Why do People Follow Leaders?

Evidence from 1936 Spain

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Abstract

Why do people follow leaders? We study the 1936 Spanish coup, where the army split between rebels and loyalists. While the 1936 chain of command collapsed, we show that officers followed their former commanders, even though these leaders no longer held formal authority or coercive power over them. Our identification exploits plausibly exogenous rotation, comparing officers exposed to a rebel leader with peers posted to the same posting at a different time. We examine three channels through which past leaders might influence their former subordinates: indoctrination, coordination, and career concerns. We find evidence for the latter two. JEL codes: D74, N44, M51, M54, L14.

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1 Introduction

The Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939) was a short-lived democracy, and its demise began on July 17, 1936, when a military uprising attempted to overthrow it. The army was divided, with 35% of the officers supporting the government and 65% backing the rebels. This division allows us to study what drove the decisions of five thousand individuals. For them, the decision of whether to support the rebellion or stay loyal to the Republic was highly consequential: 22% died during the conflict. For Spain as a whole, the coup led to a three-year civil war that foreshadowed the horrors of World War Two, with almost half a million casualties, and to a dictatorship that lasted forty years afterwards. Our paper studies how military leadership drove individual decisions and, by extension, democratic breakdown.

We find that while the 1936 chain of command was broadly disrupted, previous superiors continued to wield influence over their former subordinates. Drawing on a novel dataset of military careers, we compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders (i.e., generals who later rebelled) to their peers who served a few years earlier or later in the same post but were not exposed. We find that officers who had served (before 1936) under a rebel leader were 11 percentage points more likely to join the rebellion.

We confirm that our findings are causal with several robustness checks. First, we show that subordinates do not follow placebo leaders, that is, those who commanded a post right before or right after the subordinate served there. Second, after accounting for posting fixed effects, treated subordinates are very similar to control subordinates in a large number of observable characteristics. Relatedly, we show that selection on unobservables would have to be implausibly large compared to selection on observables to explain away our results. Third, we show that our findings are not driven by selection: subordinates who arrived at a posting with or after the rebel leader (and therefore may have been hired by him) are not more likely to rebel than those who were there before. Fourth, we address concerns about reverse causality by showing that our estimates are not increasing in subordinate's rank, and that shocks from one leader do not transmit to others through shared subordinates.

While current commanders can rely on formal authority or coercion over their subordi-

nates, former ones must find other ways to inspire loyalty. This raises a fundamental question: how does a leader elicit obedience? We explore three potential mechanisms: information, indoctrination, and career concerns.

The first mechanism is rooted in the *present* (i.e., in July 1936). Subordinates face an *informational* problem: choosing sides while trying to predict who will prevail. Because the outcome depends on how many others align, this is a coordination problem under sparse, delayed information. Former commanders likely loom larger in what officers notice and can interpret; familiarity and prior ties make their moves salient cues about which coalition may win. Therefore, past leaders wield influence because they coordinate the actions of their subordinates. We test for this channel and find supportive evidence: subordinates not only follow their former leaders but also their peers' former leaders. This finding is consistent with subordinates learning about allegiances second-hand and updating beliefs about each side's strength. Because peers' former leaders could not have directly shaped these officers' beliefs or careers (we explain those channels below), we interpret their influence as evidence for coordination.[1]

Our second mechanism places the influence of leadership in the *past*. Subordinates may have developed ideological preferences under their former leaders — they may have been *indoctrinated*. To test this, we leverage a successful coup from 1923 and a failed one from 1932. We classify those generals who supported these uprisings but were not around in 1936 (dead or retired) as "placebo authoritarians." If indoctrination were driving our results, subordinates who served under them should disproportionately support the 1936 coup. Their effects are small and not statistically significant, including when we focus on those who (from retirement) endorsed the 1936 coup. We therefore find no evidence for *indoctrination*.[2]

The third mechanism operates through the *future*. Subordinates who had previous rela-

[1] Another finding further supports the coordination mechanism: rebel leaders had twice the influence on geographically closer former subordinates in 1936, consistent with officers needing to track nearby developments closely to save their own lives.

[2] Additional evidence against indoctrination comes from age heterogeneity analysis. When splitting the sample by median age at treatment, we find that the effect is actually stronger for older officers, contrary to what we would expect if indoctrination were the mechanism, since younger people are typically more susceptible to belief changes (Ghitza et al., 2023).

tionships with rebel leaders may have supported the coup due to *career concerns*. Leaders typically favor promoting their former subordinates. If these leaders ended up on the winning side of the coup, they would gain significantly more power to advance their former subordinates' careers. Therefore, subordinates who had served under rebel leaders had a personal stake in the coup's success. We also leverage the 1923 coup and the ensuing dictatorship (1923-1930) to find evidence for this channel. We show that subordinates who were exposed to the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship but not during the Republic (1931-1936). These patterns indicate that relationships with influential leaders were a determinant of promotions in Spain, giving forward-looking officers reason to expect those ties to matter in the future.

Consider the illustrative example of Major Cuesta Monereo. He served as General Cabanellas' *aide-de-camp* in 1934, when Cabanellas was Inspector General of the Army. In 1936, Cabanellas rebelled. Despite serving under a loyalist general by then, Cuesta broke the chain of command and rebelled. This example speaks directly to our mechanisms: Cabanellas was a committed republican before 1936, so it is unlikely that he indoctrinated Cuesta with anti-democratic values. We also know that Cuesta had corresponded with Cabanellas and was aware of his proclivity to support the coup (a surprise to the government), suggesting a coordination motive. Finally, during and after the Civil War, Cuesta got promoted very rapidly, reaching the very top of the Army's hierarchy, suggesting a career concerns motive.

Contribution to the literature. The importance of leaders has been established in economics. For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bandiera et al. (2020), and Jones and Olken (2005) study the effects of leaders on firm policies, firm performance, and macroeconomic outcomes, respectively.[3] Recent papers focus specifically on the military, taking advantage of the plausible exogenous rotation involved in military assignments. Dippel and Heblich (2021) and Ferrara et al. (2025) study the impact of leaders on recruitment and

[3]More papers on the impact of leaders on nations and organizations are Assouad (2021), Boudreau et al. (2025), Becker and Hvide (2022), Dube and Harish (2020), Fenizia (2022), Marx et al. (2024), Ottinger and Voigtländer (2025), and Wang (2021).

desertion, respectively. Bai et al. (2023) and Cagé et al. (2023) show how exposure to one influential individual shapes mobilization and the distribution of political power, and long-term political beliefs and behavior, respectively.[4]

Our contribution to this literature is double. First, we test three mechanisms, helping to determine why individuals follow leaders. Organizational theorists have emphasized the importance of this question: "...a leader is someone with followers who follow voluntarily. The critical question then becomes how does a leader induce others to follow?" (Hermalin, 2013, p. 433). Handy (1993) refers to this question as one of the "Holy Grails" of organizational theory. While the military often relies on coercion to elicit compliance, we focus on *former* leaders who have no differential ability to sanction their former subordinates. What we learn can therefore be applied to organizations that rely on voluntary compliance, such as firms. Second, we uncover the effect of past hierarchies on support for a coup, and therefore on democratic survival. The fact that former leaders can have an enduring influence on subordinates is especially relevant for young democracies (as the Second Spanish Republic was), whose past hierarchies were shaped by dictators.

To the literature on coups and civil wars, we also contribute by studying individual-level drivers of participation, which have rarely been studied. Among the exceptions, La Parra-Pérez (2020) also studies the 1936 Spanish coup and shows that professional and economic interests influenced officers' decisions, and that subordinates with a rebel leader (in 1936) are more likely to rebel. In comparison, our focus on past hierarchies allows us to implement an identification strategy that exploits rotation, to explore the role of voluntary leadership (in the absence of coercion or formal authority), and to test three mechanisms. Naidu et al. (2021) shows a relationship between elites' network centrality and coup support and Guo et al. (2024) study the role of peer effects.[5]

Lastly, we contribute to the literature on the Spanish Civil War. McLauchlin and Parra-

[4]Relatedly, the role of veterans as leaders has been studied by, for example, Ang and Chinoy (2025) and Jha and Wilkinson (2012).

[5]A larger literature models coups with the military as a unified actor, such as Acemoglu et al. (2010); Besley and Robinson (2010); Aidt and Leon (2018). For a more general treatment of civil wars and coups, see Blattman and Miguel (2010); Geddes (1999); Humphreys and Weinstein (2008); Verwimp et al. (2019). Fajardo (2020) studies the role of the military hierarchy in the backlash to a coup.

Pérez (2019) study executions of officers. Balcells (2011) and Balcells (2012) study violence and victimization in Catalonia and Aragon. Tur-Prats and Valencia Caicedo (2020), Rodon (2024), and Oto-Peralías (2015) study the long-term effects of the war. More generally, we contribute to the literature on the rise of fascism.[6]

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides relevant historical background. Section 3 presents our data sources and estimation strategy. Section 4 presents our main results and robustness checks. Section 5 outlines a framework that connects our mechanisms to the theoretical literature and presents empirical tests for each channel. Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical Context

The setting for this paper is the Spanish Coup of 17-21 July 1936. Tensions between the left and the right (or monarchists vs. republicans, Catholic integrists vs. secularists, etc.) date back to the nineteenth century. The involvement of the military in civilian politics also had a long tradition. In this section, however, we provide only a brief background to the coup, as well as short accounts of two earlier coups, which are not part of our main analysis but are used to test mechanisms in Section 5.

The Second Spanish Republic was established in 1931 following the abdication of King Alfonso XIII, replacing the monarchy with a parliamentary democracy. It introduced far-reaching reforms, including land redistribution, military restructuring, and the separation of church and state. These initiatives polarized public opinion and quickly became sources of political conflict, contributing to an increasingly fragmented party system (Payne, 2017). Political tensions frequently spilled into violence, with episodes of street fighting, strikes, and assassinations becoming more common over time.

A left-wing coalition won the elections of February 1936. By March, a group of senior officers had begun coordinating a plan to overthrow the Republic by force. Their motivations

[6]For example, Acemoglu et al. (2022), Adena et al. (2015), Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021), Koenig (2023), Satyanath et al. (2017), and Voth and Voigtlander (2025).

ranged from fears of political instability to opposition to the government's recent reforms. The plot gained momentum in military circles as political tensions mounted in the spring. The conspiracy was led by General Mola and intended to have General Sanjurjo (then in exile) as its figurehead. General Franco himself was hesitant, and the main plotters did not intend for him to play a major role in the government. The newly formed government proceeded to remove suspect generals from key posts, successfully guessing some of their allegiances. Payne (2012, p 76) writes: "The government had not erred in its calculation that most generals in active command were loyal... in many garrisons the role of middle-rank and junior officers was decisive."

On 13 July (five days before the coup), an important right-wing politician was murdered by a socialist officer. The assassination precipitated the coup, and it may have convinced Franco to join (Preston, 2015, ch. 5). The uprising started on July 17$^{\text{th}}$ in Africa. Important provincial capitals like Burgos, Córdoba, and Seville had been taken by the 19$^{\text{th}}$, but others like Barcelona, Valencia, and more importantly, Madrid, stayed in the government's hands until much later. In summary, the government failed to suppress the rebellion but managed to keep control of about half of the country and half of the army (for example, 47% of the Army officers were located in government-controlled territory in July 1936).

The coup's mixed success can be explained by a divided military. 51 generals supported the coup, and 34 opposed it. On both sides, many generals failed to keep their troops in line. Payne (2017, p 336) writes: "Around 4:00 AM on the nineteenth [prime minister] Martinez Barrio began to contact district military commanders by telephone... he found that several of those loyal to the regime had been virtually deposed by younger officers." The ground was set for the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939 and involved half a million casualties. Early in 1939, the rebels occupied Madrid and declared victory. Francisco Franco became dictator and remained so until his death in 1975.

Our sample is divided between officers serving in the government- and rebel-controlled areas immediately after the coup. We observe little variation in our dependent variable within the rebel-controlled area (93.8% of the officers supported the rebels). In contrast,

the government-controlled area has significant variation (65.0% supported the rebels, 35.0% stayed loyal, see map in Figure 3). La Parra-Pérez (2020) argues that the dissimilar strategies adopted by each side explain this difference. The rebels imposed discipline and repression to intimidate those loyal to the government. In contrast, the government issued a decree declaring that "all the troops in which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are discharged" (La Parra-Pérez, 2020, p 18). Since most units had experienced some attempt at rebellion, this act gave freedom of action to the entire military. In short, the rebel strategy was to secure the support of the military, while the government deeply suspected it (and therefore proceeded to arm the people).[7] In the next paragraphs, we give short accounts of two earlier coups, which are not part of our main analysis but are used to test mechanisms in Section 5.

Primo de Rivera's 1923 Coup. In September 1923, a military coup overthrew the constitutional government and installed a dictatorship with the king's support. The coup was led by General Primo de Rivera in Barcelona and by a group of four generals known as the *Cuadrilátero* (quadrilateral) in Madrid. The resulting government was a military dictatorship, with Primo de Rivera as president and a Military Directory consisting of eight generals and one admiral.

Under the dictatorship, promotions became a divisive lever of military politics. The regime favored advancement by war merit, closely associated with the Africanista faction (officers whose careers were forged fighting in Morocco), and expanded discretionary selection. Critics favored strict seniority and condemned these practices as politicized patronage (Atienza Peñarrocha, 2012).

In January 1930, Primo de Rivera resigned and handed power to a transition government. The Republic was proclaimed in 1931 following elections and a new constitution that abolished the monarchy. Among the Republic's first measures was a far-reaching military

[7]This was confirmed by the President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, who wrote in a post-war book: "Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed all soldiers from obeisance to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important towns under republican command... Soldiers abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back home... The professional officers were suspect, and the troops, mostly workers, leaned towards obeying their parties or unions..." Azaña and Jackson (1986).

reform: it reduced the size of the officer corps, reorganized the divisional structure, and reviewed dictatorship-era promotions with the aim of restoring the primacy of seniority and curbing discretion (Huerta Barajas, 2016). Many monarchist officers, including numerous supporters of the 1923 coup, retired then.

