The Geoeconomics of Imports: Evidence from UN Security Council Elections*

Yanduo Chen† Jing Wu‡

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Abstract

This paper examines how trade functions as U.S. geoeconomic statecraft and how firms participate in it. Exploiting elections to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), we show that U.S. public firms increase imports from a country by 16 percent when it rotates onto the council. This increase is unique to the U.S. relative to comparable developed countries without permanent UNSC membership and is concentrated in products where elected countries lack comparative advantage, reflecting strategic reallocation of U.S. imports rather than improvements in exporter economies. Consistent with geopolitical motivations, the effect is concentrated among swing countries and is more pronounced when the elected country holds greater agenda-setting power. We identify two channels of import politicization: policy concessions and rent-seeking by firms. First, imports from newly elected countries face lower duty rates despite unchanged trade costs and prices, and federal procurement shifts toward their contractors and products. Second, the increase is disproportionately driven by firms whose top lobbying issues are overseen by senators who serve concurrently on the Foreign Relations Committee, with the effect increasing in senator seniority. These firms exhibit lower operational efficiency but higher subsequent valuations. Finally, countries with larger import increases during their UNSC terms exhibit greater voting alignment with the U.S.

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†School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University. Email: yanduo.chen.2022@phdacc.smu.edu.sg.
‡CUHK Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Email: jingwu@cuhk.edu.hk.

"U.S. diplomats are hinting at greater trade if Chile backs the United States."

Barry Renfrew, Associated Press (2003)

1 Introduction

Since 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has served as one of the world's most powerful international organizations, entrusted with global peacemaking and empowered to impose sanctions and authorize the use of force. Ten of its fifteen seats are held by rotating members who serve two-year terms, with five elected each year. Although these members are nominally committed to the global good, evidence suggests their votes are often influenced by major powers (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher, Lang, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, 2022). Such concerns have intensified amid escalating geopolitical tensions, as the UNSC remains the central forum for international conflict resolution. Its geopolitical importance and vulnerability to influence make it a natural setting for studying geoeconomic statecraft (Hirschman, 1945; Baldwin, 1985; Clayton, Maggiori, and Schreger, 2025a).

This paper shows how imports serve as a channel of influence over the UNSC's ostensibly independent role in world affairs.[1] Because U.S. imports flow predominantly through private firms, this process also reveals how firms participate in geoeconomic statecraft. While prior literature suggests that quid pro quo arrangements occur in the UNSC, it has not examined the role of trade in this process. This omission is notable given the size of the U.S. market and the dominance of the dollar. Granting greater access to U.S. markets matters both symbolically and materially: it signals commitment to a long-term relationship while delivering economic gains that translate into domestic political capital for incumbent leaders (Key, 1966; Kramer, 1971).

The United States can therefore offer expanded market access as a diplomatic "carrot" to elected members. Deepening trade dependency may also create an implicit threat of future restriction,

[1] Trade policy has long served as an instrument of geopolitical influence. In 1806, Napoleon's Continental Blockade sought to sever British access to European markets. More recently, several U.S. regional trade agreements were signed while the partner country held a UNSC seat: the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (April 12, 2006), and the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (June 28, 2007).

providing a complementary "stick" in negotiations. Although redirecting trade flows may impose costs on the U.S. economy, it yields influence over votes on critical geopolitical matters, where resolutions require nine affirmative votes and confer international legitimacy. Importantly, while the economic distortions are borne broadly by consumers and taxpayers, concentrated benefits accrue to U.S. politicians and interest groups (Lindsay, 1994; Haney, 2017).

Since imports in the U.S. operate through firm decisions, geopolitically motivated trade requires that firms find it privately optimal to participate. This tension allows us to uncover the domestic political arrangements that align firm and government interests. Recent studies show that geopolitical factors increasingly shape supply chain decisions (Ayyagari, Gao, and Ma, 2025; Charoenwong, Peng, and Wu, 2025; Kempf, Luo, and Tsoutsoura, 2025), largely attributing these patterns to firms' perceptions of geopolitical risk. We propose a complementary mechanism: firms reconfigure supply chains to cultivate political capital. By expanding imports from rotating UNSC members, firms help U.S. politicians exert influence abroad and advance geopolitical objectives. In return, they anticipate favorable regulatory treatment. We therefore focus on public firms' behavior, which allows us to link geopolitical sourcing to political participation credibly.

We use the S&P Panjiva database, which links U.S. Customs and Border Protection bills of lading to corporate entities and provides country of origin, Harmonized System (HS) product codes, importer identity, and transaction-level quantities and values. We match importers' ultimate parents to Compustat and restrict the sample to public firms with meaningful import exposure. We then construct two-year event windows around each UNSC rotation, form a balanced panel within each cohort, and stack across cohorts.

Our identification relies on the plausible exogeneity of UNSC elections to bilateral U.S. trade. Rotating seats are allocated across five regional groups that often agree on an endorsed candidate. Elections are then decided by secret ballot in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), requiring a two-thirds majority. These features jointly render intervention by major powers costly. Consistent with this view, Dreher, Gould, Rablen, and Vreeland (2014) show that UNSC membership is uncorrelated with a country's economic or political proximity to the United States. Rather, it

reflects a compromise between populous countries' claims to representation and a regional turn-taking norm.

To further mitigate selection bias from differences between elected and non-elected countries, we restrict the control group to countries that formally declared UNSC candidacy during 2007–2023 but were never elected. Because mounting a candidacy requires substantial investment (Malone, 2000), declared-but-unelected candidates provide a more comparable counterfactual than the broader pool of non-members. We validate that in this setting, the turn-taking norm is the dominant predictor of election outcomes (94.9% of within-R^2), and elected and non-elected candidates are well balanced on pre-treatment covariates. We then employ a stacked difference-in-differences design (Baker, Larcker, and Wang, 2022) to test how UNSC rotation affects imports. Our final sample covers approximately 900 firms across 17 rotation cohorts, yielding roughly 700,000 cohort-origin-product-firm-quarter observations.

Our dependent variable is the share of a firm's product-level imports sourced from each origin country. The import share measure captures reallocation across source countries within the same firm and product while naturally handling entry and exit. We find that U.S. public firms significantly increase the share of imports sourced from treated countries upon UNSC rotation. This effect holds across shipment counts, volumes, weights, and values, but is concentrated at the extensive margin. An alternative log-transformation specification yields approximately a 16 percent increase in import levels following UNSC rotation—roughly $100 million per treated country-year—comparable to prior estimates in the literature (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Ayyagari et al., 2025).

Next, we examine whether the increase reflects strategic import reallocation rather than fundamental improvements in exporters' economies. This distinction matters because UNSC membership may raise a country's visibility and access to foreign aid or financing, potentially enhancing productivity. We therefore compare the United States with other major developed economies that play similar roles in global supply chains but have weaker incentives to influence UNSC votes. These comparator countries are not permanent UNSC members and therefore cannot formally propose or sponsor draft resolutions, limiting their direct stake in voting outcomes. Using the BACI dataset

on bilateral trade flows, we find that the import increase is unique to the United States, consistent with politically motivated sourcing rather than improved export competitiveness.

A narrower alternative explanation remains: exporter economies may have improved specifically in sectors relevant to U.S. imports. Following Berger, Easterly, Nunn, and Satyanath (2013), we show that the increase is concentrated in products where rotating members have comparative disadvantage. This pattern contradicts standard trade theory, which predicts specialization along comparative advantage and export expansion in relatively efficient sectors. Importing products in which partners are inefficient offers little economic rationale absent non-market considerations. The pattern is, however, fully consistent with our mechanism that UNSC membership confers voting power and that the United States extends market access to support exports these countries would otherwise struggle to sell.

We then examine heterogeneity along two dimensions to show that the import increase is geopolitically driven. First, we analyze how import responses vary with ex ante ideological alignment between rotating members and the United States. Using Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten's (2017) ideal point estimates from UNGA voting patterns, we find a non-monotonic relationship. Specifically, import responses increase with ideological distance, peak for moderately divergent countries, and then decline for those with extreme ideological differences. This pattern supports a geopolitical mechanism described in Vreeland and Dreher (2014): economic inducements are most effective for "swing" countries that are not automatically aligned but remain persuadable through market access.

Second, we exploit variation in agenda-setting power. Each UNSC member holds the rotating presidency for one month, once or twice during its two-year term, determined by alphabetical order. Although the presidency carries no additional votes, it grants significant control over which issues are discussed, and these agenda decisions cannot be vetoed by permanent members. If the United States aims to influence which issues reach the Council floor, it has stronger incentives to expand imports from members who preside more than once. Consistent with this prediction, the import increase is concentrated among countries with greater agenda-setting power.

Having shown that the United States strategically leverages its consumer market to advance geopolitical goals, we next examine the underlying channels. We identify two: policy concessions and rent-seeking by connected firms. The United States has signed several free trade agreements while partner countries held UNSC seats, suggesting trade policy as a potential concession. Using calculated duty rates from the U.S. Census (Schott, 2008), we find a significant reduction for newly elected countries, yet general trade costs like import charges and goods prices show no significant declines.[2] We also examine federal procurement, a concession directly controlled by the U.S. government. The results show higher procurement shares and more new contracts with elected countries' contractors, whether measured by contractor nationality or product origin.

Second, we examine which firms align their incentives with those of the U.S. government and reconfigure their supply chains accordingly, potentially at the expense of economic efficiency. While private firms have limited incentive or ability to influence U.S. geopolitical legitimacy (Davis, Fuchs, and Johnson, 2019), they are highly motivated to shape the domestic regulatory environment. When lawmakers value geopolitical outcomes, firms may assist them by strategically expanding imports and, in return, expect regulatory favor. Such non-monetary influence strategies are well documented (Akey, Gupta, and Lewellen, 2025). To test this channel, we follow Bertrand, Bombardini, Fisman, and Trebbi (2020) in identifying settings where the expected returns to lobbying through strategic importing vary.

Our identification exploits the institutional structure of the U.S. Senate, where senators can serve on multiple committees. We focus on firms whose top lobbying issues are overseen by senators who serve concurrently on the Foreign Relations Committee (hereafter "dual-seated senators"). Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee have direct political stakes in UNSC outcomes, which the committee closely monitors as signals of international legitimacy.[3] These senators gain substantial

[2]Import charges represent the total cost of freight, insurance, and other expenses (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred to move merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of export to alongside the carrier at the first U.S. port of entry.

[3]The Foreign Relations Committee receives an annual statutory report assessing every country's UN voting record (22 U.S.C. §2414a), advises and consents on the appointment of U.S. Ambassadors to the United Nations, authorizes the foreign aid budget that U.S. law has linked to UN voting compliance since 1985, and closely tracks UNSC decisions as signals of international legitimacy.

political returns from geopolitical success, including career advancement (Lindsay, 1994), reputational benefits (Chapman, 2007; Carter and Scott, 2009), and credit-claiming opportunities with certain interest groups (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Haney, 2017). This vested interest creates strong alignment of incentives: firms support lawmakers' geopolitical objectives through strategic importing, and lawmakers reward them with regulatory favor on issues central to their business.

A natural concern is reverse causality: firms that import from politically sensitive countries may directly lobby the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To address this, we exclude such firms, so any differential import response must flow through the dual-seated senator mechanism. We find that import responses are significantly stronger for firms connected to dual-seated senators, with the effect increasing in senator seniority. This test also strengthens the causal interpretation of our baseline findings because the election of UNSC members is unlikely to be influenced by individual firms, particularly those with no active foreign policy engagement. Turning to firm-level consequences, firms that engage in geopolitical importing exhibit weaker operating performance yet higher market valuations, suggesting that supply chain reconfiguration imposes real economic costs but yields non-market rewards.

