Growth with Endogenous Industry Dynamics

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Abstract

This paper develops a Schumpeterian growth model in which entrepreneurs choose between entering an incumbent industry and creating a new one. This entry margin endogenously determines the rate of industry renewal and, through it, the composition of growth. New industries begin as monopolies, transition into oligopolies with active innovation and follower entry, and gradually mature as technology gaps widen, innovation incentives weaken, and entry declines. Individual industries therefore follow non-stationary life-cycle paths, while the economy exhibits a constant long-run growth rate because the cross-sectional distribution of industries over life-cycle states is stationary. The model delivers an explicit decomposition of aggregate growth into variety creation, frontier innovation, and follower catch-up, and identifies a novel inefficiency on the industry-creation margin. Private entrants undervalue variety creation because they cannot fully appropriate the knowledge gains from seeding new industries, discount future profits too heavily under creative destruction, and fail to internalize how entry reshapes the distribution of industries across life-cycle states. Calibrating the model to U.S. data from 1982–2011, I find that equilibrium industry renewal is inefficiently low. Comparative statics imply a U-shaped relationship between startup entry and growth, and in equal-cost policy experiments subsidies to variety creation generate larger gains in long-run growth and welfare than subsidies to incumbent R&D.

Keywords: Schumpeterian growth; Endogenous industry dynamics; Industry life-cycle; Variety creation; Innovation policy

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1 Introduction

In his presidential address at the 1998 annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Harberger (1998) contrasted two views of the growth process: a "yeast" view, in which productivity rises broadly and proportionately across sectors, and a "mushroom" view, in which growth comes from a rotating set of high-performance industries that sprout, flourish, and fade. The empirical record strongly supports the mushroom view of growth. Productivity gains are concentrated in a small set of sectors whose identity changes over time, rather than being spread uniformly across the economy (Ferguson and Wascher, 2004; Sarte and Taylor, 2025). At any point in time, only a few industries account for a large share of aggregate TFP growth, and the leaders are not persistent.

A large empirical literature on industry and product life-cycles provides a natural micro-level counterpart to this perspective. Young industries typically exhibit high entry, rapid product innovation, and volatile market shares. As they mature, entry slows, concentration rises, and innovation becomes more incremental (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996; Filson, 2001; Argente, Lee and Moreira, 2024). In other words, industries tend to surge early and then slow down, so the industries that lead in TFP contribution can change as cohorts mature and new ones emerge.

Yet aggregate productivity growth in advanced economies has remained relatively steady over long horizons. This tension between micro-level turbulence and macro-level stability is at the core of the questions this paper addresses. How do non-stationary life-cycles of individual industries aggregate into a constant long-run growth rate for the economy as a whole? What determines the rate at which new "mushrooms" appear to replace mature, low-growth sectors? How do entry and innovation policies affect the balance between improving existing products and creating entirely new markets? These questions have direct policy implications: the same R&D subsidy can operate very differently in a young, rapidly expanding industry than in a mature, follower-heavy one where business stealing is severe and innovation incentives are weak.

Standard endogenous growth models typically fix the set of product lines or treat industry creation as exogenous, so they cannot explain how the economy's industry composition evolves or why that evolution matters for growth. I develop and quantify a step-by-step Schumpeterian growth model in which the set of active industries is endogenous. Upon arrival, an entrepreneur can either join an existing industry and compete for incumbent market share, or pay a sunk cost to create a new industry and obtain a temporary monopoly position. I show that this entry margin determines the rate of industry renewal, which pins

down the stationary cross-sectional distribution of industries and thereby sustains a constant long-run growth rate despite non-stationary industry life-cycles.

The model generates industry life-cycles endogenously. New industries begin as small monopolies with a one-step lead over the competitive fringe. As they prove profitable, they attract followers, transition into oligopoly, and experience high innovation rates. Over time, leaders pull ahead, followers catch up less frequently, and the incentives for further entry and follower innovation decline. Mature industries become larger but less dynamic, and joining them becomes less attractive for new entrepreneurs, who instead bear the cost of creating new industries. The economy continuously renews itself through this process, in line with Harberger's mushroom view.

This paper makes two main contributions. First, I develop a step-by-step Schumpeterian growth model in which industries follow endogenous life-cycles and aggregate growth emerges from the overlapping dynamics of these industries. Despite non-stationary behavior at the industry level, the economy admits a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with an invariant cross-sectional distribution of industries and a constant long-run growth rate. This structure yields an explicit decomposition of growth into contributions from variety creation, frontier innovation by leaders, and catch-up innovation by followers, weighted by the stationary distribution over life-cycle states.

Second, the model implies policy-relevant wedges because entry affects not only within-industry competition but also the economy's renewal rate. Entrants do not internalize how their choice between entering an incumbent industry and creating a new one reshapes the stationary distribution of industries across life-cycle states, which feeds back into aggregate growth and innovation incentives. Entry is further distorted by knowledge gains from seeding new industries that are not fully appropriable, by the creative-destruction hazard that raises private discounting relative to the planner, and by the resource cost of market creation. I discipline the magnitudes by calibrating the model to U.S. data from 1982–2011. The calibrated economy exhibits insufficient industry renewal: startup entry has a U-shaped relationship with growth, reflecting the tension between business stealing and variety creation, and tougher product-market competition raises growth primarily by redirecting entrants toward new industries. At a common fiscal cost of 1% of output, subsidies to variety creation raise the long-run growth rate by 7.7 basis points and welfare by 7.6%, compared with 5.8 basis points and 5.0% for subsidies to incumbent R&D.

Related Literature This paper contributes to the endogenous growth literature. I build on the Schumpeterian growth framework in which innovation is step-by-step and driven by patent races (Aghion et al., 2001; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Akcigit and Ates, 2021,

2023). Relative to canonical step-by-step frameworks, I allow follower technology to improve gradually rather than through instantaneous leapfrogging (Liu, Mian and Sufi, 2022). I also do not add an exogenous catch-up term to followers' innovation rates. Instead, stationary aggregate growth is sustained by the extensive margin of endogenous variety creation, which makes new industries' early life-cycle innovation compensate for the slowdown of mature cohorts.

Among recent contributions, Olmstead-Rumsey (2019) and Cavenaile, Celik and Tian (2023) are closest in terms of modeling within-industry competition and innovation in Schumpeterian environments. Olmstead-Rumsey (2019) study how changes in the distribution of idea quality affect innovation outcomes and market structure, and use the framework to interpret recent trends in concentration. Cavenaile, Celik and Tian (2023) develop an oligopolistic Schumpeterian model in which the number of dominant firms within an industry is endogenously determined and firms choose innovation intensities strategically, with implications for concentration and business dynamism. My contribution is to add an endogenous extensive margin of industry creation that determines the stationary cross-sectional mix of young and mature industries. This renewal margin is central for policy, because private entrants do not internalize how their entry location reshapes the long-run distribution of industries and, through it, aggregate growth and welfare.

The paper also relates to the literature on industry and product life-cycles (Agarwal, 1998; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996; Filson, 2001; Jovanovic and Wang, 2024). The literature has confirmed several stylized life-cycle patterns including the increasing industry-level output with decreasing prices (Gort and Klepper, 1982), decreasing product-level output (Argente, Lee and Moreira, 2024), decreasing firm entry rate (Agarwal and Gort, 1996), and decreasing innovation frequencies (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), and develops partial-equilibrium models to account for them. I contribute by embedding life-cycle dynamics into a general equilibrium growth framework with endogenous industry creation and a stationary cross-sectional distribution of industries over life-cycle states.

Finally, this paper relates to work on innovation policy and externalities in endogenous-growth environments (Jones and Williams, 2000; Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2013; Atkeson and Burstein, 2019; Acemoglu et al., 2018; Akcigit, Hanley and Stantcheva, 2022). Closest in spirit, Acemoglu and Cao (2015) develop a Schumpeterian model with incremental innovation of incumbents and radical innovation of entrants, and show that subsidizing entrant innovation can have limited growth effects when entry depresses incumbent innovation incentives. My contribution is to identify and quantify externalities that arise specifically from endogenous industry creation and to show how they reshape the welfare comparison between subsidies to incumbent R&D and subsidies to entry and variety cre-

ation. In the calibrated model, potential entrants undervalue variety creation relative to business stealing, so the decentralized equilibrium is biased against renewal. As a result, in equal-cost experiments, subsidies targeted at variety creation deliver larger gains in long-run growth and welfare than subsidies targeted at incumbent R&D because they operate directly on the renewal margin.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews stylized facts on industry life-cycles and sectoral contributions to aggregate growth. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 characterizes the stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium, derives the decomposition of aggregate growth, and analyzes the constrained planner's problem on the industry creation margin. Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis and policy experiments. Section 6 concludes.

2 Motivating Evidence

This section summarizes four empirical patterns that motivate the framework and flesh out the Harberger's "mushroom" view of growth discussed in the introduction. Each pattern highlights a different aspect of the tension between non-stationary industry dynamics and relatively stable aggregate growth, and points to the importance of modeling industry creation and life-cycles explicitly.

The first pattern is that, over long horizons, aggregate productivity growth is relatively stable even as the industries that account for that growth change substantially over time. Ferguson and Wascher (2004) show that the U.S. has experienced several distinct productivity booms, each associated with different leading sectors. Using postwar U.S. data, Sarte and Taylor (2025), Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2008), and Oliner, Sichel and Stiroh (2007) show that the industries making the largest contributions to aggregate productivity growth have shifted over time—from durable goods manufacturing to IT-producing industries, and then toward IT-using service industries later. More recently, Hobijn et al. (2025) use quarterly industry-level data since 2008 to show that the main contributors to U.S. labor productivity growth have continued to rotate across industries before and after the pandemic, while average labor productivity in the nonfarm private sector has remained close to a stable pre-Covid linear trend. In the model, the rotating set of high-growth industries arises from a stationary cross-sectional distribution of industries over life-cycle states. Industries move through non-stationary paths, but the population shares in each state remain constant, delivering balanced aggregate growth.

The second pattern is that, at the aggregate industry level, output tends to rise while prices decline, whereas individual product- or brand-level quantities decrease. Gort and

Klepper (1982) and Agarwal (1998) document that, across a wide range of product markets, diffusion and industry evolution are typically associated with increasing quantities and falling prices, and that this combination of rising physical output and falling prices is a robust feature of the industry life-cycle in many markets. At the product level, by contrast, quantities tend to quickly peak and then decline, with products frequently replaced by new varieties (Argente, Lee and Moreira, 2024). Thus, growing industries with declining prices coexist with shrinking or disappearing products—a contrast that the model captures through overlapping product and industry life-cycles. The model captures this contrast through overlapping life cycles where industries expand through entry and innovation even as individual varieties are displaced over time.

The third pattern concerns firm demographics over the industry life-cycle. In many industries, the number of active firms rises strongly in the early stages and later levels off or declines, while entry intensity falls as the industry matures (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Agarwal, 1998). Using a larger set of product markets with explicit entry and exit data, Agarwal and Gort (1996) show that industry entry rates peak in the early growth stages and then fall over time, while exit rates rise later in the life-cycle, so that the number of firms grows rapidly at first and then stabilizes or, in many markets, eventually turns down. For the purposes of this paper, the key feature is the declining entry rates in more mature industries, rather than the eventual shakeout. The model captures this through an endogenous entry decision. As industries become more mature and profitable opportunities shrink, expected entry returns fall and fewer new firms choose to enter.[1]

The fourth pattern is that innovation activity is front-loaded in the industry life-cycle: product innovation is especially intense early on and declines as industries mature. Drawing on multiple case studies, Abernathy and Utterback (1978) argue that new industries begin in a "fluid" phase with frequent major product innovations, after which a dominant design emerges and innovation shifts toward incremental process improvements. Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Klepper (1996) document similar trajectories across a range of industries, with high rates of new product introduction and technological experimentation in the early stages, followed by lower rates of product innovation and a greater focus on cost-reducing process innovation once the market structure stabilizes. Quantitative evidence in Agarwal (1998) shows that patenting activity tends to rise in the early years of a product market and then decline in later stages, indicating an eventual slowdown in technological activity. In the model, this shows up as a declining innovation rate at the industry level, even as existing varieties continue to be produced and new industries continue to appear.

[1]To keep the analysis tractable, I do not model the late-stage decline in the number of firms. A standard extension with fixed operating costs could generate such a shakeout without changing the main mechanisms.

Taken together, these patterns point to a growth process in which aggregate regularities emerge from the interaction of many industries at different life-cycle stages, rather than from a representative sector, and motivate the model developed in the next section.

3 Model

The model builds on a step-by-step Schumpeterian growth framework (Akcigit and Ates, 2021, 2023; Liu, Mian and Sufi, 2022; Olmstead-Rumsey, 2019; Cavenaile, Celik and Tian, 2023) with heterogeneous industries and firm-level innovation. Time is continuous and indexed by $t \in [0, \infty)$. The economy is populated by a representative household that consumes, saves, and supplies labor, and a continuum of industries indexed by $i \in [0, N_t]$. The mass of active industries N_t is endogenous and changes over time as entrepreneurs create new markets and existing industries exit. Each industry has a discrete number of firms, represented by a set $\mathcal{F}_i$ for industry i.

The central feature of the model is the *endogenous industry life-cycle*. Industries are created by entrepreneurs, evolve through phases of monopoly and oligopolistic competition driven by step-by-step innovation, and eventually exit due to exogenous obsolescence. Unlike standard Schumpeterian models with a fixed set of product lines, *potential entrants* in this economy face a key strategic choice between two margins. They can enter an incumbent industry to compete for existing market share, or they can create a new industry and obtain a temporary monopoly position. This choice between intensifying competition and expanding variety governs both aggregate growth and the structural evolution of the economy.

I first describe households and the final-good technology, then the structure of industries, and finally the innovation, entry, and exit processes. Throughout the section I state the assumptions explicitly and keep notation close to the economic objects they represent.

3.1 Household

A representative household has logarithmic preferences over a final consumption good. The household maximizes lifetime utility

$$U_t \;=\; \int_t^{\infty} e^{-\rho(s-t)} \log C_s \, ds, \tag{1}$$

where $\rho > 0$ is the rate of time preference and C_t denotes consumption at time t. The household owns the aggregate asset A_t and supplies one unit of labor inelastically to the

labor market. Its budget constraint is

$$C_t + \dot{A}_t \;=\; w_t + r_t A_t, \tag{2}$$

where w_t is the wage and r_t is the interest rate.

The final consumption good, which serves as the numeraire, is produced with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over industry outputs:

$$Y_t \;=\; N_t \exp\left(\frac{1}{N_t}\int_0^{N_t} \ln Y_{it}\, di\right),$$

where N_t is the mass of industries at time t and Y_{it} is the output of industry i. The aggregator implies that each industry i receives the same revenue flow $\bar{Y}_t \equiv Y_t/N_t$.

3.2 Industries and Production

Unless noted otherwise, I omit time subscripts for brevity. Each industry consists of a finite number of firms. If an industry has only one firm, it is a *monopoly*. If there are multiple firms, the industry is an *oligopoly* with one *leader* (the firm with the highest technology level) and a set of *followers* that share a common (lower) technology level. Firms produce differentiated varieties within the industry and compete in prices.

