Inflation Dynamics with a Generalized Lucas Phillips Curve

John H. Cochrane*

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Abstract

I investigate a generalized form of the Lucas (1972, 1973) Phillips curve,

$$\kappa x_t = p_t - \int_{j=0}^{\infty} \alpha_j E_{t-j} p_t dj$$

in otherwise standard textbook new-Keynesian models. This Phillips curve helps to reconcile the sharp divergence between the standard model on the one hand and the beliefs of most policy analysts and the available evidence on the other. In the standard model, inflation and output *rise* after interest rates rise, with only the possibility of a one-time downward jump. With the generalized Lucas Phillips curve, inflation is initially unstable, so a small initial disinflation builds up before turning around. With long-term debt, higher interest rates can temporarily lower future inflation with no change in fiscal policy. The model preserves the desirable long-run stability and neutrality of the standard model. Above all, the model is *tractable*, with textbook transparency and simplicity and analytic solutions.

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*Hoover Institution, Stanford University and NBER. john.cochrane@stanford.edu, https://www.johnhcochrane.com. I thank four thoughtful referees, Adrian Auclert, and attendees as the Stanford Macro Lunch for helpful comments. A companion paper Cochrane (2025) contains much material from an earlier working paper under the title of this article.

1 Introduction

This paper investigates a generalization of the Lucas (1972) Phillips curve, in which some firms take longer than others to figure out whether a price change represents aggregate or relative demand. The output gap x_t follows

$$\kappa x_t = p_t - \int_{j=0}^{\infty} \alpha_j E_{t-j} p_t dj \tag{1}$$

where p_t is the log price level, and α_j is the fraction of firms that take j periods to learn the aggregate state of the economy. I place this Phillips curve in the standard new-Keynesian framework, i.e. an intertemporal IS curve and an interest rate target. The resulting response of inflation to shocks is hump-shaped. Inflation is initially unstable, building up over time. Later on, inflation dynamics become stable, and inflation goes away.

Specifically, I start by uniting the Phillips curve (1) with the standard intertemporal substitution IS curve,

$$\frac{E_t(dx_t)}{dt} = \sigma(i_t - \pi_t), \tag{2}$$

and I compute the response to a shock consisting of an AR(1) interest rate and an -0.5% initial inflation. Figure 1 presents the resulting response of inflation and output, using exponential weights $\alpha_j = ae^{-aj}$. Disinflation grows following the initial shock, in a hump-shaped pattern, before subsiding. That is the central result.

This is an easy computation. With exponential weights $\alpha_j = ae^{-aj}$, the output and price level responses to a time-0 shock in (1) are related by

$$\kappa x_t = e^{-at} p_t. \tag{3}$$

At time t, output is proportional to the fraction $\int_{j=t}^{\infty} ae^{-aj}dj = e^{-at}$ of firms that have not gotten the news, times the price surprise. The IS curve (2) says that the output, interest rate, and inflation responses are related by

$$\frac{dx_t}{dt} = \sigma(i_t - \pi_t). \tag{4}$$

Take the derivative of (3), eliminate output growth from it and (4), and solve the resulting ordinary differential equation linking $dp/dt = \pi_t$, p_t, and i_t.




Figure 1: Responses to AR(1) interest rate and $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$ with exponential weights $\alpha_j = ae^{-aj}$. Dynamic IS and a generalized Lucas Phillips curve. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, $b = 0$, $\eta_i = 0.3$. The u line plots u_t in $i_t = \phi\pi_t + u_t$ with $\phi = 1.1$. With $r = 2\%$ and short-term debt, the inflation path requires a fiscal tightening $\tilde{s}/r$ equal to 13.7% of the value of debt.

1.1 Motivation

What is the minimal, simplest, economic model that captures the basic sign and dynamics of how nominal interest rates move inflation? Most economists would answer, the standard three-equation new-Keynesian model. The new-Keynesian literature is well-understood as elaboration of this basic structure.

Yet there is a chasm between how the three-equation model actually operates and the standard doctrine among policy makers, commentators, and most economists, taught to undergraduates, and even expressed somewhat incongruously in the introductions, conclusions and executive summaries of many new-Keynesian analyses: Higher nominal interest rates raise real interest rates, which slowly lowers demand, lowers output and employment, and then, more slowly, lowers inflation via the Phillips curve. Leaving aside the mechanism, there is a similar sharp difference between this model and the facts as understood (if tenuously) by VARs, and the standard history of large events such as the 1980s disinflation.

In the standard three-equation model, by contrast, inflation and output jump down im-

mediately when interest rates rise, and then both *rise* together after that. (See the companion Cochrane, 2025 for a plot and discussion of these standard results.) That rise is deeply embedded: higher real interest rates raise expected consumption growth by the standard first order condition, and low output lowers inflation relative to future inflation, so inflation rises over time (Ball, 1994). Still, those are exactly the opposite signs of the standard doctrine. Saying out loud that higher real interest rates raise consumption growth or lower employment raises future relative to current inflation would provoke derision in policy spheres.

The standard new-Keynesian model retains the Fisherian character of its flexible-price foundation. Higher nominal interest rates, on their own, raise inflation going forward. Price stickiness splits this rise between higher real rates and higher output growth, but does not raise real interest rates more than one for one as would be necessary to lower future inflation. Inflation only goes down at all in the presence of higher nominal rates via a coincident equilibrium-selection policy, which induces a fiscal contraction.

The aim of this paper is to begin to bridge the gap: to work towards a simple, analytically tractable, explainable baseline economic model of inflation under interest rate targets that captures the signs of the standard doctrine, if not the standard mechanism.

Many policy makers square the circle between the downward jump of simple models and the long decline of the standard doctrine by alluding to "long and variable lags," an unstated process of adjustment to equilibrium.[1] But modern dynamic economic theory does not allow hand-waving dynamics. Each price and quantity must be part of an intertemporal equilibrium. We must model and understand dynamics.

That higher interest rates raise inflation fundamentally comes from the underlying and desirable stability and long-run neutrality of new-Keynesian models. Given a nominal interest rate path, inflation will eventually converge to the level of nominal interest rates. By contrast, in the traditional policy view, inflation is unstable given the path of interest rates. Instability means that raising nominal interest rates drives inflation down in a spiral. (Cochrane, 2024 explains this stability issue in detail.)

In that context, the generalized Lucas Phillips curve produces short-run instability while retaining long-run stability. Roughly speaking, it generates dynamics $d\pi/dt = \gamma(t)\pi_t + \delta(t)i_t$, in which $\gamma(t) > 0$ for small t, but $\gamma(t) < 0$ for larger t. In this way, the generalized Lucas Phillips

[1]The term originates from Milton Friedman (1948) (p. 254) and must represent one of the most durable of economic dictums. Dupor (2023) has a nice review, and Nelson (2020) (p. 141) discusses the term's coinage.

curve produces an inflation response closer to standard beliefs and VARs, but maintaining the long-run stability and neutrality of the standard rational expectations model.

However, the mechanism remains fundamentally the same as the standard new-Keynesian model, and not that of the policy doctrine. Disinflation still needs an initial downward inflation jump $\pi_0 < 0$ to get going. Higher nominal interest rates, on their own, still just drag inflation up.

By contrast, the mechanism in the standard doctrine wants higher real interest rates to push inflation down, something like $d\pi/dt = -\gamma(t)(i_t - \pi_t)$ with $\gamma(t) > 0$ for small t, rather than $d\pi/dt = \gamma(t)\pi_t + \delta(t)i_t$.

Mechanically adaptive expectations produce such responses (Cochrane, 2024). But our goal since the 1980s has been to avoid such non-economic and hence likely ephemeral and non-policy-invariant ingredients, at least as central necessary ingredients to get the basic sign of monetary policy right.

I then include long-term debt and a persistent interest rate disturbance. With short-term debt, the model with a generalized Lucas Phillips curve, like the standard model, requires an equilibrium-selection shock, with a fiscal tightening, to get disinflation going in the presence of higher nominal interest rates. But there is no reason that the disinflationary initial shocks should accompany higher interest rates. With long-term debt and a persistent interest rate disturbance, initial inflation declines even with no change in fiscal policy. This mechanism gives a reason that the initial disinflation shock is linked to higher interest rates, and a reason why central banks might want to raise interest rates at all in order to lower inflation. With the standard forward-looking Phillips curve, this long-term debt mechanism still produces a jump down in inflation, followed by a rise. The generalized Lucas Phillips curve then amplifies the initial shock, producing more realistic dynamics. The amplification can be large enough that one might not notice the initial jump in time-averaged data.

The mechanism remains completely different from the standard doctrine however. The best that anyone has achieved so far is that the rational expectations new-Keynesian model somewhat mimics standard beliefs about the effects of monetary policy — the impulse response function — but not the standard story for its mechanism.

Mixing the generalized Lucas Phillips curve with a standard intertemporal IS equilibrium condition, output still rises going forward after an initial downward jump, as can be seen in Figure 1. Using an IS curve that features an external habit or one that downweights future output

produces response functions in which output also falls before turning around, and output falls more quickly than inflation. I focus on inflation, however. Understanding how central banks control inflation with nominal interest rates is the first, central, and unsettled task of monetary economics.