1932 Coup Attempt *(Sanjurjada).* On August 10, 1932, military officers attempted a coup. Among the conspirators were monarchist generals who had participated in Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, such as José Cavalcanti and Emilio Barrera. The government had full knowledge of the conspiracy and successfully repressed the coup in Madrid, imprisoning the main plotters. José Sanjurjo led the uprising in Sevilla, successfully taking control of the city. No other city was affected by the coup attempt. When news of the failure in Madrid was known in Seville, the troops returned to their barracks. Sanjurjo was sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. When a coalition of right-wing parties won the 1934 elections, Sanjurjo was pardoned and left for Portugal. This government also reincorporated other conspirators into the military, such as Manuel Goded (who later on supported the 1936 coup).

3 Data and Estimation

3.1 Data

Military careers. We build a novel dataset of officers' careers for ten years before the coup, from 1927 to 1936, using military yearbooks *(Anuario militar de España)*.[8] We use the yearbooks to track the career of every army officer[9] during the ten years before the coup. We define generals as leaders and everyone below as a subordinate. In particular,

[8] Available for download on the website of the Spanish National Library https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/results?parent=170edc64-562e-4aa6-baca-6dfa60260d5b&t=alt-asc We digitized the yearbooks using *Textract*, a machine learning OCR tool, together with extensive manual checking.

[9] "Officer" denotes commissioned ranks (lieutenants and above, graduates of the military academies), excluding rank-and-file enlisted troops.

each yearbook lists every officer, their rank,[10] their date of birth, their date of entry into the Army, their seniority, and their *posting*. We use the posting (in the yearbooks, *destino*) to link officers to their leaders. Our definition of posting is the literal job description in the yearbook. It can be a regiment, a brigade, or the divisional headquarters. It can also be a support post, such as the Army Inspectorate. Figure 1 provides an example. We further discuss the postings in Section 3.2 below.

To assess the quality of the name matching across years, Table A.1 lists the number of unique individuals per year and the number of "exits": officers who appear in a given year but not in the next. Since we only collect data on officers who were serving in 1936, all exits are temporary (that is, they reappear later on). We cannot ascertain whether these exits are due to failed name matches or due to periods of inactivity (i.e., being assigned to the reserve or temporarily incapacitated). In a typical year, between 3 and 4% of the sample exits. Reassuringly, the years with the highest number of exits (around 8%) correspond to the military reform, when many officers were transferred to the reserve.

Leader and subordinate loyalties. The original data source for the classification of officers into rebels and loyalists is Carlos Engel's book *El Cuerpo de Oficiales de la Guerra de España* (Engel Masolvier, 2008).[11] The book classifies the entirety of the Spanish officer corps serving in July 1936 into rebels and loyalists. Engel classifies officers using official documents and secondary sources, including promotions, rewards, punishments, and defections. For example, if an officer was promoted by the rebel side, Engel classified him as a rebel. If the government executed another officer, he classified him as a rebel.[12] Importantly, Engel's book also contains information on officers' postings in July 1936 (which may differ from their

[10]Subordinate ranks, from lower to higher, are second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, and lieutenant colonel. Leader ranks, from lower to higher, are brigadier general, major general, and lieutenant general. In the original Spanish, these ranks are: *alférez, teniente, capitán, comandante, coronel, teniente coronel, general de brigada, general de division,* and *teniente general.*


[11]This dataset was previously digitized by La Parra-Pérez (2020). We are very thankful to the author for making his replication dataset available. And, of course, we are very grateful to Carlos Engel for his work.

[12]Engel also uses the post-war outcomes: if an officer served under the government but was afterward reincorporated to the Army by Franco, Engel classifies him as a rebel. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war. In a robustness check, we show that our results are robust to excluding these officers (Table A.23).

postings when the last yearbook was printed in April 1936). See an example of a page in Figure 2. We merged La Parra-Pérez (2020)'s version of the Engel dataset to our dataset on military careers using names, and occasionally checking additional information such as posting and rank. We achieved a very high merge success rate: we found 96.3% of the Engel officers in the yearbooks (and we cannot rule out that some of the missing officers joined the army after the yearbook was printed).


Example from our dataset. We use two people from our dataset to exemplify data construction: Major Cuesta Monereo (a subordinate) and General Miguel Cabanellas (a leader). Cuesta was Cabanellas' *aide-de-camp* in 1934. Since the latter was a leader of the rebellion, the former is classified as being treated by a rebel leader in our dataset. In 1936, Cuesta was serving under a loyalist general, but he rebelled anyway. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate our data collection process. The first reproduces part of the military yearbooks. In particular, panels (a) and (b) show Cabanellas in 1934 and 1936, and panels (c) and (d) show Cuesta in 1934 and 1936. The last column contains the posting *(destino)*, which we use to link leaders to subordinates. For example, in 1934, Miguel Cabanellas was Second Inspector General of the Army, and his aide-de-camp was Cuesta (Cabanellas being mentioned by name in Cuesta's posting is not necessary to link them, they are matched because Cuesta's posting includes the text *"2a Inspección General"*). In 1936, they were in different postings: Cabanellas in charge of the 5th Division (Zaragoza) and Cuesta under General Villa-Abrile in the 2nd Division (Seville). Figure 2 reproduces pages of Engel Masolvier (2008), which we use to classify the loyalties (support for either the rebels or the government) for both leaders and subordinates. Note that both Cabanellas (panel a) and Cuesta (panel b) have an "N" next to their names, indicating their rebel ("Nationalist") allegiance, while Villa-Abrille has an "R" ("Republican"). In Section 5, we resume this story to illustrate our mechanisms.

Figure 1: Example from our dataset: yearbooks




Número por clase.	NOMBRES	FECHAS del nacimiento	FECHAS del ingreso en el servicio	FECHAS de antigüedad	Procedencia	DESTINO O SITUACIÓN
	TENIENTES GENERALES (A extinguir)					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1	⊕ D. Pío López Pozas.....	7- 4-71	30- 8-88	22- 4-927	Inf.ª	Disponible 1.ª División.
2	☆ M. M. D. Alberto Castro Girona....	7-10-75	14- 9-92	1-10-927	Inf.ª	Disponible 1.ª División.
3	⊕ D. José Rodríguez Casademunt....	8-12-70	31- 8-86	9-11-928	Inf.ª	Presidente del Consejo Director de las Asambleas de las Ordenes Militares de San Fernando y San Hermenegildo.
	GENERALES DE DIVISIÓN					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1	D. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuondo.....	31- 1-77	27- 8-93	19- 1-924	Inf.ª	3.ª Inspección General.
2	» Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.....	1- 1-72	22- 8-89	19- 5-924	Cab.ª	2.ª Inspección General.
3	☆ D. Angel Rodríguez del Barrio....	28- 8-76	28- 8-93	19-10-925	Inf.ª	1.ª Inspección gral.-Vicepresidente Consejo Superior de la Guerra.-Presidente Junta Clasifica-

(a) Cabanellas in 1934




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1	D. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuondo.....	31- 1-77	27- 8-93	19- 1-924	Inf.ª	Disponible.
2	» Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.....	1- 1-72	22- 8-89	19- 5-924	Cab.ª	5.ª División.
3	☆ D. Angel Rodríguez del Barrio....	28- 8-76	28- 8-93	19-10-925	Inf.ª	1.ª Inspección Gral.-Vicepresidente Consejo Superior de la Guerra.-Presidente Junta Clasificadora de Generales y Coroneles.

(b) Cabanellas in 1936



46	O. P. A. D. Angel Negrón Cuevas.....	27- 4- 95	30- 8-909	2- 2-924	1.ª	División orgánica.
47	D. Luis Serrano Gómez.....	17-12- 92	1- 3-909	6- 3-924	5.ª	División orgánica.
48	» Francisco Mut Ramón.....	3- 2- 94	30- 8-910	13- 3-924	4.ª	División orgánica.
49	» José Cuesta Monereo.....	5-12- 95	28- 8-910	13- 3-924	Ayudante de Campo del General Cabanellas (M) 2.ª Insp. General del Ejército.	
50	» Enrique González Pons.....	22- 4- 89	29- 8-909	15- 3-924	Sec. Topográfica de la 2.ª División.	
51	» Miguel Rodríguez Pavón.....	1-11- 92	30- 1-911	31- 7-924	Sección Cartográfica.	

(c) Cuesta in 1934




26	O. P. A. D. Angel Negrón Cuevas.....	27- 4- 95	30- 8-909	2- 2-924	1.ª	División orgánica.
27	D. Luis Serrano Gómez.....	17-12- 92	1- 3-909	6- 3-924	5.ª	División orgánica.
28	» Francisco Mut Ramón.....	3- 2- 94	30- 8-910	13- 3-924	4.ª	División orgánica.
29	» José Cuesta Monereo.....	5-12- 95	28- 8-910	13- 3-924	2.ª	División orgánica.
30	» Enrique González Pons.....	22- 4- 89	29- 8-909	15- 3-924	Sec. Topográfica 2.ª	División.
31	» Miguel Rodríguez Pavón.....	1-11- 92	30- 1-911	31- 7-924	E. M. C., Sec.ª Cartográfica.	
32	» Felipe Amillo Miguel.....	2- 2- 92	31- 8-911	31- 7-924	Ayudante del Gral. Rodríguez Ramírez.	

(d) Cuesta in 1936

Example of our dataset construction. In 1934, Miguel Cabanellas was 2nd Inspector General of the Army, and his *aide-de-camp* was Cuesta (note that the fact that Cabanellas is mentioned by name in Cuesta's posting is not necessary to link them, they are matched because Cuesta's posting includes *"2ª Inspección General"*). In 1936, they were both in different postings: Cabanellas in charge of the 5th Division and Cuesta under Villa-Abrile in the 2nd Division. These images are extracted from the 1934 and 1936 Military Yearbooks, Chapter IX, section "Generales de Division" (major generals) for Cabanellas and section "Comandantes" (majors) for Cuesta.

Figure 2: Example from our dataset: Engel's book




450 CARLOS ENGEL MASOLIVER

Jefatura de la 5ª División Orgánica

N	general de división	Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	José Cebollero Garcés

El general Cabanellas falleció de enfermedad en Málaga en el año 1938.

(a) Cabanellas loyalty and posting in 1936, according to Engel Masolvier (2008) (p. 450)



Jefatura de la 2ª División Orgánica

R	general de división	José Fernández-Villabrille Calivara
N	teniente coronel de Artillería	Manuel Lizaúr de Paúl (ayudante)
N	comandante de Infantería	Mariano Allende Nuviola (ayudante)
N	profesor 1º de Equitación	Gabriel Fuentes Ferrer

El general Fernández-Villabrille, que se había resistido a la sublevación, fue dado de baja y permaneció en prisión durante toda la guerra.

Estado Mayor

R	coronel de Estado Mayor	Juan Cantero Ortega
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	José Cuesta Monereo
R	comandante de Estado Mayor	Francisco Hidalgo Sánchez
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	Enrique González Pons (Sección de Topografía)
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	Manuel Lombardero Vicente
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Manuel Escribano Aguirre
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Manuel Gutiérrez Flores
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Fernando Fuster Vilaplana (Sección de Topografía)

El coronel Cantero y el comandante Hidalgo fueron retirados por indecisión.

(b) Cuesta Monereo's and Villa-Abrille's loyalty and posting in 1936, according to Engel Masolvier (2008) (pp. 390-391)

Example of our dataset construction. These are example pages from Engel Masolvier (2008). The **N** next to Cabanellas and Cuesta indicates that they joined the rebels (Nationalists), and the **R** next to Villa-Abrille means that he remained loyal to the government (Republican).

Retired generals. We added to the dataset all generals that were not present in the Engel dataset (237 individuals) but had been active at any point between 1927 and 1936. Fourteen of those 237 generals supported an earlier coup (in 1923 or 1932), and we use them to test the indoctrination mechanism. The 1923 coup supporters were conspirators (members of the *Cuadrilatero*), members of the Military Directory, and the War Minister of Primo de Rivera's government. The 1932 coup supporters are classified according to Payne (2017).[13] We further classify them into those who endorsed the 1936 coup or not, based on their biographical information in the Spanish Biographical Dictionary.[14] Table A.2 contains a list of retired generals who supported previous coups.

Government- and rebel-controlled areas. As we explained in Section 2, after the first days of the coup, Spain was divided into two zones, one controlled by the government and one by the rebels. We observe almost no variation in regions of Spain that were controlled by the rebels right after the coup (93.8% of the officers there rebelled). In contrast, the Republican area has significant variation (65.0% supported the rebels, 35.0% stayed loyal). Since there is little variation in the rebel area, our baseline regressions limit the sample to officers in the Republican area. Our results remain significant if we include the full sample (our estimates become significantly smaller, as should be expected from roughly doubling the sample and adding almost no extra variation in the dependent variable).


The map in Figure 3 illustrates these patterns. The areas are colored based on territorial control: For each officer in our dataset, we know whether they were posted in rebel or government territory according to La Parra-Pérez (2020), and we use this information to color the area around them.[15] Circles show the number of officers at each location, with pie

[13]José Sanjurjo is a complicated case because he was retired by 1936 (so in our main regressions his subordinates are in the control sample), but he did more than endorse the 1936 coup, he was part of the conspiracy. Moreover, he died three days into the coup in a plane accident (on his way to join the rebellion). Our results do not change if we reclassify him.

[14]The Spanish Biographical Dictionary is published by the Royal Academy of History, and its entries are written by historians. Available at https://dbe.rah.es/db e.

[15]The rebels (grey in the map) controlled the African colonies, most of Northern Spain, except for a strip on the Northern coast that included the Basque Country. Most of Andalucia is coded as rebel-controlled because they managed to take the cities of Seville, Granada, and Cordoba. The government controlled Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and most of Central and Eastern Spain. The Balearic and Canary Islands (the latter excluded from the map) were also controlled by the rebels.

