# The Effect of Democrat Governor on Internal Migration of Low-Skilled Immigrants

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**Abstract**

Using 2000–2019 data on Hispanic immigrants without a college degree, I compare states narrowly won by Democrats to those narrowly won by Republicans to causally identify how partisan control of state government affects interstate migration. Despite the Democratic Party's pro-immigration stance and strong Hispanic support, I find that Democratic victories reduce net interstate migration flows of Hispanic immigrants while they increase those of low-skilled U.S.-born Whites and Blacks. This divergence is driven by heterogenous impacts in the labor-market. Democratic governors worsen (improve) Hispanic immigrants' (native-born workers') employment prospects. Policy differences associated with Democratic control (higher minimum wages and more generous earned income tax credits) interact with imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives, shifting employment toward native-born workers despite a more politically favorable climate. These findings indicate that interstate migration among Hispanic immigrants is driven primarily by economic returns rather than ideological alignment.

**Keywords:** Internal migration; Immigration; Partisan policy; Labor market substitution; Minimum wage; Regression discontinuity

**JEL Classification Numbers:** D72, H73, J15, J61, J82

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# 1 Introduction

What drives people to move, and who responds to which incentives? A long tradition models migration as a utility-maximizing choice over locations (McFadden 1973), and abundant evidence shows that economic incentives shape domestic mobility.[1] Yet as political polarization has deepened, political alignment has become a salient non-pecuniary motive behind geographic sorting.[2] Existing work typically studies economic conditions and political environments separately, leaving limited causal evidence on how the two jointly shape migration decisions. This limitation is especially consequential for immigrants, for whom economic and political incentives co-vary, often generating sharp trade-offs in location choice.[3][4] Strong job prospects may offset political hostility, while more inclusive environments can attract migrants even in economically weaker areas. This paper addresses this gap by estimating the causal effect of narrowly electing a Democratic governor on interstate migration among low-skilled Hispanic immigrants without a college degree.

To study how concurrent shifts in economic and political incentives shape internal migration, I exploit the close election of a Democratic governor. Partisan control of the governorship changes both policy instruments and the governing stance that define the local opportunity set for immigrants. On the economic side, Democratic governors tend to pursue more interventionist labor-market and redistributive policies—such as higher minimum wages and a stronger emphasis on welfare spending—that affect migrants' expected returns through wages and employment prospects, and thereby real expected income.[5] On the political side, Democratic governors tend to promote inclusion, whereas Republican governors emphasize stricter enforcement and more exclusionary approaches.[6] Political messaging and hostility can deter immigrant inflows,[7] consistent with evidence that Republicans are less likely to support pro-immigrant measures and hold stronger anti-immigrant views.[8]

Identifying the causal effect of Democratic governors on migration is challenging because partisan control is endogenous: immigrants can influence electoral outcomes (Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2022), and location choices may be jointly determined with politics through residential sorting (Tiebout and the Big Sort narrative).[9] To address these concerns, the analysis employs a bias-corrected local linear regression discontinuity design (RDD) with

1. For labor mobility as an adjustment channel to regional shocks, see, among many others, Blanchard and Katz 1992; Decressin and Fatás 1995; Dao, Furceri, and Loungani 2017. For international migration determinants, see Mayda 2010.

2. For political sorting, see Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013; Gimpel and Hui 2015; Johnston, Manley, and Jones 2016; Brown and Enos 2021.

3. U.S. evidence shows that immigrants respond more strongly than natives to regional labor-market shocks; see Orrenius and Zavodny 2008; Cadena 2014; Cadena and Kovak 2016; Churchill and Sabia 2019.

4. Evidence from Italy shows far-right mayoral victories reduce immigrant inflows, an effect attributed to an "inhospitality" channel rather than pecuniary policy changes; see Bracco et al. 2018; Farina 2017; Cerqua and Zampollo 2022. Because Italian mayors have limited fiscal authority, this evidence primarily captures political incentives, with little scope to assess economic channels.

5. See Leigh 2008; L. P. Beland and Oloomi 2017; and the related close-election evidence on various outcomes in L.-P. Beland 2015; L.-P. Beland 2016; L. P. Beland and Unel 2018; Keita and Mandon 2018; L. P. Beland and Unel 2019.

6. For example, Republican governors are more likely to sign 287(g) agreements that facilitate state cooperation with federal immigration enforcement; see Creek and Yoder 2012.

7. See Bracco et al. 2018; Cerqua and Zampollo 2022.

8. See Facchini and Steinhardt 2011; Conconi et al. 2020; Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2022.

9. Complementing the peer-reviewed evidence cited above, widely read accounts in books, reports, and the media frame the "Big Sort" narrative as an extension of Tiebout's hypothesis: migration is shaped not only by economic considerations (e.g., taxes and public-good provision) but also by political and ideological preferences, which can reinforce regional political homogeneity and polarization; see *The Big Sort*, NPR (2022), UVA Center for Politics (2022), and Brooks (2023) in *The New York Times*.

covariate adjustment to estimate the effect of narrowly electing a Democratic governor.[10] The main analysis focuses on elections decided within a ±5 percentage-point margin, which sharpens the local comparison at the cutoff and limits bias that can arise when wider windows pool less comparable states. The recent RDD inference procedure addresses the high variance that arises in small samples with narrow bandwidths, improving the reliability of causal estimates. Using a common ±5 pp. window across specifications facilitates comparisons across outcomes and groups; as robustness checks, the results are similar under standard data-driven bandwidth choices. The main analysis uses American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000–2019 to measure interstate migration flows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and, for comparison, low-skilled U.S.-born White and Black individuals.

Widely recognized partisan gaps across demographic groups—documented in descriptive evidence from the Cooperative Election Study (CES, 2006–2019) and in survey evidence—show that Hispanic-Latino and Black populations overwhelmingly support Democrats, whereas White natives display weaker alignment.[11] In turn, partisan sorting would predict that narrowly electing a Democratic governor raises net inflows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants into the state. Contrary to this expectation, low-skilled Hispanic immigrants exhibit lower annual net interstate migration flows under Democratic governors, driven by both smaller inflows and larger outflows. Over a four-year Democratic gubernatorial term, the cumulative change in the low-skilled Hispanic immigrant population is estimated to be 11.34 percent lower than in Republican states, with this decline concentrated among non-citizen immigrants. By contrast, low-skilled White and Black natives experience higher net migration flows under Democratic governors, implying subpopulations that are about 1.6 and 1.62 percent larger over a typical Democratic term.

The evidence suggests that, despite the Democratic Party's pro-immigrant stance, economic conditions in Democratic-led states reduce the attractiveness of residence for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants. Under Democratic governors, unemployment rises disproportionately for this group: the unemployment rate for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants is 6.9 percentage points higher, whereas it is 1.3 and 6.1 percentage points lower for low-skilled White and Black natives, respectively, consistent with sectoral labor market adjustments in construction and food services where low-skilled Hispanic immigrants have increasingly been displaced by native workers. Expected labor market returns also weaken for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, especially among non-citizens, whose expected unit payoff in blue states is 5.2 percent lower than in Republican states. Housing costs reinforce these disparities: the annual increase in the housing price index is 2.7 percentage points higher in Democratic states, and higher living expenses combined with weaker employment prospects further diminish incentives for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants—particularly those without citizenship and with limited access to social safety nets—to reside in Democratic-led states.

One plausible mechanism behind these heterogeneous labor-market and migration responses is the more interventionist labor-market policy mix typically implemented under Democratic governors. Democratic-led states exhibit a 2.8 percent higher real minimum wage, are 74.5 percent more likely to raise it, and record 0.743 additional increases over a gubernatorial term.[12] They also feature an earned income tax credit (EITC) rate roughly two percentage points higher than that in Republican states. This mechanism is consistent with Edo and Rapoport 2019, who show that immigration-induced reductions in natives'

10. Following the methodological advances in Calonico, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik 2014, Gelman and Imbens 2019, and Calonico, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Max H. Farrell 2018. See D. S. Lee and Lemieux 2010, L.-P. Beland 2015, and Potrafke 2017 for applications of RDD to close elections.

11. See Pew Research statistics; Doherty and Kiley 2018; Krogstad, Edwards, and Lopez 2022.

12. Related evidence shows that Republican governors are less likely than Democrats to raise the minimum wage (Besley and Case 1995), whereas Democratic governors are more inclined to do so (Keita and Mandon 2018; Leigh 2008).

wages and employment at the state–skill-cell level are more pronounced in low-minimum-wage states and interpret this heterogeneity as evidence that higher minimum wages mitigate adverse labor-market impacts on natives, especially among low-skilled workers. Higher EITC rates can reinforce this buffering role by raising natives' effective returns to work without proportionally increasing firms' labor costs, thereby strengthening native labor supply precisely in the low-wage jobs where minimum-wage policies bind.

Within an imperfect substitution framework,[13] these policy differences can shift both labor demand and labor supply in ways that change the composition of the local low-skilled workforce. On the demand side, higher minimum wages raise the marginal cost of employing the least productive workers, strengthening incentives to substitute toward more productive native-born workers with greater U.S.-specific human capital (e.g., language proficiency and institutional familiarity). On the supply side, the interaction of minimum wages and the EITC increases the effective return to work and can draw natives into low-wage employment by lifting expected after-tax earnings above reservation wages. This supply response is particularly plausible if immigrants have lower reservation wages due to higher search costs, weaker outside options, higher costs of unemployment abroad, and more limited access to the safety net (e.g., Battisti et al. 2018; Chassamboulli and Palivos 2014). Together, demand-side substitution and supply-side crowd-in can tighten job prospects for low-skilled immigrants while improving outcomes for low-skilled natives, helping reconcile why Democratic-led states may offer ideological affinity yet nonetheless experience lower net inflows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants—consistent with the documented responsiveness of immigrant populations to economic incentives (Orrenius and Zavodny 2008; Cadena 2014; Churchill and Sabia 2019; Cadena and Kovak 2016). These forces also have direct implications for natives' location choices: low-skilled White natives appear to trade political disutility and higher housing costs for better employment outcomes, while low-skilled Black natives' net inflows rise mainly through reduced outmigration as labor-market gains and ideological alignment offset the housing-cost penalty.

This study contributes to the literature by bringing together two strands that have rarely been analyzed in a unified empirical framework: the political economy of migration and the role of economic conditions in spatial adjustment. While prior work documents that economic shocks and local labor-market conditions shape regional mobility, and a separate literature emphasizes political sorting and political climates, relatively little empirical evidence traces how partisan shifts translate into changes in economic opportunity sets that then affect migration decisions. Exploiting the quasi-random election of Democratic governors, this paper provides new evidence that partisan shocks influence internal migration through both ideological and material channels, and that these effects are sharply heterogeneous across low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and low-skilled White and Black natives. The setting further allows a direct comparison of political affinity and economic incentives, and the evidence indicates that economic opportunities dominate political alignment in shaping low-skilled Hispanic immigrants' location choices.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple location-choice framework that maps changes in key utility components into migration responses and, ultimately, the spatial distribution of demographic groups. Section 3 documents heterogeneous shifts in political alignment across groups following Democratic gubernatorial victories using the Cooperative Election Study (CES), 2006–2019. Section 4 describes the migration and policy data, presents descriptive evidence, and lays out the identification strategy. Section 5 estimates the effects of Democratic gubernatorial victories on interstate migration flows over 2000–2019 and characterizes heterogeneity across groups. Section 6 examines labor-market

13. See Peri and Sparber 2009; Card 2009; Peri and Sparber 2011; Ottaviano and Peri 2012.

adjustments that help account for the migration responses. Section 7 investigates the policy mechanisms and economic outcomes underlying these adjustments. Section 8 concludes.

# 2 Theoretical Framework

Living in a region governed by a preferred political party offers multiple utilities. Supporters benefit from policies aligned with their interests and values, which enhance political representation and satisfaction. This alignment reinforces social and political identity while fostering a sense of belonging and significance in society. Additionally, the predictability of policy changes under a familiar party reduces adaptation costs, and the promotion of shared social values provides broader societal affirmation.

