Job Exploration Risk and Spousal Co-working: Evidence from India

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Abstract

In labor markets with potentially unsafe working conditions and information frictions, job exploration is risky for women. I study spousal co-working, a work arrangement that can mitigate exploration risks, using surveys and three field experiments with workers and employers in India's garment sector. Survey data on more than 4,000 workers show that 46% of married women in the sector work in the same factory as their husbands, typically following them there. An incentivized job choice experiment reveals that women value the option to switch to a new workplace with their spouse as much as a 36% wage increase. Although spousal control plays a role, risk mitigation emerges as the primary driver. Application rates are equal when employed couples randomly receive offers to switch employers together or for the husband to switch alone, and fall by 50% when only wives receive offers. Men working with their wives in factories with worse conditions are *less* willing to switch alone, contributing to job lock. Recognizing that co-working couples have lower job mobility, employers are 54–152% more interested in hiring them than other job seekers in an incentivized hiring experiment, and take advantage by offering co-working women slightly lower wages.

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1 Introduction

In low- and middle-income settings, many of the available jobs are not desirable (Breza and Kaur 2025). These jobs offer low wages and a wide range of disamenities, including health risks, long commutes, threats of verbal or physical abuse, and the possibility of wage theft (Blattman and Dercon 2018, International Labour Organization et al. 2022, Donald and Grosset-Touba 2025, Kapoor 2025). Workplaces can be particularly challenging for women, who face an increased risk of harassment and gender-based violence (Folke and Rickne 2022, Boudreau et al. 2023).

Working conditions can vary widely between firms in the same industry and even the same labor market (Tanaka 2020, Boudreau et al. 2024). Information frictions make it difficult for job seekers to learn about the work environment before joining a workplace. Concerns about landing in a harsh workplace not only deter women from entering the labor force, but can also discourage working women from exploring new job opportunities, limiting their outside options and wage growth (Sharma 2023, Paul-Delvaux 2024). These barriers to women's job mobility contribute to misallocation and reduce economic productivity (Hsieh et al. 2019, Goldberg et al. 2025).

I study a job search strategy that women can use to reduce the risk of a bad job match: working in the same establishment as their husbands, or "co-working". Husbands can absorb the risk of job exploration by joining new jobs alone and screening the workplace before referring their wives. If couples start a new job concurrently, the husband's presence can offer protection and support if the workplace proves unsafe or exploitative. Working with a spouse may deter workplace harassment, help women negotiate with male supervisors, and even make commutes safer and more pleasant. I investigate this phenomenon in the context of India's garment manufacturing sector, the second-largest employer in the country after agriculture.

Using newly collected observational data on more than 4,000 workers in this industry, I first show that 46% of married women employed in the garment sector work in the same establishment as their spouse, despite living within commuting distance of hundreds of factories.[1] Co-working has remained largely undocumented as linked household and employer data are rarely available.[2] However, proxy measures based on cross-country labor-force surveys suggest co-working may be a common feature of the labor market, especially in emerging economies.[3] Of course, couples

[1] This estimate is based on *all* married women working in a garment factory, regardless of the husband's employment status. Limiting the sample to those with working husbands increases the co-working share to 52%.

[2] To the best of my knowledge, only two papers have estimated co-working rates. Hyatt (2019) and Rong (2023) find that 8%-12% of dual-earner couples in the US and Norway are employed in the same establishment.

[3] 19% of dual-earner couples engaged in non-agricultural salaried work are employed in the *same* three-digit industry, rising to 40-60% in some low- and middle-income countries. Estimates are based on micro data from nationally-representative labor force surveys for 35 countries, accessed through IPUMS International. I use the share of couples working in the same narrowly-defined industry as a proxy for working in the same establishment.

may co-work for various reasons. For instance, they may want to spend time together, husbands may want to monitor their wives at work, or the husband's presence may make the commute or the workplace safer.

In this paper, I demonstrate that couples primarily rely on co-working to navigate workplace safety concerns and the resulting job search and matching frictions. On the labor supply side, I estimate the value job seekers place on switching to a new job with a spouse rather than alone and investigate potential drivers of these preferences. I also assess potential costs, asking whether co-working introduces additional job search frictions. On the labor demand side, I evaluate whether employers adjust their wage setting behavior to capture rents when couples value the amenity of working together. Together, these exercises shed light on the economic costs of unsafe workplaces for women. I focus on how these risks shape workplace choice and job-job mobility for working women, and briefly discuss implications for women's extensive margin labor supply at the end.

India's garment manufacturing sector provides an ideal setting for studying these questions. The textile and apparel industry employs 45 million people in India, contributing 2.3% to the GDP, 13% to industrial production, and 12% to exports (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India 2025). Although 57.97% of women working in India's manufacturing sector are employed in this industry (Periodic Labor Force Survey 2024), it is known to offer poor working conditions (International Labour Organization 2016).[4] To systematically investigate household labor supply decisions and employer responses in this setting, I implement observational surveys and three experiments in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, a major garment hub, which accounts for 90% of India's cotton knitwear exports.

I begin by collecting two rounds of observational data on garment workers in Tirupur.[5] I then conduct three experiments to understand households' job search behavior in the presence of gendered safety risks and information frictions and to investigate employers' responses. First, I implement an incentivized *Job Choice Experiment* with nearly 800 married garment workers to estimate how much job seekers value switching to a new job with their spouse versus alone, and to disentangle the mechanisms driving these preferences. Second, I evaluate how employed couples respond to new job opportunities through an *Applications Experiment* with 338 couples,

[4]Extensive qualitative research on garment factories in the state of Karnataka has revealed that workers face pressure to meet targets at the expense of food, water, and restroom breaks, the use of abusive language, sexual harassment, prolonged exposure to heat and dust, etc. (Cividep India 2023, López 2023).

[5]I conducted an initial survey with 551 workers in 2023 (*Exploratory Survey*) and a second survey with 4,050 workers in 2024-25 (*Listing Survey*). Garment workers were recruited for the study through door-to-door household surveys in residential areas near three industrial clusters in Tirupur. Using a household survey to recruit garment workers for the study helps avoid selection issues that may have arisen if I had collaborated with specific firms which allowed me to survey their workers. Data collection is described in Section 4 and Appendix Section B.1.

randomizing whether both spouses receive an offer to join the same workplaces or the offer is extended only to the husband or the wife. The samples for both these experiments include couples working together and separately. Finally, to study employer responses, I implement an incentivized *Hiring Experiment* with 65 garment sector employers who are asked to make hypothetical hiring decisions between co-working couples and other job seekers.

The observational data reveal four key insights about the labor market. First, working conditions are often harsh and vary across factories within the same cluster. On average, 20-35% of garment workers report specific challenges such as long working hours, unsafe conditions, delayed pay, wage theft, and sexual harassment. Thus, exploring a new job can be risky, especially for women.[6] Second, switching factories is the primary driver of wage growth, as promotions and wage increases tend to be modest and infrequent. If the fear of ending up in a harsh work environment discourages job exploration, this carries real costs. Third, the husband's presence can provide protection. In a ranking task, 54% of married women selected their husband's presence as the single most safety-enhancing feature when switching factories, ahead of female supervisors, CCTV cameras on the factory floor, and other measures. Finally, co-working is widespread. 46% of married women in the garment sector work with their husbands, despite living within commuting distance of hundreds of potential employers. 48% of couples working in separate garment factories report that they co-worked in the past. Interestingly, job switches are sequential and led by the husband: 60% of couples working together say the husband joined the factory first. Motivated by these facts, I outline a simple model of dual-earner job search, incorporating heterogeneous workplace conditions for women across employers, information frictions, and a variety of motives for co-working, discussed in detail below.

To measure how much garment workers value switching jobs with their spouse instead of moving alone, I implement an incentivized *Job Choice Experiment* with 792 married workers (446 couples). All participants were employed in the garment sector, either with their spouse or separately. They were asked to choose between several pairs of hypothetical job opportunities, with randomized monthly salaries and job attributes (Mas and Pallais 2017, Maestas et al. 2023). One of the jobs in each pair was randomly assigned to be a "co-working job": participants were told that the factory was looking to hire multiple people for different roles and their spouse could switch to the new job with them immediately. The other job was at a factory with only one vacancy. To incentivize truthful reporting of preferences, participants were informed that the study team was collaborating with HR managers at nearby garment factories who were looking to hire, and could recommend them for real job opportunities based on their survey responses.

[6] In fact, 63% of female garment workers have never switched factories compared to 48% of men.

I find workers have substantial willingness to pay for moving to a new factory with their spouse. Women value the opportunity to switch jobs with their spouse as much as a 36% wage increase, while estimates for men are positive but significantly lower at 24%.[7] However, when men are asked to choose a new job for their wives, jobs that allow co-working are valued as much as a 38% wage increase, closing the gender gap in co-working preferences. Together, these patterns suggest that co-working may address challenges that disproportionately affect women.

Next, I consider three possible explanations for co-working preferences.[8] First, couples may prefer to switch to a new, unfamiliar workplace together because the husband's presence can protect the wife if working conditions turn out to be harsh. Harsh conditions encompass safety risks (harassment, injury, illness, commuting safety etc.) as well as labor exploitation (wage theft, forced overtime work).[9] Second, workers may simply value working with someone they know, or derive high amenity value from spending time with their spouse. Finally, co-working may be a result of intra-household dynamics, such as spousal control: husbands may want to monitor their wives' interactions at work or control their wages.

To disentangle these mechanisms, I first turn to the model predictions. If co-working is primarily a risk mitigation strategy to protect the wife, women will be less likely to switch jobs alone than men. Couples will either switch together or husbands will screen workplaces before referring their wives. Additionally, husbands will be more willing to search alone once they have secured a safe job for their wife. By contrast, if co-working reflects the value of spending time together or spousal control, couples will prefer joint moves over either spouse switching jobs alone.

I test these predictions through the *Applications Experiment* embedded within the *Job Choice Experiment*. Couples employed in the garment sector, including those working together and separately, were offered the opportunity to be recommended for new job opportunities at nearby factories. I randomized whether both spouses would be recommended to the same factories ("Joint" arm), or only one of the two would be recommended ("Husband Only" and "Wife Only" arms). Selected participants had to "apply" for the opportunity offered to them by calling a hotline number. I compare differences in take-up across treatment arms.

The evidence suggests that co-working functions as insurance against the risks women face when exploring new jobs. Across specifications, I find low take-up in the Wife Only arm, between

[7] Women's willingness to pay remains higher when measured in absolute amounts (Rupees per month).

[8] Workers may value switching jobs with their spouse because they have small networks, and their spouse is the only one who can give them a job referral. The experiment shuts down this channel by telling participants they have received two job offers and must choose between them. Thus, co-working is clearly valued beyond the role it plays in helping households navigate referral-based hiring.

[9] Since 84% of people walk to work or take a free bus provided by their factory, monetary costs of commuting are not a relevant factor in this setting.

12–14%, while application rates in the Husband Only and Joint arms are approximately twice as high. If co-working were driven by husbands' efforts to monitor their wives' interactions at work or control their earnings, take-up should have been lower in the Husband Only arm than the Joint arm, especially among couples working together. Instead, take-up rates are statistically indistinguishable.[10] Moreover, when co-working couples have higher job satisfaction at baseline, husbands are more willing to explore new jobs alone. A one-standard deviation increase in satisfaction is associated with a 15 percentage point (54%) increase in application rates in the Husband Only arm, while no such pattern emerges in other arms.[11] Thus, once the couple learns that the workplace is safe for the wife, husbands are comfortable searching for higher-paid opportunities elsewhere.[12]

I also introduce random variation in job attributes across the hypothetical jobs in the *Job Choice Experiment* to test whether the value of co-working increases in the presence of specific disamenities: long commutes, the risk of workplace harassment, and language barriers.[13] In addition to deterring harassment and improving commute safety, co-working can help women communicate and negotiate with Tamil-speaking supervisors, because many workers are inter-state migrants and men are more fluent in the local language (Tamil) than their wives. Focusing on the "worst" jobs in the experiment which feature all three disamenities, I find women are in fact more willing to accept these jobs if they can join with their husbands than if they had to switch alone.

Next, I assess the importance of the alternative mechanisms mentioned above. In a supplementary job choice experiment with the same sample, I randomize whether the hypothetical offer allows co-working with a spouse or a same-sex peer.[14] Workers value working with a peer as much as a 15.5% wage increase, about half the value of working with a spouse, suggesting that spousal co-working offers substantial additional benefits. Finally, I evaluate the role of intra-household dynamics. If households endorse conservative gender norms that restrict women's mobility or husbands want to monitor their wives at work, women may only be permitted to work if they work with their husbands. Indeed, both women who are more mobility-constrained and

[10]Further, I find limited evidence to suggest that husbands who leave might be delegating control to someone else. In fact, when co-working couples have more relatives working with them in their factory, husbands are less willing to switch alone.

[11]Job satisfaction is reported on a 4-point Likert scale. I take the mean satisfaction for both spouses.

[12]Heterogeneity analysis from the *Job Choice Experiment* further supports the idea that co-working helps couples manage job exploration risks. Women who are more concerned about commuting safety and occupational safety risks value co-working with their husbands more than those who are less worried.

[13]I randomized the following attributes of each job: commute time; whether the factory has arrangements for women's safety, such as CCTV cameras, female HR managers, and female security guards; and whether the supervisor and most co-workers can speak the respondents' native language.

[14]Previous work has shown that people value working with friends so they can socialize at work and commute together (Park 2019, Donald and Grosset-Touba 2025).

men who are classified as being more jealous, based on their wives' reports, value co-working 36%-50% more than other garment workers. While spousal control may play a role, results from the *Applications Experiment* and observational data help rule this out as a primary driver of co-working. Co-working husbands are willing to explore new jobs alone. Moreover, 60% of co-working couples say the husband joined the factory first.[15]

Taken together, evidence from the two labor supply-side experiments suggests that couples co-work as a way to protect wives from the risk of ending up in a harsh workplace. Women rarely switch to new jobs alone, but are able to move to higher-paid opportunities through joint or sequential job search. Thus, co-working can make it easier for women to switch jobs relative to searching alone if some workplaces offer poor conditions.

However, couples' dependence on this work arrangement may reduce their job mobility *relative to other job seekers*, contributing to job lock and dampening couples' wage growth. In the *Applications Experiment*, husbands working with their wives in lower-quality factories were reluctant to explore new jobs alone. Therefore, couples working in factories with worse environments may be compelled to wait until they can coordinate a joint move or remain in place.

In the second part of the paper, I investigate how employers respond. Is co-working associated with a wage premium or a penalty? Standard models predict that firms would mark down wages for workers with lower labor supply elasticity (Card et al. 2018, Lamadon et al. 2022). On the other hand, since churn is pervasive and costly in this setting, employers may prefer hiring co-working couples over others who are more mobile. Lower churn can increase firm productivity and employers may share this surplus with workers. I study employers' hiring and wage-setting decisions over co-working couples versus other job seekers through the *Hiring Experiment*. Employers were asked to make hiring decisions between several pairs of hypothetical job applicants with randomized experience, and to report expected tenures and proposed salaries for each candidate. I randomized whether male applicants would refer their wives, a male friend, or no one in the future, capturing the sequential nature of job search among co-working couples. Similarly, I randomized whether female candidates had been referred for the position by their husbands, a female friend, or no one.[16]

I find that employers have a strong preference for employing co-working couples. They are 33 percentage points (151.9%) more likely to hire female applicants seeking to work with a spouse than those seeking to work with a friend, expecting married couples to have lower attrition. The

[15]This remains true when focusing on couples where the wife has had a previous job, suggesting that couples are comfortable working separately. This pattern is not driven by men who are referring their wives for their *first* jobs.

[16]I follow the approach in Kessler et al. (2019) to incentivize respondents: employers were told that they would be matched with real job seekers based on their survey responses.

corresponding gap for male applicants is 15.8 percentage points (53.6%).

Data on proposed monthly salaries reveal that lower job mobility among co-working women translates into small wage markdowns. Proposed wages for women hired for operator roles are 6% lower among women referred by their husbands compared to those who do not have any network members working at the firm, and I can rule out markdowns larger than 11.37%. Although co-working preferences confer some market power, the observed markdown is far below women's willingness to pay for co-working (36% of monthly income), suggesting that the surplus is not eliminated. I find no evidence of markdowns for men, consistent with the fact that employers perceive co-working women to be less mobile than their husbands.

Together, the results suggest that in settings where some workplaces offer harsh working conditions and signals of firm quality are weak, dual-earner couples co-work as a strategy to insure women against the risks of a bad job match. Through joint job-switching or sequential job search led by the husband, couples mitigate the risk that women are exposed to unsafe or exploitative environments. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that job mobility and wage growth are higher for women when they have the option to co-work than when they do not. A supplementary survey experiment with non-working women reveals that co-working opportunities may even facilitate labor market entry for women. Employers recognize that couples value co-working as a source of protection, and adapt their wage setting policies to partially capture rents.

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, I contribute to the literature on the causes and consequences of labor market frictions, especially in developing countries. While prior work has shown that demand-side information frictions about workers' ability can inhibit the formation of efficient matches between job seekers and firms (Abel et al. 2020, Abebe et al. 2021, Bassi and Nansamba 2022, Carranza et al. 2022), and induce employers to rely on referral based hiring (Pallais and Sands 2016), there has been relatively little work on supply-side information frictions about job attributes (Boudreau et al. 2024). I present novel evidence on married couples co-working in the same establishment, an under-studied labor market phenomenon, showing that this work arrangement is driven by couples' efforts to navigate uncertainty about working conditions. Co-working can protect the wife from the risk of ending up in a workplace that is unsafe, exploitative, or otherwise low quality.

Second, I contribute to a growing body of work on under-exploration in urban labor markets (Dean et al. 2024). I show that the fear of ending up in a harsh work environment discourages women from exploring new jobs alone, despite living near hundreds of potential employers. Building on recent work showing that joint commuting with peers helps women engage in job search and enter the labor force (Donald and Grosset-Touba 2025, Kapoor and Gade 2025), I

show that joint or sequential job switching with their husbands facilitates job exploration and job mobility for working women.

Third, I contribute to an extensive body of work documenting barriers to women's job search, labor force participation, and career progression, particularly in low-income countries. Previous research has considered the role of social norms (Fernández 2013, Jayachandran 2021, Field et al. 2021, Jalota and Ho 2024), commuting frictions (Cheema et al. 2019, Le Barbanchon et al. 2021, Borker et al. 2021, Garlick et al. 2025), safety concerns (Folke and Rickne 2022, Siddique 2022, Becerra and Guerra 2023, Buchmann et al. 2024), the need for flexible jobs (Fletcher et al. 2018, Ho et al. 2024), and intra-household constraints, including opposition from husbands and in-laws (Bernhardt et al. 2018, Dean and Jayachandran 2019, Anukriti et al. 2020, Bursztyn et al. 2020, McKelway 2021, Adams et al. 2024, Hsu et al. 2025, Kala and McKelway 2025, Lowe and McKelway 2025, Rajah 2025, Sanin 2025). While previous work emphasizes how husbands constrain their wives' labor supply, I show that supportive husbands can help their wives overcome barriers to job exploration. Recent work suggests that employers in developing countries have greater monopsony power over female employees who have limited outside options (Sharma 2024, Paul-Delvaux 2024). I document a new source of employer monopsony power: employers recognize that co-working women have lower job mobility than other job seekers and offer them lower wages.

Finally, I build on the literature studying married couples' labor supply, most of which focuses on co-location frictions and is set in advanced economies (Mincer 1978, Frank 1978, Lundberg and Pollak 1996, Costa and Kahn 2000, Guler et al. 2012, Burke and Miller 2018, Venator 2022, Jayachandran et al. 2024, Hsu et al. 2024). Only two papers, set in Norway and the US, have studied co-working couples, and neither explores why couples co-work (Hyatt 2019, Rong 2023). I show that in settings characterized by safety concerns, information frictions, and conservative gender norms, an even more extreme form of co-location emerges. Couples choose to work in the same establishment, not just the same commuting zone. While co-working may be a second-best solution in these contexts, it increases household exposure to income risk and may contribute to misallocation if spouses would be more productive working in separate industries. I discuss these considerations and associated policy implications in greater detail in the conclusion.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting and motivating facts. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4 describes the data collection. Sections 5 and 6 present the design and results for the labor supply experiments with workers. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the design and results for the labor demand experiment with employers. Section 9 discusses implications for women's extensive margin labor supply and

assesses the net benefits of spousal co-working. Section 10 concludes.

2 Context

The study is set in the ready-made-garment and textile manufacturing sector in India, the second-largest employer in the country after agriculture. All three experiments were implemented in Tirupur district in Tamil Nadu, a major garment manufacturing hub, which employs 31% of India's garment workers (Sharma 2024) and accounts for 90% of India's cotton knitwear exports. The garment sector in Tirupur employs 800,000 workers in production and ancillary roles across 20,000 factories (Tirupur Exporters' Association 2025).

Garment and textile manufacturing plants in Tirupur are organized in dense clusters scattered across the district. Most individuals working in these clusters live in residential compounds nearby, while others commute from surrounding villages. According to India's most recent Economic Census, Tirupur had an average of 4.3 textile and garment manufacturing establishments per square kilometer in 2012-13. Thus, garment workers in Tirupur have many potential employers. A large share of these workers are internal migrants from rural areas. Between 50% and 60% of the workforce belongs to other states in India or other districts in Tamil Nadu (Valsan 2013, Pattanayak 2021), mirroring patterns observed in Bangladesh and China (Boudreau et al. 2024).

The study was implemented around three such clusters of garment factories in Tirupur. The clusters include small, informal enterprises with fewer than 50 employees as well as medium and large establishments, with 50-250 and 250+ employees respectively.[17] Production workers in these factories include machine operators, helpers, line supervisors, and those engaged in ancillary tasks such as quality control, packing, ironing, etc.[18] Each area also features a dense network of residential compounds situated near the factories, where garment workers rent rooms.

To identify the sample for the three experiments, I implemented a door-to-door household survey (*Listing Survey*) in these residential compounds. Appendix Figure A.2 shows examples of residential compounds, and Appendix Figure A.3 illustrates the spatial distribution of a subset of *Listing Survey* respondents relative to factories located in one of the study locations.[19]

[17] The median worker is employed at a factory with 350 employees, while the 90th percentile is 1,000.

[18] Garment and textile units employ manufacturing workers across a range of roles, including cutting (manual and machine-operated); dyeing and fabric cleaning; ironing and folding; packaging and labeling; quality check and finishing; screen printing; sewing and embroidery machine operators (tailors); spot washing; supervisors; warehouse workers (loading and unloading raw materials and finished products); and weaving and knitting machine operators. Entry-level workers may be initially hired as "helpers" in each of these departments at lower pay.

[19] While a few compounds are owned by specific factories, the vast majority are privately owned. Factory-owned residential compounds were excluded from the *Listing Exercise*.

2.1 The Market for Labor in Tirupur's Garment Sector

Before describing the data collection in detail, I highlight a set of motivating facts about the labor market. Statistics presented in this section are summarized in Table 1 along with the underlying data sources. I primarily draw on data from an *Exploratory Survey* with a representative sample of 551 garment workers which I implemented in Tirupur in October 2023. The sample includes married and unmarried workers in the three garment factory clusters. Details on sampling and data collection for this survey are provided in Appendix B.1. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table B.1. I also draw on two supplementary datasets generated during the study, described in detail in Section 4: survey data on 4,050 garment workers collected through a door-to-door household survey at the time of study recruitment in 2024-25 (*Listing Survey*), and data on 446 married garment worker couples in the *Job Choice Experiment* sample.

Fact 1: *Job seekers, especially women, face the risk of a bad match when exploring new jobs.* Between 20% and 35% of garment workers in the *Exploratory Survey* report facing various challenges in their current jobs, including long working hours, unsafe working conditions, delayed salary payments, and the threat of wage theft. Reports are slightly higher among women than men (Appendix Figure A.4). Reported working conditions even vary between workers employed in different factories in the same cluster (Appendix Figure A.5).[20] The cost of a bad match is higher for women than men, as women face increased risk of workplace harassment (International Labour Organization et al. 2022). 36% of respondents in my setting have heard of at least one incident of sexual harassment in a garment factory or experienced one themselves.

Relatedly, extensive qualitative research on garment factories in the neighboring state of Karnataka has documented the use of exploitative practices, commonly described as "production torture" by factory workers (Cividep India 2023, López 2023, Cividep India 2024, Cividep India 2025). "Production torture" encompasses a range of practices, including intense pressure to meet production targets, often at the expense of food, water, and restroom breaks; the use of abusive and demeaning language by supervisors; physical abuse; compulsory over time work; threats to deduct wages for making production mistakes or showing up late to work, etc. Supervisors may be more likely to use these tactics with women, believing they are less likely to retaliate (International Labour Organization 2016). Qualitative interviews with factory workers in Tirupur revealed similar concerns. Moreover, workers reported that the labor contractors and network members who refer them for jobs do not always reveal the real working conditions in the factory.

[20] In each of the three survey locations, responses span the full Likert scale: some workers strongly agree their factory features a specific challenge while others strongly disagree.

Fact 2: *Although job switching can be risky, it is the primary driver of wage growth.*
Switching jobs is the most effective path to higher wages and career advancement in this setting.[21] The *Exploratory Survey* shows that among workers with at least one year of experience at their current factory, 63% never received a raise and the median annual raise is only 4.1%. A proxy measure suggests that, on average, those who switch jobs experience a 10% increase in wages; the 75th and 90th percentiles are as high as 20%-33%.[22] Switching jobs also enables early-career workers to advance more quickly. Entry-level workers are hired as low-paid helpers and can seek promotion to operator roles after acquiring the necessary skills. Although many reach basic proficiency within one to four months, interviews reveal that many factories delay promotion for a year or more.[23] Among those currently working in operator roles, 98% joined as operators.

Fact 3: *Despite high factory density and gains from switching, job transitions are rare.*
Even with 100-200 potential employers nearby, 54% of garment workers have worked at a single factory throughout their average tenure of 4.4 years in Tirupur. These never-switchers first started working here nearly three years ago on average, suggesting that the effects are not driven by recent entrants. Notably, the share of never-switchers is higher among women (63%) than men (48%).

Fact 4: *The husband's presence can play a protective role in the workplace.*
When asked what would make them feel safer about switching to a new garment factory, married women overwhelmingly cite having their husbands at the new workplace as a top factor, compared to other workplace attributes: having a friend or relative in the factory, CCTV cameras on the factory floor, female supervisors etc. (Appendix Table A.6). The presence of the husband can offer women support and protection that they would lack if they were navigating the new job alone. For instance, the husband's presence may deter workplace harassment, offer immediate support in case of injury, and negotiate with male supervisors if wages are delayed or under-paid. Women may find it difficult to negotiate on their own, as supervisors tend to be male and may not speak their native language. Consistent with this, *Exploratory Survey* data show that women with

[21] Wage differences persist among firms as factories producing for the export market can afford to pay more. Similarly, some factories hire workers on piece rate contracts instead of shift contracts with a fixed wage. High productivity workers can earn more if they are compensated on a piece-rate basis.