Figure 3: Map of Spain



Map of territorial control and officer loyalty during the Spanish Civil War. Areas (or Voronoi polygons) are colored based on territorial control: for each officer in our dataset, we know whether they were in rebel (grey) or government (white) territory, and we use this information to color the area around them. The pie charts indicate the proportion of rebel (grey) and loyalist (white) officers. Note that in rebel-controlled areas, almost all officers were rebels (94%), whereas in government-controlled areas, there was substantial variation (65% were rebels). The size of the circles is proportional to the square root of the number of officers at each location.

charts indicating the proportion of rebel (grey) and loyalist (white) officers.

Table A.3 shows descriptive statistics for the full army and for the army in the government-controlled zone (who are our sample in the main specification). The officers in the government zone are representative of the full army in a number of variables. For example, officer rank and tenure are higher by only 3 and 4% respectively (to be expected since it includes Madrid). Other variables are less balanced; for example, years in Africa are much higher outside (as expected since Africa was under rebel control).

3.2 Estimation

We classify every general in a given posting (including both major generals and brigadier generals) as a leader. We categorize them into rebels (51 generals), loyalists (34), and retired (237).[16] Everyone else serving in the posting is a subordinate. The dependent variable is the subordinate's decision to support the rebels or the government, and it varies at the individual level for 5,324 subordinates. The independent variable is the exposure to generals who rebelled in 1936. For identification, we exploit arguably exogenous rotation among leaders and subordinates. We compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served in the same post but were not exposed.

Because our identification hinges on posting fixed effects, we take the individual–posting (i, j) as our baseline unit of observation. That is, if i served in three postings during his career, he will appear three times in the dataset. Below, we outline alternative estimations at finer (individual–year) and coarser (individual level with ever-served-in-posting dummies) aggregations.

The key regressor is $Post^{reb}_{i,j}$, which equals one if the leader of posting j when i was serving there was a rebel; $Post^{loy}_{i,j}$ and $Post^{ret}_{i,j}$ indicate loyalist and retired leaders, respectively. All three equal zero if the posting had no general when i served there. We estimate:

$$y_i \;=\; \beta\, Post^{reb}_{i,j} \;+\; \alpha\, Post^{loy}_{i,j} \;+\; \rho\, Post^{ret}_{i,j} \;+\; Posting^{career}_{j} \;+\; Posting^{1936}_{i} \;+\; \gamma' X_i \;+\; \upsilon_{i,j},$$

Where y_i equals 1 if officer i rebelled in 1936, and 0 if he remained loyal. With "no general" as the omitted category, β measures the effect of serving under a rebel relative to serving with no general present. Comparisons to other leader types are given by $\beta - \rho$ (rebel vs. retired) and $\beta - \alpha$ (rebel vs. loyalist). Since both ρ and α are indistinguishable from zero in most of our regressions, we treat these three estimands as indistinct when we discuss results.

We include two sets of posting fixed effects that vary at different levels and absorb different sources of heterogeneity. $Posting^{1936}_{i}$ are fixed effects for an officer's posting in July 1936;

[16] There are two neutral generals, which we include in the same category as those retired. Alternative classification or exclusion does not change any of our findings.

they absorb contemporaneous local conditions at the time of the coup, as well as current peer and leader effects. $Posting_j^{career}$ are fixed effects for pre–coup career postings; they absorb time-invariant features of each posting that sort officers into different career paths, so identification comes from officers who served in the same posting at different times. There are 1662 career postings and 490 July 1936 postings. Table A.5 provides summary statistics on the number and treatment status of postings by year (see Table A.4 for the percentage of officers treated by year). The average posting has 59 officers (see table A.6 for more descriptive statistics on posting size).[17]

Controls and balance. The set of controls X_i includes individual-level covariates that may be related to support for the coup. Specifically, we include the number of postings, tenure, and age (all of which are mechanically related to exposure to rebel generals). We also include the officer's rank in 1936 and in posting j (the latter is the only one of these controls that varies at the i, j level instead of at the i level). Further, we add variables shown to predict rebellion by La Parra-Pérez (2020): service in Africa[18] and hierarchical variation during the Republic. The first, because members of the *africanista* faction were discontent with the government's military policy. The second captures the fact that those who benefited from promotions during the Republic may have been less willing to join the rebellion. We also include indicators for corps (infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc.). Lastly, we account for the fact that, by serving in the same posting, subordinates and their superiors may have been exposed to the same political environment, which may have colored their subsequent views about the coup. We therefore add a variable for "political exposure": for each officer, the simple average over his pre–coup career of the province-level share of votes for left parties

[17]Following the 1931 army reform that restructured military organization, the set of military postings fundamentally changed, preventing us from comparing officers across the reform. We therefore split postings into two distinct periods: 1927-1931 and 1932-1936. An advantageous consequence of this split is that each comparison group consists of officers who served in the same posting at most four years apart.

[18]We include a dummy for any service in Africa, the number of years serving there, and the number of years serving in the *core* units of the *africanista* faction. This last variable only counts years served between 1910 and 1927 (the Rif War) and postings in "... the Spanish Foreign Legion, in the African Regular Army, or were Marksmen, Nomads, Mehal-las, or Police Special Forces." (La Parra-Pérez, 2020, p. 577).

in the provinces where he was posted.[19] Table A.7 lists and defines all variables and Table A.8 provides summary statistics.

In Table 1 and Figure A.1, we show that the control and treatment samples are balanced. Consistent with chance, the treatment correlates with only two variables out of nineteen at the 10% level (hierarchical variation and the Carabineros corps). We report regressions with and without the set of controls, and our main estimate does not change when we include them.

Table 1: Balance: Effect of Treatment Status on Covariates

Covariate	Control mean	Treatment - control	Covariate	Control mean	Treatment - control
Number of postings	4.525	-0.054 (0.133)	Cavalry	0.066	-0.015 (0.017)
Tenure (in years)	22.788	-0.631 (0.834)	General Staff	0.025	-0.025 (0.020)
Age in 1936	40.645	-0.665 (0.786)	Infantry	0.363	0.020 (0.021)
Rank in 1936	3.903	-0.021 (0.121)	Engineers	0.096	0.010 (0.011)
Rank in posting	2.609	0.055 (0.093)	Air Force	0.046	-0.002 (0.001)
Years in Africa	1.972	0.015 (0.180)	Carabineros	0.095	0.017* (0.008)
Years in Africa (core)	0.272	-0.072 (0.056)	Transport	0.004	-0.014 (0.016)
Any African posting	0.622	0.034 (0.029)	Civil Guard	0.152	0.005 (0.004)
Hierarchical Position Variation (32-36)	0.786	-0.068* (0.029)	Artillery	0.154	0.004 (0.016)
Political Exposure	0.438	0.008 (0.005)			

For each covariate, we reports $\hat{\beta}$ from the regression $X_{i,j} = \beta\, Post^{reb}_{i,j} + Posting_j + Posting36_i + u_{i,j}$. "Control mean" is the unconditional mean among controls ($Post^{reb}_{i,j} = 0$). After conditioning on career fixed effects ($Posting_j$) and 1936 posting fixed effects ($Posting36_i$), officers who served under a rebel leader are not systematically different from those who did not across most pre-treatment covariates. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Alternative units of observation. As robustness, we re-estimate the design on an

[19] In regressions where we do not include 1936 posting fixed effects (not in our baseline), we control for 1936 posting characteristics, namely the leftist vote, industrial output, and urbanization rate of the province, and distance to Madrid.

individual–year panel. The unit of observation is the individual-year (i, t), and exposure is coded annually with $Post_{it}^{reb}$, $Post_{it}^{loy}$, and $Post_{it}^{ret}$ defined as in the baseline but at yearly level (subordinates spend around two years in each posting on average, so they may be treated for only part of their stint in this alternative sample).

We also implement an individual-level cross-section. Here, the unit is i and treatment is summarized by the number of postings under each leader type prior to 1936 ($NPost_i^{reb}$, $NPost_i^{loy}$, $NPost_i^{ret}$). To absorb heterogeneity in career paths, we include "ever served in posting j" indicators as career posting fixed effects and retain July 1936 location effects. This specification aligns the dimension of the outcome with the unit of observation. Its main drawback is that individuals serve in several postings, so treatment and control groups are not cleanly delineated and require controlling for a set of 2,152 dummies to adjust for selection. For this reason, we prefer the individual–posting design, where treatment and control are defined transparently. Reassuringly, the estimates are close across all three samples.

4 Results

Panel (a) of Table 2 presents our baseline results. Subordinates in postings with rebel leaders are 10.7 pp more likely to rebel than subordinates who served in the same posting without a general (model 1). The estimates for loyalist and retired leaders are small and not statistically significant (we discuss potential reasons why loyalist leaders had no effect on Section 5). Model 2 adds two placebo treatments: the leads and lags of our treatment variable. That is, indicators of whether the posting had a rebel general right before (lag) or right after (lead) the subordinate served there. Neither variable is significant, and our main coefficient remains substantially unchanged, further indicating that our result is due to the interaction between the general and the subordinate and not due to posting characteristics. Model 3 adds the set of controls described above, and our coefficient remains stable.

To understand the magnitude of our result, consider that 65% of the subordinates in our sample rebelled (or 68.6% of the subordinate-postings observations). A 10.7 pp. increase in

Table 2: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

	Subordinate joins the Rebels				
	(a) Baseline			(b) Comparison to current leaders	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.107***	0.115***	0.107***	0.138***	0.141***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.028	0.025	0.020	0.020	0.007
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Posting under Retired Leader	0.009	−0.001	−0.015	0.019	−0.002
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.024)
Posting under Rebel Leader (lead)		−0.011	−0.013		0.001
		(0.019)	(0.020)		(0.025)
Posting under Rebel Leader (lag)		−0.060	−0.054		−0.071*
		(0.044)	(0.037)		(0.038)
Posting under Rebel Leader in 1936				0.077***	0.067***
				(0.022)	(0.024)
Posting under Loyalist Leader in 1936				−0.095***	−0.089***
				(0.029)	(0.030)
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Subordinate controls	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
1936 posting controls	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.319	0.319	0.350	0.151	0.192

This table shows the effect of former leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. The dependent variable equals one if the individual joined the rebellion in 1936. The independent variables equal one if there was a rebel/loyalist/retired general in the posting when the individual served there (before 1936). In panel (a), models include career posting and 1936 posting fixed effects. Model 2 further includes two placebo treatments: whether the posting had a rebel general right before or right after the subordinate served there. Model 3 further adds individual-level controls. In panel (b), we include variables indicating the allegiance of the subordinate's leaders in 1936 (which are collinear with the 1936 postings, so those fixed effects are not included). We therefore include posting-level controls in model 6. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

the rebellion probability is equivalent to around 15% of the mean probability of rebellion. Consider also that 24.6% of the individuals in our sample were at any time exposed to rebel generals. This number can be computed directly from the individual-level sample, or by multiplying 3.38 (average number of postings per subordinate) times 0.073 (probability of treatment for the average subordinate-posting). Therefore, a back-of-the-envelope calcula-

tion suggests that we can attribute the rebellion of 2.6% of the officers (or 3.8% of the rebels) to their former leaders. Panel (a) of Table A.9 displays these results for different ranks. Our effect is largest for majors: 10.5% of them joined the rebellion due to the influence of former leaders. More junior officers (lieutenants) had less exposure to generals, so their effect is more noisily estimated and results in very few rebels attributed to treatment.[20]

Table A.11 reports very similar results using alternative units of observation (individual-year and individual).[21] Panels (b) and (c) of Table A.9 report the back-of-the-envelope calculations discussed above for these alternative units of observation. For the individual-year dataset, they are almost identical to the individual-posting. They are very similar for individual-level regressions: we calculate 3.4% of the officers rebelling due to the treatment.[22]

In panel (b) of Table 2, we compare the effect of former leaders to current ones. Models 4 and 5 include dummies that equal 1 if the subordinate served under a rebel or loyalist general in July 1936. In Table A.12, we report specifications using an alternative definition of 1936 leaders. Our estimates for the effect of current leaders range from 47 (Table 2, model 5) to 113% (Table A.12, model 2) of the effect of past leaders. Note, however, that these regressions do not include 1936 posting fixed effects (as they would be collinear with the 1936 leader variables). Therefore, features of the 1936 postings may bias these estimates (including contingent features of the early coup dynamics that could make rebellion locally safer). For that reason, in model 5, we add controls for 1936 posting characteristics: vote for the left in the province, industry output, urbanization rate, and distance to Madrid. With that caveat, we find it remarkable that former leaders are as influential as contemporary

[20]Table A.10 reports our main regressions splitting our sample by rank. We find significant effects for mid-career officers (majors and captains). We find no significant results for lieutenants (low ranks), nor for lieutenant colonels and colonels (high ranks).

[21]The individual-level dataset uses "number of postings under a rebel general" as its main treatment variable. Without fixed effects, the coefficient of the rebel posting dummy in the individual-posting model is equivalent to the coefficient for the number of rebel postings in the individual-level dataset (assuming homogeneous effects across postings). The structure of the fixed effects is different across specifications (in the individual-level dataset, a subordinate gets a 1 in a posting dummy if he ever served in that posting), but we still find roughly similar estimates. The estimates in the individual-level dataset are around 27% larger than our baseline estimates.

[22]The estimates in the individual-level dataset are less precise when we partition the sample by rank due to the inclusion of 2152 posting dummies in the regression.

ones.

This result agrees with assessments from historians such as Payne (2012, 2017): the government's strategy consisted of appointing loyal generals to some key positions, but new arrivals failed to gain the loyalties of their troops. Table A.13 describes how often officers followed the decision of their commanding officer for different subsamples. In the government-controlled area (our main sample), only 58% of officers joined the same side as their immediate superior. These findings indicate that leadership influences behavior beyond formal authority.

Extensive and Intensive Margins. Our baseline specifications in Table 2 capture the *extensive margin* of treatment, that is, whether an individual-posting was exposed to a rebel leader or not. In Table A.14, we test the *intensive margin*. Some individuals were exposed to rebel leaders for a larger number of years. Therefore, in addition to the variables already listed, we include the sum of years under rebel and loyalist leaders. We detect no effect on the intensive margin, and the extensive margin result remains unchanged after including the new variables. This result sheds light on a potential staffing mistake by the democratic government. In an attempt to coup-proof the regime, the republic frequently rotated generals, appointing those perceived as loyal to strategic positions. In doing so, they "exposed" more officers to more generals (some of whom ended up on the rebel side). Since more years under a rebel do not increase the probability of rebellion, a better strategy may have consisted of having suspect generals as stationary as possible.

