On the Political Economy of Urbanization: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique*

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Abstract

Urbanization generates large economic gains, but for urban incumbents, integrating rural migrants involves a trade-off between expanding the electorate and risking political backlash. This paper studies the political feasibility of urban integration policies using a field experiment conducted in the run-up to municipal elections in a rapidly growing city in Mozambique. We randomly vary access to an integration program for rural migrants and its political salience by delivering it either through local leaders, who act as political brokers between citizens and the city government, or independently of them. The program increases rural–urban migration even without political brokerage, but economic integration in the city depends critically on it. Leader involvement raises brokers' centrality and generates politically salient effects, increasing mobilization in favor of the incumbent, raising voter turnout among migrants, and shifting political support in migrants' origin areas. We do not observe any backlash among residents. Together, these findings show that urbanization is not only an economic process but can also serve as a political strategy.

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1 Introduction

Urbanization generates large and well-documented economic benefits, from increased productivity (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2009; Bryan & Morten, 2019; Duranton & Puga, 2023) to improved urban–rural market integration (Egger et al., 2024). Yet, governments often fail to facilitate the movement and integration of rural populations into cities, even in settings where the economic returns are highest. A key explanation lies in the political incentives surrounding urbanization (Bryan et al., 2020). Policies that expand urban populations can alter local electorates, shift demands for public services, and rebalance power between rural and urban constituencies. As a result, reallocating labor from agriculture to cities may be economically efficient, but it may face political resistance. Evidence on how such incentives shape urban policy and electoral outcomes remains limited in the literature.

This paper studies the political feasibility of urban integration policies. For urban incumbents, integrating rural migrants poses a trade-off between expanding the electorate and risking political backlash from residents or rival political actors. We ask how facilitating integration alters political behavior in the city. To do so, we use a field experiment embedded in a city-level integration program implemented in the run-up to municipal elections. Exploiting within-city randomized variation in the availability of the program and its political salience through the involvement of city government intermediaries, we demonstrate that urbanization is not merely an economic process, but can also serve as a political strategy. In particular, we identify a novel mechanism linking the implementation of urban integration policies to political outcomes, in which politically salient delivery induces mobilization and does not backfire.

We study this question in Mozambique, a setting that provides unusually sharp leverage on the political economy of urban integration. Mozambique combines large potential gains from rural–urban reallocation with institutional features that make the political incentives of internal migration salient. National power remains anchored in rural constituencies, while a small number of opposition-governed municipalities face rapid urban growth and competitive local elections. As a result, rural-to-urban migration is often viewed as a political threat at the national level but a potential electoral opportunity for urban incumbents. This divergence in political incentives is common across many cities in Sub-Saharan Africa and creates

a setting in which economically efficient integration policies may be politically contested by national ruling parties but advantageous to opposition parties.[1] Mozambique thus offers a unique context to examine how urban governments can implement integration policies without electoral backlash.

We designed and implemented the field experiment in collaboration with the municipality of Quelimane, a mid-sized and rapidly growing coastal city governed by an opposition party. In the run-up to the 2023 municipal elections, an integration policy for recent rural migrants was launched. The program consisted of repeated face-to-face coaching visits over the course of one year, offering job-matching services, mobile money training, and information about the city, its public services, and local voting.

The experiment randomly varies the access and political salience of the program within the city. We assigned the city's blocks (i.e., the lowest administrative unit) to one of three groups and delivered the program accordingly. In the first treatment group, the program was offered in collaboration with the block's leader. These leaders act as intermediaries between residents and politicians by leveraging local knowledge and social ties (Stokes et al., 2013). These functions are a natural channel through which program implementation can acquire political salience, and they are particularly important in urban settings, where rapid population growth makes it difficult for governments to reach and mobilize new residents. In the second treatment group, political salience was reduced by implementing the program administratively without such collaboration. Finally, in the control group, we removed access to the program by not offering the intervention at all.

To capture the economic and political effects of treatments, we combine experimental variation with comprehensive outcome measurement among leaders, migrants, city residents, and migrants' origin-area contacts. We interpret the estimated effects as policy-relevant intention-to-treat impacts, as block-level randomization allows us to compare alternative implementation regimes while recognizing that, in dense urban environments, information may diffuse. Multiple rounds of survey data captured program awareness, interactions among actors, political preferences, and economic outcomes, including migration responses. Taking advantage

[1] Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa has progressed slowly relative to other regions (United Nations, 2024), despite large urban–rural wage gaps (Young, 2013; Gollin et al., 2014; Hamory et al., 2021), substantial human-capital gains from migration (Alesina et al., 2021; Van Maarseveen, 2025), and rising climate pressures that push households toward urban relocation (Henderson et al., 2017; Burzyński et al., 2022).

of the proximity to municipal elections, surveys were supplemented with behavioral measures to capture politically salient actions, including partisan mobilization and participation in the elections.

We show that the program reinforces the process of urbanization and influences the economic integration of migrants. Although the retention of recent migrants is already high where the program was not offered, both treatment variants induce substantial additional rural–urban migration from the migrants' origin areas. These migration responses arise even without leader involvement, indicating that information and visibility alone are sufficient to stimulate further mobility through social networks. By contrast, economic integration within the city depends on political brokerage. While both treatments increase migrants' exposure to job opportunities and mobile-money use, only the involvement of the leader translates into higher employment. Leaders thus play a central role in converting information into realized economic outcomes.

The program generates politically salient responses, especially when leaders participate in program delivery. Leaders become more central as they know more migrants, are contacted more frequently, and are approached more often for job assistance by both migrants and residents. These changes do not arise without leader involvement, despite the identical program content. In addition, leader involvement increases mobilization in support of the incumbent and verified voter turnout among migrants, without reducing participation among residents. These findings suggest that political support responds when appeals are channeled through the intermediaries of local government. These effects extend beyond the city: migrants' origin contacts exhibit shifts in reported vote choice against the national ruling party, consistent with information and migration spillovers.

Our results show how urban integration policies can be used as a political instrument by urban incumbents. These findings first contribute to the literature on local governance. A growing body of work shows that political competition and decentralization can improve governance and service delivery (Dal Bó et al., 2021; Akhtari et al., 2022; Callen et al., 2023; Dahis & Szerman, 2025). To our knowledge, our study is the first to experimentally vary the political salience of a programmatic urban policy and to show that brokerage and electoral returns can emerge from its implementation, particularly during electorally salient periods.

Involving local leaders in policy delivery increases their centrality, intensifies mediation with migrants and residents, and raises political mobilization capacity. Existing work highlights the importance of local leaders not only for state capacity (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Banerjee et al., 2019; Balán et al., 2022; Henn, 2023; Manara & Regan, 2025), but also for their role in channeling votes through contingent exchanges, such as clientelism and vote buying (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015; Larreguy et al., 2016; Bobonis et al., 2022; Shenoy & Zimmermann, 2025), or through their centrality in the diffusion of information (Duarte et al., 2025). By contrast, we show that political brokerage can emerge from policy implementation rather than through transfers or targeted persuasion. This alternative mechanism is likely to be relevant in any setting where urban growth interacts with competitive local politics and decentralization.

We further contribute to the literature on internal migration and urbanization by shifting attention from migration decisions at the individual level to the institutional conditions that shape migrant integration and mobility. Evidence on the drivers of internal migration has focused almost exclusively on economic mechanisms in both low- and middle-income countries (Lagakos, 2020; Henderson & Turner, 2020) and high-income countries (Jia et al., 2023). Rural–urban mobility is found to be influenced by migration costs and movement barriers (Bryan et al., 2014; Bryan & Morten, 2019; Lagakos et al., 2023), infrastructure investments (Morten & Oliveira, 2024), asset constraints (Ardington et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2021; Balboni et al., 2022), and information frictions (Bazzi et al., 2021; Baseler, 2023; McKenzie, 2024). We provide two novel contributions to this literature. First, we show that promoting integration in the city can induce migration responses through network spillovers. Second, we show how political frictions can limit rural-to-urban migration. In particular, we find that internal migration affects political behavior not only in destination cities but also in migrants' origin locations, contributing to a growing literature on how internal migration reshapes political equilibria across space (Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017; Kramon et al., 2022; Bazzi et al., 2020, 2023).[2]

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context of our study in Mozambique. Section 3 describes the experimental design and the data instruments. Section 6 discusses the results, and Section 7 provides concluding remarks.

[2] A related literature studies the political effects of international migration (e.g., Docquier et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2019; Karadja & Prawitz, 2019), which differ from those of internal migration because they operate through cross-border regimes rather than sub-national incentives within a common institutional framework.

2 Background

Urbanization in low-income countries presents a paradox: the economic returns to reallocating labor from agriculture to cities are large, but urbanization often proceeds slowly. Mozambique exemplifies this pattern. It is among the poorest countries in the world, ranking fifth from the bottom in GDP per capita (USD 1,566; World Bank, 2024). Nearly 70% of the population is employed in agriculture, where productivity levels are very low, implying large potential returns to reallocating labor toward cities. Yet, urbanization has progressed slowly. The share of the population living in urban areas increased from 29% in 2000 to 37% in 2020, remaining well below both the Sub-Saharan African average of 47% and the global average of 56% (UN-Habitat, 2024).

This pattern reflects not only economic constraints but also political incentives arising from Mozambique's combination of strong central political control and highly decentralized local governance (Alexander, 1997). Since independence in 1975, Mozambique has been governed at the national level by a dominant ruling party, FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique). Political authority has historically been anchored in rural areas, where control has been exercised through appointed local leaders and strong central oversight. Although multiparty elections were introduced in 1994 and market-oriented reforms followed, the ruling party has largely maintained a development strategy centered on rural constituencies, with limited emphasis on urban expansion. At the same time, decentralization reforms have granted municipalities autonomy over service delivery, local administration, and political mobilization, particularly in opposition-governed cities. A salient example is land policy: while land remains state-owned, access is mediated by local authorities, creating a political lever over rural populations (e.g., World Bank, 1997). In this institutional environment, rural-to-urban migration can weaken national-level control rooted in rural constituencies while simultaneously expanding the electorate of urban incumbents. As a result, internal migration is often perceived as a threat at the national level but a potential opportunity at the municipal level.

Political incentives differ in urban areas. Municipal elections are held only in cities, and it is primarily there that opposition parties have gained electoral ground and govern a limited number of municipalities. For city governments facing electoral competition, migrant inflows

can therefore represent a political opportunity by expanding the urban electorate. This divergence between national and local political incentives links urbanization directly to political competition.[3]

This institutional configuration is not unique to Mozambique. As documented by Resnick (2014), decentralization across Sub-Saharan Africa has transferred responsibility for urban governance to municipal authorities, while political competition has led opposition parties to govern a growing number of cities under conditions of vertically divided authority. Similar tensions between the economic returns of urbanization and the political incentives of incumbents arise in many low- and middle-income countries where political authority is centralized and urban governance is electorally contested. In these settings, national governments often have limited incentives to support urban policy initiatives that could strengthen local incumbents, rendering urban service delivery and urban expansion highly politicized.

Quelimane is one such city. It has been governed by the opposition since 2011 and is led by the current mayor, Manuel de Araújo, of RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), FRELIMO's main and long-standing electoral challenger. Like many mid-sized African cities, Quelimane has experienced rapid growth driven largely by rural in-migration. As the capital of Zambézia province, it attracts migrants from surrounding rural areas as well as from other parts of the country. Its population more than doubled after 2010, surpassing 500,000 today and making it the seventh largest city in Mozambique (United Nations, 2024).

Quelimane is governed by a municipal council consisting of one elected president and chief executive ("mayor"), as well as 8 councilors. Administratively, the city is divided into five administrative posts, which are subdivided into 54 neighborhoods.

At the lowest tier of municipal governance, neighborhoods are divided into small administrative units (540 blocks), each headed by a block leader who mediates interactions between residents and the municipality, including conflict resolution, information transmission, and the local implementation of public projects.[4] In this role, block leaders function as grassroots political brokers, connecting households to public resources and acting as interme-

[3]Recent national elections have also been followed by violent unrest concentrated in urban areas (e.g., The Economist, 2024), underscoring the political salience of cities in Mozambique's political landscape.

[4]A block contains, on average, 145 households. This proxy is based on the city-wide census of job offers (see Section 3, during which enumerators attempted to visit every house in the city. Considering that Mozambique's urban households average approximately 4.2 persons per household (UN-Habitat, 2023), each leader is responsible, on average, for roughly 600 individuals.

diaries between citizens and elected officials. Although block leaders do not receive formal wages and are not formally partisan actors, their appointment through the municipal hierarchy closely links their incentives to those of the incumbent local government. Many leaders have strong political ambitions and engagement, as nearly half aspire to political positions in municipal government, two-thirds participate in political rallies and campaigns, and close to one-third report assisting citizens with voter registration or vote choice (Appendix B.1). As a result, policies affecting urban residents are shaped not only by national priorities or mayoral strategies, but also by the incentives of grassroots political intermediaries. This institutional structure makes block leaders a natural channel through which policies affecting migrant integration can acquire political salience.

The study was implemented during the final half of the mandate of Mayor de Araújo, in 2022–23, with key outcomes measured in close temporal proximity to the October 2023 municipal elections. De Araújo had already governed the city for more than a decade, having first been elected mayor in a 2011 by-election and subsequently re-elected in the municipal elections of 2013 and 2018. During the 2018 elections, RENAMO obtained 59% of the votes, compared to 36% for FRELIMO, with a turnout of 65% (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, 2013, 2018). This history of repeated electoral contests underscores the degree of political competition in Quelimane and the salience of municipal elections in shaping local political incentives. The timing of the intervention, therefore, places it in a period of heightened political competition, when local incumbents and their intermediaries face strong incentives to mobilize support and signal responsiveness to voters. The 2023 municipal elections were ultimately won by the incumbent mayor following a contested post-electoral period that concluded with a Supreme Court ruling in favor of RENAMO's allegations of electoral irregularities against FRELIMO.

3 The experiment

3.1 The *Quelimane trabalha com todos* program

The intervention is a migrant integration program for recent rural migrants. The identification of this target group and of program participants is described in Section 3.3. The program was

sponsored by the municipality of Quelimane and implemented under the name *Quelimane trabalha com todos* ("Quelimane works with everybody").

The objective of the program was to ease the economic and psychological barriers that rural migrants face upon arrival, facilitating their integration into urban life. The program consisted of individualized coaching delivered through up to five in-home visits conducted by the implementing team between August 2022 and July 2023. On average, each visit lasted approximately one hour. Appendix A provides operational details of the program, including scripts and graphical examples of the materials used.[5] Section 6 provides details about the actual participation in the program.

The content of the coaching focused on three main components combining economic, financial, and institutional support. The design of the program was informed by both baseline evidence of constraints among migrants and recent evidence from the literature studying the economic and financial inclusion of vulnerable populations in urban areas. In our setting, half of recent migrants report moving primarily for work, with family and education as secondary motives. For one third of them, the main challenge they encounter in the city is finding work, followed by financial constraints, while social and housing difficulties are less binding. Concerning supporting evidence from the literature, see, for instance, McKenzie (2017), for a review on labor-market policies in low- and middle-income countries, and Suri & Jack (2016) and Batista & Vicente (2024) for the role of mobile money in facilitating occupational change and migration.

The first and core component being job matching, reflecting that most rural migrants in Quelimane move in search of employment. Program staff provided migrants with tailored information on local job opportunities, including the names and phone numbers of potential employers, which were assembled through two city-wide censuses of job opportunities covering households and establishments, followed by three rounds of phone-based updates with previously identified employers. In total, 1,582 job offers were identified during the project, with their geographical distribution presented in Appendix Figure A3. Job offers were matched to migrants based on elicited skills and preferences, with each participant el-

[5]When possible, visits were scheduled in advance using the contact phone numbers provided by migrants at the time of listing. When this was not feasible, the implementation team visited participants' dwellings while covering the area. If migrants were unavailable at the time of a visit, at least one follow-up visit was actively arranged. Nevertheless, it was not possible to reach every participant in each round, and a share of listed migrants was never enrolled in the program (see Section 3.3).

igible to receive up to ten job leads. Job opportunities matched with program participants (Appendix Table A1) were concentrated in the construction and housekeeping sectors and were predominantly informal and low-skilled. After each visit, migrants received a text message summarizing the employer contacts shared, and during the fourth visit, they were also shown a short testimonial video featuring a former participant who successfully integrated into the city through employment found with program support. In the last two visits, implementers further facilitated contact by calling potential employers during the visit and arranging interview dates.

The second component of the program focused on financial inclusion through mobile money. This module aimed to promote account adoption among unbanked migrants and to facilitate the initial use of transfers, which could also foster information sharing between migrants and their origin-area networks. During the visits, implementers introduced migrants to Mozambique's leading mobile money service (M-PESA), providing practical information on account opening, cash-in and cash-out procedures, and transfers. To incentivize the use of and practice with mobile banking, during the third visit, participants received a small endowment that they were encouraged to deposit and transfer to a contact in their district of origin.

The third component provided institutional information about city life. In the first two visits, migrants received a presentation developed by the municipality covering administrative divisions, documentation required for residence, access to public services such as schooling and healthcare, and the local political context, including voter registration and the electoral process ahead of the 2023 municipal elections. From the third visit onward, this content was incorporated into a survey platform, allowing for an interactive format centered on reinforcing understanding through questions.

