Governing Environmental Markets: Evidence From Irrigation In Water Markets*

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Abstract

Water resources present a classic tragedy of the commons that is of increasing relevance due to climate change. This paper provides evidence of how property rights institutions, particularly local irrigators' organizations, impact water markets' efficiency. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset that integrates administrative records, hydrological measures, geographic information, and satellite imagery. We develop a novel misallocation test, which suggests that these organizations reduce misallocation caused by the natural capacity of upstream users to over-extract. Using different identification strategies, we show that these efficiency gains are a result of both water redistribution and individual adaptation, as downstream farmers increase substantially their water consumption and agricultural yield, and also extend their growing season. Large farms adopt more efficient irrigation technologies, and overall gather more benefits from the analyzed property rights institution. Meanwhile, although upstream farmers reduce their water consumption, their productive outcomes remain unchanged. We also document increases in river streamflow during the irrigation season, concentrated in basins with higher agricultural activity. Our results provide micro-evidence of the consequences of effective governance for both allocative efficiency and equity. *JEL codes: D23, D24, H41, O13, Q12, Q15, Q25.*

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1 Introduction

Climate change is closely intertwined with the Tragedy of the Commons. It arises from a commons problem–the unrestricted emission of greenhouse gases–and generates new challenges around other common pool resources, such as the increasing frequency of droughts worldwide (IPCC, 2021). The establishment of environmental markets over those resources aims to address these issues by restricting open access and forcing agents to internalize the negative externalities of their actions (Greenhill et al., 2026). However, our understanding of the institutions necessary to sustain the operation of these markets remains limited. This is particularly important since managing common pool resources presents inherent challenges–such as high exclusion costs and monitoring difficulties (Ostrom, 1990, 2009)–that complicate market implementation. In this paper, we use intra-country variation in property rights institutions to show empirically that water markets may fail to allocate water efficiently despite legally well-defined property rights, and further study how specialized enforcement institutions can improve their operation.

We study water allocation in 12 large-scale river basins in Chile, which share a unique institutional setting that allows us to isolate the role of local enforcement institutions. In Chile, water is allocated through water rights that, unlike many natural resource markets in developing countries (e.g., land, see Chari et al., 2021; Manysheva, 2022), are full property rights: they are perpetual, tradable, inheritable, independent of land tenure rights, and constitutionally protected against expropriation. Yet these strong protections have led regulations and courts to restrain government action, making it difficult for state agencies to enforce property rights, particularly to protect downstream users from upstream over-extraction. In this context, local formal irrigation organizations called Water Boards (Juntas de Vigilancia) have been established with both the goal and power to enforce water rights and resolve conflicts between users.[1]

Our analysis shows that water markets achieve within-basin allocative efficiency only when supported by these specialized enforcement institutions, despite property rights being

[1]Their design combines features of private associations and local regulators, reflecting a governance model where water administration and enforcement are largely exercised by user organizations within the legal framework established by the State. See Section 2 for details.

well defined across the territory. In a competitive market equilibrium, the marginal value of the resource should be equal across locations, with deviations from this benchmark indicating a Pareto inefficient allocation. To empirically assess whether this condition holds and where, we develop a novel misallocation test that exploits idiosyncratic variation in rainfall timing and volume to compare the shadow value of water at different locations within a basin. This "sufficient statistic approach" measure identifies economic misallocation even after accounting for adaptation, entry and exit decisions, and private arrangements made by the agents. Our results show that the average shadow value of water remains constant within basins governed by Water Boards. In contrast, in areas without such boards, the shadow value of water is significantly higher in downstream than in upstream locations, indicating over-extraction by upstream users relative to a socially optimal allocation.

To establish that Water Boards causally affect water allocation, we exploit the staggered adoption of Water Boards across basins in an event-study difference-in-differences design, focusing on the dry season (December-February) when water scarcity is most acute and irrigation demand peaks. Using remote sensing-based estimates of water consumption and agricultural yields at the farm-plot level, we measure the distributive impacts of Water Board establishment across locations within treated areas. We find that following the establishment of a Water Board, downstream farms increase their water consumption by 1 standard deviation of their individual historical distribution, growing up to 2 standard deviation after 7 years; upstream farms, instead, see reductions up to 0.8 standard deviations after 7 years. We also show how this addresses a source of misallocation directly: downstream farms increase their yields by 0.6 standard deviations after 7 years, while upstream farms do not see significant reductions in this measure.

These farm-level redistribution patterns are driven by changes in river streamflows, the main physical channel through which Water Boards reallocate water for irrigation. Exploiting the staggered adoption of Water Boards in a difference-in-differences design at the river segment level, we find that Water Board establishment increases river streamflows by 25% during the dry season, when incentives to over-extract are strongest. This effect is concentrated in upstream monitoring stations and in areas with high agricultural intensity, consistent with Water Boards preventing upstream over-extraction by physically controlling

water flows through canal gates,[2] and enabling water to reach downstream users. We do not observe effects in the rest of the year, when the absence of enforcement is not binding.

To identify long-run effects, we employ an instrumental variable strategy based on the cost of reaching the specific courts with jurisdiction to initiate Water Board establishment—costs that are irrelevant for other legal matters affecting downstream users. Our IV estimates reveal that property rights enforcement substantially impacts water allocation and agricultural productivity both through large-scale redistribution and private investments. Water Boards increase water consumption per area by 68% among farms located in the most downstream tercile of each basin, while they reduce consumption among farms in the most upstream tercile by around 31%. We observe qualitatively similar effects in agricultural yield: an increase of 57% among downstream irrigated farmers, and no significant effects among upstream ones. Remarkably, these effects align with our DID estimates after 7 years, which rely on a different source of variation, serving as mutual robustness checks.

Our IV estimates further reveal that enforcement effects extend beyond the mechanical redistribution of water. The greater stability and predictability of water access enabled by Water Boards allows downstream farms to make complementary investments: they extend their growing season by approximately a month, allowing numerous farms to switch to summer crops, while large downstream farms adopt more efficient irrigation technologies. These induced private responses help explain the pattern observed in our event-study estimates, where increases in water consumption among downstream users exceed the reduction among upstream farmers, indicating that enforcement generates net gains through both direct reallocation and the productive investments it enables.

It's possible to formalize this intuition in a theoretical model, featuring unobservable productivity differences and unverifiable water consumption.[3]. We focus on two equilibria: with governance, responsibility for downstream water access is centralized, generating incentives for a governing body to invest in costly enforcement. Without governance, responsibility for enforcement is dispersed across users, resulting in a Tragedy of the Commons in which enforcement is underprovided.

[2] See Section 2 for a detailed description of the enforcement mechanism and Figure I for an illustration.
[3] Available upon request.

Overall, our results indicate that legally well-defined property rights alone are insufficient to ensure efficient resource allocation when enforcement is weak. At first glance, Chile's water rights system appears to satisfy the Coase Theorem's prerequisites: property rights are clearly defined, tradable, and protected in a country with strong Rule of Law.[4] Yet our findings reveal that these conditions are not sufficient for markets to allocate water efficiently (Coase, 1960; Medema, 2020; Deryugina et al., 2021).

The key missing element is effective enforcement–a gap that emerges directly from Chile's regulatory design, which deliberately limits government intervention in favor of decentralized transactions (Bauer, 2004; Tamayo and Carmona, 2019b). This reflects a fundamental tension in the design of environmental markets: while reducing state oversight may lower some transaction costs, it can simultaneously undermine the enforcement mechanisms necessary for markets to function. Our results show that institutional arrangements empowering local user communities to monitor and enforce rights can bridge this gap (Ostrom, 1990), improving allocative efficiency even when formal property rights are already well established.

Related Literature. Our paper contributes to a range of literatures, including management of water and common pool resources in general, frictions in developing markets, and the economic impacts of agricultural infrastructure. We first contribute to the literature on common pool resource management.[5] Ostrom (1990) identifies local communities as an alternative to state management or privatization for governing common pool resources, with subsequent work testing these ideas in small-scale settings through case studies and lab experiments (e.g. Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Ostrom, 2009; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ostrom, 2010; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008; Cárdenas and Ostrom, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006).[6]

[4] In 2024 Chile ranked 25th worldwide in the V-DEM Rule of Law Index with a score of 0.945, comparable to the United Kingdom, France and Singapore (Herre et al., 2013).

[5] Water exhibits the classic features of a common pool resource—difficulty enforcing exclusion and rivalry in consumption—creating incentives for over-extraction in the absence of effective governance (Hardin, 1968). Conventional approaches allocate decision rights to either the state or private agents through privatization, but implicitly assign monitoring and enforcement tasks to the state.

[6] Among the conditions Ostrom (1990) identifies for successful community governance are monitoring capability, availability of sanctions among community members, and closed access to outsiders. However, in our context—distribution of water within basins encompassing multiple communities—these conditions do not directly apply: agents cannot observe actions outside their community, cannot exclude others from purchasing water rights, and asymmetric externalities (upstream actions harm downstream users, but not

We extend this literature by showing how local enforcement organizations can address free-riding across multiple communities in large-scale river basins by wielding state-like authority to resolve disputes and sanction violations. More broadly, we contribute to work on water institutions and property rights enforcement (Libecap, 2011; Bauer, 2004; Jacoby et al., 2020; Chong and López-de Silanes, 2006; Edwards, 2015; Edwards et al., 2021; Edwards, 2016; Mesías and Torralba, 2023), providing the first design-based causal evidence on the impact of enforcement institutions in settings with well-defined, tradable property rights over common pool resources, and water in general.

We also contribute to the literature on the efficiency and operation of markets for natural resources and environmental goods. In water markets, Rafey (2023) estimates substantial gains from trading in Australia under strong government enforcement, while other work on water compares markets to alternative allocation mechanisms, finding efficiency losses from rationing (Ryan and Sudarshan, 2022), mixed results relative to quota systems (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2023), and net gains relative to open access (Ayres et al., 2021). Research on misallocation in other natural resources shows how property rights reforms in land markets enable efficient reallocation and productivity gains (De Janvry et al., 2015; Chari et al., 2021; Gollin and Udry, 2021; Manysheva, 2022), while recent work on the operation of environmental markets has focused on pollution permits, highlighting that enforcement is of particular concern (Calel et al., 2025b; Gonzalez-Lira and Mobarak, 2022) and that institutional design has first-order effects on market outcomes (Colmer et al., 2024; Greenstone et al., 2025; Calel et al., 2025a). We contribute methodologically by developing a misallocation test for surface water that recovers the marginal product of water from output responses to exogenous availability shocks. This sufficient statistics approach does not require direct consumption measurement–critical since water use is not metered in many contexts. Substantively, we provide the first causal evidence on how enforcement of property rights affects water allocation. Most related work identifies misallocation from legal limits on exercising property rights; we instead demonstrate how limits to government action—designed to prevent market interference—can undermine enforcement capacity and generate misallocation (Bauer, 2004). This is possible because, unlike pollution spillovers

vice versa) prevent informal cooperation through repeated interactions.

that disperse across space, water externalities in river basins are directional and geographically contained, allowing us to isolate and measure enforcement impacts in ways that are not feasible in other environmental markets.

We further contribute to research on the economic impacts of water infrastructure. Studies of large-scale irrigation infrastructure find increases in agricultural productivity alongside substantial distributional consequences (Duflo and Pande, 2007; Blakeslee et al., 2021; Asher et al., 2022; Burlig et al., 2024; Cisse et al., 2026). We document large differences in efficiency and benefits from infrastructure and arkets within a country, and show how these productivity and distributional impacts depend critically on the interaction between local institutions and geography, documenting substantial heterogeneity by location (upstream vs. downstream) and farm characteristics.

Methodologically, we join the first wave of research using remote sensing to measure agricultural water consumption at the farm level (Boser et al., 2024), enabling causal analysis at scales previously infeasible.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of Chile's water property rights system and the role of Water Boards. After describing our data in Section 3, we present our misallocation test and its results in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the key mechanisms driving our findings–water redistribution and farmers' private responses. Section 6 concludes.

2 Context

We study the introduction of Water Boards, a local governance institution that manage rivers in periods of water scarcity and solve legal conflicts among users. Thanks to their local nature, Water Boards know and interact directly with water users, in contrast to most centralized bureaucracies in charge of water management. In this section, we provide background information on the study area, the system of property rights over water, and the characteristics of Water Boards.

Geography. The area under study covers latitudes -30 to -38 and the full longitudinal

range of Chile in this area (approximately −68 to −72.5) as shown in the central panel of Figure II. This area covers 87% of Chile's population and 85% of its agricultural GDP. The geography is marked by both the Andes –which defines the eastern border of the country– and Coastal Mountain Ranges that extend in a North-South axis. Most agricultural activity takes place in the Central Valley that separates both ranges, and most rivers run from the Andes (East) to the Coast (West)(Fernández and Gironás, 2021). The rugged topography makes the construction of infrastructure connecting basins extremely costly. In our analysis, we focus on 12 large-scale rivers that run across the full longitudinal range of Chile in this area –i.e. with river heads in the Andes, at the border with Argentina, to the river mouth in the Pacific. We present these basins in Figure III.

The climate in this area is characterized as Mediterranean, with rainfall increasing in a North-South gradient; and a dry season extending from November to March. Rivers in this area are mostly fed by both rainfall and snowmelt (Varas and Varas, 2021; **?**). This implies that rivers reach their maximum stream levels in the boreal winter and spring, then decline to reach minimum levels in summer and early fall (between February and April). Importantly, longer days make summer a key period for agricultural production, implying that irrigation is most important in the driest months.[7]

Background on the Chilean System of Private Property Rights. Since 1981, Chile has been the only country in the world where perpetual private property rights over water (water rights in what follows) have constitutional protection against expropriation, which has resulted in limited administrative action by governments (Bauer, 2004; World Bank, 2011a, 2021; Tamayo and Carmona, 2019a). These rights are fully transferable, separated from land, and legally considered real estate, such that a water rights purchase is legally equivalent to a purchase of land (CNR, 2018a)[8]. These rights are defined in terms of a stream of water (measured in liters per second) to be extracted from a specific location and

[7] Appendix Table A.XIV presents the irrigation calendar for Chile's major crops, which are concentrated during the summer months. Appendix Figure A.I illustrates how monthly water distribution closely mirror this seasonal pattern in irrigation demand.

[8] The titles also include the property over the infrastructure that allows the distribution of water, but there are legal figures that allow to mandate one user to share the infrastructure with other users that own water rights (CNR, 2018a).

source and following a monthly schedule; each of these attributes are defined during the creation of each water right. Appendix Figure A.II presents an example of a water right.

Water rights can be claimed for free through public requests to the Directorate of Water (DGA, a national public institution similar to the US Bureau of Reclamation), the regulatory agency in charge of assessing water resources and enforcing laws governing water issues. These rights can be generated until the DGA declares the river exhausted. After a source is declared exhausted, any user needing water rights in the area must purchase them from other users. Water rights can be freely traded among both individuals and firms, without any interference by the government, and they are legally considered real estate (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 1981).

The legal body that regulates water matters is the Water Code of 1981. Enforcement in principle relies on the DGA, which is supposed to address water stealing and over-extraction. However, Chile's higher courts have overruled and systematically limited the scope of DGA's enforcement capacities (Bauer, 2004). A second enforcement layer is that the infrastructure in place shall be built consistently with the water rights owned. The diameter of the pipe–checked by DGA agents at the time of reclamation–connecting the farm to the canal or well limits the total extraction capacity (CNR, 2018a). This coarse measure limits over-extraction in normal times by limiting the maximum water intake, but it does not during droughts: while the law establishes that users should limit their water extraction proportionally to the reduction in total streamflow (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 1981), the infrastructure cannot adapt accordingly. The DGA guidelines establish that permanent water rights should have an exceedance probability of 85%, meaning that they can be created up to the point where the total volume claimed in a water source is available 85% of the time. This implies that water is insufficient to satisfy all rights–and so, that infrastructure should not bind–for almost two months per year on average.