[22] Respondents in the *Listing Survey* were asked how much their salary increased in the last two years and how many factories they had worked at during that time. I divide the wage growth by the number of job switches to calculate the approximate average wage increase from each switch.

[23] This strategy allows employers to minimize the risk of production errors and evaluate whether workers are reliable before integrating them in assembly line production. Anecdotally, some factories do not promote experienced helpers to operator roles because they want to continue paying them lower wages while benefiting from their productivity.

spouses in the garment industry, especially those working in the same factory, face a lower risk of wage theft. These women are 13 percentage points (43%) less likely to report wage penalties for infractions like tardiness or production errors than other female garment workers (Appendix Table A.7 Columns 1 and 2). Having a friend or relative in the industry does not offer similar protection (Appendix Table A.7 Columns 5 - 8).[24]

Fact 5: *Married couples often work together, and wives tend to be the trailing spouse.*
76% of garment workers are married, and 45% of married garment workers work in the *same establishment* as their spouse. Wives tend to be the trailing spouse, as 60% of couples co-working at baseline report that the husband joined the factory first, while 27% report joining together.[25] Moreover, 48% of married couples working in separate factories have co-worked in the past.[26] These patterns suggest that husbands may be absorbing the risks of job exploration: they initially switch alone, refer their wives if the job proves acceptable, and move on in search of better opportunities to repeat the cycle.[27]

3 Conceptual Framework

Taken together, the facts documented in Section 2 suggest that job switching can be risky, especially for women, and married couples may try to mitigate the risks of job exploration by engaging in joint or sequential job search, with husbands taking the lead. I set up a simple three-period model of couples' workplace decisions motivated by these facts.

3.1 Set-up

The labor market has a discrete number of firms $j \in 1, ..., J$ offering gender-specific wages w_j^M and w_j^F and working conditions d_j. Firm-level working conditions are characterized as disamenities, contribute negatively to workers' utility, and have variance σ^2. Larger values of d signify worse

[24] Specifications include controls for survey location, years of experience working in Tirupur, and whether the respondent belongs to the state of Tamil Nadu.

[25] This remains true when focusing on couples where the wife has had a previous job, suggesting that this pattern is not driven by couples where men are referring their wives for their *first* jobs.

[26] Effectively, 79% of dual-earner households in the garment sector have *ever* co-worked.

[27] Consistent with this, Appendix Table A.7 Columns 3 and 4 show that married women whose husbands work in a *different* garment factory are slightly less likely to report wage penalties than (i) unmarried women and (ii) women whose husbands are outside the industry. This pattern points to husbands screening workplaces so they can place their wives in better factories, or a reputation channel whereby, after a co-working spell, supervisors know the husband and are less likely to mistreat the wife even after he leaves.

working conditions. I assume that the utility cost of disamenities, denoted by $c(d_j)$ is an increasing, convex function ($c' > 0$, $c'' > 0$) such that $c(d_j) \geq 0$. d_j can be parametrized in terms of an underlying random variable Y_j: $d_j = \mu + \sigma \cdot Y_j$, where $\mu > 0, \sigma > 0, \mathbf{E}[Y_j] = 0$, and $Var(Y_j) = 1$.[28]

I assume that disamenities only impact women's utility. This simplifying assumption is consistent with the fact that men may be more likely to negotiate for better treatment and push back against exploitative practices than women (Chang et al. 2020, Recalde and Vesterlund 2020, Roussille 2024), limiting the downside risk of landing in an exploitative workplace.

The husband's presence can offset the cost of workplace disamenities for women: the utility cost of harsh working conditions is scaled down by $(1-\eta)$ if the couple works together, where $0 < \eta \leq 1$.[29] Additionally, co-working contributes directly to household utility because couples value spending time together ($\gamma \geq 0$). Finally, working in separate factories entails a utility cost $\kappa \geq 0$. This cost can reflect various factors, including commuting costs, conservative gender norms, or spousal control.[30] Both γ and κ may vary across couples. In my empirical analysis, I will test for heterogeneity by factors that predict higher κ.

In period $t = 0$, both husband and wife are employed, either at the same garment factory ("co-working") or separately. Workers' utility is separable in wages and working conditions. Let the wife's factory be denoted by j and the husband's factory be denoted by j'. $C_0 = \mathbf{1}\{j = j'\}$ is a binary indicator for whether the couple works at the same factory in period 0. Joint household utility is given by:

$$u(w^M, w^F, d, C_0) = w^M_{j'} + w^F_j - c(d_j) \cdot (1 - \eta \cdot C_0) + \gamma \cdot C_0 - \kappa \cdot (1 - C_0) \tag{1}$$

3.2 Understanding the Nature of Workplace Disamenities

In the context of garment factories, workplace disamenities include both physical and social aspects of the work environment, including heat, verbal abuse, workplace harassment, duration and safety of the commute, and injury risk, as well as compensation-related risks, such as

[28] Y has a continuous differential pdf $\varphi(Y)$ with full support $(-\infty, \infty)$. I assume the pdf is right skewed, i.e. $d < 0$ events are unlikely. Further, a function of the form $c(d) = \exp(d)$ would ensure $c(d) \geq 0 \forall d$.

[29] This assumption reflects the fact that employers, supervisors, and co-workers may be less likely to subject a woman to verbal abuse, sexual harassment, or other forms of exploitation, if her husband works in the same factory. Long commutes and night shift work may feel less painful if women can commute with their husbands. Husbands can also help their wives negotiate with supervisors for better treatment or higher wages.

[30] For example, if women cannot commute alone, the husband may have to drop off his wife before he goes to work, prolonging the commute. If husbands are jealous or controlling, they may be suspicious about their wives' interactions with other men at work, generating intra-household conflict. Finally, in households that endorse conservative gender norms, the wife may not be permitted to work at all unless she works with her husband. For these couples κ may be prohibitively high, preventing them from ever working separately.

delayed or underpaid wages. Certain workplace conditions remain stable over time, while others are stochastic: each period may carry some risk of an adverse incident, such as an accident, harassment, or underpaid wages. Although I focus on the aggregate disamenity d_j, I briefly discuss how optimal job search behavior depends on the underlying nature of workplace disamenities. I decompose d_j into three components:

"Known" factory type: A subset of disamenities is constant and observable at the time of the job offer. These include features such as the length of the commute and shift timings. Since these attributes are known ex ante, they do not generate information frictions.

"Unknown" factory type: Other persistent features of the work environment may be unobservable at the time of the offer but can be *perfectly* learned soon after joining the factory. This fixed component captures conditions such as temperatures on the factory floor; whether colleagues are respectful; regular, enforced rest breaks of adequate length; pressure to meet production targets; whether overtime and night shift work are compulsory or voluntary; language barriers etc.

Risk of adverse incidents: Workers may face the risk of experiencing an adverse incident in any period. Even after joining a factory, workers can only learn the *probability* of various risks, such as workplace harassment; occupational injuries; payment delays; under-payment of wages when the factory is experiencing low demand etc. While risk probabilities may viewed as elements of the "unknown factory type", they arguably take longer to learn than the features discussed above. Workers update their beliefs about these probabilities with experience.

Couples' job search behavior and labor supply dynamics depend on which of these elements dominate. First, if disamenities are perfectly observable before joining, women can identify harsh workplaces without relying on their husbands. If information asymmetries exist, co-working offers screening and protective benefits. Husbands face lower risk of exploration and can screen workplaces; switching to a new factory with the husband lowers the cost of potential disamenities relatively to switching alone. Second, if the unknown aspects of the work environment are fairly constant and quickly revealed upon joining, then the husband need not remain once he has discovered the factory is a "good" type. He can search elsewhere while the wife continues at the current factory. On the other hand, if uncertainty is driven by risk probabilities that can only be learned over time, the husband may need to stay to provide protection in case adverse events occur. Third, the husband may continue to co-work even when the perceived probability of an adverse event is low if the loss from such an event is extremely large. As a result, couples may co-work in

factories that are otherwise "good quality."[31]

Importantly, since workplace conditions include elements which are subjective and uncertain, factory jobs are inherently "experience goods" (William 1978, Jovanovic 1979, Viscusi 1980). It may be difficult to provide meaningful information on working conditions, and mechanisms to publicize factory working conditions may not fully solve the problem.[32]

In the remaining discussion, I focus on the aggregate workplace conditions d_j. I return to the decomposition when discussing labor supply dynamics.

3.3 Actions and Payoffs

In period $t = 1$, the couple receives a job offer from a factory denoted by j^*.[33] While the wages in the new job are known, working conditions d_j are unobservable prior to switching. Couples must decide whether to remain where they were working in period $t = 0$, or switch.

The couple chooses among four actions to maximize joint expected utility over periods 1 and 2: (i) both remain at their current jobs, (ii) only the husband switches, (iii) only the wife switches, or (iv) both switch together to the new factory. If one spouse switches alone and discovers favorable working conditions, they can refer the other spouse for a job in the final period. Workers do not receive any other offers at the end of period 1, and cannot return to a factory they left in period 1.

The combined expected payoffs associated with each action for periods 1 and 2 are given below:

$$U^{\text{Both Stay}} = [w^M_{j'} + w^F_j - c(d_j)\cdot(1-\eta\cdot C_0) + \gamma\cdot C_0 - \kappa\cdot(1-C_0)]\cdot(1+\beta) + \varepsilon^{\text{Both Stay}} \tag{2}$$

$$U^{\text{H-Only}} = w^M_{j^*} + w^F_j - c(d_j) - \kappa + \beta\cdot \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[\max\{w^M_{j^*} + w^F_j - c(d_j) - \kappa, w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*})\cdot(1-\eta) + \gamma\}] + \varepsilon^{\text{H-Only}} \tag{3}$$

$$U^{\text{W-Only}} = w^M_{j'} + w^F_{j^*} - E_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})] - \kappa + \beta\cdot \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[\max\{w^M_{j'} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*}) - \kappa, w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*})\cdot(1-\eta) + \gamma\}] + \varepsilon^{\text{W-Only}} \tag{4}$$

$$U^{\text{Both Switch}} = [w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})]\cdot(1-\eta) + \gamma]\cdot(1+\beta) + \varepsilon^{\text{Both Switch}} \tag{5}$$

[31] For example, even if the incidence of sexual harassment is relatively low, its consequences can be severe, including psychological and physical harm, social stigma, and job loss, so the household treats it as a low-probability, high-severity risk. In this case, the husband's presence serves as insurance against a catastrophic outcome, making co-working attractive despite otherwise favorable conditions.

[32] For instance, some workers may have higher tolerance for long working hours, high temperature, or night shift work than others. Similarly, harassment risk may vary and can be difficult to measure. Young, migrant women face a higher risk of sexual harassment (International Labour Organization et al. 2022) than other women and harassment may be under-reported due to stigma and fear of retaliation (Boudreau et al. 2023).

[33] For simplicity of exposition, assume $j^* \neq j, j'$.

where β is a discount factor and ε denotes an idiosyncratic preference shock distributed i.i.d. according to an Extreme Value Type I distribution.

3.4 Implications for Co-working Preferences and Job Mobility

Within this framework, couples might prefer joint switching over either spouse switching to a new workplace alone for several reasons. I derive comparative statics and experimentally test the model predictions to help disentangle mechanisms.

Differentiating with respect to the exogenous parameters, I find that the payoff from switching jobs together increases relative to the payoff from one person switching alone when: (i) separation costs are higher (κ increases), (ii) the value of spending time together is higher (γ increases), and (iii) when the husband's presence offsets the utility cost of workplace disamenities to a greater degree (η increases). Proofs are presented in Appendix Section B.2.

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}})}{\partial \kappa} > 0\,, \quad \frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \kappa} > 0 \tag{6}$$

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}})}{\partial \gamma} > 0\,, \quad \frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \tag{7}$$

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}})}{\partial \eta} > 0\,, \quad \frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \eta} > 0 \tag{8}$$

On the other hand, when the variance of the amenity distribution (σ^2) increases, making job switching riskier for women, the comparative statics suggest joint moves are preferred over women switching alone. Additionally, if (i) the disamenity level in the wife's job is sufficiently low in period 0 (Y_j is low), and (ii) both γ and κ are low, then the relative payoff from the husband switching alone to screen the workplace increases compared to the wife switching alone and joint switching.

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}})}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0 \tag{9}$$

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{H-Only}} - U^{\text{W-Only}})}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0 \tag{10}$$

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{H-Only}} - U^{\text{Both Switch}})}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0 \tag{11}$$

Together, the comparative statics yield a sharp test to disentangle the primary driver of co-working preferences, which I test experimentally:

Proposition 1: *If co-working is primarily a risk mitigation strategy to protect the wife, then (i) women will be less likely to explore new jobs alone than men, (ii) husbands will be willing to explore new workplaces alone, provided the disamenity level in the wife's current job is not too high, (iii) couples will be willing to explore new jobs together. On the other hand, if couples value co-working because they value spending time together or because conservative norms/jealousy dictate they can only work together, couples will be more likely to switch to new jobs together over either spouse switching alone.*
Proof: See Appendix Section B.2.

I also derive a related result:
Proposition 2: *If co-working is primarily a risk mitigation strategy, then husbands working with their wives in "high-quality" factories will be more likely to explore alone than husbands co-working in "low-quality" factories.*
Proof: See Appendix Section B.2.

Husbands' job search behavior can shed light on the nature of workplace disamenities. If husbands are willing to leave their wives behind while searching for better opportunities, this would suggest that the key unknown is a fixed "factory type". Once the couple learns they are in a "high-quality" factory, the husband's continued presence is no longer required.[34]

Finally, although co-working offers insurance against job exploration risk, the theoretical framework also suggests that a new form of job lock may arise for couples co-working in period 0. Consider a couple working together in a factory with working conditions denoted by $d_j = \mu + \sigma \cdot Y_j$. There is a range of values of Y_j (baseline working conditions) for which the relative payoff of remaining together in the baseline factory may be higher than the payoff of the husband exploring alone, provided the husband's presence substantially offsets workplace disamenities (η is sufficiently large).

$$\frac{\partial(U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{H-Only}})}{\partial Y_j} > 0 \tag{12}$$

When conditions in the baseline factory are poor, the husband is less willing to leave his wife behind. Similarly, as long as the current conditions are not too harsh, switching together and the wife switching alone can become less attractive than remaining in the current job, since there is a

[34] If instead there was a recurring risk of experiencing an adverse event in each time period, the husband may not feel comfortable leaving.

risk of ending up in a workplace which is worse. Thus, for a range of parameter values, the couple may end up remaining in a job with poor working conditions, leading to job lock.

Proposition 3: *For couples working together at baseline, there exists an intermediate range of workplace disamenities for which staying in the current job dominates (i) the husband switching alone, (ii) the wife switching alone, and (iii) both switching together.*
Proof: See Appendix Section B.2.

I use these model predictions to interpret the experimental results.

4 Data Collection

This section describes the data collection process for the three main experiments: the *Job Choice Experiment* and *Applications Experiment* conducted with married garment workers, and the *Hiring Experiment* conducted with garment sector employers.

Data collection for two supplementary surveys is discussed in detail in the Appendix. The *Exploratory Survey* of 551 garment workers is presented in Appendix B.1. Appendix B.9 discusses the survey experiment with married women who are not in the labor force, designed to understand how co-working shapes labor market entry and validate the willingness to pay estimates from the *Job Choice Experiment*. The survey was implemented in the state of Odisha which is a major source of migrant labor for the garment industry in Tamil Nadu.

4.1 Sample Recruitment

Listing: To identify the sample for the three experiments, I first implemented a door-to-door household survey (*Listing Survey*) near three industrial clusters in Tirupur. In each study location, enumerators approached the compound owners to seek their approval to conduct surveys. Door-to-door listing surveys took place in July to August 2024 and December 2024 to March 2025, and targeted 4,296 households, i.e. all households in compounds where compound owners granted permission. A "household" is defined as all individuals living together in one room in the compound, who may be members of the same family or unrelated tenants. The primary purpose of the listing survey was to identify respondents who would be eligible for the *Job Choice Experiment*, *Applications Experiment*, and the *Hiring Experiment*. Additionally, the survey was used to gather basic information on demographics, migration history, and employment and to

administer an unincentivized job preferences elicitation for a representative sample of garment workers. Enumerators were instructed to survey any adult member of the household ("primary respondent"), even if they did not work in a garment factory themselves, and record information on each household member who currently worked in a garment factory or had done so in the past year ("secondary respondents"). Listing and recruitment took place in parallel and respondents were enrolled in the study on a rolling basis.

Job Choice Experiment* and *Applications Experiment

Eligibility: Participants were eligible for the *Job Choice Experiment* and the embedded *Applications Experiment* if they met the following criteria: (1) were married; (2) currently worked in a garment factory in a production role or had done so in the past year and were currently available for work; and (3) were married to someone currently working in a garment factory in a production role or who had done so in the past year.[35] Two additional eligibility criteria were imposed to ensure the sample comprised people who were genuinely interested in information about new job opportunities and would be incentivized to respond to the job choice survey truthfully. During the *Listing Survey*, respondents were asked if they were interested in learning about new job opportunities in garment factories, either for themselves or anyone else in their household. If interested, they were asked to spend a few minutes filling out a CV form for themselves or the relevant household member, outlining their skills and work experience. Only those who were interested in new job opportunities and filled out the CV form were invited to participate in the study. Surveyors were able to survey 3,132 of the 4,296 households that were targeted, and 567 of these households had at least one eligible couple.

Recruitment and Informed Consent: Couples eligible for the *Job Choice Experiment* and *Applications Experiment* were approached at home by a pair of enumerators, typically within a week after the initial *Listing Survey*. Enumerators introduced themselves as part of a J-PAL/IFMR team implementing a survey to learn about the skills, job preferences, and experiences of workers employed in the garment industry. Enumerators also mentioned that the research team was in contact with HR managers at garment factories located nearby who were looking to hire workers.[36] Participants were told that the research team had randomly selected either one or both members of the couple, and could recommend these names for new jobs if they participated in the survey

[35] Those working in administrative, managerial, or auxiliary roles were excluded. For example, merchandising, accounts, HR, housekeeping, security, maintenance, etc.

[36] Factory names were not mentioned to prevent participants from selecting into or out of the sample based on their opinions of specific firms.

and decided that they wanted the name(s) to be shared. Enumerators did not reveal who had been selected during recruitment to avoid influencing participation decisions.[37]

Hiring Experiment

Eligibility: The target sample for the *Hiring Experiment* comprised individuals involved in recruitment on behalf of garment factories, such as factory owners, supervisors, HR managers, and labor contractors who serve as intermediaries connecting factories and job seekers. Respondents who were eligible for both experiments based on their responses to the *Listing Survey* were only invited to participate in the *Job Choice Experiment*, as this was the primary focus of the study.

Since factory owners, supervisors, HR managers and labor contractors typically do not live in the same neighborhoods as garment workers, two additional strategies were used to identify respondents eligible for the *Hiring Experiment*. Eligible respondents identified through the listing survey were asked if they would be willing to share the enumerators' contact information with any garment factory owners, HR managers, supervisors, or labor contractors who might be interested in participating in the survey, so they can contact the research team. Additionally, enumerators directly approached factory units and asked to speak to the owner, supervisor, or labor contractor affiliated with the factory and invited them to participate in the survey.

Recruitment and Informed Consent: Respondents eligible for the *Hiring Experiment* based on their responses to the *Listing Survey* were approached at home by an enumerator. Those identified through snowball sampling or by approaching factories directly were either surveyed immediately in-person or an appointment was made to administer the survey by phone. During recruitment, enumerators introduced themselves as part of a J-PAL/IFMR team interested in understanding garment factories' hiring preferences over different types of workers. Respondents were told that the research team was concurrently implementing a survey of garment workers interested in new opportunities, and could match them with five real job seekers who might be a good fit for their factory based on their survey responses.[38] Of the final sample of 65 respondents, 35 were identified through the *Listing Survey*.

Enlisting HR managers at garment factories for the *Job Choice Experiment*

[37] Enumerators were not told who had been selected from each household ex-ante.

[38] At the end of the *Listing Survey*, respondents were informed that the research team was conducting a separate survey with factory owners, supervisors, and labor contractors, and sharing job seekers' profiles with them. If respondents expressed interest in having their profile shared, they were included in the pool of job seekers used for matching. Additional details on the matching procedure are provided in Section B.6.

To make the *Job Choice Experiment* incentivized, participants were told that some of their survey responses would be used to recommend them for real job opportunities. Members of the research team approached factories located in and around all three study locations through door-to-door outreach to build relationships with HR managers looking to hire. HR managers were told that the research team was conducting a study on garment workers' job preferences, and connecting workers to real job opportunities as an incentive for participating in the survey. HR managers were asked if they wanted to receive job seekers' profiles and contact information to meet current or future recruitment needs. The team advertised the collaboration as a cost-free way for the factory to expand the pool of candidates and get in touch with experienced workers.[39] HR managers who were interested in joining the study were asked to provide information on the types of production roles available in the factory (tailor, quality check, cutting, ironing, etc.), and the salary range.[40]

HR managers at eight factories signed up to receive worker profiles as part of the *Job Choice Experiment*. All these factories are engaged in manufacturing ready-made garments and employ workers in a variety of roles: tailor, quality check, cutting, ironing, packing, printing, knitting, and dyeing. They range in size from 190 to 1,200 workers. HR Managers who were enlisted to receive profiles as part of the *Job Choice Experiment* sample were recruited for the *Hiring Experiment*.

4.2 Survey Implementation

Figure A.1 depicts the study timeline. The *Exploratory Survey* was implemented in October 2023. The *Job Choice Experiment*, *Applications Experiment*, and *Hiring Experiment* were implemented between July 2024 and June 2025. The *Job Choice Experiment* was implemented in two waves. I piloted an unincentivized stated preference elicitation with 196 respondents between July-September 2024. Minor modifications were made to survey instruments before the full rollout in December 2025. However, since the estimated willingness to pay for job amenities is similar across incentivized and un-incentivized versions of the survey, I stack data from the pilot and the full rollout. Details on implementation protocols are presented in Appendix Section B.3. Finally, the supplementary survey with non-working women took place in August 2025.

[39] Managers were willing to participate in the study since worker attrition is a major challenge in this setting. Close to 60% of the workforce consists of migrants from other states who return home for several months during the year. Factories employ three strategies to meet their hiring needs: (1) hiring through referrals from current workers, (2) relying on intermediaries such as labor contractors or agents, and (3) posting vacancy advertisements in public places, including bus stands and markets.

[40] HR managers were hesitant to share information on the exact salary for each role, but were generally willing to provide a salary range for tailor and non-tailor roles.

4.3 Sample Description

***Job Choice Experiment* and *Applications Experiment*:** Appendix Table A.1 reports the baseline characteristics for 792 married garment workers in the *Job Choice Experiment* sample.[41] The average age is 29.6 for female respondents and 33.9 for men. Educational attainment looks similar by gender: 7.88 years for women and 8.38 years for men. Although respondents have 1.3 children on average, only 30% of respondents have children living with them in Tirupur, as many internal migrants choose to leave their children behind with other relatives. The average respondent first arrived to work in the Tirupur garment industry 3 to 5 years ago. Co-working rates are even higher among garment workers whose spouse works in the same industry, reaching nearly 70%.

Appendix Table A.2 compares garment workers who were eligible for the *Job Choice Experiment* and *Applications Experiment* to all the garment workers in the *Listing Survey* data. Eligible participants are more likely to be married, female, and to have at least one family member working in their garment factory, as expected given the eligibility criteria. They are more likely to have migrated to Tirupur from outside Tamil Nadu. Importantly, they look similar to the full sample in terms of the total years spent in Tirupur, occupation, monthly salary, and contract type.

***Hiring Experiment*:** 80% of the employers in the *Hiring Experiment* sample are men (Appendix Table A.3), and 97% work as supervisors or labor contractors. On average, they have 11 years of experience in roles where they were involved in hiring or referral decisions in a garment factory.

5 Co-working and Labor Supply: Experimental Design

The *Job Choice Experiment* and the *Applications Experiment* were designed to address the following research questions: How much do workers value switching to a new workplace with their spouse and why? While co-working may offer important benefits, might it also impose costs by introducing new job search frictions?

5.1 Job Choice Experiment

To estimate willingness to pay for co-working with a spouse when exploring new job opportunities, I administered an in-person incentivized stated preference experiment with 792 respondents currently working in the garment sector (446 married couples). The sample included couples working together and separately.

[41] The *Applications Experiment* sample excludes 196 of these 792 respondents who were surveyed during piloting.

The survey module was presented to the participants as a research study on job choice, where they would be asked to choose between a series of hypothetical jobs in garment factories, so that the research team could learn what types of jobs they are interested in. Participants were informed that the research team had randomly selected either one or both members from each household, and would use some of their survey responses to match them to real job opportunities at garment factories nearby. Their names would be recommended to HR managers at these factories if they were interested in pursuing the opportunity. This feature helped to incentivize truthful reporting of preferences. Each participant was matched to up to four real opportunities. The matching procedure is outlined in Appendix Section B.5. Spouses were surveyed separately.

Creating Hypothetical Job Profiles

During the survey, participants were presented with seven pairs of hypothetical jobs, labeled Job 1 and Job 2, defined by a randomly varying set of features and a monthly wage, and asked to indicate which of the two jobs they would prefer. The experimental design is similar to the approach introduced by Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) and used in previous work, including Mas and Pallais (2017), Wiswall and Zafar (2018), and Maestas et al. (2023). Each job was characterized by five attributes: monthly salary, the possibility of joining the new factory with one's spouse, commute time, whether the factory has invested in measures for women's safety, and the presence of language barriers.[42] To generate variation in language barriers, I randomized whether the supervisors and most co-workers could speak the respondent's native language. To generate variation in perceived workplace safety for women, I randomized between two vignettes: "*We do not have specific information about arrangements for women's safety in this factory.*" or "*This factory is committed to ensuring a safe workplace for women. They have security cameras, female HR managers, and female security guards. Women working in this factory report that they feel very safe with their supervisors and co-workers*". Non-wage attributes were coded as binary indicators for data analysis. Attributes and their potential values are listed in Appendix Table A.4.