3.2 Program participants

Identifying and contacting recent rural migrants in a growing city in a low-income country is intrinsically challenging. The city lacks an up-to-date population census, administrative records do not systematically track recent arrivals, and the migrant population is highly mobile, with frequent changes in residence and household composition.

We proceeded in two steps. First, we defined the target population of the program as individuals who had settled in the city in the last 12 months and who reported an intention to remain for at least one additional year. Second, using this rule, we created a listing of rural migrants in the city. Within each block, the enumerators started from a randomly chosen point and followed a deterministic algorithm that dictated the order in which households were approached to assess whether they included any recent migrants. This process continued until all houses had been visited or until at least eight migrant households had been identified. Appendix Figure B1 displays the distribution of the number of migrants found per block.

The listing of migrants was conducted between October and December 2021. Following the same procedure, in September 2022, a second listing was performed to identify three additional migrant households in each block.[6] In total, we identified 2,320 migrants in the first wave and an additional 1,312 migrants in the second wave, totaling 3,632 migrants. The listing is a representative sample of recent rural migrants in the city, and served as the basis for our baseline survey (see Section 4).

3.3 The experimental variation

The listing exercise described in Section 3.2 establishes a representative sample of rural migrants to whom the program could have been offered. Using the universe of city blocks—the smallest administrative division of the city—in which at least one recent rural migrant was identified (493 blocks), we designed a randomized experiment to study both access to the program and its political salience.[7] Blocks were randomly allocated into three comparison groups that determined how the program was offered to listed migrants.

In the first group of blocks, the *leader treatment* group, the program was offered with the explicit support and active participation of the block leaders corresponding to the blocks where migrant participants resided. The engagement of the leader was stimulated through two distinct channels. First, during each round of visits, the field team initiated face-to-face

[6]The number of migrant households listed per block is thus capped at 11. When the program began in August 2023, migrants from the first wave had been in the city for approximately one to two years, while those listed in the second wave had arrived within the previous 12 months. Participants recruited in the second wave entered the program after it had already started and therefore received only four rounds of visits. All analyses account for this difference in exposure.

[7]We excluded 47 blocks where no migrants were found during the listing process (see Section 3.2).

interactions by showing a short video on a tablet featuring a message recorded by the relevant block leader. In these videos, leaders expressed clear support for the program and encouraged migrants to follow the instructions and advice provided by the program implementers. In the fourth round, leaders were additionally asked to emphasize the importance of participating in elections in the video messages shown to migrants. The content and framing of these messages were left to the leaders' discretion, and most delivered political messages related to the upcoming 2023 municipal elections. At the end of each visit, implementers reminded migrants of the leader's name and contact information so they could reach out if needed. The field team also sent a follow-up text message with the leader's name and contact details after the visit. Second, block leaders were encouraged to be physically present during the face-to-face visits with migrants. In practice, their presence was systematic only during the fifth visit—the closest to the elections—when a large majority (77%) participated in house visits within their respective blocks alongside the field team. Throughout the visits, implementers explicitly framed the program as being carried out under the authority of the corresponding block leader, reinforcing the attribution of responsibility and political salience. Section 4 provides descriptive characteristics of block leaders. Appendix A.3 provides further details about the participation of block leaders in the program.

In the second group of blocks, the *basic treatment* group, the program was offered without the support and participation of the block leader. In these blocks, the implementing team provided the same coaching content and visit schedule, but no leader-related engagement was included. As a result, for this group, the program was delivered in a low–political-salience benchmark against which the leader treatment can be compared.

In the third group of blocks, the *control* group, the program was not offered. While randomization at the block level and the restriction of program activities to treated blocks were designed to limit contamination, some degree of information diffusion across blocks is expected in practice, given social interactions among migrants and spatial proximity within the city. Rather than viewing such diffusion as a design limitation, we interpret the resulting estimates as policy-relevant treatment effects that incorporate realistic patterns of informal information sharing. We discuss the extent of spillovers and their implications for interpretation in more detail in Section 5.

Randomization was stratified within strata of up to three blocks. These strata were created by sorting blocks within neighborhoods by the number of migrants listed (see Section 3.2). The 493 blocks in the study were then split into the leader treatment (165 blocks), the basic treatment (163 blocks), and the control group (165 blocks). A map representing the randomization of blocks into treatment conditions is presented in Appendix Figure B1.

Using administrative data from the implementation of the program, Appendix A.4 shows descriptive statistics about the take-up of the program and the intensity of the intervention. Among the listed migrants, the take-up of the program was 77% in both the leader and basic treatment groups. Migrants who took up the program in the leader and basic treatment groups participated, on average, in 3.31 and 3.43 visits out of the 5 planned visits, respectively. Importantly, none of the migrants originally listed in the control group blocks took up the program or received any visits. In both the leader and basic treatment groups, the share of migrants who participated in a visit ranges from 28% of the corresponding treatment group in the first round of visits to 72% in the last round and was never below 50% in all other rounds.

4 Data

Understanding both the direct and indirect effects of the program requires collecting information from multiple actors involved in or affected by the integration of rural migrants into urban life. While rural migrants are the primary targets of the intervention, the program operates through local political authorities, interacts with incumbent city residents, and may generate informational and political spillovers toward migrants' origin communities. To capture these channels, we collected data not only from migrants, but also from block leaders, other city residents, and migrants' contacts in their districts of origin, combining a set of surveys and behavioral activities that we designed and implemented for this purpose. All surveys collected information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, as well as civic and political attitudes. Behavioral activities were used to measure political behavior directly, reducing reliance on self-reported outcomes. Appendix A provides implementation details, and Appendix C presents a comprehensive description of all outcome variables used in the analysis.

The sample of rural migrants is described in Section 3.2. The sample of block leaders includes all leaders of the 493 blocks participating in the experiment.[8] To measure outcomes among incumbent city residents, we sampled up to two households per block that had resided in the city for more than two years, yielding a total of 995 residents. These households were selected during the first migrant listing wave and followed the same random selection procedure. For the sample of migrants' contacts in their districts of origin, at the time of the first survey, migrants were asked to report the name and contact information of the adult person in their district of origin to whom they felt closest and with whom they were still in phone contact.[9] During the second survey, we asked for an additional contact, the next closest person, using the same phrasing, and thus expanded the sample of contacts. In total, we collected 2,519 such contacts, 95% of whom are family members. The high prevalence of family ties suggests that these respondents provide a proxy for migrants' origin households. Appendix Figure B2 depicts the geographical distribution of all samples.

Survey data were collected at three main points in time (see Appendix Figure A1 for the exact timeline): baseline (prior to the start of the program), midline (toward the end of the intervention, before the final visit), and endline (after program completion and before or after the October 2023 municipal elections, depending on the actor surveyed). Migrants and city residents were interviewed in person at baseline (in conjunction with the listing exercise), midline, and endline (in November 2023, right after the elections). Block leaders were interviewed in person at baseline (immediately after the listing phase), midline, and endline (in August 2023, right before municipal elections).[10] Migrants' origin contacts were interviewed by phone at midline and endline (in December 2023, after the elections). In addition, to capture rural-to-urban migration in the medium run, we conducted a follow-up phone survey among migrants' origin contacts approximately one year after the end of the intervention. Appendix B.1 reports tests for differential attrition across survey waves and actor types; we find no significant differences across treatment arms.

In addition to surveys, we implemented behavioral measures of political behavior in close

[8] A few blocks changed leaders between survey waves. In all estimates, we use the information for the leader in office at the time of the survey.

[9] The exact wording was: "Now think about the adult person to whom you feel closest, who still lives in your district of origin, and with whom you can talk by phone. Who is that person?"

[10] We conducted the leader survey before the elections to capture campaign mobilization at a moment of maximum political salience, before electoral outcomes could affect leaders' behavior or reporting.

temporal proximity to the 2023 municipal elections. These measures are based on observed behavior and on Structured Community Activities (SCAs; see, e.g., Casey et al., 2012), and capture political mobilization capacity among leaders, actual mobilization among migrants and residents, and participation in the 2023 municipal elections. Behavioral measures substantially reduce the biases associated with standard survey questions on political behavior (see, e.g., Aker et al., 2017; Grácio & Vicente, 2021). We describe each measure in detail in Section 6, when presenting the corresponding results.

Descriptive statistics at baseline for all actors are reported in Appendix B.1. Blocks contain, on average, 4.8 sampled migrants. Migrants are young (mean age 24) and predominantly male, with low family attachment and low socioeconomic status: only 37% are married or cohabiting, they have just over one child on average, 34% are illiterate, and 22% report having no occupation. Half of them moved to Quelimane in search of work, and their most frequently cited difficulty is finding a job, while engagement with local authorities remains limited. Migrants' origin contacts exhibit a similar profile but are older, more likely to be married or cohabiting, have more children, and educational attainment remains low.

Block leaders are substantially older than migrants (mean age 50), predominantly male, and socially more established, as 72% are married or cohabiting, 95% own their dwelling, and they have held office for an average of 3.6 years, but education levels are low. Incumbent city residents lie between migrants and leaders in age and socioeconomic status. Their average age is 34 years, 40% are male, and 46% are married or cohabiting. Illiteracy is lower than among migrants, though only 36% have completed primary schooling. Compared to migrants, residents are more engaged with local authorities, with 40% reporting contact with their block leader in the previous year.

5 Estimation strategy

The analysis closely follows the pre-analysis plan (Armand et al., 2024). Appendix B.1 assesses the baseline balance across treatment arms and the control group for all actors in the study. Across 180 balance tests, including comparisons of each treatment arm to the control separately and joint tests of equality across all treatment assignments, we find no more statistically significant differences than would be expected by chance at conventional significance

levels (approximately 10%). This pattern indicates that the treatment and control groups are observationally equivalent at baseline, providing reassurance that block-level randomization successfully generated comparable groups.

Let $Y_{ibs,t}$ be the outcome variable of interest for individual i (migrant, leader, resident, or migrant's contact) living in block b, which is part of the randomization stratum s, and is measured at time t, where $t = 0$ indicates the baseline, $t = 1$ the midline, and $t = 2$ the endline. Using post-intervention observations ($t > 0$), we estimate treatment effects by employing standard econometric analysis of experiments using the following OLS specification:

$$Y_{ibs,t} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + \delta_t + \lambda_s + \omega \boldsymbol{Z}_b + \gamma \boldsymbol{X}_{ibs,0} + \varepsilon_{ibs,t} \quad (1)$$

where TL_b and TB_b are indicator variables for living in a block in the leader or the basic treatment, respectively, λ_s and δ_t are strata and survey-wave fixed effects, $\boldsymbol{Z}_{bs}$ and $\boldsymbol{X}_{ibs}$ are a set of block and individual control variables.[11] Appendix D.7 shows the robustness of our results to alternative selections of controls using the Post–Double Selection Lasso (PDSL) procedure of Belloni et al. (2013). Finally, the error term, ε_{ibs}, is assumed to be clustered at the block level.

For outcomes measured in both post-baseline surveys, we exploit the repeated observations over time by estimating treatment effects using a multiple-period specification. This approach increases statistical power by pooling information across survey rounds and improves precision by accounting for within-unit correlation over time (McKenzie, 2012). In each table's footer, we indicate which round of surveying is used in the estimation, reporting it as *pooled* when the data are stacked.

In terms of the interpretation of β_L and β_B, a salient feature to consider is the potential presence of information spillovers across treatment units, i.e., blocks. In dense urban environments, social networks are highly interconnected, and information about valuable or scarce opportunities can diffuse rapidly through word-of-mouth and social reciprocity (see, e.g., Banerjee et al., 2019; Beaman & Dillon, 2021). This possibility implies that treatment

[11] Block-level controls include a proxy for the block population. Individual-level controls include age, gender, and, for the migrant sample, an indicator variable for whether the individual was listed in the first or second wave (see Section 3.2). In addition, when baseline data for the outcome variable are available, we include the value of the dependent variable at baseline ($Y_{ibs,0}$) as a control, thus estimating an ANCOVA specification.

exposure is unlikely to be geographically sealed. We therefore interpret our estimates as policy-relevant intention-to-treat effects, capturing the consequences of alternative program implementation regimes rather than as individual-level treatment effects while holding others' exposure fixed (see, e.g., Manski, 2013). Given the setting and the experimental design, some degree of information diffusion is expected and is best viewed as an integral feature of the policy environment. Evidence rules out spatial contamination as an alternative explanation for the estimated treatment effects of equation (1) and supports the interpretation that information diffusion operates through social networks rather than through local exposure to treatments.[12] To the extent that spillovers attenuate differences between treated and control blocks, our estimates should be understood as conservative lower bounds on the direct effects of treatment assignment. We further discuss this issue in Section 6. Appendix D.5 complements intention-to-treat estimates presented in the main text with treatment-on-the-treated estimates using the number of visits completed by a migrant as a measure of treatment intensity.

Finally, in Section 6 we evaluate treatment effects across multiple related outcome variables, which raises concerns about inflated Type I error due to multiple hypothesis testing. To address this issue, we supplement conventional significance indicators with adjusted p-values based on the procedure of Romano & Wolf (2016). We apply this correction at the actor-by-treatment level within each table of outcomes, accounting for the joint dependence of test statistics across related measures. The procedure tests the joint null hypothesis that a given treatment arm has no effect on any of the outcomes presented in a table for a specific actor and provides adjusted p-values for individual outcomes that control the family-wise error rate. Relative to standard multiple-testing adjustments, this approach improves statistical power while maintaining rigorous control of false rejections.

[12] Appendix D.8 provides an empirical test for spatial contamination by exploiting available data on the exact geo-location of each migrant's dwelling and estimating versions of equation (1) controlling for the shares of migrants in the geographical proximity of a respondent that are allocated to different treatment groups. Our main estimates are robust to this check.

6 Results

Section 3.3 highlights that the implementation of the experiment has generated differential exposure to the program. Administrative records capture the intensity of program delivery but do not measure its perceived salience or diffusion beyond directly visited households. Because political and economic effects may operate through awareness, visibility, and social interactions rather than direct participation alone, we complement administrative data with self-reported measures of program awareness, perceived targeting, and involvement among different actors. Figure 1 reports treatment effects on these outcomes, estimated using equation 1 and pooling midline and endline observations. Appendix A.4 reports the corresponding regression results.

The leader treatment was particularly effective in inducing engagement among block leaders (panel A). Leaders in treated blocks are significantly more likely to be aware of the program and report that it involves rural migrants, both effects amounting to 13 percentage points. They are also 17-percentage-points more likely to report being involved in the program. In contrast, the effects of the basic treatment are never statistically distinguishable from those of the control group. Among migrants (panel B), both treatments significantly increase program awareness by 7–8 percentage points and knowledge of the targeted group by 4–5 percentage points. A comparable pattern emerges for migrants' involvement in the program, with an effect of 7 percentage points for both treatments. For all outcomes, the effects are statistically indistinguishable across treatments. Panels C and D show more limited effects among city residents and migrants' origin contacts, but patterns consistently point to a stronger reach under the leader treatment. In particular, the leader treatment increases residents' knowledge about the targeted group by 4 percentage points and raises the probability that migrants' origin contacts are aware of the program by 3 percentage points.

These results show that treatment assignment translated into meaningful differences in program reach and that leader involvement substantially amplified program salience beyond that of direct beneficiaries. At the same time, Appendix A.4 shows that awareness among leaders, migrants, and residents in control blocks is nonetheless high (72%, 70%, and 59%, respectively), while it is lower among the origin contacts of control migrants (22%).

At the same time, it is important to note that much of the diffusion of information oc-

curs around election-time. If we estimate effects considering only pre-election observations, we observe much larger effects and smaller sample means in the control group. Growing awareness over time in control blocks highlights the role of information diffusion in dense urban settings, especially during politically-salient periods. As discussed in Section 5, this finding reinforces the interpretation of the results as policy-relevant effects under realistic implementation conditions.

In Sections 6.2–6.3, we consider the effects on two broad sets of outcomes: economic and political. On the economic dimension, we expect improved labor-market outcomes driven by enhanced access to job opportunities, including higher employment rates and increased work hours. We also anticipate increased use of mobile money, particularly for transfers to households in migrants' districts of origin, and potential improvements in attitudes toward migrants among city residents. Finally, we hypothesize effects on migration dynamics, including higher retention of migrants in the city and increased migration of relatives from origin areas.

On the political dimension, we expect both treatment variants to increase interaction with local leaders. Migrants may become more politically engaged, participate more in campaigning and elections, and increase contact with block leaders. In the leader treatment, block leaders may also leverage the program to mobilize migrants politically in favor of the local incumbent, potentially through clientelistic channels. As a result, migrants may express greater support for the incumbent. Given migrants' ongoing ties to their origin communities, these political effects may also diffuse to migrants' contacts at the origin.

We discuss pre-specified expectations in Armand et al. (2024). In summary, assuming that outcomes are coded so that higher values reflect positive effects, we expect the program to generate improvements relative to the control group (i.e., $\beta_L > 0$ and $\beta_B > 0$). Because our experimental design allows us to isolate the role of local leaders by comparing the leader treatment to a basic version, thanks to block leaders having a direct political role, we expect their participation to amplify treatment effects (i.e., $\beta_L > \beta_B$).

6.1 Urbanization and economic integration

This section analyzes the economic effects of the program, focusing first on migration responses, which provide the most direct measure of urbanization. An integration policy that successfully reduces frictions faced by recent migrants should not only retain migrants already in the city but also induce additional rural–urban mobility through social networks linking migrants to their origin households. We therefore begin by examining migration outcomes for both migrants and their origin contacts. We then analyze the direct economic channels through which the program operates, which plausibly mediate its migration and political effects.