Building on Diamond 2016 and Kim, J. Lee, and Peri 2025, consider the indirect utility[14] $V$ of a *low-skilled*[15] individual $j$ of nativity $k \in \{native, immigrant\}$ in state $i$, modeled as a log-linear approximation of real expected income, real local expenditures, and individual-nativity-specific political alignment:

$$V_{ijk} = ln(\frac{W_{ik} \times \lambda_{ik}}{P}) - \chi ln(\frac{R_i}{P}) + \phi_k(PA_{ijk}) + \epsilon_{ijk} \tag{1}$$

The term $\frac{W_{ik} \times \lambda_{ik}}{P}$ denotes real expected wages, adjusted for employment probability $\lambda_{ik}$ and the national price level $P$. The term $\chi ln\frac{R_i}{P}$ represents real local housing expenditure, with $\chi$ as the income share spent on housing. Political alignment, $\phi_k(PA_{ijk})$, contributes to utility based on the weight $\phi_k$, reflecting the importance of political factors relative to income. Positive utility arises when the preferred party governs, while negative utility arises under the opposing party.

This framework aligns with the utility maximization approach of McFadden 1973 using a conditional logit model. Differences in average utility across states for individuals of type $T = d, r$(Democratic or Republican supporters) predict variations in their population distribution. Assuming the idiosyncratic term $\epsilon_{ijk}$ follows an extreme value distribution, the population $N_{iTk}$ is proportional to the exponential of their average utility:

$$N_{iTk} = exp(ln(\frac{W_{ik} \times \lambda_{ik}}{P}) - \chi ln(\frac{R_i}{P}) + \phi_k(PA_{iTk})) \tag{2}$$

Taking logarithms and incorporating an exogenous shock, such as a narrowly decided Democratic gubernatorial election, the resulting population shift for each nativity $k$ and type $T$ in state $i$ is proportional to the weighted changes in utility components, with weights reflecting their respective coefficients.

$$\Delta ln(N_{iTk}) = \Delta ln(\frac{W_{ik} \times \lambda_{ik}}{P}) - \chi \Delta ln(\frac{R_i}{P}) + \phi_k \Delta(PA_{iTk}) \tag{3}$$

From Equation 3, if the migration response of low-skilled individuals of type $T$ and nativity $k$ is significantly larger (smaller) after a Democratic governor's narrow victory compared to the alternative, the political shock's total effect on this group is correspondingly greater (smaller). This utility-based framework enables an analysis of how such electoral outcomes shape migration responses and utility components. Integrating empirical results with the

14. The model assumes a utility maximization problem under a Cobb-Douglas utility function and a budget constraint: $ln(H_i^{\chi}) + ln(T^{1-\chi}) + \phi_j PA_{ijk}$ and $RH + PT \leq W_{ijk} \times \lambda_{ijk}$, where $H$ is a local housing good and $T$ is tradable consumption good.

15. One can set up a generalized model integrating different skill levels.

theoretical model identifies the dominant component and provides insights into their relative contributions, even when components exert opposing effects.

# 3 Political Orientation of Key Groups

The political alignment of low-skilled workers in the United States varies across groups, shaped by historical, economic, and cultural factors. Low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and Black natives predominantly support the Democratic Party due to its focus on inclusive immigration policies, social equity, and welfare policies, while white low-skilled workers have increasingly shifted toward the Republican Party in recent decades, reflecting differing socioeconomic priorities.

Surveys indicate that immigrants, Hispanic/Latino, and Black populations predominantly align with the Democratic Party, perceiving it as more attentive to their needs and committed to securing their support[16]. Figures 1a and 1c, based on Cooperative Election Study data, show a strong Democratic alignment among low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and Black natives, regardless of citizenship status or immigrant generation.

In contrast, white natives show a slightly higher support for the Republican Party (Doherty and Kiley 2018). The share of Democratic supporters among low-skilled white natives in Figure 1b, based on CES data, is comparatively lower, making it difficult to categorize them as a strong Democratic base when compared to the other two groups of interest.

Given the expected ideological and economic shifts under Democratic governors, who tend to support migration[17] and low-income earners, significant migration responses from low-skilled immigrants are anticipated. The "big sort" literature suggests that individuals often relocate to areas where political views align with local representatives' partisanship and policies[18]. However, the findings of this paper do not support this expectation.

# 4 Data and Identification

## 4.1 Data

I use American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000 to 2019, provided by IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al. 2022), to construct annual interstate migration flows. The ACS offers detailed information on both U.S.-born and foreign-born individuals, covering various characteristics such as educational attainment, race, and ethnicity. It also includes undocumented immigrants[19], allowing comprehensive coverage of the low-skilled immigrant population. While imputation may inflate migration estimates in other datasets[20], this is less of a concern in the ACS. For precaution, I treat imputed migration data as stayers in the main analysis. Given the impact of COVID-19 on migration, the primary analysis focuses on the pre-2020 period.

16. See Pew Research statistics; Doherty and Kiley 2018; Krogstad, Edwards, and Lopez 2022

17. Low-skilled immigrants are more likely to be undocumented, with an estimated 18%-20% undocumented share. They face ongoing deportation risks. Creek (2012) found a positive correlation between Republican governors and the adoption of 287(g) MOA, which enables state law enforcement to assist in detaining individuals violating federal immigration law.

18. See Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013; Gimpel and Hui 2015; Johnston, Manley, and Jones 2016; Brown and Enos 2021; The Big Sort; NPR (2022); UVA Center for Politics (2022).

19. See Cadena and Kovak 2016

20. See Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011

I count *actual* interstate movers, individuals who reported having moved from one state to another in the past year. I define annual interstate migration flows as

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Netflow}_{i,t} &\equiv \frac{\text{Individuals Moved In}_{i,t} - \text{Individuals Moved From}_{i,t}}{\text{State Working-age Total Population}_{i,e(it)}} \times 100 \\
\text{Inflow}_{i,t} &\equiv \frac{\text{Individuals Moved In}_{i,t}}{\text{State Working-age Total Population}_{i,e(it)}} \times 100 \\
\text{Outflow}_{i,t} &\equiv \frac{\text{Individuals Moved From}_{i,t}}{\text{State Working-age Total Population}_{i,e(it)}} \times 100
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

of each population group of interest normalized by the state's total working-age population(ages 18-64) in the election year $e(it)$ of a state $i$ in year $t$. The main sample focuses on working-age individuals (ages 18-64) who are not enrolled in school and do not reside in group quarters[21] I define immigrants as those born abroad and natives as those born in the US[22]. Unilateral migration flows are generated by aggregating interstate movers by origin (outflow) or destination (inflow) state[23].

I use state-level voting data from US gubernatorial elections (2000-2019), provided by Leip 2022. The running variable in the regression discontinuity design is the Democratic Party's vote share margin of victory:

$$MV_{it} = \frac{v_{it}^{1st} - v_{it}^{2nd}}{v_{it}} = \frac{v_{e(it)}^{1st} - v_{e(it)}^{2nd}}{v_{e(it)}} \tag{5}$$

which is the percent difference of votes cast for the winner and the second-place contender in elections where either the Democratic or Republican Party won. A positive value indicates a Democratic victory, while a negative value indicates a Republican victory[24]. The margin of victory remains constant throughout an office term, meaning the RDD estimates reflect the average annual effect of the unexpected election of a Democratic governor on migration flows of the foreign-born population over the full office term.

To validate the research design and explore potential channels, I use National Welfare Data from Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 2023 for additional state-level data on population, employment, unemployment, welfare, poverty, and politics. Economic outcomes, such as per-capita personal income, are sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). State tax rates by year are obtained from the Book of the State, while the Housing Price Index is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Individual-level party identification, shown in Figure 1, is derived from the Cooperative Election Study.

Table 1 provides information about state-level demographic, economic, and political circumstances in the pre-treatment period, the years when the gubernatorial elections are held. The table also contains the balanced covariate test result, which is a formal continuity-based analysis for covariates that examines if variables are predetermined before treatment assign-

21. Excluding group quarters residents is important (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011). Prior to 2006, the ACS did not cover group quarters residents, who had a higher tendency to migrate. IPUMS' warning also also recommends excluding group quarters.

22. Individuals born abroad to US citizens are counted as natives.

23. Outflows from Washington DC and Puerto Rico to other states are included, but inflows to Washington DC and Puerto Rico from other states are excluded.

24. For example, if Democrats receive 50% and Republicans receive 45%, the Democratic margin of victory is 5 percentage points (pp). If Democrats receive 40% and Republicans receive 50%, the Democratic margin of victory is -10 pp, and this election is excluded from the |5|pp bandwidth.

ment and responsible for erroneous associations.[25] In the |5| pp bandwidth, the main specification, all variables are balanced across the cutoff in the election year, which serves as the pre-treatment period before the governor's terms analyzed. The total number of state-year observations in the governor's terms analyzed within this bandwidth is 233. For detailed information on the distribution of state-year observations and vote share margins, see Table 2 and Figure 2.

## 4.2 Identification

The main empirical challenge in estimating the causal effect of Democratic Party governance on interstate migration flows is endogeneity, stemming from omitted-variable bias. Political, cultural, and religious factors, along with unmeasured economic conditions and ideological attitudes, may simultaneously affect both vote shares and a state's attractiveness.

Reverse causality also contributes to endogeneity. Previous immigrant (or native) location influences voting patterns and election outcomes, as demonstrated by Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2022 in their analysis of first-generation immigrants' effects on U.S. elections. Voters may anticipate future demographic changes and their economic and non-economic impacts. Given that local voting behavior is influenced by immigrant distribution, reverse causality arises, as immigrants' location decisions are shaped by the existing immigrant distribution and local (non)economic conditions, as noted by researchers using the shift-share instrumental variable (IV) approach (Card 2001).

These factors can lead to a spurious association between governors' political affiliation and interstate mobility. Close election results provide exogenous variation to address this identification issue, as shown by D. S. Lee 2008 and Eggers et al. 2015. This approach relies on the random assignment of the winner when the margin of victory is near zero, resembling a *coin toss*. Given the winner-takes-all nature of U.S. elections, this setup reflects a sharp RDD. Political economy has frequently employed this method[26].

I employ a bias-corrected local linear RDD with covariate adjustment[27] to estimate the causal effect of electing a Democratic governor by a small margin on interstate migration of the foreign-born population. I conduct local estimations within bandwidths of |5| pp. State characteristics may differ when comparing observations from landslide elections at each extreme. However, for observations near the cutoff, I expect similarities across all factors except for the treatment of interest: gubernatorial election results. The small bandwidth provides both strong identifying variation and facilitates convenient comparisons of migration flows across different groups.

The empirical model estimates the causal effect, $\tau$, of having a Democratic governor on migration flows through the following weighted least-squares regression of $Y_{it}$ in a state $i$ in year $t$ in election year *e(it)* using triangular kernel weight (Matias D. Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Rocío Titiunik 2019) $K(u) = (1 - |u|)\mathbf{1}\{|u| \leq 1\}$ for a transformed vote margin of victory, $\frac{MV_{it}}{h}$, within bandwidth $h$:

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall MV_{it} \in [-h, h], \\ &Y_{it} = \alpha + \tau Demwon_{it} + \mu_{-} MV_{it} + \mu_{+} Demwon_{it} \times MV_{it} + \mathbf{Z}'_{it}\gamma + \epsilon_{it} \\ &where \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

25. The trend in the RDD literature moves from simply presenting the T-test for variables across the threshold to conducting a formal balanced covariate test. The official strategy is to conduct RDD regressions without controlling for any additional covariates and use the baseline covariates as the dependent variables (Matias D. Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Rocío Titiunik 2019).