Obviously, this approach is based on Lucas (1972) and the simplified loglinearization in Lucas (1973). In the current literature, the generalized Lucas Phillips curve is closest to the "sticky information" Phillips curve of Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007). One may view the contribution as a variation on Mankiw and Reis that makes the model much more tractable, leading to easy analytical solutions. Medium-scale numerical models such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016, 2018) and Smets and Wouters (2007) also produce hump-shaped responses, but with a smorgasbord of additional ingredients. My goal is to find the simplest necessary and most economically compelling ingredients that produce the basic sign of monetary policy. Adaptive expectations and classic ISLM embody the standard doctrine of monetary policy, and easily produce inflation that goes down following a rise in interest rates. That rise must still be accompanied by a fiscal tightening to pay interest costs on the debt, but the mechanism does not rely on an equilibrium-selection shock to get inflation going. However, my goal is to find a simple baseline fully economic model. If there is no such model, and the basic sign of monetary policy *requires* irrational expectations, that is news. Let us not too quickly throw out the entire Lucas-critique-compliant new-Keynesian DSGE enterprise too quickly. Going halfway there, lagged inflation, justified by either indexing or less than perfect expectations, is commonly used to produce a hump-shaped response. But prices are not indexed, so if that is the central necessary ingredient for the sign of monetary policy, it rests on shaky foundations. I pursue the sticky-information possibility instead on the hope that it seems more economically robust. Each path is worth exploring. The Appendix includes a full literature review.

2 A Generalized Lucas Model

Again, I investigate a generalization of the Lucas Phillips curve,

$$\kappa x_t = p_t - \int_{j=0}^{\infty} \alpha_j E_{t-j} p_t dj. \tag{5}$$

One can do all the computations in discrete time, starting with

$$\kappa x_t = p_t - \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \alpha_j E_{t-j} p_t.$$

Continuous time forces us to think a bit harder about which variables can jump or diffuse in response to shocks and which must move differentiably. The formulas and pictures are a bit more elegant as well.

One can arrive quickly at (5) starting from the Lucas (1973) supply curve for firm j, in my notation

$$\kappa x_{j,t} = p_{j,t} - E(p_t | I_{j,t})$$

where $I_{j,t}$ is the information set of firm j at time t. The firm expands output in response to its perceived relative price. The confusion of relative prices with the overall price level is at the heart of most Phillips curves, as otherwise the price level is independent of real quantities.

Assume that firm j forms its expectations of the aggregate price level at time t based on aggregate information j periods old. To keep the answer simple, also assume that aggregate shocks are so much smaller than idiosyncratic shocks that the firm does not update its estimate of the aggregate price level from its observations of its own price between time $t-j$ and t. This simplifying assumption could also come from the various behavioral, information-processing cost, and near-rationality arguments that pervade the literature surveyed below. When one considers the bewildering number of goods in any advanced economy, it does not seem a terrible assumption. Averaging over firms, with fraction α_j firms of type j, we arrive at (5).

The weights $\{\alpha_j\}$ are positive and satisfy $\int_{j=0}^{\infty} \alpha_j dj = 1$. I use two examples for calculations, an exponential

$$\alpha_j = a e^{-aj} \tag{6}$$

and a double exponential,

$$\alpha_j = \frac{e^{-aj} - e^{-bj}}{\frac{1}{a} - \frac{1}{b}}. \tag{7}$$

The simple exponential leads to simple calculations and captures most of the message. The double exponential has a hump-shaped pattern, with $\alpha_0 = 0$, graphed in Figure 2. Unlike the exponential case, no firms figure out instantly whether a disturbance is relative or aggregate. It adds a few simplifications and refinements to the results. It also is a more reasonable extension of Lucas's ideas to continuous time. Once we get past the idea that firms know aggregate vs.




Figure 2: Convenient weights in the generalized Lucas Phillips curve. The plot shows weights α_j for an exponential $\alpha_j = ae^{-aj}$ and double exponential $\alpha_j = (e^{-aj} - e^{-bj})/(a-b)$ examples. $a = 1$ and $b = 2$. The shaded area illustrates $\Phi_t \equiv \int_{j=t}^{\infty} \alpha_j dj$ for $t = 2$ in the double exponential case

local demand the instant that money stock aggregates are published, the peak of the double exponential stands in well for Lucas's "period," with some firms getting news sooner and others later.

I characterize the model solutions by impulse-response functions. Since the models are linear, the response function—how $(E_{t+1} - E_t)y_{t+j}$ changes when there is a shock at time $t+1$, for any variable y_t—is the same as the response to an "MIT shock" at time 0, in which all variables and expectations start at zero, and then jump unexpectedly to new values. I use unadorned time-series notation y_t to denote such impulse-response functions.

From the Phillips curve, we can compute how the price level or inflation responses to any shock are related to the output response. For any $j < 0$, $E_j p_t = 0$, while $E_j p_t = p_t$ for any $j \geq 0$. Thus, the price and output responses are related by

$$\kappa x_t = p_t - \int_{j=0}^{t} \alpha_j dj \; p_t$$

$$\kappa x_t = \left(\int_{j=t}^{\infty} \alpha_j dj \right) \; p_t = \Phi(t) p_t. \tag{8}$$

Output moves in proportion to the fraction of firms that have not yet learned aggregate information. Equation (8) also gives us the output response once we solve for the price level response below.

The last equality in (8) introduces notation $\Phi(t)$ for the fraction of firms that have not yet learned aggregate demand; also the right tail of $\{\alpha_j\}$. It obeys

$$\Phi(0) = 1; \; \Phi(\infty) = 0; \; \frac{d\Phi(t)}{dt} = -\alpha_t.$$

For exponential weights (6)

$$\Phi(t) = e^{-at},$$

and for double exponential weights (7)

$$\Phi(t) = \frac{\frac{1}{a} e^{-aj} - \frac{1}{b} e^{-bj}}{\frac{1}{a} - \frac{1}{b}}.$$

We will shortly need the response of output growth. Taking the derivative of (8),

$$\kappa \frac{dx_t}{dt} = -\alpha_t p_t + \Phi(t) \frac{dp_t}{dt}. \tag{9}$$

One can derive a Phillips curve linking output and inflation, in the standard tradition, rather than output and the price level. However, it turns out to be algebraically simpler to solve the model in terms of the price level and then take a derivative.

In the continuous time version of the standard Calvo (1983) pricing model, only a fraction λdt of firms can change prices between time t and $t + dt$, so the price level cannot have a jump or diffusion, though the rate of inflation can do so. In this generalized Lucas Phillips curve prices and output can diffuse or jump. If that result seems counterintuitive, remember that individual firm prices and output flows do jump and all our statistics are time averaged. One could add small costs of output or price movement, but let's first see how the model behaves without them.

3 Model Response With a Dynamic IS curve

How the economy behaves depends, of course, on the full model not just the Phillips curves. The response of the standard intertemporal IS curve to a time-zero shock is, for $t \geq 0$

$$\frac{dx_t}{dt} = \sigma(i_t - \pi_t). \tag{10}$$

This is the continuous time equivalent to the familiar

$$x_t = x_{t+1} - \sigma(i_t - \pi_{t+1}).$$

Figures 1 plots the response of the model consisting of the generalized Lucas Phillips curve and the IS curve (10) to the combination of an AR(1) interest rate path and a $p_0 = -0.5\%$ price level shock.




Figure 3: Responses to AR(1) interest rate and $p_0 = -0.56\%$ with double-exponential weights. Dynamic IS and a generalized Lucas Phillips curve. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, $b = 2$, $\eta_i = 0.3$.

Figure 3 presents the response of inflation and output to the same shock, using a hump-shaped pattern of weights generated by the difference between two exponentials. (See (7) and Figure 2.) The major difference is that expected inflation does not jump downwards on impact.

Avoiding that feature is a main motivation (aside realism) for examining hump-shaped weights. The price level still jumps down, so measured year-on-year inflation declines as shown.

To compute these responses, I eliminate output growth from (9) and (10). Rearranging, the price level then follows the differential equation

$$[\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa]\ \frac{dp_t}{dt}-\alpha_t p_t=\sigma\kappa i_t \tag{11}$$

All of the derivatives are forward-looking and so interpreted hold at time zero as well.

Since $\Phi'(t)=\alpha_t$ the left hand side is the total differential of $[\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa]\,p_t$. We quickly have the solution

$$p_t=\frac{1+\sigma\kappa}{\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa}p_0+\frac{\sigma\kappa}{\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa}\int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj. \tag{12}$$

For exponential weights,

$$p_t=\frac{1+\sigma\kappa}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}p_0+\frac{\sigma\kappa}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}\int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj. \tag{13}$$

The coefficient in front of p_0 is the central story. The variables $\Phi(t)$ and e^{-at} in particular start at 1 and then decrease. Price grows over time from an initial p_0, but then stabilizes at $(1+\sigma\kappa)/(\sigma\kappa)$ of that original value. Also in the differential equation (11), the coefficient of dp_t/dt on p_t is positive, so the model exhibits explosive dynamics, amplifying an initial negative shock over time. However $\alpha_t\to 0$ and $\Phi(t)\to 0$ as t grows, so the price level eventually converges.

I use an AR(1) for the interest rate

$$i_t=i_0e^{-\eta_i t}$$

so

$$\int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj=\frac{1-e^{-\eta_i t}}{\eta_i}.$$

This completes the calculation of the price level path.

To find the inflation response, we can differentiate the price response, yielding

$$\pi_t=\frac{(1+\sigma\kappa)\,\alpha_t}{[\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa]^2}p_0+\frac{\sigma\kappa\alpha_t}{[\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa]^2}\int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj+\frac{\sigma\kappa}{\Phi(t)+\sigma\kappa}i_t. \tag{14}$$

In the single exponential case,

$$\pi_t = \frac{(1+\sigma\kappa)\, a e^{-at}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} p_0 + \frac{\sigma\kappa a e^{-at}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} \int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj + \frac{\sigma\kappa}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa} i_t. \tag{15}$$

Equations (12) and (14) show that we must characterize the policy input by both an interest rate path and an initial price level, which solves the mystery of why I did so. Given a path of interest rates, there are multiple equilibria, indexed by p_0. Each choice of p_0 also carries different fiscal implications. Thus, and anticipating later discussion, we can call the choice of p_0 the equilibrium-selection/fiscal policy specification. Holding constant the initial price level p_0, higher nominal interest rates *raise* inflation. Thus, any disinflationary response must come by amplifying a negative initial price level or negative inflation. For this reason, I plot responses to an AR(1) interest rate path *and* an initial $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$ or $p_0 = -0.56\%$ price decline.