Background on Water Boards. Droughts reduce the total stream flow, and Chilean law establishes that these reductions should be prorated proportionally among all users, such that a reduction of 50% of the total river streamflow should imply a 50% reduction in maximum extractions by each user. Until recently, public agencies have not been able

to intervene effectively in the allocation of water under scarcity, due to restrictions on administrative government action and lack of resources, leaving a void in the enforcement of drought-induced reductions (Bauer, 2004).

In response to droughts, early in the 20th century agricultural users created Water Boards as a representative body of water users (Peña, 2021). With the passing of the Water Code of 1981, Water Boards gained the legal authority to 1) determine and enforce water allocations across legal users under extraordinary circumstances, such as drought, 2) adjudicate disputes among users within their jurisdiction, 3) keep track of Water Rights claims, and 4) provide common goods such as legal assistance and common infrastructure, while defining its own funding sources.[9] Their design combines features of private associations and local regulators: they maintain registries of water rights, mediate disputes, and enforce allocations during scarcity by physically controlling water flows through canal gates (Bauer, 2004; Donoso, 2016; Engler et al., 2021; Blanco and Donoso, 2024). This arrangement reflects a governance model where the practical administration of water and the enforcement of rights are largely exercised by user organizations within the legal framework established by the State (Vergara Blanco, 2014).

This enforcement mechanism becomes critical during periods of water stress—typically summer months—when Chilean law mandates that water shortages be distributed proportionally among users according to their rights. Figure I illustrates this: in normal times (Panel A), fixed irrigation infrastructure provides enforcement. During droughts, without Water Boards (Panel B), upstream farmers can over-extract, leaving downstream users without their water allotment. With Water Boards (Panel C), instead, they enforce proportional allocation based on water rights, stopping upstream over-extraction and allowing water to reach downstream farmers.

Water Boards enforce water allocations during droughts by implementing a system of irrigation shifts, in which the Boards calculate the number of days or hours of unrestricted irrigation that correspond to each farmer, given each farmer's water allotment and the to-

[9] Appendix Figures A.III, A.IV, and A.V illustrate core functions typically performed by Water Boards, including (1) enforcement of water rights through proration during scarcity, (2) organization of general assemblies, and (3) maintenance of shared irrigation infrastructure such as canal cleaning and repairs. The images were retrieved on July 29, 2025, from LinkedIn posts and official websites of Water Boards in Chile.

tal water available for distribution. The Boards enforce this delineated irrigation time by opening and locking canal gates, such as the one depicted in Figure IV. This technology is not unique to the Chilean context (e.g., the case of Murcia, see Ostrom, 1990, pg. 77), nor costly: in 2005, membership fees represented less than 4% of the total average cost of production for farms growing the most common crops in the area of study (Jorge et al., 2009)..

During their 2 or 3-year tenure, Water Boards report only to their constituents, who elect them with votes weighted by their Water Rights streamflow property. Water Boards are further subject to regulation by the DGA, but courts have curtailed the DGA's ability to intervene (Bauer, 2004). Therefore, Water Boards are effectively the highest administrative authority in water-related issues in the basins under their jurisdiction, except for emergency situations.

The creation of Water Boards is triggered by either an agreement by at least half of the water rights owners within the area under consideration, or by a lawsuit from at least one water user. This process is under the jurisdiction of an ordinary judge housed in the most upstream province capital city within the basin in question.[10] During this process, each community agrees on the final jurisdiction and statutes, which are subject to restrictions by the Water Code. The location and establishment date of these boards are presented in Figure V.

Administrative and Legal Jurisdiction. Water Boards' jurisdictions covers surface water bodies within their boundaries.[11]. Figure VI presents flowcharts of how Water Boards relate to Chilean administrative (Panel a) and legal institutions (Panel b) on water matters. Administrative measures, such as cutting allotments in the context of drought, are decided by each Water Board, for water rights within their jurisdiction.[12] If any user wants to dispute a given decision, they can appeal to the DGA; however, in practice, DGA's capacity

[10] Articles 269^{th} and 270^{th} of the Water Code of 1981 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 1981).

[11] In 2005, their jurisdiction expanded, to include groundwater (CNR, 2018a; Fernández and Gironás, 2021).

[12] For water rights registered in canals, Water Boards make decisions regarding allotments for the full canal, and the corresponding Canal Association will solve the matter within the canal. Users willing to dispute their Canal Association decisions may direct their complaints to the Water Board.

is limited, and its decisions have been overruled by courts in several lawsuits (Bauer, 2004; World Bank, 2011b).

In the case of legal actions, any people and firms owning water rights should ask for a ruling from the Water Board that has jurisdiction over the water source in question. [13] Part of the duties of a Water Board is to appoint a "Judge of Waters," who is usually part of the board or an employee of the Board. This judge has full authority to solve legal disputes and to enforce their rulings with the authority of the Water Board. In the absence of a Water Board, instead, the only option available to users is to initiate legal action through ordinary courts (civil or penal courts, depending on the nature of the conflict). Water Boards substitute ordinary courts on water matters, with additional field expertise.

Appeals to Water Board rulings –or lawsuits against the Boards themselves– must be made to the Appeals Courts, and eventually can be escalated to the Supreme Court. Bauer (2004) discusses how higher courts lacked water-specific knowledge and how their rulings have ignored substantive water issues, instead focusing exclusively on the legal issues at hand and emphasizing the "letter of the law."

3 Data

We gathered a richness of information that reflects the *de jure* and *de facto* allocation of water across space and time, together with detailed agricultural information to measure outcomes and climatic controls. Our analysis has three stages: first, our misallocation test, implemented using farm level census data, combined with weather data at the county level; then a farm level analysis based on remote sensing and administrative data, and finally our basin level analysis.

[13] If the users under conflict own water rights linked to a canal, their first step is to address their Canal Association, which manages water issues within a given canal. If the agents are unsatisfied with their ruling, they can appeal to their Water Board, or ordinary courts, if there is no Water Board with jurisdiction in the area. Water Boards also have jurisdiction over all conflicts that may arise among canals themselves, as long as they are within the Boards' jurisdiction.

3.1 Farm level, Misallocation Test

2007 Agricultural Census. The misallocation test uses data from the 2007 Agricultural Census, collected by the National Statistic Bureau (INE, the official statistical office of Chile). This Census includes operation-level information on land use and extension, crop choice, capital and employment decisions, managerial characteristics and legal organization. Importantly, includes information on production for more than 20 annual crops, and self-reported information on the use of irrigation and the sources and legal status of irrigation water, together with affiliation to agricultural organizations (including specifically Canal Associations).

Climate Data. The Center for Climate and Resilience Research (CR^2) created daily climatic estimates for the entire Chilean territory at a $0.05° \times 0.05°$ resolution, by calibrating satellite measures with local input from climatic monitoring stations (Alvarez-Garreton et al., 2018). These estimates include precipitation, potential evapotranspiration and minimum and maximum temperatures. We aggregate these climatic estimates at the plot, county or the drainage basin level, according to the analysis on which the data is being used.

3.2 Farm Level, DID and IV Analysis

Water Organizations. The information on the jurisdictions and establishment date of Water Boards was provided by the DGA. This institution also provided the maps of the jurisdictions of each board, and also information on the location and jurisdiction of Canal Associations.

Land Plot Limits and Canal Locations. SII (the Chilean Tax Authority) maintains for tax purposes a Land Cadaster, with detailed information on each plot of land in the country. CIREN geocoded the Land Cadaster for 2013. CIREN also has information on soil quality, measured as their suitability for irrigation. Our sample corresponds to land

plots located less than 1km away from a canal. We obtained the canal locations and data from the DGA and CIEDESS, a local research center focused on natural resources.

Satellite Information on Evapotranspiration and Greenness. We use EVI and Evapotranspiration estimates by the USGS based on LANDSAT 5 images. USGS estimates and maps Evapotranspiration using the SSEBop model (Senay, 2018; Senay et al, 2023). This method recovers Evapotranspiration from an Energy Balance condition that equates the measured sun radiation on the surface to the calculated surface reflectance, estimated soil heat absorption, and Evapotranspiration (which is recovered as a residual)(Allen et al., 2015). We use images captured since the year 1986 using as input Landsat-5 images, with a resolution of $30m \times 30m$, a resolution fine enough to allow us to perform plot-level analysis. We also use EVI estimates based on Landsat 5 images from the same source, also with a resolution of $30m \times 30m$.

3.3 Basin Level Analysis

Basins, Streamflows and Climate. The DGA maintains a network of 803 monitoring stations in rivers and canals across the country since 1913. Our main sample is composed by 306 of these stations that have been created before 1980 in the Study Area. CR^2 has identified the drainage areas of each monitoring station and their characteristics. These characteristics include the cultivated surface within the drainage area, and also the amount of water rights created in the area each year.

Figure VII summarizes the correspondence between data sources, stage of analysis, and units of analysis employed throughout the paper.

4 Misallocation Test

In this section, we provide evidence that water misallocation occurs only in areas without Water Boards. We propose a misallocation test based on the idea that if irrigation water can be reallocated within a basin through a frictionless market, the marginal product of water (MPW) should be equalized within the basin.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, consider the problem of a farmer choosing the amount of water rights to acquire at the beginning of the season; this corresponds to the maximum amount of irrigation the farmer could use during the irrigation season. Rainfall substitutes for irrigation water at a fixed rate, but follows a known random distribution (Rafey, 2023). The First Order Condition of this problem is that the farmer acquires water rights such that the expected marginal product of water is equal to the expected shadow value of water in the irrigation season. Second, the effect of an unexpected rainfall shock during the irrigation season is equal to the marginal product of water (times the marginal rate of technical substitution between rainfall and irrigation water), as a consequence of the Envelope Theorem, combined with the presence of fixed inputs (Hsiang, 2016; Deryugina and Hsiang, 2017). Finally, a benevolent Social Planner maximizing the total value of the production by society will equate the expected shadow values of water across users[14].

To test empirically the null hypothesis of equal average marginal product of water across locations, we identify unexpected rainfall shocks at different positions within the basin. By measuring how these shocks affect profits, we can calculate the semielasticity of profits to rainfall, which equals the marginal value of water. Our results show that in areas without Water Boards, the marginal value of water declines significantly from downstream to upstream locations, showing a pattern of misallocation consistent with the natural advantage of upstream users to over-extract. In contrast, areas governed by Water Boards show no significant differences in marginal returns across locations.

4.1 Model of Agricultural Production and Irrigation under Water Rights

Environment. Consider a Social Planner's problem of allocating water rights to N farmers, who can freely choose inputs for agricultural production. Agricultural production follows a cycle over the year, with 3 seasons: a Planting season $s = 0$, a Growing season ($s = 1$) and Harvest time ($s = 2$). Water supply has different impacts depending on this stage; in what follows, we assume that irrigation is only useful in $s = 1$.

[14] We focus on the allocation of water rights instead of effective water because our setting has limited short-term (i.e. intra-seasonal) trading due to limited storage capacity in most basins (Bauer, 2004; Hadjigeorgalis and Lillywhite, 2004). Hence, most trading decisions happen when there is still uncertainty about how much water will be effectively available. Nevertheless, this analysis is equivalent to a first-order approximation to a similar analysis for the allocation of water itself.

At stage $s = 0$ each farmer $i \in N$ chooses crop c, capital K_i and land S_i, which are fixed over the full production cycle. At stage $s = 1$, the farmer chooses the flexible inputs, namely labor L_i and effective irrigation w_i. Effective irrigation is capped by the amount of water rights allocated to the farmer $\bar{w}_i$. Rainfall r is a perfect substitute for irrigation water, up to a technical rate of substitution constant θ. Rainfall is a random variable with a distribution known by all agents. We assume that input and output prices are known in advance, and all markets are competitive.

There is a Social Planner who allocates Water Rights to each user; each user will extract after rainfall uncertainty is realized. The timeline of decisions is therefore:

Time= 0 : Social planner allocates water rights. Farmers choose crops, capital and land.

Time= 1 : Farmers hire labor and apply irrigation water subject to their Water Rights caps

Time= 2 : Profits are realized

Finally, each production function F_c is increasing, continuous, strictly concave, and monotone[15].

Farmers' Problem. We solve by backward induction: the problem of user i at stage $s = 1$ is to choose the optimal irrigation and labor quantities to maximize profits:

$$\max_{L_i, w_i} \quad p_c F_i^c(S_i, K_i, L_i, w_i + \theta r_i) - \lambda_i^s(w_i - \bar{w}_i) - c_L L_i$$

[15] While the first two properties are assumed to keep the analysis simple (i.e. to guarantee that the demands for all factors are functions and not correspondences) and it is possible to replace them without loss of generality, the last assumption may be more controversial, as it rules out scenarios where excessive rainfall adversely affects production. While such a scenario is certainly realistic, in the area under study– with mostly dry Mediterranean weather with a well-marked rainfall season in the winter–is rare, and it did not take place in the period under analysis (2006-2007 Austral agricultural year).

Consider the case where irrigation increases production until a total water input threshold, after which water damages production: any rainfall that falls below this threshold will just supplement the water input provided by the farmer up to this threshold, after which it will just crowd-out the farmer's input (i.e. the farmer will reduce its water input up to keep water below the threshold). In this scenario, the shadow value of water is zero, and so the problem and the shadow value preserve their meaning.

The First Order Conditions of this problem are

$$\begin{aligned} FOC\left(w_i\right) &: p_c F_{i\,w}^{c\prime} = \lambda_i^w \\ FOC\left(L_i\right) &: p_c F_{i\,L}^{c\prime} = c_L \end{aligned}$$

Under the assumptions above, each farmer will just use the total amount of water rights allocated to them. The shadow value of water will be equal to the marginal product of irrigation water.

In stage $s = 0$ the problem of the farmer is to choose the optimal Capital, Land, and crop: The fixed inputs are chosen based on

$$\max_{K_i, S_i} \quad \mathbb{E}_r \left\{ p F_i^c \left(S_i, K_i, L_i\left(K_i, S_i, \bar{w}_i\right), w_i\left(K_i, S_i, \bar{w}_i\right) + \theta r_i\right) - c_S S_i - c_K K_i | I_0 \right\}$$

The First Order Conditions of this problem are

$$\begin{aligned} FOC\left(S_i\right) &: \mathbb{E}_r \left\{ p_c F_{i\,S}^{c\prime} | I_0 \right\} = c_S \\ FOC\left(K_i\right) &: \mathbb{E}_r \left\{ p_c F_{i\,K}^{c\prime} | I_0 \right\} = c_K \end{aligned}$$

where the Envelope Theorem rules out any indirect effects on any flexible inputs. Given the choices for each input, we can define the expected profits for farmer i conditional on choosing crop c:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_i^c(\bar{w}_i) \equiv & \mathbb{E}_r \left\{ p_c F_i^c \left(S_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right), K_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right), L_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right), w_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right) + \theta r_i\right) \right. \\ & \left. - c_S S_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right) - c_K K_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right) - c_L L_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right) - \lambda_i^w \left(w_i\left(\bar{w}_i\right) - \bar{w}_i\right) | I_0 \right\} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

The farmers, therefore, will choose the crop with maximum expected profits. The farmer's expected profits are

$$\bar{\pi}_i(\bar{w}_i) \equiv \max \left\{ k : \pi_i^k(\bar{w}_i) \right\} \tag{2}$$

Social Planners' Problem. Let's define the Social Welfare Function as the sum of the

expected production of all farmers within the basin:

$$\Omega\left(\bar{\mathbf{w}}\right) \equiv \sum_{i} \bar{\pi}_i(\bar{w}_i)$$

The problem of the social planner is to allocate water rights across users to maximize the expected total production value, subject to the total availability of water:

$$\max_{\{\bar{w}_i\}|_{i=1}^{N}} \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{w}) = \sum_{i} \bar{\pi}_i(\bar{w}_i) - \lambda^W \left(\sum_{i} \bar{w}_i - \bar{W} \right) \tag{3}$$

Note that the social planner's objective function is just the sum of value functions of all farmers; therefore, as a consequence of the Maximum Theorem, the social planner's objective function is continuous on each water right $\bar{w}_i$. The first order condition with respect to $\bar{w}_i$ is

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{w})}{\partial \bar{w}_i} = 0 \iff \frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{w}_i} = \lambda^W \tag{4}$$

Therefore, the optimal allocation satisfies $\dfrac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{w}_i} = \dfrac{\partial \bar{\pi}_j}{\partial \bar{w}_j}$, $\forall i, j \in N$[16]. Note that:

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\pi}_i}{\partial \bar{w}_i} = \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}_r \left\{ p_k F_i^K | I_0 \right\}}{\partial \bar{w}_i} = \mathbb{E}\left\{ \lambda_i^w | I_0 \right\}$$

where K represents the crop chosen by the farmer, and the second equality is a consequence of the Envelope Theorem.[17] In the socially optimal allocation, therefore, the expected shadow value of water is equal across farmers; any deviation from that implies the opportunity to increase expected welfare by redistributing water rights from users with a high shadow value of water to users with a low shadow value.