Table 1 reports the treatment effects on these outcomes, estimated using equation (1). Columns (1)–(3) examine migration responses, including migrant retention (i.e., whether migrants remained in the city at the end of the program) and migration to the city (i.e., whether their origin contacts intended to migrate to the city during the program and whether they migrated to the city one year after the end of the program).[13] Columns (4)–(7) instead analyze the economic integration of migrants. Columns (4)–(5) focus on the labor-market exposure of migrants, captured by the probability of having been exposed to job opportunities and labor supply. Columns (6)–(7) report effects on mobile money adoption and remittance behavior. The latter is captured by whether origin contacts report having received a transfer from the migrant in the 30 days prior to the interview, capturing realized transfers to a specific household member. Appendix D.2 provides further results on the remittance behavior of migrants.

We begin by analyzing migration responses. Control-group outcomes indicate a high attachment to the city among sampled migrants, as 95.5% remain in the city at endline, while migration from origin areas is relatively rare, with 11.4% of contacts intending to migrate and 8.9% having migrated to the city within the year after the end of the program. The program does not affect the probability that sampled migrants remain in the city at endline, reflecting the high baseline retention rates. By contrast, we find clear effects on migration among origin contacts. Both treatments significantly increase their intentions to migrate by 3.9 percentage points under the leader treatment and 2.7 percentage points under the basic treatment. One

[13] Information on whether a migrant is in the city at the end of the program is based on field reports from the endline report. If a migrant is not found, information on whether the migrant left the city was obtained from phone calls or by asking neighbors. Information about the migration of origin contacts is based on surveys.

year after the end of the program, the likelihood that origin contacts are in Quelimane are also significantly higher, with an effect of 4.9 percentage points under the leader treatment and 3.7 percentage points under the basic treatment, robust to multiple hypothesis testing. These findings indicate that the program induced additional rural–urban migration through migrants' social networks. The magnitudes of these effects are large, corresponding to 41.6% and 55.1% relative to the control group mean.

Concerning labor-market exposure, we observe that in the control group, exposure to job opportunities is limited (23.4 percent), while migrants work an average of 4.5 hours per day. Both treatment variants significantly increase migrants' exposure to job opportunities. Migrants in leader-treatment blocks are 6.8 percentage points more likely to report having heard about jobs, while those in basic-treatment blocks experience an increase of 8.1 percentage points. Both effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and robust to multiple hypothesis testing. These results indicate that the program successfully disseminated labor-market opportunities.

Although both the leader and the basic treatments increase exposure to job opportunities among migrants, the two treatments differ sharply in their effects on labor supply. The leader treatment significantly increases hours worked by 0.4 hours per day on average, an effect that is significant at the 1 percent level and robust to multiple hypothesis testing. This effect corresponds to an increase of 8.9% in labor supply relative to the control group mean. By contrast, the basic treatment has no positive effect on hours worked. This magnitude is economically meaningful given that the program primarily reduces information and coordination frictions rather than directly creating jobs, thereby improving access to opportunities without altering labor demand or wages. In addition, job opportunities available to recent migrants are often informal, temporary, or part-time, which reinforces this point. The difference between the two treatments is statistically significant, suggesting that leader involvement is critical for translating job opportunities into actual employment rather than merely increasing awareness.

Concerning financial inclusion, we find that mobile money use and remittance activity are already common in the control group. Migrants use, on average, 2.5 mobile money services, 24.2% report having sent transfers to origin households in the previous month, and

41.7% of origin contacts report having received a transfer from the migrant. Although these statistics indicate strong baseline financial linkages, both treatments increase migrants' use of mobile money by 0.19 services under the leader treatment and by 0.28 services under the basic treatment, with both effects being statistically significant and robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Turning to remittances, both the leader and the basic treatment significantly increase the probability that origin contacts report having received a transfer from the migrant by 8.6 and 8.1 percentage points, respectively. The effects are not statistically different. Appendix D.2 shows that the probability that migrants report sending transfers to people in the origin district, which reflects a more general propensity to remit, also increases significantly in the basic treatment by 5.3 percentage points. However, the estimate is smaller and not statistically significant for the leader treatment. The absence of an effect under the leader treatment, despite an increase in employment, likely reflects measurement limitations, as the question might capture more general attitudes towards remittances rather than actual behavior. It is also possible that remittances are strategically delayed or concealed in the presence of increases in employment (e.g., Jakiela & Ozier, 2016). In addition, we observe no effect on transfers from the origin contacts towards migrants in the city.

Taken together, these results highlight two main lessons. First, integration policies shape dynamics beyond the individuals directly targeted by the program, inducing additional migration through social networks. These migration responses arise under both treatment variants, suggesting that they are driven primarily by the dissemination of information and improved perceptions of urban opportunities rather than by leader involvement. Second, the relevant margin of leader involvement is not awareness or participation, but effectiveness. While many migrants in control blocks have heard about job opportunities, the leader treatment substantially increases hours worked, indicating that mediation helps convert diffuse information into realized labor supply. The program, therefore, improves the quality of labor-market integration, not only its visibility.

6.2 Leader interactions and brokerage

Section 6.1 shows that the program improved migrants' integration, with effects that differ depending on whether the policy was delivered with leader involvement. This section examines how leader involvement reshapes interactions between leaders, migrants, and residents. These interactions are central to the program because block leaders are locally influential actors who can facilitate access to jobs, mediate relations with municipal institutions, and mobilize political support. If leader involvement meaningfully shapes behavior rather than merely perceptions, we should observe changes in whom leaders know, who contacts them, and whether they are approached for job-related assistance.

Table 2 examines how the treatments affected social interactions with block leaders. The outcomes capture both leader-side knowledge of migrants and leader-centered interactions reported by migrants and residents. Columns (1)–(2) measure whether leaders report knowing any migrants in their block and the share of sampled migrants they recognize individually. Columns (3)–(8) measure whether migrants and residents know their block leader, have contacted the leader, and have resorted to the leader for job-related assistance. Treatment effects are estimated using equation 1 applied to a single wave of surveying or to pooled observations, depending on data availability (indicated in the table footer).

Baseline levels of interaction with block leaders are already substantial in control blocks: a majority of leaders report knowing migrants in their block, and more than half of migrants and residents report knowing their leader. Active engagement is also common, with roughly 10 percent of migrants and 17 percent of residents reporting having recently contacted the leader. By contrast, resorting to block leaders for job-related assistance is rare at baseline, reported by only about one percent of migrants and by less than one percent of residents.

The leader treatment generates systematic and economically meaningful increases in interactions with block leaders. Leaders in treated blocks are more likely to report knowing migrants in their block (9.1 percentage points) and to recognize a larger share of the sampled migrants (6.4 percentage points). At the same time, migrants are more likely to know their leader (6.3 percentage points), to have contacted him or her (5.2 percentage points), and to resort to the leader for job-related assistance (1.2 percentage point). Importantly, these effects extend beyond migrants: residents in leader-treatment blocks are also more likely to know

and contact the leader and to resort to the leader for jobs, by 8.3, 5.2 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively.

The basic treatment has no systematic effects on leader–citizen interactions, except for a small increase in migrants' likelihood of resorting to leaders for jobs. One outcome—migrants resorting to the leader for job-related assistance—also increases under the basic treatment, despite the effect being small and the overall prevalence of this practice being rare. This pattern is potentially consistent with the program increasing the salience of local leaders as potential intermediaries, even in the absence of formal leader involvement. Because leaders are aware of the program and are commonly perceived as brokers in local labor markets, migrants may endogenously approach them once job matching becomes salient. Importantly, this effect is limited in scope and does not extend to other interaction margins or to residents, highlighting the distinct role of formal leader participation in generating systematic changes in leader–citizen interactions.

The Romano–Wolf adjusted p-values confirm that the pattern of results is not driven by multiple hypothesis testing. The effects of the leader treatment remain statistically significant for most interaction outcomes after adjustment, while the basic treatment generally does not. This reinforces the interpretation that formal leader involvement, rather than program exposure alone, is the primary driver of increased leader–citizen interactions.

These findings indicate that leader involvement did more than increase program salience. It reshaped patterns of interaction between leaders and residents, positioning block leaders as more central intermediaries. This is consistent with the content and framing of the intervention and points to a plausible mechanism through which leader endorsement can amplify both the economic and political effects of the program.

6.3 Political mobilization and electoral participation

Sections 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate that leader involvement increases brokerage—interaction and mediates economic integration, two key channels through which policies can translate into political responses. The program was implemented in close temporal proximity to municipal elections, making political responses both salient and observable. However, these effects need not be confined to a single group. Leaders may respond by intensifying mobilization

efforts, migrants by increasing engagement and participation, residents by adjusting political support in response to perceived redistribution, and migrants' origin contacts by updating political preferences through information and migration networks. We therefore examine whether the program affected broader political engagement and participation among all actors involved, moving from political mobilization to realized electoral behavior. To address the sensitivity of political outcomes and the limitations of self-reported measures, we combine survey data with multiple behavioral measures, allowing us to capture politically salient actions while reducing concerns about reporting bias.

Table 3 reports treatment effects on a set of behavioral measures capturing political mobilization prior to, during, and immediately after the 2023 elections. We focus on two measures: columns (1)–(2) focus on the exposure of migrants and residents to political campaigning, while columns (3)–(6) on the leader's ability to mobilize migrants in support of the incumbent.

We begin by examining the treatment effects on the exposure to political campaigning among migrants and residents. This variable was measured through direct observation of visible political materials during interviews, including stickers, posters, T-shirts, and caps. Because such materials are frequently distributed at rallies or public events, this measure captures both exposure to campaign activity and willingness to display political affiliation. Display rates are low in control blocks, corresponding to 4.7% among migrants and 13.1% among residents.

Both treatments increase migrants' display of political objects by 2–3 percentage points, with no detectable effects among residents. The fact that both treatments have similar effects is consistent with this outcome capturing broad exposure to political activity among migrants. Participation in the program likely increased migrants' exposure to campaign activities by raising their social inclusion in the city, making them more likely to encounter and accept political materials distributed at public events or by local leaders, even in the absence of changes in political preferences. In line with this, Appendix D.1 shows that political objects are associated with multiple parties, indicating general exposure rather than partisan alignment.

Columns (3)–(4) focus instead on block leaders' campaign mobilization capacity ahead

of the 2023 elections, measured using a purpose-designed SCA. Bicycle taxi drivers, who constitute the main mode of transportation in the city and are closely associated with the incumbent mayor's campaign infrastructure, were used as the target group, many of whom are recent migrants. Block leaders were instructed to compile a list of drivers in their block and to convene them for a block meeting on a specific date. We distinguish between leaders' reported mobilization capacity, captured by the size of the list they provided, and realized mobilization, captured by the number of drivers who actually attended the meeting, as observed by enumerators. This distinction allows us to separate leaders' claimed outreach from their ability to convert contacts into political participation.

In the control group, 63% of leaders report at least one person on the list to mobilize, while on average, they manage to mobilize 1.5 cyclists. Leaders in treated blocks are 10.9 percentage points more likely to report mobilizing cyclists for campaign activities, and enumerators observe approximately 0.75 additional cyclists relative to control blocks, corresponding to an increase of 50% relative to the control group mean. These effects are robust to correcting for multiple hypothesis testing. While the basic treatment also increases mobilization, none of the estimates are statistically significant. This pattern suggests that leader involvement in the program enhances its mobilization capacity.

In columns (5)–(6), we verify whether visible political support for the incumbent responds to leader involvement. To measure support, we designed and implemented another SCA based on the distribution prior to the elections of political stickers praising the mayor for the integration of migrants through the program. Each block leader received 40 brown stickers (see Appendix Figure C2) and was instructed to distribute them to households in their block, with encouragement to place them on front doors. Sticker visibility on migrants' homes serves as a measure of leader influence and citizen responsiveness in support of the incumbent. In parallel, we implemented a version in which stickers were distributed directly to migrants and residents rather than through block leaders. These stickers were identical in content but differed in color (pink). During endline interviews, enumerators recorded the presence of both sticker types on respondents' doors, allowing us to isolate the role of leaders in mobilization.

In the control group, brown and pink stickers appear on 44% and 75% of houses, re-

spectively. Brown stickers are 3.8 percentage points more likely to be observed on doors in leader-treatment blocks, corresponding to an increase of 8.7% relative to the control mean, robust to multiple hypothesis testing. By contrast, pink stickers show no treatment effects, and in the basic treatment, we observe no effect on either sticker type. This sharp contrast indicates that political expression increases only when it is channeled through local leaders.

A useful way to interpret these patterns is through a political brokerage and mobilization framework. In Quelimane, block leaders are mayoral appointees who are unpaid, politically active, and often aspire to future positions within the municipal administration. Therefore, political brokers have incentives to exert observable effort to demonstrate loyalty and mobilization capacity to higher-level authorities (Stokes et al., 2013; Larreguy et al., 2016). The distribution of brown stickers, which are visible, low-cost, and explicitly tied to a municipal program, provides an opportunity for such signaling. When the program is implemented through leaders, political expression reflects both citizen responsiveness and leaders' mobilization efforts. Instead, when identical materials are distributed directly to citizens, bypassing leaders, political expression does not increase. This interpretation explains why political mobilization responds only to leader involvement and why brokerage intensifies during electorally salient periods, without implying clientelistic transfers or endogenous selection of leaders into treatment.

We now turn to participation in the 2023 municipal elections. Table 4 relates to voter turnout and vote choice during the 2023 municipal elections. To build an objective indicator of voter turnout, we exploited the fact that, in Mozambique, voters' index fingers are marked with purple ink after casting a ballot to avoid multiple voting. We leveraged this institutional feature by deploying a large team of enumerators to canvass the city in the two days following the election and record whether block leaders', migrants', and residents' fingers were inked. This measure allows us to capture high-cost political participation in response to campaign exposure and leader mobilization. Concerning vote choice, we rely instead on self-reports from survey data.

Turnout levels are high in the control group: 90% among leaders, 70% among migrants, and 82% among residents. Against this backdrop, we find that the leader treatment increases migrant turnout by 3.0 percentage points, a modest but meaningful effect given the already

high baseline. This effect corresponds to an increase in turnout of 4.3% relative to the control group, robust to multiple hypothesis testing. The basic treatment also increases turnout by 2.2 percentage points, which is not statistically significant. The effects of both treatments for leaders and residents are imprecisely estimated and not statistically different from zero, likely due to limited variation at higher levels of baseline turnout.

Turning to vote choice in columns (4)–(6), we focus on self-reported voting for the nationally ruling party (FRELIMO) among migrants, residents, and migrant's origin contacts. For the latter, the sample of origin contacts is restricted to those living within the boundaries of urban municipalities, because no election ran beyond this bound. Unlike our turnout measure, which is based on direct observation of inked fingers, vote choice relies on self-reports and should, therefore, be interpreted with greater caution. Self-reported voting behavior may be affected by social desirability concerns, recall error, or strategic misreporting, particularly in politically polarized contexts. For this reason, we view these results as indicative of directional shifts in partisan alignment rather than precise estimates of vote shares, and we place greater weight on their consistency with the behavioral mobilization and turnout patterns documented above.

In line with the ruling party's stronger base in rural areas, 21.3% of origin contacts of control migrants report having voted for FRELIMO, compared to 7.4% and 12.0% among migrants and residents in control blocks. We observe little response to treatments among migrants and residents. However, a striking pattern emerges for migrants' origin contacts. Under the leader treatment, origin contacts are 16 percentage points less likely to report voting for FRELIMO, implying increased support for the opposition. While this estimate is noisy and sensitive to multiple-hypothesis adjustments, its magnitude is large (76.5% relative to the control mean) and aligns with earlier evidence of information and migration spillovers to origin areas.

The stronger political responses observed among migrants' origin contacts likely reflect a combination of information and selection mechanisms. Origin contacts receive information about urban policies primarily through migrants. Unlike migrants or city residents, origin contacts do not face immediate trade-offs related to urban redistribution or local political competition, allowing belief updating to translate more directly into expressed political pref-

erences. In addition, urban integration policies are particularly relevant for origin households' future migration options, making political evaluations more responsive to perceived improvements in access and opportunity. These features help explain why political shifts are more pronounced among origin contacts, even though direct mobilization efforts are concentrated in the city.

Taken together, these results indicate that migrant integration policies are politically feasible in dense urban settings, particularly when embedded in local brokerage structures and implemented during electorally salient periods. Rather than generating backlash, the program expanded political engagement among migrants, strengthened leaders' mobilization capacity, and produced electoral returns without eroding support among incumbent residents. Political responses operated primarily through mediation, suggesting that integration policies can align with, rather than conflict with, local political incentives. The heterogeneity analysis presented in Appendix D.6 reinforces this point. The leader treatment is more effective for migrants who arrived earlier in the city, especially in terms of political participation and employment outcomes, while the effects are generally larger in blocks led by older, more experienced leaders, by leaders who are politically aligned with the incumbent government, and in blocks with a larger number of migrants. At the same time, spillovers to migrants' origin areas highlight that the political consequences of urban integration may extend beyond city boundaries.

6.4 Summary of effects

Given the large number of outcomes analyzed in previous sections, in Appendix **??**, we complement the outcome-by-outcome analysis with domain indices that aggregate related measures following Kling et al. (2007). Outcomes are first standardized using the control-group mean and standard deviation and then averaged to the block level. Indices are computed by summing non-missing standardized measures within each domain, combining outcomes for different actors. We estimate treatment effects on these indices using the same specification as for individual outcomes, interpreting them as equally weighted summary effects across components.