4.1 Robustness Checks

Weights. A potential problem with the individual-posting dataset is that individuals who served in many postings are overrepresented in the dataset. Therefore, in Table A.15, we weight observations by $\frac{1}{\text{number of postings}}$. Our results remain substantively unchanged.

Selection? The main threat to our identification strategy is selection. That is, would-be rebel generals may have hired like-minded subordinates. In Table 3, we show that selection does not drive our results. We classify treated subordinates as "potentially selected" if they

joined a posting *after or at the same time* as the leader. Everyone else had been serving at the unit *before* the arrival of the leader. Individuals who arrived after may have been hired by the leader and therefore selected in unobservables (for example, proclivity to support a coup). In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected individual-postings, and the coefficient of interest remains positive and significant (only slightly bigger). In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the individual-posting was potentially selected. The estimate is not statistically significant, indicating that officers who arrived at the posting with or after a leader were not more likely to follow than those who were there before. Therefore, we conclude that either leaders were not hiring based on coup proclivity or that they could not observe it.

We also account for "inverse selection". Even if generals did not hire like-minded subordinates, they may have fired opposite-minded subordinates. If they did so as soon as they arrived (before the next yearbook), republican-minded officers would be less likely to serve under rebel generals. We also show that this is not the case. In Table A.16, we drop potentially fired subordinates (i.e., those that transferred away from a posting the year a rebel or loyalist general arrived), and our results do not change. In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the individual-posting follows a potential transfer.

The only remaining potential source of selection is generals selecting into postings filled with like-minded subordinates. While the government appointed generals to destinations, they could lobby to influence the process. Since we include posting fixed effects, they would have to time their appointment to arrive in a year with an unusually high number of like-minded subordinates. We do not believe this was the case. First, we show in Table 1 that treated and control postings are not distinguishable in observable characteristics of subordinates. Second, the results described in this section show that generals did not hire or fire based on coup proclivity. This fact implies that the coup proclivity of subordinates was either not relevant or not observable and unlikely to drive the rotation of generals. Third, Table A.17 shows that the effect is somewhat larger for subordinates treated during the period 1927-1931 than for those treated during 1932-1936 (though the differences in

Table 3: Selection? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Date of Incorporation

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.114***	0.125***	0.094***	0.102***
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.036	0.024	0.047	0.038
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Posting under Retired Leader	−0.042	−0.045	0.010	−0.020
	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Potentially Selected by Rebel Leader			0.014	0.001
			(0.038)	(0.035)
Potentially Selected by Loyalist Leader			−0.028	−0.030
			(0.039)	(0.033)
Potentially Selected by Retired Leader			−0.004	0.0002
			(0.011)	(0.010)
Drop potentially selected by rebels	Yes	Yes	No	No
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.683	0.683	0.686	0.686
Observations	16,900	16,900	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.324	0.355	0.319	0.350

This table shows the effect of rebel, loyalist, and retired leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We classify a treated subordinate-posting as "potentially selected" if he arrived at the posting at the same time or after a rebel leader. In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected observations. In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the subordinate was potentially selected. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

coefficients are not significant). We find this result reassuring: strategic concerns are less likely to matter so long before the coup.

Reverse causality? A potential concern is that subordinates may have influenced their former leaders into joining the rebellion. We provide three pieces of evidence that indicate that subordinates did not influence generals. We do not argue that generals did not care about the allegiance of subordinates. The success of the coup very much depended on it. Rather, we show that they were not disproportionally influenced by subordinates who served under them (even if they cared about the general mood of the Army).

We first run two tests of cross-leader spillovers mediated by shared subordinates. The intuition is that if subordinates causally influence their general, then leadership shocks from some generals should propagate—through those subordinates—to other generals. In the first test, we partition rebel generals into two sets, A and B.[23] We estimate the individual-level version of our baseline estimate (reported in Table A.11, model 3).[24] In Table A.18, column 1, we report the "first stage": the effect of exposure to A generals (measured in number of postings) on the probability that the subordinate rebels. We detect a positive and significant result similar to our baseline. Column 2 reports the "second stage": the effect of predicted probabilities of rebellion (from column 1) on the number of generals from group B that the subordinate served under. The estimated coefficient is small and non-significant. Column 3 reports the "reduced form", the effect of exposure to A generals on exposure to B generals. We also find a small and non-significant estimate, suggesting an absence of reflection.

In the second test (Table A.19), we build general–general dyads and ask whether pairs that share more subordinates are more likely to end up on the same side. For each pair (i, j), we compute three overlap measures—an indicator for any shared subordinate, the number shared, and the proportion shared—and interact each with Rebel_j (equals one if general j rebelled, zero otherwise). The dependent variable is Rebel_i. Across all three specifications, the interaction terms are near zero and statistically insignificant, indicating no subordinate-mediated spillovers between generals and further arguing against reverse causality. We also add a control that equals one if the two generals served in the same posting together in models 4 to 6.

Lastly, we show that our estimates are not increasing in the subordinate's rank. Intuitively, if subordinates influence generals and higher-ranked subordinates have a larger effect, we should observe the largest effects among colonels and lieutenant colonels (ranks immediately below generals). Conversely, we find that our results are driven by middle ranks:

[23] We build these sets by sorting generals by number of treated subordinates, and assigning odd rows to group A and even rows to group B. Our results hold if we swap the groups.

[24] We use the individual-level version of our baseline (instead of the individual-posting version) because our focus here is to study whether subordinates exposed to different generals over their careers (potentially in different postings) transmit shocks between these generals.

captains and majors. The effect for lieutenant colonels and colonels is smaller than our estimate for the full sample and non-significant (Tables A.10 and A.9).

Omitted variable bias? Above, we argued that omitted variable bias is unlikely because our coefficients remained stable after including important determinants of rebellion as control variables. We now proceed to formally test this argument, using the method developed by Oster (2019). We compare the "short" regression in Table 2, column 1 (without controls) to the "medium" regression in column 3 (with subordinate-level controls). We find that, for our main estimate to be zero, the selection into the treatment on unobservables has to be 3.21 times the magnitude of the selection on observables.[25]

Alternative sample definitions. In Table A.20, we show that our results are robust to different decisions in sample definition. First, in columns 1 and 2, we show that when we include the rebel-controlled area in our estimation, our estimates remain positive and significant (with very similar precision) but decrease by roughly half. This is to be expected since there is almost no variation in the dependent variable within the rebel-controlled area (see the map in Figure 3 and an explanation in Section 3). In columns 3 and 4, we drop those serving under loyal generals (instead of adding exposure to loyalists as control, as we do in the baseline). In columns 5 and 6, we drop the observations where a subordinate is treated by both a rebel and a loyalist. The estimates we obtain from these specifications are larger than in our baseline. A potential explanation for this finding is that the treatment was more intense in postings with fewer generals. In columns 7 and 8, we drop postings without generals. Since we include exposure to loyalist generals as a control, the estimate now compares subordinates exposed to rebels to those exposed to retired generals. Our

[25] We obtain this result by setting the R^2 of the "long" regression (which includes omitted variables) to 0.455 (1.3 times the value of the R^2 of the "medium" regression, as suggested by Oster (2019)). If we set the R^2 of the "long" regression to 1, we still obtain that selection into the treatment on unobservables has to be 1.38 times the magnitude of the selection on observables.

result remains substantively unchanged (11.2 pp. higher probability of rebellion).[26]

By organizational distance. We use the Army's organizational chart to build more distant links between subordinates and generals. For example, we link subordinates serving in regiments and battalions to the generals in charge of the corresponding divisions or brigades. Table A.21 reports results. Column 1 replicates our baseline result from Table 2, column 3. Officers serving in the same posting as their general are defined as having a distance equal to zero. Columns 2 to 4 report results for distances 1 to 3, where we find null results. Therefore, the effects we document in this paper are likely to be driven by face-to-face interactions.


By general. In Figure 4, we report separate regressions for individual rebel generals. We restrict the individual-posting sample to the postings where the general served. We then run a univariate regression where serving under the general is the treatment. There are 20 rebel generals (out of 51) with at least 20 officers in the control group and 20 in the treatment group. We find two facts reassuring: First, Francisco Franco had the largest effect. This is consistent with historical accounts that stress his pre-coup prestige within the officer corps.[27] Second, the point estimates are positive for all but three generals.[28] Despite the limited sample sizes, seven generals have estimates significant at the 95% level. The figure also reports some observable characteristics of the generals, such as age and whether they were part of the conspiracy. In Table A.22, we do not find heterogeneous effects for any of these characteristics. If there are any differential effects, they are not due to observables.

[26]The sample is smaller (2,791 observations, down from 17,962). This is a product of how we define the postings. In our baseline regressions, we take the postings as they appear in the yearbooks (see Figure 1 for an example). Therefore, someone serving in the "First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment" will not be serving under a general because they were in charge of brigades and divisions, not regiments. This is the case for most lower-ranking officers. As we explained before, exposure to generals for lieutenants is very low, and we do not detect effects for this group.

[27]"...Mola and the other conspirators were loath to proceed without him [Franco]. He had enormous influence in the officer corps, having been for a time Director of the Military Academy in Zaragoza as well as Chief of the General Staff under Gil Robles. In particular, he was greatly respected in the Spanish Moroccan Army, the country's toughest military force, in which he had made his own meteoric career. The Africanista officers respected him for his icy ruthlessness..." (Preston, 2007, p 84)

[28]Of those three, two have effects indistinguishable from zero. The only general with a negative effect is Manuel González Carrasco, perhaps due to his failure as a rebel leader. He is described as "responsible for the failure of the uprising in Barcelona". He was sentenced to imprisonment by the rebels, though later pardoned by the latter (de Ceballos-Escalera y Gila, 2024).

Figure 4: Effect on Leaders Subordinate's Probability of Rebellion, by Rebel General



This figure depicts the effect of each general on his subordinates' rebellion probability. For each general, we restrict the individual-posting sample to the postings where the general served. We then run a univariate regression where serving under the general is the treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. We only depict here generals with at least 20 treated and 20 control officers. The columns in the right panel denote whether the general was involved in the conspiracy that led to the coup, if he was executed by the government, if he was younger than the median general, and if he was a major or lieutenant general (as opposed to a brigadier general). The last column shows the number of individuals treated by him.

Alternative definitions of the dependent variable. There are three types of information that could get an officer classified as a rebel or a loyalist by Engel. First, Engel uses records of the officer serving in one of the two armies during the ensuing Spanish Civil War (74.5%). Second, if an officer was executed by side A, he was classified as belonging to side B (17.2%).[29] Third, some officers were classified using post-war outcomes (8.3%). If an officer served under the government but was afterward reincorporated into the Army by Franco, he is classified as a rebel. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war.[30] In Table A.23 we show robustness to different ways of coding the dependent variable. In column 1, we limit our sample to loyalists and executed rebels (the number of executed loyalists is too low to compare only executed officers). In column 2, we do the opposite: we drop executed rebels. We obtain estimates that are very similar to our baseline estimate. The estimate for non-executed subordinates is slightly higher. This may be due to extra noise, as the government executed many officers suspected of rebellion in a short amount of time. In column 3, we drop officers classified with post-war outcomes and obtain the same estimate as in our baseline. This is reassuring, as it rules out the concern that loyalist officers connected to former leaders used their connections to get a pardon and a reincorporation into the army.

5 Mechanisms

This section lays out three mechanisms linking former leadership to officers' choices. First, an informational–coordination channel operates in the *present*: officers decide under uncertainty which side will prevail and may overweight signals from former commanders. Second, a career-concerns channel looks to the *future*: expected promotions and rewards make alignment with former leaders attractive when such promises are credible. Third, a channel of

[29]To compute this variable, we merged our dataset to McLauchlin and Parra-Pérez (2019)'s replication data. We found 74% of our sample there, of which 23% corresponded to executed officers. We assume that the unmatched officers were not executed, arriving at the 17% estimate.

[30]These officers were known at the time as "geographic loyalists" (i.e., they served on a given side because of their geographic location and not because of their preferences) and were affected by the Varela Law of 1940 (Varela was Franco's minister for the Army).

indoctrination rooted in the *past* posits that prior command shaped subordinates' durable beliefs. We first present a framework that links these mechanisms to theoretical literature and to our empirical tests. We then present our evidence. Anticipating the results, we find evidence consistent with the informational–coordination and career-concerns mechanisms, but not for indoctrination.

5.1 Theoretical Framework

First, deciding which side to join may be an informational problem, where subordinates attempt to predict the winning side. The cost of joining the losing side can be as high as execution. Hermalin (1998) models leadership by example: a leader with private information cannot persuade via cheap talk, so he exerts costly effort that is more attractive when prospects are good, allowing observers to infer favorable conditions. Analogously, generals may possess better information about a coup's chances, and their act of rebellion credibly signals their confidence. Rebellion can be costly: 19 out of 51 rebel generals were executed by the government (and 7 out of 34 loyalists were executed by the rebels).[31]

This informational problem has a coordination dimension: outcomes hinge on how many others back the same side, so officers must form beliefs about others' actions to infer which coalition will prevail. As Geddes (1999, p. 126) emphasizes, a central concern for officers is how many others will join. Summarizing interviews with army officers, Singh (2014) concludes that the risk to life trumps ideological considerations, reinforcing that choices are guided by expectations about where others will converge.[32]

In our setting, officers may not observe all generals' allegiances contemporaneously; they operate with sparse, delayed information. We assume former commanders are overrepre-

[31] In Figure 4, we report effects by individual general. The second most influential general (after Franco) is Eduardo Lopez Ochoa. His assassination was particularly salient: at the time of the coup, he was convalescing in the hospital. He was captured and executed by a leftist militia. He was later decapitated, and his head was paraded around Madrid (Ranzato, 2016).

