Nonpecuniary Returns to Selective Higher Education*

Juliana Londoño-Vélez
Luis Esteban Álvarez-Arango
Catherine Rodríguez
Fabio Sánchez

This version: March 25, 2026.

Abstract

We study the long-run nonpecuniary returns to selective higher education using Colombia's Ser Pilo Paga, which expanded access to high-quality universities for low-income students above a test-score cutoff. Combining an RD design with original survey data collected more than a decade after college entry, we show that access to selective universities substantially reshapes social and economic trajectories. In addition to increasing educational attainment and earnings, the program alters marriage markets and close friendships: recipients are more likely to have partners and close friends with higher educational attainment and higher social status. Educational aspirations and perceived social status also increase. At the same time, upward mobility is accompanied by worse health and lower subjective well-being: recipients are more likely to smoke regularly, report worse health, and exhibit lower life satisfaction. These findings suggest that selective higher education generates broad welfare effects beyond earnings, including both substantial gains and less visible costs. **JEL:** H23, I22, I23, I26

*Londoño-Vélez: Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, UCLA (e-mail: j.londonovelez@econ.ucla.edu). Álvarez-Arango: Ph.D. student, Department of Economics, UCLA. Rodríguez: Researcher, Department of Economics, Universidad de Los Andes. Sánchez: Researcher, Department of Economics, Universidad de Los Andes. We thank Yotam Shem-Tov, Adriana Lleras-Muney, and Matthew Notowidigdo for helpful feedback. We are grateful to Consuelo Malatesta and Luciano Mendivelso from the Department of National Planning. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spencer Foundation through Large Grant #10040436. This project has approval from UCLA's IRB (IRB#24-000220).

1 Introduction

Access to selective higher education can generate large earnings gains, yet its broader effects on individuals' social relationships, health, and subjective well-being remain poorly understood. A large literature documents substantial *pecuniary* returns to higher education, particularly to selective universities (e.g., Black et al., 2023; Bleemer, 2021; Dale and Krueger, 2014; Hoekstra, 2009; Mountjoy, 2025; Mountjoy and Hickman, 2021; Zimmerman, 2014). However, higher education may also generate important *nonpecuniary* returns that shape welfare and life trajectories beyond income (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). In particular, access to selective universities can influence health, social networks, marriage markets, family formation, civic engagement, and subjective well-being, with potentially lasting consequences even when earnings gains are modest.

Despite their importance for welfare analysis and policy design, credible evidence on these broader returns remains scarce for two main reasons. First, many key outcomes—such as subjective well-being, social ties, and aspirations—are rarely observed in administrative data. Second, access to higher education, particularly to selective universities, is highly nonrandom and correlated with family background, prior achievement, and preferences, complicating causal identification. As a result, evaluations of financial-aid and access-expanding policies may understate both the full social benefits and the less visible costs of selective higher education.

This paper provides causal evidence on the long-run nonpecuniary returns to selective higher education. We study Colombia's Ser Pilo Paga (SPP), a merit-based financial aid program that fully covered tuition for low-socioeconomic-status (SES) students admitted to high-quality universities. Eligibility was determined by a sharp test-score cutoff, which we exploit in a regression discontinuity (RD) design. We estimate effects on nonpecuniary outcomes more than a decade after college entry using original survey data on roughly 5,000 individuals located narrowly around the cutoff.

We first assess whether survey respondents are representative of the broader complier population identified in administrative data. Complier characteristics, as well as treatment effects on earnings, are highly similar across the survey and administrative samples, suggesting that survey participation does not materially alter the population under study. Survey responses also replicate the core pecuniary gains documented in Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026): more than a decade after high school

completion, SPP increases earnings by 18 log points.

Our first set of novel findings concerns social relationships. Access to selective universities reshapes both partner choice and friendships. While SPP does not affect the likelihood of being in a stable romantic relationship, it induces strong positive assortative matching. Recipients are substantially more likely to partner with individuals of higher educational attainment and social class: the probability that a partner has less than a bachelor's degree declines by 20.2 p.p., while the probabilities that the partner holds at least a bachelor's or a graduate degree increase by 20.2 p.p. and 7.1 p.p., respectively. Recipients are also 18.7 p.p. more likely to have a partner who graduated from a high-quality university. Consistent with this pattern, partners' socioeconomic backgrounds shifts upward, with recipients more likely to match with individuals from upper-class backgrounds and less likely to match with those from lower-class backgrounds.[1]

These effects extend beyond family formation to close friendships. SPP improves the educational composition of close social ties: recipients are less likely to report that their closest friend has less than a bachelor's degree and more likely to report that this friend completed undergraduate or graduate education. The socioeconomic composition of close friendships also shifts upward, with recipients more likely to have close friends from upper- and upper-middle-class backgrounds. Together, these patterns show that selective universities reshape durable social networks.

A second set of findings concerns aspirations and perceived status. SPP shifts how individuals view their social position and future prospects: recipients are less likely to identify as lower class and more likely to place themselves in higher social strata. Educational aspirations also rise—among barely ineligible individuals, nearly four-fifths aspire to graduate education, and SPP increases this probability by 10.7 p.p. Recipients also place greater weight on educational attainment in potential partners, particularly a college degree.

A third, more unexpected finding is that despite large gains in education, earnings, social networks, and aspirations, recipients experience worse health and lower subjective well-being. SPP increases regular smoking, and an index combining smoking behavior, self-reported health, depressive symptoms, and anxiety rises

[1] We find that SPP strengthens assortative matching for both men and women, consistent with Artmann et al. (2021) but contrasting with prior work that finds positive effects for women and null or negative effects for men (Duflo et al., forthcoming; Kaufmann et al., 2021; Kirkebøen et al., 2021). We instead document substantial heterogeneity in fertility effects by sex: SPP shifts fertility in opposite directions for men and women, yielding small and statistically insignificant average effects in the full sample.

by 11.1% of a standard deviation. Subjective well-being also declines: an index combining five satisfaction measures falls by 11.4% of a standard deviation, and reported happiness decreases as well. These patterns suggest that upward mobility may carry meaningful psychological and behavioral costs, even when economic returns are large.

Finally, we examine political attitudes and civic engagement. Recipients are more likely to view the SPP program more favorably. While they are more likely to attribute both their own success and that of others to luck rather than effort, they do not become more supportive of redistribution more broadly. Civic engagement does not increase; if anything, informal political engagement declines.

Taken together, these results show that access to selective universities generates broad and persistent effects that extend well beyond earnings. Selective higher education reshapes social networks, partner matching, aspirations, health, beliefs, and well-being—revealing both substantial nonpecuniary gains and previously undocumented costs of upward mobility.

Several mechanisms may explain why selective university access generates both large economic gains and declines in health and subjective well-being. These institutions may expose low-SES students to environments marked by status comparisons, belonging uncertainty, and pressure to adapt to unfamiliar norms (Jack, 2019; Álvarez Rivadulla, 2024), while shifting the reference groups against which success is evaluated. At the same time, the trajectories associated with higher earnings may increase stress: recipients work longer hours, are more likely to live in large metropolitan areas, and provide greater financial support to relatives. Upward mobility may also reshape beliefs about merit, with recipients more likely to attribute success to luck rather than effort. Together, these patterns suggest that selective university access alters not only economic opportunities, but also the social and psychological conditions under which mobility is experienced.

Our findings contribute to several literatures. First, we add to research estimating the causal returns to selective higher education. Existing studies have focused primarily on earnings and employment, showing that access to selective institutions can generate large pecuniary gains, particularly for disadvantaged students (e.g., Black et al., 2023; Bleemer, 2021; Dale and Krueger, 2014; Hoekstra, 2009; Mountjoy, 2025; Mountjoy and Hickman, 2021; Zimmerman, 2014). Exploiting quasi-random access to selective universities and combining administrative records with original survey data, we show that these gains extend well beyond labor-market

outcomes: selective university access also reshapes social networks, partner matching, aspirations, beliefs, health, and subjective well-being.

Second, we contribute to a growing literature on the nonpecuniary returns to education. Much of the existing causal evidence relies on compulsory schooling reforms to study outcomes such as marriage and fertility (Black et al., 2008; Geruso and Royer, 2018), mortality, physical health, and subjective well-being (Clark and Royer, 2013; Davies et al., 2018; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Meghir et al., 2018; Oreopoulos, 2007; van Kippersluis et al., 2011), and civic participation (Milligan et al., 2004). This literature shows that additional schooling reduces teenage childbearing, strengthens assortative mating, and increases political interest without necessarily raising voting. However, compulsory-schooling reforms identify returns at the lower margin of educational attainment, whereas our setting identifies returns for high-achieving students at the margin of attending a selective university. This distinction is conceptually important because the welfare consequences of education may depend not only on years of schooling, but also on where in the educational distribution treatment occurs. At lower margins, reforms mainly affect school completion; at upper margins, they alter access to elite institutions, social environments, and mobility trajectories. We therefore provide causal evidence on long-run nonpecuniary returns at a very different margin of educational choice.

Third, we contribute to the literature on social mobility and stratification by showing that colleges shape marriage markets and the composition of durable social ties (Artmann et al., 2021; Barrios-Fernandez et al., forthcoming; Kaufmann et al., 2021; Kirkebøen et al., 2021; Michelman et al., 2021). A growing body of work emphasizes that universities shape mobility not only through skills and credentials but also through peer exposure and social capital. Our results show that access to selective universities leads to persistent changes in partner matching and close friendships, shifting both toward more educated and higher-status individuals. These findings suggest that selective higher education affects mobility not only by raising earnings, but also by reshaping the social environments through which mobility is reproduced across adulthood.[2]

Finally, the paper relates to emerging work on the psychological consequences of upward mobility. A growing interdisciplinary literature highlights that mobility can

[2] Wiswall and Zafar (2021) show that students perceive positive marriage-market returns to college completion when making education choices under uncertainty. Chiappori et al. (2017) develop a structural model of household decision-making and show that the marital college premium has risen for women but not for men.

also generate psychological and health trade-offs (e.g., Chen et al., 2022; Friedman, 2016; Morrissey and Kinderman, 2020). Our results provide causal evidence of such costs in the context of selective higher education. Despite large economic gains, recipients experience slightly worse health and lower subjective well-being. These findings suggest that upward mobility through selective education can generate meaningful welfare trade-offs even when economic returns are large.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the college admissions process in Colombia and the SPP financial aid program. Section 3 presents the methodology and data, and presents statsitical evidence supporting the validity of the RD design and survey-based estimates. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 reports heterogeneity. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results.

2 Background

College admissions in Colombia are decentralized, and applicants apply to specific college–major pairs. Admissions decisions rely primarily on performance on SABER 11, the national standardized high school exit exam taken by virtually all high school seniors, regardless of whether they plan to pursue higher education.

Ser Pilo Paga. In October 2014, the Colombian government launched SPP, a forgivable student-loan program that fully covered tuition for any bachelor's degree, provided students were admitted to one of 33 universities holding government-certified "High-Quality Accreditation" (HQA).[3] Eligibility required meeting two sharp thresholds: (i) scoring at least 310 on the SABER 11 exam (the 90.7th percentile), and (ii) demonstrating economic disadvantage based on the SISBEN index (Figure A.1), a proxy-means test. Among 2014 high-school test takers, 53% met the poverty threshold; we refer to these students as "low SES," and the remainder as "high SES."

Exploiting these eligibility cutoffs, Londoño-Vélez et al. (2020, 2026) show that SPP had large effects on college access, institutional choice, and labor-market outcomes. Low-SES students just above the test-score cutoff were nearly 10 p.p. more likely to ever enroll in college (Figure A.2). Beyond expanding enrollment on the extensive

[3] Colleges obtain this status through a peer-review process, and researchers and policymakers widely regard it as a proxy for educational quality (OECD, 2016). By October 1, 2014, the 33 HQA universities enrolled about one-fifth of all students and outperformed others in key indicators, including higher entry and exit test scores, graduation rates, per-student spending, and the share of faculty with Ph.D. degrees (Londoño-Vélez et al., 2020, 2026).

margin, SPP substantially reshaped enrollment on the intensive margin: it increased enrollment in HQA institutions by 44 p.p. and reduced enrollment in all other colleges by 34 p.p. (Figure A.3). These shifts were driven primarily by *private* HQA institutions, where enrollment rose by more than 47 p.p., steering low-SES students toward college–major combinations with stronger learning environments and higher expected earnings. Nine years later, recipients earned 17.8 log points more and were twice as likely to reach the top 1% of the cohort earnings distribution relative to barely ineligible students.

3 Methodology, Data, and RD Validity

3.1 Methodology: An RD Design

We exploit the sharp eligibility rule in the assignment variable to implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. Let X_i denote the running variable (the SABER 11 test score), normalized so that $x_i \equiv X_i - c$, where c is the eligibility cutoff of 310. Define $D_i \equiv \mathbf{1}\{X_i \geq c\}$ as an indicator for crossing the cutoff, and let T_i denote actual program participation. Because eligibility induces a discontinuous change in—but does not perfectly determine—program take-up due to imperfect compliance, we estimate a fuzzy RD. Under certain conditions, this fuzzy RD design identifies the local average treatment effect at the cutoff. The equivalent "local Wald" estimand is

$$\tau_{\text{FRD}} = \frac{\lim_{x \downarrow 0} \mathbb{E}[Y_i \mid x_i = x] - \lim_{x \uparrow 0} \mathbb{E}[Y_i \mid x_i = x]}{\lim_{x \downarrow 0} \mathbb{E}[T_i \mid x_i = x] - \lim_{x \uparrow 0} \mathbb{E}[T_i \mid x_i = x]}.$$

As specified in our pre-analysis plan (see `https://osf.io/5be97/overview`), we estimate local linear regressions on either side of the cutoff using triangular-kernel weights. Our baseline specification uses a fixed bandwidth of 44 score points around the cutoff, chosen ex ante to maintain a common estimation sample across survey-based outcomes and to include all 5,017 survey respondents. This bandwidth is slightly wider than the MSE-optimal choice for the main outcomes while preserving adequate local support on both sides of the threshold. Although the bandwidth is fixed, inference relies on the procedure implemented in `rdrobust`, so confidence intervals remain valid conditional on the chosen bandwidth. We report conventional local linear estimates following Cattaneo et al. (2014), and show that results are robust to alternative bandwidth choices in

Appendix C.

3.2 Data

Thanks to a collaboration with the Colombian government, we have access to a unique administrative dataset linking the population of high-school test takers to all SPP recipients, postsecondary attendees, college graduates, and formal workers. We also have contact information from several sources:

1. **Test scores.** We use the population of fall 2014 SABER 11 test takers from the *Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación* (Icfes), which oversees standardized testing in Colombia. These data include test scores, sociodemographic information (e.g., residential stratum, parental education, sex), and contact information (e.g., phone, email).[4]

2. **Poverty.** We use sociodemographic and contact information from the Department of National Planning (DNP)'s SISBEN registry. We use information for the student and all household members listed in the original version of SISBEN (SISBEN III) from December 2014, and any updates as of December 2019, December 2020, and December 2021. Additionally, for the student and all of his/her household members listed in the December 2014 version of SISBEN III, we obtain their updated contact information as of February 17, 2025 (SISBEN IV).

3. **The SPP program take-up.** We identify program beneficiaries using administrative records from ICETEX, the agency managing Colombia's financial aid programs.

4. **College enrollment.** We use information from the Ministry of Education's *Sistema Nacional de Información de la Educación Superior* (SNIES), which tracks students in the postsecondary education system and provides panel information on enrollment status, institution, type of degree program (e.g., associate, bachelor's), and field of study (e.g., STEM) from 2013 to 2020.

5. **College completion.** We use administrative data from Icfes on all students who took Colombia's mandatory college graduation exams. Bachelor's degree students must take the SABER PRO exam to graduate. Prior to 2016, associate degree students were also required to take the SABER PRO exam; starting in 2016, they

[4] From this sample, we exclude 2% of test takers who had previous college experience before (re)taking the exam.

must take the SABER T&T exam instead. We observe SABER PRO test takers from 2013 to 2021 and SABER T&T test takers from 2016 to 2021. We use exam participation as a proxy for college graduation.

6. **Formal labor-market outcomes.** We use social security records from Colombia's Ministry of Health and Social Protection's *Planilla Integrada de Liquidación de Aportes* (PILA). PILA provides detailed payroll and earnings information for all formal workers in Colombia. The dataset covers April, August, and December 2023.

7. **Survey outcomes.** We use survey data collected by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) specifically for this research project between October 22, 2025, and February 21, 2026. Responses were linked to the administrative data using personal names and identification numbers. The recruitment material and survey instrument are available in Appendices E and F.

Main Outcome Variables. In the following, we list the outcome variables, by outcome group:

1. *Marriage, fertility, and partner quality:* marital status; fertility outcomes (whether respondents have children, number of children, age of the oldest child, and desired number of children); and partner characteristics (how they met, educational attainment, attendance at a high-quality university, and social class).

2. *Close social ties and social integration:* characteristics of respondents' closest friend (where they met, educational attainment, and social class); and whether respondents strongly agree that they feel comfortable interacting with people from all social classes.

3. *Perceived social class and aspirations:* current perceived social class, aspired social class, aspired educational attainment, preferred partner educational attainment.

4. *Health and subjective well-being:* smoking behavior; self-reported health; depression, and anxiety; satisfaction with job, financial situation, romantic life, friendships and social circle, and life overall; and happiness.

5. *Political attitudes and civic engagement:* beliefs about the determinants of success (luck versus effort, both personally and in general); willingness to pay higher

taxes to finance public goods without direct personal benefit; preferences over tax revenue allocation (college financial aid versus poverty reduction); views of the SPP program; willingness to donate the participation incentive to SPP-like programs, political discussions with friends; and voting behavior.

6. *Firm characteristics, work conditions, and job amenities:* firm size and sector (public vs. private); pension contributions; contract type (written versus verbal, permanent versus temporary), occupational skill, and job responsibility; location-related amenities (log commute time and remote work), schedule amenities (flexibility and weekend or night shifts), use of skills and abilities, social and psychological job attributes (sense of purpose, interesting work, and perceived social impact), and promotion opportunities.

    - *Job-amenity preferences:* importance of having a job that offers promotion opportunities, is interesting, is useful to society, and provides a flexible schedule.

7. *Job-search behavior:* how respondents obtained their first and current jobs (through college networks versus other methods); current job-search behavior and search methods; and perceived importance of university for personal and professional success and of social contacts for labor-market outcomes.

Secondary Outcome Variables.

- *Educational attainment:* high school completion; enrollment in or completion of a short-cycle program; enrollment in or completion of a bachelor's degree; and enrollment in or completion of graduate education (specialization, master's, or Ph.D.).

- *Labor-market outcomes:* labor-force participation, unemployment, employment, occupational choice (wage employment, self-employment, or other employment type), log wage earnings, log self-employment earnings, and weekly hours.

- *Financial support to relatives:* whether respondents provide financial support to parents, siblings, or other relatives living outside the household, and the natural logarithm of the amount transferred.

- *Migration intentions:* whether respondents desire to migrate outside of Colombia, intended migration duration, and reasons for wanting to migrate.

3.3 Survey Sample, Method, and Validity

Appendix B shows the results of the survey collection and presents statistical evidence supporting the validity of the RD design.