Finally, we examine the diplomatic consequences of the import increases. If the trade expansion is geopolitically motivated, countries receiving larger increases should vote more closely with the U.S. in the UNSC. Three endogeneity concerns arise. First, we cannot observe counterfactual voting behavior absent the import increase. We partially address this by conditioning on prior ideological distance. Second, UNSC agendas are strategically curated, limiting variation in observable voting. We mitigate this by including resolution fixed effects and estimating within-resolution variation. Third, reverse causality may arise if the U.S. rewards supporting votes with subsequent trade. We cannot fully rule out this channel, but establishing a robust association nonetheless validates the geoeconomic mechanism. Consistent with our prediction, countries experiencing larger import increases vote more closely with the U.S.: moving up one quintile in import growth is associated with a 10 percent reduction in voting distance. Together with our earlier findings, this evidence completes the chain: UNSC rotation reshapes trade, and trade in turn shifts voting outcomes.

We subject our findings to several robustness checks. First, balance checks confirm that election is uncorrelated with the country's economy or its relations with the United States (Trade relation, Ideological distance, US aid), but is strongly predicted by the turn-taking norm. Second, dynamic analyses support the parallel-trends assumption for both our baseline specification and additional tests. Third, the results are robust to alternative estimation methods, including the midpoint growth method with weighted least squares, which has desirable aggregation properties (Matray, Müller, Xu, and Kabir, 2025). Fourth, firms in industries with higher relationship specificity exhibit weaker import responses to UNSC rotations (Nunn, 2007), consistent with firms rationally trading off the benefits of political favor against the costs of reconfiguring supply chains.

Additionally, we assess results under alternative samples and settings. Expanding the control group to include all U.S. trade partners that never served on the UNSC during 2007–2024 yields consistent results, enhancing external validity. We also exploit Saudi Arabia's unexpected refusal of its UNSC seat in October 2013, citing frustration with the Council's handling of Syria and Palestine. Jordan was subsequently elected to fill the vacancy and assumed the seat at the start of the new term in January 2014. This episode provides a plausibly exogenous shock to UNSC composition, and the results align with our broader findings.

This paper relates to three strands of existing work. First, we contribute to the emerging literature on geoeconomics. Building on Hirschman's (1945) seminal insights, recent studies develop theoretical foundations (Thoenig, 2024; Mohr and Trebesch, 2025), analyze optimal trade policy under geopolitical objectives (Becko, Grossman, and Helpman, 2025; Clayton, Maggiori, and Schreger, 2025b), and document empirical evidence on how geopolitics shapes trade and investment (Kastner, 2016; Davis et al., 2019; Aiyar, Malacrino, and Presbitero, 2024; Broner, Martin, Meyer, and Trebesch, 2025; Clayton, Coppola, Maggiori, and Schreger, 2025; Liu and Yang, 2025). We provide causal evidence that access to the U.S. consumer market functions as an instrument of geoeconomic statecraft, exploiting UNSC rotations as exogenous shifts in countries' geopolitical value and examining subsequent UNSC voting as the outcome. Leveraging the same setting, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) show that U.S. foreign aid increases for rotating members,

and Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2015); Dreher et al. (2022) find that they receive more favorable multilateral financing terms. We extend their insights to trade, a channel that operates primarily through private firms and lacks visibility. While Davis et al. (2019) argue that U.S. trade is rarely politicized because of low levels of state ownership, we show otherwise: policy concessions lead profit-maximizing firms to follow naturally, and domestic political arrangements incentivize rent-seeking firms to import strategically.

Second, rising geopolitical tensions have spurred new research on the geopolitics of the supply chain. Ayyagari et al. (2025) find that firms led by CEOs politically aligned with the U.S. administration reduce imports substantially more from countries that become ideologically distant from the U.S. Charoenwong et al. (2025) and Kempf et al. (2025) exploit foreign elections to show that increases in ideological distance between foreign countries and firms significantly reduce import propensity. Jing, Liu, and Tian (2024) use text-based measures of geopolitical risk and find that firms are more likely to terminate relationships with suppliers located in regions experiencing rising geopolitical tensions. These studies attribute supply chain adjustments to firms' perceptions of geopolitical risk. In contrast, we argue that these adjustments also embed countries' geoeconomic strategies. In our setting, the relevant variation is not ideological alignment or geopolitical risk, but shifts in a country's voting power on international matters. Together, these findings and ours indicate that supply chain geopolitics reflects two distinct motives: firms avoid geopolitical risk, but they also passively follow policy concessions or actively strengthen political connections to accumulate political capital.

Third, we expand the literature on money in politics and its influence. Tullock (1972) first noted the puzzle that the returns to political influence far exceed its observable costs. This puzzle remains central to the literature (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003; Zingales, 2017; Akey et al., 2025; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2025). A key explanation is that firms rely on less traceable forms of influence to avoid public scrutiny. Hertel-Fernandez (2017) shows that companies build political power by mobilizing employees in elections, and Bertrand et al. (2020) show that charitable disbursements can serve as a conduit for political engagement. Our paper

highlights another concealed channel: firms can appeal to politicians by strategically reallocating imports toward diplomatically valuable countries. Because such reallocation appears as ordinary commercial activity, it evades the scrutiny applied to lobbying or campaign contributions. Given the economic magnitude of our estimates, conventional measures likely understate the true costs of corporate political activity. Our findings thus lend support to the Bebchuk et al. (2011) petition, which has attracted a record-breaking 1.2 million public comments, that the SEC "develop rules to require public companies to disclose to shareholders the use of corporate resources for political activities."[4]

2 Institutional Background

The United Nations (UN) was established with the signing of the UN Charter on June 26, 1945. It serves as a center for coordinating state actions to maintain international peace and security, foster friendly relations among nations, and promote international cooperation. Today, the UN consists of 193 member states and two observer states and is widely viewed as a leader of global peace and human development. The UN includes six principal organs, and our analysis focuses on the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The UNGA operates under Chapter IV of the UN Charter. It oversees the UN budget, elects non-permanent members to the Security Council, appoints the secretary-general, receives reports from other UN bodies, and issues recommendations through resolutions. It is the only UN organ in which all member states have equal representation. Member states vote on resolutions by a simple or two-thirds majority, but UNGA resolutions are not legally binding. As a result, UNGA voting is less susceptible to capture and more likely to reflect countries' underlying ideological positions (Bailey et al., 2017).[5]

The UNSC is the UN's primary organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It is widely viewed as the most powerful body, as Chapter VII of the UN Charter

[4]The petition, later reinforced by Bebchuk, Jackson, Nelson, and Tallarita (2020), remains pending.

[5]A counterargument is that such votes constitute low-cost signals and lack meaningful commitment (Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013).

authorizes it to identify threats and to mandate responses, including sanctions and the use of force. It is also the only UN organ whose resolutions are legally binding on member states. The UNSC consists of five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and, since 1965, ten non-permanent members. Non-permanent members are elected by the UNGA to two-year terms beginning on January 1, with elections staggered so that five seats turn over each year. Candidates face no formal restrictions aside from a prohibition on immediate re-election, but securing a seat requires support from at least two-thirds of the votes cast.[6] Seats are allocated by regional groups: five to Africa and Asia, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America and the Caribbean, and two to Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Malone, 2000).

The Security Council presidency rotates monthly among members in English alphabetical order. The president sets the agenda, presides over meetings, and manages crisis responses. Because fifteen countries serve over a two-year cycle, some non-permanent members hold the presidency twice during their term, while others serve only once. On each resolution, members may vote Yes, No, or Abstain.[7] Substantive decisions require at least nine (i.e., three-fifths) affirmative votes, but any permanent member can unilaterally block a measure through its veto, regardless of majority support. Importantly, the veto applies only to substantive matters. Procedural and agenda decisions cannot be vetoed, giving the presidency substantial discretion over which issues reach the Council floor.

Observational evidence suggests that regional powers, such as Japan and Brazil, serve more frequently than less influential states, and Malone (2000) argues that countries invest significant resources in campaigns to demonstrate commitment, secure votes, and build networks with future colleagues. However, prior research indicates that, from an ex post perspective, election to the UNSC is plausibly exogenous to a country's economic or political standing (Dreher et al., 2014). Instead, membership is robustly predicted by the norm of turn-taking. For example, the African

[6]The only exception is the 2016 UNSC election, in which neither Italy nor the Netherlands secured the required two-thirds majority, and they subsequently agreed to split the term, with each serving one year.

[7]In rare cases, members may also choose to "not participate," casting no active vote.

group explicitly maintains a system of rotation within sub-regional groups to ensure equitable access.

We provide further evidence supporting this claim. Figure 1 reports a Shapley decomposition of within-R^2 from a regression predicting UNSC election. The turn-taking norm accounts for 94.9% of the within-R^2, while other factors—including domestic politics, relations with the U.S., trade openness, and country size—contribute minimally. Figure C1 reinforces this finding. Panel A presents coefficient estimates from a determinant regression, showing that the turn-taking norm is the only statistically significant predictor of election. Panel B reports normalized differences in pre-treatment covariates between elected and non-elected candidate countries. All covariates fall well below the 0.25 threshold recommended by Imbens and Rubin (2015), indicating satisfactory covariate balance.

3 Data and Sample Selection

Our analysis draws on four primary sources: (i) UN data at the election and resolution levels; (ii) transaction-level Bills of Lading (BoL) data from S&P Panjiva; (iii) aggregate trade and calculated duty data at the $Origin \times Product \times Destination \times Time$ level; and (iv) U.S. political data on firm lobbying and Senate committee assignments.

3.1 UN Data

We assemble data on UNSC rotations, presidencies, and voting from official archives supplemented with manual coding of media reports. First, we hand-collect each year's non-permanent members from UN records and identify unsuccessful candidates using official documents and contemporaneous media coverage. Countries defeated in UNSC elections appear in General Assembly voting records, while publicly declared candidates that later withdrew are typically reported in the press. Appendix A provides the full list of elected and failed candidates. Second, we obtain presidential information from the UN archive. Third, we use the voting dataset from Dreher et al. (2022), compiled from the UN Library in Geneva using UN web pages and verbatim meeting minutes.

This dataset includes all recorded UNSC proposals and votes, regardless of outcome.[8]

We also use the ideological distance measures from Bailey et al. (2017), which are derived from UNGA voting patterns. In their model, each country's vote on a resolution is a probabilistic outcome influenced by (i) the country's policy preferences, or "ideal point" (θ), and (ii) the resolution's characteristics, such as its degree of polarization.[9] Based on observed votes, the algorithm uncovers the hidden parameters, including θ, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. Ideal points are estimated at the session level and averaged within a year. A country's ideological distance from the U.S. is then defined as the absolute difference between its ideal point and that of the U.S. By construction, the measure is comparable across years.

3.2 BoL Data

We obtain BoL data from S&P Panjiva from 2007 (the first year data is available) to 2024. Panjiva collects BoLs from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and constructs additional standardized variables. In particular, it links consignee information to corporate entities, maps product descriptions to HS codes, imputes shipment volume in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), and estimates the transaction's value in U.S. dollars. For each transaction, Panjiva provides the shipment origin, arrival date, consignee entity, HS codes, and quantity measures. Due to data limitations, Panjiva only covers maritime trade.[10]

We follow Charoenwong et al. (2025) to link Panjiva data to Compustat and drop observations without a valid $GVKEY$. We then apply several sample construction procedures: (i) we retain only firms that import in more than 50% of quarters; (ii) we exclude firms in the finance and utilities industry (SIC first digit = 6 or SIC first two digits = 49); (iii) to limit sparsity, we drop origin-firm-product pairs that appear less than 5% of the sample period, which also helps restrict the analysis to economically meaningful import relationships; (iv) we construct a balanced panel at the origin-

[8] Another common data source, the UN Bibliographic Information System, records only adopted resolutions.