[32] Geddes (1999, p 126) writes "... the most important concern for many officers deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy is their assessment of how many others will join." Singh (2014, p.6) explains: "In fact, they believed that it would have been selfish to let their personal political beliefs guide their response. As officers, their first responsibility was to their men, and they felt it was wrong to use their troops, possibly endangering their lives, to support the side they preferred if it was likely to lose."

sented in what subordinates attend to: ties may persist, messages may travel faster along prior chains of command, and queries may be more readily answered. Familiarity may also sharpen interpretation, making a former leader's public move more informative than the same move by an unknown general. In the related theoretical literature, Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) present a model of history and expectations, and show that the visible actions of prominent agents can coordinate beliefs and shift play toward better outcomes. Likewise, in Akerlof and Holden (2016) "movers and shakers"—actors with superior network reach—mobilize participation by diffusing awareness and aligning private signals, endogenously emerging as focal leaders. Further, in Chen and Suen (2021) and Bueno De Mesquita (2010), leaders mobilize citizens by producing costly signals about the state of the world.

Secondly, leaders with a right-wing ideology may have indoctrinated their troops while in command, transmitting durable preferences through persuasion or organizational practice. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) present a model where organizations can invest in changing the identities of their members, resulting in better performance for lower pay. They use the West Point Military Academy as an example. Empirically, Ertola Navajas et al. (2022) show that military conscription changes personality and beliefs. In Van den Steen (2010), leaders can influence employees' beliefs by controlling what experiences they learn from (a practice they call manager-directed learning). Since managers choose the organization's actions, they determine what outcomes employees observe. Over time, employees' beliefs tend to converge based on these shared experiences, even if they initially disagreed with the manager, which helps explain why managerial influence on culture can persist after they leave.[33] In our setting, rebel generals may have shaped their past subordinates' beliefs or ideologies, leading them to favor right-wing or authoritarian governments.

Lastly, career concerns may lead officers to follow past leaders. Previous literature has established that subordinates are more likely to receive promotions when their patrons gain more influence (for example, see Jia et al., 2015, Shih et al., 2012, Voth and Xu, 2020,

[33]Similarly, in Bénabou and Tirole (2003), the incentives and tasks that the principal implements can influence agents' beliefs. Also, Verdier and Zenou (2015, 2018) develop models showing how cultural leaders can influence identity formation by providing community-specific public goods.

and Xu, 2018). Leaders who had been in charge of subordinates in the past may promote them faster in the future, maybe because they have a more accurate signal of their ability, or because they expect reciprocity in the future. In Myerson (2008, 2011), leaders succeed only if they can credibly commit to future rewards, making promotion promises to loyal subordinates believable ex ante and fulfilled ex post.

We test indoctrination and coordination by distinguishing the influence of an officer's own former leaders from that of his peers' former leaders, and by classifying each leader as active in 1936 or retired. Because these categories align differently with the channels in our framework, they allow targeted tests.

Retired generals. We treat retired leaders as unable to shift the coup's prospects directly and as unable to affect careers from retirement. By revealed preference, however, those who participated in the 1923 or 1932 coups are likely to have held authoritarian or anti-democratic views; prior service under them could have shaped subordinates' beliefs. We therefore use exposure to retired "placebo authoritarians" to test indoctrination, abstracting from coordination and career effects.

Peers' former generals. Officers plausibly learn second-hand about the allegiances of their peers' past leaders and may incorporate these signals when assessing which side will prevail. At the same time, peers' former leaders neither indoctrinated the officer (no direct command relationship) nor can they offer credible career rewards. We thus use peers' former leaders to isolate coordination/information.

In other words, we assume: (i) success is increasing in the number of rebel generals, while officers only observe a subset of allegiances (their own and their peers' former leaders); (ii) indoctrination operates only through an officer's own former leaders; and (iii) retired or peers' leaders cannot credibly generate career rewards. These restrictions yield the mapping in Table 4.

For career rewards to shape behavior ex-ante, officers must view promotion promises as credible. A natural source of credibility is an observable record that the same leaders have rewarded supporters when they held power in the past. Forward-looking officers, therefore,

Table 4: How Different Leaders Affect an Officer's Decision to Rebel

	Own former leaders	**Peers' former leaders**
Active	indoctrination + coordination + career concerns	coordination
Retired	indoctrination	no effect

look backward: if ties to a leader previously translated into faster advancement when that leader governed, similar rewards are plausible in the future. We implement this logic with the 1923 coup and the ensuing dictatorship (1923-1931). We compare promotion rates of officers who had served under 1923 coup leaders to comparable officers without such ties, across regimes.

5.2 Evidence

Coordination. Peers are defined as fellow subordinates who were serving in the same post in 1936. They are considered treated if they had served under a rebel/loyalist general before 1936. In Table 5, the first independent variables measure the proportion of treated peers. We find that a subordinate with more peers treated by rebel leaders was also more likely to rebel. In model 1, we report a positive correlation between the two variables. In models 2 to 5, we add further controls to establish the causality of this relationship. We include the allegiance of the 1936 leader, the proportion of peers who rebelled (which allows us to separate the direct impact of peers from their role as intermediaries), the set of subordinate-level controls, and 1936 posting controls.[34] Our preferred specification includes all these controls simultaneously (model 5). We find that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of peers treated by rebels (equal to 26.2% of his peers, or 2.1 officers in a median size posting of 1936) increases the probability of rebellion by 2.7 pps. This effect is smaller than our baseline, reflecting either a loss in signal precision when an intermediary is involved and/or the role of other mechanisms in our main regressions.

[34]Note that since the proportion of treated peers does not vary within the 1936 posting, we do not include 1936 posting fixed effects.

Table 5: Coordination? The Impact of Peers' Former Leaders

	Subordinate joins the Rebels				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Prop. of treated peers (by rebels)	0.209***	0.206***	0.082*	0.114**	0.104**
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Prop. of treated peers (by loyalists)	−0.177***	−0.177***	−0.094**	−0.074	−0.079*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Prop. of treated peers (by retired)	−0.001	0.001	0.003	−0.018	0.007
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Posting under Rebel Leader		0.139***	0.125***	0.117***	0.121***
		(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Posting under Loyalist Leader		0.020	0.020	0.016	0.013
		(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Posting under Retired Leader		0.024	0.016	−0.011	−0.009
		(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Proportion of Rebel Peers			0.496***	0.484***	0.464***
			(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 posting FE	No	No	No	No	No
Subordinate controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
1936 posting controls	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,754	17,754	17,754	17,754	17,754
R^2	0.151	0.153	0.190	0.222	0.224

This table shows the effect of peers' former leaders on subordinates' decisions to rebel. The variable "Prop. of treated peers" measures the proportion of peers in 1936 who were under rebel/loyal/retired leaders at some point prior to 1936. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. All regressions include career posting fixed effects (1936 posting FE are collinear with the variable of interest). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup.Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

One additional result provides credence to the coordination mechanism. We report heterogeneous results by distance (in 1936) between officers and subordinates. Officers had an incentive to keep track of the situation on the ground (especially to save their own lives), and had limited strategic value in tracking decisions of geographically distant generals. Therefore, for each subordinate-posting, we calculate the distance (in 1936) between the subordinate and his (former) leaders, and we split the sample in two (above and below the median). We report results in Table 6. Indeed, we find that the effect is larger below the median distance (columns 1 and 3, with and without controls). It is still positive and significant above, but

half the size.

Table 6: Coordination? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Distance to Subordinate

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.207***	0.094**	0.209***	0.071**
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.034)
Difference between Coefficients	0.113**		0.138**	
	(0.057)		(0.066)	
Median condition (distance in 1936)	Below	Above	Below	Above
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	16,934	16,959	16,934	16,959
R^2	0.325	0.325	0.356	0.356

In this table, we split the sample by geographic distance between leader and subordinate in 1936 (for treated units, the control sample is the same in all regressions). For observations with multiple leaders, we calculate the average distance. We present OLS regressions with career posting and 1936 posting fixed effects (models 1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (models 3 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Indoctrination? In Table 7, we show that officers who served under retired right-wing generals were not more likely to rebel than soldiers who served in the same units at different times (models 1 and 2). In columns 3 and 4, we disaggregate the right-wing generals into those who endorsed the 1936 coup and those who did not. It makes no difference whether or not they supported the coup.[35] Therefore, we conclude that indoctrination is unlikely to be the mechanism behind our results. A potential concern is that retired generals are less influential because their contact with subordinates was, on average, less recent than that of active generals. That is, their indoctrination may have faded out. However, in Table A.17, we disaggregate our main result into the dictatorship (1927-31) and the Republic (1932-36),

[35]With the exception of Sanjurjo, we found no evidence of a retired general playing an important role in the conspiracy, the coup, or in the Civil War (maybe due to their age, or maybe because if reincorporated into the Army, they would have outranked the principal conspirators). Because he was retired and because he died two days into the coup, Sanjurjo is included in this group. The results are unchanged if we exclude him.

and we find that the links made during the earlier period are stronger predictors of rebellion.

Table 7: Indoctrination? The Effect of Right-Wing Retired Generals

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under Right-Wing Retired	0.062	0.018		
	(0.062)	(0.048)		
Posting under Right-Wing Retired (Endorsed the 1936 coup)			0.055	0.021
			(0.053)	(0.034)
Posting under Right-Wing Retired (Inactive in 1936)			−0.019	−0.037
			(0.043)	(0.049)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.098***	0.100***	0.113***	0.113***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.020	0.016	0.036	0.029
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Posting under Retired Leader (Not Right-Wing)	−0.003	−0.018	−0.013	−0.024
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.319	0.350	0.319	0.350

This table shows the effect of retired right-wing generals on subordinates' decisions ($Rebel = 1$). These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coups. The unit of observation is individual-posting. We report OLS regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects (1 and 3) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Additional evidence argues against indoctrination. Since the influence of political events on beliefs is known to decrease with age (Ghitza et al., 2023), we split our sample by median age at treatment (35 years old) in Table A.24. If indoctrination were driving our results, we would expect stronger effects among younger officers. However, we find the opposite pattern: the effect of rebel leaders is roughly twice as large and only statistically significant for officers above age 35. The coefficients for the younger half, while positive, are not statistically significant. Since our sample consists only of commissioned officers rather than cadets, we have very few observations in what would typically be considered the most impressionable years (under 25), making the 35-year threshold a reasonable cutoff for examining age effects.

Career concerns. We check whether, during the regime installed in 1923, former subordinates of coup supporters got promoted more rapidly. In Table 8, column 1, we find that they did while the dictatorship lasted (until 1931). In column 2, we show that this pattern reversed during the Republic (after 1931). The effects are sizable: a promotion was 30 percentage points more likely for connected officers (the average probability was 29.8%). There were only ten ranks in the hierarchy (including three general-level ranks), so a promotion of this kind was a considerable step forward.[36] We interpret this result as proof of favoritism towards subordinates of coup leaders, and a reversal to the mean after the dictatorship came to an end.[37]

Historical accounts are consistent with this result. The dictatorship used war merits to decide on promotions. The republican government interpreted that this system had too much discretion and instituted a reform that made seniority the basis for advancement. Members of the *africanista* faction, losers from the reform, were more likely to support the coup (La Parra-Pérez, 2020; Atienza Peñarrocha, 2012; Huerta Barajas, 2016).

Lack of effect of loyalist generals. In Table 2, exposure to loyalist generals does not predict joining the rebellion.[38] This null is consistent with our mechanism tests. First, we find no evidence of ideological transmission, so it is not surprising that republican leaders did not "inculcate" democratic values that would later deter defection. Second, the career-concerns channel is asymmetric: subordinates tied to rebel generals could expect discretionary favors in a rebel victory, whereas a government victory would leave civilian promotion control in place and the 1931 merit reforms binding, limiting loyalists' scope for patronage. Loyalty could still be rewarded ex post, but not differentially through pre-coup connections. Lastly, two considerations help explain why loyalist generals did not coordinate

[36]The average pay increase between these ranks was 27%. Given that a connection to a general increases the probability of promotion by 28 pps., a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that for subordinates, having served under a successful coup supporter increases earnings by 7.56% within three years. This effect may be larger in a longer time frame. We obtain the salaries from San Martin Losada (1941).

[37]Appendix Table A.25 presents the same exercise using the individual–year dataset, which ensures that promotions are measured exactly at the time of treatment. The results remain strongly robust and consistent across specifications, with only a slight reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients.

[38]Loyalist generals are not significantly different from rebel generals in any observable characteristic we tested, including age, tenure, rank, and service in Africa.

Table 8: Career Concerns? Effect of Connections on Promotions

	Promotion in Posting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a 1923 Coup Leader	0.307***	−0.168***	0.274**	−0.241***
	(0.095)	(0.023)	(0.107)	(0.024)
Posting under a Retired (not 1923) Leader	0.158**	−0.041	0.129*	−0.105*
	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.071)	(0.058)
Posting under 1936 Rebel Leader	−0.005	−0.091**	0.014	−0.107**
	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Posting under 1936 Loyalist Leader	−0.048	−0.003	−0.058*	−0.016
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Promotions	0.298	0.249	0.298	0.249
Observations	7,658	10,314	7,658	10,314
R^2	0.234	0.214	0.275	0.281

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). The variable Promotion equals one if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

subordinates before July 1936. First, for uninformed officers the natural peacetime prior may have been "no conspiracy," and thus "no generals involved". A signal from a loyalist general may have moved priors very little. Second, we could not find an example of a loyalist general who either publicized opposition to the plot or organized against it before the coup. Consequently, loyalist generals transmitted little countervailing information and built no pre-coup mobilization capacity.

5.3 Examples from our Dataset: José Cuesta Monereo and Miguel Cabanellas

In section 3, we exemplified our dataset construction with Major Cuesta Monereo (a subordinate) and General Miguel Cabanellas (a leader). We now show how their story illustrates our mechanisms.

