Regulatory Arbitrage within the Firm

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Abstract

Regulation shapes the boundaries of firms. When prudential standards bind asymmetrically across subsidiaries of an integrated organization, internal capital markets become a mechanism for regulatory arbitrage. We study this in U.S. banking, where holding companies control both heavily regulated depository institutions and lightly regulated nonbank affiliates. Following Basel III in 2015, holding companies extract equity from nonbank subsidiaries to recapitalize their banks, avoiding costly external issuance and raising profitability. Bank subsidiaries accumulate 5–8 percentage points more excess capital than comparable standalone banks, entirely through internal transfers; consolidated equity, assets, and lending are unchanged. Within the same organization, banks become safer while nonbank affiliates experience declining capital ratios, deteriorating credit quality, and aggressive expansion into consumer lending. Risk is shifted rather than eliminated, creating hidden fragility: stress tests calibrated to 2008-scale shocks indicate that 5–8% of holding companies would exhaust their capital buffers. Our findings, therefore, demonstrate that organizational structure is a first-order determinant of regulatory outcomes.

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1 Introduction

A fundamental question in economics concerns how organizations structure economic activity across internal boundaries. Coase (1993) argued that firms exist when internal organization economizes on transaction costs relative to market exchange, and subsequent work has explored how organizational form affects resource allocation (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986), capital budgeting (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Stein, 1997), and responses to external shocks (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Yet despite extensive theoretical and empirical work on organizational economics, we have limited understanding of how regulation interacts with organizational structure to shape firm behavior and resource allocation.

This gap is particularly consequential in financial markets. The canonical framework for analyzing bank capital regulation treats financial institutions as standalone entities: requirements specify minimum equity ratios, leverage constraints, and risk-weighted capital buffers for "the bank" as if it were a simple, unitary firm. Yet most systemically important financial institutions are not standalone banks but complex holding companies comprising dozens of legally separate subsidiaries — commercial banks, broker-dealers, consumer lenders, asset managers, insurers — that face dramatically different regulatory regimes despite operating under common ownership and integrated management. When regulation designed for standalone entities meets this organizational reality, a fundamental question arises: do tighter capital requirements reduce risk at the organizational level, or do they simply reallocate risk across internal boundaries?

The answer depends on how internal capital markets respond. In a frictionless world, reallocating equity across subsidiaries would be neutral; a dollar of capital is a dollar of capital regardless of where it sits in the organizational chart. But when raising external equity is costly, as a large literature documents (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Altınkılıç and Hansen, 2000), a profit-maximizing holding company facing tighter requirements on its bank subsidiary has a cheaper alternative: extract equity from lightly regulated nonbank affiliates and redeploy it internally. This avoids costly external issuance, satisfies regulatory requirements, and raises consolidated profitability. The same reallocation, however, strips nonbank affiliates of capital and loads risk onto the less regulated side of the firm. This has systemic implications. If the parent recapitalizes a distressed nonbank subsidiary, it draws down the capital buffer that backstops the bank. The bank's improved capital position is therefore not fully insulated from nonbank risk: distress at the nonbank can propagate to the bank through the parent's balance sheet.

The U.S. banking industry provides an ideal setting to study this mechanism. We exploit the phased implementation of Basel III capital requirements beginning in 2015, which substantially tightened minimum capital ratios for bank subsidiaries while leaving nonbank affiliates formally unregulated. We show that bank holding companies respond precisely as the mechanism predicts: rather than issuing new equity, they extract equity from nonbank subsidiaries and reallocate it to their banks. BHC profitability rises, external equity issuance does not increase, and bank capital ratios improve, but the same reallocation strips nonbank affiliates of capital, raises their internal funding costs, and induces them to shift aggressively into riskier lending. Risk is not eliminated; it is relocated to the less regulated, less protected side of the firm.

To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in organizational complexity generated by the staggered timing of interstate banking deregulation during the 1970s–1990s. Following Strahan et al. (2003), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we instrument for organizational complexity using the year in which each BHC's home state removed restrictions on interstate banking. States that deregulated earlier allowed BHCs more time to expand and build multi-subsidiary structures before the Riegle–Neal Act of 1994 harmonized restrictions nationwide. This historically determined variation, shaped by state-level political economy decades before our study period (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999), generates persistent differences in organizational structure plausibly orthogonal to factors determining post-2015 regulatory responses.

We establish three core findings. First, BHCs with more complex organizational structures respond to enhanced capital requirements by extracting equity from nonbank subsidiaries to recapitalize their bank affiliates. Using instrumental variables estimation that exploits state-level deregulation timing, we find that banks in BHCs from states deregulating one year earlier accumulate 0.74 percentage points more excess capital post-2015. For the median gap of 7 years between early and late deregulators, this implies approximately 5 percentage points more bank capital. Importantly, this capital accumulation occurs exclusively at the bank subsidiary level: we find no corresponding increase in consolidated holding company capital, total BHC assets, or BHC lending, consistent with internal reallocation rather than external equity issuance or consolidated deleveraging.

We trace the internal reallocation through direct observation of equity flows between parent and subsidiaries: a contribution that addresses an important gap in the literature. While prior research on internal capital markets emphasizes liquidity reallocation through loans and deposits

between affiliates (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012*a*,*b*; Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Cetorelli and Prazad, 2025; Bai, Campello and Muthukrishnan, 2025), the role of equity transfers, which directly affect risk-bearing capacity and regulatory capital ratios, has received limited attention. We document that equity dominates internal funding by an order of magnitude: equity investments average 20–25% of BHC assets while non-equity investments total just 2–5%. This dominance explains why organizational structure, specifically, the presence of nonbank subsidiaries from which equity can be extracted, becomes a first-order determinant of regulatory responses.

Post-2015, we observe systematic equity reallocation operating through three channels. First, nonbank equity-to-asset ratios decline by 7.71 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure. Second, nonbank dividend yields to parents increase by 9.47 percentage points while net balances to parents and other subsidiaries increase by 13.60 percentage points. Third, parent equity investments in bank subsidiaries increase by 2.28 percentage points while investments in nonbanks decline by 2.64 percentage points, with no change in total investments. We further document that parents charge nonbanks sharply higher internal funding rates post-2015: nonbank internal borrowing costs increase 0.52 percentage points per year of exposure while bank rates show no change, creating a 200 basis point spread by 2020 for high-exposure BHCs. This pricing divergence reveals that internal capital markets operate subject to funding frictions, amplifying the real effects of equity extraction beyond mechanical balance sheet adjustments.

The key mechanism underlying these patterns is the asymmetric distribution of equity within bank holding companies, which makes nonbank subsidiaries natural sources of internal capital. Nonbank subsidiaries within BHCs hold dramatically higher equity-to-asset ratios than banks (median 69% versus 10%), making them natural "equity reservoirs" despite small asset footprints. This creates an internal equity multiplier: the median nonbank subsidiary represents just 2% of consolidated assets but holds 16% of consolidated equity, meaning each dollar of nonbank assets supports a disproportionately large share of consolidated equity available for reallocation.

Our second core finding examines the systemic implications of internal capital reallocation using subsidiary-level stress tests. While internal equity extraction that avoids costly external financing is privately optimal for BHCs, it can create two channels for systemic fragility. First, depleted nonbank capital buffers may make subsidiaries vulnerable to shocks that would have been absorbed under higher pre-extraction capitalization. Second, nonbank distress may transmit to banks through contagion: when parents must inject equity to recapitalize distressed nonbanks, they draw down the very bank buffers regulators sought to protect through stricter requirements.

We quantify these risks by simulating scenarios comparable to the 2008 financial crisis: nonbank subsidiaries suffer asset losses requiring recapitalization to restore prudential capital ratios. Using 2013Q4 balance sheets (before equity extraction), we calculate losses of 5%, 10%, and 15% on nonbank assets, magnitudes consistent with the substantial mark-to-market losses and balance sheet contractions experienced by broker-dealers during 2007–2009 (Adrian and Shin, 2010), and compute the equity injection needed to restore nonbank capital ratios to values around the population median, ranging from 40% to 70% of assets.

Under our baseline scenario (5% shock requiring recapitalization to 40% capital ratios), the mean BHC would need to deploy 19% of its excess capital to recapitalize nonbanks. At the 95th percentile, this rises to 91% of available parent capital, and 5% of BHCs would completely exhaust capital buffers. More severe scenarios generate tail risks exceeding 100% of available BHC capital. Thus, the stress tests reveal substantial hidden fragility: while banks appear individually safer, the consolidated holding company structure faces increased vulnerability to nonbank shocks that could exhaust parent equity and trigger disorderly liquidations, and potentially transmit stress back to affiliated banks, eroding their capital cushions.

Our third core finding is that internal capital reallocation generates a stark divergence in risk, performance, and business models across subsidiaries within the same holding company. Bank subsidiaries become safer and more profitable following the tightening of capital requirements, while nonbank subsidiaries become significantly more fragile.

On the bank side, increased internal equity injections translate into higher profitability and lower risk without higher leverage. Bank return on assets rises persistently following 2015, driven by shifts toward safer balance sheet composition rather than by increased risk-taking. Banks reduce exposure to risk-weighted assets, increase holdings of securities and cash, and operate with higher capital buffers relative to risk. Importantly, leverage and marginal return on equity remain unchanged, indicating that performance gains arise from improved efficiency and risk composition rather than from deploying additional capital into high-return activities.

In contrast, nonbank subsidiaries within the same holding companies become significantly more fragile. As equity is extracted, nonbank capital ratios fall sharply, profitability declines, and credit quality deteriorates. In response, nonbanks shift away from capital-intensive lines of business (e.g., trading, venture capital, advisory) toward capital-light lending, particularly consumer lending, which allows balance-sheet expansion despite diminished equity buffers. This reorientation is accompanied by higher income volatility and a pronounced decline in distance-to-default,

indicating heightened exposure to adverse shocks. Together, these patterns show that internal capital reallocation shifts risk away from regulated, safety-net-protected banks toward less regulated, uninsured nonbank affiliates.

Beyond balance sheet adjustments, organizational structure itself adapts endogenously to regulatory pressure. Rather than simplifying, BHCs expand the scope of nonbank activities after 2015, increasing the number of distinct nonbank business lines while rebalancing subsidiary portfolios toward capital-light lending operations and away from capital-intensive insurance affiliates. This extensive-margin response, combined with intensive-margin shifts in nonbank business models, shows that organizational complexity actively adapts to regulatory constraints.

More broadly, our findings highlight that regulation interacts with firm boundaries in first-order ways. When prudential standards bind asymmetrically across subsidiaries within integrated organizations, internal capital markets mediate the incidence of regulation, potentially increasing fragility at the organizational level. Banks become safer while nonbanks performing identical economic functions become more fragile, shifting credit provision from entities with regulatory oversight and safety nets to entities with neither.

1.1 Related Literature

This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, we extend research on internal capital markets by documenting how regulation shapes internal capital allocation and showing that organizational structure is a first-order determinant of regulatory incidence. While prior work emphasizes liquidity reallocation through loans and deposits and repo transactions between affiliates (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Stein, 1997; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012*a*,*b*; Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Cetorelli and Prazad, 2025; Bai, Campello and Muthukrishnan, 2025), we show equity transfers dominate by an order of magnitude and directly affect risk-bearing capacity and regulatory capital ratios. Our evidence demonstrates that internal capital markets, whose transaction costs justify organizational existence, create real economic consequences when regulation distorts internal allocation decisions.[1]

Second, we contribute to understanding the effects of bank capital regulation (Kashyap, Stein and Hanson, 2010; Admati et al., 2013; Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2011; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Gropp et al., 2019). These studies typically treat banks as standalone entities or analyze consolidated holding company responses. We show subsidiary-level heterogeneity within firms

[1] (Bai et al., 2025) study internal repo markets within BHCs and find evidence of regulatory arbitrage.

is crucial: identical consolidated capital requirements generate divergent outcomes across subsidiaries depending on organizational structure. This challenges the implicit assumption that consolidated oversight fully captures economic risks.

Third, we identify a new dimension of regulatory arbitrage distinct from cross-border (Houston, Lin and Ma, 2012; Ongena, Popov and Udell, 2013; Danisewicz, Reinhardt and Sowerbutts, 2017), cross-sector (Buchak et al., 2018; Irani et al., 2021), and cross-time (Kisin and Manela, 2016) channels emphasized in prior work. Regulatory arbitrage occurs *within* legally integrated organizations, as firms exploit differential treatment of subsidiaries to minimize regulatory costs. This within-firm arbitrage may be particularly concerning because it occurs within the regulatory perimeter, under consolidated supervision, yet escapes effective oversight. Our findings complement work by Tarullo (2019), Acharya, Cetorelli and Tuckman (Forthcoming), and Bai, Campello and Muthukrishnan (2025) emphasizing the challenges of regulating multi-entity financial conglomerates.

Our analysis also documents substantial growth in lending and risk-taking by nonbank subsidiaries within BHCs, complementing work on nonbank financial intermediation outside the banking sector (Pozsar et al., 2010; Buchak et al., 2018; Irani et al., 2021; Jiang et al., 2020). Buchak et al. (2024) document the secular decline of banks' share of credit intermediation as nonbanks expand. We show that regulatory pressure accelerates this migration even within the boundaries of bank holding companies: BHCs reallocate lending activity from regulated bank subsidiaries to lightly-regulated nonbank affiliates in response to stricter capital requirements. This organizational channel for regulatory arbitrage operates alongside the cross-sector reallocation emphasized in prior work, and has important implications for measuring and monitoring systemic risk. Many economically important nonbanks operate as wholly owned subsidiaries of BHCs, creating direct channels for risk transmission that are invisible in sector-level data (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012; Cetorelli and Prazad, 2025).

Broadly, our findings suggest that organizational complexity is not merely a veil over economic activity but a first-order determinant of how regulation shapes behavior and allocates risk. Effective prudential policy may need to account for the boundaries of the firm, recognizing that regulation applied to legally separate subsidiaries within economically integrated organizations creates exploitable wedges and potentially destabilizing risk migration.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data sources and sample construction. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework that organizes our empirical analysis.

Section 4 presents the identification strategy. Section 5 documents internal capital reallocation. Section 6 documents the divergent consequences for subsidiary outcomes: banks become safer while nonbanks become more fragile, with implications for the consolidated holding company's systemic risk profile. Section 7 presents key robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.

2 Data

We use regulatory filings to study changes at the BHC, bank, and nonbank levels. Our primary data sources are the FR Y-9C (consolidated BHC financials), FR Y-9LP (unconsolidated BHC financials and inter-entity flows), Call Reports (bank subsidiary financials), and FR Y-11 (nonbank subsidiary financials). We link entities across filings using the organizational structure database introduced in Cetorelli and Stern (2015).

2.1 BHC-Level Data

The FR Y-9C provides quarterly consolidated financial statements for BHCs, including balance sheets, income statements, and regulatory capital measures such as risk-weighted assets and capital ratios. The FR Y-9LP reports quarterly unconsolidated data for the top-tier holding company, capturing equity investments and financial flows between the parent, bank subsidiaries, and nonbank subsidiaries.

We use the FR Y-9LP in two primary ways. First, it provides information on nonbank activity, including the number of nonbank subsidiaries and their aggregate assets, loans, and revenues, allowing us to distinguish BHCs with and without nonbank financial subsidiary activity. Appendix Figure C.1 shows that nonbank assets held within BHC structures represent approximately 20% of total nonbank financial assets post-2010, with the sharp increase in 2008–2010 reflecting the conversion of large investment banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley) to BHC status following the financial crisis. This indicates our sample captures a substantial share of shadow banking activity. Second, the FR Y-9LP contains detailed data on equity investments and intercompany lending, allowing us to measure internal equity and non-equity transfers within the BHC's organizational structure.

2.2 Bank and Nonbank Subsidiary Data

Call Reports (FFIEC 031/041) provide detailed quarterly information on bank balance sheets, income statements, and regulatory capital, allowing us to observe equity and capital positions of depository institution subsidiaries. We also use Call Reports to measure bank-level lending activity across loan categories, charge-offs, and other performance indicators.

The FR Y-11 provides balance sheet information on nonbank subsidiaries, including equity, lending activity, and loss provisions. Top-tier holding companies must submit FR Y-11s for large nonbank subsidiaries at either quarterly or annual frequency. However, only a subset of nonbank subsidiaries are required to file, and reporting frequencies are not uniform across entities.

2.3 BHC Organizational Structure Database

We use a comprehensive database of BHC organizational structures covering 1970 to the present, first documented in Cetorelli and Stern (2015) and described further in Cetorelli and Prazad (2025). This database combines information from FR Y-6 and FR Y-10 filings to construct a quarterly panel of bank and nonbank subsidiary relationships and counts for each top-tier holding company. To our knowledge, this is the only dataset providing time-consistent, comprehensive coverage of organizational structure for the full population of Y-9C filing BHCs.

We use this database in two main ways. First, it allows us to link BHC-level financial data with subsidiary-level filings. Second, it records the primary business activity of each subsidiary using five-digit NAICS codes, enabling us to distinguish between different types of nonbank financial institutions within a BHC's organizational structure.

2.4 Excess Capital Construction

We construct measures of excess regulatory capital at BHC and depository institution levels using FR Y-9C and Call Report data, respectively. Excess capital is defined as the amount of regulatory capital held by an institution in excess of all binding regulatory requirements, normalized by risk-weighted assets (RWA). For each institution–quarter, we compute observed capital ratios (Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, Total Capital, and leverage-based ratios) and compare them to the applicable regulatory minimums in effect at that time. Excess capital is defined as the minimum distance between observed capital ratios and their corresponding regulatory thresholds, ensuring that the most binding constraint determines the measure value.

Our construction accounts for changes in U.S. bank capital regulation over time, including the transition from pre-Basel III to Basel III, the phase-in of the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), the introduction of the Stress Capital Buffer (SCB) at the BHC level, G-SIB surcharges, and leverage-based constraints such as the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR). For advanced approaches institutions, capital ratios are defined as the minimum across standardized and advanced approaches calculations. We exclude banks that opt into the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) framework, as they do not report RWA. Full details of the regulatory framework and construction procedure are provided in Appendix B.

2.5 Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the BHC, bank, and nonbank samples used in the empirical analysis from 2010 to 2024. BHCs are heterogeneous in size, with mean assets of $97.8 billion (95th percentile of $323.6 billion) and mean risk-weighted assets of $61.6 billion. On average, bank subsidiaries of BHCs compose of a greater share of consolidated assets than nonbank subsidiaries. Commercial banks are typically smaller than their top-tier holding company, with mean assets of $40.0 billion, while nonbank subsidiaries are substantially smaller with mean assets of just $2.4 billion. Balance sheet composition measures indicate that BHCs and banks are primarily deposit-funded and loan-oriented, whereas nonbanks historically hold relatively low loan shares and span a range of subsidiary types including brokers, lenders, and funds.

3 A Framework for Internal Capital Reallocation

We develop a model to organize our empirical analysis and clarify the mechanism. A profit-maximizing bank holding company owns two subsidiaries: a regulated bank B and an unregulated nonbank N. The bank faces a capital requirement $E_B \geq \kappa_B \cdot A_B$; the nonbank faces none. The BHC can meet a tightening requirement either by raising costly external equity K at convex cost $c(K)$, or by transferring equity internally from the nonbank to the bank at transaction cost τ per dollar. When external equity is sufficiently costly — the empirically relevant case given well-documented issuance frictions (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Altınkılıç and Hansen, 2000) — the BHC's optimal response is purely internal. This is privately optimal: the BHC avoids costly external issuance and consolidated profitability rises. We show in Section 6 that BHC profitability increases following Basel III, consistent with this prediction.

Proposition 3.1 (Internal Reallocation Equilibrium)**.** *When $c'(0) > \tau$ and regulation binds, the BHC optimally sets $K^* = 0$, $E_B^* = \kappa_B \cdot A_B$, and $E_N^* = E^0 - \kappa_B \cdot A_B$, yielding:*

$$\frac{\partial E_B^*}{\partial \kappa_B} = A_B > 0, \quad \frac{\partial E_N^*}{\partial \kappa_B} = -A_B < 0, \quad \frac{\partial (E_B^* + E_N^*)}{\partial \kappa_B} = 0 \tag{1}$$

Bank equity rises one-for-one with the regulatory requirement; nonbank equity falls in equal proportion; consolidated BHC equity is unchanged.

