The Legislature, by a joint resolution, advised courts of equity not to decree foreclosure where the mortgagor is making a bona fide effort to pay. (H.J. Res. 18, Regular Session, 1933, Effective March 2, 1933.)

Pennsylvania

Law Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings The Court of Common Pleas is vested with power to stay Writs of Execution for the sales of dwellings or farms to prevent serious inequity. Provision of this Act not applicable to mortgages under Title II of the National Housing Act. (P.L. 707, Act of May 18, 1933, Effective May 18, 1933, extended by H.B. 200, Laws of 1935, Effective March 28, 1935, to continue in force until March 31, 1937.)

Law Insuring Sale of Property at Fair Value in Foreclosure Proceedings Procedure is provided for courts to determine fair value of property to be sold at foreclosure sales. (Act No. 59, Laws of 1933, Effective January 17, 1934, to continue in force until July 1, 1935.) Construed in Market Street National Bank, et al., v. Huff, et al., Pa. Sup. Ct., E. D., June 29, 1935; and Evans v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, Pa. Sup. Ct., E. D., June 29, 1935. Deficiency Judgment Act of 1933 is constitutional as a reasonable remedial act. – Ridge Allen Building & Loan Association v. Leshefko, 24 D. & C. 702.

Rhode Island

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this state.

South Carolina

Law Postponing Foreclosure Courts of the State are empowered to stay foreclosure suits. Boards of Conciliation appointed to effect settlements in mortgage cases. (Act No. 923, Laws of 1934, Effective March 2, 1934, Expires after two years; extended 18 months from April 10, 1936, by Act No. 300, H.B. 611, Act of 1936, Effective April 10, 1936.)

Laws Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment When a personal judgment is asked, any defendant may, within 90 days after sale of mortgaged property, apply for an order of appraisal of true value. If the value is in excess of the deficiency, after application of the net proceeds of sale, the judgment is extinguished. If of the returned value, after deduction of the sale price, is less than the deficiency, the deficiency is deemed paid, pro-tanto, and is enforceable for only the remainder. (Act 264, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective May 2, 1933.)

South Dakota

Law Suspending Foreclosure Actions Foreclosures by advertisement may be suspended by court when so requested by mortgagor. (Chapter 138, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective March 11, 1933.)

This Act held valid in State ex rel. N.W. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Circuit Court (S.D., S. Ct., July 7, 1933.), 249 N.W. 603, since there remains sufficient remedy on contract which secures all substantial rights or parties. The Act simply restricts the conditions under which the power of foreclosure by sale might be exercised. Statute held to cover mortgages in existence at the time of its passage.

Laws Extending Redemption Period Redemption period may be extended for an additional year in mortgage foreclosure proceedings if mortgagor pays: (1) all taxes due, (2) interest on mortgage to that date, (3) 6

This law does not apply to mortgage held by joint stock land bank organized under Federal Farm Loan Act. Ellingson, et al., v. Iowa Joint Stock Land Bank, S. Dak. Sup. Ct., January 10, 1936.

The mortgagor may file a petition with the Circuit court prior to the expiration of the normal redemption period, and secure an extension of such period to not later than March 1, 1937. The Act does not apply to mortgages held by the State, the United States, or agency, to obligations guaranteed by the United States, or to mortgages held as security for a public debt or deposit. (H.B. 20, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 2, 1935.)

Law Abolishing Deficiency Judgments Deficiency judgments abolished. (Chapter 138, Laws of 1933, Effective May 28, 1933, as amended by H.B. 103, Laws of 1935, Effective February 27, 1935.)

Law Affecting Mortgage Contract in General All contracts between mortgagors and mortgagees are unenforceable and unrecordable if containing: (1) pledge or assignment of right to possession of homestead, etc., property prior to expiration of redemption period; (2) agreement for mortgagor to pay taxes; (3) waiver of exemptions; (4) consent to receivers' appointment; however, these provisions are not applicable to any mortgage executed to the United States or any instrumentality thereof. (H.B. 27, Laws of 1935, Approved and Effective March 10, 1935.)

Tennessee

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State, as liberal provisions for redemption is provided by present legislation.

Texas

Laws Postponing Foreclosure Proceedings Courts empowered to grant stays of proceedings in suits for the recovery of real property or foreclosure of liens or mortgages on real property, file within 180 days from the effective date of the Act or pending when the Act becomes effective; the extension shall not exceed 180 days, but the Court may, upon further application at the end of the first extension period, but not after 200 days from the effective date of the Act, grant further extensions, but not beyond May 1, 1934. (Chapter 102, Laws of 1933, Effective May 1, 1933. Expires after 200 days.)

The Act is unconstitutional in that it impairs the obligation of contracts executed before its effective date. Life Insurance Company of Virginia v. Sanders, Texas Circuit Court of Civil Appeals, El Paso Division, 62 S. W. (2d) 348.

The Act is constitutional and is "the lawful exercise of legitimate governmental powers in the interest of public welfare in extending the time for the sale of land under a deed of trust. Lingo Lumber Company v. Haynes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835. This Act was also construed in South Texas Bank and Trust Company v. Ochoa, 72 S. W. 657; Knox v. Morrison, 66 S. W. (2d) 384; Mountain Townsite Company v. Cooper, 63 S. W. (2d) 1050.