Within-industry demand and production. Industry i's output is a CES aggregate of the individual varieties produced by firms $j \in \mathcal{F}_i$:

$$Y_i \;=\; \left(\sum_{j\in\mathcal{F}_i} y_{ji}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \qquad \sigma > 1,$$

where y_{ji} is the quantity of a firm j's variety and σ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties within an industry. Industry demand for Y_i comes from the final-good sector.

Each firm j combines labor with its technology to produce:

$$y_{ji} \;=\; q_{ji}\, l_{ji}, \qquad q_{ji} \;=\; \lambda^{s_{ji}},$$

where l_{ji} is labor input, $s_{ji} \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the technology level, and $\lambda > 1$ is the step size of the quality ladder. A one-step increase in s_{ji} raises firm j's productivity by a factor λ. Firms take wages and the demand system as given and set prices to maximize profits. For a given industry state (number of firms and their technology levels), price competition uniquely determines equilibrium markups and profits.

Competitive fringe in new industries. The economy features a public knowledge stock, denoted $s_t^K \in \mathbb{R}_+$, which summarizes the average level of publicly available technology. When a new industry is created at time t, it starts with a monopolist whose technology is one step ahead of the public knowledge, $s_{ji} = s_t^K + 1$, and with a competitive fringe of firms whose technology is fixed at s_t^K and who do not innovate. The fringe serves two roles. Economically, it captures the early exploratory phase of a new product line, in which many unsuccessful imitators can enter quickly using widely available technologies. Technically, the fringe ensures the monopolist faces a finite price elasticity and therefore a well-defined markup, as formalized below.

Pricing decisions. Equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits within an industry are functions of a small set of state variables. To summarize the state of an industry, I adopt the following notations. A superscript M refers to monopolies or monopolist-specific variables. $\hat{s}$ denotes the technology advantage of a monopolist over the fringe; for example, $V_{\hat{s}}^M$ is the value of a monopolist with advantage $\hat{s}$ over the fringe. A subscript (m, n) refers to an oligopoly in which the leader is m steps ahead of the followers and there are n followers; for example, Π_{mn} denotes the leader's profit in such an industry. A subscript $-mn$ refers to a representative follower in an (m, n)-industry.

Given the Cobb–Douglas aggregation in the final-good sector, each active industry earns the same revenue flow $\bar{Y} \equiv \frac{Y}{N}$ in equilibrium, and I use $\bar{Y}$ to scale firm-level variables. The equilibrium firm profits are proportional to industry revenue and expressed as $\Pi = \pi\bar{Y}$ where $\pi \in (0, 1)$ is a normalized profit. The industry price is defined as $P_i \equiv \frac{\sum_j p_{ji} y_{ji}}{Y_i}$ for industry i with prices p_{ji}, $\forall j \in \mathcal{F}_i$. Profits, output, and prices satisfy the following properties in equilibrium

Lemma 3.1 (Properties of firm profits and industry output and price)**.** *Consider a monopoly industry born at time τ and currently with relative advantage $\hat{s}$ over the fringe, and an oligopoly with gap m, n followers, and follower technology level s_f.*

1. *The monopolist's normalized profit $\pi_{\hat{s}}^M$ depends only on $\hat{s}$, and $\pi_{\hat{s}}^M \nearrow 1$ as $\hat{s} \to \infty$.*
2. *The oligopoly leader and follower's normalized profits, π_{mn} and π_{-mn}, depend only on m and n. As $m \to \infty$, $\pi_{mn} \nearrow 1$ and $\pi_{-mn} \searrow 0$; as $n \to \infty$, $\pi_{mn} \searrow 0$ and $\pi_{-mn} \searrow 0$.*
3. *The wage-adjusted industry price P_i/w depends only on s_τ^K in the monopoly case and (m, n, s_f) in the oligopoly case. $P_i/w \searrow 0$ as $s_\tau^K \to \infty$ for a monopoly, and $m \to \infty$, $n \to \infty$, or $s_f \to \infty$ for an oligopoly.*

Lemma 3.1 implies several economic mechanisms that underpin the main theoretical results. The monotone profit properties govern innovation incentives throughout the life-cycle. A monopolist gains from increasing its relative lead over the competitive fringe, since $\pi_{\hat{s}}^M$ is increasing in $\hat{s}$. In an oligopoly, the leader invests in innovation to widen the technology gap and capture a larger profit share, while followers invest to narrow the gap and reduce the leader's advantage. Once an industry enters the oligopoly stage, additional entry reduces profits for all incumbents, making mature, crowded industries progressively less attractive. These properties are the key inputs to the characterization of equilibrium innovation incentives in Section 4.1.

The third part of Lemma 3.1 anticipates one of the main life-cycle results. As described in Section 3.3, the model's structure implies that firm counts and technology levels cannot decrease within any surviving industry. Combined with the equilibrium result that the expected technology gap in oligopolies increases asymptotically (Proposition 4.5), this implies that the wage-adjusted industry price P_i/w declines over the life-cycle, consistent with the empirical evidence in Section 2. This normalization, combined with the Cobb-Douglas aggregator structure, also implies that industry output scaled by $\bar{Y}/w$ depends only on the corresponding state variables $(\hat{s}, s_\tau^K)$ or (m, n, s_f), a property used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.

3.3 Innovation, Industry Creation, and Destruction

Firms invest in R&D to improve their technology. Innovation is uncertain and arrives at Poisson rates that depend on firms' R&D choices. At the same time, new potential entrants arrive and decide whether to join existing industries or create new ones. Industries exit exogenously. This subsection describes these processes and the implied channels of creative destruction and knowledge diffusion.

Innovation and R&D costs. Consider a firm that chooses an innovation intensity $x \geq 0$. To achieve this rate, the firm must incur a flow R&D cost $R(x)\bar{Y}$ in units of the final good, where

$$R(x) \;=\; \frac{\alpha}{\psi} x^{\psi}, \qquad \alpha > 0,\ \psi > 1. \tag{3}$$

The parameter ψ governs the curvature of the R&D technology and the scale parameter α controls the overall costliness of innovation.

Conditional on choosing x, innovations arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity x. Each successful innovation raises the firm's technology index s_{ji} by one step, $s_{ji} \;\to\; s_{ji} + 1$, and thus, $q_{ji} \;\to\; \lambda q_{ji}$. For followers in an oligopoly, I assume that knowledge

is shared instantaneously among all followers: when any follower innovates, the technology level of all followers in that industry increases by one step. Thus, from the perspective of an individual follower, the effective innovation intensity includes both its own effort and the efforts of its peers. This captures the idea that some incremental improvements are easily codified and diffused among firms using similar, relatively mature technologies.

Potential entrants and industry creation. In each existing industry, a potential entrant arrives at Poisson rate $z > 0$. Upon arrival, the potential entrant chooses between:

1. *Joining an existing industry*: the entrant adopts the lowest technology level among active producers in that industry (the followers' level in an oligopoly, or the monopolist's level in a monopoly), becoming either a new follower or a neck-and-neck competitor. This reflects the idea that older technologies are easier to access and that entry into established markets typically occurs at the lower end of the quality spectrum.

2. *Creating a new industry*: the entrant starts a fresh industry as a monopolist at technology level $s^K + 1$, one step ahead of the current public knowledge stock s^K. Creating a new industry requires paying a sunk cost $\kappa \bar{Y}$ in units of the final good, where κ is drawn from a distribution G with support $[\underline{\kappa}, \overline{\kappa}]$, $\underline{\kappa} \geq 0$, before the arrival. A lower draw κ represents a more promising or more easily implementable idea for a new product line.

The potential entrant compares the expected value of joining an existing industry with that of paying $\kappa \bar{Y}$ to found a new industry that starts with a temporary monopoly position. This entry decision jointly determines the number of firms in each industry, the rate at which new industries appear, and thus the balance between intensifying competition within incumbent markets and expanding the variety of industries in the economy.

Public knowledge and knowledge diffusion. Let s^K denote the *public knowledge stock*, defined as the average of the lowest technology levels across all industries. This object summarizes the level of widely available knowledge that can be accessed by new entrants when they design a new product. When a new industry is created, its initial technology s^K+1 depends on the current value of s^K and, conversely, as industries experience innovation and as followers catch up, s^K gradually increases.

Knowledge diffusion in the model operates through three channels:

- spillovers among followers within an industry when any follower innovates;

- adoption of incumbent technology by potential entrants that join existing industries;

- creation of new industries at $s^K + 1$ based on the evolving public knowledge stock.

These channels link firm-level innovation decisions to the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of industries and to the growth of s^K over time.

Industry exit. Each active industry exits the economy at an exogenous Poisson rate $\delta > 0$. When an industry exits, all firms in that industry disappear and their products cease to be available in the final-good aggregator. Industry exit captures obsolescence of product lines due to shifts in tastes, technologies, or regulations that are not explicitly modeled.

Before turning to the dynamic equilibrium, it is useful to note that simple parameter restrictions nest two familiar benchmark environments. First, if I shut down industry creation and destruction by setting $z = 0$ and $\delta = 0$, the mass of industries is fixed and the model reduces to a multi-industry step-by-step quality-ladder framework in which growth is driven solely by within-industry innovation. Second, if I instead set $\alpha \to \infty$ so that incumbent firms do not invest in R&D, while keeping $z > 0$, long-run growth is driven solely by the creation of new industries, as in expanding-variety models. The baseline environment studied below maintains both $\alpha < \infty$ and $z > 0$, so that aggregate growth reflects a combination of quality improvements within industries and the creation of new industries over time.

4 Analysis of a Stationary Equilibrium

This section characterizes a stationary and symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium and studies its implications for industry dynamics and aggregate growth. Firm policies depend only on the current state of their industry, the cross-sectional distribution of industries over states is stationary, and key aggregates such as the public knowledge stock and the mass of industries grow at constant rates. I first describe the value functions and innovation decisions of monopolists, leaders, followers, and potential entrants. I then characterize the implied stationary distribution of industries and the aggregate growth rate.

4.1 Value Functions

The household's Euler equation,

$$\frac{\dot{C}_t}{C_t} = r_t - \rho,$$

will be used below to connect firm values to aggregate growth. On the firm side, let $V_{\hat{s}}^M$ denote the value of a monopolist with relative advantage $\hat{s}$ over the fringe, and let V_{mn} and

V_{-mn} denote the values of a leader and a follower in an oligopoly with technology gap m and n followers.

Because all flow payoffs in a given industry state scale with the common revenue level $\bar{Y}$, it is convenient to express firm values in units of $\bar{Y}$ and work with normalized values $v \equiv V/\bar{Y}$. In a stationary equilibrium these normalized values are time-invariant, so I write $V = v\bar{Y}$ and work directly with v throughout this section (see Appendix B.1).

Monopolist. A monopolist's position is defined by the size of its technological lead over the competitive fringe. This lead determines both how much profit the monopolist can extract today and how much it stands to gain from pushing further ahead. Consider a monopolist with relative technological advantage $\hat{s}$ over the fringe. Its normalized value $v_{\hat{s}}^M$ solves

$$(\rho + g_N)\, v_{\hat{s}}^M = \max_{x \geq 0} \Big\{ \pi_{\hat{s}}^M - R(x) + x\big(v_{\hat{s}+1}^M - v_{\hat{s}}^M\big) + z\,\theta_M\big(v_{01} - v_{\hat{s}}^M\big) - \delta\, v_{\hat{s}}^M \Big\}. \tag{4}$$

The left-hand side is the flow cost of the monopolist's value, which includes both time discounting at rate ρ and the dilution of normalized values as the mass of industries expands at rate g_N. On the right-hand side, the monopolist collects its current normalized profit $\pi_{\hat{s}}^M$ and invests in R&D at cost $R(x)$ to generate innovations at Poisson rate x. Each successful innovation advances the monopolist one step further ahead of the fringe, yielding a capital gain of $v_{\hat{s}+1}^M - v_{\hat{s}}^M$.

The term $z\theta^M(v_{01} - v_{\hat{s}}^M)$ captures the threat of entry. θ_M denotes the probability that a potential entrant who meets a monopoly chooses to join the industry rather than create a new one, and the probability is the same for any monopolists because, whatever the current $\hat{s}$ is, the new entrant gets the same v_{01}, the neck-and-neck duopoly firm value, after entrance. At rate $z\theta^M$, a potential entrant chooses to join the monopoly as a follower rather than start a new industry, converting the monopoly into a duopoly and inflicting a capital loss of $v_{\hat{s}}^M - v_{01}$. Finally, the monopolist faces exogenous exit at rate δ, destroying its accumulated value.

The optimal innovation intensity is

$$x_{\hat{s}}^M = \left(\frac{\max\{v_{\hat{s}+1}^M - v_{\hat{s}}^M,\, 0\}}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\psi - 1}}.$$

The monopolist's incentive to invest in R&D is governed entirely by the marginal value of an additional step, $v_{\hat{s}+1}^M - v_{\hat{s}}^M$.

Equation (4) and the optimal policy make transparent that the monopolist innovates to extend its technological lead and earn higher profits, but faces two forces that limit the

incentive to do so. First, there are diminishing marginal gains from pushing an already-large lead further, as Lemma 3.1 establishes. Second, the possibility of entry converting the market into competition and wiping out the monopoly position exists. These forces are among the key forces that drive the eventual slowdown of innovation as industries mature in the model.

Leader and follower. Once a potential entrant joins an incumbent industry, the monopoly transitions into an oligopoly and both the competitive environment and innovation incentives change fundamentally. Within an oligopoly, the leader and followers are locked in a patent race in which each party's payoff depends on the other's actions and on the current state (m, n).

In an industry with a leader m steps ahead of n followers, the leader's normalized value v_{mn} satisfies

$$(\rho + g_N)v_{mn} = \max_{x \geq 0} \Big\{ \pi_{mn} - R(x) + x\big(v_{m+1,n} - v_{mn}\big) + nx_{-mn}\big(v_{m-1,n} - v_{mn}\big) + z\,\theta_{mn}\big(v_{mn+1} - v_{mn}\big) - \delta v_{mn} \Big\}. \tag{5}$$

In an oligopoly with gap m and n followers, the leader earns flow profits π_{mn} and chooses its innovation intensity x. A successful leader innovation arrives at the chosen rate and widens the gap to $m+1$, raising continuation value by $v_{m+1,n} - v_{mn}$. Followers innovate at common intensity x_{-mn}, so the leader faces a total catch-up intensity nx_{-mn}. A follower innovation narrows the gap to $m-1$ and reduces the leader's continuation value by $v_{mn} - v_{m-1,n}$. In addition, potential entrants arrive at rate z and join this incumbent industry with probability θ_{mn}, which increases the number of followers from n to $n+1$ and changes the leader's continuation value from v_{mn} to $v_{m,n+1}$. As before, exogenous exit arrives at rate δ.

Given follower behavior, the optimal innovation intensity of the leader is

$$x_{mn} = \left(\frac{\max\{v_{m+1,n} - v_{mn},\, 0\}}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\psi - 1}}.$$

Equation (5) and the optimal policy highlights a motive to escape competition, by widening the technology gap and protecting its rents. Two forces discipline this incentive. First, as the gap m widens, the leader's profit rises but the marginal value of widening the gap further falls, since catching up becomes increasingly difficult for followers and their competitive threat diminishes. Second, as the number of followers n increases, both the leader's profit and the marginal value of innovation decline, because each follower erodes the leader's market share and contributes to the total catch-up rate nx_{-mn}. Together these forces imply that leader's innovation incentive is strongest in relatively early-stage oligopolies with

few followers and a small gap, and weakens as the industry either matures into a wide-gap duopoly or becomes crowded with followers.