The systemic implications of this reallocation depend on a second consideration. When a nonbank subsidiary suffers losses, the parent must choose between injecting equity to recapitalize it, liquidating assets at potentially fire-sale prices, or allowing failure. If the parent recapitalizes, it draws down the same capital buffer that backstops the bank. The bank's improved balance sheet may therefore be partially offset by a weakened parent: the additional excess capital accumulated by the bank is implicitly at risk if the nonbank encounters distress and the parent responds by injecting equity.

We capture this through a contagion parameter $\lambda \in [0, 1]$, where $\lambda = 0$ denotes perfect ring-fencing and $\lambda = 1$ denotes full transmission of nonbank distress to the bank through the parent. The probability of bank failure incorporates both direct shocks and contagion:

$$\Pr(\text{Bank Failure}) = F_B(-E_B) + \lambda \cdot \Pr(\theta_N < -E_N \text{ and } \theta_B > -E_B) \tag{2}$$

The second term captures the channel of interest: nonbank distress transmits to the bank even in states where the bank would otherwise survive its own shock, because the parent depletes its buffer to recapitalize the nonbank.

Proposition 3.2 (Contagion Externality)**.** *There exists a threshold λ^* such that internal reallocation is privately and socially aligned when $\lambda < \lambda^*$, and generates unpriced systemic costs when $\lambda > \lambda^*$. The BHC ignores the contagion externality $\lambda \cdot \Delta L_B$, leading to excessive internal reallocation when contagion is material.*

The model delivers three testable predictions that organize our empirical analysis. First, tighter bank capital requirements should raise bank excess capital without any corresponding increase in consolidated BHC equity through internal reallocation rather than external issuance. Second, nonbank subsidiaries in the same organizations should experience declining capital ratios, higher internal funding costs, and distorted business models as equity is extracted. Third, the systemic

implications depend on λ: the degree to which nonbank distress depletes the parent resources that backstop the bank. We calibrate λ empirically by simulating adverse shocks to nonbank portfolios and measuring the implied draw on parent capital buffers. Our estimates imply $\lambda \in [0.2, 0.5]$, indicating material but not complete contagion, placing the system below the efficiency threshold $\lambda^* \approx 0.7$ under baseline parameters, though the post-2015 depletion of nonbank capital buffers means this margin is narrowing. Complete derivations, proofs, and calibration details are in Appendix A.

4 Empirical Strategy

This section outlines our identification strategy for estimating the effect of stricter bank capital regulation on internal capital allocation within BHCs. The central empirical challenge is that Basel III capital requirements were implemented uniformly for all U.S. BHCs beginning in 2015, precluding a simple cross-sectional comparison between treated and control institutions. We address this challenge by exploiting pre-determined variation in BHC organizational structure, comparing BHCs with nonbank financial subsidiaries to those without such subsidiaries. Our identifying assumption is that, absent the regulatory change, BHCs with and without nonbank subsidiaries would have exhibited parallel trends in capital allocation decisions. We present extensive evidence supporting this assumption and demonstrate robustness to alternative specifications, samples, and inference methods.

4.1 Institutional Setting and Treatment Timing

The Basel III regulatory framework fundamentally altered capital requirements for U.S. BHCs. The framework introduced higher minimum common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratios, stricter definitions of regulatory capital, capital conservation buffers, and enhanced risk-weighting of certain assets. Importantly, these requirements apply exclusively to bank subsidiaries within holding company structures, leaving nonbank financial subsidiaries formally unregulated.

We define our treatment period as beginning in 2015. While Basel III was announced in 2010 and certain standards were adopted in 2013, binding minimum capital ratios did not take effect until January 1, 2015. Moreover, the phase-in schedule meant fully binding requirements, particularly the capital conservation buffer, were not fully effective until 2019. We focus on 2015 as the treatment year because this marks the first year BHCs face materially higher minimum capital

requirements that cannot be satisfied through grandfathered capital instruments or transitional provisions. We demonstrate robustness to alternative treatment definitions, including using the initial rulemaking date and the full phase-in date as alternative cutoff points.

Our sample period spans 2010 through 2024. The sample includes all BHCs that file consolidated financial statements with the Federal Reserve, subject to data availability requirements.

4.2 Treatment Variable: Nonbank Financial Exposure

We construct our primary treatment variable as an indicator for the presence of material nonbank financial subsidiaries within the BHC structure:

$$\text{NBFI}_i = \mathbb{1}\left[\frac{\text{Nonbank Financial Assets}_{i,2013}}{\text{Total Assets}_{i,2013}} > 0\right] \tag{3}$$

This binary variable equals one if BHC i holds any nonbank financial assets as of year-end 2013, and zero otherwise. The choice of 2013 as the measurement year ensures that our treatment variable is pre-determined with respect to any anticipatory adjustments BHCs might have made in response to expected regulatory changes.[2]

The indicator specification has two advantages relative to a continuous measure of NBFI exposure. First, it directly captures the extensive margin: the presence or absence of an internal capital market capable of facilitating equity reallocation. BHCs without nonbank subsidiaries have no internal source from which to extract equity, while those with any nonbank presence possess this margin of adjustment. Second, the indicator approach is robust to measurement error in the precise magnitude of nonbank activities, which may be substantial given reporting complexities and off-balance-sheet items.

4.3 Baseline Difference-in-Differences Specification

Our baseline empirical specification is a difference-in-differences design that compares outcomes for BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries (treated) to those without (control) before and after the implementation of stricter capital requirements in 2015:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \cdot (\text{NBFI}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \gamma_i + \delta_t + X'_{i,2013}\boldsymbol{\theta} \cdot \text{Post}_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{4}$$

[2]Using 2013 values eliminates concerns about reverse causality: BHCs could not have adjusted their organizational structure in 2013 based on capital requirements that would not be implemented until 2015. We verify that results are similar when we use alternative pre-treatment years as the measurement period.

where Y_{it} is the outcome variable of interest, NBFI_i is the indicator for nonbank presence defined in equation (3), Post_t is an indicator equal to one for periods 2015Q1 and later, γ_i are BHC fixed effects, δ_t are quarter-year fixed effects. The error term ε_{it} is clustered at the BHC level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation within BHCs over time. The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the differential change in outcome Y for treated BHCs relative to control BHCs, following Basel III implementation.

BHC fixed effects absorb all time-invariant differences between BHCs with and without nonbank subsidiaries, controlling for persistent differences in business models, risk preferences, regulatory status, geographic footprint, or any other characteristics that remain constant over our sample period. Quarter-year fixed effects absorb common trends affecting all BHCs equally, such as macroeconomic conditions, monetary policy, or secular changes in the banking industry. The identifying variation therefore comes from the differential evolution of outcomes for treated versus control BHCs around 2015.

A potential concern is that BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries differ systematically from those without along dimensions that independently affect capital allocation decisions post-2015. This concern is particularly acute because multiple concurrent regulatory changes could confound our estimates. The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) introduced enhanced prudential standards for large BHCs, the Volcker Rule (2014) restricted proprietary trading, and stress testing requirements (CCAR/DFAST) were progressively tightened. Each of these policies could differentially affect BHCs based on size, activities, or regulatory status.

We address both selection and confounding concerns by including pre-treatment characteristics $X_{i,2013}$ interacted with the post-treatment period. At the BHC level, we control for log total assets, leverage, return on assets, asset growth, deposit-to-assets ratio, and total subsidiary count. At the bank level, we control for log assets, leverage, return on assets, and asset growth. These controls, particularly size (log assets), top-200 BHC indicators, and organizational complexity (subsidiary counts), flexibly absorb differential exposure to concurrent regulations while allowing us to isolate the effect of nonbank presence.

4.4 Instrumental Variable Strategy

While controlling for observables addresses many selection concerns, unobservable differences between treated and control BHCs remain a potential threat. We address this using an instrumental variables strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in BHC organizational complex-

ity arising from state-level banking deregulation. Following Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Strahan et al. (2003), and Rice and Strahan (2010), we use the timing of interstate branching deregulation across U.S. states as an instrument for organizational structure. States deregulated at different times between the 1970s and 1990s, driven primarily by idiosyncratic political economy factors unrelated to future capital regulation. BHCs headquartered in early-deregulating states had more time to build complex multi-subsidiary organizational structures, including both geographic expansion and diversification into nonbank activities.

We construct the instrument by measuring each BHC's headquarters state between 1970 and 1981 (before interstate banking was permitted) and calculating:

$$\text{Years from Dereg}_i = 1994 - \text{Interstate Dereg Year}_{\text{HQ state}(i)} \tag{5}$$

where 1994 marks the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which mandated interstate banking nationwide. The instrument measures how many years elapsed between a state's interstate deregulation and the federal mandate. BHCs in states that deregulated earlier (higher values of the instrument) had more time to develop organizational complexity, including nonbank subsidiaries, before interstate expansion became universal.

Reduced-Form Specification. Our baseline empirical approach estimates the reduced-form effect of deregulation timing on capital allocation outcomes:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \cdot (\text{Years from Dereg}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \gamma_i + \delta_t + X'_{i,2013}\boldsymbol{\theta} \cdot \text{Post}_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{6}$$

where Y_{it} is an outcome variable (bank capital ratios, nonbank equity, or BHC equity), $\text{Years from Dereg}_i$ is the instrument defined in equation (5), Post_t indicates periods 2015Q1 and later, γ_i are BHC fixed effects, δ_t are quarter-year fixed effects, and $X_{i,2013}$ includes the same pre-treatment BHC and bank characteristics as in Equation 4, interacted with Post_t, same as in Equation 4. The coefficient β captures how much more (or less) BHCs in early-deregulating states adjust capital allocation in response to Basel III, per additional year of deregulation exposure.

We adopt the reduced-form specification rather than two-stage least squares (2SLS) because it requires weaker identifying assumptions and offers several practical advantages. The reduced form requires only that (i) deregulation timing predicts organizational complexity (*relevance*) and (ii) early and late deregulators exhibit parallel trends in outcomes absent Basel III (*parallel trends*).

In contrast, 2SLS additionally requires the *exclusion restriction*—that deregulation timing affects outcomes *only* through organizational structure, with no direct effects—a stronger and less testable assumption.[3]

The reduced form also offers transparent interpretation: the coefficient β directly answers the policy-relevant question of how an additional year of pre-Riegle-Neal deregulation exposure affects capital reallocation after Basel III, without requiring assumptions about the functional form linking deregulation to organizational structure. Because not all BHCs in early-deregulating states fully exploit the opportunity to build complex structures, β captures intent-to-treat effects that are conservative relative to treatment-on-the-treated but do not rely on strong functional form assumptions. As a robustness check, Appendix Table D.14 reports 2SLS estimates that scale the reduced-form effects by the first-stage relationship. These estimates are larger in magnitude, as expected when moving from ITT to treatment-on-the-treated effects, but rely on the stronger exclusion restriction.

Figure 1 provides evidence supporting both conditions for the reduced form. Panel (a) validates the parallel trends assumption: BHCs in early- versus late-deregulating states exhibit parallel trends in nonbank subsidiary share from 1986–1994, before Riegle-Neal forced universal interstate banking. The parallel pre-trends indicate that deregulation timing is uncorrelated with differential pre-existing trends in organizational structure or capital management. Panel (b) shows the gap remains stable at approximately 8 percentage points through 2014, then widens after 2015 when Basel III capital requirements become binding, precisely the pattern expected if early deregulation creates persistent organizational differences that only affect capital allocation when the regulatory constraint tightens.

Instrument Validity. The instrument satisfies the relevance condition. Appendix Table D.1 compares pre-treatment characteristics between BHCs headquartered in early- versus late-deregulating states as of 2013Q4. Panel A shows that early deregulators have larger total assets and nonbank assets, reflecting greater organizational complexity developed during the deregulation period. Panel B shows balance sheet characteristics. Leverage, portfolio composition, and deposit ratios are statistically indistinguishable between groups. Importantly, the characteristics that do differ (total assets, top 200 BHC status, distinct NAICS codes, and ROA) are explicitly accounted for

[3]This concern is particularly relevant because the first-stage relationship may exhibit threshold effects: BHCs may need a minimum level of organizational complexity before internal capital markets become operative, in which case 2SLS estimates can be severely biased while reduced-form estimates remain valid.

in our reduced-form specification through pre-treatment BHC controls interacted with Post. This supports the validity of our instrument: conditional on controls, variation in deregulation timing is orthogonal to factors determining post-2015 regulatory responses.

These results are consistent with prior evidence that early-deregulating states experienced substantially greater growth in organizational complexity. Mian, Sufi and Verner (2020) show that states deregulating their banking sectors before 1983 experienced 42 percentage points stronger credit growth between 1982 and 1988 compared to states deregulating after 1983, with particularly pronounced increases in nonbank lending activities. Kundu and Vats (2025) provides direct evidence that early deregulation fostered organizational expansion: the share of gross domestic assets owned by out-of-state multi-BHCs grew from 6% to 47% between 1979 and 1994 in early-deregulating states, compared to only 7% to 29% in late-deregulating states. This organizational expansion included both geographic diversification and functional diversification into nonbank activities. We verify strong first-stage relationships in Appendix Table D.13, where we show that BHCs headquartered in early-deregulating states are substantially more likely to have nonbank financial subsidiaries.

The persistence of organizational structure further supports our identification strategy. Appendix Table D.2 shows NBFI share exhibits high autocorrelation: a BHC with 10 percentage points higher nonbank share in year t has 9.7 percentage points higher share five years later. This means organizational complexity developed in the 1980s–1990s provides pre-determined variation today, almost three decades after Riegle-Neal eliminated regulatory differences.[4]

A natural concern is that our instrument captures organizational complexity generated by Glass-Steagall's repeal in 1999 rather than by interstate banking deregulation in the 1970s–1990s. The evidence strongly rejects this interpretation. First, the timing is mechanical: our instrument measures years elapsed between state-level interstate deregulation and Riegle-Neal (1994), predating Glass-Steagall's repeal by five years. The organizational complexity we exploit was built during the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, and more fundamentally, Glass-Steagall imposed far less binding constraints on BHC nonbank activity than the common narrative suggests. Cetorelli and Prazad (2025) document that the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 granted regulators broad discretion to define the permissible boundaries of banking, and that by the mid-1980s this

[4]Appendix Figure C.2 displays the geographic and temporal variation in deregulation timing and shows that early deregulators maintain consistently higher nonbank shares throughout 1986–2024. This timing was driven by idiosyncratic political factors, including small bank lobby strength and state legislature composition, rather than economic fundamentals, size of local non-bank sector, or business cycle conditions (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Rice and Strahan, 2010).

discretion was exercised expansively — regulators explicitly invited banks to become financial supermarkets" (Markham, 2009) and a bipartisan Senate vote of 94–0 proposed repealing Glass-Steagall as early as 1988. The result, as Cetorelli and Prazad (2025) document, was "virtually unrestricted choice of business activities for banks" for two decades prior to the global financial crisis. The nonbank organizational structures we study therefore reflect endogenous expansion that preceded Glass-Steagall's formal repeal by 10–15 years; the 1999 legislation ratified an organizational reality that had already emerged.

5 Main Results

5.1 Motivation: Scale of Equity vs. Liquidity Flows

We begin by documenting the composition of internal funding flows within BHCs. Understanding whether parents fund subsidiaries primarily through equity investments or debt-like instruments is critical for interpreting how BHCs respond to capital regulation. Prior research on internal capital markets emphasizes liquidity reallocation through loans and deposits within banks. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012*a*,*b*) examine how BHCs reallocate liquidity across bank subsidiaries in response to funding shocks, while Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016) show that bank liquidity shocks propagate to other geographic markets through internal credit transfers. These studies provide important insights into internal debt markets, but the role of equity transfers, which directly affect risk-bearing capacity and regulatory capital ratios, has received limited attention.

Figure 2 decomposes total investments from parent BHCs into bank subsidiaries, plotting three components normalized by bank assets over 2005–2024: (1) equity investments (common stock, goodwill, and intangibles), (2) non-equity investments (loans, receivables, and other direct exposures), and (3) net borrowing from related banks and nonbanks (intracompany debt positions). The dominance of equity over debt-like instruments is immediate and striking. Equity investments (green line) average 10–11% of bank assets throughout the sample period and increase to 12–13% post-2015. In contrast, non-equity investments (red line) average just 1–2% of bank assets with no discernible trend, while net borrowing from related entities (brown line) hovers near zero throughout. Equity flows are an order of magnitude larger than non-equity flows.

The magnitude of this difference has important implications for understanding internal capital allocation. Equity investments directly affect subsidiary capital ratio. A $100 million equity injec-

tion increases bank capital by $100 million, while internal loans merely rearrange balance sheet positions without improving regulatory capital. The order of magnitude dominance of equity suggests that equity reallocation, not debt-like transfers, is the primary channel through which BHCs respond to changes in bank capital requirements.

This motivates our empirical focus. If equity dominates internal funding by an order of magnitude, organizational structure, specifically, the presence of nonbank subsidiaries from which equity can be extracted, becomes a first-order determinant of how BHCs respond to tighter bank capital requirements. The remainder of this section examines whether and how BHCs use this equity channel to satisfy Basel III capital standards.

5.2 Internal Reallocation: Banks Build Excess Capital, BHCs Do Not

We now present our main empirical finding: banks within BHCs that possess nonbank affiliates accumulate substantially larger capital buffers following Basel III implementation in 2015, yet this bank-level capital accumulation occurs without corresponding increases in consolidated BHC equity. This divergence, greater excess bank capital, no change in excess BHC capital, provides prima facie evidence of internal equity reallocation.

Difference-in-Differences and Reduced-Form Estimates. Table 2 presents estimates of internal capital reallocation at three levels: bank excess capital (Column 1), BHC excess capital (Column 2), and the ratio of bank to BHC excess capital (Column 3). Panel A reports difference-in-differences estimates comparing BHCs with versus without nonbank subsidiaries. Banks in BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries accumulate 2.06 percentage points more excess capital post-2015 (Column 1), while BHC-level excess capital shows no significant change (Column 2). The ratio of bank to BHC excess capital increases 2.91 percentage points (Column 3), confirming that capital accumulation occurs specifically at the bank subsidiary level rather than through consolidated equity raising.

To address concerns that organizational structure reflects endogenous choices correlated with unobserved determinants of capital policy, Panel B exploits variation in organizational complexity generated by interstate banking deregulation timing. This instrumental variables strategy, described in Section 4.4, uses the timing of state-level deregulation to isolate quasi-experimental variation in BHC structure. Banks in BHCs from states deregulating earlier accumulate 0.74 percentage points more excess capital per year of pre-Riegle-Neal exposure post-2015 (Column 1), with no corresponding effect at the BHC level (Column 2). The ratio of bank to BHC excess capital

increases 1.78 percentage points per year of exposure (Column 3). For the median gap of 7 years between early and late deregulators, this implies approximately 5 percentage points more bank capital ($7 \times 0.74 \approx 5$pp).[5]

The combination of large positive effects at the bank level alongside precisely estimated null effects at the BHC level indicates that higher bank capital is achieved through internal reallocation of existing equity rather than through external capital issuance or balance sheet contraction. Appendix Tables D.3 and D.4 present the full specifications with all intermediate columns, showing robustness across alternative specifications.

Visual Evidence. Figure 3 presents the evolution of excess capital for BHCs with versus without nonbank subsidiaries over 2010–2024, confirming the patterns documented in Table 2. Panel (a) shows bank-level capital. Pre-2015, banks in both groups hold similar excess capital buffers (8–10 percentage points above regulatory minimums). Beginning precisely in 2015Q1, banks in BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries begin accumulating significantly more capital, with the differential growing from 2–3 percentage points in early 2015 to 8–10 percentage points by 2018–2020. By the end of the sample, banks in BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries hold capital buffers nearly double those of banks without such affiliates: 17–18 percentage points versus 9–10 percentage points above regulatory minimums.

