Demand for Gender Equality in Conservative Contexts

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Abstract

Societies have dramatically changed their stance on many sociocultural issues over the last century. When such shifts occur, it is often unclear whether citizens are driving them or responding to cues from political elites. We estimate the effect of elite platform shifts toward more liberal positions on voter preferences and partisan realignment by leveraging two independently implemented campaign experiments conducted during the 2023 and 2024 Turkish elections. In these experiments, pro-opposition parties advanced distinct policy promises: one introducing a more progressive stance on gender equality, and another focused on more conventional, ideologically moderate issues. We document two key findings. First, official voting records reveal that gender-equality promises, rather than generating backlash, increased the opposition bloc vote share by as much as the conventional campaign (1.1 percentage points). Despite these similar aggregate effects and the campaigns being delivered by the same party, the two campaigns reshaped support within the opposition bloc differently: the gender campaign shifted votes toward the most liberal party, whereas the non-gender campaign shifted support toward the most traditional party, suggesting voters respond to issue salience rather than party persuasion. Second, we collect post-election survey data and uncover a striking divergence between the effects in administrative voting records and those in self-reported vote choice. This discrepancy is especially pronounced for the gender intervention and is accompanied by more regressive reported gender attitudes. This divergence appears to be driven by misreporting rather than by survey implementation. Overall, our findings demonstrate genuine support for progressive gender policy promises in a conservative and polarized context, even though such promises may simultaneously generate reported—or publicly expressed—backlash.

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1 Introduction

Over the past century, societies around the world have experienced profound shifts toward more liberal values on cultural and social issues. Milestones such as the widespread adoption of women's suffrage, the expansion of LGBTQ+ protections, the legalization of divorce in Catholic-majority countries, and the criminalization of marital rape reflect a broad movement toward greater civil rights and personal freedoms. These long-run changes can be understood as the outcome of an equilibrium between political supply, as elites adapt their platforms and policies, and political demand, as citizens' preferences evolve over time. Despite this historical trajectory, contemporary politics continues to display deep tensions around sociocultural issues. In many contexts, recent progress on gender equality has slowed or even reversed, while political polarization has intensified, often with sociocultural issues at its core. Understanding how elite advocacy for progressive gender policies shapes citizens' responses is therefore essential for assessing the prospects for reform and for understanding the roots of ongoing social conflict.

The challenge in isolating these effects is threefold. First, party platforms typically bundle multiple issues, making it difficult to identify voter responses to specific policy positions. Second, commonly used methods for eliciting attitudes toward sensitive topics, such as surveys, may be particularly ill-suited and are prone to misreporting [Kuran, 1995]. Respondents may feel social pressure, fear repercussions for expressing their views, or view surveys as a low-stakes opportunity to signal expressive preferences. This issue is particularly acute under authoritarian rule, where progressive policies face strong opposition and freedom of expression is constrained. Third, the direction of causality is often unclear: do citizens' preferences drive party positions, or do party signals shape voter preferences? Together, these hurdles have constrained our ability to credibly assess voter responses to elite advocacy for progressive gender policies.

We address these challenges through two independently conducted field experiments in Turkey, a conservative, semi-authoritarian context ranked 124th out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum's 2022 Global Gender Gap Report, positioning it among the lowest-performing countries in terms of gender equality. Following a non-partisan approach, we contacted all five major parties and invited them to collaborate on a study of voter demand for democratic norms. Two opposition parties agreed to participate: the İYİ Party during the 2023 national elections in Kars and the CHP during the 2024 local elections in İzmir, where the intervention was implemented at a considerably larger scale.

In both cases, neighborhoods were randomly assigned to receive either (i) a gender-equality campaign addressing gender-based domestic violence, pay equality, and women's

labor force participation; (ii) a non-gender campaign focused on transparency and education; or (iii) no campaign. We measure voter responses using administrative voting records at the neighborhood level. In İzmir, we also conducted an individual-level post-election survey, enabling us to compare self-reported (public) support with actual (private) voting behavior and to measure additional attitudes.

Using official ballot-box–level returns, we find that both campaigns increased support for the opposition bloc by approximately one percentage point across the two experiments—an effect equivalent to roughly 2 percent of the control-group mean. In neither case do we detect meaningful changes in aggregate turnout, indicating that the campaigns operated through vote switching rather than mobilization.

Despite their similar aggregate effects, however, the two interventions reshaped support within the opposition differently. The non-gender campaign primarily increased vote share for the mainstream opposition party (CHP), including in the province where it delivered the canvass. By contrast, the gender-equality campaign shifted support toward the DEM Party, the opposition party most strongly associated with gender equality and minority rights, even though the DEM Party did not deliver the campaign in either province.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that voters respond to the content of elite appeals rather than simply rewarding the party that makes contact: when gender equality is made salient, voters disproportionately support the party perceived as most credible on that issue, whereas more conventional policy appeals benefit the mainstream opposition. Importantly, shifts toward more liberal gender positions are not electorally penalized; if anything, they are as salient to voters as conventional policy platforms in shaping vote choice. These patterns replicate across two sharply different contexts—a large, urban, and relatively secular metropolitan province (İzmir) and a smaller, more rural and economically less developed province (Kars)—and remain robust across election types and alternative specifications.

In contrast to the administrative results, the post-election survey, based on more than 3,300 respondents across treated and control neighborhoods, reveals a pronounced divergence in estimated treatment effects. In treated neighborhoods, respondents exposed to either campaign report lower support for the opposition relative to the control group, despite the increase in opposition vote share observed in official returns. The magnitude of this discrepancy is economically large: the gender-equality campaign is associated with an 11 percentage point decline in reported opposition support, while the non-gender campaign produces a smaller negative estimate. These reported declines are driven primarily by reduced self-reported support for the CHP, the delivering party in İzmir, and are accompanied by higher reported abstention and a marginal increase in unwillingness to disclose vote choice. Yet we observe no corresponding decline in administrative turnout. Across outcomes,

the divergence between administrative and survey-based treatment effects is larger for the gender-equality campaign.

We first assess whether the divergence could be explained by survey representativeness or implementation issues. Explaining the discrepancy through selective participation would require strong heterogeneous treatment effects across voter types, yet we detect little evidence of such heterogeneity in either the administrative or survey data. Nor do our results change meaningfully when we reweight observations to match neighborhood-level population characteristics. More importantly, we carefully examine survey implementation and find no systematic differences in enumerator behavior or field procedures across treatment arms that could plausibly account for the observed patterns.

We then examine misreporting as an explanation for the divergence between administrative and survey treatment effects. We explore two potential sources of misreporting: intra-household pressures and external survey-context forces, such as concerns about monitoring or expressive responses. We find limited evidence that the campaigns increased intra-household monitoring during interviews, although some heterogeneity patterns are consistent with intra-household influence; in particular, the divergence in treatment effects is more pronounced among women than men. At the same time, several findings are more consistent with external pressures. Treated respondents—particularly under the gender-equality campaign—express more regressive gender attitudes and are rated as less friendly by enumerators, patterns that are difficult to reconcile with data-quality explanations but consistent with expressive reactions or reluctance to disclose true political preferences in a survey setting. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the divergence reflects misreporting in public responses rather than flaws in survey design.

Our study relates to several strands of literature in political economy and development economics. First, we contribute to the literature on understanding policy support and backlash in response to policies and laws on cultural issues (e.g., Gethin et al. [2022], Longuet-Marx [2025], Wheaton [2022], Gulesci et al. [2025]) and the role of institutional signals, e.g., organizations, government, and political actors, in changing attitudes and perceptions of norms [Bursztyn et al., 2020, Dhar et al., 2022, Tankard and Paluck, 2016]. Methodologically, we follow other studies in using variation in political positions to recover voter preferences, and contribute to these studies by using experimental variation [Adams et al., 2004, Elff, 2009, Evans and Tilley, 2012, Danieli et al., 2024, Longuet-Marx, 2025]. The positive electoral effects we document demonstrate that even in conservative, semi-authoritarian contexts, there exists demand for gender equality policies that parties can activate through campaign policy promises. Therefore, our work complements the literature examining determinants of gender equality [Alesina et al., 2013, Bursztyn et al., 2020] by focusing on the

supply side—how elite advocacy interacts with citizen preferences.

Second, we contribute to understanding voter sophistication and multidimensional political choice. Our finding that DEM—not the campaign-delivering parties—captured the largest vote share gains in response to gender-equality messaging provides experimental evidence of issue-based rather than party-based persuasion. This speaks directly to theories of issue ownership [Petrocik, 1996, Bélanger and Meguid, 2008], which argue that voters select parties based on perceived competence when issues become salient.

Third, our paper contributes to research on the challenges of measuring political preferences in settings where survey responses may diverge from actual behavior [Frye et al., 2017, Blair et al., 2020] . Had we relied solely on survey data, we would have concluded that gender-equality campaigns triggered backlash; the administrative data reveal the opposite. This divergence could reflect either differential selection into survey response—which Dutz et al. [2024] show can substantially bias survey-based inference in the context of labor market outcomes—or a form of expressive backlash, where voters use the low-stakes survey setting to register discontent with their party's progressive messaging without actually punishing them at the ballot box. Regardless of mechanism, the substantive implication is the same: surveys may not only understate true effects but show effects of the opposite sign when treatments alter either reporting incentives or respondent composition. This has implications for interpreting the literature on gender attitudes, where apparent backlash effects [Cullen et al., 2024, Beaman et al., 2012] may partly reflect measurement artifacts rather than genuine preference shifts.

Finally, this paper complements the experimental literature on evaluating the impact of policy promises on voter behavior [Kendall et al., 2015, Cruz et al., 2024, 2025] and studies using door-to-door campaigns as a methodology to uncover voters' revealed preferences from experimental variation in informational environments [Baysan, 2022, Acemoglu et al., 2025]. Although door-to-door campaigns require substantial organizational capacity, they allow us to vary a specific message at scale, generate salient neighborhood-level exposure, and link treatment to administrative election returns, an advantage relative to many media-based designs, where exposure and content are harder to isolate. The positive electoral response to gender-equality proposals implies that politicians may underestimate demand for progressive reforms. The misreporting we document may itself contribute to this underestimation: if elites rely on polls showing conservative attitudes, they may fail to adopt platforms that voters would actually support. Altogether, these dynamics may help explain why high levels of gender inequality, and perceptions of divisions surrounding sociocultural issues, persist even when voters are willing to reward progressive policy at the ballot box.

2 Background

2.1 Gender Inequality in Turkey

Gender inequality in Türkiye remains substantial by international comparison. In the World Economic Forum's *Global Gender Gap Report* (2022), Türkiye ranked 124th out of 146 countries, reflecting persistent gaps in political representation, labor-force participation, and protection from gender-based violence [World Economic Forum, 2022]. Compared to the 2024 OECD average female labor-force participation rate (FLFP, 54%), Türkiye's FLFP is substantially lower at 37%, placing it closer to India (32%) and Saudi Arabia (33%) and below Bangladesh (39%), all of which are characterized by relatively conservative gender norms [World Bank, 2026].

These broader gender inequalities are also evident in patterns of gender-based violence. Based on 2018 data, 32 percent of women in Turkey report having experienced intimate partner violence, compared with a global average of 27 percent.[1] While additional administrative data on gender-based violence in Türkiye are limited, available statistics seem consistent with the presence of an underlying issue. The Ministry of Family and Social Services of Türkiye reported a 58% increase in applications per center to Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers, from 2,037 to 3,214, between 2019 and 2024, a period during which these centers operated nationwide.[2]

In 2021, despite being the first country to ratify it, Türkiye withdrew from the Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe treaty designed to prevent and combat violence against women, further elevating the salience of women's rights in public debate [Association for Monitoring Gender Equality (CEID), 2025]. Using data from V-Dem, Figure 1 illustrates these disparities, showing parallel declines over the past decade in the democracy index, women's political empowerment, and civil-liberties indicators.

2.2 Political Context, Parties and the 2023 and 2024 Elections

Over the past two decades, Türkiye's political landscape has been shaped by the prolonged dominance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The party's early years were marked by economic growth and tentative political reforms, but by the late 2000s, these had given way to growing centralization of power and a pattern of democratic backsliding. This period saw restrictions on media independence, the weakening of institutional checks, and the erosion of civil liberties, leaving the

[1] See data source description here: https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/turkiye

[2] See Ministry of Family and Social Services of Türkiye, Monthly Statistical Bulletins, available at https://www.aile.gov.tr/sgbd/istatistik-sayfalari/aylik-istatistik-bulteni/.

country with increasingly constrained political competition.

The May 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections took place amid severe economic hardship, soaring inflation, and the devastation of the February earthquakes. The election also followed more than 20 years of rule by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP, during which Türkiye saw one of the steepest erosions of democratic institutions worldwide—ranked second only to Nicaragua in V-Dem data (Freedom House, 2024). Two major blocs dominated the contest. The governing AKP, allied with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, far-right) in the "People's Alliance," retained its parliamentary majority and secured President Erdoğan's re-election. Opposing them was the "Nation Alliance," led by the Republican People's Party (CHP, secular center-left) under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and joined by the Good Party (İYİ Party, a smaller center-right party) and several smaller parties. The pro-Kurdish and left-liberal Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party, formerly HDP) also played a meaningful role in the broader opposition camp. The DEM Party was part of the Labor and Freedom Alliance in 2023 Election period which was made up of various other Kurdish and left-wing parties, but publicly announced its support for Kılıçdaroğlu for the presidential election. The AKP won about 35.6% of the parliamentary vote and the CHP had the second-highest vote share of about 25.3%, illustrating the ruling coalition's electoral resilience. In the second round of the presidential election, Erdoğan beat Kılıçdaroğlu with 52% of the vote share securing his 20th consecutive year in leading the nation.

The March 2024 local elections were held across all metropolitan and district municipalities. The party system during this period was structured around three poles. In İzmir and most cities, the governing AKP and its ally, the MHP, again contested together as the "People's Alliance". The CHP, now led by Özgür Özel, and İYİ Party ran independently. The DEM Party fielded two candidates (one female, one male) for both metropolitan and district mayor elections across several provinces including İzmir, whereas other parties nominated only one candidate per race, with varying demographic profiles. The CHP achieved notable gains, winning control of 35 provinces, including key metropolitan areas such as İzmir, while the AKP's share of provincial capitals declined to 24 percent. These outcomes reflected a mix of continuity and change: the ruling coalition remained dominant in much of Anatolia, but opposition parties consolidated influence in urban centers. This political landscape provides the setting for our analysis of voter responses to gender-focused and non-gender campaign appeals across the 2023 and 2024 elections.