The Effect of a Rainfall Shock and the Marginal Product of Water. Consider the effect on social welfare of an unanticipated rainfall shock over farm i at $s = 1$. As the water

[16] This is not true in the presence of fixed costs. In that case, the previous statement is true for every pair of farms i, j that are optimally receiving water, and so, the fixed cost is sunk.

[17] The application is direct in this case; a more general discussion can be found in Hsiang (2016); Deryugina and Hsiang (2017)

rights allocation is fixed, then:

$$\frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial r_i} = \theta \lambda_i^w$$

. So the total effect of an unexpected rainfall shock on production is equal to the shadow value of water of the affected farmer, times the marginal rate of technical substitution between irrigation water and rainfall. Note that Rafey (2023) estimate θ to be equal to 1.048 for annual irrigated crops, which is approximately equal to 1.[18]

Two key conclusions emerge from the previous discussion. First, the optimal allocation of water rights equalizes the expected marginal product of irrigation water across users. Second, the effect of an unexpected rainfall shock is equal to the marginal product of irrigation water.

4.2 Test Implementation

We can test the null hypothesis of equal average marginal product of water across locations by identifying unexpected rainfall shocks by position within the basin, for treated and control areas, and then to measure their impact over profits; the semielasticity of profits to these rainfall shocks will equate the marginal value of water (Deryugina and Hsiang, 2017). Our Agricultural Census data do not measure the effective water input for each parcel; but as rainfall is a perfect substitute for irrigation water, up to an absorption rate (equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution between rainfall and irrigation water) (Rafey, 2023), we exploit the timing of rainfall to get within county variation in water input received during the irrigation season–which we call "useful rainfall"–at the parcel level across the production cycle.

We illustrate the construction of this variable in Figure VIII. We define useful rainfall as the total rainfall falling in a farmer's county during the months when their crop requires irrigation in the current agricultural year. In this example, Farms A and B are both located in County 1, with rainfall over the agricultural year represented by the blue bars. Farm A cultivates a crop that follows the yellow irrigation schedule, while Farm B cultivates one

[18] The estimates of θ for other crop choices are 1.081 for perennial crops, for annual non-irrigated crops is 0.591 and for dairy is 0.148.

that follows the green schedule. Consequently, all rainfall received in December, January, and February is useful for Farm A but not for Farm B. Another source of variation comes from geography. Consider a farm with the same irrigation schedule as Farm A, but located in a nearby county where rainfall is represented by the red bars. This farm experiences a slightly different water input than Farm A, due to the distinct monthly rainfall pattern in its county. This variation, conditional on fine spatial fixed effects and agricultural choices, allows us to test for differences in the average shadow value of water between farms that rely on canal-based irrigation and those with water rights, even when located within the same basin.

We implement our misallocation test using the 2007 Chilean Agricultural Census, which contains a rich set of technology and input choices (including irrigation technology, planted surface, hired and total workers, machinery use, and property of water rights), which we combined with soil quality estimates and daily climate data at the county level, including precipitation and temperature by calendar day. The sample for the estimation includes farms with irrigation from canals, owning or renting water rights, and with a cultivated area below 50 hectares, and located in counties whose centroids belong to one of the 12 basins under study.[19]

We estimate

$$\begin{aligned}\log\left(\frac{Y}{\text{Hectares}}\right)_{irc}^{2007} &= \beta_1 \text{Board}_c + \beta_2 \text{Useful Rain}_{rc} + \beta_3 \text{Distance to Sea}_c \\ &+ \beta_4 \text{Board}_c \times \text{Useful Rain}_{rc} + \beta_5 \text{Board}_c \times \text{Distance to Sea}_c \\ &+ \beta_6 \text{Useful Rain}_{rc} \times \text{Distance to Sea}_c \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{Board}_c \times \text{Useful Rain}_{rc} \times \text{Distance to Sea}_c \\ &+ \beta_X \mathbb{X}_i^{2007} + \mu_c + \mu_r + \varepsilon_{irc}\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where $\log(Y/\text{Hectares})$ is the logarithm of the value of output per hectare obtained by farm i on planting crop r in county c, Useful rainfall$_{r,c}$ is the rainfall received during the irrigation season of crop r in county c, in megaliters per hectare per months ($ML/ha/month$),

[19] We eliminate farms above 50 hectares to eliminate outliers; including farms above this threshold does not change the results qualitatively, but the standard errors are higher.

Distance to Coast$_c$ is the distance to the river mouth from the centroid of each county c through the river, in kilometers.[20] $\mathbb{X}_i^{2007}$ is the set of controls, which includes the logarithm of the total labor hired during the 2007 agricultural year, a vector of capital and technology choices and the irrigated surface. Board$_c$ equals 1 if the farms belong to a county whose centroid falls inside the jurisdiction of a water board. Finally, μ_c is a county fixed effect, and μ_r is a crop fixed effect.

On estimating equation 5, we are exploiting within-county, within-crop variation in the timing of rainfall, which is arguably exogenous on most determinants of agricultural production.[21] County fixed effects will capture common shocks to all farms and average expectations, and individual farm controls–including crop fixed effects– will capture long term and short term determinants of output. On estimating equation 5, we are exploiting within-county, within-crop variation in the timing of rainfall, which is arguably exogenous on most determinants of agricultural production. One threat to our identification strategy is the presence of imbalances: farmers may try to match the pattern of rainfalls to optimize their water (Kala, 2019); if our controls do not capture the farmers' information, then it is possible to have biased estimates.

In Table I we present a Balance Table for useful rainfall, after including our main controls: basin fixed effects, 0.5×0.5-degree-cell fixed effects, and crop fixed effects. There are no systematic differences for our sample. For our main sample (irrigated fields) we only observe a decrease in rainfall as we move from the coast to upstream locations, but there is no significant differential rainfall pattern between farms located in counties with and without water boards. In the case of our placebo sample, there are some differences in useful rainfall that disappear once we include finer spatial controls (i.e. 0.5×0.5-degree-cell fixed effects). In any case, any difference that may have had appear in this table would be controlled by the inclusion of county fixed effects, which are included in our preferred specification.

Equation 5 allows us to estimate directly the functions needed for our Misallocation

[20] This distance corresponds to the length of the least cost path connecting each county centroid to the river mouth, through the river network representing the hydrology of each basin. For details, see Annex B.

[21] In other words, useful rainfall is as good as random, conditional on locational, crop, input, and technology choices.

Test. First, we estimate the Average Shadow Value of Water as a function for the distance to the coast, in the absence of water boards:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}\left\{\pi_i | \, I_0, \text{Distance to Sea, No Board}\right\}}{\partial w_i} = \beta_2 + \beta_6 \times \text{Distance to Sea} \tag{6}$$

Second, we estimate the Average Shadow Value of Water as a function for the distance to the coast, under water boards:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}\left\{\pi_i | \, I_0, \text{Distance to Sea, Board}\right\}}{\partial w_i} = (\beta_2 + \beta_4) + (\beta_6 + \beta_7) \times \text{Distance to Sea} \tag{7}$$

We test for misallocation by comparing the shadow value of water as a function of each farm's position in the river. We investigate how the shadow value of water varies with distance from the river mouth, specifically examining whether the marginal value of water differs between the top of the river (its head) and the location where it drains to the sea.

Results. In Table II we present the results of estimating equation 5, considering an array of location-fixed effects. Our preferred specification is in column 4, which we also present graphically in Figure IX. The estimated coefficient associated with rainfall (β_6) implies that for farms in our sample - water right owners, affiliated to canal associations and with irrigation - an extra unit of water ($ML/ha/month$) would increase yield by 42% if they are at the river mouth. When taking into account the coefficient associated with the interaction of useful rainfall and distance to the mouth, we see that for farms located approximately $200km$ upstream, the increase becomes a non-significant reduction of 10%. The estimated average MPW is presented as the red function in Figure IX and clearly displays a higher average shadow value of water in locations downstream versus upstream.

This result is consistent with misallocation: farms located downstream are water-restricted, while farms located upstream are not; a marginal displacement of water through the river from upstream locations to downstream locations would increase the total value of production, but the lack of enforcement prevents such reallocation. At the bottom of Table II we present the p-values of the test of equality of MPW across locations; for all specifica-

tions, we reject the null hypothesis of no misallocation at the 10% confidence threshold[22].

In contrast, for counties within the jurisdiction of Water Boards, the average shadow value of water is similar, regardless of their distance to the river mouth. For counties located next to the coast, there is a non-significant reduction in value per hectare of around 5% per extra megameter of water per hectare per month), which is approximately the same for farms located $200km$ upstream. The average shadow value of water as a function of the distance to the coast is presented as the blue function in Figure IX, is flat compared to the function for places with boards, and never significantly different from zero. These results do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no misallocation in counties under the jurisdiction of a Water Board, as it is reflected in the last row of Table II. The results are similar controlling for basin, 0.5-degree cells, and county fixed effects.

Placebo Exercise: Rainfed Farms. To address concerns regarding potential confounders that may cause the former cross-sectional results, we present a placebo exercise, where we estimate equation 5 including the same set of controls, but for rainfed farms. These agricultural operations display different technology choices but are located in the same territory as the former sample, so they are exposed to similar geographies and climates. These parcels rely exclusively on natural precipitation, so there is no additional water input on top of rainfall; Water Boards have no mechanism to affect their input. Therefore, we expect to find no effect of Water Boards on these farms.[23].

Table III presents the results of this exercise. Our preferred specification is in column 4, where we again exploit within-county, within-crop variation in useful rainfall across farms. The results suggest that the yield per hectare increases by around 8% per extra unit of water ($m^3/ha/month$) at the coast. The increase in yield for farms located the farthest from the coast (at $219km$) is 11%, which is not statistically different from the effect on the coast. For counties with Water Boards, the corresponding estimates are 12% and 6%; they are not statistically different either. Importantly, all interaction terms involving the water

[22] This test was performed considering the standard errors clustered by county; the results do not change by considering the SE clustered by county and irrigation season crop type.

[23] Also, our estimates will correspond to the marginal product of water for these farms. Manysheva (2022) and Rafey (2023) use this strategy to estimate the production functions of rainfed farms

board dummy are not significant and economically small. The last rows of Table III show that after including our finer spatial fixed effects –either 0.5-degree cells or county fixed effects–, we cannot reject that the MPW is equal for all locations, either with or without water boards, as expected.

Figure X presents the estimated functions of Average MPW for areas with and without water boards. The most important conclusion from the figure is that none of these funtions exhibit a significant slope, and despite the existence of some (statistically non-significant) differences in levels, both functions are contained in the confidence intervals of the other.

This placebo exercise suggests that the estimated effects of rainfall on irrigated parcels (our main exercise) recover a causal relationship between water and yield across different locations, and so our Misallocation Test identifies the underlying misallocation existing in the absence of water rights enforcement. More importantly, our test fails to find such misallocation in places with water boards exerting property rights enforcement, suggesting that we cannot reject the efficiency of water markets supported by Water Boards.

Other Robustness Checks. We present additional robustness checks addressing different potential concerns Appendix Table A.I. One is that crops with different requirements may exhibit different elasticities with respect to irrigation; in that case, the relationship found above could reflect crop choices rather than misallocation. In columns 1–2 we re-estimate the models from columns 3–4 of Table II, now allowing for interactions between crop fixed effects and useful rainfall. This effectively permits elasticities to useful rainfall to vary by crop. Reassuringly, the results are unchanged relative to the main estimates.

Another potential concern is that the relationship between revenue and useful rainfall may be confounded by other inputs or technology choices. In column 3 of Table A.I, we re-estimate our main equation, interacting useful rainfall with a dummy equal to one if a farm uses fertigation[24], a technology complementary to irrigation. The results remain unchanged.

We further assess sensitivity to the linear functional form in equation 5 by replacing the continuous distance variable with quintile indicators (Appendix Figure A.VI). The marginal

[24]The application of fertilizer through the irrigation system

product of water is substantially higher for farms without Water Boards located closest to the coast (quintile 1), and converges across quintiles under Water Board jurisdiction, consistent with the main resultsl.

One assumption implicit in our model is that farmers cannot anticipate the amount of useful rainfall they will receive during the irrigation season; systematic differences in the ability to anticipate rainfall may correlate with productivity and crop choice, confounding our estimates. In Table A.III, we provide evidence that farmers cannot anticipate useful rainfall by examining the demand for temporary labor—the only flexible factor for which we have detailed intensive margin measurement. We regress—using a Poisson model—the number of workers hired in each season against useful rainfall, conditional on farm size, county, and crop fixed-effects. In the Fall and Winter seasons, before the irrigation season begins, labor demand is uncorrelated with useful rainfall, consistent with farmers being unable to anticipate it. In contrast, labor demand responds significantly to useful rainfall during the Spring and Summer irrigation seasons.

5 Mechanisms: Reallocation and Private Decisions

In the previous section, we documented intra-basin water misallocation between farms except where Water Boards operate. Here, we employ two identification strategies—Event Study and Instrumental Variable—to investigate how Water Boards enhance agricultural productivity in both the short and long run. We will focus on mechanisms related to water redistribution to downstream users, and farmers' private responses, including crop and irrigation technology choices.

Our analysis focuses on the dry season (December-February), when water scarcity is most acute and enforcement of property rights becomes critical. During these months, precipitation is minimal while irrigation demand for high-value crops remains high, creating a seasonal mismatch that generates the strongest incentives for upstream over-extraction. This makes Water Board enforcement most consequential for agricultural outcomes.

Our main analysis relies on a novel database, containing more than $75,000$ land parcels located less than 1km away from a canal in the whole area of study (i.e. regions IV to IX,

in Central Chile). We follow these farms between 1986 and 2012. We estimate plot-level water consumption using more than 15,000 images of a new LANDSAT 5-based product that provides estimates of Evapotranspiration at a 30m resolution every 16 days since 1986[25] . In addition, we also estimate agricultural yield and crop choice using Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) estimates from LANDSAT 5 from the same period. To illustrate the detailed nature of this data, Figure XI present our estimates of water consumption and agricultural yield (proxied by actual evapotranspiration and EVI, respectively) for all farms in the Aconcagua Basin. In Panel (a) we observe a decline in water consumption when comparing upstream (right) to downstream (left) locations. Panel (b) presents a similar decline in yield. However, there is substantial intra-location variation, especially in upstream locations.

In Table IV we present summary statistics over our full sample. Farms within the jurisdiction of water boards have slightly lower EVI and evapotranspiration levels than farms outside them, but they also face substantially dryer conditions. In the next subsections, we will address the identification challenges by implementing first a Difference-in Differences and then an Instrumental Variable analysis.