I randomly assigned one of the two jobs in each choice table to allow co-working with a spouse, while the other required switching to the new job alone. The co-working job was described as follows: "*This factory is hiring more than one person in different roles so if you accept this job, your spouse can also get a job at the same time.*" The description of the non-co-working job stated: "*This factory is only hiring one person, so if you accept this job, you would have to move here alone, without your spouse.*" Enumerators verbally described the two jobs in the respondent's

[42]Close to 60% of garment workers in Tirupur are migrants from other states and do not speak the local language, Tamil. Since men tend to be more fluent in Tamil as well as Hindi, the second most widely spoken language, co-working may also help overcome language barriers (Appendix Figure A.6).

native language and also showed them the choice table on the tablet.

For some respondents, the co-working job presented in the choice table may imply a substantial salary increase for their spouse, making it mechanically more desirable than the non-co-working option. To hold the spouse's salary fixed across the two hypothetical jobs, respondents were told that even if their spouse moved with them to the new factory, their spouse would continue to receive their current monthly salary. Since the sample is largely restricted to employed couples, we can set aside the concern that the co-working job is preferred because it creates a job for an unemployed spouse.[43]

Values for the remaining job traits were drawn with equal probabilities from a list (with replacement), reported in Appendix Table A.4. Respondents were asked to report their usual monthly salary in an earlier module and the hypothetical salaries were randomly assigned to be between 20% lower and 30% higher than their current salary.[44] Using the respondent's actual monthly salary to anchor the compensation offered in the hypothetical jobs helps to ensure that the values seem realistic. Characteristics for each hypothetical job were assigned independently, and randomization was stratified by the respondent's gender, co-working status at baseline, and years of experience working in Tirupur (above or below median). Figure B.1 in the Technical Appendix depicts an example of a choice table.

Besides the co-working amenity which is the primary focus of the study, the other non-wage attributes used to describe the hypothetical jobs were finalized based on extensive qualitative interviews and piloting, with the intention of capturing features of the workplace that might make workplaces safer or more comfortable for women, and mitigate the need to co-work.

Additionally, to limit concerns that specifying certain job attributes may signal others that have not been explicitly mentioned (Manski 1999), respondents were told that the two jobs were identical in all other ways. This approach also helps to ensure that respondents perceived the two jobs to be similar in terms of canonical job attributes, such as the type of contract (piece rate or shift), paid time off, etc. After describing the two opportunities, enumerators asked respondents which job they would prefer if offered both. Enumerators went over one practice question with the participant before starting the module to check comprehension.[45]

[43] Sample recruitment was limited to households where both husband and wife are currently employed in a garment factory in Tirupur, or were employed in the past year and are interested in working. Only 2.27% of respondents are not currently working.

[44] In case a respondent refused to report their current salary during the survey, the value recorded during the household screening survey could be used to anchor the hypothetical salary instead. However, this situation did not arise during data collection.

[45] Additional implementation details are discussed in Appendix Section B.3.2.

Estimating Amenity Valuations

Participants' valuations of each job attribute can be measured using their willingness to pay for these workplace characteristics. I use the binary choice data to estimate a random utility model, assuming that individuals' choices are governed by the following linear indirect utility function:

$$V_{ijt} = \alpha + A'_{ijt} \cdot \theta + \delta \cdot \ln w_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \tag{13}$$

where V_{ijt} corresponds to the indirect utility for individual i if they chose job $j \in \{1,2\}$ in choice table $t = 1,2,...,7$; A_{ijt} is a vector of non-wage job attributes; w_{ijt} is the monthly wage offered to individual i for doing job j in choice table t. I assume the idiosyncratic preference shocks ε_{ijt} are distributed i.i.d. according to an Extreme Value Type I distribution. Under these assumptions, the probability that individual i would prefer job j with characteristics A_{ijt} and wage w_{ijt} over another job j' with characteristics $A_{ij't}$ and wage $w_{ij't}$ is:

$$Pr(V_{ijt} > V_{ij't}) = \frac{\exp\left(\left(A'_{ijt} - A'_{ij't}\right) \cdot \theta + \delta \cdot \left(\ln w_{ijt} - \ln w_{ij't}\right)\right)}{1 + \exp\left(\left(A'_{ijt} - A'_{ij't}\right) \cdot \theta + \delta \cdot \left(\ln w_{ijt} - \ln w_{ij't}\right)\right)} \tag{14}$$

I estimate the above equation by applying a standard logit model to the choice data.[46] First, the choice data is transformed into a dataset where each row represents one respondent and one choice table. The outcome variable is a binary indicator taking value 1 if the respondent selected Job 1 in that choice table, and the dependent variables include the difference in log wage between Job 1 and Job 2, as well as the vector $A_{i1t} - A_{i2t}$, i.e. a set of variables Δa_{it} capturing the difference between an indicator for whether Job 1 displayed to person i in choice table t has attribute a and an indicator for whether Job 2 in the same choice table has that attribute.

The estimated parameters of the indirect utility function from the logit specification can be transformed to measure the average willingness-to-pay for a desirable job attribute $a \in A$. If individual i is willing to pay WTP_i^a for attribute a, they must be indifferent between (i) a job which pays wage w_i per month and does not offer attribute a and (ii) a job which offers the attribute, but has a lower monthly wage of (w_i - WTP_i^a). Therefore:

$$\delta \cdot \ln w_i = \theta^a + \delta \cdot \ln\left(w_i - WTP_i^a\right) \tag{15}$$

[46] 196 respondents were administered an un-incentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment* during piloting where respondents were simply asked to choose between a series of hypothetical jobs. However, as described in more detail in Section 6.1.3, estimated willingness to pay for job amenities is similar across incentivized and un-incentivized versions of the survey. Therefore, the preferred specification includes respondents from pilot surveys to increase statistical power. Section 6.1.3 also demonstrates that results remain stable if pilot data is excluded from the sample.

where θ^a denotes the marginal utility of attribute a and δ denotes the marginal utility of the log monthly wage. Solving for the willingness to pay, we obtain the following expression:[47]

$$WTP_i^a = w_i \left(1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\theta^a}{\delta}\right)\right) \tag{16}$$

Therefore, gaining the desirable amenity a is equivalent to a $100 \cdot \left(1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\theta^a}{\delta}\right)\right)\%$ *increase* in the monthly wage. Conversely, gaining a disamenity a' is equivalent to a $100 \cdot \left(1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\theta^{a'}}{\delta}\right)\right)\%$ *decrease* in the monthly wage. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method and adjusted for clustering by respondent.

The primary object of interest is the willingness to pay for co-working. I use heterogeneity in willingness to pay to investigate the potential mechanisms driving co-working demand, as outlined in the model from Section 3: the value of spending time together (γ), cost of separation (κ), the husband's role in attenuating workplace disamenities (η), and job exploration risk (σ^2).

5.2 Applications Experiment

I embedded the *Applications Experiment* within the *Job Choice Experiment* to (i) examine how co-working opportunities affect participants' interest in jobs in a real-stakes setting, (ii) disentangle the mechanisms driving co-working preferences, and (iii) test whether couples' dependence on co-working induces job lock. To incentivize truthful-reporting of preferences in the *Job Choice Experiment*, respondents were informed at the beginning of the survey that either one or both members would be randomly selected from their household for a "job recommendation" opportunity, where some of their survey responses would be used to match them to up to four real job opportunities in garment factories nearby, and their names would be recommended to HR managers at these factories if they were interested. The experiment was implemented with 338 couples who participated in the incentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment*.

I randomized households into one of the following treatment arms, stratifying by co-working status at baseline (Appendix Figure A.7):

1. Joint: Both husband and wife would be recommended to the same factories (50%)
2. Husband Only: Only the husband would be recommended to factories matching his preferences (25%)

[47] The derivation is outlined in Appendix Section B.7.

3. Wife Only: Only the wife would be recommended to factories matching her preferences (25%)

Treatment status was only revealed to the respondent at the end of the *Job Choice Experiment* survey so it would not influence their responses to the job choice module. Respondents were then told that the selected individual(s) would receive information on up to four real job opportunities through a series of phone calls, once every five days. Finally, respondents received a visiting card with a unique Household ID number and a hotline number and were instructed that the selected individual(s) would only be recommended to factories if they confirmed their interest ("applied") by calling the hotline and entering their unique Household ID. Section B.5 presents additional details on the matching procedure. The main outcome of interest is whether the household applied to any of the opportunities advertised to them.

Estimation

I estimate the following specification at the household-level:

$$Y_h = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Joint}_h + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Husband Only}_h + \varepsilon_h \tag{17}$$

where Y_h is a binary indicator for whether the household called the hotline number (take-up); $Joint_h$ is a binary indicator for whether the household was randomly assigned to the Joint recommendation arm; $Husband\ Only_h$ is a binary indicator for whether the household was randomly assigned to the Husband Only recommendation arm; and ε_h is the heteroskedasticity-adjusted error term.

I use the following specification to test for heterogeneity in treatment effects by baseline characteristics:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_h = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Joint}_h + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Husband Only}_h + \\ \beta_3 \cdot X_h + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Joint}_h \cdot X_h + \beta_5 \cdot \text{Husband Only}_h \cdot X_h + \varepsilon_h \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

I report results for two samples: 338 households where at least one of the two spouses was surveyed and 254 households where both husband and wife were successfully surveyed. The rationale for considering the second sample of households is two-fold. First, in cases where only one of the spouses was surveyed, the surveyed spouse may not have been selected for the recommendation opportunity themselves or may not hold the decision-making power over employment-related decisions. As recent evidence suggests that there are information frictions within the household (Conlon et al. 2021, Delavande et al. 2025), information about the recommendation opportunity may not reach the intended recipient or primary decision maker,

dampening take-up rates. Second, one of the most commonly cited reasons for refusing to participate in the survey was that the respondent had decided to return to the village, permanently or for an extended period. Therefore, households where only one spouse was surveyed may be disproportionately less likely to apply. For these reasons, the preferred set of estimates is based on the sample of households where both husband and wife completed the survey.[48]

6 Co-working and Labor Supply: Results

In this section, I present estimates of the willingness to pay for switching to a new job with one's spouse versus switching alone, discuss a series of robustness checks, and investigate the mechanisms driving co-working preferences. Finally, I test whether couples' dependence on co-working induces job lock.

6.1 How much do workers value co-working with their spouse?

6.1.1 Measuring WTP for Co-working in the Job Choice Experiment

I begin with a non-parametric illustration to visualize the choice data. Figure 1 plots the share of respondents selecting a new job where they can co-work with their spouse over the non-co-working job against the wage difference between the two jobs. Negative wage differences correspond to cases where the job that allows spousal co-working has a lower wage than the non-co-working job. The choice data used to generate this scatterplot is limited to choice pairs where *only* the wage and co-working amenity vary across the two jobs to ensure that any observed differences can be attributed to preferences for co-working. 20% of respondents would prefer the co-working job even when it pays 40% less per month than the alternative, suggesting substantial willingness to pay for switching to a new job with one's spouse instead of switching alone. The share increases with the relative wage of the co-working job, and approaches 100% once the co-working job offers a large, positive wage premium.

Although the non-parametric approach clearly demonstrates that co-working is a highly valued job amenity, it is based on a very restricted subset of the data. Table 2 presents the estimated valuations for the co-working amenity and other non-wage job attributes from the logit specification using the entire choice dataset. Being able to transition to a new job with one's spouse

[48] Column (2) in Appendix Table A.5 shows that the share of households where both spouses completed the survey does not vary significantly across treatment arms. Appendix Table A.14 shows that respondents from households where both spouses were surveyed look broadly similar to the full sample. However, they have slightly fewer years of experience working in Tirupur (5.55 versus 7.2 years) and are less likely to be tailors.

rather than switching alone is valued as much as a 29% wage increase.[49] Women value this amenity more than men, and are willing to pay 36% of monthly income, while men are willing to pay 24% on average ($p < 0.01$). When measured in levels, women's willingness to pay remains higher than men's: Rs. 6,646 versus Rs. 4,939 per month ($p < 0.01$).

Since the remaining attributes are disamenities (e.g. the presence of language barriers), willingness to pay estimates for these attributes should be interpreted as the monetary compensation respondents require to tolerate the disamenity. Estimates have the expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. I find that respondents have a distaste for longer commutes. Women exhibit a stronger distaste for language barriers than men, consistent with the fact that women are less fluent than men in both Tamil and Hindi, the next most widely spoken language (Appendix Figure A.6). They demand 9.3% higher wages to join a workplace where the supervisor and most co-workers do not speak their native language, significantly higher than the estimate of 2.8% for men ($p < 0.05$). Finally, women demand 15.3% higher wages to join a workplace when they are told there is no information on factory arrangements for women's safety, relative to one that has invested in safety measures. Men require significantly lower compensation, 5.2% of monthly wages ($p < 0.01$).[50]

Thus, the option to switch to a new job with one's spouse is a highly valued job amenity, more so than other features of the work environment, especially among women. Male respondents were also presented a series of three hypothetical choice pairs where they were asked to choose between two jobs on behalf of their wives. Appendix Table A.8 reveals that men's willingness to pay for jobs that enable co-working is significantly higher at 38% of the monthly wage when they choose new jobs for their wives, instead of themselves ($p < 0.01$). These results suggest that switching jobs with a spouse may address constraints that disproportionately impact women.

Before turning to mechanisms, I briefly discuss a series of validation exercises and robustness checks. A detailed discussion can be found in Appendix Section B.8.

6.1.2 Validation: Preference Heterogeneity and Job Sorting

Models of compensating differentials predict that those who value certain amenities are more likely to sort into jobs that have those amenities (Rosen 1986). Consistent with this, I find that respondents whose current jobs feature co-working have a higher willingness to pay for this amenity. Importantly, willingness to pay for co-working remains positive among those who have

[49] This estimates closely matches the non-parametric illustration from Figure 1, where approximately 50% of respondents choose the co-working job when it pays 30% less than the non-co-working job.

[50] Another way to describe these results is that women are willing to pay 9.3% of monthly income for a workplace without language barriers, or 15.3% of monthly income for a workplace which is known to have made arrangements for women's safety.

never co-worked with their spouse, at 12.2% of monthly income ($p < 0.01$). On the other hand, those whose current jobs feature longer commutes and language barriers have lower distaste for these disamenities than respondents who do not face these challenges in their current jobs.

6.1.3 Validation: Robustness Checks

To test the sensitivity of results to the choice of specification and sample, I implement a series of robustness checks reported in Appendix Tables A.9 and A.10. This includes (i) excluding participants who failed the attention check; (ii) excluding participants who were not alone when the survey was administered; (iii) excluding respondents who completed an unincentivized version of the survey during piloting; (iv) including a binary indicator for pilot observations in the logit model; (v) estimating a probit model and linear probability model; and (vi) estimating a mixed logit model which allows for unobserved heterogeneity in individuals' marginal utility from non-wage amenities. Willingness to pay estimates remain stable across these specifications.

6.1.4 Validation: External Validity

To validate estimates of job seekers' willingness to pay for spousal co-working, I implemented a hypothetical job choice experiment with married women not currently engaged in paid work in the state of Odisha, India. I recruited a sample of 102 married women interested in work opportunities from ten villages in Khordha district, Odisha, where a new cluster of garment factories is being built. For these women, working in the same garment factory as one's husband, rather than in a separate factory within the same industrial park, is equivalent to a 28.2% wage increase, similar to the garment worker sample. By contrast, working with a female friend or relative is valued less than half as much, at 11.2% ($p < 0.01$). See Appendix Section B.9 for details on survey implementation.

6.2 What drives co-working preferences?

I consider three possible explanations for couple's co-working preferences. First, co-working may be valued because it protects women from the risks associated with job exploration. Switching to a new job with a spouse can help women navigate these challenges if it turns out the workplace has harsh working conditions. Alternatively, co-working may be driven by intra-household dynamics, such as spousal control and the value of spending time together. Finally, people may simply value working or commuting with someone they know, instead of going to a new workplace alone.

The model yields a sharp test to help disentangle the mechanisms driving co-working preferences. If co-working is primarily valued because it protects women from the risks associated with job exploration, then: (i) women will be less likely to explore new jobs alone than men, (ii) husbands will be willing to explore new workplaces alone, provided the disamenity level in the wife's current job is not too high, and (iii) couples will be willing to explore new jobs together. On the other hand, if co-working is primarily driven by husbands' desires to constantly control their wives (the cost of separation κ is high) or because the couples value spending time together (γ is high), couples need to be together to experience these benefits. Thus, take-up will be highest in the Joint Arm.

I first discuss several pieces of evidence suggesting that co-working is valued because it offers insurance against job exploration risk. I test the model predictions by comparing application rates across treatment arms in the *Applications Experiment*, and test for heterogeneity in application rates by baseline job satisfaction. I present additional evidence from the *Job Choice Experiment* supporting this explanation. Finally, I evaluate the importance of alternative explanations, finding that they appear secondary to the risk mitigation channel.

6.2.1 Co-working offers women insurance against job exploration risk

Evidence from the Applications Experiment

I randomized whether couples received an opportunity to be recommended for a new job together ("Joint" arm) or an offer to switch to a new job alone ("Husband Only" and "Wife Only" arms). Figure 2 Panel A shows the application rates by treatment arm. Only 14% of the households randomly assigned to the Wife Only arm express interest in being recommended for a real job opportunity. The application rate is nearly twice as large in the Husband Only arm at 24% (p = 0.10) and the Joint Recommendation arm at 23% (p = 0.07).

Differences between treatment arms are even more pronounced in the preferred analysis sample, i.e. households where both spouses were surveyed. Only 12% of households in the Wife Only arm want the wife's name to be recommended for a new job alone, while take-up is more than two and a half times as large in the Husband Only arm at 32% (p = 0.01) and more than twice as large in the Joint Recommendation arm at 26% (p = 0.01).[51] I focus on this sample for the remaining analysis, although results are qualitatively similar for the full sample as shown in the Appendix.

[51] Appendix Table A.16 shows that results remain stable after excluding respondents from the Husband Only and Wife Only treatment arms who were confident that both spouses could get a job despite only one being recommended. Therefore, the high take-up observed in the Husband Only arm cannot be explained by households assuming that a single recommendation would be sufficient for both spouses to simultaneously obtain jobs at the new factory.

Application rates are not statistically distinguishable between the Husband Only and Joint arms, even among couples working together at baseline (Table 3 Column 4). When husbands get the opportunity to explore a new job, they are willing to leave their wives behind. Together, the evidence supports the theory that co-working is a strategy to manage job exploration risk.

Propositions 1 and 2 from the model also predict that if co-working is a strategy to manage risk, husbands will be more willing to explore alone if the disamenity level in the wife's current job is low. I test for heterogeneity in take-up based on baseline job satisfaction among couples working together. Column 2 of Table 4 shows that among couples that are co-working in the same factory, a one standard deviation increase in average job satisfaction at baseline is associated with a 15 percentage point (54%) increase in application rates under the Husband Only arm, while there is no significant difference in other arms.[52] Thus, husbands are willing to leave their wives behind while they explore new opportunities alone, provided they are confident that the wife's current factory offers good working conditions.[53]

I implement two robustness checks to validate this result. First, since overall job satisfaction may reflect satisfaction with wages as well as non-wage attributes of the job, I residualize the mean job satisfaction measure with respect to the salaries of both spouse, finding that results remain stable (Appendix Table A.17). Next, to capture workplace conditions more directly, I use two survey questions about supervisor behavior. Respondents were asked to report whether supervisors in their current factory use abusive language and impose wage penalties for tardiness or production errors using a 4-point Likert scale. For each measure, I calculate the average across both spouses and standardize the variables to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Among couples that are co-working in the same factory, a one standard deviation increase in supervisor misconduct is associated with a 17-19 percentage point (70%-74%) decrease in application rates under the Husband Only arm (Appendix Table A.17), but estimates are imprecise ($p = 0.11$).[54]

As a final test, I use the fact that disamenity levels are likely to be lower in factories where women are working without their husbands. Consistent with this, Column (4) of Table 3 show that take-up in the Husband Only arm is 18 percentage points (72%) higher among households

[52] To measure the overall quality and safety of the baseline factory, I ask respondents to rate their satisfaction with their current job on a 4-point Likert scale. I calculate the average satisfaction for both spouses and standardize the variable to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one.

[53] Columns (2) and (3) in Appendix Table A.17 show that results look qualitatively similar when using the individual satisfaction levels of each spouse instead of the mean for the couple.

[54] Once again, application rates under the Wife Only arm do not vary with supervisor misconduct in the current factory. Application rates under the Joint Arm are 5-9 percentage points *higher* when the current job features greater misconduct, suggesting that couples are interested in seeking a better workplace if they can go together. However, these estimates are fairly noisy with p-values between 0.39 and 0.56.

that do not currently work together than those who do (p = 0.08).[55] Although this difference may partly reflect other differences between co-working and non-co-working couples, the direction and magnitude provide suggestive evidence for the risk mitigation mechanism.

If couples valued switching jobs together due to a strong preference for spending time together or because husbands wanted to maintain constant control over their wives, application rates should have been higher in the Joint arm than in the Husband Only arm. Instead, the value of working together appears to diminish once the couple learns that the factory is safe for the wife.

Evidence from the Applications Experiment: Robustness Checks

The results discussed above are robust to a number of checks. First, although the *target* sample was largely balanced on observables at the time of randomization, the sample of workers who actually participated in the survey is not balanced on some covariates, such as occupation (Appendix Table A.13). Similarly, Appendix Table A.14 shows that respondents in the preferred sample of households where both spouses completed the survey have slightly lower experience and are less likely to be tailors than the full sample. However, Appendix Table A.15 shows that estimated take-up rates across treatment arms remain stable after controlling for all covariates that are not balanced. Second, I confirm that participants assigned to the Husband Only and Wife Only arms in the *Applications Experiment* understood that there was no guarantee that the other spouse could get a job at the same factory (Appendix Figure A.9). Only 20% believed with certainty that both spouses would get a job even though only one was recommended. Finally, I show that the estimates in Table 3 remain stable after excluding respondents who strongly believed that both spouses could get a job together despite only one being recommended (Appendix Table A.16). Therefore, high take-up in the Husband Only arm is not driven by these incorrect beliefs.

Although I argue that higher job satisfaction makes husbands more willing to explore alone because they are comfortable leaving their wives behind, another possibility is that higher satisfaction makes participants more optimistic about working conditions at other factories, increasing willingness to explore. However, since job satisfaction is associated with significantly higher take-up *only* in the Husband Only arm, it is more likely that this reflects husbands feeling more comfortable leaving their wives behind while they explore a new job opportunity.[56]

[55] Column 2 shows the corresponding estimate for the full sample. Take-up in the Husband Only arm is 12 percentage points (60%) lower among non-co-working couples than co-working couples, but estimates are imprecise.

[56] One might expect that co-working couples who are dissatisfied with their current jobs may be more willing to switch to a new job together than those who are satisfied, resulting in higher take-up in the Joint arm. However, take-up in the Joint arm does not vary significantly with job satisfaction for co-working couples (Table 4). Switching jobs together may be perceived as more costly or couples may prefer to remain in a factory with "known" risks over moving to an unfamiliar workplace together, dampening application rates.

Evidence from the Job Choice Experiment

Heterogeneity analysis from the *Job Choice Experiment* lends further support to the theory that co-working is a protective measure. Table 5 shows that women who are more worried about women's safety while commuting to work and the risk of illness or injury at work have a higher willingness to pay for switching to a new job with their spouse rather than switching alone, compared to those who are less worried ($p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$).[57] The pattern is driven by women who are "extremely" worried about these risks whose willingness to pay is 14.8-26 percentage points (40%-71%) higher than women who are less worried. I do not find significant differences between women who are above and below median in terms of the number of sexual harassment incidents they have heard of at other garment factories in Tirupur, a proxy for fear of harassment.[58]

On the other hand, men who are more concerned about the risk of workplace illness and injury and those who have heard of more incidents of sexual harassment at other garment factories have *lower* willingness to pay for switching to a new job with their wife, preferring to explore alone first (Table A.19, $p < 0.05$). Their valuation for switching to a new job with their wives is 7 and 8 percentage points (25% - 30%) lower than men who are less worried about these issues.

Finally, workers with limited exposure to factories, particularly those who have primarily worked in factories with harsh environments, may overestimate the risks of a bad job match when switching.[59] Broader experience likely corrects these perceptions, easing anxiety about unfamiliar workplaces, and reducing the need for women to switch jobs with their husbands. To explore this, I compare willingness to pay for co-working among workers who have only worked at one factory (bottom 25% of the distribution) with those who have worked at more (top 50%, 25%, 10%, and 5%, respectively), controlling for total years of experience working in the garment industry.[60] Estimates from these regressions, reported in Figure 3, show a clear decline in the co-working premium as exposure increases. Those who have never switched factories value co-working as much as a 32.9% increase in the wage, while those in the top 10% of the distribution only value is as much as a 12.1% increase in the wage, less than half as much.

[57] According to data from the Exploratory Survey, 71% of garment workers in this setting walk to their place of work. Since the typical work-day extends from 8 am to 8 pm, this entails walking home after dark on streets that are often isolated, uneven, and poorly-lit. Women in particular are at risk of street harassment, including unwanted comments or inappropriate touching.

[58] Variable construction is described in the Data Appendix Section B.4.

[59] Relatedly, Jäger et al. 2024 show that workers tend to under-estimate the wages they could earn elsewhere. Since subjective workplace attributes are even more difficult to learn about than wages, it is plausible that inexperienced workers may over-estimate the likelihood of adverse incidents in the workplace.

[60] Thresholds are: ≥ 3 factories for the top 50%, ≥ 5 for the top 25%, ≥ 10 for the top 10%, and ≥ 20 for the top 5%.

The design of the *Job Choice Experiment* further enables me to identify whether co-working is valued because of its role in mitigating specific workplace challenges. Working with a spouse can make commutes safer and more pleasant, reduce the risk of workplace harassment, and ease language barriers for women. Random variation in job attributes in the *Job Choice Experiment* allows me to test whether co-working demand is higher when a prospective workplace has a long commute (20 minutes or longer), language barriers, or when there is no information about arrangements for women's safety in the workplace.[61]

I limit the sample to the "best" and "worst" jobs in the experiment, and evaluate how the possibility of switching jobs with a spouse impacts workers' willingness to accept the job in each case. The "worst" jobs, i.e. those with the least amenities, have a commute time of 20 minutes or longer, supervisors and coworkers who cannot speak the respondent's native language, and no information on arrangements for women's safety in the workplace. The "best" jobs offer the most amenities: a 10 minute commute, no language barriers, and extensive arrangements for women's safety, such as CCTV cameras, female security guards, and female HR managers. I estimate two logit specifications, restricting the sample to the "best" and "worst" jobs:

$$\log\left(\frac{Pr\left(Accept_{ijt}=1\right)}{1-Pr\left(Accept_{ijt}=1\right)}\right)=\beta_0+\beta_1\cdot\text{Wage Multiplier}_{ijt}+\beta_2\cdot\text{Cowork}_{ijt}+ \tag{19}$$

$$\beta_3\cdot\text{Wage Multiplier}_{ijt}\cdot\text{Cowork}_{ijt}+\varepsilon_{ijt} \tag{20}$$

where $Accept_{ij}$ is a binary indicator for whether respondent i said they would choose job j in choice table t, and standard errors are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Figure 4 presents the marginal effects of the wage multiplier on job take-up, depending on whether the new job allows co-working. Panel A demonstrates that co-working enables women to accept the least desirable jobs when they offer sufficiently high pay. In contrast, take-up is very low and does not respond to wages at all if co-working is not an option. However, Panel B shows that even when jobs do not feature any of the three disamenities included in the experiment, take-up remains 30-40 percentage points higher if women can switch to the new job with their spouse than when they must switch alone.[62] Similarly, Table 6 shows that on average, workers' willingness to pay for co-working does not increase significantly when the job features one of these challenges.