Each follower's value v_{-mn} solves

$$(\rho + g_N)v_{-mn} = \max_{x \geq 0} \Big\{ \pi_{-mn} - R(x) + \big(x + (n-1)x_{-mn}\big)\big(v_{-m+1,n} - v_{-mn}\big) + x_{mn}\big(v_{-m-1,n} - v_{-mn}\big) + z\,\theta_{mn}\big(v_{-mn+1} - v_{-mn}\big) - \delta v_{-mn} \Big\}. \quad (6)$$

A follower earns flow profits π_{-mn} and chooses an innovation intensity x. Because follower innovations are shared, the follower benefits not only from its own effort but also from other followers' effort. With total intensity $x + (n-1)x_{-mn}$, the follower group innovates and collectively moves one step closer to the leader, increasing the follower's continuation value from v_{-mn} to $v_{-(m-1),n}$. By contrast, leader innovation arrives at rate x_{mn} and moves the leader further ahead, reducing the follower's continuation value from v_{-mn} to $v_{-(m+1),n}$. Entry at rate $z\theta_{mn}$ adds an additional follower, tightening competition among followers, and exogenous exit arrives at rate δ.

The common innovation intensity of followers is

$$x_{-mn} = \left(\frac{\max\{v_{-m+1,n} - v_{-mn},\, 0\}}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\psi - 1}}.$$

The follower's R&D problem highlights a tension between free-riding and catch-up motives. Because improvements diffuse among followers, each follower enjoys part of the benefit of peers' R&D, but the private return to investing in catch-up declines when the leader is already far ahead and when the follower tier is crowded.

When $m = 0$, firms are symmetric neck-and-neck competitors and the value of a representative firm v_{0n} satisfies

$$(\rho + g_N)v_{0n} = \max_{x \geq 0} \Big\{ \pi_{0n} - R(x) + x\big(v_{1n} - v_{0n}\big) + n x_{0n}\big(v_{-1,n} - v_{0n}\big) + z\,\theta_{0n}\big(v_{0,n+1} - v_{0n}\big) - \delta v_{0n} \Big\}. \quad (7)$$

A firm's innovation at rate x moves it into a temporary leader position (state $m = 1$), while innovations by any of the n firms at total rate nx_{0n} can displace its current position. Entry adds an additional competitor at rate $z\theta_{0n}$, further intensifying business stealing.

This case isolates the classic mechanism that competition can raise innovation when firms are close to the frontier, because the prize from becoming the temporary leader is high. At the same time, the model disciplines this force through endogenous entry: as n rises, business

stealing intensifies and the net private return to R&D can fall.

The structure of these Bellman equations is standard in step-by-step innovation models. Leaders benefit from pulling ahead and suffer when followers catch up, while followers benefit from their own and their peers' innovation and lose when the leader moves further ahead. Entry and exit shift the number of followers in the industry and truncate the horizon, and the Poisson innovation structure ensures that all continuation values are linear in the normalized scale $\bar{Y}_t$.

Potential entrant. The entry decision is the central margin that links within-industry competition to the economy's renewal rate. I assume that the cost of creating a new industry, κ, is drawn from a distribution G with support $[\underline{\kappa}, \bar{\kappa}]$, where $0 \leq \underline{\kappa} < \bar{\kappa} < v_1^M$ in equilibrium, so that even the highest-cost potential entrant would obtain strictly positive surplus from starting a new industry.

A potential entrant with cost draw κ compares two options. Joining an existing industry is cheap but competitive: the entrant adopts the lowest available technology and earns a follower value, either v_{01} if the industry is currently a monopoly or v_{-mn+1} if it is an oligopoly with gap m and n followers. Creating a new industry is costly but secures a temporary monopoly: the entrant pays $\kappa\bar{Y}$ and earns v_1^M, the value of a monopolist starting with a one-step lead over the public knowledge frontier. The entrant joins the incumbent industry if and only if the follower value exceeds the net value of creating a new industry, that is, if $v_{S+}^f \geq v_1^M - \kappa$, where v_{S+}^f denotes the relevant follower value in state S. The relative attractiveness of the two options depends critically on the state of the industry the entrant encounters. In young, competitive industries where the follower's catch-up probability is substantial, the follower value v_{S+}^f is high and direct entry is more attractive. In mature industries where technology gaps are wide and profits are compressed by crowding, follower values are depressed and more entrants find it worthwhile to bear the fixed cost of creating a new market instead.

These choices can be represented by indicator functions

$$\iota_\kappa^M = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_{01} \geq v_1^M - \kappa, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \qquad \iota_{mn,\kappa} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_{-mn+1} \geq v_1^M - \kappa, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Aggregating over κ using its distribution G yields the joining probabilities

$$\theta_M \equiv \int \iota_\kappa^M \, dG(\kappa), \qquad \theta_{mn} \equiv \int \iota_{mn,\kappa} \, dG(\kappa),$$

which are the probabilities that a potential entrant who meets a monopoly or an (m, n)-industry, respectively, decides to join rather than create a new industry, and appear in the Bellman equations (4)-(7), closing the link between the entry decision and incumbent innovation. A higher joining probability in a given state means more frequent follower entry, which lowers leader values and dampen R&D investment by incumbents, while simultaneously reducing the flow of new-industry creation and slowing the economy's renewal rate.

The joining rules pin down state-contingent joining probabilities (θ_M, θ_{mn}). Whenever a potential entrant meets an incumbent industry in state ω, it creates a new industry with probability $1 - \theta(\omega)$ and joins with probability $\theta(\omega)$. Since such meetings occur at rate z per incumbent industry, define the gross rate of variety creation per incumbent industry as

$$\gamma \equiv z\,\mathbb{E}[1 - \theta(\omega)],$$

where the expectation is taken over the state of the industry encountered by the entrant, which coincides with the cross-sectional distribution in the stationary equilibrium characterized below. This object governs the evolution of the mass of industries with the exit rate δ and, together with ρ, determines the effective horizon for normalized firm values.

The next lemma summarizes key properties of the value functions and innovation rates in a stationary equilibrium.

Lemma 4.1 (Properties of value functions and innovation rates)**.** *In any stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the normalized value functions and innovation rates satisfy:*

(i) For any normalized value v,

$$0 < v < \frac{1}{\rho + \gamma}.$$

(ii) The monopolist's value $v_{\hat{s}}^M$ increases in its technology lead $\hat{s}$, with

$$\lim_{\hat{s}\to\infty} v_{\hat{s}}^M \;=\; \frac{1 + z\theta_M v_{01}}{\rho + \gamma + z\theta_M}.$$

The associated innovation rate $x_{\hat{s}}^M$ is strictly positive and decreases with $\hat{s}$, and satisfies $\lim_{\hat{s}\to\infty} x_{\hat{s}}^M = 0$.

(iii) For any $m \geq 0$, the values v_{mn}, v_{-mn} and their corresponding innovation rates x_{mn}, x_{-mn} converge to 0 as $n \to \infty$. For fixed n, we have

$$\lim_{m\to\infty} v_{mn} = \frac{1}{\rho + \gamma}, \qquad \lim_{m\to\infty} v_{-mn} = \lim_{m\to\infty} x_{mn} = \lim_{m\to\infty} x_{-mn} = 0.$$

(iv) There exists a finite upper bound $n^* \geq 1$ on the number of followers such that entry into an industry with $n \geq n^*$ followers is never profitable. In particular, $\theta_{mn} = 0$ for all m and all $n \geq n^*$.

Lemma 4.1 characterizes how market structure shapes innovation incentives across different stages of the industry life cycle. Part (i) establishes that normalized firm values are finite and bounded above by $\frac{1}{\rho+\gamma}$, the present value of a perpetual unit profit stream discounted at the effective rate $\rho+\gamma$. The upper bound reflects two sources of discounting: the household's time preference ρ and the dilution of each industry's revenue share as new industries enter at rate γ. No firm can be worth more than this bound because flow profits are always below one.

Part (ii) describes how a monopolist's value and innovation effort evolve as it pulls further ahead of the fringe. A larger lead raises current profits, since $\pi^M_{\hat{s}}$ increases in $\hat{s}$, and therefore raises the monopolist's value. However, the marginal profit gain from one additional step diminishes, which implies that the incremental return to innovation, $v^M_{\hat{s}+1} - v^M_{\hat{s}}$ shrinks with $\hat{s}$ so the monopolist's R&D effort declines even as its value rises. In the limit, as the monopolist's lead grows arbitrarily large, its value converges to $\frac{1+z\theta^M v_{01}}{\rho+\gamma+z\theta^M}$. At this limit, the marginal return to further innovation is zero while the entry threat still exists. This declining innovation effort of an established monopolist is one of the forces that generates a growth slowdown within maturing industries.

Part (iii) reveals how competition shapes innovation incentives within oligopolies along two dimensions, the technology gap m and the number of followers n. As the number of followers grows holding m fixed, profits are competed away by crowding, follower values collapse to zero, and both leaders and followers cease to innovate. This is the extensive crowding effect where too many competitors chasing the same rents destroys the private return to R&D for all parties. Along the other dimension, as the technology gap grows holding n fixed, the industry converges to a different limit. The leader's value approaches the upper bound $\frac{1}{\rho+\gamma}$, reflecting the near-monopoly profits of a dominant firm with an insurmountable lead, while follower values and innovation rates collapse to zero. Followers in such industries face an increasingly futile catch-up problem, where the expected gain from a successful innovation, $v_{-m+1,n} - v_{-mn}$, shrinks as the gap widens, because closing one step still leaves the follower far behind. The leader, meanwhile, faces a negligible competitive threat and has little incentive to invest further. Wide-gap oligopolies thus converge to a low-innovation equilibrium that resembles a de facto monopoly, even though multiple firms remain active.

Part (iv) connects the crowding effect to the entry margin. Since follower values fall to zero as n grows, there exists a finite threshold n^* beyond which no potential entrant finds it worthwhile to join the industry as an additional follower, even at the lowest possible market-

creation cost $\underline{\kappa}$. Beyond n^*, all potential entrants who encounter that industry choose to create new industries instead, redirecting the flow of entrepreneurial activity toward the extensive margin, which keeps the relevant set of industry sizes finite in equilibrium.

4.2 Stationary Markov-Perfect Equilibrium

Given the optimal decisions described in the previous subsection, I now characterize the cross-sectional distribution of industries across states and use it to define equilibrium. Let $\mu_{\hat{s}}^M$ denote the share of monopoly industries whose leader is $\hat{s}$ steps ahead of the fringe, and let μ_{mn} denote the share of oligopoly industries with technology gap m and n followers. These shares satisfy

$$\sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M \;+\; \sum_{m=0}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \mu_{mn} \;=\; 1.$$

Let $\mu^M = \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M$ denote the total share of monopolies. The gross rate of variety creation γ, defined in Section 4.1 as $z\,\mathbb{E}[1-\theta(\omega)]$, can now be expressed explicitly using the cross-sectional distribution:


$$\gamma \;=\; z \left[(1-\theta^M)\mu_M + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \sum_{m=0}^{\infty} (1-\theta^{mn})\mu_{mn} \right].$$

This expression formalizes the relationship between entry decisions and aggregate growth that was previewed in Section 4.1. The rate γ is an equilibrium object, which aggregates the fraction of potential entrants who choose to create new industries rather than join existing ones, weighted by the mass of industries in each state. A higher fraction of mature industries, where follower values are depressed and joining is unattractive, diverts more entrepreneurial activity toward industry creation and raises γ. The Kolmogorov forward equations that determine $\{\mu_{\hat{s}}^M, \mu_{mn}\}$ in a stationary equilibrium are given in the appendix.

To understand what shapes the stationary distribution, it is useful to trace the life cycle of a typical industry through the state space. Figure 1 summarizes the resulting flows. Every industry enters the economy as a fresh monopoly at $\hat{s} = 1$, contributing to the flow γ of newly created industries. From there, monopoly industries evolve along two margins. First, the monopolist climbs the quality ladder through successful innovation. At rate $x_{\hat{s}}^M$, the monopolist advances from $\hat{s}$ to $\hat{s}+1$, pulling further ahead of the fringe and raising its profit. Second, at rate $z\theta^M$, a potential entrant chooses to join the monopoly as a follower rather than create a new market, converting the monopoly into a neck-and-neck duopoly at state $(0,1)$ and initiating the oligopoly phase of the life cycle.

Once an industry enters the oligopoly phase, its evolution is governed by the interplay of

Figure 1: Flowchart of industry shares



leader and follower innovation and continued entry. The technology gap widens at rate x_{mn} when the leader innovates and narrows at the total rate nx_{-mn} when any of the n followers successfully catches up. At the same time, new followers join at rate $z\theta_{mn}$, pushing the industry toward more crowded states. As Lemma 4.1 establishes, this crowding progressively depresses both leader and follower values, weakening innovation incentives for all parties and eventually driving joining probabilities to zero once the industry reaches n^* followers. An industry therefore traverses a predictable arc: it is born competitive, passes through an oligopolistic phase of active innovation and entry, and gradually settles into a mature, low-innovation configuration before exiting at rate δ.

Each industry disappears at rate δ, and its relative share also declines at rate g_N due to the expanding mass of industries. The evolution of the total mass of industries N is governed by

$$g_N = \gamma - \delta,$$

the net rate of variety creation. In a stationary equilibrium, the distribution $\{\mu_{\hat{s}}^M, \mu_{mn}\}$ is time-invariant, meaning that the flows of industries into and out of each state exactly balance. The key aggregate state variables for growth are therefore the rate of variety

creation γ and the distribution of gaps and followers summarized by $\{\mu_{\hat{s}}^M, \mu_{mn}\}$. I can now define the equilibrium formally.

Definition 4.2 (Equilibrium)**.** *A stationary and symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium consists of values* $\{v_{\hat{s}}^M, v_{mn}, v_{-mn}\}$*, policies* $\{x_{\hat{s}}^M, x_{mn}, x_{-mn}, \theta^M, \theta_{mn}\}$*, an industry distribution* $\{\mu_{\hat{s}}^M\}_{\hat{s}} \cup \{\mu_{mn}\}_{m,n}$*, and scalars* $\{g_N, \gamma\}$ *such that all individual decisions solve the corresponding optimization problems and the laws of motion for industry shares are satisfied.*

With the equilibrium distribution in hand, I can characterize how the aggregate technology level evolves. Let $\bar{s}_t^M$ denote the average monopolist technology level and $\bar{s}_t^{cf}$ the average technology level of the associated competitive fringe firms. For oligopoly industries, let $\bar{s}_t^f$ denote the average lowest technology level and $\bar{s}_t^l$ the average highest technology level, and define the average technology gap among oligopolies as $\bar{m}$. The public knowledge stock can then be written as

$$s_t^K = \mu_M \bar{s}_t^M + (1 - \mu_M)\bar{s}_t^f.$$

Lemma 4.3 (Properties of technology levels in a stationary equilibrium)**.** *The public knowledge stock grows at a constant rate*

$$\dot{s}^K = \gamma + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M x_{\hat{s}}^M + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn} \mu_{mn}.$$

The average technology levels satisfy

$$\begin{aligned}
\gamma(\bar{s}_t^M - \bar{s}_t^{cf}) &= \gamma + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M x_{\hat{s}}^M, \\
\gamma(1 - \mu_M)(\bar{s}_t^l - \bar{s}_t^f) &= \gamma(1 - \mu_M)\bar{m} \\
&= \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \left[(n+1) x_{0n} \mu_{0n} + \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} x_{mn} \mu_{mn} \right] - \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn} \mu_{mn}.
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 4.3 characterizes the aggregate technology dynamics that underpin balanced growth. The first result establishes that the public knowledge stock grows at a constant rate in a stationary equilibrium, combining three distinct sources of productivity advance. The first is variety creation at rate γ. Each new industry is born at a productivity level one step above the current public knowledge frontier, so the mere creation of new industries pushes up s^K even before any within-industry innovation occurs. The second and third terms capture within-industry innovation by monopolists and followers respectively. Monopolists push the knowledge frontier upward by innovating beyond the fringe, while followers con-

tribute by catching up to the leader, which advances the lowest technology tier and thereby raises the public knowledge stock.