Sampling. We utilize an RD design exploiting the test score cutoff determining financial aid eligibility and compare 5,000 low-SES individuals located narrowly around the test score cutoff—2,500 just above (treatment) and 2,517 just below (control). This sample size was determined by budget constraints and statistical power considerations.[5]

There are 72,056 low-SES individuals with test scores between 266 and 354—i.e., within 44 points below and above the eligibility cutoff of 310—corresponding to percentiles 68 to 99. We sent invitations to a sample of 27,385 of these individuals. Following best practices for internal validity in RD designs (Cattaneo et al., 2019), we first sampled individuals closest to the cutoff. Specifically, we ordered observations within each treatment status by absolute distance to the cutoff and selected individuals sequentially, starting with those closest to the threshold and proceeding outward within each group until reaching the target sample size of approximately 2,500 control observations and 2,500 treated observations. Figure B.1 compares the kernel density of the full population of low-SES students near the cutoff with that of the subsample of 5,017 surveyed individuals.

Survey Method. Data collection was implemented by Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), a Bogotá-based market research and consulting firm, using a combination of in-person, phone, and online interviews. Participants were recruited through WhatsApp messages, emails, phone calls, and in-person contact.

We incentivized participation by offering two Cinemark movie vouchers (worth COP 30,000 or approximately USD 8), delivered immediately upon survey completion. Surveyors used all available contact information for each individual and their current or former household members—including mobile and home phone numbers, email addresses, and residential addresses—to reach respondents directly

[5] In principle, one could also exploit variation around the *poverty* threshold among students with top-decile test scores. As Londoño-Vélez et al. (2020) and Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026) show, eligibility at this margin also raised enrollment in high-quality universities and boosted earnings by 19 log points. However, because relatively few students score in the top decile, a research design based on this threshold would have substantially lower statistical power when using survey data. To maximize power, we therefore focus on variation around the *test-score* cutoff.

or obtain updated contact details. If direct contact was not possible, household members could facilitate completion of the survey call, in which case the CNC recorded the individual's responses; assisting household members were compensated with two movie vouchers. Surveyors attempted to contact each participant up to three times before moving on to the next potential respondent.

The median completion time of the survey was 21.5 minutes. 2% of surveys were completed in-person, 83% via phone, and 15% online.

Role of Selection into the Survey. Of the 27,385 individuals invited from the target population, 12,911 could not be reached or did not respond after multiple contact attempts, suggesting that contact information was outdated in many cases. In an additional 3,575 cases, someone other than the targeted individual answered and reported not knowing the intended respondent. Another 3,422 either declined to participate or were screened out. Among those who initiated the survey, 75 dropped out before completion. In total, 5,017 individuals completed the survey (2,517 control and 2,500 treated).

The overall survey response rate is 18.3% (=5,017/27,385). Conditional on successfully locating the targeted individual, the response rate rises to 46.0% (=5,017/(27,385-12,911-3,575)), which is relatively high for a sample of new potential respondents with no prior history of survey participation. For comparison, reported response rates are 4% in Giglio et al. (2021), 8% in Chile (Paredes et al., 2025), 20% in Hvidberg et al. (2023), 34% in Kondylis and Stein (2023), and 52% in Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2011). Our overall response rate of 18.3% is also close to the interview rate reported by the AmericasBarometer for Latin America (Warner and Camargo-Toledo, 2019).

Since we observe all individuals invited to participate, we can examine selection into survey response. Table B.1 reports summary statistics for three groups: all invited individuals (column 1), survey respondents (column 2), and non-respondents (column 3). Column (4) presents p-values from tests of equality between respondents and non-respondents. Individuals who complete the survey differ systematically from those who do not along several observable dimensions. Respondents tend to be slightly older and to come from lower-SES backgrounds, as reflected in lower parental education, lower socioeconomic stratum, and lower SISBEN scores.[6] They are more likely to have graduated from part-time public high schools and are slightly more

[6] The *estrato* is based on neighborhood and housing quality and ranges from 1 to 6 (poorest to richest).

likely to have lived in rural areas. They also have higher test scores. In addition, respondents are more likely to have earned a bachelor's degree—particularly from a high-quality university—and are more likely to be formally employed in 2023.

RD Validity. We assess RD validity using several standard diagnostics. First, Figure B.2 shows that among low-SES students, survey response rates are smooth in test scores, with no visible discontinuity at the cutoff. Table B.2 confirms this: the estimated discontinuity in survey response is small and statistically insignificant (-0.008, s.e. 0.009; p-value = 0.338). Second, Figure B.3 tests for manipulation of the running variable among survey respondents using the local polynomial density estimator of Cattaneo et al. (2018, 2020), which yields a robust-corrected p-value of 0.038. Given the discrete nature of the test score variable, however, we interpret this result cautiously and rely more heavily on the continuity of predetermined covariates across the threshold. To examine sorting around the cutoff, Table B.3 examines balance in baseline covariates around the cutoff in both the full administrative sample (columns 1–3) and the survey–respondent subsample (columns 4–6). Of the 37 baseline characteristics considered, only three exhibit statistically significant discontinuities, consistent with what would be expected by chance. The p-value for the joint F-statistic is 0.08. Fourth, Figure B.4 shows that, among survey respondents, the probability of receiving SPP increases sharply at the cutoff by 60.9 p.p., consistent with a fuzzy RD first stage.

Finally, we assess whether survey nonresponse affects complier composition and the external validity of survey–based estimates. Table B.4 compares complier characteristics in the full administrative sample with those among survey respondents and shows that the two groups are remarkably similar across observables, suggesting that survey participation does not meaningfully alter complier composition near the threshold. Table B.5 then compares the main first-stage and IV estimates using administrative outcomes in the full sample and the survey–respondent subsample, finding quantitatively similar treatment effects in both groups. Taken together, these results suggest that selective survey response is limited near the cutoff and that survey–based estimates are externally valid for the broader complier population.

4 Results

Before presenting impacts on nonpecuniary outcomes, we first use the survey to examine educational and labor-market effects eleven years after high school completion.

4.1 Educational and Labor-Market Impacts Eleven Years Later

Figure A.4 plots degree attainment by distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff; corresponding fuzzy RD estimates are reported in Table A.1. SPP substantially increased educational attainment. Eleven years after high school completion, the probability of earning at least a bachelor's degree rises by 16.0 p.p. (p-value = 0.00), equivalent to a 27.3% increase relative to a mean of 58.6% just below the cutoff. Graduate degree completion (specialization, master's, or Ph.D.) increases by 7.6 p.p. (p-value = 0.00), equivalent to a 77.2% increase. By contrast, short-cycle degree attainment declines by 15.2 p.p. (p-value = 0.00), a 68.2% reduction, similar in magnitude to the estimate based on administrative data (Table B.5).

Estimated earnings effects closely mirror the administrative evidence. Figure A.5 and Table A.2 show that monthly wage earnings increase by 17.8 log points, equivalent to a 19.5% gain (= exp(0.178)-1; p-value = 0.00). This estimate matches that reported by Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026) using administrative records and the optimal bandwidth proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2014), and is close to the 22.4% increase in formal earnings (= exp(.202)-1) estimated in the survey sample under a fixed bandwidth (Table B.5). Together, these similarities suggest that unobserved informal earnings do not materially bias the estimated earnings gains from SPP.

Finally, Figure A.6 shows that SPP increases labor supply on the intensive margin. Although labor-force participation and employment are unaffected, weekly hours worked rise by 2.7 hours, a 6.5% increase (p-value = 0.00).

4.2 Fertility, Marriage, and Partner Quality

Figure 1 and Table 1 report impacts on fertility, desired fertility, and marital status. Because respondents are, on average, only 29, we cannot yet assess completed fertility. Columns (1)–(6) therefore focus on current and desired fertility. Among barely ineligible individuals, 20.8% have children, and the average desired number of children is 1.1. Point estimates suggest that SPP reduces current fertility, though these

effects are not statistically significant under the fixed bandwidth. Under the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust`, however, the estimate for the number of children is negative and marginally significant (Table C.1). As we show in Section 5, these averages mask substantial heterogeneity by sex.

Across the score distribution, current fertility declines sharply with test scores, while desired fertility remains flat. Consistent with this pattern, Figure 1(d) shows that SPP increases desired fertility by 0.14 children—a 12.8% increase (p-value = 0.098). The effect is larger and more precisely estimated under the optimal bandwidth.

Table 1 also reports effects on marital status. Among barely ineligible individuals, 48.2% are single and not in a stable relationship, 27% are in a stable relationship, 24.5% are married or cohabiting, 0.1% are divorced, and 0.2% are widowed. Point estimates suggest that SPP reduces the likelihood of being single and slightly increases the likelihood of divorce, although these effects are only marginally statistically significant. There is no statistically significant effect on being in a stable relationship, married, or cohabiting (p-value = 0.41). We therefore next examine partner characteristics among individuals in relationships.

Figure 2 compares partner characteristics among those who are in a stable relationship, married, or cohabiting. Among barely ineligible individuals, 14.3% report having met their partner in college or through college friends. Table 2 shows that SPP increases this probability. While the effect is not statistically significant under the fixed-bandwidth specification, it is significant under the optimal bandwidth (Table C.2). These findings are consistent with SPP expanding access to college-based social networks and reshaping where individuals meet potential partners.

We also find evidence of positive assortative matching: SPP recipients are more likely to have partners with higher educational attainment and higher social class. The probability that a partner has less than a bachelor's degree declines by 20.2 p.p., or 40.4% (p-value = 0.00). By contrast, the probability that a partner attained at least a bachelor's degree increases by 20.2 p.p. (p-value = 0.00), while the probability that a partner has graduate education rises by 7.1 p.p. (p-value = 0.07). Additionally, SPP increases the probability that the partner's B.A. degree was obtained from a high-quality university by 18.7 p.p., or 74.9% (p-value = 0.00).

The final columns of Table 2 show that SPP also shifts partners' socioeconomic background upward: it increases the probability that the partner belongs to the upper class by 2.8 p.p. relative to a low baseline (p-value = 0.04), and reduces the probability that the partner belongs to the lower class by 7.5 p.p., or 56% (p-value = 0.03).

4.3 Close Social Ties and Social Integration

Figure 3 and Table 3 examine impacts on the characteristics of respondents' closest friend. Among barely ineligible individuals, 27.4% report having met their closest friend in college. Point estimates suggest that SPP increases this probability, although the effect is not statistically significant.

SPP, however, strongly affects the characteristics of that friend. It reduces the probability that the closest friend has less than a bachelor's degree by 9.3 p.p. (30%, p-value = 0.01), increases the probability that the friend has at least a bachelor's degree by 8.7 p.p. (13%, p-value = 0.02), and raises the probability that the friend has graduate education by 8 p.p. (76%, p-value = 0.00). SPP also shifts the social-class composition of close friendships: it increases the probability that the closest friend belongs to the upper or upper-middle class, while reducing the probability that the friend belongs to the lower-middle or lower class.[7,8]

Overall, these results indicate that SPP reshapes both the educational and socioeconomic composition of close social ties. They are consistent with prior works in economics (Londoño-Vélez, 2022; Velasco, 2023) and sociology (Álvarez Rivadulla et al., 2022), which documents that SPP promoted cross-class social interactions and close friendships at selective universities.

4.4 Perceived Social Class and Aspirations

Table 4 reports effects on perceived current social class and aspired social class. Fewer than 5% of barely ineligible individuals perceive themselves as upper or upper-middle class. More than three-quarters identify as middle or lower-middle class, while 16.5% identify as lower class. Figure 4 shows that SPP reduces the likelihood of self-identifying as lower class by 6.5 p.p., or 39% (p-value = 0.02), and increases the likelihood of identifying as upper, upper-middle, or middle class, although these latter effects are not statistically significant.

When asked which social class they aspire to belong to in ten years, 37.9% of barely ineligible individuals report aspiring to be upper class and 45% upper-middle class. SPP increases the likelihood of aspiring to be upper class by 4.7 p.p. and reduces the

[7] Class-specific estimates are marginally significant under the fixed-bandwidth specification but highly significant under the optimal bandwidth (Table C.3).

[8] Column (11) of Table 3 shows that 60% of barely-ineligible individuals report they "completely agree" with feeling comfortable interacting with people from all social classes. SPP increases this probability, but the estimate is sensitive to bandwidth choice (Table C.3).

likelihood of aspiring to lower social classes, although these effects are not statistically significant and are sensitive to bandwidth choice (Table C.4).

Figure 5 and Table 5 report effects on educational aspirations. Nearly four-fifths of barely ineligible individuals aspire to graduate education (specialization, master's, or Ph.D.), and SPP raises this share by 10.7 p.p. (13%; p-value = 0.00). Correspondingly, the likelihood of aspiring to only a bachelor's degree declines by 8.3 p.p. (p-value = 0.00), and the likelihood of aspiring to less than a bachelor's degree declines by 2.3 p.p. (58%; p-value = 0.09).

For respondents who have a stable partner—or who do not but would like one—the survey also elicits preferences over a partner's educational attainment. Nearly 70% report caring about their partner's education. Among those who do, SPP increases the likelihood of preferring a partner with a college degree by 5 p.p. (5.6%; p-value = 0.08).

4.5 Health and Subjective Well-Being

We find that large gains in educational and earnings coexist with slightly worse health and lower subjective well-being. Figure 6 and Table 6 report effects on four measures of physical and mental health around the test-score cutof. Among barely ineligible individuals, about 87% report never smoking cigarettes or vaping, 9% report doing so ocassionally, and 4.5% report smoking or vaping regularly (a few times a week or daily). SPP increases the probability of smoking regularly by 4.9 p.p., more than doubling the baseline rate (p-value = 0.01). Self-reported health also worsens: while 88% of barely ineligible individuals report being in good or very good health, this probability declines by 4.7 p.p. (5.3%; p-value = 0.08).

The survey also included four mental-health questions: two from the Patient Health Questionnaire-2 (PHQ-2) and two from the Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD-2). The PHQ-2 asks how often, over the last two weeks, respondents were bothered by (i) little interest or pleasure in doing things and (ii) feeling down, depressed, or hopeless. The GAD-2 asks how often, over the last two weeks, respondents were bothered by (i) feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge and (ii) not being able to stop or control worrying.[9] We sum the corresponding recoded items to construct depressive-symptoms and anxiety indices ranging from 0 to 6, and

[9] Responses are recorded on a 5-point scale: 1 = not at all, 2 = several days, 3 = more than half the days, 4 = nearly every day, and 5 = every day. To align the responses with standard PHQ-2 and GAD-2 scoring, we recoded them as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 3, respectively.

report both continuous indices and binary indicators based on standard screening thresholds.

Among barely ineligible individuals, 10.6% exhibit depressive symptoms and 11.7% exhibit anxiety symptoms. Point estimates suggest that SPP increases both outcomes, although the effects are not statistically significant under the fixed bandwidth. Under the optimal bandwidth, only one estimate is marginally significant (Table C.6).[10]

Columns (7) and (8) report effects on positively coded summary health indices following Anderson (2008), constructed using the continuous or binary versions of smoking, self-rated health, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms. SPP worsens health by 11.4% of a standard deviation (p-value = 0.049), although this effect loses significance under the optimal bandwidth (Table C.6).

Table 7 reports effects on subjective well-being. Respondents rate their satisfaction with their job (among those employed; column 1), financial situation (column 2), romantic life (column 3), friends and social circle (column 4), and life overall (column 5) on a scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Point estimates are negative across all domains, although only the effect on overall life satisfaction is statistically significant. The magnitude is modest: 94% of barely ineligible individuals report being either satisfied or very satisfied with their lives. Figure 7(a) and column (6) of Table 7 report a summary index of these five satisfaction measures, constructed following Anderson (2008). SPP lowers this index by 11.4% of a standard deviation (p-value = 0.02), although again this effect loses significance under the optimal bandwidth (Table C.7).

Finally, Figure 7(b) and column (7) of Table 7 report effects on happiness. Nearly 90% of barely ineligible individuals report being very happy or quite happy. SPP reduces this probability by 4.2 p.p., although the estimate is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.098). These results suggest that upward mobility may come with psychological and behavioral costs, despite sizable gains in education and earnings.

[10] In 2016, as part of an early evaluation of SPP, Álvarez et al. (2017) interviewed low-SES students near the test-score cutoff who had graduated from high school in 2015, when SPP recipients were in their first year of college. Consistent with our findings, they show that SPP eligibility increased depressive symptoms. However, they also document short-term gains in life satisfaction, whereas our estimates indicate declines in the long run. Years later, Álvarez Rivadulla (2024) interviewed SPP recipients as they entered the labor market and found that many experienced stress and anxiety related to securing stable earnings, often compounded by substantial family responsibilities. Many also reported frustration and disappointment as they navigated the post-pandemic labor market.

Why might SPP have worsened recipients' health and subjective well-being? First, selective institutions may expose low-SES students to social environments in which upward mobility involves persistent status comparisons, belonging uncertainty, and pressure to adapt to unfamiliar norms (Jack, 2019; Álvarez Rivadulla, 2024), while also shifting the reference groups against which success is evaluated. Second, the social and occupational trajectories associated with higher earnings may increase stress: recipients work longer hours and, as we will later show, are more likely to hold managerial and professional positions, and rely more on college-based labor-market networks. They also provide greater financial support to parents, siblings, or other relatives living outside their household (Figure A.7 and Table A.3). Third, SPP recipients are more likely to live in one of the five largest metropolitan areas—Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, or Cartagena (Figure A.8 and Table A.4)—which may increase stress and weaken ties with childhood friends and relatives. Finally, upward mobility reshapes beliefs about merit and success: as the next section shows, SPP recipients are more likely to attribute both their own success and that of others to luck rather than effort.

4.6 Political Attitudes and Civic Engagement

Figure 8 and Table 8 examine impacts on political attitudes—beliefs about luck versus effort, redistributive preferences, support for the SPP program—and civic engagement. Among barely ineligible students, nearly one-fourth attribute their own success more to luck than effort, and more than half hold this view about success in Colombia more broadly. SPP increases these beliefs by 10.3 p.p. (45%; p-value = 0.00) and 8.3 p.p. (16%; p-value = 0.034), respectively.

Several mechanisms may explain this shift. First, because SPP eligibility hinges on a sharp cutoff, students near the threshold may perceive access to selective universities—and the upward mobility that follows—as quasi-random. Second, exposure to peers with greater preparation, resources, and networks may weaken the perceived role of individual effort. Third, attributing success to luck may help reconcile improved economic outcomes with lower subjective well-being.

We next examine whether these changes translate into redistributive preferences (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). More than 84% of barely ineligible individuals report willingness to pay higher taxes to finance public goods even without direct personal benefit, and SPP has no detectable effect on this outcome. When asked how additional

tax revenue should be allocated, SPP shifts preferences toward financial aid for high-achieving low-income youth relative to subsidies for poor households, but these estimates are not statistically significant. Similarly, when offered the option to donate a Cinemark voucher to scholarship programs for low-income youth, roughly three-quarters of respondents do so, with no detectable effect of SPP. Taken together, SPP shifts beliefs about the role of luck versus effort but does not meaningfully affect redistributive preferences.

In contrast, SPP meaningfully improves views of the program itself. Among barely ineligible individuals, 53% report somewhat or very favorable views; SPP increases this share by 16.5 p.p. (31%; p-value = 0.00). Recipients are also more likely to express an opinion in open-ended responses and to frame the program in personal terms—emphasizing their beneficiary status, expanded access to higher education, and entry into high-quality and prestigious universities. They are less likely to associate SPP with classism or discrimination in selective institutions, or with transfers to private universities—two common public critiques (Londoño-Vélez et al., 2025). At the same time, recipients are more likely to highlight unmet needs, particularly the lack of psychological support and guidance (*acompañamiento*). Taken together, these patterns suggest that direct exposure to SPP improves perceptions of the program and increases its perceived benefits, while also making some limitations more salient.

Finally, we examine civic engagement and voting behavior. Two-thirds of barely ineligible individuals report discussing politics with friends at least occasionally, and SPP reduces this share by 7.5 p.p. (11.3%; p-value = 0.048). In contrast, more than 63% report always voting in national elections, and SPP has no statistically significant effect on this outcome. Thus, SPP appears to reduce informal political engagement without affecting formal electoral participation.