Panel (b) examines consolidated BHC capital and reveals a starkly different pattern. Throughout the entire sample period, BHCs with and without nonbank subsidiaries maintain similar capital ratios, both declining gradually from approximately 8% excess capital in 2010 to 4% by 2020 as Basel III phase-in raises minimum requirements industry-wide. The absence of divergence at the BHC level, combined with the sharp divergence at the bank level, visually confirms internal reallocation.[6] Appendix Figure C.3 presents a complementary two-period comparison confirming these patterns: banks in control BHCs show little change in excess capital (9.1% to 8.7%), while banks

[5]The coefficient 0.74 comes from Panel B of Table 2, Column (1), which shows that banks in BHCs from states deregulating one year earlier accumulate 0.74 percentage points more excess capital post-2015. Multiplying by the median exposure of 7 years yields the total effect: $7 \times 0.74 = 5.18$ percentage points.

[6]The sharp decline in average excess capital for BHCs in Panel (b) is not mirrored for bank subsidiaries in Panel (a). Excess capital is defined as the minimum buffer across all regulatory capital ratios active in a given quarter. When Basel III phased in after 2015, new constraints such as the CET1 requirement entered the set of potentially binding ratios. Because BHCs held smaller pre-Basel III buffers than bank subsidiaries, the binding constraint switched from the total capital ratio to the CET1 ratio for a larger share of BHCs than banks, mechanically lowering measured excess capital for BHCs.

in treated BHCs increase sharply (13.9% to 17.7%), generating a post-period gap corresponding to an 80–90% increase in excess capital for treated relative to control banks.

5.3 Tracing Internal Capital Flows.

Having established the bank-BHC divergence visually and through regression analysis, we now trace the specific internal flows through which this reallocation occurs. Internal capital reallocation operates through parent equity investments flowing from nonbanks to banks, facilitated by asymmetric dividend policies and differential earnings retention. We restrict this analysis to BHCs where nonbank subsidiaries represent at least 1% of consolidated assets, ensuring the equity reallocation mechanism is economically relevant. This restriction excludes BHCs with trivial nonbank operations where internal reallocation would be infeasible or immaterial.

Table 3 presents reduced-form estimates of internal equity flows. Column (1) shows direct evidence of reallocation: parent equity investments in bank subsidiaries (as share of total BHC equity) increase by 2.28 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure post-2015. Column (2) shows the mirror image: equity investments in nonbank subsidiaries decline by 2.64 percentage points. Column (3) confirms the reallocation operates internally: total equity investments across all subsidiaries show no significant change. The near-perfect symmetry between bank increases and nonbank decreases, combined with the null effect on total investments, provides direct evidence that parents redistribute existing equity rather than raising new external capital.[7]

This reallocation reflects asymmetric dividend and retention policies. Columns (4)–(5) show that BHCs extract earnings from nonbanks through higher dividend payouts: dividend yields from nonbank subsidiaries increase by 9.47 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure (Column 5), while dividend yields from bank subsidiaries show no change (Column 4). Simultaneously, banks retain earnings rather than distributing them upward. Appendix Figure C.4 visualizes this cumulative retention: banks in BHCs with nonbank affiliates increase retained earnings from $\sim$5% to $\sim$10% of assets between 2015 and 2020, while banks without nonbank affiliates remain flat near 5%. Appendix Table D.6 presents the regression specification, showing bank retained earnings as a share of assets increase by 0.19 basis points per quarter per year of deregulation exposure.

The combination of higher nonbank dividends, increased parent equity injections into banks,

[7] Appendix Table D.5 presents robustness using bank equity stock (actual equity held by bank subsidiaries as share of total BHC equity) rather than parent equity investments. Results confirm equity capital shifts to banks within the holding company structure, with bank equity stock shares increasing significantly post-2015.

and bank earnings retention creates a self-reinforcing internal capital reallocation mechanism. Nonbanks transfer equity upward to the parent through dividends and net transfers; the parent redeploys this capital into bank subsidiaries; and banks, which operate with substantially lower equity-to-asset ratios than nonbanks, translate each injected dollar into a larger expansion of assets than would be possible at the nonbank level. Each dollar extracted from a highly capitalized nonbank subsidiary therefore supports a multiple of bank assets at the consolidated level. This mechanism explains how bank capital ratios improve substantially without external equity issuance or reductions in consolidated balance sheets, as we quantify in the following section.

5.4 The Equity Multiplier

Having documented the internal equity flows, a natural question is why nonbank subsidiaries provide such an accessible source of equity for reallocation. The answer lies in a fundamental asymmetry: nonbanks maintain high capital ratios while representing relatively small shares of consolidated assets. This creates what we term an "equity multiplier"; nonbanks hold disproportionately large equity stakes relative to their asset footprint.

For each BHC, we compute the equity multiplier as:

$$\text{Equity Multiplier} = \frac{\text{Nonbank Equity Share}}{\text{Nonbank Asset Share}} \tag{7}$$

where nonbank equity share is nonbank subsidiary equity divided by total BHC equity, and nonbank asset share is nonbank assets divided by total BHC assets. A multiplier above 1 indicates that nonbanks hold more than their proportional share of equity. That is, they are equity-intensive relative to their size.

Table 4 presents summary statistics. The median equity multiplier is 6.5×, meaning the typical nonbank subsidiary holds more than six times its proportional share of consolidated equity relative to its asset footprint. This concentration arises from two forces. First, nonbanks operate with high voluntary capital ratios (median 69% equity-to-assets compared to a bank median near 10%). Second, nonbank balance sheets are relatively small, so even modest absolute equity holdings represent large equity shares. The multiplier distribution exhibits substantial right skew: the 75th percentile is 12× and the 95th percentile exceeds 21×, reflecting BHCs where small nonbank subsidiaries hold especially concentrated equity positions.[8]

[8]Panel (a) of Appendix Figure C.5 shows the full distribution of equity multipliers across BHC-quarters, documenting

Heterogeneity Across Nonbank Types. Panel B of Table 4 decomposes the equity multiplier by subsidiary type. Funds exhibit the highest multipliers (mean 12.7×), followed by asset management companies (7.8×), insurance subsidiaries (6.7×), broker-dealers (6.3×), and nonbank lenders (4.8×). Figure 4 visualizes this.[9]

The variation across types reflects different business models and regulatory environments. Funds maintain near-100% equity ratios by design, as they represent pass-through investment vehicles. Insurance subsidiaries hold high equity to meet state-level solvency standards and ratings agency requirements. Broker-dealers maintain substantial equity cushions beyond SEC net capital rules due to market discipline from prime brokerage clients and counterparties. Even nonbank lenders, the most leveraged category, operate with 40–50% capital ratios, far exceeding bank requirements.

This heterogeneity has important implications for internal capital allocation. BHCs with large fund operations (high-multiplier subsidiaries) can extract substantial equity through modest changes in subsidiary capitalization. Consider a BHC where funds represent 10% of consolidated assets with a 70% capital ratio, contributing $7 in equity per $100 of BHC assets. A 10 percentage point reduction in the fund's capital ratio (from 70% to 60%) frees $1 in equity, 1% of consolidated BHC equity, while leaving the fund well-capitalized. Achieving the same $1 extraction from a nonbank lender with a 50% initial capital ratio would require a 20 percentage point reduction (from 50% to 30%), approaching distress thresholds. High-multiplier subsidiaries thus provide accessible equity reservoirs that can be tapped without triggering subsidiary fragility. Before examining the consequences for bank and nonbank operations, we first quantify the systemic implications of this reallocation, specifically, whether the equity extraction that makes banks safer simultaneously creates hidden fragility at the nonbank level.

5.5 Hidden Fragility: Stress Testing Nonbank Subsidiaries

We quantify these systemic implications by simulating adverse shocks to nonbank subsidiary portfolios using pre-extraction balance sheets. Proposition 3.2 establishes that the systemic implications of internal reallocation depend on λ, the degree to which nonbank distress depletes the parent capital that backstops the bank. Under perfect ring-fencing ($\lambda = 0$), nonbank losses would

substantial right skew with mass above 10×. Panel (d) shows the aggregate multiplier declines from 5.5× pre-2015 to 3.0× post-2015, consistent with equity extraction documented in our main results.

[9] Panel (b) of Appendix Figure C.5 shows box plots of the full multiplier distributions by type, and Panel (c) documents that heterogeneity in multipliers stems primarily from variation in capital ratios across subsidiary types.

be fully contained and the bank's improved capital position would be unambiguously beneficial. But when $\lambda > 0$, the same reallocation that makes the bank look safer also weakens the parent's capacity to absorb nonbank shocks, creating a channel for contagion back to the bank. We calibrate λ by simulating adverse shocks to nonbank subsidiary portfolios and measuring the implied draw on parent capital buffers. The magnitude of these recapitalization needs is a direct empirical measure of contagion intensity: a large draw implies high λ, while a small draw is consistent with effective ring-fencing.

Stress Test Design. We conduct stress tests using 2013Q4 balance sheets, before Basel III implementation. For each BHC, we simulate asset shocks of varying severity (1%, 5%, 10%, 15%) applied to all nonbank subsidiaries simultaneously. Following each shock, we calculate the capital injection required to restore each subsidiary to a target capital ratio ranging from 20% to 70%.

Specifically, for each nonbank subsidiary i in BHC j, we compute:

$$\text{Loss}_{ij} = \text{shock} \times \text{Assets}_{ij,2013Q4} \tag{8}$$

$$\text{Post-Shock Equity}_{ij} = \text{Equity}_{ij,2013Q4} - \text{Loss}_{ij} \tag{9}$$

$$\text{Capital Shortfall}_{ij} = \max\left(0, \kappa \times \text{Assets}_{ij,2013Q4} - \text{Post-Shock Equity}_{ij}\right) \tag{10}$$

where κ represents the target capital ratio (equity-to-assets) to which the parent must restore the subsidiary. We aggregate shortfalls to the BHC level and express total recapitalization needs as a percentage of the parent BHC's excess capital buffer (capital above regulatory minimums):

$$\text{BHC Equity at Risk}_j = \frac{\sum_i \text{Capital Shortfall}_{ij}}{\text{BHC Excess Capital}_j} \times 100 \tag{11}$$

This metric directly measures the parent's financial capacity to absorb subsidiary losses. Values exceeding 100% indicate scenarios where recapitalization needs exceed available parent buffers, representing potential insolvency if the BHC must fully support its nonbank subsidiaries.

The stress test design captures three key features of the sample. First, nonbank subsidiaries operate with substantially higher capital ratios than banks (median 69% versus 10%).[10] Second, while consolidated BHC capital requirements account for nonbank assets in risk-weighted calculations, there are no *subsidiary*-level capital requirements binding on nonbanks themselves, mean-

[10]This equity has been systematically extracted post-2015, leaving nonbanks vulnerable to shocks despite appearing well-capitalized on pre-extraction balance sheets.

ing nonbanks can become severely undercapitalized without triggering regulatory intervention, so long as consolidated ratios remain adequate. Third, when nonbank subsidiaries suffer losses, parent BHCs face costly recapitalization decisions: they can inject equity into nonbanks (thereby drawing down bank capital buffers), liquidate subsidiary assets (potentially at fire-sale prices), or allow subsidiaries to fail (triggering reputational damage and potential regulatory intervention). Our stress tests quantify this hidden fragility: bank subsidiary capital becomes implicitly exposed to nonbank losses, generating intra-organizational contagion risk that consolidated capital ratios fail to capture.

Baseline Results. Table 5 presents recapitalization needs across shock severity and target capital ratio combinations. Panel A shows mean requirements. Under a baseline scenario of 5% asset shock with 40% target capital ratio, comparable to financial crisis losses for diversified financial institutions, the mean BHC must deploy 18.84% of its excess capital to restore nonbank subsidiaries. This represents a substantial draw on parent resources. Panel B examines tail risk at the 95th percentile. The distribution exhibits significant right skew: under the baseline scenario, tail-risk BHCs face recapitalization needs of 90.58% of excess capital, approaching complete buffer depletion. Under more severe scenarios (15% shock, 50% target), tail-risk BHCs exceed 100% of excess capital (marked with asterisks), implying potential parent insolvency if forced to fully recapitalize subsidiaries.[11]

Figure 5 visualizes the nonlinearity in stress test outcomes. Panel (a) plots recapitalization requirements against shock severity, holding the target capital ratio constant at 40%. Mean requirements (solid line) increase roughly linearly from 16.57% under 1% shocks to 24.97% under 15% shocks, but tail risk (dashed line) exhibits pronounced convexity: the 95th percentile rises from 79.94% at 1% shocks to 131.21% at 15% shocks, crossing the 100% insolvency threshold at approximately 12% shock severity.

Panel (b) examines complete buffer exhaustion. We define a BHC as "depleted" if recapitalization needs exceed its entire excess capital buffer, leaving no cushion against further shocks. Under the baseline 5% shock scenario, 5.10% of BHCs experience complete depletion (Panel C of Table 5). This fraction rises modestly to 6.12% under 10% shocks and 8.16% under 15% shocks. While the majority of BHCs retain some buffer capacity, the 5–8% depletion rate suggests meaningful

[11] Appendix Table D.7 presents the full grid of mean and 95th percentile recapitalization needs across all shock and capital ratio combinations, along with the percentage of nonbank assets requiring recapitalization. Appendix Figure C.6 shows sensitivity to alternative specifications.

systemic fragility: during crisis episodes when correlated shocks affect multiple BHCs simultaneously, this translates to dozens of large financial institutions forced to liquidate assets, cut credit, or raise emergency capital under adverse market conditions.

Sensitivity to Target Capital Ratios. The sensitivity to target capital ratios highlights a fundamental policy tension. Panel C shows that depletion rates increase sharply with higher capital targets: from 4.08% of BHCs at 30% targets to 10.20% at 70% targets under 5% shocks. While higher nonbank capital requirements would reduce subsidiary vulnerability to initial losses, they also increase the capital injection needed to restore solvency following shocks, potentially exceeding parent capacity.

Concentration of Risk and Implications. Two additional findings merit emphasis. First, the concentration of risk within organizational structures amplifies systemic concerns. While Panel A of Table 5 shows that only 18.84% of BHC equity is at risk on average under baseline scenarios, Appendix Table D.7 shows that at the 95th percentile, 38.19% of individual nonbank subsidiaries require recapitalization. This dispersion indicates that some BHCs operate highly concentrated portfolios where multiple subsidiaries experience simultaneous distress following correlated shocks, similar to the scenario observed during 2008 when broker-dealers, mortgage lenders, and structured investment vehicles experienced losses simultaneously.

Second, our stress tests use 2013Q4 balance sheets, before equity extraction accelerated post-2015. As nonbank capital ratios decline in subsequent years, contemporary recapitalization needs exceed our estimates, and the 5.10% buffer depletion rate understates current vulnerability: a shock comparable to 2008 losses would today likely deplete capital buffers for 8–12% of BHCs.

The stress tests reveal that internal reallocation creates a fundamental tension: the equity extraction that satisfies bank capital requirements simultaneously depletes the nonbank buffers that provide loss-absorbing capacity at the consolidated level. The magnitude of this tension depends on subsidiary-level outcomes, how much safer banks actually become, and how much more fragile nonbanks become as a result. We now examine each in turn.

6 Consequences of Internal Capital Reallocation

Internal equity reallocation reshapes the organization at every level. We begin at the top. From the perspective of the holding company, internal reallocation is the profit-maximizing response

to tighter regulation. Rather than accessing costly external equity markets, the BHC exploits an internal margin: it extracts equity from lightly regulated nonbank affiliates and redeploys it where regulation binds. Regulatory requirements are satisfied, external issuance costs are avoided, and the savings flow directly to the bottom line. Table 6 confirms this: consolidated ROA and ROE both rise following Basel III while charge-offs decline. Critically, this improvement in profitability is not accompanied by changes in consolidated portfolio composition or capital structure. Appendix Table D.8 shows these are unchanged, ruling out the interpretation that profitability gains reflect a shift toward riskier consolidated assets. The BHC is simply doing more with the same resources by arbitraging the regulatory wedge between its subsidiaries.

Below the consolidated level, however, the consequences are asymmetric. Bank subsidiaries become substantially safer as injected equity improves capital ratios, reduces asset risk, and enhances profitability. Nonbanks, stripped of equity and facing higher internal funding costs, expand aggressively into riskier lending while abandoning capital-intensive fee-based activities. We document these divergent trajectories in turn.

6.1 Consequences for Bank Safety

A central question in banking regulation concerns whether higher capital requirements improve financial stability or merely encourage risk-taking to restore target returns on equity. Our setting allows us to distinguish these channels: banks receive equity injections from parents without facing direct regulatory pressure, isolating the effect of capital on bank behavior. We examine how bank operations and risk profiles change in response to these equity injections.

We document three key findings. First, banks become substantially safer along multiple dimensions: profitability increases, credit quality improves, and insolvency risk declines. Second, safety improvements operate primarily through asset reallocation rather than leverage expansion. Banks shift portfolios toward lower-risk securities and cash, reducing risk-weighted assets relative to total assets, rather than expanding balance sheets to restore ROE through scale. Third, these changes emerge after the Basel III implementation in 2015, suggesting banks in organizationally complex BHCs respond to the combined effect of higher capital buffers and consolidated regulatory scrutiny.

Appendix Figure C.7 provides visual evidence of these patterns through event studies. Panels (a)–(b) show profitability and retained earnings improvements: ROA increases approximately 0.06 percentage points while retained earnings increase by 0.40 percentage points, with effects build-

ing over time and sustained through 2024. Panel (c) documents capital quality improvements, with equity-to-RWA ratios rising following the Basel III implementation period. Panel (d) shows risk-weighted assets as a share of total assets decline, indicating banks shift toward safer asset compositions rather than merely scaling up operations.

Bank Performance and Portfolio Composition. Table 7 presents reduced-form estimates of bank safety improvements.[12] Panel A documents performance gains. Column (1) shows ROA increases by 12 basis points per quarter per year of deregulation exposure. Cumulated over 20 quarters, this implies approximately 2.4 percentage points higher ROA for the most exposed banks. Column (2) shows ROE increases by similar magnitudes. Column (3) shows charge-offs as a share of loans decline by 0.02 percentage points.

Panel B examines portfolio composition. Column (1) shows that the loan share of assets declines by 0.60 percentage points, while Columns (2)–(3) show that securities and cash shares increase by 0.33 and 0.52 percentage points, respectively. This shift toward liquid, safe assets reduces balance sheet risk without requiring asset sales or deleveraging. Columns (4)–(6) demonstrate that these compositional changes are driven by differential portfolio expansion rather than contraction of risky assets. Loan growth increases only modestly at 0.08 percentage points, whereas securities and cash grow more rapidly—by 0.23 and 0.46 percentage points, respectively. In other words, incremental balance sheet growth is disproportionately allocated to the safest assets. The pattern of growth—cash expanding fastest, followed by securities, then loans, indicates that banks deploy additional capital conservatively rather than using higher capital ratios to support greater risk-taking.

These findings speak to a longstanding concern that higher capital requirements may reduce bank profitability and induce risk-shifting behavior. Instead, we find that exogenous increases in bank equity strengthen safety without encouraging risk-taking, consistent with Admati and Hellwig (2023).

Capital Quality Without Leverage Expansion. Table 8 examines the channels through which equity injections affect returns. The critical finding is that banks do not restore ROE through leverage expansion or balance sheet growth. Column (1) shows leverage (liabilities/equity) changes by only -0.11 percentage points, indicating banks allow equity injections to flow through to capital

[12] We exclude ROA from controls when examining balance sheet outcomes to isolate structural capital reallocation from profitability effects, which may reflect both treatment responses and independent business cycle variation.

ratios rather than using new equity to fund asset growth. Column (2) shows equity relative to risk-weighted assets increases 1.13 percentage points, while Column (3) shows risk-weighted assets as a share of total assets decline 0.67 percentage points. Together, these results indicate banks simultaneously increase capital buffers and reduce balance sheet risk, with both effects contributing to higher capital quality.