5.1 Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Water Redistribution and Agricultural Productivity

In our first analysis, we exploit the staggered adoption of Water Boards across basins to estimate the causal impact of property rights enforcement and governance on the allocation of water. Table V presents the year of establishment of Water Boards, and the number of farm plots under their jurisdiction. Given the data available and the institutional design in place, we focus our analysis on the boards established after 1981 and before 2010. This window captures Water Board establishments under Chile's 1981 Water Code framework and before the severe hydrological changes experienced from 2010 onwards, ensuring our estimates reflect a consistent institutional and environmental context. We consider 5 years before and 7 years after the establishment of the board for our analysis.

[25] Although LANDSAT 5 was launched in 1984, it actually started operating in 1985. Starting in 1986 there is stable supply of frequent images of our area of study (Senay, 2018; Senay et al., 2023).

Identification Strategy. The establishment of Water Boards is triggered by either an agreement among water users or a lawsuit by users who perceive their interests are being affected by the lack of governance in the basin. In both cases, there is latent conflict over the resource, driven by both water supply and demand factors.

We explore the potential role of water supply factors in Figure XII, where we show the standardized total precipitation over our sample of farms for each year around a Board Establishment event. This figure shows that, indeed, the years surrounding a Board Establishment event are drier: during the year of a Board Establishment, the farms under their jurisdiction experience almost 10% of a standard deviation lower precipitation. Therefore, although the timing of Board Establishment to environmental conditions, they seem to be most adverse for agricultural activity, making our estimates of benefits from Water Boards likely a lower bound of their true values.

Exploring demand side-drivers of Water Boards adoption is more complex, as they are mostly unobservable. The process, however, is long and irreversible, implying that the most likely driver of Water Boards adoption is long-term conflict[26]. Motivated by this, we will focus our analysis on a sample of ever-treated units, and therefore, for any Board Establishment event, we will consider as a control group only not-yet-treated plots.

Econometric Specification of the DID Analysis. Our main equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathrm{Y}_{it} = & \sum_{k=-5}^{7} \delta_k \text{Board Establishment}_{it} \times 1\left[t - t^* = k\right] \\ & + \beta \mathrm{X}_{it} + \alpha_i + \mu_{t,g(i),q(i)} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

where Y_{it} is either Average Evapotranspiration in the Summer or the Peak Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) over the season at plot i in year t. These are satellite-derived variables averaged at the parcel level that proxy for water consumption and agricultural yield, respec-

[26] There is no systematic documentation of the length of the full constitution process, but one testimony about Water Board established through a lawsuit in 2015 describes a process of at least two years: the first year for lawsuit resolution and the second year for executing the resolution and establishing the board(CNR, 2018b).

tively[27]. In our preferred implementation, we use standardized versions of these variables[28] to address the substantial heterogeneity across units in space and time. Board_{it} equals 1 if plot i is under any Water Board jurisdiction. t^* denotes the establishment year of the Water Board with jurisdiction over i. X_{it} is a vector of annual climatic characteristics, including total precipitation over the year and over the Summer, and the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following temperature ranges: $[25, 29], [29, 31], [31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^+)$, in Celsius degrees. α_i is a plot-level fixed effect, while $\mu_{t,g(i),q(i)}$ denotes flexible time trends by geographical grid cell and quantile position within the basin, where $g(i)$ represents the $2^\circ \times 2^\circ$ latitude-longitude cell and $q(i)$ represents the quantile of distance to the river mouth for plot i. Quantiles correspond to terciles defining downstream, mid-section, and upstream farm locations.

Our main hypothesis is that Water Boards play a distributive role, which in our case translates into possible heterogeneous treatment effects across upstream and downstream locations within the basin. We therefore use the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator proposed by Borusyak et al. (2024). This approach handles within-cohort heterogeneous effects in a context of staggered adoption, and provides a standard errors estimator that allows for correct coverage under clustering and small sample size.[29]

Difference-in-Differences Results. Figure XIII presents our main set of results for the effect of Water Boards establishment on water consumption effects. Panel (a) shows heterogeneous effects estimates by location within basin. Downstream farms experience an immediate 1 standard deviation increase in water consumption, growing to 2 standard deviations after 7 years. Upstream plots show an increasing reduction in water consumption, that reaches 0.8 standard deviations after 7 years, while mid-section plots show no discernible pattern. There is some evidence of pre-trends, reflecting the increasing pressure on the resource in basins adopting these boards.

[27] Evapotranspiration is measured in average millimeters per pixel during summer season (December-February). Peak EVI corresponds to the maximum value of Enhanced Vegetation Index over the growing season. Both variables are derived from LANDSAT 5 satellite imagery.

[28] Obtained by subtracting each plot's mean from its observed value and dividing by its standard deviation.

[29] Similar to our setting, Cisse et al. (2026) apply the same estimator to evaluate irrigation projects in the Senegal River Valley, where treatment timing is staggered and the panel is unbalanced due to missing satellite imagery, a challenge also present in our context.

Panel (b) presents combined estimates across all locations to examine the net effect on basin-wide water consumption, testing whether downstream gains outweigh upstream losses. Although our average estimate is just over 0.5 standard deviations after 7 years, these estimates are statistically significant in only 2 out of 7 post-treatment years. Appendix Figure A.VII shows similar patterns using non-standardized evapotranspiration: downstream farms increase water consumption by $0.7mm$ immediately, reaching $1.5mm$ after 7 years, while upstream farms experience reductions of $0.3mm$ by year 7.

In Figure XIV we present our estimates of the effect of Water Boards establishment on agricultural yield. Panel (a) shows heterogeneous effects estimates by location within basin. Downstream farms increase their yield by 0.4 standard deviations in the first year, and the gains increase to more than 0.6 standard deviations after 7 years. Upstream plots show lower average yields in the years after the event, with reductions smaller in magnitude (averaging 0.25 standard deviations), not significant for all years, and seeming to dissipate at 7 years. Mid-section plots do not show any discernible pattern.

Panel (b) presents combined estimates for impacts on agricultural yield. These estimates are positive, but only significant for the year of the event. Appendix Figure A.VIII presents estimates using non-standardized EVI, showing downstream farms increase peak EVI by 0.04 immediately and 0.06 after 7 years, while upstream farms experience smaller reductions. The downstream gains clearly outweigh upstream losses, though combined coefficients are significant only for a number of years.

Appendix Figure A.IX presents analogous heterogeneous estimates for both outcomes when including our full set of controls, confirming that downstream farms sustain sizable gains in yield and water consumption after 7 years, while upstream farms experience persistent reductions in water consumption and yield losses that dissipate by year 7

5.2 Basin Level Analysis: Streamflows and Redistribution of Water

The previous subsection documented increases in water consumption among downstream farms and reductions upstream following Water Board establishment. We now examine the physical mechanism underlying this redistribution: changes in river streamflows. Using a difference-in-differences design that leverages the staggered adoption of Water Boards

across basins, we analyze their impact on streamflows during the dry season (December-February)—when water scarcity is most acute and incentives to over-extract are strongest.

Our empirical strategy follows a staggered difference-in-differences approach as in the previous subsection, but now applied at the river segment-month level rather than farm-year level. Our unit of analysis is the river segment, operationalized through monitoring stations that measure streamflows. We use monthly streamflow data from the DGA's network of monitoring stations. From the DGA's network of 803 stations nationwide, our sample consists of 306 stations established before 1980 in the study area, allowing us to analyze the impacts of Water Board establishments that occurred after 1981. Table VI presents the year of establishment of Water Boards for the monitoring stations within our study area.

Difference-in-Differences design for River Streamflows. Our main equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Stream}_{gmt} = &\sum_{i=-3}^{3} \delta_i \text{Board Establishment}_{gst} \times 1\left[t - t^* = i\right] \\ &+ \beta \text{X}_{gmt} + \gamma \text{WR}_{gmt} + \mu_t + \eta_{gm} + \varepsilon_{gmt} \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where Stream_{gmt} is streamflow at monitoring station g in month m and year t, Board_{gt} equals 1 if segment g is under Water Board jurisdiction in year t, and t^* denotes the Water Board establishment year. X_{gmt} includes monthly climatic controls (rainfall, temperature, and potential evapotranspiration), and WR_{gmt} is total water rights claimed in the drainage area. μ_t and η_{gm} are year and station-month fixed effects.[30]

Identification. Rivers that eventually adopt Water Boards differ systematically from those that do not. Figure XV shows that Water Boards emerge in rivers with lower annual streamflow but relatively high summer streamflow—characteristic of nivo-glacial regimes where snowmelt provides water during the irrigation season. Given these systematic differences, we focus on an event study sample of monitoring stations in basins that eventually adopt Water Boards, relying on the timing of adoption for identification. We report full sample results as a robustness check.

[30] Equation 9 is derived from a water balance equation, where inflows equalize outflows in a basin.

Our identification assumes timing of adoption is as good as random conditional on fixed effects and covariates. The long and irreversible establishment process—requiring lawsuits or agreements—implies that adoption is driven by long-term water availability rather than short-term shocks.[31] We rule out two additional concerns. First, we discard that mean reversion in precipitation explains positive impacts of boards on streamflows: if Water Boards were established during unusually dry periods, we would expect precipitation to increase afterward, but Figure XVI shows precipitation is actually lower after Board establishment. Second, regarding potential endogeneity of water rights creation, our estimates are robust to including or excluding controls for new water rights claimed in each basin.[32]

We use the staggered difference-in-differences estimator of Borusyak et al. (2024), which handles heterogeneous effects in staggered adoption settings and provides correct standard errors under clustering.

Results. Water Boards significantly increase river streamflows during the dry season, consistent with water redistribution from upstream to downstream users. Figure XVII presents our main estimates. For our event study sample (Panel a), streamflows increase by approximately 25% in years 2-3 post-establishment, averaging 13% across all post-establishment years (0-3). Full sample estimates (Panel c) yield similar results: 27% in years 2-3, and 16% on average. Results are robust to including water rights controls (Panel b and d). We find no evidence of pre-trends in either sample. These summer-specific effects contrast sharply with estimates for the entire year (Figure A.X), where no coefficients are statistically significant.

These results reflect large-scale redistribution of water. Assuming half of summer streamflow is used for irrigation, the 25% increase in years 2-3 implies a 50% increase in water consumption among downstream farms.[33]

To further test whether Water Boards prevent upstream over-extraction, we examine where impacts are concentrated. If enforcement works through this mechanism, effects

[31] In a 2015 Board establishment, the lawsuit alone took at least one year (CNR, 2018b).

[32] Moreover, we find no evidence that Water Boards affect new water rights creation.

[33] This back-of-the-envelope calculation aligns with our short-run farm-level DID estimates (Subsection 5.1), which show similar magnitudes. Our long-run IV estimates (Subsection 5.3) show larger effects, likely reflecting private adaptations enabled by more reliable water access.

should be stronger at: 1) upstream monitoring stations (positioned between upstream diverters and downstream users), and 2) basins with higher agricultural intensity. Figure XVIII confirms these predictions. Upstream stations (Panel a) show increases of approximately 28% in years 2-3, compared to 25% at downstream stations (Panel b). Stations in high-cropland areas (Panel c) show increases of over 40% in years 2-3, compared to 20% in low-cropland areas (Panel d). The strongest effects occur for upstream stations in high-cropland basins (Figure XIX, Panel d), while downstream stations in low-cropland areas show no significant effects (Figure XIX, Panel a).

5.3 Instrumental Variable Analysis: Long-Run Impacts

In this section, we explore the long-run impacts of Water Boards using an instrumental variables approach, which also allows us to incorporate agricultural census data to examine private decisions such as crop choice and irrigation technologies. Cross-sectional OLS estimates of Water Boards' effects would likely be biased because boards are adopted in response to unobservable factors that also affect water distribution patterns. The spatial distribution of Water Boards across the country (Figure V) reflects a non-linear relationship between board presence and water availability: both very dry areas (which cannot support enough agriculture to generate conflict) and very wet areas (where water abundance prevents conflict) are less likely to adopt boards. Since our sample only includes agricultural areas, we observe locations conditional on their ability to support farming, which may induce a downward bias.

Instrument and Identification. We exploit a unique institutional feature of the Water Code: board establishment may be initiated by an agreement of users or through a lawsuit, and this lawsuit must be filed in the provincial capital with jurisdiction over the upstream section of the basin (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 1981). If the water source lies entirely within one province, the filing must occur in that province's capital; otherwise, it must be filed in the most upstream provincial capital. This rule generates systematic variation in the cost to users of initiating a Water Board.

We leverage this variation by constructing an instrument based on the driving distance

from each plot to the relevant upstream provincial capital. Within each basin—the area draining to a river mouth—water flows from the Andes eastward to the Pacific, making the easternmost provincial capital the relevant one. In our preferred specification, we use the square of this distance to emphasize variation at longer ranges.[34]

Water Board establishment is a collective-action decision: downstream users weigh the benefits of coordinated enforcement against the costs of filing and pursuing the lawsuit in the upstream provincial capital. The outside option—relying on state enforcement or rainfall—depends on alternative water availability; groundwater was not widely used during this period (Taucare et al., 2024). Distance to the capital shifts the cost side of this decision. Figure XX illustrates this pattern: downstream areas closer to the upstream capital eventually fall under Water Board jurisdiction, while those farther away do not.

This cost-based variation identifies a local average treatment effect for compliers (Angrist and Pischke, 2009): farms in areas where a Water Board is established when the upstream capital is relatively close, but would not be established if it were farther away. The exclusion restriction requires that distance to the upstream capital affect outcomes only through Water Board establishment. Potential violations would arise if distance were systematically correlated with other determinants of agricultural productivity or water access. Appendix Table A.II shows the instrument is uncorrelated with climatic variables, market access, and farm characteristics (farm size and potential yield), consistent with this assumption.

Econometric Specification of the IV Analysis. We estimate separate IV models by terciles of distance to the river mouth of each basin, corresponding to downstream, midsection, and upstream areas. This allows for heterogeneous effects and, more importantly, mitigates potential SUTVA violations[35] .

[34] Appendix Tables A.VI, A.VII, A.VIII, and A.IX report results using linear and piecewise-linear specifications, including functional forms designed to capture agglomeration shadows (e.g. Hornbeck et al., 2025).

[35] Estimating separate models mitigates SUTVA violations to the extent that water externalities depend on aggregate extraction by all upstream users rather than on extraction by nearby users at similar locations within the basin.

Our main specification for the long-run estimates is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathrm{Y}_{it} =& \alpha \mathrm{Board}_i + \gamma X_{it} + \mu_g(i) + \psi_t + \varepsilon_i \\ \mathrm{Board}_i =& \beta \mathrm{ucd}_i^2 + \delta X_{it} + \eta_g(i) + \zeta_t + u_{it} \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

where Y_{it} is either Average Evapotranspiration in the Summer or the Peak Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) over the season at plot i in year t, observed annualy from 2005 to 2009. These variables proxy for water consumption and agricultural yield, respectively. Although the outcome Y_{it} and controls X_{it} vary across years, the treatment variable Board_i is time-invariant: it indicates whether farm i is under the jurisdiction of a Water Board by 2005, and remains constant thereafter. X_{it} is a vector of farm-level controls including market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following temperature ranges: $[25, 29], [29, 31], [31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^+)$, in Celsius degrees (Hsiang, 2016); and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. $\mu_g(i)$ and $\eta_g(i)$ are $1° \times 1°$ latitude-longitude cell fixed effect. Our instrument is ucd_i^2, the square of the driving distance (in kilometers) along the optimal route from each plot to the most upstream provincial capital within its basin.We address spatial correlation using clustered standard errors by county. To assess the strength of our first stages, following Andrews et al. (2019) we provide the Effective F-statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013)[36].