Since $p_0 < 0$ does all the disinflationary work, and given p_0 raising interest rates only raises inflation, it seems almost dishonest to plot the response to such a joint policy and call it the result of monetary policy that raises interest rates. I only do so reflecting a long tradition that does exactly that. The exact same points hold with the standard model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, so this is indeed an analogue of the standard calculation. See the companion Cochrane (2025). The next section contains other policy specifications.

To understand the behavior at time zero and how it differs across the single and double exponential forms, consider the initial conditions. We can read these directly off the differential equation (11) or the inflation response (14) at $t = 0$:

$$(1+\sigma\kappa)\,\pi_0 - \alpha_0 p_0 = \sigma\kappa i_0. \tag{16}$$

When $\alpha_0 > 0$ as it is for the exponential weights, then the initial price level and inflation rate are tied together. I specify $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$ and find the implied $p_0 = -0.56\%$. One can in this case also solve (16) as

$$p_0 = \frac{1}{\alpha_0}\left[(1+\sigma\kappa)\,\pi_0 - \sigma\kappa i_0\right], \tag{17}$$

and express inflation in (15) as a function of an initial inflation choice π_0 rather than the initial price level p_0.

When $\alpha_0 = 0$ as in the double exponential weights, initial inflation has no connection to the initial price level, though as α_t rises the initial price level soon feeds back to the inflation path.

Initial inflation must be positive when the initial interest rate is positive, a brief "price puzzle" that one can (barely) see in Figure 2. I specify $p_0 = -0.56\%$ so the calculation is comparable to the exponential weight case.

The lines marked inflation π is Figures 1 and 3 plot the instantaneous inflation rate, ignoring the price level jump that gets the whole thing going. To display that phenomenon, Figure 3 also plots inflation measured as change from the previous period $p_t - p_{t-1}$. Here we see inflation starting at -0.56%, the initial price level jump less its value (0) one period previously. Measured inflation jumps up as the initial price level drop enters the moving average. That seems unrealistic, and one might add small frictions to smooth out the model. However, the triangles plot year on year inflation at discrete time intervals, which is what we would typically measure. The triangles show that jumps are not obviously counterfactual. In reality, the price level is also time-averaged to monthly or quarterly intervals, further smoothing the response.

While the double-exponential case is more realistic, I plot the simple exponential response as well to emphasize that the hump-shaped response does not come from hump-shaped weights. Since my focus is on the simplest and most tractable model that gets basic facts right, the single exponential case is it.

The central story is initially unstable inflation, followed by a return to stability as time increases. To see this behavior, we can write the differential equation for inflation by differentiating the price differential equation (11), and then using it again to eliminate the price level from the differential equation in favor of inflation. For exponential weights, the result is

$$\frac{d\pi_t}{dt} = \frac{(e^{-at} - \sigma\kappa)}{(e^{-at} + \sigma\kappa)} a\pi_t + \frac{1}{e^{-at} + \sigma\kappa}\left[a\sigma\kappa i_t + \sigma\kappa \frac{di_t}{dt}\right]. \tag{18}$$

For $\sigma\kappa < 1$, inflation is initially unstable, with a positive coefficient on inflation π_t. As t rises and e^{-at} falls, the sign changes and inflation becomes stable in the long run, with a negative coefficient on π_t. For this reason, I calculate the response in Figure 1 with σ and κ relatively small, at 0.2 each. A smaller value of σ and κ allows a generous period of instability before e^{-at} falls below $\sigma\kappa$ and inflation becomes stable. The parameter $a = 1$ means the typical firm learns the aggregate price level in about a year. Smaller values capturing slower learning slow down the dynamics.

Output x_t follows from the price level (12) and (8),

$$\kappa x_t = \left(\int_{j=t}^{\infty} \alpha_j dj\right) p_t = \Phi(t) p_t. \tag{19}$$

Whether output rises or falls after an initial jump $\kappa x_0 = p_0$ depends whether the reduction in $\Phi(t)$ outweighs the growth in p_t. Using (12)

$$\kappa x_t = \frac{\Phi(t) + \Phi(t)\sigma\kappa}{\Phi(t) + \sigma\kappa}\kappa x_0 + \frac{\Phi(t)\sigma\kappa}{\Phi(t) + \sigma\kappa}\int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj. \tag{20}$$

We see that for $p_0 < 0$ and $x_0 < 0$, the leading coefficient is less than one, and output always reverts to trend, as shown in Figures 1 and 3. Fiddling with parameters will not help. If we want to modify this behavior we have to modify the model, which I do below.

We can see the basic mechanism for inflation dynamics with a static IS curve and the Lucas Phillips curve,

$$x_t = -\sigma\left(i_t - E_t\pi_{t+1}\right)$$

$$\kappa x_t = \pi_t - E_{t-1}\pi_t.$$

Eliminating x_t, we obtain the equilibrium condition

$$E_t\pi_{t+1} = i_t + \frac{1}{\sigma\kappa}(\pi_t - E_{t-1}\pi_t).$$

Denote the impulse response function $\pi_0,\ \pi_1$, etc. following a shock at time 0. Given an interest rate path $\{i_t\}$ and first period inflation π_0, inflation follows

$$\pi_0;\ \pi_1 = i_1 + \frac{1}{\sigma\kappa}\pi_0;\ \pi_2 = i_1, , ...\pi_t = i_{t-1}.$$

If $\sigma\kappa < 1$, the period 1 response can amplify the period 0 response. We have initially unstable dynamics, before turning around and becoming stable and neutral.

This simple case helps to see the intuition: If $\pi_0 > 0$, then we have a positive output response x_0 via the Lucas Phillips curve. In this model (with an IS equation and interest rate target rather than MV=PY), higher output x_0 requires a lower real interest rate. So $i_0 - E_1\pi_1$ must fall. With a fixed nominal rate i_0, that rise requires a rise in π_1 relative to i_0. The rise in π_1 is, when time 1 rolls around, a rise in expected inflation — $\pi_1 = E_0\pi_1$ in the impulse response function — so has no further output effect. Lucas (1972) is famously a model without persistence. But that dictum

is restricted to output. Even Lucas' Phillips curve generates inflation persistence when married to an interest rate target and an IS condition.

4 Policy Specification

It is a little unconventional that I specify the policy environment by an interest rate path and also by the initial price level, reflecting an equilibrium-selection/fiscal choicel. It also seems unusual that equilibrium-selection choice does all the work of lowering inflation, and that higher nominal interest rates on their own raise inflation.

As explained in Cochrane (2025), the issues are exactly the same for the standard forward-looking Calvo Phillips curve. In that model, the relation between interest rates and inflation is given by

$$\pi_t = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\lambda_1}+\frac{1}{\lambda_2}}\left[Ce^{-\lambda_1 t} + \int_{s=0}^{t} e^{-\lambda_1(t-s)} i_s ds + \int_{s=t}^{\infty} e^{-\lambda_2(s-t)} i_s ds\right] \tag{21}$$

where λ_1 and λ_2 are positive functions of the underlying model parameters.

Broadly, (21) works in the same way as (14) and (15). Inflation is a two-sided moving average of the interest rate, plus an exponentially decaying transient which can be indexed by initial inflation. Given the interest rate, there are multiple equilibria, each with different fiscal underpinnings, so inflation is determined by an equilibrium-selection/fiscal choice along with the interest rate path. The weights of inflation on the interest rate are all positive, so for a given equilibrium-selection choice higher interest rates raise inflation. The only way for inflation to decline with higher interest rates is via a contemporaneous negative equilibrium-selection/fiscal π_0 shock.

There are some differences, of course. Inflation in (21) responds to future interest rates, while only past interest rates enter in model with a generalized Lucas Phillips curve (14) and (15). This is a selling point as most empirical work sees more backward-looking dynamics. The response to the initial inflation shock in (21) is a pure exponential decay, which is why the Calvo model produces a rise in inflation after an initial downward jump. The initially unstable then stable dynamics of the generalized Lucas model are by contrast its central innovation.

As explained in detail in Cochrane (2025), there are three ways to understand the equilib-

rium choice. The most classic is via a Taylor rule

$$i_t = \phi\pi_t + u_t.$$

This seems to avoid the equilibrium-selection choice, but it does not. There are many different $\{u_t\}$ that produce a given $\{i_t\}$, and each produces a different inflation path $\{\pi_t\}$. One can see this by reverse-engineering: For any $\{\pi_t\}$, pick a ϕ, and construct $u_t = i_t - \phi\pi_t$. Thus, the choice of the disturbance $\{u_t\}$ path, in the set that produces a given interest rate path $\{i_t\}$, is equivalent to the choice of initial price level or inflation, *independently* of the interest rate path. The conventional restriction that the disturbance follows an AR(1) is a strong identification restriction linking the interest rate path and the equilibrium-selection choice, but there is no reason for such a restriction.

We can also write the interest rate policy rule in the equivalent representation suggested by King (2000),

$$i_t = i_t^* + \phi(\pi_t - \pi_t^*). \tag{22}$$

Here i_t^* is the central bank's desired equilibrium interest rate path, and π_t^* is the equilibrium the central bank wishes to choose, among the set consistent with $\{i_t^*\}$. This expression makes clear how the central bank chooses an equilibrium pi_t^*.

The linearized government debt identity implies

$$\int_{j=0}^{\infty} e^{-rj}\tilde{s}_j dj = \int_{j=0}^{\infty} e^{-rj}(i_j - \pi_j)dj - p_0 + q_0. \tag{23}$$

where $\tilde{s}$ is the real primary surplus divided by the initial (steady state) value of debt and q_0 is the jump in the nominal value of debt when there is long-term debt. (See Cochrane, 2023.) Primary surpluses must pay interest costs on the debt, and the windfall gains and losses to bondholders coming from a price level jump or bond price jump.