An alternative interpretation is that banks deploy incremental equity toward especially profitable opportunities that were previously constrained by lower capital levels. If the marginal ROE exceeds the average ROE, adding equity would mechanically raise average ROE even in the absence of operational improvements. Column (4) tests this mechanism directly and finds no significant change in marginal ROE. This null result rejects the view that ROE gains reflect superior deployment of newly injected capital. Instead, when combined with the significant increase in average ROE documented in Panel A of Table 7, the evidence indicates that higher ROE arises from improved profitability of existing operations rather than high returns on marginal capital. Column (5) further shows that off-balance-sheet commitments decline modestly, suggesting banks do not substitute toward contingent exposures to restore returns.

6.2 Consequences for Nonbank Risk

While bank subsidiaries become safer through equity injections, this capital must come from somewhere within the organization. Our stress tests reveal that nonbank subsidiaries become substantially more vulnerable post-2015, with mean recapitalization needs of 18.84% of BHC equity under baseline scenarios. We now trace how capital extraction from nonbanks creates this fragility through four interconnected mechanisms.

Figure 6 provides visual evidence of these patterns through event studies. Panel (a) shows equity-to-assets ratios decline sharply at 2015Q1, falling by 5–6 percentage points. Panel (b) shows dividend yields spike at 2015Q1, rising from near zero to 1–2 percentage points. Panel (c) shows net balances to parent surge at 2015Q1 by almost 20 percentage points, indicating increased borrowing from or reduced lending to parent entities. These changes in capital structure force operational adjustments: Panel (d) shows loan shares increase by 5 percentage points post-2015, while Panel (e) shows past-due and nonaccrual loans increase sharply by 3 percentage points. Panel (f) shows the consequence of these adjustments: return on equity (ROE) declines sharply, falling by more than 10 percentage points by the end of the sample. The consistent breaks at 2015Q1 across

all panels, precisely when banks in the same organizations experience improvements, provide compelling evidence that equity reallocation drives both outcomes.

Capital Extraction. Table 9 quantifies the capital extraction documented visually. Panel A presents balance sheet changes. Equity as a share of assets declines 7.71 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure, shown in Column (1). For the median BHC from a state deregulating 7 years before Riegle-Neal, this implies a 54 percentage point decline in nonbank capital ratios post-2015. Simultaneously, net balances to parent and other subsidiaries increase 13.60 percentage points, indicating nonbanks increasingly borrow from or reduce lending to affiliated entities, shown in Column (4). This pattern aligns with evidence from Acharya, Cetorelli and Tuckman (Forthcoming) showing how banks remain exposed to nonbanks through credit lines. Dividend payments as a share of equity increase 0.96 percentage points, shown in Column 5, demonstrating how capital is systematically drained from nonbank subsidiaries to satisfy bank regulatory requirements.

Implied Internal Funding Rates. This capital extraction creates funding stress that extends beyond simple balance sheet effects. We construct implied interest rates on internal funding by dividing interest income received by parents from subsidiaries by the stock of non-equity investments, revealing the shadow cost of capital across differently-regulated entities.

Table 10 shows nonbank internal funding rates increase 0.52 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure post-2015, while bank rates show no significant change. The spread widens by 0.44 percentage points per year. For the median BHC with 7 years of exposure, this implies nonbank funding costs increase approximately 3.0 percentage points relative to bank costs. This divergence creates a vicious cycle where capital-depleted entities face sharply higher marginal funding costs precisely when their balance sheets are weakest.

Operational Restructuring toward Lending. Faced with reduced equity capital and higher internal funding costs, nonbank subsidiaries fundamentally restructure operations toward lending. Table 11 presents the key finding: nonbank lending (aggregated to the BHC level) grows 7.20% per quarter per year of deregulation exposure, while bank lending shows no significant change at 0.09%. For the median BHC, nonbank lending grows 50 times faster than bank lending post-2015, confirming that aggressive lending expansion occurs specifically within lightly-regulated nonbank subsidiaries. This migration of credit provision from banks to nonbanks within the same holding company parallels the broader secular decline in bank market share documented

by Buchak et al. (2024), but occurs through internal organizational reallocation rather than competitive displacement across independent institutions.

Table 12 examines portfolio rebalancing, underlying this shift. Column (1) shows earning assets as a share of total assets increase 6.88 percentage points. Column (2) shows the specific channel: loans as a share of assets increase 3.52 percentage points. The fact that loans account for approximately half of the increase in earning assets indicates that nonbanks shift toward income-generating activities broadly, with lending as the primary but not exclusive driver. This reallocation reduces the equity capital required to support a given level of total assets, loans typically require less equity than trading operations or proprietary investments, but increases exposure to credit risk.

The nature of this lending expansion reveals strategic regulatory arbitrage. Appendix Table D.9 shows nonbanks shift dramatically toward consumer lending while reducing commercial and real estate lending. Consumer lending growth increases 1.47 percentage points across all nonbanks (Panel A) and 7.46 percentage points among specialized nonbank lenders (Panel B). This shift toward segments with lower capital requirements but potentially higher credit risk occurs alongside broader business model changes: nonbanks reduce capital-intensive fee-based activities while interest income nearly doubles for high-exposure BHCs.[13]

The shift toward lending represents a fundamental business model transformation. Nonbanks increasingly perform functions traditionally associated with depository institutions – originating, underwriting, and holding consumer loans on balance sheet – yet operate outside the regulatory perimeter that governs banks. Unlike their bank affiliates within the same holding company, these nonbank lenders lack access to deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve discount window, or direct prudential supervision by bank regulators. As bank capital requirements tighten to enhance financial stability, credit provision migrates to entities that combine bank-like activities with substantially weaker safety nets and thinner capital buffers.

Credit Quality Deterioration. The aggressive lending expansion comes at substantial cost to credit quality. Table 13 documents deteriorating loan performance. Panel A presents measures

[13] Appendix Table D.10 documents these broader business model changes, showing nonbanks reduce capital-intensive fee-based activities including trading, advisory, and venture capital revenue. Appendix Table D.11 shows BHCs strategically rebalance their subsidiary portfolios, increasing additions of nonbank lender subsidiaries while increasing removals of capital-intensive insurance subsidiaries, confirming that organizational adaptation operates strategically to reduce equity intensity. Appendix Table D.12 further shows that despite shedding some capital-intensive operations, BHCs increase the total number of distinct nonbank activity types, suggesting increased organizational complexity overall.

of past-due loans and loss provisions. Column (1) shows loans 30–89 days past due as a share of total loans increase 0.43 percentage points, indicating modest deterioration in early-stage delinquencies. Column (2) shows loans 90+ days past due increase 2.66 percentage points, indicating serious delinquencies increase substantially. Column (3) combines these measures: all past-due loans increase 3.08 percentage points. Column (4) shows loss provisions as a share of loans increase 9.37 percentage points conditional on nonzero provisioning.

These credit quality problems translate directly into profitability declines, presented in Panel B. ROE falls 10.79 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure, while ROA declines only modestly. The stark contrast between stable ROA and declining ROE indicates the profitability decline operates primarily through reduced equity rather than reduced operating income – a pattern consistent with the capital extraction documented above.

Increased Fragility and Default Risk. The combination of reduced capital, aggressive lending growth, and credit quality deterioration materializes in substantially increased fragility. Table 14 quantifies several dimensions of insolvency risk. The probability of negative earnings rises by 15.19 percentage points per year of deregulation exposure. At the same time, the volatility of log interest income increases by 19.69 percentage points, indicating substantially greater earnings variability. In contrast, the volatility of log non-interest income remains unchanged, suggesting that the rise in overall earnings volatility is driven primarily by interest-generating activities rather than fee-based income. The concentration of volatility in interest income is consistent with our earlier finding that nonbanks reallocate toward lending, as loan portfolios inherently carry greater earnings volatility due to credit and interest rate risk compared to fee-based services.

Summary measures of insolvency risk show consistent deterioration. Z-scores decline 8.61 points per year of deregulation exposure while the probability of default increases by 1.68 percentage points, repesenting a 24% rise from the pre-2015 baseline of 7.14%.[14] These fragility measures connect directly to our stress test results, where the mechanisms of reduced capital ratios, concentrated loan portfolios, and higher earnings volatility collectively increase nonbank vulnerability to adverse shocks, making the equity reallocation that strengthens banks simultaneously weaken the broader organizational structure.

[14] Z-score is a standard measure of distance to default, calculated as (equity/assets + ROA) / (standard deviation of ROA)

7 Robustness

This section presents additional evidence supporting our identification strategy and examines the robustness of our main findings. We provide four sets of results. First, we verify the first-stage relationship between our instrument (years from state deregulation to Riegle-Neal) and organizational complexity, documenting strong predictive power with F-statistics exceeding 10 across all specifications. Second, we present traditional two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates as an alternative to our baseline reduced-form approach, showing larger effect magnitudes consistent with the interpretation that reduced-form estimates represent intent-to-treat effects. Third, we conduct placebo tests that randomly permute either the treatment timing or the geographic variation in our instrument, confirming that our results do not arise from spurious correlations.

First Stage Relationship. Appendix Table D.13 verifies that our instrument predicts organizational complexity.

The dependent variable in the first stage is nonbank asset share interacted with the post-2015 indicator, capturing the presence and scale of nonbank operations in the period when capital requirements become binding. Column (1) presents the unconditional correlation: each additional year of pre-Riegle-Neal deregulation exposure increases nonbank share by 0.29 percentage points post-2015. Column (2) adds quarter-year fixed effects to control for aggregate time trends, increasing the coefficient to 0.51 percentage points. Column (3) adds bank fixed effects to absorb time-invariant heterogeneity across banks, with the coefficient remaining at 0.53 percentage points. Column (4) includes our full set of differential trends controls (2013Q4 characteristics interacted with post-2015), yielding a coefficient of 0.35 percentage points. The first-stage F-statistics substantially exceed conventional thresholds for weak instrument concerns.[15]

Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates. Appendix Table D.14 reports conventional 2SLS estimates as a complement to our baseline reduced-form specification. We instrument excess bank capital using the interaction of nonbank share with the post-2015 indicator, where nonbank share is itself instrumented by years since deregulation interacted with post-2015.

Column (1) presents the unconditional 2SLS estimate: a one-percentage-point increase in non-

[15]The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic ranges from 10.99 to 19.64 across specifications, well above the Stock-Yogo critical value of 10 for 10% maximal IV bias. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic exceeds 500 in all specifications, indicating very strong instruments. These statistics confirm that deregulation timing provides powerful variation in organizational complexity, validating the relevance condition for our instrumental variables approach.

bank share raises bank excess capital by 9.41 percentage points. Columns (2)–(4) introduce progressively richer sets of fixed effects and controls. Across all specifications, the estimates remain statistically significant and economically large.

Our most conservative 2SLS estimates are approximately two to three times larger, at 2.14 percentage points, than the corresponding reduced-form estimates in the baseline specifications, consistent with the reduced-form coefficients capturing intent-to-treat effects.[16] We emphasize the reduced-form results because they rely on weaker identifying assumptions.

Placebo Tests. Appendix Figures C.8 and C.9 present permutation-based placebo tests that validate our identification strategy. Appendix Figure C.8 randomly reassigns the deregulation instrument 1,000 times while maintaining the true post-2015 treatment period. If our results reflect spurious geographic correlations rather than the effect of organizational complexity, we would observe similar effects under random instrument assignment. Instead, the placebo distribution is tightly centered at zero, and none of the 1,000 permutations yields coefficients exceeding our true estimate of 0.739. The permutation p-value of 0.000 strongly rejects that our results arise by chance from random geographic variation.

Appendix Figure C.9 randomly reassigns the post-2015 treatment timing 1,000 times while maintaining the true instrument. If our results reflect pre-existing differential trends between early and late deregulators rather than a response to Basel III, we would observe similar effects when falsely assigning treatment to other years. The placebo distribution is centered at zero, and none of the 1,000 permutations yields coefficients approaching our true estimate. The permutation p-value of 0.000 confirms that the effect operates specifically through the 2015 regulatory change, not through spurious time-series patterns or pre-trends.

Together, these placebo tests provide strong evidence against alternative explanations based on omitted geographic factors or differential trends. The fact that random permutations of either the instrument or the timing produce null results, while the true specification produces large and significant effects, indicates that both dimensions of variation, cross-sectional differences in deregulation timing and the 2015 Basel III implementation, are essential to our identification.

[16] This difference is expected when moving from intent-to-treat to treatment-on-the-treated effects. The reduced form captures the average impact across all banks exposed to early deregulation, regardless of whether their BHCs ultimately develop complex organizational structures. The 2SLS estimates rescale by the first stage, recovering the effect for banks whose BHCs expand into nonbank activities.

8 Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that subsidiary-level capital regulation within multi-entity financial firms can reallocate risk rather than eliminate it, generating hidden vulnerabilities inside consolidated organizations. When capital requirements bind more tightly at bank subsidiaries than at affiliated nonbanks, parent firms respond by reallocating equity internally toward the regulated entities. Banks consequently appear safer, while nonbank subsidiaries operate with thinner capital buffers and heightened exposure to distress. This regulatory-induced risk migration occurs within organizational boundaries and remains largely invisible to supervisory frameworks that focus on consolidated capital ratios or evaluate regulated entities in isolation.

These reallocations have real economic consequences. Extracting equity from nonbanks increases their reliance on debt precisely when weaker balance sheets make such funding more expensive, while lower capital buffers distort portfolio choices and raise expected distress costs. Consequently, nonbank subsidiaries respond by shifting toward higher-risk activities and experience deteriorating credit quality and profitability. Internal transfers therefore translate into changes in risk-taking and solvency, not merely accounting movements of capital across affiliates.

The regulatory architecture creates an inconsistency. Entity-level capital requirements successfully improve bank subsidiary safety, but simultaneously incentivize the migration of traditional lending activities to nonbank affiliates within the same holding company. These nonbank lenders now originate and hold consumer credit—performing bank functions—yet operate without deposit insurance, Federal Reserve discount window access, or the comprehensive prudential oversight applied to depository institutions. Banks that hold consumer loans maintain capital ratios, face regular examinations, and access emergency liquidity. Nonbank affiliates performing identical activities face none of these requirements despite operating with lower capital buffers after 2015. This creates channels for financial instability that bypass the safety net designed to protect depositors and maintain credit availability during stress.

The broader implication is that consolidated capital requirements alone are unlikely to eliminate regulatory arbitrage when regulatory stringency differs across subsidiaries within the same holding company. Even well-capitalized groups may optimally concentrate equity where constraints bind most tightly, leaving lightly regulated affiliates to absorb risk. Ensuring that gains in bank resilience are not offset by growing vulnerabilities elsewhere in the organization may require extending prudential standards to material nonbank subsidiaries, constraining equity extraction,

and more closely monitoring internal capital and funding flows. More generally, effective financial regulation must treat organizational structure as a first-order determinant of regulatory incidence and systemic risk.

The regulatory implications are significant. Entity-level capital requirements successfully improve bank subsidiary safety, but simultaneously incentivize the migration of traditional lending activities to nonbank affiliates. These nonbank lenders now originate and hold consumer credit, performing bank functions, but operate without deposit insurance, discount window access, or the comprehensive prudential oversight applied to depository institutions. When combined with the depleted capital buffers documented in our analysis, this creates potential channels for financial instability that bypass the safety net designed to protect depositors and maintain credit availability during stress periods. Extending capital requirements to nonbank subsidiaries engaged in credit intermediation, or applying consolidated requirements that account for nonbank risk concentration, could address this regulatory gap while preserving the stability gains at the bank level.

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
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
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Figure 1: Deregulation Timing as an Instrument for Organizational Complexity




(a) Parallel Pre-Trends (1986-1994)



(b) Difference-in-Differences: Early - Late


Notes: The figure validates the use of interstate banking deregulation timing as an instrument for organizational complexity. Panel (a) shows the trends in nonbank financial subsidiary share from 1986-1994, between BHCs headquartered in early-deregulating states and late-deregulating states. Panel (b) plots the difference in nonbank share between early and late deregulators over time. Early deregulators are defined as states with median interstate deregulation year before 1986. Source: BHC Organizational Structure Database described in Section 2.

Figure 2: BHC Investments in Bank Subsidiaries and Intra-Company Borrowing



Notes: This figure shows parent BHC equity and nonequity investments in bank subsidiaries, as well as net intra-company borrowing, scaled by bank subsidiary assets. Equity investments in bank subsidiaries are defined as the sum of BHC equity investments in common stock, goodwill, and other intangibles. Nonequity investments in bank subsidiaries are defined as the sum of BHC investments in loans and other receivables and net balances due from subsidiaries (balances due from bank subsidiaries minus balances due to bank subsidiaries). Net borrowing from related banks and nonbanks is defined as balances held by subsidiary banks due to related banks and nonbanks minus balances held by subsidiary banks due from related banks and nonbanks. All variables are aggregated across BHCs in the sample using value-weighted averages. Source: FR Y-9LP.

Figure 3: Excess Capital: Banks vs BHCs




(a) Bank Excess Capital (Event Study)

(b) BHC Excess Capital (Event Study)


Notes: The figure compares average excess bank and BHC capital for BHCs with nonbank exposure and those without exposure. Panel (a) compares average excess bank capital from 2010 through 2024 for BHCs with nonbank exposure to BHCs without nonbank exposure, based on 2005 exposure status. Panel (b) presents the corresponding event-study estimates for excess BHC capital over the same period. Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9C, FR Y-9LP, and Call Reports.

Figure 4: Equity Multiplier Varies by Nonbank Subsidiary Type



Notes: The figure presents the mean equity multiplier by nonbank subsidiary type with 95% confidence intervals. Equity multiplier is constructed as the ratio of subsidiary equity share to subsidiary asset share within BHC, measuring capital intensity. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Appendix Table 4 provides detailed distributional statistics by type. Source: Authors' calculations using the FR Y-11.

Figure 5: Nonbank Stress Tests: Recapitalization Needs and Buffer Exhaustion




(a) Recapitalization Needs by Shock Severity


(b) Capital Buffer Depletion

Notes: The figure presents the nonbank stress test results. Panel (a) shows percentage of BHC excess capital required for recapitalization. Solid line: mean across BHCs. Dashed line: 95th percentile (tail risk). Horizontal dashed line at 100% indicates potential parent insolvency. Panel (b) shows percentage of BHCs with completely depleted capital buffers (recapitalization needs exceed available excess capital). Both panels assume nonbank subsidiaries target 40% capital ratio following asset shocks. Appendix Figures C.6a and C.6b show sensitivity to alternative target capital ratios.