These results shed light on the nature of workplace disamenities women face. Even when

[61] I pool all commutes longer than 20 minutes since the median commute time in the sample is 10 minutes.

[62] Simulations suggest that these empirical patterns are consistent with a discrete choice model of job choice where utility increases with wages and co-working, utility decreases in the presence of disamenities, co-working reduces the utility cost of disamenities, and preference shocks follow an Extreme Value Type I Distribution.

commutes are relatively short, there are no language barriers, and the factory has invested in safety measures that ought to improve women's safety on paper, women would strongly prefer to move to a new workplace with their husbands.[63] This is perhaps not surprising once we consider the commuting conditions and other features of the work environment.

In this setting, even a ten minute commute may feel challenging. For most workers, the typical work-day extends from 8 am to 8 pm and women must walk home after dark on streets that are often isolated, uneven, and poorly-lit.[64] Women in particular are at risk of street harassment, including unwanted comments or inappropriate touching. 20.21% of *Job Choice Experiment* respondents have heard of garment workers experiencing street harassment while returning from work.

Similarly, workplaces feature a range of other disamenities that were not incorporated into the experiment, including the risk of occupational accidents, verbal abuse, under-payment of wages, production pressure (Cividep India 2023). Women value co-working for protection and support in the face of these challenges because they may not feel comfortable seeking support from male supervisors and factory management.[65, 66] Thus, co-working functions as "second-best" response to a wide range of challenges that may be difficult to address without comprehensive enforcement of labor standards and strict monitoring of factory conditions.

6.2.2 Alternative Mechanisms

1. Benchmarking against co-working with peers

People may value switching jobs with their spouse because they enjoy sharing a workplace with or commuting with someone they know (Park 2019, Donald and Grosset-Touba (2025), Kapoor and Gade (2025)). During the *Listing Survey*, I implemented a simplified, unincentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment*, to measure how much garment workers value switching to a new job with a spouse over switching with a same-sex friend or relative (peer). Respondents were asked to choose between three pairs of hypothetical jobs at different garment factories, characterized by a monthly wage, commute time, and type of co-working arrangement. The design was similar to the *Job Choice Experiment* and details are presented in Section B.3.

Willingness to pay estimates are reported in Table 7. The sample is restricted to those *Listing Survey* respondents who eventually participated in the incentivized *Job Choice Experiment*. The

[63] It may also be that workers do not believe the proposed measures for women's safety (CCTV cameras, female HR managers, security guards, etc.) would be as effective at deterring workplace harassment as the husband's presence.

[64] 71% of garment workers in this setting walk to their place of work.

[65] 90% of garment workers in the *Exploratory Survey* sample reported having a male supervisor. Prior evidence suggests that female workers are more comfortable seeking support from female supervisors (Alan et al. 2025).

[66] Despite learning how to operate the machines, workers in helper roles are denied promotions unless they persistently advocate for themselves, because employers want to continue paying them lower wages.

average willingness to pay for co-working with a spouse is 29% of monthly income, while the valuation of co-working with a peer is only about half as much, at 15.5% of monthly income ($p < 0.01$).[67] Therefore, switching jobs with a spouse clearly offers substantial additional benefits over working with a network member, plausibly because it is easier for couples to commute together and the husband's presence offers protective benefits.

It is also worth noting that although this stated preference elicitation was not incentivized, estimated willingness to pay for co-working with one's spouse is identical to the estimate from the incentivized sample. This within-respondent test justifies the decision to combine data from the incentivized *Job Choice Experiment* with data from the unincentivized pilot survey.

2. Intra-household dynamics: Co-working enables husbands to maintain spousal control

Husbands may value co-working because it allows them to monitor their wives at work and know exactly how much they earn each month.[68] Similarly, the wives of controlling husbands may recognize that they would never be permitted to work in a separate factory, prompting them to always choose the co-working job. These scenarios correspond to a high cost of separation (κ) in the model. To explore the relevance of this mechanism, I test for heterogeneity in willingness to pay for co-working by baseline characteristics that are correlated with spousal control: an index of mobility and an index of husband's jealousy.[69]

Mobility is defined as the number of times the respondent left the house alone in the past month, not including going to work. I use self-reported mobility for women and wife's mobility for men, and classify respondents as above or below median. Women were also asked to report whether their husband gets angry or jealous if they speak to other men using a 4-point Likert scale (never, rarely, sometimes, always). I invert this index so that *higher* values imply *less* jealousy, and classify male respondents as above- or below-median based on their wives' responses.

Table 8 shows that willingness to pay for co-working is 10.8 percentage points (36.6%) higher for women with below-median mobility ($p < 0.05$) and 9.7 percentage points (50.8%) higher for men whose wives have low mobility ($p < 0.01$), than their above-median counterparts. Men whose wives describe them as more jealous, i.e. those who are below median on the inverse jealousy index, also value co-working 10.4 percentage points (47.9%) more than those who are described as less jealous ($p < 0.05$). Women whose husbands are more jealous do not value co-working

[67] Donald and Grosset-Touba (2025) estimate that the amenity value of sharing a workplace with a peer is between 13% and 20%, similar to my estimate.

[68] Anecdotally, most workers get paid in their own bank account, so co-working demand is unlikely to be driven by husbands wanting to take their wives' salaries. Only 19% of women reported that their husband decided how their income should be spent, and the share does not differ by baseline co-working status.

[69] Variable construction is described in detail in the Data Appendix B.4.

significantly more than those with less jealous husbands, suggesting that for some households, co-working may be enforced by the husband as a form of control.

While spousal control plays a role, it is unlikely to be the primary driver of co-working preferences for two reasons. First, 60% of co-working couples at baseline report that the husband joined the factory first. Although this pattern could reflect husbands referring their unemployed wives, the results are robust to restricting the sample to couples where the baseline job is not the wife's first job, suggesting that husbands are generally willing to leave their wives behind in another factory while exploring new opportunities. Second, co-working husbands were willing to explore new jobs alone in the *Applications Experiment*. Further, I find no evidence that husbands who were willing to leave may be delegating control to another family member who works at the factory. In fact, among co-working couples assigned to the Husband Only arm, application rates are about 70% lower when at least one other relative also works at the factory ($p< 0.1$).

3. Intra-household dynamics: Co-working helps couples coordinate leisure time

Couples may want to switch to a new job together because they value coordinating their leisure time and spending time together at work (Goux et al. 2014, Georges-Kot et al. 2024). Long workdays and unpredictable demands for overtime work may limit their ability to spend time together unless they work in the same factory. The value of spending time together (γ) should be higher among couples with better relationships. Since I do not find significant differences in willingness to pay for co-working when I split the sample by an index of relationship quality (Table 8) and I observe husbands willing to explore alone in the *Applications Experiment* once the wife is in a good workplace, I rule out this mechanism as a primary driver of co-working demand.[70]

6.3 Does co-working induce job lock?

Taken together, these results suggest that co-working increases job mobility for women, by making it safer for them to switch jobs. Low take-up rates under the Wife Only arm suggest that women would rarely explore new jobs if they had to do so alone.

However, as suggested by the conceptual framework, a new form of job lock may emerge if the couple is co-working in a factory with poor working conditions (Y_0). If the risk of exploring a new workplace (σ^2) is high, and the husband's presence substantially offsets workplace disamenities in the current job (η is high), then the couple may end up staying in the current job

[70]The relationship quality index is based on two survey questions where female respondents were asked to indicate how happy they are in their marital relationship and the frequency of spousal arguments using Likert scales. I combine the two into a summary index following (Anderson 2008); higher values suggest better relationship quality. Variable construction is described in the Data Appendix B.4.

with "known" risks, even if it offers poor conditions, instead of switching to an unknown factory together or the husband exploring alone.

This hypothesis is supported by the data. Application rates under the Husband Only arm in the *Applications Experiment* are substantially higher among co-working couples who are more satisfied in their current jobs (Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4). Symmetrically, husbands working in low-quality factories are less willing to search for new opportunities alone. I find no evidence that couples are more likely to apply under the Joint Arm if they are unsatisfied in their current jobs.

If husbands cannot explore alone, co-working couples may be less likely to leave a factory than other workers, contributing to job lock.[71] In fact, 64% of respondents said that if they heard about a job opportunity at a nearby factory offering higher pay, the husband would switch alone to assess whether it is a good place to work. Only 23% said they would switch together. When asked why they would not switch to a new job together, all participants cited uncertainty about working conditions at the new factory (Appendix Table A.11).

6.4 Co-working and Labor Supply: Key Insights

Results from the *Job Choice Experiment* and *Applications Experiment* reveal that women strongly prefer switching to a new workplace alongside their husbands over switching alone. I find strong evidence to suggest that uncertainty about working conditions in unfamiliar workplaces play a central role in driving these preferences.

In settings where job exploration is risky, co-working increases women's job mobility compared to searching alone. However, couple's dependence on co-working can also produce a different kind of lock-in. If couples start out at a factory with harsh working conditions, husbands seem less willing to search unilaterally, potentially dampening job mobility for the couple relative to others in the labor market.

[71] If couples want to switch together rather than sequentially, they must find a factory willing to hire both, and they must be confident that if conditions are poor, the husband's presence will suffice to protect the wife. Given high churn, most factories can accommodate multiple hires, and the first constraint is likely weak. However, the second is more binding: the set of employers acceptable for a joint move is likely to be strictly narrower than the set the husband would be willing to explore alone.

7 Co-working and Labor Demand: Experimental Design

7.1 Hiring Experiment

Do employers believe that co-working couples have lower job mobility than other workers and how do they respond? When firm-specific labor supply elasticities are low, employers enjoy greater market power and can mark down wages (Manning 2003, Lamadon et al. 2022). Thus, firms may prefer to hire co-working couples if they can pay them less. On the other hand, since worker attrition poses a significant challenge in this setting, employers may prefer hiring couples if they expect lower churn among this group.[72] I test for evidence of both channels through the *Hiring Experiment*, measuring how employers respond to co-working couples versus other job seekers when making hiring decisions and wage offers.

I recruited 65 employers, individuals with experience hiring and referring workers on behalf of garment manufacturing factories in Tirupur. The sample includes supervisors, labor contractors, and factory owners. The experimental design is similar to the incentivized resume rating experiment developed by Kessler et al. (2019). Respondents were shown ten pairs of hypothetical job applicants (five male pairs and five female pairs) seeking a job at the respondent's factory, and asked to report how interested they would be in hiring each applicant on a Likert scale from 1 to 10. To incentivize truthful reporting of preferences, respondents were told that their survey responses will be used to match them to five real candidates who are interested in new job opportunities in the garment sector. The names and contact details of the matched candidates were sent via text message within two weeks after the survey.

Creating Hypothetical Job Applicants

I designed the hypothetical job applicant profiles keeping in mind three features of the labor market. First, garment factories in this setting rely heavily on employee referrals for recruitment, much like urban labor markets in many developing countries (Caria et al. 2023). Close to 80% of garment workers in the *Exploratory Survey* reported that they found their job through a referral from a relative or friend. Since hiring tends to be informal, job seekers applying for production roles do not have resumes or reference letters from prior employers. Interviews with labor contractors revealed that it is standard for employers to ask about job seekers' prior experience, whether they knew someone already working in the factory, and whether they might be able to bring others with

[72] Worker turnover tends to be higher in developing countries compared to advanced economies, specially in the industrial sector (Tybout 2000, Donovan et al. 2023). Using administrative data from India's largest garment manufacturing firm, Adhvaryu et al. (2022) document a turnover rate of 18% over a five-month horizon. Since the industry relies on assembly-line production, turnover entails sizable training costs and production disruptions.

them. Second, results from the *Applications Experiment* and survey data on married couples' job search behavior suggest that sequential job search led by husbands is a common strategy. Third, data from the *Listing Survey* reveal that married garment workers who do not work in the same factory as their spouse may either co-work with a same-sex relative or friend (46.61%), or no one at all (49.32%). It is therefore important to document whether employers respond differently to job seekers who seek to work alongside a spouse versus a peer.

I incorporated these features into the experimental design as follows. I showed respondents a series of simple hypothetical profiles for married job applicants, randomly varying only the duration of prior work experience and the type of referral. Respondents were told that the two applicants were identical in all other ways. Since job switches are typically sequential, with husbands taking the lead, hypothetical job seekers were described as applying for the job alone. For male applicants, I randomized whom they would refer in the *future* (spouse, male friend, or no one). For female applicants, who tend to be the trailing spouse, I randomized whether they *already* have a reference working at the factory (spouse, female friend, or no one).

Respondents were asked to select one of the production roles offered at their factory, and to imagine all hypothetical applicants were applying for that role. Appendix Figure B.3 in the Technical Appendix depicts examples of choice pairs. Enumerators went over one practice question with the participant before beginning the module to check comprehension.

Randomization

Values for applicants' total work experience were randomly selected with replacement from a list of values: no experience, three months, six months, or one year. I varied applicants' preferences for co-working by randomizing the type of expected referral. I randomly assigned one of the two hypothetical applicants in each choice table to have a "spouse referral". The other applicant in the choice table was assigned to have either no referral or a friend referral, with equal probability. Appendix Table A.20 lists potential values for each applicant characteristic.

Estimation

After describing the applicants in each choice pair, enumerators asked the respondent how much they would like to hire each of them on a scale from 1 to 10 and to select one of the two applicants to hire. For each applicant, respondents were also asked: (1) how long they expected the applicant to work at the factory if hired; (2) which production role they would hire the applicant for (entry-level or "senior"); (3) what monthly salary they would offer; and (4) the likelihood that the applicant

would quit if their request for a salary increase were denied after working for six months.[73,74]

First, I transform the survey data into a dataset where each row represents one respondent i and one hypothetical applicant $j \in \{1,2\}$ from choice pair $t \in \{1,...,10\}$. For each of the outcome variables described above, I estimate this specification using ordinary least squares:

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha_i + \sum_{k \in 3,6,12} \delta_k \cdot \mathbf{1}\{Experience_{ijt} = k\} + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Spouse Referral}_{ijt} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Friend Referral}_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \tag{21}$$

where $\mathbf{1}\{Experience_{ijt} = k\}$ denotes a set of binary indicators recording whether applicant j shown to respondent i had 3, 6, or 12 months of experience; $\text{Spouse Referral}_{ijt}$ is a binary indicator for whether the applicant has a spouse referral; $\text{Friend Referral}_{ijt}$ is a binary indicator for whether the applicant has a friend referral; α_i is a respondent fixed effect; ε_{ijt} is a random error term, clustered at the respondent-level. I include respondent fixed effects to control for differences in factory type.[75] Since male applicants vary in their propensity to make future referrals while female applicants vary in terms of whether they have an existing referral, the coefficients β_1 and β_2 have different interpretations depending on the gender of the applicant. Therefore, I report disaggregated results by applicant gender.

8 Co-working and Labor Demand: Results

8.1 Hiring responses

Figure 5 shows that employers have a strong preference for hiring applicants who are keen to work with their spouse, relative to those working alone or with peers. Regression results are reported in Table 9. Relative to women with no referral, women whose husbands already work at the factory are 43.9 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to be hired, while those with a female friend working at the factory are 11.4 percentage points ($p < 0.05$) more likely to be hired. Comparing the two, women seeking to co-work with their husbands are 32.5 percentage points (152%) more

[73] Within each production category, some workers hold lower-paid entry-level "helper" positions, while more experienced workers are assigned to higher-paid roles, hereafter referred to as "senior roles" for the sake of clarity. For example, this includes tailor helpers versus sewing machine operators, or cutting helpers versus cutting machine operators. A helper versus senior hierarchy is also found in departments without machinery, such as quality control.

[74] The likelihood of quitting is reported on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 4 (very likely).

[75] For example, some factories may specialize in male-dominated occupations such as cutting or knitting, resulting in lower levels of hiring interest for female candidates. Similarly, smaller factories typically have lower churn, resulting in longer expected tenures. Including respondent fixed effects allows me to control for these systematic differences across factory types.

likely to be hired than those referred by a female friend ($p < 0.01$). I focus on comparing women referred by their husbands to those referred by friends, as the primary objective is to isolate the effect of co-working with a spouse, rather than the general benefits of being referred.

I also find that employers believe co-working couples have lower job mobility, expecting lower attrition among women who work with their husbands, compared to those working with peers. Respondents were asked to report expected tenure in months for both candidates in each choice table and to report the likelihood that each candidate would quit if denied a raise after six months using a 4-point Likert scale (ranging from not at all likely to very likely). I create a binary indicator for whether the candidate is expected to stay longer than their counterpart in the choice pair, and another indicator for whether the respondent believes the candidate is likely or very likely to quit.[76] Column 3 of Table 9 shows that employers are more likely to believe a woman will have a longer tenure at the factory if she is working with her husband than if she is working with a peer ($p < 0.01$). Employers also believe that women working with their husbands are 16.8 percentage points (19%) less likely to quit than those working with peers ($p < 0.01$) as shown in Column 4. Since worker attrition is a major challenge in this setting, employers may value co-working women more than other job seekers because they are less likely to quit their jobs.

I find the same pattern of results for male candidates (Table 10). Employers are 15.8 percentage points (54%) more likely to hire men who will refer their wives for a job in the future over those who would refer a male network member ($p < 0.05$), at least partly because they expect these men to have lower job mobility ($p < 0.01$).

Importantly, employers recognize that men working with their wives are more mobile than women working with their husbands. Compared to those working alone, men working with their wives are 19% less likely to quit if denied a raise, while women working with their husbands are 27% less likely to quit ($p < 0.1$). Results from the *Hiring Experiment* provide robust evidence that employers do recognize the fact that co-working couples tend to have lower job mobility than other job seekers, and women experience greater lock-in than men.

8.2 Wage-setting responses

Finally, I examine whether employers take advantage of their monopsony power and engage in price discrimination during wage setting. In this context, many factories hire workers on shift contracts, with a fixed wage per shift, and tend to cluster around the minimum wage for each skill level (Sharma 2024), which may limit their ability to engage in price discrimination. However,

[76] Appendix Table A.21 shows that results look similar when using expected tenure in months and the continuous Likert scale measure as outcome variables instead.

firms do have the flexibility to assign workers to a higher or lower pay grade. Therefore, I test for differences in role assignment as well as proposed salaries. Noting that minimum wages are more likely to bind for entry-level than operator roles, I also test for differences in role-specific salaries. Since descriptions of male applicants indicated that they would refer their male friend or spouse to the factory in the future, they will not immediately benefit from the co-working amenity, potentially making it difficult for the employer to extract a compensating wage differential at the time of hiring. Therefore, I focus on employers' hiring responses to female applicants who were described as having references working in the factory.

Employers are 9.8 percentage points (196%) more likely to offer female applicants the senior role if they are referred by their spouse than those who do not have a referral ($p < 0.05$) and 7.7 percentage points (156%) more than those who were referred by a friend ($p < 0.05$) as shown in Column (3) of Table 9. Workers in senior roles are directly involved in assembly line production, where attrition can significantly disrupt operations. Employers expect less attrition among women who work with their spouse, which could increase their willingness to assign these applicants to senior production roles.

Although employers consistently propose higher salaries on average for workers they would hire for senior roles, women co-working with their spouse do not receive a wage premium relative to those without a referral (Column (1) in Table 11). The sample includes all hypothetical applicants, including those the respondent said they would not like to hire, and therefore would offer systematically lower wages to. Consequently, the estimated coefficients may be biased. In Column (2), I limit the sample to the set of applicants that employers said they would hire. I find that women whose husbands work in the same factory would be offered 4.3% lower wages than women who are joining alone, but estimates are imprecise ($p = 0.26$).

Splitting the sample by role reveals interesting heterogeneity in markdowns. Column 3 shows that the proposed monthly salary is 6% lower for women hired for senior roles if they would be working with their husbands ($p = 0.03$) than those working alone. Based on the 95% confidence interval for this estimate, I can rule out wage markdowns larger than 11.4%. On the other hand, employers appear to be willing to pay a wage premium of 9.8% to entry-level workers working with their husbands; once again estimates are imprecise due to the small sample ($p = 0.2$).

The wage premium for co-working women in entry-level roles likely reflects the surplus gained from reduced churn. Churn is highest among entry-level workers, who can secure large raises by switching factories to transition to senior roles once they acquire skills. Consistent with this, the perceived reduction in churn among co-working couples (Tables 9 and 10) is entirely driven by entry-level hires. Since lower churn boosts manufacturing output (Srivastava 2025),

employers appear willing to share part of this surplus with workers.

I find no evidence of price discrimination against co-working husbands during the initial wage-setting process (Appendix Table A.22). Since these candidates are expected to refer their wives *in the future*, they do not immediately benefit from the co-working amenity when they join. Employers in the sample may have felt it would be inappropriate to offer them lower wages.

Together, the results from the *Hiring Experiment* suggest that employers prefer to hire job seekers who want to co-work with a spouse, at least partly because they recognize these workers have lower job mobility. I also find evidence of wage markdowns for women hired for senior roles, consistent with employer monopsony power. Employers may also take advantage of the fact that co-working couples have lower job mobility when allocating promotions or salary increments across employees (Rong 2023). Since these decisions are not captured by the experimental design, the markdowns may be under-estimated.

9 Benefits and Costs of Co-working

This paper shows that while co-working offers protective benefits, there can be trade-offs. Whether co-working improves welfare depends on the counterfactual we consider, and a comprehensive welfare calculation is beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, I explore whether couples and employers might be better off when the option to co-work is available than when it is not, holding fixed the fact that job exploration is especially risky for women and some husbands may prevent their wives from working separately (out of concern or control). This comparison is relevant because co-working may sometimes be infeasible, for example, when husbands work in male-dominated industries or employers prohibit spousal referrals and joint hires. I focus on how co-working shapes economic outcomes, such as labor market entry, job mobility, and earnings.[77]

I discuss policy implications in the conclusion, asking whether better enforcement of labor standards and greater transparency about working conditions might be more effective solutions to increase women's labor force participation and job mobility.

Women's Outcomes

Co-working $\rightarrow$ Labor Market Entry: Results from a survey experiment with non-working women suggest that co-working opportunities can actually facilitate labor market entry for women. I conducted the survey in ten villages surrounding an upcoming cluster of garment factories in

[77] A more thorough welfare analysis would take into consideration non-pecuniary factors, such as the value of spending time together or whether the husband's presence creates an oppressive work environment for women.

Odisha, India, recruiting a sample of 102 married women interested in paid work (see Appendix Section B.9 for details). Respondents were told to imagine that their husbands already worked at one of these factories. Women were then shown a series of hypothetical job offers and asked if they would accept each one. I randomized wages, whether the job was at in husband's factory, and whether a female friend or relative of the respondent worked there. Logit estimates reveal that women are 23.08 percentage points more likely to accept an offer at the husband's factory than an identical job at another factory in the same cluster ($p < 0.01$) (Appendix Table B.4).[78] By contrast, the presence of a female peer increases acceptance rates by 6.58 percentage points ($p < 0.05$). The difference is significant at the 1% level.

Co-working → Job Mobility: Results also suggest that having a spouse in the same industry can raise job mobility for working women.[79] I first consider women whose husbands currently work in the garment sector. The *Applications Experiment* shows that removing the co-working option would reduce job switching. Only 12% of households applied when wives were randomly offered a chance to switch jobs alone, compared with 26% for joint moves and 32% for husband-only moves (which typically generate referrals for the wife).

For women whose husbands work in another industry, the ideal test would randomly assign some husbands to enter the garment industry and compare subsequent switching rates. Since this is not feasible, I compare switching rates by husband's occupation, with the caveat that observed differences may partly reflect selection.[80] In the *Listing Survey*, married women whose husbands currently work in the garment sector are 6.7 percentage points (24%) more likely to have switched jobs than married women whose husbands work in a different industry, but the estimate is imprecise ($p = 0.25$). Since the survey question asked about switches over the previous two years, I limit the sample to women with at most two years experience in Tirupur (N = 275).[81]

Job Mobility → Wage Growth: Observational data from the *Exploratory Survey* of garment workers also show that job switching is the primary driver of wage growth (Table 1). 63% of workers with a tenure of at least one year in their current job said they had never received a raise; the average annual raise is only 4.1%. In contrast, switching jobs is associated with an average

[78] Respondents were told that factories provide private bus transport for employees, a common practice for large garment factories, to rule out commuting concerns.

[79] These benefits are enjoyed by both marginal and inframarginal workers, i.e. women who would have worked even if co-working was not an option.

[80] For example, women whose husbands work in another sector may be managing risk through other channels (e.g., relying on trusted labor contractors, working with other male family members etc.) or have higher tolerance for disamenities; having the husband around may not increase job switching substantially for this group.

[81] Restricting the sample to women who have worked for exactly two years generates slightly larger estimates (14.8 percentage points or 32%, $p = 0.31$), as those who have arrived recently may be less likely to switch, but the sample size is very small (N=59).

wage increase of 10%. Even though employers mark down wages by 6% for co-working women in operator roles, switching jobs to advance beyond the entry-level role remains profitable as women in senior roles earn 22.5% more than entry-level workers.[82]

A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that women's annual wage growth is 1.03-1.3 percentage points (41%-48%) higher when they have the option to co-work than when they do not. I combine (a) the expected raise when staying and (b) the average gain from switching, with (c) the probability of switching with and without a co-working option (assuming women only receive one opportunity to switch in a year). The expected wage increase from staying in the same factory is $0.63 \times 0 + 0.37 \times 4.1\% = 1.5\%$. The expected wage increase from switching is 10% if women go alone, and $10\% \times 0.94 = 9.4\%$ if they go with a spouse, reflecting the 6% wage markdown. On net, access to co-working appears to increase women's earnings.[83]

Men's Outcomes: Men's job mobility may be constrained if they need to coordinate with their wives than if they were searching alone. Until the couple identifies a safe workplace for the wife, the husband's job search must take into account both partners' needs, limiting their choices.[84] Consistent with this, the *Applications Experiment* showed that men working with their wives in lower-quality factories were less likely to switch jobs alone, as their protective presence is needed. If the wife is not working, works from home, or has a good job in another industry instead, husbands choose jobs for themselves and can switch jobs more easily. It is worth noting that once the wife secures a suitable position where she is comfortable working without her husband, this coordination constraint no longer binds. Moreover, since employers prefer hiring co-working couples over other job seekers, men's hiring prospects may improve if they signal that they will refer their wives in the future. If co-working enables wives to work, men also benefit from higher household income. Therefore, net benefits for men are ambiguous.