[9] For example, some votes concern procedural matters and convey little ideological information.

[10] This limitation is unlikely to materially bias our estimates for two reasons. First, maritime shipments represent the majority of U.S. imports, exceeding 50% of the total import value. Second, there is no clear reason for firms or origin countries to strategically substitute across transportation modes around UNSC rotations. Consistent with this view, our results remain robust when excluding Canada and Mexico, where non-maritime imports are disproportionately concentrated.

product-firm-quarter level by imputing zeros for missing observations;[11] (v) we remove origins that never claimed candidacy for the UNSC election during our sample period; (vi) for each cohort, we require at least one non-zero observation in the event window for each origin-firm-product pair and require each firm-product to have at least one observation for the treated and control countries.

Given the high frequency of the raw data, we aggregate data by origin, 2-digit HS products, $GVKEY$, year, and quarter. Using quarterly frequency allows us to capture more granular variation in firms' import decisions within a year. After aggregation, we obtain four measures of import quantity: the total number of shipments, total volume in TEUs, total weight in kilograms, and total value in U.S. dollars. We convert these into import shares, defined as the import from a specific $origin$ divided by total imports at the $Firm \times Product \times Quarter$ $(Year)$ level:

$$Import\ Share_{opit} = \frac{Imports_{opit}}{\sum_o Imports_{opit}},$$

where o represents an origin, p a product, i a firm and t the time. This measure captures within-unit reallocation and reflects both the extensive and intensive margins, with a natural decomposition into each margin. The granular structure of $Firm \times Product \times Quarter$ $(Year)$ measure allows us to include $cohort \times origin \times product \times firm$ fixed effects, which absorb time-invariant sourcing relationships, and $cohort \times product \times firm \times time$ fixed effects, which control for firm-product level demand shocks.

3.3 Aggregate Trade Data

We construct bilateral trade flows at the origin-product-year level from the BACI dataset maintained by CEPII. BACI harmonizes UN COMTRADE data, eliminates double-reporting, and reports trade values in free-on-board (FOB) terms. It covers roughly 200 countries and 5,000 products at the HS 6-digit level annually. We use the HS07 classification to maintain comparability with the BoL data, covering 2007–2023. For tractability, we focus on nine developed countries other than the U.S.:

[11] This imputation does not introduce bias or measurement error because a missing BoL corresponds to no shipment, and thus no imports.

Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Japan, and New Zealand. These countries occupy similar positions in international trade as the U.S. but are not permanent members in the UNSC.

From BACI data, we also calculate the exporter's revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for a product from an origin in a certain year. Following UN Trade and Development guidance, a country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in a given product when the ratio of its exports of that product to its total exports of all goods (products) exceeds the same ratio for the world as a whole.

$$RCA_{op} = \frac{\frac{X_{op}}{\sum_{q \in P} X_{oq}}}{\frac{X_{wp}}{\sum_{q \in P} X_{wq}}} \geq 1,$$

where w indicates the world and P is the set of all products. We compute RCA annually to capture time-varying productivity patterns and use the lagged RCA in our regressions to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

We acquire duty, price, and charges data from Schott (2008), who processes raw U.S. Census Bureau data and aggregates them at the HS10-year-origin-Port level. The U.S. extends HS codes to ten digits for tariff administration. Each observation reports import value, quantity, charges, and duties. Charges include freight, insurance, and all other costs—excluding U.S. import duties—incurred to move the merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of export to alongside the carrier at the first U.S. port of entry.

3.4 Political Data

We obtain firm lobbying data from LobbyView (Kim, 2018). We use three datasets: (i) the Clients dataset, which reports firms' annual lobbying expenditures and can be matched to Compustat via $GVKEY$; (ii) the Reports dataset, which links each client (company) to corresponding congressional Lobbying Disclosure Act reports; (iii) the *Issues* dataset, which identifies the specific issues covered in a given report. Linking these datasets allows us to observe how much a firm spends each year to lobby on a given issue.

Next, we identify the issues on which firms concentrate their lobbying efforts by summing expenditures across all reports that reference a given issue (Bertrand et al., 2020). We focus on the top issue or issues with the highest total expenditure for each firm-year. When a report lists multiple issues, we allocate its expenditure evenly across them. We then use the crosswalk in Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2014) to map reported issues to the corresponding congressional committees. This procedure links each firm to the committee or committees most relevant to its lobbying activity.

Finally, we obtain senator committee assignments and seniority data from Charles Stewart III's website.[12] We focus on senators who simultaneously serve on the committee relevant to a given firm and on the Foreign Relations Committee, as they can both gain political returns from diplomatic outcomes and provide regulatory benefits to firms. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we exclude firms whose primary lobbying target is the Foreign Relations Committee itself, since firms heavily importing from geopolitically important countries may be directly motivated to lobby on diplomatic issues.

We combine the three sources of information to construct an indicator of political motivation for each firm, equal to one if at least one senator simultaneously serves on both the committee overseeing the firm's relevant issues and the Foreign Relations Committee. Specifically, we define:

$$Politically\ Motivated_{ft} = \sum_{c} \sum_{i} l_{fit}\, x_{ic}\, Membership_{ct},$$

where:

$$l_{fit} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if issue } i \text{ is a top issue for firm } f \text{ lobbying in year } t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

$$x_{ic} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if issue } i \text{ is overseen by committee } c \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

[12] See Stewart III and Woon (2016).

$$Membership_{ct} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if Senator in } c \text{ sits on the Foreign Relations Committee in year } t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We also construct a seniority measure defined as the maximum seniority among cross-seated senators on the committee overseeing the firm's top lobbying issue.

To align the firm-year measure with the stacked difference-in-differences design, we aggregate them to the firm-cohort level.[13] For each cohort c, we define:

$$Political_{fc} = \mathbf{1}\left(\sum_{t \in Post_c} Politically\ Motivated_{ft} > 0\right),$$

where $Post_c$ represents the periods after the UNSC rotation for each cohort. We convert the seniority measure in the same manner.

4 Main Results

4.1 Research Design and Basic Data Facts

We adopt a stacked difference-in-differences design to estimate the effects of UNSC rotation on firm imports:

$$Import\ Share_{copit} = \beta_1 Treat_{co} \times Post_{ct} + u_{copi} + v_{cpit} + \varepsilon_{copit}, \tag{1}$$

where u_{copi} denotes the $cohort \times origin \times product \times firm$ fixed effects, which absorb time-invariant sourcing characteristics, and v_{cpit} denotes $cohort \times product \times firm \times time$ fixed effects, which absorb firm-product level demand shocks. Together, these isolate within-firm shifts in sourcing toward elected countries relative to declared-but-unelected candidates for the same product and quarter. The coefficient of interest is β_1, which captures the effect of UNSC rotation on imports

[13] Without this transformation, the political-motivation measure would vary across firms and years within a cohort, complicating interpretation. Our analysis focuses on cross-sectional differences across firms within each cohort, rather than within-firm time-series variation.

from newly elected countries relative to control countries. The stand-alone effect of $Treat$ and $Post$ is absorbed by fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by origin-year and product-year.

For each cohort, treated countries are those newly rotating onto the UNSC. The control group consists of countries that formally declared candidacy during 2007–2023 (corresponding to terms 2008–2025) but were never elected. We restrict the control sample to unsuccessful candidates to mitigate potential selection bias arising from differences between elected countries and the broader set of non-elected countries. Because UNSC membership tends to correlate with regional political influence, elections may not be fully random. Mounting a credible UNSC campaign requires substantial diplomatic and financial resources (Malone, 2000), so countries that officially declare candidacy presumably have a reasonable chance of winning. These candidate countries provide a more appropriate counterfactual to elected members than the full set of non-elected countries.

$Post_{ct}$ indicates periods after a country formally rotates onto the UNSC on January 1. We construct two-year event windows ($[-2, +2]$) around each rotation and stack these cohorts. Because the UNSC allows for non-immediate re-election, some countries appear more than once in the treated group. Since there is no established econometric guidance for handling repeated treatments in stacked designs, we restrict the sample to cohorts with no prior treatment in the preceding six years to ensure stable pre-treatment performance.

We successfully link approximately 900 firms to 17 distinct UNSC rotations. The final regression sample contains around 700,000 observations at the cohort-origin-product-firm-time level. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the stacked sample. Treated (Post) and Control (Pre) groups are well balanced. On average, firms record about four shipments per origin-product-quarter, corresponding to 8 TEUs, 168,556 kg in weight, and an estimated value of \$926,906. About 37% of observations involve positive imports, and each country represents approximately 7% of total imports. Twenty-nine percent of observations correspond to politically motivated firms, and the dual-seated senators associated with these firms have an average seniority of 17 years.

4.2 Public Firms' Reaction

We estimate specification (1) on the universe of active public importers and present the results in Table 2. Import shares are constructed using the four BoL-based measures—total shipments, total volume, total weight, and total value—and standardized for ease of interpretation. We find that import shares from newly rotated countries increase by roughly 1.8% of a standard deviation (5.4% of the mean) following their entry onto the UNSC. The effect is consistent across measures in both statistical significance and magnitude.

We decompose import shares into extensive and intensive margins and report the results in Table C1. These estimates should be interpreted with caution because the intensive margin is inherently endogenous (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We find significant effects along both margins. The extensive margin is more robust, reflecting a clearer signal of economic support, especially given that the imports affected are concentrated in products where exporting countries lack a comparative advantage.

While import share design has advantages such as natural incorporation of entry and exit, it faces challenges in interpreting the economic magnitude. To facilitate comparison with prior work, we follow Ayyagari et al. (2025) and re-estimate the specification using the log of total imports. The results, reported in Table C2, indicate a 16 percent increase in import value following a country's rotation onto the UNSC, corresponding to an additional $100 million in imports for elected members per year.[14] The economic magnitude is likely a lower-bound estimate given our focus on public firms that can be credibly matched to the S&P Panjiva database.

Moreover, even this estimate likely understates the political significance. First, the material effect is especially pronounced when benefits accrue to politically connected groups (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco, 2013), as is often the case. For example, garments were the top export for Bangladesh during its UNSC term in 2000–2001, and major factories are connected to politicians. Sugar was the main export for the Philippines and Guatemala, where the industry is controlled by a few powerful families. Second, the imports may

[14] The average import per origin-year is about $628 million.

serve as a symbolic gesture signaling commitment to long-term relationships—much as political gifts carry weight beyond their material value (Tahoun, 2014).

We also estimate dynamic effects around the UNSC rotation using an event-time specification:

$$Import\ Share_{copit} = \sum_{k=-1\,(-6)}^{2\,(9)} \beta_k Treat_{co} \times 1_{t=t_c+k} + u_{copi} + v_{cpit} + \varepsilon_{copit}, \tag{2}$$

where k indicates event time in years or quarters, c indicates a cohort, and t_c is the year before rotation for each cohort (or the three quarters before rotation in the quarterly design).[15] Parameter $1_{t=t_c+k}$ is an indicator equal to one if period t falls k periods from t_c.

Figure 2 plots the dynamic effects at the quarterly and annual frequencies. For the quarterly analysis, we use the three quarters before rotation as the base period, as election results are typically announced around June or October of the preceding year. Setting this period to zero allows us to capture any incremental effects of the election prior to formal entry (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). We find no evidence of pre-trends, a modest increase following the election, and a pronounced rise after formal entry, consistent with the parallel-trends assumption. The annual results show a similar pattern.