2.3 İzmir and Kars

We conduct our analysis in two contrasting provinces. İzmir (population ≈4.4 million) is a large, urban, secular-leaning metropolitan area. Kars (population ≈270,000) is smaller, rural, and more conservative on average. Labor-market participation illustrates the disparities between two provinces. Female labor-force participation (FLFP) is low overall and varies across regions: metropolitan İzmir exhibits a substantially higher FLFP rate (about 45%) than the more rural NUTS-2 region including Kars (about 32%), underscoring the heterogeneity in baseline gender norms and economic opportunities across our two study sites. [3]

The experimental sample in Kars, and its broader population, is more rural and smaller than in İzmir. The average number of registered voters per neighborhood is 2,961 in İzmir and 332 in Kars. Additionally, 63% and 83% of voters have less than a high school degree in İzmir and Kars, respectively. 50% and 78% of voters live in poor areas in İzmir and Kars, respectively.[4] Finally, around 12% of İzmir's population migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces, our proxy for ethnicity.[5] Panel C also provides detailed descriptive statistics from our endline survey, which we turn to later in Section 5. The table also provides information on the party vote share distribution for each province, which we also illustrate in Appendix Figure A-1. This figure shows that the opposition party is dominant in our experimental sample in İzmir and the reverse is true in Kars. Additionally, the vote share is more fragmented across parties in Kars. The CHP (35%) and the AKP (30%) are the two dominant parties in İzmir whereas the AKP (53%) is the dominant party in Kars. Additionally, the vote share across opposition parties is more fragmented in Kars with the CHP having 9.8% of the vote share, the İYİ party having 5.9% of the vote share and the DEM Party having 18.5% of the vote share. Therefore, another significant difference is the prominence of the pro-minority and Kurdish rights party in Kars, the DEM Party. Voter turnout is also lower in Kars: 77% compared to 88% in İzmir, despite turnout being generally higher for the presidential and general elections than for the local elections.

[3] Data source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), Turkish Labor Force Survey microdata, 2019.

[4] Socioeconomic status (SES) of the neighborhood is based on the real estate website Endeksa's SES Index which uses a statistical model that combines data on household characteristics, demographic composition, and real estate indicators. Poor areas are defined as those classified under group C and below in the index. See the detailed description of Endeksa SES Index here: https://www.endeksa.com/en/blog/article/what-is-socio-economic-status-ses-why-is-it-important-in-the-choice-of-housing-and-land

[5] Estimated migrant share is defined as the share of neighborhood residents originating from Kurdish-majority provinces, weighted by the maximum combined vote share of DEM and HÜDAPAR in the corresponding province over the past ten years. A province is classified as Kurdish-majority if DEM has at least the second-highest vote share in that province. Data source: Endeksa Demographics Data https://www.endeksa.com/tr/analiz/turkiye/izmir/demografi. We only recently accessed the equivalent data for Kars, and will include it in the analysis soon.

2.4 Parties' Issue Ownership

Issue ownership on gender and broader civil-rights questions is not uniform across parties. The DEM Party has consistently emphasized women's and minority rights in its platform and organizational practices. In the 2023 parliamentary elections, DEM fielded the highest share of female candidates (43%), ahead of CHP (27%), İYİ (26%), AKP (19.2%), and MHP (15.5%); it also elected the highest share of female MPs (47.4%), compared with CHP (18.5%), İYİ (11.4%), AKP (19%), and MHP (8%). Figure 2 summarizes V-Party (V-Dem) party positions for three Turkish political blocs across four dimensions: clientelism, support for minority rights, women's representation in national-level party leadership, and support for women's labor force participation [Lindberg et al., 2022]. Scores are shown on a common -5 to +5 scale with confidence intervals reflecting uncertainty in country experts' ratings. Overall, the figure indicates that the AKP/MHP (People) is coded as comparatively less supportive across these dimensions (negative values), the CHP/İYİ (Nation) as moderately supportive (positive but smaller magnitudes), and the DEM as the most supportive, especially on minority rights and gender equality. The DEM and the CHP/İYİ are tied on the clientilism measure. These differences imply clear partisan variation in the credibility of gender-equality-promoting pledges, a feature we exploit when interpreting electoral responses to gender-focused campaigning.

3 Experimental Design and Data

This study investigates informational interventions that communicated campaign promises on gender-related and non-gender policy issues through large-scale, door-to-door canvassing delivered to voters shortly before the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections and the 2024 local elections in Türkiye. We evaluate their effects on vote share using official administrative election returns, as well as on changes in voters' attitudes, self-reported voting behavior, and other outcomes using post-election survey data. This section gives an overview of the timeline and the design of the two experiments, and describes the survey and administrative data.

3.1 Timeline

In December 2022, we extended invitations to the five parties represented in parliament, the AKP, the CHP, the HDP, the İYİ Party, and the MHP, to participate in a previous study related to voters' preferences for democratic institutions for the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections (See Acemoglu et al. [2025] for details.) The İYİ Party and the CHP

agreed to participate in the study. This involved disseminating information about the state and value of democratic institutions through a door-to-door information campaign in İzmir.

During the implementation phase of the previous study by Acemoglu et al. [2025], the İYİ Party proposed that we also evaluate a small-scale door-to-door campaign in Kars, in which the party planned to share policy promises on gender equality and women's civil liberties as part of its campaign for the 2023 elections. Given the relevance of this topic to democracy and civil liberties, we agreed to evaluate their proposed campaign as a randomized control trial. We submitted a separate PAP for it, because the campaign messages were distinct from the other study, the intervention could not be implemented in İzmir, and it was conducted at a smaller scale. The İYİ Party started campaigning less than two weeks before the presidential and general elections, and completed the intervention two days before the election. The İYİ Party designed the details of the campaign. This initiative was not part of the İYİ's broader national strategy but the campaign team in Kars wanted to understand how such a platform shift would impact voters.

In December 2023, we invited same five parties for a collaboration to replicate the study on gender equality for the 2024 local elections. We also followed-up with them January 2024. Following this invitation, the CHP and the İYİ Party agreed to collaborate; however, the İYİ Party was unable to implement the intervention. The CHP planned to implement the door-to-door campaign in four provinces –Adana, Manisa, Muğla, and İzmir– between March 3rd, 2024 and March 28th, 2024, stopping a few days before the election. While the CHP printed the required pamphlets for all provinces, they successfully implemented the campaign only in İzmir.[6] We therefore administered the endline survey only in İzmir.

Data collection in İzmir begun five weeks after the election due to Ramadan and the politically tense environment, and was completed in the first week of June 2024.[7] We did not implement a baseline survey given all of the uncertainty surrounding the election and the CHP's capacity to organize a campaign in different provinces. After the loss of the 2023 presidential election, the party's volunteer capacity dwindled. Additionally, the headquarters were not fully aware that the local politicians and staff did not want to coordinate with them. Finally, the party did not choose it's candidates until just two months prior to the election.

[6]Details of the province-level issues are provided in our AEA registry.

[7]Survey data collection around Turkish elections is challenging. After the 2023 presidential and general elections, we were unable to implement an endline survey, despite having implemented a baseline survey. This was a historical and polarizing elections, as the opposition was expecting Erdogan's longstanding rule to come to an end. The conditions were less tense after the 2024 local elections, and we waited to start data collection and create distance from the election.

3.2 Experimental Design for Kars and İzmir

3.2.1 Recruitment and Sample

Randomization between different policy promise treatments and the control group was at the neighborhood level in each experiment, as the neighborhood is the smallest geographic unit in official electoral data that we can track over time. The districts included in each sample were selected by the implementing parties. The details of sampling vary across two provinces:

İzmir

There are 30 districts in İzmir and 4 are included in our sample: Menderes, Menemen, Bayraklı, and Karabağlar. We used data from the 2023 Parliamentary Elections to exclude from our sample neighborhoods that were too remote, would require more time for our canvassers to visit a sufficient number of voters (number of registered voters was smaller than 150 or greater than 9,000), or where any party received more than 75% of the vote share and CHP received more than 65% or less than 10% of the vote share in the previous presidential election. Randomization is stratified by six quantiles of vote share for the National Alliance in 2023 Parliamentary Elections. We ended up with a final experimental sample of 146 neighborhoods, out of which 96 were randomly selected as treatment neighborhoods.[8] These treatment neighborhoods contained 305,571 registered voters according to our 2024 Local Elections rolls.

Kars

There are 8 districts in Kars and 3 are included in our sample: Sarıkamış, Arpaçay, and Akyaka. We used data from the 2018 Parliamentary Elections to exclude from our sample neighborhoods that were outliers in terms of neighborhood size (number of registered voters was smaller than 150 or greater than 9,000) and had more than 50% of votes for the Nation Alliance. Randomization is stratified by district and terciles of the vote share of Nation Alliance in 2018 Presidential Elections. We ended up with a final experimental sample of 91 neighborhoods, out of which 44 were randomly selected as treatment neighborhoods. These treatment neighborhoods contained 14,165 voters according to our 2023 Parliamentary Elections rolls. We needed to keep the sample size small due to having limited time for implementation and the İYİ Party's limited resources. Due to the small number of treated neighborhoods in Kars, we had statistical power to detect only large treatment effects.

The total number of registered voters and neighborhoods in our experimental sample for Kars and İzmir are shown in Appendix Table A-1.

[8] We selected a well-balanced draw from among 10,000 re-randomizations to avoid other chance imbalances for each treatment arm (following Banerjee, Chassang, and Snowberg 2017).

3.2.2 Treatment Description: Policy Promise Campaigns

In both provinces, the intervention involved a door-to-door canvassing campaign in which canvassers distributed and explained a brochure presenting the party's policy pledges. Each treated neighborhood was assigned to a single brochure type, and all households within the neighborhood were visited. The control group did not receive either of these two campaigns. Canvassers verbally explained the pamphlet content to any voting-age household member who opened the door and left behind a pamphlet regardless of whether the door was opened.

In one treatment arm, which we refer to as gender-equality campaign, voters received a brochure containing campaign policy pledges to promote gender equality. The İYİ Party designed the original pamphlet for the 2023 elections. They chose to focus on three themes: economic empowerment, domestic violence, and financial assistant for child and elderly care. The İYİ Party also included its party logo and its affiliation with the Nation Alliance on the pamphlet, indicating its explicit support for Kilicdaroglu as the presidential candidate and the broader alliance. The research team shared the pamphlet with the CHP ahead of the 2024 local election. Following the Nation Alliance's unsuccessful performance in the 2023 elections, and broader ideological rifts, the İYİ Party left the Nation Alliance before the 2024 local elections. The CHP modified some of the details, but included the three same policy themes as the İYİ Party, in addition to its party logo and the name and picture of the district's political candidate. As examples, both parties made promises to establish job training centers for women, monthly basic income support, establishing justice centers to provide legal support for victims of domestic violence, and monetary support for childcare and elderly care. Further details of the pledges can be seen in Appendix Figure A-2.

In the other treatment arm, which we refer to as the non-gender specific campaign, the brochure included policy pledges that were not designed to target preferences specifically related to gender inequality and addressed issues usually emphasized by the implementing parties. The topics of the pledges in the second treatment differed across two experiments due to the parties' different priorities. In Kars, the pledges addressed "youth" issues such as subsidizing university tuition, eliminating nepotism, and establishing autonomy of universities from the state. In İzmir, the policy pledges consisted of the pledges to use municipality resources more efficiently if elected, including increased savings, public participation in budget creation, and more transparent budgeting. The party and alliance-related details remained the same as the gender equality campaign. Our purpose of including non-gender specific campaign treatment arm is to isolate the effects of the specific campaign promises from party canvasser effects on vote share. The details of the non-gender specific campaign can be seen in Appendix Figure A-3.

3.3 Data

3.3.1 Electoral Data: Kars and İzmir

Our analysis of administrative electoral results relies on official ballot box–level data on vote shares and turnout from the 2023 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and the 2024 Local Elections, obtained from the Turkish Supreme Election Council's website. Our sample covers 117 ballot boxes in Kars and 1,383 ballot boxes in İzmir. Summary statistics for the post-treatment electoral variables used in our analysis are reported in Panels A and B of Appendix Table A-5 for İzmir and Appendix Table A-6 for Kars. Summary statistics for the pre-treatment electoral variables are reported in Panel A of Table 1 for İzmir and Table 2 for Kars.

3.3.2 Survey Data: İzmir

Between April 30th, 2024 and June 3rd, 2024, we administered an endline survey in our sample of neighborhoods in İzmir to measure the treatment effect primarily on self-reported voting preferences, individual attitudes towards the issues addresses by election campaigns in both treatment arms, and their perceived norms on these issues. We aimed to collect between 16 and 20 respondents per neighborhood, and surveyors visited all neighborhoods in both the treatment and control groups.

Surveyors conducted door-to-door interviews using a random-walk sampling strategy. They began from four focal points in each neighborhood, which were selected to maximize residential coverage. After completing the first household interview, they proceeded to every fifth building, conducting one survey per building. Surveyors approached households and invited one voting-eligible household member to participate. Respondents were informed that the survey was being administered by researchers at a local university and focused on local government policies.

The survey takes approximately ten minutes to complete and covers questions on: (1) Socio-demographic characteristics; (2) attitudes toward and perceived norms regarding gender equality and corruption; (3) policy priorities and rankings of gender-progressive and other policies; (4) respondent's perception on political parties' competence in implementing different policies; (5) exposure to election campaigns; (6) additional respondent characteristics, including voting preferences in the district mayor election; and (7) interviewer-reported interview conditions. Details on survey summary statistics and balance tests are provided in Section 5.

3.3.3 Neighborhood Demographic Data: Kars and İzmir

We use two different data sources of neighborhood-level demographics to assess the robustness of our estimates to different survey weights and to further investigate the mechanisms underlying the treatment effect. First, we collected data of neighborhood-level demographics shared by *endeksa.com* which is a real estate data analytics and insights platform based in Türkiye. Based on information provided on their website, these data were sourced from Turkish Statistical Institute in 2023. The dataset includes counts of neighborhood residents by educational attainment, marital status, the province of Türkiye where their families originate from, and who live in an area classified under a specific socioeconomic class. Socioeconomic classes are constructed and assigned by Endeksa using a neighborhood-level index they developed, which combines data on household characteristics, demographic composition, and real estate indicators. Second, we utilize administrative data of neighborhood-level distribution of eligible voters' gender and age, provided by the political parties we collaborated with. Summary statistics for the neighborhood-level demographic variables used in our analysis are reported in Panel B of Table 1 for İzmir and Panel B of Table 2 for Kars.

4 Results Based on Administrative Electoral Data

This section examines the treatment effects of the informational campaigns on *actual* voting behavior using administrative election data. The analysis draws on the 2023 Kars intervention preceding the presidential and parliamentary elections and the larger 2024 İzmir intervention preceding the local elections, which included district mayoral, metropolitan mayoral, and municipal council races.