At first glance, this pattern contrasts with prior evidence that education increases political interest and involvement (Dee, 2004; Milligan et al., 2004; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). However, the two are not mutually exclusive. SPP recipients may be more informed about politics but less likely to discuss it with friends. As we document, SPP shifts recipients into new social networks—often more educated and higher SES. If their views or experiences differ from those of their peers, they may avoid political conversations to reduce friction. At the same time, weaker ties to pre-college friends may limit settings where such discussions previously felt natural. Consistent with belonging uncertainty, recipients may also avoid contentious topics to maintain social acceptance. Finally, if they increasingly attribute success to luck, they

may feel less inclined to engage in debates about redistribution or meritocracy.

4.7 Nonwage Job Amenities and Job-Search Behavior

Table A.5 reports IV estimates of effects on firm characteristics and working conditions among salaried workers employed in the previous week. About 71% of barely ineligible individuals work in firms with more than 10 employees, and SPP has no detectable effect on this outcome. More than 84% work in the private sector, also unaffected by SPP. Columns (4) through (6) show similarly null effects on working conditions. SPP does not affect the likelihood of having a written contract. Although point estimates suggest a shift toward permanent contracts and away from other types (e.g., fixed-term or service contracts), these differences are not statistically significant.

Table 9 reports IV estimates of effects on job amenities and provides mixed evidence. Commuting time appears to increase by nearly 20% (= exp(0.179)-1), although this estimate is not statistically significant under the optimal bandwidth (Table C.9). One explanation is that recipients are more likely to live in the five largest cities (Table A.6), where commutes are longer. Estimates for nonwage amenities are sensitive to bandwidth choice. Under the fixed bandwidth, we find no significant effects on individual amenities or on an index constructed following Anderson (2008) (Figure 9). Under the optimal bandwidth, however, several effects emerge: the probability of reporting that it is very important that a job has purpose, is interesting, or positively affects others increases by 14.9 p.p. (22%), 17.5 p.p. (28%), and 17.9 p.p. (32%), respectively. The job-amenities index also rises marginally by 17% of a standard deviation.[11]

The survey also collected information on respondents' occupations and supervisory responsibilities through questions on job title and the number of workers reporting directly to them. These measures capture both the skill content of jobs and respondents' level of responsibility within the workplace.[12] Figure 10 plots occupational skill level against distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Skill level 1 includes occupations involving simple and routine tasks, while skill level 4 corresponds to occupations requiring advanced technical knowledge, problem-

[11] Table A.6 reports impacts on preferences for job amenities. SPP does not significantly affect preferences for jobs offering promotion opportunities, interesting work, or a flexible schedule. However, it reduces the preference for jobs that positively impact society by 9.7 p.p., or 15.1% (p-value = 0.01).

[12] Occupations were reported in an open-ended format and hand-coded into the nine major groups of ISCO-08 defined by ILO (2012). Occupations were aggregated into four broad categories: skill level 1 (ISCO major group 9), skill level 2 (groups 4–8), skill level 3 (group 3), and skill level 4 (groups 1–2).

solving, and typically higher levels of formal education. Among barely ineligible individuals, fewer than 1% work in skill 1 occupations, 34% in skill level 2, 26% in skill level 3, and 40% in skill level 4. Table 10 shows that SPP reduces the probability of working in skill level 2 occupations by 9.2 p.p. and increases the probability of working in skill level 4 occupations by 10.0 p.p. These changes are driven by greater employment in managerial and professional occupations and lower employment in clerical and other mid-skill routine occupations, pointing to an upward shift in the occupational distribution.

Regarding supervisory responsibilities, 60% of barely ineligible individuals report that no one reports directly to them, while 40% supervise at least one worker. SPP increases the probability of supervising others, although these effects are not statistically significant.

Table 11 reports impacts on job-search behavior. Among barely-ineligible individuals, 15.7% found their first job through college-related networks—such as friends, professors, or contacts met during college—while 26% relied on relatives or childhood friends. The rest used other channels, such as internships, job postings, direct applications, or employment agencies. For current jobs, both college and pre-college networks play a smaller role, while formal search methods become more important. SPP has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on obtaining the current job through college networks. However, Figure 11 shows that SPP increases active job search, particularly through college contacts (p-value = 0.028).[13]

5 Heterogeneity

As pre-specified, Appendix D examines heterogeneity in SPP's effects by sex, SES, and whether students lived in 2014 in a metropolitan area with an HQA college. For most outcomes, we find little evidence of systematic heterogeneity, with three notable exceptions.[14]

First, fertility outcomes differ by sex. For men, SPP reduces the probability of having children (p-value = 0.07), particularly at age 25 or older; for women, it increases this probability (p-value = 0.03), especially at older ages. Conditional on

[13] As specified in our preanalysis, we also test for impacts on desire for migration outside of Colombia. Table A.7 reports impacts on this outcome, showing null effects.

[14] Although Appendix D reports reduced-form RD estimates, these remain informative for interpreting the IV results because we find no evidence of heterogeneity in the first stage by sex or SES. By contrast, the first stage is larger for individuals who lived in 2014 in a metropolitan area with an HQA college.

having children, SPP delays age at first birth for women but has no effect for men. Taken together, these patterns suggest that SPP shifts the timing of fertility differently by sex. For women, delayed childbearing combined with higher fertility at older ages is consistent with postponement followed by catch-up. For men, the decline in fertility—without a corresponding delay—suggests either postponed fertility beyond the observation window or a reduction in completed fertility. These differences may reflect gender-specific responses in union formation, labor-market trajectories, or the marriage-market returns to college.

Second, partner outcomes and preferences also differ by sex. SPP increases the likelihood that men meet their partner in college but has no effect for women. Partner educational attainment and social class rise for both sexes, indicating that selective university access strengthens assortative matching. Although the point estimate for having a partner who attended a high-quality university is more than twice as large for women, this difference is not statistically significant.

In contrast, effects on preferences are concentrated among men. Among barely ineligible individuals, women already report stronger baseline preferences for educated partners—over 13 p.p. higher for college-educated partners and nearly 12 p.p. higher for graduate-educated partners. SPP increases these preferences for men but has no significant effect for women, suggesting that men adjust their preferences in response to improved matching opportunities, while women's preferences are already high.

Finally, political attitudes also vary by sex. For men, SPP reduces support for redistribution, and the point estimate for donations to SPP-like programs is also negative. For women, by contrast, SPP increases both support for redistribution and willingness to donate.

6 Discussion

Our findings show that the long-run effects of selective higher education extend well beyond educational attainment and earnings. Access to high-quality universities through SPP reshapes recipients' social environments, partner matching, aspirations, beliefs, health, and subjective well-being more than a decade after college entry. These results highlight that selective higher education affects welfare through multiple channels beyond income alone.

A key implication is that nonpecuniary returns to education depend on where

in the distribution treatment occurs. Most causal evidence comes from compulsory-schooling reforms that affect individuals at the lower margin. In contrast, SPP shifts high-achieving students into selective institutions, changing not just years of schooling but exposure to elite academic and social environments. Our results suggest that these environments are themselves central to long-run outcomes, particularly through marriage markets, friendships, and aspirations.

At the same time, the results point to less visible costs of upward mobility. Despite substantial economic gains, recipients experience slightly worse health and lower subjective well-being. One interpretation is that selective environments alter the social and psychological conditions of mobility: individuals face persistent status comparisons, pressure to adapt to unfamiliar norms, and new reference groups for evaluating success. Higher earnings may also come with more demanding careers, longer hours, greater financial obligations to family. Taken together, these patterns suggest that the welfare effects of selective education are more complex than earnings gains alone would imply.

Several questions remain. First, more evidence is needed on mechanisms within selective institutions—whether peer composition, institutional culture, academic competition, or access to support networks drive these effects. Second, it remains unclear whether similar patterns arise in other settings where disadvantaged students access elite institutions, such as affirmative action, selective public universities, or highly stratified systems outside Colombia.

References

Alesina, A. and G. Angeletos, "Fairness and redistribution: US versus Europe," *American Economic Review*, 2005, *95* (4), 960–980.

Anderson, Michael, "Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 2008, *103*, 1481–1495.

Artmann, Elisabeth, Nadine Ketel, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Bas van der Klaauw, "Field of study and partner choice," *Economics of Education Review*, 2021, *84*. C.

Barrios-Fernandez, Andres, Christopher Neilson, and Seth Zimmerman, "Elite Universities and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human and Social Capital," *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.

Black, Sandra E., Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes, "Staying in the Classroom and out of the maternity ward? The effect of compulsory schooling laws on teenage births," *The Economic Journal*, 2008, *118* (530), 1025–1054.

Black, Sandra, Jeffrey T. Denning, and Jesse Rothstein, "Winners and Losers? The Effect of Gaining and Losing Access to Selective Colleges on Education and Labor Market Outcomes," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, January 2023, *15* (1), 26–67.

Bleemer, Zachary, "Top Percent Policies and the Returns to Postsecondary Selectivity," 2021. UC Berkeley Job Market Paper.

Calonico, Sebastian, Max Farrell, Filippo Palomba, and Rocío Titiunik, "Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Regression Discontinuity Designs," 2025. Manuscript.

Cattaneo, Matias D., Michael Jansson, and Xinwei Ma, "Manipulation Testing Based on Density Discontinuity," *The Stata Journal*, 2018, *18* (1), 234–261.

_ , _ , and _ , "Simple Local Polynomial Density Estimators," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 2020, *115* (531), 1449–1455.

_ , Rocío Titiunik, and Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare, "Power calculations for regression-discontinuity designs," *The Stata Journal*, 2019, *19* (1), 210–245.

_ , Sebastian Calonico, and Rocio Titiunik, "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs," *Econometrica*, 2014, *82* (6), 2295–2326.

Chen, Edith, Gene H. Brody, and Gregory E. Miller, "What Are the Health Consequences of Upward Mobility?," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 2022, *73*, 599–628.

Chiappori, Pierre-André, Bernard Salanié, and Yoram Weiss, "Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium," *American Economic Review*, August 2017, *107* (8), 2109–67.

Clark, Damon and Heather Royer, "The Effect of Education on Adult Mortality and Health: Evidence from Britain," *American Economic Review*, October 2013, *103* (6), 2087–2120.

Dale, Stacy B. and Alan Krueger, "Estimating the Effects of College Characteristics over the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data," *Journal of Human Resources*, 2014, *49* (2).

Davies, Neil M., Matt Dickson, George Davey Smith, Gerard J. van den Berg, and Frank Windmeijer, "The Causal Effects of Education on Health Outcomes in the UK Biobank," *Nature Human Behaviour*, Feb 2018, *2* (2), 117–125. Epub 2018 Jan 29.

Dee, Thomas S., "Are there civic returns to education?," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2004, *88* (9), 1697–1720.

Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, Elizabeth Spelke, and Mark P Walsh, "Intergenerational Impacts of Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana," *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.

Friedman, Sam, "Habitus Clivé and the Emotional Imprint of Social Mobility," *The Sociological Review*, 2016, *64* (1), 129–147.

Geruso, Michael and Heather Royer, "The Impact of Education on Family Formation: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the UK," Working Paper 3121352, SSRN February 2018. Available at SSRN.

Giglio, Stefano, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, and Stephen Utkus, "Five Facts about Beliefs and Portfolios," *American Economic Review*, May 2021, *111* (5), 1481–1522.

Hoekstra, Mark, "The Effect of Attending the Flagship State University on Earnings: A Discontinuity-Based Approach," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2009, *91* (4), 717–724.

Hvidberg, Kristoffer B, Claus T Kreiner, and Stefanie Stantcheva, "Social Positions and Fairness Views on Inequality," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 03 2023, *90* (6), 3083–3118.

ILO, *ISCO-08 Volume I: International Standard Classification of Occupations: Structure, Group Definitions and Correspondence Tables*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2012.

Jack, Anthony Abraham, *The Privileged Poor: How Elite Colleges Are Failing Disadvantaged Students*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019.

Kaufmann, Katja Maria, Matthias Messner, and Alex Solis, "Elite higher education, the marriage market and the intergenerational transmission of human capital," Discussion Paper, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series 2021.

Kirkebøen, Lars, Edwin Leuven, Magne Mogstad, and Jack Mountjoy, "College as a Marriage Market," Working Paper 28688, National Bureau of Economic Research April 2021.

Kondylis, Florence and Mattea Stein, "The Speed of Justice," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 05 2023, *105* (3), 596–613.

Lleras-Muney, Adriana, "The Relationship Between Education and Adult Mortality in the United States," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 01 2005, *72* (1), 189–221.

Londoño-Vélez, Juliana, Catherine Rodríguez, and Fabio Sánchez, "Upstream and Downstream Impacts of College Merit-Based Financial Aid for Low-Income Students: Ser Pilo Paga in Colombia," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, May 2020, *12* (2), 193–227.

_ , _ , _ , and Luis E. Alvarez, "Financial Aid and Upward Mobility: Evidence from Colombia's Ser Pilo Paga," *Journal of Political Economy*, July 2026, *134* (7).

Londoño-Vélez, Juliana, Catherine Rodriguez, Fabio Sánchez, and Luis Esteban Álvarez-Arango, "Targeting Social Assistance: The Evolution of College Financial Aid in Colombia," *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, May 2025, *115*, 340–44.

Londoño-Vélez, Juliana, "The impact of diversity on perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2022, *214*, 104732.

Álvarez, María José, Carlos Castro, Javier Corredor, Juliana Londoño-Vélez, Carolina Maldonado, Catherine Rodríguez, Fabio Sánchez, Tatiana Velasco, Daniel Mateo Ángel, María Camila Ayala, and Xiomara Pulido, "El Programa

Ser Pilo Paga: impactos iniciales en equidad en el acceso a la educación superior y el desempeño académico," Technical Report 2017-59, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE), Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes October 2017.

Álvarez Rivadulla, María José, *Costly Opportunities: Social Mobility in Segregated Societies* Elements in Politics and Society in Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 2024.

Álvarez Rivadulla, Maria Jose, Ana María Jaramillo, Felipe Fajardo, Laura Cely, Andrés Molano, and Felipe Montes, "College integration and social class," *Higher Education*, 2022, *84*, 647–669.

Malamud, Ofer and Cristian Pop-Eleches, "Home Computer Use and the Development of Human Capital *," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 05 2011, *126* (2), 987–1027.

Meghir, Costas, Mårten Palme, and Emilia Simeonova, "Education and Mortality: Evidence from a Social Experiment," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2018, *10* (2), 234–256.

Michelman, Valerie, Joseph Price, and Seth D Zimmerman, "Old Boys' Clubs and Upward Mobility Among the Educational Elite," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 12 2021, *137* (2), 845–909.

Milligan, Kevin, Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos, "Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2004, *88* (9), 1667–1695.

Morrissey, Karyn and Peter Kinderman, "The impact of financial hardship in childhood on depression and anxiety in adult life: Testing the accumulation, critical period and social mobility hypotheses," *SSM - Population Health*, 2020, *11*, 100592.

Mountjoy, Jack, "Marginal Returns to Public Universities," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 12 2025, *141* (1), 429–497.

_ **and Brent R Hickman**, "The Returns to College(s): Relative Value-Added and Match Effects in Higher Education," Working Paper 29276, National Bureau of Economic Research September 2021.

OECD, *Education in Colombia*, OECD Publishing, 2016.

Oreopoulos, Philip, "Do Dropouts Drop Out Too Soon? Wealth, Health, and Happiness from Compulsory Schooling," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2007, *91* (11–12), 2213–2229.

_ **and Kjell G. Salvanes**, "Priceless: The Nonpecuniary Benefits of Schooling," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, March 2011, *25* (1), 159–84.

Paredes, Valentina, M. Daniele Paserman, and Francisco J. Pino, "Does Economics Make You Sexist?," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 09 2025, *107* (5), 1247–1259.

van Kippersluis, Hans, Owen O'Donnell, and Eddy van Doorslaer, "Long-Run Returns to Education: Does Schooling Lead to an Extended Old Age?," *Journal of Human Resources*, 2011, *46* (4), 695–721.

Velasco, Tatiana, "The Effects of College Desegregation on Academic Achievement and Students' Social Interactions: Evidence from Turnstile Data," Columbia University Job Market Paper May 2023.


Warner, Zach and Gabriel N. Camargo-Toledo, "Methodological Note: How Does LAPOP Calculate Response Rates?," Technical Report 005, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2019.

Wiswall, Matthew and Basit Zafar, "Human Capital Investments and Expectations about Career and Family," *Journal of Political Economy*, 2021, *129* (5), 1361–1424.


Zimmerman, Seth, "The Returns to College Admission for Academically Marginal Students," *Journal of Labor Economics*, 2014, *32* (4), 711–754.

Figure 1: Current and Desired Fertility


(a) First childbirth before age 25




(b) First childbirth at age 25 or later



(c) Fertility




(d) Desired fertility




Notes: This figure plots four outcomes as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff: the probability of first childbirth before age 25 (panel a), first childbirth at age 25 or later (panel b), having children (panel c), and desired number of children (panel d). Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 2: Romantic Partner's Characteristics


(a) Has a bachelor's degree




(b) Attended a high-quality university



(c) Belongs to the lower class




(d) Belongs to the upper class




Notes: Among respondents who are married, cohabiting, or in a stable relationship, the figure plots the probability that their romantic partner has a bachelor's degree (panel a), attended a high-quality university (panel b), belongs to the lower class (panel c), or belongs to the upper class (panel d), as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 3: Best Friend's Characteristics


(a) Has less than a bachelor's degree




(b) Has a graduate degree



(c) Belongs to lower or lower-middle classes




(d) Belongs to upper or upper-middle classes




Notes: The figure plots the probability that respondents' closest friend (a) has less than a bachelor's degree, (b) has a graduate degree, (c) belongs to the lower or lower-middle classes, or (d) belongs to the upper or upper-middle classes, by distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 4: Perceived Current Social Class

(a) Lower class




(b) Upper, upper-middle, or middle classes




Notes: The figure plots the probability that respondents identify themselves as belonging to (a) the lower class (panel a) or (b) the upper, upper-middle, or middle classes, by distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 5: Aspired Educational Attainment

(a) Aspires to a bachelor's degree




(b) Aspires to a graduate degree




Notes: The figure plots the probability that respondents report aspiring to earn a bachelor's degree (panel a) or a graduate degree (panel b) as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 6: Mental and Physical Health


(a) Regularly smokes




(b) Reported health




(c) Exhibits depressive symptoms



(d) Exhibits anxiety symptoms




(e) Index measure of health




Notes: The figure plots the probability that respondents smoke regularly (panel a), report good or very good health (panel b), exhibit depressive symptoms based on the PHQ-2 (panel c), or exhibit anxiety symptoms based on the GAD-2 (panel d), as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Panel (e) plots a positively-coded summary health index constructed from these four binary outcomes following Anderson (2008). Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 7: Subjective Well-Being

(a) Satisfaction index




(b) Happiness




Notes: The figure plots a composite satisfaction index constructed following Anderson (2008) (panel a) and self-reported happiness (panel b) as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 8: Political Attitudes and Civic Engagement


(a) My success depends on luck




(b) Supports SPP



(c) Discusses politics with friends




(d) Votes in elections



Notes: The figure plots the probability that respondents somewhat or strongly agree that their own success depends more on luck than hard work (panel a), report somewhat or very favorable views of the SPP program (panel b), report sometimes or frequently discussing politics with friends (panel c), or report always voting in national elections (panel d). Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).