IV Results. Table A.IV presents the IV estimates of equations 10 for water consumption (evapotranspiration). Columns 1–3 show OLS estimates; Columns 4–6 show IV estimates by section of the river (downstream, mid-section, and upstream, respectively). Water Boards increase downstream water consumption by $2.01mm$ (68%) and reduce upstream consumption by $1.07mm$ (31%). Overall, the IV estimates reveal economically significant redistribution of water from upstream to downstream farms, with net gains concentrated downstream[37].

[36] This is equal on exactly identified IV models to the robust F-statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).

[37] Notably, we cannot reject equality between OLS and IV estimates for upstream locations, consistent

Table A.V presents results for agricultural yield (peak EVI per pixel during the season). The results are consistent with the water redistribution pattern but suggest decreasing returns to water consumption: Water Boards increase downstream yield by 57% with no detectable effects upstream.

Comparison between DID and IV estimates and Interpretation. Our Difference-in-Differences and IV estimates yield consistent results across both water consumption and agricultural productivity. Downstream farms increase water consumption by $1.5mm$ after seven years (DID) and $2.01mm$ in the long run (IV), while upstream farms face smaller reductions of $-0.3mm$ (DID) to $-1.07mm$ (IV). For agricultural productivity, downstream farmers increase yields by 60% of a standard deviation after seven years (DID) and 57% of the control group mean in the long run (IV), while upstream farmers experience no significant effects.

While these estimates seem large, they align with findings from other contexts, such as Cisse et al. (2026)'s analysis of irrigation infrastructure impacts in Senegal, which documented a sixfold increase in dry season cultivation rates. Our estimates show that institutions can generate substantial variation on the impacts of infrastructure investments.

The asymmetric pattern —where downstream gains substantially exceed upstream losses—can be explained by different, non-mutually exclusive mechanisms; we discuss two here. First, downstream gains occur mainly along the extensive margin–shifting farms from no irrigation to irrigation –whereas upstream losses may occur along the intensive margin–limiting previously unrestricted access. Appendix Table A.X provides supporting evdience for this mechanism. Using our IV approach on a variable from the 2007 Agricultural Census indicating whether a farm has any irrigation from surface water sources, we find increases among downstream farms in this extensive margin measure of irrigation, concentrated in large farms. We do not find negative effects upstream, although a very weak first stage precludes definitive conclusions. Second, net increases in water consumption and yield may reflect complementarity between reliable water provision and individual or collective investments, which we explore in the next subsection.

with the idea that Water Board establishment is driven by downstream users and is therefore plausibly exogenous for upstream users.

5.4 Private Investments and Choices

We now examine how Water Boards affect private investments that complement increased water availability: crop choice and irrigation technology. By enforcing property rights, Water Boards provide a public good that enhances supply reliability for downstream irrigators, enabling cultivation of crops requiring extended irrigation seasons and complementing technologies such as micro-irrigation that depend on reliable water supply. However, adoption of these complementary investments may be constrained by liquidity, particularly for smaller farmers (e.g Karlan et al., 2014).

Crop choice and irrigation technology are long-run outcomes that involve learning curves, as farmers require time to adapt to new techniques and institutional conditions. They were also shaped by increasing integration into international markets, particularly Chile's Free Trade Agreements signed in the early 2000s. Given these long-run dynamics and that most Water Board establishments predate public FTA discussions, we employ the same IV strategy as in the previous section.

Crop Choice. We show that the presence of water Boards allows an expansion of the production possibility set. Table VII presents estimates of equations 10 for two crop choice outcomes: the number of months between the beginning of the season and the month when the greenness peak is reached (Panel A) and a binary variable identifying if the maturity of a crop happens during the Summer or not (reflected by when the peak of greenness in a farm is happening) (Panel B). Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6) present OLS (IV) estimates for Downstream, Mid-section and Upstream farms, respectively.

Water Boards increase the likelihood of peak greenness occurring after December by 42*pp* for downstream farms (Panel A, IV estimate), with the Anderson-Rubin test confidence interval excluding zero despite a moderate F-statistic. Upstream farms show reductions of 11*pp*, approximately one-quarter the downstream gain. Similarly, Water Boards extend growing season length by 1.15 months for downstream farms (Panel B, IV estimate), with negligible and statistically insignificant effects upstream.

Irrigation Technology. Using data from the 2007 Agricultural Census, we examine tech-

nology adoption across three categories: traditional (primarily furrow), micro-irrigation (e.g. drip and micro-spray), and macro-irrigation (mostly high-volume sprinklers). Technology choice depends on profitability, credit access, and water availability: traditional techniques have low maintenance costs, macro-irrigation requires high water volumes, while micro-irrigation requires reliable supply to avoid clogging.[38] Table VIII presents estimates for traditional irrigation (columns 1–4) and micro-irrigation (columns 5–8), with odd-numbered columns showing downstream farms and even-numbered columns showing upstream farms.[39] Panel A shows all farms, Panel B large farms, and Panel C small farms.

The results show technology shifts only among large downstream farms (Panel B). Water Boards reduce traditional irrigation use by 20pp and increase micro-irrigation adoption by 21pp (both IV estimates, significant at 10% and 5% respectively). We find no significant effects among small farms (Panel C), and no significant changes for upstream farms in any specification.[40]

Fertigation. We further examine the adoption of fertigation—the application of fertilizer through the irrigation system—a technology that complements both reliable water supply and intensive crop management. Like micro-irrigation, fertigation requires stable water availability and involves upfront investment costs, making its adoption particularly sensitive to both enforcement and liquidity constraints. Table IX presents IV estimates of the effect of Water Boards on fertigation adoption for all farms (Panel A), large farms (Panel B), and small farms (Panel C).

The results mirror those for irrigation technology: Water Boards increase fertigation adoption only among large downstream farms (Panel B, columns 3–4), with an estimated increase of 11*pp* (significant at 5%). Point estimates for small downstream farms are similar in magnitude but imprecisely estimated.

Taken together, the results for crop choice, irrigation technology, and fertigation sug-

[38] Jatana and Sanders III (2024)

[39] We do not report results for mid-section farms, as the first stages are weak.

[40] The concentration of effects among large farms is consistent with the disaggregated estimates in Annex Tables A.XI, A.XII, and A.XIII. In those tables, we show that large downstream farms experience substantially larger increases in water consumption and agricultural productivity than small farms—providing both the means and incentives to adopt more efficient irrigation technologies and adjust crop choices.

gest that reliable water supply from Water Board enforcement enables farmers to grow summer crops and adopt efficient irrigation technologies that require stable water input. However, these opportunities appear available only to the largest farms, suggesting that the distributional impacts documented in previous subsections—where downstream gains exceed upstream losses—may be at least partially explained by liquidity constraints that limit smaller farmers' ability to make complementary investments.

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we examine how specialized enforcement institutions affect water markets' allocative efficiency, even in contexts with well-defined property rights that are perpetual, tradable, inheritable, and constitutionally protected against expropriation. Using a sufficient statistic approach, we find that within basins governed by Water Boards, the shadow value of water remains constant across locations. By contrast, we find evidence of misallocation in areas without such Boards, such that downstream users face higher shadow values due to upstream over-extraction. Using various identification strategies and measures, we further explore how Water Boards' enforcement creates net economic gains through extensive water redistribution that enables private investments.

Our analysis of Water Boards provides novel insights into the challenges of establishing environmental markets. The operation of these markets must overcome subtractability and high monitoring and enforcement costs–resource attributes that lead to the Tragedy of the Commons. While water is a leading example of a resource subject to this issue, similar characteristics are present in many others, including fisheries and atmospheric emissions. Surface water offers a unique analytical advantage: the directional nature of surface water flows allows for clear identification of affected agents and precise measurement of redistribution. This directionality may explain why water boards are effective: with a single entity maintaining both accountability and authority, it creates strong incentives for downstream users to invest in basin-wide enforcement. This highlights how market design challenges differ across resources: similar decentralized institutions may prove less effective where such incentives are weak.

Our results indicate that individual adaptation and markets cannot fully offset the lack of effective governance in ensuring efficient resource use, even in contexts with strong property rights and rule of law, causing substantial welfare losses: the estimates suggest that the impacts in water consumption after 1 year may duplicate the yields per hectare for the 20% of most downstream farms, without substantial upstream costs. This reflects a fundamental tension in environmental markets: empowering users over governing authorities may reduce some market frictions but weaken enforcement, as administrative actions under changing conditions remain necessary. We show that institutional arrangements that empower local communities can resolve this tension; however, the resulting efficiency gains are unevenly distributed. These findings have important implications for the design of environmental markets, suggesting that successful implementation requires careful attention to enforcement mechanisms and their distributional consequences.

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Tables

Table I: Balance Table for Misallocation Test

Outcome: Useful Rainfall (Rainfall during the Crop Irrigation Season)

	Full Sample		Irrigated fields sample		Placebo sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance to coast (100km)	0.0412	0.0469	-0.521	-0.958	0.102	0.111
	(0.0539)	(0.0610)	(0.103)***	(0.219)***	(0.0399)**	(0.0540)**
Water Board=1	-0.0814	0.0596	-0.415	-0.618	-0.413	-0.114
	(0.301)	(0.338)	(0.280)	(0.399)	(0.440)	(0.329)
Water Board=1 × Distance to coast (100km)	0.101	0.111	0.138	0.381	0.624	0.299
	(0.211)	(0.237)	(0.196)	(0.263)	(0.294)**	(0.248)
Basin FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
0.5 degree cell FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Crop FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	79,133	79,132	15,149	15,147	63,838	63,838
R-squared	0.885	0.931	0.910	0.944	0.924	0.946
Outcome mean	0.899	0.899	0.765	0.765	0.931	0.931
Outcome SD	0.944	0.944	0.836	0.836	0.966	0.966

Notes: This balance table presents regressions of the double interaction between a Water Boards dummy and the location in the basin, measured as the distance to the sea through the river network. The outcome variable is useful rainfall: precipitation fell during the irrigation season of the crop planted in the parcel.

Table II: Shadow Value of Water: Impact of Useful Rainfall on Production for Irrigated Farms, by Treatment Status

	Outcome is log(Value Yield p/Hectare)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month)	0.464	0.330	0.462	0.421
	(0.196)**	(0.197)*	(0.221)**	(0.232)*
	[0.201]**	[0.200]	[0.221]**	[0.232]*
Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month) × Distance to coast (100km)	-0.225	-0.188	-0.250	-0.272
	(0.129)*	(0.125)	(0.139)*	(0.148)*
	[0.131]*	[0.125]	[0.136]*	[0.144]*
Water Board=1 × Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month)	-0.134	-0.237	-0.396	-0.481
	(0.240)	(0.217)	(0.251)	(0.258)*
	[0.242]	[0.217]	[0.245]	[0.251]*
Water Board=1 × Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month) × Distance to coast (100km)	-0.00902	0.130	0.235	0.298
	(0.164)	(0.145)	(0.166)	(0.170)*
	[0.166]	[0.144]	[0.161]	[0.163]*
Parcel Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Basin FE	No	Yes	No	No
0.5 degree cell FE	No	No	Yes	No
Crop FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	14,716	14,716	14,714	14,712
R-squared	0.598	0.621	0.628	0.642
Misallocation Test: Water Board=0	0.08	0.13	0.07	0.07
Misallocation Test: Water Board=1	0.01	0.42	0.87	0.76

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 5 for irrigated parcels, with water rights, registered in canal associations. Distance to the coast measured through the river network. Controlling for logarithm of cultivated surface, logarithm of number of hired workers plus 1, dummies for educational level of manager of the farm, legal organization category of the operation, irrigation technology, and County and Crop fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level (round parenthesis) and the county× irrigation season level (squared parentheses).

Table III: Placebo Exercise: Impact of Rainfall on Rainfed Farms Production

	Placebo: Outcome is log(Value Yield p/Hectare)			
	(1) m5	(2) m6	(3) m7	(4) m8
Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month)	-0.0606	0.00566	0.0146	0.0830
	(0.0502)	(0.0677)	(0.0493)	(0.0408)**
	[0.0473]	[0.0602]	[0.0466]	[0.0411]**
Distance to coast (100km)	-0.202	-0.168	0.194	
	(0.104)*	(0.114)	(0.0721)***	
	[0.0950]**	[0.105]	[0.0625]***	
Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month) × Distance to coast (100km)	0.150	0.154	0.0407	0.0141
	(0.0439)***	(0.0447)***	(0.0282)	(0.0287)
	[0.0409]***	[0.0417]***	[0.0291]	[0.0263]
Water Board=1	-0.567	-0.811	0.159	
	(0.299)*	(0.398)**	(0.387)	
	[0.324]*	[0.388]**	[0.368]	
Water Board=1 × Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month)	0.104	0.143	0.000591	0.0457
	(0.130)	(0.0966)	(0.0593)	(0.0680)
	[0.140]	[0.112]	[0.107]	[0.0707]
Water Board=1 × Distance to coast (100km)	0.687	0.893	0.00530	
	(0.208)***	(0.247)***	(0.277)	
	[0.228]***	[0.248]***	[0.274]	
Water Board=1 × Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month) × Distance to coast (100km)	-0.146	-0.173	-0.0180	-0.0446
	(0.0980)	(0.0739)**	(0.0499)	(0.0542)
	[0.102]	[0.0822]**	[0.0848]	[0.0540]
Parcel Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Basin FE	No	Yes	No	No
0.5 degree cell FE	No	No	Yes	No
Crop FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	63,838	63,838	63,838	63,836
R-squared	0.582	0.588	0.618	0.631
Misallocation Test: Water Board=0	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.63
Misallocation Test: Water Board=1	0.97	0.76	0.56	0.46

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 5 for non-irrigated parcels, as a placebo exercise. Distance to the coast measured through the river network. Controlling for logarithm of cultivated surface, logarithm of number of hired workers plus 1, dummies for educational level of manager of the farm, legal organization category of the operation, irrigation technology, and County and Crop fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level (round parenthesis) and the county× irrigation season level (squared parentheses).

Table IV: Summary Statistics: Parcel Level Dataset

Panel A: Parcels Not Under Water Board Jurisdiction

	Mean	SD	p10	p90	Min	Max
Evapotranspiration (Summer)	3.28	1.2	1.7	4.7	0.0	7.8
Peak EVI over season	0.40	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.9
Area (m^2)	59659.00	132126.2	3920.7	150559.0	47.6	4199398.0
Latitude	-34.82	1.4	-36.8	-32.9	-37.7	-29.8
Longitude	-71.41	0.5	-72.2	-70.7	-73.0	-70.5
Mean annual prec.	1620.35	867.4	687.1	2873.4	0.0	5199.5
Mean summer prec.	184.81	145.9	40.5	406.2	0.0	1000.9
Distance to Santiago (main dom. market)	238.82	165.4	48.9	498.8	9.4	620.5
Distance to Valparaiso (main port)	305.83	187.7	89.4	592.2	15.8	707.2
Distance to San Antonio (second main port)	252.42	158.9	94.5	506.4	20.4	626.0
Distance to Coast (location in basin)	105.10	34.7	54.7	141.6	0.9	149.9
Distance to Upstream Capital	56.34	28.4	30.0	98.7	30.0	180.3
Observations	446177					

Panel B: Parcels Under Water Board Jurisdiction

	Mean	SD	p10	p90	Min	Max
Evapotranspiration (Summer)	2.95	1.4	1.1	4.7	0.0	7.8
Peak EVI over season	0.38	0.1	0.2	0.5	-0.1	0.9
Area (m^2)	58084.77	134182.9	3748.4	138617.7	24.9	3433859.8
Latitude	-33.62	2.0	-36.7	-30.7	-37.0	-29.8
Longitude	-71.20	0.4	-72.0	-70.7	-72.3	-70.5
Mean annual prec.	1108.56	643.9	427.4	1966.6	0.0	4285.9
Mean summer prec.	121.92	95.1	34.0	237.7	0.0	688.2
Distance to Santiago (main dom. market)	269.96	173.2	46.8	504.5	20.7	589.8
Distance to Valparaiso (main port)	299.32	165.2	102.1	548.4	35.5	609.3
Distance to San Antonio (second main port)	289.47	160.5	120.4	510.0	43.2	595.3
Distance to Coast (location in basin)	103.82	34.0	48.8	140.7	0.9	150.0
Distance Upstream Capital	58.31	24.7	30.0	97.1	30.0	126.3
Observations	193035					

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for agricultural parcels, separated by water board jurisdiction status. Panel A shows statistics for parcels not under the jurisdiction of the water board, while Panel B shows statistics for parcels under jurisdiction. Evapotranspiration and Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) are satellite-derived variables averaged at the parcel level. Evapotranspiration measured in average millimeters per pixel during summer season (December-February) between years 1986 and 2012. Peak EVI corresponds to the maximum value of Enhanced Vegetation Index. Area measured in square meters. All distance measures in kilometers. Santiago corresponds to the main domestic market. Valparaíso and San Antonio are the main ports. Distance to coast indicates location within basin. Upstream capital refers to the most eastward province capital city within each basin. Precipitation variables measured in millimeters.