4.1 Empirical Strategy

Our focus is on intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, which capture the causal effect of assignment to the gender-equality campaign and to the non-gender-equality campaign. For each province, we estimate:

$$Y_{bne} = \alpha_e + \beta^G T_n^G + \beta^N T_n^N + X_{bn}' \delta_e + \varepsilon_{bne}, \tag{1}$$

where the subscript b, indexes a ballot box within neighborhood n. The index e denotes the election type, which includes the 2024 local elections for metropolitan mayor, district mayor, and council in the case of İzmir and the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in the case of Kars. The outcome Y_{bne} indicates the ballot-box–level vote share for different

parties, candidates or electoral blocs, or voter turnout, constructed from official election returns of the respective election. The variables T_n^G and T_n^N are indicators for assignment to the gender-equality and non-gender campaign treatments, respectively. The vector X_{bn} includes pre-treatment ballot-box- and neighborhood-level characteristics, with coefficients allowed to vary by election type. Finally, ε_{bne} denotes the error term.

In our baseline specification, we follow our pre-analysis plan and include: (i) a vector of neighborhood-level controls from the preceding election (2023 for İzmir and 2018 for Kars), including turnout, the number of registered voters, and vote shares for opposition parties (CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and the combined vote share of remaining opposition parties); (ii) district fixed effects and indicators for sextiles of opposition vote share, capturing the key stratification dimensions in both provinces; and (iii) the number of registered voters in the current election at the ballot-box–level controls.[9]

Our parameters of interest, β^G and β^N, capture the average treatment effects of the gender and non-gender campaigns relative to the control group that received no information. In addition to the province-specific estimates from equation (1), we report pooled treatment effects across provinces to provide an overall estimate of campaign impacts.[10] In the appendix, we present estimates by election type within each province.

Because the number of ballot boxes within a neighborhood is highly correlated with the number of voters, our baseline specifications report unweighted regression results.[11] In all specifications, we report standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level, as this is the level at which we conduct the randomization.

[9]For clarity, we adopt a baseline specification that follows the same approach in both provinces. In the Appendix, we present robustness checks addressing two considerations. First, we pre-registered a neighborhood-level specification for Kars and a ballot-box–level specification for İzmir. This difference reflected uncertainty, at the time of the Kars intervention in 2023, about the availability of ballot-box–level data. Since we subsequently obtained access to these data, we deviate from the Kars pre-analysis plan and estimate the more granular ballot-box–level specification in both provinces. This approach allows us to include finer-grained controls on the right-hand side. In Appendix Table A-2, we show that the results are very similar, though slightly noisier, when instead estimating the neighborhood-level specification. Second, due to design considerations and partner logistics, the stratification schemes differed across provinces. In Kars, randomization was stratified by district and terciles of opposition vote share in the preceding election, whereas in İzmir it was stratified by sextiles of opposition vote share. In our baseline specification, for each province, we include controls for sextiles of opposition vote share and district fixed effects. Appendix A-3 shows that using the respective stratification variables as controls (sextile fixed effects for İzmir and tercile and district fixed effects for Kars) yields very similar results.

[10]Specifically, we estimate:

$$Y_{bnpe} = \alpha_{ep} + \beta^G T_{np}^G + \beta^N T_{np}^N + X'_{bnp}\delta_{ep} + \varepsilon_{bnpe}. \tag{2}$$

[11]The Online Supplementary Material presents estimates from regressions weighted by the number of actual voters, which yields similar results.

4.2 Summary Statistics, Balance, and Compliance

Appendix Tables A-5 and A-6 present summary statistics for the main post-treatment variables in Izmir (2024) and Kars (2023). Tables 1 and 2 report baseline covariates and the corresponding balance tests for each province. We find no statistically significant imbalances across treatment groups, although some baseline differences are economically meaningful. In Izmir, for example, the DEM vote share is approximately 1 percentage points higher in neighborhoods assigned to either the gender or non-gender campaign relative to the control group. In Kars, opposition vote share is 9.6 percentage points higher in the gender group compared to the control group. Although this difference is far from statistically significant (p-values for joint significance are 0.85 and 0.33, respectively), their magnitude warrants attention. In the robustness section, we show that controlling for prior vote shares affects the magnitude of some coefficients—in the direction of the baseline differences—but in no case do these adjustments materially alter the direction of our results.

Appendix Table A-4 shows that canvassers successfully completed conversations and delivered pamphlets in 32 percent of visits in İzmir. Completion rates are similar across the gender and non-gender campaigns (p-value of equality across both campaigns is 0.58), and cross-treatment contamination—households receiving materials from a campaign different from their assignment—is rare and not differential across treatments.

4.3 Main Results

4.3.1 Support toward the Opposition Bloc

Table 3 summarizes the main treatment effects of the gender and non-gender campaigns on voting behavior using administrative records. Panels A and B report the province-specific estimates for İzmir and Kars, respectively, while Panel C reports the pooled estimates combining data from both provinces.

Column (1) reports the treatment effects on the opposition bloc's vote share. In İzmir, neighborhoods assigned to either the gender or non-gender campaign increased their support for opposition parties relative to the control group; both effects are statistically significant. In Kars, we also find positive effects for both campaigns, although the point estimate is larger in magnitude and statistically significant only for the gender campaign.

The aggregated estimates in Column (1) of Panel C indicate a precisely estimated 1 percentage point increase in the opposition vote share in response to each campaign. This effect corresponds to a 1.9 percent increase relative to the control group mean and approximately 9 percent of its standard deviation.

The one percentage point effect we estimate is comparable to, and if anything slightly larger than, those documented in related experimental studies.[12]

Column (2) reports the effects on turnout and shows that neither campaign generates statistically significant changes in participation in either province. The estimated effects are also small in magnitude—approximately 0.2 and less than 0.1 percentage points for the gender and non-gender campaigns, respectively. Therefore, the increase in support for the opposition bloc appears to reflect a shift away from the incumbent rather than higher electoral participation.

The previous results suggest that, in the context we study, campaigns on liberal issues, such as gender-equality policy promises, appear to produce genuine shifts in ideological support rather than backlash. Moreover, the fact that the aggregate effects of the gender and non-gender campaigns are similar in magnitude is consistent with the idea that campaigning on these sensitive issues can be as salient to voters as campaigning on more traditional issues. An important question, however, is whether the similarity in coefficients instead reflects a persuasion effect—namely, that voters respond to the visit itself or to being reached by the parties, rather than to the specific content of the campaign. We now turn to explore this question.

4.3.2 Party-Specific Support

Columns (3)–(6) of Table 3 decompose the bloc-level effects by party, allowing us to assess which opposition parties benefit from each campaign. Interestingly, we find highly asymmetric effects by campaign type.

In both provinces, the non-gender campaign significantly increases the CHP's vote share, raising it by about 0.9 percentage points in the pooled sample (s.e. 0.4), with no meaningful changes for other opposition parties. In contrast, the gains for the opposition bloc generated by the gender-equality campaign are driven primarily by increased support for the DEM Party; estimated effects on the remaining opposition parties are close to zero and statistically insignificant. The aggregate effect for the DEM Party under the gender-equality campaign is 0.6 percentage points (s.e. 0.2), and, as with the non-gender campaign, we observe the same pattern in both provinces.

Consistent with these differences, we reject the null hypothesis that either campaign

[12]For example, Acemoglu et al. [2025] find that informational campaigns aimed at correcting misperceptions about democracy in İzmir increased opposition vote share by 0.8 percentage points in the 2023 election. Baysan [2022] find no aggregate effects of messages on executive performance and power prior to the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum (though effects vary by baseline opposition support). Similarly, Pons [2018] show that a traditional campaign supporting François Hollande's presidential candidacy in the 2012 French election increased vote share by 0.8 percentage points.

generates equal effects across parties. The p-value for equality across all parties equals 0.043 for the gender-equality campaign and 0.044 for the non-gender campaign.[13]

These asymmetric effects are difficult to reconcile with a pure persuasion mechanism, as the only difference between the two campaigns is the message content. Moreover, recall that in İzmir both campaigns were delivered by the CHP, while in Kars both were delivered by the İYİ party. Yet we do not observe a consistent increase in support for the delivering parties following the interventions, further suggesting that persuasion is unlikely to be the primary mechanism at work. This pattern is particularly striking in the case of the gender-equality campaign, which significantly benefited the DEM Party in both provinces, despite the party not being involved in the campaign delivery in either province.

4.3.3 Further Interpretation of the Electoral Analysis Results

There are a number of mechanisms that can explain why voters increased their vote share for a party that did not deliver the campaign messages and why they voted for DEM, specifically. The campaigns may have increased the salience of gender-related policies, changed the issues that voters consider most important (agenda-setting), or legitimized and made mainstream an issue neglected by most parties other than the DEM Party. Under all of these explanations, voters prefer the party that is most credible in supporting that message and for which there is "issue ownership" [Petrocik, 1996]. It's also possible that the implementing parties were viewed as insincere and instrumentalist in promoting gender equality. This could have had a demobilizing effect for some of their voters, while mobilizing progressive voters to increase support for the DEM Party. It's less likely that the explanation is related to strategic voting where voters supported the DEM Party in order to benefit the other opposition parties. This is because we see that the DEM Party's vote share increases at the expense of the incumbent parties' vote share rather than other opposition parties.

Taken together, these findings are more consistent with issue-based voter sorting than with a pure persuasion or contact effect. If campaign visits operated mainly by increasing goodwill toward the delivering party, we would expect that party to benefit regardless of content. Instead, when the campaign emphasizes gender equality, voters disproportionately shift toward the opposition party that is most strongly associated with that issue. This pattern indicates that the campaigns increase the salience of policy positions and that voters respond in a discerning manner, selecting the party they perceive as most aligned with their preferences.

[13] P-values for equality of the two campaign types within the same party are also reported. These equal 0.137 for the CHP and 0.126 for the DEM Party, the two parties primarily driving support in the non-gender and gender-equality campaigns, respectively.

Therefore, the gender-equality campaigns led by opposition parties generated a genuine shift in voter behavior toward the opposition bloc as a whole. However, we see that the gender-equality campaign did not increase the vote share of either delivering party (the CHP and the İYİ Party). Instead, voters disproportionately shifted their votes toward the DEM Party, by 0.6 percentage points (10 percent relative to the mean). In contrast, the non-gender campaign increased the CHP's vote share by 0.9 percentage points (2.1 percent relative to the mean). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the campaign treatments have the same effect on vote share for each party, but we can reject the null hypothesis that the campaign treatment effect on each opposition party's vote share is equal.

Panels B and C show the unpooled results by province. In İzmir, the gender campaign increased DEM's vote share by 0.6 percentage points (11 percent relative to the mean), and in Kars by 3 percentage points (19 percent relative to the mean). By contrast, the non-gender campaign increased support for the delivering party (CHP) in İzmir and had no statistically significant effect on the delivering party (İYİ) in Kars. Therefore, in two distinct contexts, which vary significantly by gender inequality levels, and the campaign delivering party, we see similar patterns in voter sophistication. Taken together, these results suggest that voters respond not to party persuasion per se, but to campaigns that increase the salience of gender equality, and that they select the party that they prefer for this specific policy issue. As discussed previously, the DEM Party has a longstanding record in advocating for gender equality and is ranked higher on this issue by V-Party.

Table 3 also shows that there is no evidence of changes in aggregate voter turnout. Therefore, the results indicate that the gender-inequality campaign causes a shift from the incumbent parties to the opposition parties, and the DEM Party in particular in both İzmir and Kars.

4.3.4 Heterogeneity Analysis

Next, we investigate which voters are driving the campaign treatment effects on vote share in each province. While focused on the U.S. and other Western democracies, research investigating the rise of "populism," an issue that extends beyond Western democracies, to include countries such as Turkey, finds that there has been partisan realignment by educational levels, and in the opposite direction by gender, between "left-wing" to "right-wing" parties in recent years. Some scholars attribute this realignment to sociocultural issues rather than economic factors and preferences [Longuet-Marx, 2025, Gethin et al., 2022]. Accordingly, we estimate heterogeneous campaign treatment effects using demographic data on neighborhood-level measures of education and socio-economic status. We also use data on Kurdish ethnicity because the Kurdish population constitute the largest ethnic minority group facing significant

human rights and civil rights violations in Turkey, and the pro-Kurdish political movement is strongly linked to gender equality advocacy (e.g., Campa et al. [2024]). Finally, we also incorporate baseline oppositional vote share for the heterogeneity analysis. We use these same variables for our heterogeneity analysis with the survey data, in addition to individual level data on demographics, including gender.

Table 4 shows the results of our heterogeneity analysis in İzmir. The results indicate that the only significant source of heterogeneous treatment effect for the gender-equality campaign is the Kurdish neighborhood-level population share. The estimates in Panel A imply that neighborhoods with a Kurdish pop share 10 p.p. higher show a female treatment effect that is about twice as large. In Table 5 for Kars, we also do not see any striking heterogenous treatment effects for the gender equality campaign; the treatment effect is somewhat lower in neighborhoods with a higher oppositional vote share. Overall, we do not see evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects by education level or socio-economic status. We revisit this heterogeneity analysis when discussing the survey based data.

4.4 Robustness

One important dimension of robustness relates to the set of controls. Although we detect no statistically significant imbalances across treatment groups, the small effective number of units (neighborhoods) in the interventions implies that even statistically insignificant differences may affect the estimates. Table A-7 reports estimates using alternative control sets for aggregated opposition vote share and turnout, and Table A-8 reports the corresponding effects for each opposition party. Varying the control set does not materially affect the qualitative conclusions, although the treatment effects are smaller when we control for past vote shares, consistent with small differences in baseline vote shares across treatment arms (see Tables 1 and 2). Including additional covariates beyond lagged vote shares does not further alter the results. In all specifications, the informational treatment remains in the same direction as in Table 3. Estimates that omit controls for prior voting outcomes are less precise and not always statistically significant at the 5% level. Vote shares are highly persistent across consecutive elections in both provinces, so controlling for prior vote shares substantially reduces residual variation and increases statistical power. This consideration motivated the pre-specified inclusion of lagged vote shares in our main specification.

Appendix Table A-9 reports two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates that instrument the share of completed conversations with random assignment for İzmir (information on completed conversations is not available for Kars). The estimates indicate that full compliance—a 100 percentage point increase in completed conversations—would raise the opposition's vote

share by approximately 3 percentage points, with the gender equality campaign increasing the DEM's vote share by about 1.8 percentage points and the non-gender campaign increasing the CHP's vote share by about 2.9 percentage points. Because these estimates rely on stronger identification assumptions, we prioritize the ITT estimates in the main text and interpret the 2SLS results with caution.[14]

Opposition vote share in Table 3 serves as a proxy for support for liberal positions, as incumbent parties have largely adopted less progressive stances on sociocultural issues (Section 2). Column (1) of Appendix Table A-10 shows similar results using an alternative measure that classifies parties as liberal or non-liberal, independent of incumbent status.

The remaining columns in Appendix Table A-10 report estimates comparable to those in Table 3, but focus on incumbent rather than opposition parties. They show that the treatment effects documented above operate primarily through reductions in AKP vote share (and MHP in Kars; in Izmir, MHP ran in coalition with the AKP and did not compete separately), rather than through declines in smaller parties.

Appendix Table A-13 estimates equation (1) separately for each election type, including the 2024 local elections for district mayor, metropolitan mayor, and council in the case of İzmir, and the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections in the case of Kars. The results are highly consistent for each individual election and closely align with those reported in Table 3.