Cabanellas. Miguel Cabanellas[39] joined the army in 1889 and got "meteoric" promotions during the 1910s, thanks to his performance in battle in Africa. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1919. He did not support Primo de Rivera's coup in 1923, but he was still promoted to major general in 1924. He was put in reserve in 1926. He conspired against the government in 1929 and 1930, the last year of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Around this time, he joined an association of like-minded republican generals, the *Asociación de Ciudadanía Militar*. He was also a mason (Paz Sánchez, 2004).

After the end of the dictatorship and the abolition of the monarchy, he was rehabilitated by the new republican government. He had important commands during the early 1930s, including Inspector General of the Army. At that time, Cuesta Monereo was his *aide-de-camp*, and they traveled the country inspecting regiments. We have an account of one such visit to the VII Brigade. Cabanellas demanded that the officers say "long live the Republic" when they saluted with their sabers, and suggested they hang artwork with some sort of allegory of the Republic (Coque, 2017, pp. 154-155, based on Guarner, 1975).[40]

In January 1936, he got assigned command of the 5$^{\text{th}}$ Division, based in Zaragoza. When the left won the February elections, the government replaced many of the division commanders with more loyal generals (e.g., Franco was sent to Canarias and Goded to the Balearic Islands). Due to his reputation as a republican, Cabanellas was confirmed in his post. On June 5$^{\text{th}}$, Mola (the main plotter) got him to join the conspiracy (Coque, 2017, p 104). His rebellion was a complete surprise to the government. It is not entirely clear why he joined the uprising, as he did not share the ideas of conservative and monarchist officers such as Franco and Mola. His participation was crucial: Zaragoza, strategically located between Madrid and Barcelona, fell to the rebels, with all the troops and resources of the 5$^{\text{th}}$ Division and with little opposition from loyalist forces.

[39]The biographical information in these paragraphs is mostly based on Cabanella's entry in the Biographical Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of History (Egea Bruno, 2024).

[40]As a further confirmation of Cabanellas' republicanism, he participated in politics as a candidate for the Radical Republican Party in 1933. In a manifesto, he proclaimed: *"I am not a Marxist nor an anti-Marxist, I recognize the proletarian desires as just..."* (Egea Bruno, 2024). Coque (2017) describes him as "one of the most republican bosses in the Army" (p. 154, our translation).

Cuesta's pre-coup career. Cuesta Monereo[41] graduated from the Toledo Infantry Academy in 1913 and participated in campaigns in Morocco in 1924 and 1925, where he was described as "affable, cultured, active and tireless in the fulfillment of his duties and, in short, a brilliant Chief of Staff".

From 1931 to 1934, he was *aide-de-camp* of General Miguel Cabanellas. In 1933, Cabanellas was named chief of the 2nd General Inspection of the Army, and Cuesta accompanied him in visits to garrisons all over Spain. Coque (2017) affirms that the pair had "strong personal ties" and that Cuesta may have been influenced by Cabanellas' republicanism "within an idea of social progress, but with order." Cuesta corresponded with Cabanellas about the coup (for example, in a letter dated April 28th, 1936) (Coque, 2017, pp 101-102).

In 1935, Cuesta was assigned to the 2nd division, headquartered in Seville. In February 1936, General Villa-Abrille was appointed to command the division by the new leftist government.

The coup in Seville. In mid-June, Villa-Abrille was approached by rebel general Queipo de Llano, but he refused to join the conspiracy (Serem, 2012, p 28). However, he failed to report the conspirators to the government. When assessing the coup's chances, Mola concluded that despite the lack of support by the top ranks, success in Seville (and all of Andalusia) was almost certain, thanks to the support of the middle ranks (including Cuesta) (Coque, 2017, pp 101-102, 151-152).

When the coup was launched on July 18, the rebels, led by Queipo de Llano, took control of Seville's largest regiment in just a few hours. Because Villa-Abrile was a recent arrival to Seville, and because his more competent subordinates carried out the coup successfully, Serem (2012) argues that Villa-Abrille was the leader of the 2nd Division "in name only" (p. 58).[42] By the end of the day, the rebels had secured the main government buildings, and Queipo de Llano addressed the population through the radio. During the following three days, the rebels managed to defeat loyalist forces in the workers' neighborhoods, where

[41] The biographical information in these paragraphs is mostly based on Cuesta's entry in the Biographical Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of History (Gómez y González de la Buelga, 2024)

[42] In February 1939, Villa-Abrile was sentenced to six years in prison by a rebel court. He died in 1946, shortly after finishing his sentence.

militias had risen up to defend the Republic. The rebels' success in Seville was key. It was the fourth largest city in Spain and the biggest to fall to the rebels in July. Strategically, it was crucial for the arrival of rebel African troops to the Peninsula (Serem, 2012, p 52).

Cuesta's post-coup career. In the civil war that followed the coup, Cuesta Monereo played an important command role, for example in the battles of Málaga and Peñarroya. He also acted as a liaison between Queipo de Llano and Franco. When the war was over, he was assigned to the Army's General Staff with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He eventually made it to the top of the military hierarchy: he was promoted to brigadier general in 1947, major general in 1951, and lieutenant general in 1957. For reference, without counting bonuses, a lieutenant general's salary was 2.72 times a major's (Cuesta's rank at the beginning of the war) (San Martin Losada, 1941).

Summary. Cuesta was Cabanellas' *aide-de-camp* in 1934, and since the latter was a leader of the rebellion, the former is classified as being treated by a rebel leader in our dataset. In 1936, Cuesta was serving under a loyalist general, but he rebelled anyway. Before 1936, Cabanellas was a committed republican, so it is unlikely that he indoctrinated Cuesta with anti-republican ideals. We cannot establish for certain why Cuesta supported the rebellion, but two things are clear: First, he corresponded with Cabanellas before the coup. He had deep knowledge of the conspiracy and, therefore, a good idea about its probability of success. Second, during and after the Civil War, Cuesta got promoted very rapidly, reaching the very top of the Army's hierarchy.

6 Discussion

A leader is someone who has followers who follow voluntarily (Hermalin, 2013). Then, why do individuals follow leaders? While current commanders can rely on formal authority or coercion, former leaders must find other ways to inspire loyalty.

The two sides in the Spanish Civil War were separated by wide ideological differences. The government had support from the left, including republicans, socialists, communists, and

anarchists. The rebels were backed by the right, constituted by monarchists, conservatives, and fascists. Internationally, the government had support from the Soviet Union, while the rebels had support from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. However, we do not find that indoctrination played a role in individual decision-making.

Our results point to mechanisms consistent with forward-looking agents who are worried about both the immediate present (surviving the coup) and their future career prospects. We provide evidence consistent with a theory of leadership based on coordination, in which officers try to predict the winner by sampling the allegiances of their former leaders. We also find support for a theory of leadership based on reciprocity - subordinates support their leaders because they expect material rewards if they ascend to power.

Our findings are also relevant to understanding democratic breakdown. Military coups are responsible for 75% of democratic failures (Marinov and Goemans, 2014) and are, therefore, the most significant threat to democracy. While Levitsky and Ziblatt (2019) argue that elected politicians who erode democratic institutions are the biggest current threat, even these leaders need the explicit or implicit support of the armed forces to stay in power. In Venezuela, Chavez started his political career with a failed coup in 1992. After being democratically elected, he survived a coup in 2002. He then managed to purge detractors and use promotions and lucrative opportunities to turn the army into a bastion of support for the regime (EL PAÍS, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2019).[43]

Our analysis reveals that while there was a widespread breakdown of the chain of command during the 1936 Spanish Coup, the role of the military hierarchy remained crucial, albeit in an unexpected way: subordinates followed their former leaders rather than current ones. This finding illuminates the persistent influence of past hierarchies. This is especially relevant for young democracies, whose past hierarchies were shaped by former dictators.

Our results also have practical insights for democratic leaders trying to coup-proof their

[43]It is not hard to find further examples. In Türkiye, Erdoğan successfully defeated a military coup in 2016 and solidified his rule partly through military purges and reorganizations afterwards (Esen and Gümüşcü, 2017). In the United States, the Joint Chiefs had to issue a force-wide memo on January 12, 2021, condemning the Capitol attack, reminding troops that "any act to disrupt the Constitutional process is ... against the law," and affirming that Biden would be the next president. (The Washington Post, 2021).

regimes. The republic made frequent use of rotation to place likely loyal generals in strategic positions. In doing so, they exposed more officers to more generals (some of whom ended up on the rebel side). Since we do not find an effect on the intensive margin (i.e., more years under a rebel do not increase the probability of rebellion), keeping suspect generals as stationary as possible may have been more effective.

In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that formal authority and coercion do not determine military loyalty—past hierarchical relationships play a crucial role in shaping officers' decisions during political crises. These results have implications beyond military coups, speaking to fundamental questions about organizational behavior and institutional design. When formal and informal hierarchies diverge, the latter may prove more influential in determining individual behavior. Future research might explore whether similar dynamics exist in other organizational contexts where formal authority structures undergo rapid change, such as corporate mergers or political transitions.

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A Online Appendix

Table A.1: Number of Officers per Year

All of Spain

Year	Entries All	Entries New	Entries Returning	Exits	Unique Individuals	Exits as % of N
1927				247	5456	4.53%
1928	406	406		179	5862	3.05%
1929	882	698	184	284	6560	4.33%
1930	296	151	145	548	6711	8.17%
1931	409	179	230	482	6890	7.00%
1932	1254	720	534	324	7610	4.26%
1933	850	377	473	249	7987	3.12%
1934	666	338	328	293	8325	3.52%
1935	872	604	268	336	8929	3.76%
1936	2707	2379	328		11308	

Republican Area

Year	Entries All	Entries New	Entries Returning	Exits	Unique Individuals	Exits as % of N
1927				134	2692	4.98%
1928	211	211		102	2903	3.51%
1929	391	297	94	160	3200	5.00%
1930	158	70	88	279	3270	8.53%
1931	230	101	129	237	3371	7.03%
1932	634	355	279	165	3726	4.43%
1933	374	149	225	113	3875	2.92%
1934	301	134	167	137	4009	3.42%
1935	378	249	129	182	4258	4.27%
1936	1224	1072	152		5330	

This table reports the number of officers per year in our dataset. The entries are officers who appear in a given year but were not present the year before. Exits are the officers who appear in that year but not in the next. Since we only look for officers present in 1936, all exits later return. We cannot ascertain whether these missing observations are due to failed name matches or due to periods of inactivity. Reassuringly, the years with the highest number of exits correspond to the military reform, when many officers were transferred to the reserve.

Table A.2: List of Retired Generals who Supported Previous Coups

Name	Supported the 1923 Coup	Supported the 1932 Coup	Endorsed the 1936 Coup
Severiano Martinez Anido	Yes		Yes
José Cavalcanti de Alburquerque y Padierna	Yes	Yes	Yes
Emilio Barrera Luyando		Yes	
Dámaso Berenguer Fusté	Yes		
José Sanjurjo Sacanell	Yes	Yes	Yes*
Juan O'Donnell Vargas	Yes		
Francisco Gomez-Jordana Sousa	Yes		
Federico Berenguer Fusté	Yes		
Leopoldo de Saro Marin	Yes		
Francisco Ruiz del Portal y Martinez	Yes		
Luis Navarro y Alonso de Celada	Yes		
Dalmiro Rodriguez Pedré	Yes		
Mario Muslera Planes	Yes		Yes
Miguel Ponte y Manso de Zunfiga		Yes	Yes

This is a list of the retired generals we use to test the indoctrination mechanism (Table 7). The 1923 coup supporters were conspirators *(Cuadrilatero)*, members of the Military Directory, and the War Minister of Primo de Rivera's government. The 1932 coup supporters are classified according to Payne (2017). Their endorsement of the 1936 coup is based on their biographies in Wikipedia or in the *Diccionario Biografico Electronico* of the Royal Academy of History. José Sanjurjo is a complicated case because he did more than endorse the 1936 coup, he was part of the conspiracy (despite being retired). Our results do not change if we reclassify him.

Table A.3: Comparison between the Full Army and the Army in the Republican Zone

	All of Spain Mean	Republican Area Mean	Difference
Rebel Subordinate	0.814	0.686	0.128
p-value			0.000
diff as % of mean			0.157
Number of Postings	4.493	4.553	-0.061
			0.000
			-0.013
Tenure	22.123	23.066	-0.943
			0.000
			-0.043
Age 1936	40.057	40.882	-0.825
			0.000
			-0.021
Officer Rank in 1936	3.862	3.961	-0.099
			0.000
			-0.026
Officer Rank in Posting	2.587	2.670	-0.083
			0.000
			-0.032
Years in Africa	2.372	1.997	0.375
			0.000
			0.158
Years in Africa (Core)	0.320	0.284	0.036
			0.000
			0.113
Dummy Africa	0.653	0.627	0.026
			0.000
			0.040
Hierarchical Position Variation (1932-1936)	0.746	0.785	-0.039
			0.000
			-0.052
Political Exposure	0.409	0.435	-0.026
			0.000
			-0.064

The purpose of this table is to compare the full Spanish Army with the Army in the government-controlled area. Since most officers in the rebel-controlled Area did not have the choice of whether or not to rebel, our baseline specifications only use the government-controlled area.