Table V: Farm plots by Year of Board Establishment

	N plots	Percent	Cumulative perc.
1974	951	1.09	1.09
1989	1774	2.03	3.13
1993	920	1.06	4.18
1994	2338	2.68	6.86
1995	275	0.32	7.18
1996	2963	3.40	10.57
1997	1690	1.94	12.51
1998	755	0.87	13.38
1999	10055	11.53	24.91
2000	515	0.59	25.50
2001	689	0.79	26.29
2003	262	0.30	26.59
2004	1769	2.03	28.62
2005	2090	2.40	31.02
2010	28	0.03	31.05
2011	182	0.21	31.26
2012	1464	1.68	32.94
2013	2652	3.04	35.98
2018	694	0.80	36.77
2019	620	0.71	37.48
No Board	54512	62.52	100.00
Total	87198		

Notes: This table shows the total number of farm plots in our area of study, and the establishment date of a water board.

Table VI: Monitoring Stations by Year of Board Establishment

Year	N segments	Percent	Cumulative perc.
1974	1	0.33	0.33
1989	12	3.96	4.29
1993	10	3.30	7.59
1994	20	6.60	14.19
1995	4	1.32	15.51
1996	38	12.54	28.05
1997	6	1.98	30.03
1998	14	4.62	34.65
1999	62	20.46	55.12
2000	10	3.30	58.42
2001	11	3.63	62.05
2004	1	0.33	62.38
2005	3	0.99	63.37
2013	1	0.33	63.70
2018	5	1.65	65.35
2019	22	7.26	72.61
No Board	83	27.39	100.00
Total	303	100.00	
Observations	303		

Notes: This table shows the total number of monitoring stations in our area of study, and the establishment date of a water board (in case the monitoring station is in a subsubbasin within the jurisdiction of a water board).

Table VII: Crop Choice: Instrumental Variables Estimation at the Parcel Level

Panel A: Peak after December (dummy)

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	0.0353	0.0114	0.00136	0.416	2.319	0.106
	(0.0213)	(0.0142)	(0.0234)	(0.138)***	(9.875)	(0.168)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.076	0.113	0.129	0.007	-3.406	0.123
Mean Dependent Var.				0.280	0.369	0.353
Effective F-stat				12.622	0.051	6.430
AR test CI				[.1742, .8482]	(-∞, ∞)	[-.2311, ∞)

Panel B: Season Length (months)

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	0.105	0.00839	-0.00977	1.148	6.179	-0.0296
	(0.0620)*	(0.0402)	(0.0463)	(0.374)***	(26.50)	(0.310)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.078	0.118	0.131	-0.002	-4.534	0.131
Mean Dependent Var.				6.924	7.121	7.060
Effective F-stat				12.622	0.051	6.430
AR test CI				[.5155, ∞)	(-∞, ∞)	[-.9328, .9642]

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a plot reached its maximum value of EVI in the season in Summer (December or after), and 0 otherwise, for the period 2005-2009. The outcome variable in Panel B is the the number of months between May (first month of the agricultural year) and peak of EVI within the corresponding year, for the period 2005-2009. Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^{+})$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^{\circ} \times 1^{\circ}$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table VIII: Irrigation Technology: Instrumental Variables Estimation at the Farm Level

Panel A: Full Sample

	Traditional Irrigation (Furrow)				Micro Irrigation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Board	-0.00	-0.03	-0.12	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.08	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.02)*	(0.07)*	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Observations	21,157	14,081	21,157	14,081	21,157	14,081	21,157	14,081
R-squared	0.277	0.326	0.269	0.326	0.258	0.256	0.252	0.254
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Method	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
Mean Dependent Var.	0.882	0.920	0.882	0.920	0.079	0.021	0.079	0.021
Effective F-stat			4.884	1.578			4.884	1.578
AR test CI			[-.4795, -.0311]	(-∞, ∞)			[-.0281, .4113]	(-∞, ∞)

Panel B: Large Farms

	Traditional Irrigation (Furrow)				Micro Irrigation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Board	0.02	-0.03	-0.20	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.21	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.10)*	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.10)**	(0.08)
Observations	11,331	8,592	11,331	8,592	11,331	8,592	11,331	8,592
R-squared	0.373	0.360	0.351	0.358	0.340	0.285	0.311	0.283
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Method	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
Mean Dependent Var.	0.891	0.868	0.891	0.876	0.088	0.032	0.088	0.077
Effective F-stat			3.753	1.729			3.753	1.729
AR test CI			[-.8577, -.09626]	(-∞, ∞)			[.09749, .8081]	(-∞, ∞)

Panel C: Small Farms

	Traditional Irrigation (Furrow)				Micro Irrigation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Board	0.03	-0.03	0.05	-0.12	-0.03	0.02	-0.09	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Observations	2,480	1,110	2,480	1,110	2,480	1,110	2,480	1,110
R-squared	0.134	0.110	0.134	0.079	0.135	0.125	0.133	0.101
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Method	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
Mean Dependent Var.	0.856	0.990	0.856	0.990	0.087	0.005	0.087	0.005
Effective F-stat			6.290	0.685			6.290	0.685
AR test CI			[-.2952, .316]	(-∞, ∞)			[-.3621, .2486]	(-∞, ∞)

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for farms reporting the use of irrigation in the Agricultural Census of 2007. The outcome variable in columns 1-4 (5-8) are dummies equal to 1 if a farm reports the use of traditional irrigation techniques (micro-irrigation techniques); the base category is the use of macro-irrigation. Panel A includes all farms, Panel B only those classified as large (being in the 5th quintile of farm size, among all farms), and Panel C those classified as small (being below the median of farm size). Odd (even) columns include farms in the first (third) decile of distance to the coast, measured through the river network to the centroid of each county. All models include farm-level controls (logarithm of labor input, dummies for education of the operation manager, being organized as a firm, and deciles of farm area), county-level controls (number of days above 29 Celsius degrees ("killing days"), average soil quality, market access (distance to Santiago and the main ports), dummies for climate zone), and 1x1-degree cell fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table IX: Fertigation: Instrumental Variables Estimation at the Farm Level

Panel A: Full Sample

	OLS		IV		IV, w/ Irrigation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Board	0.00	0.00	0.10	-0.12	0.10	-0.12
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Observations	67,713	42,236	67,713	42,236	67,713	42,236
R-squared	0.329	0.317	0.324	0.304	0.324	0.305
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Mean Dependent Var.	0.126	0.086	0.031	0.086	0.126	0.086
Effective F-stat			5.989	0.521	5.942	0.524
AR test CI			[-.03777, .3975]	(-∞, ∞)	[-.03496, .4051]	(-∞, ∞)

Panel B: Large Farms

	OLS		IV		IV, w/ Irrigation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Board	0.00	-0.02	0.11	0.25	0.11	0.26
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)**	(0.35)	(0.05)**	(0.36)
Observations	14,236	11,730	14,236	11,730	14,236	11,730
R-squared	0.287	0.217	0.275	0.099	0.275	0.096
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Mean Dependent Var.	0.035	0.018	0.035	0.018	0.080	0.041
Effective F-stat			3.653	0.427	3.441	0.416
AR test CI			[.02125, .3599]	(-∞, ∞)	[.01997, .3607]	(-∞, ∞)


Panel C: Small Farms

	OLS		IV		IV, w/ Irrigation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Board	0.01	0.00	0.10	-0.42	0.11	-0.41
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.50)	(0.10)	(0.49)
Observations	40,807	23,536	40,807	23,536	40,807	23,536
R-squared	0.335	0.330	0.332	0.258	0.333	0.261
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Mean Dependent Var.	0.041	0.020	0.041	0.020	0.041	0.020
Effective F-stat			6.422	0.204	6.410	0.207
AR test CI			[-.08884, .5947]	(-∞, ∞)	[-.08474, .5934]	(-∞, ∞)


Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for farms reporting the use of irrigation in the Agricultural Census of 2007. The outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a farm reports the use of fertigation. Panel A includes all farms, Panel B only those classified as large (being in the 5th quintile of farm size, among all farms), and Panel C those classified as small (being below the median of farm size). Odd (even) columns include farms in the first (third) decile of distance to the coast, measured through the river network to the centroid of each county. Columns 1–4 present OLS and IV estimates; columns 5–6 additionally control for whether the farm uses micro-irrigation. All models include farm-level controls (logarithm of labor input, dummies for education of the operation manager, being organized as a firm, and deciles of farm area), county-level controls (number of days above 29 Celsius degrees ("killing days"), average soil quality, market access (distance to Santiago and the main ports), dummies for climate zone), and 1x1-degree cell fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Figures


Figure I: How Property Rights Enforcement Affects Water Allocation and Agricultural Outcomes



(a) No drought




(b) Drought, and no enforcement of water rights




(c) Drought, and Water Boards enforce water rights

Figure II: Area of Study



Notes: Left, center, and right panels correspond to the northern, central, and southern areas of Chile. The colored region represents the total area of study.

Figure III: Basins and Rivers in Area of Study




Notes: This map zooms into the colored area of map II. Blue lines represent rivers and orange lines represent their corresponding basin boundaries.

Figure IV: Example of Canal Gate



Notes: This picture shows a canal gate. Water Boards have the legal right to open and close them with locks during droughts, to implement a system of irrigation shifts as a water allocation enforcement mechanism.


Figure V: Water Boards Jurisdictions



Notes: Left, center, and right panels correspond to the northern, central, and southern areas of Chile. The colored areas represent the boundaries of existing Water Boards jurisdictions and their year of establishment.

Figure VI: Administrative and Legal Hierarchy of Institutions over Water Rights Issues

(a) Administrative



(b) Legal





Figure VII: Data Sources and Corresponding Analyses

Data Sources	Analysis (Section)	Unit
2007 Agricultural Census	Misallocation Test (Section 4)	Farm Level
Land Plots (SII/CIREN) Satellite Data (LANDSAT 5)	DID & IV Analysis (Section 5)	Plot Level
Streamflow Data (DGA)	DID Analysis (Section 5)	Basin Level


Notes: All analyses use water organization data (DGA), as well as climate data and basin boundaries from CR^2, as common inputs. The table presents additional data sources, along with their corresponding analyses and units of observation.

Figure VIII: Construction of Useful Rainfall




Notes: This figure illustrates the construction of our measure of useful rainfall, and the sources of variation. We define useful rainfall as the rainfall falling in a farmer's county when their crop needs irrigation. In this example, Farm A and Farm B are located in County 1, with rainfall over the agricultural year depicted with the blue bars. While Farm A chose a crop that follows the yellow irrigation schedule, Farm B chose one that follows the green schedule. Therefore, all the rainfall received by both farms in the months of December, January and February is useful for farm A but not farm B. Another source of variation is provided by the space: consider another farm following the same irrigation schedules as farm A, but located in a nearby county, facing rainfall illustrated in red bars. That farm will have a marginally different water input than A, given the different rainfall received on each month in their county.

Figure IX: Main Results: Effect on log(Production) of Rainfall during the Irrigation Season by Longitude and Treatment Status for Irrigated Parcels Registered in Canal



Notes: Graphical representation of results in Table II.


Figure X: Placebo Exercise: Effect on log(Production) of Rainfall during the Irrigation Season by Longitude and Treatment Status for Rainfed Parcels




Notes: Graphical representation of results in Table III.

Figure XI: Example: Water Consumption and Agricultural Yield Estimates for Farms in Aconcagua Basin

(a) Water Consumption




(b) Agricultural Yield



Notes: Panel (a) shows estimated water consumption (evapotranspiration) and panel (b) shows agricultural yield (using Enhanced Vegetation Index) for farms in the Aconcagua Basin.


Figure XII: Precipitation dynamics around Water Board events




Notes: This figure presents the dynamics of standardized precipitation around Water Board establishment events, using the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator by Borusyak et al. (2024). The x-axis shows years relative to the establishment year, with year 0 indicating the establishment year. The sample includes farms located in basins with Water Boards established between 1981-2010, covering 5 years pre- and 7 years post-establishment. Controlling for plot-level fixed effects, and flexible time trends by latitude-longitude cells (2°×2°) and quantile of location in the basin. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak et al. (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the 3rd level basin.

Figure XIII: Differences-in-Differences estimates of Impacts of Water Boards on Standardized Water Consumption

(a) Heterogeneous Impacts, by tercile of distance to the coast.




(b) Combined estimates.




Notes: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment on standardized summer evapotranspiration, using the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator by Borusyak et al. (2024).Panel A presents heterogeneous effects by location within the river basin, where the solid blue line with squares represents downstream farms, the dashed gray line with triangles shows mid-basin farms, and the dotted line with diamonds represents upstream farms. Panel B presents combined estimates aggregating across all farm locations within basins. The x-axis shows years relative to Water Board establishment, with year 0 marking the establishment year. The sample includes farms located in basins with Water Boards established between 1981-2010, covering 5 years pre- and 7 years post-establishment. Controlling for plot-level fixed effects and flexible time trends by latitude-longitude cells (2°×2°) and quantile of location in the basin. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak et al. (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the clustering at the 3rd level basin.

Figure XIV: Differences-in-Differences estimates of Impacts of Water Boards on Standardized Agricultural Yield

(a) Heterogeneous Impacts, by tercile of distance to the coast.




(b) Combined estimates.




Notes: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment on standardized agricultural productivity (EVI), using the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator by Borusyak et al. (2024). Panel A presents heterogeneous effects by location within the river basin, where the solid blue line with squares represents downstream farms, the dashed gray line with triangles shows mid-basin farms, and the dotted line with diamonds represents upstream farms. Panel B presents combined estimates aggregating across all farm locations within basins. The x-axis shows years relative to Water Board establishment, with year 0 marking the establishment year. The sample includes farms located in basins with Water Boards established between 1981-2010, covering 5 years pre- and 7 years post-establishment. Controlling for plot-level fixed effects and flexible time trends by latitude-longitude cells (2°×2°) and quantile of location in the basin. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak et al. (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the clustering at the 3rd level basin.

Figure XV: Streamflow and Precipitation Within and Outside Water Board Jurisdictions, Pre-1985



Notes: Average streamflow and precipitation in monitoring stations within and outside water board jurisdictions before 1985. Source: Authors' calculation.

Figure XVI: Precipitations and Board Establishment Events (Placebo) Event




(a) Full sample


(b) Event Study sample

Notes: This figure presents the dynamics of precipitation around Water Board establishment events, using the Event Study estimator by Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024). The Full Sample correspond to monitoring stations located in the Study Region, while the Event Study sample only includes eventually treated monitoring stations (i.e. monitoring stations located in subsubbasins within Water Boards jurisdictions). Controlling for monitoring station-month and year fixed effects. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the hydrological basin level and allowing for effects heterogeneity based on 4 groups by longitudinal distance to the coast and agricultural land share in the drainage area of each monitoring station.