5 Results Based on Survey Data

This section discusses the intervention's effects on self-reported voting measures, contrasts them with results from administrative data, and reviews additional survey outcomes, including voters' views on gender equality issues. This analysis focuses exclusively on İzmir, where we conducted the endline survey five weeks after the 2024 local elections.

5.1 Empirical Strategy

For survey-data outcomes, we estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{ni} = \delta + \gamma_G T_n^G + \gamma_N T_n^N + X_n'\theta + v_{ni}, \tag{3}$$

[14]Identification requires that assignment affect outcomes only through completed conversations. In our setting, however, canvassers left pamphlets when no one answered the door, so assignment may have influenced voting even in the absence of a conversation. For instance, if pamphlet-only exposure has a direct effect, the 2SLS estimates reflect both conversations and pamphlet exposure. If that effect is non-negative, the 2SLS estimates provide an upper bound on the causal effect of completed conversations.

where i indexes individuals interviewed in neighborhood n. T_n^G and T_n^N are indicators equal to one if individual i resides in a neighborhood assigned to the gender or non-gender campaign, respectively. X_n denotes the vector of controls, and v_{ni} is the error term. This specification is the individual-level analogue of equation (1), and we include the same baseline set of controls.[15]

As in the previous section, standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. We weight each observation by the ratio of the number of voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents in that neighborhood, ensuring that the estimates are representative of the voting population and comparable to those reported in the previous section.

5.2 Summary Statistics and Balance

A total of 3,378 participants completed the endline survey, comprising 1,180 from neighborhoods assigned to the control group, 1,108 assigned to the gender treatment campaign, and 1,090 assigned to the non-gender treatment campaign.

Appendix Table A-11 presents summary statistics and balance tests for survey implementation characteristics (Panel A). Panel B complements this by reporting differences across treatment arms in endline demographic characteristics.[16] We do not observe any statistically significant imbalance across all variables.

Appendix Table A-12 presents summary statistics for the non-demographic endline survey questions, including self-reported voting preferences, views on gender and other sociocultural issues, perceptions of others' views, and assessments of party competence.

Table A-12 shows that the sample is equally represented by men and women, 65% have less than a high school degree, and 11% report speaking a native language that is not Turkish. We have four attitudinal questions on gender inequality, which we use to construct an index. We find that 49% of respondents agree than men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce, 37% agree that men make better political leaders, 4% agree that beating a wife can be justifiable, and 61% agree that children suffer when the mother works. It's worth noting, however, that all of these attitudinal measures, except whether children suffer when a mother works, are significantly different from what respondents believe about their neighbors. We asked them out of their 10 closest neighbors, the number that agree with each statement. The gender inequality index increases from 38%, in regards to own attitudes, to 46%, in

[15] The only exception is that, because we cannot map survey respondents to ballot boxes, ballot-box-level controls (e.g., the number of registered voters in the same electoral year) are included at the neighborhood level.

[16] Although measured post-treatment, these variables are largely predetermined and unlikely to respond materially over such a short horizon, so they provide informative—albeit imperfect—tests of balance in these characteristics.

regards to views about neighbors' attitudes. In particular, 16% believe that their neighbors agree that beating a wife can be justifiable. The only variable that is not different is beliefs about the negative consequences of mothers working, suggesting that this attitude is less taboo. Agreement with all of these questions, except for the impact of mothers working, again increase when we ask about the rest of Turkey, but it's worth noting that İzmir is a more liberal relative to the national average (e.g., the female labor force participation rate in Izmir is 45% while the national average is 36%). Respondents believe that 27% of Turks agree that beating a wife is justifiable. This is close to the 2018 national average (32 percent) of women reporting experience with intimate partner violence, according to data from the Demographic Health Survey and as disseminated by the World Bank.[17] Altogether, these summary statistics suggest that privately held attitudes may reflect social desirability concerns, such as what is considered taboo.

The attitudinal question related the non-gender campaign measures respondents' views on whether corruption can be eradicated from politics. Interestingly, we find that attitudes about whether corruption can be removed from politics does not vary relative to perceived local norms or country-wide norms on this issue; 53% of respondents believe corruption can be eradicated from local politics while respondents believe that 52% of their neighbors, and 54% of Turks believe that it can be eradicated.

We also measured respondent' perceptions of parties' competence to implement gender-equality related policies versus transparency-related policies . While the CHP is considered the most competent in implementing both policies, reflecting the oppositional sampling bias of survey respondents, it is considered more competent on transparency.[18] Voters' perceptions of the CHP's lower competence in implementing gender-equality policies is driven by 21% of respondents believing there is no difference between parties in their ability to implement gender equality related policies versus 14% for transparency-related policies. There is little support for the minority parties; not only is the DEM Party's vote share in İzmir small, but respondents may be wary to report their attitudes about this party. Much of the Turkish population associates them with a terrorist group, and the former party leaders are still in jail. The party has been shut down multiple times over the years because of these accusations. Therefore, it is unsurprising that a small share of respondents report voting for

[17] See data source description here: https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/turkiye

[18] In the Control group, the party vote shares based on our electoral data are .432 and .416 for the AKP and the CHP, respectively. 12% of voters prefer not to answer the question about their voting behavior. While the province and districts in our sample have a higher vote share for the CHP, we restricted our sample to neighborhoods where the CHP did not receive more than 65% or less than 10% of the vote share as discussed in the Recruitment and Sample section. Official voter turnout is also .756, while it is reported as .94 based on our surveyed sample

them or viewing them as competent.[19]

5.3 Treatment Effects on Reported Behavior and Attitudes

5.3.1 Self-Reported Voting

Table 6 reports treatment effects of the intervention on self-reported voting behavior in the 2024 İzmir district mayoral election, the only electoral outcome included in the endline survey. Column (1) shows effects on overall opposition vote share and indicates that respondents in neighborhoods assigned to either campaign report lower support for the opposition bloc relative to those in control neighborhoods. The estimated decline is 10.8 percentage points (s.e. 3.5) for the gender campaign and 5.9 percentage points (s.e. 2.8) for the transparency campaign (the non-gender campaign in İzmir). These correspond to reductions of approximately 18 percent and 10 percent, respectively, relative to the control-group mean of 0.586.

Column (2) shows that the gender campaign reduced reported turnout by 4.0 percentage points (s.e. 1.6), whereas the estimated effect of the non-gender campaign is smaller (–1.6 percentage points) and non-statistically significant.

Columns (3)–(6) decompose these effects by party and show that the aggregate decline in reported opposition support in Column (1) is driven by reduced self-reported support for the CHP, the delivering party in İzmir. Column (3) reports declines of 11.9 (s.e. 3.5) and 5.6 (s.e. 2.9) percentage points in reported CHP support under the gender and transparency campaigns, respectively. Columns (4)–(6) show no statistically distinguishable effects on reported support for other opposition parties. We reject equality of effects across opposition parties for the gender campaign ($p = 0.011$); with the corresponding p-value for the non-gender campaign being 0.175.

Finally, Column (7) shows effects on the probability that respondents prefer not to disclose their vote choice. The gender campaign is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase (s.e. 2.8), while the estimate for the non-gender campaign is 0.8 percentage points (s.e. 2.2). Neither estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero.

Importantly, the findings in Table 6 stand in stark contrast to the results based on administrative voting data (reported in Table 3; see also Appendix Table A-13 for estimates specific to the district mayoral election), which show that the same interventions increased

[19] We also asked voters their policy preferences for two policies related to gender inequality (domestic violence and labor force participation), one related to transparent and efficient use of municipality funds, and one related to urban infrastructure projects to create jobs and reduce congestion. 42% of voters list gender-equality related policies in their top two preferred policies versus 62 to 66% listing the other two in their top two preferred policies.

overall opposition vote share. In the administrative data, these gains are driven by increased support for the DEM in response to the gender campaign and for the CHP in response to the non-gender campaign. In the survey data, by contrast, we find no positive effect on overall opposition support and no evidence of differential responses across opposition parties beyond the CHP. Moreover, the decline in turnout observed in the survey data is not present in the administrative data.

Notably, the negative treatment effects of the gender campaign on opposition vote share, turnout, and CHP vote share, as well as the positive effect on nonresponse to the vote-choice question, are systematically larger in absolute value—though not always statistically distinguishable—than those of the non-gender campaign. This pattern suggests that the divergence between administrative and survey results is more pronounced for the gender campaign.

As a robustness exercise, we directly estimate the effect of campaign assignment on the difference between administrative and survey vote shares under a common specification. This allows us to assess the statistical significance of the gap and to ensure that the observed differences are not driven by differences in specifications or election types. To do so, we compute neighborhood-level vote shares for the district mayoral election in both data sources and regress their difference on treatment assignment, following a specification analogous to equation (3), estimated at the neighborhood level with the outcome defined as the difference between the two measures. Appendix Table A-14 reports these results and confirms that this gap is statistically significant and mirrors the patterns described above.

The divergence between the effects on administrative outcomes and survey responses raises two broad possibilities. One is that the survey data fail to accurately represent the underlying voting population. An alternative is that the survey individuals misreport their behavior when asked directly about sensitive political choices. We investigate these two possibilities in turn, after presenting results on attitudes toward gender inequality and corruption.

5.3.2 Attitudes

Table 7 reports the treatment effects of the campaign interventions on attitudes toward gender inequality and corruption. Higher values indicate greater agreement with each statement.

The gender-equality campaign increases the gender-inequality index by 6.9 percentage points (s.e. 2.3) in Column (1), corresponding to a 22 percent increase relative to the control mean. Examining the subcomponents (Columns (2)–(5)), we observe more regressive attitudes regarding whether men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce (9.6 percentage points, s.e. 3.3), whether men are better political leaders (9.2 percentage points, s.e. 3.3),

and whether children suffer if the mother works (7.1 percentage points, s.e. 4.2). We do not detect a statistically significant effect on whether beating one's wife is justifiable. The non-gender campaign does not have statistically significant effects on any of the gender-related outcomes, and the estimated coefficients are smaller in magnitude. The p-value for the test that the two campaigns have the same effect on the gender-inequality index is 0.079.

By contrast, we find no statistically significant treatment effects on the non-gender attitude outcome in Column (7), which is more directly related to the transparency campaign.

Overall, we observe a backlash in gender-related attitudes—though not in non-gender attitudes—mirroring the pattern found in self-reported voting behavior. Consistent with the voting results, this backlash is concentrated in response to the gender-equality campaign.[20]

5.4 Data Quality vs Misreporting

5.4.1 Representativeness and Differential Survey Quality

We begin by examining whether features of survey implementation can account for the differential treatment effects observed between the survey and administrative data. Survey data were collected within each neighborhood using a random-walk protocol. In each neighborhood, the surveying company selected four focal points and conducted a random walk around each, ensuring at least 5 buildings or households between each surveyed household. This implies that, on average, the aggregate sample should be representative of the voting population within the selected neighborhoods. Nevertheless, it remains possible that the final group of respondents is not fully representative—for example, if voters with certain characteristics were systematically more likely to participate in the survey.[21] Explaining our results through selective participation, however, would require substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects across voter types. In particular, the treatment would need to generate a sharply negative effect among the subset of voters overrepresented in the endline survey, while producing a positive effect in the broader voting population. This is a demanding

[20] Tables A-19 and A-20 show that the self-reported results on voting behavior and attitudes are robust to the inclusion of controls based on the same set used in the administrative analysis.

[21] We do observe clear differences in the shares of self-reported voting for each party and in voter turnout relative to the actual electoral vote shares for our experimental sample; however, these are the types of variables for which we suspect misreporting. This is reflected in the fact that 12 percent of respondents prefer not to answer the question on vote choice and turnout. We have two variables that we can directly match with our neighborhood-level demographic data: the share with at least a high school degree (64%) and the share of voters born in Kurdish-majority provinces (11%). In our endline survey data, 63% of respondents have less than a high-school degree, and while a different measure of ethnicity, 11% report that Turkish is not their native language (10% report Kurdish or Zaza, which are commonly spoken in Kurdish majority provinces). As reflected in the summary statistics table (Appendix Table A-12), we asked the surveying company to have an equal share of female and male respondents. Other than requiring respondents to be of voting age, we did not have any other restrictions on respondent identity.

requirement, and the available evidence appears inconsistent with such an explanation.

First, as discussed above, Table 4 shows little evidence of meaningful heterogeneity in treatment effects across neighborhoods with higher versus lower levels of opposition support, education, or socioeconomic status in the administrative voting data. If anything, the estimates suggest broadly similar effects across these dimensions. Second, consistent with this pattern, in Appendix Table A-15 we also fail to find systematic heterogeneity in the survey results across a richer set of respondent demographic characteristics.[22] Finally, our main findings are highly stable when we re-estimate the baseline specification using post-stratification weights that reweight survey respondents to match neighborhood-level demographic distributions (see Appendix Table A-16).

A different possibility we explore is that issues related to differential survey implementation across treatment could plausibly account for the results. In particular, we examine whether differential effort or behavior by the survey firm or enumerators across treatment arms may have affected responses. As shown in Appendix Table A-11, however, we find no evidence of systematic differences across treatment arms along a wide range of survey implementation characteristics, making this explanation unlikely. In particular, if exposure to the campaign affected households' willingness to participate in the survey, the resulting sample could disproportionately reflect voters with systematically different political responses. Yet, rejection rates are balanced across treatment arms, and the composition of respondents does not differ meaningfully across observable dimensions. Moreover, we do not observe patterns consistent with interviewer-driven reporting bias or differential survey execution that could plausibly generate the observed treatment effects on self-reported voting behavior.

Overall, we find little evidence that issues related to survey implementation or representativeness can account for the observed patterns in self-reported voting outcomes. This motivates a closer examination of alternative explanations for the divergence between administrative and survey-based measures, which we turn to next.

5.4.2 A Gap Between Public and Private Political Signals

We explore an alternative explanation for the pronounced divergence between treatment effects on administrative voting outcomes and self-reported voting outcomes: misreporting of actual voting behavior. Discrepancies between realized and reported vote choice have long been noted as a potential concern in the literature (e.g., Frye et al. [2017], Blair et al. [2020], Frye et al. [2023]); however, to the best of our knowledge, there is limited empirical evidence documenting the extent to which such misreporting meaningfully affects estimated

[22]The primary exception is heterogeneity by respondent gender, which we discuss separately below.

treatment effects in practice.[23]

This misreporting can arise for several reasons in survey settings, particularly in contexts involving sensitive political or social issues. One potential source is intra-household dynamics. Campaign messages that emphasize contested topics may generate disagreement among household members, leading some respondents to feel pressure to conform in their reported answers or to withhold information altogether (e.g., Bursztyn et al. [2017]).