In the Taylor or King rule vision, surpluses react "passively" to central bank equilibrium selection choices. But they must react, and we can index the various equilibria by their fiscal underpinnings. In the fiscal theory of the price level, the change in surpluses directly selects the equilibrium. Looked at either way, policy is always joint monetary - fiscal policy.

To illustrate these foundations, for each response I compute the fiscal underpinnings or determinants, the left-hand side of (23). The timing of surplus does not matter in this model,

so I calculate the discounted sum of a permanent change in surplus $\tilde{s}_0/r$ for each case. Its units are fraction of the total outstanding debt. In several cases I compute the Taylor rule disturbance $u_t = i_t - \phi\pi_t$. The King rule interpretation is evident by the direct choice of initial inflation.

Figure 1 includes all three interpretations of the policy specification. All cases share the same AR(1) interest rate path, as shown. Most directly, as explained above, I *also* specify $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$, needed for the inflation response (15)-(17). With short-term debt ($q_0 = 0$), this solution requires a fiscal tightening equal to 13.7% of the value of debt. You can see the long period of interest rates larger than inflation, generating interest costs. Fiscal surpluses must rise to pay those, plus the initial price level jump.

Now, we can directly consider that equilibrium an instance of the King rule equilibrium selection policy plus passive fiscal tightening, or we can consider it an instance of the fiscal theory of the price level, with a fiscal tightening contemporaneous to the interest rate rise.

I also compute and plot a Taylor rule disturbance $u_t = i_t - \phi\pi_t$ with $\phi = 1.1$. If one turns the logic around, this Taylor rule disturbance produces the same equilibrium. You might object that I seem to bake in the hump-shaped outcome with a hump-shaped disturbance. But hump-shaped inflation with an AR(1) interest rate and $i_t = \phi\pi_t + u_t$ must have a hump-shaped disturbance. Putting a hump-shaped disturbance in the Calvo model would produce a hump-shaped interest rate, not hump-shaped inflation. VARs typically find something like an AR(1) interest rate path. They do not measure the disturbance. We calibrate models and evaluate evidence such as VARs by the interest rate path, not the disturbance path. Calibrated or estimated models report the interest rate path, and not the disturbance which produces that path, despite the fact that the shape of the disturbance is crucial to equilibrium selection. If such models produce AT(1) shaped interest rates and a hump-shaped inflation, they must estimate a hump-shaped Taylor rule disturbance. (Most models estimate a rule with persistence and output responses, such as

$$i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1-\rho)(\phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_x x_t + u_t);$$

or in continuous time,

$$di_t = -\rho[(i_t - \phi_\pi \pi_t - \phi_x x_t + u_t)dt + d\varepsilon_t].$$

Such rules lead to broadly similar hump-shaped disturbances however.)

So, we can describe the policy experiment of Figure 1 as a response to the plotted Taylor rule disturbance $\{u_t\}$ supported by a "passive" 13.7% fiscal contraction; we can describe it as a

response to the plotted interest path and a $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$ King rule equilibrium-selection shock, again with a "passive" 13.7% fiscal contraction, or we can describe it as the plotted interest rate path plus an "active" 13.7% fiscal contraction which directly selects the plotted inflation path. Obviously, I find the latter interpretation most compelling, but the reader may choose any interpretation. The Taylor rule story, however, hides the fact that equilibrium selection is a separate and independent policy choice. There are many other disturbances that produce the same interest rate path, and different inflation paths. Once un-hidden, the uncomfortable fact remains that higher interest rates raise inflation, and the equilibrium selection/fiscal shock does all the work.

4.1 Interest Rates vs. Equilibrium Selection

In case staring at the solutions (15) and (21) does not drive the point home enough, I now examine how the initial inflation or price level assumption vs. the interest rate path assumption affect inflation. Again, the basic points hold also with the standard Calvo Phillips curve.

Figure 4 presents the inflation response for the same generalized Lucas and exponential weight model and interest rate path as Figure 1, but different values of initial inflation π_0. The solid line repeats the case $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$ from Figure 1. The dashed lines present choices $\pi_0 = 0$, $\pi_0 = -0.25\%$, and $\pi_0 = -1\%$.

Clearly, the initial equilibrium-selection / fiscal shock has a major influence on the path of inflation. With $\pi_0 = 0$, inflation rises throughout the episode. The disinflation episode depends crucially on a negative initial inflation shock.

Figure 5 presents instead the inflation response for different values of the interest rate path, holding constant initial inflation π_0. The figure shows that the initial disinflation is nearly entirely driven by the selection/fiscal shock π_0, as it is nearly the same for all values of the interest rate. Interest rates fully control long-run inflation however. But higher interest rates *raise* inflation throughout, as they do in the conventional model with a Calvo Phillips curve.

I include a response with a permanent interest rate rise. Inflation rises to meets this interest rate in the long run. This response emphasizes an unconventional but desirable property of rational expectations models: Inflation is stable and neutral in the long run. But stability and long-run neutrality imply that higher interest rates must eventually raise inflation, just as stability and long-run neutrality imply that higher money growth must eventually raise inflation in




Figure 4: Inflation responses for various values of initial inflation, and the same interest rate. Continuous-time model with a dynamic IS curve and a generalized Lucas Phillips curve. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, $\eta_i = 0.3$. The solid line uses the original value $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$. Dashed lines give the inflation response for alternative choices $\pi_0 = 0$, $\pi_0 = -0.25\%$, and $\pi_0 = -1\%$, also noted by triangular markers. With $r = 2\%$, and short-term debt, a permanent fiscal surplus must rise by 1.06%, 7.4%, 13.7%, and 26.4% of the debt respectively.

standard monetarist analysis. In this response, however, inflation declines in the short run. So common experience, which sees a lot more short run than long run, could well see that negative sign but not the long run positive relationship.

I include a response with no interest rate movement at all. In fiscal theory, this is the response to a fiscal tightening equal to 15.9% of the value of debt, with no change in monetary policy. This is, in my interpretation, just the kind of shock that occurred in 2021-2023 with the opposite sign. It generates a hump-shaped disinflation, just as occurred in 2021-2023 with the opposite sign. In a new-Keynesian interpretation, this is an "open-mouth" operation, a pure equilibrium-selection shock. The central bank announces a changed inflation target π^*, or a well-constructed sequence of Taylor-rule disturbances $\{u_t\}$, that generate a change of inflation with no movement in the interest rate. Fiscal policy then "passively" enacts the needed 15.9% fiscal tightening.

I also include an interest rate path that rises temporarily and then declines rather than the




Figure 5: Inflation (red) for various values of the interest rate path (blue), and the same initial inflation. Continuous-time model with a standard dynamic IS curve and a generalized Lucas Phillips curve. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$. The solid line uses the original value $i_0 = 1\%$. Other interest rate lines use $i_0 = 0$ and $i_0 = 2\%$ as indicated. The permanent shock uses $\eta_i = 0$, other lines use $\eta_i = 0.3$. With $r = 2\%$, and short term debt, a permanent fiscal surplus must rise by 12.7%, 13.7%, 15.9%, and 11.0% of the debt, from top to bottom.

standard AR(1). This path is reminiscent of what happened in the 1980s. A high interest rate was followed by lower interest rates as inflation came down. Inflation and interest rates decline together over a long period of time, as they did in the 1980s. Cause and effect are reversed from the usual interpretation, of course. Here the interest rates drag down inflation, not the other way around. And the disinflation would have been quicker had the central bank not raised interest rates at all, and simply followed the negative selection/fiscal shock with lower nominal interest rates. Still, we should plot monetary policy responses that look something like successful disinflations not just AR(1)s that leave no mark in the long run. And it is comforting that this model can produce something that *looks* like the 1980s, though with a mechanism utterly different from the standard one.

Figure 5 shows that monetary policy does completely control long-run inflation, no matter what the equilibrium-selection/fiscal shock does. However the direction is Fisherian: inflation follows interest rates up or down.

5 Long Term Debt and a Coordinating Mechanism

It seems that monetary policy relies on a coincident fiscal contraction for all of any disinflationary power of higher interest rates, with both Calvo and generalized Lucas Phillips curves. That isn't altogether unreasonable as a reading of the data. The same events that provoke a central bank to tighten also provoke fiscal authorities to tighten. But if the central bank's interest rate increases are per-se counterproductive, that's news to central banks and most economists.

The Taylor rule with AR(1) disturbance offers a vision linking higher interest rates to the fiscal tightening that does all the work. By pledging to follow that policy, not any of the other disturbance paths that produce the same interest rate path, the central bank ties higher interest rates to contractionary equilibrium selection, and forces fiscal authorities to enact the necessary surpluses. But central banks don't follow explosive equilibrium-selection policies, and if they did the restriction to an AR(1) or other specific disturbance process is a tenuous link between interest rates and equilibrium selection.

Here I pursue the one coordination mechanism I know of in which higher interest rates lower initial inflation π_0, and thus subsequent inflation, *without* requiring any change in fiscal policy. This is the "stepping on a rake" (Sims, 2011; Cochrane, 2017b) or "unpleasant interest rate arithmetic" mechanism (Cochrane, 2023).

To make a calculation, I assume a geometric maturity structure in which the face value at maturity j is proportional to $\omega e^{-\omega j}$ and the expectations hypothesis, so the bond price is

$$q_0 = -\int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-(r+\omega)t} i_t dt.$$

Then the fiscal condition (23) becomes

$$\int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-rt} \tilde{s}_t = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-rt}(i_t - \pi_t)dt - p_0 - \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-(r+\omega)t} i_t dt. \tag{24}$$

Given a maturity structure ω, and given a path of interest rates, we can then find the initial price level p_0 that results when there is no change in surpluses on the left hand side. The Appendix gives formulas.