Figure 6: Nonbank Event Study around Basel III Implementation




(a) Net Balance to Parent/Subs




(b) Equity/Assets




(c) Dividend Yield



(d) Loan Share



(e) Past Due & Nonaccrual



(f) ROE

Notes: The figure presents event study estimates of nonbank outcomes relative to 2014 baseline. Panel (a) shows equity-to-assets ratios, Panel (b) shows dividend yields, Panel (c) shows net balances to parent/other subsidiaries, Panel (d) shows loan shares, Panel (e) shows past-due and nonaccrual loans, and Panel (f) shows return on equity. Coefficients estimated from specification including nonbank subsidiary fixed effects, industry-quarter-year fixed effects, and BHC controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, subsidiary count measured 2013Q4) interacted with post-2015 indicator. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Error bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	p5	p25	p50	p75	p95
Panel A: BHCs								
2005 Nonbank Subsidiary								
Has Nonbank Subsidiary	25,726	0.569	0.495	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
2013 Controls								
2013 BHC Assets (Billions)	29,921	28.287	189.400	0.503	0.774	1.312	3.282	44.512
2013 BHC Leverage	29,921	9.847	6.248	5.423	7.539	9.081	10.768	15.528
2013 BHC Deposit Share	29,921	0.805	0.107	0.663	0.782	0.827	0.863	0.899
2013 BHC Asset Growth	29,294	0.038	0.090	-0.098	-0.007	0.031	0.072	0.195
2013 BHC Subsidiary Count	29,921	48.197	301.781	1.000	3.000	5.000	10.000	66.000
Time-Varying Variables								
BHC Assets (Billions)	29,921	34.817	225.200	0.511	0.833	1.664	5.476	64.695
BHC RWA (Billions)	29,804	21.223	126.400	0.321	0.574	1.187	4.038	47.965
BHC Capital (Billions)	29,921	3.493	21.410	0.037	0.078	0.162	0.567	7.117
BHC Net Income (Billions)	29,921	0.083	0.583	-0.001	0.001	0.004	0.014	0.170
BHC Leverage	29,921	0.102	0.048	0.056	0.084	0.099	0.116	0.152
BHC Deposit Share	29,921	0.805	0.482	0.664	0.778	0.822	0.858	0.896
BHC Loan Share	29,921	0.648	0.139	0.392	0.578	0.668	0.744	0.832
BHC Securities Share	29,921	0.210	0.118	0.046	0.125	0.193	0.277	0.428
BHC Nonbank Assets (Billions)	29,903	8.300	75.393	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.685
BHC Bank Assets (Billions)	29,921	27.420	179.900	0.497	0.819	1.622	5.274	53.484
Panel B: Banks								
Bank Assets (Billions)	57,188	14.549	127.400	0.101	0.534	0.976	2.281	21.357
Bank RWA (Billions)	55,056	10.103	80.413	0.056	0.346	0.691	1.710	15.892
Bank Capital (Billions)	57,188	1.520	12.584	0.013	0.054	0.102	0.240	2.565
Bank Net Income (Billions)	57,188	0.040	0.364	-0.000	0.001	0.002	0.006	0.062
Bank Leverage	57,187	0.866	0.149	0.812	0.879	0.896	0.909	0.929
Bank Deposit Share	57,187	0.802	0.166	0.640	0.795	0.840	0.873	0.907
Bank Loan Share	57,187	0.625	0.185	0.234	0.556	0.665	0.746	0.837
Bank Securities Share	57,187	0.214	0.143	0.018	0.116	0.191	0.286	0.476
Panel C: Nonbanks								
Nonbank Assets (Billions)	25,666	3.806	10.285	0.010	0.286	1.071	2.748	16.108
Nonbank Capital (Billions)	25,666	1.938	4.885	0.000	0.072	0.448	1.499	9.718
Nonbank Net Income (Billions)	25,664	0.043	0.212	-0.038	0.000	0.008	0.043	0.249
Nonbank Leverage	21,412	0.415	1.779	0.000	0.005	0.193	0.758	0.999
Nonbank Loans Share	20,378	0.118	0.290	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.949
Nonbank Securities Share	25,666	0.017	0.093	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.036
Broker (NAICS 523)	25,667	0.191	0.393	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Nonbank Lender (NAICS 5222, 5223)	25,667	0.119	0.324	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Insurer (NAICS 524)	25,667	0.003	0.058	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Fund (NAICS 525)	25,667	0.346	0.476	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Real Estate (NAICS 531)	25,667	0.029	0.169	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Percentiles are computed at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th levels. The sample period ranges from 2010 to 2024. Only BHCs that filed an FR Y-9C in 2013Q4 and their bank/nonbank subsidiaries are included in the samples. Source: FR Y-9C and FR Y-9LP for BHC Panel, Call Reports for Bank Panel, FR Y-11 for Nonbank Panel.

Table 2: Internal Capital Reallocation and Organizational Complexity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Bank Excess Capital	BHC Excess Capital	Bank/BHC Excess Ratio
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences (NBFI Presence)			
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}] \times \text{Post}$	2.0646**	0.4333	2.9060***
	(0.8277)	(0.2931)	(0.9498)
Observations	54,814	29,267	39,052
R^2	0.940	0.784	0.419
Panel B: Reduced-Form (Deregulation Timing)			
Years from Dereg $\times$ Post	0.7395*	0.0058	1.7766***
	(0.3992)	(0.0721)	(0.6211)
Observations	12,558	6,079	9,873
R^2	0.950	0.796	0.695
Bank FE	✓		✓
BHC FE		✓	
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table presents estimates of internal capital reallocation within BHCs. Dependent variable in Column (1) is bank excess capital (equity relative to regulatory minimum). Column (2) is BHC excess capital. Column (3) is the ratio of bank to BHC excess capital. Panel A reports difference-in-differences estimates where $\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}] \times \text{Post}$ indicates BHCs with nonbank financial subsidiaries as of 2013Q1 interacted with Post. Panel B reports reduced-form estimates where Years from Dereg measures years between a BHC's headquarters state interstate branching deregulation and the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act (headquarters state measured as of 1981). Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include entity fixed effects (bank or BHC) and quarter-year fixed effects. Controls measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Columns (1) and (3) control for bank size, leverage, ROA, and asset growth. Column (2) controls for BHC top 200 indicator, size, leverage, ROA, asset growth, deposits/assets, and subsidiary count. Standard errors clustered at bank level (Columns 1, 3) or BHC level (Column 2). Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9C, FR Y-9LP, and Call Reports. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Internal Equity Reallocation: Parent Investments and Subsidiary Dividends

	Parent Equity Investments			Dividend Yields	
	Bank Share (1)	Nonbank Share (2)	Total Share (3)	Bank Yield (4)	Nonbank Yield (5)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0228**	-0.0264**	0.0045	0.0000	0.0947**
	(0.0093)	(0.0114)	(0.0104)	(0.0005)	(0.0459)
Observations	1,334	1,334	1,334	1,334	1,334
R^2	0.810	0.669	0.912	0.164	0.070
BHC FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of internal equity reallocation within BHCs. Dependent variable in Column (1) is equity investments in bank subsidiaries divided by total BHC equity. Column (2) is equity investments in nonbank subsidiaries divided by BHC equity. Column (3) is total equity investments in all subsidiaries divided by BHC equity. Equity investments include common stock, preferred stock, goodwill, and other intangibles. Column (4) is quarterly dividends received by parent from bank subsidiaries divided by lagged equity investment in banks. Column (5) is dividends from nonbank subsidiaries divided by lagged equity investment in nonbanks. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include BHC fixed effects and quarter-year fixed effects. BHC controls include top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, ROA, deposits/assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Sample restricted to BHCs with nonbank asset share exceeding 1%. Source: FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Nonbank Capital Structure and Equity Multiplier

Panel A: Summary Statistics (All BHCs)

	N	Mean	SD	5%	25%	50%	75%	95%
NBFI Asset Share	6,596	0.07	0.13	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.32
NBFI Equity Share	6,596	0.21	0.21	0.01	0.06	0.16	0.30	0.68
NBFI Capital Ratio	6,596	0.69	0.59	0.04	0.26	0.69	0.99	1.40
BHC Capital Ratio	6,596	0.11	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.17
Equity Multiplier	6,596	8.24	7.68	0.30	2.33	6.46	11.95	21.56

Panel B: Equity Multiplier by Nonbank Type

NBFI Type	Mean Mult	Median Mult	SD	25th Pct	75th Pct	Capital Ratio	Equity Share	Obs
Fund	12.71	12.83	4.68	10.59	15.28	0.931	0.289	6,924
Management	7.78	7.67	3.68	5.52	9.96	0.787	0.242	1,809
Insurance	6.66	6.31	2.81	5.34	8.10	0.702	0.060	206
Broker/Dealer	6.34	6.05	4.01	3.18	9.35	0.607	0.108	1,476
Real Estate (REIT)	5.75	5.23	3.63	2.76	8.47	0.642	0.054	758
Nonbank Lender	4.80	2.89	5.02	1.66	6.73	0.493	0.162	2,172
Other Financial	3.64	3.08	2.05	2.07	5.01	0.442	0.103	103

Notes: The table documents capital structure asymmetry between bank and nonbank subsidiaries within BHCs. Panel A shows summary statistics for all BHC–quarter observations from 2010–2024 with nonbank subsidiaries. "NBFI Asset Share" is nonbank assets divided by total BHC assets. "NBFI Equity Share" is nonbank equity divided by total BHC equity. "NBFI Capital Ratio" is nonbank equity divided by nonbank assets. The Equity Multiplier is constructed as the "NBFI Equity Share" divided by "NBFI Asset Share" and measures capital intensity. Values above one indicate that nonbanks hold disproportionately large equity relative to their asset footprint. Appendix Figure C.5 shows full distributions by type. Source: FR Y-9LP, FR Y-9C, FR Y-11.

Table 5: Nonbank Recapitalization Needs: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Mean BHC Equity at Risk (%)

	Target Capital Ratio				
Shock to Assets	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	11.23	16.57	22.42	28.99	36.23
5% (Baseline)	13.30	18.84	24.97	31.78	39.33
10%	16.02	21.82	28.30	35.47	43.29
15%	18.84	24.97	31.78	39.33	47.62

Panel B: 95th Percentile BHC Equity at Risk (%)

	Target Capital Ratio				
Shock to Assets	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	55.45	79.94	114.71*	156.84*	200.33*
5% (Baseline)	65.00	90.58	131.21*	174.17*	222.71*
10%	77.39	110.65*	152.51*	195.91*	253.56*
15%	90.58	131.21*	174.17*	222.71*	288.43*

Panel C: BHCs with Completely Depleted Capital Buffers (%)

	Target Capital Ratio				
Shock to Assets	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	4.08	5.10	8.16	8.16	8.16
5% (Baseline)	4.08	5.10	8.16	8.16	10.20
10%	5.10	6.12	8.16	8.16	10.20
15%	5.10	8.16	8.16	10.20	10.20

Notes: The table presents the stress test results using 2013Q4 balance sheets (before Basel III implementation). Panel A shows mean percentage of BHC excess capital required to recapitalize nonbank subsidiaries following asset shocks (rows) to restore target capital ratios (columns). Panel B shows 95th percentile (tail risk), with asterisks (*) indicating scenarios where recapitalization exceeds 100% of parent excess capital (potential insolvency). Panel C shows percentage of BHCs with completely depleted capital buffers (recapitalization needs exceed available excess capital). Baseline scenario (5% shock, 40% target) is comparable to 2008 financial crisis losses. Calculations assume full BHC ownership of subsidiaries and 100% loss recognition on nonbank assets. Source: FR Y-9LP, FR Y-9C.

Table 6: Internal Reallocation is Privately Optimal: BHC Profitability

	(1) ROA	(2) ROE	(3) Charge-Offs
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0011**	0.0001**	-0.0001**
	(0.0005)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Observations	5,896	5,896	5,896
R^2	0.329	0.477	0.485
BHC FE	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of BHC-level profitability. Dependent variable in Column (1) is quarterly net income divided by lagged total assets (ROA). Column (2) is quarterly net income divided by lagged equity (ROE). Column (3) is quarterly charge-offs divided by lagged total loans. All dependent variables are measured at the consolidated BHC level. Years from Dereg measures the number of years between the interstate branching deregulation of the BHC headquarters state and the 1994 Riegle–Neal Act. Post is an indicator equal to one for 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include BHC fixed effects and quarter-year fixed effects. BHC controls include an indicator for top 200 BHCs, log total assets, leverage, deposits-to-assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured as of 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9C. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Bank Performance and Portfolio Composition

Panel A: Performance

	(1) ROA	(2) ROE	(3) Charge-Offs
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0012***	0.0001***	-0.0002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Observations	12,054	12,054	12,054
R^2	0.375	0.277	0.350
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓

Panel B: Portfolio Composition and Growth

	Shares			Growth Rates		
	Loan Share	Securities Share	Cash Share	Δln(Loans)	Δln(Sec)	Δln(Cash)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0060***	0.0033*	0.0052**	0.0008*	0.0023**	0.0046**
	(0.0021)	(0.0019)	(0.0024)	(0.0005)	(0.0011)	(0.0021)
Observations	13,333	13,333	13,333	11,774	11,774	11,774
R^2	0.919	0.883	0.877	0.132	0.100	0.076
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of bank safety improvements. Panel A shows performance measures. Dependent variable in Column (1) is quarterly net income divided by lagged total assets (ROA). Column (2) is quarterly net income divided by lagged equity (ROE). Column (3) is quarterly charge-offs divided by lagged total loans. Panel B shows portfolio composition and growth. Columns (1)-(3) show asset shares (loans, securities, and cash as shares of total assets). Columns (4)-(6) show quarter-on-quarter growth rates (log changes in loans, securities, and cash holdings). Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include bank fixed effects and quarter-year fixed effects. Bank controls include log assets, leverage, and asset growth, all measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at bank level. Source: Call Reports. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Bank Capital Quality Without Leverage Expansion

	(1) Leverage	(2) Equity/RWA	(3) RWA/Assets	(4) Marginal ROE	(5) Off-BS
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0011	0.0113***	-0.0067***	0.0085	-0.0017
	(0.0007)	(0.0039)	(0.0016)	(0.0090)	(0.0018)
Observations	11,442	11,442	11,442	11,442	11,442
R^2	0.973	0.958	0.896	0.047	0.828
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table examines channels through which equity injections affected bank returns. Dependent variable in Column (1) is total liabilities divided by equity (leverage). Column (2) is equity divided by risk-weighted assets. Column (3) is risk-weighted assets divided by total assets. Column (4) is marginal return on equity, calculated as change in net income over past four quarters divided by change in equity over same period. Column (5) is unused loan commitments divided by total assets. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include bank fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and bank controls (log assets, leverage, asset growth measured 2013Q4) interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at bank level. Source: Call Reports. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Nonbank Capital Extraction and Funding Constraints

	(1) Equity/ Assets	(2) Bal From Subs	(3) Bal To Subs	(4) Net Bal to Subs	(5) Dividends /Equity	(6) ln(Assets)
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0771**	-0.0667*	0.0693**	0.1360***	0.0096**	0.0454
	(0.0363)	(0.0374)	(0.0324)	(0.0439)	(0.0037)	(0.1539)
Observations	4,697	4,697	4,697	4,697	4,697	4,697
R^2	0.855	0.890	0.808	0.867	0.299	0.929
Nonbank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table documents capital extraction from nonbank subsidiaries. Panel A shows balance sheet changes. Dependent variable in Column (1) is equity divided by lagged assets. Column (2) is balances due from subsidiaries (amounts nonbanks owe to parents/affiliates) divided by lagged assets. Column (3) is balances due to subsidiaries (amounts parents owe to nonbanks) divided by lagged assets. Column (4) is net balances to parent and subsidiaries, calculated as (balances due to subs - balances due from subs) divided by lagged assets; positive values indicate net borrowing from or reduced lending to affiliates. Column (5) is cash dividends declared divided by lagged equity. Column (6) is log total assets. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include nonbank subsidiary fixed effects and industry-quarter-year fixed effects (NAICS code × quarter-year). BHC controls include top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Source: FR Y-11. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Internal Funding Rates: Regression Estimates

	(1) Nonbank Rate	(2) Bank Rate	(3) Spread Rate (NB - Bank)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0052**	0.0008	0.0044*
	(0.0024)	(0.0008)	(0.0025)
Observations	992	992	992
R^2	0.530	0.548	0.519
BHC FE	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table reports regression estimates of internal funding rate differentials. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the annualized interest rate on internal funding to bank subsidiaries, calculated as quarterly interest income from bank subsidiaries multiplied by four and divided by the stock of nonequity internal funding to bank subsidiaries (the sum of internal loans, parent affiliate deposits, and net balances due from bank subsidiaries). Column (2) reports the corresponding annualized interest rate on internal funding to nonbank subsidiaries, calculated analogously using interest income from nonbank subsidiaries and the stock of nonequity internal funding to nonbank subsidiaries. Column (3) reports the internal funding spread, defined as the nonbank funding rate minus the bank funding rate. Years from Dereg measures the number of years between the interstate branching deregulation of the BHC headquarters state and the 1994 Riegle–Neal Act. Post is an indicator equal to one for 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include BHC fixed effects and quarter-year fixed effects. BHC control variables include top 200 BHC indicator, log total assets, leverage, deposits-to-assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured as of 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. The sample is restricted to BHCs with non-missing internal funding rate measures for both bank and nonbank subsidiaries. Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: Lending Growth: Nonbank vs Bank Subsidiaries

	(1)	(2)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Lending})$	Nonbank	Bank
Years from Dereg $\times$ Post	0.0720***	0.0009
	(0.0151)	(0.0019)
Observations	760	760
R^2	0.107	0.172
BHC FE	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓
Controls $\times$ Post	✓	✓

Notes: The table compares lending growth between nonbank and bank subsidiaries at the BHC level. Dependent variable is quarter-on-quarter log change in total lending aggregated across all nonbank subsidiaries (Column 1) or all bank subsidiaries (Column 2) within each BHC. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. Both specifications include BHC fixed effects and quarter-year fixed effects. BHC controls include top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, ROA, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Sample restricted to BHC-quarters with non-missing lending data for both nonbank and bank subsidiaries. Source: Call Reports, FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Nonbank Shift to Lending Activities

	(1) Earning Assets/ Assets	(2) Loans/ Assets
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0688**	0.0352**
	(0.0276)	(0.0145)
Observations	5,327	5,327
R^2	0.891	0.956
Nonbank FE	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓

Notes: This table documents shifts in nonbank subsidiary portfolio composition. Dependent variable in Column (1) is earning assets divided by total assets. Column (2) is total loans divided by total assets. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include nonbank subsidiary fixed effects, industry-quarter-year fixed effects (NAICS × quarter-year), and BHC-level controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, subsidiary count measured 2013Q4) interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Figure 6 Panel (c) visualizes loan share increase. Appendix Tables D.9-D.10 examine which loan types and business activities expanded. * Source: FR Y-11. $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Nonbank Credit Quality Deterioration

Panel A: Past-Due Loans and Provisions

	(1) 30-89 Days	(2) 90+ Days Past Due	(3) All Past Due	(4) Loss Provisions
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0043	0.0266***	0.0308***	0.0937***
	(0.0054)	(0.0069)	(0.0085)	(0.0142)
Observations	1,548	1,548	1,548	571
R^2	0.478	0.676	0.685	0.766
Nonbank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓

Panel B: Profitability

	(1) ROA	(2) ROE
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0037	-0.1079**
	(0.0056)	(0.0464)
Observations	4,708	4,708
R^2	0.403	0.309
Nonbank FE	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓

Notes: The table documents credit quality deterioration and profitability decline. Panel A shows past-due loans and loss provisions. Dependent variable in Column (1) is loans 30-89 days past due divided by lagged total loans. Column (2) is loans 90+ days past due divided by lagged loans. Column (3) is all past-due loans (30+ days) divided by lagged loans. Column (4) is loan loss provisions divided by lagged loans, conditional on nonzero provisioning. Panel B shows profitability measures. Column (1) is quarterly net income divided by lagged assets (ROA). Column (2) is quarterly net income divided by lagged equity (ROE). Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include nonbank subsidiary fixed effects, industry-quarter-year fixed effects, and BHC controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, subsidiary count measured 2013Q4) interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Figure 6 Panels (d)-(e) visualize credit deterioration and profitability decline. Source: FR Y-11. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: Nonbank Increased Fragility and Default Risk

	(1) Negative Earnings	(2) σ (Int Inc)	(3) σ (Non-Int)	(4) Z-Score	(5) Prob (Default)
Years from Dereg $\times$ Post	0.1519***	0.1969***	0.0422	-8.6147***	0.0168**
	(0.0341)	(0.0660)	(0.1030)	(2.4028)	(0.0058)
Observations	2,714	2,714	2,714	2,714	2,714
R^2	0.4349	0.6934	0.5513	0.9767	0.0661
Nonbank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls $\times$ Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table presents measures of nonbank fragility and default risk. Dependent variable in Column (1) is indicator equal to one if quarterly net income is negative. Column (2) is rolling 8-quarter standard deviation of log interest income. Column (3) is rolling 8-quarter standard deviation of log non-interest income. Column (4) is Z-score, calculated as (equity/assets + ROA) / standard deviation of ROA; higher values indicate lower default risk. Column (5) is probability of default calculated using Merton model as normal CDF of negative Z-score. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include nonbank subsidiary fixed effects, industry-quarter-year fixed effects, and BHC controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, subsidiary count measured 2013Q4) interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-11. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Online Appendix for:

"Regulatory Arbitrage within the Firm"

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Appendix A Theoretical Framework: Complete Derivations

This appendix provides complete derivations and proofs for the propositions stated in Section 3, along with comparative statics, calibration details, and model figures. The notation follows Section 3 throughout.