Misreporting may also stem from external factors. Respondents may fear political monitoring. Even when the survey clearly states that it is independent and confidential and collects no identifying information—including names or addresses—individuals may still worry that interviewers are affiliated with political actors or that their responses could eventually be accessed by parties or authorities. In such settings, respondents may strategically tailor their answers to avoid potential repercussions or to align with what they perceive to be the interviewer's expectations, rather than reporting their true behavior. More broadly, surveys provide a low-stakes environment in which respondents may express views that diverge from their actual behavior. Core supporters of a political party may disagree with specific campaign positions yet continue to support the party at the ballot box for other policy, identity, or strategic reasons. In this context, reporting lower support, withholding responses, or adopting more conservative stated positions may serve as a costless form of expression rather than a reflection of intended voting behavior.

In the remainder of this section, we present further suggestive evidence consistent with misreporting in survey responses—primarily reflecting external survey-context pressures, with a more limited role for intra-household monitoring. Importantly, these patterns would arguably be less likely to emerge if the divergence between administrative and self-reported outcomes were driven mainly by survey quality or implementation issues.

We begin by examining the intra-household monitoring channel. If campaign messages on sensitive issues generated disagreement within households, this could increase the likelihood that other household members were present during the interview. To test this direct implication, enumerators recorded whether others were present at the time of the survey. As shown in Table A-17, we find little evidence that the gender-equality campaign increased intra-household monitoring.

A related hypothesis is that intra-household influence may operate asymmetrically, with individuals who have relatively lower bargaining power being more susceptible to persuasion within the household. While we find little evidence of increased intra-household monitor-

[23] A large related literature examines why voters tend to overreport turnout (e.g., Anderson and Silver [1986], Ansolabehere and Hersh [2017]), documenting, for instance, the role of social image concerns [Dellavigna et al., 2016] as well as other potential mechanisms.

ing, influence may nonetheless occur through learning, persuasion, or deference to other household members' views Conlon et al. [2021]. Consistent with this possibility, the gender heterogeneity results reported earlier (Appendix Table A-15) show that although backlash effects are present for both women and men, they are more pronounced among women.

We next turn to mechanisms operating outside the household. We next turn to mechanisms operating outside the household. Tables 6 and A-18 show that the decline in self-reported support for the opposition is not primarily offset by increased reported support for the incumbent. Instead, it is accompanied by a significant decline in reported turnout—despite no corresponding decline in administrative turnout—and a marginal increase in unwillingness to disclose vote choice. This pattern is consistent with respondents being skeptical about revealing their true voting behavior to non-household members, whether due to concerns about political monitoring or because the survey offers a low-stakes opportunity to signal dissatisfaction without altering their actual vote. We also observe changes in respondents' interactions with enumerators. Appendix Table A-17 shows that the gender-equality campaign increases enumerator-reported hostility. This pattern is less suggestive of fear and more indicative of reluctance or expressive resistance, consistent with respondents signaling dissatisfaction in the survey context rather than revising their underlying voting behavior.

Taken together, these findings are suggestive of misreporting in survey responses, arising from a combination of intra-household influence and external survey-context pressures—whether reluctance to disclose or expressive dissatisfaction. While we cannot fully disentangle these channels, the overall pattern is comparatively difficult to reconcile with explanations based solely on survey implementation or data-quality concerns.

6 Conclusion


We evaluate how changes on the political supply side — specifically, parties' emphasis on progressive sociocultural policies — shape voters' preferences using actual voting behavior. Combined with survey data, we also analyze the gap between private political behavior and public reporting. To avoid issues related to bundled policies and reverse causality, we use two randomized field experiments in Turkey to estimate the effect of elite platform shifts on voter demand for progressive gender policies.

Administrative voting records show that gender-equality campaign promises increased opposition support by approximately one percentage point, comparable to a conventional policy campaign, with gains concentrated among voters who shifted toward the party with the strongest credibility on gender issues. This pattern is consistent with issue-based sorting

rather than party persuasion, and replicates across two sharply different contexts. Post-election survey data tell a different story: the same campaign that increased votes for the opposition reduced self-reported opposition support by 11 percentage points and was accompanied by more regressive stated gender attitudes. We find little evidence that this divergence reflects survey implementation problems or selective participation; the patterns are more consistent with misreporting.


Taken together, these findings reveal genuine latent demand for progressive gender policies even in a conservative, authoritarian setting. They also carry a broader methodological implication: when interventions alter respondents' reporting incentives, survey-based estimates may not only understate true effects but even reverse their sign. An important question for future research is how far such misreporting extends beyond sociocultural issues, and under what conditions survey responses diverge most sharply from validated political behavior. Whether the shifts in stated attitudes we document also shape other behavioral outcomes — and whether these dynamics evolve as progressive reforms become more politically salient — remains an open question. To the extent that researchers and policymakers rely on surveys to measure public preferences, understanding these divergences is essential for accurately assessing support for progressive reform.

Figure 1: V-Dem



Notes: This figure uses Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data to show the evolution of Turkey's democracy index, the women's political-empowerment index and the women's civil-liberties index from 1995 to 2020. The vertical axis reports the index values (unit–free and comparable across indices) and the horizontal axis shows calendar years.The vertical dashed line marks March 2003, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Prime Minister of Turkey.

Figure 2: V-Dem Party Characteristics



Notes: This figure summarizes party positions for three Turkish political blocs across four dimensions based on 2018 data: clientelism, support for minority rights, women's representation in national-level party leadership, and support for women's labor force participation. Scores are shown on a common -5 to +5 scale with confidence intervals reflecting uncertainty in country experts' ratings.

Table 1: Balance Across Treatment Groups in the İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean			p-value
	Control	Gender Equality	Transparency	difference
A. 2023 Electoral Variables				
A1. Main Presidential Election Variables				
Registered Voters	5,057.967	5,529.789	5,201.350	0.76
Turnout	0.882	0.881	0.883	0.93
Vote Share Opposition	0.575	0.588	0.591	0.85
A2. Presidential Election Variables by Alliance				
People's Alliance	0.425	0.412	0.409	0.85
Nation Alliance	0.570	0.582	0.586	0.85
A3. Main Parliamentary Election Variables				
Registered Voters	5,057.967	5,529.789	5,201.350	0.76
Vote Share Liberal	0.595	0.607	0.611	0.84
Vote Share Opposition	0.600	0.611	0.615	0.85
Turnout	0.874	0.873	0.875	0.96
A4. Parliamentary Election Variables by Party and Alliance				
AKP	0.293	0.284	0.281	0.85
MHP	0.055	0.055	0.054	0.97
CHP	0.348	0.358	0.350	0.96
IYI	0.107	0.100	0.107	0.72
DEM	0.096	0.106	0.106	0.90
Rest of Liberal Parties	0.043	0.044	0.048	0.72
Rest of the Opposition	0.048	0.048	0.053	0.74
People's Alliance	0.371	0.360	0.355	0.84
Nation Alliance	0.461	0.463	0.462	1.00
Ancestral Alliance	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.93
Labor Alliance	0.109	0.119	0.123	0.84
Others	0.031	0.029	0.031	0.34
B. Neighborhood Demographics				
Share of residents living in poorer areas	0.426	0.473	0.441	0.34
Share of residents who migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces	0.121	0.138	0.122	0.83
Share of residents with less than high school degree	0.580	0.583	0.560	0.81
Number of households	2,188.848	2,402.198	2,279.481	0.76
Number of residential buildings	808.009	878.079	821.907	0.88
Number of streets	57.806	65.818	62.713	0.63
C. Tiles				
Sixtile 1	0.086	0.103	0.040	0.33
Sixtile 2	0.214	0.125	0.175	0.65
Sixtile 3	0.170	0.160	0.228	0.81
Sixtile 4	0.192	0.176	0.173	0.98
Sixtile 5	0.117	0.218	0.175	0.57
Sixtile 6	0.222	0.218	0.209	0.99
D. District				
District 1	0.081	0.075	0.110	0.90
District 2	0.496	0.501	0.525	0.97
District 3	0.216	0.191	0.143	0.67
District 4	0.207	0.233	0.222	0.97

Notes: This table reports balance tests across the three experimental arms (Control, gender-equality campaign and transparency campaign) for the İzmir field experiment. Columns (1)–(3) report mean values for each variable by arm and Column (4) reports the p-value from tests of equality across arms. The table is divided into four panels: Panel A contains sub-panels A1–A4 reporting pre-treatment electoral outcomes from the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections and vote shares by party and alliance; Panel B reports neighborhood-demographic characteristics; Panel C reports the distribution across the six stratification tiles used in randomization; and Panel D reports indicators for each of the four sampled districts. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table 2: Balance Across Treatment Groups in the Kars Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean			p-value
	Control	Gender Equality	Youth	difference
A. 2018 Electoral Variables				
A1. Main Presidential Election Variables				
Registered Voters	412.242	392.393	358.741	0.68
Vote Share Opposition	0.357	0.457	0.365	0.31
Turnout	0.763	0.771	0.774	0.84
A2. Presidential Election Variables by Alliance				
People's Alliance	0.643	0.543	0.635	0.31
Nation Alliance	0.205	0.211	0.209	0.99
No Alliance	0.153	0.246	0.156	0.52
A3. Main Parliamentary Election Variables				
Registered Voters	412.242	392.393	358.741	0.68
Vote Share Opposition	0.355	0.451	0.350	0.33
Vote Share Liberal	0.348	0.446	0.343	0.31
Turnout	0.759	0.771	0.774	0.73
A4. Parliamentary Election Variables by Party and Alliance				
AKP	0.523	0.459	0.509	0.59
MHP	0.106	0.076	0.126	0.25
DEM	0.182	0.276	0.173	0.51
CHP	0.108	0.079	0.096	0.58
IYI	0.057	0.091	0.073	0.38
Rest of the Opposition	0.009	0.006	0.008	0.29
People's Alliance	0.639	0.541	0.646	0.32
Nation Alliance	0.173	0.175	0.177	0.99
No Alliance	0.188	0.283	0.177	0.49
B. Neighborhood Demographics				
Share of residents living in poorer areas	0.772	0.789	0.798	0.31
Share of residents with less than high school degree	0.797	0.847	0.850	0.29
Number of households	161.016	133.321	121.074	0.44
Number of residential buildings	136.194	130.857	118.630	0.67
Number of streets	6.871	2.821	4.407	0.19
C. Tiles				
Sixtile 1	0.161	0.179	0.148	0.96
Sixtile 2	0.161	0.143	0.185	0.95
Sixtile 3	0.145	0.214	0.185	0.82
Sixtile 4	0.177	0.143	0.148	0.93
Sixtile 5	0.177	0.107	0.185	0.66
Sixtile 6	0.177	0.214	0.148	0.85
D. District				
District 1	0.129	0.179	0.148	0.90
District 2	0.290	0.250	0.259	0.93
District 3	0.581	0.571	0.593	0.99

Notes: This table reports balance tests across the three experimental arms in the Kars field experiment (Control, gender-equality campaign and youth (non-gender) campaign—using pre-treatment administrative electoral and neighborhood-level variables. Columns (1)–(3) give the mean of each variable by arm and Column (4) reports the p-value from tests of equality across arms. Panel A contains sub-panels A1–A4 that report pre-treatment electoral variables from the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. Panel B lists neighborhood-demographic characteristics. Panel C shows the distribution of neighborhoods across the stratification tiles used in randomization. Panel D reports indicators for the three districts in the Kars sample. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table 3: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. İzmir 2024 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.002	0.002	0.006***	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.000	0.009**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.892	0.542	0.144	0.156	0.147	0.784
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.102					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.074					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ (Delivered by)	DEM	Rest of Opposition
B. Kars 2023 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.049***	0.011	0.006	0.013	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.020	-0.008	0.012	-0.001	0.019	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.256	0.323	0.743	0.389	0.507	0.939
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.021					
	Youth p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.316					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
C. Pooled Results						
Gender Equality	0.011***	-0.002	0.003	0.002	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Non-Gender Equality	0.011**	0.000	0.009**	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	4,383	4,383	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266
Mean	0.514	0.753	0.403	0.034	0.060	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.940	0.643	0.137	0.122	0.126	0.777
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.043					
	Non-Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.044					

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on electoral outcomes using official administrative records. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively, corresponding to the subsequent local and general elections in those years and estimated using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Column (1), turnout in Column (2), and vote shares for individual opposition parties: the CHP in Column (3), the İYİ Party in Column (4), the DEM Party in Column (5), and the remaining opposition parties in Column (6). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote-share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on 2024 Election Outcomes in İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. Share of migrants from Kurdish-majority provinces within a neighborhood						
Gender Equality	0.007*	-0.003	0.001	0.001	0.004***	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.000	0.009**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × Migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces (%)	0.088**	0.004	0.054	0.012	0.049**	-0.027**
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.010)
Transparency × Migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces (%)	0.035	0.021	0.003	0.006	0.038	-0.012
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.010)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.558	0.620	0.068	0.229	0.196	0.354
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces (%)	0.006	0.965	0.153	0.212	0.024	0.014
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces (%)	0.149	0.499	0.720	0.629	0.189	0.234
B. Opposition Vote Share in 2023 Parliamentary Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.004	0.002	0.002	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.011**	0.002	0.011**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	0.005	0.039	0.016	-0.001	-0.020	0.009
	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Transparency × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	-0.029	-0.032	-0.041	0.013	-0.005	0.005
	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.739	0.282	0.079	0.103	0.152	0.895
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	0.709	0.242	0.554	0.980	0.362	0.247
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Opposition in 2023 Parliamentary (%)	0.659	0.340	0.403	0.392	0.865	0.604
C. Share of population with less than median education degree within a neighborhood						
Gender Equality	0.010**	-0.003	0.002	0.003	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.004	0.009*	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	0.009	0.008	-0.014	0.018	0.014	-0.008
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Transparency × Less than median education degree (%)	0.005	0.040	-0.007	0.000	0.014	-0.002
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.922	0.186	0.168	0.060	0.318	0.970
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	0.641	0.881	0.745	0.101	0.242	0.301
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Less than median education degree (%)	0.694	0.219	0.957	0.964	0.385	0.670
D. Z-score of Neighborhood-level SES Percentile Rank						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.003	0.002	0.005**	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.012**	0.002	0.012**	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Gender Equality × SES Z-score	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency × SES Z-score	0.007	0.008	0.009**	-0.001	0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.576	0.309	0.054	0.139	0.332	0.503
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × SES Z-score	0.226	0.940	0.565	0.365	0.271	0.712
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × SES Z-score	0.016	0.177	0.007	0.516	0.451	0.138