Figure XVII: Dynamic Effects of Board Establishment Events on Dry Season Streamflow




(a) Event Study sample



(b) Event Study sample - water reclamations control




(c) Full sample



(d) Full sample - water reclamations control

Notes: This figure presents our main estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment events on streamflows, using the Event Study estimator by Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024). The Full Sample correspond to monitoring stations located in the Study Region, while the Event Study sample only includes eventually treated monitoring stations (i.e. monitoring stations located in subsubbasins within Water Boards jurisdictions). Controlling for monthly climatic measures in the drainage area of each monitoring station (linear and squared terms for precipitation and average maximum temperature,, average minimum temperature, and potential evapotranspiration) and monitoring station-month and year fixed effects. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the hydrological basin level and allowing for effects heterogeneity based on 4 groups by longitudinal distance to the coast and agricultural land share in the drainage area of each monitoring station.

Figure XVIII: Heterogeneous Effects on Dry Season Streamflow by Location and Cropland Share



(a) Upstream monitoring stations


(b) Downstream monitoring stations

(c) Above median cropland share


(d) Below median cropland share

Notes: This figure presents our heterogeneous effects estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment events on streamflows, using the Event Study estimator by Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024). All estimates correspond to the Event Study sample (eventually treated monitoring stations, i.e. monitoring stations located in subsubbasins within Water Boards jurisdictions). Upper panels present heterogeneous impacts according to longitudinal distance to the coast: upstream (Panel a) versus downstream (Panel b) monitoring stations. Lower panels present heterogeneous impacts according to share of cropland in the drainage area: monitoring stations with above median cropland share (Panel c) versus those with below median cropland share (Panel d). Controlling for monthly climatic measures in the drainage area of each monitoring station (linear and squared terms for precipitation and average maximum temperature, average minimum temperature, and potential evapotranspiration) and monitoring station-month and year fixed effects. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the hydrological basin level and allowing for effects heterogeneity based on 4 groups by longitudinal distance to the coast and agricultural land share in the drainage area of each monitoring station.


Figure XIX: Heterogeneous Effects on Dry Season Streamflow by Location-Cropland Combinations




(a) Downstream farms with low cropland share



(b) Upstream farms with low cropland share




(c) Downstream farms with high cropland share



(d) Upstream farms with high cropland share

Notes: This figure presents our heterogeneous effects estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment events on streamflows, using the Event Study estimator by Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024). All estimates correspond to the Event Study sample (eventually treated monitoring stations, i.e. monitoring stations located in subsubbasins within Water Boards jurisdictions). The panels show the interaction between geographical location and agricultural intensity: downstream farms with low cropland share (Panel a), upstream farms with low cropland share (Panel B), downstream farms with high cropland share (Panel c), and upstream farms with high cropland share (Panel d). Controlling for monthly climatic measures in the drainage area of each monitoring station (linear and squared terms for precipitation and average maximum temperature, average minimum temperature, and potential evapotranspiration) and monitoring station-month and year fixed effects. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the hydrological basin level and allowing for effects heterogeneity based on 4 groups by longitudinal distance to the coast and agricultural land share in the drainage area of each monitoring station.


Figure XX: Example: Farm-Level Data and Distance to Most Upstream Capital in the Aconcagua Basin



Notes: The map presents the Aconcagua Basin, illustrating the jurisdiction and year of Establishment of its four Water Boards, and our sample of irrigated farms. The color of each farm plot represents distance through the road network to the most upstream province capital.


A Appendix

Figure A.I: Water Distribution by El Arrayan Water Board to Governed Canals, 2019-2023



Notes: Panel (a) shows average streamflow and precipitation in monitoring stations within and outside water board jurisdictions before 1985. Source: Authors' calculation. Panel (b) displays water distribution by El Arrayan Water Board to governed canals from 2019-2023, measured in liters per second. Source: https://jmapocho.cl/reparto-total/. Captured on November 7, 2023.

Figure A.II: Example: Water Right Title



AMELIA GALVEZ CARVALLO
CONSERVADOR ARCHIVERO
SAN BERNARDO

Fs. 100 Nº 197

Año 1999/gcg.

COPIA DE INSCRIPCION

(Registro de Propiedad de Aguas)


Nº 197 MADECO S. A., Rut Nº 91.021.000-9, con domicilio en calle Ureta Cox número novecientos treinta, comuna de San Miguel, es dueña de un derecho de aprovechamiento consuntivo de aguas subterráneas, de ejercicio permanente y continuo, de sesenta y cuatro litros por segundo, que se captarán por elevación mecánica desde un pozo de ciento treinta metros de profundidad, ubicado el predio de la interesada, Lote de terreno que formaba parte del predio denominado hoy, fundo La Divisa, Rol de Avalúo número cuatro mil quinientos guión dieciséis, a doscientos cincuenta y cinco metros al norte del deslinde sur y dieciocho coma ocho metros al oriente del eje de la calle La Divisa. El Area de protección del pozo queda definida por un circulo de doscientos metros de radio con centro en el eje del pozo, la que no podrá abarcar más del cincuenta por ciento de la superficie de las propiedades vecinas." Adquirió este derecho de aprovechamiento, por constitución que le hizo la Dirección General de Aguas, de conformidad a los Articulos 60, 61, 141, 149 y 150 del Código de Aguas y en virtud de la Resolución Nº 275 de la Dirección General de Aguas del Ministerio de Obras Públi-

DERECHO DE APROVECHAMIENTO DE AGUAS SUB-TERRANEAS

MADECO S. A.

Rol 2397

Figure A.III: Water Rights Proration Adjustment



Notes: Screenshot taken on July 29, 2025, from a LinkedIn post by Junta de Vigilancia Río Choapa y sus Afluentes.

Figure A.IV: General Assembly of Water Users




Notes: Screenshot taken on July 29, 2025, from a LinkedIn post by Junta de Vigilancia Río Choapa y sus Afluentes.

Figure A.V: Irrigation Infrastructure Maintenance



Notes: Photograph of a cleaning campaign, as featured on the official website of the Junta de Vigilancia del Río Maipo, depicting canal maintenance activities. Image retrieved on July 29, 2025, from their website: https://jvriomaipo.cl/limpieza-basura-canales-regadio/.


Figure A.VI: Robustness: Effect on log(Production) of Rainfall during the Irrigation Season by Longitude Quintile and Treatment Status for Irrigated Parcels Registered in Canal




Notes: This figure presents a robustness check on the functional form of equation 5, replacing the continuous distance to the coast with quintile indicators.

Figure A.VII: Difference-in-Differences estimates of Impacts of Water Boards on Water Consumption (non-standardized)

(a) Heterogeneous Impacts, by tercile of distance to the coast.




(b) Combined estimates




Notes: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment on non-standardized standardized summer evapotranspiration, using the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator by Borusyak et al. (2024). Panel A presents heterogeneous effects by location within the river basin, where the solid blue line with squares represents downstream farms, the dashed gray line with triangles shows mid-basin farms, and the dotted line with diamonds represents upstream farms. Panel B presents combined estimates aggregating across all farm locations within basins. The x-axis shows years relative to Water Board establishment, with year 0 marking the establishment year. The sample includes farms located in basins with Water Boards established between 1981-2010, covering 5 years pre- and 7 years post-establishment. Controlling for plot-level fixed effects and flexible time trends by latitude-longitude cells (2°×2°) and quantile of location in the basin. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak et al. (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the clustering at the 3rd level basin.

Figure A.VIII: Difference-in-Differences estimates of Impacts of Water Boards on Agricultural Yield (non-standardized)

(a) Heterogeneous Impacts, by tercile of distance to the coast.




(b) Combined estimates




Notes: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment on non-standardized agricultural productivity (EVI), using the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator by Borusyak et al. (2024). Panel A presents heterogeneous effects by location within the river basin, where the solid blue line with squares represents downstream farms, the dashed gray line with triangles shows mid-basin farms, and the dotted line with diamonds represents upstream farms. Panel B presents combined estimates aggregating across all farm locations within basins. The x-axis shows years relative to Water Board establishment, with year 0 marking the establishment year. The sample includes farms located in basins with Water Boards established between 1981-2010, covering 5 years pre- and 7 years post-establishment. Controlling for plot-level fixed effects and flexible time trends by latitude-longitude cells (2°×2°) and quantile of location in the basin. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak et al. (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the clustering at the 3rd level basin.

Figure A.IX: Differences-in-Differences estimates of Impacts of Water Boards with Controls

(a) Water Consumption: Heterogeneous Impacts, by tercile of distance to the coast.




(b) Agricultural Yield: Heterogeneous Impacts, by tercile of distance to the coast.




Notes: *Notes:* This figure presents heterogeneous effects by location within the river basin for standardized Water Consumption (Panel A) and standardized agricultural yield (Panel B), using the staggered difference-in-differences imputation estimator by Borusyak et al. (2024). In both panels, the solid blue line with squares represents downstream farms, the dashed gray line with triangles shows mid-basin farms, and the dotted line with diamonds represents upstream farms. The x-axis shows years relative to Water Board establishment, with year 0 marking the establishment year. The sample includes farms located in basins with Water Boards established between 1981–2010, covering 5 years pre- and 7 years post-establishment. Estimates control for plot-level fixed effects, annual climatic characteristics (total precipitation, summer precipitation, and temperature ranges), and flexible time trends by latitude-longitude cells (2°×2°) and quantile of location in the basin. Standard errors are estimated using the Borusyak et al. (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the 3rd level basin.


Figure A.X: Dynamic Effects of Board Establishment Events on Streamflow - Full Year




(a) Event Study sample



(b) Event Study sample - water reclamations control



(c) Full sample



(d) Full sample - water reclamations control

Notes: This figure presents our main estimates of the impact of Water Board establishment events on streamflows, using the Event Study estimator by Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024). The Full Sample correspond to monitoring stations located in the Study Region, while the Event Study sample only includes eventually treated monitoring stations (i.e. monitoring stations located in subsubbasins within Water Boards jurisdictions). Controlling for monthly climatic measures in the drainage area of each monitoring station (linear and squared terms for precipitation and average maximum temperature, average minimum temperature, and potential evapotranspiration) and monitoring station-month and year fixed effects. Standard errors estimated using Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024) leave-one-out procedure, clustering at the hydrological basin level and allowing for effects heterogeneity based on 4 groups by longitudinal distance to the coast and agricultural land share in the drainage area of each monitoring station.

Table A.I: Misallocation Test: Additional robustness checks

	Outcome is log(Value Yield p/Hectare)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	m5	m6	m7
Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month) × Distance to coast (100km)	-0.221	-0.203	-0.270
	(0.118)*	(0.110)*	(0.147)*
	[0.116]*	[0.108]*	[0.143]*
Water Board=1 × Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month)	-0.362	-0.410	-0.480
	(0.242)	(0.223)*	(0.256)*
	[0.234]	[0.218]*	[0.249]*
Water Board=1 × Useful pp. (ML per Ha per month) × Distance to coast (100km)	0.208	0.262	0.297
	(0.160)	(0.147)*	(0.168)*
	[0.152]	[0.141]*	[0.162]*
Parcel Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Controls	Yes	No	No
Bin (Lat, Lon) FE	Yes	No	No
County FE	No	Yes	Yes
Useful Rain. × Crop FE	Yes	Yes	No
Useful Rain. × Fertirigation	No	No	Yes
Observations	14,714	14,712	14,712
R-squared	0.662	0.674	0.642
Misallocation Test: Water Board=0	0.06	0.07	0.07
Misallocation Test: Water Board=1	0.89	0.52	0.74

Notes: This table present different robustness check, including new control variables and interactions of useful rainfall with some relevant controls. We regress $\log(Y)$ of rainfall during the irrigation season by longitude and treatment status for irrigated parcels registered in canal associations.

Table A.II: Correlation between the Instrumental Variable and Other Covariates

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid Section	(3) Upstream
Climatic covariates			
Mean summer prec.	.0055	.0038	.00034
	(.0039)	(.0033)	(.0021)
Mean annual prec.	.01	.022	.0044
	(.024)	(.023)	(.016)
Days between 25 and 29 $°C$	-.00024	-.00041	-.00013
	(.0003)	(.00036)	(.00039)
Days between 29 and 31 $°C$	-.00004	-.000038	-.00012
	(.00013)	(.00016)	(.0002)
Days between 31 and 35 $°C$	.000012	.000027	-.00022
	(.00013)	(.0001)	(.00017)
Days above 35 $°C$	-.000011	-3.6e-06	-.000044
	(.000015)	(.000024)	(.000026)
Market Access			
Distance to Santiago (main dom. market)	.0011	.0024 *	.0017
	(.00077)	(.0014)	(.0014)
Distance to Valparaiso (main port)	-.0016	.001	.000045
	(.0011)	(.0015)	(.0015)
Distance to San Antonio (second main port)	.0004	.00077	.000031
	(.00092)	(.0015)	(.0015)
Farm Characteristics			
log(area)	-.000039	.000051 ***	.000014
	(.000023)	(.000013)	(.000017)
Potential Yield under irrigation, high input (FAO/GAEZ)	-.016	.022	.011
	(.01)	(.017)	(.011)

Notes: Each row reports the coefficient from a separate regression of the listed covariate on the instrument. All regressions include fixed effects for year and for 1°×1° grid cells. No additional controls are included. Standard errors clustered by county.

Table A.III: Anticipation of Useful Rainfall: Temporary Labor Demand

	Non-Irrigation Season				Irrigation Season			
	Fall		Winter		Spring		Summer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Useful Rainfall	0.0204	0.157	-0.0336	0.0538	-0.622	-0.733	-0.395	-0.220
	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.298)**	(0.387)*	(0.217)*	(0.222)
Observations	15,446	14,982	15,573	15,116	15,829	15,402	15,828	15,406
Pseudo-R^2	0.979	0.981	0.979	0.981	0.976	0.979	0.958	0.965

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Poisson models of temporary labor hired on each season on our measure of useful rainfall, for the main sample (described in Section 4). Useful Rainfall is measured in ML per hectare per month. All columns control for log-farm size and county fixed-effects. The outcomes are temporary labor in: Fall 2006 in columns 1 and 2, Winter 2006 in columns 3 and 4, Spring 2006 in columns 5 and 6, and Summer 2007 in columns 7 and 8. Odd-numbered columns control for crop fixed-effects, while even-numbered columns control for crop-times-agricultural zone fixed effects.