Figure 9: Nonwage Job Amenities




Notes: The figure plots an index of nonwage job amenities, following Anderson (2008), as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 10: Occupational Skill Level


(a) Skill level 1 (lowest)




(b) Skill level 2



(c) Skill level 3




(d) Skill level 4 (highest)



Notes: The figure plots occupational skill level, grouped into four broad categories based on ILO (2012) framework, against distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Skill level 1 includes occupations involving simple and routine tasks, while skill level 4 corresponds to occupations requiring advanced technical knowledge, problem-solving, and typically higher levels of formal education. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure 11: Job Search Through College Networks



Notes: The figure plots the probability that respondents are currently searching for a job and use college networks, as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Table 1: Impacts on Fertility and Marital Status

	Current and Desired Fertility						Marital Status				
	Any	Number	Fertility before 25	Fertility at 25+	Age at first birth	Desired number	Single	In a stable relationship	Married or cohabiting	Divorced	Widowed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
τ	-0.027	-0.115	-0.011	-0.019	0.127	0.142	-0.044	0.066	-0.034	0.011	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.139)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.894)	(0.086)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.005)	(0.003)
μ^c	0.208	1.328	0.118	0.090	23.818	1.110	0.482	0.270	0.245	0.001	0.002
N	5,017	1,056	5,017	5,017	1,050	5,007	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on fertility outcomes (columns 1–5), desired fertility (column 6), and marital status (columns 7–11) using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 2: Impacts on Partner Characteristics

	How met partner		Partner's education			Partner	Partner's social class				
	College	Other	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	HQ college	Upper	Upper-mid.	Middle	Lower-mid.	Lower
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
τ	0.024	-0.024	-0.202	0.202	0.071	0.187	0.028	-0.012	-0.005	0.063	-0.075
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.034)
μ^c	0.143	0.857	0.499	0.501	0.130	0.250	0.008	0.124	0.411	0.323	0.134
N	2,636	2,636	2,608	2,608	2,608	1,474	2,636	2,636	2,636	2,636	2,636

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on partner characteristics using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 3: Impacts on Close Social Ties and Social Integration

	Where met best friend		Best friend's education			Best friend's social class					Comfortable
	College	Other	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	Upper	Upp-mid.	Middle	Low-mid.	Lower	interacting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
τ	0.042	-0.042	-0.093	0.087	0.080	0.019	0.049	0.045	-0.084	-0.029	0.012
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.039)
μ^c	0.274	0.726	0.310	0.668	0.106	0.026	0.147	0.385	0.351	0.091	0.600
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on close social ties and integration using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (1)–(2) report where respondents met their closest friend, columns (3)–(5) the closest friend's educational attainment, and columns (6)–(10) the closest friend's social class. Column (11) reports effects on whether respondents strongly agree that they feel comfortable interacting with people from all social classes. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 4: Impacts on Perceived Own Social Class and Aspired Social Class

	Perceived social class					Aspired social class				
	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Lower	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Lower
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
τ	0.003	0.010	0.050	0.002	-0.065	0.047	-0.023	-0.012	-0.011	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.005)
μ^c	0.003	0.048	0.380	0.404	0.165	0.379	0.450	0.152	0.015	0.004
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on perceived own social class (columns 1–5) and aspired social class (columns 6–10) using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 5: Impacts on Aspired Educational Attainment

	For self			For partner			
	$<$ B.A.	B.A.	Graduate	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	Not imp.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
τ	-0.023	-0.083	0.107	-0.050	0.050	0.031	-0.023
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.038)
μ^c	0.040	0.167	0.793	0.106	0.894	0.297	0.297
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	3,128	3,128	3,128	4,308

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on educational aspirations for respondents (columns 1–3) and their romantic partners (columns 4–6) using a fuzzy RD design. Column (7) examines whether respondents report not caring about their partner's educational attainment; accordingly, estimates in columns (4)–(6) are restricted to those who report caring about it. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 6: Impacts on Health

	Regularly smokes	Good health	Mental Health Symptoms				Health Index	
			PHQ-2		GAD-2		Continuous	Binary
			Index	Indicator	Index	Indicator		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
τ	0.049	-0.047	0.171	0.009	0.120	0.024	-0.114	-0.111
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.105)	(0.025)	(0.107)	(0.026)	(0.058)	(0.056)
μ^c	0.045	0.880	1.156	0.106	1.118	0.117	-0.016	-0.027
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on whether respondents smoke regularly (column 1), report good or very good health (column 2), exhibit depressive symptoms based on a continuous (column 3) or binary (column 4) PHQ-2 measure, and exhibit anxiety symptoms based on a continuous (column 5) or binary (column 6) GAD-2 measure, using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (7) and (8) report impacts on positively coded summary health indices following Anderson (2008), constructed using the continuous or binary versions of smoking, self-rated health, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 7: Impacts on Subjective Well-Being

	Satisfaction						Happiness
	Job	Financial	Romantic life	Friends	Life	Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
τ	-0.033	-0.022	-0.017	-0.024	-0.054	-0.114	-0.042
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.026)
μ^c	0.884	0.666	0.880	0.971	0.940	-0.012	0.894
N	3,791	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on subjective well-being using a fuzzy RD design. Respondents report their satisfaction with their job (among those employed; column 1), financial situation (column 2), romantic life (column 3), friends and social circle (column 4), and life overall (column 5), on a scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Column (6) reports impacts on a summary index of these five satisfaction measures, constructed following Anderson (2008). Respondents also report, in general, how happy they are on a scale from 1 (very happy) to 4 (not happy at all); column (7) reports effects on this outcome. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 8: Impacts on Political Attitudes and Civic Engagement

	Success depends on luck		Supports	Spending preference		Supports	Donates	Talks politics	Votes in
	For myself	In general	redistribution	Higher ed.	Poverty	SPP	to SPP	with friends	elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
τ	0.103	0.083	-0.008	0.052	-0.052	0.165	-0.005	-0.075	0.018
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.038)
μ^c	0.230	0.536	0.520	0.685	0.315	0.530	0.745	0.663	0.634
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on political attitudes and civic engagement using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (1) and (2) report effects on whether respondents somewhat or strongly agree that their own success has depended more on luck than hard work, and that success in the country generally depends more on luck than hard work, respectively. Column (3) reports effects on willingness to pay higher taxes to finance public goods even without direct personal benefit. Columns (4) and (5) report effects on whether respondents prefer additional tax revenue be allocated to financial aid for high-achieving low-income youth or to subsidies for poor households, respectively. Column (6) reports effects on whether respondents hold somewhat or very favorable views of the SPP program. Column (7) reports effects on willingness to donate the participation incentive to scholarship programs for talented low-income youth. Columns (8) and (9) report effects on whether respondents sometimes or frequently discuss politics with friends and whether they always vote in national elections. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 9: Impacts on Nonwage Job Amenities

	Can WFH (1)	Flexible schedule (2)	Weekends or nights (3)	Log commute (4)	Has purpose (5)	Is interesting (6)	Has positive impact (7)	Use my skills (8)	Promotion opportunity (9)	Index (10)
τ	0.056	0.005	-0.034	0.179	-0.004	-0.011	0.054	-0.033	-0.014	0.000
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.090)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.051)
μ^c	0.452	0.576	0.570	3.288	0.722	0.709	0.635	0.699	0.645	0.011
N	3,791	3,791	3,791	3,286	3,791	3,791	3,791	3,791	3,791	3,791

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on job amenities using a fuzzy RD design. Column (10) reports impacts on an index of job amenities, following Anderson (2008). Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 10: Impacts on Occupational Skill Level and Job Responsibilities

	Skill level				Responsibility	
	1	2	3	4	None	Some
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
τ	0.002	-0.092	-0.010	0.100	-0.034	0.034
	(0.008)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
μ^c	0.006	0.340	0.256	0.399	0.599	0.401
N	2,970	2,970	2,970	2,970	3,009	3,009

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on occupational skill level, grouped into the four broad categories following the ILO (2012) framework (columns 1–4), and on job responsibilities (columns 5–6), using a fuzzy RD design. Skill level 1 includes occupations involving simple and routine tasks, whereas skill level 4 includes occupations requiring advanced technical knowledge, problem-solving, and typically higher levels of formal education. The sample is restricted to currently employed salaried workers. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table 11: Impacts on Job-Search Behavior


	First job search			Current job			Searching for a job	Current job search			College was important	Contacts are important	
	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other		College networks	Pre-college networks	Other		for me	for others
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
τ	0.012	0.014	-0.038	0.024	0.010	-0.035	0.070	0.117	0.034	0.008	0.027	-0.004	0.030
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.020)
μ^c	0.157	0.260	0.579	0.103	0.202	0.695	0.366	0.204	0.225	0.939	0.517	0.585	0.918
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	3,791	3,791	3,791	5,017	1,983	1,983	1,983	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on job-search behavior and perceptions of the importance of college and social contacts for labor-market success using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).


Appendix A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Eligibility Conditions for the SPP Financial Aid Program

(a) Standardized high school test score




(b) Wealth index



Notes: The SPP financial aid program has specific eligibility criteria based on performance in the national standardized high school exit exam, SABER 11, and the household SISBEN wealth index. Panel A shows the distribution of test scores two months before the policy announcement in 2014, with the vertical line marking the highest 9.5% of test scores eligible for SPP. Panel B illustrates the wealth distribution for test takers, with vertical lines indicating SPP's location-specific eligibility thresholds. (One-third of test takers are not included in SISBEN and denoted as "N/A.") Among test takers, 52.8% meet the eligibility criteria based on their SISBEN score. *Sources:* Figure 1 in Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026), based on SABER 11 (Icfes) and SISBEN (DNP).


Figure A.2: An Expansion of College Enrollment

(a) Probability of Attending College Immediately After High School



Sample restricted to low-SES students.

(b) Probability of Ever Attending College




Sample restricted to low-SES students.

Notes: Panels A and B display low-SES students' probability of ever attending college within zero and six years after completing high school, respectively, based on the distance to the test-score cutoff. A student scoring 40 points below the test-score cutoff is in the 71st percentile of the test-score distribution, while a student scoring 40 points above the cutoff is in the 98th percentile. Financial aid eligibility increases the likelihood of attending any college within six years after high school by 9.6 p.p. *Sources:* Figure 2 in Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026), based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and SNIES (MEN).


Figure A.3: Increased Attendance at Higher-Quality Colleges

(a) Probability of Ever Attending an HQ College



Sample restricted to low-SES students.


(b) Probability of Ever Attending an LQ College



Sample restricted to low-SES students.


Notes: The figure breaks down the long-term enrollment effect by college quality. An HQ college refers to one of the 33 institutions with high-quality status by October 2014; all other colleges are LQ colleges. Around three-quarters of barely ineligible students choose LQ colleges. However, the SPP program redirects students toward HQ colleges, increasing the likelihood of attending an HQ college by 43.7 percentage points. Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026) shows that this effect is concentrated in HQ *private* colleges, where enrollment increases by 47.3 p.p. *Sources:* Figure 3 in Londoño-Vélez et al. (2026), based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and SNIES (MEN).

Figure A.4: Educational Attainment (Survey Outcomes)




Notes: The figure plots the probability of earning a short-cycle degree (gray), at least a bachelor's degree (black), or a graduate degree (blue) as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure A.5: Wage Earnings (Survey Outcomes)




Notes: The figure plots the natural logarithm of monthly wage earnings (including in-kind payments) as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure A.6: Weekly hours worked (Survey Outcomes)




Notes: The figure plots weekly hours worked as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014).
Sources: Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure A.7: Log (Financial Support to Relatives)



Notes: The figure plots the natural logarithm of monthly amount transferred to relatives as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure A.8: Lives in Five Largest Metropolitan Areas



Notes: The figure plots likelihood of living in one of Colombia's five largest metropolitan areas—Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena—as a function of distance to the SABER 11 test-score cutoff. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Table A.1: Impacts on Educational Attainment (Survey Outcomes)

	Upper	Short-Cycle Programs		University Bachelor's		Graduate		At least a
	Secondary	Some	Complete	Some	Complete	Some	Complete	Bachelor's
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
τ	-0.034	-0.014	-0.152	0.017	0.085	-0.001	0.076	0.160
	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.038)
μ^c	0.078	0.028	0.223	0.077	0.458	0.030	0.099	0.586
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on educational attainment using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (1)–(7) report effects on the probability of completing high school with no further education; enrolling in or completing technical or technological programs; enrolling in or completing a university bachelor's degree with no further education; and pursuing graduate education (specialization, master's, or doctorate). Column (8) reports impacts on attaining at least a bachelor's degree. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014).
Source. Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table A.2: Impacts on Labor-Market Outcomes (Survey Outcomes)

	LPF	UE	Employed				Log (Earnings)		Weekly
			Any	Employee	Self-empl.	Other	Wage	Self-empl.	hours
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
τ	0.033	0.003	0.032	0.024	0.011	-0.003	0.178	0.127	2.675
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.117)	(1.021)
μ^c	0.888	0.108	0.746	0.586	0.139	0.021	14.762	14.343	41.271
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	2,851	650	3,791

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on labor-market outcomes using a fuzzy RD design. Column (1) reports impacts on labor-force participation; column (2), unemployment; and column (3), having any employment or business income in the previous week. Columns (4)–(6) decompose column (3) into wage employment, self-employment or employer status, and other employment type. Columns (7) and (8) report effects on the natural logarithm of monthly wage earnings (including in-kind payments) and net monthly profits after expenses, respectively. Column (9) reports impacts on weekly hours. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table A.3: Impacts on Financial Support to Relatives (Survey Outcomes)

	Helps relatives	
	Any	Log(Amount)
	(1)	(2)
τ	-0.017	0.156
	(0.039)	(0.080)
μ^c	0.569	12.867
N	5,017	2,637

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on providing financial support to parents, siblings, or other relatives living outside the household, and on the natural logarithm of the amount transferred. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table A.4: Lives in Five Largest Metropolitan Areas

	Top 5 M.A.
τ	0.103
	(0.039)
μ^c	0.490
N	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on residing in one of the five largest metropolitan areas—Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, or Cartagena—using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table A.5: Impacts on Firm Characteristics and Work Conditions (Survey Outcomes)

	Firm Characteristics			Written Contract		
	Size	Public	Private	Any	Permanent	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
τ	0.067	-0.038	0.030	0.042	0.061	-0.063
	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.050)
μ^c	0.714	0.147	0.843	0.886	0.542	0.457
N	3,009	3,009	3,009	3,009	2,703	2,703

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on firm characteristics and work conditions using a fuzzy RD design. Column (1) reports impacts on having more than ten people at the workplace. Columns (2) and (3) report impacts on the probability of being employed in the government or a private company, respectively. Columns (4)–(6) report impacts on having a written employment contract, whether open-ended or fixed term. Sample is restricted to salaried workers. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table A.6: Impacts on Preferences for Nonwage Job Amenities

	Offers promotion	Interesting	Society	Flexible	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
τ	-0.013	-0.008	-0.097	-0.007	-0.068
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.055)
μ^c	0.646	0.675	0.643	0.468	0.001
N	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017	5,017

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on preferences for nonwage job amenities using a fuzzy RD design. Respondents report the importance of having a job that offers promotion opportunities, is interesting, is useful to society, and provides a flexible schedule. Columns (1)–(4) report effects on each outcome separately; column (5) reports a composite index constructed following Anderson (2008). Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).


Table A.7: Desire to Migrate

	Wants to migrate	Intended migration duration			Main reason given for wanting to migrate				
		<12 months	1-5 years	Permanent	Study	Work	Security	Family	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
τ	-0.018	-0.017	0.021	-0.003	-0.029	0.042	-0.005	-0.012	0.019
	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.022)
μ^c	0.523	0.224	0.565	0.211	0.283	0.585	0.034	0.029	0.034
N	5,017	2,521	2,521	2,521	2,521	2,521	2,521	2,521	2,521

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on whether respondents wants to migrate (column 1). For those expressing a desire to migrate, columns (2)–(4) report effects on intended migration duration, and columns (5)–(9) report effects on the reasons given for wanting to migrate, using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).


Appendix B Validity

Figure B.1: Density of Full Population versus Surveyed Sample




Notes: This figure compares the kernel density of the full population of 72,056 low-SES students scoring near the SPP test-score eligibility cutoff (gray) with that of the subsample of 5,017 surveyed individuals (black). Following best practices for internal validity in RD designs (Cattaneo et al., 2019), we first prioritized sampling individuals closest to the test-score cutoff. Specifically, within the control and treatment groups, we ordered observations by their distance to the cutoff and then surveyed individuals sequentially, starting with those nearest to the cutoff and proceeding outward within each group until reaching the target sample sizes for control and treated observations. *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure B.2: The Survey Response Rate as a Function of Test Scores




Notes: This figure reports the average survey response rate as a function of the SABER 11 test score for low-SES students. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented in `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure B.3: Density Discontinuity of Test Scores



Notes: This figure presents a histogram of test scores for the surveyed sample. We test for a discontinuity in the density of test scores at the cutoff using the `rddensity` package (Cattaneo et al., 2018). Specifically, we estimate an unrestricted local polynomial density model with a uniform kernel and asymptotic plug-in standard errors. The estimated p-value of 0.038 provides marginal evidence of a density discontinuity at the cutoff. Because the running variable is discrete, taking integer test-score values only, we interpret this result cautiously, as local density estimators can be sensitive to mass points near the threshold. We therefore place greater weight on the absence of discontinuities in predetermined covariates around the cutoff. *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Figure B.4: The Probability of Receiving SPP Financial Aid (Survey Sample)



Notes: The figures plot the probability of receiving SPP financial aid program as a function of distance to the SABER 11 eligibility cutoff for low-SES students who completed the survey. The probability of being a SPP recipient increases from 0% to 60.9% at the test-score cutoff. These estimates are obtained using a local linear RD with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented with `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table B.1: Predictors of Survey Completion

	All	Completed	Did not complete	p-value (2)–(3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.462	0.463	0.462	0.949
Age	28.585	28.660	28.568	0.013
Ethnic minority	0.042	0.044	0.042	0.472
Family size	4.611	4.649	4.603	0.062
Mother's education: primary	0.259	0.299	0.250	0.000
Mother's education: secondary	0.479	0.467	0.481	0.063
Mother's education: T&T	0.138	0.126	0.141	0.007
Mother's education: professional	0.124	0.108	0.128	0.000
Father's education: primary	0.339	0.375	0.331	0.000
Father's education: secondary	0.429	0.414	0.432	0.026
Father's education: T&T	0.103	0.097	0.104	0.118
Father's education: professional	0.130	0.114	0.133	0.000
Household SES: stratum 1	0.350	0.399	0.339	0.000
Household SES: stratum 2	0.443	0.425	0.447	0.005
Household SES: stratum 3	0.185	0.158	0.191	0.000
Household SES: stratum 4-6	0.019	0.014	0.020	0.000
School: private	0.177	0.149	0.183	0.000
School hours: full day	0.198	0.188	0.200	0.073
School hours: morning	0.609	0.624	0.606	0.021
School hours: evening	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.948
School hours: afternoon	0.170	0.161	0.172	0.062
School hours: weekends	0.011	0.014	0.010	0.023
School: schedule A	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.819
School: schedule B	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.884
School: other schedule	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.860
School: urban	0.914	0.904	0.917	0.004
Student resides: urban	0.860	0.836	0.865	0.000
SISBEN: score	34.360	33.700	34.508	0.000
SISBEN: percentile	52.231	50.832	52.545	0.000
SISBEN: main metro area	0.400	0.378	0.405	0.000
SISBEN: other urban area	0.496	0.501	0.495	0.402
SISBEN: rural area	0.104	0.121	0.100	0.000
Family has internet	0.583	0.552	0.590	0.000
Family has laptop	0.724	0.696	0.730	0.000
Family has car	0.179	0.169	0.181	0.039
Family has cellphone	0.948	0.945	0.949	0.312
Worked in 2014	0.053	0.054	0.053	0.786
SABER 11 test score (distance to cutoff)	-1.859	-0.203	-2.230	0.000
Ever attended any college	0.793	0.803	0.791	0.044
Obtained any college degree	0.598	0.625	0.592	0.000
Obtained a B.A. degree	0.452	0.482	0.445	0.000
Obtained a B.A. in HQA college	0.251	0.274	0.246	0.000
Formally employed in 2023	0.639	0.661	0.634	0.000
Formal earnings in 2023	1.152	1.170	1.148	0.320
N	27,385	5,017	22,368	

Notes. This table reports summary statistics for the sample of individuals who received an invitation (column 1), completed the survey (column 2), and did not complete the survey (column 3). Column (4) reports the p-values from tests of equality between respondents and non-respondents. *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), SNIES (MEN), SABER PRO & T&T (MEN), PILA (MinSalud), and the original survey (CNC).