The entire Act was held unconstitutional in Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W. (2d) 404. Rehearing in this case was denied October 4, 1933; However, a contrary decision was reached in Beaumont Petroleum Syndicate v. Broussard, Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 9th District, November 2, 1933.

Court may grant continuances and stays of execution until February 1, 1935, where neither the indebtedness nor the lien securing same has been renewed or created since May 1, 1933. (S. B. No. 3, Second Special Session, 1934, Approved and Effective February 28, 1934, Expires February 1, 1935.)

This "Moratorium Act" violates Section 16 of Article I of the Constitution of Texas, which prohibits the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of contracts – Travelers Insurance Company it al v. Marshall et al, 76 S. W. (2d) 1007. This Act also construed in Lumm v. Jones, 76 S. W. (2d) 1072; Glenn v. Hollums, 76 S. W. (2d) 1038; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ballard et al, 76 S. W. (2d) 297; Oppenheimer v. Haley, 76 S. W. (2d) 411; Williams v. Holmes, 74 S. W. (2d) 1040; Brown v. Bellfork Development Corporation, 76 S. W. (2d) 913.

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment In suits to collect deficiency judgments rendered after foreclosure proceedings, defendant allowed to plead as a defense tent the property was sold for less than its actual value. The actual value may be shown and the defendant is entitled to a credit of any difference between its actual value and the sale price of the property. Any action to enforce deficiency judgment must be begun within six months from the date of sale. (Chapter 92, Laws of 1933, Effective April 21, 1933.)

This anti-deficiency judgment law violates Section 16, Article I, of the Constitution, which prohibits legislation, impairing the obligation of contracts. Langever v. Miller, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025.

Utah

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State. However, Code of State provides that Court, in its discretion, may grant stay of execution on judgment.

Vermont

Law Postponing Execution or Foreclosure Sales Court empowered to stay execution or foreclosure sales for three months. (No. 30, Laws of 1933, Effective March 24, 1933; Expired March 1, 1935, unless by joint resolution or proclamation of the Governor the emergency is considered terminated before said date; as amended by Laws of 1935, H.B. No. 108, Effective February 28, 1935, extending moratorium until March 1, 1937.)

Law Extending Period of Redemption Court within its discretion and for the benefit of the parties concerned may extend the period of redemption. (Same Statutory citations as above.)

Virginia

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State. However, the Court in its discretion may fix an equitable redemption period as justified by all the surrounding circumstances of case.

Washington

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State. However, redemption provisions of present foreclosure laws are rather lenient.

West Virginia

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State.

Wisconsin

Law Postponing Foreclosures Sales in foreclosure action on any farm or homestead commenced prior to March 1, 1935, may, within the discretion of the court, be prohibited for a reasonable period not to exceed two years beyond the usual one year period, but not beyond March 1, 1937. At all times, motion for confirmation of sale shall be made only on notice given by plaintiff to mortgagor. (Chap. 11, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective February 17, 1933; Chap. 125, Laws of 1933, Approved May 15, Effective May 17, 1933; Chap. 474, Laws of 1933, Approved and Effective July 29, 1933, as amended and repealed in part by Laws of 1935, Chap. 319, Effective August 2, 1935, Expires April 1, 1937, and Chap. 482, Effective September 19, 1935.)

Construed in Foelish v Stockhausen, 254 N.W. 340: First National Bank v R. J. Durham Lumber Co., 256 N.W. 753.

Law Extending Redemption Period Period of redemption may be extended not later than April 1, 1938, where mortgage foreclosed and redemption period has not expired, or where sale occurs after August 2, 1935, in such foreclosure action, now pending, or begun before April 1, 1937, or on sale where redemption period has not expired, or where such sale occurs after August 2, 1935, and before April 1, 1937. (Laws of 1935, Chap. 319, Effective August 2, 1935. Expires April 1, 1937, as amended by Laws of 1935, Chap. 547, Effective October 2, 1935.)

Constitutionality upheld in Mutual Building & Savings Assn. v Willing, et al., Wis. Sup. Ct., June 2, 1936.

Local county mediation boards are established to effect compromises between mortgage debtors and creditors. (See part of above cited Acts.)

In actions for foreclosure or performance of land contracts where judgment is entered before April 1, 1937, the court may extend redemption period three years, the defendant paying current interest or taxes or both. (Laws of 1935, Chap. 301, Effective June 28, 1935, as amended by S. B. 35. 311, Laws of 1935, Chap. 302, Effective August 14, 1935.)

No extension of redemption period permitted unless court directs mortgagor, owner or judgment debtor to pay taxes and interest. In any ejection or unlawful detainer action brought prior to April 1, 1937, against a lessee on a lease of ten years or more, where the lessee has constructed improvements of more than one-half the land's value, except leases mentioned in Sec. 234.19 court may allow redemption period of one to three years. (Laws of 1935, Chap. 482, Effective September 20, 1935.)

Law Limiting Right to Deficiency Judgment Before sale in foreclosure action, in which judgment is rendered prior to January 1, 1938, court must exercise its equitable powers and fix the value of the mortgaged premises. (Chap. 15, Laws of 1933, Approved February 23, 1933, Effective February 28, 1933.)

Wyoming

No emergency mortgage moratorium legislation has been enacted in this State. However, execution on judgment is within the discretion of the Court.