26. See D. S. Lee and Lemieux 2010; Potrafke 2017

27. I follow methods suggested by Calonico, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik 2014, Gelman and Imbens 2019, and Calonico, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Max H. Farrell 2018.

$$\mathbf{Z}_{it} \equiv \{\delta_i,\ \eta_{e(it)},\ \lambda \cdot \mathbf{1}\{e(it) \in P\}\}$$
$$P = \{years\ that\ presidential\ elections\ were\ held\}.$$

where $Demwon_{it}$ is the indicator function that equals 1 if a Democratic candidate wins the election, $MV_{it}$ is vote share margin of victory controlled separated across the cutoff. $\delta_i$ represents the state fixed effects, capturing factors such as state population, economic size, and political history. $\eta_{e(it)}$ accounts for national-level influences in the election year. I control for the interaction between the gubernatorial and presidential election years ($\lambda \cdot \mathbf{1}\{e(it) \in P\}\}$) to address any differences in migration effects due to the timing of elections. The idiosyncratic error term is $\epsilon_{it}$. I take |5|pp. as $h$ that defines the bandwidth. Standard errors are clustered at the state level (D. S. Lee and Card 2008; Bartalotti and Brummet 2017). Following the literature suggesting lower-order polynomials, I use local-linear regressions for point estimation and local-quadratic regressions for bias correction to balance the bias-variance trade-off[28]. Thus, $\hat{\tau}$ captures the average change in annual interstate migration flows at the cutoff over a full office term, after controlling for the covariate vector $\mathbf{Z}_{it}$, which is assumed to be predetermined.

To test the validity of the research design, I conduct a manipulation test inspired by McCrary (2008), examining continuity in the vote margin density around the cutoff, as shown in Figure 3. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.6023), indicating no evidence of manipulation, which supports the validity of the RDD and suggests that governors cannot influence the election outcome.

# 5 Migration Responses

Figure 4 illustrates the effect of electing a Democratic governor on net interstate migration flows for the low-skilled groups. The scatter plots depict the average values within bins, with 50 bins allocated on each side of the threshold, where each bin corresponds to a 0.1 percentage point voting margin. Linear polynomial fits are applied separately on each side of the threshold, with Democratic governors on the right, to estimate their effect, indicated by the discontinuity at the cutoff. Low-skilled Hispanic immigrants exhibit lower net interstate migration flows under Democratic governors compared to the cases under Republican governors. Their population size and mobility appear to drive the overall migration patterns of low-skilled immigrants. In contrast, low-skilled White and Black natives display higher netflows under Democratic governors, shaping the overall migration patterns of low-skilled natives. Figure 5, using a second-order polynomial fit, visualizes consistent results. Although first- and second-order polynomial fits indicate possible jumps at the threshold, the scatter plots do not clearly reveal decisive discontinuities. Thus, validating the statistical significance of the discontinuity requires a more rigorous RDD analysis.

Table 3 presents RDD estimates of the impact of narrowly electing a Democratic governor, |5| pp. margin, on interstate migration flows. It includes estimates, standard errors, and the mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables within this bandwidth over the past two decades. Panel A examines the full sample without skill divisions, Panel B focuses on low-skilled individuals, and Panel C highlights the key groups driving the patterns observed in Panel B. For low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, Democratic governors are associated with lower average annual netflows by 0.095 percentage points, driven by lower inflows and higher outflows. In contrast, low-skilled White natives experience 0.12 higher netflows due to higher inflows and lower outflows, while low-skilled Black natives' 0.017 higher netflows result from

28. The use of higher-order polynomials and the bias-variance trade-off are concerns of the recent regression discontinuity design estimation approach. Recently, bias-corrected local linear estimations have been proposed. See Gelman and Imbens 2019; Calonico, Matias D Cattaneo, and Max H Farrell 2017.

lower outflows. Using the mean group shares in election years (Table 1, Column 3) and the estimates from Table 3, Panel C, Column 1, the average population change over a 4-year Democratic governor term is projected as follows: 11.34% lower for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, 1.6% higher for low-skilled White natives, and 1.62% higher for low-skilled Black natives[29].

The migration patterns of key groups diverge from prevailing perceptions of U.S. politics and party identification depicted in Figure 1. Low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and White natives exhibit migration responses inconsistent with their party affiliations. Notably, the differing migration responses between low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and Black natives—both strong Democratic supporters—are particularly striking. Another noteworthy aspect of economic significance is the more pronounced expected change among immigrants compared to natives. This aligns with existing literature showing that low-skilled immigrants exhibit higher geographic mobility than their native counterparts in response to economic incentives[30]. Building on this, I further investigate the mechanisms through which political shocks shape these migration patterns.

## 5.1 Robustness and Sensitivity Checks

### 5.1.1 MSE-optimal Bandwidth

To ensure a more rigorous data-driven bandwidth, I test the migration response results using the mean squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth. Table 4 reports RDD coefficients, standard errors, and the number of effective state-year observations corresponding to each MSE-optimal bandwidth, which varies across flow types and subgroups. The results confirm that the main findings are robust to the data-driven bandwidths. Using a single smaller bandwidth facilitates easier comparisons across subgroups and their flows, potentially yielding genuine identifying variation despite the strong rigidity of each party's voters.

### 5.1.2 Arbitrary Cutoff

To enhance the reliability of the main results and validate the research design, I employ placebo cutoffs. Testing artificial cutoffs examines the continuity of control and treatment groups at points distant from the actual cutoff. This indirect approach assesses the assumption of continuity at the cutoff in the absence of treatment, which cannot be directly tested. The arbitrary cutoffs of $(-10)$ and $(+10)$ percentage points provide reasonable boundaries, offering sufficient state-year observations between these and the original cutoff of zero (0). Figure 6 plots net interstate migration flows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, White natives, and Black natives using these artificial cutoffs. The figures show no strong evidence of discontinuity at the alternative cutoffs. Although continuity away from the true threshold does not definitively confirm continuity at the actual cutoff in the absence of treatment, the results highlight the importance of selecting the correct baseline cutoff for accurate estimation of the key findings.

### 5.1.3 Additional Control Variables

The main specification relies on the exogeneity of close elections, with no additional controls beyond the three sets of fixed effects. Explicitly controlling for subsequent variations from endogenous political decisions would not establish clear causality. To enhance understanding

29. Calculated as (annual netflow effect $\times$ 4 years) divided by the group's mean population share in the state (expressed as a proportion): (-0.095 $\times$ 4)/0.03351 = -11.34, (0.12 $\times$ 4)/0.29956 = 1.60, and (0.017 $\times$ 4)/0.0419 = 1.62.

30. See Cadena and Kovak 2016, Basso, D'Amuri, and Peri 2019, and Yu 2023.

and ensure robustness, I controlled for various sources of variation in the election year. Table 5 shows that the main findings remain robust in specifications controlling for potential variations in the pre-treatment period within a |5 pp. bandwidth.

The additional control variables include states' economic outcomes, benefits, political composition of state legislation[31], and state demographic composition[32]. In the various specifications in Table 5, Columns 7, 8, and 9 show that low-skilled Hispanic immigrants experience lower netflows, while low-skilled White and Black natives experience higher netflows[33].

## 5.2 Migration Response of Low-Skilled Hispanic Immigrants by Citizenship

The migration response of low-skilled immigrants, primarily driven by Hispanics, challenges the prevailing narrative about US politics, particularly the strong association between the Democratic Party and low-skilled immigrants and Hispanics[34]. This raises questions about the potential impact of losing low-skilled Hispanic immigrants on future voting behavior and political support for the Democratic Party. Additionally, this unexpected migration pattern prompts further investigation into whether undocumented immigrants make different internal migration decisions compared to documented immigrants following the election of Democratic governors. A preliminary approach to address these questions involves decomposing data on low-skilled Hispanic immigrants by citizenship status[35]. From pooled ACS 2000–2019, the share of citizens among low-skilled Hispanic immigrants is 23.92%. The citizenship rate is 18.92% for those without a high school diploma and 31.01% for those who completed high school. Among low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, 58.67% have less than a high school education, while 41.33% have completed high school.

Table 6 presents RDD estimates for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, separated by citizenship status. Means and standard deviations of state-year averages within the |5|pp bandwidth are presented for each variable. Both citizens and non-citizens show lower netflows under Democratic governors. Non-citizen low-skilled Hispanic immigrants experience lower inflows and higher outflows, while citizens' migration response is primarily driven by higher outflows. Given their larger numbers, non-citizens, including undocumented immigrants, appear to drive the overall migration response of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants. The inter-state migration behavior of undocumented immigrants may not significantly differ from that of non-citizens, or if it does, it is not enough to alter the overall trend.

These patterns offer another key insight: the loss of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants is unlikely to significantly harm the Democratic Party's political support and future votes; in fact, it could be beneficial for them. While there may be some loss of low-skilled Hispanic immigrant voters supporting the Democratic Party, drawing on the findings of Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2022, a reduction in low-skilled Hispanic immigrant non-citizens could indirectly affect other voters, potentially diminishing support for the Republican Party. Therefore, the

31. Whether the Democratic Party is more than half in the state house and senate serves as a proxy for policy orientation on taxes, spending, and benefits (Besley and Case 2003).

32. Immigrant enclaves play a significant role in immigrants' location choices (Altonji and Card 1991; Card 2001). Racial segregation has also been a subject of attention.

33. Low-skilled White natives show exceptions in specifications controlling for racial share. However, they display positive coefficients in other specifications, underscoring the role of spatial adjustment across race and nativity. When spatial adjustment is constrained by controlling for demographic shares, their netflows diverge from the main results

34. I do not assume that first-generation Hispanic immigrants from Cuba share the same party affiliation due to their historical context with the Castro regime.

35. Low-skilled Hispanic immigrant non-citizens may serve as a proxy for the undocumented population, though studies such as Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo, and Sevilla 2018 highlight the prevalence of mixed-status households.

fact that immigrants who leave are mostly non-citizens does not contradict the conventional view that Democrats support immigrants; they may simply prioritize immigrant *voters*.

# 6 Labor Market Outcomes

People may prefer governors who align with their values and views on social issues. However, as highlighted by the concept of pocketbook voting in political science, individuals tend to favor governors whose decisions serve their economic interests. I examine how the first term on the right-hand side of Equation 3 influences "voting by their feet" of key groups of interest.

Table 7 presents the effect of electing a Democratic governor on the labor market outcomes of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants[36], White natives, Black natives, and native teenagers[37], who are often considered to be competing with one another in the labor market. Means and standard deviations of state-year averages within the |5|pp bandwidth are presented for each variable. Column 1 presents RDD estimates for the unemployment rate based on questions about respondents' current labor force participation and employment status. It is notable that low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, regardless of citizenship, experience very higher unemployment rate[38] in the Democratic states, while the other native groups exhibit significantly smaller unemployment rates. Low-skilled Hispanic immigrants face higher unemployment rates in the Democratic states by 6.9pp for all, 8.5pp for citizens, and 5.2pp for non-citizens[39]. The magnitude of the unemployment effect is smaller in non-citizens that include undocumented immigrants. On the other hand, White and Black adult natives and native teenagers exhibit lower unemployment rates by 1.3pp, 6.1pp, and 2.2pp, respectively.

Columns 2 and 3 examine the intensive margin of labor supply for past 12 months. For low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, no statistically significant effects are observed at the aggregate level. However, outcomes differ by citizenship status: Hispanic citizens work 0.859 fewer hours per week and 1.718 fewer weeks in the past 12 months, whereas non-citizens report 0.808 more hours per week and 2.574 more weeks. In contrast, White and Black adult natives, as well as native teenagers, experience higher coefficients in hours worked per week and weeks worked in the past 12 months.

36. The effective number of state-year observations within |5|pp. is slightly smaller for low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizens compared to the main analysis ($N - /+ = 108/125$), as some state-year observations have no individuals from this group in the labor force and the overall sample size is smaller. For their labor supply (extensive and intensive margins), observations are 105/121, and for hourly wages of paid employees, 103/121, due to stricter sample restrictions. For low-skilled Hispanic immigrant non-citizens, the reduction is minor, with 108/124 observations across all measures. Note that RDD estimates for all low-skilled Hispanic immigrants cannot be directly recovered as a convex combination of estimates for citizens and non-citizens, adjusted by their share, because these estimates reflect group-specific differences between Democratic and Republican states.

37. See Smith 2012 and Cadena 2014 for intense competition for jobs in the labor market, due to considerable overlap in the types of occupations typically held by native teens and low-skilled adult immigrants.

38. L. P. Beland and Unel 2018 observed a positive employment effect for low-skilled immigrants when Democrats win the gubernatorial election. They used a linear probability model in a traditional parametric RDD at the individual level, with various controls, spanning the entire vote margin. My approach differs in several ways: (1) I use a local linear RDD with a bias-correction method, (2) analyzing the state-level unemployment rate, (3) with a parsimonious specification including only three fixed effects, (4) within a |5| pp bandwidth that ensures significant treatment randomness, and (5) focusing on low-skilled Hispanic immigrants as the specific subgroup. These differences may explain the contrasting findings.