The second set of expressions in Lemma 4.3 links the average technology gaps to the balance of innovative activity across sectors. The average lead of monopolists over the fringe, $\bar{s}^M - \bar{s}^{cf}$, is maintained in steady state by opposing forces, with new monopoly creation and monopolist innovation widening the average gap while the expansion of the industry mass at rate γ continuously dilutes it. Similarly, the average oligopoly gap $\bar{m}$ is kept constant by the balance between leader innovation, which widens gaps, follower innovation, which narrows them, and the dilution by industry mass growth. These stationarity conditions are not mechanical accounting identities but reflect equilibrium restrictions which require that the cross-sectional distribution of industries across states be consistent with the individual innovation incentives characterized in Section 4.1. These relationships underpin the aggregate growth decomposition in the next subsection.

4.3 Aggregate Growth with Industry Dynamics

The previous subsection established that the cross-sectional distribution of industries admits a stationary equilibrium, with constant shares of industries in each life-cycle state and a well-defined rate of variety creation γ. I now characterize how the aggregate growth rate emerges from this stationary distribution. The central result is that balanced aggregate growth arises despite the fact that individual industries follow non-stationary life-cycle paths, because the stationary cross-section ensures that the average contribution of each growth margin remains constant over time.

Proposition 4.4 (Steady growth with non-stationary industry life-cycle)**.** *A symmetric stationary Markov perfect equilibrium exists. In the equilibrium, the constant growth rate can be expressed as:*

$$\begin{aligned} g &= \ln \lambda \left(\gamma + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M x_{\hat{s}}^M + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn} \mu_{mn} \right) \\ &= \ln \lambda \left(\gamma + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M x_{\hat{s}}^M + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \left((n+1) x_{0n} \mu_0 + \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} x_{mn} \mu_{mn} \right) - \gamma(1-\mu_M)\bar{m} \right) \\ &= \ln \lambda \cdot \dot{s}^K. \end{aligned}$$

The first line decomposes the growth rate into three distinct sources, each scaled by the step size $\ln \lambda$. The first term, γ, captures the contribution of variety creation. Each new industry is born with a productivity level one step above the current public knowledge

frontier, so the flow of new industries directly raises the average technology level. With rate γ, a new monopolist with level $s^K + 1$ appears, but the s^K component is offset by the disappearance of incumbent industries at rate $\gamma = \delta + g_N$, leaving a net contribution of γ to growth. The second term aggregates the innovation effort of monopolists weighted by their share $\mu^M_{\hat{s}}$, capturing how incumbents push the technology frontier upward within existing monopoly industries. The third term captures catch-up innovation in oligopolies where followers innovate at the combined rate nx_{-mn}, advancing the lowest technology tier and thereby raising the public knowledge stock even without moving the frontier.

The second line rewrites the same expression in terms of the evolution of leaders' technology levels and the stationary gap $\bar{m}$, using Lemma 4.3. This alternative decomposition replaces the follower catch-up terms with leader innovation, net of the correction term $\gamma(1 - \mu_M)\bar{m}$. This correction arises because when oligopoly industries exit at rate γ, new industries replace them starting at s^K+1, so only the s^K component of the exiting industry's technology is replaced by the first γ term. The above-lowest-level component of oligopoly leaders, which on average equals $\bar{m}$, simply disappears upon exit and is not replenished by the new entrant. The last equality simply notes that the sum of these contributions is, by definition, the rate of growth of the public knowledge stock $\dot{s}^K$.

Proposition 4.4 shows that aggregate growth is fully determined by industry dynamics. Variety creation, innovation in monopoly industries, and catch-up innovation in oligopolies all contribute to growth, and their relative importance depends on the stationary distribution of industries across life-cycle states. This structure implies that policies or parameter changes that shift the cross-sectional distribution—for instance, by making entry into existing industries more or less attractive—affect aggregate growth through several margins simultaneously, a point I return to in Section 4.4.

The existence of a stationary equilibrium relies on two features of the model working in tandem. First, private innovation incentives are disciplined by diminishing marginal gains from pushing an already-large lead further and by congestion from an expanding follower base, which jointly make innovation and profits negligible in very mature, crowded industries. Second, endogenous industry creation continually replenishes the cross-section with new, innovation-intensive monopolies, offsetting the gradual maturation and exit of incumbent industries. Without the first feature, the cross-sectional distribution would unravel as gaps grow without bound. Without the second, the economy would eventually be populated only by mature, low-innovation industries and growth would stall.

Proposition 4.4 characterizes balanced growth using stationary cross-sectional objects. The next result clarifies how this stationary cross-section relates to the dynamics of surviving oligopoly cohorts. A stationary cross-sectional distribution does not imply that old

surviving industries are representative of the cross-section. Because industries are continually replenished by newborn oligopolies, surviving cohorts are selectively older and more mature, so cohort-level technology gaps can drift upward over the life-cycle even while the cross-sectional mean gap remains constant.

Let $(\tilde{m}, \tilde{n})$ denote an oligopoly state drawn from the stationary cross-sectional distribution μ conditional on being an oligopoly, and let $\tilde{m}_\Delta$ denote the technology gap after a short interval Δ under the within-oligopoly transition dynamics, starting from the cross-sectional draw $(\tilde{m}, \tilde{n})$. Let $\hat{m}_a$ denote the realized technology gap of an oligopoly industry at age a, where age is measured from the first time the industry has at least one follower, so that $a = 0$ corresponds to a newborn oligopoly. Define

$$f(a) \equiv \mathbb{E}[\hat{m}_a \mid \text{alive at age } a].$$

Let $U \sim \text{Exp}(\gamma)$ denote the age of a randomly sampled surviving oligopoly from the stationary cross-section. Then

$$\bar{m} = \mathbb{E}[f(U)], \qquad \bar{m}_\varepsilon = \mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U > \varepsilon].$$

That is, $\bar{m}_\varepsilon$ is the average technology gap among surviving oligopolies older than ε.

Proposition 4.5 (Cross-sectional and cohort technology-gap dynamics)**.** *In a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with stationary cross-sectional industry distribution μ, oligopoly technology gaps satisfy:*

(i) In the stationary cross-section, technology gaps tend to widen on average at the industry level:

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}\big[\tilde{m}_\Delta - \tilde{m}\big] = \gamma \bar{m} > 0.$$

(ii) Older surviving oligopolies have above-average gaps: for sufficiently small $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$\bar{m}_\varepsilon > \bar{m}.$$

Proposition 4.5 makes clear that stationarity in this model is an aggregate and cross-sectional property, not an industry-level one. Part (i) shows that even when an oligopoly is drawn from the stationary cross-section, its technology gap tends to widen on average under the within-industry dynamics. Thus, the stationary distribution is not sustained because industries themselves become individually stationary. Rather, it is sustained because the widening and maturation of incumbent oligopolies are continuously offset by exit and by the replenishment of the cross-section with young industries, including newborn oligopolies.

Part (ii) is the cohort counterpart of this observation. The stationary cross-section places disproportionate weight on young oligopolies, which begin with low technology gaps. As a result, once a sufficiently small neighborhood of newborn surviving oligopolies is excluded, the average technology gap exceeds the stationary cross-sectional mean. This result shows that a stationary cross-section is not representative of surviving cohorts, but it does not yet imply a general monotone age profile or long-run widening for all older cohorts.

The next result strengthens Proposition 4.5 to a monotone age profile under an additional condition on the balance of leader and follower innovation in mature industries.

Assumption 4.1. *For sufficiently mature surviving oligopolies, leader innovation weakly dominates follower catch-up on average.*

Corollary 4.6 (Eventual cohort gap widening)**.** *Under Assumption 4.1, $f(a)$ is weakly increasing for sufficiently large ages.*

This stronger cohort result again relies on endogenous industry creation. New industries are continually born with low technology gaps, which replenishes the cross-section with young oligopolies even as surviving cohorts become progressively more mature. In the calibrated economy, I verify numerically that Assumption 4.1 is satisfied and that $f(a)$ is strictly increasing over the relevant range of ages. As technology gaps widen along surviving cohorts, the marginal return to innovation falls for both leaders and followers, entry becomes less attractive, and leadership turnover becomes rare.

Since follower counts do not decrease in the baseline model, Corollary 4.6 implies that older surviving oligopolies tend to have both larger technology gaps and weakly larger follower bases. Larger gaps and more followers lower relative prices and raise industry quantities, so the gap dynamics developed here provide the bridge from cohort maturation to the price and quantity implications of Proposition 4.7. The next proposition collects these life-cycle implications and connects them to the empirical regularities documented in Section 2.

To state the life-cycle implications, define the following industry-level variables. Let $P_{mn}(s^f)$ denote the industry price of an oligopoly with technology gap m, n followers, and follower technology level s^f. Let $Y_{mn}(s^f)$ denote the corresponding industry output.

Proposition 4.7 (Properties of industry life-cycle)**.** *In a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, conditional on industry survival:*

(i) Monopoly quality growth slows:

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}\left[\ln q^M_{a+\Delta} - \ln q^M_a \,\middle|\, \text{still monopoly, alive}\right] \searrow 0 \qquad \text{as } a \to \infty.$$

(ii) Mature oligopoly states have lower relative prices and higher quantities: For each $n \in \{1, \ldots, n^*\}$, there exists $M_P(n) < \infty$ such that

$$\frac{P_{m+1,n}(s^f)}{w} \leq \frac{P_{mn}(s^f)}{w}, \qquad Y_{m+1,n}(s^f) \geq Y_{mn}(s^f) \qquad \text{for all } m \geq M_P(n).$$

Moreover, for each m and each $n \in \{1, \ldots, n^* - 1\}$,

$$\frac{P_{m,n+1}(s^f)}{w} \leq \frac{P_{mn}(s^f)}{w}, \qquad Y_{m,n+1}(s^f) \geq Y_{mn}(s^f).$$

(iii) Under Assumption 4.1, for sufficiently large ages, surviving oligopoly cohorts move toward lower-price, higher-quantity, lower-innovation, lower-entry, and lower-turnover states.

Proposition 4.7 summarizes the industry-level forces that generate the model's life-cycle patterns. Balanced aggregate growth does not arise because individual industries are stationary. Instead, industries move through non-stationary stages, while the aggregate economy remains on a balanced growth path because new industries are continually created and the cross-sectional distribution of industries is stationary.

Part (i) characterizes the monopoly stage. As a surviving monopolist extends its lead over the fringe, the marginal gain from further innovation declines. Monopoly quality growth therefore slows over time until the industry eventually attracts entry and transitions into oligopoly.

Part (ii) characterizes mature oligopoly states. For a given follower base, a sufficiently large technology gap lowers the industry price relative to the wage and raises industry quantity. For a given technology gap, a larger follower base has the same effect through stronger within-industry competition. These state-level properties provide a micro-foundation for one of the stylized facts emphasized in Section 2, namely that industry prices tend to fall while industry quantities rise over the life-cycle, even though the quantities of individual products may decline as they are replaced by newer varieties (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Filson, 2001; Argente, Lee and Moreira, 2024).

Part (iii) translates the cohort gap dynamics of Corollary 4.6 into broader life-cycle implications. As surviving oligopoly cohorts age, they move toward lower-price, higher-quantity, lower-innovation, lower-entry, and lower-turnover states. This is consistent with the industry life-cycle evidence that early phases are marked by rapid innovation and entry, while later phases are characterized by consolidation and lower technological activity (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1996; Filson, 2001; Jovanovic and Wang, 2024).

The economy therefore does not converge to a representative mature industry. Instead, balanced growth is sustained by continual renewal of the cross-section through the birth, evolution, and exit of industries. This mechanism is also why policies that encourage variety creation can be more growth-enhancing than policies aimed solely at incumbent R&D, a point developed in Section 5.5.

4.4 Constrained efficiency of industry creation

The equilibrium entry decision in Section 4.1 is formulated as a binary choice for each potential entrant with a realized cost draw κ: join the encountered incumbent industry or create a new one. To compare the equilibrium allocation with a social benchmark, it is useful to rewrite this decision in terms of state-specific cost thresholds. Let S index an industry state, where $S = M$ denotes a monopoly with relative advantage $\hat{s}$ and $S = mn$ denotes an oligopoly with gap m and n followers. Let μ_S be the stationary share of industries in state S and let v^f_{S+} denote the follower value after joining that industry (for example v_{01} if the industry was a monopoly, or v_{-mn+1} if it was an oligopoly with gap m and n followers).

Before being randomly assigned to an incumbent industry and before observing its own cost draw κ, a potential entrant chooses a vector of thresholds $\{\hat{\kappa}^{CE}_S\}_S$ that solves

$$\max_{\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S} \sum_S \mu_S \left[\int_{\underline{\kappa}}^{\hat{\kappa}_S} \left(v_1^M - \kappa \right) dG(\kappa) + \int_{\hat{\kappa}_S}^{\overline{\kappa}} v^f_{S+} \, dG(\kappa) \right], \tag{8}$$

where G is the distribution of market initiation costs and v_1^M is the value of a new monopolist.[2] In each state S, the entrant draws a cost κ and compares two options. If $\kappa < \hat{\kappa}_S$, the entrant pays κ to create a new industry and earns $v_1^M - \kappa$. If $\kappa \geq \hat{\kappa}_S$, the entrant joins the incumbent industry and earns the follower value v^f_{S+}. The first-order condition for an interior threshold in state S is

$$\mu_S G'(\hat{\kappa}^{CE}_S) \left[-\hat{\kappa}^{CE}_S + v_1^M - v^f_{S+} \right] = 0, \tag{9}$$

so that whenever $\mu_S G'(\hat{\kappa}^{CE}_S) > 0$ the equilibrium cutoff satisfies

$$\hat{\kappa}^{CE}_S = v_1^M - v^f_{S+} \approx \frac{\pi_1^M - \pi^f_{S+}}{\rho + \gamma}. \tag{10}$$

The approximation on the right replaces the full value difference with the flow profit differential $\pi_1^M - \pi^f_{S+}$ capitalized at the effective discount rate $\rho + \gamma$. The implied incumbent

[2] I assume $\underline{\kappa} < v_1^M$ so that starting a new industry yields strictly positive surplus at low costs.

joining probability is

$$\theta_S \;=\; 1 - G\big(\hat{\kappa}_S^{CE}\big) \tag{11}$$

and it coincides with the probabilities defined in the entry problem above.