Table B.2: Balance in Survey Response Rate

	μ^c	RD Estimate	
		Coef.	S.E.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Completed interview	0.218	-0.008	0.009

Notes. This table reports the difference in the survey response rate at the test-score cutoff. Column (1) the mean among students barely ineligible for SPP, while Columns (2) and (3) report the conventional RD coefficient and standard errors estimated using the `rdrobust` package by Cattaneo et al. (2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Table B.3: Covariate Balance Test around Test-Score Threshold: Full vs. Survey Sample

	Full sample			Survey sample		
	μ^c	τ	p-value	μ^c	τ	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.46	0.00	0.78	0.47	-0.02	0.41
Age	28.55	-0.11	0.00	28.63	-0.16	0.14
Ethnic minority	0.04	0.00	0.85	0.04	0.00	0.95
Family size	4.61	-0.04	0.13	4.66	-0.09	0.26
Mother's education: primary	0.25	0.00	0.97	0.29	-0.01	0.51
Mother's education: secondary	0.50	-0.01	0.17	0.51	-0.02	0.44
Mother's education: T&T	0.14	0.00	0.97	0.12	0.00	0.92
Mother's education: professional	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.02
Father's education: primary	0.34	0.00	0.89	0.39	-0.03	0.15
Father's education: secondary	0.43	0.00	0.95	0.43	0.00	0.98
Father's education: T&T	0.11	0.00	0.67	0.09	0.02	0.26
Father's education: professional	0.12	0.00	0.62	0.10	0.02	0.25
Household SES: stratum 1	0.34	0.00	0.83	0.40	-0.04	0.12
Household SES: stratum 2	0.46	-0.01	0.14	0.43	0.01	0.58
Household SES: stratum 3	0.18	0.01	0.23	0.16	0.01	0.72
Household SES: stratum 4-6	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.01	0.02	0.00
School: private	0.17	0.00	0.73	0.13	0.04	0.04
School hours: full day	0.20	0.00	0.64	0.19	0.02	0.35
School hours: morning	0.62	0.00	0.67	0.62	-0.01	0.82
School hours: evening	0.01	0.00	0.15	0.01	-0.01	0.14
School hours: afternoon	0.17	0.00	0.89	0.17	-0.01	0.52
School hours: weekends	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.31
School: schedule A	1.00	0.00	0.55	1.00	0.00	0.59
School: schedule B	0.00	0.00	0.74	0.00	0.00	0.30
School: other schedule	0.00	0.00	0.59	0.00	0.00	0.74
School: urban	0.92	-0.01	0.18	0.91	0.00	0.86
Student resides: urban	0.86	-0.01	0.22	0.84	-0.01	0.64
SISBEN: score	34.66	-0.37	0.15	33.74	0.45	0.49
SISBEN: percentile	52.83	-0.77	0.16	50.98	0.86	0.53
SISBEN: main metro area	0.40	-0.01	0.26	0.40	-0.03	0.26
SISBEN: other urban area	0.50	0.00	0.71	0.48	0.01	0.61
SISBEN: rural area	0.10	0.01	0.22	0.12	0.01	0.37
Family has internet	0.59	0.01	0.21	0.56	0.03	0.25
Family has laptop	0.73	0.00	0.73	0.71	0.00	0.82
Family has car	0.17	0.01	0.05	0.14	0.02	0.28
Family has cellphone	0.95	0.00	0.59	0.94	0.00	0.68
Worked in 2014	0.05	0.00	0.69	0.05	0.00	0.73
Joint F-Stat (p-value)		0.23			0.08	

Notes: This table presents a covariate balance test around the test-score cutoff for the full sample (columns 1–3) and survey–respondent sample (columns 4–6). Column (1) presents the mean of the control group. Column (2) reports conventional RD coefficients, while Column (3) presents conventional p-values. The last row reports the p-value from a joint significance test using all baseline characteristics. All results are estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Sources:* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Table B.4: Complier Characteristcs: Full vs. Completed Survey Samples

	Full sample		Survey sample	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.472	0.010	0.430	0.021
Age	28.247	0.024	28.209	0.054
Ethnic minority	0.035	0.004	0.037	0.008
Family size	4.588	0.031	4.613	0.069
Mother's education: primary	0.227	0.008	0.251	0.018
Mother's education: secondary	0.479	0.010	0.479	0.022
Mother's education: T&T	0.155	0.007	0.129	0.015
Mother's education: professional	0.139	0.007	0.141	0.015
Father's education: primary	0.318	0.009	0.327	0.021
Father's education: secondary	0.437	0.010	0.439	0.022
Father's education: T&T	0.117	0.007	0.113	0.014
Father's education: professional	0.128	0.007	0.121	0.014
Household SES: stratum 1	0.339	0.009	0.336	0.020
Household SES: stratum 2	0.444	0.010	0.462	0.022
Household SES: stratum 3	0.196	0.008	0.181	0.017
Household SES: stratum 4-6	0.019	0.003	0.018	0.006
School: private	0.172	0.008	0.177	0.017
School hours: full day	0.198	0.008	0.236	0.018
School hours: morning	0.615	0.010	0.588	0.021
School hours: evening	0.007	0.002	0.004	0.002
School hours: afternoon	0.173	0.008	0.164	0.016
School hours: weekends	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.003
School: schedule A	0.997	0.001	1.000	0.000
School: schedule B	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000
School: other schedule	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
School: urban	0.913	0.005	0.913	0.012
Student resides: urban	0.864	0.007	0.842	0.015
SISBEN: score	34.612	0.277	34.634	0.596
SISBEN: percentile	52.786	0.585	52.683	1.266
SISBEN: main metro area	0.406	0.010	0.396	0.021
SISBEN: other urban area	0.498	0.010	0.485	0.022
SISBEN: rural area	0.096	0.006	0.120	0.014
Family has internet	0.619	0.010	0.618	0.021
Family has laptop	0.757	0.008	0.737	0.019
Family has car	0.186	0.008	0.172	0.016
Family has cellphone	0.948	0.004	0.942	0.010
Worked in 2014	0.049	0.004	0.051	0.009
N				
	72,056		5,017	

Notes. This table compares complier characteristics for the full sample and the survey sample. *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), and the original survey (CNC).

Table B.5: Main Treatment Effects: Full vs. Completed Survey Samples

	Full sample		Survey sample	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: *Reduced-form estimates*				
SPP beneficiary	0.577	0.007	0.609	0.016
Panel B: *IV estimates*				
Any college enrollment	0.163	0.012	0.151	0.029
HQA enrollment	0.759	0.010	0.775	0.027
Private HQA enrollment	0.823	0.008	0.848	0.019
Public HQA enrollment	-0.064	0.010	-0.072	0.026
Non-HQA enrollment	-0.596	0.013	-0.624	0.033
Any degree attainment	0.108	0.016	0.126	0.037
Short-cycle attainment	-0.201	0.010	-0.140	0.027
B.A. attainment	0.309	0.015	0.266	0.037
in HQA institutions	0.584	0.011	0.618	0.027
in private HQA institutions	0.604	0.010	0.638	0.023
in public HQA institutions	-0.020	0.007	-0.020	0.018
in non-HQA institutions	-0.275	0.012	-0.353	0.031
Formal work	0.023	0.016	0.062	0.037
Earnings (in min wages)	0.275	0.046	0.385	0.098
Earnings (in logs)	0.152	0.033	0.202	0.075
N	72,056		5,017	

Notes. This table compares the main effects of the SPP program among the targeted sample and the sample of completed surveys. *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Appendix C Robustness using the Optimal Bandwidth

Table C.1: Impacts on Fertility and Marital Status: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Current and Desired Fertility						Marital Status				
	Any	Number	Fertility before 25	Fertility at 25+	Age at first birth	Desired number	Single	In a stable relationship	Married or cohabiting	Divorced	Widowed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
τ	-0.004	-0.487	-0.011	-0.006	1.334	0.452	-0.047	0.094	-0.067	0.005	0.002
	(0.057)	(0.258)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(1.352)	(0.174)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.068)	(0.005)	(0.004)
μ^c	0.204	1.451	0.120	0.093	23.408	1.041	0.487	0.254	0.270	0.000	-0.002
h	9.373	12.024	12.589	8.398	12.985	7.239	9.872	9.394	7.551	9.171	4.939
N ef.	2,151	519	2,620	2,014	516	1,846	2,151	2,151	1,850	2,151	1,261

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on fertility outcomes (columns 1–5), desired fertility (column 6), and marital status (columns 7–11), using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.2: Impacts on Partner Characteristics: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	How met partner		Partner's education			Partner	Partner's social class				
	College	Other	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	HQ college	Upper	Upper-mid.	Middle	Lower-mid.	Lower
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
τ	0.131	-0.131	-0.222	0.222	0.078	0.278	0.015	0.014	-0.038	0.088	-0.089
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.068)	(0.107)	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.062)
μ^c	0.085	0.915	0.529	0.471	0.146	0.166	0.010	0.099	0.436	0.330	0.138
h	9.108	9.108	8.955	8.955	10.564	9.209	11.493	12.889	10.445	12.593	9.361
N ef.	1,129	1,129	1,039	1,039	1,202	637	1,301	1,368	1,217	1,368	1,129

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on partner characteristics using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.3: Impacts on Close Social Ties and Social Integration: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Where met best friend		Best friend's education			Best friend's social class					Comfortable
	College	Other	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	Upper	Upp-mid.	Middle	Low-mid.	Lower	interacting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
τ	0.005	-0.005	-0.121	0.112	0.077	0.072	-0.033	0.110	-0.109	-0.033	-0.119
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.067)
μ	0.303	0.697	0.327	0.647	0.120	-0.001	0.197	0.345	0.365	0.087	0.624
h	10.106	10.106	10.072	10.187	12.384	7.362	7.838	12.096	12.010	8.365	9.932
N ef.	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,328	2,620	1,850	1,850	2,620	2,620	2,014	2,151

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on close social ties and integration using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (1)–(2) report where respondents met their closest friend, columns (3)–(5) the closest friend's educational attainment, and columns (6)–(10) the closest friend's social class. Column (11) reports effects on whether respondents strongly agree that they feel comfortable interacting with people from all social classes. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.4: Impacts on Perceived Own Social Class and Aspired Social Class: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Perceived social class					Aspired social class				
	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Lower	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Lower
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
τ	0.007	-0.012	0.115	-0.004	-0.071	0.066	-0.114	0.102	-0.024	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.012)	(0.007)
μ^c	-0.001	0.051	0.371	0.404	0.161	0.374	0.519	0.084	0.014	0.005
h	7.646	9.703	10.974	13.662	8.587	10.781	10.165	7.110	9.952	14.175
N ef.	1,850	2,151	2,328	2,767	2,014	2,328	2,328	1,850	2,151	2,846

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on perceived own social class (columns 1–5) and aspired social class (columns 6–10) using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.5: Impacts on Aspired Educational Attainment: Robustness to Optimal Bandwidth

	For self			For partner			
	$<$ B.A.	B.A.	Graduate	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	Not imp.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
τ	-0.044	-0.038	0.092	-0.082	0.082	0.027	0.067
	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.070)
μ^c	0.058	0.146	0.793	0.120	0.880	0.310	0.250
h	7.738	12.584	9.124	10.380	10.380	12.004	8.962
N ef.	1,850	2,620	2,151	1,429	1,429	1,616	1,716

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on educational aspirations for respondents (columns 1–3) and for their romantic partner (columns 4–6) using a fuzzy RD design. Column (7) examines whether respondents report not caring about their partner's educational attainment; accordingly, estimates in columns (4)–(6) are restricted to those who report caring about it. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.6: Impacts on Health: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Regularly smokes	Good health	Mental Health Symptoms				Health Index	
			PHQ-2		GAD-2		Continuous	Binary
			Index	Indicator	Index	Indicator		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
τ	0.070	-0.043	0.345	0.055	0.142	0.008	-0.149	-0.138
	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.185)	(0.044)	(0.159)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.095)
μ^c	0.030	0.872	1.138	0.089	1.132	0.134	-0.017	-0.030
h	9.804	9.395	8.870	8.216	14.107	11.321	11.969	10.317
N ef.	2,151	2,151	2,014	2,014	2,846	2,476	2,476	2,328

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on whether respondents smoke regularly (column 1), report good or very good health (column 2), exhibit depressive symptoms based on a continuous (column 3) or binary (column 4) PHQ-2 measure, and exhibit anxiety symptoms based on a continuous (column 5) or binary (column 6) GAD-2 measure, using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (7) and (8) report impacts on positively coded summary health indices following Anderson (2008), constructed using the continuous or binary versions of smoking, self-rated health, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.7: Impacts on Satisfaction and Subjective Well-Being: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Satisfaction						Happiness
	Job	Financial	Romantic life	Friends	Life	Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
τ	-0.024	-0.035	-0.047	0.041	-0.032	-0.050	-0.050
	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.082)	(0.045)
μ^c	0.874	0.679	0.895	0.951	0.927	-0.037	0.907
h	9.738	8.694	10.335	8.175	9.414	10.967	8.233
N ef.	1,611	2,014	2,328	2,014	2,151	2,328	2,014

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on satisfaction and subjective well-being using a fuzzy RD design. Respondents report their satisfaction with their job (among those employed; column 1), financial situation (column 2), romantic life (column 3), friends and social circle (column 4), and life overall (column 5), on a scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Column (6) reports impacts on a summary index of these five satisfaction measures, constructed following Anderson (2008). Respondents also report, in general, how happy they are on a scale from 1 (very happy) to 4 (not happy at all); column (7) reports effects on this outcome. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.8: Impacts on Political Attitudes and Civic Engagement: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Success depends on luck		Supports	Spending preference		Supports	Donates	Talks politics	Votes in
	For myself	In general	redistribution	Higher ed.	Poverty	SPP	to SPP	with friends	elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
τ	0.014	0.064	-0.087	0.088	-0.088	0.291	-0.015	-0.119	0.099
	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.065)
μ^c	0.273	0.511	0.542	0.679	0.321	0.467	0.762	0.676	0.596
h	7.874	7.478	9.165	10.797	10.797	8.125	9.928	10.856	10.290
N ef.	1,850	1,850	2,151	2,328	2,328	2,014	2,151	2,328	2,328

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on political attitudes and civic engagement using a fuzzy RD design. Columns (1) and (2) report effects on whether respondents somewhat or strongly agree that their own success has depended more on luck than hard work, and that success in the country generally depends more on luck than hard work, respectively. Column (3) reports effects on willingness to pay higher taxes to finance public goods even without direct personal benefit. Columns (4) and (5) report effects on whether respondents prefer additional tax revenue be allocated to financial aid for high-achieving low-income youth or to subsidies for poor households, respectively. Column (6) reports effects on whether respondents hold somewhat or very favorable views of the SPP program. Column (7) reports effects on willingness to donate the participation incentive to scholarship programs for talented low-income youth. Columns (8) and (9) report effects on whether respondents sometimes or frequently discuss politics with friends and whether they always vote in national elections. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.9: Impacts on Nonwage Job Amenities: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Can WFH (1)	Flexible schedule (2)	Weekends or nights (3)	Log commute (4)	Has purpose (5)	Is interesting (6)	Has positive impact (7)	Use my skills (8)	Promotion opportunity (9)	Index (10)
τ	0.071	-0.032	-0.103	0.262	0.149	0.175	0.179	-0.049	0.035	0.170
	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.166)	(0.069)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.098)
μ^c	0.463	0.595	0.631	3.235	0.674	0.623	0.564	0.713	0.628	-0.054
h	9.802	13.038	6.770	9.150	9.465	6.866	7.354	11.613	9.482	8.417
N ef.	1,611	2,091	1,237	1,389	1,611	1,237	1,385	1,870	1,611	1,512

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on nonwage job amenities using a fuzzy RD design. Column (10) reports impacts on an index of job amenities, following Anderson (2008). Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.10: Impacts on Occupational Skill Level and Job Responsibilities: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	Skill level				Responsibility	
	1	2	3	4	None	Some
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
τ	-0.011	-0.085	-0.029	0.120	0.044	-0.044
	(0.013)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.079)	(0.105)	(0.105)
μ^c	0.008	0.327	0.271	0.395	0.506	0.494
h	7.536	12.473	12.646	11.708	7.196	7.196
N ef.	1,075	1,560	1,560	1,466	1,091	1,091

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on occupational skill level, grouped into the four broad categories following the ILO (2012) framework (columns 1–4), and on job responsibilities (columns 5–6), using a fuzzy RD design. Skill level 1 includes occupations involving simple and routine tasks, whereas skill level 4 includes occupations requiring advanced technical knowledge, problem-solving, and typically higher levels of formal education. The sample is restricted to currently employed salaried workers. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table C.11: Impacts on Job-Search Behavior: Robustness using Optimal Bandwidth

	First job search			Current job			Searching	Current job search			College	Contacts are important	
	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	for a job	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	was important	for me	for others
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
τ	0.062	0.029	-0.059	0.013	0.042	-0.043	0.034	0.060	0.017	0.097	0.070	-0.007	0.048
	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.035)
μ^c	0.139	0.261	0.578	0.107	0.206	0.684	0.404	0.250	0.249	0.892	0.494	0.592	0.917
h	9.054	9.763	12.963	10.176	10.105	13.444	7.452	12.974	14.348	8.947	9.093	9.743	10.297
N ef.	2,151	2,151	2,620	1,753	1,753	2,091	1,850	1,019	1,113	766	2,151	2,151	2,328

Notes. This table reports IV estimates of the effects on job-search behavior and perceptions of the importance of college and social contacts for labor-market success using a fuzzy RD design. Conventional RD estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using a local linear specification with the optimal bandwidth selected by `rdrobust` (Cattaneo et al., 2014). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Appendix D Heterogeneity

Table D.1: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Fertility and Marital Status