A.1 Model Setup

Consider a BHC that owns two subsidiaries: a regulated bank (B) and an unregulated nonbank financial institution (N). The BHC operates over two periods, $t \in \{1, 2\}$.

Assets and Equity. Each subsidiary $i \in \{B, N\}$ operates with exogenous assets $A_i > 0$ and chooses equity level $E_i \geq 0$ in period 1. Total BHC equity is $E = E_B + E_N$. Subsidiaries generate returns $R_i(E_i, A_i)$ with standard properties:

$$\frac{\partial R_i}{\partial E_i} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 R_i}{\partial E_i^2} < 0 \tag{A.1}$$

Higher equity increases returns by reducing expected distress costs, but with diminishing marginal benefits.

Regulation. The bank faces a capital requirement

$$E_B \geq \kappa_B \cdot A_B \tag{A.2}$$

where κ_B is the regulatory minimum capital ratio. The nonbank faces no binding capital requirement ($\kappa_N = 0$), consistent with the institutional setting where Basel III applies only to depository institutions.

Financing. The BHC can raise external equity $K \geq 0$ at convex cost $c(K)$ with $c(0) = 0$, $c'(K) > 0$, and $c''(K) > 0$. This captures well-established pecking order preferences: internal funds are cheaper than external equity due to issuance costs, asymmetric information, and market timing considerations (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988).

Internal equity transfers from nonbank to bank incur a small transaction cost $\tau \geq 0$ per dollar transferred, reflecting administrative frictions and potential tax considerations.[17]

Shocks and Failure. In period 2, each subsidiary faces an idiosyncratic shock $\theta_i \sim F_i(\theta)$ with support $[-\bar{\theta}_i, 0]$. Subsidiary i fails if its equity cushion is insufficient:

$$E_i + \theta_i < 0 \tag{A.3}$$

Failure of subsidiary i generates a deadweight social loss $L_i > 0$, where $L_B > L_N$ reflects the greater systemic importance of regulated depository institutions.

Contagion. We model contagion through spillover parameter $\lambda \in [0, 1]$:

- $\lambda = 0$: Perfect ring-fencing (nonbank failure fully contained)
- $\lambda = 1$: Full contagion (nonbank failure triggers bank failure)

The total probability of bank failure incorporates both direct shocks and contagion:

$$\Pr(\text{Bank Failure}) = F_B(-E_B) + \lambda \cdot \Pr(\theta_N < -E_N \text{ and } \theta_B > -E_B) \tag{A.4}$$

The probability of nonbank failure is:

$$\Pr(\text{Nonbank Failure}) = F_N(-E_N). \tag{A.5}$$

This captures that nonbank distress can transmit to the bank even when the bank would otherwise survive its own shock, consistent with channels including funding pressure, reputation damage, and consolidated capital depletion.

[17] In practice, τ is small relative to external equity costs. Our calibration suggests $\tau \approx 0$ to 0.05, while external equity costs exceed 5% of capital raised.

A.2 BHC Optimization

The BHC chooses equity allocations (E_B, E_N) and external equity K to maximize expected value:

$$\max_{E_B, E_N, K} \quad \mathbb{E}[R_B(E_B, A_B) + R_N(E_N, A_N)] - \Pr(\text{Failure})_B \cdot L_B - \Pr(\text{Failure})_N \cdot L_N - c(K) - \tau \cdot |E_B - E_B^0| \tag{A.6}$$

subject to:

$$E_B \geq \kappa_B \cdot A_B \qquad \text{(regulatory constraint)} \tag{A.7}$$

$$E_B + E_N \leq E^0 + K \qquad \text{(resource constraint)} \tag{A.8}$$

$$E_B, E_N, K \geq 0 \qquad \text{(non-negativity)} \tag{A.9}$$

where E^0 and E_B^0 denote initial BHC and bank equity levels. Internal equity transfers from non-bank to bank incur a transaction cost $\tau \geq 0$ per dollar transferred, reflecting administrative frictions and potential tax considerations associated with intercompany transfers.

A.3 Optimal Capital Allocation

We characterize the solution through three cases.

Case 1: Slack Regulation. When $\kappa_B \cdot A_B < E_B^*$ (where E_B^* is unconstrained optimum), the constraint does not bind and the BHC allocates equity to equate marginal risk-adjusted returns:

$$R_B'(E_B) - L_B \cdot f_B(-E_B) = R_N'(E_N) - L_N \cdot f_N(-E_N) \tag{A.10}$$

This represents standard portfolio allocation with no regulatory distortion.

Case 2: External Financing. When regulation binds ($\kappa_B \cdot A_B > E_B^*$) but external equity is relatively cheap, the BHC raises external capital: $K^* > 0$. The regulatory constraint binds with $E_B = \kappa_B \cdot A_B$, and minimal internal reallocation occurs. Appendix Figure A.3 shows that satisfying the 10.5% Basel III requirement would require external equity equal to approximately 3.2% of total BHC assets under this scenario.

Case 3: Internal Reallocation. When external equity is prohibitively costly relative to internal transfers ($c'(0) > \tau$), the BHC meets the regulatory requirement through internal reallocation: $K^* = 0$ and $E_B = \kappa_B \cdot A_B$.

Proposition A.1 (Internal Reallocation Equilibrium)**.** *When external equity is costly ($c'(0) > \tau$) and regulation binds ($\kappa_B \cdot A_B > E_B^0$), the BHC optimally chooses:*

$$E_B^* = \kappa_B \cdot A_B \tag{A.11}$$

$$E_N^* = E^0 - \kappa_B \cdot A_B \tag{A.12}$$

$$K^* = 0 \tag{A.13}$$

with comparative statics:

$$\frac{\partial E_B^*}{\partial \kappa_B} = A_B > 0 \qquad \textit{(bank equity increases with requirements)} \tag{A.14}$$

$$\frac{\partial E_N^*}{\partial \kappa_B} = -A_B < 0 \qquad \textit{(nonbank equity decreases one-for-one)} \tag{A.15}$$

$$\frac{\partial (E_B^* + E_N^*)}{\partial \kappa_B} = 0 \qquad \textit{(consolidated BHC equity unchanged)} \tag{A.16}$$

Proof of Proposition A.1. Form the Lagrangian, incorporating the contagion term from equation (A.4):

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L} = {} & \mathbb{E}[R_B(E_B, A_B) + R_N(E_N, A_N)] - [F_B(-E_B) + \lambda \cdot \Pr(\theta_N < -E_N,\, \theta_B > -E_B)] \cdot L_B \\ & - F_N(-E_N) \cdot L_N - c(K) - \tau \cdot (E_B - E_B^0) + \mu \cdot (E_B - \kappa_B \cdot A_B) + \nu \cdot (E^0 + K - E_B - E_N)\end{aligned}$$

where $\mu \geq 0$ is the multiplier on the regulatory constraint (A.7) and $\nu \geq 0$ is the multiplier on the resource constraint (A.8). The term $\tau \cdot (E_B - E_B^0)$ captures internal reallocation costs, which are positive when regulation binds and equity flows from nonbank to bank ($E_B > E_B^0$).

The first-order conditions are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial E_B} = R_B'(E_B) - L_B \cdot f_B(-E_B) - \lambda \cdot \frac{\partial \Pr(\theta_N < -E_N,\, \theta_B > -E_B)}{\partial E_B} \cdot L_B - \tau + \mu - \nu = 0 \tag{A.17}$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial E_N} = R_N'(E_N) - L_N \cdot f_N(-E_N) - \lambda \cdot \frac{\partial \Pr(\theta_N < -E_N,\, \theta_B > -E_B)}{\partial E_N} \cdot L_B - \nu = 0 \tag{A.18}$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K} = -c'(K) + \nu = 0 \tag{A.19}$$

Let $\Phi(E_B, E_N) \equiv \Pr(\theta_N < -E_N, \theta_B > -E_B)$ denote the joint probability of nonbank distress and bank survival. Note that $\partial\Phi/\partial E_B > 0$ (higher bank equity reduces the set of states where the bank would otherwise survive, so the marginal contagion cost is positive) and $\partial\Phi/\partial E_N < 0$ (higher nonbank equity reduces the probability of nonbank distress).

Step 1: Show $K^* = 0$. When external equity is costly, $c'(0) > \tau$. From equation (A.19), any interior solution with $K^* > 0$ requires $\nu = c'(K^*)$. Since c' is increasing, $K^* > 0$ implies $\nu > c'(0)$.

But from equation (A.18), the shadow value of funds is:

$$\nu = R_N'(E_N) - L_N \cdot f_N(-E_N) - \lambda \cdot \frac{\partial\Phi}{\partial E_N} \cdot L_B \tag{A.20}$$

For $K^* > 0$ to be optimal, we would need $\nu > c'(0)$—that is, the marginal benefit of additional funds (captured by ν) must exceed the marginal cost of external equity. When $c'(0)$ is sufficiently large relative to the marginal returns and risk reduction benefits in equation (A.20), this condition fails and the BHC optimally chooses $K^* = 0$. With $K^* = 0$, the complementary slackness condition holds with inequality: $c'(0) \geq \nu$.

Step 2: Show the regulatory constraint binds. Suppose the constraint does not bind ($\mu = 0$). From (A.17) and (A.18):

$$R_B'(E_B) - L_B \cdot f_B(-E_B) - \lambda \cdot \frac{\partial\Phi}{\partial E_B} \cdot L_B - \tau = R_N'(E_N) - L_N \cdot f_N(-E_N) - \lambda \cdot \frac{\partial\Phi}{\partial E_N} \cdot L_B \tag{A.21}$$

This is the unconstrained optimum E_B^*. When regulation binds ($\kappa_B \cdot A_B > E_B^*$), the constraint must bind at the optimum, so $E_B = \kappa_B \cdot A_B$ and $\mu > 0$.

Step 3: Solve for E_N^*. With $K^* = 0$ and $E_B^* = \kappa_B \cdot A_B$, the resource constraint (A.8) gives:

$$E_N^* = E^0 - E_B^* = E^0 - \kappa_B \cdot A_B \tag{A.22}$$

Step 4: Comparative statics. Differentiating (A.11)–(A.12) with respect to κ_B:

$$\frac{\partial E_B^*}{\partial \kappa_B} = A_B > 0 \tag{A.23}$$

$$\frac{\partial E_N^*}{\partial \kappa_B} = -A_B < 0 \tag{A.24}$$

$$\frac{\partial (E_B^* + E_N^*)}{\partial \kappa_B} = A_B - A_B = 0 \tag{A.25}$$

These hold for any $A_B > 0$. □

These predictions match our empirical findings exactly: banks accumulate equity (Panel A, Table 2), nonbanks lose equity (Column 1 of Table 9), and BHCs do not raise external capital (Panel A of Column 2, Table 2). Appendix Figure A.1 visualizes these comparative statics. Panel (a) shows that as bank capital requirements increase from 6% to 16%, bank capital ratios (blue line) rise from 6% to 17%, while nonbank capital ratios (red line) decline from 33% to 8%, the "waterbed effect" where regulatory pressure on one subsidiary causes risk to migrate to another. Appendix Figure A.3 demonstrates that external equity financing increases only modestly with tighter regulation (from approximately 1.3% to 3.2% of BHC assets), confirming that BHCs rely primarily on internal reallocation rather than external capital markets.

A.4 Systemic Implications and Externalities

While internal reallocation is privately optimal for BHCs (avoiding costly external equity), it may be socially suboptimal due to a contagion externality. Let $\Delta E \equiv \kappa_B \cdot A_B - E_B^0 > 0$ denote the required equity transfer from nonbank to bank—the gap between the regulatory requirement and the bank's initial equity.

Private Optimum. From the Case 3 analysis, the BHC chooses internal reallocation over external equity when the marginal cost of external financing exceeds the transaction cost of internal transfer:

$$c'(0) > \tau \tag{A.26}$$

Social Optimum. A regulator additionally accounts for the systemic costs of contagion. Internal reallocation reduces E_N by ΔE, increasing the probability of nonbank failure and, through contagion, the probability of bank failure. Internal reallocation is efficient only if the saved external financing costs exceed the increase in expected systemic losses:

$$c'(0) \cdot \Delta E > \tau \cdot \Delta E + \Delta L_N + \lambda \cdot \Delta L_B \tag{A.27}$$

where:

$$\Delta L_N \equiv L_N \cdot [F_N(-E_N + \Delta E) - F_N(-E_N)] \geq 0 \quad \text{(expected nonbank failure costs)} \tag{A.28}$$

$$\Delta L_B \equiv L_B \cdot [F_N(-E_N + \Delta E) - F_N(-E_N)] \cdot \Pr(\theta_B > -E_B) \geq 0 \quad \text{(expected bank failure costs via contagion)} \tag{A.29}$$

ΔL_N captures the direct increase in expected nonbank failure costs from reducing nonbank equity by ΔE. ΔL_B captures the increase in expected bank failure costs through contagion: the additional probability of nonbank failure $[F_N(-E_N + \Delta E) - F_N(-E_N)]$ multiplied by the probability the bank would otherwise survive $\Pr(\theta_B > -E_B)$, scaled by bank failure costs L_B.

Proposition A.2 (Contagion Externality)**.** *The BHC ignores the contagion externality $\lambda \cdot \Delta L_B$, leading to excessive internal reallocation when λ is large. There exists a critical contagion threshold:*

$$\lambda^* = \frac{(c'(0) - \tau) \cdot \Delta E - \Delta L_N}{L_B \cdot [F_N(-E_N + \Delta E) - F_N(-E_N)] \cdot \Pr(\theta_B > -E_B)} \tag{A.30}$$

such that internal reallocation is:

- ***Privately and Socially Aligned*** *if $\lambda < \lambda^*$ (ring-fencing effective, contagion costs small relative to saved financing costs)*
- ***Socially Costly*** *if $\lambda > \lambda^*$ (contagion costs exceed saved external equity costs)*

Proof of Proposition A.2. The social condition (A.27) requires saved financing costs $(c'(0) - \tau) \cdot \Delta E$ to exceed increased systemic risk costs $\Delta L_N + \lambda \cdot \Delta L_B$. Rearranging to isolate λ, internal reallocation is efficient if and only if:

$$\lambda < \frac{(c'(0) - \tau) \cdot \Delta E - \Delta L_N}{\Delta L_B} \tag{A.31}$$

Substituting the definition of ΔL_B from (A.29) yields equation (A.30). The BHC's private condition (A.26) ignores both ΔL_N and $\lambda \cdot \Delta L_B$. The private-social wedge therefore equals $\Delta L_N + \lambda \cdot \Delta L_B > 0$, so the BHC undertakes excessive reallocation from a social perspective whenever $\lambda > 0$. □

Interpretation. When ring-fencing is effective (λ small), internal reallocation is both privately and socially optimal. BHCs meet regulatory requirements without incurring costly external financing, and contagion costs are contained. However, when contagion risk is material ($\lambda > \lambda^*$), the social cost of increased systemic fragility outweighs the private benefit of avoided issuance costs.

Empirical Calibration. Our stress test analysis provides empirical discipline for the model. Appendix Figure A.2b presents heatmaps showing BHC equity at risk under various shock scenarios. The three panels show: (i) mean equity required as a percentage of total BHC equity to recapitalize nonbank subsidiaries, (ii) 95th percentile equity at risk, and (iii) the fraction of BHCs experiencing complete buffer depletion. At our baseline scenario of a 5% shock to nonbank assets (consistent with 2008-level losses) combined with a 40% target recapitalization ratio, the mean BHC requires 18.84% of excess capital to restore nonbank solvency, while the 95th percentile BHC requires 90.58% of excess capital. If nonbanks were perfectly ring-fenced ($\lambda = 0$), this BHC-level vulnerability would not exist. The observed equity-at-risk implies $\lambda \in [0.2, 0.5]$, suggesting material, though not complete, contagion.

Appendix Figure A.4a plots the change in systemic costs from internal reallocation as a function of λ, expressed as a percentage of total BHC assets. Externalities are low when $\lambda < \lambda^* \approx 0.7$, reaching approximately 4% of assets when contagion is negligible ($\lambda = 0$). The externalities function crosses zero at $\lambda^* \approx 0.7$ and becomes increasingly negative for $\lambda > \lambda^*$, reaching approximately -2% of assets at complete contagion ($\lambda = 1$). Our calibrated range $\lambda \in [0.2, 0.5]$ falls below this threshold, suggesting internal reallocation is efficient under baseline parameters.

The externality threshold λ^* is sensitive to assumptions about relative failure costs. Appendix Figure A.4b explores how λ^* varies with the ratio L_B/L_N. When bank failures are only twice as costly as nonbank failures ($L_B/L_N = 2$), $\lambda^* \approx 0.2$, implying reallocation becomes socially costly even at low contagion. At our baseline calibration of $L_B/L_N = 6$, the threshold rises to $\lambda^* \approx 0.7$. At very high systemic cost ratios ($L_B/L_N = 20$), λ^* increases to approximately 0.9. Our calibrated range $\lambda \in [0.2, 0.5]$ falls below the baseline threshold across all panels of Figure A.4b, suggesting internal reallocation is efficient in our empirical setting under baseline assumptions about failure costs.

A.5 Comparative Statics and Additional Predictions

The model generates several additional predictions that align with our empirical findings.

Effect of Stricter Regulation. Define system-wide expected failure costs as:

$$\mathcal{S} \equiv \Pr(\text{Bank Failure}) \cdot L_B + \Pr(\text{Nonbank Failure}) \cdot L_N \tag{A.32}$$

Using $E_B^* = \kappa_B \cdot A_B$ and $E_N^* = E^0 - \kappa_B \cdot A_B$ from Proposition A.1, and applying the chain rule:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{S}}{\partial \kappa_B} = \underbrace{-f_B(-E_B) \cdot A_B \cdot L_B}_{<0 \text{ (banks safer)}} + \underbrace{\lambda \cdot f_N(-E_N) \cdot A_B \cdot L_B + f_N(-E_N) \cdot A_B \cdot L_N}_{>0 \text{ (nonbank and contagion risk)}} \tag{A.33}$$

The net effect on system-wide risk is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of contagion and nonbank failure costs relative to direct bank safety improvements.

Heterogeneity in External Financing Costs. The condition $c'(0) > \tau$ determines whether a BHC operates in Case 3 (internal reallocation) or Case 2 (external financing). BHCs with higher external financing costs are more likely to satisfy this condition, and therefore more likely to rely on internal reallocation rather than raising external equity. Appendix Figure A.2a illustrates this mechanism by varying the marginal cost of external equity $c'(0)$ from 0% to 20%. When external equity is cheap ($c'(0) < 5\%$), BHCs raise approximately 1.80% of assets externally and the nonbank capital ratio falls by 7.01 percentage points. As external costs rise to 15–20%, external issuance falls to 1.69% of assets and the nonbank capital ratio decline increases to 7.05 percentage points.

A.6 Calibration Details

Parameter Values. Table A.1 summarizes the baseline parameter values. The model is a stylized framework intended to illustrate the internal reallocation mechanism and derive qualitative comparative statics; it is not a structural estimation. Parameters are chosen to be broadly consistent with the data and existing literature where possible, and assumed otherwise.

Regulatory Parameters. $\kappa_{\text{low}} = 0.08$ and $\kappa_{\text{high}} = 0.105$ match pre- and post-Basel III total capital requirements exactly, including the 2.5% capital conservation buffer.