4.3 U.S. vs Other Developed Countries

Next, we turn to the aggregate-level trade analysis. This test serves two purposes: First, it provides evidence that the import increase is not driven by our importer (firms) selection criteria. Second, it allows us to assess whether the effect is unique to the U.S. relative to other developed countries. These countries occupy similar positions in global supply chains but have weaker incentives to influence UNSC voting, as only UNSC members can formally sponsor resolutions. We estimate:

$$Import\ Share_{copdt} = \beta_1 Treat_{co} \times Post_{ct} + \beta_2 Treat_{co} \times Post_{ct} \times USA_d + u_{copd} + v_{cpdt} + \varepsilon_{copdt}, \tag{3}$$

[15] Election results are typically announced in June (post-2016) or October (pre-2016). The gap between the election result announcement and formal rotation makes our results more credible because firms typically need two to three months to switch suppliers (Brown, 2020; Charoenwong, Han, and Wu, 2023).

where d denotes destination (importer) country and USA is an indicator equal to one if the importer is the U.S. The coefficient of interest is β_2, which captures the incremental effect of UNSC rotation on U.S. import allocation relative to other developed countries. We also estimate specification (1) at the country level separately for the U.S. and for other countries.

Table 3 reports the results using standardized dependent variables. In column (1), we find robust evidence that the U.S. increases import shares from rotated countries, with an economic magnitude similar to our baseline estimates. In column (2), we find no significant evidence of a comparable increase among other developed countries. In column (3), the triple-interaction specification shows a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that the difference in effects between the U.S. and other countries is itself statistically meaningful.

These results help rule out key alternative explanations. We consider two possibilities. First, rotation onto the UNSC may increase an exporter's general visibility. Second, rotation may coincide with increases in foreign aid or multilateral financing that raise exporter productivity (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2022). However, any visibility or productivity effects should apply uniformly across importing countries, particularly among developed economies with similar positions in global trade. The absence of effects for non-U.S. countries is inconsistent with these stories, while the significant triple-interaction term indicates that the U.S. increases imports from rotated countries for reasons specific to the U.S. Similarly, we estimate dynamic effects for the U.S. and other countries separately and plot them in Figure 3. We find no evidence of pre-trends for either group. The effects of UNSC rotation on import shares are significantly positive for the U.S. but remain insignificant for non-U.S. countries.

4.4 Revealed Comparative (Dis)Advantage

Although our earlier tests rule out general visibility and productivity channels, concerns may remain about fundamental changes in suppliers' economies that are specific to the U.S. imports. We follow Berger et al. (2013) and interact our baseline specification with the revealed comparative advantage. If the trade response were driven by standard economic forces, Ricardian trade models would imply

stronger growth in products where exporting countries hold a comparative advantage. By contrast, increases in goods where exporters have a comparative disadvantage typically indicate non-market motives. In our setting, such patterns would reflect the U.S. providing expanded market access to newly elected countries precisely in products they struggle to sell elsewhere.

Table 4 presents the regression result. Across all measures of import shares, we find a significantly positive coefficient for $Treat \times Post$ and a significantly negative coefficient on $Treat \times Post \times RCA$. This pattern indicates that the increase in imports is concentrated in products where newly rotated UNSC countries lack a comparative advantage, consistent with geopolitically motivated trade. Figure 4 plots the dynamic effects separately for products with comparative advantage and disadvantage. For each measure, we observe no pre-trends in either subsample. The post-rotation increase appears only for products in which exporters hold a comparative disadvantage.

5 Geopolitical Motivations

In this section, we show that the import increase is consistent with geopolitical motivations. We use two approaches to isolate incentives related to influencing geopolitical outcomes in the UNSC, and both methods consistently indicate that the increase in imports is geopolitically driven. We discuss each approach in turn.

5.1 Ideological Distance

We follow Ayyagari et al. (2025) and Liu and Yang (2025) in measuring countries' prior ideological differences using UNGA voting patterns from Bailey et al. (2017). If the baseline import response is geopolitically driven, both the magnitude and sign of the effect should depend on prior ideological distance. The incentive for politically motivated importing reflects two forces: the probability of influencing a country's votes and the value of doing so. The probability of influence decreases with ideological distance, while the potential reward from shifting a more distant country's position increases with distance. Together, these forces imply an inverse U-shaped relationship between effect size and ideological distance.

This prediction aligns with intuition. Countries that are ideologically very close to the U.S. (e.g., Canada) generally vote with the U.S. regardless, giving the U.S. little incentive to increase imports. At the opposite extreme, countries that are ideologically distant are unlikely to be swayed by economic inducements, so the U.S. has little reason to target them either. By contrast, countries at moderate ideological distance are neither automatic allies nor unreachable. Their votes are more contestable, and import increases may meaningfully shift their positions. Thus, it is optimal for the U.S. to target these "swing" countries, much like politicians focus on swing regions in domestic politics.

We estimate the inverse U-shaped relationship using a quadratic specification and report the results in Table 5. The coefficient on $Treat \times Post \times Distance$ is significantly positive, while the coefficient on $Treat \times Post \times Distance^2$ is significantly negative, indicating that the baseline effects initially increase with ideological distance but decline beyond the turning point. Roughly 25–50% of observations lie to the right of the turning point, consistent with a meaningful inverse U-shape. Figure C2 plots the simulated relationship.

5.2 Agenda Setting Power

Although all non-permanent members of the UNSC have equal voting rights, their agenda-setting power varies. In particular, the Council president holds disproportionate influence over which issues are placed on the agenda. For example, Venezuela put the issue of Israel/Palestine on the agenda in 2016, and South Korea scheduled a formal meeting on North Korea's human rights in 2024 despite opposition from China and Russia. The presidency rotates monthly among all fifteen members in English alphabetical order. Because fifteen members share these rotations over two years, some serve as president twice during their term while others serve only once. In our sample, roughly 75% of treated observations correspond to countries that served as president twice.

We partition the treated sample based on presidency frequency and construct two indicators, $Treat1_{co}$ and $Treat2_{co}$, which equal one when the treated country serves as Council president

once or twice, respectively. We then estimate the following specification:

$$Import\ Share_{copit} = \beta_1 Treat1_{co} \times Post_{ct} + \beta_2 Treat2_{co} \times Post_{ct} + u_{copi} + v_{cpit} + \varepsilon_{copit} \quad (4)$$

The coefficients of interest are β_1 and β_2, which capture the effect of UNSC rotation on imports for cohort-countries that serve one and two presidencies separately. The estimated effect is identical to those obtained from separate regressions that include only $treat1_{co}$ or $treat2_{co}$. A weighted average of β_1 and β_2 also matches the baseline estimation. Table 6 reports the results. Across all measures of import shares, we find significant effects only for the cohort-countries that serve two presidential terms.

6 Channels

In this section, we examine the channels through which the U.S. facilitates geopolitical importing. We focus on two channels. First, we assess whether the U.S. adopts favorable trade policies or procurement directives toward member countries. Second, we study whether firms' incentives to influence domestic policy also motivate them to increase imports from these countries.

6.1 Policy Concessions

Trade policies have substantial effects on import flows and are frequently used by hegemons to exert influence on foreign countries. Historical examples include the 1806 Napoleonic blockade, which sought to cut Britain off from European markets. As motivating evidence, several regional trade agreements were signed or renewed when counterpart countries served on the UNSC: the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (April 12, 2006), and the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (June 28, 2007). In addition, the United States reportedly offered "promises of rich rewards" to secure support in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Because formal trade policy changes are relatively infrequent, we focus instead on effective duty rates. Duty rates are the most common policy instrument affecting imports; for example, President Trump recently threatened broad-based tariff increases. Governments may also implement implicit directives through differential enforcement of trade policies, which would likewise be reflected in effective duty rates.

We obtain duty-rate data at the $origin \times product \times year \times port$ level from the U.S. Census Bureau following Schott (2008). We do not aggregate beyond the port level to avoid bias arising from variation in port-specific charges and customs administration. U.S. duty rates are set at the 10-digit HS level and may be based on value (ad valorem), quantity (specific), or combined. Because we cannot separately identify the duty type, we estimate the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} Log(Duty+1)_{copdt} = \beta_1 Treat_{co} \times Post_{ct} + \beta_2 Log(Value+1)_{copdt} \\ + \beta_3 Log(Quantity+1)_{copdt} + u_{copd} + v_{cpdt} + \varepsilon_{copdt}, \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where d denotes the unlading district (port), $Value$ is the value of imports, and $Quantity$ is the quantity of imports. $Quantity$ is measured at 10-digit HS level in the units associated with each HS10 code.

We present the results in Table 7. We find that the calculated duties are significantly lower for treated countries after the UNSC rotation, both with and without conditioning on the value and quantity of imports. These results indicate that treated countries face systematically reduced duty collections. In Columns (3)–(6), we repeat the analysis for charges (freight, insurance, and other non-duty costs) and for prices. Without conditioning on import value and quantity, we find significant increases in charges and prices (Columns (3) and (5)). After conditioning on these controls, we cannot reject the null that charges or prices change (Columns (4) and (6)). Figure C3 presents the corresponding dynamic estimates. In Table C3, we also show that both the extensive and intensive margins of duty rates are significantly negative. In addition, we include the triple interaction term $Treat \times Post \times Log(Value+1)$ and find that the sensitivity of calculated duties

to import value (and quantity) decreases after the UNSC rotation for treated countries.

We also examine the federal procurement as an alternative form of policy concession. We obtain federal procurement data for 2008–2024 from the official archive.[16] We restrict the sample to newly signed contracts (excluding modifications to prior contracts) where the U.S. is the primary performance location.[17] Aggregating the data to the cohort-origin-product-award type level, we find both higher procurement shares and a greater likelihood of new contracts formation for contractors from newly elected countries after the UNSC rotation. Alternatively, we use the source origin of the products or services being contracted, regardless of the contractor's nationality, and we find consistent results. We present the results in Table C4.

6.2 Politically Motivated Firms

Imports are ultimately channeled through firms that lack both the incentives and the capacity to influence the UNSC votes. Davis et al. (2019) argue that U.S. trade is not politicized because low levels of state ownership in the economy limit the government's ability to align firm behavior with geopolitical goals. However, we notice that private firms are strongly motivated to shape the domestic regulatory environment. This rent-seeking incentive, combined with U.S. political arrangements, can create motives for politicized importing. Domestic lawmakers care about geopolitical goals and also wield regulatory authority. By importing more from newly elected UNSC countries, firms help politicians exert influence abroad and, in turn, improve their prospects for favorable domestic regulation.

A key premise of this channel is that senators on the Foreign Relations Committee have direct political stakes in UNSC outcomes. UNSC votes serve as visible signals of international legitimacy and create credit-claiming opportunities with domestic constituencies, and the committee's institutional position ensures its members are both informed about and invested in these outcomes. Under 22 U.S.C. §2414a, the Secretary of State must transmit an annual report to the committee chair

[16] https://www.usaspending.gov/download_center/award_data_archive

[17] In some cases, the U.S. government signs procurement contracts with foreign countries to support U.S. entities abroad, such as embassies. Because these contracts are endogenous to diplomatic proximity and do not affect imports, we exclude them.

assessing every country's UN voting practices and evaluating their responsiveness to U.S. policy. The committee also confirms every U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, giving its members direct influence over U.S. conduct at the Security Council.