Across domains, both treatment arms generate positive effects, indicating that the inte-

gration program itself not only improves economic, but also alters political outcomes. Leader involvement, however, consistently amplifies these effects, particularly in relation to political mobilization and support for the urban incumbent.

7 Conclusion

This paper reports evidence from a randomized controlled trial conducted in Quelimane, Mozambique, evaluating the political and economic effects of a city-sponsored integration program targeting recent rural migrants. Involving local leaders fundamentally changed the effects of the program. Leader participation increased engagement and interactions with migrants, positioned leaders as key brokers, and translated program exposure into higher electoral participation and visible support for the local incumbent. Political effects extended beyond the city, shifting support among migrants' origin households. At the same time, leader involvement converted increased access to job information into a higher labor supply, improved perceptions of migrants, expanded mobile-money use and transfers, and induced additional rural–urban migration after the program ended. Together, these results show that integration policies can simultaneously reshape economic outcomes, political behavior, and urbanization dynamics when embedded in local governance structures.

These findings have broad implications for development policy. Urbanization and structural transformation are central to long-run development, yet in many low-income countries, national policies have often constrained urban growth. Our results show that city-level integration policies can be politically viable and even electorally advantageous when embedded in local governance structures, despite being misaligned with national political incentives. Contrary to concerns that migrants represent a political liability, we find that urban integration can expand political participation and generate support rather than backlash.

More broadly, our results underscore that the success of development policies depends not only on their economic content but also on their political embedding. When policies align local political incentives with development objectives, cities can become effective engines of structural change. Urbanization, in this sense, is not only an economic process but also a political one, in which local governments may be uniquely positioned to make it work.

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
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Figure 1: Awareness of the program and participation



Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1 applied to stacked post-intervention observations. Panel A reports results for block leaders; Panel B for sampled migrants; Panel C for sampled residents; and Panel D for migrants' origin contacts. Outcome variables are: (1) *Aware of the program* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos", and 0 otherwise; (2) *Knows targeted group* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Involved* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having been involved in the program or if a family member was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise (in panel D, the outcome refers to family members only). All specifications include strata fixed effects and block- and individual-level controls (see Section 5). Standard errors are clustered at the block level; 90% confidence intervals are reported. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Full results are reported in Appendix A.4.

Table 1: Migration responses and economic integration

	Migration responses			Employment and financial inclusion			
	Migrant is in the city	Origin contact intends to migrate	Origin contact migrated to the city	Job opportunities	Labor supply	Mobile money adoption	Remittance to origin contact
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.003	0.038***	0.046***	0.068***	0.404***	0.186**	0.086**
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.154)	(0.094)	(0.040)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.010	0.025*	0.036***	0.081***	-0.157	0.275***	0.081**
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.164)	(0.097)	(0.039)
Observations	3589	3731	2315	6119	6119	2855	985
Adjusted R^2	0.050	0.026	0.005	0.164	0.124	0.190	0.015
Mean (control group)	0.955	0.114	0.089	0.234	4.517	2.539	0.417
TL = TB (p-value)	0.339	0.324	0.445	0.373	0.000	0.357	0.904
Outcome data	Endline	Pooled	Follow-up I	Pooled	Pooled	Midline	Midline
Romano-Wolf p-value TL	0.720	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.009	0.047	0.026
Romano-Wolf p-value TB	0.187	0.061	0.009	0.001	0.356	0.007	0.036

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1 applied to the data reported in the table footer (*outcome data*). Dependent variables by column: (1) *Migrant is in the city* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent is in Quelimane at the time of the survey; (2) *Origin contact intends to migrate* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent reports intending to migrate; (3) *Origin contact migrated to the city*; (4) *Job opportunities* ; (5) *Labor supply* ; (6) *Mobile money adoption* ; (7) *Sent to origin district* ; (8) *Received by origin contact* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having received mobile money transfers from households in the city, and 0 otherwise. All specifications include block and individual controls (Section 5 provides the full list of controls), as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Romano-Wolf p-values* are the *p*-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C.

Table 2: Leader interactions and brokerage

	Personal ties to migrants (leader-reported)		Citizen-leader interaction					
	Any tie in the block	Share of migrants known	Knows the leader		Contacted the leader		Sought the leader for job assistance	
			Migrant	Resident	Migrant	Resident	Migrant	Resident
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.091**	0.064***	0.063**	0.083*	0.040***	0.052**	0.012***	0.016**
	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.003)	(0.007)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.046	0.003	-0.038	-0.041	0.007	0.006	0.009**	0.002
	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Observations	821	849	2855	745	6119	1573	6093	1565
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.134	0.241	0.186	0.055	0.080	0.008	0.061
Mean (control group)	0.670	0.161	0.539	0.580	0.098	0.165	0.012	0.007
TL = TB (p-value)	0.221	0.002	0.000	0.008	0.001	0.031	0.435	0.038
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Midline	Midline	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Romano-Wolf p-value TL	0.012	0.002	0.023	0.087	0.001	0.032	0.002	0.032
Romano-Wolf p-value TB	0.389	0.852	0.202	0.328	0.500	0.913	0.030	0.913

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1 applied to the data reported in the table footer (*outcome data*). Outcomes in columns (3)–(4) are available only in the midline survey. None of the specifications includes the baseline value of the dependent variable since they were not collected at baseline. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Leader knows block migrants – general* is an indicator variable for whether the leader knows any rural migrants living in their block, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Leader knows block migrants – % sampled* is the share of sampled migrants that the leader knows (the leader was shown the list of sampled migrants and asked to indicate those personally known); (3)-(4) *Knows leader* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent correctly identifies the name of their block leader, and 0 otherwise; (5)-(6) *Contacted leader* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent reports having approached the block leader at least once since the previous survey waves; (7)-(8) *Resorted to leader for a job* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent reports having contacted or paid the leader for a job in the previous year. All specifications include block and individual controls (Section 5 provides the full list of controls), as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Romano-Wolf p-values* are the *p*-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C.

Table 3: Campaigning and political mobilization

	Exposure to campaigning		Mobilization in support of the incumbent			
	Migrant	Resident	Reports cyclists	Observed # mobilized	Stickers from leaders	Stickers from field team
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.016***	-0.046	0.109**	0.745*	0.038**	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.399)	(0.017)	(0.048)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.025***	0.038	0.080	0.632	-0.009	0.020
	(0.006)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.387)	(0.019)	(0.056)
Observations	6117	805	429	429	429	429
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.033	0.126	0.047	0.717	0.487
Mean (control group)	0.047	0.131	0.629	1.490	0.436	0.745
TL = TB (p-value)	0.140	0.019	0.591	0.795	0.018	0.732
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Endline	Endline	Endline	Endline
Romano-Wolf p-value TL	0.067	0.079	0.052	0.964	0.014	0.626
Romano-Wolf p-value TB	0.277	0.244	0.857	0.857	0.001	0.612

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1 applied to the data reported in the table footer (*outcome data*). Column (1) refers to leaders, columns (2) and (4) to migrants, columns (3) and (5) to residents, and column (6) to migrant's origin contacts. Dependent variables by column: (1)-(2) *Exposure to political campaigning* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if, during the survey interview, the enumerator observed any objects with political content held by the respondent, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Reports cyclists* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the list left with leaders for cyclist mobilization contains any names at the time of collection, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Observed # mobilized* is the number of cyclists mobilized by leaders and observed by the enumerator; (5) *Stickers from leader* is the percentage of brown stickers (out of the 40 stickers distributed to the leader) found hanging on households' doors during the enumerators' visit to the blocks; (6) *Stickers from field team* is the percentage of pink stickers (out of the number of stickers distributed in each block) found hanging at households' doors during the enumerators' visit to the blocks. All specifications include block and individual controls (Section 5 provides the full list of controls), as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Romano-Wolf p-values* are the *p*-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C.

Table 4: Electoral participation

	Electoral turnout			Self-reported voting for FRELIMO		
	Leaders	Migrants	Residents	Migrants	Residents	Origin contacts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.051	0.030*	-0.046	-0.009	0.054	-0.203**
	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.082)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.030	0.022	0.038	-0.018	0.053	-0.083
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.038)	(0.085)
Observations	399	3332	805	2090	527	270
Adjusted R^2	-0.033	0.079	0.033	0.031	0.157	0.124
Mean (control group)	0.896	0.698	0.823	0.074	0.120	0.213
TL = TB (p-value)	0.559	0.611	0.019	0.494	0.964	0.151
Outcome data	Election	Election	Election	Endline	Endline	Endline
Romano-Wolf p-value TL	0.119	0.089	0.193	0.538	0.131	0.884
Romano-Wolf p-value TB	0.340	0.205	0.243	0.164	0.122	0.898

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1 applied to the data reported in the table footer (*outcome data*). Column (1) refer to leaders, columns (2) and (4) to migrants, columns (3) and (5) to residents, adn column (6) to migrant's origin contacts. Dependent variables by column: (1)–(3) *Electoral turnout* is an indicator variable for whether the respondent's finger was marked with purple ink during the enumerators' visit in the two days following the 2023 municipal elections (see Section 6.3 for details about this measure); (4)-(6) *Self-reported voting FRELIMO* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having voted for FRELIMO in the 2023 municipal elections, and 0 otherwise. All specifications include block and individual controls (Section 5 provides the full list of controls), as well as strata fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Romano-Wolf p-values* are the *p*-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C.

ONLINE APPENDIX

Supplementary material to

On the Political Economy of Urbanization: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Alex Armand, Frederica Mendonça, Wayne Aaron Sandholtz and Pedro C. Vicente

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
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A Details about the program implementation

A.1 Timeline

Figure A1 provides the timeline of activities, including both the program intervention and the measurement activities.

Figure A1: Timeline of measurements and of program implementation



Note. Elements to the left of the temporal scale indicates activities related to measurements, while elements to the right indicates activities related to the implementation of the program. Details about measurement activities are provided in Section 4. Note that, under *Migrants and residents*, the second baseline activity is restricted to the migrants listed in the second wave of the migrant listing. Details about the program and its implementation are provided in Section 3 and Appendix A.2.

A.2 Modules of the integration program

Job matching module. The main focus of the five face-to-face home visits was job matching. To this end, prior to each visit, we gathered information on the supply of job opportunities suitable for recent rural migrants. To gather this information, we implemented two censuses of job opportunities by visiting every household and establishment in the city before the first and third visits. For both rounds, Figure A3 maps all attempted households and establishments: those where interviews were completed and those where job opportunities were identified. The censuses were supplemented by three rounds of phone-based follow-up interviews with previously identified employers, which allowed us to update job availability prior to the second, fourth, and fifth visits. Table A1 reports descriptive statistics for the job offers collected in each round.

Prior to each visit, program participants were matched with job opportunities based on elicited job preferences and provided with the names and phone numbers of potential employers. Each participant received three contacts during the first visit, up to seven (depending on availability) during the second visit, and up to ten during the third, fourth, and fifth visits. During the final two visits, implementers further facilitated matching by contacting employers directly during the home visit and scheduling interview dates. At the end of each visit, participants were sent a text message containing the contact details of the relevant employers.

To enhance engagement, during the fourth visit, the participant was shown a short video featuring a recently arrived migrant describing a successful experience with the intervention. Two versions of the video (one featuring a female migrant and one featuring a male migrant) were produced, but only one, randomly selected through the survey platform, was shown to the participant. The script of the video is as follows:

> Good morning/afternoon, My name is [name], and I was born in [district]. I moved to Quelimane in [year] for [reason]. In September 2021, I joined the "Quelimane trabalha com todos" integration program in collaboration with the Quelimane Municipality. Since then, I have received three home visits from the program team. During these visits, I was provided with contacts of people potentially looking for employment. However, the first number I called did not go through, and the second person said they didn't have time to talk. This made me start doubting the program. By the third visit, I had received a new list with 10 contacts, so I decided to keep trying. I started calling the numbers one by one. The third person I reached finally picked up, but the job was no longer available—same with the fourth. Finally, with the fifth and seventh contacts, I was able to schedule short interviews. Both were for positions as a


> occupation. In each interview, I introduced myself, explained my qualifications and conditions, and one of them gave me the opportunity to start on a trial basis. It went well. Today, thanks to the program, I am still employed as a [occupation]. I also have additional contacts to explore in the future if needed, but for now, I am happy where I am. The key takeaway is that the program truly works, you just need to be persistent. There are jobs and opportunities in the city for everyone. Keep trying!

Mobile money module. This module introduced migrants to mobile money through a structured presentation on Mozambique's leading service, M-PESA. Facilitators provided step-by-step guidance on account setup and basic usage, including securing accounts with PINs, avoiding fraud, depositing and withdrawing cash through agents, and checking balances (panel A in Figure A2 provides an example). The module emphasized the use of mobile money for everyday transactions and income management, showing migrants how to receive payments for work and pay for airtime, transportation, utilities, and small purchases. Facilitators also explained transaction fees and costs, highlighting when mobile money is advantageous compared to cash and how it can reduce the risks associated with carrying cash. The module also focused on remittances, providing guidance on how to send money quickly and securely to family members, planning the timing of transfers, and using mobile money to respond to emergencies. To encourage the active use of the service, participants in the third round of visits were given 20 Meticais ($\approx$ 0.30 US$), which they were instructed to cash and transfer to a family member in their home districts. This exercise was designed both to incentivize account opening among migrants who did not already hold one and to allow participants to trial transfers to their origin households using mobile money.

City module. This module aimed to reduce informational, coordination, and institutional barriers faced by recent rural migrants. Throughout the five home visits, facilitators began each interaction with a city integration module designed to provide migrants with practical administrative and institutional information about living in Quelimane. In the first two visits, this module consisted of a presentation covering city services and institutions, providing information on basic municipal services (access to schooling and healthcare, procedures for obtaining citizen cards and residence documentation, voter registration, and voting processes), key public infrastructures, local cultural traditions, neighborhood-level governance structures, and how to contact local authorities (panel B in Figure A2 provides an example). From the third visit, the same content was provided, but the presentation was incorporated

into the survey platform and transformed into an interactive experience in the form of a quiz. Respondents were first asked to guess based on the two prior visits and were then given the correct answer. When delivered with leader involvement, block leaders were explicitly introduced as local representatives of the municipal government, clarifying their role and formalizing a point of contact that is often opaque to new arrivals.


Figure A2: Examples of content provided in the mobile money and city modules




Note. Panel A provides an extract from the presentation provided to participants as part of the mobile money module. Panel B shows instead an extract from the presentation provided to participants as part of the city module.

Figure A3: Geographical distribution of job offers, by round of job census

A. Round 1



B. Round 3



Note. TBD

Table A1: Job opportunities for rural migrants

	Round 1		Round 2		Round 3		Round 4		Round 5		Total	
	% (1)	N (2)	% (3)	N (4)	% (5)	N (6)	% (7)	N (8)	% (9)	N (10)	% (11)	N (12)
Collection of job offers:												
Attempts		69150		952		33094		1462		1171		
Doors answered		36227		952		26660		1403		983		
Job offers		499		149		416		310		208		
Offers by job:												
Domestic worker	0.58	290	0.23	35	0.54	224	0.44	137	0.53	110	0.50	796
Farming & cattle / fishing	0.16	80	0.05	7	0.16	65	0.15	48	0.10	21	0.14	221
Construction	0.14	70	0.04	6	0.15	62	0.12	38	0.16	33	0.13	209
Merchant	0.04	19	0.05	8	0.04	18	0.05	16	0.06	12	0.05	73
Guard	0.07	33	.	0	0.04	15	0.03	8	0.08	16	0.05	72
Handyman	0.02	9	0.01	2	0.02	7	0.01	4	0.03	6	0.02	28
Barber/Hairdresser	0.01	7	0.00	0	0.02	9	0.02	6	0.02	4	0.02	26
Assistant to mechanic	0.01	6	.	0	0.02	10	0.01	3	0.01	3	0.02	22
Driver	0.01	4	0.01	1	0.02	7	0.00	1	0.03	6	0.01	19
Office work	0.01	5	0.00	0	0.01	6	0.01	2	0.00	1	0.01	14
Sewer	0.00	2	.	0	0.01	4	0.01	3	0.00	1	0.01	10
Adman	0.02	11	.	0	0.00	1	.	0	.	0	0.01	12
Shoemaker	0.00	1	.	0	0.00	2	.	0	0.00	1	0.00	4
Services	.	0	.	0	.	0	.	0	0.00	1	0.00	1
Docker	0.00	2	.	0	.	0	.	0	.	0	0.00	2
Mobile money agent	0.00	1	.	0	.	0	.	0	.	0	0.00	1

Note. The table shows statistics about the job opportunities for migrants, as gathered from the censuses of job opportunities and the follow-up phone surveys with the employers.

A.3 Instructions for engagement with the block leaders

For migrants in the leader treatment group, at the beginning of the conversations, the implementing team was instructed to inform the participants about the name of the block leader, the fact that the leader supports the program and will be present during the visits whenever possible, and to provide the contact phone number of the leader. The team proceeded to show a video on a tablet with a short message from the leader, expressing support for the program and encouraging migrants to join the program. The script of the video is as follows:

> I am [name] and I have been the leader in block [block] for [years] years. I am here today to express my interest and support the integration of rural migrants into the city of Quelimane. I am deeply interested in understanding what we can do to improve your current living conditions and the support you provide to your family outside the city. Over the past year, interviews have been conducted with people who recently arrived, with my support. You are one of these individuals. Over the next six months, we will carry out monthly visits to better understand your main challenges, follow up on job opportunities, and help you better understand how you can support your family and friends more easily. I personally invite you to join "Quelimane trabalha com todos." We hope to support you during this transition period into the city.