Figure 6 presents a calculation. This is the same model and parameters as in Figure 1. I reverse-engineer a maturity structure parameter $\omega = 0.026$ which, with more persistent interest rate movement $\eta_i = 0.05$ rather than $\eta_i = 0.30$ generates $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$, to be consistent with




Figure 6: Higher interest rates can lower inflation with no fiscal tightening. Response of inflation and output to the indicated interest rate path with no change in surpluses and long-term debt. Continuous-time model with a dynamic IS curve and a generalized Lucas Phillips curve. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, and $\omega = 0.026$. Solid lines: $i_t = e^{-0.05t}$. Dashed lines: $i_t = e^{-0.05t} - e^{-0.3t}$.

previous graphs.

The mechanism: When the central bank raises the nominal interest rate persistently, it raises long-term inflation. That lowers long-term bond prices. If the present value of surpluses does not change, then the nominal market value of government debt declines against an unchanged real present value. That difference is resolved by an unexpected disinflation. The requirement of no change in fiscal surpluses provides the link between higher nominal interest rates and a lower initial price level or inflation.

With this mechanism, the central bank has a reason to raise interest rates when it wishes to fight a spurt of inflation. Conversely, lowering interest rates, which would otherwise lower inflation, would temporarily raise inflation and so dissuade the central bank from that otherwise (in these models) attractive option.

With a standard Calvo Phillips curve, this mechanism still generates inflation that jumps down and then rises going forward. See Cochrane (2025). The generalized Lucas Phillips curve

produces disinflation that increases going forward with this mechanism. The dynamics are not different than previous cases. The framework just gives a reason tying the initial price level decline to rising interest rates.

As in other computations, the Lucas Phillips curve does not remove the need for a lower initial price level to get disinflation going, but it makes the disinflation much larger than that initial impetus, and makes the initial price level shock much smaller for a given disinflation, to the point that one might arguably have missed it empirically.

Of course, this mechanism also has nothing to do with the standard story that high real interest rates depress aggregate demand which pushes down inflation via the Phillips curve. Neither does the standard new-Keynesian model have anything to do with that story, as we have seen. But at least it gives a result with much the same appearance as the standard beliefs, and now not requiring joint fiscal action.

	Maturity ω, perpetual to instantaneous				
	0	0.0026	0.1	0.3	∞
s_0/r, $\eta_i = 0.05$ (Figure 6)	-0.50%	0	7.9%	12.9%	13.8%
s_0/r, $\eta_i = 0.30$ (Figure 1)	10.6%	10.6%	11.4%	12.1%	13.7%

Table 1: Surplus required for different values of the maturity structure of debt ω. This is the left-hand side of equation (24).

Table 1 presents the change in surplus, the left side of equation (24), required for the solution plotted in Figure 6, for different values of the maturity structure of debt ω. If debt has maturity structure characterized by $\omega = 0.026$, this equilibrium requires exactly no change in surplus. This is the central case whose possibility the calculation emphasizes.

The table also presents the same calculation for the solution plotted in Figure 1. With the less persistent interest rate $\eta_i = 0.30$, the plotted solution requires a fiscal contraction, for every maturity structure of the debt. To generate disinflation early on without a fiscal contraction, there must be inflation later on, as one sees in Figure 6. In Figure 1, the interest rate essentially returns to zero before inflation has a chance to follow interest rates upward. The long-term debt mechanism requires persistent interest rates to generate lower inflation without a fiscal contraction. Monetary policy on its own, must raise inflation in this circumstance.

I emphasize the response with no change in current and future primary surpluses to illustrate its possibility, and to give a reason by which the central bank acting on its own might wish

to raise interest rates in order to lower inflation, even temporarily. Other coordinated monetary-fiscal responses are interesting and important for actual policy and historical episodes. It is not necessary to hold surpluses constant, or to specify them exogenously, or to specify that they do not react to central bank action or to macroeconomic variables. Matching episodes or realistic policy evaluation should include how surpluses react to inflation, recession, interest costs, and debt, and consider coincident and coordinated fiscal policy shocks.

5.1 Forward guidance and inertial interest rates

VARs focus on the short-lived AR(1)-like interest rate excursions that typically follow identification of small exogenous monetary policy shocks. The Fed, however, increasingly relies on forward guidance. Also, when it turns to tighter or looser policy, it does not do so all at once but rather begins a predictable set of interest rate moves that can last a year or more. In most estimates, the Fed follows an "intertial" rule with past interest rates on the right hand side, or a partial -adjustment rule, which display the same sort of persistence. These long-term movements dominate movements in interest rates. They just are not the response to the tiny slice of unexpected interest rate movement that VARs find to be exogenous.

The long-term debt mechanism gives a reason for both practices: The key to reducing inflation today is to raise expectations of high nominal interest rates and inflation in the far future, to produce lower inflation today. Higher short-run nominal interest rates are really irrelevant or even counterproductive to inflation reduction. In this feature, the stepping on a rake/unpleasant interest rate arithmetic mechanism is dramatically different from the standard doctrine, which focuses on today's actual interest rates and their effect on aggregate demand.

To display this behavior, I feed the model a mixture of AR(1) interest rate paths, that generates a hump-shaped interest rate path. This can represent either a forward guidance announcement – interest rates will be higher or lower than you expected for a period of years in the future – or the beginnings of a tightening or loosening cycle. I use a combination of two AR(1) to generate the interest rate path, so the solution will end up a linear combination of solutions we already have,

$$i_t = i_s(e^{-\eta_1 t} - e^{\eta_2 t}).$$

i_s is a scale variable, since $i_0 = 0$.

Figure 6 includes this calculation as well, represented in the dashed lines. I use the same

maturity structure of the debt $\omega = 0.026$, and I again hold surpluses fixed. The different interest rate path gives a slightly different p_0 and π_0.

The main point of the contrast between the two calculations is that the inflation and output paths are very similar, even though the interest rate paths are quite different. The contrast emphasizes that the *long-run* behavior of nominal rates is crucial to the long-term debt mechanism, and short-run behavior of interest rates is not important.

6 Downweighted Expectations and Habits

The dynamic path of inflation and output depend on the IS part of the model as well as the Phillips curve. While still striving for the simplest textbook model, I investigate here two different and common IS specifications. Both allow a hump-shaped response of output as well as of inflation.

6.1 Downweighted Expectations

Here, I consider

$$m\frac{dx_t}{dt} - (1-m)x_t = \sigma\left(i_t - \frac{dp_t}{dt}\right). \tag{25}$$

This specification allows an intermediate case between the previous dynamic IS curve, with $m = 1$, and a static IS curve in which the level of output is directly affected by the real interest rate, with $m = 0$. The specification (25) is the continuous time equivalent of downweighting future output by a factor m in discrete time,

$$x_t = mx_{t+1} - \sigma(i - \pi),$$

as in Gabaix (2020).

Figure (7) presents the results, contrasting the previous case ($m = 1$, dashed lines) and a downweighted case ($m = 0.5$, solid lines). Otherwise I use the same parameters. I include the AR(1) interest rate path for comparability, even though we saw above that higher interest rates just uniformly raise inflation and the initial inflation shock does all the work.

The specification greatly enhances the power of the Lucas Phillips curve to generate lower inflation, or equivalently lowers the size of the initial shock needed to get inflation going. It also




Figure 7: Inflation and output with a generalized Lucas Phillips curve and an IS curve with down-weighted expectations. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, $\eta_i = 0.3$, $i_0 = 1\%$, $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$, $r = 2\%$. Dashed lines are the previous case $m = 1$. Solid lines are downweighted with $m = 0.5$. The surplus rises by $\tilde{s}/r = 13\%$ and 43% of the value of debt in the two cases.

leads to output that declines before rising again, bringing that response closer to common policy beliefs. Output still moves before inflation.

6.2 Habits

I also mix the generalized Lucas Phillips curve with an IS curve that features external habit persistence. This specification maintains the purity of rational expectations. It is a well known ingredient to produce hump-shaped output dynamics.

Marginal utility depends on consumption relative to a moving average of past consumption. The IS curve becomes

$$E_t d\left(x_t - \theta b \int_{s=0}^{\infty} e^{-bs} x_{t-s} ds\right) = \sigma[i_t dt - E_t(dp_t)]. \tag{26}$$

(In discrete time one-period habits are common, $x_t - \theta x_{t-1}$, but a cost to a second derivative of consumption is awkward in continuous time. The AR(1) formulation keeps a lag in place while

shrinking the time period.)




Figure 8: Inflation and Output Response with Autoregressive Habit and Generalized Lucas Phillips Curve. Parameters $\sigma = 0.2$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $a = 1$, $\eta_i = 0.3$, $i_0 = 1\%$, $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$, $r = 2\%$, $\theta = 0.7$, $b = 1$. The surplus rises by $\tilde{s}/r = 8.23\%$ of the value of debt.

Figure 8 presents the results, adding habit with $b = 1$ and $\theta = 0.7$. Habits induce a hump-shaped output response, as hoped.

To derive the inflation response to interest rates, define the external habit as

$$X_t = b \int_{s=0}^{t} e^{-b(t-s)} x_s ds$$

which solves

$$\frac{dX_t}{dt} = b(x_t - X_t).$$

Then (26) becomes

$$\frac{dx}{dt} - \theta b(x_t - X_t) = \sigma \left(i_t - \frac{dp}{dt} \right).$$

I eliminate output and its derivative from the generalized Lucas Phillips curve with expo-

nential weights (8) and its derivative (9), yielding

$$(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)\frac{dp}{dt}-(a+\theta b)e^{-at}p_t+\theta b\kappa X_t=\sigma\kappa i_t.$$

$$\frac{d\kappa X_t}{dt}=b(\kappa e^{-at}p_t-\kappa X_t).$$

I solve this pair of differential equations numerically, starting with the initial condition

$$(1+\sigma\kappa)\pi_0-(a+\theta b)p_0=\sigma\kappa i_0$$

and $X_0=0$.