Table A.4: Proportion of Treated Officers by Year

	All officers				
		Proportion of officers serving under...			
	Number of Officers	Rebel General	Loyalist General	Retired General	Any General
All Years	11308	0.153	0.130	0.183	0.285
Monarchy	6890	0.100	0.056	0.253	0.285
Republic	11273	0.115	0.108	0.061	0.180
1927	5456	0.018	0.005	0.118	0.128
1928	5615	0.037	0.018	0.133	0.167
1929	6318	0.035	0.001	0.120	0.145
1930	6330	0.021	0.001	0.120	0.137
1931	6191	0.063	0.045	0.129	0.147
1932	6963	0.055	0.022	0.060	0.092
1933	7489	0.046	0.021	0.039	0.076
1934	7906	0.034	0.063	0.039	0.090
1935	8485	0.045	0.042	0.005	0.083
April 1936	10856	0.058	0.053	0.000	0.112
July 1936	11297	0.053	0.049	0.000	0.095
	Officers in the Republican Area in July 1936				
		Proportion of officers serving under...			
	Number of Officers	Rebel General	Loyalist General	Retired General	Any General
All Years	5330	0.186	0.157	0.202	0.312
Monarchy	3371	0.109	0.071	0.264	0.290
Republic	5308	0.149	0.130	0.079	0.217
1927	2692	0.020	0.004	0.136	0.144
1928	2769	0.035	0.023	0.144	0.169
1929	3058	0.033	0.002	0.124	0.146
1930	3056	0.020	0.001	0.128	0.141
1931	3007	0.073	0.057	0.135	0.151
1932	3404	0.064	0.027	0.070	0.107
1933	3613	0.053	0.031	0.051	0.090
1934	3801	0.042	0.079	0.054	0.112
1935	4042	0.063	0.058	0.006	0.114
April 1936	5084	0.085	0.059	0.000	0.141
July 1936	5324	0.087	0.062	0.000	0.134

This table presents descriptive statistics for our treatment variables. It shows the proportion of officers serving under generals who rebelled, remained loyal, or were retired by 1936. The last column shows the proportion of *officers* serving under any general (the remainder were typically low-ranking officers stationed in postings with no generals). Note that columns 2, 3, and 4 do not necessarily add up to column 5 because some postings had multiple generals.

Table A.5: Proportion of Treated Postings by Year

	Number of Postings	Proportion of postings under... Rebel General	Loyalist General	Retired General	Any General
All Years	2076	0.042	0.032	0.082	0.106
Monarchy	1092	0.036	0.020	0.125	0.132
Republican	984	0.050	0.046	0.036	0.077
1927	663	0.012	0.003	0.109	0.116
1928	693	0.016	0.010	0.114	0.130
1929	679	0.018	0.012	0.106	0.128
1930	825	0.023	0.006	0.113	0.136
1931	774	0.031	0.013	0.089	0.116
1932	668	0.021	0.019	0.031	0.064
1933	706	0.023	0.031	0.030	0.072
1934	703	0.027	0.038	0.028	0.080
1935	679	0.038	0.037	0.015	0.080
April 1936	763	0.043	0.034	0.000	0.079
July 1936	679	0.044	0.037	0.000	0.077

This table presents descriptive statistics for our treatment variables. It shows the proportion of *postings* under generals who rebelled, remained loyal, or were retired by 1936. The last column shows the proportion of postings under any general. Note that columns 2, 3, and 4 do not add up to column 5 because there were postings with more than one general. For July 1936, we discard "inactive" postings *(situación de disponible)*.

Table A.6: Number of Officers in Each Posting

	Min	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Quartile	Max	Std Dev
Number of officers per posting							
All Periods	1	27	50	87.955	81	714	131.810
Monarchy postings	1	22	39	75.975	65	611	120.339
Republic postings	1	32	63	96.823	84	714	139.035
July 1936 postings	1	3	8	16.634	24	258	20.896
Number of officers per posting-year							
All Years	1	13	24	41.422	40	352	57.697
Monarchy postings	1	11	19	35.681	29	262	53.242
Republic postings	1	16	30	45.616	43	352	60.402

In the upper panel, this table shows descriptive statistics for the size of each type of posting. We use three types of postings: during the monarchy (1927-1931), those during the Republic (1932-April 1936), and the postings at the time of the coup. The first two types are different because the Republic reformed the Army structure. The postings in July 1936 are different because they do not come from the yearbooks but from Engel's loyalty dataset. Note that the numbers refer to unique individuals, and not all of them necessarily serve at the same time. In the lower panel, we present descriptive statistics for the size of each posting-year.

Table A.7: Descriptions of Variables: Individual–Posting Dataset

Variable	Description
Dependent Variable	
Subordinate joins the Rebels	Indicator variable equal to one if the subordinate joined the rebel forces during the conflict and zero otherwise (Engel, *El Cuerpo de Oficiales en la Guerra de España*, 2008).
Treatments and Placebos	
Posting under Rebel Leader	Indicator variable equal to one if, in the specific posting, the subordinate was commanded by a rebel leader and zero otherwise.
Posting under Rebel Leader (lead)	Indicator variable equal to one if the subordinate will be assigned in the next posting to a unit commanded by a rebel leader (lead indicator) and zero otherwise.
Posting under Rebel Leader (lag)	Indicator variable equal to one if, in the previous posting, the subordinate was commanded by a rebel leader (lag indicator) and zero otherwise.
Posting under Loyalist Leader	Indicator variable equal to one if, in the specific posting, the subordinate was commanded by a loyalist leader and zero otherwise.
Posting under Retired Leader	Indicator variable equal to one if, in the specific posting, the subordinate was commanded by a retired leader and zero otherwise.
Posting under Rebel Leader in 1936	Indicator variable equal to one if, in his 1936 posting, the subordinate was commanded by a rebel leader and zero otherwise.
Subordinate-Level Covariates	
N Postings	Number of postings the subordinate served in between 1927–1936.
Tenure	Years of military service accumulated by the subordinate by 1936.
Age 1936	Officer's age in 1936.
Officer Rank in 1936	Officer's rank in 1936 (1 is the lowest, 10 is the highest).
Officer Rank in Posting	Officer's rank when he served in the posting.
Years in Africa	Number of years served in Africa.

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Table A.7 – continued from previous page

Variable	Description
Years in Africa (Core)	Number of years served in Africa between 1910 and 1927 (Rif War) in units involved in the war.
Dummy Africa	Equal to one if the officer served in Africa at least once and zero otherwise.
Cavalry Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Cavalry and zero otherwise.
Estado Mayor Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Estado Mayor and zero otherwise.
Infantry Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Infantry and zero otherwise.
Engineers Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Engineers and zero otherwise.
Aviation Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Aviation and zero otherwise.
Carabineros Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Carabineros and zero otherwise.
Transport Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Transport and zero otherwise.
Guardia Civil Corps	Equal to one if the officer belongs to the Guardia Civil and zero otherwise.
Hierarchical Position Variation (1932–1936)	Change in the officer's hierarchical position between 1932 and 1936 from La Parra-Pérez (2020).
Political Exposure	Continuous variable between 1 and 0 measuring the officer's pre–coup political environment. It is calculated as the average share of votes for leftist parties (in 1936) in the provinces where he was posted (over his entire career).
1936 Posting Covariates	
Leftist Vote in Province	Proportion of votes received by leftist parties in the posting's province in 1936.

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
Table A.7 – continued from previous page

Variable	Description
Industry Output in Province	Proportion of industrial output of total output in the posting's province in 1936.
Urbanization Rate in Province	Urbanization rate of the posting's province in 1936.
Distance to Madrid in 1936	Distance in kilometers from the posting to Madrid in 1936.

Table A.8: Summary Statistics: Individual-Posting Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Dependent Variable					
Subordinate joins the Rebels	0.686	0.464	0	1	17972
Treatment Variables					
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.073	0.260	0	1	17972
Posting under Rebel Leader (lead)	0.027	0.163	0	1	17972
Posting under Rebel Leader (lag)	0.033	0.180	0	1	17972
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.056	0.230	0	1	17972
Posting under Retired Leader	0.089	0.285	0	1	17972
Subordinate-level Covariates					
N Postings	4.554	1.897	1	11	17972
Tenure	23.066	8.754	5	57	17972
Age 1936	40.882	8.761	22	83	17972
Officer Rank in 1936	3.961	1.269	1	7	17972
Officer Rank in Posting	3.448	1.485	1	7	17972
Year of Entry (1927-1936)	1928.414	2.695	1927	1936	17972
Years in Africa	1.998	2.427	0	18	17972
Years in Africa (Core)	0.284	0.876	0	12	17972
Dummy Africa	0.627	0.484	0	1	17972
Cavalry Corps	0.071	0.258	0	1	17972
Estado Mayor Corps	0.032	0.177	0	1	17972
Infantry Corps	0.363	0.481	0	1	17972
Engineers Corps	0.097	0.295	0	1	17972
Aviation Corps	0.046	0.209	0	1	17972
Carabineros Corps	0.091	0.288	0	1	17972
Cuerpo de Tren Corps	0.006	0.075	0	1	17972
Guardia Civil Corps	0.143	0.350	0	1	17972
Artillery Corps	0.151	0.357	0	1	17972
Hierarchical position variation (1932-1936)	0.785	0,621	-1.698	2.948	17972
Political Exposure	0.435	0.068	0	1	17972
1936 posting covariates					
Leftist Vote in Province	0.475	0.193	0	0.820	17972
Industry Output in Province	0.236	0.129	0	0.471	17972
Urbanization Rate in Province	0.533	0.282	0	0.800	17972
Distance to Madrid in 1936	202.974	210.027	0	572	17972

Figure A.1: Balance: Effect of Treatment Status on Covariates



Points show standardized differences in covariates between officers who served under a rebel leader and those who did not. For each covariate X, the dot is $\hat{\beta}/\sigma$, where $\hat{\beta}$ comes from $X_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta\, Post^{reb}_{i,j} + Posting_j + Posting36_i + u_{i,j}$ and $\sigma = \mathrm{sd}(\tilde{X})$ with $\tilde{X}$ residualized on $Posting_j$ (career-assignment FE) and $Posting36_i$ (1936-posting FE). Positive values indicate higher X among officers posted under a rebel leader. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals using two-way clustered standard errors (career posting j and officer i).

Table A.9: Rebels Attributed to Treatment: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations

Rank	N	Coefficient (1)	Treatment mean (2)	Obs. per officer (3)	Rebels attributed to treatment (1)×(2)×(3)
		Individual-posting level sample			
All	17,972	0.107 (0.061, 0.153)	0.073	3.376	0.026 (0.015, 0.037)
Lieutenants and below	6,494	0.077 (-0.102, 0.256)	0.027	2.393	0.005 (-0.007, 0.017)
Captains	6,332	0.059 (0.004, 0.114)	0.061	4.331	0.016 (0.001, 0.031)
Majors	3,102	0.173 (0.107, 0.239)	0.140	4.351	0.105 (0.065, 0.145)
Lt col. and colonels	2,044	0.022 (-0.073, 0.117)	0.153	4.699	0.016 (-0.052, 0.084)
		Individual-year level sample			
All	36,033	0.078 (0.056, 0.100)	0.051	6.768	0.027 (0.020, 0.034)
Lieutenants and below	11,684	0.036 (-0.065, 0.137)	0.017	4.305	0.003 (-0.004, 0.010)
Captains	13,752	0.030 (-0.001, 0.061)	0.037	9.406	0.011 (0.000, 0.022)
Majors	6,511	0.112 (0.077, 0.147)	0.100	9.132	0.102 (0.070, 0.134)
Lt col. and colonels	4,086	0.020 (-0.029, 0.069)	0.116	9.393	0.021 (-0.032, 0.074)
		Individual level sample			
All	5,324	0.139 (0.050, 0.228)	0.246	1	0.034 (0.012, 0.056)
Lieutenants and below	2,714	-0.111 (-0.451, 0.229)	0.064	1	-0.007 (-0.029, 0.015)
Captains	1,462	0.346 (-0.021, 0.713)	0.265	1	0.092 (-0.005, 0.189)
Majors	713	0.821 (-6.583, 8.225)	0.610	1	0.501 (-4.016, 5.018)
Lt col. and colonels	435	0.750 (-46.097, 47.597)	0.720	1	0.540 (-33.169, 34.248)

This table reports back-of-the-envelope calculations of the proportions of rebels attributed to the treatment, by rank and by sample. For example, the first row reports our baseline coefficient (From Table 2, model 2). The next column reports that 7.3% of the individual postings were under a rebel leader. We observe 3.376 postings per officer on average. Therefore, assuming an additive effect of postings, 2.6% of the officers in the government-controlled zone rebelled because of the treatment (4% of those who rebelled). The effect is null for lieutenants, who were rarely exposed, and peaks for majors. We replicate this analysis for the individual-year and individual level samples. We find similar results across samples.

Table A.10: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel: By Rank

	Subordinate joins the Rebels							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.077	−0.002	0.059**	0.064**	0.173***	0.158***	0.022	0.035
	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.040)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.149**	0.138**	−0.016	−0.016	−0.025	−0.038	0.072*	0.043
	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Posting under Retired Leader	0.022	−0.084	−0.0003	−0.012	0.015	0.033	0.003	0.010
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Posting under Rebel Leader (lead)		0.032		−0.005		0.004		−0.013
		(0.060)		(0.041)		(0.032)		(0.033)
Posting under Rebel Leader (lag)		0.033		−0.023		0.012		0.019
		(0.034)		(0.040)		(0.054)		(0.074)
Sample	Lieutenants		Captains		Majors		Lt col. and colonels	
Career Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.676	0.676	0.724	0.724	0.666	0.666	0.634	0.634
Mean Posting under Rebel Leader	0.027	0.027	0.061	0.061	0.14	0.14	0.153	0.153
Observations	6,494	6,494	6,332	6,332	3,102	3,102	2,044	2,044
R^2	0.407	0.456	0.480	0.490	0.657	0.671	0.739	0.766

This table shows the effect of rebel, loyalist and retired leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. All regressions include career and 1936 postings. Even-numbered models further include individual controls. We split the sample by rank, grouping first and second lieutenants in the first category, and colonels and lieutenant colonels in the last. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.11: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel, Alternative Units of Observation

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.136***	0.154***	0.138***			
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	0.020	0.017	0.0004			
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.040)			
N Postings under Retired Leader	−0.026	−0.033	−0.055			
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)			
N Postings under Rebel Leader (lag)		−0.104**	−0.076			
		(0.047)	(0.051)			
N Postings under Rebel Leader (lead)		−0.075	−0.069			
		(0.050)	(0.048)			
Posting under Rebel Leader				0.078***	0.084***	0.071***
				(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Posting under Loyalist Leader				0.022**	0.019*	0.013
				(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Posting under Retired Leader				0.023	0.019	0.007
				(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Posting under Rebel Leader (lag)					−0.056**	−0.037*
					(0.029)	(0.023)
Posting under Rebel Leader (lead)					−0.025*	−0.020
					(0.013)	(0.014)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Year	Ind-Year	Ind-Year
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,324	5,324	5,324	36,033	36,033	36,033
R^2	0.495	0.495	0.520	0.319	0.319	0.345