In the fourth round of visits, all leaders were asked to emphasize in their videos the relevance of participating in elections. The content and framing of such messages were left to their discretion, with most leaders delivering a political message related to the approaching municipal elections. The exact instructions provided to the leaders were as follows:

> Hi, my name is [enumerator name]. We have been working with the Municipality for some time to implement a program aimed at integrating recent rural migrants into the community. We believe that by fostering a more dignified life and ensuring better integration for migrants, we are contributing to the overall development of the city. Your support has been invaluable in promoting this initiative, and today we are here once again to ask for your cooperation. We came to you last year to ask you to shoot a video promoting and supporting our program to integrate rural migrants in Quelimane. Today we return to shoot one more video with similar content. The idea is, once again, to promote our program and build momentum for this final round. The program aims to have a positive impact on the block's life and the Municipality in general, and since you, as the leader, are someone important to the community, we are certain you are key in encouraging migrants to join our program. At the same time, the local elections will take place in September this year, so you can take this opportunity to remind migrants of the importance of voting in elections. It is also a good opportunity to show migrants how the Municipality has policies that help the community and the well-being of its citizens. In summary, we ask you to mention three topics in this video: your perception of how this program matters for integrating rural migrants into the


community; how the program is advocated by the Municipality; and how important it is for everyone to participate in the 2023 local elections. We ask you to make a short recording of about 3–4 minutes.

During all visits, the leader's support was reinforced throughout the different modules by providing supportive statements. During the city module, "I remind you that this program is sponsored by your block leader [name]. We count on his/her support, and you can turn to him/her whenever you have any struggles in the block. You can reach him/her at: [contact numbers]." During the job matching module, "once more, I remind you that this program has the support of the block leader [block leader name]. All these offers have been approved and made available by him." Finally, during the module on mobile money, "this presentation is also supported by the block leader [name]. He acknowledges and promotes the benefits of adhering to mobile money." At the end of the visit, the implementing team was instructed to deliver the contact card of the block leader to the participant.

A.4 Program implementation and perceived participation

Using administrative data about the implementation of the program, Figure A4 shows the number of visits received by each sampled migrant in each treatment group (panel A) and the share of sampled migrants who participated in the visits during each round of visits (panel B). Panels C and D use this information to estimate treatment effects using equation (1) on an indicator variable for whether, between two surveys, the respondent has received and attended a visit, and on the cumulative share of visits received and attended at the time of the survey. Table A2 complements these results using survey data and focusing on self-reported awareness of the program and the targeted group, as well as perceived involvement in the program. The estimates provided in the table are the basis for Figure 1 in the main text. Panel A includes all data points for surveys, while panel B restricts the sample to midline surveys.

Figure A4: Take-up of integration efforts



Note. Statistics based on administrative data from the implementation of the program. Panel A reports the number of visits received by each sampled migrant, by treatment group. Panel B reports the share of sampled migrants that participated in the visit during each round of visits. In Round 1, we removed from the sample the migrants that were listed during the second wave of listing because they could have not participated in the round of visits. Panels C and D provide estimates of treatment effects based on OLS regressions using equation 1 applied to stacked post-intervention observations or separately for the midline and endline observations. The outcome variable in panel C is an indicator variable for whether, between two surveys, the respondent has received and attended a visit. The outcome variable in panel D is the (cumulative) share of visits received and attended at the time of the survey (the share is computed out of 4 visits at midline and out of 5 visits at endline). All specifications include strata fixed effects and block- and individual-level controls (see Section 5). Standard errors are clustered at the block level; 90% confidence intervals are reported. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C. Full results are reported in Appendix A.4. Details about the program and its implementation are provided in Section 3.

Table A2: Awareness and program participation

	Leaders			Migrants			Residents			Origin contacts	
	Aware of the program (1)	Knows targeted group (2)	Involved (3)	Aware of the program (4)	Knows targeted group (5)	Involved (6)	Aware of the program (7)	Knows targeted group (8)	Involved (9)	Aware of the program (10)	Family member is involved (11)
Panel A. Pooled observations											
(TL) Leader treatment	0.133***	0.130***	0.169***	0.072***	0.054***	0.074***	-0.002	0.038*	-0.012	0.029*	0.016
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.013)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.018	-0.037	0.022	0.083***	0.035**	0.069***	-0.042*	0.016	-0.046**	0.001	0.008
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Observations	849	849	935	6118	6110	7264	1573	1573	1990	3812	4642
Adjusted R^2	0.196	0.221	0.168	0.183	0.114	0.168	0.365	0.178	0.221	0.099	0.097
Mean (control group)	0.723	0.327	0.430	0.703	0.281	0.519	0.593	0.197	0.379	0.220	0.151
TL = TB (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.407	0.244	0.753	0.084	0.320	0.144	0.117	0.589
Panel B. Pre-election observations											
(TL) Leader treatment	0.169***	0.080	0.174***	0.194***	0.074***	0.166***	0.014	0.099***	-0.018	0.093***	0.036***
	(0.060)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.014)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.073	-0.062	0.025	0.197***	0.052***	0.147***	-0.035	0.019	-0.054*	0.050**	0.021
	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Observations	349	349	421	2854	2848	3631	745	745	995	1525	2315
Adjusted R^2	0.187	0.175	0.105	0.186	0.095	0.202	0.175	0.181	0.109	0.065	0.047
Mean (control group)	0.600	0.175	0.298	0.478	0.199	0.355	0.319	0.074	0.216	0.104	0.060
TL = TB (p-value)	0.000	0.005	0.008	0.890	0.326	0.406	0.249	0.005	0.254	0.068	0.282

Note. Treatment effect estimates from OLS regressions based on equation 1. Panel A reports results using stacked post-intervention observations. Panel B reports results from the pre-election survey wave. Columns (1) to (3) present results for block leaders; Columns (4) to (6) report results for sampled migrants; Columns (7) to (9) report result for sampled residents; Columns (10) to (11) report results for migrant's origin contacts. Outcome variables are: (1), (4), (7), (10) *aware of the program* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos", and 0 otherwise; (2), (5), (8) *knows targeted group* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3), (6), (9), (11) *involved* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having been involved in the program or if a family member was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise (in column (11), the outcome refers to family members only). All specifications include strata fixed effects and block- and individual-level controls (see Section 5). Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix C.

B Sampling and randomization

The sampling procedure for rural migrants is described in Section 3. Panel A in Figure B1 displays the geographical distribution of the number of migrants in each block within the city, as listed during the first round of listing. Figure B2 shows the geographical distribution of sampled migrants, residents, and block leaders at the baseline.


Randomization was performed within strata of up to three blocks. Two variables were used to compute the stratification metric. First, the neighborhood of the block, i.e, the administrative division containing groups of blocks and defined by the municipality. The city encompasses 54 neighborhoods in total. Second, the number of migrants in the block. We consider the number of migrants as listed in the first round of listings because the second round was implemented after randomization.

Figure B1: Sampling and treatment allocation

A. Migrants sampled at baseline in each block




B. Sample distribution by treatment group




Note. TBD Panel A shows... Panel B shows...


Figure B2: Sampling



(a) Sampled migrants



(b) Sampled residents



(c) Leaders found

B.1 Balance checks and selective attrition

Tables B1–B3 provide summary statistics and balance checks for the observable characteristics of all actors. Table B4 provides tests for selective attrition by treatment. We do not observe any significant differences in attrition rates across treatment arms.

Table B1: Descriptive statistics – blocks and block leaders

	Mean (control)	Any treatment	TL	TB	*p*-value	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Block characteristics						
Household proxy	144.50	-14.87*	-9.13	-20.49**	0.11	493
	[118.34]	(8.25)	(8.90)	(9.82)		
# sampled migrants	4.78	-0.08	-0.05	-0.11	0.51	493
	[2.63]	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)		
Ilegal construction	0.42	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.74	482
	[0.50]	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
# of taxi drivers	25.34	-8.70	-8.05	-9.38	0.24	418
	[96.44]	(6.31)	(7.71)	(5.69)		
Distance to school	1.61	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.90	483
	[0.84]	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)		
Distance to water fountain	1.55	0.00	-0.12	0.12	0.15	465
	[1.16]	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)		
B. Leader characteristics						
Age	49.91	-1.00	-0.54	-1.46	0.61	441
	[12.21]	(1.22)	(1.39)	(1.47)		
Male	0.67	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.92	441
	[0.47]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Married/cohabiting	0.72	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.60	441
	[0.45]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Catholic	0.64	-0.04	-0.02	-0.06	0.50	493
	[0.48]	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)		
Literate	0.78	-0.03	-0.00	-0.06	0.48	441
	[0.42]	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Primary schooling	0.42	-0.02	-0.00	-0.05	0.74	441
	[0.49]	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Own dwelling	0.84	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.91	493
	[0.37]	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Years in position (leader)	3.59	0.34	0.13	0.55	0.56	441
	[3.99]	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.52)		
Aims at higher office position	0.55	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	0.62	432
	[0.50]	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Participated in a rally/campaign	0.70	-0.07	-0.10*	-0.04	0.24	439
	[0.46]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Assists citizens with voting	0.31	-0.02	0.00	-0.04	0.63	432
	[0.46]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Likes migrants	0.77	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.33	431
	[0.42]	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Gov. is helping the poor	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.59	434
	[0.14]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B2: Descriptive statistics – migrants and residents

	Mean (control)	Any treatment	TL	TB	p-value	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Migrant characteristics						
Age	24.30	-0.29	-0.25	-0.34	0.57	3582
	[8.40]	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.32)		
Male	0.66	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03	0.17	3632
	[0.48]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Married/cohabiting	0.37	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.77	3627
	[0.48]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Number of children	1.16	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.83	3507
	[1.68]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Catholic	0.57	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.67	6151
	[0.50]	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Literate	0.66	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.49	3609
	[0.47]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Primary schooling	0.32	0.03*	0.02	0.03*	0.20	3629
	[0.47]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
No occupation	0.14	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.05	3632
	[0.35]	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Visited district since migration	0.25	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.74	3626
	[0.43]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Moved to work	0.50	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.75	3632
	[0.50]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Moved for family	0.25	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.78	3625
	[0.43]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Struggle w/ moving: finding a job	0.33	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.33	3632
	[0.47]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Struggle w/ moving: financial constraints	0.18	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.50	3632
	[0.38]	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Contacted local leader	0.24	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.79	2105
	[0.63]	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
B. Resident characteristics						
Age	34.25	-0.75	-0.79	-0.71	0.70	991
	[14.68]	(0.88)	(1.03)	(1.00)		
Male	0.40	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.48	995
	[0.49]	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Married/cohabiting	0.46	0.05	0.04	0.06*	0.24	995
	[0.50]	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Number of children	2.33	-0.14	-0.17	-0.12	0.55	994
	[2.25]	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)		
Catholic	0.63	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.64	995
	[0.48]	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
From Quelimane	0.61	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.46	995
	[0.49]	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Literate	0.82	0.03	0.05*	0.01	0.21	978
	[0.39]	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Primary schooling	0.36	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	0.58	995
	[0.48]	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Contacted local leader	0.40	0.13**	0.10	0.16**	0.06	965
	[0.79]	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)		

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B3: Descriptive statistics – origin contacts

	Mean (control)	Any treatment	TL	TB	p-value	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	33.08	-0.72**	-0.38	-1.01**	0.04	2519
	[8.21]	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.39)		
Male	0.56	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.21	2321
	[0.50]	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)		
Married/cohabiting	0.46	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.50	2519
	[0.50]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Number of children	2.24	0.08	0.30*	-0.11	0.03	1535
	[2.57]	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)		
Catholic	0.62	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.86	2286
	[0.49]	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)		
Literate	0.89	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.99	1539
	[0.31]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Primary schooling	0.35	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.46	2383
	[0.48]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Primary occupation: none	0.17	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.60	2383
	[0.37]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Primary occupation: student	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.38	2383
	[0.25]	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		

Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B4: Attrition rates and selective attrition, by survey round and sample

	Midline				Endline				Follow-up	
	Leaders	Migrants	Residents	Origin contacts	Leaders	Migrants	Residents	Origin contacts	Origin contacts	Leaders
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(TL) Leader treatment	-0.039	-0.009	0.028	-0.002	-0.026	0.011	0.013	0.013	-0.003	-0.031
	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.040)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.017	-0.009	0.028	0.030	-0.038	0.005	0.009	0.001	0.007	-0.019
	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.042)
Observations	493	3632	995	2518	493	3632	995	2519	2519	493
R^2	0.247	0.137	0.111	0.035	0.424	0.066	0.084	0.114	0.110	0.279
Mean (control group)	0.212	0.220	0.234	0.378	0.097	0.096	0.172	0.064	0.098	0.224
TL = TB (p-value)	0.607	0.974	0.998	0.254	0.618	0.679	0.892	0.386	0.598	0.787

Note. Estimates based on OLS equations using equation 1. Columns (1) and (5) present estimates for leaders; columns (2) and (6) present estimates for migrants; columns (3) and (7) present estimates for residents; columns (4) and (8) present estimates for origin contacts. Dependent variables by column: (1)-(4) Attrition from baseline to midline: dummy varible equal to 1 if the respondent was not interviewed at midline; (5)-(8) Attrition from baseline to endline: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was not found at endline; (7) Attrition from baseline to follow-up I: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was not found at the follow-up I; (8) Attrition from baseline to follow-up II: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was not found at the follow-up II. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

C Definition of outcome variables

Table C1 provides a detailed definition of all outcome variables used in the paper. As part of measurement, we implemented three behavioral activities. They were implemented during the final survey with the Block Leaders in August 2023. Figure C1 provides a photo of mobilized cyclists by a block leader. Figure C2 provides the stickers used as part of the corresponding behavioral measurement.

Table C1: Definition of outcome variables

Topic	Variable and description
Program knowledge	**Aware of the program:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having heard of the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos", and zero otherwise. The survey question is asked without describing any details of what the program entailed. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Who is involved in the program?	**Knows targeted group:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that rural migrants were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was asked conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually set to zero if the respondent reported not being familiar with the program. The respondent was directly asked about whether the rural migrants were involved. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Involved:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having been involved in the program or if a family member was involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was asked conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was set to zero if the respondent reports not having heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked whether they or a family member were involved in the program. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Migration	**Migrant is in the city**: Variable equal to 1 if the respondent is still in Quelimane, and 0 otherwise. Variable constructed based on records from field administrators, and it takes the value of one if the respondent has answered the survey and reported still living in Quelimane. The variable was constructed for the second post-baseline survey waves.

(continued on next page)

Table C1: Definition of outcome variables

Topic	Variable and description
	Likely to move: Indicator variable constructed from a categorical variable with options *"Very likely"*, *"Likely"*,*"Not very likely"* and *"Not likely at all"*, in which migrants' origin contacts were asked about the likelihood of moving to Quelimane within the next year. The variable is equal to 1 if the respondent reports being *"Very likely"* or *"Likely"*, and zero otherwise. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Employment and financial inclusion	**Job opportunities**: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job opportunity in the 12 months previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Labor supply:** The variable is constructed out of a subset of 24 other variables, in which the respondent is asked about the activity conducted in each hour of the day before the interview date (options include *sleeping* or *eating*, for example). This variable is constructed by summing the number of hours the respondent reported being at work. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was asked during the baseline survey wave and is included as a control variable in the displayed regression. **Mobile money adoption**: Variable constructed by summing the total number of available mobile money services that the respondent reports using. The respondent is asked to report all the features of mobile money that they use, and field administrators report it in a multiple option question. The variable is then constructed by summing all the selected options. The variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same variable was not collected at baseline. **Remittance to origin contact:** Variable equal to 1 if the migrant's origin contact reports having received a mobile money transfer from the migrant in the 30 days previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. This variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Personal ties to migrants (leader-reported)	**Any tie in the block:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the leader reports personally knowing any migrants living in the same block as the respondent, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.

(continued on next page)

Table C1: Definition of outcome variables

Topic	Variable and description
	Share of migrants known: For this question, leaders was initially presented with a list of migrants living in their assigned blocks. The list displayed the names of all the people in that block who were sampled for this project (migrants and residents). The respondent was asked to select the names of the people with whom they were acquainted. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, and indicates the percentage of rural migrants that the leader selects from the list, out of the total number of migrants sampled in the block. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Citizen-leader interaction	**Knows the leader:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent correctly names the current leader in their living block, and zero otherwise. The respondents are asked to report the leader's name, which was considered correct if it matched the one in the field records. The variable is self-reported. Due to a field mistake, the variable was not correctly collected during the second post-baseline survey wave and so the table presents results for the first post-baseline survey wave only. The same variable was not collected at baseline.
	Contacted the leader: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having contacted the block leader in between survey waves, and zero otherwise. The variable represents the extensive margin as it does not dive into the purpose of the contact. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
	Sought the leader for job assistance: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having contacted or paid the leader in the previous year to get a job, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Campaigning and political mobilisation	**Exposure to campaigning:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the field administrator identified any object with political content in the respondent's living place - which include hats, t-shirts, posters, pins, or others - and zero otherwise. The variable is observational: the field administrator was instructed not to ask the question but to observe the surroundings and report if any items were found. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.