Employers' Outcomes: Employers likely benefit from the fact that couples rely on co-working to navigate job exploration risk. Results from the *Hiring Experiment* reveal that co-working couples have lower turnover once they start working in a factory, and recent evidence from India suggests that decreasing turnover in manufacturing firms results in higher output (Srivastava 2025). Employers also face less pressure to make costly investments in improving workplace amenities to attract workers, as women are willing to work in harsh workplaces with their husbands.

[82] This estimate is based on *Exploratory Survey* data, controlling for total years of experience and contract type.

[83] The estimate remains positive as long as switching jobs is associated with a 2% or larger increase in the wage.

[84] While men may be willing to work in certain environments themselves for higher pay, they may not want to subject their wives to these conditions due to genuine safety concerns or paternalism (Buchmann et al. 2024).

10 Conclusion

This paper uses detailed, newly-collected observational data and three carefully-designed experiments to present novel evidence on co-working by married couples, an important but under-studied labor market phenomenon. In settings where workplaces have harsh work environments, and information frictions make it difficult to learn about working conditions in advance, job exploration can be particularly risky for women, limiting their outside options, job mobility, and wage growth.

Although the study focuses on the garment industry in India, job seekers in many low- and middle-income countries face similar challenges, especially those employed in manufacturing jobs. I find that couples choose to co-work as a strategy to mitigate the risks associated with job exploration. Spousal control plays a role, but is not the primary driver. I also show that women strongly prefer switching to new workplaces with their husband or joining a suitable workplace which the husband has identified, instead of switching to new jobs alone. As a result, this work arrangement can increase women's job-to-job mobility relative to situations where they must navigate job transitions independently. Further, the survey experiment with women outside the labor force suggests that having the option to co-work with a spouse may also facilitate labor market entry.

However, co-working is only a stopgap solution to harsh working conditions. The results in this paper suggest that the prevalence of unsafe and exploitative workplaces may have substantial economic costs. First, I demonstrate that couples' dependence on co-working in these settings contributes to job lock and increases employers' monopsony power over women. Of course, these problems would likely be even more severe if co-working was not feasible. Second, co-working may create a perverse incentive for firms to maintain poor working conditions. In unsafe factories, husbands working alongside their wives appear unwilling to leave to find better opportunities if it means leaving their wives behind. Fear of ending up in a workplace that is even worse may further deter joint moves. Since worker attrition is a major challenge in many low- and middle-income settings, employers may prefer to maintain harsh, unsafe conditions if doing so induces some workers to stay. As a result, this strategy devised by job seekers in response to poor working conditions may inadvertently reinforce their persistence. Third, working for the same employer exposes households to greater income risk, especially in an export-driven industry such as garment manufacturing, where firms are vulnerable to demand fluctuations. Finally, by tying spouses to the same industry, co-working may divert each from their comparative advantage, contributing to misallocation. Willingness to pay estimates indicate that couples would separate only for a 29% wage premium. A wedge of this magnitude likely deters most moves, preventing reallocation to higher-productivity matches.

This work yields three insights to guide policy that seeks to improve labor market outcomes for women and low-income households. First, interventions to alleviate information asymmetries about working conditions and better enforcement of labor standards may reduce job exploration risks for women, and reduce couples' need to coordinate labor supply. Instead of working in the same establishment, they can diversify across workplaces, reduce their exposure to household income risk, and move to sectors where they would be most productive. Second, as agricultural employment continues to decline in many emerging economies, inducing higher rates of rural-urban migration, creating jobs in industries where couples can co-work may boost female labor force participation. Lastly, since spousal co-working allows women to endure harsh conditions, it weakens factories' incentives to comply with labor standards. Robust government enforcement and consumer pressure are essential to ensure safe, fair workplaces.

11 Figures


Figure 1: Share Preferring to Switch Jobs with their Spouse Over Switching Alone (Job Choice Experiment)




Notes: The figure depicts the share of respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment* who prefer the co-working job, which allows them to switch to a new job with their spouse, over the non-co-working job, for each possible value of the difference in monthly wage between the two jobs. Since the monthly wage for each hypothetical job in a choice table was randomly assigned, ranging from 20% lower than to 30% higher than the current monthly wage, the difference in wage between two jobs in any choice table may range from -50% to +50%. Choice data is limited to the subset of 273 choice pairs where all other non-wage amenities (commute time, language barriers, and facilities for women's safety) were identical between the two hypothetical jobs. I also drop choice pairs where the wage difference was -50pp, +40pp, or +50pp due to insufficient observations (< 10) in these cells, resulting in a final sample of 250 choice pairs.

Figure 2: Application Rates by Recommendation Type (Applications Experiment)

(a) Panel A: All Households




(b) Panel B: Both Husband and Wife Surveyed



Notes: The figures depict the share of households in each treatment arm in the *Applications Experiment* that applied to at least one of the advertised job opportunities by calling the hotline number. The omitted category in the regression is households in the Wife Only treatment arm. The sample in Panel A comprises all households, while the sample in Panel B comprises households where both husband and wife were successfully surveyed. The figure also presents p-values for tests of difference in means across treatment arms. Regression results are reported in Table 3.


Figure 3: Heterogeneity in Willingness to Pay for Co-working With One's Spouse by Factory Exposure (Job Choice Experiment)




Notes: The figure depicts how respondents' willingness to pay for co-working with a spouse varies with the total number of garment factories they have worked at in Tirupur. The bottom 25% of respondents have never switched factories. I report willingness to pay estimates and 95% confidence intervals for respondents in the bottom 25%, top 50% (3+ factories), top 25% (5+ factories), top 10% (10+ factories) and top 5% (20+ factories) of the distribution. I estimate separate regressions comparing respondents who have never switched (bottom 25%) to the other groups, controlling for total years of experience. The dashed line represents average willingness to pay for co-working in the full sample. Standard errors are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Figure 4: Estimated Marginal Effects of Wages on Job Take-up Among Female Respondents (Job Choice Experiment)

(a) Panel A: Jobs With All Three Disamenities




(b) Panel B: Jobs With No Disamenities



Notes: These figures depict how the predicted probability of selecting a hypothetical job offer in the *Job Choice Experiment* varies with the wage, depending on whether the respondent can co-work with a spouse when they switch jobs or must switch alone, estimated using a standard logit model. The analysis sample is limited to female respondents. The sample in Panel A includes jobs with the lowest possible amenity levels in the experimental design: a commute time of 20 minutes or more, supervisors and most coworkers who do not speak the respondent's native language, and no information provided on whether the factory has invested in women's safety. The sample in Panel B includes jobs with the highest possible amenity levels: a 10-minute commute, a supervisor and coworkers who speak the respondent's native language, and confirmed factory investments in women's safety. Wages were randomized to fall between 20% below and 30% above respondents' actual monthly earnings. The Wage Multiplier on the x-axis reflects this variation. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Figure 5: Hiring Probability by Referral Type (Hiring Experiment)



Notes: The figures depicts hiring probabilities for hypothetical candidates in the *Hiring Experiment* by type of referral. Referral Type captures the type of co-working. For male candidates, "Spouse Referral" represents those who are likely to refer their wife (spousal co-working), "Friend Referral" corresponds to those who are likely to refer a male friend (peer co-working), and "No Referral" corresponds to applicants who will not refer anyone to the factory in the future (no co-working). For female candidates, "Spouse Referral" represents those whose husband currently works in the factory (spousal co-working), "Friend Referral" corresponds to those who have a female friend working in the factory (peer co-working), and "No Referral" corresponds to applicants who do not have any network member working in the factory. The omitted category in the regression is applicants with no referral and no prior work experience. The figure also presents p-values for tests of difference in hiring probabilities across referral types. Regression results are reported in Tables 9 and 10.

12 Tables

Table 1: Motivating Facts about the Labor Market in Tirupur

Summary Statistic	Source	Value
Fact 1: *Job exploration carries risk as some factories offer bad working conditions*		
Report at least one workplace disamenity (%)	Exploratory Survey	0.68
Heard of or experienced harassment in a Tirupur garment factory (%)	Job Choice Experiment	0.36
Fact 2: *Job switching is the primary driver of wage growth*		
Average change in monthly wage after switching jobs	Listing Survey	+10%
Never received a raise (% workers with $\geq$ 1 year tenure)	Exploratory Survey	0.63
Average annual raise	Exploratory Survey	4.1%
Fact 3: *Job transitions are rare*		
Never switched jobs (%)	Exploratory Survey	0.54
Female; Male		0.63; 0.48
Fact 4: *Husbands' presence can play a protective role*		
Rank husband's presence as top factor that would make new workplace feel safer (% female garment workers)	Job Choice Experiment	0.54
Fact 5: *Co-working is widespread, and wives tend to be the trailing spouse*		
Married garment workers who are co-working (%)	Listing Survey	0.45
Female; Male		0.46; 0.44
Who joined factory first? (% co-working couples)	Job Choice Experiment	
Husband alone		0.60
Joined together		0.27
Wife alone		0.13
Co-working history (if both spouses in garment sector)	Job Choice Experiment	
Currently co-working		0.59
Not co-working, co-worked in the past		0.20
Not co-working, never co-worked in the past		0.21

Notes: The table presents summary statistics associated with the motivating facts in Section 2.1. Data sources include: (i) *Exploratory Survey* of 551 garment workers, (ii) *Listing Survey* data on 4,050 garment workers collected during study recruitment, and (iii) data on 792 married garment workers in the *Job Choice Experiment*. "Report at least one workplace disamenity" captures the share facing one of these: long hours, no wage premium for overtime work, delayed salary payment, unsafe working conditions, wage penalties for production errors, wages withheld on quitting.

Table 2: Willingness to Pay for Job Attributes (Job Choice Experiment)

	Full Sample (1)	Female (2)	Male (3)
Co-work with Spouse	0.292***	0.364***	0.236***
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Commute: 20 mins	0.006	-0.045	0.036
	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Commute: 30 mins	-0.065***	-0.100***	-0.038
	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Commute: 40 mins	-0.093***	-0.133***	-0.071***
	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.023)
Language Barriers	-0.051***	-0.093***	-0.028*
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.015)
No Info. on Women's Safety	-0.091***	-0.153***	-0.052***
	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.019)
Observations	5,306	2,695	2,611

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes as a fraction of the monthly wage from the *Job Choice Experiment*. Column 1 presents estimates from a logit specification estimated on the full sample. Column 2 presents estimates for female respondents and Column 3 presents estimates for male respondents. The omitted category corresponds to a job with only one vacancy, requiring the respondent to switch jobs alone, with a 10-minute commute, no language barriers, and multiple measures to ensure workplace safety for women. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Table 3: Applications by Treatment Arm and Co-working Status at Baseline (Applications Experiment)

	P(Applied)			
	Full Sample		Both Husband and Wife Surveyed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Husband Only	0.10	0.20*	0.20***	0.37***
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.12)
	[0.101]	[0.069]	[0.006]	[0.003]
Joint	0.09*	0.05	0.14**	0.16*
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)
	[0.068]	[0.575]	[0.011]	[0.068]
Coworking at Baseline		0.03		0.08
		(0.08)		(0.07)
		[0.752]		[0.266]
Husband Only × Coworking At Baseline		-0.15		-0.26*
		(0.13)		(0.15)
		[0.242]		[0.081]
Joint × Coworking At Baseline		0.06		-0.02
		(0.10)		(0.11)
		[0.531]		[0.843]
Mean: Wife Only Arm	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.06
p-value: Husband Only = Joint	0.87		0.46	
p-value: Husband Only = Joint (Coworking at Basline)		0.35		0.76
p-value: Husband Only = Joint (Not Coworking at Basline)		0.13		0.10
Observations	338	338	254	254

Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions based on equation (17). The dependent variable is whether the household applied to at least one job opportunity by calling the hotline number. The unit of observation is the household. Columns (1) and (2) are based on the full sample of households. Columns (3) and (4) are based on the sample of households where both husband and wife were successfully surveyed. The omitted category is households that were randomly assigned to receive a recommendation for the wife only ("Wife Only Arm"). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 4: Applications by Treatment Arm and Job Satisfaction at Baseline (Applications Experiment)

	All Households	Co-working At Baseline	Not Co-working At Baseline
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Husband Only	0.19***	0.14	0.26**
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)
	[0.01]	[0.12]	[0.04]
Joint	0.14**	0.14*	0.13
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)
	[0.01]	[0.05]	[0.19]
Mean Job Satisfaction	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
	[0.32]	[0.67]	[0.31]
Husband Only × Mean Job Satisfaction	0.22***	0.17**	0.30**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)
	[0.00]	[0.04]	[0.02]
Joint × Mean Job Satisfaction	0.08	0.05	0.15
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)
	[0.17]	[0.46]	[0.15]
Constant	0.12***	0.14***	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.31]
Mean: Wife Only Arm	0.12	0.14	0.06
Observations	251	176	75

Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions based on equation (18). The dependent variable is whether the household applied to at least one job opportunity by calling the hotline number. The unit of observation is the household. The sample includes households where both husband and wife were successfully surveyed. The omitted category is households that were randomly assigned to receive a recommendation for the wife only ("Wife Only Arm"). During the *Job Choice Experiment*, respondents rated their current job satisfaction on a 4-point Likert scale. I compute the average satisfaction across spouses and standardize the resulting variable to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 5: Heterogeneity in Willingness to Pay for Co-working With One's Spouse by Concerns about Commuting and Workplace Conditions (Female Respondents, Job Choice Experiment)

	Worried About Commuting Safety		Perceived Occ. Safety and Health Risk		No. SH Incidents at Other Factories
	Likert	Binary	Likert	Binary	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Above Median	0.408***	0.521***	0.430***	0.624***	0.321***
	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.035)
Below Median	0.382***	0.373***	0.346***	0.364***	0.391***
	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Diff.	0.026	0.148**	0.084*	0.260***	-0.070
	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.044)
Observations	2,128	2,135	2,128	2,128	2,640

Notes: The table reports heterogeneity in estimated willingness to pay for co-working with one's spouse among female respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment* based on concerns about a variety of workplace conditions. Columns (1) and (2) consider heterogeneity in WTP based on perceived commuting safety. Respondents were asked to indicate how safe it would be for a hypothetical female garment worker to commute alone to and from work on 4-point Likert scale (very unsafe, unsafe, safe, very safe). Column (1) presents differences in WTP between those who are above- and below-median in terms of this measure while Column (2) tests for differences between those who perceive the commute to be very unsafe for women (denoted by "Above Median" in the table), and all others. Columns (3) and (4) consider heterogeneity in WTP based on perceived occupational safety/health risks. Respondents were asked to indicate how worried they were that they would suffer an injury or start feeling unwell at work on a 4-point Likert scale (not at all scared, slightly scared, moderately scared, extremely scared), and also report how worried they were about their spouse. The Occupational Safety and Health Risk index is defined as the average of the two variables. Column (3) presents differences in WTP between those who are above- and below-median in terms of this measure while Column (4) tests for differences between those who are moderately or extremely scared, and all others. Column (5) examines heterogeneity in willingness to pay for co-working based on respondents' exposure to reports of sexual harassment at other garment factories, using a median split on the number of incidents the respondent has heard about. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, adjusting for clustering by respondent, and reported in parentheses.

Table 6: Heterogeneity in Willingness to Pay for Co-working With One's Spouse by Presence of Other Job Attributes (Job Choice Experiment)

	Full Sample	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Co-work with Spouse	0.293***	0.365***	0.239***
	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.030)
Commute 20+ mins	-0.058***	-0.104***	-0.029
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.026)
Language Barriers	-0.060***	-0.106***	-0.035
	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.022)
No Info. on Women's Safety	-0.070***	-0.111***	-0.041
	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.025)
Co-work with Spouse × Commute 20+ mins	0.019	0.028	0.012
	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.033)
Co-work with Spouse × Language Barriers	0.012	0.018	0.011
	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Co-work with Spouse × No Info. on Women's Safety	-0.036	-0.079	-0.015
	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.035)
Observations	5,306	2,695	2,611

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes as a fraction of the monthly wage from the *Job Choice Experiment*. Column 1 presents estimates from a logit specification estimated on the full sample. Column 2 presents estimates for female respondents and Column 3 presents estimates for male respondents. Commute times of 20 minutes or longer are classified as Long Commutes. The omitted category corresponds to a job with only one vacancy, requiring the respondent to switch jobs alone, with a 10-minute commute, no language barriers, and multiple measures to ensure workplace safety for women. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Table 7: Willingness to Pay for Co-working with a Spouse versus a Same-Sex Peer

	Full Sample (1)	Female (2)	Male (3)
Co-work with Spouse	0.290***	0.324***	0.268***
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Co-work with Peer	0.155***	0.218***	0.106***
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Commute: 20 mins	0.016	0.001	0.037
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Commute: 30 mins	-0.032	-0.054	-0.007
	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.032)
Commute: 40 mins	-0.093***	-0.084**	-0.095***
	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.034)
p-value: Spouse = Peer	0.00	0.00	0.00
Observations	1,008	453	555

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes as a fraction of the monthly wage. The sample includes individuals in the *Job Choice Experiment sample* who also participated in an unincentivized job choice experiment during the household *Listing Survey*. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent. Reported p-values correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the logit coefficients on "Co-work with Spouse" and "Co-work with Peer" are equal, i.e. the marginal utilities are the same. Peers are defined as a same-sex friend or relative.

Table 8: Heterogeneity in Willingness to Pay for Co-working With One's Spouse by Intra-Household Dynamics (Job Choice Experiment)

	Female Respondents (Self-Reported)			Male Respondents (Wife's Report)		
	Mobility	Inverse of Spousal Jealousy Index	Relationship Quality Index	Wife's Mobility	Inverse of Spousal Jealousy Index	Relationship Quality Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Above Median	0.295***	0.412***	0.363***	0.191***	0.217***	0.224***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Below Median	0.403***	0.363***	0.422***	0.288***	0.321***	0.278***
	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.031)
Diff.	-0.108**	0.049	-0.060	-0.097***	-0.104**	-0.055
	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Observations	2,236	1,799	1,792	1,769	1,505	1,498

Notes: The table reports heterogeneity in estimated willingness to pay for co-working with one's spouse when switching to a new job from the *Job Choice Experiment* by measures of intra-household dynamics. In Columns (1) and (4), mobility is measured as the number of instances when an individual left their home alone in the past month, not including going to work. I classify respondents as having above versus below median mobility. Male respondents are classified based on the mobility reported by their wives, not their own. Columns (2) and (5) consider heterogeneity based on a measure of spousal jealousy. Female respondents were asked to report whether their husband gets angry or jealous if they speak to another man using a 4-point Likert scale (never/rarely/sometimes/always). I invert this index so that *higher* values imply *less* jealousy. I classify female respondents as being above versus below in terms of this Inverse Spousal Jealousy index. Male respondents are classified as above versus below median based on their wives' responses. Male respondents are only included in the sample if their wives completed the survey as well. Columns (3) and (6) test for heterogeneity in willingness to pay by an index of relationship quality. Female respondents were asked to report how happy they were in their relationship with their husbands on a 4-point Likert scale and how often they have arguments with their husbands. I combine these variables into a summary index following Anderson (2008), such that higher values signify higher relationship quality. I classify respondents as being above or below median in terms of this measure. Male respondents are classified based on their wives' responses. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, adjusting for clustering by respondent, and reported in parentheses.

Table 9: Employer Hiring Responses and Expected Attrition by Referral Type (Female Applicants, Hiring Experiment)

	Dependent Variable:				
	P(Hire)	Rating	P(Stay Longer)	P(Quit if Denied Raise)	P(Senior Role)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Reference in Factory: Spouse	0.439***	1.094***	0.336***	-0.258***	0.098**
	(0.068)	(0.249)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.045)
Reference in Factory: Friend	0.114**	0.338	0.008	-0.090*	0.021
	(0.057)	(0.245)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Experience = 3 months	0.190***	0.802***	0.101**	-0.074	0.450***
	(0.055)	(0.204)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.069)
Experience = 6 months	0.257***	1.416***	0.077*	-0.096*	0.653***
	(0.051)	(0.257)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.071)
Experience = 12 months	0.461***	2.586***	0.238***	-0.067	0.756***
	(0.058)	(0.340)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.058)
Mean of Outcome Variable	0.10	5.26	0.12	0.96	0.05
p-value: Friend = Spouse	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
Observations	650	640	650	444	642

Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions estimated on data from the *Hiring Experiment*. The analysis sample is limited to hypothetical female applicants. Referral Type captures the type of co-working. "Reference: Spouse" means the applicant's husband works at the factory (spousal co-working). "Reference: Friend" means her female friend works there (peer co-working). The omitted category is a female applicant with no reference and no prior garment experience. Means of the dependent variables for the omitted category are reported at the bottom of the table. All specifications include respondent fixed effects. Reported p-values correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on Spouse Referral and Friend Referral are equal. *P(Hire)* is a binary indicator for whether the respondent would prefer to hire the applicant over the other in the choice pair. *Rating* takes values between 1 and 10 reflecting how interested the respondent is in hiring the applicant. *P(Stay Longer)* is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the applicant is expected to have a longer tenure at the factory than the other in the choice pair. Respondents also rated the likelihood that each applicant would quit if denied a raise after six months, using a four-point Likert scale: very unlikely (1) to very likely (4). *P(Quit if Denied A Raise)* is a binary indicator for whether the response was "likely" or "very likely". *P(Senior Role)* is a binary indicator for whether the respondent would hire the applicant for the "senior" role instead of the entry-level role. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by respondent are reported in parentheses.

Table 10: Employer Hiring Responses and Expected Attrition by Referral Type (Male Applicants, Hiring Experiment)

	Dependent Variable:				
	P(Hire)	Rating	P(Stay Longer)	P(Quit if Denied Raise)	P(Senior Role)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Will Refer: Spouse	0.323***	0.962***	0.359***	-0.157**	0.085**
	(0.065)	(0.243)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.039)
Will Refer: Friend	0.165**	0.728***	0.148**	-0.014	0.048
	(0.064)	(0.241)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.042)
Experience = 3 months	0.117*	0.836***	-0.036	-0.035	0.518***
	(0.062)	(0.243)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.061)
Experience = 6 months	0.261***	1.503***	0.047	-0.041	0.735***
	(0.065)	(0.269)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Experience = 12 months	0.487***	2.856***	0.205***	0.055	0.805***
	(0.060)	(0.345)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.055)
Mean of Outcome Variable	0.13	4.49	0.18	0.83	0.03
p-value: Friend = Spouse	0.04	0.30	0.01	0.00	0.45
Observations	650	648	650	450	646

Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions estimated on data from the *Hiring Experiment*. The analysis sample is limited to hypothetical male applicants. Referral Type captures the type of co-working. "Will Refer: Spouse" means the applicant will refer his wife for a job in the future (spousal co-working). "Will Refer: Friend" means he will refer a male friend (peer co-working). The omitted category is a male applicant who will not refer anyone and has no prior garment experience. Means of the dependent variables for the omitted category are reported at the bottom of the table. All specifications include respondent fixed effects. Reported p-values correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on Spouse Referral and Friend Referral are equal. *P(Hire)* is a binary indicator for whether the respondent would prefer to hire the applicant over the other applicant in the choice pair. *Rating* takes values between 1 and 10 reflecting how interested the respondent is in hiring the applicant. *P(Stay Longer)* is a binary indicator for whether the applicant is expected to have a longer tenure at the factory than the other in the choice pair. Respondents also rated the likelihood that each applicant would quit if denied a raise after six months, using a four-point Likert scale: very unlikely (1) to very likely (4). *P(Quit if Denied A Raise)* is a binary indicator for whether the response was "likely" or "very likely". *P(Senior Role)* is a binary indicator for whether the respondent would hire the applicant for the "senior" role instead of the entry-level role. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by respondent are reported in parentheses.

Table 11: Price Discrimination by Employers in the Hiring Experiment (Female Applicants)

	Dependent Variable: Proposed Monthly Salary (Rs.)			
	All Applicants	Hired Applicants	Hired Applicants by Role	
			Senior Role	Entry-level Role
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reference in Factory: Spouse	-186.30	-458.82	-981.35**	1,043.67
	(193.43)	(401.62)	(428.22)	(788.51)
Reference in Factory: Friend	-342.36	-644.40	-730.62	1,699.25*
	(222.77)	(453.58)	(455.30)	(977.23)
Experience = 3 months	770.98**	830.88*	-1,260.96	1,313.25**
	(313.59)	(496.63)	(757.33)	(503.69)
Experience = 6 months	1,650.02***	1,649.09***	-285.37	2,504.46***
	(376.34)	(578.92)	(756.57)	(688.67)
Experience = 12 months	3,354.59***	3,325.45***	1,475.93*	1,273.32
	(496.05)	(732.81)	(795.70)	(801.20)
Mean of Outcome Variable	12,297.30	10,666.67	16,000.00	10,666.67
p-value: Friend = Spouse	0.34	0.47	0.37	0.21
Observations	628	313	231	62

Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions estimated on data on female applicants from the *Hiring Experiment*. Referral Type captures the type of co-working. "Reference: Spouse" means the applicant's husband works at the factory (spousal co-working). "Reference: Friend" means her female friend works there (peer co-working). The omitted category is an applicant with no prior experience working in a garment factory who has no reference working in the factory and assigned to the entry-level role. Means of the dependent variables for the omitted category are reported at the bottom of the table. All specifications include respondent fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) include controls for the role the applicant was assigned by the respondent. Reported p-values correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on Spouse Referral and Friend Referral are equal. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by respondent are in parentheses.

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
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A Empirical Appendix

A.1 Appendix Figures

Figure A.1: Study Timeline



Notes: The figure depicts the timeline of the experiments and supplementary surveys. Field work primarily took place in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, a major garment manufacturing hub in South India. The survey experiment with married women not currently in the labor force was implemented in Khordha district in Odisha, a nearby state and a major source of migrant labor for Tamil Nadu's garment industry.

Figure A.2: Photographs of Residential Compounds



(a) Compound 1



(b) Compound 2




(c) Compound 3



(d) Compound 4

Notes: The figure depicts examples of residential compounds in Tirupur where surveys took place.

Figure A.3: Listing Survey Respondents Around TEKIC Industrial Park SIDCO




Notes: The figure depicts a subset of the *Listing Survey* respondents surveyed in Mudalipalayam Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO) and the factories located in the Tirupur Export Knitwear Industrial Complex (TEKIC), the primary cluster of factories in SIDCO.