39. The magnitudes of these RDD estimates may seem very big. The average unemployment rate for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants within the |5|pp bandwidth is 6.6%, with Republican state-year observations averaging 6% and Democratic state-year observations averaging 7.1%. Notably, 38 state-year observations exhibit unemployment rates ranging from 10% to 54.8%, including a record 54.8% in West Virginia in 2014 (vote margin: 4.84), which may drive the big discontinuity in the RDD fitting.

Column 4 presents RDD estimates for the average log of real hourly wages among paid employees. Overall low-skilled Hispanic immigrants earn 7.1% higher wages, with citizens earning 24.9% higher wages[40]. Interestingly, no statistically significant effect on real hourly wages is observed for non-citizens. On the other hand, White and Black adult natives earned higher real hourly wages, by 2.5% and 9.4%, respectively. Native teenagers earn lower hourly wages by 3.8%.

Admitting that it might not be a meticulous measure, Column 5 calculates the share of expected hourly payoffs in Democratic states relative to Republican states using only statistically significant RDD coefficients from Columns 1 and 4 to provide a simple measure for comparison[41]. Column 6 reports the resulting percentage difference in expected payoffs between Democratic and Republican states[42]. Despite higher hourly wages, overall low-skilled Hispanic immigrants face slightly lower expected unit payoffs in Democratic states due to a lower likelihood of employment. For citizens, the small sample size introduces high magnitude, but they may experience some benefits in expected unit payoffs, which could be moderated by reduced labor hours when considering total payoffs. Non-citizens, including both documented and undocumented immigrants, tend to face lower expected unit payoffs due to reduced employment probability, though this may be partially offset by a higher intensive labor supply. On the other hand, White and Black adult natives would experience higher expected unit payoffs, driven by both a higher probability of employment and higher unit labor prices. Combined with a higher intensive margin of labor supply, these groups would have stronger incentives to live in Democratic states. Native teens may face slightly lower expected unit payoffs due to a lower hourly wages, but longer weeks worked could offset this effect. Additionally, unlike other groups, their location decision is constrained by their family's residence, making mobility less likely.The diverging labor market outcomes across the groups presented in Table 7 will be further discussed in relation to a channel introduced in Section 7.2.

This paper examines spatial adjustments driven by changes in incentives resulting from political shocks, highlighting the need for caution when interpreting the combined effects on employment and geographic mobility. Changes in population composition, even within specific subpopulations, can affect the calculation of employment rates. For example, previous studies on the employment effects of minimum wage increases and the mobility of low-skilled immigrant workers emphasize the challenges posed by such composition changes and the difficulty of fully addressing them[43]. Disentangling the impact of Democratic governors on labor market outcomes from the effects of interstate migration they prompt ideally requires comparing populations with and without mobility. However, isolating a population that strictly excludes movers—those who have relocated or will relocate—is challenging without access to detailed, high-quality panel data. In the absence of such ideal conditions, a feasible approach is to focus on "stayers," defined as individuals who did not report living in another state one year ago, to partially mitigate composition changes.

Table 8, representing a (a bit closer to) "no-spatial-adjustment" scenario, confirms that the heterogeneous unemployment effects of Democratic governors are robust: adverse effects for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and positive effects for low-skilled White and Black adult natives and native teenagers. Compared to Table 7, which reflects a "spatial-adjustment-

40. The large magnitude seems to be driven by extreme values in a small subset of low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizens in certain Republican states. For instance, in 2017, Maine (vote margin: -4.81) recorded an average log of real hourly wages of 1.323623 among 471 individuals in the group, while in 2003, Vermont (vote margin: -2.55) recorded a value of 0.8491936 with 96 individuals, including ones with very low total wage income in past 12 months.

41. I apply the formula $(1 - Column(\mathbf{1})) \times (1 + Column(\mathbf{4}))$.

42. I apply $(Column(\mathbf{5}) - 1) \times 100$.

43. See Orrenius and Zavodny 2008; Cadena 2014; Churchill and Sabia 2019.

allowed" scenario, the negative employment impact on low-skilled Hispanic immigrants is smaller. This difference may be attributed to their lower net interstate migration flows to Democratic states, coupled with poorer employment prospects in those states, which could widen the unemployment rate gap between Democratic and Republican states.

Conversely, the positive employment effects for natives are more pronounced in Table 8, possibly reflecting disparities in migration responses and job opportunities between Democratic and Republican states. Similarly, reliance, in the intensive margin, on low-skilled Hispanic immigrant non-citizens, White and Black adult natives, and native teenagers is bigger, while the use of low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizen labor lower than "spatial-adjustment-allowed" scenario.

Hourly wages also show differences across groups when comparing the two tables. Notably, in Table 8, low-skilled Hispanic non-citizen stayers in Democratic states now earn 3.7% higher hourly wages than their counterparts in Republican states. This may reflect greater bargaining power among those who remain, compared to the post-spatial-adjustment scenario, which is characterized by lower inflows and higher outflows (resulting in lower netflows). While selection and sorting cannot be ruled out, as the remaining individuals may be relatively more competitive, this dynamic appears to contribute to their improved bargaining position. Therefore, comparing the two tables and examining the differing labor market outcomes across groups provides evidence suggesting that spatial adjustment is occurring.

Note that the groups in Table 7 overlap significantly in industries, particularly in the construction and food service sectors, suggesting potential competition among them. Analyzing workforce composition dynamics in these sectors helps clarify how labor market effects and spatial adjustments unfold following the political shock. Table 9 estimates the impact of a Democratic governor on the worker composition within the construction and restaurant sectors. Panel A uses a measure that divides specific subgroups in the sector by all low-skilled workers in the state working in that sector. Panel B uses the election-year state's total working-age population as the denominator, offering a more stable reference. The key finding in Table 9 is that the composition change substitutes Hispanic immigrants with White and Black adult natives and native teens in the overlapping sectors. In Panel A, in both sectors, the loss of Hispanic-immigrant share is offset by gains in adult natives and native teen share. This substitution is also evident in Panel B, particularly in the construction sector.

Low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, particularly those at the lower end of the income distribution, may rely more heavily on labor income than their native counterparts. Therefore, their primary concern is likely immediate earnings in the labor market. If they face joblessness and reduced employment prospects, they are more likely to relocate than natives in search of economic opportunities[44], unless they have access to safety-net policies like unemployment insurance.

# 7 Economic Policies and Outcomes

Previous research has shown that Democratic governors differ from Republicans in economic policies and outcomes, such as taxation, workers' compensation, public expenditure, inequality, poverty, unemployment, and labor market outcomes[45]. In this section, I examine the factors shaping the labor market outcomes discussed earlier, as well as the second term of

44. See Orrenius and Zavodny 2008; Cadena 2014; Cadena and Kovak 2016; Churchill and Sabia 2019; Basso, D'Amuri, and Peri 2019; Yu 2023.

45. Since governors have a significant impact on state-level decision-making, there exist many studies employing sharp RDD in gubernatorial elections including Keita and Mandon 2018; L. P. Beland and Unel 2019; Leigh 2008; L.-P. Beland 2015; L.-P. Beland 2016; L. P. Beland and Oloomi 2017; L. P. Beland and Unel 2018.

Equation 3. Table 10 presents RDD estimates of potential channels using the same specifications as the main analysis. The results align with existing literature, the Democratic Party platform, and public perceptions, showing that Democratic states perform well economically.

## 7.1 Housing Price Index

Regardless of political affiliation, excessively low or high housing prices negatively impact approval ratings. Low housing prices may signal economic instability or a sluggish real estate market, which can cause dissatisfaction among homeowners and harm political support. On the other hand, high housing prices increase living costs, especially for middle- and low-income households, creating discontent among potential homebuyers and contributing to distrust in the ruling party's policies.

Therefore, governors, regardless of party, aim to maintain appropriate housing prices. They may do so by increasing supply through government intervention or improving access to public housing, or by easing regulations to encourage market-driven housing supply. This paper focuses not on governors' housing policy approaches but on the finding in Table 10 that housing price indices and their growth rates are higher in Democratic states. In states where Democratic governors win narrowly, the annual housing price growth rate is 2.7 percentage points higher. This indicates an increase in housing cost burdens, and there may be heterogeneous effects between low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and natives, particularly in terms of access to public housing under Democratic governors.

## 7.2 State Minimum Wage and Earned Income Tax Credit Rate

Based on the estimates in Table 10, I argue that the divergent labor market outcomes for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and natives can be primarily explained by the combination of 2.8% higher state minimum wages and 2 percentage points higher state earned income tax credit (EITC) rates. Research indicates that Democratic governors are more likely to implement higher minimum wages[46]. Consistently, Table 10 shows that Democratic governors are 74.5% more likely to adjust the nominal minimum wage during their term, doing so 0.743 times more frequently.[47]

To determine if the channel has substantial influence, the next question to address is whether the key subpopulations are constrained by minimum wage changes. Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution function of wage differences for low-skilled groups. I define wage difference as the difference between the log real hourly wage and the log real effective minimum wage, where the effective minimum wage is the higher of the federal or state minimum wage. A significant share of individuals earn around the minimum wage. Over 20% of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, 16% of low-skilled White natives, 20% of low-skilled Black natives, and 55% of low-skilled native teens[48] are paid below the minimum wage.

Furthermore, a substantial share of the population,—both immigrants and natives—are paid at the minimum wage level and just above it. Higher minimum wages under Democratic governors would affect a sizable share of people who were paid just above the original minimum wage. The immigrants who are paid just a bit more than the minimum wage would already face significant competition with natives in the labor market, even before an increase in minimum wage, and a minimum wage increase would amplify the competition, leading

46. Democratic governors are known for minimum wage increases; see Besley and Case 1995; Leigh 2008; Keita and Mandon 2018.

47. Changes to the nominal state minimum wage tend to occur earlier in a governor's term, especially in states with Democratic governors.

48. The fact that very significant share of native teenagers are paid below and just above the minimum-wage level is in line with existing literature; see Smith 2012 and Cadena 2014.

to subsequent changes in worker composition. Therefore, this sizable share of immigrant and native populations who were paid less than and just above minimum wages makes the explanation based on an increase in minimum wage more credible in this context.

Taken together, the evidence points to a coherent partisan-policy mechanism behind the observed divergence in low-skilled labor market outcomes. Table 10 shows that Democratic governors systematically operate in a policy environment with higher state minimum wages and higher state EITC rates, and that they are substantially more likely to enact nominal minimum-wage increases and to do so more frequently during their terms. At the same time, the labor-market outcome estimates in Tables 7 and 8 indicate a clear asymmetry: low-skilled Hispanic immigrants experience higher unemployment, whereas low-skilled natives exhibit lower unemployment and higher wages. Given that a nontrivial share of both groups is clustered at and just above the effective minimum wage (Figure 7), these patterns are consistent with the idea that partisan differences in wage floors and in-work tax credits can generate compositional shifts and differential employment effects across imperfectly substitutable worker groups.

This interpretation aligns closely with the evidence in Edo and Rapoport 2019, who show that the negative impact of immigration on natives' wages and employment at the state–skill-cell level is more pronounced in low-minimum-wage states. They interpret this heterogeneity as implying that higher minimum wages buffer or protect native labor-market outcomes, and they further document that the pattern is primarily driven by low-skilled workers. In that sense, the inference that partisan differences in minimum wages and EITC generosity can simultaneously worsen low-skilled Hispanic immigrants' employment prospects while improving those of low-skilled natives is not ad hoc, but consistent with a well-established empirical regularity in the literature.