(continued on next page)

Table C1: Definition of outcome variables

Topic	Variable and description
	Reports cyclists: This variable derives from the behavioral activity described in section 4. Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the list delivered to the leaders contained at least one name of a cyclist to participate in the political bicycle rallies, and zero otherwise. Quelimane is largely dependent on bicycle taxi drivers as its main transportation method. These drivers have often been used by the incumbent Mayor for political campaigning through bicycle rallies. During the second post-baseline survey wave, block leaders were given a blank list to fill with names of bicycle taxi drivers living in their blocks that could be mobilized for these rallies. Field administrators conducted a second visit to the blocks to collect these lists. This visit was announced two days in advance, and block leaders were also instructed to request the people on the list to attend. These lists were collected up to two weeks after the initial visit. For names which did not attend the visit, field administrators confirmed their veracity with a phone call. The variable reflects whether the list contained at least one *"true"* name (extensive margin). This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.
	Observed # mobilized Numerical variable counting the number of bicycle taxi drivers that attended the field team's confirmation visit. Each of these people represents a roster entry in a confirmation survey. The registration was not conditional on prior record on the list, and it reprents the sum of all the entered rosters. This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.
	Stickers from leader: Variable ranging from 0 to 1 as a percentage of brown (leader) stickers found hanging at the front doors of the blocks' inhabitants. Each leader received 40 brown stickers, as presented in figure C2, and was instructed to distribute them to the population living in their block. Two weeks after, the field team was instructed to circle the sampled blocks and count the number of brown stickers identified hanging in front doors. This variable is constructed as the percent number out the 40 distributed identified in front doors. This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.
	Stickers from field team: Variable ranging from 0 to 1 as a percentage of pink (field team) stickers found hanging at the front doors of the blocks' inhabitants. Field administrators visited every migrant and resident in the sample to distribute a pink sticker, as presented in figure C2. Two weeks after, the field team was instructed to circle the sampled blocks and count the number of pink stickers identified hanging in front doors. This variable is constructed as the percentage of pink stickers found out of the total number of respondents (migrants and residents) sampled in each block. This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.
Electoral participation	**Electoral turnout:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger was colored with purple ink at the time of the field team's visit, and zero otherwise. Mozambique has a long-standing tradition of marking fingers with ink after voting as a sign of participation. The ink mark should stay up to two or three days after. The field team visited the entire project sample in the two days following the 2023 local elections in Mozambique to check for the ink mark on the fingers. This measurement was collected in October 2023.

(continued on next page)

Table C1: Definition of outcome variables

Topic	Variable and description
	Self-reported voting for FRELIMO: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having voted for the political party FRELIMO (national incumbent/local opposition) during the 2023 local elections in Mozambique, and zero otherwise. The variable is missing if the respondent has previously reported not having voted at all. The variable is self-reported. The question was asked during the second post-baseline survey wave.

Note. Information about the timing of data collection is provided in Appendix A.1. Details about the measurement activities are provided in Section 4.

Figure C1: Mobilized cyclists for political rally



Figure C2: Stickers



D Additional analysis

D.1 Detailed results on political outcomes

Table D1: Holding partisan political objects, by political party

	Migrants			Residents		
	RENAMO	FRELIMO	MDM	RENAMO	FRELIMO	MDM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.010**	0.006	-0.000	0.011	-0.010	-0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.003)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.017***	0.005	-0.001	-0.006	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.003)
Observations	6117	6117	6117	1571	1571	1571
Adjusted R^2	0.044	0.027	0.007	0.081	0.002	0.022
Mean (control group)	0.030	0.017	0.003	0.045	0.039	0.006
TL = TB (p-value)	0.231	0.723	0.569	0.117	0.465	0.167

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(2) use equation 1, employing the the midline and endline (stacked regressions). We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Columns (1)-(3) present results for migrants; columns (4)-(6) present results for residents. Dependent variables by column: (1) and (4) *RENAMO*: observational variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any object belonging to the respondent and corresponding to the political party RENAMO during the survey interview, and 0 otherwise; (2) and (5) *FRELIMO*: observational variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any object belonging to the respondent and corresponding to the political party FRELIMO during the survey interview, and 0 otherwise; (3) and (6) *MDM*: observational variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any object belonging to the respondent and corresponding to the political party MDM during the survey interview, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D2: Self-reported voting

	Vote RENAMO			Vote FRELIMO			Vote OTHER		
	Migrant	Resident	Origin contact	Migrant	Resident	Origin contact	Migrant	Resident	Origin contact
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.003	-0.057	0.121	-0.005	0.056	-0.155**	0.005	-0.056	0.155**
	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.078)	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.078)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.020	-0.038	0.002	-0.014	0.037	-0.056	0.014	-0.037	0.056
	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.073)	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.073)
Observations	2092	534	273	2092	534	273	2092	534	273
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.142	0.065	0.036	0.151	0.141	0.036	0.151	0.141
Mean (control group)	0.910	0.861	0.736	0.074	0.119	0.218	0.926	0.881	0.782
TL = TB (p-value)	0.219	0.631	0.185	0.508	0.618	0.218	0.508	0.618	0.218

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(6) show results from a phone survey conducted after the 2024 national elections in Mozambique. Column (3) shows results for the endline survey. We do not include the lagged values of any of the dependent variables. Dependent variables by columns: (1) *In a party (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to a political party, and 0 otherwise; (2) *In RENAMO (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to RENAMO, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Municipal elections 2023 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2023 municipal elections, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Presidential elections 2024 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Presidential elections 2024 – FRELIMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for FRELIMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (6) *Presidential elections 2024 – PODEMOS*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for PODEMOS in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D3: Leaders' political behavior

	In a party (2024)	In RENAMO (2024)	Municipal elections 2023	Presidential elections 2024				
			RENAMO	RENAMO	FRELIMO	PODEMOS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
(TL) Leader treatment	0.029	0.042	0.005	0.142**	-0.022	-0.108	0.047**	0.034*
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.007)	(0.071)	(0.022)	(0.074)	(0.024)	(0.021)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.079	-0.066	0.001	0.149**	-0.034	-0.110	0.022	0.008
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.011)	(0.069)	(0.022)	(0.069)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Observations	359	357	391	324	324	324	816	816
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.057	0.071	0.105	0.097	0.080	0.159	0.232
Mean (control group)	0.862	0.844	0.992	0.393	0.037	0.561	0.090	0.076
TL = TB (p-value)	0.046	0.049	0.691	0.918	0.391	0.984	0.278	0.171
Outcome data	Follow-up II	Follow-up II	Endline	Follow-up II	Follow-up II	Follow-up II	Endline	Endline

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(6) show results from a phone survey conducted after the 2024 national elections in Mozambique. Column (3) shows results for the endline survey. We do not include the lagged values of any of the dependent variables. Dependent variables by columns: (1) *In a party (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to a political party, and 0 otherwise; (2) *In RENAMO (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to RENAMO, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Municipal elections 2023 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2023 municipal elections, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Presidential elections 2024 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Presidential elections 2024 – FRELIMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for FRELIMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (6) *Presidential elections 2024 – PODEMOS*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for PODEMOS in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table D4: Views about migrants' integration

	Migrants unfairly treated			Migrants are positive		
	Leader (1)	Migrant (2)	Resident (3)	Leader (4)	Migrant (5)	Resident (6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.095**	0.012	0.016	0.112*	-0.004	0.045
	(0.048)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.063)	(0.018)	(0.030)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.028	0.008	0.021*	0.088	-0.003	0.034
	(0.048)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.064)	(0.019)	(0.031)
Observations	347	3571	1493	357	5958	1536
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.044	0.039	0.153	0.087	0.101
Mean (control group)	0.109	0.052	0.033	0.496	0.452	0.441
TL = TB (p-value)	0.196	0.649	0.653	0.710	0.973	0.689
Outcome data	Midline	Pooled	Pooled	Midline	Pooled	Pooled

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1) and (4) use equation 1, and include data from the midline survey. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) use equation 1, employing the midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include the lagged value of the dependent variable as a control. We did not collect the lagged values for columns (1) and (4). Columns (1) and (4) show results for block leaders; columns (2) and (5) show results for migrants; columns (3) and (6) show results for residents. Dependent variables by column: (1)-(3) *Migrants treated unfairly*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that migrants are frequently or very frequently treated unfairly by community members, and 0 otherwise; (4)-(6) *Migrants are positive*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement that migrants are positive for the community, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

D.2 Remittances

Table D5: Mobile money

	# services used	Transfers to (...) reported by migrant		Value of transfers to OC reported by	
	Origin contact (1)	Migrant (2)	Origin contact (3)	Migrant (4)	Origin contact (5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.021	0.008	0.078**	0.019	-0.039
-0.027					
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.033)
(0.028)					
(TB) Basic treatment	0.051**	0.009	0.075**	0.044	-0.025
0.000					
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.030)
(0.029)					
Observations	2856	2856	988	984	1522
1523					
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.051	0.029	0.067	0.194
0.205					
Mean (control group)	0.242	0.183	0.417	0.487	0.461
0.478					
TL = TB (p-value)	0.133	0.930	0.943	0.534	0.672
0.353					
Outcome data	Midline	Midline	Midline	Midline	Endline
Endline					

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. All outcomes were collected in the midline survey. We did not collect lagged values of any of the presented variables. Columns (1)-(2) and (4) display results for migrants; columns (3) and (5) display results for origin contacts. Dependent variables by column: (1) # *services used*: variable summing the total number of mobile money services that the respondent reports using from the list of all available services; (2) *Transfers to origin reported by migrant*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sent mobile money transfers to a relative living in their origin district in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Transfers to origin reported by origin contact*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having received mobile money transfers from a relative living in Quelimane in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Transfers to migrant reported by migrant*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having received mobile money transfers from a relative living in their origin district in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Transfers to migrant reported by origin contact*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sent mobile money transfers to a relative living in Quelimane in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

D.3 Robustness to sample selection - origin contacts

Table D6: Robustness to sample selection - initial sample

	Figure 1		**Table 1**			**Table 4**
	Awareness of the program	Family member is involved	Intends to migrate	Migrated to the city	Received remittances	Voted FRELIMO
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.041**	0.019**	0.024	0.057***	0.008	-0.024
	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.129)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.001	0.004	0.023	0.078***	0.012	-0.058
	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.092)
Observations	2431	2423	2383	1432	1601	139
Adjusted R^2	0.080	0.034	0.025	0.007	0.060	0.290
Mean (control group)	0.210	0.026	0.120	0.080	0.434	0.157
TL = TB (p-value)	0.048	0.069	0.949	0.314	0.890	0.763
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Follow-up I	Midline	Endline

TBD

D.4 Results for aggregated outcomes

Table D7: Aggregation of outcome variables - treatment adherence outcomes

	Program awareness				Interaction with leader		
	Leaders	Migrants	Residents	Dist. relatives	Leaders	Migrants	Residents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.251***	0.120***	0.049	0.097***	0.205***	0.110***	0.129***
	(0.050)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.020)	(0.039)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.044	0.106***	-0.034	0.029	0.060	0.024	0.002
	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.072)	(0.020)	(0.035)
Observations	849	6105	1571	3813	821	6093	1565
Adjusted R^2	0.144	0.178	0.140	0.053	0.079	0.057	0.077
Mean (control group)	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	0.013	-0.001	-0.002
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.000	0.513	0.025	0.047	0.032	0.000	0.001

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Standard errors are clustered at the block level in regressions with observations at a lower level than the block. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped by table in indices built using the Kling et al. (2007) procedure. Outcomes are first normalized in standardized units (using the mean and standard deviation of the control group), and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D8: Aggregation of outcome variables - political outcomes

	Political participation			Political support for the local incumbent				
	Leaders	Migrants	Residents	Leaders	Blocks	Migrants	Residents	Origin contacts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.172	0.090***	-0.075	0.257**	0.072	0.015	-0.161	0.371*
	(0.121)	(0.027)	(0.060)	(0.109)	(0.062)	(0.049)	(0.117)	(0.215)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.101	0.085***	0.014	0.205*	0.005	0.078	-0.147	0.060
	(0.120)	(0.029)	(0.057)	(0.110)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.120)	(0.237)
Observations	399	3035	763	429	429	2090	527	270
Adjusted R^2	-0.033	0.084	0.102	0.088	0.626	0.025	0.137	0.010
Mean (control group)	-0.015	0.003	-0.003	0.012	0.022	-0.000	0.002	-0.016
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.559	0.826	0.145	0.654	0.312	0.212	0.912	0.146

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Standard errors are clustered at the block level in regressions with observations at a lower level than the block. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped by table in indices built using the Kling et al. (2007) procedure. Outcomes are first normalized in standardized units (using the mean and standard deviation of the control group), and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D9: Aggregation of outcome variables - economic outcomes

	Labor market outcomes - migrants			Migration	
	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migrants	Origin contacts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.230***	0.063**	-0.006	0.014	0.094***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.036)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.222***	-0.040	0.043	0.050	0.088**
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Observations	1719	6114	4715	3589	1445
Adjusted R^2	0.241	0.175	0.038	0.050	0.014
Mean (control group)	0.877	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.070
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.759	0.000	0.275	0.339	0.865

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Standard errors are clustered at the block level in regressions with observations at a lower level than the block. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped by table in indices built using the Kling et al. (2007) procedure. Outcomes are first normalized in standardized units (using the mean and standard deviation of the control group), and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

D.5 Treatment intensity

Table D1: Treatment intensity - migrant indices

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rounds TL	0.037***	0.030***	0.016**	0.002	0.057***	0.009	-0.005	0.025***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Rounds TB	0.036***	0.006	0.014*	0.016	0.057***	-0.014*	0.007	0.031***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	6105	6093	3035	2090	1719	6114	4715	3589
Adjusted R^2	0.181	0.057	0.082	0.024	0.243	0.174	0.038	0.053
Mean (control group)	-0.005	-0.002	0.012	-0.003	0.878	0.002	-0.003	-0.016
TLI = TBI (p-value)	0.766	0.000	0.823	0.301	0.967	0.003	0.257	0.517

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D2: IV Regression with treatment intensity - migrant outcomes

	Number of rounds TL		**Number of rounds TB**		Test of equality (p-value)	N
	Coeff. (1)	S.E. (2)	Coeff. (3)	S.E. (4)	(5)	(6)
Program awareness	0.029	0.012	0.028	0.011	0.016	6105
Interaction w/ leader	0.032	0.009	0.001	0.008	0.000	6093
Political participation	0.023	0.011	0.016	0.011	0.114	3035
Political support	-0.000	0.018	0.019	0.016	0.339	2094
Employment	0.059	0.012	0.058	0.012	0.000	1728
Job offers	0.007	0.012	-0.016	0.012	0.114	6114
Wages	-0.004	0.016	0.008	0.015	0.748	4715
Migration	0.006	0.015	0.022	0.013	0.183	3590

D.6 Heterogeneous effects

Table D1: Heterogeneous effects: earlier vs. later migrant arrivals

	Earlier						Later			
	TL		TB				TL		TB	
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Migrants										
Migrant is in the city	-0.01	0.01	-0.04**	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.03	0.02
Mobile money adoption	0.31**	0.14	0.16	0.15	-0.23	0.17	0.50***	0.14	-0.43**	0.18
Job opportunities	0.08***	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.08***	0.02	0.00	0.03
Worked	0.08***	0.02	0.05*	0.03	-0.06*	0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.03
Hours worked	0.72***	0.21	0.51**	0.25	-0.58**	0.30	-0.04	0.21	-0.20	0.28
Knows the leader	0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.04	0.02	0.04
Contacted the leader	0.03**	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.03*	0.02
Sought the leader for job assistance	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Campaign exposure	0.02**	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02**	0.01	-0.00	0.01
Voted FRELIMO	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
Electoral turnout	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04
Electoral turnout										
Electoral turnout										
Electoral turnout									

Table D2: Heterogeneous effects: earlier vs. later migrant arrivals

	Earlier					Later				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.12***	0.03	0.09***	0.03	2926	0.13***	0.03	0.12***	0.03	3131
Interaction w/ block leader	0.11***	0.03	-0.00	0.03	2923	0.12***	0.03	0.05*	0.03	3121
Political participation	0.14***	0.04	0.08*	0.04	1453	0.05	0.04	0.07*	0.04	1550
Political support	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.08	1000	-0.03	0.07	0.06	0.06	1036
Job offers	0.18***	0.04	0.14***	0.04	783	0.28***	0.04	0.32***	0.04	883
Employment	0.10**	0.04	-0.01	0.04	2934	-0.01	0.04	-0.09**	0.04	3132
Wages	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.07	2231	-0.02	0.04	0.07	0.05	2450
Migration	-0.02	0.06	0.01	0.06	1769	0.07	0.05	0.09*	0.05	1787
Panel B: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.14***	0.05	0.06	0.05	1713	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.04	2132
Political support	0.11	0.42	0.52	0.41	91	0.31	0.28	-0.07	0.25	116
Migration	0.05	0.06	0.12*	0.07	603	0.14***	0.05	0.10*	0.05	797

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table D3: Heterogeneous effects: leader is male vs. female