Figure A.4: Share of Garment Workers Reporting Challenges in the Workplace by Gender (Exploratory Survey)




Notes: The figure depicts the share of garment workers in the *Exploratory Survey* who reported facing each of these challenges in their current workplace by gender. "Deduct wage if quit" indicates whether the respondent believes the employer would withhold part of the salary if an employee quits. "Long hours" refers to perceptions that working hours are excessively long. "No overtime pay" captures whether the factory fails to offer the legally mandated overtime rate. "Salary not paid on time" indicates delayed wage payments. "Unsafe work cond." refers to perceptions that working conditions are unpleasant or unsafe. "Wage penalties" indicates whether the employer deducts wages for infractions such as arriving to work late, phone use, or production errors.


Figure A.5: Share of Garment Workers Reporting Challenges in the Workplace by Industrial Cluster (Exploratory Survey)




(a) No overtime pay



(b) Salary not paid on time



(c) Unsafe working conditions




(d) Wage penalties


Notes: The figure depicts the share of garment workers in the *Exploratory Survey* who reported facing each of these challenges in their current workplace in each industrial cluster. "No overtime pay" captures whether the factory fails to offer the legally mandated overtime rate. "Unsafe work conditions" refers to perceptions that working conditions are unpleasant or unsafe. "Wage penalties" indicates whether the employer deducts wages for infractions such as arriving to work late, phone use, or production errors.

Figure A.6: Language Fluency by Gender

(a) Panel A: Tamil Fluency




(b) Panel B: Hindi Fluency



Notes: Panel A presents the distribution of self-reported Tamil fluency for respondents participating in the *Job Choice Experiment*, by gender. Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 denotes being completely fluent. Panel B presents the share of male and female respondents in the *Listing Survey* who reported how fluent they were in Hindi, the next most widely spoken language after Tamil in this setting.


Figure A.7: Applications Experiment Randomization Design




Notes: The figure depicts the randomization design for the *Applications Experiment*.

Figure A.8: Willingness to Pay for Job Attributes by Prevalence of Attribute in Current Job (Job Choice Experiment)

(a) Panel A: Co-working with One's Spouse and Language Barriers



(b) Panel B: Commute Time (Walking)



Notes: Panel A depicts two sets of estimates and 95% confidence intervals: (1) WTP for co-working with one's spouse among those currently co-working with their spouse and those who have *never* co-worked (2) WTP for a workplace where the supervisor and most co-workers *cannot* speak your native language among those whose current jobs feature language barriers and those whose jobs do not. Respondents were asked to indicate if their colleagues could communicate with them in their native language: *co-workers only*, *supervisors only*, *both*, *neither*. I classify workers as facing language barriers in their current job unless they selected "*both*". Panel B depicts the WTP for a job with a 20/30/40 minute commute (walking distance) among those who currently have a below- versus above-median commute time. The omitted category is a job with a 10 minute commute. Reported p-values correspond to tests for differences in WTP between the two groups.

Figure A.9: Perceived Likelihood that Both Spouses Can Get A Job in the Applications Experiment



Notes: The figure depicts respondents' beliefs of the likelihood that both spouses can get a job together at the new factory despite being assigned to the Husband Only or Wife Only treatment arms in the *Applications Experiment*. The sample excludes respondents assigned to the Joint treatment arm. Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all possible) to 10 (definitely).

A.2 Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Worker Characteristics in Job Choice Experiment Sample

	Female	Male
Demographic Characteristics		
Age	29.64	33.86
	(8.45)	(9.83)
Years of Education	7.88	8.38
	(3.73)	(3.61)
Number of children	1.30	1.30
	(1.33)	(1.29)
Any children in Tirupur	0.32	0.30
Employment Characteristics		
Working in same factory as spouse	0.66	0.69
Years of garment sector experience	3.43	5.64
	(4.54)	(6.28)
Number of factories worked at in Tirupur	3.94	7.38
	(6.31)	(12.57)
Monthly salary (Rs.)	13608.62	17293.03
	(3943.07)	(5775.09)
Working days per week	6.02	6.03
	(0.44)	(0.37)
Working hours per day	11.11	11.32
	(1.65)	(1.45)
Occupation, share of workers:		
Tailor	0.44	0.44
Quality Check	0.32	0.13
Helper	0.11	0.07
Cutting	0.01	0.08
Ironing	0.01	0.09
Packaging	0.08	0.06
Other	0.02	0.12
Establishment size, share of workers:		
1 to 9	0.02	0.01
10 to 49	0.12	0.10
50 to 199	0.17	0.18
200 to 499	0.21	0.20
500+	0.39	0.47
Missing	0.09	0.04
Observations	401	391

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment* sample, by gender. All respondents are married, and either currently work in a garment factory (97.73%) or have done so in the past year (2.27%). The table reports standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables.

Table A.2: Workers Eligible for Job Choice Experiment and Applications Experiment versus All Garment Workers

	Mean		Difference
	All Garment Workers	Eligible Garment Workers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.45	0.50	0.05 (0.02)***
Married	0.76	1.00	0.24 (0.01)***
Works with at least one relative	0.53	0.71	0.18 (0.02)***
Years since first move to Tirupur	5.51	5.43	-0.08 (0.19)
Does not belong to Tamil Nadu	0.86	0.91	0.05 (0.01)***
Occupation, share of respondents			
Tailor	0.45	0.45	-0.00 (0.02)
Helper	0.14	0.12	-0.02 (0.01)
Quality check	0.18	0.20	0.02 (0.01)
Cutting	0.05	0.04	-0.01 (0.01)
Ironing	0.04	0.04	0.01 (0.01)
Packing	0.05	0.05	0.00 (0.01)
Other	0.10	0.08	-0.02 (0.01)**
Monthly salary (Rs.)	14,565.71	14,441.84	-123.87 (162.41)
Piece rate worker	0.29	0.29	-0.01 (0.02)
Observations	4,050	1,176	

Notes: The table compares respondents who were eligible for the *Job Choice Experiment* and the *Applications Experiment* compared to the full sample of garment workers based on data collected during the *Listing Survey*. Columns (1) and (2) show means and Column (3) shows tests of differences in means based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors.

Table A.3: Employer Characteristics in Hiring Experiment Sample

Variable	Mean (S.D.)
Female share	0.20
	(0.40)
Total years of garment sector experience in any hiring/referring role	11.40
	(8.03)
Current role, share of respondents:	
Factory owner	0.03
HR manager	0.00
Labor contractor	0.43
Supervisor	0.54
Establishment size, share of respondents:	
1 to 9	0.00
10 to 49	0.22
50 to 199	0.31
200 to 499	0.25
500+	0.23
Observations	65

Notes: The table reports key summary statistics for respondents in the *Hiring Experiment* sample. "Total years of garment sector experience" is the number of years the respondent has worked in a role where they were involved in making hiring or referral decisions in a garment factory: supervisor, labor contractor, owner, or HR manager. The table reports standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables.

Table A.4: Values of Hypothetical Job Attributes in Job Choice Experiment

	Attribute	Potential Values
1.	Monthly Salary (Rs.)	$\{0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3\} \times$ current monthly salary
2.	Commute time	$\{10, 20, 30, 40\}$ minutes walking distance from home
3.	Co-Working opportunity	- [1] This factory is hiring more than one person in different roles, so if you accept this job, your spouse can also get a job at the same time. - [0] This factory is only hiring one person, so if you accept this job, you would have to move here alone, without your spouse.
4.	Uncertainty about arrangements for women's safety in the factory	- [1] We do not have any specific information about arrangements for women's safety in this factory - [0] This factory is committed to ensuring a safe workplace for women. They have security cameras, female HR managers, and female security guards. Women working in this factory report that they feel very safe and comfortable in the factory with their supervisors and co-workers.
5.	Language barriers	- [1] Your supervisor and most co-workers cannot speak your native language - [0] Your supervisor and most co-workers can speak your native language

Notes: Each of the non-wage attributes is converted into a series of binary variables for each potential value. The omitted categories are: 10 minute commute; non-co-working job with only one vacancy; factory has arrangements for women's safety; and supervisor and most co-workers can speak the respondent's native language. To hold the spouse's salary fixed across the two hypothetical jobs, respondents were told that even if their spouse moved with them to the new factory, their spouse would continue to receive their current monthly salary.

Table A.5: Job Choice Experiment Participation Rates by Treatment Arm

	P(At Least One Participated)	P(Both Participated|At Least One)
	(1)	(2)
Husband Only	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)
	[0.36]	[0.64]
Joint	-0.00	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)
	[0.95]	[0.22]
Constant	0.74***	0.79***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
	[0.00]	[0.00]
N	464	338

Notes: The table reports results from an OLS regression testing whether the household's decision to participate in the *Job Choice Experiment* is correlated with their randomly assigned treatment arm for the *Applications Experiment* embedded within it. Treatment assignment was only revealed at the end of the *Job Choice Experiment* survey if at least one spouse participated. The sample in column (1) includes all 464 couples that were approached to participate in the *incentivized* version of the *Job Choice Experiment* and the dependent variable is whether at least one member of the household participated. The sample in column (2) includes 338 couples where at least one spouse participated in the *Job Choice Experiment* and the dependent variable is whether both spouses participated. The unit of observation is the household. The sample includes all households where at least one spouse participated in the *Job Choice Experiment*. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A.6: Factors that Make Female Respondents Feel Safe When Starting a New Job

Factor	Share reporting (0-1)			
	Rank 1 (1)	Rank 2 (2)	Rank 3 (3)	Total (4)
Husband works in the new factory	.54	.12	.09	.75
CCTV cameras on factory floor	.13	.27	.21	.61
Female relative or friend works in new factory	.13	.22	.17	.51
Co-workers can speak my native language	.09	.09	.14	.32
Female supervisor	.04	.11	.11	.25
Female security guards	.01	.08	.12	.22
Male relative or friend works in new factory	.01	.05	.06	.12
Female-only workplace	.02	.03	.06	.1
Previously worked at this factory	.03	.03	.03	.08
Husband previously worked at this factory	0	.01	.03	.04

Notes: The table reports the share of female respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment* who ranked each factor in their top three when asked to indicate which features would make them feel most safe when deciding whether to accept a job at a new garment factory. The question was posed to a randomly selected subset of 158 female respondents. Values in Column (4) reflect the share of respondents who ranked the factor as rank 1, rank 2 or rank 3.

Table A.7: Share Female Respondents Reporting Wage Penalties in Exploratory Survey

	Dependent Variable: P(Current Factory Imposes Wage Penalties)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Spouse Works in Garment Industry	-0.13**	-0.12**			-0.12**	-0.12**		
	(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.05)	(0.05)		
Spouse Works in Different Factory			-0.11*	-0.11*			-0.11	-0.10
			(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.07)	(0.07)
Spouse Works in Same Factory			-0.16**	-0.15**			-0.16**	-0.15**
			(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.07)	(0.07)
Peer Works in Garment Industry					0.07	0.09		
					(0.07)	(0.07)		
Peer Works in Different Factory							0.08	0.10
							(0.08)	(0.09)
Peer Works in Same Factory							0.07	0.09
							(0.07)	(0.08)
Intercept	0.30***	0.29***	0.30***	0.29***	0.24***	0.21***	0.24***	0.21***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	246	241	246	241	246	241	246	241

Notes: The table presents the share of female respondents in the *Exploratory Survey* who state that their current factory deducts wages for infractions (being late to work, phone use, production errors, etc.), disaggregated by whether the respondent has a spouse or peer (friend, relative) working in Tirupur garment industry and in the same factory. The omitted category in Columns (1) to (4) includes unmarried women and married women whose husbands are not employed in a garment factory in Tirupur. In Columns (5) to (8), the omitted category is further restricted to women who also report having no friends or relatives working in garment factories in Tirupur. Specifications in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) include controls for survey location, years of experience, contract type, and whether the respondent is originally from Tamil Nadu. Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.8: Willingness to Pay for Job Attributes, Male Respondents (Job Choice Experiment)

	Choosing Jobs For:	
	Self	Wife
	(1)	(2)
Co-work with Spouse	0.236***	0.382***
	(0.015)	(0.037)
Commute: 20 mins	0.036	-0.044
	(0.022)	(0.053)
Commute: 30 mins	-0.038	-0.140**
	(0.024)	(0.060)
Commute: 40 mins	-0.071***	-0.160***
	(0.023)	(0.061)
Language Barriers	-0.028*	-0.061*
	(0.015)	(0.036)
No Info. on Women's Safety	-0.052***	-0.064
	(0.019)	(0.044)
Observations	2,611	1,061

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes as a fraction of the monthly wage for male respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment*. Column 1 presents estimates from a logit specification based on choice data where respondents were choosing jobs for themselves. Column 2 presents estimates based on choice data where male respondents were asked to choose between jobs on behalf of their wives. The omitted category corresponds to a job with only one vacancy, requiring the respondent to switch jobs alone, with a 10-minute commute, no language barriers, and multiple measures to ensure workplace safety for women. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Table A.9: Willingness to Pay for Job Attributes, Alternative Specifications (Job Choice Experiment)

	Logit (1)	Logit w. Pilot Dummy (2)	Probit (3)	OLS (4)	Mixed Logit: Median (5)
Co-work with Spouse	0.292***	0.292***	0.296***	0.335***	0.328***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Commute: 20 mins	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.001	-0.008
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.016)
Commute: 30 mins	-0.065***	-0.065***	-0.064***	-0.051*	-0.065***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.017)
Commute: 40 mins	-0.093***	-0.093***	-0.091***	-0.077***	-0.096***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.018)
Language Barriers	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.054***	-0.052**	-0.068***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.012)
No Info. on Women's Safety	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.092***	-0.100***	-0.114***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.015)
Observations	5,306	5,306	5,306	5,306	10,612

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes as a fraction of the monthly wage from the *Job Choice Experiment*. Column 1 reproduces estimates from the logit specification. Column 2 controls for whether the respondent was administered an unincentivized version of the survey during piloting by adding an indicator variable for these observations. Column 3 presents estimates from a probit model and Column 4 presents estimates from an OLS model. Column 5 presents estimates of median willingness to pay (WTP) from a mixed logit model assuming the marginal values of amenities follow normal distributions. Since the main coefficient of interest is the willingness to pay for co-working with one's spouse, I assume the marginal value of the co-working amenity is random, while other coefficients are assumed to be fixed. Standard errors are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Table A.10: Willingness to Pay for Job Attributes, Alternative Samples (Job Choice Experiment)

	Full Sample	Attentive	Alone	Incentivized
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Co-work with Spouse	0.292***	0.280***	0.284***	0.308***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Commute: 20 mins	0.006	0.005	0.013	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Commute: 30 mins	-0.065***	-0.063***	-0.052**	-0.066***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Commute: 40 mins	-0.093***	-0.094***	-0.077***	-0.083***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Language Barriers	-0.051***	-0.047***	-0.041**	-0.048***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
No Info. on Women's Safety	-0.091***	-0.089***	-0.067***	-0.095***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	5,306	4,995	4,078	4,172

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes as a fraction of the monthly wage from the *Job Choice Experiment*. Column 1 reproduces estimates from the logit specification for the full sample. Column 2 limits the sample to respondents who pass the attention check. Column 3 limits the sample to respondents who were alone throughout the duration of the survey. Column 4 excludes respondents who were surveyed during piloting and were administered an un-incentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment*. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Table A.11: Why Couples Prefer Solo Job Exploration over Joint Moves

	Reason	Share of Respondents
1.	My spouse and I have been working in our current jobs for some time, so we know how the work environment is and how the supervisors behave. Since we don't know anything about working conditions at the new factory yet, it would be risky for both of us to change jobs together	.65
2.	If one of us remains at the current factory, it will be easier for the other to come back if the new place is not good for us.	.54
3.	It will be harder to get hired at the new factory if both of us want to get a job at the same time. It is better if one person goes first and later refers the other person.	.21

Notes: Respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment* were asked how they would respond if they heard of a higher-paid job opportunity at another factory for themselves and their spouse, located close to their house. Those who said only one spouse would switch were asked why they would not try to move together, and were permitted to select multiple reasons. The table reports the share of respondents reporting each reason. This question was added to the survey later and posed to 95 participants.

Table A.12: Applications by Treatment Arm and Job Satisfaction at Baseline, Full Sample (Applications Experiment)

	All Households	Co-working At Baseline	Not Co-working At Baseline
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Husband Only	0.09	0.06	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)
	[0.12]	[0.43]	[0.25]
Joint	0.08*	0.11*	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)
	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.85]
Mean Job Satisfaction	-0.02	0.00	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
	[0.56]	[0.94]	[0.41]
Husband Only × Mean Job Satisfaction	0.16***	0.11	0.23*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.12)
	[0.01]	[0.15]	[0.05]
Joint × Mean Job Satisfaction	0.05	0.02	0.11
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)
	[0.36]	[0.74]	[0.23]
Constant	0.14***	0.15***	0.13*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.06]
Mean: Wife Only Arm	0.14	0.15	0.12
Observations	335	229	106

Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions from equation (18). The dependent variable is whether the household applied to at least one job opportunity by calling the hotline number. The unit of observation is the household. The sample includes all households in the *Applications Experiment* sample where *at least one spouse* was successfully surveyed. The omitted category is households that were randomly assigned to receive a recommendation for the wife only ("Wife Only Arm"). During the *Job Choice Experiment*, respondents rated their current job satisfaction on a 4-point Likert scale. I compute the average satisfaction across spouses and standardize the resulting variable to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A.13: Respondent Characteristics in Applications Experiment by Treatment Arm

	Mean			Difference		
	Wife Only (1)	Husband Only (2)	Joint (3)	H Only - W Only (4)	Joint - W Only (5)	Joint - H Only (6)
Works in same factory as spouse	0.74	0.64	0.69	-0.10 (0.05)*	-0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Years since first move to Tirupur	5.36	6.02	5.91	0.66 (0.70)	0.55 (0.59)	-0.11 (0.66)
Belongs to Tamil Nadu	0.10	0.16	0.13	0.06 (0.04)*	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)
Household size	2.60	2.62	2.55	0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.10)
Occupation, share of respondents						
Tailor	0.44	0.33	0.47	-0.11 (0.06)**	0.03 (0.05)	0.14 (0.05)***
Helper	0.07	0.15	0.14	0.08 (0.04)**	0.07 (0.03)**	-0.02 (0.04)
Quality check	0.26	0.26	0.18	0.00 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)*	-0.08 (0.04)*
Cutting	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Ironing	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)*
Packing	0.07	0.06	0.06	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Other	0.07	0.06	0.08	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Missing	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.01)
Monthly salary (Rs.)	15126.26	14155.63	14680.61	-970.62 (598.63)	-445.65 (531.82)	524.98 (466.20)
Inverse Jealousy Index	3.59	3.48	3.37	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.12)*	-0.11 (0.15)
Mobility	3.77	3.95	3.75	0.18 (0.78)	-0.02 (0.68)	-0.21 (0.68)

Notes: The table shows participant characteristics by treatment arm for the *Applications Experiment*. Columns (1) to (3) show means for each treatment arm. Columns (4) to (6) show tests of differences in means across treatment arms based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors.

Table A.14: Respondent Characteristics in Applications Experiment by Survey Status

	Mean		Difference
	At Least One Surveyed	Both Surveyed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Works in same factory as spouse	0.64	0.70	0.05 (0.06)
Years since first move to Tirupur	7.20	5.55	-1.65 (0.84)*
Belongs to Tamil Nadu	0.18	0.12	-0.06 (0.04)
Household size	2.43	2.60	0.17 (0.10)*
Occupation, share of respondents			
Tailor	0.55	0.41	-0.14 (0.06)**
Helper	0.11	0.13	0.02 (0.04)
Quality check	0.19	0.22	0.03 (0.05)
Cutting	0.02	0.05	0.02 (0.02)
Ironing	0.02	0.04	0.02 (0.02)
Packing	0.05	0.06	0.01 (0.03)
Other	0.04	0.08	0.04 (0.02)*
Missing	0.02	0.01	-0.02 (0.02)
Monthly salary (Rs.)	14647.98	14675.24	27.26 (697.67)
Inverse Jealousy Index	3.50	3.45	-0.05 (0.16)
Mobility	3.25	3.89	0.64 (0.59)

Notes: The table shows mean respondent characteristics for the full sample of married couples in the *Applications Experiment* (Column 1) and the subset of couples where both spouses were surveyed (Column 2). Column (3) shows test of differences in means across samples based on respondent-level OLS regressions with robust standard errors.

Table A.15: Applications by Treatment Arm in Applications Experiment, with Baseline Controls

	Full Sample		Both Surveyed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Husband Only	0.10	0.11	0.20***	0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
	[0.101]	[0.144]	[0.006]	[0.025]
Joint	0.09*	0.12**	0.14**	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
	[0.068]	[0.035]	[0.011]	[0.009]
Mean: Wife Only Arm	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.11
p-value: Husband Only = Joint	0.87	0.84	0.46	0.73
Baseline Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	338	303	254	227

Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions based on equation (17). The dependent variable is whether the household applied to at least one job opportunity by calling the hotline number. The unit of observation is the household. Columns (1) and (2) are based on the full sample of households in the *Applications Experiment*. Columns (3) and (4) are based on the sample of households where both husband and wife were successfully surveyed. The omitted category is households that were randomly assigned to receive a recommendation for the wife only ("Wife Only Arm"). Columns (2) and (4) include baseline controls for: current co-working status, whether the couple belongs to Tamil Nadu, household size, years since each spouse moved to Tirupur to work, and occupation dummies for each spouse. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A.16: Applications by Treatment Arm in Applications Experiment, Sensitivity to Beliefs About Joint Hiring Likelihood

	Sample Restriction: Confidence that Both Spouses Will Get a Job Even if Only One is Recommended (Likert Scale 1-10)						
	≤ 10	≤ 9	≤ 8	≤ 7	≤ 6	≤ 5	≤ 4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Husband Only	0.20***	0.20***	0.20**	0.16*	0.18**	0.21**	0.34**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.059]	[0.034]	[0.028]	[0.018]
Joint	0.14**	0.14**	0.14**	0.14**	0.17***	0.17***	0.20***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.008]
Mean: Wife Only Arm	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.06
p-value: Husband Only = Joint	0.46	0.45	0.42	0.84	0.88	0.65	0.29
Observations	254	239	232	216	206	189	155

Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions from equation (17). The dependent variable is whether the household applied to at least one job opportunity by calling the hotline number. The unit of observation is the household. The sample includes households in which both spouses were successfully surveyed. Households belonging to the Husband Only and Wife Only treatment arms were asked to rate the likelihood that both spouses could get a job in the new factory even though only one person was being recommended, using a 10-point Likert scale. The regressions in each column are estimated on samples that include all Joint arm households and apply additional restrictions to the Husband Only and Wife Only arms based on the mean rating reported by both spouses. The omitted category is households that were randomly assigned to receive a recommendation for the wife only ("Wife Only Arm"). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A.17: Job Applications by Treatment Arm and Job Satisfaction for Co-working Couples in Applications Experiment (Alternative Measures of Satisfaction)

	Satisfaction Measure				Supervisor Misconduct Measure	
	Mean	Husband	Wife	Mean, Residualized by Wages	Verbal Abuse	Wage Penalties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Husband Only	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Joint	0.14*	0.13*	0.14*	0.12*	0.12	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Job Satisfaction	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	0.00		
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)		
Husband Only × Job Satisfaction	0.17**	0.13*	0.13	0.13*		
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)		
Joint × Job Satisfaction	0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.00		
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)		
Supervisor Misconduct					-0.02	-0.03
					(0.06)	(0.08)
Husband Only × Supervisor Misconduct					-0.15	-0.16
					(0.09)	(0.10)
Joint × Supervisor Misconduct					0.05	0.09
					(0.08)	(0.10)
Mean: Wife Only Arm	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15
Observations	176	176	175	175	142	142

Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions from equation (18). The dependent variable is whether the household applied to at least one job opportunity. The unit of observation is the household. The sample includes households co-working at baseline in which both spouses were successfully surveyed for the *Applications Experiment*. The omitted category is households that were randomly assigned to receive a recommendation for the wife only ("Wife Only Arm"). During the *Job Choice Experiment*, respondents rated their current job satisfaction on a 4-point Likert scale. Columns (1)-(3) reports heterogeneity in application rates by the average satisfaction across spouses, husband's satisfaction, and wife's satisfaction. Column (4) uses the mean satisfaction measure, residualized with respect to the salaries of both spouses. A subset of respondents were also asked to indicate on a 4-point Likert scale whether supervisors in their current factory use abusive language or deduct wages for tardiness or production errors. Columns (5) and (6) report heterogeneity by these measures of supervisor misconduct. Job satisfaction and misconduct measures are standardized, so that the resulting variable has mean zero and standard deviation one. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A.18: Values of Hypothetical Job Attributes (Job Choice Experiment during Listing Survey)

	Attribute	Potential Values
1.	Monthly Salary (Rs.)	{0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3} $\times$ current monthly salary
2.	Commute time	{10, 20, 30, 40} minutes walking distance from home
3.	Co-Working opportunity	- Factory has one vacancy, spouse and peer cannot get a job - Factory has multiple vacancies, spouse can get a job - Factory has multiple vacancies, but only require workers of a specific gender. Same-sex friend or relative (peer) can get a job

Notes: Each of the non-wage attributes is converted into a series of binary variables for each potential value. The omitted categories are: 10 minute commute; non-co-working job with only one vacancy. For unmarried respondents, co-working opportunity was randomized between no co-working and peer co-working only. To hold the spouse's salary fixed when respondents were asked to choose between co-working and non-co-working jobs, respondents were told that even if their spouse moved with them to the new factory, their spouse would continue to receive their current monthly salary.

Table A.19: Heterogeneity in Willingness to Pay for Co-working With One's Spouse by Concerns about Commuting and Workplace Conditions (Male Respondents, Job Choice Experiment)

	Worried About Commuting Safety		Perceived Occ. Safety and Health Risk		No. SH Incidents at Other Factories
	Likert	Binary	Likert	Binary	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Above Median	0.240***	0.254***	0.203***	0.267***	0.177***
	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.025)
Below Median	0.250***	0.243***	0.272***	0.242***	0.256***
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Diff.	-0.010	0.010	-0.069**	0.025	-0.079**
	(0.035)	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.031)
Observations	2,030	2,037	2,030	2,030	2,576

Notes: The table reports heterogeneity in estimated willingness to pay for co-working with one's spouse among male respondents in the *Job Choice Experiment* based on concerns about a variety of workplace conditions. Columns (1) and (2) consider heterogeneity in WTP based on perceived commuting safety. Respondents were asked to indicate how safe it would be for a hypothetical female garment worker to commute alone to and from work on 4-point Likert scale (very unsafe, unsafe, safe, very safe). Column (1) presents differences in WTP between those who are above- and below-median in terms of this measure while Column (2) tests for differences between those who perceive the commute to be very unsafe for women, and all others. Columns (3) and (4) consider heterogeneity in WTP based on perceived occupational safety/health risks. Respondents were asked to indicate how worried they were that they would suffer an injury or start feeling unwell at work on a 4-point Likert scale (not at all scared, slightly scared, moderately scared, extremely scared), and report how worried they were about their spouse. The Occupational Safety and Health Risk index is defined as the average of the two variables. Column (3) presents differences in WTP between those who are above- and below-median in terms of this measure while Column (4) tests for differences between those who are moderately or extremely scared, and all others. Column (5) examines heterogeneity in willingness to pay for co-working based on respondents' exposure to reports of sexual harassment at other garment factories, using a median split on the number of incidents the respondent has heard about. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, adjusting for clustering by respondent, and reported in parentheses.