Building on the graphical framework in Edo and Rapoport 2019, Figure 8 summarizes how a higher minimum wage and a more generous EITC rate can insulate similarly educated natives from the adverse labor-market consequences of an immigration-induced labor supply expansion. In the baseline competitive setting, an increase in immigration shifts labor supply outward and pushes the market wage down from $W_0$ to $W_1$. As the wage falls, some native-born workers—whose participation decisions are sensitive to the return to work—exit employment, so native employment declines from $N_0$ to $N_1$. Even though native employment falls, total employment rises from $N_0$ to $E_1$ because immigrants absorb part of the expansion in labor supply. Now consider the introduction of a binding minimum wage $\tilde{W}$ satisfying $W_1 < \tilde{W} < W_0$. The wage floor limits how far wages can adjust downward, thereby attenuating the displacement of natives: the reduction in native employment is smaller, with native employment moving from $N_0$ to $\tilde{N}$ rather than to $N_1$. Total employment still increases relative to the pre-immigration benchmark, but it rises by less than under full wage adjustment, reaching $\tilde{E}$ instead of $E_1$. Because the wage is held above the competitive level, the equilibrium features involuntary unemployment, denoted $\tilde{U}$. Under imperfect substitutability within an education cell, this unemployment is borne disproportionately by immigrants. Finally, adding a more generous EITC strengthens the insulation for natives by raising the effective return to work without increasing the employer's per-hour labor cost. At the higher effective wage $\hat{W}$ faced by eligible workers and increased natives' labor supply, native employment is supported further, increasing from $\tilde{N}$ to $\hat{N}$. Since the EITC is financed outside the firm's wage bill, total employment remains at $\tilde{E}$ in this simplified diagram. The counterpart to this additional support for natives is a larger amount of involuntary unemployment among immigrants, which rises from $\tilde{U}$ to $\hat{U}$.

Given this interpretation, I propose a simplified framework to contextualize the dynamics of partisan labor market policies, focusing on two key outcomes: (1) how higher minimum wages and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) rates in Democratic states can form higher

unemployment rates for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and lower unemployment rates for low-skilled natives, and (2) how these unemployment shifts contribute to lower netflows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants and higher netflows of low-skilled natives to Democratic states. This framework emphasizes the role of imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives[49] in shaping these patterns.

On the labor demand side, an increase in the minimum wage raises the marginal cost of employing the least productive workers, narrowing the gap between their marginal return and cost. This shift may incentivize employers to prioritize slightly more productive workers over the least-skilled ones. Immigrants are often considered less productive, while natives are viewed as more productive due to their US-specific skills, such as language proficiency.

This channel may be more pronounced among low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizens, as shown in Table 7, where a significant increase in unit labor costs occurs due to the need to comply with the minimum wage increase. Given the substantial impact on unit wages for this group and the mean real hourly wages across groups, the labor price of low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizens is comparable to that of low-skilled white natives. However, disparities in productivity result in a sharply lower probability of obtaining a job, and, coupled with a lower intensive margin, employers may reduce their use of labor from this group.

Moreover, this channel may have mixed effects for low-skilled Hispanic immigrant non-citizens, with different outcomes for documented and undocumented individuals. Although the data does not allow for a clear distinction between the two, based on this framework and the results from Table 7, undocumented immigrants—who were likely already earning lower wages than other adult groups—may continue to be employed at a price below the new market rate for labor at their productivity level, as employers are more willing to take on the risk of non-compliance with the minimum wage increase. As a result, demand for undocumented workers may increase, leading to positive impacts on both the extensive and intensive margins. In contrast, for documented non-citizens, if their minimum wage compliance rate is similar to that of citizens, employers will be less likely to hire them at a price below the new market rate, reducing incentives for hiring. Therefore, non-citizens as a whole may experience higher unemployment rates, though the difference will not be as pronounced as for citizens. Conditional on being employed, the intensive margin-hours worked per week and weeks worked-may show a positive impact, particularly for undocumented workers.

On the labor supply side, reservation wages are likely to differ systematically across worker groups, even within the same observed education category. In particular, the literature emphasizes that immigrants may have lower reservation wages than natives (e.g., Battisti et al. 2018; Chassamboulli and Palivos 2014). One reason is that immigrants often face different job-search frictions and weaker outside options, including more limited access to unemployment insurance and other safety-net programs. In addition, nonemployment can be especially costly for immigrants because remaining in the host country without work may be difficult to finance and may be tied to legal-status or residence constraints. These factors imply a higher cost of joblessness and, therefore, a lower wage threshold at which immigrants are willing to accept employment.

If immigrants are willing to accept lower wages, it follows that natives—who generally have stronger fallback options and better access to social insurance and in-work benefits—tend to exhibit higher reservation wages. As a result, jobs that would be profitable for immigrants at prevailing wages may not attract slightly more productive natives unless the effective return to work rises sufficiently. This intuition is consistent with the argument that native workers

49. The interchangeability of native labor and immigrant labor has been a topic of discussion. Numerous studies show that immigrants are not perfect replacements for natives in the labor market of their host nation, even in the same (or close) skill cell, for a variety of reasons, such as different skill sets and legal status. Refer to Peri and Sparber 2009, Card 2009, Peri and Sparber 2011, and Ottaviano and Peri 2012.

would take jobs typically held by immigrants if wages were high enough.[50] This labor-supply logic is central to the interaction between minimum wages and the EITC: while a higher wage floor raises the offered wage, a more generous EITC increases the net-of-tax return to work, making it more likely that the effective wage clears natives' reservation-wage threshold and draws them into low-wage jobs.

Building on the graph in Neumark and Wascher 2011, Figure 9 illustrates how higher minimum wages and EITC rates together incentivize labor supply of high-productivity workers. Without policy intervention, high-productivity workers are unlikely to take jobs that were previously filled by the least productive workers, due to their higher reservation wages. Neither policy alone—higher minimum wages or increased EITC rates—would suffice; only their combined effect raises the effective wage above the reservation threshold, encouraging labor supply from high-productivity workers. As a result, these workers may now be willing to take jobs previously filled by the least productive workers.

This allows employers to upgrade their workforce by replacing less productive workers with relatively more productive ones, given higher unit labor costs. The influx of (slightly) more productive native workers, driven by economic incentives, intensifies competition in the labor market and reduces demand for low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizens and documented noncitizens. As a result, their job prospects are likely to deteriorate. On the other hand, driven by the robust gap between their marginal labor cost and return even under a minimum wage increase, low-skilled Hispanic undocumented immigrants are likely to occupy a niche labor market.

As a result, low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, known for their mobility in seeking economic opportunities, may relocate to states with lower minimum wages[51] and more favorable conditions. In contrast, low-skilled White and Black native workers may be drawn to the improved opportunities in states with higher wages, EITC rates in addition to their better access to extended benefits in Democratic states.

As noted by Peri and Sparber 2009 and Peri and Sparber 2011, horizontal specialization may occur, with natives and immigrants specializing in tasks such as communication-intensive versus manual labor-intensive jobs. Additionally, a productivity hierarchy may exist, where natives, with their local labor market-specific skills, can replace immigrants who are less productive. I think both scenarios can happen together in the labor market. This paper provides empirical evidence supporting the notion of imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives, which is explained by a productivity hierarchy.

Consistent with findings in existing literature, I find that low-skilled immigrants are more geographically mobile than natives in response to economic incentives[52]. This paper identifies partisan policy differences as a key factor driving divergent migration responses to political shocks. Higher state minimum wages and EITC rates reduce job prospects for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants while attracting low-skilled White and Black natives. Although high housing costs deter both groups, natives may benefit from better access to public housing and welfare programs, helping to mitigate the impact.

50. Dukakis and Mitchell, New York Times.

51. The impact of minimum wages on employment has been debated for over a century. Despite differing views, a substantial body of research, as summarized by Neumark and Shirley 2022, consistently finds negative employment effects from minimum wage increases. Regarding immigrants, some studies, such as Zavodny 2014, find no evidence that minimum wage increases harm them, while others, like Boffy-Ramirez 2013 and Giulietti 2014, suggest that higher minimum wages attract low-skilled immigrants. In contrast, Orrenius and Zavodny 2008, Cadena 2014, and Churchill and Sabia 2019 report adverse employment effects for immigrants and find that lower minimum wages influence their location choices, drawing them to regions with less stringent wage policies. My results provide evidence suggesting that a higher minimum wage repels low-skilled immigrants and attracts low-skilled natives.

52. Again, see Orrenius and Zavodny 2008; Cadena and Kovak 2016; Churchill and Sabia 2019; Basso, D'Amuri, and Peri 2019; Yu 2023.

Considering both Equation 3 and the empirical results, the weight and/or magnitude of political alignment utility for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants may not be sufficient to offset the negative effects of expected labor income and housing costs. Conversely, despite political disalignment, the weight and/or magnitude of the disutility that low-skilled White natives gauge may not outweigh the positive effects from improved job prospects and (possibly mitigated) housing costs. Higher housing costs, though potentially mitigated, may make Democratic states less attractive destination for low-skilled Black natives. However, better job prospects and political alignment utility likely make their outflows remain lower, leading to higher netflows.

# 8 Conclusion

There have been attempts to investigate drivers of internal migration, while the analysis on how political impacts shape migration responses in the US remained scarce. Using a bias-corrected local linear RDD, this paper analyzes the impact of the close election of Democratic governors, between 2000 and 2019, on interstate migration flows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, White natives, and Black natives. The unexpected election of Democratic governors, compared to the other scenario, resulted in lower annual net interstate migration flows for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, driven by a combination of smaller inflows and larger outflows. In contrast, low-skilled White and Black natives show higher netflows resulting from larger inflows and smaller outflows. These migration responses are particularly interesting as survey data and CES findings highlight the strong political alignment of Hispanic-Latino and Black populations with the Democratic Party, while White natives show limited support for the party.

A potential factor behind these migration patterns is the heterogenous unemployment effects of Democratic governors across groups. In Democratic states, the unemployment rate of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants is 6.9 percentage points higher, whereas low-skilled White and Black natives experience a 1.3 and 6.1 percentage points lower unemployment rate, respectively. Additionally, the annual increase in the housing price index is 2.7 percentage points higher in Democratic states, reflecting a greater housing cost burden.

The empirical results suggest that for low-skilled Hispanic immigrants, the political alignment utility is insufficient to offset the negative impacts of worsened job prospects and higher housing costs. In contrast, for low-skilled White natives, political misalignment may be outweighed by the benefits of improved employment opportunities and potentially mitigated housing burdens. Higher housing costs, though potentially mitigated, may make Democratic states less attractive for low-skilled Black natives. However, better job prospects and political alignment utility likely make their outflows remain low, leading to higher netflows.

The 2.8% higher real state minimum wage and 2 percentage point higher state EITC rate under Democratic governors can contribute to the diverging labor market outcomes and migration responses. Under imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives (Peri and Sparber 2009; Card 2009; Peri and Sparber 2011; Ottaviano and Peri 2012), a higher minimum wage may lead employers to favor more productive workers, typically natives with U.S.-specific skills such as language proficiency. Combined with higher EITC rates, the minimum wage increases raise effective wage levels and incentivize the labor supply of more productive workers. In contrast, low-skilled immigrants, facing weaker job prospects, may seek opportunities elsewhere, consistent with their documented geographic mobility in response to economic incentives(Orrenius and Zavodny 2008, Cadena 2014, Churchill and Sabia 2019, and Cadena and Kovak 2016).

The findings of this paper can be extended in several ways. The lower netflows of low-skilled immigrants to Democratic states, according to Mayda, Senses, and Steingress 2023,

could improve state-government fiscal health by increasing the per-capita tax base, boosting public revenues, and reducing the need for benefits, thereby enhancing the provision of local public goods. Demographically, fewer low-skilled immigrants—who tend to be younger and have higher fertility rates—would shift demographic composition in Democratic states. In production, the Rybczynski effect may occur, as fewer low-skilled immigrants could lead to a contraction in sectors heavily reliant on their labor, typically nontradable goods and services, while expanding other sectors. Finally, in terms of trade (Parsons and Vezina 2018; Steingress 2018) and foreign investment (Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan 2019), fewer low-skilled Hispanic immigrants could diminish trade and foreign investment between Democratic states and the immigrants' countries of origin, particularly Mexico.

This paper provides baseline analysis by examining whether political shocks influence internal migration in the United States, using unilateral migration flows at the state level. However, future studies that incorporate bilateral migration flows, controlling for characteristics of both origins and destinations—including political factors—and apply methods like gravity models, could offer valuable insights and further enrich the literature this paper seeks to contribute to.