External Equity Cost ($c'(0)$). **?** estimates direct costs of 4–7% for seasoned equity offerings, with additional indirect costs from dilution and adverse selection. We set $c'(0) = 0.07$, consistent with this range.

Transaction Cost (τ). Internal equity transfers incur administrative and tax frictions. We set $\tau = 0.02$, consistent with the assumption that internal transfer costs are small relative to external equity costs. The condition $c'(0) = 0.07 > \tau = 0.02$ confirms that Case 3 (internal reallocation) applies at baseline.

Contagion Parameter (λ). We calibrate λ directly from our stress tests. Under a 5% shock to nonbank assets requiring recapitalization to 40% capital ratios, the mean BHC deploys 18.84% of excess capital while 5.10% completely exhaust buffers. If nonbanks were perfectly ring-fenced ($\lambda = 0$), no BHC-level vulnerability would exist. The observed equity-at-risk implies $\lambda \in [0.2, 0.5]$; we use the midpoint $\lambda = 0.35$ as our baseline.

Failure Costs and Remaining Parameters. $L_B/L_N = 6$ is assumed as a baseline reflecting the greater systemic importance of regulated depository institutions. Appendix Figure A.4b shows that the externality threshold λ^* is robust across a wide range of L_B/L_N ratios. Asset parameters (A_B, A_N), return parameters (α_B, α_N), and shock parameters ($\bar{\theta}_B$, $\bar{\theta}_N$) are chosen to produce capital ratios and failure probabilities broadly consistent with the data, and are not calibrated to specific empirical moments.

Table A.1: Model Calibration

Parameter	Description	Value	Source
Assets and Initial Equity			
A_B	Bank assets (normalized)	100	—
A_N	Nonbank assets	30	Illustrative; see notes
$E^0/(A_B + A_N)$	Initial consolidated equity ratio	11%	Sample mean, pre-2015
Regulatory Parameters			
κ_{low}	Pre-Basel III capital requirement	8%	Basel I/II
κ_{high}	Post-Basel III capital requirement	10.5%	Basel III + CCB
Return Function: $R_i(E_i) = \alpha_i \log(1 + E_i)$			
α_B	Bank return parameter	15	Chosen to produce qualitatively reasonable capital ratios
α_N	Nonbank return parameter	12	Chosen to produce qualitatively reasonable capital ratios
Frictions and Costs: $c(K) = c'(0) \cdot K + 0.5 \cdot K^2$			
τ	Internal transfer cost per dollar	0.02	Assumed small; $\tau \in [0, 0.05]$
$c'(0)$	Marginal cost of external equity	0.07	Altınkılıç and Hansen (2000); range $[0.05, 0.10]$
Failure Costs and Shock Distribution: $\theta_i \sim \textit{Uniform}[-\bar{\theta}_i, 0]$			
L_B	Social cost of bank failure	60	Assumed; $L_B/L_N = 6$ baseline
L_N	Social cost of nonbank failure	10	Normalized
$\bar{\theta}_B$	Maximum bank shock magnitude	20	Assumed; sensitivity in Appendix Figure A.4b
$\bar{\theta}_N$	Maximum nonbank shock magnitude	15	Assumed; sensitivity in Appendix Figure A.4b
Contagion			
λ	Contagion parameter	0.35	Midpoint of $[0.2, 0.5]$; calibrated from stress tests

Notes: The model is a stylized framework intended to illustrate the internal reallocation mechanism and derive qualitative comparative statics; it is not a structural estimation. Assets are normalized so $A_B = 100$. $A_N = 30$ is chosen to produce economically meaningful nonbank operations and is not calibrated to a specific sample moment. Return parameters α_B and α_N are chosen so the model produces capital ratios broadly consistent with the data (pre-period bank capital ratios of approximately 8% and nonbank capital ratios substantially higher). Regulatory parameters κ_{low} and κ_{high} match Basel I/II and Basel III total capital requirements exactly. The contagion parameter $\lambda = 0.35$ is the midpoint of the range $[0.2, 0.5]$ calibrated from stress test results in Section 5.5. The condition $c'(0) = 0.07 > \tau = 0.02$ confirms that Case 3 (internal reallocation) applies at baseline. Appendix Figure A.4b reports sensitivity of the externality threshold λ^* to L_B/L_N and shock parameters.

A.7 Model Figures






Figure A.1: The "Waterbed Effect" of Entity-Level Regulation

Notes: The figure compares the subsidiary capital ratio for bank and nonbank subsidiaries as a function of the bank capital requirement.



(a) Heterogeneity by External Financing Costs



(b) Stress Test: BHC Equity at Risk

Figure A.2: Internal Reallocation: Mechanism and Systemic Implications

Notes: Panel (a) shows how the internal reallocation mechanism varies with external financing costs. The red line (left axis) shows the magnitude of nonbank equity extraction, while the blue dashed line (right axis) shows external equity issuance. Panel (b) presents stress test results showing BHC equity at risk under various shock scenarios. The three heatmaps display (left to right): mean BHC equity needed to recapitalize nonbanks as percentage of total BHC equity, 95th percentile (tail risk), and fraction of BHCs with completely depleted capital buffers. Colors range from dark red (low risk) to bright yellow (high risk).





Figure A.3: External Equity Counterfactual

Notes: The figure shows external equity that would be required to satisfy bank capital requirements if internal reallocation were not available, expressed as a percentage of total BHC assets. The line plots external equity raised as a function of the bank capital requirement κ_B. The slope represents the marginal external financing cost avoided through internal capital markets.



(a) Contagion Externality

(b) Sensitivity: λ^* vs. Failure Cost Ratio

Figure A.4: Systemic Implications Analysis and Model Calibration

Notes: Panel (a) plots the change in systemic costs from internal reallocation as a function of the contagion parameter λ, expressed as a percentage of total BHC assets. The externality is negative when $\lambda < 0.74$, crosses zero at $\lambda^* \approx 0.74$, and becomes positive for $\lambda > 0.74$. Panel (b) shows how the externality threshold λ^* varies with the ratio of bank-to-nonbank failure costs (L_B/L_N). The red dashed line marks our calibrated contagion parameter ($\lambda = 0.35$) from stress test evidence.

Appendix B Data Construction

This section describes the construction of the excess capital measure used in the analysis for both BHCs and depository institution (DI) subsidiaries. Excess capital is computed separately at the BHC-quarter level using FR Y-9C data and at the DI-quarter level using Call Report data, applying the regulatory requirements relevant to each institutional level.

Definition

Excess capital is defined as the amount of regulatory capital held by an institution (either a BHC or a depository institution) in excess of all binding regulatory requirements, normalized by that institution's risk-weighted assets (RWA). Formally, for institution i in quarter t, excess capital is constructed as the minimum distance between the institution's observed capital ratios and the applicable regulatory minimums across different capital categories.

Regulatory Capital Framework

Over the sample period, U.S. bank capital regulation is characterized by two main periods ((Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2024)).

Pre-Basel III (1992–2014). Banks (both holding companies and depository institution subsidiaries) were subject to three binding requirements:

- Tier 1 Capital Ratio: Tier 1 Capital $\geq$ 4% of RWA;
- Total Capital Ratio: Total Capital $\geq$ 8% of RWA;
- Leverage Ratio: Tier 1 Capital $\geq$ 4% of Total Consolidated Assets.

Basel III (2015–present). Beginning in 2015, banks are subject to:

- Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) Capital Ratio: CET1 Capital $\geq$ 4.5% of RWA;
- Tier 1 Capital Ratio: Tier 1 Capital $\geq$ 6% of RWA;
- Total Capital Ratio: Total Capital $\geq$ 8% of RWA;
- Leverage Ratio: Tier 1 Capital $\geq$ 4% of Total Consolidated Assets.

In addition, banks must satisfy the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), which is added to the minimum CET1, Tier 1, and Total capital ratios. The CCB was phased in between 2016 and 2019, reaching its full value of 2.5% of RWA in 2019. Banks must maintain these buffers to avoid limitations on capital distributions and discretionary payments.[18]

For most institutions, the CCB was phased in as follows:

- 2015: CCB = 0% of RWA
- 2016: CCB = 0.625% of RWA
- 2017: CCB = 1.25% of RWA
- 2018: CCB = 1.875% of RWA
- 2019-Present: CCB = 2.5% of RWA

In 2020, the Fed implemented the stress capital buffer (SCB) which replaces the CCB at the BHC level. The SCB is floored at the CCB of 2.5% but additionally requires BHCs to hold enough capital to cover stress test losses and four quarters of dividends. Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) face an additional capital surcharge applied at the holding company level, on top of the CCB (or SCB post-2020).

Advanced Approaches Institutions

Advanced Approaches (AA) institutions are required to compute risk-weighted assets under both standardized and internal-risk rating (AA) models (Congressional Research Service, 2023). Large, complex banking organizations[19] and their depository institution subsidiaries must use advanced approaches framework. For these banks, regulatory compliance is assessed using the lower of the capital ratios calculated under the standardized and advanced approaches. Accordingly, for each AA institution, CET1, Tier 1, and Total capital ratios are defined as the minimum across standardized and AA calculations in each quarter. This procedure is applied symmetrically at the BHC and depository institution levels, using the relevant standardized and advanced approach calculations reported for each entity.

[18] The countercyclical capital buffer is also in principle included in regulatory capital requirements, but remains zero throughout the sample.

[19] Until 2019, all banks that had at least $250 billion in total consolidated assets or at least $10 billion in total on-balance sheet foreign exposure were required to use the AA framework. After 2019, only Category I and II banks are required to use the AA framework, though other banks can elect to if they wish (Congressional Research Service, 2023).

TABLE 5—REGULATORY CAPITAL LEVELS FOR ADVANCED APPROACHES BANKING ORGANIZATIONS

	Jan. 1, 2014 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2015 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2016 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2017 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2018 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2019 (percent)
Capital conservation buffer	.....	.....	0.625	1.25	1.875	2.5
Minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio + capital conservation buffer	4.0	4.5	5.125	5.75	6.375	7.0
Minimum tier 1 capital ratio + capital conservation buffer	5.5	6.0	6.625	7.25	7.875	8.5
Minimum total capital ratio + capital conservation buffer	8.0	8.0	8.625	9.25	9.875	10.5
Maximum potential countercyclical capital buffer	.....	.....	0.625	1.25	1.875	2.5

TABLE 6—REGULATORY CAPITAL LEVELS FOR NON-ADVANCED APPROACHES BANKING ORGANIZATIONS

	Jan. 1, 2015 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2016 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2017 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2018 (percent)	Jan. 1, 2019 (percent)
Capital conservation buffer	.....	0.625	1.25	1.875	2.5
Minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio + capital conservation buffer	4.5	5.125	5.75	6.375	7.0
Minimum tier 1 capital ratio + capital conservation buffer	6.0	6.625	7.25	7.875	8.5
Minimum total capital ratio + capital conservation buffer	8.0	8.625	9.25	9.875	10.5

Figure B.1: Regulatory Requirements for AA and Non-AA Banking Organizations

Leverage Constraints and the Supplementary Leverage Ratio

Beginning in 2018, large banks are additionally subject to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR), defined as Tier 1 capital divided by total leverage exposure, which includes off-balance-sheet items. Advanced approaches banks must meet a 3% SLR at the BHC and depository subsidiary levels. G-SIBs and their depository institution subsidiaries are subject to an enhanced SLR (ESLR) of 5% at the BHC level and 6% at the depository subsidiary level.

Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) Framework

Beginning in 2020, qualifying community banks may opt into the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) framework. Electing banks are exempt from all risk-based capital requirements and are instead subject only to a Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement of at least 9%. These banks do not report RWA while in the CBLR regime, and are hence dropped from the sample.

Construction Procedure

Excess bank capital is constructed in four steps:

1. *Observed capital ratios.* For each institution-quarter, CET1 (post-2015), Tier 1, Total Capital, and Leverage Ratios are computed from FR Y-9C (for BHCs) or Call Report (for depository institution subsidiaries) data. For AA institutions, capital ratios reflect the minimum across standardized and advanced approaches.

2. *Applicable regulatory minimums.* Regulatory minimum capital ratios (inclusive of the CCB, GSIB-surcharge, or SCB for BHCs when applicable) are assigned based on the regulatory regime in place in quarter t.


3. *Accounting for the leverage ratio.* To account for potentially binding leverage constraints, for each institution-quarter, we compute the minimum amount of Tier 1 capital required to satisfy their applicable leverage ratio (Tier 1 leverage ratio, SLR, or ESLR). If this implied Tier 1 requirement exceeds the Tier 1 capital implied by risk-based requirements, the leverage-based requirement is treated as binding. The implied minimum Tier 1 capital is then expressed as a ratio of the institution's RWA, allowing leverage-based and risk-based constraints to be compared on a common scale.

4. *Excess capital.* Excess CET1, Tier 1, and Total capital are defined as the difference between observed ratios and their respective regulatory minimums. Excess capital is the minimum of these three values.

Appendix C Additional Empirical Figures

C.1 Share of BHC-Affiliated Nonbanks


Figure C.1: Percent of Aggregate Nonbank Assets Attributable to BHC Subsidiaries




Notes: The figure presents the percent of aggregate nonbank assets attributable to BHC subsidiaries from 2005 through 2025. This measure is constructed as the ratio of BHC-affiliated nonbank assets (from the FR Y-9LP) to aggregate nonbank assets (from the Financial Accounts of the United States). The denominator is constructed using asset-level proxies for Broker/Dealers, ABS, Equity REITs, Finance Companies, Life Ins., Mortgage REITs, Other Fin. Bus., PC Ins., Closed-End Funds. Mutual funds and ETF assets under management (AUM) are excluded from industry totals as they are not included in the FR Y-9LP numerator. Source: FR Y-9LP and the Financial Accounts of the United States.

C.2 Interstate Banking Deregulation and Nonbank Financial Exposure

Figure C.2: Interstate Banking Deregulation and Nonbank Financial Exposure



(a) Interstate Deregulation Timing by State




(b) Nonbank Share: Early vs Late Deregulators

Notes: Panel (a) displays the year each state removed restrictions on interstate banking. Lighter shading indicates earlier deregulation while darker shading indicates later deregulation. Panel (b) shows compares the nonbank share between BHCs headquartered in early-deregulating states and BHCs in late deregulating states.

C.3 Bank Capital by Nonbank Status


Figure C.3: Pre-Post Comparison: Bank Capital by Nonbank Status



Notes: The figure compares bank capital ratios before (2010–2014) and after (2016–2024) the policy change for BHCs with and without nonbank subsidiaries, classified based on their 2005 status. Source: Authors' calculations using the FR Y-9LP and Call Reports.

C.4 Retained Earnings by BHC Nonbank Status


Figure C.4: Bank Retained Earnings as a Share of Bank Assets by BHC Nonbank Status



Notes: The figure shows average bank retained earnings as share of bank assets over time, comparing banks in BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries as of 2005 (red line) versus banks in BHCs without nonbank affiliates (blue line). Retained earnings measured as quarterly undistributed subsidiary income scaled by bank assets in that quarter. Scaled retained earnings are averaged across banks in BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries as of 2005 and banks in BHCs without nonbank affiliates by quarter. Vertical dashed line indicates 2015Q1 (Basel III implementation). Differential accumulation consistent with reduced-form regression estimates in Appendix Table D.6 showing 0.19-0.43 basis point increase per quarter per year of deregulation exposure, which cumulates to approximately 3.8-10.8 percentage points over 20 quarters post-2015. Sample includes all commercial banks 2010-2024. Source: Call Reports.

C.5 Equity Multiplier

Figure C.5: Equity Multiplier: Distributions and Dynamics



(a) Overall Distribution

(b) Distribution by Type


(c) Capital Ratios by Type

(d) Multiplier Over Time


Notes: The figure provides a comprehensive view of equity multiplier distributions and dynamics. Panel (a) shows a histogram of equity multiplier across all BHC-quarters. Panel (b) shows box plots by subsidiary type (see heterogeneity documented in Table 4) Panel (c) shows mean capital ratios by type. Panel (d) shows time-series of aggregate equity multiplier. Shaded region shows 90% confidence interval. Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-11.

C.6 Assets and Equity at Risk


Figure C.6: Stress Test Sensitivity Analysis




(a) BHC Equity at Risk by Capital Target



(b) Buffer Depletion by Capital Target



(c) Nonbank Assets at Risk by Shock




(d) Nonbank Assets at Risk by Target


Notes: The table presents the stress test sensitivity analysis. Panel (a) shows percentage of BHC excess capital required to restore nonbanks to varying capital ratio targets following a 5% asset shock. Panel (b) shows percentage of BHCs with completely depleted capital buffers under varying targets (5% shock). Panel (c) shows percentage of nonbank assets requiring recapitalization by shock severity (40% target). Panel (d) shows nonbank assets at risk across capital targets (5% shock). Solid line: mean. Dashed line: 95th percentile. Horizontal dashed line at 100% marks potential parent insolvency. All panels use 2013Q4 balance sheets.

C.7 Bank Event Studies


Figure C.7: Bank Event Studies: Safety and Profitability Improvements




(a) ROA



(b) Retained Earnings



(c) Equity/RWA




(d) RWA/Assets

Notes: The figure presents event study estimates of bank outcomes relative to 2014 baseline. Panel (a) shows return on assets, Panel (b) shows equity-to-risk-weighted-assets ratios, Panel (c) shows risk-weighted assets, and Panel (d) shows retained earnings. Coefficients estimated from specification including bank fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and bank controls (log assets, leverage, asset growth measured 2013Q4) interacted with post-2015 indicator. Standard errors clustered at bank level. Error bars indicate 90% confidence intervals. Source: Call Reports.


C.8 Placebo Tests

Figure C.8: Placebo Test: Randomized Deregulation Timing



Notes: The figure presents permutation-based placebo test. Distribution shows coefficients from 1,000 regressions where years from deregulation (instrument) is randomly reassigned to BHCs. Specification uses bank fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and differential trends controls matching Column (1) of Panel B, Table 2. Placebo distribution tightly centered at zero: mean = -0.0003, standard error = 0.0024, t-statistic = -0.15, p-value = 0.880. True estimate of 0.739 percentage points (not shown to preserve scale) falls far in right tail.

Figure C.9: Placebo Test: Randomized Treatment Timing



Notes: The figure presents permutation-based placebo test validating the temporal variation in our identification strategy. Distribution shows coefficients from 1,000 regressions where post-period indicator is randomly assigned to years 2010-2024. Specification uses bank fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and differential trends controls matching Column (1) of Panel B, Table 2. Placebo distribution centered at zero: mean = 0.0001, standard error = 0.0005, t-statistic = 0.29, p-value = 0.769. True estimate of 0.739 percentage points (not shown to preserve scale) falls far in right tail.