Table A.20: Characteristics of Hypothetical Job Applicants in Hiring Experiment

	Characteristic	Potential Values
1.	Prior Work Experience	{None, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year}
2.	Male Applicants: Future Referral Type	**No Referral:** This candidate will not refer anyone to the factory in the future as his acquaintances prefer to work in the construction sector. **Friend Referral:** This person has a male friend who works in another garment factory in Tirupur and is likely to refer him for a job at your factory in the future. **Spouse Referral:** This person's wife works in another garment factory in Tirupur and he is likely to refer her for a job at your factory in the future.
2.	Female Applicants: Current Referral Type	**No Referral:** This person's husband works in construction and she does not have any friend or relative currently working in your factory. **Friend Referral:** This person's husband works in construction, but she has a female friend who already has a job at your factory. **Spouse Referral:** This person's husband already has a job at your factory.

Notes: Each of the characteristics is converted into a series of binary variables for each potential value. The omitted categories are: no experience; no future referral (male applicants); no existing referral (female applicants). Values for work experience were randomly selected from the list with replacement, with equal probability. One of the two hypothetical applicants in every choice table was randomly assigned to have a "Spouse Referral". The referral type for the other applicant was randomized between "No Referral" and "Friend Referral" with equal probability.

Table A.21: Employers' Expectations of Churn by Referral Type and Applicant Gender, Alternative Measures (Hiring Experiment)

	Expected Tenure (Months)		Quit if Denied a Raise (Likert)	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reference in Factory/Will Refer: Spouse	2.881***	3.337**	-0.308***	-0.172**
	(1.066)	(1.347)	(0.064)	(0.073)
Reference in Factory/Will Refer: Friend	0.467	1.912	-0.127**	0.008
	(0.779)	(1.324)	(0.061)	(0.073)
Experience = 3 months	1.224*	0.629	-0.131	-0.012
	(0.709)	(0.865)	(0.090)	(0.119)
Experience = 6 months	2.308***	2.747**	-0.143	0.015
	(0.791)	(1.195)	(0.087)	(0.114)
Experience = 12 months	4.131***	4.717***	-0.093	0.074
	(1.091)	(1.202)	(0.120)	(0.116)
Mean of Outcome Variable	8.91	7.72	3.22	3.03
p-value: Friend = Spouse	0.00	0.15	0.01	0.00
Observations	590	591	444	450

Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions estimated on data on male and female applicants from the *Hiring Experiment*. Referral Type captures the type of co-working. "Reference in Factory/Will Refer: Spouse" means the female applicant's husband works at the factory and the male applicant will refer his wife in the future (spousal co-working). "Reference in Factory/Will Refer: Friend" means the female applicant has a female friend working in the factory and the male applicant will refer his friend in the future (peer co-working). *Expected Tenure* is the number of months the applicant is expected to stay if hired. *Quit if Denied a Raise* is the employer's expectation that the applicant would quit if denied a raise after six months, measured on a four-point Likert scale: very unlikely (1) to very likely (4). The omitted category is an applicant with no prior experience working in a garment factory who has no reference working in the factory/will not refer anyone and assigned to the entry-level role. Means of the dependent variables for the omitted category are reported at the bottom of the table. All specifications include respondent fixed effects. Reported p-values test if coefficients of interest differ from zero. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by respondent are in parentheses.

Table A.22: Price Discrimination by Employers in Hiring Experiment (Male Applicants)

	Dependent Variable: Proposed Monthly Salary (Rs.)			
	All Applicants	Hired Applicants	Hired Applicants by Role	
			Senior Role	Entry-level Role
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Will Refer: Spouse	25.55	284.10	416.60	15.50
	(228.69)	(346.94)	(389.65)	(385.54)
Will Refer: Friend	96.95	357.57	256.50	238.84
	(263.55)	(345.42)	(464.80)	(462.32)
Experience = 3 months	1,215.53***	1,916.24**	880.58	1,327.66**
	(420.21)	(774.67)	(1,828.82)	(546.42)
Experience = 6 months	2,549.82***	2,770.48***	1,414.49	2,259.12***
	(435.01)	(672.96)	(1,658.71)	(745.79)
Experience = 12 months	4,327.84***	4,399.26***	3,191.14*	2,648.57***
	(533.35)	(742.80)	(1,677.96)	(567.07)
Mean of Outcome Variable	11,621.62	10,000.00	15,000.00	10,000.00
p-value: Spouse	0.91	0.42	0.29	0.97
Observations	631	318	237	63

Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions estimated on data on male applicants from the *Hiring Experiment*. Referral Type captures the type of co-working. "Will Refer: Spouse" means the applicant will refer his wife for a job in the future (spousal co-working). "Will Refer: Friend" means he will refer a male friend (peer co-working). The omitted category is an applicant with no prior experience working in a garment factory who has no reference working in the factory and assigned to the entry-level role. Means of the dependent variables for the omitted category are reported at the bottom of the table. All specifications include respondent fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) include controls for the role the applicant was assigned by the respondent while Column 3 limits the sample to applicants hired for the senior role. Reported p-values test if coefficients of interest differ from zero. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by respondent are in parentheses.

B Technical Appendix

B.1 Exploratory Survey of Garment Workers

In October 2023, I surveyed 551 garment workers in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu living around three clusters of garment factories in Tirupur: Mudalipalayam Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO), Chinnakarai, and Netaji Apparel Park. The *Job Choice Experiment*, *Applications Experiment*, and *Hiring Experiment* were later implemented in the same areas.

To identify a representative sample of garment workers, I first implemented a door-to-door listing exercise with households living in residential compounds surrounding these clusters. Surveyors were instructed to identify households with at least one garment worker and to interview any available adult to collect basic information on all garment workers residing in the household. 649 such households agreed to participate in the listing survey, yielding a sampling frame of 1,253 garment workers. I selected a random sample of 606 workers employed in production roles to target for the survey, stratifying by occupation, survey location, whether the individual had migrated to Tirupur in the last two years, and contract type (shift contract or piece rate work).

Since many garment workers work for up to 12 hours per day, administering the survey for target respondents proved logistically challenging. Since the survey target had to be met in a relatively short period of time, enumerators were instructed to approach alternative garment workers living in the same residential compound if they were available and interested in participating in the survey, but only after confirming that none of the originally selected respondents were available. 60% of the final sample of 551 garment workers belonged to the pre-selected sample.

Table B.1 presents summary statistics for male and female workers in the *Exploratory Survey* sample. Female garment workers in the sample are slightly older and significantly more likely to be married than their male counterparts.[85] Among married workers, the majority have a spouse who works in the garment sector. In fact, 35% of married female workers and 43% of married male workers work in the same factory as their spouses. Women are over-represented in lower-paid occupations such as Helper and Quality Check relative to men, earning 21% less on average.

[85] While unmarried women do work in the garment industry in Tirupur, they primarily live in factory-owned hostels rather than rented rooms, making it difficult to survey them.

Table B.1: Worker Characteristics in Exploratory Survey Sample

	Female	Male
Demographic Characteristics		
Age	29.99	27.29
	(8.25)	(8.59)
Years of Education	7.28	8.80
	(4.24)	(3.84)
Married	0.75	0.47
Number of children, if married	1.69	1.58
	(1.13)	(1.13)
Spouse's occupation status, share of married workers:		
Spouse not in garment industry	0.45	0.41
Spouse in garment industry, diff. factory	0.20	0.16
Spouse in garment industry, same factory	0.35	0.43
Employment Characteristics		
Years of garment sector experience	3.81	4.81
	(4.87)	(4.79)
Monthly salary (Rs.)	11,007.95	13,897.59
	(2,777.29)	(3,695.32)
Working days per week	6.02	6.05
	(0.42)	(0.29)
Working hours per day	11.32	11.39
	(1.58)	(1.76)
Occupation, share of workers:		
Tailor	0.32	0.47
Quality Check	0.32	0.14
Helper	0.32	0.18
Cutting	0.00	0.06
Ironing	0.01	0.07
Other	0.04	0.08
Establishment size, share of workers:		
1 to 9	0.00	0.00
10 to 49	0.03	0.05
50 to 199	0.12	0.18
200 to 499	0.27	0.26
500+	0.37	0.38
Missing	0.21	0.14
Observations	250	301

Notes: The table reports key summary statistics for respondents in the *Exploratory Survey* sample, by gender. The table reports standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables.

B.2 Conceptual Framework Proofs

This section outlines the proofs for the comparative statics and propositions presented in Section 3. The payoffs from each action are given by:

$$U^{\text{Both Stay}} = [w^M_{j'} + w^F_j - c(d_j)\cdot(1-\eta\cdot C_0) + \gamma\cdot C_0 - \kappa\cdot(1-C_0)]\cdot(1+\beta) + \varepsilon^{\text{Both Stay}} \tag{B.1}$$

$$U^{\text{H-Only}} = w^M_{j^*} + w^F_j - c(d_j) - \kappa + \beta\cdot\mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[\max\{w^M_{j^*} + w^F_j - c(d_j) - \kappa, w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*})\cdot(1-\eta) + \gamma\}] + \varepsilon^{\text{H-Only}} \tag{B.2}$$

$$U^{\text{W-Only}} = w^M_{j'} + w^F_{j^*} - E_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})] - \kappa + \beta\cdot\mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[\max\{w^M_{j'} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*}) - \kappa, w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*})\cdot(1-\eta) + \gamma\}] + \varepsilon^{\text{W-Only}} \tag{B.3}$$

$$U^{\text{Both Switch}} = [w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})]\cdot(1-\eta) + \gamma]\cdot(1+\beta) + \varepsilon^{\text{Both Switch}} \tag{B.4}$$

Before turning to the comparative statics, I first identify the conditions under which the couple chooses to reunite in the new factory j^* if only one spouse switched in period 1, which will in turn determine household utility in period 2.

Ultimately, the distribution of $c(d_{j^*})$ depends on the distribution of the underlying random variable Y^*, since $c(d_{j^*}) = c(\mu + \sigma\cdot Y^*)$ where $\sigma, \mu > 0$. Since $c(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing ($c' > 0$), the mapping $Y^* \mapsto c(\mu + \sigma Y^*)$ is one–to–one and monotone. I therefore work directly with the induced distribution of $c()$, writing its CDF and PDF as $F(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$, respectively, which is algebraically simpler than carrying the change-of-variables from Y^* each time.

Period 2 Action if Only Husband Switched in Period 1

If the husband switches to factory j^* alone in period 1, he will arrange a job for his wife in the next period if:

$$c(d_{j^*}) \leq \frac{w^F_{j^*} - w^F_j + \gamma + \kappa + c(d_j)}{1-\eta} = \bar{C}^H \tag{B.5}$$

Let this cut-off value be denoted by $\bar{C}^H$. If $\bar{C}^H < 0$, the couple will continue working separately in period 2, since $c(d) \geq 0\ \forall d$ by definition. On the other hand, as long as $\bar{C}^H \geq 0$, both spouses will end up in factory j^* in period 2 with probability $F(\bar{C}^H)$.

Period 2 Action if Only Wife Switched in Period 1

Similarly, if the wife switches to factory j^* alone in period 1, the husband will also move there in

the next period if:

$$c(d_{j^*}) \geq -\frac{w^M_{j^*} - w^M_{j'} + \gamma + \kappa}{\eta} = \bar{C}^W \tag{B.6}$$

Let this cut-off value be denoted by $\bar{C}^W$. If $\bar{C}^W < 0$, the couple will definitely reunite in factory j^* in period 2, since $c(d_j) \geq 0 \; \forall d$. If $\bar{C}^W \geq 0$, both spouses will end up in factory j^* in period 2 with probability $1 - F(\bar{C}^W)$.

I now derive comparative statics under each of these cases.

Comparative Statics w.r.t. κ, γ, η,: $U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}$

Differentiating the payoff from both spouses switching to j^* together w.r.t. κ, γ, η yields:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial \kappa} = 0 \tag{B.7}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial \gamma} = (1+\beta) > 0 \tag{B.8}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial \eta} = (1+\beta) \cdot \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})] > 0 \tag{B.9}$$

If $\bar{C}^W < 0$, then

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \kappa} = -1 \tag{B.10}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \gamma} = \beta > 0 \tag{B.11}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \eta} = \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})] > 0 \tag{B.12}$$

Therefore, we get:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \kappa} > 0 \tag{B.13}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \tag{B.14}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \eta} > 0 \tag{B.15}$$

On the other hand, if $\bar{C}^W \geq 0$, then the expected payoff from the wife switching jobs alone in period

1 is:

$$U^W = w^M_{j'} + w^F_{j^*} - \mathbf{E}_{d_{j^*}}[c(d_{j^*})] - \kappa + \beta \cdot \Big[\int_0^{\bar{C}^W} \Big(w^M_{j'} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*}) - \kappa \Big) f(c)dc + \int_{\bar{C}^W}^{\infty} \big(w^M_{j^*} + w^F_{j^*} - c(d_{j^*})(1-\eta) + \gamma \big) f(c)dc \Big] \tag{B.16}$$

Applying the Leibniz rule yields the following derivatives:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \kappa} = -1 - \beta \cdot F(\bar{C}^W) \tag{B.17}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \gamma} = \beta \cdot (1 - F(\bar{C}^W)) > 0 \tag{B.18}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \eta} = \beta \cdot \int_{\bar{C}^W}^{\infty} c(d_{j^*}) \cdot f(c)dc \tag{B.19}$$

Once again, we find:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \kappa} > 0 \tag{B.20}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \tag{B.21}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \eta} > 0 \tag{B.22}$$

Therefore, the payoff from both spouses switching together increases relative to the payoff from the wife switching alone when: the couple places greater value on spending time together (γ is higher), the cost of separation is higher, for instance because the husband will not permit the wife to work separately (κ is higher), and the husband's presence offers greater protection against workplace exploitation (η is higher).

Comparative Statics w.r.t. η, γ, κ: $U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}$

A similar set of calculations reveal that the same relationships hold when comparing the payoffs

from switching together versus the husband switching alone:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \kappa} > 0 \tag{B.23}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \tag{B.24}$$

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \eta} > 0 \tag{B.25}$$

Comparative Statics w.r.t. σ^2

What happens when the variance of d_j is higher, making it riskier for women to switch to a new factory? I model increased risk as a mean-preserving spread: $d = \mu + \sigma \cdot Y$, where Y is a random variable with $\mathbf{E}[Y] = 0$, $Var[Y] = 1$. Although Y has a continuously differentiable pdf $\varphi(Y)$ with full support ($Y \in (-\infty, \infty)$), I make the additional assumption that the distribution is right-skewed.[86] Step-by-step derivations are available in the Online Appendix and results are summarized here.

Husband Only versus Wife Only

There are four cases to consider: $\bar{C}^H < 0$ and $\bar{C}^W < 0$, $\bar{C}^H \geq 0$ and $\bar{C}^W < 0$, $\bar{C}^H < 0$ and $\bar{C}^W \geq 0$, $\bar{C}^H \geq 0$ and $\bar{C}^W \geq 0$. Across all cases, $\frac{\partial U^{\text{H-Only}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0$ provided Y_j, γ, κ are sufficiently low.

Husband Only versus Both Switch

There are two cases to consider: $\bar{C}^H < 0$ and $\bar{C}^H \geq 0$. In both cases, $\frac{\partial U^{\text{H-Only}} - U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0$ provided Y_j is small relative to the mean, and γ, κ are low.

Both Switch versus Wife Only

When $\bar{C}^W < 0$, $\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0$ unambiguously. When $\bar{C}^W \geq 0$, $\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}} - U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \sigma^2} > 0$ provided σ is small.

B.2.1 Proposition 1

If co-working is primarily a risk mitigation strategy to protect the wife, then (i) women will be less likely to explore new jobs alone than men (ii) husbands will be willing to explore new workplaces alone, provided the disamenity level in the wife's current job is not too high (iii) couples will be willing to explore new jobs together. On the other hand, if couples value co-working because they

[86] Recall, $d = \mu + \sigma Y$ with $\mu, \sigma > 0$. This assumption enables me to ensure that $d < 0$ events are unlikely, without needing to truncate the distribution. d is defined as a disamenity, negative realizations would correspond to amenities rather than costs.

value spending time together or because conservative norms/jealousy dictate they can only work together, couples will be more likely to switch to new jobs together over either spouse switching alone.

Proof: Household utility functions include an idiosyncratic preference shock ε, distributed i.i.d. according to an Extreme Value Type I distribution (ε is known to the household so there is no uncertainty). If the relative pay-off of action *a* relative to action *b* increases, then the probability of action *a* being chosen over action *b* increases. The proof then follows from the comparative statics derived above. The relative payoff from the husband switching to the new job alone increases relative to joint switching and the wife switching alone only when γ, κ are low, σ is high, and the disamenity level in the wife's current job Y_j is not too high.

B.2.2 Proposition 2

If co-working is primarily a risk mitigation strategy, then husbands working with their wives in "high quality" factories will be more likely to explore alone than husbands co-working in "low quality" factories.

Proof:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial \sigma^2} = -(1+\beta)\cdot c'(\mu+\sigma\cdot Y_j)\cdot Y_j \cdot \frac{1}{2\sigma} \tag{B.26}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 U^{\text{H-Only}}}{\partial Y_j\,\partial \sigma^2} = -\frac{1+\beta}{2\sigma}\Big[c'(\mu+\sigma Y_j)+\sigma Y_j\, c''(\mu+\sigma Y_j)\Big] \tag{B.27}$$

The second expression is likely to be negative since $c' > 0$ and we assumed $\varphi(Y)$ is right-skewed, i.e. negative values of Y_j occur with extremely low probability. Note that $\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial \sigma^2}$ and $\frac{\partial U^{\text{W-Only}}}{\partial \sigma^2}$ do not depend on Y_j. Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial^2 U^{\text{H-Only}} - U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial Y_j\,\partial \sigma^2} < 0 \tag{B.28}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 U^{\text{H-Only}} - U^{\text{Wife Only}}}{\partial Y_j\,\partial \sigma^2} < 0 \tag{B.29}$$

$$\tag{B.30}$$

When risk is high, it becomes more attractive for the husband to switch factories alone when Y_j is low, i.e. when the couple is working together in a high-quality factory. Since household utility

depends on an idiosyncratic preference shock ε, distributed i.i.d. according to an Extreme Value Type I distribution, an increase in the relative payoff increases the probability of the action being taken. Husbands will be more likely to explore alone when they are working with their wives in a high-quality factory (low Y_j) than when they are co-working in a low-quality factory (high Y_j).

B.2.3 Proposition 3

For couples working together at baseline, there exists an intermediate range of workplace disamenities for which staying in the current job dominates (i) the husband switching alone, (ii) the wife switching alone, and (iii) both switching together.

Proof: Observe that:

$$\frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Wife Only}}}{\partial Y_j} = \frac{\partial U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Both Switch}}}{\partial Y_j} = -(1+\beta)(1-\eta)c'(\mu + \sigma \cdot Y_j)\sigma < 0 \tag{B.31}$$

There exists a range of parameter values $w^M, w^F, \gamma, \kappa, \eta, \sigma$ for which $U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Both Switch}} \geq 0$ and $U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{W-Only}} \geq$. Since these relative payoffs are strictly decreasing in Y_j, there exist finite thresholds Y_B, Y_W such that

$$U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Both Switch}} \geq 0 \text{ and } U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Wife-Only}} \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } Y_j \leq \min\{Y_B, Y_W\}.$$

Additionally, if the wife's potential wage gain ($w^F_{j^*} - w^F_j$), γ, and κ are not too large, $U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Husband Only}}$ is strictly increasing in Y_j. Then there exists the threshold Y_H such that

$$U^{\text{Both Stay}} - U^{\text{Husband-Only}} \geq 0 \text{ for all } Y_j \geq Y_H.$$

Therefore, on the interval $Y_j \in \Big[Y_H,\ \min\{Y_B, Y_W\}\Big]$, we have

$$U^{\text{Both Stay}} \ \geq\ \max\Big\{U^{\text{H-Only}},\ U^{\text{Both Switch}},\ U^{\text{W-Only}}\Big\},$$

Using the fact that utility depends on an Extreme Value Type I shock, this implies the likelihood of the couple staying in their period 0 factory will be higher than other actions in this interval, generating a job lock region.

B.3 Survey Implementation Details

Job Choice Experiment: All surveys were implemented in person. To the extent possible, female enumerators were assigned to survey female respondents, while male enumerators interviewed male respondents. If both husband and wife were present at home during the first visit, they were surveyed separately by two enumerators. If only one of the two was present and agreed to participate, they were asked to complete the survey, and enumerators made an appointment to return and recruit the other spouse. Surveys were administered in four languages: Bangla, Hindi, Odia, and Tamil, based on respondents' needs.

The *Job Choice Experiment* was implemented in two waves. I piloted an un-incentivized stated preference elicitation with 196 respondents between July-September 2024. Minor modifications were made to survey instruments before the full rollout in December 2025. However, since the estimated willingness to pay for job amenities is similar across incentivized and un-incentivized versions of the survey, I stack data from the pilot and the full rollout.[87]

Out of the 567 couples the enumerators attempted to recruit, 446 were successfully surveyed. In 346 households, both spouses agreed to participate in the survey; in 56 households only the wife agreed to participate; and in 44 households only the husband was surveyed. Importantly, using a household survey to recruit garment workers for the study helps avoid selection issues that may have arisen if I had collaborated with a firm to survey their workers.

Hiring Experiment: 17% of the surveys took place over the phone, while the remaining were in person. Surveys were administered in four languages: Bangla, Hindi, Odia, and Tamil, based on respondents' needs. Out of the 92 respondents the enumerators attempted to recruit, 65 were successfully surveyed.

B.3.1 Modifications to Job Choice Experiment Based on Pilot Surveys

During the pilot with 196 respondents, the *Job Choice Experiment* was implemented as an un-incentivized survey module with purely hypothetical job scenarios. Each respondent was asked to choose between six pairs of jobs, including one attention check question. Rather than directly varying women's workplace safety, I used night shift work as a proxy: respondents were told "*There is never any night shift work in this factory*" or "*There is night shift work in this factory.*" However, pilot results and qualitative interviews suggested that night shift work was not perceived

[87] Section B.8 shows results remain stable if pilot data is excluded from the sample and Appendix Section B.3 provides additional details on pilot activities.

as a serious safety concern. In this context, night shifts typically involve working two additional hours until 10 p.m., rather than overnight shifts ending in the early morning.

Based on these findings, I made two key adjustments before launching the incentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment*. Participants were asked to complete seven job choice tasks instead of six to increase statistical power. Additionally, instead of using the night shift attribute as a proxy for safety, I incorporated a new attribute: a vignette describing women's workplace safety in the factory, allowing for more salient and meaningful variation in perceived safety. I randomly assign one of the following vignettes: (i) "*We do not have any specific information about arrangements for women's safety in this factory.*" (ii) "*This factory is committed to ensuring a safe workplace for women. They have security cameras, female HR managers, and female security guards. Women working in this factory report that they feel very safe and comfortable in the factory with their supervisors and co-workers.*"

Since I include pilot data in the analysis sample, two adjustments need to be made to account for the changes in the experimental design:

1. Regressions include binary indicators for whether each of the hypothetical jobs in the choice pair required night shift work. In the incentivized survey, the night shift attribute was randomly assigned, but held constant across the two jobs in each choice pair.

2. Regressions include binary indicators equal to one if there is no information on arrangements for women's safety in the factory, and zero if the factory has made arrangements. Hypothetical jobs presented during the pilot did not include any information about women's workplace safety. I set these indicators equal to 1 for all hypothetical job options in the pilot sample.

Appendix Section 6.1.3 shows that estimates remain stable if I include a dummy variable for pilot observations or exclude them from the sample.

B.3.2 Job Choice Experiment Implementation Details

This section provides additional implementation details for the *Job Choice Experiment*.

Randomization: The monthly salary for each job was calculated by applying the randomly assigned multiplicative factor (0.8, 0.9, 1, ..., or 1.3) to the respondent's actual monthly wage, and rounding to the nearest 1,000. No adjustments were made in cases where both jobs ended up being identical in terms of all features other than the co-working amenity or cases were one job strictly dominated the other on all dimensions. Since participants were enrolled in the study in waves as listing surveys progressed, the hypothetical jobs were constructed for each wave separately and

pre-loaded into the survey instrument used by enumerators for the Job Choice Experiment.

Survey implementation: Figure B.1 depicts an example of a choice table. Enumerators were instructed to verbally describe the two jobs using the detailed descriptions above the table, and show the table to the respondent.

B.3.3 Listing Survey Job Choice Experiment

I implemented an un-incentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment* to all garments workers participating in the *Listing Survey*. Respondents were asked three hypothetical questions where they had to choose between pairs of job opportunities for themselves. Wages and commute times were randomly assigned following the same procedure as the *Job Choice Experiment*.


However, in this version of the experiment, each hypothetical job could have one of three co-working arrangements, randomly assigned with equal probability.

1. **Non-co-working job:** "*This factory is only hiring one person, so if you accept this job, you would have to work here alone, without your spouse or other relatives and friends*"
2. **Spousal co-working:** "*This factory is hiring more than one person in different roles so if you accept this job, your spouse could also get a job here.*"
3. **Peer co-working:** "*This factory is hiring more than one person in different roles, but they only need [respondent gender] workers at this time. If you accept this job, your [respondent gender] relative or friend could also get a job and work here with you.*"

Appendix Table A.18 presents the possible values for all job attributes and Appendix Figure B.2 depicts an example of a choice table.

B.3.4 Experimental Interfaces

Figure B.1: Experimental Interface for Job Choice Experiment



Imagine there are two jobs in different garment factories.

Job 1 pays Rs. 12000 per month and is located 10 minutes walking from your house. This company is only hiring one person.The supervisor and most co-workers can speak to you in your language.This factory is committed to ensuring a safe workplace for women. They have security cameras, female HR managers, and female security guards. Women working in this factory report that they feel very safe and comfortable in the factory with their supervisors and co-workers.