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# Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics in Election Year

| | | Mean and S.D. of Pre-treatment, \|5\|pp. | | | Balanced Covariate Test | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| | | | | | \|5\|pp. | MSE-Opt. | |
| | | Republican | Democratic | All in \|5\|pp. | Coeff.. / S.E. | Coeff.. / S.E. | N-/+ / BW |
| **Panel A: (Election Year Group / Election Year Working-aged Population)*100** | | | | | | | |
| Native | Mean | 88.767 | 91.014 | 89.984 | -4.116 | -4.928 | 69/74 |
| | S.D. | (7.898) | (8.222) | (8.097) | (9.989) | (4.583) | 10.9 |
| Immigrant | Mean | 12.655 | 9.990 | 11.212 | -4.116 | -4.928 | 70/75 |
| | S.D. | (8.549) | (8.264) | (8.443) | (9.989) | (4.583) | 11.5 |
| Low-skilled Immigrant | Mean | 6.478 | 5.356 | 5.870 | 0.694 | 0.021 | 72/75 |
| | S.D. | (4.679) | (4.943) | (4.823) | (1.431) | (0.844) | 11.8 |
| Low-skilled Hispanic Immigrant | Mean | 3.535 | 3.195 | 3.351 | -1.865 | -1.677 | 76/80 |
| | S.D. | (3.556) | (3.880) | (3.713) | (3.406) | (1.548) | 12.6 |
| Low-skilled White Native | Mean | 28.199 | 31.443 | 29.956 | 0.300 | 0.132 | 69/74 |
| | S.D. | (7.853) | (11.615) | (10.132) | (1.117) | (0.725) | 10.9 |
| Low-skilled Black Native | Mean | 4.845 | 3.636 | 4.190 | -1.775 | -0.796 | 80/83 |
| | S.D. | (4.577) | (4.728) | (4.666) | (2.320) | (1.045) | 13.4 |
| **Panel B: State-level Information in Election Year** | | | | | | | |
| ln(Working-age Population) | Mean | 14.721 | 14.360 | 14.526 | -0.548 | -0.819* | 69 / 74 |
| | S.D. | 0.985 | 0.943 | 0.973 | 0.741 | 0.479 | 10.7 |
| Share of Low-skilled ($\leq$ HS grad) | Mean | 0.418 | 0.435 | 0.428 | -0.07 | 0.014 | 75 / 76 |
| | S.D. | 0.047 | 0.078 | 0.066 | 0.052 | 0.026 | 12.1 |
| ln(Real Gross State Product) | Mean | 25.814 | 25.408 | 25.594 | -0.313 | -0.853* | 69 / 73 |
| | S.D. | 1.034 | 1.020 | 1.039 | 0.803 | 0.49 | 10.6 |
| ln(Real Per Capita Personal Income) | Mean | 10.358 | 10.319 | 10.337 | 0.11 | -0.085 | 77 / 81 |
| | S.D. | 0.137 | 0.192 | 0.169 | 0.127 | 0.082 | 12.8 |
| State Unemployment Rate | Mean | 5.609 | 5.836 | 5.732 | 1.582 | 1.014 | 69 / 74 |
| | S.D. | 2.303 | 1.855 | 2.060 | 1.198 | 0.883 | 10.7 |
| ln(Real State Minimum Wage) | Mean | 1.664 | 1.668 | 1.666 | 0.057 | 0.028 | 93 / 95 |
| | S.D. | 0.105 | 0.134 | 0.121 | 0.086 | 0.049 | 15.6 |
| State Poverty Rate | Mean | 11.873 | 11.636 | 11.744 | -1.66 | 0.454 | 75 / 76 |
| | S.D. | 2.868 | 3.096 | 2.975 | 1.881 | 1.415 | 12.1 |
| I(Democrat House Majority) | Mean | 0.485 | 0.641 | 0.569 | 0.434 | 0.37 | 67 / 70 |
| | S.D. | 0.508 | 0.486 | 0.499 | 0.48 | 0.236 | 10.1 |
| I(Democrat Senate Majority) | Mean | 0.455 | 0.692 | 0.583 | 0.136 | 0.324 | 79 / 83 |
| | S.D. | 0.506 | 0.468 | 0.496 | 0.49 | 0.215 | 13.3 |
| Observations (Election Year) | | 33 | 39 | 72 | 33/39 | | |

Notes: Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico are excluded. All of the variables are in the election year (pre-treatment period). State-level information variables come from UKCPR data except for the working age population, low-skilled share, immigrant share (own calculation based on ACS and CPS (1996-1999 for the year 2000)), and per capita personal income (BEA). Real dollar values are in terms of 1999 dollars. Formal RD balanced covariate test: |5|pp BW and MES-optimal BW (data-driven), triangular kernel, SE clustered at state, no controls. N- and N+ denote the number of cases within the bandwidth below and above the threshold, respectively.

Table 2: Number of Elections and State×Year Observations within |5|, |10| pp Bandwidth

| State | 5 pp BW | | 10 pp BW | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Elections | Obs | Elections | Obs |
| ALABAMA | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| ARIZONA | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| CALIFORNIA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| COLORADO | 2 | 7 | 2 | 7 |
| CONNECTICUT | 3 | 9 | 3 | 9 |
| FLORIDA | 3 | 9 | 4 | 13 |
| GEORGIA | 1 | 1 | 4 | 12 |
| HAWAII | 2 | 7 | 2 | 7 |
| ILLINOIS | 3 | 11 | 4 | 15 |
| INDIANA | 2 | 5 | 4 | 12 |
| IOWA | 1 | 1 | 5 | 16 |
| KANSAS | 1 | 4 | 3 | 9 |
| LOUISIANA | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| MAINE | 2 | 8 | 5 | 17 |
| MARYLAND | 2 | 8 | 3 | 12 |
| MASSACHUSETTS | 3 | 11 | 4 | 15 |
| MICHIGAN | 2 | 8 | 3 | 9 |
| MINNESOTA | 2 | 8 | 4 | 16 |
| MISSISSIPPI | 1 | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| MISSOURI | 2 | 8 | 3 | 11 |
| MONTANA | 4 | 15 | 4 | 15 |
| NEVADA | 2 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| NEW HAMPSHIRE | 4 | 8 | 6 | 11 |
| NEW JERSEY | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| NORTH CAROLINA | 2 | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| OHIO | 2 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| OKLAHOMA | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| OREGON | 2 | 8 | 6 | 17 |
| RHODE ISLAND | 2 | 8 | 4 | 15 |
| SOUTH CAROLINA | 1 | 4 | 4 | 12 |
| SOUTH DAKOTA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| TENNESSEE | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| VERMONT | 3 | 6 | 4 | 8 |
| VIRGINIA | 1 | 4 | 4 | 14 |
| WASHINGTON | 2 | 8 | 4 | 15 |
| WEST VIRGINIA | 3 | 9 | 5 | 13 |
| WISCONSIN | 2 | 5 | 6 | 17 |
| WYOMING | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| ALASKA | | | 2 | 5 |
| ARKANSAS | | | 1 | 4 |
| DELAWARE | | | 1 | 4 |
| IDAHO | | | 1 | 4 |
| KENTUCKY | | | 1 | 4 |
| NEBRASKA | | | 1 | 3 |
| NEW MEXICO | | | 2 | 7 |
| PENNSYLVANIA | | | 3 | 12 |
| TEXAS | | | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 72 | 233 | 134 | 431 |

Table 3: Effect of Democratic Governor on Interstate Migration

| $\hat{\tau}$ Demwon<br>\|5\|pp BW (N-/+: 108/125) | | (1)<br>Netflow | (2)<br>Inflow | (3)<br>Outflow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Total Individuals** | | | | |
| Individuals | Coeff. | -0.278*** | -0.147*** | 0.131*** |
| | SE | (0.042) | (0.030) | (0.044) |
| | Mean | 0.099 | 2.895 | 2.796 |
| | SD | (0.756) | (1.022) | (0.806) |
| Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.091*** | -0.108*** | -0.017 |
| | SE | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.015) |
| | Mean | 0.008 | 0.319 | 0.311 |
| | SD | (0.168) | (0.194) | (0.171) |
| Natives | Coeff. | -0.187*** | -0.039 | 0.148*** |
| | SE | (0.037) | (0.026) | (0.039) |
| | Mean | 0.092 | 2.576 | 2.485 |
| | SD | (0.674) | (0.964) | (0.763) |
| **Panel B: Low-skilled** | | | | |
| Individuals | Coeff. | -0.026 | -0.054*** | -0.028 |
| | SE | (0.027) | (0.015) | (0.028) |
| | Mean | 0.033 | 0.943 | 0.910 |
| | SD | (0.331) | (0.456) | (0.398) |
| Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.086*** | -0.062*** | 0.025*** |
| | SE | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.006) |
| | Mean | 0.016 | 0.125 | 0.109 |
| | SD | (0.103) | (0.108) | (0.086) |
| Natives | Coeff. | 0.061** | 0.008 | -0.052* |
| | SE | (0.024) | (0.012) | (0.027) |
| | Mean | 0.017 | 0.819 | 0.802 |
| | SD | (0.300) | (0.412) | (0.374) |
| **Panel C: Low-skilled Subgroup of Interest** | | | | |
| Hispanic Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.095*** | -0.065*** | 0.029*** |
| | SE | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.006) |
| | Mean | 0.015 | 0.077 | 0.062 |
| | SD | (0.073) | (0.082) | (0.067) |
| White Natives | Coeff. | 0.120*** | 0.051*** | -0.069** |
| | SE | (0.026) | (0.010) | (0.028) |
| | Mean | 0.002 | 0.628 | 0.625 |
| | SD | (0.241) | (0.374) | (0.316) |
| Black Natives | Coeff. | 0.017*** | -0.003 | -0.019*** |
| | SE | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.006) |
| | Mean | -0.002 | 0.094 | 0.095 |
| | SD | (0.119) | (0.097) | (0.136) |

Note: Interstate Migration flows are calculated, from ACS 2000-2019, using working-aged (aged 18-64) individuals who are neither in group quarters or enrolled in school. I classify individuals with educational attainment up to high school completion as *low-skilled*. The local linear RD estimates and Robust bias-corrected SEs are from *rdrobust* package, using triangular kernel weight and SE is clustered at state ($^*p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$). Control variables: Election year FE, State FE, and Cycle sync with Presidential election FE. The means and standard deviations are calculated from 233 state-year observations within a $\pm 5$ percentage point bandwidth over the past 20 years for each dependent variable. $N-/+$: effective number of state-year observations, within the |5|pp. bandwidth, below and above the threshold.