Notes: This table reports heterogeneous treatment-effect estimates for the 2024 İzmir field experiment using ballot-box–level administrative election returns. Estimates are ITT effects from equation (1) that interact the assignment to the gender-equality and transparency campaigns with neighborhood characteristics. Panel A examines heterogeneity by interacting treatment indicators with the share of residents who migrated from Kurdish-majority provinces. Panel B interacts treatments with the neighborhood's pre-treatment opposition vote share in the 2023 parliamentary elections. Panel C interacts treatments with share of population with less than median education degree and Panel D interacts treatment with a socioeconomic-status (SES) Z-score. Heterogeneity variables are demeaned prior to interaction in Panel A, B, and C. In each panel, Columns (1)–(6) report treatment effects on the aggregated opposition vote share (Column 1), turnout (Column 2) and vote shares for the CHP, İYİ, DEM and other opposition parties (Columns 3–6). The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values for equality of gender equality and transparency treatment effects and for equality of the sum of the main and interaction effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on 2023 Election Outcomes in Kars Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ (Delivered by)	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. Opposition Vote Share in 2018 Parliamentary Elections						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.007	0.009	0.012	0.029*	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.018	-0.012	0.014	-0.002	0.016	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	-0.078	0.008	-0.102**	-0.010	-0.017	0.000
	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.092)	(0.020)
Youth × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	-0.096	-0.175***	0.074	-0.037	-0.120	0.022
	(0.108)	(0.056)	(0.093)	(0.055)	(0.124)	(0.020)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.224	0.285	0.804	0.382	0.477	0.951
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	0.697	0.864	0.066	0.970	0.901	0.872
p-value: Youth+Youth × Opposition in 2018 Parliamentary (%)	0.483	0.003	0.390	0.524	0.440	0.383
B. Share of population less than median education degree within a neighborhood						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.015	0.010	0.009	0.029*	-0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.021	-0.007	0.014	-0.001	0.018	-0.004
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	-0.145	0.043	-0.119	0.060	-0.070	0.078*
	(0.158)	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.171)	(0.155)	(0.046)
Youth × Less than median education degree (%)	0.589	0.082	0.336*	0.199	-0.046	0.069*
	(0.433)	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.214)	(0.311)	(0.037)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.201	0.269	0.847	0.527	0.582	0.756
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Less than median education degree (%)	0.547	0.682	0.385	0.686	0.800	0.107
p-value: Youth+Youth × Less than median education degree (%)	0.167	0.696	0.054	0.352	0.931	0.088
C. Z-score of Neighborhood-level SES Percentile Rank						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.009	0.004	0.016	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.004)
Youth	0.024	-0.011	0.017	-0.001	0.019	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Gender Equality × SES Z-score	-0.013	0.023	-0.001	-0.044***	0.018	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.004)
Youth × SES Z-score	0.041*	-0.002	0.065***	-0.026*	-0.007	0.003
	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.004)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.300	0.259	0.402	0.244	0.525	0.998
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × SES Z-score	0.100	0.156	0.858	0.092	0.024	0.514
p-value: Youth+Youth × SES Z-score	0.045	0.579	0.000	0.080	0.717	0.839

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment-effect estimates based on ballot-box–level administrative data from the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Kars. Estimates are ITT effects from equation (1) that interact the assignment to the gender equality and youth campaigns with neighborhood characteristics. Panel A examines heterogeneity by interacting the treatment indicators with the neighborhood's pre-treatment opposition vote share in the 2018 parliamentary election; Panel B interacts them with the share of the neighborhood's population having less than a median education degree. Panel C interacts treatments with a socioeconomic-status (SES) Z-score. In panels A and B the heterogeneity covariates are demeaned before interaction. In each panel, Columns (1)–(6) report treatment effects on the aggregated opposition vote share (Column 1), turnout (Column 2) and vote shares for the CHP, İYİ, DEM and other opposition parties (Columns 3–6). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-values testing equality of gender equality and youth treatment effects and of treatment-by-covariate effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table 6: Treatment Effects on Self-Reported Voting at Endline in the 2024 İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
			Opposition by party				
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition	Prefer not to answer
Gender Equality	-0.108***	-0.040**	-0.119***	0.004	0.000	0.005	0.043
	(0.035)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.028)
Transparency	-0.059**	-0.016	-0.056*	0.002	-0.007	0.001	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.022)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.586	0.935	0.538	0.014	0.029	0.006	0.120
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.178	0.142	0.079	0.734	0.449	0.555	0.222
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.011						
	Non-Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.175						

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on self-reported voting behavior using individual-level survey data collected five weeks after the 2024 İzmir local elections estimated using equation (3).The outcomes include opposition vote share in Column (1); self-reported turnout in Column (2); vote shares for individual opposition parties — the CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and remaining opposition parties — in Columns (3)–(6); and the fraction of respondents who prefer not to answer the vote-choice question in Column (7). Observations are weighted by the ratio of registered voters in the neighborhood to the number of survey respondents so that estimates are representative of the voting population. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of treatment effects across campaign arms. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table 7: Treatment Effects on Individual Attitudes at Endline in the 2024 İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Index Subcomponents				
	Gender Inequality Index	Men has more right to job	Men are better political leaders	Beating wife is justifiable	Child suffer if mother works	Possible to eradicate corruption
Gender Equality	0.069***	0.096***	0.092***	0.005	0.071*	-0.016
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.030	0.034	0.022	0.012	0.036	-0.028
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.320	0.407	0.286	0.029	0.571	0.537
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.079	0.060	0.051	0.385	0.350	0.743

Notes: This table presents treatment effects on attitudinal outcomes measured in the endline survey in İzmir estimated using equation(3). Column 1 reports a standardized index constructed from four gender equality questions: whether men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce, whether men are better political leaders, whether beating one's wife is justifiable, and whether children suffer when the mother works. Columns 2–6 report treatment effects on each component separately: (i) men have more right to a job; (ii) men are better political leaders; (iii) beating a wife is justifiable; and (iv) children suffer if the mother works. (v) belief that corruption can be eradicated from local politics (non-gender campaign analogue). All regressions employ population weights equal to the ratio of registered voters to survey respondents in each neighborhood. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

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
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Figure A-1: Party Vote Shares



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of party vote shares in the study's experimental neighborhoods in İzmir (2024 local elections) and Kars (2023 national elections).The bars display vote shares for the main opposition parties (CHP, İYİ, DEM), the incumbent parties (AKP, MHP) and the residual "rest" category.

Figure A-2: Gender Equality Campaign

Region: İzmir
Implementing party: CHP



Region: Kars
Implementing party: İYİ



Notes: The figure reproduces the brochures used in the gender-equality treatment. Separate panels display the pamphlets distributed by the CHP in İzmir and the İYİ Party in Kars.

Figure A-3: Non-Gender Equality Campaign

Region: İzmir
Implementing party: CHP
Transparent and Accountable
Government Expenditure

Region: Kars
Implementing party: İYİ
Supporting Higher Educational
Attainment and Removing Nepotism





Notes: This figure displays the brochures used in the non-gender (transparency/youth) treatment. Separate panels show materials distributed by the CHP in İzmir and the İYİ Party in Kars.

Table A-1: Treatment Group Assignments at Neighborhood Level for the Field Experiments

	Neighborhoods		Registered Voters	
Campaign Type	Kars	İzmir	Kars	İzmir
Control	47	50	15,587	148,067
Gender Equality	22	48	6,956	149,089
Non-Gender Equality	22	48	7,209	156,482
Total	91	146	29,752	453,638

Notes: This table reports the number of neighborhoods and registered voters in the experimental sample for the two field experiments by province and campaign assignment. Neighborhoods are the unit of randomization.

Table A-2: Treatment Effects on Neighborhood-Level Administrative Electoral Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. İzmir 2024 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.002	0.001	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.009*	-0.001	0.008*	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	438	438	438	438	438	438
Mean	0.526	0.754	0.416	0.031	0.056	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.948	0.648	0.203	0.211	0.186	0.829
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.092					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.113					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ (Delivered by)	DEM	Rest of Opposition
B. Kars 2023 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.043**	0.010	0.008	0.009	0.025	-0.003
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.004)
Youth	0.014	-0.003	0.010	0.001	0.015	-0.004
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.004)
Observations	182	182	91	91	91	91
Mean	0.372	0.722	0.117	0.088	0.163	0.031
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.201	0.511	0.939	0.601	0.596	0.937
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.125					
	Youth p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.400					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
C. Pooled Results						
Gender Equality	0.010**	-0.003	0.002	0.001	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Non-Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.001	0.008*	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	620	620	529	529	529	529
Mean	0.517	0.752	0.406	0.033	0.059	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.938	0.699	0.204	0.193	0.171	0.826
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.057					
	Non-Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.086					

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on electoral outcomes using official neighborhood-level administrative records. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively, corresponding to the subsequent local and general elections in those years and estimated using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). The estimates are weighted by the number of registered voters in each neighborhood in the relevant election year. The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Column (1), turnout in Column (2), and vote shares for individual opposition parties: the CHP in Column (3), the İYİ Party in Column (4), the DEM Party in Column (5), and the remaining opposition parties in Column (6). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote-share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-3: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results - Robustness to Different Strata Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. İzmir 2024 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.008*	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.005**	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010*	-0.002	0.009**	-0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.726	0.828	0.123	0.147	0.335	0.626
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.181					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.077					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ (Delivered by)	DEM	Rest of Opposition
B. Kars 2023 Elections						
Gender Equality	0.048***	0.012	0.007	0.013	0.030*	-0.004
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.003)
Youth	0.022	-0.007	0.011	-0.001	0.022	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)
Observations	234	234	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.378	0.723	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.285	0.327	0.864	0.386	0.651	0.851
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.029					
	Youth p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.278					
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
C. Pooled Results						
Gender Equality	0.010**	-0.000	0.002	0.002	0.006**	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Non-Gender Equality	0.011**	-0.002	0.009**	-0.001	0.003	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	4,383	4,383	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266
Mean	0.514	0.753	0.403	0.034	0.060	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.861	0.738	0.119	0.118	0.312	0.639
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.092					
	Non-Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.049					

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on electoral outcomes using official neighborhood-level administrative records estimated with respective stratification variables as controls. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively, corresponding to the subsequent local and general elections in those years and estimated using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). Each specification includes the indicated strata fixed effects (sextile fixed effects for İzmir and tercile and district fixed effects for Kars). The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Column (1), turnout in Column (2), and vote shares for individual opposition parties: the CHP in Column (3), the İYİ Party in Column (4), the DEM Party in Column (5), and the remaining opposition parties in Column (6). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote-share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-4: The Effects of Campaign Treatments on Completed Conversations in the Field

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	The dependent variable is the fraction of households with completed conversations			
	Any		Gender Equality	Transparency
Treatment	0.323***			
	(0.021)			
Gender Equality		0.319***	0.320***	-0.001
		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Transparency		0.327***	0.001	0.326***
		(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
F-Stat	241.2	121.0	117.1	163.4
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency		0.580		

Notes: This table presents the first-stage effects of the campaign interventions on completed door-to-door conversations in the 2024 İzmir field experiment using administrative implementation data estimated using equation (1).The dependent variable is the fraction of households with a completed conversation. Column (1) reports the effect of assignment to either campaign (bundled treatment) on the overall completion rate ("Any"). Column (2) separates the effects of the Gender-equality and Transparency campaigns; Columns (3) and (4) report treatment effects on the fraction of completed conversations delivering the gender-equality and transparency campaign materials, respectively.The table reports the number of observations, F-statistics, and the p-value testing equality of the gender-equality and transparency completion effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-5: Summary Statistics of Post-Treatment Administrative Electoral Variables in İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Observations	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
A. Pooled Local Election Data						
A1. Aggregate Outcomes						
Opposition vote share	1,362	0.53	0.52	0.11	0.20	0.98
Liberal parties' vote share	1,362	0.52	0.51	0.11	0.18	0.97
Turnout	1,362	0.76	0.76	0.06	0.58	0.96
A2. Individual Party Outcomes						
AKP	1,362	0.43	0.44	0.11	0.00	0.76
Rest of incumbent	1,362	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.14
CHP	1,362	0.42	0.40	0.13	0.13	0.86
İYİ	1,362	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.14
DEM	1,362	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.35
Rest of opposition	1,362	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.45
B. Individual Election Data						
B1. Metropolitan Mayor Elections						
B1.a. Aggregate Outcomes						
Opposition vote share	454	0.52	0.51	0.11	0.20	0.98
Liberal parties' vote share	454	0.51	0.50	0.11	0.18	0.97
Turnout	454	0.76	0.76	0.06	0.60	0.96
B1.b. Individual Party Outcomes						
AKP	454	0.44	0.45	0.11	0.00	0.76
Rest of incumbent	454	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.11
CHP	454	0.41	0.40	0.13	0.13	0.85
İYİ	454	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.09
DEM	454	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.33
Rest of opposition	454	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.45
B2. District Mayor Elections						
B2.a. Aggregate Outcomes						
Opposition vote share	454	0.52	0.52	0.11	0.22	0.90
Liberal parties' vote share	454	0.51	0.51	0.11	0.20	0.89
Turnout	454	0.76	0.76	0.06	0.59	0.95
B2.b. Individual Party Outcomes						
AKP	454	0.44	0.44	0.11	0.09	0.73
Rest of incumbent	454	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.12
CHP	454	0.42	0.41	0.13	0.13	0.86
İYİ	454	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.12
DEM	454	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.33
Rest of opposition	454	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.07
B3. Metropolitan Council Elections						
B3.a. Aggregate Outcomes						
Opposition vote share	454	0.54	0.52	0.11	0.20	0.89
Liberal parties' vote share	454	0.53	0.51	0.11	0.18	0.89
Turnout	454	0.75	0.75	0.06	0.58	0.96
B3.b. Individual Party Outcomes						
AKP	454	0.41	0.43	0.11	0.09	0.74
Rest of incumbent	454	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.14
CHP	454	0.41	0.40	0.13	0.14	0.85
İYİ	454	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.14
DEM	454	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.00	0.35
Rest of opposition	454	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.22
C. Share of Completed Visits, Sample of Treated Neighborhoods						
Treatment	96	0.32	0.28	0.15	0.07	0.84
Gender Equality	96	0.15	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.81
Transparency	96	0.17	0.10	0.20	0.00	0.84

Notes: This table presents key summary statistics, including the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) values for different variables. Panel A reports pooled local election outcomes in İzmir. Panels B1, B2, and B3 report the same outcomes separately for the metropolitan mayor, district mayor, and metropolitan council elections, respectively. Panel C reports the share of completed visits (completed conversations) in treated neighborhoods, separately for the gender equality and transparency campaign arms.

Table A-6: Summary Statistics of Post-Treatment Administrative Electoral Variables in Kars Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Observations	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
A. Pooled Presidential and Parliamentary Election Data						
A1. Aggregate Outcomes						
Opposition vote share	124	0.38	0.37	0.18	0.06	0.84
Turnout	124	0.72	0.73	0.07	0.51	0.88
B. Individual Election Data						
B1. First Round Presidential Elections						
Opposition vote share	62	0.35	0.35	0.18	0.06	0.81
Turnout	62	0.73	0.74	0.07	0.51	0.87
B2. Parliamentary Elections						
B2.a. Aggregate Outcomes						
Opposition vote share	62	0.41	0.41	0.18	0.10	0.84
Liberal parties' vote share	62	0.40	0.41	0.18	0.10	0.84
Turnout	62	0.72	0.73	0.07	0.51	0.88
B2.b. Individual Party Outcomes						
AKP	62	0.39	0.38	0.18	0.07	0.79
MHP	62	0.17	0.11	0.17	0.00	0.69
Rest of incumbent	62	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.18
CHP	62	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.00	0.33
İYİ	62	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.24
DEM	62	0.16	0.11	0.19	0.00	0.73
Rest of opposition	62	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.08

Notes: This table presents key summary statistics, including the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) values for different variables. Panel A reports pooled outcomes from the first-round presidential and parliamentary elections in Kars. Panel B1 reports outcomes for the first-round presidential election. Panel B2 reports outcomes for the parliamentary election, including aggregate outcomes and party-specific vote shares.