Committee members routinely author legislation responding to specific UNSC votes, such as the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which passed the committee unanimously and established congressional review authority over the agreement endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2231. Committee chairs and ranking members also routinely issue public commentary on individual UNSC votes, treating Security Council outcomes as visible signals of international legitimacy. In 2000, SFRC Chairman Jesse Helms became the first legislator from any country to personally address the UN Security Council. Moreover, the committee authorizes the foreign aid budget, and U.S. law has linked aid disbursements to UN voting behavior since 1985. These arrangements ensure that UNSC outcomes are both politically salient and electorally consequential for committee members.

To test this channel, we identify situations where the returns to lobbying through importing vary across firms. We follow Bertrand et al. (2014, 2020) to map firms' lobbying expenditures to key issues and then to corresponding Senate committees.[18] We then merge this with Senate assignments data from Charles Stewart III's website, yielding a measure that links firms to senators who oversee their top lobbying issues. Our identification strategy exploits the institutional structure of the U.S. Senate, where senators can serve on multiple committees. We focus on senators who also sit on the Foreign Relations Committee, because they can gain political return from U.S. diplomatic success. We construct the variable $Political_{fc}$ as defined in Section 3.4 and estimate the baseline specification augmented with its interaction term.

We present the results in Table 8. Across all measures of import shares, the effects are concentrated among firms with political motivations. This finding supports our argument that firms adjust their supply chain decisions in response to geopolitical considerations, driven by incentives to capture domestic policy. Figure 5 shows the dynamic effects: we observe no pre-

[18]Due to data limitations, we can only test cohorts up to 2018.

trends for either subsample, but only politically motivated firms exhibit a significantly positive post-rotation response. This test also strengthens the causal interpretation of our baseline findings: UNSC elections are unlikely to be influenced by individual firms, particularly those with no active foreign policy engagement.

We also exploit the well-documented institutional hierarchy of the U.S. Senate, where tenure confers both procedural advantages and informal influence. The more senior senators within a committee hold disproportionately greater sway over regulatory outcomes and have stronger capabilities for influencing domestic policy. We therefore predict that firms' incentives to adjust suppliers increase with the seniority of the relevant senator. We estimate the specification with the triple interaction term $Treat \times Post \times Log(Seniority)$ and present the result in Table 9. We address missing committee-seniority values for non-politically motivated firms in two ways: Panel A assigns them a seniority of zero, while Panel B excludes them. Across both approaches, we find consistent evidence that the baseline effect is stronger when the dual-seated senator is more senior.

These results are further supported by senators' ability to observe firms' import behavior. Firm-level import data is readily accessible: bills of lading for ocean shipments are public records under 19 U.S.C. §1431, and Senate committees routinely receive trade data from CBP through its Office of Congressional Affairs, with subpoena power as a backstop. Senators have publicly identified individual firms' import patterns and supply chain relationships.[19] Beyond direct observation, Bertrand et al. (2014) show that lobbyists are primarily attached to specific legislators rather than to specific issues, implying that the firm's lobbyist connected to the dual-seated senator is a natural channel through which the firm communicates its trade behavior. Even absent direct communication, Congress's committee structure facilitates repeated interactions between interest groups and legislators, supporting a reputational equilibrium that sustains this implicit exchange (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998).

In Table C5, we use an alternative measure of political motivation. We argue that firms headquartered in the same state as the Foreign Relations Committee Chair may also have incentives

[19]For example, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Wyden traced specific firms' imports to individual component suppliers. Senator Rubio similarly identified and publicly named firms over their sourcing decisions.

to import strategically. Two considerations motivate this prediction. First, even if the state's senator does not oversee the firm's top lobbying issue, they may exert substantial influence over state-level regulation. Second, senators shape the broader regulatory environment, and the returns to lobbying are greater for in-state firms, to whom senators pay closer attention. We find consistent results for this alternative group, although the statistical significance of the effects is weaker.

In Table C6, we conduct a consequence test for these firms. If firms maximize profitability, we expect higher market valuations when their import patterns align with government preferences. We find that firms' operational performance declines and that this effect is driven by higher cost of goods sold, indicating that strategic global sourcing is not operationally optimal. However, these firms exhibit higher valuations, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, suggesting they are rewarded along other dimensions. Further analysis indicates that these firms experience lower perceived domestic political risk, consistent with the benefits of lobbying. We note two limitations of this test. First, it is endogenous because firms' responses to UNSC elections are not exogenous to their performance or political risk. Second, because the shock is not at the firm level, the firm-level panel is less clean than the baseline import panel.

7 Consequences

In this section, we examine the consequences of geopolitically driven imports using UNSC voting records. Consistent with our mechanism, we expect countries experiencing a larger increase in imports to vote more similarly to the U.S. We measure similarity in two ways. First, we construct a variable $Same\ Vote_{or}$, which equals 1 if a country o casts the same vote as the U.S. on resolution r. Second, we code each vote as Yes = 1, Abstain = 0, and No = -1, and define $Vote\ Distance_{or}$ as the absolute difference between a country's vote and the U.S. vote. For example, if a country votes Yes while the U.S. votes No, the distance is 2; if the U.S. Abstains, 1; and if the U.S. also votes Yes, 0.

We use the BACI dataset to compute the change in trade value between the two-year post-rotation period and the two-year pre-rotation period. We then normalize the trade changes in two

ways. First, we scale the change by the pre-period average trade value to obtain $Scaled\ Change_{ot}$. Second, for each year, we sort trade changes into quintiles and construct two variables: $TradeQtl_{ot}$, the raw quintile rank of trade changes, and $Large\ Trade_{ot}$, an indicator equal to 1 if the trade change falls in the top quintile and 0 if it falls in the bottom quintile.

In Figure 6, we present binned scatter plots of trade-change quintiles and voting similarity. We observe a clear and consistent pattern: that larger trade changes are positively associated with greater voting alignments with U.S. votes, whether measured by $Same\ Vote$ or by $Vote\ Distance$. To conduct a more stringent test, we estimate:

$$Vote\ Similarity_{or} = \beta_1 Trade\ Changes_{ot} + \beta_2 Distance_{ot-1} + u_r + \varepsilon_{or}, \tag{6}$$

where r denotes resolution, $Vote\ Similarity$ represents the similarity measures described above, $Trade\ Changes$ represents the normalized trade changes, and $Distance$ is the ideological distance between an origin country and the U.S. in the previous year, calculated from Bailey et al. (2017).

We control for prior ideological distance to address the endogeneity concern that U.S. trade responses vary systematically with ideological proximity, as documented in Section 5.1. Prior distance also serves as a proxy for the counterfactual voting similarity absent trade responses, which cannot be observed ex post (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). We also include resolution fixed effects to estimate within-resolution effects, thereby mitigating the endogeneity from strategic agenda setting.[20] Moreover, any endogenous agenda-setting bias works against finding significant results.

We obtain official UNSC voting records from Dreher et al. (2022), which contain each country's votes on every resolution regardless of whether it passes. We standardize the dependent variables to facilitate interpretation. Table 10 shows that larger trade responses are robustly associated with greater voting similarity after conditioning on prior ideological distance. Moving up one trade-change quintile is associated with a 10 percent reduction of voting distance.[21]

[20] Agenda setters typically know the preferences of each member before bringing a resolution to a vote. This likely explains why most Security Council resolutions pass unanimously and why failed resolutions are rare.

[21] The raw estimate (without standardization) is −0.004, while the mean of voting distance is 0.04.

Finally, we clarify the interpretation of this result. Although we document a significantly positive association between trade changes and vote similarity, we cannot identify the direction of causality. Non-permanent members may first signal support through their votes, with the U.S. subsequently increasing imports, or both sides may adjust simultaneously in a strategic setting if they understand each other's incentives. Importantly, our argument does not require a causal relationship. The strong association alone is consistent with the geoeconomic mechanism.

8 Robustness

In this section, we provide numerous additional analyses, assessing the robustness and validity of our findings across alternative samples and research designs.

8.1 Midpoint Growth

We follow Matray et al. (2025) and measure import changes using midpoint growth, defined as

$$\Delta Import_{copft} = \frac{Import_{copft} - Import_{copf,-1}}{0.5(Import_{copft} + Import_{copf,-1})}$$

The midpoint growth measure accommodates zero trade flows naturally and is bounded at (−)2 to account for entry (exit). When combined with weighted least squares, it also has a nice aggregation property that estimates remain comparable across different levels of saturation. To assign greater importance to firms with larger import value (and thus greater influence on allocation), we define the weights as

$$\frac{(ImportValue_{copft} + ImportValue_{copf,-1})}{\sum_{o,p}(ImportValue_{copft} + ImportValue_{copf,-1})}$$

We present the results in Table C7. We find consistent evidence that midpoint growth is significantly associated with UNSC rotation under both ordinary least squares and weighted least squares.

8.2 Relationship Specificity

We validate that our results are stronger for firms operating in industries with lower relationship specificity. If geopolitically motivated importing requires firms to reconfigure their supply chains, the cost of doing so is higher in industries where inputs are more relationship-specific. We therefore expect weaker import responses when switching suppliers is more costly. We use the industry-level relationship-specificity index from Nunn (2007), which is based on the share of inputs that are not traded on organized exchanges and/or not reference priced, as classified by Rauch (1999). Inputs that are traded on exchanges or reference priced entail lower search and contracting costs, and therefore lower relationship specificity. Table C8 shows that the effects are significantly weaker in industries with higher relationship specificity, consistent with firms rationally trading off the benefits of political favor against the costs of reconfiguring supply chains.

8.3 Alternative Control Sample

In the baseline and subsequent analyses, we restrict the control group to countries that unsuccessfully contested UNSC elections between 2007 and 2023. This choice improves comparability between treated and control units but limits external validity. As an alternative, we expand the control group to include all countries that did not serve on the UNSC during 2007–2024 and re-estimate the specification. Table C9 reports the results.

8.4 Case Studies

We examine a case where the change in UNSC membership was largely unexpected. Saudi Arabia was elected to a 2014–2015 non-permanent seat but unexpectedly declined the position in October 2013, citing the "double standards" in UNSC resolutions. Jordan was subsequently elected as the replacement member. Because Saudi Arabia's withdrawal was unanticipated, Jordan's entry was less likely to be shaped by U.S. influence. We analyze this episode using BACI data. Table C10 reports the results.

9 Conclusion

This paper provides causal evidence that the United States strategically leverages its consumer market to influence United Nations Security Council voting. As geopolitical tensions intensify and economic statecraft becomes increasingly central to international relations, understanding how major powers convert economic dominance into geopolitical influence within key international institutions is crucial for both corporate strategy and economic policy.

Using large-scale, granular datasets on firm-level imports, we find that U.S. public companies increase imports from countries newly elected to the UNSC. By contrast, no such patterns emerge for other developed countries. This increase is concentrated in products where elected countries lack comparative advantage, suggesting that the trade response reflects strategic reallocation of U.S. imports rather than fundamental changes in exporters' economies. The effect also exhibits heterogeneity consistent with geopolitical motives. First, it follows an inverse U-shape with ideological distance, peaking for "swing" countries that are moderately aligned with the U.S. Second, it is more pronounced when the elected country holds greater agenda-setting power, as determined by the exogenous rotation of the UNSC presidency.

We further identify two channels through which imports become politicized. First, the U.S. extends policy concessions to newly elected countries. Imports from these countries face significantly lower duty rates, while general charges and prices remain unchanged. Federal procurement also shifts toward contractors and products from newly elected countries. Second, the import increase is disproportionately driven by firms whose top lobbying issues are overseen by senators who serve concurrently on the Foreign Relations Committee. These firms assist politicians in achieving geopolitical objectives through strategic importing, expecting favorable regulatory treatment in return. The effect is stronger when the relevant senator is more senior. Finally, we validate our geoeconomic mechanism by showing that countries experiencing larger import increases during their UNSC terms vote more closely with the U.S., even after conditioning on prior ideological distance.