Table 4: Effect of Democratic Governor on Interstate Migration, MSE-optimal Bandwidth

| $\hat{\tau}$ Demwon MSE-Optimal BW | | (1) Netflow | (2) Inflow | (3) Outflow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Total Individuals** | | | | |
| Individuals | Coeff. | -0.237*** | -0.237*** | 0.015 |
| | SE | (0.074) | (0.047) | (0.080) |
| | N-/+ | 136/168 | 112/134 | 136/155 |
| | BW | 6.6 | 5.3 | 6.3 |
| Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.091*** | -0.041*** | 0.033* |
| | SE | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| | N-/+ | 172/203 | 182/206 | 136/168 |
| | BW | 8.4 | 8.8 | 6.6 |
| Natives | Coeff. | -0.123* | -0.153*** | -0.031 |
| | SE | (0.063) | (0.039) | (0.066) |
| | N-/+ | 136/164 | 112/134 | 136/155 |
| | BW | 6.5 | 5.2 | 6.2 |
| **Panel B: Low-skilled** | | | | |
| Individuals | Coeff. | 0.048 | 0.030 | -0.021 |
| | SE | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.029) |
| | N-/+ | 176/206 | 156/183 | 171/196 |
| | BW | 8.6 | 7.7 | 8.0 |
| Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.060*** | -0.025** | 0.033*** |
| | SE | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.007) |
| | N-/+ | 160/188 | 180/206 | 172/203 |
| | BW | 7.9 | 8.7 | 8.3 |
| Natives | Coeff. | 0.092*** | -0.002 | -0.088** |
| | SE | (0.027) | (0.020) | (0.036) |
| | N-/+ | 160/188 | 115/134 | 148/171 |
| | BW | 7.8 | 5.5 | 7.0 |
| **Panel C: Low-skilled Subgroup of Interest** | | | | |
| Hispanic Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.047*** | -0.033*** | 0.012 |
| | SE | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.009) |
| | N-/+ | 172/206 | 192/215 | 152/177 |
| | BW | 8.5 | 9.1 | 7.3 |
| White Natives | Coeff. | 0.136*** | 0.027 | -0.060** |
| | SE | (0.024) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
| | N-/+ | 152/171 | 124/152 | 172/206 |
| | BW | 7.1 | 5.8 | 8.5 |
| Black Natives | Coeff. | 0.013 | 0.003 | -0.018 |
| | SE | (0.012) | (0.006) | (0.012) |
| | N-/+ | 136/164 | 112/134 | 136/155 |
| | BW | 6.5 | 5.2 | 6.1 |

Note: See notes in Table 3. A data-driven bandwidth, MSE-optimal bandwidth, is employed. $N-/+$: effective number of state-year observations within the bandwidth below and above the threshold.

| $\hat{\tau}$ Demwon, Netflow<br>Specifications within \|5\|pp BW (N-/+: 108/125) | Total Individuals | | | Low-skilled | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1)<br>Individuals | (2)<br>Immigrant | (3)<br>Native | (4)<br>Individuals | (5)<br>Immigrant | (6)<br>Native | (7)<br>Hispanic Immigrnats | (8)<br>White Natives | (9)<br>Black Natives |
| No Control | -0.311 | -0.032 | -0.279 | -0.185 | -0.059 | -0.125 | -0.066* | -0.060 | -0.086 |
| | (0.347) | (0.076) | (0.294) | (0.117) | (0.039) | (0.120) | (0.037) | (0.092) | (0.062) |
| 3 FEs + AFDC/TANF FS - 2 person | -0.281*** | -0.093*** | -0.187*** | 0.019 | -0.073*** | 0.092*** | -0.079*** | 0.138*** | 0.022*** |
| | (0.042) | (0.012) | (0.037) | (0.024) | (0.006) | (0.022) | (0.008) | (0.025) | (0.006) |
| 3 FEs + Gross State Product | -0.341*** | -0.099*** | -0.242*** | 0.025 | -0.060*** | 0.085*** | -0.068*** | 0.115*** | 0.034*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.012) | (0.033) | (0.028) | (0.006) | (0.025) | (0.005) | (0.026) | (0.007) |
| 3 FEs + Per Capita Personal Income | -0.290*** | -0.066*** | -0.225*** | -0.046* | -0.065*** | 0.018 | -0.082*** | 0.049** | 0.036*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.012) | (0.034) | (0.026) | (0.008) | (0.022) | (0.008) | (0.022) | (0.006) |
| 3 FEs + Poverty Rate | -0.145*** | -0.065*** | -0.081* | -0.040 | -0.093*** | 0.053** | -0.095*** | 0.051** | 0.031*** |
| | (0.047) | (0.011) | (0.041) | (0.027) | (0.007) | (0.024) | (0.008) | (0.022) | (0.005) |
| 3 FEs + Personal Income | -0.369*** | -0.085*** | -0.284*** | 0.050* | -0.043*** | 0.093*** | -0.058*** | 0.123*** | 0.035*** |
| | (0.037) | (0.012) | (0.031) | (0.028) | (0.006) | (0.025) | (0.005) | (0.026) | (0.007) |
| 3 FEs + Unemployment Rate | -0.518*** | -0.083*** | -0.435*** | -0.064** | -0.077*** | 0.013 | -0.088*** | 0.029 | 0.054*** |
| | (0.044) | (0.012) | (0.038) | (0.026) | (0.008) | (0.023) | (0.008) | (0.023) | (0.005) |
| 3 FEs + Worker's Compensation | -0.276*** | -0.077*** | -0.199*** | -0.037 | -0.068*** | 0.031 | -0.078*** | 0.108*** | -0.005 |
| | (0.042) | (0.012) | (0.036) | (0.028) | (0.006) | (0.025) | (0.007) | (0.027) | (0.005) |
| 3 FEs + State Senate/House Composition | -0.212*** | -0.106*** | -0.106*** | 0.109*** | -0.069*** | 0.178*** | -0.091*** | 0.209*** | 0.022*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.012) | (0.032) | (0.023) | (0.007) | (0.020) | (0.007) | (0.024) | (0.005) |
| 3 FEs + Imm share | -0.202*** | -0.030*** | -0.172*** | -0.055** | -0.089*** | 0.034 | -0.117*** | 0.079*** | 0.023*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.011) | (0.036) | (0.027) | (0.007) | (0.024) | (0.007) | (0.025) | (0.005) |
| 3 FEs + Race share | -0.446*** | -0.069*** | -0.377*** | -0.182*** | -0.103*** | -0.079*** | -0.130*** | -0.071*** | 0.052*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.010) | (0.035) | (0.026) | (0.007) | (0.025) | (0.006) | (0.025) | (0.003) |
| 3 FEs + State Senate/House Composition + Imm share | -0.139*** | -0.050*** | -0.089*** | 0.058*** | -0.075*** | 0.133*** | -0.114*** | 0.153*** | 0.029*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.010) | (0.032) | (0.021) | (0.007) | (0.019) | (0.006) | (0.022) | (0.005) |
| 3 FEs + State Senate/House Composition + Race share | -0.364*** | -0.052*** | -0.312*** | -0.064*** | -0.073*** | 0.008 | -0.107*** | 0.005 | 0.065*** |
| | (0.033) | (0.010) | (0.030) | (0.018) | (0.006) | (0.019) | (0.006) | (0.020) | (0.004) |
| 3 FEs + Imm share + Race share | -0.441*** | -0.072*** | -0.369*** | -0.185*** | -0.106*** | -0.079*** | -0.129*** | -0.072*** | 0.052*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.010) | (0.035) | (0.025) | (0.005) | (0.025) | (0.006) | (0.025) | (0.004) |
| 3 FEs + State Senate/House Composition + Imm share + Race share | -0.354*** | -0.059*** | -0.295*** | -0.071*** | -0.081*** | 0.009 | -0.103*** | 0.003 | 0.064*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.010) | (0.029) | (0.018) | (0.005) | (0.019) | (0.006) | (0.020) | (0.004) |

Table 5: Effect of Democratic Governors on Interstate Net Migration Flows from Various Specifications

Note: See the note in Table 3 for detailed information. Control variables are the values of the election year, the pre-treatment period. AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), and FS (Food Stamp) monthly maximum benefits are combined and the 2-person family amount has a very high correlation with the other categories of families by size. State Senate and House Composition consists of dummies indicating whether the Democratic party is more than half in the state house and senate, respectively.

Table 6: Effect of Democratic Governor on Interstate Migration Flows of Low-skilled Hispanic Immigrants by Citizenship

| | | Low-skilled Hispanic Immigrant | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $\hat{\tau}$ Demwon | | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| \|5\|pp BW (N-/+: 108/125) | | Netflow | Inflow | Outflow |
| Citizen | Coeff. | -0.005*** | 0.000 | 0.005*** |
| | SE | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| | Mean | 0.004 | 0.014 | 0.010 |
| | SD | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.016) |
| Non-Citizen | Coeff. | -0.090*** | -0.066*** | 0.024*** |
| | SE | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.005) |
| | Mean | 0.012 | 0.063 | 0.051 |
| | SD | (0.066) | (0.068) | (0.061) |

Note: See the note in Table 3 for detailed information. The sample is restricted to low-skilled Hispanic immigrants. The means and standard deviations are calculated from 233 state-year observations within a ±5 percentage point bandwidth over the past 20 years for each dependent variable. $N-/+$: effective number of state-year observations within the |5|pp bandwidth below and above the threshold.

| | | Low-skilled | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| \|5\| pp. BW. | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Dep. Var. | | Unemployment Rate | Usual Hours Worked per Week | Weeks Worked | ln(Real Hourly Wage) | Exp. Unit Payoff Ratio (Dem/Rep) | Perc. Diff. |
| Hispanic Immigrants | Coeff. | 0.069*** | 0.255 | 0.365 | 0.071*** | 0.997 | -0.290 |
| | S.E. | (0.006) | (0.330) | (0.295) | (0.013) | | |
| | Mean | 0.066 | 39.869 | 45.327 | 2.161 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.059 | 3.231 | 2.795 | 0.201 | | |
| Hispanic Immigrant Citizen | Coeff. | 0.085*** | -0.859*** | -1.718*** | 0.249*** | 1.143 | 14.284 |
| | S.E. | (0.005) | (0.190) | (0.350) | (0.056) | | |
| | Mean | 0.056 | 39.804 | 46.354 | 2.302 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.062 | 4.994 | 3.447 | 0.217 | | |
| Hispanic Immigrant Non-Citizen | Coeff. | 0.052*** | 0.808* | 2.574*** | 0.027 | 0.948 | -5.200 |
| | S.E. | (0.007) | (0.460) | (0.397) | (0.024) | | |
| | Mean | 0.067 | 40.196 | 44.935 | 2.119 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.064 | 3.956 | 4.620 | 0.226 | | |
| White Natives | Coeff. | -0.013*** | 0.448*** | 0.224*** | 0.025*** | 1.038 | 3.832 |
| | S.E. | (0.002) | (0.036) | (0.050) | (0.005) | | |
| | Mean | 0.080 | 39.575 | 45.209 | 2.363 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.027 | 1.108 | 0.963 | 0.113 | | |
| Black Natives | Coeff. | -0.061*** | 3.100*** | 2.471*** | 0.094*** | 1.161 | 16.073 |
| | S.E. | (0.010) | (0.235) | (0.356) | (0.027) | | |
| | Mean | 0.163 | 37.101 | 42.585 | 2.190 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.094 | 3.538 | 4.754 | 0.264 | | |
| Teen Natives | Coeff. | -0.021*** | 0.283* | 2.540*** | -0.038*** | 0.982 | -1.780 |
| | S.E. | (0.006) | (0.167) | (0.219) | (0.009) | | |
| | Mean | 0.235 | 18.320 | 21.117 | 1.591 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.079 | 2.066 | 2.228 | 0.111 | | |

Table 7: Effect of Democratic Governor on Labor Market Outcomes of Low-skilled Group of Interest

Note: Specification is same as the main specification in Table 3. Hispanic Immigrants exclude those from abroad one year ago. Native teens are defined as U.S. citizens aged 16-17, following the criteria established by Smith 2012. The unemployment rate is defined as the proportion of unemployed individuals within the labor force for each group for each state-year observation. Both employment status and labor force participation reflect the respondent's situation at the time of the ACS interview and include both paid employees and unpaid family workers. Variables representing the intensive margin of labor supply are calculated as the average value for each state-year observation, considering both paid employees and unpaid family workers. The "usual hours worked" variable measures the number of hours worked per week. For "weeks worked," which is originally a categorical variable, I converted it into a continuous variable by assigning the midpoint of each interval, excluding the lowest interval labeled as "N/A." The log of real hourly wages is calculated as the average value for each state-year observation. To provide a very pin-pointed picture on paid worker, I calculate hourly wages using wage income during past 12 months from individuals with non-zero wage income, excluding top-coded values to reduce the influence of outliers. This measure is further restricted to individuals who worked last year, at least one week, and at least one hour per week during the past 12 months. The wage is adjusted for year-round responses about the past 12 months ' information (The ACS collects responses throughout the whole year. ACS asks for income information for the previous 12-month period. The Census Bureau offers an additional variable called ADJUST, which adjusts dollar amounts to what they would have been if earned totally throughout the calendar year.).Wages are expressed in real terms, adjusted to 1999 dollars. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing the real adjusted total wage income by the product of the number of weeks worked and the usual hours worked per week. Column 5 calculates the share of expected payoffs in Democratic states relative to Republican states using statistically significant RDD coefficients from Columns 1 and 4, applying the formula $(1 - \mathbf{(1)}) \times (1 + \mathbf{(4)})$. Column 6 reports the resulting percentage difference in expected payoffs between Democratic and Republican states: $(\mathbf{(5)} - 1) \times 100$.