To assess the efficiency of this allocation, I consider a constrained planner who can intervene only in the variety creation margin. The planner does not directly control incumbent pricing or innovation decisions and chooses a vector of thresholds $\{\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP}\}_S$ to maximize the representative household's lifetime utility, subject to the aggregate resource constraint and the induced law of motion for the industry distribution. Firms continue to optimize given the competitive environment they face. However, the planner recognizes that changing entry thresholds alters the stationary distribution of industries, which in turn affects firm values and innovation incentives through the equilibrium fixed-point.

For any given set of thresholds $\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S$, the induced entry probabilities $\{\theta_S\}_S$ determine a unique stationary distribution over industry states and a corresponding balanced growth path for consumption. Let $\mathcal{R}(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S)$ denote the ratio of incumbent R&D expenditure to aggregate output and $\mathcal{K}(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S)$ the ratio of market initiation costs to output as defined in Appendix B.3, and $g(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S)$ the implied aggregate growth rate. With log preferences, the planner's welfare can be written as

$$W\big(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S\big) = \frac{1}{\rho}\ln\big(1 - \mathcal{R}\big(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S\big) - \mathcal{K}\big(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S\big)\big) + \frac{1}{\rho^2}\, g\big(\{\hat{\kappa}_S\}_S\big), \tag{12}$$

where the first term captures the level of net consumption on the balanced growth path and the second term captures the contribution of long-run growth to lifetime welfare. The coefficient $1/\rho^2$ arises from log preferences and reflects that a permanent increase in the growth rate affects consumption at all future dates. Because these gains accumulate linearly over time and are discounted at rate ρ, a one-unit increase in g raises welfare by $1/\rho^2$.

The constrained planner's first-order condition for the cutoff in state S can be written as

$$\frac{z}{\rho}\,\mu_S G'\big(\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP}\big)\left[-\frac{1}{1-\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{K}}\,\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP} + \frac{1}{\rho}\ln\lambda\right] + \Phi_S = 0, \tag{13}$$

where all objects are evaluated at $\{\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP}\}_S$. The term $\frac{z}{\rho}\mu_S$ is the mass of potential entrants throughout history who encounter an industry in state S, and $G'(\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP})$ weights the marginal entrant at the cutoff. Inside the brackets, $-\frac{1}{1-\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{K}}\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP}$ is the utility cost of the market initiation expenditure, evaluated at the shadow value of consumption, and $\frac{1}{\rho}\ln\lambda$ is the welfare gain from permanently raising the knowledge level by one quality step. The term Φ_S collects the marginal welfare effect of changing industry composition and incumbent innovation rates when the vector of thresholds is perturbed.

Comparing the planner's first-order condition (13) with the private entrant's optimality condition (9) reveals the sources of inefficiency in the decentralized equilibrium. The private entrant equates the market initiation cost $\hat{\kappa}_S^{CE}$ to the value differential $v_1^M - v_{S+}^f$, which is approximately $\frac{\pi_1^M - \pi_{S+}^f}{\rho+\gamma}$. The planner instead weighs the shadow cost $\frac{1}{1-R-K}\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP}$ against the social benefit $\frac{\ln\lambda}{\rho}$, plus the composition adjustment Φ_S. Four distinct forces drive a wedge between these two cutoffs: three operate through the direct terms inside the brackets of (13), while a fourth arises from the general equilibrium response of the industry distribution captured by Φ_S. I discuss each in turn.

First, there is a *resource-cost externality* distorting the cost valuation. Private firms treat the market initiation cost as an expense in output units, whereas the planner applies the shadow value $\frac{1}{1-\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{K}}$ to account for the aggregate resource constraint. Higher aggregate investment in R&D and market creation raises the marginal utility of consumption, making the utility cost of funding variety creation strictly higher than its output-unit cost.

Second, there is a *knowledge externality*. Private entrants value variety creation through the flow of appropriable rents, $\pi_1^M - \pi_{S+}^f$, whereas the planner values the permanent expansion of the knowledge stock by one quality step λ. Since $\ln\lambda > \pi_1^M = 1 - \lambda^{-1}$ for $\lambda > 1$, the private rent necessarily falls short of the social return to variety creation. Potential entrants undervalue the contribution of new industries to the aggregate knowledge stock because they cannot appropriate the full productivity gain.

Third, there is a *creative-destruction externality* that amplifies this wedge through the discount rate. The private discount rate, $\rho + \gamma$, is strictly larger than the social discount rate, ρ, because new industries arrive at rate γ and erode incumbent market shares. Private firms therefore discount future profits more heavily than is socially warranted. The planner discounts knowledge accumulation only at the time preference rate ρ, recognizing that the productivity gain $\ln\lambda$ persists beyond the life of the firm.

Finally, there is an *equilibrium adjustment effect*. The term Φ_S embeds the general equilibrium response of values, policies, and industry shares when the entire vector of thresholds is perturbed. A local change in $\hat{\kappa}_S$ affects not only the flow of entrants into state S but also the induced evolution of other states through the stationary distribution and the aggregate resource constraint. This adjustment further shifts the planner's preferred cutoff away from the private one. In the next section, I evaluate these conditions in the calibrated economy and quantify the resulting entry wedge.

5 Quantitative Analysis

This section uses computational methods to study the quantitative implications of the model. I first calibrate a stationary equilibrium of the economy to match key moments for the U.S. economy over the 1982–2011 period. I then use the calibrated model to examine how changes in the parameters governing entry and competition shape industry dynamics and aggregate growth. Finally, I evaluate the constrained efficiency benchmark from Section 4.4 in the calibrated economy and compare two innovation policies that subsidize incumbent R&D and variety creation.

For the quantitative analysis, I parameterize the distribution of market initiation costs as follows. Let κ denote the cost of creating a new industry, and write

$$\kappa = k\,\tilde{v}_1^M,$$

where k is drawn from a transformed beta distribution with support $[0, 0.9]$ and $\tilde{v}_1^M$ is the value of a monopolist in the baseline equilibrium.[3] In comparative statics, I vary the mean of this distribution while holding its standard deviation fixed at 0.1. In the next section, I evaluate these conditions in the calibrated economy and quantify the resulting entry wedge.

5.1 Calibration

I calibrate eight parameters to reflect the U.S. economy over the 30-year period starting in 1982. Table 1 reports the parameter values. Two parameters are chosen externally. The rate of time preference ρ is set to 0.0228, the difference between the average 10-year Treasury rate and average TFP growth, where TFP is measured using the utilization-adjusted series from Fernald (2014). The industry exit rate δ is set to 0.15, based on the median 1-year brand exit rate in Broda and Weinstein (2010).

The remaining six parameters—$\{\sigma, \lambda, \alpha, \psi, \hat{k}, z\}$—are estimated jointly (details are provided in the appendix), targeting the empirical moments in Table 2. While all parameters simultaneously affect all moments in general equilibrium, I provide a heuristic argument for which data moments primarily identify each parameter.

The elasticity of substitution σ governs the intensity of static price competition, while the market initiation cost parameter $\hat{k}$ governs the extensive margin of entry. Both capture the level and dispersion of within-industry competition, and I identify σ and $\hat{k}$ by matching the average and standard deviation of cost-weighted markups. I compute these markup moments

[3] This normalization ties the support of market initiation costs to the value of a new monopolist, which is convenient for comparing cutoffs across equilibria.

Table 1: Calibrated Parameters

Externally calibrated		
ρ	0.0228	Rate of time preference (10-year Treasury rate − TFP growth)
δ	0.1500	Exit rate (brand exit rate (Broda and Weinstein, 2010))
Internally calibrated		
σ	3.8961	Elasticity of substitution
λ	1.0351	Innovation step size
α	0.0897	Multiplier of R&D cost function
ψ	1.2917	Curvature of R&D cost function
$\hat{k}$	0.0872	Mean of market initiation cost divided by baseline v_1^M
z	0.3115	Potential entrant arrival rate

using Compustat data and the production approach from De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020) with input weights, which is more comparable to the product-level environment of the model.


Table 2: Targeted moments

	Data	Model	Source
Average TFP growth	0.0091	0.0091	Fernald (2014)
Average cost-weighted markup	1.3667	1.3717	Compustat, De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020)
S.D. of cost-weighted markup	0.2904	0.2872	Compustat, De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020)
Average R&D/GDP	0.0255	0.0252	NCSES (NSF), 2025
Average innovation frequency	0.5195	0.5198	Cai and Tian (2024) (1981–2014)
1-year median brand entry rate	0.1618	0.1586	Broda and Weinstein (2010) (1994, 1999–2003)

To identify the R&D cost parameters (α, ψ), which govern the cost of innovation for incumbents, I target the average R&D-to-GDP ratio and the average innovation frequency. The R&D-to-GDP ratio comes from NCSES (National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics , NCSES), and the innovation frequency from Cai and Tian (2024), covering 1981–2014. In the model, both incumbent R&D spending and market creation costs are counted as R&D, since both represent forms of innovation.

The innovation step size λ determines the return to innovation and is the primary driver of the aggregate growth rate. The parameter is calibrated to match the average TFP growth rate. Finally, z governs the frequency of potential entrant shocks and is identified by the median brand entry rate.

Figure 2: Industry Life-Cycle Patterns



5.2 Industry Life-Cycle Patterns

In the model, industries follow non-stationary life-cycles: they start small and highly innovative, then grow in size while innovation activity gradually slows. The profiles in Figure 2 show that the calibrated economy exhibits this pattern in a way that is qualitatively consistent with the industry life-cycle evidence discussed in Section 2. Each panel shows the expected change in an industry variable over a 50-year period, conditional on survival. Details of the calculation are provided in the appendix.

The top-left panel plots changes in output relative to the initial level. I report two measures. *Unadjusted output* (dash-dotted line) corresponds to the industry-level aggregator in the model and is best interpreted as the output of a narrowly defined market, close to a group of brands that compete directly. *Variety-adjusted output* (solid line) adjusts for changes in effective market size due to between-industry business-stealing effects from variety creation. In practice, new varieties often do not immediately generate new industry

classifications, so business stealing is more salient at the brand level than at the industry level. The unadjusted series therefore aligns more closely with brand-level dynamics, while the adjusted series is more comparable to industry-level outcomes. As documented by Gort and Klepper (1982), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and Filson (2001), industry-level output tends to rise over time, whereas brand-level output tends to decline as newer products capture market share—a pattern emphasized by Argente, Lee and Moreira (2024). The model reproduces both trends: variety-adjusted output rises over the life-cycle, while unadjusted output eventually declines as new varieties compete away demand.

The top-right panel shows the expected change in industry prices, adjusted for wage inflation, relative to the initial level. I define the industry price of industry i as

$$P_i = \left(\sum_{j \in i} p_{ji}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}.$$

Dividing by the wage accounts for aggregate inflation. Consistent with the evidence, industry prices fall over the life-cycle as innovation reduces unit costs and competition intensifies.

The bottom panels plot the expected number of firms and the expected innovation rate over time. As industries evolve, firm counts increase while innovation rates decline (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Filson, 2001; Jovanovic and Wang, 2024). This trajectory captures the stylized fact of early expansion with frequent entry, followed by consolidation and lower innovation in more mature industries. The model does not feature an explicit shakeout phase with declining firm counts as in Klepper (1996), but such a pattern could be generated by introducing a fixed operating cost: as technology gaps widen and follower profits fall, some firms would optimally exit.

These age profiles are not directly targeted in the calibration in Table 2, so their qualitative similarity to the empirical life-cycle patterns is a useful check on the mechanism.

5.3 Constrained Efficiency of Calibrated Economy

I now use the constrained planner framework of Section 4.4 to assess the efficiency of variety creation in the calibrated economy. The goal is to quantify the wedge between the decentralized entry cutoffs $\{\hat{\kappa}_S^{CE}\}_S$ and the planner's cutoffs $\{\hat{\kappa}_S^{SP}\}_S$ that maximize welfare subject to the equilibrium laws of motion.

The planner's first-order condition for the cutoff in state S, equation (13), combines three components: (i) a congestion effect through the shadow value of aggregate consumption $1/(1-\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{K})$, (ii) a knowledge effect through the term $(\ln \lambda)/\rho$, and (iii) a composition term Φ_S that captures how reallocating entrants across states affects the cross-sectional

distribution of industries and incumbent innovation incentives. In this subsection, I evaluate these objects at the competitive equilibrium.

First, by construction the planner attaches a higher utility cost to market initiation than private entrants: the shadow value of aggregate consumption is scaled by $1/(1-\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{K}) > 1$, so any given resource cost is magnified relative to the private valuation. In the calibrated economy, this congestion effect is modest but non-trivial: for a given cutoff $\hat{\kappa}$, the planner's effective valuation of the market initiation cost is 2.59% higher than the private valuation.

Second, the knowledge component pushes in the opposite direction and dominates in the baseline equilibrium. Although the private value v_1^M exceeds the simple bound $\pi_1^M/(\rho+\gamma)$ because it includes the option value of future innovation, the net private incentive $v_1^M - v_{S+}^f$ remains strictly below the social benefit $(\ln\lambda)/\rho$ for any state with positive mass ($\mu_S > 0$). Ignoring higher-order composition effects, the planner's cutoff would satisfy

$$\hat{\kappa}^{SP} = \frac{1-\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{K}}{\rho}\ln\lambda.$$


Under the current calibration, this expression evaluates to 1.47, which is strictly above the maximum cost $\overline{\kappa} = 0.57$ in the support of G. Conditional on holding innovation rates and industry shares fixed, it is therefore socially desirable to bear higher market initiation costs and create more varieties than in the competitive equilibrium.

Third, I quantify the full equilibrium wedge by computing the derivative of welfare with respect to the state-contingent thresholds at the competitive equilibrium. Evaluating the planner's first-order condition at the decentralized cutoffs and numerically approximating the derivatives, I find that they are positive for all economically relevant states ($\mu_S > 2\%$): for any state with substantial mass, variety creation is chosen less frequently than the constrained optimum. When I recompute these derivatives while keeping innovation rates and industry shares fixed at their competitive values—so that only the direct externalities enter and the composition terms Φ_S are suppressed—they remain positive for all active states, consistent with the comparison above between $v_1^M - v_{S+}^f$ and $(\ln\lambda)/\rho$. The equilibrium adjustment effect therefore does not overturn the sign of the wedge. In the calibrated economy, variety creation is too low relative to the constrained planner's benchmark. Potential entrants are too willing to enter existing oligopolies to chase short-term business-stealing rents, and too reluctant to pay the fixed costs to open new markets.

5.4 Comparative Statics

To understand how industry dynamics shape productivity growth, I conduct comparative statics with respect to parameters governing industry creation and competition. I first vary

Figure 3: Comparative Statics: Changing z and $\hat{k}$




the potential entrant arrival rate z and the market initiation cost parameter $\hat{k}$, which control the intensity and cost of entry. I then vary the elasticity of substitution σ, which governs the strength of within-industry competition.