Our findings have two implications. First, they highlight access to the U.S. consumer market as a tool of statecraft for advancing geopolitical objectives. Second, they suggest that domestic political arrangements can induce firms to adjust supply chains based on geopolitical considerations, even at the expense of operational efficiency. Several promising directions for future research remain. One natural extension is to explore how economic rents are allocated within exporting countries, testing whether politically connected firms disproportionately benefit from increased U.S. imports. Another is to examine how multiple major powers deploy geoeconomic tools simultaneously, potentially leading to fragmentation within international institutions.

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




Figure 1: **Shapley Decomposition.** This figure reports the Shapley decomposition of within-R^2 from a regression predicting UNSC election. Predictors are grouped into six categories: Domestic Politics (Democracy, Conflict), Relation with US (Ideological Distance from US, Log(US Trade Value), Log(US Trade Quantity), Log(US Aid)), Trade Openness (Export Share of GDP, Import Share of GDP), Country Dynamism (GDP Growth, Population Growth), Country Size (Log(GDP), Log(Population)), and Turn-Taking Norm. Each bar shows the cumulative share of within-R^2 attributable to the corresponding group. The Turn-Taking Norm accounts for 94.9% of the within-R^2, while other factors contribute minimally, consistent with the plausible exogeneity of UNSC elections to a country's economic or political proximity to the United States. Sample restricted to 103 declared-candidate countries, 2008–2024. Permanent members (P5) excluded. See Appendix B.2 for variable definitions.



Panel A: Quarterly Design



Panel B: Yearly Design

Figure 2: **Dynamic Effects of UNSC Rotation.** This figure plots the result from dynamic analyses for the baseline regression, examining the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. firm imports. In Panel A, we adopt a quarterly design, and the benchmark period is three quarters before rotation (normalized to zero), when the election results come out. In Panel B, we adopt a yearly design, and the benchmark period is the year before UNSC rotation (normalized to zero). The blue dots represent the coefficient estimates from the interaction term $Treat_{co} \times \mathbf{1}_{t=t_c+k}$ regarding the import decision of *Shipment Share* from Equation (2). The red triangles, green dots, and yellow triangles represent the coefficient estimate regarding *Volume Share*, *Weight Share* and *Value Share*, respectively. The inner capped bars are 90% confidence intervals, and the outer uncapped bars are 95% confidence intervals for each import share measure.







Figure 3: **Dynamic Analysis for Aggregate Trade Patterns.** This figure plots the result from dynamic analyses for the effects of UNSC rotation on aggregate-level trade for the U.S. and other developed countries. The benchmark period is the year before UNSC rotation (normalized to zero). Event time is $\tau = t - t_c$, where t_c is the rotation year for the cohort c. The dependent variable is the share of the total value of imports for a product from an origin. The blue dots (red triangles) represent coefficient estimates for the U.S. and other developed countries, respectively. The inner capped bars are 90% confidence intervals, and the outer uncapped bars are 95% confidence intervals for each import share measure.




Panel A: Shipment Share



Panel C: Weight Share




Panel B: Volume Share




Panel D: Value Share


Figure 4: **Different Effects for RCA and non-RCA Products.** This figure plots the heterogeneous effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. firm imports regarding the product's comparative advantage. The Comparative (Dis)Advantage refers to the goods that an origin country has a revealed comparative (dis)advantage in a given product in the previous year. An origin is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in a given product when its ratio of exports of that product to its total exports of all goods (products) exceeds the same ratio for the world as a whole, and the origin is considered to have an export strength in that product. The benchmark period is the year before UNSC rotation (normalized to zero). Each panel presents the results for an import decision: Shipment Share, Volume Share, Weight Share, and Value Share, respectively. The blue dots (red triangles) represent coefficient estimates for the goods without (with) comparative advantage from the interaction term $Treat_{co} \times \mathbf{1}_{t=t_c+k}$ from Equation (2), respectively. The inner capped bars are 90% confidence intervals, and the outer uncapped bars are 95% confidence intervals for each import share measure.




Panel A: Shipment Share



Panel B: Volume Share




Panel C: Weight Share




Panel D: Value Share

Figure 5: **Different Effects for Politically Motivated Firms and Other Firms.** This figure plots the heterogeneous effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. firm imports regarding the firm's political motivation. Politically Motivated Firms refers to firms that are politically motivated in at least one year during the post-period for each cohort. A firm is said to be politically motivated when there is a senator cross-seat on both the committee overseeing its top lobbying issue and the Foreign Relations Committee. The benchmark period is the year before UNSC rotation (normalized to zero). Each panel presents the results for an import decision: *Shipment Share*, *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share*, respectively. The blue dots (red triangles) represent coefficient estimates for the firms with (without) political motivation from the interaction term $Treat_{co} \times \mathbf{1}_{t=t_c+k}$ from Equation (2), respectively. The inner capped bars are 90% confidence intervals, and the outer uncapped bars are 95% confidence intervals for each import share measure.



Panel A: Same Vote



Panel B: Vote Distance

Figure 6: **Binscatter Plot of Trade Increases and Vote Similarity.** This figure plots the relation between UNSC vote similarity and changes in imports from two years pre-rotation to two years at the resolution level. Panel A measures vote similarity by an indicator of the same vote with the U.S., and Panel B measures vote similarity by assigning 1 (0, −1) to Yes (Abstain, No) and calculating the absolute distance. The x-axis indicates the changes in raw import value between an origin and the U.S., and the y-axis indicates the vote similarity of an origin and the U.S. The dots represent the average vote similarity for each quintile of import changes, the capped bars are 95% confidence intervals for the average value, and the solid line represents the fitted regression line between the two variables.

Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics**

This table presents summary statistics for the main variables, including treatment structure, trade quantity measures, firm politics variables, and UNSC vote dynamics. The unit of observation is cohort–origin–product–firm–time for Panels A–C, and at the resolution level for Panel D. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix B.1.

Panel A: Treatment Structure

Variable	N	Mean	Std	P1	P25	P50	P75	P99
Treat	707,604	0.41						
Post	707,604	0.50						
Presidency Count	291,788	1.73	0.44					

Panel B: Trade Data

Variable	N	Mean	Std	P1	P25	P50	P75	P99
Shipment	707,604	4.16	14.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	106.00
Volume	707,604	8.11	31.73	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.66	240.00
Weight	707,604	168,556.31	976,763.69	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,873.50	8,759,129.25
Value	707,604	926,905.84	4,508,587.59	0.00	0.00	0.00	70,800.00	37,429,566.00
Have Import	707,604	0.37	0.48					
Shipment Share	707,604	0.07	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	1.00
Volume Share	707,604	0.07	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	1.00
Weight Share	707,604	0.07	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	1.00
Value Share	707,604	0.07	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	1.00

Panel C: RCA, Ideological Distance, and Firm Politics

Variable	N	Mean	Std	P1	P25	P50	P75	P99
RCA	690,440	2.65	6.81	0.01	0.54	1.01	1.60	37.46
Ideological Distance	705,984	2.20	1.00	0.12	1.48	2.21	3.06	3.96
Political	414,816	0.29	0.45					
Seniority	119,824	17.08	8.71	5	11	13	25	35

Panel D: UNSC Votes

Variable	N	Mean	Std	P1	P25	P50	P75	P99
Pass	745	0.95						
Same Vote	7,450	0.97	0.17					
Vote Distance	7,450	0.04	0.23					

Table 2: **Firms' Import Patterns Following UNSC Rotation**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Shipment Share* refers to the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share* are defined similarly. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share*	*Volume Share*	*Weight Share*	*Value Share*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.018**	0.019**	0.019***	0.019**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	707,604	707,604	707,604	707,604
Adjusted R-squared	0.464	0.432	0.430	0.412

Table 3: **Aggregate Trade Patterns Following UNSC Rotation**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on the U.S. and other developed countries (Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Japan, and New Zealand) aggregate import decisions. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–destination–time level. The sample in column (1) includes U.S. imports, the sample in column (2) includes other developed countries' imports, and the sample in column (3) includes both U.S. and other countries' imports with a triple interaction term *Treat* × *Post* × *USA*. *Value Share* refers to the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country in that quarter. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. *USA* is an indicator that turns to one if the destination country is the U.S. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Value Share*		
	USA	*Non USA*	*All*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat × *Post*	0.017***	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Treat × *Post* × *USA*			0.014***
			(0.004)
Cohort×Destination×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Destination×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	144,770	1,074,410	1,219,180
Adjusted R-squared	0.983	0.937	0.947

Table 4: **Effect of Revealed Comparative Advantage**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for goods with a comparative advantage compared to those with a comparative disadvantage. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Shipment Share* refers to the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share* are defined similarly. *RCA* is an indicator that equals one if the goods of an origin country have a revealed comparative advantage in a given product in the previous year. An origin is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in a given product when its ratio of exports of that product to its total exports of all goods (products) exceeds the same ratio for the world as a whole. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	0.030***	0.034***	0.032***	0.029***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
RCA	−0.029	−0.030	−0.038*	−0.036*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Treat × *RCA*	0.057	0.069*	0.059	0.052
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Post × *RCA*	0.020***	0.025***	0.022***	0.021***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Treat × *Post* × *RCA*	−0.028**	−0.033***	−0.029**	−0.026**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	690,440	690,440	690,440	690,440
Adjusted R-squared	0.469	0.438	0.435	0.418

Table 5: **The Non-monotonic Effect of Ideological Distance**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for origins with different ideological distances. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Shipment Share* refers to the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share* are defined similarly. *Ideological Distance* is the ideological distance between an origin country and the U.S. in the year before the rotation for each cohort, calculated from Bailey et al. (2017). *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	−0.144*	−0.105	−0.108	−0.143*
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.078)
Post × *Distance*	−0.032**	−0.031**	−0.034**	−0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Treat × *Post* × *Distance*	0.138**	0.111*	0.110*	0.145**
	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Post × $Distance^2$	0.010***	0.009**	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Treat × *Post* × $Distance^2$	−0.026**	−0.022*	−0.021*	−0.029**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	705,864	705,864	705,864	705,864
Adjusted R-squared	0.463	0.432	0.429	0.412

Table 6: **The Effect of Agenda-Setting Power**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for elected origins with different presidency service terms. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Shipment Share* refers to the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share* are defined similarly. *Treat(1 Pres.)* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC and serves presidency once in a cohort, and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or is defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Treat(2 Pres.)* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC and serves a presidency twice in a cohort, and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or is defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
$Treat_1 \times Post$	0.007	0.001	0.004	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
$Treat_2 \times Post$	0.023**	0.025***	0.025***	0.024***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	707,604	707,604	707,604	707,604
Adjusted R-squared	0.464	0.432	0.430	0.412

Table 7: **Trade Costs Following the UNSC Rotation**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. calculated duties, general charges, and price. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–port–time level. *Duty* is the total value of calculated duty for a product imported from an origin country to a port in a year. *Charges* is the total cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred in bringing a product from an origin country to a port in a year. *Value* is the total value of shipments for products imported from an origin country to a port in a year. *Quantity* is the total quantity of shipments for products imported from an origin country to a port in a year. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Log(Duty+1)*		*Log(Charges+1)*		*Log(Value+1)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat × *Post*	−0.049***	−0.066***	0.032**	0.005	0.027**	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Log(Value + 1)		0.510***		0.800***		
		(0.010)		(0.005)		
Log(Quantity + 1)		0.066***		0.110***		0.517***
		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.011)
Cohort×Product×Origin×Port	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Product×Port×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,736,810	5,736,810	5,736,810	5,736,810	5,736,810	5,736,810
Adjusted R-squared	0.876	0.906	0.674	0.839	0.752	0.856