| | | Low-skilled Stayers | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| \|5\| pp. BW. | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Dep. Var. | | Unemployment Rate | Usual Hours Worked per Week | Weeks Worked | ln(Real Hourly Wage) | Exp. Unit Payoff Ratio (Dem/Rep) | Perc. Diff. |
| Hispanic Immigrants | Coeff. | 0.065*** | -0.103 | 0.118 | 0.066*** | 0.997 | -0.329 |
| | S.E. | (0.006) | (0.350) | (0.304) | (0.011) | | |
| | Mean | 0.065 | 39.824 | 45.469 | 2.163 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.059 | 3.203 | 2.772 | 0.193 | | |
| Hispanic Immigrant Citizen | Coeff. | 0.082*** | -1.239*** | -1.818*** | 0.227*** | 1.126 | 12.639 |
| | S.E. | (0.005) | (0.177) | (0.347) | (0.054) | | |
| | Mean | 0.054 | 39.739 | 46.483 | 2.306 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.061 | 5.095 | 3.537 | 0.215 | | |
| Hispanic Immigrant Non-Citizen | Coeff. | 0.044*** | -0.121 | 2.488*** | 0.037* | 0.991 | -0.863 |
| | S.E. | (0.008) | (0.474) | (0.301) | (0.022) | | |
| | Mean | 0.067 | 40.061 | 45.092 | 2.130 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.065 | 3.987 | 4.445 | 0.203 | | |
| White Natives | Coeff. | -0.014*** | 0.448*** | 0.350*** | 0.027*** | 1.041 | 4.138 |
| | S.E. | (0.002) | (0.037) | (0.050) | (0.005) | | |
| | Mean | 0.078 | 39.571 | 45.353 | 2.367 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.027 | 1.116 | 0.912 | 0.112 | | |
| Black Natives | Coeff. | -0.065*** | 3.641*** | 2.754*** | 0.095*** | 1.166 | 16.617 |
| | S.E. | (0.011) | (0.232) | (0.348) | (0.027) | | |
| | Mean | 0.163 | 37.118 | 42.776 | 2.194 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.107 | 3.547 | 4.884 | 0.266 | | |
| Teen Natives | Coeff. | -0.025*** | 0.323* | 2.752*** | -0.039*** | 0.985 | -1.498 |
| | S.E. | (0.006) | (0.168) | (0.209) | (0.010) | | |
| | Mean | 0.233 | 18.276 | 21.139 | 1.592 | | |
| | S.D. | 0.079 | 2.042 | 2.252 | 0.112 | | |

Table 8: Effect of Democratic Governor on Labor Market Outcomes of Low-skilled Group of Interest - Stayer

Note: See notes in Table 7. Stayer indicates individuals whose state of residence one year ago is the same as their current state of residence. When I further restrict the data to stayers, the number of effective state-year observations for low-skilled Hispanic immigrant citizens is reduced to 105/121 for labor supply variables and 103/121 for wages. In contrast, the attenuation is milder for non-citizens, with 108/122 observations remaining. For overall low-skilled Hispanic immigrant stayers, the count is 108/124.

Table 9: Effect of Democratic Governor on Share of Low-skilled Subgroups in Construction and Food Service Sectors

| | | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: (Low-skilled Group / Total Low-skilled working in the Industry each Year) × 100** | | | |
| $\hat{\tau}$ Demwon<br>\|5\|pp. BW, At least one worker from each group | | Construction | Restaurants & Food Services |
| N-/+ | | 80/101 | 93/100 |
| Hispanic Immigrants | Coeff. | -5.360*** | -1.393*** |
| | S.E. | (0.265) | (0.286) |
| White Natives | Coeff. | 4.357*** | -1.227*** |
| | S.E. | (0.355) | (0.270) |
| Black Natives | Coeff. | 0.789*** | 0.772*** |
| | S.E. | (0.148) | (0.123) |
| Teen Natives | Coeff. | 0.517*** | 4.097*** |
| | S.E. | (0.031) | (0.216) |
| Others | Coeff. | -0.303 | -2.249*** |
| | S.E. | (0.269) | (0.289) |
| **Panel B: (Low-skilled Group / Election Year Total State Working-aged Population) × 100** | | | |
| $\hat{\tau}$ Demwon<br>\|5\|pp. BW, At least one worker from each group | | Construction | Restaurants & Food Services |
| N-/+ | | 80/101 | 93/100 |
| Total Low-skilled in the Industry | Coeff. | 0.173*** | 0.157*** |
| | S.E. | (0.034) | (0.040) |
| Hispanic Immigrants | Coeff. | -0.050*** | -0.018 |
| | S.E. | (0.017) | (0.011) |
| White Natives | Coeff. | 0.087*** | 0.047*** |
| | S.E. | (0.019) | (0.015) |
| Black Natives | Coeff. | 0.041*** | 0.050*** |
| | S.E. | (0.006) | (0.004) |
| Teen Natives | Coeff. | 0.017*** | 0.138*** |
| | S.E. | (0.001) | (0.007) |
| Others | Coeff. | 0.078*** | -0.060*** |
| | S.E. | (0.014) | (0.015) |

Note: Specification is same as the main specification in Table 3. The low-skilled individuals aged 16-64 who are currently working in either the construction or restaurant sector are counted. Native teens are defined as U.S. citizens aged 16-17, following the criteria established by Smith 2012. This age definition differs from the working age sample used in the main analysis, which starts at 18 years old. The state × year observations are restricted to those that have at least one (1) worker in the key groups.

# Table 10: Effect of Democratic Governor on Economic Outcomes and Policies

RDD Estimation in 5 pp. BW. (N -/+: 108/125)

Panel A: Economic Outcomes

| | (1) Gross State Product | (2) Personal Income | (3) Per Capita Personal Income | (4) Unemployment rate | (5) Poverty Rate | (6) Housing Price Index | (7) ln(HPI) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RDD | 0.032*** | 0.069*** | 0.016*** | -0.278*** | -1.747*** | 18.885** | 0.027*** |
| SE. | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.095) | (0.171) | (8.543) | (0.005) |

Panel B: Economic Policies - Minimum Wages and EITC Rate

| | (1) State Minimum Wage ° | (2) Number of Changes in Nominal State Minimum Wage in a Governor Term | (3) Prob(Any Changes in Nominal State Minimum Wage in a Governor Term) | (4) State EITC Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RDD | 0.028*** | 0.743*** | 0.745*** | 0.020*** |
| SE. | (0.010) | (0.213) | (0.088) | (0.005) |


Panel C: Economic Policies - Tax and Benefits

| | (1) State individual income tax rate (bottom) | (2) State individual income tax rate (top) | (3) State individual income tax rate spread(top-bottom) | (4) AFDC/TANF/FS 2 person °° | (5) AFDC/TANF/FS 3 person °° | (6) AFDC/TANF/FS 4 person °° |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RDD | 0.000 | -0.003* | -0.007*** | 0.070*** | 0.054*** | 0.039*** |
| SE. | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.009) |


Note: Specification is same as the main specification in Table 3. $^{o}$: log real-term of variables in 1999 dollars. $^{oo}$: log real combined (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamp (FS)) monthly maximum benefit for n-person family in 1999 dollars. State Earned income tax credit, which is a refundable tax credit for low- to moderate-income working individuals and couples, benefit rate as a percentage of the federal EITC rate. Housing price index is yearly average of not seasonally adjusted index with 1980 Q1=100. $\Delta ln(HPI)$ is yearly first difference. Sources: BEA, UKCPR, the Book of the State, and FHFA.

# Figures


Figure 1: Share of Democratic Party Supporters in Low-skilled Group of Interest




(a) Hispanic Immigrants





(b) White Natives





(c) Black Natives

Note: The proportion of individuals in low-skilled groups of interest identifying as Democrats (among those who disclosed their party identification as Democrat, Republican, or Independent) was measured using Cooperative Election Study (CES) data. Second-generation refers to individuals with at least one foreign-born parent, while third-generation and beyond have no foreign-born parents.


Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Average Vote Margin, Elections/Observations in 5pp BW




(a) Average Vote Margin by State





(b) Number of Elections within 5 pp BW by State





(c) Number of State-Year Observation within 5 pp BW by State

Figure 3: Manipulation Test on Estimated Density of Elections Over Vote Margin of Victory, 2000-2019





Note: The figure shows the estimated density of elections over the vote margin of victory in the year gubernatorial elections were held (pre-treatment period), from 2000 to 2019. The solid lines are the point estimate of the density function and the shaded area presents a 95% confidence interval. It failed to reject the null hypothesis in this case, as shown by the p-value of 0.6023 and T-statistic of 0.5211.


Figure 4: RDD Plot - Net Interstate Migration Flows of Low-skilled Groups





(a) Total Individuals





(b) Immigrants





(c) Natives




(d) Hispanic Immigrants





(e) White Natives





(f) Black Natives

Notes:The figures are generated using the Stata package *rdplot*. The scatter plots depict the average values within bins, with 50 bins allocated on each side of the threshold, where each bin corresponds to a 0.1 percentage point voting margin. Linear polynomial fits are applied separately on either side of the threshold. A triangular kernel is used, and the control variables are consistent with those in the main analysis: election-year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for synchronization with the Presidential election cycle.


Figure 5: RDD Plot - Net Interstate Migration Flows of Low-skilled Groups, Second-order Polynomial Fit





(a) Total Individuals





(b) Immigrants





(c) Natives




(d) Hispanic Immigrants





(e) White Natives





(f) Black Natives

Notes:The figures are generated using the Stata package *rdplot*. The scatter plots depict the average values within bins, with 50 bins allocated on each side of the threshold, where each bin corresponds to a 0.1 percentage point voting margin. Second-order polynomial fits are applied separately to each side of the threshold. A triangular kernel is used, and the control variables are consistent with those in the main analysis: election-year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for synchronization with the Presidential election cycle.


Figure 6: RDD Plot - Net Interstate Migration Flows of Low-skilled Groups, Placebo Graph of Arbitrary Cutoffs:−10 pp and +10 pp





(a) −10 pp Hispanic Immigrant





(b) +10 pp Hispanic Immigrant





(c) −10 pp White Native




(d) +10 pp White Native





(e) −10 pp Black Native





(f) +10 pp Black Native

Note: The figures are generated using the Stata package *rdplot*. The scatter plots depict the average values within bins, where each bin corresponds to 0.1 pp vote margin. The specification is the same as in Figure 4. 95% Confidence Interval is presented.


Figure 7: Estimated CDF of Wage Relative to Minimum Wage for Low-skilled Groups





(a) Hispanic Immigrants




(b) White Natives





(c) Black Natives




(d) Teen Natives


Note: *Wage relative to minimum wage* is defined as *ln(real hourly wage) − ln(real effective minimum wage)*. The *effective minimum wage* is defined as *max(federal minimum wage, state minimum wage)*. Real values are in 1999 dollars. The differences exceeding |2.5| are excluded from the analysis for a better illustrative purpose. To capture the full distribution, including paid employees, unpaid family workers, and those with little wage income, I analyze wage income over the past 12 months without excluding the top-coded or bottom 5% and without restricting the sample to individuals with positive working hours, weeks, or wage income. Wage is adjusted for year-round responses about the past 12 months ' information (The ACS collects responses throughout the whole year. ACS asks for income information for the previous 12-month period. The Census Bureau offers an additional variable called ADJUST, which adjusts dollar amounts to what they would have been if earned totally throughout the calendar year.). Hispanic Immigrants exclude those from abroad one year ago. Native teens are defined as U.S. citizens aged 16-17, following the criteria established by Smith 2012. This age definition differs from the working age sample used in the main analysis, which starts at 18 years old.

Figure 8: The Short-Run Impact of Immigration on Natives with Comparable Education




Note: This figure is an augmented version of the graph for a better illustration of the mechanism of the migration responses reported in the paper, based on the explanation in Edo and Rapoport 2019.

Figure 9: Minimum Wage & EITC - Labor Supply of High Productivity Type




Note: This figure is an augmented version of the graph for a better illustration of the mechanism of the migration responses reported in the paper, based on the explanation in Neumark and Wascher 2011.