The left panel of Figure 3 shows how aggregate growth and its components respond to changes in z. As z increases, the variety creation rate γ rises, but the average innovation rates of monopolists and oligopoly followers decline. More potential entrants generate more new industries, but they also reduce incumbent profits through both between- and within-industry business-stealing effects. This lowers the expected value of innovation and crowds out R&D investment by incumbent firms. The net result is a U-shaped relationship between z and aggregate growth: when z is low, increasing it reduces growth because the crowding-out effect dominates, while further increases in z beyond a threshold raise growth as the extensive-margin benefit from greater variety creation outweighs the loss from reduced incumbent innovation. The discrete jumps visible in these series are discussed below.

The right panel of Figure 3 varies the mean market initiation cost $\hat{k}$. Reducing $\hat{k}$ uniformly lowers the cost of starting new industries and monotonically increases the growth rate. As $\hat{k}$ falls, the variety creation rate γ rises steadily. Incumbents' R&D incentives decline, but the magnitude is smaller than under changes in z, because the within-industry business-stealing channel is weaker. Leaders are affected more than followers, as the value of market leadership

Figure 4: Comparative Statics: Changing σ



falls when the economy is filled with new and differentiated product lines. However, the overall reduction in R&D is muted by a shrinking average technology gap and a smaller oligopoly share. Thus, despite lower incumbent innovation and total R&D spending, growth rises due to more frequent variety creation and the entry of younger, more competitive firms.

These experiments also have a simple policy interpretation. The U-shaped relationship between z and growth cautions against the view that "more entrepreneurs" are always the right response to low growth. In the model, indiscriminately increasing the mass of potential entrants can move the economy into a region where additional entry mainly intensifies business stealing in existing industries and crowds out high-value incumbent R&D, with only limited gains in variety creation. What matters for long-run growth is not just the quantity of startups but their composition: growth is highest when entry takes the form of new-industry creation rather than incremental entry into incumbent markets. Reducing the effective initiation cost $\hat{k}$ is a more targeted way to tilt entry toward new industries and raise growth, but it is also harder to implement in practice, since $\hat{k}$ reflects deep features of the business environment—regulation, fixed setup costs, and institutional barriers—that are difficult to change quickly.

Figure 4 reports comparative statics for the elasticity of substitution σ. As σ increases,

competition intensifies within industries and the leader position becomes more valuable. The net effect on incumbent innovation is modest and depends on the industry distribution. In industries with small technology gaps, stronger competition encourages both leaders and followers to invest more aggressively. In industries with large gaps, higher σ discourages follower innovation because catching up becomes less attractive. In the calibrated economy, the average incumbent innovation rate decreases slightly when σ is low and increases slightly when σ is high, but the magnitude of these changes is small.

In contrast, the effect on variety creation is more pronounced. As it becomes less attractive to enter existing industries as a follower, potential entrants are more likely to initiate new industries instead. The variety creation rate γ rises with σ, and this extensive-margin effect dominates the small changes in incumbent innovation, so the aggregate growth rate increases. This pattern underscores a complementarity between pro-competitive product-market policies and technological diversification in the model.

From a theoretical perspective, the muted and sign-ambiguous response of incumbent innovation to σ reflects the importance of industry composition: the effect of tougher competition depends on the distribution of industries over technology gaps and life-cycle stages. This echoes the findings of Aghion et al. (2005), who show that the competition-innovation relationship depends on firms' distance to the technological frontier. In my environment, however, the main action comes from the extensive margin: stronger competition within industries pushes potential entrants away from mature sectors and toward the creation of new industries, raising γ and, through this channel, the aggregate growth rate. In this sense, the analysis adds a complementary mechanism to the competition-and-innovation literature, highlighting that competition can foster growth not only by stimulating "escape competition" innovation by incumbents, but also by accelerating structural change through variety creation.

5.4.1 Discontinuities in Comparative Statics

The comparative statics in Figures 3 and 4 exhibit several discrete jumps in growth and innovation outcomes as parameters vary. These discontinuities arise from the discrete industry state space and the bounded support of market initiation costs, not from numerical instability.

Entry decisions are governed by threshold comparisons among value functions: for a given distribution of costs, a potential entrant compares the value of joining an incumbent industry in state S with the value of creating a new industry. As parameters change, the ordering of values such as v_{02} and v_1^M can switch. Because G has bounded support, the economy can hit a corner in which the entry condition for a given state moves from interior to corner, shifting

the probability of entry in that state from strictly positive to zero (or vice versa) for the entire cost distribution. These nonlinear switches in state-contingent entry generate abrupt changes in the variety creation rate γ. Since γ enters the effective discount rate $(\rho + g_N)$, these shifts feed back into firm values, generating the discrete changes in aggregate rates and welfare visible in the figures. This feature reflects the inherently discrete and non-linear nature of industrial evolution in the model.

5.5 Policy Experiments: Subsidizing Innovation

I now compare two policy interventions that subsidize innovation activity in the economy. Both policies are financed through lump-sum taxes on the representative household:

1. *Policy 1 (P1): Rewarding successful R&D investment.* A firm receives a subsidy equal to $b_r \Delta V$ upon a successful innovation, where $b_r \in [0, 1)$ is the subsidy rate and ΔV is the value increase resulting from the innovation.


2. *Policy 2 (P2): Rewarding variety creation.* A potential entrant receives a subsidy equal to $b_i V_1^M$ if it chooses to start a new industry, where $b_i \in [0, 1)$ is the subsidy rate and V_1^M is the value of a new monopolist.

Policy 1 directly targets incumbent R&D, aiming to boost technological improvement within existing industries. Policy 2 instead targets the extensive margin by increasing the returns to successful variety creation.

Figure 5 shows comparative statics for both policies across a range of subsidy-to-output ratios. Neither policy substantially changes the average innovation rate of incumbent firms. The marginal returns to R&D are already low in mature, follower-heavy industries, and the subsidies only partially offset the business-stealing effects of entry. Both policies, however, increase the rate of variety creation, with Policy 2 generating a much stronger response. This difference arises because P2 directly raises the payoff from starting a new industry, whereas P1 affects variety creation only indirectly through its effect on firm values.

To compare the two policies at a common fiscal cost, I choose subsidy rates such that government expenditures on each policy amount to 1% of output in the stationary equilibrium. Under Policy 1, this corresponds to rewarding $b_r \approx 0.611$ of the value increase from a successful incumbent innovation. At this level, the long-run growth rate rises by about 5.8 basis points and welfare increases by 5.0%. Under Policy 2, the 1% of output constraint implies a much lower subsidy rate, $b_i \approx 0.087$ of the value of a new monopolist. Even with this smaller subsidy, Policy 2 delivers a larger impact: the growth rate increases by about 7.7 basis points and welfare rises by 7.6%.

Figure 5: Policy Comparison: Rewarding Incumbent R&D and Variety Creation



For any given level of fiscal expenditure, the policy that rewards variety creation is therefore more effective at raising both growth and welfare. It fosters a higher rate of technological renewal by encouraging entry into new markets, sustaining aggregate growth through ongoing industry turnover. In contrast, subsidizing incumbent R&D yields smaller gains, in part because the benefits are diluted by business stealing and declining innovation incentives in mature industries. These results highlight a key implication of the model: directing innovation policy toward the extensive margin of industry creation can be more growth-enhancing than traditional R&D subsidies focused on incumbents, even when the latter are calibrated to be quite generous on a per-innovation basis.

6 Conclusion

This paper has developed a Schumpeterian growth framework in which industries follow endogenous life-cycles and aggregate growth emerges from the overlapping dynamics of these industries. Industries are born as monopolies, become oligopolies with intense competition

and leadership turnover, and eventually mature as technology gaps widen and innovation incentives decline. Despite this non-stationary behavior at the industry level, the economy admits a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium in which the cross-sectional distribution of industries is constant and aggregate productivity grows at a constant rate.

A central contribution is to derive an explicit growth decomposition that links aggregate TFP growth to industry dynamics. The long-run growth rate can be written as the sum of three components: variety creation through the birth of new industries, frontier innovation by monopolists, and catch-up innovation by followers within oligopolies. Each term is expressed in terms of equilibrium innovation intensities and the stationary distribution of industries over life-cycle states. This provides a Harberger-style map from the cross-section of industries to aggregate growth and clarifies how stable long-run growth can coexist with front-loaded innovation and declining business dynamism at the industry level.

The quantitative analysis shows that the parameters governing entry and competition shape both industry dynamics and aggregate growth in systematic ways. Varying the potential entrant arrival rate z yields a U-shaped relationship between startup entry and growth: when z is low, additional entry mainly intensifies business stealing in existing industries and crowds out high-value incumbent R&D, whereas beyond a threshold the extensive-margin benefit from variety creation dominates. Lowering the market-initiation cost $\hat{k}$ tilts entry more directly toward new industries and monotonically raises growth, although changing $\hat{k}$ in practice would require shifting deep features of the business environment. Increases in the elasticity of substitution σ have modest, composition-dependent effects on incumbent innovation but a clear effect on the extensive margin: tougher within-industry competition pushes entrants away from mature sectors and toward starting new industries, raising the rate of variety creation and, through this channel, the aggregate growth rate.

The constrained-efficiency analysis and policy experiments highlight the role of entry wedges and the target of innovation policy. Potential entrants undervalue variety creation because they focus on appropriable rents, discount future profits at a rate that includes the creative-destruction hazard, and ignore the aggregate resource constraint. Consistent with this, for a given fiscal cost, subsidies that reward the creation of new industries generate larger gains in long-run growth and welfare than equally costly subsidies to incumbent R&D: policies aimed at the extensive margin "enable" structural renewal by seeding new, innovation-intensive industries, whereas incumbent R&D subsidies are diluted by business stealing and low marginal returns in mature industries.

More broadly, the analysis suggests that understanding the sources of long-run growth requires taking seriously the life-cycle of industries and the extensive margin of industry creation, not just the intensive margin of R&D within existing markets. The framework

is deliberately parsimonious, but it provides a tractable laboratory for studying changes in business dynamism, the interaction between competition and innovation, and the design of policies that shape the structure and pace of economic growth.

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A Derivations and Proofs

A.1 Lemma 3.1

I define a firm's markup as the ratio of its price to marginal cost, $\eta \equiv p/(w/q)$, where w is the wage and q is the firm's productivity.

Let p_{mn} denote the leader's price in an industry with gap m and n followers and p_{-mn} the common price of a follower, and define the relative price of the leader as $\phi_{mn} \equiv p_{mn}/p_{-mn}$. Given the CES demand system within an industry and the Cobb–Douglas allocation of expenditure across industries, the resulting static pricing game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium markups, quantities, and profits as functions of the state (m, n).

The markup is increasing in the monopolist's lead $\hat{s}$, and the normalized profit $\pi^M_{\hat{s}}$ rises from $1 - \lambda^{-1}$ toward one as the monopolist pulls further ahead of the fringe. The presence of the fringe keeps demand elastic and delivers a well-defined, finite markup for any finite $\hat{s}$.

Lemma A.1 (Pricing decisions)**.** *At time t, consider a monopolist with relative advantage $\hat{s}$ over the fringe, born at some date $\tau < t$. Given industry demand $\bar{Y}$ and the presence of the competitive fringe, the monopolist's static profit-maximization problem yields the markup, $\eta^M_{\hat{s}} = \lambda^{\hat{s}}$, the output, $y^M(\tau) = \frac{\bar{Y}}{w}\lambda^{s^K_\tau}$, and the profit, $\Pi^M_{\hat{s}} = \pi^M_{\hat{s}}\bar{Y}$, where $\pi^M_{\hat{s}} = 1 - \lambda^{-\hat{s}}$ is the normalized profit.*

Given technology gap m and n followers, all with productivity λ^{s_f}. Let $\bar{Y}$ denote normalized industry output and w the wage. In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices, the markups, outputs, and profits of the leader (denoted by subscript mn) and a representative follower (denoted by subscript $-mn$) are:

- Markups*:*

$$\eta_{mn} = \frac{\sigma n + \phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}}{(\sigma-1)n},$$
$$\eta_{-mn} = \frac{\sigma\big(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1\big) + 1}{(\sigma-1)\big(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1\big)}.$$

- Outputs*:*

$$y_{mn}(s_f) = \frac{(\sigma-1)n\,\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}\,\lambda^{m+s_f}}{\big(\sigma n + \phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}\big)\big(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n\big)}\,\frac{\bar{Y}}{w},$$
$$y_{-mn}(s_f) = \frac{(\sigma-1)\big(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1\big)\lambda^{s_f}}{\big(\sigma(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1) + 1\big)\big(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n\big)}\,\frac{\bar{Y}}{w}.$$

- Profits*:*

$$\Pi_{mn} = \pi_{mn}\bar{Y}, \qquad \Pi_{-mn} = \pi_{-mn}\bar{Y}, \tag{14}$$

$$\pi_{mn} = \frac{1}{\sigma n \phi_{mn}^{\sigma-1} + 1}, \qquad \pi_{-mn} = \frac{1}{\sigma\left(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1\right) + 1}. \tag{15}$$

Moreover, the equilibrium price ratio ϕ_{mn} is uniquely defined by

$$\phi_{mn} n \lambda^m \left(\sigma + \frac{1}{\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1}\right) \;=\; \sigma n + \phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} \tag{16}$$

for all $m \in \{0, 1, \dots\}$ and $n \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$.

From the maximization problem, the demand for firm j in industry i is $y_{ji}^d = \frac{p_{ji}^{-\sigma}}{\sum_j p_{ji}^{1-\sigma}}\bar{Y}$. The expressions for markups, outputs, and profits are straightforward from the firm's problem given demand and the price competition. Most of the properties follow from algebra.

1. Following equation can be derived by rearranging the expression.

$$\phi n \lambda^m \left(\sigma + \frac{1}{\phi^{1-\sigma} + n - 1}\right) = \sigma n + \phi^{1-\sigma}.$$

   Consider ϕ as a variable for LHS and RHS while other parameters and variables being constant. As LHS is increasing while RHS is decreasing in ϕ, $\lim_{\phi\to 0} \text{LHS} = 0$ while $\lim_{\phi\to 0} \text{RHS} = \infty$, and $\lim_{\phi\to\infty} \text{LHS} = \infty$ while $\lim_{\phi\to\infty} \text{RHS} = \sigma n < \infty$, the solution uniquely exists.

3. Markup changes when m increases and follower markup decreasing in n follow from the previous property. As $\phi_{mn}\lambda^m = \eta_{mn}/\eta_{-mn}$, η_{mn} is also decreasing in n. It means that $\frac{1}{n}\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}$ is decreasing in n.

A.2 Lemma 4.1

1. For any normalized value v, $0 < v < \frac{1}{\rho+\gamma}$.
   A normalized profit π a firm can experience satisfies $0 < \pi < 1$ to Lemma 3.1. Therefore, for any states,
$$v < \int_0^\infty e^{-(\rho+\gamma)t} \cdot 1 dt = \frac{1}{\rho+\gamma}.$$
   If a firm never invest in R&D, the value is bigger than 0, similarly. Therefore, the sequences are bounded below by 0.