Table A-7: Treatment Effects on Administrative Aggregate Outcomes - Robustness to Different Set of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Opposition Vote Share				Turnout			
A. İzmir 2024 Elections								
Gender Equality	0.010	0.008**	0.009**	0.008**	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Transparency	0.011	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**	-0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.756	0.756	0.756	0.756
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.939	0.851	0.892	0.831	0.585	0.670	0.542	0.224
R-square	0.738	0.808	0.812	0.812	0.178	0.410	0.505	0.534
Adj.R-square	0.737	0.806	0.810	0.810	0.172	0.405	0.499	0.528
B. Kars 2023 Elections								
Gender Equality	0.109*	0.047***	0.049***	0.050***	0.005	-0.002	0.011	0.015
	(0.062)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Youth	-0.001	0.017	0.020	0.025	-0.002	-0.011	-0.008	0.001
	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	234	234	234	234	234	234	234	234
Mean	0.378	0.378	0.378	0.378	0.723	0.723	0.723	0.723
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.097	0.213	0.256	0.310	0.741	0.662	0.323	0.415
R-square	0.198	0.852	0.859	0.862	0.269	0.492	0.542	0.591
Adj.R-square	0.135	0.834	0.838	0.839	0.212	0.447	0.471	0.524
C. Pooled Results								
Gender Equality	0.015	0.010***	0.011***	0.011***	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Non-Gender Equality	0.011	0.010**	0.011**	0.010**	-0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383	4,383
Mean	0.514	0.514	0.514	0.514	0.753	0.753	0.753	0.753
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.731	0.970	0.940	0.955	0.611	0.711	0.643	0.371
R-square	0.671	0.824	0.828	0.828	0.193	0.422	0.513	0.530
Adj.R-square	0.668	0.821	0.825	0.824	0.185	0.416	0.504	0.521
Sixtile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition 23		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Turnout Parliamentary 23, Number of Registered Voters 23 & 24			✓	✓			✓	✓
Common Demographics (Education, socioeconomics)				✓				✓

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on administrative electoral outcomes using alternative sets of control variables. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively estimated using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2).The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Columns (1)–(4) and turnout in Columns (5)–(8). Across columns, specifications progressively incorporate additional controls. Columns (1) and (5) include only the stratification fixed effects used in the experimental design. Columns (2) and (6) additionally control for lagged electoral outcomes, including pre-treatment party vote shares. Columns (3) and (7) further include pre-treatment turnout and the number of registered voters. Columns (4) and (8) additionally include neighborhood socio-economic and demographic controls. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, R-square, adjusted R-square. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-8: Treatment Effects on Administrative Party Outcomes - Robustness to Different Set of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	CHP				İYİ				DEM				Rest of Opposition			
A. İzmir 2024 Elections																
Gender Equality	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.010	0.005**	0.006***	0.005**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.006	0.008*	0.009**	0.009**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.891	0.287	0.144	0.117	0.476	0.260	0.156	0.131	0.807	0.372	0.147	0.209	0.786	0.907	0.784	0.718
R-square	0.645	0.866	0.869	0.869	0.208	0.462	0.467	0.471	0.138	0.848	0.850	0.850	0.156	0.179	0.183	0.185
Adj.R-square	0.643	0.865	0.868	0.868	0.203	0.456	0.461	0.464	0.132	0.847	0.848	0.848	0.150	0.171	0.174	0.175
B. Kars 2023 Elections																
Gender Equality	-0.002	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.007	0.010	0.013	0.013	0.104*	0.030*	0.031**	0.032**	-0.003	-0.006	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.061)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Youth	0.005	0.011	0.012	0.019	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.016	0.019	0.019	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.162	0.162	0.162	0.162	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.709	0.814	0.743	0.576	0.758	0.480	0.389	0.353	0.114	0.482	0.507	0.495	0.704	0.870	0.939	0.803
R-square	0.622	0.694	0.699	0.725	0.581	0.637	0.653	0.655	0.391	0.931	0.932	0.933	0.089	0.146	0.312	0.325
Adj.R-square	0.590	0.656	0.651	0.675	0.545	0.591	0.597	0.592	0.340	0.922	0.922	0.920	0.012	0.038	0.202	0.201
C. Pooled Results																
Gender Equality	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.002	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.012	0.005**	0.006***	0.006***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Non-Gender Equality	0.006	0.008*	0.009**	0.009**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266	4,266
Mean	0.403	0.403	0.403	0.403	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.884	0.279	0.137	0.121	0.500	0.217	0.122	0.107	0.714	0.327	0.126	0.177	0.813	0.916	0.777	0.737
R-square	0.684	0.879	0.882	0.882	0.403	0.576	0.583	0.585	0.232	0.873	0.874	0.874	0.155	0.179	0.189	0.190
Adj.R-square	0.681	0.877	0.880	0.880	0.398	0.571	0.577	0.579	0.225	0.871	0.872	0.872	0.148	0.169	0.176	0.177
Sixtile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition 23		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Turnout Parliamentary 23, Number of Registered Voters 23 & 24			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓
Common Demographics (Education, socioeconomics)				✓				✓				✓				✓

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on party-level administrative electoral outcomes using alternative sets of control variables. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively, corresponding to the subsequent local and general elections in those years and estimated using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2). The outcomes include vote shares of individual opposition parties: the CHP in Columns (1)–(4), the İYİ Party in Columns (5)–(8), the DEM Party in Columns (9)–(12), and the remaining opposition parties in Columns (13)–(16). Across columns, specifications progressively incorporate alternative control sets. Columns (1), (5), (9), and (13) include only the stratification fixed effects used in the experimental design. Columns (2), (6), (10), and (14) additionally control for lagged electoral outcomes, including pre-treatment party vote shares. Columns (3), (7), (11), and (15) further include pre-treatment turnout and the number of registered voters. Columns (4), (8), (12), and (16) additionally include neighborhood socio-economic and demographic controls. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, R-square, and adjusted R-square. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Completed Conversations on Administrative Electoral Results in the 2024 İzmir Field Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
Gender Equality	0.029**	-0.008	0.008	0.005	0.018***	-0.002
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Transparency	0.031**	0.001	0.029**	-0.003	0.007	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149	4,149
Mean	0.526	0.756	0.416	0.031	0.055	0.024
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.931	0.530	0.142	0.153	0.136	0.796

Notes: This table presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the effect of completed door-to-door conversations on administrative electoral outcomes in the 2024 İzmir field experiment, where completed conversations are instrumented using random assignment to the gender-equality and transparency campaign treatments.Columns (1)–(6) report effects on opposition vote share, turnout, and vote shares for individual opposition parties—CHP, İYİ Party, DEM Party, and the remaining opposition parties—measured at the ballot-box level and pooled across the 2024 metropolitan mayoral, district mayoral, and municipal council elections. All specifications include the baseline set of controls used in the administrative analysis, including district fixed effects, strata fixed effects based on pre-treatment opposition vote share, lagged electoral outcomes, and neighborhood-level covariates. The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the 2SLS coefficients for gender equality and transparency conversations. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-10: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results for the Incumbent and Liberal Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Incumbent by Party		
	Liberal	Incumbent	AKP	MHP	Rest of Incumbent
A. İzmir 2024 Elections					
Gender Equality	0.010***	-0.009**	-0.008**		-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.002)
Transparency	0.011**	-0.010**	-0.009**		-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.002)
Observations	4,149	4,149	4,149		4,149
Mean	0.518	0.474	0.432		0.042
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.927	0.892	0.817		0.810
B. Kars 2023 Elections					
Gender Equality	0.046**	-0.049***	-0.034	-0.011	-0.001
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.014)
Youth	0.027	-0.020	-0.042*	-0.002	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Observations	117	234	117	117	117
Mean	0.401	0.622	0.385	0.166	0.043
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.502	0.256	0.723	0.733	0.525
C. Pooled Results					
Gender Equality	0.011***	-0.011***	-0.009**		-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.002)
Non-Gender Equality	0.011***	-0.011**	-0.010**		-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.002)
Observations	4,266	4,383	4,266		4,266
Mean	0.513	0.486	0.430		0.042
p-value: Gender Equality=Non-Gender Equality	0.980	0.940	0.787		0.663

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on administrative electoral outcomes for liberal and incumbent political blocs using official administrative records. Panels A and B report results from the 2024 intervention in İzmir and the 2023 intervention in Kars, respectively using equation (1). Panel C reports pooled effects across both provinces estimated using equation (2).The outcomes include Liberal bloc vote share in Column (1), Incumbent bloc vote share in Column (2), and vote shares for incumbent parties: the AKP in Column (3), the MHP in Column (4), and the remaining incumbent parties in Column (5). Liberal and Incumbent bloc vote shares are constructed by aggregating parties within each political bloc. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-11: Balance Across Treatment Groups in Survey Implementation and Post-Treatment Demographics at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean			p-value
	Control	Gender Equality	Transparency	difference
A. Technical Variables				
Number of attempts	2.97	2.90	2.91	0.96
Number of unanswered door knocks	1.31	1.20	1.27	0.82
Number of attempts with ineligible participants	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.98
Number of rejections	0.52	0.55	0.50	0.87
Survey day of the year	129.47	129.51	129.42	0.99
Survey conducted on a weekend	0.30	0.22	0.20	0.34
Survey conducted in the afternoon	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.77
Survey conducted by female surveyor	0.74	0.73	0.69	0.59
B. Demographics (Post-treatment)				
Woman	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.57
Age	49.50	49.46	49.14	0.97
Marital: Single	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.81
Marital: Married	0.77	0.74	0.76	0.29
Has any children	0.85	0.83	0.84	0.57
Number of children	2.04	2.02	2.08	0.81
Number of daughters	1.00	0.98	0.98	0.90
Number of sons	1.04	1.05	1.09	0.51
Education: Without any degree	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.80
Education: Primary school degree	0.43	0.43	0.40	0.69
Education: Middle school degree	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.86
Education: High school degree	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.98
Education: Bachelor's degree or above	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.71
Education: Less than high school degree	0.64	0.64	0.62	0.91
Employment: Employed	0.33	0.30	0.32	0.51
Employment: Unemployed	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.60
Employment: Homemaker	0.34	0.35	0.36	0.84
Employment: Retired	0.25	0.27	0.24	0.41
Income	4.74	4.55	4.67	0.55
Non-Turkish native language	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.96

Notes: This table reports balance tests for the endline survey in İzmir. Panel A contains technical variables related to survey implementation (e.g., number of attempts, unanswered door knocks, rejections, survey timing, and interviewer gender). Panel B reports post-treatment demographic characteristics of respondents (sex, age, marital status, number of children, education, employment status, income, and language spoken at home). Columns (1)–(3) report the mean values for the control, gender equality, and transparency treatment groups, respectively, while Column (4) reports the p-value from a test of equality of means across treatment arms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table A-12: Summary Statistics of Post-Treatment Variables at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Observations	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
A. Individual Attitudes						
Decrease corruption	1,124	0.56	1.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Gender inequality index	1,140	0.35	0.25	0.28	0.00	1.00
Men more right to job	1,164	0.48	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Men better leaders	1,158	0.32	0.00	0.47	0.00	1.00
Beating wife justifiable	1,176	0.04	0.00	0.19	0.00	1.00
Mother works suffer	1,173	0.59	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
B. Perception of Local Norms						
Decrease corruption	1,081	0.53	0.55	0.31	0.00	0.95
Gender inequality index	1,083	0.44	0.45	0.18	0.00	0.95
Men more right to job	1,134	0.56	0.55	0.26	0.00	0.95
Men better leaders	1,113	0.50	0.55	0.25	0.00	0.95
Beating wife justifiable	1,148	0.15	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.95
Mother works suffer	1,141	0.55	0.55	0.26	0.00	0.95
C. Perception of Country-wide Norms						
Decrease corruption	1,100	0.56	0.55	0.26	0.00	0.95
Gender inequality index	1,113	0.53	0.55	0.13	0.00	0.95
Men more right to job	1,149	0.62	0.55	0.20	0.00	0.95
Men better leaders	1,133	0.59	0.55	0.20	0.00	0.95
Beating wife justifiable	1,159	0.27	0.15	0.22	0.00	0.95
Mother works suffer	1,157	0.62	0.55	0.20	0.00	0.95
D. Self-reported Voting Preferences						
Opposition vote share	1,180	0.57	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
AKP	1,180	0.27	0.00	0.44	0.00	1.00
CHP	1,180	0.54	1.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
İYİ	1,180	0.02	0.00	0.12	0.00	1.00
DEM	1,180	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.00	1.00
Rest of opposition	1,180	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
Turnout	1,180	0.95	1.00	0.22	0.00	1.00
Prefer not to answer	1,180	0.10	0.00	0.30	0.00	1.00
E. Party Competence in Policies						
E1. Competent in Gender Equality Policies						
Opposition	1,023	0.49	0.00	0.50	0.00	1.00
Incumbent	1,023	0.32	0.00	0.47	0.00	1.00
No difference	1,023	0.19	0.00	0.39	0.00	1.00
E2. Competent in Transparency Policies						
Opposition	998	0.59	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
Incumbent	998	0.29	0.00	0.45	0.00	1.00
No difference	998	0.13	0.00	0.33	0.00	1.00
F. Ranked in Respondent's Top Two Municipal Policy Priorities						
Policies supporting gender equality	1,180	0.42	0.00	0.49	0.00	1.00
Policies improving transparency	1,180	0.68	1.00	0.47	0.00	1.00
Policies targeting inflation and infrastructure	1,180	0.61	1.00	0.49	0.00	1.00

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Column (1) shows the number of observations, column (2) the sample mean, column (3) the median, column (4) the standard deviation, column (5) the minimum and column (6) the maximum. The table is organized by category: Panel A reports individual attitudes toward corruption and gender norms; Panel B reports perceptions of local norms; Panel C reports perceptions of country-wide norms; Panel D reports self-reported voting behavior; Panel E reports perceptions of party competence in gender-equality and transparency policies; and Panel F reports the share of respondents ranking each policy area among their top two municipal priorities.