Table A.IV: Water Consumption: Instrumental Variables Estimation at the Parcel Level

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	-0.0210	-0.0993	0.0487	2.010	-9.785	-1.071
	(0.101)	(0.0677)	(0.0851)	(0.759)***	(42.88)	(0.601)*
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	139,693	144,580	143,795	139,693	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.298	0.357	0.371	0.028	-11.566	0.249
Mean Dependent Var.				2.953	3.476	3.407
AR test CI				[.7185, ∞)	($-\infty$, ∞)	($-\infty$, -.2224]

Panel B: First Stage

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream
ucd^2	-0.0000290	0.00000260	0.0000308
	(0.00000815)***	(0.0000116)	(0.0000122)**
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.534	0.320	0.368
Effective F-stat	12.266	0.051	6.430

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the average Evapotranspiration for each plot in the Summer months (January and February) for the period 2005-2009. Columns 1 and 4 present estimates for farms located downstream (in the lowest tercile of distance to the coast); columns 2 and 5 for mid-section farms (second tercile of distance to the coast); and columns 3 and 6 for plots located upstream (in the highest tercile of distance to the coast). Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^+)$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.V: Agricultural Productivity: Instrumental Variables Estimation at the Parcel Level

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	0.000500	-0.000508	0.0120	0.205	-0.590	0.00281
	(0.00740)	(0.00656)	(0.00647)*	(0.0695)***	(2.573)	(0.0352)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.278	0.178	0.247	-0.001	-4.119	0.246
Mean Dependent Var.				0.370	0.413	0.410
AR test CI				[.09944, ∞)	($-\infty$, ∞)	[-.1132, .1028]

Panel B: First Stage

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream
ucd^2	-0.0000290	0.00000260	0.0000308
	(0.00000815)***	(0.0000116)	(0.0000122)**
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.534	0.320	0.368
Effective F-stat	12.622	0.051	6.430

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the maximum value of the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) reached within the year for the period 2005-2009. Distance to the coast wasmeasured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^{+})$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^{\circ} \times 1^{\circ}$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.VI: Water Consumption: IV Estimation using Linear Distance Instrument

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	-0.0210	-0.0993	0.0487	2.148	-2.733	-0.555
	(0.101)	(0.0677)	(0.0851)	(0.981)**	(3.453)	(0.480)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	139,693	144,580	143,795	139,693	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.298	0.357	0.371	-0.010	-0.524	0.336
Mean Dependent Var.				2.953	3.476	3.407
AR test CI				[.6008, 5.955]	(-∞, ∞)	[-2.331, .3081]

Panel B: First Stage

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream
ucd	-0.00435	0.00121	0.00429
	(0.00133)***	(0.00151)	(0.00143)***
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.532	0.322	0.379
Effective F-stat	10.164	0.637	8.963

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the average Evapotranspiration for each plot in the Summer months (January and February), for the period 2005-2009. The instrument corresponds to the optimal-route distance between the land plot and the most upstream province capital city in the basin. Columns 1 and 4 present estimates for farms located downstream (in the lowest tercile of distance to the coast); columns 2 and 5 for mid-section farms (second tercile of distance to the coast); and columns 3 and 6 for plots located upstream (in the highest tercile of distance to the coast). Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^{+})$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^{\circ} \times 1^{\circ}$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.VII: Agricultural Productivity: IV Estimation using Linear Distance Instrument

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	0.000500	-0.000508	0.0120	0.212	-0.105	0.0289
	(0.00740)	(0.00656)	(0.00647)*	(0.0884)**	(0.175)	(0.0330)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.278	0.178	0.247	-0.018	0.041	0.244
Mean Dependent Var.				0.370	0.413	0.410
AR test CI				[.08338, .574]	($-\infty$, ∞)	[-.0425, .1301]

Panel B: First Stage

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream
ucd	-0.00435	0.00121	0.00429
	(0.00133)***	(0.00151)	(0.00143)***
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.532	0.322	0.379
Effective F-stat	10.703	0.637	8.963

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the maximum value of the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) reached within the year, for the period 2005-2009. The instrument corresponds to the optimal-route distance between the land plot and the most upstream province capital city in the basin. Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^{+})$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^{\circ} \times 1^{\circ}$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.VIII: Water Consumption: IV Estimation using Piece-wise Linear Distance Instrument

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	-0.0210	-0.0993	0.0487	1.976	-3.299	-0.844
	(0.101)	(0.0677)	(0.0851)	(0.871)**	(4.507)	(0.527)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	139,693	144,580	143,795	139,693	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.298	0.357	0.371	0.036	-0.944	0.293
Mean Dependent Var.				2.953	3.476	3.407
AR test CI				[.5774, 5.146]	(-∞, ∞)	[-3.439, -.03336]

Panel B: First Stage

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream
$\min\{pcd, 30\}$	-0.00489	0.00120	0.00492
	(0.00144)***	(0.00159)	(0.00178)***
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.536	0.321	0.376
Effective F-stat	11.046	0.565	7.672

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the average Evapotranspiration for each plot in the Summer months (January and February), for the period 2005-2009. The instrument corresponds to the maximum between the optimal-route distance between the land plot and the most upstream province capital city in the basin, and $30km$. Columns 1 and 4 present estimates for farms located downstream (in the lowest tercile of distance to the coast); columns 2 and 5 for mid-section farms (second tercile of distance to the coast); and columns 3 and 6 for plots located upstream (in the highest tercile of distance to the coast). Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^{+})$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^{\circ} \times 1^{\circ}$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.IX: Agricultural Productivity: IV Estimation using Piece-wise Linear Distance Instrument

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS			IV		
	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream	(4) Downstream	(5) Mid section	(6) Upstream
Board	0.000500	-0.000508	0.0120	0.200	-0.198	0.0125
	(0.00740)	(0.00656)	(0.00647)*	(0.0805)**	(0.287)	(0.0328)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.278	0.178	0.247	0.014	-0.302	0.247
Mean Dependent Var.				0.370	0.413	0.410
AR test CI				[.08163, .5131]	$(-\infty, \infty)$	[-.07429, .1067]

Panel B: First Stage

	(1) Downstream	(2) Mid section	(3) Upstream
$\min\{pcd, 30\}$	-0.00489	0.00120	0.00492
	(0.00144)***	(0.00159)	(0.00178)***
Observations	141,675	144,580	143,795
R-squared	0.536	0.321	0.376
Effective F-stat	11.579	0.565	7.672

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the maximum value of the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) reached within the year, for the period 2005-2009. The instrument corresponds to the maximum between the optimal-route distance between the land plot and the most upstream province capital city in the basin, and $30km$. Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^+)$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.X: Extensive Margin Irrigation: Instrumental Variables estimation at the parcel level.

Panel A: Full Sample				
	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Board	0.05	0.04	0.16	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)*	(0.22)
Farm level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1x1 degree cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	67,713	42,236	67,713	42,236
R-squared	0.703	0.696	0.700	0.695
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Mean Dependent Var.	0.322	0.342	0.185	0.342
Effective F-stat			5.989	0.521
AR test CI			[-.07419, .435]	(-∞, ∞)
Panel B: Large Farms				
	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Water Board	0.13	0.04	0.48	0.46
	(0.05)**	(0.04)	(0.16)***	(0.54)
Farm level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1x1 degree cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,236	11,730	14,236	11,730
R-squared	0.533	0.582	0.473	0.520
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Mean Dependent Var.	0.462	0.491	0.462	0.491
Effective F-stat			3.653	0.427
AR test CI			[.186, 1.148]	(-∞, ∞)
Panel C: Small Farms				
	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Board	-0.00	0.00	0.07	0.11
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)*	(0.19)
Farm level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1x1 degree cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	40,807	23,536	40,807	23,536
R-squared	0.681	0.868	0.070	0.073
Sample	Downstream	Upstream	Downstream	Upstream
Mean Dependent Var.	0.059	0.045	0.059	0.045
Effective F-stat			6.422	0.204
AR test CI			[-.107, .1569]	(-∞, ∞)

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the farm reports any type of irrigation technology. Panel A includes all farms, Panel B only those classified as large (being in the 5th quintile of farm size, among all farms), and Panel C those classified as small (being below the median of farm size). Odd (even) columns include farms in the first (third) decile of distance to the coast, measured through the river network to the centroid of each county. The instrument corresponds to the optimal-route distance between the land plot and the most upstream province capital city in the basin, entered in the specification as both a linear and a squared term. All models include farm-level controls (logarithm of labor input, dummies for education of the operation manager, being organized as a firm, and deciles of farm area), county-level controls (number of days above 29 Celsius degrees ("killing days"), average soil quality, market access (distance to Santiago and the main ports), dummies for climate zone), and 1x1-degree cell fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.XI: Water Consumption and Heterogeneous Effects by Farm Size

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS, small		OLS, large		IV, small		IV, large	
	(1) Downstream	(2) Upstream	(3) Downstream	(4) Upstream	(5) Downstream	(6) Upstream	(7) Downstream	(8) Upstream
Board	-0.00700	0.130	-0.0691	-0.00476	1.465	-0.722	4.534	-1.758
	(0.115)	(0.0923)	(0.0990)	(0.0979)	(0.618)**	(0.644)	(1.891)**	(0.855)**
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	74,563	69,650	25,092	29,905	74,563	69,650	25,092	29,905
R-squared	0.285	0.397	0.337	0.334	0.138	0.325	-0.836	0.032
Mean Dependent Var.					2.758	3.282	3.346	3.649
AR test CI					[.3216, 3.146]	(-∞, .2615]	[2.173, ∞)	(-∞, -.6504]

Panel B: First Stage

	First stage, small		First stage, large	
	(1) Downstream	(2) Upstream	(3) Downstream	(4) Upstream
ucd^2	-0.0000333	0.0000309	-0.0000192	0.0000284
	(0.00000824)**	(0.0000142)**	(0.00000861)**	(0.0000114)**
Observations	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905
R-squared	0.541	0.364	0.577	0.345
Effective F-stat	15.928	4.732	4.945	6.203

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the average Evapotranspiration for each plot in the Summer months (January and February), for the period 2005-2009. Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^+)$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.XII: Agricultural Productivity and Heterogeneous Effects by Farm Size

Panel A: Main Result

	OLS, small		OLS, large		IV, small		IV, large	
	(1) Downstream	(2) Upstream	(3) Downstream	(4) Upstream	(5) Downstream	(6) Upstream	(7) Downstream	(8) Upstream
Board	-0.00626	0.0176	-0.00613	0.00650	0.142	0.0115	0.459	-0.0464
	(0.00753)	(0.00798)**	(0.00733)	(0.00724)	(0.0559)**	(0.0405)	(0.202)**	(0.0487)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905
R-squared	0.282	0.242	0.320	0.262	0.126	0.242	-0.857	0.233
Mean Dependent Var.					0.349	0.398	0.412	0.424
AR test CI					[.04895, .3097]	[-.154, .2007] ∪ [.4289, ∞)	[.2218, ∞)	(-∞, .03637]

Panel B: First Stage

	First stage, small		First stage, large	
	(1) Downstream	(2) Upstream	(3) Downstream	(4) Upstream
ucd^2	-0.0000333	0.0000309	-0.0000192	0.0000284
	(0.00000824)**	(0.0000142)**	(0.00000861)**	(0.0000114)**
Observations	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905
R-squared	0.541	0.364	0.577	0.345
Effective F-stat	16.301	4.732	4.963	6.203

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable is the maximum value of the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) reached within the year, for the period 2005-2009. Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^+)$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.XIII: Crop Choice: Heterogeneous Effects by Farm Size

Panel A: Peak after December (dummy)

	OLS, small		OLS, large		IV, small		IV, large	
	(1) Downstream	(2) Upstream	(3) Downstream	(4) Upstream	(5) Downstream	(6) Upstream	(7) Downstream	(8) Upstream
Board	0.0472	0.0133	-0.00188	-0.00106	0.352	0.217	0.887	-0.00339
	(0.0219)**	(0.0289)	(0.0242)	(0.0294)	(0.111)***	(0.225)	(0.382)**	(0.198)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905
R-squared	0.064	0.123	0.098	0.136	0.017	0.099	-0.205	0.136
Mean Dependent Var.					0.231	0.324	0.375	0.414
Effective F-stat					16.301	4.732	4.963	6.203
AR test CI					[.1355, .635]	[-.1648, ∞)	[.4261, ∞)	[-.6148, .6272]

Panel B: Season Length (months)

	OLS, small		OLS, large		IV, small		IV, large	
	(1) Downstream	(2) Upstream	(3) Downstream	(4) Upstream	(5) Downstream	(6) Upstream	(7) Downstream	(8) Upstream
Board	0.134	0.0150	-0.0233	-0.0202	1.012	0.179	2.293	-0.302
	(0.0650)**	(0.0587)	(0.0566)	(0.0618)	(0.292)***	(0.401)	(1.022)**	(0.406)
Climatic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plot controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905	75,915	69,650	25,235	29,905
R-squared	0.068	0.113	0.096	0.145	0.011	0.110	-0.245	0.136
Mean Dependent Var.					6.810	6.994	7.124	7.197
Effective F-stat					16.301	4.732	4.963	6.203
AR test CI					[.4693, 1.796]	[-.8499, ∞)	[1.086, ∞)	(-∞, .565]

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation 10 for parcels located at elevations below 1,000 meters and within 150 km of the river mouth in the study area. The outcome variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a plot reached its maximum value of EVI in the season in Summer (December or after), and 0 otherwise, for the period 2005-2009. The outcome variable in Panel B is the the number of months between May (first month of the agricultural year) and peak of EVI within the corresponding year, for the period 2005-2009. Distance to the coast was measured through the river network. Plot-level controls include market access measures (driving distance to Santiago and the main ports of Valparaíso and San Antonio); dummies for soil quality quartiles; annual, combined winter and spring, and summer precipitation; temperature, measured as the number of days with maximum temperatures in the following ranges: $[25, 29]$, $[29, 31]$, $[31, 35]$, and $[35, \infty^{+})$ in Celsius degrees; and a dummy for whether the plot has groundwater rights. All regressions include $1^{\circ} \times 1^{\circ}$ cell fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.

Table A.XIV: Irrigation Calendar, by Crop.

Irrigated crops	Crop Needs Irrigation in Month											
	J	**F**	**M**	**A**	**M**	**J**	**J**	**A**	**S**	**O**	**N**	**D**
Wheat						x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Rice	x	x	x								x	x
Maize	x	x	x								x	x
Barley						x	x	x	x	x	x	
Other cereals	x	x	x								x	x
Vegetables	x	x	x								x	x
Fruits	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Grapes	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Citrus	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Oil crops	x	x	x								x	x
Potatoes	x	x	x								x	x
Pulses	x	x	x								x	x
Sugar beet	x	x	x							x	x	x
Fodder temporary						x	x	x	x	x	x	
Tobacco	x	x	x								x	x
Pasture permanent	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: FAO, INE.

B Appendix: Measuring Distances

This appendix details the calculations developed to determine spatial relationships between various entities (e.g., gauges, municipality irrigated areas, farms) along a river system, which we use to determine relative positions along rivers, i.e. downstream and upstream locations. It also describe measures of distance along road networks used to control for market access and create instrumental variable.

B.1 Distance to the River Mouth

This algorithm estimates how far each entity is from the river mouth, measured along the river's path. This measure is used later as in input to determine the relative position of entities in the river network. Along the way, it provides a first order approximation of the relative position of each entity in the river system: places close to the river mouth can be roughly said to be downstream while places far from the mouth can roughly said to be upstream.

B.1.1 Inputs

- A set of georeferenced points of interest. This is straightforward when the object of interest is approximately a point (e.g. a gauge). If the object of interest has a non-negligible area (e.g. farm, municipality's irrigated area), we use its point of inaccessibility as reference point.
- River network layer.
- River mouth coordinate.

B.1.2 Steps

1. Convert the river network into a set of points.
2. For each point of interest, find the closest point in the river. Call each of these points a river connecting point (rcp).

3. Rasterize the river. In the resulting raster, every pixel crossed by the river has a value of 1. The rest of the raster has null values.

4. Estimate the least cost path connecting each rcp to the mouth of the river, over the rasterized version of the river.

5. For each rcp, recover the length of its corresponding least cost path.

6. For each object of interest, assign the distance to the outfall from its corresponding rcp.

B.1.3 Output

For each object of interest we have its distance to the river mouth over the river network. This corresponds to the distance to the outfall from the point of the river that is closest to the object of interest. This process is illustated in figure B.I.

B.2 Distance Calculation over Road Network

This algorithm estimates distances between a set of points (e.g., farms) and key locations such as the upstream provincial capital within the basin, ports, and the national capital. The calculation is performed using the built-in least-cost-path tool in QGIS. The road network is represented by a rasterized layer of paved roads from 2014. To reflect the varying quality of road types, paved roads are assigned half the travel cost of other road types (e.g., dirt roads, stabilized roads, gravel roads). The algorithm then calculates the shortest path over the road network, ensuring that distances reflect actual travel paths rather than straight-line distances.




Figure B.I: Algorithm Illustration. An arbitrary area—shown in green—is connected to the closest point in the river, marked by a red circle. The distance assigned to this arbitrary object will be the distance along the river from the connecting point (red circle) to the river mouth or outfall (red square).