Appendix D Additional Empirical Tables

D.1 Balanced Panel Analysis

Table D.1: Balance Table: Pre-Treatment Characteristics (2013Q4)

	Early Dereg	Late Dereg	Difference
Number of BHCs	75	89	14
Panel A: Size and Organizational Complexity			
Log(Total Assets)	15.188	14.211	0.976^{***}
Asset Growth	0.021	0.040	-0.019
Top 200 BHC	0.347	0.191	0.156^{**}
Log(Nonbank Assets)	11.514	8.252	3.262^{***}
Nonbank # Distinct NAICS	0.348	0.421	-0.074^{**}
ROA	0.002	0.003	-0.001^{**}
Panel B: Balance Sheet Characteristics			
Leverage	9.852	9.760	0.092
Loan Share	0.599	0.594	0.005
Securities Share	0.233	0.265	-0.032
Deposits/Assets	0.807	0.821	-0.014
Cash Share	0.083	0.081	0.002

Notes: The table compares pre-treatment characteristics of BHCs headquartered in early-deregulating states (those that removed intrastate branching restrictions by 1986 or earlier) versus late-deregulating states. The fraction of observations in the Early Dereg sample does not significantly differ from the Late Dereg sample (difference in proportions test, $p = 0.27$.) All variables are measured as of 2013Q4, the quarter before Basel III implementation. Panel A reports size and organizational complexity measures. Panel B reports balance sheet composition measures. The "Difference" column reports differences in means. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks based on t-test equality of means. Source: FR Y-9C, FR Y-9LP, BHC Organizational Database described in Section 2. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

D.2 Persistence of Nonbank Exposure

Table D.2: Persistence of Nonbank Financial Subsidiary Exposure

	Dependent Variable: NBFI Share$_t$ (% of Total Assets)				
	(1) 1-Year Lag	(2) 2-Year Lag	(3) 3-Year Lag	(4) 4-Year Lag	(5) 5-Year Lag
NBFI Share$_{t-1}$	0.900***				
	(0.025)				
NBFI Share$_{t-2}$		0.857***			
		(0.028)			
NBFI Share$_{t-3}$			0.805***		
			(0.036)		
NBFI Share$_{t-4}$				0.758***	
				(0.044)	
NBFI Share$_{t-5}$					0.709***
					(0.053)
Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	44,308	39,029	34,510	30,585	26,957
R-squared	0.922	0.885	0.846	0.818	0.790

Notes: The table examines the persistence of nonbank financial subsidiary (NBFI) exposure over time by regressing current NBFI share on lagged values at 1-, 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year horizons. The dependent variable in all columns is the share of nonbank financial assets as a percentage of total BHC assets in quarter t. Each column includes quarter fixed effects to control for aggregate time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. Source: FR Y-9LP and FR Y-9C. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

D.3 Internal Capital Reallocation: NBFI Presence

Table D.3: Internal Capital Reallocation and Organizational Complexity

Panel A: Bank Excess Capital

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}] \times \text{Post}$	4.8312**	4.8349**	2.0532*	2.0646**
	(2.3535)	(2.3377)	(1.0553)	(0.8277)
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}]$	15.2740***	15.2727***		
	(3.0533)	(3.0547)		
Post	-1.7105***			
	(0.5685)			
Constant	9.1104***			
	(0.8462)			
Observations	54,814	54,814	54,814	54,814
R^2	0.0248	0.0251	0.9395	0.9401

Panel B: BHC Excess Capital

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}] \times \text{Post}$	-0.1793	-0.0362	-0.0066	0.4333
	(0.3183)	(0.3121)	(0.2679)	(0.2931)
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}]$	0.6165*	0.6231*		
	(0.3202)	(0.3201)		
Post	-2.5508***			
	(0.2017)			
Constant	7.2883***			
	(0.1927)			
Observations	29,267	29,267	29,267	29,267
R^2	0.0791	0.1003	0.7722	0.7838

Panel C: Bank-to-BHC Excess Capital Ratio

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}] \times \text{Post}$	4.8312**	4.8349**	2.0532*	2.0646**
	(2.3535)	(2.3377)	(1.0553)	(0.8277)
$\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}]$	15.2740***	15.2727***		
	(3.0533)	(3.0547)		
Post	-1.7105***			
	(0.5685)			
Constant	9.1104***			
	(0.8462)			
Observations	54,814	54,814	54,814	54,814
R^2	0.0248	0.0251	0.9395	0.9401
Fixed Effects:				
Bank FE			✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE		✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post				✓

Notes: The table presents difference-in-differences estimates relating excess capital to nonbank subsidiary presence. The dependent variable is bank excess capital (Panel A), BHC excess capital (Panel B), and the ratio of bank to BHC excess capital (Panel C). $\mathbb{1}[\text{NBFI Sub}]$ indicates BHCs with nonbank financial subsidiaries as of 2013Q1. Post equals one for 2015Q1 and later. Controls are measured in 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Panel A and C controls include 2013Q4 bank size, leverage, ROA, and asset growth. Panel B controls include 2013Q4 BHC top 200 indicator, size, leverage, ROA, asset growth, deposits/assets, and subsidiary count. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level (Panels A and C) or BHC level (Panel B). Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9C, Call Reports, and FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.4 Internal Capital Reallocation: Deregulation Timing

Table D.4: Internal Capital Reallocation and Deregulation Timing

Panel A: Bank Excess Capital				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Years from Dereg × Post	2.6967*	2.6954*	0.7634*	0.7395*
	(1.4094)	(1.4062)	(0.4225)	(0.3992)
Years from Dereg	6.0085***	6.0063***		
	(1.7622)	(1.7659)		
Post	-13.3012*			
	(7.0483)			
Constant	-12.0218			
	(8.6498)			
Observations	12,558	12,558	12,558	12,558
R^2	0.0474	0.0490	0.9500	0.9503
Panel B: BHC Excess Capital				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0061	0.0157	-0.0583	0.0058
	(0.1028)	(0.0988)	(0.0680)	(0.0721)
Years from Dereg	-0.1331	-0.1310		
	(0.0986)	(0.0989)		
Post	-2.4567***			
	(0.8104)			
Constant	8.2797***			
	(0.7489)			
Observations	6,079	6,079	6,079	6,079
R^2	0.1009	0.1428	0.7860	0.7961
Panel C: Bank-to-BHC Excess Capital Ratio				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Years from Dereg × Post	3.3797**	3.1142**	2.0478**	1.7766***
	(1.3785)	(1.3162)	(0.8339)	(0.6211)
Years from Dereg	1.0960***	1.0989***		
	(0.2996)	(0.3008)		
Post	-13.3325*			
	(7.9656)			
Constant	-2.7111*			
	(1.4704)			
Observations	9,873	9,873	9,873	9,873
R^2	0.0712	0.0993	0.6697	0.6946
Bank FE			✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE		✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post				✓

Notes: The table presents reduced-form difference-in-differences estimates relating excess capital to deregulation timing. The dependent variable is bank excess capital (Panel A), BHC excess capital (Panel B), and the ratio of bank to BHC excess capital (Panel C). Years from Dereg measures the number of years between a BHC's headquarters state interstate branching deregulation and the 1994 Riegle–Neal Act; headquarters state is measured as of 1981. Post equals one for 2015Q1 and later. Controls are measured in 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Panel A and C controls include 2013Q4 bank size, leverage, ROA, and asset growth. Panel B controls include 2013Q4 BHC top 200 indicator, size, leverage, ROA, asset growth, deposits/assets, and subsidiary count. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level (Panels A and C) or BHC level (Panel B). Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9C, Call Reports, and FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.5 Bank/BHC Equity Share

Table D.5: Bank Equity as Share of BHC Equity

	(1) Bank Equity Share	(2) Bank Equity Share
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0199*	0.0194**
	(0.0100)	(0.0075)
BHC FE	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓
Controls × Post		✓
Observations	1,400	1,400
R^2	0.7667	0.7997

Notes: The table presents alternative measure of internal equity reallocation using bank equity stock rather than parent equity investments. Dependent variable is bank subsidiary equity divided by total BHC equity. This measures equity held by bank subsidiaries as share of consolidated BHC equity, complementing the parent equity investment measures in Table 3. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. Column (2) includes BHC controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, ROA, deposits/assets, asset growth, subsidiary count) measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Sample restricted to BHCs with nonbank asset share exceeding 1%. Source: FR Y-9C and FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.6 Bank Retained Earnings

Table D.6: Bank Retained Earnings

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0054**	0.0054**	0.0020**	0.0019**
	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)
Years from Dereg	0.0035	0.0035		
	(0.0032)	(0.0032)		
Post	-0.0130			
	(0.0106)			
Constant	0.0525***			
	(0.0157)			
Bank FE			✓	✓
Qtr-Year FE		✓	✓	✓
Controls				✓
N	12,558	12,558	12,558	12,558
R^2	0.0190	0.0209	0.9500	0.9529

Notes: The table presents the bank-level regression of retained earnings on organizational complexity. Dependent variable is bank retained earnings as share of bank assets, measured as quarterly undistributed subsidiary income scaled by beginning-of-quarter assets. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. Specification includes bank fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and bank controls (log assets, leverage, ROA, asset growth) measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at bank level. Source: Call Reports. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.7 Assets and Equity at Risk

Table D.7: Complete Stress Test Results: BHC Equity at Risk and Nonbank Subsidiaries Affected

Panel A: Mean BHC Equity at Risk (%)

	Target Capital Ratio					
Shock to Assets	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	6.61	11.23	16.57	22.42	28.99	36.23
5%	8.38	13.30	18.84	24.97	31.78	39.33
10%	10.74	16.02	21.82	28.30	35.47	43.29
15%	13.30	18.84	24.97	31.78	39.33	47.62

Panel B: 95th Percentile BHC Equity at Risk (%)

	Target Capital Ratio					
Shock to Assets	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	27.07	55.45	79.94	114.71*	156.84*	200.33*
5%	40.23	65.00	90.58	131.21*	174.17*	222.71*
10%	53.06	77.39	110.65*	152.51*	195.91*	253.56*
15%	65.00	90.58	131.21*	174.17*	222.71*	288.43*

Panel C: Mean Percentage of Nonbank Subsidiaries Requiring Recapitalization

	Target Capital Ratio					
Shock to Assets	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	3.15	5.17	7.69	10.81	14.45	18.45
5%	3.86	6.12	8.90	12.21	15.99	20.14
10%	4.94	7.42	10.49	14.07	18.04	22.41
15%	6.12	8.90	12.21	15.99	20.14	24.97

Panel D: 95th Percentile of Nonbank Subsidiaries Requiring Recapitalization

	Target Capital Ratio					
Shock to Assets	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%
1%	16.40	26.34	35.85	43.92	53.92	63.92
5%	20.34	30.34	38.19	47.92	57.92	67.92
10%	25.34	35.34	42.92	52.92	62.92	72.92
15%	30.34	38.19	47.92	57.92	67.92	77.92

Notes: The table presents stress test results using 2013Q4 balance sheets (FR Y-9C and FR Y-9LP). Panels A–B show percentage of BHC excess capital required to recapitalize nonbank subsidiaries following asset shocks (rows) to restore target capital ratios (columns). Panel A shows the mean across BHCs. Panel B shows the 95th percentile (tail risk), with asterisks (*) indicating scenarios where recapitalization exceeds 100% of parent excess capital. Panels C–D show the percentage of nonbank subsidiaries falling below the target capital ratio following shocks. Panel C reports the mean; Panel D reports the 95th percentile, highlighting concentration of risk. Calculations assume full BHC ownership and 100% loss recognition.

D.8 BHC Balance Sheet

Table D.8: BHC-Level Balance Sheet: Limited Consolidated Effects

Panel A: Portfolio Composition

	(1) Loan Share	(2) Securities Share	(3) Cash Share
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0019	0.0016	0.0010
	(0.0028)	(0.0031)	(0.0010)
Observations	6,067	6,067	6,067
R^2	0.916	0.893	0.775
BHC FE	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓

Panel B: Capital Structure

	(1) Leverage	(2) Equity/RWA	(3) RWA/Assets	(4) Marginal ROE	(5) Off-BS
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0363	0.0003	-0.0059**	0.0179	-0.0009
	(0.0568)	(0.0010)	(0.0026)	(0.0260)	(0.0015)
Observations	5,388	5,388	5,388	5,388	5,388
R^2	0.718	0.871	0.880	0.039	0.873
BHC FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table reports estimates using BHC-level (consolidated) balance sheet data. Panel A presents portfolio composition measures: loan share, securities share, and cash share. Panel B presents capital structure measures: leverage, equity-to-risk-weighted-assets, risk-weighted-assets-to-assets, marginal ROE, and off-balance-sheet loan commitments. BHC profitability results are reported separately in Table 6. Years from Dereg measures the number of years between the interstate branching deregulation of the BHC headquarters state and the 1994 Riegle–Neal Act. Post is an indicator equal to one for 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include BHC fixed effects and quarter-year fixed effects. BHC controls include an indicator for top 200 BHCs, log total assets, leverage, deposits-to-assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured as of 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. Source: Authors' calculations using FR Y-9C. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.9 Nonbank Shift to Consumer Lending

Table D.9: Loan Composition: Shift Toward Consumer Lending

Panel A: All Nonbank Subsidiaries

	(1) Real Estate Growth	(2) C&I Growth	(3) Consumer Growth	(4) Non-US Growth
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0341***	-0.0524**	0.0147*	0.0217
	(0.0121)	(0.0195)	(0.0082)	(0.0171)
Observations	4,572	4,572	4,572	4,572
R^2	0.206	0.199	0.354	0.161
Nonbank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓

Panel B: Nonbank Lenders Only

	(1) Real Estate Growth	(2) C&I Growth	(3) Consumer Growth	(4) Non-US Growth
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0290	0.0230	0.0746***	-0.0471
	(0.0166)	(0.0400)	(0.0067)	(0.0554)
Observations	851	851	851	851
R^2	0.063	0.085	0.435	0.083
Nonbank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The table reports regression estimates of loan growth by loan category for nonbank subsidiaries. The dependent variables are quarter-on-quarter log changes in loans by type: real estate (Column 1), commercial and industrial (Column 2), consumer (Column 3), and loans to non-U.S. borrowers (Column 4). Panel A includes all nonbank subsidiaries with lending activity. Panel B restricts the sample to subsidiaries classified as nonbank lenders, including finance companies, mortgage companies, and other specialized lending entities. Years from Dereg measures the number of years between the interstate branching deregulation of the BHC headquarters state and the 1994 Riegle–Neal Act. Post is an indicator equal to one for 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include nonbank subsidiary fixed effects and industry–quarter–year fixed effects. BHC control variables include an indicator for top 200 BHCs, log total assets, leverage, deposits-to-assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured as of 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. Source: FR Y-11. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.10 Nonbank Business Model Changes

Table D.10: Business Model Changes: Shift from Fees to Interest Income

Panel A: Decline in Capital-Intensive Activities

	(1) Trading Revenue	(2) Advisory/Fiduciary	(3) Venture Capital
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0005***	-0.0066*	-0.0005*
	(0.0002)	(0.0037)	(0.0003)
Observations	4,496	4,496	4,496
R^2	0.279	0.919	0.254
Nonbank FE	✓	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓

Panel B: Shift to Interest Income

	(1) ln(Interest Income)	(2) ln(Non-Interest Income)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.9351***	-0.2755
	(0.3125)	(0.2310)
Observations	2,387	2,387
R^2	0.775	0.809
Nonbank FE	✓	✓
Industry-Qtr-Year FE	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓

Notes: The table reports regression estimates of changes in nonbank subsidiary business model composition. Panel A presents measures of fee-based and investment-related activities. The dependent variables, all scaled by lagged assets, are trading revenue (Column 1), advisory and fiduciary revenue (Column 2), and venture capital revenue (Column 3). Panel B presents measures of income composition. The dependent variables are log interest income (Column 1) and log non-interest income (Column 2). Years from Dereg measures the number of years between the interstate branching deregulation of the BHC headquarters state and the 1994 Riegle–Neal Act. Post is an indicator equal to one for 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include nonbank subsidiary fixed effects and industry–quarter–year fixed effects. BHC control variables include an indicator for top 200 BHCs, log total assets, leverage, deposits-to-assets, asset growth, and subsidiary count, all measured as of 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level. Source: FR Y-11. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.11 Nonbank Compositional Shifts

Table D.11: Extensive Margin: Changes in Subsidiary Composition

Panel A: Net Change in Subsidiary Count

	(1) Broker	(2) Lender	(3) Insurer	(4) Fund	(5) REIT
Years from Dereg × Post	0.1222	-0.0107	-0.0113**	0.0670	0.0160
	(0.1025)	(0.0224)	(0.0053)	(0.0999)	(0.0175)
Observations	5,982	5,982	5,982	5,982	5,982
R^2	0.043	0.235	0.031	0.052	0.212

Panel B: Additions (Increase from Prior Quarter)

	(1) Broker	(2) Lender	(3) Insurer	(4) Fund	(5) REIT
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.0610	0.0067**	0.0025	0.0017	0.0016
	(0.0431)	(0.0030)	(0.0022)	(0.0245)	(0.0035)
Observations	6,155	6,155	6,155	6,155	6,155
R^2	0.066	0.066	0.091	0.237	0.054

Panel C: Removals (Decrease from Prior Quarter)

	(1) Broker	(2) Lender	(3) Insurer	(4) Fund	(5) REIT
Years from Dereg × Post	-0.1781	0.0171	0.0134**	-0.0670	-0.0132
	(0.1378)	(0.0208)	(0.0059)	(0.0801)	(0.0144)
Observations	6,155	6,155	6,155	6,155	6,155
R^2	0.091	0.249	0.079	0.073	0.248
BHC FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table examines changes in subsidiary composition at the extensive margin. Dependent variables measure quarter-to-quarter changes in subsidiary counts by type. Panel A shows net changes (current count minus prior quarter count, which equals additions minus removals). Panel B shows additions only (maximum of zero and the change, capturing only increases). Panel C shows removals only (maximum of zero and negative change, capturing only decreases). Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. All specifications include BHC fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and BHC controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, total subsidiary count measured 2013Q4) interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Source: BHC Organizational Database described in Section 2. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.12 Organizational Complexity

Table D.12: Organizational Complexity: Number of Distinct NBFI Types

	(1) ln(NBFI Types)	(2) ln(NBFI Types)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.0821***	0.0270*
	(0.0107)	(0.0157)
BHC FE		✓
Quarter-Year FE		✓
Controls × Post		✓
Observations	5,558	5,558
R^2	0.108	0.964

Notes: The table examines changes in organizational complexity measured by number of distinct nonbank activity types within BHC. Dependent variable is log of number of distinct NAICS-based nonbank subsidiary types. Column (1) shows pooled OLS. Column (2) includes BHC fixed effects, quarter-year fixed effects, and BHC controls (top 200 BHC indicator, log assets, leverage, deposits/assets, asset growth, subsidiary count) measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Post indicates 2015Q1 and later. Standard errors clustered at BHC level. Source: BHC Organizational Database described in Section 2. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.13 2SLS Design

Table D.13: First-Stage Relationship: Deregulation Timing and Organizational Complexity

NBFI Share × Post	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Years from Dereg × Post	0.2877***	0.5105***	0.5269***	0.3461***
	(0.0649)	(0.1419)	(0.1389)	(0.1044)
Bank FE			✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE		✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post				✓
Observations	12,558	12,558	12,558	12,558
R^2	0.108	0.130	0.636	0.686

Notes: The table presents first-stage estimates verifying that deregulation timing predicts organizational complexity. Dependent variable is nonbank asset share (nonbank assets / total BHC assets) interacted with Post indicator (2015Q1 and later). Years from Dereg measures years between BHC headquarters state's interstate branching deregulation and 1994 Riegle-Neal Act. Column (1) presents unconditional correlation. Column (2) adds quarter-year fixed effects. Column (3) adds bank fixed effects. Column (4) adds differential trends controls at the bank level: log assets, leverage, ROA, and asset growth measured 2013Q4 and interacted with Post. Standard errors clustered at bank level in parentheses. Source: FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.14: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates

Excess Bank Capital	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NBFI $\widehat{\text{Share}}$ × Post	9.4067***	17.0469***	1.4489*	2.1365*
	(3.4466)	(5.6947)	(0.8095)	(1.1549)
Bank FE			✓	✓
Quarter-Year FE		✓	✓	✓
Controls × Post				✓
Observations	12,558	12,558	12,558	12,558
First-Stage Diagnostics:				
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic	16.458	11.065	12.257	10.144
Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic	1524.187	1201.771	1161.075	524.242
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic	19.635	12.941	14.384	10.992

Notes: The table presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using deregulation timing as instrument for organizational complexity. Dependent variable is excess bank capital, defined as bank equity capital ratio minus regulatory minimum. Endogenous regressor is nonbank asset share interacted with Post (2015Q1 and later). Instrument is years from state deregulation to Riegle-Neal interacted with Post. Column (1) presents unconditional 2SLS. Column (2) adds quarter-year fixed effects. Column (3) adds bank fixed effects. Column (4) adds differential trends controls (log assets, leverage, ROA, asset growth measured 2013Q4 interacted with Post). Standard errors clustered at bank level in parentheses. First-stage diagnostics reported at bottom. Source: Call Reports, FR Y-9LP. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.