Habits alone together with the standard forward-looking Phillips curve do not generate a hump-shaped inflation response. The Appendix includes a calculation.

7 Concluding Comments

This paper investigates a generalization of the classic Lucas Phillips curve. It works towards a model of textbook simplicity and analytic tractability that can start to bridge the yawning gap between the effects of monetary policy most economists and central bank officials talk about and the effects of monetary policy in rational expectations/DSGE/new-Keynesian models that have dominated academic work for the last three decades, without adding a smorgasbord of complications. In the former, higher nominal interest rates mean higher real interest rates that lower aggregate demand, lower output, and then via a Phillips curve lower inflation, all pushing inflation and output downward in the future, with long and perhaps variable lags. That view is captured by 1970s era adaptive expectations models, but not by models with forward-looking expectations (Cochrane, 2024). In the latter, higher nominal rates raise inflation going forward. The only mechanism for lower inflation is a coincident downward equilibrium-selection/fiscal shock.

The generalized Lucas Phillips curve turns a small downward inflation or price level jump into a larger disinflation, coincident with the basic sign of standard beliefs. The long term debt mechanism allows higher nominal interest rates to set off such a small downward jump without needing a coincident fiscal contraction, and it gives central banks a reason to raise interest rates if they want to lower inflation.

The resulting responses look a great deal more like those of common beliefs than the responses of the standard model with a forward-looking Calvo Phillips curve. The responses continue to act, however, by a completely different mechanism, as do those of all other rational expectations models.

I pursue here a standard research paradigm, though more explicitly than usual: We modify the baseline new-Keynesian model to aim for results that look like the results of standard beliefs, accepting that those results are produced by an utterly different mechanism. Alternatively, the standard beliefs may be wrong. VARs are imprecisely measured (Ramey, 2016), subject to a long specification search to produce the "right" answer, and often measure the wrong thing: They do not tell us how more persistent interest rate movements would affect output and other variables, they do not tell us how changes in the rule would affect the economy, and nobody has tried to construct monetary policy shocks orthogonal to fiscal policy. Maybe monetary policy does act quickly (Buda et al., 2023). It's hard to measure instantaneous inflation, and the change from a year ago will always appear sluggish. Many VARs do not allow inflation to jump on impact by assumption, either by orthogolalization or by use of high-frequency shock data and lower frequency inflation data. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021) show inflation jumps with such an assumption. But all this is a different path, perhaps more attractive if we give up on finding a simple economic model that delivers the standard beliefs.

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Appendices

A Literature and its Lessons

The twin components of this paper, the sticky information idea, and attempts to patch up the standard new-Keyensian model to produce inflation and output that drift down with higher interest rates rather than jump down and then rise, are both well established.[2] This paper's main contribution is a a simple and analytically tractable version of the former, along with clarity on the link between interest rates and equilibrium selection.

Obviously, this approach is based on Lucas (1972) and the simplified loglinearization in Lucas (1973). Lucas mixed this supply curve with $MV = PY$ to describe aggregate demand. A central difference here is to merge the Lucas supply curve with aggregate demand that comes from an interest rate target, via an IS curve, with no money demand or supply control, and equilibrium selection/fiscal underpinnings.

The basic rational expectations model incorporating the Lucas Phillips curve lost favor from the impression that it could not give persistent output responses. The output response only lasts one "period" until all firms learn to distinguish relative vs. aggregate demand. But that characterization already leaves open how long a "period" is. While in 1972 and with $MV = PY$ in mind it seemed reasonable that everyone knew aggregate demand perfectly the minute money stock numbers were published, that swift information diffusion is less compelling today and in the context of models based on interest rate targets. Economists are still debating if the 2021 inflation surge came from aggregate (deficits) vs. relative (supply chain) shocks. That average businesses don't know relative from aggregate demand for quite some time is not unreasonable. Even publication of the national CPI does not resolve the relevant question for a producer, as local price indices and composition of consumption baskets differ from the national CPI.

A.1 Mankiw and Reis

In the current literature, the generalized Lucas Phillips curve is closest to the "sticky information" Phillips curve of Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007).

Mankiw and Reis show that the sticky-information Phillips curve can display a hump-shaped

[2] I thank three referees of an earlier draft of this paper for suggesting important additional references to an already lengthy version of this appendix.

inflation response. Mankiw and Reis (2002) (Figure I, bottom panel) show a pattern similar to that of Figure 1, in response to a one-time decline in the money stock. Inflation jumps down in the first period, and then keeps going, before turning around and returning to zero. One might call that "locally explosive" as I do, or "inertial" as Mankiw and Reis do. That behavior contrasts with the forward-looking Phillips curve, in which inflation jumps down and then reverts in an AR(1) pattern.

Mankiw and Reis start from firms that wish to set their prices p_t^* by

$$p_t^* = p_t + \kappa x_t \tag{27}$$

where p_t is the overall price level and x_t is log aggregate output (my notation). Firm j that "updated its plans j periods ago" sets price

$$p_{j,t} = E_{t-j} p_t^*.$$

As I do, Mankiw and Reis leave out any information the firm might glean about the aggregate price level from information between $t-j$ and t. They additionally assume the firm pays no attention to idiosyncratic demand, specifying that that the firm does not change price at all between $t-j$ and t. ("Plans" vs. "information" is important.) Averaging across firms in the economy, they obtain, in my notation,

$$p_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \alpha_j p_{j,t} = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \alpha_j E_{t-j}(p_t + \kappa x_t) \tag{28}$$

The differences are small. I place individual rather than output in (27), and I allow firms to change price and output at every date with only the expectations being sticky. This difference leads to lagged expectations of output in (28) instead of current output, and lagged expectations of current output growth when they express their Phillips curve in terms of inflation. In turn, that complication makes it difficult to compute model solutions. The differences are not fundamental however. The starting point of this paper may be seen as a formulation of similar ideas in a more tractable form.

Why is the sticky-information Phillips curve not already widely used in subsequent models, and already a standard ingredient? Following standard practice, Mankiw and Reis (2002) derive

a Phillips curve for inflation (p. 1300)

$$\pi_t = \left[\frac{\alpha\lambda}{1-\lambda}\right] x_t + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1-\lambda)^j E_{t-1-j} \left(\pi_t + \alpha \Delta x_t\right). \tag{29}$$

The presence of the extra Δx_t on the right hand side is a nuisance. More importantly, it is not easy to embed this Phillips curve in a standard model and compute responses. Mankiw and Reis (2002) only draw illustrative responses to money supply shocks.

Mankiw and Reis (2007) take on the challenge of embedding their sticky information Phillips curve in a full model with an interest rate target. Their aggregate log-linearized Phillips curve is (p.605)

$$p_t = \lambda \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1-\lambda)^j E_{t-j} \left[p_t + \frac{\beta(w_t - p_t) + (1-\beta)x_t - a_t}{\beta + \nu(1-\beta)} - \frac{\beta \nu_t}{(\nu-1)[\beta + \nu(1-\beta)]}\right]$$

where beyond standard symbols, β measures returns to scale, a_t is productivity, and ν_t is a time-varying substitution elasticity between varieties. With wages in the Phillips curve, we also need a wage adjustment equation, (p. 606)

$$w_t = \omega \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1-\omega)^j E_{t-j} \left[p_t + \frac{\gamma(w_t - p_t)}{\gamma + \psi} + \frac{l_t}{\gamma + \psi} + \frac{\psi(x_\infty^n - \theta R_t)}{\theta(\gamma + \psi)} - \frac{\psi \gamma_t}{(\gamma + \psi)(\gamma - 1)}\right]$$

where beyond standard symbols, l_t is labor, ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ω is the fraction of workers who become informed each period. Mankiw and Reis complete the model with a standard production function $x_t = a_t + \beta l_t$ and IS curve. They plot impulse-response functions to shocks (p.608) sadly omitting the interest rate however, which is the central question for monetary policy.

The Mankiw-Reis Phillips curve "raises several thorny technical issues" (p. 603). "Ready-to-use solution algorithms" are not "particularly useful to solve the sticky-information model. The model involves both an infinite number of past expectations of the present through sticky information, as well as present expectations of variables at an infinite number of future dates through intertemporal smoothing. This double infinity implies that the state space of the model has an infinite dimension, which current algorithms cannot handle." (p. 604.) Mankiw and Reis provide an alternative solution algorithm, but few have wanted to follow them in that path.

I provide this level of detail so we can answer the puzzle, and learn appropriate lessons.

Mankiw and Reis (2002) has, as of February 18 2025, an impressive 3508 Google scholar citations. Mankiw and Reis (2007) though more directly useful to the construction of a standard NK-DSGE model with an interest rate target, has only 309 citations. And of these, I have not yet found anyone who has *used* the Mankiw-Reis model. Claude.ai reports "What I can say with confidence is that while the Mankiw-Reis model has been influential in theoretical discussions, empirical applications using their exact framework have been less common than papers that cite or discuss their work conceptually." Mankiw and Reis (2007) may also have been overlooked because they jumped to the construction of a "medium-scale" model without a simpler "textbook" model.

Lucas (1972) has been even more influential, of course, with 8416 Google Scholar cites. Lucas' actual model is much harder. But the loglinear simplified form in Lucas (1973) led to a very simple and useable aggregate Phillips curve,

$$\kappa x_t = \pi_t - E_{t-1}\pi_t. \tag{30}$$

This form, rather than the full microfounded islands plus overlapping generations model, took off. (Actually, Lucas (1973) p. 327 (3) writes output of firm z with a lagged output term, as

$$y_{ct}(z) = \gamma[P_t(z) - E(P_t|I_t(z)] + \lambda y_{c,t-1}(z).$$

The lagged term appears to be ad-hoc, to give the model some output persistence, and is usually dropped in later literature.)