2. $v_{\hat{s}}^M$ is increasing in $\hat{s}$ with $\lim_{\hat{s}\to\infty} v_{\hat{s}}^M = \frac{1+z\theta_M v_{01}}{\rho+\gamma+z\theta_M}$ and $x_{\hat{s}}^M$ is positive and decreasing in $\hat{s}$ with $\lim_{s\to\infty} x_{\hat{s}}^M = 0$.
For a given s, assume $v_{\hat{s}+1}^M \leq v_{\hat{s}}^M$. Then, $x_{\hat{s}}^M = 0$, so

$$\begin{aligned}(\rho+\gamma+z\theta_M)v_{\hat{s}}^M &= \pi_{\hat{s}}^M + z\theta_M v_{01} \\ &< \pi_{\hat{s}+1}^M - R(x_{\hat{s}+1}^M) + x_{\hat{s}+1}^M(v_{\hat{s}+2}^M - v_{\hat{s}+1}^M) + z\theta_M v_{01} \\ &= (\rho+\gamma+z\theta_M)v_{\hat{s}+1}^M.\end{aligned}$$

Sum of the second and third terms in the RHS of the inequality is weakly positive, as the sum can be zero when $x_{\hat{s}+1}^M = 0$. This is an contradiction, so $v_{\hat{s}+1}^M > v_{\hat{s}}^M$ for any s. $\{v_{\hat{s}}^M\}_{s=1}^\infty$ is an increasing and bounded sequence, so a limit exists. From equation (4), $\lim_{s\to} v_{\hat{s}}^M = \frac{1+z\theta_M v_{01}}{\rho+\gamma+z\theta_M}$.

The positivity of $\{x_{\hat{s}}^M\}_{s=1}^\infty$ comes from increasing $\{v_{\hat{s}}^M\}_{s=1}^\infty$. The normalized value also has a finite limit, so $\lim_{s\to\infty} x_{\hat{s}}^M = 0$.

Define $\Delta\pi_{\hat{s}}^M = \pi_{\hat{s}+1}^M - \pi_{\hat{s}}^M$, $\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M = v_{\hat{s}+1}^M - v_{\hat{s}}^M$, and $\Lambda(\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M) = -R(x_{\hat{s}}^M) + x_{\hat{s}}^M \Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M$. Assume $\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M > \Delta v_{\hat{s}+1}^M$, but $\Delta v_{\hat{s}-1}^M \leq \Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned}(\rho+\gamma+z\theta_M)\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M &= \Delta\pi_{\hat{s}}^M + \Lambda(\Delta v_{\hat{s}+1}^M) - \Lambda(\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M) \\ &< \Delta\pi_{\hat{s}-1}^M + \Lambda(\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M) - \Lambda(\Delta v_{\hat{s}-1}^M) = (\rho+\gamma+z\theta_M)\Delta v_{\hat{s}-1}^M.\end{aligned}$$

The inequality comes from the monotonicity of Λ. Contradiction. Therefore, $\Delta v_{\hat{s}-1}^M > \Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M$. As $\{x_{\hat{s}}^M\}_{s=1}^\infty$ is positive and goes to 0, for any $\hat{s}$, there exists $\hat{s} > s$ such that $x_{\hat{s}}^M > x_{\hat{s}+1}^M$, hence $\Delta v_{\hat{s}}^M > \Delta v_{\hat{s}+1}^M$, so $x_{\hat{s}}^M$ decreases in $\hat{s}$.

3. For any $m \in \{0, 1, \cdots\}$, v_{mn}, v_{-mn}, x_{mn}, and x_{-mn} converge to 0 as $n \to \infty$. For any $n \in \{1, 2, \cdots\}$, v_{mn} converges to $\frac{1}{\rho+\gamma}$ while v_{-mn}, x_{mn}, and x_{-mn} converge to 0 as $m \to \infty$.
A leader's profit always goes to 1, while a follower's profit always goes to 0 as m goes to infinity, regardless of n. As n goes to infinity, the profits go to 0 for any m. Thus the result follows.

4. A finite maximum number of followers n^* exists.
As $v_{0n} \to 0$ when $n \to \infty$, there exists $\tilde{n}$ such that $v_{0n} \leq v_1^M - \overline{\kappa}$ for any $n \geq \tilde{n}$. Consider a follower in state mn gets payoff $\pi_{0n'}$, where n' is the current number of followers, until it first becomes a neck-and-neck competitor, while the Markov rates of

the process are the same. Let the value from such process be v^0_{-mn}. Then, if $n \geq \tilde{n}$

$$v_{-mn} \leq v^0_{-mn} \leq \max\left\{\frac{\pi_{0n}}{\rho+\gamma}, v_1^M - \overline{\kappa}\right\},$$

because any possible follower payoffs after reaching mn is smaller than π_{0n} and for any n, $v_{0n} \leq v_1^M - \overline{\kappa}$. As π_{0n} also goes to 0 as n increases, there exists some $\hat{n}$ such that $\frac{\pi_{0\hat{n}}}{\rho+\gamma} \leq v_1^M - \overline{\kappa}$, therefore, $v_{-m\hat{n}} \leq v_1^M - \overline{\kappa}$ for any m. In other words, there always exists n^* such that, if $n < n^*$, there is at least one m such that $\theta_{mn} > 0$, while $\theta_{mn^*} = 0$ for any m.

A.3 Lemma 4.3

The average levels follow the following differential equations in a stationary equilibrium.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_M \dot{\bar{s}}^M_t &= -(z\theta_M + \gamma)\mu_M \bar{s}^M_t + \gamma(s^K_t + 1) + \sum_{\hat{s}}^{\infty} \mu^M_{\hat{s}=1} x^M_{\hat{s}}, \\
\mu_M \dot{\bar{s}}^{cf}_t &= -(z\theta_M + \gamma)\mu_M \bar{s}^{cf}_t + \gamma s^K_t, \\
(1-\mu_M)\dot{\bar{s}}^f &= -\gamma(1-\mu_M)\bar{s}^f + z\theta_M \mu_M \bar{s}^M + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn}\mu_{mn}, \\
(1-\mu_M)\dot{\bar{s}}^l &= -\gamma(1-\mu_M)\bar{s}^l + z\theta_M \mu_M \bar{s}^M + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\left((n+1)x_{0n}\mu_0 + \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} x_{mn}\mu_{mn}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

As $\bar{s}^M_t - \bar{s}^{cf}_t = \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu^M_{\hat{s}} \hat{s}$ and $\bar{s}^l_t - \bar{s}^f_t = \bar{m} = \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=0}^{\infty} \mu_{mn} m$ are constant in a stationary equilibrium, one can get the three equations in the lemma using the differential equations, the fact that $\mu_M = \frac{\gamma}{z\theta_M+\gamma}$, and $s^K = \mu_M \bar{s}^M + (1-\mu_M)\bar{s}^f$.

A.4 Proposition 4.4

Let S denote the (countable) set of industry states with unbounded technology gaps $m \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ and $1 \leq n \leq n^*$. Fix a candidate variety–creation rate $\gamma \in [0, z]$. The firms' HJBs define a discounted continuous–time Markov decision problem on S which, by standard uniformization, can be written as a discrete–time Bellman equation on $\ell_\infty(S)$ with discount factor $\beta(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ and bounded payoffs. The associated Bellman operator is a contraction, so for each γ there exists a unique bounded value function $v(\gamma)$ and associated optimal R&D and entry policies $\theta(\gamma)$. These policies induce a generator $Q(\gamma)$ for the industry–level Markov chain on S with killing at rate $\delta > 0$. Under standard regularity conditions on $Q(\gamma)$ (bounded jump rates and irreducibility), this chain admits a unique stationary cross–sectional

distribution $\mu(\gamma)$ over alive states. Define the implied variety–creation rate

$$\Gamma(\gamma) \equiv z \sum_{s \in S} \big(1 - \theta_s(\gamma)\big)\mu_s(\gamma).$$

$\Gamma : [0, z] \to [0, z]$ is continuous. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists at least one fixed point $\gamma^* \in [0, z]$ such that $\Gamma(\gamma^*) = \gamma^*$.

A monopoly industry with relative level $\hat{s}$ and was born at τ produces $Y^M(\hat{s}, \tau) = y^M(\tau) = \frac{\bar{Y}}{w}\lambda^{s_\tau^K}$ until it stops to be a monopolist. Output produced by an oligopoly industry with a technology gap of m and n followers with technology level s^f can be written as $Y_{mn}(s^f) = \tilde{Y}^f_{mn}\lambda^{s^f}\frac{\bar{Y}}{w} = \tilde{Y}^l_{mn}\lambda^{m+s^f}\frac{\bar{Y}}{w}$, where $\tilde{Y}^f_{mn}$ and $\tilde{Y}^l_{mn}$ only depend on m and n. From the labor market conditions, the growth rate of $\frac{\bar{Y}}{w} = \frac{Y}{wN}$ in a stationary equilibrium is $-g_N$.

Over time interval $[t, t + \Delta t]$, changes in industry log outputs are as follows.

$$\Delta \ln Y^M(\hat{s}, \tau) = \begin{cases} \hat{s}\ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{01} = \hat{s}\ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{01} & \text{with probability } z\theta_M\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ -\ln y^M(\tau) & \text{with probability } \delta\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ -g_N\Delta t & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

$$\Delta \ln Y_{0n}(s^f) = \begin{cases} \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{0n} = \ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{0n} & \text{with probability } (n+1)x_{0n}\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{0n+1} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{0n} = \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{0n+1} - \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{0n} & \text{with probability } z\theta_{0n}\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ -\ln Y_{0n}(s^f) & \text{with probability } \delta\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ -g_N\Delta t & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

$$\Delta \ln Y_{mn}(s^f) = \begin{cases} \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{m+1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn} = \ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{m+1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{mn} & \text{with probability } x_{mn}\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ \ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{m-1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn} = \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{m-1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{mn} & \text{with probability } nx_{-mn}\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn+1} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn} = \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{mn+1} - \ln \tilde{Y}^l_{mn} & \text{with probability } z\theta_{mn}\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ -\ln Y_{mn}(s^f) & \text{with probability } \delta\Delta t + o(\Delta t), \\ -g_N\Delta t & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

In cases except for destruction of industries, outputs also decrease by $g_N\Delta t$ in addition to the changes from state transition, but it is ignored as it would not appear in the limit. Also, at each moment t, a new industry with output $Y^M(1, t)$ appears with rate γ per each industry. Therefore,

$$\frac{d}{dt}\int_0^{N_t} \ln Y_{it} di = \gamma N_t \ln Y^M(1, t) + \mu_M N_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{d}{dt}\ln Y^M + (1 - \mu_M)N_t\mathbb{E}_t\frac{d}{dt}\ln Y_{mn}.$$

Let F^f_{mnt} be a distribution of followers' technology levels for the industries with gap m and n followers at time t and F^M_{cft} be a distribution of fringe firms' technology levels for the monopolies at t. Using the stationary distribution of technology gaps, the aggregate growth rate is as follows.

$$
\begin{aligned}
g_t &= g_N + \frac{d}{dt}\ln \bar{Y}_t = g_N - \frac{\dot{N}_t}{N_t^2}\int_0^{N_t} \ln Y_{it} di + \frac{1}{N_t}\frac{d}{dt}\int_0^{N_t} \ln Y_{it} di \\
&= g_N - g_N \ln \bar{Y}_t + \gamma \ln Y^M(1,t) - \delta \ln \bar{Y}_t - g_N + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu^M_{\hat{s}} z\theta_M(\hat{s}\ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{01}) \\
&\quad + \ln\lambda \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn}\mu_{mn} + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\left(\mu_{0n}\left[(n+1)x_{0n}(\ln \tilde{Y}^f_{1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{0n}) + z\theta_{0n}(\ln \tilde{Y}^f_{0n+1} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{0n})\right]\right. \\
&\quad \left. + \sum_{m=1}^{\infty}\mu_{mn}\left[x_{mn}(\ln \tilde{Y}^f_{m+1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn}) + nx_{-mn}(\ln\lambda + \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{m-1n} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn}) + z\theta_{mn}(\ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn+1} - \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn})\right]\right) \\
&= -g_N \ln \bar{Y}_t + \gamma(\ln\frac{\bar{Y}_t}{w_t} + s^K_t \ln\lambda) + (g_N - \gamma)\ln \bar{Y}_t + z\theta_M \ln\lambda \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty}\mu^M_{\hat{s}}\hat{s} + \ln\lambda\sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn}\mu_{mn} \\
&\quad + \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{01}(x_{-11}\mu_{11} - 2x_{01}\mu_{01} + z\theta_M\mu_M - z\theta_{01}\mu_{01}) + \cdots \\
&\quad + \ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn}(x_{m-1n}\mu_{m-1n} + nx_{-m-1n}\mu_{m+1n} - (x_{mn} + nx_{-mn})\mu_{mn} + z\theta_{mn-1}\mu_{mn-1} - z\theta_{mn}\mu_{mn}) \\
&\quad + \cdots
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&= \gamma s^K_t \ln\lambda - \gamma\mu_M \ln\lambda \int_0^{\infty} s dF^M_{cft}(s) - \gamma\sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\mu_{mn}\int_1^{\infty}\left(\ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn} + s\ln\lambda\right) dF^f_{mnt}(s) \\
&\quad + z\theta_M\mu_M\bar{s}^M \ln\lambda - z\theta_M\mu_M\ln\lambda\int_0^{\infty} s dF^M_{cft}(s) + \ln\lambda\sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn}\mu_{mn} + \gamma\sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\mu_{mn}\ln \tilde{Y}^f_{mn} \\
&= \ln\lambda\left[\gamma s^K_t + z\theta_M\mu_M\left(\bar{s}^M_t - \bar{s}^{cf}_t\right) - \gamma\left(\mu_M\bar{s}^{cf}_t + (1-\mu_M)\bar{s}^f_t\right) + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn}\mu_{mn}\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

Using $s^K_t = \mu_M\bar{s}^M_t + (1-\mu_M)\bar{s}^f_t$ and $\mu_M = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + z\theta_M}$ in a stationary equilibrium, it can be shown that the sum of the first three terms in the bracket is equal to $\gamma\left(\bar{s}^M_t - \bar{s}^{cf}_t\right)$. From Lemma 4.3,

$$
g = \ln\lambda\left(\gamma + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty}\mu^M_{\hat{s}}x^M_{\hat{s}} + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*}\sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn}\mu_{mn}\right) = \ln\lambda\cdot\dot{s}^K.
$$

Similarly,

$$g = \ln \lambda \left(\gamma + \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^{M} x_{\hat{s}}^{M} + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \left((n+1) x_{0n} \mu_0 + \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} x_{mn} \mu_{mn} \right) - \gamma (1 - \mu_M) \bar{m} \right).$$

A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5

For part (i), fix an oligopoly state (m, n). Over a short interval Δ, the gap changes only through innovation events that either widen or narrow the leader's advantage.