	Current and Desired Fertility						Marital Status				
	Any	Number	Fertility before 25	Fertility at 25+	Age at first birth	Desired number	Single	In a stable relationship	Married or cohabiting	Divorced	Widowed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Panel A: *Sex*											
τ^{men}	-0.060	0.058	-0.001	-0.060	-1.378	0.143	-0.045	0.052	-0.013	0.004	0.002
pv^{men}	0.074	0.641	0.731	0.037	0.532	0.114	0.150	0.058	0.683	0.407	0.778
τ^{women}	0.037	-0.137	-0.011	0.044	1.247	0.008	-0.010	0.030	-0.029	0.010	-0.001
pv^{women}	0.031	0.224	0.774	0.007	0.031	0.367	0.760	0.734	0.799	0.090	0.663
$pv^{men=women}$	0.005	0.900	0.668	0.001	0.055	0.509	0.445	0.295	0.940	0.190	0.624
Panel B: *Baseline SES*											
τ^{high}	0.007	-0.059	0.018	-0.013	-0.374	0.079	-0.042	0.056	-0.026	0.013	-0.001
pv^{high}	0.154	0.400	0.314	0.498	0.620	0.158	0.456	0.077	0.213	0.032	0.392
τ^{low}	-0.040	-0.060	-0.031	-0.011	0.310	0.097	-0.010	0.025	-0.017	0.000	0.002
pv^{low}	0.303	0.435	0.285	0.858	0.384	0.138	0.356	0.632	0.624	0.981	0.211
$pv^{high=low}$	0.084	0.748	0.143	0.536	0.850	0.908	0.896	0.357	0.221	0.065	0.150
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*											
τ^{no}	-0.017	-0.115	-0.001	-0.019	0.633	0.095	0.020	0.019	-0.051	0.010	0.002
pv^{no}	0.913	0.170	0.826	0.805	0.191	0.117	0.356	0.805	0.090	0.061	0.265
τ^{yes}	-0.013	0.022	-0.014	-0.001	-0.875	0.081	-0.092	0.069	0.023	0.002	-0.002
pv^{yes}	0.799	0.690	0.573	0.351	0.854	0.225	0.002	0.025	0.220	0.872	0.593
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.902	0.787	0.569	0.385	0.497	0.929	0.003	0.114	0.043	0.092	0.361

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for fertility outcomes (columns 1–4), desired fertility (column 5), and marital status (columns 6–9). Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.2: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Partner Characteristics

	How met partner		Partner's education			Partner	Partner's social class				
	College	Other	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	HQ college	Upper	Upper-mid.	Middle	Lower-mid.	Lower
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Panel A: *Sex*											
τ^{men}	0.034	-0.034	-0.125	0.125	0.061	0.082	0.011	-0.015	0.002	0.056	-0.055
pv^{men}	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.007	0.023	0.078	0.149	0.829	0.837	0.438	0.078
τ^{women}	-0.011	0.011	-0.116	0.116	0.02	0.172	0.024	0.006	-0.016	0.020	-0.034
pv^{women}	0.793	0.793	0.088	0.088	0.711	0.010	0.343	0.838	0.745	0.581	0.339
$pv^{men=women}$	0.129	0.129	0.513	0.513	0.211	0.516	0.836	0.767	0.707	0.880	0.548
Panel B: *Baseline SES*											
τ^{high}	0.048	-0.048	-0.144	0.144	0.057	0.098	0.015	0.006	-0.032	0.033	-0.022
pv^{high}	0.038	0.038	0.013	0.013	0.108	0.092	0.256	0.740	0.844	0.689	0.507
τ^{low}	-0.018	0.018	-0.101	0.101	0.027	0.141	0.020	-0.024	0.025	0.045	-0.066
pv^{low}	0.441	0.441	0.051	0.051	0.391	0.015	0.208	0.508	0.870	0.071	0.046
$pv^{high=low}$	0.415	0.415	0.737	0.737	0.553	0.598	0.982	0.501	0.799	0.119	0.188
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*											
τ^{no}	0.010	-0.010	-0.147	0.147	0.041	0.122	0.021	-0.001	0.045	-0.008	-0.057
pv^{no}	0.240	0.240	0.003	0.003	0.211	0.031	0.099	0.906	0.655	0.936	0.133
τ^{yes}	0.017	-0.017	-0.101	0.101	0.047	0.105	0.012	-0.020	-0.078	0.112	-0.026
pv^{yes}	0.120	0.120	0.119	0.119	0.209	0.051	0.504	0.716	0.455	0.083	0.206
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.692	0.692	0.473	0.473	0.934	0.849	0.573	0.719	0.390	0.223	0.910

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for partner characteristics. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025).
Source. Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.3: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Close Social Ties and Social Integration

	Where met best friend		Best friend's education			Best friend's social class					Comfortable
	College	Other	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	Upper	Upp-mid.	Middle	Low-mid.	Lower	interacting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Panel A: *Sex*											
τ^{men}	0.039	-0.039	-0.081	0.070	0.045	0.008	0.021	0.040	-0.042	-0.028	0.015
pv^{men}	0.291	0.291	0.020	0.050	0.229	0.548	0.995	0.141	0.286	0.273	0.451
τ^{women}	0.013	-0.013	-0.031	0.035	0.052	0.016	0.040	0.012	-0.058	-0.010	-0.005
pv^{women}	0.573	0.573	0.162	0.081	0.045	0.142	0.183	0.635	0.102	0.376	0.415
$pv^{men=women}$	0.262	0.262	0.502	0.883	0.449	0.464	0.332	0.508	0.625	0.824	0.932
Panel B: *Baseline SES*											
τ^{high}	0.002	-0.002	-0.083	0.092	0.050	0.004	0.076	0.008	-0.090	0.002	0.039
pv^{high}	0.505	0.505	0.016	0.005	0.024	0.553	0.129	0.167	0.005	0.773	0.572
τ^{low}	0.049	-0.049	-0.028	0.012	0.048	0.019	-0.019	0.047	-0.010	-0.037	-0.024
pv^{low}	0.294	0.294	0.196	0.384	0.361	0.121	0.738	0.454	0.951	0.126	0.041
$pv^{high=low}$	0.226	0.226	0.459	0.190	0.353	0.491	0.185	0.643	0.057	0.303	0.066
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*											
τ^{no}	0.001	-0.001	-0.071	0.066	0.056	0.024	-0.002	0.056	-0.062	-0.015	-0.015
pv^{no}	0.407	0.407	0.007	0.011	0.125	0.026	0.786	0.200	0.094	0.716	0.039
τ^{yes}	0.063	-0.063	-0.036	0.035	0.038	-0.006	0.075	-0.015	-0.033	-0.021	0.041
pv^{yes}	0.138	0.138	0.399	0.340	0.097	0.699	0.085	0.405	0.257	0.058	0.418
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.096	0.096	0.299	0.386	0.758	0.079	0.129	0.871	0.812	0.251	0.052

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for close social ties and integration. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.4: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Perceived Own Social Class and Aspired Social Class

	Perceived social class					Aspired social class				
	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Lower	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Lower
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: *Sex*										
τ^{men}	0.004	-0.016	0.018	0.018	-0.024	-0.001	0.020	-0.008	-0.010	0.000
pv^{men}	0.090	0.300	0.532	0.828	0.419	0.818	0.962	0.802	0.081	0.575
τ^{women}	-0.001	0.030	0.048	-0.019	-0.058	0.064	-0.053	-0.007	-0.003	-0.001
pv^{women}	0.418	0.283	0.125	0.879	0.010	0.211	0.133	0.375	0.125	0.429
$pv^{men=women}$	0.060	0.136	0.487	0.795	0.198	0.446	0.259	0.645	0.803	0.886
Panel B: *Baseline SES*										
τ^{high}	0.002	0.016	0.016	-0.014	-0.020	0.043	-0.018	-0.020	-0.007	0.002
pv^{high}	0.514	0.970	0.076	0.284	0.220	0.389	0.455	0.681	0.054	0.776
τ^{low}	0.002	-0.005	0.042	0.018	-0.056	0.013	-0.010	0.007	-0.007	-0.003
pv^{low}	0.283	0.943	0.678	0.284	0.047	0.641	0.570	0.477	0.180	0.359
$pv^{high=low}$	0.651	0.991	0.326	0.129	0.414	0.781	0.903	0.826	0.554	0.338
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*										
τ^{no}	0.005	-0.002	0.073	-0.038	-0.037	0.054	-0.037	-0.017	0.000	0.000
pv^{no}	0.103	0.609	0.024	0.256	0.167	0.077	0.079	0.744	0.391	0.663
τ^{yes}	-0.003	0.017	-0.033	0.058	-0.040	-0.008	0.019	0.007	-0.018	0.000
pv^{yes}	0.960	0.651	0.819	0.157	0.035	0.490	0.489	0.409	0.019	0.474
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.334	0.511	0.110	0.070	0.561	0.096	0.098	0.661	0.147	0.761

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for perceived own social class and aspired social class. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.5: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Aspired Educational Attainment

	For self			For partner			
	$<$ B.A.	B.A.	Graduate	$<$ B.A.	$\geq$ B.A.	Graduate	Not imp.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: *Sex*							
τ^{men}	-0.014	-0.046	0.060	-0.082	0.082	0.060	-0.018
pv^{men}	0.252	0.678	0.324	0.032	0.032	0.077	0.553
τ^{women}	-0.016	-0.055	0.071	0.016	-0.016	-0.023	-0.022
pv^{women}	0.100	0.234	0.080	0.759	0.759	0.644	0.812
$pv^{men=women}$	0.976	0.578	0.617	0.056	0.056	0.119	0.777
Panel B: *Baseline SES*							
τ^{high}	-0.013	-0.038	0.051	-0.062	0.062	0.063	-0.003
pv^{high}	0.128	0.629	0.743	0.070	0.070	0.164	0.987
τ^{low}	-0.015	-0.063	0.078	-0.001	0.001	-0.024	-0.024
pv^{low}	0.413	0.047	0.026	0.981	0.981	0.758	0.550
$pv^{high=low}$	0.574	0.076	0.173	0.190	0.190	0.230	0.679
Panel B: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*							
τ^{no}	-0.010	-0.041	0.052	-0.018	0.018	0.018	-0.016
pv^{no}	0.231	0.329	0.143	0.352	0.352	0.579	0.892
τ^{yes}	-0.020	-0.066	0.086	-0.049	0.049	0.024	-0.012
pv^{yes}	0.274	0.585	0.302	0.337	0.337	0.600	0.604
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.874	0.884	0.953	0.879	0.879	0.976	0.760

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for educational aspirations. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.6: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Health

	Regularly smokes	Good health	Mental Health Symptoms				Health Index	
			PHQ-2		GAD-2		Continuous	Binary
			Index	Indicator	Index	Indicator		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: *Sex*								
τ^{men}	0.041	-0.017	0.125	0.003	0.057	0.008	-0.076	-0.060
pv^{men}	0.039	0.876	0.286	0.910	0.727	0.746	0.262	0.507
τ^{women}	0.017	-0.045	0.096	0.013	0.119	0.030	-0.074	-0.090
pv^{women}	0.332	0.182	0.244	0.492	0.208	0.188	0.194	0.110
$pv^{men=women}$	0.217	0.351	0.845	0.648	0.454	0.217	0.838	0.448
Panel B: *Baseline SES*								
τ^{high}	0.030	-0.036	0.048	-0.008	0.121	0.018	-0.072	-0.065
pv^{high}	0.126	0.328	0.918	0.714	0.550	0.830	0.408	0.442
τ^{low}	0.029	-0.020	0.158	0.019	0.021	0.011	-0.066	-0.068
pv^{low}	0.059	0.697	0.045	0.329	0.452	0.538	0.168	0.205
$pv^{high=low}$	0.968	0.705	0.193	0.345	0.940	0.782	0.718	0.709
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*								
τ^{no}	0.012	0.006	0.069	0.009	0.054	0.013	-0.013	-0.027
pv^{no}	0.148	0.416	0.346	0.536	0.592	0.438	0.829	0.501
τ^{yes}	0.054	-0.077	0.150	0.000	0.090	0.015	-0.147	-0.122
pv^{yes}	0.059	0.013	0.247	0.951	0.422	0.970	0.040	0.164
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.476	0.015	0.754	0.654	0.741	0.624	0.130	0.496

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for health. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.7: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Subjective Well-Being

	Satisfaction						Happiness
	Job	Financial	Romantic life	Friends	Life	Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: *Sex*							
τ^{men}	-0.037	-0.006	-0.004	-0.016	-0.030	-0.070	-0.007
pv^{men}	0.100	0.769	0.472	0.717	0.677	0.368	0.606
τ^{women}	-0.006	-0.020	-0.017	-0.012	-0.038	-0.070	-0.050
pv^{women}	0.676	0.519	0.564	0.427	0.062	0.339	0.109
$pv^{men=women}$	0.443	0.503	0.945	0.424	0.336	0.991	0.462
Panel B: *Baseline SES*							
τ^{high}	-0.032	-0.017	0.001	-0.010	-0.023	-0.055	-0.031
pv^{high}	0.205	0.950	0.986	0.778	0.926	0.763	0.384
τ^{low}	-0.009	-0.010	-0.023	-0.019	-0.044	-0.086	-0.020
pv^{low}	0.470	0.714	0.214	0.882	0.062	0.130	0.267
$pv^{high=low}$	0.765	0.758	0.353	0.767	0.172	0.362	0.849
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*							
τ^{no}	0.001	-0.005	-0.021	-0.016	-0.039	-0.069	-0.027
pv^{no}	0.687	0.725	0.216	0.809	0.152	0.191	0.655
τ^{yes}	-0.048	-0.026	0.004	-0.012	-0.024	-0.069	-0.024
pv^{yes}	0.096	0.913	0.943	0.693	0.581	0.614	0.092
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.314	0.756	0.378	0.644	0.621	0.695	0.312

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for subjective well-being. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.8: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Political Attitudes and Civic Engagement

	Success depends on luck		Supports	Spending preference		Supports	Donates	Talks politics	Votes in
	For myself	In general	redistribution	Higher ed.	Poverty	SPP	to SPP	with friends	elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: *Sex*									
τ^{men}	0.058	0.054	-0.054	0.039	-0.039	0.122	-0.058	-0.083	0.015
pv^{men}	0.919	0.438	0.085	0.547	0.547	0.002	0.112	0.009	0.837
τ^{women}	0.067	0.050	0.047	0.022	-0.022	0.074	0.057	-0.008	0.002
pv^{women}	0.098	0.610	0.530	0.156	0.156	0.071	0.074	0.295	0.525
$pv^{men=women}$	0.257	0.874	0.102	0.535	0.535	0.404	0.017	0.345	0.741
Panel B: *Baseline SES*									
τ^{high}	0.044	0.053	-0.033	0.022	-0.022	0.062	-0.010	-0.031	0.022
pv^{high}	0.970	0.930	0.229	0.307	0.307	0.056	0.790	0.136	0.715
τ^{low}	0.082	0.049	0.026	0.043	-0.043	0.138	0.002	-0.062	-0.001
pv^{low}	0.096	0.295	0.818	0.248	0.248	0.003	0.957	0.058	0.571
$pv^{high=low}$	0.227	0.496	0.312	0.912	0.912	0.445	0.885	0.775	0.881
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*									
τ^{no}	0.064	0.066	0.017	0.026	-0.026	0.077	0.005	-0.030	-0.001
pv^{no}	0.113	0.224	0.682	0.177	0.177	0.033	0.887	0.085	0.614
τ^{yes}	0.058	0.028	-0.038	0.039	-0.039	0.134	-0.013	-0.068	0.025
pv^{yes}	0.930	0.885	0.115	0.503	0.503	0.005	0.831	0.090	0.738
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.289	0.374	0.141	0.712	0.712	0.438	0.938	0.841	0.939

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for political attitudes and civic engagement. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.9: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Nonwage Job Amenities

	Can WFH (1)	Flexible schedule (2)	Weekends or nights (3)	Log commute (4)	Has purpose (5)	Is interesting (6)	Has positive impact (7)	Use my skills (8)	Promotion opportunity (9)	Index (10)
Panel A: *Sex*										
τ^{men}	0.004	0.030	-0.009	0.137	-0.030	-0.049	0.048	-0.057	-0.015	-0.038
pv^{men}	0.696	0.797	0.395	0.129	0.994	0.386	0.297	0.225	0.770	0.538
τ^{women}	0.069	-0.038	-0.049	0.084	0.033	0.050	0.026	0.031	-0.007	0.052
pv^{women}	0.399	0.264	0.342	0.380	0.951	0.271	0.827	0.830	0.772	0.728
$pv^{men=women}$	0.374	0.311	0.202	0.745	0.968	0.162	0.578	0.326	0.980	0.500
Panel B: *Baseline SES*										
τ^{high}	0.046	0.055	0.015	0.082	-0.004	0.040	0.052	-0.009	0.039	0.044
pv^{high}	0.278	0.351	0.288	0.424	0.731	0.246	0.380	0.670	0.590	0.479
τ^{low}	0.025	-0.054	-0.061	0.144	-0.004	-0.061	0.014	-0.034	-0.063	-0.050
pv^{low}	0.533	0.115	0.398	0.105	0.771	0.213	0.837	0.416	0.287	0.247
$pv^{high=low}$	0.232	0.074	0.178	0.556	0.656	0.088	0.659	0.763	0.251	0.183
Panel C: *Lived near HQA university at baseline*										
τ^{no}	0.012	-0.016	-0.069	0.089	-0.029	-0.049	0.032	-0.027	-0.050	-0.036
pv^{no}	0.655	0.719	0.123	0.333	0.615	0.388	0.675	0.635	0.343	0.523
τ^{yes}	0.066	0.028	0.040	0.132	0.031	0.047	0.039	-0.013	0.044	0.048
pv^{yes}	0.275	0.805	0.056	0.136	0.612	0.385	0.507	0.385	0.612	0.862
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.266	0.955	0.014	0.618	0.476	0.221	0.823	0.738	0.314	0.585

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for job amenities. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Table D.10: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Occupation Skill Level and Job Responsibilities

	Skill level				Responsibility	
	1	2	3	4	None	Some
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: *Sex*						
τ^{men}	0.003	-0.010	-0.041	0.047	0.011	-0.011
pv^{men}	0.273	0.744	0.277	0.272	0.896	0.896
τ^{women}	-0.001	-0.120	0.033	0.088	-0.044	0.044
pv^{women}	0.870	0.050	0.615	0.165	0.130	0.130
$pv^{men=women}$	0.384	0.238	0.267	0.797	0.321	0.321
Panel B: *Baseline SES*						
τ^{high}	0.000	-0.034	-0.053	0.088	-0.076	0.076
pv^{high}	0.389	0.956	0.078	0.105	0.102	0.102
τ^{low}	0.004	-0.084	0.039	0.041	0.035	-0.035
pv^{low}	0.614	0.038	0.216	0.434	0.795	0.795
$pv^{high=low}$	0.697	0.144	0.034	0.563	0.341	0.341
Panel C: *Lived near HQA university at baseline*						
τ^{no}	-0.002	-0.018	0.025	-0.005	0.000	0.000
pv^{no}	0.881	0.556	0.425	0.932	0.405	0.405
τ^{yes}	0.006	-0.110	-0.051	0.154	-0.049	0.049
pv^{yes}	0.040	0.102	0.172	0.008	0.322	0.322
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.266	0.426	0.119	0.047	0.860	0.860

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for job occupation and job responsibilities. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).