Calvo (1983) (13454 Google scholar citations) is similarly influential, despite its obviously counterfactual microfoundations, and the rather tortured path one must take to arrive at its familiar Phillips curve (Woodford, 2003b, Ch. 3). But that Phillips curve is both intuitive and easy to incorporate into other models. Rotemberg (1982) menu costs offer a similar path to about the same answer.

There are hundreds of other papers that investigate various microfounded models of sticky prices, many designed to replicate the equally large microeconomic empirical work on price stickiness. And yet they have not become standard ingredients of the larger project, or made their way to the standard textbook model. Apparently, we are all the drunk of the joke, who looks for his car keys under the street light rather than down the road where he dropped them. Well, looking in the light has some wisdom.

The lesson seems clear: To be sticky, a model must produce an easily *useable* and inter-

pretable aggregate Phillips curve, or a similarly simple and tractable description of price-level dynamics. That principle guides this paper.

A.2 Medium-scale new-Keynesian Models

It is hardly news that the standard three-equation new-Keynesian model produces inflation and output that jump down and then rise, rather than slowly decline. A large number of models include a smorgasbord of additional ingredients to match VARs and thus produce something like the standard dynamics, though still not by the standard mechanism. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016, 2018) are notable examples. Many other empirically-oriented models, such as the famous Smets and Wouters (2007) model, fit well other data but still produce responses in which inflation jumps down with the shock and then rises after only a brief hump shape. (Smets and Wouters Figure 6, bottom left panel.)

However, these models include major changes and elaborations of the basic model, including prices and wages fixed one period in advance, a strong one-period habit in utility, sticky wages driven by labor monopoly power, firms that must borrow to pay the next period's wage bill, capital with adjustment costs that depend on investment growth rather than the investment to capital ratio, and more. Not all of these elaborations are consistent with microeconomic evidence. They are admirably reverse-engineered to produce aggregate impulse response functions that match the data, at the cost of some Lucas-critique robustness. They are also designed to match dynamics of a wide variety of series, with more emphasis on output, consumption, investment, and employment than on the price level. Inflation moves little in these models, as in the VARs that they match.

For many applications, such extensions are reasonable. Policy applications often want a good fit to recent data, at the potential expense of simplicity, transparency, and Lucas-critique purity.

If the three-equation model captured the basic sign and operation of monetary policy, large-scale extensions, to accurately fit many time series and make quantitative policy evaluation, would make sense, just as the large scale Keynesian models of the late 1970s expanded on the basic ISLM model.

But the basic three-equation model does not capture what most economists and policy makers consider the basic sign and operation of monetary policy. Thus, such extensions leave

open the question, what is the minimal *necessary* set of economically plausible ingredients that describe the basic sign and mechanism of monetary policy? What distinguishes the basic sign and operation of monetary policy from the flexible price rational expectations model $i_t = r + E_t\pi_{t+1}$? Which of these extensions, if abandoned, would leave us with the uncomfortable implications of the flexible price model – higher interest rates raise inflation, period? And all economic models are, in the end, quantitative parables. Numerically solved medium scale models that operate with fundamentally different signs from the interpretable baseline leave open the question, just how do they work? My goal and contribution is focus on these questions.

González and Ramaswamy (2024) obtain a hump-shaped inflation response by adding variable capacity utilization. This is a nice ingredient that helps several dimensions of dynamics. But one has to ask whether variable capacity utilization is a central, minimal, necessary ingredient for the basic sign of monetary policy. It is a good element for the project of extending a basic model to medium-scale, but I hope we can find some more basic necessary ingredients.

A.3 Lags in the Phillips Curve

Of course, if one wishes to capture the intuition and mechanism of the standard doctrine, one can quickly write down an old-style ad-hoc ISLM model that does so. Lagged inflation in the Phillips and IS curves are the key, which are traditionally motivated by adaptive expectations. This is easy to see with a static IS curve. (See Cochrane, 2024.) Consider

$$x_t = -\sigma(i_t - \pi_{t-1})$$
$$\pi_t = \pi_{t-1} + \kappa x_t.$$

In this example, we have

$$\pi_t = (1 + \sigma\kappa)\pi_{t-1} - \sigma\kappa i_t.$$

Higher interest rates lower inflation going forward. Inflation is unstable under an interest rate peg; a Taylor rule $i_t = \phi\pi_t + u_t$ restores stability. The continuous time version is

$$x_t = -\sigma(i_t - \pi_t)$$
$$\frac{d\pi_t}{dt} = -\kappa x_t.$$

Adaptive expectations specifies a negative sign for κ, and that π_t cannot jump. We still have

$$\frac{d\pi_t}{dt} = \sigma\kappa(i_t - \pi_t).$$

With negative κ, higher interest rates lower inflation going forward.

One does not have to get in to a fruitless debate about just how "rational" people are. The central question is whether expectations of the model are the same as expectations in the model. More specifically, the central question is whether expectations in the model react to changes in interest rate. Exogenous expectations, amenable to central banker speeches, or "non-reactive" expectations loosely connected to past experience give the same general results. This view more closely characterize how central banks see expectations. The belief in "anchored" expectations reflects this view.

For many policy economists and many applied purposes this is enough. But it is fundamentally a non-economic view. If this is the simplest baseline model, we then state that, if people ever learned how monetary policy worked, or paid more attention, then the entire ability of central banks to lower inflation by raising interest rates would vanish. This may be where applied policy oriented thinking remains for another 35 years, but it would be nice to know if there *is* an economically founded model that gives the basic sign and operation of monetary policy.

Backward-looking terms in the Phillips curve, such as

$$\pi_t = \frac{\beta}{1+\beta\gamma} E_t\pi_{t+1} + \frac{\gamma}{1+\beta\gamma}\pi_{t-1} + \kappa x_t$$

give some of the same kinds of dynamics as adaptive expectations models, and can produce a hump-shaped inflation response.

As a result, one can summarize an enormous literature, including many papers in what follows, as more or less complex alternative microfoundations to justify putting lagged inflation itself in the Phillips curve, and sometimes the IS curve as well. I have not found in all the literature cited here a close match to the calculations in this paper. Can a mixed Phillips curve plus an intertemporal IS curve produce inflation dynamics similar to those I show here for the Lucas model? Can it do better, not requiring an initial equilibrium-selection jump?

Still, for the most basic model that produces something like the desired results, lagged inflation in the Phillips curve seems the most likely competitor to sticky information. Well, more

than one flower may bloom. It's still worth investigating what sticky information can do. Later readers can judge which works better, and which has clearer and more robust foundations. For the moment, the foundations of lagged inflation surveyed below are pretty complex, but the foundations of sticky information used to be complex as well.

Lagged inflation in the Phillips curve followed quickly once Ball (1994) pointed out that the Calvo model predicts that inflation increases – inflation today less than future inflation – when output is low, whereas casual empiricism, the standard doctrine, and empirical estimates suggest the other sigh.

Steinsson (2003) introduces lagged inflation in the Phillips curve by positing two types of firms. "One acts rationally given Calvo-type constraints on price setting. The other type sets prices according to a rule-of-thumb. This results in a Phillips curve with both a forward-looking term and a backward-looking term." As unobjectionable as they are if they added dynamics to a model that got the basic sign right, it would again be a shame if rule-of-thumb price setters were a minimal necessary ingredient. Steinsson presents responses to supply shocks, which jump and then revert, however, not monetary policy shocks.

Galí and Gertler (1999) also motivate the Phillips curve with lagged and future terms by rule of thumb price setters. They evaluate this Phillips curve empirically, and despite the Ball puzzle, find "Backward-looking price setting, while statistically significant, is not quantitatively important." They conclude that "the New Keynesian Phillips curve provides a good first approximation to the dynamics of inflation." However, this is a single-equation estimation, not an evaluation of whether a full model produces the desired effects of monetary policy. Furthermore, the centerpiece of their analysis is to use marginal cost, not output, as the quantity variable. This is what the theory asks for, but it means that we resolve the Ball puzzle by driving a significant wedge between output or unemployment and marginal cost. The Phillips curve no longer tracks those standard business cycle measures.

Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016, 2018) and Smets and Wouters (2007) include such backward-looking terms. Inflation still jumps in the latter with only a small hump-shape, so holding prices and wages fixed in the former is also an important ingredient. The motivate lagged inflation in the Phillips curve by price and wage indexation: firms or workers who do not get to change price or wage this period, nonetheless raise prices or wages according to the index. However, we observe very little indexation in the US economy. If we use lagged inflation justified by indexation, then once we observe that price-setters don't index to inflation, we have

to conclude that higher interest rates lose any power to lower inflation.

A.4 More Sticky Information and Expectations, Higher-order Beliefs, and Rational Inattention

Sticky information and related information processing frictions have a long literature. "Rational inattention" is a related foundation for a Lucas-style Phillips curve and, deeper, for a delayed response. Much of this literature requires sophisticated modeling and techniques. Even when the final answer is simple, it is an advantage if the most basic, simple model that generates the sign and operation of monetary policy can be arrived at transparently as both the Lucas and Mankiw-Reis approaches. But all good ideas get simpler over time.

Sims (2003) offers limited signal-processing capacity as an analytical foundation for rational attention, and an alternative to the kind of signal-extraction problem that Lucas modeled. It also naturally leads to greater and more flexible lags in incorporating aggregate information into individual decisions. It is easy to speculate that a rational attention micro-foundation for what I call a generalized Lucas Phillips curve would be straightforward to construct.