Table 8: **Effects of Firm Political Incentives**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for firms (importers) with political motivation compared to other firms. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Shipment Share* refers to the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share* are defined similarly. *Political* is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is politically motivated in at least one year during the post-period for each cohort. A firm is said to be politically motivated when there is a senator who sits on both the committee overseeing its top lobbying issue and the Foreign Relations Committee. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	0.002	0.007	0.008	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Treat × *Post* × *Political*	0.044***	0.047***	0.042***	0.047***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	414,816	414,816	414,816	414,816
Adjusted R-squared	0.468	0.429	0.431	0.417

Table 9: **Effects of Senator Seniority**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for firms (importers) with political motivation compared to other firms. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Shipment Share* refers to the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. *Volume Share*, *Weight Share*, and *Value Share* are defined similarly. *Seniority* is the maximum committee seniority of the senator who cross-sits on both the committee overseeing its top lobbying issue and the Foreign Relations Committee. In Panel A (B), we set *Seniority* to 0 (missing) when *Lobby* is missing. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Seniority Imputed as Zero for Non-Lobbying Firms

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	0.001	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Treat × *Post* × *Log(Seniority)*	0.018***	0.019***	0.017***	0.019***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	414,816	414,816	414,816	414,816
Adjusted R-squared	0.468	0.429	0.431	0.417

Panel B: Lobbying Firms Only

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	−0.058	−0.048	−0.049	−0.057
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.066)
Treat × *Post* × *Log(Seniority)*	0.039*	0.038*	0.037*	0.041*
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	119,824	119,824	119,824	119,824
Adjusted R-squared	0.467	0.420	0.424	0.401

Table 10: **Vote Similarity Following Import Increase to the U.S.**

This table reports the effects of trade changes on the origin country's vote similarity with the U.S. The sample is panel data at the origin–resolution level. *Same Vote* is an indicator equal to one if an origin country has the same vote type as the U.S. *Vote Distance* represents the absolute distance between an origin country's vote and the U.S. vote. (Yes, Abstain, and No are assigned values of 1, 0, and −1, respectively.) *Scaled Changes* are the changes in the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country from an origin country in two years after rotation from two years before, scaled by the pre-period value of trade. *Trade Qtl* represents the quintile rank of the changes in the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country from an origin country in two years after rotation from two years before. *Large Trade* is an indicator equal to one if *Trade Qtl* = 5, and equals zero if *Trade Qtl* = 1. *Distance* is the ideological distance between an origin country and the U.S. in the previous year, calculated from Bailey et al. (2017). See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by Resolution. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Same Vote*			*Vote Distance*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ScaledChange	0.101***			−0.114***		
	(0.036)			(0.032)		
TradeQtl		0.018***			−0.020***	
		(0.006)			(0.005)	
LargeTrade			0.083***			−0.073***
			(0.025)			(0.022)
Distance	−0.120***	−0.117***	−0.119***	0.110***	0.106***	0.133***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.024)
Resolution	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,450	7,450	2,980	7,450	7,450	2,980
Adjusted R-squared	0.487	0.487	0.463	0.568	0.568	0.504

Appendix

A List of Successful and Failed Candidates (2007–2023)

UNSC Election Results, 2007–2023

Election Year	Elected Countries	Defeated or Withdrawn Countries
2007	Burkina Faso; Costa Rica; Croatia; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Viet Nam	Czech Republic; Dominican Republic
2008	Austria; Japan; Mexico; Turkey; Uganda	Iran; Iceland; Mongolia
2009	Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Gabon; Lebanon; Nigeria	Poland; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Togo; Democratic Republic of Congo
2010	Colombia; Germany; India; Portugal; South Africa	Kazakhstan; Canada
2011	Azerbaijan; Guatemala; Morocco; Pakistan; Togo	Fiji; Hungary; Kyrgyzstan; Mauritania; Slovenia
2012	Argentina; Australia; Republic of Korea; Luxembourg; Rwanda	Bhutan; Finland; Cambodia
2013	Chile; Jordan; Lithuania; Nigeria; Chad	Georgia; Gambia; Saudi Arabia; Senegal
2014	Angola; Spain; Malaysia; New Zealand; Venezuela	Fiji; Turkey
2015	Egypt; Japan; Senegal; Ukraine; Uruguay	Bangladesh
2016	Bolivia; Ethiopia; Italy; Kazakhstan; Sweden	Thailand; Kenya; Seychelles
2017[a]	Cote d'Ivoire; Equatorial Guinea; Kuwait; Netherlands; Peru; Poland	Bulgaria
2018	Belgium; Germany; Dominican Republic; Indonesia; South Africa	Maldives; Israel
2019	Estonia; Niger; Tunisia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Viet Nam	Romania; El Salvador
2020	India; Ireland; Kenya; Mexico; Norway	Canada; Djibouti; Ghana
2021	Albania; United Arab Emirates; Brazil; Gabon; Ghana	Democratic Republic of Congo
2022	Switzerland; Ecuador; Japan; Malta; Mozambique	—
2023	Algeria; Guyana; Republic of Korea; Sierra Leone; Slovenia	Belarus; Tajikistan

[a] Italy and the Netherlands agreed to split a single two-year WEOG seat, with Italy serving in 2017 and the Netherlands in 2018. Italy is listed under the 2016 election and the Netherlands under the 2017 election, resulting in six elected countries for the 2017 election year.

B Variable Definitions

B.1 Regression Variables

- *Treat*: An indicator equal to one if the origin country of trade rotates on the UNSC in a cohort, and zero if the origin country formally declared candidacy but withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023.
- *Treat$_1$ (Treat$_2$)*: An indicator equal to one if the origin country of trade rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and serves the presidency for once (twice), and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023.
- *Presidency Count*: The number of times the country serves as the UNSC president in a cohort.
- *Post*: An indicator equal to one for the time periods after the rotation in each cohort.
- *Shipment*: The total number of shipments of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the number of shipments is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Volume*: The total volume of shipments (in TEUs) of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the shipment volume is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Weight*: The total weight of shipments (in kilograms) of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the shipment weight is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Value*: The total value of shipments (in USD) of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the shipment value is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
  - In Table 7, Value is the total value of shipments of a product from a source country to a port during a year. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Have Import*: An indicator equal to one if the firm has a positive import for a product from an origin country in a quarter.
- *Shipment Share*: The total number of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total number of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the Shipment Share is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Volume Share*: The total volume of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total volume of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the Volume Share is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

- *Weight Share*: The total weight of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total weight of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the Weight Share is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

- *Value Share*: The total value of shipments of products imported by the firm from an origin country in a quarter, scaled by the total value of shipments of products imported by the firm in that quarter. If the firm does not import the product from a country and quarter, the Value Share is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

  - In Table 3, the Value Share is the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country from an origin country in a year, scaled by the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country in that year. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
  - In Table C4, Value Share refers to the total value of procurement of federal agencies for a product from an origin under a certain contract type in a year, scaled by the total value of procurements of products under the contract type in that year.

- *Shipment Share Int*: Intensive measure of Shipment Share. Equals Shipment Share if Shipment Share > 0.

- *Volume Share Int*: Intensive measure of Volume Share. Equals Volume Share if Volume Share > 0.

- *Weight Share Int*: Intensive measure of Weight Share. Equals Weight Share if Weight Share > 0.

- *Value Share Int*: Intensive measure of Value Share. Equals Value Share if Value Share > 0.

- *USA*: An indicator equal to one if the importer is the U.S. This variable is used in aggregate trade analysis.

- *RCA*: An indicator equal to one if an origin country has a revealed comparative advantage in a given product in the previous year. An origin country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in a given product when its ratio of exports of that product to its total exports of all goods (products) exceeds the same ratio for the world as a whole.

- *Distance*: Ideological distance between an origin country and the U.S. in the year before the rotation for each cohort. The raw ideological distance is from Bailey et al. (2017). The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

  - In Table 10, Distance is the ideological distance between an origin country and the U.S. in the previous year, calculated from Bailey et al. (2017).

- *Political*: An indicator equal to one if the firm is politically motivated in at least one year during the post-period for each cohort. A firm is said to be politically motivated when there is a senator who sits on both the committee overseeing its top lobbying issue and the Foreign Relations Committee.

- *Seniority*: The maximum committee seniority of the senator who cross-sits on both the committee overseeing its top lobbying issue and the Foreign Relations Committee. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Committee*: An indicator equal to one if the firm is headquartered in the same state as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair during the post-period for each cohort.
- *Duty*: The total value of calculated duty for a product imported from an origin country to a port in a year. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Have Duty*: An indicator equal to one if Duty > 0.
- *Charges*: The total cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred in bringing a product from an origin country to a port in a year. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- *Quantity*: The total quantity of shipments for products imported from an origin country to a port in a year, according to census data. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This variable is only used in duty rate tests.
- *Have Procurement*: An indicator equal to one if there is a new contract of procurement of federal agencies for a product from an origin under a certain contract type in a year.
- *Importer*: An indicator equal to one if the firm has larger average import changes from countries that are UNSC members compared to other countries in a cohort. This variable is only used in firm consequence tests.
- *COGS*: Firm's cost of goods sold in quarter, scaled by the quarter's revenue. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This variable is only used in firm consequence tests.
- *Operational Margin*: Firm's operating earnings after depreciation and amortization, scaled by the quarter's revenue. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This variable is only used in firm consequence tests.
- *Market-to-Book*: Firm's market capitalization divided by book value of equity. This variable is only defined when the book value of equity is larger than zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This variable is only used in firm consequence tests.
- *Political Risk*: Firm's political risk in a quarter, as revealed in their earnings calls from Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2019). The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This variable is only used in firm consequence tests.
- *Scaled Changes*: The changes in the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country from an origin country in two years after rotation from two years before, scaled by the pre-period value of trade. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This variable is only used in vote consequence tests.
- *Trade Qtl*: Value 1–5 representing the quintile rank of the changes in the total free-on-board value of products imported by the destination country from an origin country in two years after rotation from two years before. This variable is only used in vote consequence tests.


- *Large Trade*: An indicator equal to one if Trade Qtl = 5, and equals zero if Trade Qtl = 1. This variable is only used in vote consequence tests.
- *Pass*: An indicator equal to one if the resolution is passed.
- *Same Vote*: An indicator equal to one if an origin country has the same vote type as the U.S. This variable is only used in vote consequence tests.
- *Vote Distance*: Value 0–2 representing the absolute distance between an origin country's vote and the U.S. vote. Yes, Abstain, and No are assigned values of 1, 0, and −1, respectively. This variable is only used in vote consequence tests.
- Δ*Shipment*: The midpoint growth of the total number of shipments of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. The base period is the quarter before rotation. If the firm does not import the product from a country in both the focal quarter and the base quarter, the value is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- Δ*Volume*: The midpoint growth of the total volume of shipments of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. The base period is the quarter before rotation. If the firm does not import the product from a country in both the focal quarter and the base quarter, the value is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- Δ*Weight*: The midpoint growth of the total weight of shipments of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. The base period is the quarter before rotation. If the firm does not import the product from a country in both the focal quarter and the base quarter, the value is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- Δ*Value*: The midpoint growth of the total value of shipments of a product imported by a firm from a source country during a quarter. The base period is the quarter before rotation. If the firm does not import the product from a country in both the focal quarter and the base quarter, the value is set to zero. The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- RS_1: The fraction of inputs not sold on the exchange for an industry from Nunn (2007). The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
- RS_2: The fraction of inputs not sold on the exchange and not reference-priced for an industry from Nunn (2007). The variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.