This table shows the effect of rebel, loyalist and retired leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-year (models 4–6). All regressions include career and 1936 posting fixed effects. Models 3 and 6 also include subordinate-level controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 to 3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Regressions Alternative Current Leaders Definition

	Subordinate joins the Rebels	
	(1)	(2)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.161***	0.155***
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.003	−0.007
	(0.028)	(0.027)
Posting under Retired Leader	0.018	−0.004
	(0.053)	(0.033)
Follow (La Parra-Pérez, 2020)	0.182***	0.166***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	No
Subordinate controls	No	Yes
1936 posting controls	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686
Observations	14,982	14,982
R^2	0.183	0.222

This table reports the effect of current leaders using (La Parra-Pérez, 2020)'s *Follow* measure. *Follow* equals one when the highest-ranking officer within an Engel's garrison is classified as rebel (and zero otherwise), regardless of whether the leader is a general. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A.13: Proportion Following their Superiors in 1936 by Side, Rank, Division, and Corps

		Proportion following their 1936 superiors
Area	Rebel-controlled	0.726
	Government-controlled	0.583
Rank in 1936	Second Lieutenants	0.496
	Lieutenants	0.687
	Captains	0.659
	Majors	0.627
	Lieutenant Colonels	0.530
	Colonels	0.512
Division	Division 1	0.570
	Division 2	0.628
	Division 3	0.570
	Division 4	0.601
	Division 5	0.784
	Division 6	0.709
	Division 7	0.847
	Division 8	0.660
	Balearic Islands	0.827
	Canary Islands	0.824
	Western African District	0.588
	Estern African District	0.772
	Rifi	0.857
	Ifni	0.652
	Cape Juby	0.733
	Rio de Oro	0.500
	Gulf of Guinea	1.000
Corps	Artilleria	0.742
	Aviacion	0.466
	Caballeria	0.677
	Carabineros	0.490
	Cuerpo de Tren	0.500
	Estado Mayor	0.450
	Guardia Civil	0.593
	Infanteria	0.673
	Ingenieros	0.700
	Tercio	0.000

This table describes the widespread disruption of the 1936 chain of command. In particular, it presents the proportion of officers who chose the same side as their immediate superior (i.e., the highest-ranking officer in their posting).

Table A.14: Extensive and Intensive Margins

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.107***	0.107***			0.090***	0.100***
	(0.023)	(0.025)			(0.029)	(0.029)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.028	0.020			0.026	0.015
	(0.021)	(0.020)			(0.031)	(0.030)
Posting under Retired Leader	0.009	−0.015			0.009	−0.021
	(0.039)	(0.026)			(0.034)	(0.025)
Years inside Posting under Rebel Leader			0.046***	0.039***	0.017	0.006
			(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Years inside Posting under Loyalist Leader			0.013	0.010	−0.004	0.002
			(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Years inside Posting under Retired Leader			−0.007	−0.005	−0.004	0.003
			(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.319	0.350	0.319	0.350	0.319	0.350

This table shows the effect of leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We include the number of years under treatment to capture the intensive margin. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.1 Additional Tables on Robustness Checks

Table A.15: Regressions Weighted by the Inverse of the Number of Postings

	Subordinate joins the Rebels	
	(1)	(2)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.118***	0.106***
	(0.032)	(0.030)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.034	0.029
	(0.024)	(0.022)
Posting under Retired Leader	0.057	−0.022
	(0.056)	(0.038)
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.305	0.347

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We weight observations by the inverse of the number of postings per individual. We report OLS regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects, with and without additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.16: Selection? - Potentially Transferred/Fired Subordinate

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.108***	0.106***	0.106***	0.106***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader	0.029	0.029	0.034	0.032
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Posting under a Retired Leader	0.011	−0.016	0.015	−0.011
	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.027)
Potentially Transferred away from Rebel Leader			−0.008	−0.016
			(0.038)	(0.034)
Potentially Transferred away from Loyalist Leader			0.028	0.048
			(0.041)	(0.040)
Potentially Transferred away from Retired Leader			0.092**	0.080**
			(0.044)	(0.037)
Drop Potentially Selected	Yes	Yes	No	No
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.684	0.684	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,720	17,720	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.319	0.350	0.319	0.350

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist current leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We classify a treated subordinate-posting as "potentially transferred" if he left his previous posting at the same time or after a rebel, loyalist or retired leader arrived. In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected observations. In models 3 and 4, we add two variables that equal one if the subordinate was potentially selected. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A.17: Effect of Rebel Leaders by Time Period

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.109*	0.070**	0.109*	0.077***
	(0.056)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.027)
Diff Coefficients	0.039		0.033	
	(0.065)		(0.064)	
Posting under a Loyalist Leader	0.060	0.001	0.043	−0.002
	(0.057)	(0.023)	(0.059)	(0.019)
Posting under a Retired Leader	−0.054	0.034	−0.054	0.001
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	7,658	10,314	7,658	10,314
R^2	0.367	0.302	0.386	0.342

This table shows the effect of rebel leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We split the sample by period: the Monarchy (1927-1931) and the Republic (1932-1936). The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We report OLS regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects (models 1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (models 3 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels.

Table A.18: Reverse Causality?

	Subordinate Rebels	N Postings under Rebel$_B$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
N Postings under Rebel$_A$	0.126**		−0.015
	(0.050)		(0.026)
$\widehat{\text{Subordinate}}$ Rebels$_A$		−0.120	
		(0.207)	
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,324	5,324	5,324
R^2	0.513	0.959	0.959

This table implements a test to rule out reverse causality. Rebel generals are partitioned into two sets, A and B. We show that shocks from A generals do not affect B generals through shared subordinates. The unit of observation is the individual (subordinate). In column 1, we report the "first stage": the effect of exposure to A generals (measured in number of postings) on the probability that the subordinate rebels. Column 2 reports the "second stage": the effect of predicted probabilities of rebellion on the number of generals from group B that the subordinate served under. Column 3 reports the "reduced form", the effect of exposure to A generals on exposure to B generals. All models include fixed effects and controls. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 1936 posting level. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A.19: Reverse Causality? Generals with Shared Subordinates Do Not Rebel Together

	Rebel$_i$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebel$_j$ * Shared subordinates	0.011	−0.001	0.038	−0.004	−0.001	0.030
	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.186)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.192)
Rebel$_j$	−0.015**	−0.013**	−0.014**	−0.014**	−0.013**	−0.014**
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Shared subordinates	0.055	0.003**	0.385	0.049	0.003*	0.306
	(0.056)	(0.001)	(0.240)	(0.054)	(0.001)	(0.249)
Rebel$_j$*Shared posting				0.013	−0.007	−0.009
				(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Shared posting				0.075	0.055	0.066
				(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Constant	0.615***	0.621***	0.622***	0.613***	0.619***	0.620***
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Mean shared subs	0.225	3.201	0.016	0.225	3.201	0.016
Observations	3,486	3,486	3,486	3,486	3,486	3,486
R^2	0.003	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.005

This table shows that generals connected through shared subordinates are not more likely to rebel together, providing no evidence of cross-leader spillovers and aiding in ruling out reverse causality. The unit of observation is the pair of generals (i, j). The dependent variable is *Rebel*$_i$ (indicator that general i ever rebelled). The variable of interest is *Rebel*$_j\times$ *Shared subordinates*, where *Shared subordinates* is, by column, (1) any shared subordinate, (2) the number shared, and (3) the proportion shared. Columns 4–6 additionally include the interaction *Rebel*$_j\times$ *Shared posting*, where *Shared posting* equals one if the pair ever served in the same posting (same destino–year). Standard errors (in parentheses) are two-way clustered by i and j. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A.20: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel: Alternative Sample Definitions

	Subordinate joins the Rebels							
	Including Rebel Area		*Dropping Exposed to Loyal Generals*		*Dropping Exposed to Both Loyal and Rebel*		*Only Postings with Generals*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.053***	0.054***	0.160***	0.170***	0.170***	0.183***	0.112***	0.111***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Career Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean DV	0.814	0.814	0.686	0.686	0.684	0.684	0.712	0.712
Observations	37,058	37,058	16,969	16,969	17,443	17,443	2,791	2,791
R^2	0.335	0.355	0.322	0.354	0.321	0.353	0.352	0.380

This table shows the effect of rebel leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The level of observation is the individual-posting. Columns 1 and 2 include subordinates who were in the rebel-controlled area on the day of the coup. Columns 3 and 4 exclude subordinates/subordinate-postings who served under loyalist generals. Columns 5 and 6 exclude subordinates/subordinate-postings who served under both types of general. Columns 7 and 8 restrict the sample to postings with generals. For each pair of columns, we present a regression with career and 1936 posting fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.21: Effect of Rebel Leaders by Organizational Distance

	Subordinate joins the Rebels				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rebel in Hierarchy (Distance 0)	0.107***				0.108***
	(0.025)				(0.033)
Loyalist in Hierarchy(Distance 0)	0.020				0.009
	(0.020)				(0.028)
Rebel in Hierarchy (Distance 1)		0.006			0.005
		(0.015)			(0.022)
Loyalist in Hierarchy(Distance 1)		0.012			0.008
		(0.019)			(0.023)
Rebel in Hierarchy (Distance 2)			0.015		0.016
			(0.016)		(0.022)
Loyalist in Hierarchy (Distance 2)			−0.004		−0.016
			(0.020)		(0.027)
Rebel in Hierarchy (Distance $\geq$ 3)				−0.026	−0.002
				(0.021)	(0.021)
Loyalist in Hierarchy (Distance $\geq$ 3)				0.026	0.012
				(0.022)	(0.020)
Posting under a Retired Leader	−0.015	−0.072	0.065		−0.015
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.081)		(0.026)
Career Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.686	0.685	0.674	0.689	0.686
Observations	17,972	14,695	11,450	4,698	17,972
R^2	0.350	0.361	0.357	0.379	0.350

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal using the military hierarchy. The observation level is the individual-posting. The distance variable counts how many levels separate a subordinate from a general. We present regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects plus additional controls. The number of observations varies because some postings lack higher-level counterparts at the specified organizational distance. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.22: Heterogeneous Effects by Type of General

	Subordinate Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Posting under old rebel leader	0.087*					
	(0.048)					
Posting under young rebel leader	0.103***					
	(0.024)					
Posting under higher rank rebel leader		0.128***				
		(0.042)				
Posting under lower rank rebel leader		0.075***				
		(0.022)				
Posting under rebel leader in command of troops in 1936			0.107***			
			(0.040)			
Posting under rebel leader not in command of troops in 1936			0.105***			
			(0.029)			
Posting under rebel leader (conspirator)				0.106***		
				(0.030)		
Posting under rebel leader (non-conspirator)				0.088***		
				(0.029)		
Posting under Francisco Franco					0.299***	
					(0.035)	
Posting under rebel leader (not Franco)					0.100***	
					(0.025)	
Posting under rebel leader (executed by the gov)						0.122***
						(0.030)
Posting under rebel leader (not executed)						0.099***
						(0.027)
Posting under loyalist leader	0.009	0.021	0.020	0.009	0.022	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Posting under retired leader	−0.046*	−0.043*	−0.015	−0.047*	−0.014	−0.051*
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Difference in coefficients	-0.016	0.053	0.002	0.019	0.199***	0.023
SE	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.041)
p-value	[0.786]	[0.313]	[0.968]	[0.699]	[0.000]	[0.572]
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972	17,972
R^2	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350

This table shows the effect of rebel leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. In column 1, we split the treatment by age of the general, above and below the median (61 years old). In column 2, we split it by rank (major and lieutenant generals vs. brigadier generals). In column 3, by whether the general was in command of troops in 1936. In column 4, we split the treatment by whether the general was part of the conspiracy that led to the coup. In column 5, we show the effect of Francisco Franco. In column 6, we split the treatment by whether the general was executed by the government. We report regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.23: Alternative Definitions of the Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.104*** (0.020)	0.120*** (0.030)	0.107*** (0.026)
Sample	Executed	Non-executed	No post-war outcomes
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.344	0.625	0.661
Observations	8,594	15,014	16,476
R^2	0.525	0.370	0.398

This table shows the effect of leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal, using alternative definitions of the dependent variable. In model 1, we include only rebel subordinates who were executed by the government. In model 2, we include only rebel subordinates who were not executed by the government. In model 3, we exclude officers classified with post-war outcomes ("geographic loyals", identified with expulsions and reincorporations after 1939). The unit of observation is the individual-posting. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.2 Additional Tables on Mechanisms

Table A.24: Indoctrination? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Subordinate's Age

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.042	0.022	0.100***	0.107***
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.058	0.052	0.024	0.008
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Posting under Retired Leader	−0.029	−0.045	0.027	0.0003
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.035)
Median Condition (above or below 35 years old)	Below	Below	Above	Above
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Career Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	8,139	8,139	9,833	9,833
R^2	0.418	0.426	0.374	0.399

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal, splitting the sample into subordinates below and above the median age in our sample (35 years old) at the time of the treatment. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We report OLS regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects (1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.25: Career Concerns? Effect of Connections on Promotions (Individual Year Dataset)

	Promotion in Posting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a 1923 Coup Leader	0.104**	−0.181***	0.089**	−0.183***
	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.022)
Posting under a Retired (not 1923) Leader	0.003	−0.167***	0.0002	−0.180***
	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.047)
Posting under 1936 Rebel Leader	−0.043	−0.079**	−0.040	−0.078**
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.040)
Posting under 1936 Loyalist Leader	0.010	−0.014	0.020	−0.005
	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.034)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Career posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subordinate controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Promotions	0.180	0.144	0.180	0.144
Observations	31,387	42,952	31,362	42,923
R^2	0.122	0.113	0.162	0.144

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). The variable Promotion equals one if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. The unit of observation is the individual-year. For the individual-year dataset, consider promotions within each year. We report OLS regressions with career and 1936 posting fixed effects (1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 4). Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01