Job 2 pays Rs. 12000 per month and is located 10 minutes walking from your house. This company is hiring more than one person in different roles so imagine that your spouse can also get a job here and earn the same as they do now.The supervisor and most co-workers can speak to you in your language.We do not have any information about provisions for womens safety at this factory.


Both jobs are identical in all other ways.

Amenity	Job 1	Job 2
	12000 per month	12000 per month
	10 minutes walking	10 minutes walking
	No	Yes
	Yes	No
	Yes	Yes
	No	No

Imagine you were selected for both positions, which would you prefer?

- Job 1
- Job 2

Figure B.2: Experimental Interface for Job Choice Experiment During Listing Survey



Imagine there are two jobs in different garment factories.

Job 1 pays Rs. 10800 per month and is located 10 minutes walking from your house. This company is hiring more than one person, but they only want to hire male workers at this time. So imagine you can get a job here along with your male friend or relative who lives near you and can walk to work with you.

Job 2 pays Rs. 14400 per month and is located 20 minutes walking from your house. This company is only hiring one person.

Both jobs are identical in all other ways.


Amenity	Job 1	Job 2
	10800 per month	14400 per month
	10 minutes walking	20 minutes walking
	With male friend or relative	Alone

Imagine you were selected for both positions, which would you prefer?


- Job 1
- Job 2

Figure B.3: Experimental Interface for Hiring Experiment

Choosing Between Female Applicants



Choosing Between Male Applicants



B.4 Data Appendix

Variable Construction: Exploratory Survey

Workplace disamenities discussed in Section 2 are measured using a series of questions posed to garment workers about challenges they face in the workplace. Garment workers were asked to report how strongly they agreed with the following statements about working conditions in their current jobs using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree). I convert these continuous measures into binary indicators for whether the respondent agreed with the statement. Survey questions were developed based on the components of the working conditions index for garment factory workers described in Boudreau et al. (2024).

Deduct wage if quit: "If employees decide to leave their job at the factory, the employer deducts some of their wages as punishment"
Long hours: "Working hours are too long"
No overtime pay: "Employees are not paid a higher wage rate if they work overtime hours (more than 8 hours per day)"
Salary not paid on time: "Salaries are not paid on time"
Unsafe working conditions: "Working conditions in the factory are bad or unsafe"
Wage penalties: "Wages are deducted as punishment if workers come late to work, talk on the phone at work, or make production mistakes etc."

Variable Construction: Job Choice Experiment

Mobility Index: Respondents were asked to report the number of times they left the home alone in the past month, not including going to work. I use self-reported mobility for women and wife's reported mobility for men, and classify respondents as above or below median.

Inverse Jealousy Index: Female respondents were asked to indicate how likely it is that their husbands will get angry or jealous if they speak to other men using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = always). I invert this index so that higher values imply less jealousy. I classify female respondents as above- or below-median in terms of this inverse jealousy index. Male respondents are classified as above- or below- median based on their wives' reports.

Relationship Quality Index: Female respondents were asked two questions on spousal relationship quality. First, they are asked to indicate how happy they are in the relationship with their spouse

on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = very unhappy, 2 = not too happy, 3 = quite happy, 4 = very happy). They were also asked to indicate the frequency of arguments with their husbands on the following scale: 1 = every day, 2 = few times a week, 3 = few times a month, 4 = once a month, 5 = once in a few months, 6 = never. I combine the two variables into a summary index following Anderson (2008), such that higher values signify higher relationship quality. I classify female respondents as being above- or below-median in terms of this index. Male respondents are classified based on their wives' responses if their wives completed the survey.

Worried About Commuting Safety: Respondents were asked to indicate how unsafe it would be for a hypothetical female garment worker to commute alone to and from work on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = very safe, 2 = safe, 3 = unsafe, 4 = very unsafe). I classify respondents as above or below median. I also define a binary indicator for whether the respondent believed it would be very unsafe.

Perceived Occupational Safety and Health Risk: Respondents were asked to indicate how worried they were that they would suffer an injury or start feeling unwell at work on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = not at all scared, 2 = slightly scared, 3 = moderately scared, 4 = extremely scared). They were also asked to indicate how worried they were about their spouse getting injured. The Perceived Occupational Safety and Health Risk index is defined as the average of the two variables. Higher values denote higher perceived risk.

No. Sexual Harassment Incidents at Other Factories: Respondents were asked to report the number of incidents of sexual harassment (defined as inappropriate sexual remarks or unwanted physical touch) they have heard of at other garment factories in Tirupur.

Factory Exposure: Total number of garment factories the respondent has worked at in Tirupur.

B.5 Matching Job Choice Experiment Participants to Real Job Opportunities

Participants in the incentivized version of the *Job Choice Experiment* were told that the research team would use some of their preferences from the job choice survey to suggest *up to four* real job opportunities to them, and could share their names with HR managers interested in hiring new workers. This section describes the procedure used to match participants in the *Job Choice*

Experiment to job opportunities. The research team established contact with HR managers at eight garment factories in the three study locations (Mudalipalayam SIDCO, Chinakarai, and Netaji Apparel Park) who were interested in hiring and collected information on salaries and production roles available at their factories. Although HR managers were hesitant to share precise salary information for each role, they were willing to share salary ranges for tailor and non-tailor roles.

In each household, either one or both spouses had been randomly selected for the recommendation opportunity. In households where one spouse had been chosen, the survey responses of the selected individual were used to identify up to four factories where they might like to work. In households where both were chosen, the survey responses of each spouse were used to identify up to two garment factories, so that the household was matched to a maximum of four factories.

After choosing between the two jobs in each choice pair, participants were asked to indicate whether they would prefer the selected job to their current job. Based on their responses, I identify w^*, the lowest wage at which the respondent said they would prefer a hypothetical job over their current job and d^* the longest commute time at which the respondent said they would prefer a hypothetical job over their current job.

I implemented the following procedure to match respondents to factories:

1. Exclude factories from the list if:
   (a) The participant already works at this factory.
   (b) The factory does not hire workers in the respondent's occupation.
2. Calculate the commuting distance to the factory using coordinates for the respondent's home location and the factory location.
3. Keep factories which satisfied at least one of the following criteria:
   (a) Commuting distance to the factory is $\leq d^*$
   (b) The salary range at the factory is $\geq w^*$
4. If the respondent had *exactly* four matches satisfying both these criteria, then they received phone calls informing them about these four factories.
5. If the respondent has *less than* four matches satisfying both these criteria, I made up the shortfall by matching them to companies that satisfied at least one of these criteria and came closest to satisfying both. In particular, for each of the factories f which satisfied at least one criteria:

(a) I defined $w^f_{gap} = w^* - MinSalary^f$ and $d_{gap} = CommuteTime^f - d^*$

(b) If N additional factories were required to meet the shortfall, I sorted the list by w^f_{gap} and d_{gap}, and selected the first N factories.

6. If the respondent had more than four matches satisfying both criteria, I dropped factories where the respondent's current monthly salary was less than the salary range offered in the new factory. If there continued to be more than four possible matches, four of these were randomly selected.

Once matches were generated, respondents received four phone calls (one call after every five days) informing them about a new job opportunity each time. During the call, enumerators informed participants that they have been matched to an opportunity based on their preferences reported in the survey. If the respondent worked as a tailor or a tailoring helper, enumerators shared the salary range for tailors at the new factory. Those working in any other occupation were told the salary range for non-tailor roles. [88] At the end of the call, participants were reminded that to have their name(s) recommended to the HR manager at this factory, they must "apply" by calling the hotline number and entering their unique ID within the next five days.

Among those assigned to the Joint treatment arm, 94.68% were matched to exactly two factories as intended, while the rest could only be matched to one. Among the respondents assigned to the Husband Only or Wife Only arms, I was able to match 58% to four factories, as planned. 28.67% could be matched matched to three factories, 8.67% were matched to two factories, and 4.67% could only be matched to one factory. Only 4% of participants ended up being matched to a factory where the salary range was lower than their current salary.

B.6 Matching Hiring Experiment Participants to Real Worker Profiles

To make the *Hiring Experiment* incentivized, participants were told that their survey responses would be used to match them to up to five real job seekers who matched their hiring preferences. During the household *Listing Survey*, garment workers were asked if they wanted the study team to retain their contact information and share their profiles with employers looking to hire at nearby garment factories. This list of interested garment workers served as the match pool. I generated matches by implementing the following procedure:

1. Hypothetical profiles in the *Hiring Experiment* were described in terms of their work experience (0, 3, 6, or 12 months), and whether they were seeking to work alone, with a

[88] Those employed as tailoring helpers also received information on the salary for tailors, since one of the main motivations for helpers to switch to a new factory is to transition into the tailor role.

spouse, or with a friend. I defined the following variables for each of the real job seekers using the *Listing Survey* data:

(a) *Experience*:

= 0 if they had been working in Tirupur for $<$ 3 months

= 3 if they had been working in Tirupur for $\geq$ 3 months but $<$ 6 months

= 6 if they had been working in Tirupur for $\geq$ 6 months but $<$ 12 months

= 12 if they had been working one year or longer

(b) *Cowork_Spouse* = 1 if the individual has a spouse who works in the garment industry and 0 otherwise. I use this as a proxy for whether they might be interested in working with their spouse.

(c) *Cowork_Peer* = 1 if the individual has a same-sex friend or relative working with them in their current job, and 0 otherwise. I use this as a proxy for whether they might be interested in working with a peer.[89]

2. Following the approach in Kessler et al. (2019), I first estimated the following ridge regression using the entire choice dataset generated from employers' responses to the hypothetical hiring questions:

$$Rate_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{t \in 3,6,12} \delta_t \cdot \mathbf{1}\{\text{Experience}_{ij} = \text{t months}\} + \tag{B.32}$$

$$\beta_1 \cdot \text{Spouse Referral}_{ij} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Friend Referral}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{B.33}$$

where $Rate_{ij}$ is the rating assigned by employer i to hypothetical candidate j. I use 10-fold cross validation to select the λ parameter.

3. After determining the λ parameter, I ran separate ridge regressions using the hypothetical choice data for *each* employer and saved the estimated coefficients. By combining the estimated coefficients from individual regression and the *Experience*, *Cowork_Spouse*, and *Cowork_Peer* variables described above, I generated out-of-sample predictions for the hiring rating for the real job seekers in the match pool.

[89] Data collected during the Listing Survey only allows me to determine whether the respondent has any friends or relative working with them in their current factory, not whether they have any peers working in any of the garment factories in Tirupur.

4. After excluding job seekers working in the same factory as the employer (if any) and job seekers working in occupations which are not featured in the employer's factory, I selected 5 job seekers with the highest predicted hiring rating.

5. The name, gender, occupation, and mobile number of the five matched candidates were shared with employer by text message so they could contact them directly.

B.7 Willingness to Pay Derivation

We start with the expression from equation (15):

$$\delta \cdot \ln w_i = \theta^a + \delta \cdot \ln\left(w_i - WTP_i^a\right) \tag{B.34}$$

$$\frac{-\theta^a}{\delta} = \ln\left(\frac{w_i - WTP_i^a}{w_i}\right) \tag{B.35}$$

$$\frac{WTP_i^a}{w_i} = 1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\theta^a}{\delta}\right) \tag{B.36}$$

$$WTP_i^a = w_i\left(1 - \exp\left(\frac{-\theta^a}{\delta}\right)\right) \tag{B.37}$$

B.8 Willingness to Pay Estimates: Robustness Checks

This section discusses a series of robustness checks to validate the willingness to pay estimates from the *Job Choice Experiment*.

Preference Heterogeneity and Job Sorting

Models of compensating differentials predict that those who value certain amenities are more likely to sort into jobs that have those amenities (Rosen 1986). To validate whether the willingness to pay estimates reflect respondents' true preferences, I test whether respondents whose current jobs feature co-working, short commutes, and limited language barriers actually have a higher estimated willingness to pay for these amenities. Results are summarized in Appendix Figure A.8.

As predicted by the theory of compensating differentials, I find that individuals sorting into jobs with specific attributes disproportionately value those job attributes. Average willingness to pay for co-working is 32.6% of monthly income among those who are *currently* working in the same factory as their spouse, and only 20.1% among those who are not ($p < 0.01$). In fact, average valuation of co-working among individuals who have *never* worked in the same factory as their spouse remains positive, but is significantly lower (12.2% of monthly income) as shown in the figure.

Next, I find that those who have selected into jobs where their colleagues and supervisors cannot communicate with them in their preferred language have slightly lower distaste for language barriers than those who do not face language barriers in their current job. They would need to be compensated with an additional 3.1% in monthly income to accept a job with language barriers, while those whose current jobs don't feature these barriers would need to be compensated with 6.8% higher wages (p = 0.15).

Finally, I compare willingness to pay for different commute times among those whose current commute time is below versus above median.[90] Across the board, I find that those who have a below-median commute time in their current jobs have stronger distaste for longer commutes of 20, 30, or 40 minutes, relative to the omitted category (10 minutes). Most strikingly, individuals who currently have an above-median commute time need to be compensated with an additional 5.3% in monthly income to accept a job which has a 40-minute commute, while those who currently have a below-median commute time would need to be compensated more than double this amount (12.3% of monthly income).

Attentiveness

A common concern with stated preference experiments is that respondents may not process the questions carefully before answering. If they make random choices in an effort to get through the survey quickly, this can introduce noise. Similarly, if respondents follow a simple rule of thumb, for example always choosing the job with the higher wage, this can bias estimates of their willingness to pay for non-wage amenities.

I incorporated several features into the experimental design to mitigate this concern. First, the only incentive for participating in the study was the possibility of being randomly selected to be recommended to HR managers at nearby garment factories for future vacancies. The median duration of the survey was 42 minutes, and surveys were typically administered at the end of the respondent's workday or on their weekly day off. Since no other remuneration was offered aside from the possibility of being recommended for a new job, participants' decision to complete the survey signals that they truly value the incentive. Additionally, since participants were told that their survey responses would be used to recommend jobs that are aligned with their interests, they have good reason to report their preferences accurately.

Second, during the screening process respondents were asked if they were interested in learning about new job opportunities and asked to spend a few minutes completing a CV form outlining their skills and experience. Only those participants who invested time in filling out the

[90] The median commute time in my sample is 10 minutes.

CV were invited to participate in the stated preference survey, to increase the likelihood that the sample comprised people who would value being recommended for new opportunities, and would be incentivized to answer the survey truthfully and accurately.

Finally, one of the seven choice tables presented to the participant is randomly selected to serve as an attention check. In this choice table, all non-wage amenities are identical across both jobs, but one of them has a strictly higher wage. I label respondents as inattentive if they selected the dominated job, and exclude them from the sample as a robustness check. Only 5.72% of respondents failed the attention check, indicating a high level of engagement from respondents.

Sensitivity to specification and sample

To test the sensitivity of results to the choice of specification and sample, I implement a series of robustness checks reported in Appendix Tables A.9 and A.10. This includes (i) restricting the sample to participants who passed the attention check; (ii) restricting the sample to participants who were alone when the survey was being administered; (iii) excluding respondents who were administered an unincentivized version of the survey during piloting; (iv) including a binary indicator for pilot observations in the logit model; (v) estimating a probit model and linear probability model instead of a logit model; and (vi) estimating a mixed logit model which allows for unobserved heterogeneity in individuals' marginal utility from non-wage amenities.[91] I find that the willingness-to-pay estimates remain stable across these specifications.

Social desirability bias

Another potential concern may be social desirability bias. Respondents who are currently working with their spouse may find it inappropriate to say that they would ever consider a non-co-working job. 69% of respondents who are currently working with their spouse choose the non-co-working job at least once, suggesting that this is not a significant concern.

Sample selection

Finally, there may be some concern that the set of married garment workers whose spouse also works in the garment sector may be an unusual or unrepresentative group, and learning about their

[91] Enumerators were instructed to survey both spouses separately in private to ensure respondents could report their true preferences without any external pressure. In some cases, both husband and wife were at home at the same time, and were interviewed simultaneously by separate enumerators, either in different parts of the house or with one person being surveyed outside the house. However, most couples live in small, one-room accommodations. While enumerators did their best to ensure privacy, the presence of one's spouse nearby may have influenced participants' responses. Enumerators were asked to record whether anyone else was present nearby during the survey so these respondents could be excluded from the sample if required.

preferences may not allow us to draw general conclusions. However, estimates from the 2017-18 Periodic Labor Force Survey, a nationally representative survey, reveal that working in the same industry as one's spouse is a widespread phenomenon among dual-earner households. 46% of married working women in the Indian labor market are employed in the same 3-digit industry as their spouse. The sample is limited to women employed in wage employment to make sure results are not driven by women working in household enterprises. In urban areas, such as the setting for this study, this estimate reaches 50%. This underscores that couples working in the same industry are an important feature of the labor market, and should not be perceived as outliers.

B.9 Survey Experiment with Non-Working Women in Odisha

In August 205, I implemented a survey experiment with married couples in the state of Odisha, India, focusing on households where the wife was not working to (i) assess the external validity of my estimates of willingness to pay for spousal co-working and (ii) understand how co-working opportunities shape women's labor force participation,

Sample Recruitment

A new industrial park is being built in Khordha district, Odisha, with several garment factories expected to begin operations in 2026. I identified ten villages within a five kilometer radius of this industrial park, and assigned enumerator teams to survey a sample of married couples from each village. Enumerators conducted door-to-door visits, asking whether a married woman of working age (18 to 60 years) lived in the household and was available to speak.

Women were eligible for the survey if they: (i) lived with their husband or his family, (ii) worked fewer than 20 hours of paid work per week during a typical month in the past year, and (iii) expressed some interest in new work opportunities. Interest was measured on a four-point Likert scale (not at all interested to very interested); women selecting "not at all interested" were screened out. Eligible women and their husbands were told that we were conducting a survey of people's job preferences and were invited to participate in the survey. Once approximately ten households had been surveyed in a village, the field team proceeded to the next village.

The final sample comprises 115 women and 82 husbands. Table B.2 presents descriptive statistics. Only 12% of women worked for pay in the past year, compared to 90% of men, despite having similar levels of education. 96% of women are interested in home-based work. While 72% are willing to travel to neighboring villages for work, only 38% would commute to the closest city. Husbands appear supportive of their wives' employment: the share who would approve of their wives pursuing each type of job closely matches the share of women interested in these jobs.

Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics (Odisha Married Couples Sample)

	Female	Male
Panel A: Demographic Characteristics		
Age	36.10	44.05
	(8.32)	(8.30)
Years of Education	7.38	7.68
	(3.71)	(3.66)
Number of children	2.25	-
	(1.02)	
Total household income per month (Rs.)	16,439.13	17,735.87
	(9,604.49)	(10,459.21)
No. household members engaged in paid work	1.50	-
	(0.78)	
Panel B: Employment Characteristics		
Worked for pay in past year	0.12	0.90
Ever migrated for work	0.10	0.78
Current occupation, share of respondents:		
Domestic duties only	0.85	0.00
Self-employed, worked in household enterprise	0.03	0.21
Employer (owner of an enterprise)	0.00	0.02
Regular salaried/wage employee, please specify type of work	0.08	0.13
Casual wage labor in other work	0.02	0.41
Agricultural work on own land	0.01	0.13
Agricultural work on someone else's land	0.00	0.01
Unemployed	0.00	0.07
Panel C: Desired Type of Employment (for self/wife)		
Home-based work	0.96	0.93
Job in own village	0.84	0.88
Job in neighboring village	0.72	0.76
Job in closest city	0.38	0.48
Observations	115	82

Notes: The table reports key summary statistics for respondents in the Odisha couples sample by gender. For continuous variables the table reports means and standard deviations in parentheses. Men's survey module did not include questions on number of children or number of working members in the household. Panel C is based on questions asking women if they were interested in different types of jobs and asking men if they approved of their wives accepting such jobs.

Experimental Design

The survey included a module with a hypothetical job choice experiment. Female respondents were informed that several garment factories were expected to begin operations in the industrial park near their village, and would need to hire skilled tailors and hire people for jobs which do not require prior experience, such as packing, quality check, etc. The enumerators also informed the respondents that male workers were likely to earn Rs. 15,000 per month working in these factories.[92] To eliminate commuting concerns, the respondents were told to assume that factories would arrange free buses to help people commute and employees would need to work in the factory for 8 hours. Women were first asked how interested their husbands would be in one of these jobs on a 4-point Likert scale (not at all interested to very interested). Women were then told to imagine that their husbands were working at one of the garment factories in the industrial park and asked to choice between pairs of jobs for themselves. In each choice pair, women were presented a choice between working at the same garment factory where their husband worked and another factory in the same industrial park. I randomized the monthly wages for each job and also randomized whether one of the respondent's female friends or relatives works at the factory. Monthly wages were randomly selected from a list (with replacement): Rs. 8000, Rs. 9,000, Rs. 10,000, ..., Rs. 15,000.[93, 94] Respondents were told that the jobs were identical in all other ways and asked to indicate which they would prefer if offered both. Finally, for each hypothetical job offer, women had to report whether they would rather accept the offer or remain outside the labor force.

Male respondents were instructed to imagine that they were employed in one of the garment factories in the industrial park. They were shown five pairs of jobs for their wives: one at their own factory and another at a different factory within the park. Men had to indicate which job their wife should do if offered both positions.

Finally, to obtain an incentivized measure of respondents' job preferences, respondents were told that they could sign up to receive a text message alert when factories started hiring workers. Respondents were only allowed to sign up for an alert about one type of job: jobs for the couple at the same factory, jobs for the husband and wife at two different factories, jobs for the husband

[92] Expected monthly wages were determined through qualitative interviews with village leaders who had been asked to help with recruiting workers for the factories.

[93] The wage floor (Rs. 8,000) was based on the average daily wage for female agricultural laborers in rural Odisha (sowing, planting, transplanting, and weeding) from IndiaStat, as most women in this setting are employed in agriculture. The wage ceiling (Rs. 15,000) corresponds to the expected monthly wage for men.

[94] During the first week of data collection, respondents were told that expected salaries for male workers would be Rs. 12,000 per month, based on information gathered during piloting. Wages for women were randomized to be between Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 12,000 in increments of Rs. 500. However, subsequent consultations with village leaders and conversations with study participants suggested that factories would offer higher salaries. The expected wages for men and the randomized wages for women were updated accordingly after the first week.

only, jobs for the wife only, or none of the above.[95]

Empirical Strategy

To measure respondents' willingness to pay for co-working with their spouse, I take the discrete choice data from the job choice module and estimate a standard logit model, following the same approach as the *Job Choice Experiment* described in Section 5. I limit the analysis samples to exclude women who said their husbands would not be interested in working in one of the garment factories in the industrial park, as well as men who said they would not be interested in these jobs.

Results

Working in the same factory as one's husband is equivalent to a 28.2% increase in wages for female respondents (Table B.3 Column 1). Men are willing to trade off 31.7% of their wives' monthly income to work together instead of separately. Once again, women value working with their husbands more than working with a female friend or relative: the estimated willingness to pay for co-working with a spouse is more than twice as large ($p < 0.01$).

The incentivized measure of job preferences also reveals a clear preference for co-working, supporting the willingness to pay results. 68.35% of the female respondents and 72.88% of the male respondents signed up for text alerts for opportunities where both spouses could get jobs in the same factory. On the other hand, none of the respondents were interested in receiving information about opportunities for both spouses to join separate factories.

Finally, I estimate how the probability of entering the labor force changes when women receive a job offer from their husband's factory. I estimate a logit specification using the choice data where women were asked to choose between accepting each hypothetical offer or remaining outside the labor force.

Appendix Table B.4 presents the logit coefficients and associated marginal effects. Women are 23.08 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to accept a job if it is in the husband's factory rather than another factory in the same industrial park. In comparison, the presence of a female friend or relative in the factory only increases the likelihood of accepting the offer by 6.58 percentage points ($p < 0.05$); this difference is significant at the 1% level. Husbands are also 30.34 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) more likely to say that their wives should accept an offer from the factory where they work relative to another factory in the park. Together, these results suggest that co-working opportunities can facilitate entry into the labor market for women.

[95] This question was added to the survey later and data is available for 87 female respondents and 62 male respondents.

Finally, survey evidence suggests that co-working enables women to work in part through protection from workplace risks. Women rated how concerned they were about facing various challenges if they were to start working using a 4-point Likert scale (sexual harassment, illness or injury, verbal abuse by supervisors or colleagues, wage theft, compulsory overtime work at night). Before presenting these questions, I randomized whether respondents were told to imagine working with their husbands (co-working) or alone. After converting each response to a binary indicator, I combine them into a single index following Anderson (2008). I then regress the standardized index (mean = 0, SD = 1) on the co-working indicator. Co-working reduces the index by about 0.4 SD, suggesting that this arrangement increases perceived workplace safety.

Table B.3: Willingness to Pay for Co-working (Odisha Married Couples Sample)

	Female Respondents (1)	Male Respondents (2)
Co-work with Husband	0.282***	0.317***
	(0.048)	(0.042)
Co-work with Female Peer	0.112**	0.160***
	(0.050)	(0.047)
p-value: Spouse = Peer	0.00	0.00
Observations	510	385

Notes: The table presents estimates of the willingness to pay for co-working as a fraction of the monthly wage. Column 1 presents estimates from a logit specification estimated on the sample of female respondents choosing jobs for themselves. Column 2 shows estimates for male respondents choosing jobs for their wives; estimates capture men's willingness to pay for their wives to work with them (Co-work with Spouse) and with a female friend or relative (Co-work with Peer). The omitted category is a job in another factory within the same industrial park where neither the husband nor any of the wife's female friends or relatives work. Standard errors reported in parentheses are estimated using the delta method, and are adjusted for clustering by respondent.

Table B.4: Estimated Marginal Effects on Wife's Job Take-up (Odisha Married Couples Sample)

	Female Respondents (1)	Male Respondents (2)
Co-work with Spouse	0.231***	0.303***
	(0.036)	(0.046)
Co-work with Female Peer	0.066**	0.129***
	(0.033)	(0.037)
Log Monthly Wage	0.294***	0.103
	(0.079)	(0.120)
p-value: Spouse = Peer	0.00	0.00
Observations	1,020	770

Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of changing the attributes of the hypothetical jobs on the probability of job acceptance estimated using a logit regression. Column 1 presents estimates for female respondents choosing jobs for themselves. Column 2 shows estimates for male respondents choosing jobs for their wives "Co-work with Spouse" is a binary indicator for whether the job was at the husband's factory. "Co-work with Peer" is a binary indicator for whether the wife's female friend or relative works at the factory. "Log Monthly Wage" represents the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in log wages (171.8% increase in wages). The omitted category is a job in another factory within the same industrial park where neither the husband nor any of the wife's female friends or relatives work, so the reported coefficients capture how much take-up increases when the job allows co-working with a spouse or a peer. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for clustering by respondent.