	Leader is male					Leader is female				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.29***	0.08	-0.04	0.07	522	0.03	0.11	-0.32***	0.12	257
Interaction w/ block people	0.17*	0.10	0.02	0.10	503	0.39***	0.14	0.07	0.16	249
Political participation	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.16	213	0.14	0.36	-0.14	0.37	59
Political support	0.12	0.10	0.05	0.11	222	0.03	0.13	-0.03	0.16	69
Mobilization	0.16	0.15	0.26	0.16	222	0.40	0.33	-0.15	0.33	69
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.11***	0.03	0.10***	0.03	3620	0.16***	0.05	0.10*	0.06	1923
Interaction w/ block leader	0.10***	0.03	0.03	0.03	3612	0.02	0.05	-0.05	0.05	1921
Political participation	0.08*	0.04	0.11***	0.04	1826	-0.06	0.06	0.03	0.08	938
Political support	-0.15**	0.06	0.02	0.07	1230	0.27***	0.09	0.45***	0.10	677
Job offers	0.16***	0.04	0.20***	0.04	1001	0.25***	0.07	0.16**	0.07	549
Employment	0.05	0.05	-0.02	0.05	3625	0.01	0.06	-0.03	0.08	1925
Wages	-0.02	0.05	0.08*	0.04	2771	-0.19	0.12	0.00	0.11	1507
Migration	0.04	0.06	0.10*	0.05	2125	0.14	0.11	-0.00	0.15	1133
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.01	0.05	-0.08	0.05	901	-0.04	0.06	-0.01	0.07	499
Interaction w/ block leader	0.12**	0.06	0.01	0.05	898	-0.05	0.10	-0.21*	0.12	496
Political participation	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.09	422	-0.32*	0.18	-0.24	0.16	229
Political support	0.07	0.18	-0.29	0.18	278	-0.22	0.29	-0.02	0.40	160
Panel D: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.04	2276	0.23***	0.08	0.01	0.09	1245
Political support	0.28	0.34	0.53**	0.27	150	-0.00	0.00	-0.76	0.00	67
Migration	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.05	837	-0.03	0.07	0.05	0.10	459

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table D4: Heterogeneous effects: leader's age

	Leader is <50 years old					Leader is ≥50 years old				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.25***	0.07	-0.02	0.09	469	0.28**	0.11	-0.04	0.12	310
Interaction w/ block people	0.15	0.10	0.05	0.12	455	0.30**	0.13	-0.10	0.16	299
Political participation	-0.10	0.16	-0.13	0.18	178	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.30	92
Political support	0.04	0.09	-0.02	0.10	186	0.21	0.14	0.12	0.23	100
Mobilization	0.33*	0.19	0.31	0.21	186	0.32**	0.15	0.21	0.21	100
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.13***	0.04	0.09**	0.04	3215	0.19***	0.04	0.17***	0.05	2328
Interaction w/ block leader	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.03	3203	0.07**	0.04	-0.01	0.05	2330
Political participation	0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.04	1604	0.17***	0.06	0.09	0.07	1162
Political support	-0.02	0.10	0.13	0.09	1068	0.10	0.07	-0.01	0.07	841
Job offers	0.33***	0.05	0.32***	0.05	941	0.14***	0.05	0.15**	0.06	616
Employment	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.05	3215	0.14**	0.06	0.08	0.08	2335
Wages	-0.16***	0.06	-0.00	0.05	2477	0.06	0.06	0.26**	0.10	1799
Migration	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.08	1909	-0.03	0.07	0.12	0.07	1350
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.04	0.05	-0.00	0.06	828	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.09	568
Interaction w/ block leader	0.04	0.05	-0.03	0.05	823	0.24**	0.09	-0.08	0.09	568
Political participation	-0.22**	0.09	-0.08	0.09	387	-0.13	0.11	-0.04	0.14	263
Political support	-0.23	0.22	-0.24	0.21	245	0.10	0.21	-0.33	0.21	186
Panel D: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.17***	0.05	0.09**	0.04	1983	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.06	1541
Political support	0.72**	0.29	-0.24	0.29	130	0.29	0.28	0.11	0.44	90
Migration	-0.05	0.05	0.01	0.07	718	0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.06	573

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table D5: Heterogeneous effects: leader is new vs. experienced

	New leaders (<2y experience)					Leader is experienced (≥2y experience)				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.36**	0.14	-0.12	0.13	260	0.21***	0.07	-0.10	0.07	518
Interaction w/ block people	0.27	0.19	-0.04	0.17	251	0.18*	0.10	0.14	0.11	503
Political participation	-0.34	0.31	0.06	0.23	62	0.23	0.17	0.04	0.17	202
Political support	-0.00	0.16	-0.07	0.13	73	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.09	210
Mobilization	-0.09	0.31	0.25	0.43	73	0.24	0.16	0.18	0.14	210
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.06	1875	0.18***	0.03	0.12***	0.03	3680
Interaction w/ block leader	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.04	1874	0.12***	0.03	0.06*	0.03	3671
Political participation	0.11*	0.07	0.09	0.06	904	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.04	1867
Political support	0.15*	0.08	0.13	0.10	635	-0.01	0.09	0.14*	0.08	1271
Job offers	0.25**	0.10	0.14	0.09	434	0.18***	0.04	0.19***	0.04	1119
Employment	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.06	1877	-0.00	0.04	-0.09*	0.05	3685
Wages	-0.01	0.08	0.18**	0.07	1438	-0.11**	0.05	-0.01	0.06	2850
Migration	-0.09	0.08	-0.04	0.07	1107	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	2159
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.13	0.09	0.02	0.07	475	0.09	0.05	-0.01	0.05	927
Interaction w/ block leader	0.08	0.09	-0.03	0.09	473	0.15**	0.06	-0.01	0.05	923
Political participation	0.05	0.16	0.20	0.15	202	-0.09	0.09	0.06	0.08	439
Political support	-0.18	0.28	-0.21	0.30	128	-0.06	0.21	-0.05	0.20	296
Panel D: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.10	0.08	0.16**	0.07	1140	0.10*	0.05	0.05	0.05	2391
Political support	1.27	0.76	0.51	0.48	55	0.45	0.28	0.35	0.27	164
Migration	-0.05	0.08	0.06	0.10	412	-0.00	0.05	0.03	0.05	889

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D6: Heterogeneous effects: Leader's support for RENAMO

	Leader is RENAMO declared supporter					Leader is not RENAMO declared support				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.36***	0.07	0.00	0.07	558	0.29	0.21	-0.07	0.19	226
Interaction w/ block people	0.20**	0.10	0.08	0.10	549	0.19	0.27	0.24	0.30	206
Political participation	0.16	0.17	0.28*	0.17	219	0.32	0.31	0.21	0.20	46
Political support	0.14	0.10	0.04	0.09	236	-0.29**	0.14	-0.47**	0.17	52
Mobilization	0.41**	0.17	0.38**	0.17	236	-0.16	0.21	0.06	0.28	52
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.16***	0.03	0.13***	0.03	3948	-0.13**	0.06	-0.05	0.05	1595
Interaction w/ block leader	0.13***	0.03	0.02	0.03	3945	-0.06	0.05	-0.00	0.04	1588
Political participation	0.12***	0.04	0.09**	0.04	1958	-0.19**	0.07	-0.12	0.09	807
Political support	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.06	1338	0.12	0.21	0.21	0.23	569
Job offers	0.21***	0.04	0.19***	0.04	1110	0.21***	0.07	0.31***	0.06	445
Employment	0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.04	3954	0.21*	0.12	0.12	0.11	1596
Wages	-0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	3006	-0.00	0.08	0.12	0.11	1272
Migration	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	2312	0.09*	0.06	0.03	0.07	947
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.04	0.06	-0.03	0.04	993	0.17*	0.10	0.09	0.12	407
Interaction w/ block leader	0.13**	0.06	0.03	0.05	991	0.12	0.13	-0.01	0.13	404
Political participation	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.08	463	0.06	0.21	-0.02	0.27	184
Political support	-0.05	0.17	-0.00	0.17	320	-0.36	0.44	-0.29	0.52	128
Panel D: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.11**	0.05	0.09*	0.05	2446	0.22*	0.11	0.02	0.10	1077
Political support	0.22	0.22	-0.14	0.24	165	1.96***	0.48	1.52***	0.44	57
Migration	0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.06	895	-0.05	0.09	-0.02	0.08	395

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatm (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the bl level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full lis controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and t averaged within each category.

Table D7: Heterogeneous effects: Migrant density - median

	# migrants above median					# migrants below median				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.24***	0.08	-0.08	0.07	435	0.25***	0.08	-0.00	0.08	407
Interaction w/ block people	0.18**	0.09	0.03	0.09	424	0.14	0.11	0.05	0.12	389
Political participation	0.22	0.14	0.02	0.14	188	0.21	0.21	0.24	0.20	187
Political support	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.07	199	0.12	0.10	0.02	0.12	205
Mobilization	0.18	0.18	0.04	0.19	199	0.31**	0.14	0.31**	0.13	205
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.19***	0.03	0.16***	0.03	3955	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	0.04	2150
Interaction w/ block leader	0.12***	0.03	0.04	0.03	3955	0.10***	0.03	-0.01	0.03	2138
Political participation	0.12***	0.04	0.08**	0.04	1948	0.09*	0.05	0.10**	0.05	1087
Political support	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.07	1347	0.00	0.08	0.15**	0.07	741
Job offers	0.22***	0.03	0.21***	0.04	1132	0.14**	0.06	0.13**	0.06	585
Employment	0.02	0.04	-0.10**	0.04	3965	0.07	0.05	-0.04	0.05	2149
Wages	-0.04	0.07	0.03	0.06	3080	-0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05	1635
Migration	0.07	0.05	0.09*	0.05	2351	-0.06	0.06	-0.02	0.06	1238
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.06	793	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.05	778
Interaction w/ block leader	0.14**	0.06	0.03	0.06	788	0.13**	0.06	-0.03	0.05	776
Political participation	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.08	365	-0.12	0.09	-0.07	0.09	387
Political support	-0.28	0.18	0.04	0.19	248	-0.05	0.15	-0.15	0.16	270
Panel D: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.13***	0.04	0.06	0.04	2438	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.05	1435
Political support	0.46*	0.25	0.07	0.24	180	-0.20	0.38	-0.40	0.35	82
Migration	0.11**	0.05	0.09	0.06	894	0.06	0.06	0.13**	0.06	547

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

Table D8: Heterogeneous effects: average distance between households is below/above median

	Dense block					Sparse block				
	TL		TB			TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.23***	0.09	-0.03	0.08	408	0.24***	0.09	-0.09	0.08	424
Interaction w/ block people	0.35***	0.12	0.25*	0.13	399	0.13	0.11	0.03	0.12	406
Political participation	0.39*	0.23	0.38*	0.22	167	-0.03	0.14	-0.25	0.15	156
Political support	-0.01	0.11	-0.03	0.11	178	0.09	0.09	-0.04	0.08	168
Mobilization	0.16	0.17	0.02	0.16	178	0.27	0.20	0.34*	0.20	168
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.07*	0.04	0.10**	0.04	2855	0.14***	0.04	0.08**	0.03	3250
Interaction w/ block leader	0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.03	2854	0.15***	0.03	0.01	0.03	3239
Political participation	0.12**	0.05	0.05	0.05	1406	0.11**	0.04	0.10**	0.04	1626
Political support	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.06	981	-0.12	0.07	-0.04	0.08	1097
Job offers	0.20***	0.05	0.18***	0.05	746	0.26***	0.05	0.28***	0.05	956
Employment	0.10*	0.05	-0.03	0.06	2860	-0.03	0.05	-0.05	0.05	3254
Wages	0.04	0.06	0.11**	0.06	2166	-0.06	0.06	0.01	0.05	2548
Migration	-0.07	0.05	-0.08	0.05	1661	0.09	0.06	0.15**	0.06	1926
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.01	0.07	-0.09	0.06	753	0.01	0.06	-0.02	0.05	815
Interaction w/ block leader	0.17**	0.07	0.03	0.07	750	0.14**	0.07	0.02	0.05	812
Political participation	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.09	360	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.09	373
Political support	0.10	0.21	0.10	0.22	247	-0.04	0.16	-0.04	0.15	237
Panel D: Origin contacts										
Program awareness	0.06	0.07	-0.04	0.06	1942	0.11**	0.05	0.06	0.05	1926
Political support	-0.04	0.27	-0.25	0.38	127	1.29***	0.32	0.73***	0.26	127
Migration	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05	724	0.17***	0.06	0.08	0.06	700

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

D.7 Robustness to selection of control variables

Table D9: Description of variables included in the PDSL procedure

Variable group	Description
Block characteristics	
	Stratum indicator variables. Indicator variables for whether there is illegal construction in the block. Categorical variable measuring the number of migrants sampled at baseline, the block population (approximate), the number of bicycle taxi drivers, the distance to nearest school, nearest market and nearest water fountain.
Leader characteristics	
Demographics	Indicator variables for sex, whether the respondent is married, illiterate, has less than primary education, has primary education, is catholic and is muslim. Categorical variables for age reported in number of years and household size.
Wealth	Indicator variable for whether the respondent owns their flat.
Political	Indicator variable for whether the leader is a member of RENAMO political party at baseline, voted for RENAMO in 2018 and 2019 elections, likes migrants and is employed. Categorical variable for number of years as the block leader.
Migrant characteristics	
Demographics	Indicator variables for sex, whether the respondent is married, illiterate, has less than primary education, has primary education, is catholic, is muslim, has no occupation at baseline, is a student at baseline, is working at baseline, moved to Quelimane for work. Categorical variables for age reported in number of years, number of children and household size.
Migration	Indicator variables for whether the main struggle at baseline was finding a job, main struggle at baseline was making friends, feeling a strong connection to Quelimane at baseline and feeling discriminated at baseline. Average of 4 indicator variables as an index for trust (trust in market seller, in the Mozambican president, in the provincial government and in the mayor of Quelimane).
Wealth	Indicator variables for whether the respondent rents their flat, owns their flat, has walls made of concrete, has floors made of concrete, has a roof made of zinc, owns a bank account, owns a radio, a television, a mattress, a fan, a motorcycle, a fridge, a phone, a bicycle and a solar panel. Average of 3 variables (walls, floor made of concrete, and roof made of zinc) as an indicator of house quality.

Note. Migrant characteristics are included only in the PDSL procedure for migrant-level outcomes. All continuous outcomes are also included in their squared term and are standardized. To have the same sample size in the Post-ModelSelection and PDSL, for all variables, missing values are replaced by 0 and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation was missing is included for all variables.

Table D10: Comparison with PDSL: leader outcomes

	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				
	TL		TB		TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	0.13***	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.13***	0.03	-0.01	0.03	849
Involved in program	0.18***	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.18***	0.03	0.01	0.03	849
Family was involved in program	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.02	849
Block people were involved in program	0.11***	0.04	-0.07*	0.04	0.11***	0.03	-0.07**	0.03	849
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.13***	0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.13***	0.03	-0.03	0.03	849
Knows migrants (general)	0.09**	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.10***	0.03	0.06*	0.03	821
Knows sampled migrants	0.06***	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.06***	0.02	0.01	0.02	849
Inked finger	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.05*	0.03	0.02	0.03	399

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 5). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table D9.

Table D11: Comparison with PDSL: migrant outcomes

	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				
	TL		TB		TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	0.07***	0.01	0.08***	0.01	0.07***	0.01	0.08***	0.01	6118
Involved in program	0.09***	0.02	0.08***	0.02	0.09***	0.02	0.08***	0.02	6116
Family was involved in program	0.02**	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02**	0.01	0.01	0.01	6118
Block people were involved in program	0.04**	0.02	0.03*	0.01	0.04**	0.02	0.03*	0.01	6115
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.05***	0.02	0.03**	0.02	0.05***	0.02	0.03**	0.02	6110
Knows block leader	0.04**	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.03**	0.02	-0.02	0.02	6119
Contacted block leader	0.04***	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.00	0.01	6119
Resorted to leader for job	0.01***	0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.01**	0.00	6093
Party objects	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.01	0.02***	0.01	6117
Inked finger	0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	3332
Voted RENAMO	0.00	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	2090
Heard of job offers	0.07***	0.01	0.08***	0.01	0.07***	0.01	0.08***	0.01	6119
Heard of job offers through program	0.22***	0.03	0.21***	0.03	0.22***	0.03	0.21***	0.03	1719
Working	0.01	0.02	-0.04**	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03*	0.01	6114
Tot # jobs	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02	6114
Hours working p/day	0.33**	0.16	-0.20	0.17	0.39***	0.15	-0.16	0.16	6119
Wage	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	4715
Stayed in Quelimane	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	3589

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 5). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table D9.

Table D12: Comparison with PDSL: resident outcomes

	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				
	TL		TB		TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	-0.00	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.05**	0.02	1573
Involved in program	0.00	0.03	-0.04*	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.04*	0.02	1573
Family was involved in program	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02	1572
Block people were involved in program	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02	1571
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	1573
Knows block leader	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	1573
Contacted block leader	0.05**	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.05***	0.02	-0.00	0.02	1573
Resorted to leader for job	0.02**	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02***	0.01	0.01	0.01	1565
Party objects	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	1570
Inked finger	-0.05	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.07**	0.03	0.03	0.03	805
Voted RENAMO	-0.04	0.04	-0.02	0.04	-0.06*	0.03	-0.03	0.03	527

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 5). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table D9.