Table D.11: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Job-Search Behavior

	First job search			Current job			Searching	Current job search			College	Contacts are important	
	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	for a job	College networks	Pre-college networks	Other	was important	for me	for others
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Panel A: *Sex*													
τ^{men}	0.037	0.027	-0.067	0.017	0.026	-0.043	0.018	0.065	0.029	0.014	0.001	0.041	0.031
pv^{men}	0.486	0.391	0.160	0.982	0.713	0.760	0.590	0.378	0.648	0.336	0.860	0.609	0.344
τ^{women}	-0.025	-0.015	0.027	0.016	-0.017	0.001	0.070	0.077	0.012	-0.006	0.036	-0.054	0.004
pv^{women}	0.852	0.802	0.962	0.486	0.690	0.424	0.144	0.795	0.666	0.592	0.174	0.361	0.413
$pv^{men=women}$	0.746	0.445	0.359	0.583	0.945	0.683	0.484	0.663	0.531	0.782	0.267	0.310	0.871
Panel B: *Baseline SES*													
τ^{high}	0.010	-0.008	-0.010	0.036	0.030	-0.066	0.056	0.100	0.013	-0.026	0.022	-0.026	0.015
pv^{high}	0.914	0.791	0.783	0.299	0.312	0.120	0.120	0.223	0.796	0.614	0.419	0.518	0.466
τ^{low}	0.005	0.027	-0.038	-0.006	-0.019	0.024	0.028	0.048	0.027	0.036	0.009	0.023	0.022
pv^{low}	0.366	0.404	0.100	0.634	0.731	0.517	0.741	0.862	0.860	0.038	0.786	0.717	0.353
$pv^{high=low}$	0.467	0.431	0.172	0.301	0.357	0.130	0.392	0.480	0.758	0.062	0.707	0.476	0.875
Panel C: *Lived near an HQA university at baseline*													
τ^{no}	0.004	0.009	-0.021	-0.018	0.011	0.007	0.020	0.104	-0.008	0.019	0.021	-0.015	0.011
pv^{no}	0.521	0.918	0.459	0.435	0.614	0.985	0.447	0.419	0.599	0.220	0.517	0.783	0.502
τ^{yes}	0.012	0.011	-0.030	0.057	0.003	-0.060	0.075	0.032	0.068	-0.019	0.010	0.015	0.027
pv^{yes}	0.964	0.522	0.518	0.202	0.862	0.300	0.222	0.654	0.406	0.907	0.756	0.965	0.294
$pv^{no=yes}$	0.708	0.684	0.990	0.138	0.812	0.441	0.652	0.845	0.333	0.429	0.861	0.886	0.752

Notes. This table reports reduced-form RD estimates by sex, SES, and place of residence for job-search behavior and perceptions of the importance of college and social contacts for labor-market success. Estimates and robust p-values are obtained from local polynomial regressions with a fixed bandwidth of 44, implemented using `rdhte` (Calonico et al., 2025). *Source.* Authors' calculations based on SABER 11 (Icfes), SISBEN (DNP), ICETEX, and the original survey (CNC).

Appendix E Recruitment Materials

Figure E.1: WhatsApp



Gmail **Juliana Londoño Vélez <j.londonovelez@gmail.com>**

¡Participa en nuestra encuesta y gana dos boletas de cine! 🎬

Juliana Londoño Vélez <j.londonovelez@gmail.com> Fri, Feb 6, 2026 at 3:15 PM
To: Juliana Londoño-Vélez <j.londonovelez@econ.ucla.edu>

Formato Correo

Hola **Carolina Pulido**, 👋

Desde el **Centro Nacional de Consultoría**, en colaboración con la profesora Juliana Londoño de la **Universidad de California (EE. UU.)**, estamos realizando un estudio sobre las **trayectorias de vida de los jóvenes colombianos**. Tu participación es muy valiosa y permitirá generar información útil para los hacedores de política pública sobre cómo promover la movilidad social en el país.

🎁 ¿Qué beneficios trae participar?

Además de contribuir al conocimiento, como agradecimiento por tu participación recibirás **dos (2) boletas de Cinemark**, para que disfrutes una experiencia de cine con la persona que elijas.

🔒 Sobre tu participación y privacidad

- Tu participación es **voluntaria**.
- La encuesta tiene una duración aproximada de **15 minutos**.
- Tus respuestas serán **confidenciales** y utilizadas únicamente con fines estadísticos y académicos.
- El tratamiento de tus datos personales se realizará conforme a la **Ley 1581 de 2012** y nuestra **política de privacidad**, disponible en: www.centronacionaldeconsultoria.com.

📌 Términos y Condiciones

- Pueden participar personas mayores de edad que completen voluntariamente la encuesta.
- Las **dos (2) boletas de Cinemark** son válidas en salas tradicionales de todo el país y serán entregadas al finalizar la encuesta. No son transferibles ni canjeables por dinero.
- CNC no se hace responsable por la pérdida o vencimiento de las boletas una vez entregadas.

Puedes consultar los términos y condiciones completos aquí:

👉 http://https://www.centronacionaldeconsultoria.com/sorteo-tyc-boletas-cinemark

🔗 **Haz clic aquí para participar ahora:**

Enlace de encuesta virtual

📩 **¿Tienes dudas o necesitas más información?**

💬 Escríbenos a **cnc@cnccol.com**, contáctanos por **WhatsApp al +57 321 247 4893**, o llama a la línea fija en Bogotá: **(601) 329 8131**.

También puedes visitar nuestra web: www.centronacionaldeconsultoria.com

Gracias por ser parte de esta investigación. **Tu participación marca la diferencia.** 🎬✨

Centro Nacional de Consultoría S.A.
Teléfono: **(601) 3298131l**
Celular: 321 2474893
Calle 82 N° 6-51

Appendix F Survey Instrument

Impact Evaluation of Ser Pilo Paga

Complete Bilingual Survey Form (Spanish–English, Side by Side)

Inicio y muestra / Start & Sample

Español	English

Educación / Education

Español	English
¿Cuál es el nivel educativo más alto alcanzado por usted? (E: Escuche la respuesta, confirme si tiene título o no, y marque la opción correcta.)	What is the highest level of education you have completed? (I: Listen to the response, confirm whether they hold a degree, and mark the correct option.)
01 Media (10°–13°) 02 Técnico profesional sin título 03 Técnico profesional con título 04 Formación para el trabajo sin título 05 Formación para el trabajo con título 06 Tecnológico sin título 07 Tecnológico con título 08 Profesional sin título 09 Profesional con título 10 Especialización sin título 11 Especialización con título 12 Maestría sin título 13 Maestría con título 14 Doctorado sin título 15 Doctorado con título	01 Upper secondary (10th–13th) 02 Technical professional, no degree 03 Technical professional, with degree 04 Workforce/vocational training, no certificate 05 Workforce/vocational training, with certificate 06 Technological, no degree 07 Technological, with degree 08 University, no degree 09 University, with degree 10 Specialization, no degree 11 Specialization, with degree 12 Master's, no degree 13 Master's, with degree 14 Doctorate, no degree 15 Doctorate, with degree
¿Cuál es el nivel educativo máximo que le gustaría alcanzar? [Programador: Validar con P1] 0 Media (10°–13°) 1 Técnico o tecnológico 2 Profesional universitario 3 Especialización 4 Maestría 5 Doctorado	What is the highest level of education you would like to attain? [Programmer: validate with Q1] 0 Upper secondary (10th–13th) 1 Technical or technological 2 University degree 3 Specialization 4 Master's

5 Doctorate

Puerta ocupacional / Employment gate

Español

La semana pasada, ¿tuvo algún trabajo o negocio del que recibiera ingresos?
1 Sí → Pase a 4
2 No → Pase a 3A

3A. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones mejor describe su situación actual?
1 Desempleado → Pase a 3B
2 Estudiante → Pase a 16
3 Incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar → Pase a 16
4 Ama de casa u oficios del hogar → Pase a 16
5 Rentista → Pase a 16
6 Ayudó sin pago en empresa/negocio/finca de familiar → Pase a 16
7 Otra (¿cuál?) → Pase a 16

3B. ¿Durante cuántas semanas ha estado buscando trabajo? ____ semanas → Pase a 16

English

Last week, did you have a job or business from which you received income?
1 Yes → Go to 4
2 No → Go to 3A

3A. Which of the following best describes your current situation?
1 Unemployed → Go to 3B
2 Student → Go to 16
3 Permanently unable to work → Go to 16
4 Homemaker/household duties → Go to 16
5 Rentier → Go to 16
6 Unpaid helper in family firm/farm → Go to 16
7 Other (specify) → Go to 16

3B. For how many weeks have you been looking for work? ____ weeks → Go to 16

Tipo de ocupación / Type of job

Español

En el trabajo que usted realizó la semana pasada, usted era…
1 Empleado/a u obrero/a de empresa particular → Pase a 4A
2 Empleado/a u obrero/a del gobierno → Pase a 4A
3 Empleado doméstico → Pase a 4A
4 Jornalero o peón → Pase a 4A
5 Trabajador/a por cuenta propia → Pase a 4D
6 Patrón o empleador → Pase a 4D

English

In the job you performed last week, you were…
1 Employee/worker in a private company → Go to 4A
2 Government employee/worker → Go to 4A
3 Domestic worker → Go to 4A
4 Day laborer → Go to 4A
5 Self-employed worker → Go to 4D
6 Employer → Go to 4D
77 Other → Go to 5

77 Otro → Pase a 5

Contrato y razón independencia / Contract & self-employment reason

Español

4A. En este trabajo, ¿usted firmó contrato de trabajo escrito?
1 Sí → Pase a 4B
2 No → Pase a 4C

4B. El contrato es…
1 A término indefinido
2 A término fijo
3 Por obra o labor
4 Prestación de servicios
89 Otro (especificar)

4C. Aunque no haya firmado contrato escrito, ¿usted está contratado por…
1 Prestación de servicios
2 Verbal / de palabra
3 Otro (especificar)

4D. ¿Cuál es la razón principal por la que trabaja en forma independiente…? (E: Leer opciones)
1 No encontró trabajo como asalariado
2 Por despido
3 Más independencia
4 Horario más flexible
5 Empezó su empresa/negocio
6 Trabaja en un negocio familiar
7 Mayor nivel de ingreso
8 Tradición familiar
9 Considera que no tiene los estudios necesarios
10 Otro (¿cuál?)

English

4A. In this job, did you sign a written employment contract?
1 Yes → Go to 4B
2 No → Go to 4C

4B. The contract is…
1 Open-ended (indefinite)
2 Fixed-term
3 For a specific job/task
4 Services contract
89 Other (specify)

4C. Even if there is no written contract, are you hired under…
1 Services contract
2 Verbal agreement
3 Other (specify)

4D. What is the main reason you are self-employed rather than working for an employer? (I: Read options)
1 Could not find a salaried job
2 Dismissal/layoff
3 Greater independence
4 More flexible schedule
5 Started own business
6 Work in a family business
7 Higher income
8 Family tradition
9 Feels lacking required education
10 Other (specify)

Antigüedad, tamaño y jornada / Tenure, size & schedule

Español

5. ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva trabajando de manera continua en esta

English

5. How long have you been working continuously in this

empresa/entidad/negocio/finca?
1 Menos de 1 mes
2 1 a 3 meses
3 4 a 6 meses
4 7 a 11 meses
5 1 año
6 2 a 3 años
7 4 a 5 años
8 6 a 10 años
9 Más de 10 años

5A. ¿Cuántas personas en total tiene la empresa/negocio/sitio donde trabaja (incluyendo al patrón)?
1 Trabaja solo
2 2 a 5 personas
3 6 a 10 personas
4 11 a 50 personas
5 51 a 100 personas
6 101 a 500 personas
7 Más de 500 personas
77 No sabe / No informa

6A. En este trabajo, ¿cuántas horas al día trabaja normalmente? [Límite 20 horas]
Horas [XX]

6B. En este trabajo, ¿cuántos días a la semana trabaja normalmente?
Días [XX]

firm/entity/business/farm?
1 Less than 1 month
2 1–3 months
3 4–6 months
4 7–11 months
5 1 year
6 2–3 years
7 4–5 years
8 6–10 years
9 More than 10 years

5A. Including the owner/employer, how many people are at your workplace?
1 Work alone
2 2–5 people
3 6–10 people
4 11–50 people
5 51–100 people
6 101–500 people
7 More than 500 people
77 Don't know / No response

6A. In this job, how many hours per day do you normally work? [Max 20]
Hours [XX]

6B. In this job, how many days per week do you normally work?
Days [XX]

Condiciones del trabajo / Job conditions

Español

7. Ahora le vamos a preguntar sobre varios aspectos de este trabajo. La semana pasada, ¿con qué frecuencia se presentaron las siguientes situaciones?

Puede trabajar desde casa — 1 Ningún día / 2 Algunos días / 3 Más de la mitad / 4 Casi todos / 5 Todos los días
Tiene un horario flexible — 1 Ningún día /

English

7. Now we will ask about aspects of this job. Last week, how often did the following occur?

Can work from home — 1 None / 2 Some days / 3 More than half / 4 Almost every day / 5 Every day
Has a flexible schedule — 1 None / 2 Some days / 3 More than half / 4 Almost every

2 Algunos días / 3 Más de la mitad / 4 Casi todos / 5 Todos los días
Trabaja fines de semana o por las noches — 1 Ningún día / 2 Algunos días / 3 Más de la mitad / 4 Casi todos / 5 Todos los días

8. En general, ¿cuánto se demora transportándose desde su casa hasta su trabajo?
Minutos __ (0 si trabaja 100% remoto)

9. ¿Cuál es el oficio, ocupación o cargo que desempeña? Cargo: _____

9A. En este trabajo, ¿cuántas personas tiene directamente a su cargo?
1 Ninguna
2 1 a 5
3 6 a 10
4 11 a 20
5 Más de 20

day / 5 Every day
Works weekends or nights — 1 None / 2 Some days / 3 More than half / 4 Almost every day / 5 Every day

8. In general, how long is your commute from home to work?
Minutes __ (0 if 100% remote)

9. What is your trade/occupation/position?
Position: _____

9A. In this job, how many people report directly to you?
1 None
2 1–5
3 6–10
4 11–20
5 More than 20

Ingresos y pagos en especie / Earnings & in-kind

Español

[Solo asalariados (P4=1–4)] De los siguientes rangos, antes de descuentos, ¿cuánto ganó el mes pasado en este empleo? Incluya propinas y comisiones; excluya viáticos y pagos en especie. (E: Mostrar tarjeta)
Menos de 1.000.000
Entre 1.000.000 y 1.500.000
Entre 1.500.000 y 2.000.000
Entre 2.000.000 y 2.500.000
Entre 2.500.000 y 3.000.000
Entre 3.000.000 y 3.500.000
Entre 3.500.000 y 4.000.000
Entre 4.000.000 y 4.500.000
Entre 4.500.000 y 5.000.000
Entre 5.000.000 y 6.000.000
Entre 6.000.000 y 7.000.000
Entre 7.000.000 y 8.000.000

English

[Employees only (Q4=1–4)] From the following ranges, before deductions, how much did you earn last month in this job? Include tips and commissions; exclude per diems and in-kind payments. (I: Show card)
Less than 1,000,000
Between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000
Between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000
Between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000
Between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000
Between 3,000,000 and 3,500,000
Between 3,500,000 and 4,000,000
Between 4,000,000 and 4,500,000
Between 4,500,000 and 5,000,000
Between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000
Between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000
Between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000
Between 8,000,000 and 10,000,000

Entre 8.000.000 y 10.000.000
Entre 10.000.000 y 12.000.000
Entre 12.000.000 y 15.000.000
Entre 15.000.000 y 20.000.000
Entre 20.000.000 y 25.000.000
Más de 25.000.000
NS/NR

10a. [Solo independientes (P4=5 o 6)] ¿Cuál fue la ganancia neta el mes pasado, después de gastos? (E: Mostrar tarjeta)
(mismos rangos que arriba)

11. Además del salario en dinero, ¿el mes pasado recibió pagos en especie por su trabajo (vivienda, alojamiento, alimentos, bonos tipo Sodexo, auxilio de internet, medicina prepagada, electrodomésticos, ropa)?
1 Sí → Pase a 12
2 No → Pase a 13

12. De los siguientes rangos, ¿a cuánto asciende el pago en especie?
Menos de 100.000
Entre 100.000 y 200.000
Entre 200.000 y 300.000
Entre 300.000 y 500.000
Entre 500.000 y 1.000.000
Entre 1.000.000 y 2.000.000
Más de 2.000.000

13. ¿Usted cotiza a un fondo de pensiones?
[Programador: Validar con P4B]
1 Sí
2 No

Between 10,000,000 and 12,000,000
Between 12,000,000 and 15,000,000
Between 15,000,000 and 20,000,000
Between 20,000,000 and 25,000,000
More than 25,000,000
DK/NR

10a. [Self-employed only (Q4=5 or 6)] What was the net profit last month after expenses? (I: Show card)
(same ranges as above)

11. Besides cash wages, did you receive in-kind payments last month for your work (housing, lodging, food, vouchers, internet stipend, prepaid health plan, appliances, clothing)?
1 Yes → Go to 12
2 No → Go to 13

12. From the following ranges, what was the value of in-kind payments?
Less than 100,000
Between 100,000 and 200,000
Between 200,000 and 300,000
Between 300,000 and 500,000
Between 500,000 and 1,000,000
Between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000
More than 2,000,000

13. Do you contribute to a pension fund?
[Programmer: validate with Q4B]
1 Yes
2 No

Búsqueda y redes laborales / Job search & networks

Español

14. ¿Cuál fue el medio principal por el cual consiguió este trabajo? (Marque la opción más importante)

English

14. What was the main channel through which you obtained this job? (Mark the most important)

1 Colegas o jefes de trabajos anteriores
2 Familiares o amigos de infancia
3 Amigos/profesores/otros contactos de su universidad o institución técnica/tecnológica
4 Oficina de su universidad o institución técnica/tecnológica
5 Avisos clasificados (prensa, internet, radio) o respondiendo convocatorias
6 Agencia pública o privada de empleo
7 Solicitud directa al empleador
8 Siempre ha trabajado allí
9 Inició su propio negocio/actividad por cuenta propia
10 Otro (¿cuál?)

15. ¡Ya casi estamos por la mitad! Ahora, pensando en su trabajo actual, ¿cuánto siente que su trabajo…
a. Tiene propósito — 1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Mucho
b. Es interesante para usted — 1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Mucho
c. Tiene un impacto positivo en los demás o en la sociedad — 1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Mucho
d. Le permite usar sus destrezas y habilidades — 1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Mucho
e. Ofrece oportunidades de ascenso — 1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Mucho

16. En general, ¿qué tan importante es para usted que su trabajo…
a. Ofrezca oportunidades de ascenso — 1 Nada importante / 2 Poco importante / 3 Bastante importante / 4 Muy importante
b. Sea interesante para usted — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
c. Le permita ayudar a los demás o sea útil para la sociedad — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
d. Ofrezca un horario flexible o la opción de trabajar desde la casa — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

1 Colleagues or former supervisors
2 Relatives or childhood friends
3 Friends/professors/other contacts met through your university or technical/technological institution
4 Your university's (or technical/technological institution's) office
5 Classified ads (press, internet, radio) or responding to calls for applications
6 Public or private employment agency
7 Direct application to the employer
8 Have always worked there
9 Started your own business / self-employment
10 Other (specify)

15. Almost halfway there! Now, thinking about your current job, how much do you feel your job…
a. Has purpose — 1 Not at all / 2 A little / 3 Some / 4 A lot
b. Is interesting to you — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
c. Has a positive impact on others or society — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
d. Lets you use your skills and abilities — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
e. Offers promotion opportunities — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

16. In general, how important is it to you that your job…
a. Offers promotion opportunities — 1 Not important / 2 Slightly important / 3 Quite important / 4 Very important
b. Is interesting to you — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
c. Lets you help others or be useful to society — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
d. Offers a flexible schedule or option to work from home — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

17. Do you provide financial support to parents, siblings, or other relatives who do not live in this household?

17. ¿Usted ayuda económicamente a padres, hermanos u otros familiares que no viven en este hogar?
1 Sí → ¿Monto el mes pasado? (rangos: <100.000; 100–200k; 200–300k; 300–500k; 500k–1M; 1–2M; >2M; NS/NR)
2 No

18A. En general, ¿qué tan importantes son los contactos o la "palanca" para conseguir un buen trabajo en este país?
1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Muy importante

18B. Para usted, ¿qué tan importantes han sido los contactos o las "palancas" en su vida laboral?
1 Nada / 2 Poco / 3 Algo / 4 Muy importante / 77 No aplica (nunca ha tenido trabajo)

19. En las últimas 4 semanas, ¿ha buscado trabajo o ha intentado poner en marcha un negocio?
1 Sí → Continuar
2 No → Pase a 21

20. ¿Por cuáles medios está buscando actualmente trabajo o empleo? (Marque todas las que apliquen)
1 Consultando colegas o jefes anteriores
2 Consultando familiares o amigos de infancia
3 Consultando amigos/profesores/contactos de su universidad o institución técnica/tecnológica
4 Consultando a la Oficina de su universidad o institución técnica/tecnológica
5 Consultando avisos clasificados (prensa, internet, radio)

1 Yes → Amount last month? (ranges: <100,000; 100–200k; 200–300k; 300–500k; 500k–1M; 1–2M; >2M; DK/NR)
2 No

18A. In general, how important are contacts or "connections" for getting a good job in this country?
1 Not important / 2 Slightly / 3 Somewhat / 4 Very important

18B. For you, how important have contacts or "connections" been in your working life?
1 Not / 2 Slightly / 3 Somewhat / 4 Very important / 77 Not applicable (never had a job)

19. In the last 4 weeks, have you looked for a job or tried to start a business?
1 Yes → Continue
2 No → Go to 21

20. By which means are you currently looking for a job? (Mark all that apply)
1 Consulting colleagues/former supervisors
2 Consulting relatives/childhood friends
3 Consulting friends/professors/contacts from your university or technical/technological institution
4 Consulting your university/technical institution office
5 Checking classified ads (press, internet, radio)
6 Registering with public or private employment agencies
7 Sending/delivering résumés directly to employers
8 Responding to advertisements/calls
9 Made preparations to start a business
10 Other means (specify)

21. Thinking about your first job after

6 Inscribiéndose en agencias públicas o privadas de empleo
7 Enviando/llevando hojas de vida directamente a empleadores
8 Respondiendo avisos o convocatorias
9 Hizo preparativos para iniciar un negocio
10 Otro medio (¿cuál?)