If $m = 0$, the gap can only widen, and does so by one with probability

$$(n+1) x_{0n} \Delta + o(\Delta).$$

Hence

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_\Delta - \tilde{m} \mid \tilde{m} = 0, \tilde{n} = n] = (n+1) x_{0n}.$$

If $m \geq 1$, leader innovation widens the gap by one with probability

$$x_{mn} \Delta + o(\Delta),$$

while follower catch-up narrows it by one with probability

$$n x_{-mn} \Delta + o(\Delta).$$

Therefore

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_\Delta - \tilde{m} \mid \tilde{m} = m, \tilde{n} = n] = x_{mn} - n x_{-mn}.$$

Taking expectations over the stationary cross-sectional distribution conditional on being an oligopoly gives

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_\Delta - \tilde{m}] = \frac{1}{1 - \mu_M} \left[\sum_{n=1}^{n^*} (n+1) x_{0n} \mu_{0n} + \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} x_{mn} \mu_{mn} - \sum_{n=1}^{n^*} \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} n x_{-mn} \mu_{mn} \right].$$

By Lemma 4.3, the bracketed term equals $\gamma(1 - \mu_M)\bar{m}$. Hence

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_\Delta - \tilde{m}] = \gamma \bar{m}.$$

Since $\bar{m} > 0$, this proves part (i).

For part (ii), recall that $U \sim \text{Exp}(\gamma)$ denotes the age of a randomly sampled surviving

oligopoly from the stationary cross-section. By definition,

$$\bar{m} = \mathbb{E}[f(U)].$$

Fix $\varepsilon > 0$. By the law of iterated expectations,

$$\bar{m} = \mathbb{P}(U \leq \varepsilon)\, \mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U \leq \varepsilon] + \mathbb{P}(U > \varepsilon)\, \mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U > \varepsilon].$$

Using $\bar{m}_\varepsilon = \mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U > \varepsilon]$, this becomes

$$\bar{m} = (1 - e^{-\gamma\varepsilon})\, \mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U \leq \varepsilon] + e^{-\gamma\varepsilon} \bar{m}_\varepsilon.$$

Now $f(0) = 0$, since a newborn oligopoly starts at zero gap. Moreover, $f(a) \to 0$ as $a \downarrow 0$, so

$$\mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U \leq \varepsilon] \to 0 \qquad \text{as } \varepsilon \downarrow 0.$$

Because $\bar{m} > 0$, there exists $\varepsilon_0 > 0$ such that

$$\mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U \leq \varepsilon] < \bar{m} \qquad \text{for all } \varepsilon \in (0, \varepsilon_0].$$

Rearranging the mixture identity then yields

$$\bar{m}_\varepsilon = \frac{\bar{m} - (1 - e^{-\gamma\varepsilon})\mathbb{E}[f(U) \mid U \leq \varepsilon]}{e^{-\gamma\varepsilon}} > \bar{m} \qquad \text{for all } \varepsilon \in (0, \varepsilon_0].$$

This proves part (ii).

A.6 Proof of Corollary 4.6

Because industry exit occurs at the exogenous state-independent rate δ, conditioning on survival to age a does not distort the within-oligopoly transition dynamics. Hence the derivative of the cohort mean gap is given by the expected instantaneous change in the gap conditional on survival:

$$f'(a) = \lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}[\hat{m}_{a+\Delta} - \hat{m}_a \mid \text{alive at age } a]\,.$$

Under Assumption 4.1, this quantity is weakly positive for all sufficiently large ages. Therefore

$$f'(a) \geq 0$$

for all sufficiently large a, which implies that $f(a)$ is weakly increasing for sufficiently large ages.

A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.7

For part (i), conditional on remaining a monopoly and surviving, the monopolist's quality changes only when it innovates. Hence

$$\lim_{\Delta \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\Delta} \mathbb{E}\big[\ln q^M_{a+\Delta} - \ln q^M_a \,\big|\, \text{still monopoly, alive}\big] = \ln \lambda \, \mathbb{E}\big[x^M_{\hat{s}_a} \,\big|\, \text{still monopoly, alive}\big] .$$

While the industry remains a monopoly, the lead $\hat{s}_a$ is weakly increasing along every history, since monopoly innovation can only increase the lead. By Lemma 4.1, $x^M_{\hat{s}}$ is decreasing in $\hat{s}$ and satisfies $\lim_{\hat{s}\to\infty} x^M_{\hat{s}} = 0$. Therefore

$$\mathbb{E}\big[x^M_{\hat{s}_a} \,\big|\, \text{still monopoly, alive}\big] \searrow 0 \qquad \text{as } a \to \infty,$$

which proves part (i).

For part (ii), write the oligopoly industry price as

$$P_{mn}(s^f) = \frac{w}{\lambda^{s^f}} \Phi(m,n),$$

where $\Phi(m,n)$ depends only on the relative state (m,n). Using the equilibrium price ratio ϕ_{mn} from Lemma **??**, define

$$A_{mn} \equiv \phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}.$$

Then the oligopoly price factor can be written as

$$\Phi(m,n) = \frac{\sigma(A_{mn}+n-1)+1}{(\sigma-1)(A_{mn}+n-1)} \left(A_{mn}+n\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} .$$

Moreover, the equilibrium condition for ϕ_{mn} implies

$$n\phi_{mn}\lambda^m \left(\sigma + \frac{1}{\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}+n-1}\right) = \sigma n + \phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}.$$

Fix n. As $m \to \infty$, the previous equation implies

$$\phi_{mn} \to 0, \qquad \phi_{mn} \sim (\sigma n)^{-1/\sigma} \lambda^{-m/\sigma}.$$

Substituting into the expression for $\Phi(m,n)$ yields

$$\Phi(m,n) \sim \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}(\sigma n)^{-1/\sigma}\lambda^{-m/\sigma}.$$

Hence, for each fixed $n \in \{1,\dots,n^*\}$, there exists $M_P(n) < \infty$ such that

$$\Phi(m+1,n) \le \Phi(m,n) \qquad \text{for all } m \ge M_P(n).$$

Since $P_{mn}(s^f)/w = \lambda^{-s^f}\Phi(m,n)$, this implies

$$\frac{P_{m+1,n}(s^f)}{w} \le \frac{P_{mn}(s^f)}{w} \qquad \text{for all } m \ge M_P(n).$$

For the dependence on n, Lemma 4.3 implies that, for each fixed m, the wage-adjusted industry price is weakly decreasing in n. Therefore, for each $n \in \{1,\dots,n^*-1\}$,

$$\frac{P_{m,n+1}(s^f)}{w} \le \frac{P_{mn}(s^f)}{w}.$$

Finally, each active industry earns the same revenue flow $\bar{Y}$, so

$$Y_{mn}(s^f) = \frac{\bar{Y}}{P_{mn}(s^f)}.$$

Therefore the previous price inequalities imply

$$Y_{m+1,n}(s^f) \ge Y_{mn}(s^f) \qquad \text{for all } m \ge M_P(n),$$

and

$$Y_{m,n+1}(s^f) \ge Y_{mn}(s^f) \qquad \text{for each } m \text{ and } n \in \{1,\dots,n^*-1\}.$$

This proves part (ii).

For part (iii), Corollary 4.6 implies that, under Assumption 4.1, the expected technology gap of surviving oligopoly cohorts is weakly increasing for sufficiently large ages. In addition, the number of followers cannot decrease along the industry life-cycle. Hence sufficiently old surviving oligopoly cohorts move toward states with larger gaps and weakly larger follower counts.

By part (ii), larger gaps and larger follower counts imply lower relative prices and higher quantities in sufficiently mature oligopoly states. By Lemma 4.1, for fixed n,

$$\lim_{m\to\infty} x_{mn} = \lim_{m\to\infty} x_{-mn} = 0,$$

and entry becomes unprofitable once follower counts are sufficiently high. Thus, as surviving oligopoly cohorts become more mature, innovation incentives weaken and entry becomes less attractive. Finally, leadership turnover within any fixed unit interval becomes less likely in large-gap states, because follower catch-up probabilities become small and a turnover event requires the gap to be reduced before leadership can change. Therefore, for sufficiently large ages, surviving oligopoly cohorts move toward lower-price, higher-quantity, lower-innovation, lower-entry, and lower-turnover states. This proves part (iii).

B Equilibrium Definition

B.1 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations and Normalization

The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are as follows.

$$
\begin{aligned}
rV^M_{\hat{s}} - \dot{V}^M_{\hat{s}} &= \max_{x\in[0,\infty)} \Pi^M_{\hat{s}} - R(x)\bar{Y} + x(V^M_{\hat{s}+1} - V^M_{\hat{s}}) + z\theta_M(V_{01} - V^M_{\hat{s}}) - \delta V^M_{\hat{s}} \quad \text{for } s \in \{1,2,\cdots\},\\
rV_{mn} - \dot{V}_{mn} &= \max_{x\in[0,\infty)} \Pi_{mn} - R(x)\bar{Y} + x(V_{m+1n} - V_{mn}) + nx_{-mn}(V_{m-1n} - V_{mn})\\
&\qquad + z\theta_{mn}(V_{mn+1} - V_{mn}) - \delta V_{mn} \quad \text{for } m,n \in \{1,2,\cdots\},\\
rV_{-mn} - \dot{V}_{-mn} &= \max_{x\in[0,\infty)} \Pi_{-mn} - R(x)\bar{Y} + (x + (n-1)x_{-mn})(V_{-m+1n} - V_{-mn}) + x_{mn}(V_{-m-1n} - V_{-mn})\\
&\qquad + z\theta_{mn}(V_{-mn+1} - V_{-mn}) - \delta V_{-mn} \quad \text{for } m,n \in \{1,2,\cdots\},\\
rV_{0n} - \dot{V}_{0n} &= \max_{x\in[0,\infty)} \Pi_{0n} - R(x)\bar{Y} + x(V_{1n} - V_{0n}) + nx_{0n}(V_{-1n} - V_{0n})\\
&\qquad + z\theta_{0n}(V_{0n+1} - V_{0n}) - \delta V_{0n} \quad \text{for } n \in \{1,2,\cdots\},
\end{aligned}
$$

where θs are the weighted entry decision as previously defined.

Define $v := \frac{V}{\bar{Y}}$, with corresponding state sub/superscripts. As $\dot{V} = \dot{v}\bar{Y} + v\dot{\bar{Y}}$ and $\frac{\dot{\bar{Y}}}{\bar{Y}} = g - g_N = r - \rho - g_N$,

$$
rV - \dot{V} = rv\bar{Y} - \dot{v}\bar{Y} - v\dot{\bar{Y}} = (\rho + g_N)v\bar{Y} - \dot{v}\bar{Y}.
$$

In a stationary equilibrium, the RHS of normalized HJBs become time-invariant, so $\dot{v} = 0$ for any states.

B.2 Kolmogorov forward equations

The Kolmogorov forward equations for industry shares are as follows. In a stationary equilibrium, $\dot{\mu} = 0$.

$$(\delta + g_N)\mu_1^M + \dot{\mu}_1^M = -x_1^M \mu_1^M + \gamma - z\theta_M \mu_1^M, \tag{17}$$

$$(\delta + g_N)\mu_{\hat{s}}^M + \dot{\mu}_{\hat{s}}^M = x_{\hat{s}-1}^M \mu_{\hat{s}-1}^M - x_{\hat{s}}^M \mu_{\hat{s}}^M - z\theta_M \mu_{\hat{s}}^M \quad \text{for } s \geq 2, \tag{18}$$

$$(\delta + g_N)\mu_{01} + \dot{\mu}_{01} = x_{-11}\mu_{11} - 2x_{01}\mu_{01} + z\theta_M \mu_M - z\theta_{01}\mu_{01}, \tag{19}$$

$$(\delta + g_N)\mu_{0n} + \dot{\mu_{0n}} = nx_{-1n}\mu_{1n} - (n+1)x_{0n}\mu_{0n} + z\theta_{0n-1}\mu_{0n-1} - z\theta_{0n}\mu_{0n} \quad \text{for } n \geq 2, \tag{20}$$

$$(\delta + g_N)\mu_{11} + \dot{\mu_{11}} = 2x_{01}\mu_{01} + x_{-21}\mu_{21} - (x_{11} + x_{-11})\mu_{11} - z\theta_{11}\mu_{11}, \tag{21}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(\delta + g_N)\mu_{1n} + \dot{\mu_{1n}} = {} & (n+1)x_{0n}\mu_{0n} + nx_{-2n}\mu_{2n} - (x_{1n} + nx_{-1n})\mu_{1n} \\ & + z\theta_{1n-1}\mu_{1n-1} - z\theta_{1n}\mu_{1n} \quad \text{for } n \geq 2,\end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(\delta + g_N)\mu_{mn} + \dot{\mu_{mn}} = {} & x_{m-1n}\mu_{m-1n} + nx_{-m-1n}\mu_{m+1n} - (x_{mn} + nx_{-mn})\mu_{mn} \\ & + z\theta_{mn-1}\mu_{mn-1} - z\theta_{mn}\mu_{mn} \quad \text{for } m \geq 1 \text{ and } n \geq 2,\end{aligned} \tag{23}$$

B.3 Market clearing conditions

$$\begin{aligned}
Y &= C + Y\left(\mathcal{R} + \mathcal{K}\right), \\
&\quad \text{where } \mathcal{R} = \sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M R(x_{\hat{s}}^M) + \sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \mu_{mn}\left(R(x_{mn}) + nR(x_{-mn})\right) \\
&\quad \text{and } \mathcal{K} = z\left(\mu_M \int_{\underline{\kappa}}^{\hat{\kappa}_M} \kappa dG(\kappa) + \sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \mu_{mn} \int_{\underline{\kappa}}^{\hat{\kappa}_{mn}} \kappa dG(\kappa)\right), \\
1 &= \frac{Y}{w}\left(\sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M \lambda^{-\hat{s}} + \sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \mu_{mn}\left(\frac{n(\sigma-1)\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma}}{(\sigma n + \phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma})(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n)}\right.\right. \\
&\qquad \left.\left. + \frac{n(\sigma-1)(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1)}{(\sigma(\phi_{mn}^{1-\sigma} + n - 1) + 1)(\phi_m^{1-\sigma} + n)}\right)\right). \\
A &= Y\left(\sum_{\hat{s}=1}^{\infty} \mu_{\hat{s}}^M v_{\hat{s}}^M + \sum_{m=0}^{\infty}\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \mu_M(v_m + v_{-m})\right).
\end{aligned}$$

C Quantitative Appendix

C.1 Computation Procedure

For computation, I need to set a maximum level a monopolist can reach and a maximum gap and a maximum number of followers that an oligopoly can achieve. The numbers I choose are

30, 50, and 30 in order which are large enough for calculating the outcomes. Main algorithm of the quantitative model is as follows.

1. Guess γ and v_{01}.
2. Solve for monopoly values.
3. Solve for oligopoly values using the new v_1^M.
4. Solve for stationary distribution and new γ.
5. Check if the new γ and v_{01} match the initial guess. If not, go back to the first step.

C.2 Transition Probability and Industry Variables

From the process of industry states, I can define a transition probability between different states after t amount of time, conditional on the industry's survival, as follows.

$$P_{x_1x_2}(t) = P(state(t+h) = x_2 | state(h) = x_1 \text{ and not destroyed until } t+h)$$

where $state(t) \in \{1, 2, \cdots, s, \cdots\} \cup \{01, 02, \cdots, mn, \cdots\}$ is the state of the firm at time t. The corresponding Kolmogorov backward and forward equations are as follows.

$$\dot{P}(t) = RP(t)$$
$$\dot{P}(t) = P(t)R$$

where R is a transition rate matrix of the process conditional of the survival of the industry. With the Kolmogorov equations and R, the transition probabilities conditional on survival can be derived as $P(t) = e^{Rt}$.