Table D13: Comparison with PDSL: origin contact outcomes

	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				
	TL		TB		TL		TB		
Outcome variable	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	0.03*	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.01	0.02	3874
Family was involved in program	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.02	3865
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	3864
Voted RENAMO	-0.03	0.03	-0.00	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.03	980
Likely to move	0.04***	0.01	0.03**	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.03**	0.01	3792
In Quelimane	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	3019
In Quelimane (7 months post)	0.04***	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.03***	0.01	5038

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 5). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table D9.

D.8 Testing for spatial contamination

Table D14: Migrant indices - Shares within <100

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participation	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.137***	0.161***	0.065	0.057	0.204***	0.087**	-0.042	-0.034
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.085)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.058)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.095***	0.079**	0.140***	0.139*	0.152***	-0.044	0.024	-0.012
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.082)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.068)
Share TL <100m	-0.028	-0.100**	0.050	-0.092	0.001	-0.064	0.027	0.066
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.119)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.079)
Share TB <100m	0.028	-0.088*	-0.086	-0.073	0.057	0.014	0.003	0.110
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.107)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.095)
Observations	5681	5671	2816	1941	1569	5690	4365	3325
Adjusted R^2	0.176	0.055	0.090	0.027	0.242	0.172	0.035	0.044
Mean (control group)	0.005	0.009	0.000	-0.011	0.888	-0.017	0.014	0.012
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.165	0.010	0.114	0.339	0.160	0.002	0.261	0.687

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D15: Migrant indices - Control Group: Shares within <100

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participation	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share TL <100m	-0.086	-0.084	-0.054	-0.078	-0.165	-0.020	-0.142	0.049
	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.151)	(0.266)	(0.148)	(0.103)	(0.154)	(0.152)
Share TB <100m	-0.041	-0.120	0.047	-0.138	0.067	-0.104	-0.041	-0.222
	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.128)	(0.167)	(0.173)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.159)
Observations	1915	1910	939	669	418	1919	1477	1116
Adjusted R^2	0.232	0.070	0.122	0.086	0.386	0.221	0.114	0.075
Mean	-0.025	-0.025	-0.035	0.011	0.892	0.062	0.028	-0.043

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D16: Migrant indices - Shares within <150

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.107***	0.128***	0.091**	0.075	0.225***	0.074**	-0.043	0.034
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.048)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.090***	0.041	0.097**	0.107	0.201***	-0.051	0.036	0.010
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.071)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Share TL <150m	0.033	-0.044	0.009	-0.140	-0.009	-0.044	0.070	-0.044
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.117)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.080)
Share TB <150m	0.048	-0.037	-0.039	-0.062	0.026	0.040	-0.004	0.099
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.114)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Observations	5940	5930	2950	2030	1662	5949	4576	3488
Adjusted R^2	0.177	0.054	0.085	0.023	0.242	0.174	0.037	0.051
Mean (control group)	0.002	0.004	0.002	-0.009	0.882	-0.007	0.007	0.002
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.523	0.002	0.855	0.617	0.462	0.001	0.114	0.587

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

D.9 Any treatment

D.10 Perceived freedom

Table D17: Migrant indices - Control Group: Shares within <150

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share TL <150m	-0.020	-0.115	-0.113	-0.074	-0.129	0.039	-0.099	-0.220
	(0.104)	(0.093)	(0.151)	(0.294)	(0.146)	(0.119)	(0.157)	(0.201)
Share TB <150m	-0.100	0.028	0.011	-0.291	0.044	-0.126	-0.006	-0.191
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.141)	(0.216)	(0.180)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.162)
Observations	2007	2003	988	704	439	2011	1553	1174
Adjusted R^2	0.226	0.070	0.115	0.077	0.392	0.222	0.113	0.093
Mean	-0.059	-0.057	-0.024	-0.014	0.973	0.055	-0.038	-0.049

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D18: Migrant indices - Shares within <200

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.096***	0.105***	0.084**	0.069	0.230***	0.058*	-0.025	0.035
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.043)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.090***	0.023	0.087**	0.122*	0.198***	-0.063*	0.044	0.030
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.046)
Share TL <200m	0.083*	0.019	0.031	-0.162	-0.013	-0.016	0.052	-0.074
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.129)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.092)
Share TB <200m	0.055	0.007	-0.016	-0.146	0.059	0.095	-0.005	0.077
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.073)	(0.130)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.104)	(0.097)
Observations	6026	6015	2994	2055	1693	6035	4651	3538
Adjusted R^2	0.178	0.056	0.084	0.023	0.243	0.177	0.037	0.052
Mean (control group)	-0.001	0.000	0.004	-0.004	0.880	-0.001	0.002	0.002
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.837	0.002	0.935	0.366	0.324	0.000	0.159	0.885

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D19: Migrant indices - Control Group: Shares within <200

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share TL <200m	0.004	0.028	0.051	-0.069	-0.164	0.141	-0.102	-0.178
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.156)	(0.392)	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.143)	(0.246)
Share TB <200m	-0.085	0.069	-0.055	-0.137	0.029	-0.149	0.041	-0.213
	(0.087)	(0.103)	(0.169)	(0.287)	(0.199)	(0.154)	(0.146)	(0.236)
Observations	2043	2039	1008	719	447	2047	1583	1194
Adjusted R^2	0.227	0.071	0.114	0.080	0.403	0.222	0.116	0.087
Mean	-0.059	-0.057	-0.023	-0.014	0.976	0.055	-0.038	-0.048

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D20: Migrant indices - Shares within <300

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.092***	0.102***	0.078**	0.048	0.233***	0.055*	-0.024	0.005
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.039)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.085***	0.016	0.090***	0.098*	0.204***	-0.064*	0.067	-0.009
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.039)
Share TL <300m	0.155***	0.048	0.071	-0.187	-0.023	0.033	0.115	0.030
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.088)	(0.147)	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.111)	(0.123)
Share TB <300m	0.146**	0.047	-0.026	-0.138	0.094	0.174**	-0.132	0.346***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.146)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.139)	(0.126)
Observations	6079	6068	3023	2081	1709	6088	4697	3573
Adjusted R^2	0.179	0.057	0.084	0.024	0.240	0.177	0.038	0.053
Mean (control group)	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.000	0.877	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.751	0.000	0.687	0.372	0.330	0.000	0.056	0.728

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D21: Migrant indices - Shares within <400

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.109***	0.106***	0.082***	0.051	0.229***	0.060**	-0.020	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.037)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.099***	0.019	0.083***	0.102**	0.203***	-0.053*	0.063	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Share TL <400m	0.110	0.051	0.073	-0.377**	0.022	0.032	0.119	0.176
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.103)	(0.183)	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.147)
Share TB <400m	0.089	0.043	0.007	-0.368**	0.176	0.198*	-0.208	0.547***
	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.114)	(0.174)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.129)	(0.168)
Observations	6090	6078	3028	2083	1713	6099	4705	3581
Adjusted R^2	0.178	0.057	0.083	0.026	0.240	0.176	0.038	0.054
Mean (control group)	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.000	0.877	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.685	0.000	0.969	0.304	0.373	0.000	0.068	0.969

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D22: Migrant indices - Shares within <500

	Program awareness	Interaction w/ leader	Political participa-tion	Political support	Job offers	Employment	Wages	Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.113***	0.107***	0.079***	0.046	0.237***	0.059**	-0.019	0.004
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.036)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.102***	0.020	0.082***	0.093*	0.212***	-0.051*	0.055	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.036)
Share TL <500m	0.126	0.071	0.178	-0.651***	-0.075	0.125	0.161	0.318*
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.114)	(0.205)	(0.118)	(0.128)	(0.107)	(0.184)
Share TB <500m	0.103	0.095	0.088	-0.516**	0.122	0.264*	-0.196	0.683***
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.121)	(0.211)	(0.140)	(0.154)	(0.173)	(0.212)
Observations	6103	6091	3034	2089	1718	6112	4713	3588
Adjusted R^2	0.178	0.057	0.084	0.027	0.241	0.175	0.038	0.054
Mean (control group)	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.000	0.877	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.628	0.000	0.932	0.337	0.367	0.000	0.096	0.667

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Rounds TL is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of leader treatment rounds in which the respondent participated, Rounds TB is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 5, counting the number of basic treatment rounds in which the respondent participated. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D23: Interaction with block leader - Any treatment

	Leader knows block migrants		Knows leader		Contacted leader		Resorted to leader for job	
	General	% sampled	Migrant	Resident	Migrant	Resident	Migrant	Resident
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(T) Any treatment	0.069**	0.034**	0.013	0.021	0.024***	0.030	0.010***	0.009*
	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Observations	821	849	2855	745	6119	1573	6093	1565
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.124	0.235	0.176	0.054	0.079	0.008	0.060
Mean (control group)	0.670	0.161	0.539	0.580	0.098	0.165	0.012	0.007
Outcome data			Midline	Midline	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(2) as well as (5)-(8) use equation 1, employing midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (3) and (4) use equation 1 and include only data from the first post-baseline survey wave. We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Leader knows block migrants – General*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent knows any rural migrants living in the same block, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Leader knows block migrants – % sampled*: variable ranging from 0 to 1 indicating the percentage of rural migrants that the respondent selects from the list of migrants sampled in the same block; (3)-(4) *Knows leader*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent correctly identifies the name of the current leader in the same block, and 0 otherwise; (5)-(6) *Contacted leader*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have approached the block leader at least once since the previous survey waves, and 0 otherwise; (7)-(8) *Resorted to leader for a job:* Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having contacted or paid the leader for a job in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report p-values of the procedure described in Romano & Wolf (2016) which allows for multiple hypotheses testing.

Table D24: Political participation - Any treatment

	Party objects observed		Electoral turnout: inked finger		
	Migrant	Resident	Leader	Migrant	Resident
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(T) Any treatment	0.021***	-0.000	0.041	0.026*	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.031)
Observations	6117	1570	399	3332	805
Adjusted R^2	0.048	0.038	-0.030	0.080	0.026
Mean (control group)	0.047	0.084	0.896	0.698	0.823
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Election	Election	Election

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(2) use equation 1, employing midline and endline survey waves (stacked regressions). Columns (3)-(5) use equation 1 and present results for outcomes collected in the two days following the 2023 local elections in Mozambique. We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Columns (1) and (4) present results for migrants; columns (2) and (5) present results for residents; column (3) presents results for block leaders. Dependent variable by column: (1)-(2) *Party objects observed*: variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any objects with a political content held by the respondent, and 0 otherwise; (3)-(5) *Electoral turnout: inked finger*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger was marked with purple ink during the enumerators' visit in the two days after the 2023 local elections in Mozambique, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report p-values of the procedure described in Romano & Wolf (2016) which allows for multiple hypotheses testing.

Table D25: Political support for the local incumbent - Any treatment

	Leader mobilization		Stickers		Self-reported voting RENAMO		
	Reports cyclists	Observed # mobilized	From leader (brown)	From field team (pink)	Migrant	Resident	Origin contacts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(T) Any treatment	0.094**	0.688**	0.015	0.011	0.013	-0.054	0.092
	(0.046)	(0.327)	(0.015)	(0.045)	(0.012)	(0.035)	(0.088)
Observations	429	429	429	429	2090	527	270
Adjusted R^2	0.129	0.050	0.711	0.489	0.024	0.140	0.002
Mean (control group)	0.629	1.490	0.436	0.745	0.910	0.859	0.741

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1, including only data from the endline survey wave. We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Columns (1)-(2) show results for the block leader; columns(3)-(4) show block level results; column (5) shows results for migrants; column (6) shows results for residents; column (7) shows results for the origin contacts. Dependent variables by columns: (1) *Reports cyclists*: variable equal to 1 if the list left with leaders for cyclist mobilization contains any names at the time of collection, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Observed # mobilized*: variable counting the number of cyclists mobilized by leaders that attended the second visit by enumerators; (3) *Stickers from leader (brown):* variable ranging between 0 and 1, illustrating the percentage of leader brown stickers found hanging on households' doors during the enumerators' visit to the blocks, out of the 40 stickers given to block leaders for distribution; (4) *Stickers from field team (pink)*: variable ranging between 0 and 1, illustrating the percentage of field team pink stickers found hanging at households' doors during the enumerators' visit to the blocks, out of the total distributed directly in each block; (5)-(7) *Self-reported voting RENAMO:* variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having voted RENAMO in the 2023 Mozambican municipal elections, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report p-values of the procedure described in Romano & Wolf (2016) which allows for multiple hypotheses testing.

Table D26: Labor market outcomes (migrants)- Any treatment

	Heard of job	Heard of job through program	Working	# jobs	# hours working	Wage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(T) Any treatment	0.075***	0.225***	-0.002	0.007	0.135	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.139)	(0.027)
Observations	6119	1719	6114	6114	6119	4715
Adjusted R^2	0.164	0.224	0.172	0.152	0.122	0.045
Mean (control group)	0.234	0.473	0.626	0.703	4.517	-0.003

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. All columns combine the midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (3) and (6) include the lagged value of the dependent variable. We did not collect the lagged values of the remaining dependent variables. All outcomes presented are concerning migrants. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard of job*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard of a job offer in the 12 months before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Heard of job through program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job offer through the migrants' integration program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Working*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent was employed at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise; (4) # *jobs*: number of jobs that the respondent reports having had since the beginning of the project; (5) # *hours working*: variable reporting the number of hours that the respondent reports having worked on the day before the interview date; (6) *Wage* : variable with the standardized value of the reported wage per week. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report p-values of the procedure described in Romano & Wolf (2016) which allows for multiple hypotheses testing.

Table D27: Migration - Any treatment

	Migrants	Origin contacts		
	Stayed in Quelimane (1)	Likely to move (2)	In Quelimane (3)	In Quelimane (4)
(T) Any treatment	0.007	0.031***	-0.009	0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Observations	3589	3731	1488	2315
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.026	-0.014	0.003
Mean (control group)	0.955	0.114	0.056	0.089
Outcome data	Endline	Pooled	Endline	Follow-up I

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1) and (3)-(4) use equation 1. Column (2) uses equation 1, combining the midline and endline survey waves (stacked regressions). Columns (1) and (3) use data collected in the second post-baseline survey wave. Column (4) presents results for data collected in the first follow-up phone survey, around one year after the program finished. We did not collect the lagged values of any of these dependent variables. Column (1) presents results for migrants; columns (2)-(4) present results for origin contacts. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Stayed in Quelimane*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports still living in Quelimane at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Likely to move*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports being likely or very like to move to Quelimane within the following 12 months, and 0 otherwise (3)-(4) *In Quelimane*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports living in Quelimane at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We report p-values of the procedure described in Romano & Wolf (2016) which allows for multiple hypotheses testing.

Table D28: Political freedom - migrants

	Freedom to speak	Freedom to join a political party	Freedom to vote	Freedom index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(TL) Leader treatment	-0.026	-0.031	-0.040*	-0.032*
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.090***	-0.069***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Observations	3263	3263	3263	3263
Adjusted R^2	0.301	0.246	0.196	0.287
Mean (control group)	0.259	0.346	0.372	0.326
TL = TB (p-value)	0.075	0.187	0.022	0.040
Outcome data	Endline	Endline	Endline	Endline

Table D29: Political freedom - district relatives

	Freedom to speak	Freedom to join a political party	Freedom to vote	Freedom index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.073***	0.068**	0.091***	0.077***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.026)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.030	0.033	0.049*	0.037
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Observations	2268	2270	2267	2275
Adjusted R^2	0.324	0.322	0.307	0.370
Mean (control group)	0.316	0.373	0.356	0.348
TL = TB (p-value)	0.106	0.221	0.138	0.122
Outcome data	Endline	Endline	Endline	Endline

Table D30: Political freedom - district relatives (only those in municipalities)

	Freedom to speak	Freedom to join a political party	Freedom to vote	Freedom index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.112**	0.089	0.154***	0.118**
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.046)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.105**	0.169***	0.160***	0.145***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.041)
Observations	474	477	478	478
Adjusted R^2	0.526	0.493	0.461	0.562
Mean (control group)	0.294	0.372	0.344	0.337
TL = TB (p-value)	0.871	0.197	0.926	0.578
Outcome data	Endline	Endline	Endline	Endline

Table D31: Self-reported voting (weighted)

	Vote RENAMO			Vote FRELIMO			Vote OTHER		
	Migrant	Resident	Origin contact	Migrant	Resident	Origin contact	Migrant	Resident	Origin contact
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.003	-0.057	0.121	-0.005	0.056	-0.155**	0.005	-0.056	0.155**
	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.078)	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.078)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.020	-0.038	0.002	-0.014	0.037	-0.056	0.014	-0.037	0.056
	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.073)	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.073)
Observations	2092	534	273	2092	534	273	2092	534	273
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.142	0.065	0.036	0.151	0.141	0.036	0.151	0.141
Mean (control group)	0.910	0.861	0.736	0.074	0.119	0.218	0.926	0.881	0.782
TL = TB (p-value)	0.219	0.631	0.185	0.508	0.618	0.218	0.508	0.618	0.218

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(6) show results from a phone survey conducted after the 2024 national elections in Mozambique. Column (3) shows results for the endline survey. We do not include the lagged values of any of the dependent variables. Dependent variables by columns: (1) *In a party (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to a political party, and 0 otherwise; (2) *In RENAMO (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to RENAMO, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Municipal elections 2023 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2023 municipal elections, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Presidential elections 2024 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Presidential elections 2024 – FRELIMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for FRELIMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (6) *Presidential elections 2024 – PODEMOS*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for PODEMOS in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table **??**. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 5 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.