21. Pensando en su primer empleo después de terminar sus estudios, ¿cuál fue el medio principal por el cual lo consiguió?
1 Colegas o jefes anteriores
2 Familiares o amigos de infancia
3 Contactos de su universidad/tecnológica
4 Oficina de su universidad/tecnológica
5 Avisos clasificados
6 Agencia de empleo
7 Solicitud directa al empleador
8 Siempre ha trabajado allí
9 Negocio propio/cuenta propia
10 Otro (¿cuál?)
11 No aplica (nunca ha tenido un trabajo)

finishing your studies, what was the main channel through which you obtained it?
1 Colleagues or former supervisors
2 Relatives or childhood friends
3 Contacts from your university/technological institution
4 Your university/technological office
5 Classified ads
6 Employment agency
7 Direct application to the employer
8 Have always worked there
9 Own business/self-employment
10 Other (specify)
11 Not applicable (never had a job)

Clase social, pareja y amigos / Social class, partner & friends

Español

22. Algunas personas se describen como pertenecientes a la clase alta, media o baja. ¿A qué clase social pertenece usted?
1 Alta / 2 Media alta / 3 Media / 4 Media baja / 5 Baja

23. Dentro de diez (10) años, ¿a qué clase social aspira pertenecer?
1 Alta / 2 Media alta / 3 Media / 4 Media baja / 5 Baja

24. Su estado civil es:
01 Soltero(a) y sin pareja estable (Pase a 24A)
02 Soltero(a) con pareja estable (Pase a 25)
03 Casado(a) (Pase a 25)
04 En nive libre (Pase a 25)

English

22. Some people describe themselves as belonging to the upper, middle, or lower class. Which social class do you belong to?
1 Upper / 2 Upper-middle / 3 Middle / 4 Lower-middle / 5 Lower

23. In ten (10) years, which social class do you aspire to belong to?
1 Upper / 2 Upper-middle / 3 Middle / 4 Lower-middle / 5 Lower

24. Your marital status is:
01 Single without a stable partner (Go to 24A)
02 Single with a stable partner (Go to 25)
03 Married (Go to 25)
04 Cohabiting (Go to 25)

05 Divorciado(a) (Pase a 24A)
06 Viudo(a) (Pase a 24A)

24A. ¿Usted quisiera tener una pareja estable?
01 Sí → Pase a 25
02 No → Pase a 29

25. ¿Qué nivel educativo preferiría en su pareja, o le da igual?
0 Preescolar/primaria/secundaria
1 Media (10°–13°)
2 Técnico o tecnológico
3 Profesional niversitario
4 Especialización
5 Maestría
6 Doctorado
99 Me da igual

26. [Solo para quienes respondieron 02, 03 o 04 en estado civil] El niver nivel educativo alcanzado por su pareja es:
01 Preescolar/primaria/secundaria
02 Media (10°–13°)
03 Técnico o tecnológico
04 Profesional Universitario → Pase a 26A
05 Especialización → Pase a 26A
06 Maestría → Pase a 26A
07 Doctorado → Pase a 26A
99 No sabe

26A. Nombre de la institución educativa donde realizó sus estudios de pregrado
_____

27. [Solo para quienes respondieron 02, 03 o 04 en estado civil] ¿Cómo conoció a su pareja?
01 A través de la familia
02 A través de amigos de la infancia o el colegio
03 En su Universidad o a través de amigos de la Universidad
04 En el trabajo

05 Divorced (Go to 24A)
06 Widowed (Go to 24A)

24A. Would you like to have a stable partner?
01 Yes → Go to 25
02 No → Go to 29

25. What education level would you prefer in a partner, or does it not matter?
0 Preschool/primary/secondary
1 Upper secondary (10th–13th)
2 Technical or technological
3 University degree
4 Specialization
5 Master's
6 Doctorate
99 It does not matter

26. [Only for those who answered 02, 03, or 04 in marital status] What is your partner's highest level of education?
01 Preschool/primary/secondary
02 Upper secondary (10th–13th)
03 Technical or technological
04 University degree → Go to 26A
05 Specialization → Go to 26A
06 Master's → Go to 26A
07 Doctorate → Go to 26A
99 Don't know

26A. Name of undergraduate institution
_____

27. [Only for those who answered 02, 03, or 04 in marital status] How did you meet your partner?
01 Through family
02 Through childhood or school friends
03 At university or through university friends

05 En eventos sociales o lugares públicos (gimnasio, iglesia, bares, discotecas, restaurantes)
06 Por internet: redes sociales o Apps (IG, WA, TikTok, Snapchat, Tinder, Twitter/X, otro)
77 Otro (¿cuál?)

28. [Solo para quienes respondieron 02, 03 o 04 en estado civil] ¿A qué clase social pertenece su pareja?
1 Alta / 2 Media alta / 3 Media / 4 Media baja / 5 Baja

29. Por favor piense en sus 2 amigos o amigas más cercano/as. ¿A esos amigo/as los conoció en… (marque máx. Dos)?
1 Infancia o colegio
2 Universidad/Institución técnica o tecnológica
3 Trabajo
4 Otro

30. ¿A qué clase social pertenecen sus 2 amigo/as más cercano/as? (máx. Dos)
1 Alta / 2 Media alta / 3 Media / 4 Media baja / 5 Baja

31. ¿Cuál es el nivel educativo de esos 2 amigo/as más cercano/as?
0 Preescolar/primaria/secundaria
1 Media (10°–13°)
2 Técnico o tecnológico
3 Profesional niversitario
4 Especialización
5 Maestría
6 Doctorado
99 No sabe

04 At work
05 At social events or public places (gym, church, bars, clubs, restaurants)
06 Online: social networks or apps (IG, WA, TikTok, Snapchat, Tinder, Twitter/X, other)
77 Other (specify)

28. [Only for those who answered 02, 03, or 04 in marital status] Which social class does your partner belong to?
1 Upper / 2 Upper-middle / 3 Middle / 4 Lower-middle / 5 Lower

29. Please think about your two closest friends. Did you meet them in… (mark up to two)?
1 Childhood or school
2 University/technical-technological institution
3 Work
4 Other

30. Which social class do your two closest friends belong to? (mark up to two)
1 Upper / 2 Upper-middle / 3 Middle / 4 Lower-middle / 5 Lower

31. What is the education level of those two closest friends?
0 Preschool/primary/secondary
1 Upper secondary (10th–13th)
2 Technical or technological
3 University degree
4 Specialization
5 Master's
6 Doctorate
99 Don't know

Hijos / Children

Español

32. ¿Usted tiene hijos propios?

English

32. Do you have biological children?

1 Sí → Continuar
2 No → Pase a 33A

1 Yes → Continue
2 No → Go to 33A

33. ¿Cuántos hijos tiene? _____

33. How many children do you have? _____

34. ¿Cuál es la edad de cada hijo? (Si tiene menos de un año, marque 0) [Edad máxima 18]
Hijo 1: Edad ___ Hijo 2: Edad ___ Hijo 3: Edad ___ Hijo 4: Edad ___ Hijo N: Edad ___

34. What is the age of each child? (If less than one year old, mark 0) [Maximum age 18]
Child 1: Age ___ Child 2: Age ___ Child 3: Age ___ Child 4: Age ___ Child N: Age ___

35. ¿Cuántos hijos desea tener? _____

35. How many children would you like to have? _____

Satisfacción, felicidad, universidad / Satisfaction, happiness, university

Español

36. ¡Ya casi terminamos! Ahora queremos preguntarle sobre su satisfacción. ¿Qué tan satisfecho(a) está con…
a. [Solo quienes respondieron "Sí" en P3] Su trabajo — 1 Muy insatisfecho / 2 Insatisfecho / 3 Satisfecho / 4 Muy satisfecho
b. Su situación económica — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
c. Su vida sentimental — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
d. Sus amigos y su círculo social — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
e. Su vida en general — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

37. En general, ¿diría que es: 1 Muy feliz / 2 Bastante feliz / 3 No muy feliz / 4 Nada feliz?

38. [Para quienes tienen estudios postsecundarios (P1≠01)] ¿Qué tan importante fue su universidad o institución técnica/tecnológica para su éxito personal y profesional?
1 Muy importante / 2 Bastante importante / 3 Poco importante / 4 Nada importante

English

36. Almost done! We would like to ask about your satisfaction. How satisfied are you with…
a. [Only if "Yes" in Q3] Your job — 1 Very dissatisfied / 2 Dissatisfied / 3 Satisfied / 4 Very satisfied
b. Your financial situation — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
c. Your romantic life — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
d. Your friends and social circle — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
e. Your life overall — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

37. In general, would you say you are: 1 Very happy / 2 Quite happy / 3 Not very happy / 4 Not happy at all?

38. [For those with postsecondary studies (Q1≠01)] How important was your university or technical/technological institution for your personal and professional success?
1 Very important / 2 Quite important / 3 Slightly important / 4 Not important

Salud y salud mental / Health & mental health

Español

39. Listo, últimas preguntas. En general, ¿cómo describiría su estado de salud hoy?
1 Muy bueno / 2 Bueno / 3 Regular / 4 Malo / 5 Muy malo

40. ¿Con qué frecuencia fuma cigarrillos o usa productos de vapeo (p. ej., cigarrillos electrónicos)?
1 Nunca / 2 Menos de una vez al mes / 3 Algunas veces al mes / 4 Algunas veces a la semana / 5 Todos los días

41. Durante las últimas dos semanas, ¿con qué frecuencia ha tenido molestias por los siguientes problemas?
a. Poco interés o placer en hacer las cosas — 1 Ningún día / 2 Algunos días / 3 Más de la mitad / 4 Casi todos / 5 Todos los días
b. Se ha sentido decaído(a), deprimido(a) o sin esperanzas — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
c. Se ha sentido nervioso(a), intranquilo(a) o con los nervios de punta — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
d. Ha sentido que no puede dejar de preocuparse o controlar la preocupación — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5

English

39. Okay, last questions. Overall, how would you describe your health today?
1 Very good / 2 Good / 3 Fair / 4 Poor / 5 Very poor

40. How often do you smoke cigarettes or use vaping products (e-cigarettes)?
1 Never / 2 Less than once a month / 3 A few times a month / 4 A few times a week / 5 Every day

41. During the last two weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems?
a. Little interest or pleasure in doing things — 1 Not at all / 2 Several days / 3 More than half the days / 4 Nearly every day / 5 Every day
b. Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
c. Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
d. Not being able to stop or control worrying — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5

Actitudes, política y SPP / Attitudes, politics & SPP

Español

42. Para terminar, indique si está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.
a. Para usted, su éxito ha dependido más de la suerte que del esfuerzo en el trabajo — 1 Totalmente en desacuerdo / 2 Algo en desacuerdo / 3 Algo de acuerdo / 4 Totalmente de acuerdo
b. En general, el éxito en este país depende más de la suerte que del esfuerzo en el

English

42. Finally, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.
a. For you, your success has depended more on luck than on hard work — 1 Strongly disagree / 2 Somewhat disagree / 3 Somewhat agree / 4 Strongly agree
b. In general, success in this country depends more on luck than on hard work. — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

trabajo

c. Usted se siente cómodo interactuando con personas de todas las clases sociales — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

d. Estoy dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos para financiar bienes públicos, aunque yo no reciba un beneficio directo — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

43. Cuando se reúne con sus amigos, ¿con qué frecuencia hablan de política?
1 Nunca / 2 Casi nunca / 3 Algunas veces / 4 Frecuentemente

44. Cuando hay elecciones nacionales, ¿vota: 1 Siempre / 2 Generalmente / 3 Nunca? 43.

45. ¿Le gustaría mudarse a otro país? 1 Si → Pase a 45A / 2 No

45A. ¿A cuál país? _____

45B. ¿Temporal o permanentemente? 1 Temporal (<12 meses) / 2 Mediano plazo (1-5 años) / 3 Permanente

45C. ¿Cuál es el principal motivo por el que le gustaría mudarse a otro país? 1 Para estudiar / 2 Para buscar mejores oportunidades económicas / 3 Por motivos de seguridad / 4 Para reunirse con familiares o pareja / 5 Otro

46. Suponga que el gobierno desea otorgar apoyo financiero para la educación superior y debe decidir entre dos candidatos.

La **persona A** proviene de un hogar de **clase baja** y tiene un **desempeño académico bueno**.

La **persona B** proviene de un hogar de

c. You feel comfortable interacting with people from all social classes — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4
d. I am willing to pay more taxes to finance public goods, even if I do not receive a direct benefit. — 1 / 2 / 3 / 4

43. When you meet with your friends, how often do you talk about politics?
1 Never / 2 Almost never / 3 Sometimes / 4 Frequently

44. When there are national elections, do you vote: 1 Always / 2 Usually / 3 Never?

45. Would you like to move to another country? 1 Yes → Go to 45A / 2 No

45A. Which country? _____

45B. Temporarily or permanently**?** 1 Temporary (<12 months) / 2 Medium term (1–5 years) / 3 Permanent

45C. What is the main reason you would like to move to another country? 1 To study / 2 To seek better economic opportunities / 3 For security reasons / 4 To reunite with family members or a partner / 5 Other

46. Suppose the government wants to provide financial support for higher education and must decide between two candidates.

Person A comes from a **low-class household** and has **good academic performance.**

Person B comes from a **middle-class household** and has **excellent academic performance** (far superior to A's).
Who deserves more financial support?

clase media y tiene un **desempeño académico excelente** (muy superior al de A).

¿Quién merece más el apoyo financiero?

1 La persona A / 2 La persona B / 3 Ambas merecen el mismo apoyo

47. Si los impuestos aumentan, usted prefiere que el recaudo adicional se gaste en:
1 Apoyos financieros para la educación superior de jóvenes de bajos recursos con excelente desempeño académico
2 Subsidios a hogares en condiciones de pobreza

48. ¿Qué pinion tiene acerca del programa "Ser Pilo Paga"? (apoyo financiero para educación superior de jóvenes con buen desempeño académico de bajos recursos)
1 Muy favorable / 2 Algo favorable / 3 Desfavorable / 4 Muy desfavorable / 5 No sabe

49. Si desea, cuéntenos más acerca de su pinion del programa "Ser Pilo Paga".

50. En lugar de reclamar las boletas de cine, ¿quisiera donar el dinero equivalente a programas de becas a estudiantes jóvenes brillantes de bajos recursos?
1 Sí / 2 No

1 Person A / 2 Person B / 3 Both deserve the same support

47. If taxes increase, would you prefer the additional revenue be spent on:
1 Financial support for higher education of high-achieving low-income youth
2 Subsidies to households in poverty

48. What is your opinion of the "Ser Pilo Paga" program (a financial aid program for higher education for high-achieving, low-income youth)?
1 Very favorable / 2 Somewhat favorable / 3 Unfavorable / 4 Very unfavorable / 5 Don't know

49. If you wish, please tell us more about your opinion of the "Ser Pilo Paga" program.

50. Instead of claiming the Cinemark voucher, would you like to donate the equivalent amount to scholarship programs for talented low-income youth?
1 Yes / 2 No

Cierre y controles / Closing & controls

Español

FIN DE LA ENCUESTA

Le agradecemos mucho sus opiniones. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) en el futuro a volver a

English

END OF SURVEY

Thank you very much for your opinions. Would you be willing to collaborate with us

colaborar con nosotros?
1 Sí / 2 No

again in the future?
1 Yes / 2 No

CONTROLES FINALES
Fecha de la encuesta: Día __ / Mes __ / Año 2025
Hora inicio __:__ Fin __:__
Encuestador _____ Cédula _____
Supervisor _____ Cédula _____

FINAL CONTROLS
Survey date: Day __ / Month __ / Year 2025
Start time __:__ End __:__
Interviewer _____ ID _____
Supervisor _____ ID _____

Supervisión y hallazgos / Supervision & findings

Español

SUPERVISIÓN / MONITORIZACIÓN (75%)
Re-contacto Presencial / Telefónico / Revisión en Campo / Revisión en Crítica
HALLAZGO — 1 Inconsistencia 2 Datos Ficticios 3 Pregunta faltante
ACCIÓN — 5 Anular 6 Verificar 7 Recuperar 8 Devolver a Campo
APROBADO / RECHAZADO

Verificación de Crítica / Codificación — Hallazgos y Acciones:
HALLAZGO — 1 Omisión código 2 Código errado 3 Omisión de crítica
ACCIÓN — 1 Asignar código 2 Corregir 3 Revisión pases/campos 7 Otro

INCIDENCIAS DE CAMPO (marcar):
1 No había nadie en el hogar
2 La persona seleccionada no vive ahí (pero vive en Colombia)

3 La persona seleccionada no vive ahí (vive en el exterior)
4 Rechazo del hogar (no colabora)
5 Rechazo del portero (no permite ingreso)
6 Edificación no residencial
7 No había adultos en el hogar
8 Entrevista incompleta/abandono
9 No se encontró en tres revisitas
10 Seleccionado no apto (sordo, enfermo

English

SUPERVISION / MONITORING (75%)
In-person re-contact / Phone re-contact / Field review / Desk review
FINDING — 1 Inconsistency 2 Fabricated data 3 Missing question
ACTION — 5 Cancel 6 Verify 7 Recover 8 Return to field
APPROVED / REJECTED

Desk review / Coding — Findings and Actions:
FINDING — 1 Code omission 2 Wrong code 3 Omitted review
ACTION — 1 Assign code 2 Correct 3 Check skips/fields 7 Other

FIELD INCIDENTS (mark):
1 No one at household
2 Selected person does not live there (but lives in Colombia)

3 Selected person does not live there (lives abroad)
4 Household refusal (no cooperation)
5 Doorman refusal (no entry)
6 Non-residential building
7 No adults present
8 Incomplete interview/abandonment
9 Selected person not found after three revisits