B.2 Determinant and Balance Test Variables


The following variables are used in the Shapley decomposition (Figure 1), the determinant regression (Figure C1, Panel A), and balance checks (Figure C1, Panel B). All variables are lagged one year relative to the election year unless otherwise noted.

- *UNSC*: An indicator equal to 1 if a country serves as an elected (non-permanent) member of the UN Security Council in a given year, otherwise 0. Source: UNSCdata_working_full panel.xls.
- Turn-Taking Norm
  - *Turn-Taking Norm*: Years since a country's last UNSC service (or years since entering the UN if never served) divided by the number of non-serving members in its regional group. Source: UNSC membership data.
- Country Size
  - *Log(GDP)*: Log of real GDP at purchasing power parity. Source: Penn World Table 11.0.
  - *Log(Population)*: Log of population. Source: Penn World Table 11.0.
- Country Dynamism
  - *GDP Growth*: Real GDP growth rate. Source: Penn World Table 11.0.
  - *Population Growth*: Population growth rate. Source: Penn World Table 11.0.
- Trade Openness
  - *Export Share of GDP*: Exports as a share of GDP. Source: Penn World Table 11.0.
  - *Import Share of GDP*: Imports as a share of GDP. Source: Penn World Table 11.0.
- Domestic Politics
  - *Democracy*: Electoral democracy index, measured on a continuous 0–1 scale. Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).
  - *Conflict*: An indicator equal to one if the country has at least one state-based armed conflict active in a given year. Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
- Relation with US
  - *Ideological Distance from US*: Ideological distance from the U.S. in United Nations General Assembly voting, based on ideal point estimates. Source: Bailey et al. (2017).
  - *Log(US Trade Value)*: Log of the total value of U.S. imports from the country (plus one). Source: BACI bilateral trade data.
  - *Log(US Trade Quantity)*: Log of the total quantity of U.S. imports from the country (plus one). Source: BACI bilateral trade data.
  - *Log(US Aid)*: Log of U.S. aid disbursements to the country (plus one). Source: U.S. foreign aid data.

C Appendix Figures and Tables




Panel A: Determinant Test




Panel B: Balance Check


Figure C1: **Determinant and Balance Tests.** This figure presents determinant and balance tests for UNSC election. Panel A reports coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of UNSC election on country-level covariates. The Turn-Taking Norm is the only statistically significant predictor, consistent with the plausible exogeneity of UNSC elections. Panel B reports the normalized differences in pre-treatment covariates between elected and non-elected candidate countries. Following Imbens and Rubin (2015), normalized differences below 0.25 indicate satisfactory covariate balance, with values below 0.1 suggesting excellent balance. All covariates satisfy these thresholds. Sample restricted to 103 declared-candidate countries, 2008–2024. Permanent members (P5) excluded.




Panel A: Shipment Share



Panel C: Weight Share



Panel B: Volume Share



Panel D: Value Share

Figure C2: **Non-monotonic Effect of Ideological Distance.** This figure plots the non-monotonic effects of Ideological Distance on U.S. firm imports following UNSC rotation. Ideological Distance is measured as the ideological distance between an origin country and the U.S. in the year before the rotation for each cohort from Bailey et al. (2017). The quadratic curve is the simulated curve based on the estimation in Table 5. The markers represent the percentiles based on the treated countries.




Figure C3: **Dynamic Effects of UNSC Rotation on Trade Costs.** This figure plots the result from dynamic analyses for the effects of UNSC rotation on trade costs. The benchmark period is the year before UNSC rotation (normalized to zero). The blue dots represent the coefficient estimates from the interaction term regarding the calculated duty. The red triangles and green triangles represent the coefficient estimates regarding Charges and Price, respectively. The estimation includes total value and quantity as control variables. The inner capped bars are 90% confidence intervals, and the outer uncapped bars are 95% confidence intervals for each trade cost measure.

Table C1: **Extensive and Intensive Margins**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions, decomposed into extensive and intensive margins. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Extensive Margin*	*Intensive Margin*			
	Have Import	*Shipment Share Int*	*Volume Share Int*	*Weight Share Int*	*Value Share Int*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat × *Post*	0.011***	0.020***	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	707,604	174,530	165,008	174,530	174,528
Adjusted R-squared	0.367	0.707	0.661	0.661	0.606

Table C2: **Baseline Regression with Log-transformation**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions, using the log-transformation as the dependent variable. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Log(Shipment + 1)*	*Log(Volume + 1)*	*Log(Weight + 1)*	*Log(Value + 1)*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.025***	0.029***	0.127***	0.148***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.049)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	707,604	707,604	707,604	707,604
Adjusted R-squared	0.636	0.618	0.463	0.446

Table C3: **Additional Tests on Duty Rates**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on trade costs. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–port–time level. Panel A presents the test of duty rates decomposed into extensive and intensive margins. Panel B presents the test of duty rates on triple interaction terms of *Treat* × *Post* × *Log(Value+1)* and *Treat* × *Post* × *Log(Quantity+1)*. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A

Dep. Var.	*Extensive: Have Duty*		*Intensive: Log(Duty)*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	−0.006***	−0.007***	−0.013	−0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.011)
Log(Value+1)		0.009***		0.933***
		(0.000)		(0.005)
Log(Quantity+1)		0.004***		0.006***
		(0.000)		(0.001)
Cohort×Product×Origin×Port	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Product×Port×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,736,810	5,736,810	2,892,245	2,892,245
Adjusted R-squared	0.872	0.873	0.740	0.958

Table C3: **Additional Tests on Duty Rates** (continued)

Panel B

Dep. Var.	*Log(Duty+1)* (1)	*Extensive Margin Have Duty* (2)	*Intensive Margin Log(Duty)* (3)
Treat × *Post*	0.044	−0.007*	0.098***
	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.027)
Log(Value+1)	0.513***	0.010***	0.926***
	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.006)
Treat × *Log(Value+1)*	−0.007	−0.003***	0.017**
	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Post × *Log(Value+1)*	−0.002	−0.001***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Treat × *Post* × *Log(Value+1)*	−0.008***	0.000	−0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Log(Quantity+1)	0.068***	0.004***	0.006***
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Treat × *Log(Quantity+1)*	−0.008	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Post × *Log(Quantity+1)*	0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Treat × *Post* × *Log(Quantity+1)*	−0.004	−0.000*	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Cohort×Product×Origin×Port FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Product×Port×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,736,810	5,736,810	2,892,245
Adjusted R-squared	0.906	0.873	0.958

Table C4: **Federal Foreign Procurement Following UNSC Rotation**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. federal procurement to foreign firms and on foreign products. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–type–time level. Columns (1)–(2) measure origin based on the contractor (awardee) location, and columns (3)–(4) measure origin based on the ultimate origin country of the contracted product. *Value Share* refers to the total value of procurement of federal agencies for a product from an origin under a certain contract type in a year, scaled by the total value of procurements of products under the contract type in that year. *Have Procurement* is an indicator that equals one if there is a new contract of procurement of federal agencies for a product from an origin under a certain contract type in a year. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*By Country of Awardee Contractor*		*By Country of Product Origin*	
	Value Share	*Have Procurement*	*Value Share*	*Have Procurement*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.100**	0.064**	0.071***	0.015
	(0.050)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.013)
Cohort×Origin×Product×Type	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Product×Type×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,174	6,174	34,655	34,655
Adjusted R-squared	0.133	−0.096	0.197	0.113

Table C5: **Alternative Political Motivation Measure**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for firms with political motivation compared to other firms. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share*	*Volume Share*	*Weight Share*	*Value Share*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.018**	0.018**	0.018**	0.018**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Treat × *Post* × *Committee*	0.056	0.063	0.086	0.063
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.049)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	707,604	707,604	707,604	707,604
Adjusted R-squared	0.464	0.432	0.430	0.412

Table C6: **Firm Consequences**

This table reports the effects of geopolitical importing decisions on firm performance. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–firm–time level. *Importer* is an indicator equal to one if the firm has larger average import changes from countries that are UNSC members compared to other countries in a cohort. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by Firm. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*COGS*	*Operational Margin*	*Market-to-Book*	*Political Risk*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Importer × *Post*	0.015**	−0.035**	0.024*	−0.022
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Cohort×Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	79,290	79,270	78,188	67,723
Adjusted R-squared	0.939	0.720	0.837	0.247

Table C7: **Midpoint Growth**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions, using midpoint growth as in Matray et al. (2025). The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. Panel A presents the result from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Panel B presents the result from Weighted Least Squares (WLS). *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: OLS

Dep. Var.	Δ*Shipment*	Δ*Volume*	Δ*Weight*	Δ*Value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.037***	0.037***	0.040***	0.038***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	707,604	707,604	707,604	707,604
Adjusted R-squared	0.452	0.438	0.437	0.434

Panel B: WLS

Dep. Var.	Δ*Shipment*	Δ*Volume*	Δ*Weight*	Δ*Value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.079***	0.058**	0.070***	0.072**
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	283,338	283,338	283,338	283,338
Adjusted R-squared	0.862	0.856	0.859	0.860

Table C8: **Relationship Specificity**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions for firms in industries with different levels of relationship specificity. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. Panels A and B use different measures of relationship specificity following Nunn (2007), respectively. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Panel A: Relationship Specificity Measure 1

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	0.418***	0.287***	0.403***	0.426***
	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Treat × *Post* × RS_1	−0.425***	−0.289**	−0.409***	−0.435***
	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	322,720	322,720	322,720	322,720
Adjusted R-squared	0.476	0.444	0.440	0.422

Panel B: Relationship Specificity Measure 2

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share* (1)	*Volume Share* (2)	*Weight Share* (3)	*Value Share* (4)
Treat × *Post*	0.072***	0.055***	0.067***	0.076***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Treat × *Post* × RS_2	−0.088***	−0.065**	−0.081***	−0.098***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	322,720	322,720	322,720	322,720
Adjusted R-squared	0.476	0.444	0.440	0.422

Table C9: **Alternative Control Sample**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions using an alternative control sample. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–firm–time level. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country rotates on the UNSC in a cohort and zero if the origin country was not elected to the UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Shipment Share*	*Volume Share*	*Weight Share*	*Value Share*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat × *Post*	0.035***	0.039***	0.040***	0.039***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Cohort×Firm×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Firm×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,878,456	1,878,456	1,878,456	1,878,456
Adjusted R-squared	0.473	0.438	0.437	0.419

Table C10: **Case Study: Saudi Arabia and Jordan**

This table reports the effects of UNSC rotation on U.S. public firms' import decisions using Saudi Arabia's refusal of its seat as a case study. The sample is a stacked event sample at the cohort–origin–product–destination–time level. *Treat* is an indicator that turns to one if the origin country is Jordan and zero if the origin country was a candidate that withdrew from or was defeated in UNSC elections during 2007–2023. *Post* indicates time periods after the rotation of each cohort. See Appendix B.1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are heteroskedasticity robust and double clustered by Origin×Year and Product×Year. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Dep. Var.	*Value Share*		
	USA	*Non USA*	*All*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat × *Post*	0.009*	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Treat × *Post* × *USA*			0.014**
			(0.007)
Cohort×Destination×Product×Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort×Destination×Product×Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,820	58,948	66,768
Adjusted R-squared	0.993	0.925	0.945