Table A-13: Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results for Each Election Type

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition Vote Share	Turnout	CHP	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
A. 2024 İzmir District Mayor Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009*	-0.003	0.002	0.001	0.007***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.012**	0.000	0.010*	-0.001	0.003	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Observations	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383
Mean	0.522	0.755	0.422	0.029	0.051	0.020
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.617	0.511	0.137	0.435	0.117	0.309
B. 2024 İzmir Metropolitan Mayor Elections						
Gender Equality	0.010***	-0.002	0.004	0.000	0.005**	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Transparency	0.008*	0.001	0.009**	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383
Mean	0.521	0.760	0.413	0.032	0.055	0.021
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.678	0.574	0.331	0.107	0.172	0.641
C. 2024 İzmir Municipal Council Members Elections						
Gender Equality	0.009**	-0.003	0.001	0.004**	0.004**	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Transparency	0.010**	0.000	0.009**	0.000	0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383	1,383
Mean	0.535	0.753	0.414	0.033	0.059	0.029
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.868	0.548	0.105	0.107	0.237	0.543
D. 2023 Kars Parliamentary Elections						
Gender Equality	0.046**	0.010	0.006	0.013	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.003)
Youth	0.026	-0.007	0.012	-0.001	0.019	-0.004
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117
Mean	0.406	0.719	0.123	0.090	0.162	0.030
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.484	0.387	0.743	0.389	0.507	0.939
E. 2023 Kars Presidential Elections						
Gender Equality	0.052***	0.012				
	(0.020)	(0.015)				
Youth	0.015	-0.008				
	(0.024)	(0.014)				
Observations	117	117				
Mean	0.351	0.728				
p-value: Gender Equality=Youth	0.150	0.271				

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and non-gender campaigns on administrative electoral results for each election. Panel A reports results for 2024 İzmir district mayor elections, Panel B for 2024 İzmir metropolitan mayor elections, Panel C for 2024 İzmir municipal council elections, Panel D for 2023 Kars parliamentary elections, and Panel E for 2023 Kars presidential elections. The estimates are based on ITT estimates of Equation (1). The outcomes include aggregated opposition vote share in Column (1), turnout in Column (2), and vote shares for individual opposition parties: the CHP in Column (3), the İYİ Party in Column (4), the DEM Party in Column (5), and the remaining opposition parties in Column (6). The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable, and the p-value for equality of the gender equality and non-gender campaign treatment coefficients within each column. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-14: Discrepancy between Treatment Effects on Administrative Electoral Results and Self-Reported Voting at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Opposition by party			
	Opposition	Turnout	CHP (Delivered by)	İYİ	DEM	Rest of Opposition
Gender Equality	-0.116***	-0.036**	-0.119***	0.004	-0.007	0.006
	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Transparency	-0.071**	-0.015	-0.064**	0.003	-0.010	0.001
	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Observations	146	146	146	146	146	146
Dependent mean	0.072	0.182	0.116	-0.015	-0.023	-0.015
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.241	0.222	0.152	0.926	0.798	0.510
	Gender Equality p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.009					
	Transparency p-value CHP=IYI=DEM=Rest Opposition: 0.085					

Notes: This table compares treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on administrative electoral outcomes with the corresponding effects on self-reported voting outcomes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. The dependent variable in all columns is the discrepancy between neighborhood-level administrative electoral outcomes and the mean self-reported outcome among surveyed residents in the same neighborhood (administrative minus self-reported value).Column (1) reports the discrepancy in overall opposition vote share, column (2) reports the turnout discrepancy, and columns (3)–(6) report discrepancies in opposition vote shares by party: CHP in column (3), İYİ in column (4), DEM in column (5), and all remaining opposition parties in column (6). Each column presents ITT effects of assignment to the gender equality and transparency campaigns. The table also reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, the p-value testing equality of the gender equality and non-gender treatment effects, and the p-value testing equality of treatment effects across the party-specific vote-share columns. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity

Table A-15: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Reported Vote for Opposition and Turnout at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Covariates as Respondent's Characteristics			
	Woman	Above median age	Less than high school degree	Below median income
A. Vote for Opposition				
Gender Equality	-0.051	-0.100**	-0.100**	-0.132***
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.037)
Transparency	-0.049	-0.084**	-0.085**	-0.083***
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.030)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.109*	-0.015	-0.011	0.109
	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.070)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.019	0.049	0.042	0.075
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.086)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,016
Mean	0.586	0.587	0.586	0.601
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.968	0.734	0.776	0.205
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.733
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Covariate	0.101	0.390	0.158	0.920
B. Turnout				
Gender Equality	0.006	-0.029	-0.044*	-0.037*
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Transparency	0.003	-0.033	-0.029	-0.028
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Gender Equality*Covariate	-0.091**	-0.020	0.006	-0.013
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.046)
Transparency*Covariate	-0.038	0.032	0.026	0.032
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.048)
Observations	3,378	3,374	3,378	3,016
Mean	0.935	0.937	0.935	0.934
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.884	0.878	0.583	0.657
p-value: Gender Equality+Gender Equality × Covariate	0.001	0.012	0.068	0.173
p-value: Transparency+Transparency × Covariate	0.085	0.968	0.878	0.917

Notes: This table presents heterogeneous treatment-effect estimates for self-reported voting outcomes using individual-level data from the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Estimates are ITT effects from equation (3) that interact assignment to the gender equality and transparency campaigns with respondent characteristics.Panel A examines heterogeneity in reported vote for the opposition, while Panel B examines heterogeneity in self-reported turnout. In each panel, treatment indicators are interacted with respondent characteristics: being a woman (Column 1), being above the median age (Column 2), having less than a high school degree (Column 3), and having below-median household income (Column 4).For each characteristic, columns report baseline treatment effects, interaction effects between treatment assignment and the corresponding covariate, the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, tests of equality between the gender equality and transparency treatment effects as well as tests of the combined main and interaction effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-16: Robustness of the Results on Individual Attitudes at İzmir Endline Survey to Different Weight Schemes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Index Subcomponents				
	Gender Inequality Index	Men has more right to job	Men are better political leaders	Beating wife is justifiable	Child suffer if mother works	Possible to eradicate corruption
A. Population Weights						
Gender Equality	0.069***	0.096***	0.092***	0.005	0.071*	-0.016
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.030	0.034	0.022	0.012	0.036	-0.028
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.320	0.407	0.286	0.029	0.571	0.537
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.079	0.060	0.051	0.385	0.350	0.743
B. Gender Weights						
Gender Equality	0.068***	0.092***	0.097***	0.005	0.070*	-0.022
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Transparency	0.033*	0.035	0.028	0.012	0.041	-0.037
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.320	0.411	0.283	0.031	0.567	0.546
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.110	0.091	0.050	0.434	0.451	0.698
C. Age Weights						
Gender Equality	0.069***	0.092***	0.095***	0.006	0.072*	-0.019
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Transparency	0.033*	0.042	0.027	0.015*	0.037	-0.040
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.317	0.404	0.279	0.030	0.565	0.545
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.100	0.145	0.048	0.343	0.348	0.584
D. Education Weights						
Gender Equality	0.061***	0.089**	0.078**	0.006	0.064	-0.015
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.029	0.036	0.021	0.015	0.039	-0.045
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.009)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Observations	3,250	3,339	3,308	3,354	3,347	3,215
Mean	0.329	0.417	0.295	0.030	0.583	0.551
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.144	0.128	0.116	0.329	0.489	0.447

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on individual attitudes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey using alternative survey weighting schemes. Estimates report ITT effects obtained from equation (3). Panel A applies population weights based on the ratio of registered voters to survey respondents within neighborhoods. Panel B applies gender weights, Panel C applies age weights, and Panel D applies education weights.Column (1) reports treatment effects on the overall gender-inequality index. Columns (2)–(6) report treatment effects on the index subcomponents: agreement that men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce (Column 2), that men are better political leaders (Column 3), that beating one's wife can be justified (Column 4), that children suffer if the mother works (Column 5), and the belief that corruption can be eradicated from local politics (Column 6). The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-17: Interview Conditions Under Which İzmir Endline Survey Was Conducted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Index Subcomponents				
	Influence index	Presence of others	Consulted anyone	Influenced by others	Hostility scale	Non-friendly
Gender Equality	0.016	0.028	0.002	0.017	0.082**	0.074*
	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Transparency	-0.013	-0.012	-0.018	-0.008	0.001	-0.008
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Observations	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377	3,377
Mean	0.149	0.341	0.057	0.048	1.309	0.302
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.047	0.233	0.075	0.057	0.057	0.042

Notes: This table reports treatment effects of assignment to the gender equality and transparency campaigns on interview conditions observed during the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Columns (1)–(6) correspond to the Influence index, Presence of others, Consulted anyone, Influenced by others, Hostility scale, and Non-friendly indicator, respectively. The Influence index is the mean of the three indicators reported in columns (2)–(4). Presence of others equals 1 if the respondent was not alone during the interview; Consulted anyone equals 1 if the respondent consulted another person while answering; and Influenced by others equals 1 if the enumerator assessed that responses were influenced by others. The Hostility scale records interviewer-assessed respondent attitude (1 = friendly, 2 = neutral, 3 = hostile), and Non-friendly equals 1 if the respondent was neutral or hostile.Results are weighted by the ratio of registered voters to sample size. The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-18: Treatment Effects on Self-Reported Voting for the Incumbent and Liberal Parties at İzmir Endline Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			Incumbent by Party	
	Liberal	Incumbent	AKP	Rest of Incumbent
Gender Equality	-0.106***	0.022	0.022	0.001
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.003)
Transparency	-0.058**	0.031	0.025	0.006*
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.004)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.585	0.224	0.221	0.004
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.178	0.739	0.910	0.157

Notes: This table presents the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on self-reported voting outcomes aggregated by party type. Column 1 reports effects on the combined vote share of liberal opposition parties (CHP and İYİ Party); column 2 reports effects on the self-reported vote share of incumbent parties (AKP and MHP combined); column 3 and 4 reports vote shares for the major incumbent party (AKP) and the remaining incumbent parties. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. The table also reports The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects.

Table A-19: Robustness of the Results on Self-Reported Voting at İzmir Endline Survey to Different Set of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Opposition Vote Share				
Gender Equality	-0.087**	-0.099***	-0.108***	-0.093**
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Transparency	-0.061**	-0.060**	-0.059**	-0.053*
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.586	0.586	0.586	0.586
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.523	0.308	0.178	0.251
B. Turnout				
Gender Equality	-0.038**	-0.038**	-0.040**	-0.045**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Transparency	-0.016	-0.017	-0.016	-0.020
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.935	0.935	0.935	0.935
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.188	0.195	0.142	0.110
C. CHP (Delivered by)				
Gender Equality	-0.100***	-0.111***	-0.119***	-0.102***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Transparency	-0.056*	-0.056*	-0.056*	-0.046
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.538	0.538	0.538	0.538
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.258	0.140	0.079	0.110
D. İYİ				
Gender Equality	0.001	0.005	0.004	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Transparency	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.878	0.700	0.734	0.718
E. DEM				
Gender Equality	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Transparency	-0.008	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.335	0.458	0.449	0.416
F. Rest of Opposition				
Gender Equality	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Transparency	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.506	0.598	0.555	0.532
G. Prefer not to Answer				
Gender Equality	0.037	0.044	0.043	0.031
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Transparency	0.013	0.010	0.008	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Observations	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378
Mean	0.120	0.120	0.120	0.120
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.416	0.217	0.222	0.289
Sixtile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition 23		✓	✓	✓
Turnout Parliamentary 23, Number of Registered Voters 23 & 24			✓	✓
Common Demographics (Education, socioeconomics)				✓

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on self-reported voting outcomes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Panels report results separately for opposition vote share (Panel A), turnout (Panel B), vote shares for the CHP (Panel C), İYİ Party (Panel D), DEM Party (Panel E), remaining opposition parties (Panel F), and the fraction of respondents preferring not to report their vote choice (Panel G). Across panels, Columns (1)–(4) report estimates from specifications that progressively incorporate additional control variables. Column (1) includes stratification fixed effects based on pre-treatment opposition vote share. Column (2) additionally controls for pre-treatment party vote shares. Column (3) further includes pre-treatment parliamentary turnout and the number of registered voters. Column (4) additionally includes demographic and socioeconomic controls. All estimates are ITT effects obtained from equation (3). The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A-20: Robustness of the Results on Individual Attitudes at İzmir Endline Survey to Different Set of Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Gender Inequality Index				
Gender Equality	0.070***	0.066***	0.069***	0.053**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Transparency	0.028	0.030	0.030	0.025
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	3,250	3,250	3,250	3,250
Mean	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.320
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.063	0.099	0.079	0.149
B. Men has more right to job				
Gender Equality	0.092**	0.086**	0.096***	0.075**
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Transparency	0.029	0.032	0.034	0.025
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Observations	3,339	3,339	3,339	3,339
Mean	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.070	0.122	0.060	0.104
C. Men are better political leaders				
Gender Equality	0.101***	0.090***	0.092***	0.087**
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Transparency	0.018	0.021	0.022	0.025
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Observations	3,308	3,308	3,308	3,308
Mean	0.286	0.286	0.286	0.286
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.029	0.053	0.051	0.063
D. Beating wife is justifiable				
Gender Equality	0.010	0.003	0.005	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Transparency	0.010	0.012	0.012	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	3,354	3,354	3,354	3,354
Mean	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.981	0.322	0.385	0.396
E. Child suffers if mother works				
Gender Equality	0.073*	0.078*	0.071*	0.030
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Transparency	0.037	0.037	0.036	0.017
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.032)
Observations	3,347	3,347	3,347	3,347
Mean	0.571	0.571	0.571	0.571
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.350	0.279	0.350	0.720
F. Possible to eradicate corruption				
Gender Equality	-0.020	-0.028	-0.016	-0.002
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Transparency	-0.031	-0.027	-0.028	-0.021
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Observations	3,215	3,215	3,215	3,215
Mean	0.537	0.537	0.537	0.537
p-value: Gender Equality=Transparency	0.778	0.994	0.743	0.613
Sixtile & District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHP, İYİ, DEM, Rest of Opposition 23		✓	✓	✓
Turnout Parliamentary 23, Number of Registered Voters 23 & 24			✓	✓
Common Demographics (Education, socioeconomics)				✓

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the treatment effects of the gender equality and transparency campaigns on individual attitudes measured in the 2024 İzmir endline survey. Panels report results separately for the gender-inequality index (Panel A) and its individual components: agreement that men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce (Panel B), that men are better political leaders (Panel C), that beating one's wife can be justified (Panel D), that children suffer if the mother works (Panel E), and the belief that corruption can be eradicated from local politics (Panel F).Across panels, Columns (1)–(4) report estimates from specifications that progressively incorporate additional control variables. Column (1) includes stratification fixed effects based on pre-treatment opposition vote share. Column (2) additionally controls for pre-treatment party vote shares. Column (3) further includes pre-treatment parliamentary turnout and the number of registered voters. Column (4) additionally includes demographic and socioeconomic controls.All estimates are ITT effects obtained from equation (3). The table reports the number of observations, the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, p-values testing equality of the gender equality and transparency treatment effects. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.