Woodford (2003a) is one of the central articles reviving modeling delay through information processing limits and limited attention, and the beginning of a long series of articles by Woodford on imprecise cognition and limited rationality. Woodford's central point here is about higher order expectations. He starts with a model of monopolistic competition, in which a firm cares about the prices others will charge and the aggregate price level. Then, higher order expectations —expectations of the expectations of others—matter. Woodford shows that information processing costs make those expectations slow to move. He calculates the response to an exogenous nominal GDP (money supply) disturbance, showing a slow response of output and slower response of the price level. He does not show the interest rate, or how to merge the model with an interest rate target. In a comment, Svensson (2003), offers a computation in which the central bank does not follow such a pure nominal GDP target, and gets quite different responses, leading him to worry that the "results are very sensitive to assumptions about monetary policy and the information used by the firms." Most of all, I echo the usual hope, that we do not need higher order expectations to find the minimal *necessary* assumptions for a model that generates the basic sign of how monetary policy affects inflation.

Maćkowiak, Matějka, and Wiederholt (2023) survey the rational inattention literature following Sims. Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) appliy rational inattention to sticky prices in

macroeconomics. Since idiosyncratic demand changes are so much larger than aggregate ones, "Firms then allocate almost all attention to idiosyncratic conditions. Hence, prices react strongly and quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but only weakly and slowly to aggregate shocks. Thus, the aggregate price level responds slowly to shocks." These too are, however, illustrative numerical simulations of what happens with exogenous AR(1) demand shocks with a simple profit function, not yet a simple aggregate Phillips curve that can be united with IS and other elements of a general equilibrium model, and especially exhibited in a tractable minimalist model of the sort I pursue.

Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2015) construct an equilibrium model in the new-Keynesian tradition, with monetary policy that follows a Taylor rule. They eschew "all sources of slow adjustment that usually are in New Keynesian models (Calvo pricing, habit formation in consumption, Calvo wage setting), instead featuring rational inattention... as the only source of slow adjustment." Alas, their model requires a nonstandard numerical solution. Like most of the empirically-oriented new-Keynesian literature, they focus on the output response. They write a conventional Taylor rule, and their response to a monetary policy shock is the same as the three equation model: a jump down followed by rise.

Even without Sims' framing in terms of Shannon capacity, the idea of rational inattention leading to slow adjustment has been pursued in a number of contexts. Near-rationality is sensible: the costs of not incorporating quickly are often small, so even small costs of information acquisition and processing can motivate slow adjustment, especially when aggregate information lives in a flood of more important idiosyncratic information. The monthly CPI is not that important when you're shopping for a cheap dinner. Reis (2006) uses rational inattention ideas to motivate slow adjustment of consumption to aggregates.

Nimark (2008) looks for a better microfoundation for a mixed Phillips curve than rule of thumb price setters. He introduces, in effect, higher order expectations, "the optimal price of an individual good depends positively on a firm's own marginal cost and the price chosen by other firms, but individual firms cannot observe the marginal cost of other firms and therefore do not know the current price chosen by other firms with certainty. This set up may be referred to as firms having imperfect common knowledge in an environment with strategic complementarities." As a result "firms 'herding' on the publicly observable lagged aggregate variables, inflation and output. This creates the appearance of inflation being partly 'backward looking' in spite of the fact that all firms are rational and forward looking.

Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga (2010) propose a model with both sticky prices and sticky information. The result is to add a backward-looking inflation term to a Phillips curve that otherwise resembles Mankiw and Reis'. Such backward looking terms help to fit the data. Alas, as with Mankiw and Reis, "it is generally impossible to derive the closed form solution to the dual stickiness model, due to infinitely many lagged expectations terms."

Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub (2020) is an important new paper aimed at these issues in the burgeoning HANK tradition. They aim straight at the fact that "the macroeconomic response to aggregate shocks tends to be hump-shaped, " quoting also (Woodford, 2003b, p. 322), "monetary policy can have little immediate effect on either real activity or inflation." They note that " the literature to date has used representative-agent models enhanced with a variety of adjustment frictions such as habit formation, or deviations from rational expectations such as inattention." Attention to micro MPC estimates, a central concern of HANK modeling, makes the problem worse: High MPCs lead to "an immediate jump on impact." They construct a HANK model that *also* includes "sticky expectations, sticky prices and wages with indexation, long-term debt, and investment adjustment costs." Like others such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) with that list of ingredients, they can produce prices level that rise slowly after an AR(1)-like nominal interest rate decline. (Figure 4, bottom left panel.) A notable feature is that they do trace the fiscal foundations of the model, as volume of government debt matters to the liquidity-constrained consumers of HANK models. Though advertised as easy to compute, it is of course hardly the sort of minimal textbook model that I search for.

Kwicklis (2025) also adds sticky expectations to a medium-scale HANK model. His model also includes "slow-adjusting Taylor and debt stabilization rules, a backward-indexed New-Keynesian Phillips curve, and other shocks and frictions standard to Smets and Wouters (2007)." Like others, he introduces price indexing to generate lagged inflation in the Phillips curve.

Carroll et al. (2020) use the idea of sticky expectations in consumption. They want to understand why aggregate consumption seems "excessively smooth," in not behaving like a random walk while individual consumption growth is essentially unpredictable. The construct a model in which people incorporate aggregate information more slowly than individual information.

Gabaix (2020) pursues a different approach to the same questions, and uniquely also ends up with a tractable and simple model. "Cognitive discounting," a form of limited information-

processing capacity or limited information, leads Gabaix to

$$x_t = ME_t x_{t+1} - \sigma(i_t - E_t\pi_{t+1})$$
$$\pi_t = \beta M^f E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t$$

with $M < 1$ and $M^f < 1$.

The basic properties of Gabaix' model can be seen with $M = M^f = 0$. ($M = 0$ and $M^f > 0$ is just as easy to analyze.) Then, eliminating x_t, we have

$$E_t\pi_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\sigma\kappa}\pi_t + i_t.$$

With small intertemporal substitution and large price stickiness, $\sigma\kappa < 1$, this model displays unstable dynamics, even under a fixed interest rate path. (My language, Gabaix labels things differently.) The model has a unique locally bounded equilibrium,

$$\pi_t = -E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\sigma\kappa)^{j+1} i_{t+j}. \tag{31}$$

With an AR(1) interest rate path,

$$\pi_t = -\frac{\sigma\kappa}{1 - \sigma\kappa\rho} i_t.$$

Just like the standard model with a Taylor rule, higher interest rates make inflation jump down, and then inflation rises back to zero.

Gabaix's basic model does not, and does not try to, produce lower inflation going forward or a hump-shaped response, which is the centerpiece of the generalized Lucas Phillips curve. Related, it does not move the model towards the old-Keynesian model, with lagged terms in the IS or Phillips curve, whether motivated by adaptive expectations or price indexing. The adaptive expectations model (replace $E_t\pi_{t+1}$ with π_{t-1} is also unstable, but it has no jump variable, so inflation spirals break out absent a Taylor rule. Gabaix' model is unstable, but with $E_t\pi_{t+1}$ remaining even with $M = M^f = 0$, it preserves inflation as a jump variable.

Gabaix's model solves the forward guidance puzzle in a novel way. In standard new-Keynesian models inflation is stable with a fixed interest rate; inflation converges to the interest rate. Stable forward is unstable backward, so small equilibrium-selection promises further in the future have larger effects today (See Cochrane, 2017a for this interpretation.) Since Gabaix's model, with the rule against explosive equilibria, produces unstable dynamics going forward, it is stable

backward, and changes further in the future have smaller effects today, as you can see directly in (31).

With $\beta M^f < 1$, Gabaix's Phillips curve does not display long-run neutrality, which has been the center of Phillips curve thinking since Friedman (1968). Permanently higher nominal interest rates permanently lower inflation. Gabaix restores long-run neutrality by redefining the Phillips curve in terms of the difference between actual and a long-run "default" inflation. Then only the $i_t - E_t\pi_{t+1}$ of the IS curve remains describing long-run inflation, and the model restores the long-run neutrality and long-run Fisherian property that I have argued is important. The extension to default inflation also adds some old Keynesian features, while maintaining some forward looking behavior.

García-Schmidt and Woodford (2019) investigate a "reflective equilibrium" concept, related to higher order expectations, to avoid the Fisherian implications of the standard new-Keynesian model. They "model the economy as being in a temporary equilibrium with reflective expectations (or "reflective equilibrium" for short). By temporary equilibrium we mean,...that market outcomes at any point in time result from optimizing decisions by households and firms under expectations that are specified in the model, but that need not be correct. By reflective expectations we mean expectations formed on the basis of reasoning about how the economy should evolve, under a correct understanding of the structural relations that determine market outcomes,.." The model produces downweighting (myopia) but not lagged inflation in the Phillips curve, and thus not the hump shape. That is not their point, however.

Angeletos and Huo (2021) focus on higher order expectations. They find that higher order expectations can mimic myopia (less weight on future variables, as Gabaix models) and lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. As in many of these models, the connection from informational primitives to Phillips curve coefficients is quite complex, though the final answer has the sort of simplicity I have praised.

Kiley (2007) and Coibion (2010) test sticky-price vs. sticky-information Phillips curves, finding the former performs better (or less badly). Their technique is essentially regressions of inflation on measures of inflation expectations. (Kiley adds unit labor costs and Coibon adds the output gap.) These findings are not necessarily bad news for our purposes: Which view can produce a textbook-size economically based general equilibrium model consistent with the standard view of monetary policy? Regression fits of individual model equations, with necessary identification assumptions to control for endogenous right-hand variables, are not necessarily

good guides to an ingredient's contribution to policy analysis in general equilibrium models.

In a detailed empirical investigation, Klenow and Willis (2007), examining micro data, come to the opposite conclusion, reporting that "Empirical price changes react to old information, just as sticky information models predict."

B Algebra

B.1 Downweighted expectations

The IS is (25)

$$m\frac{dx_t}{dt} - (1-m)x_t = \sigma\left(i_t - \frac{dp_t}{dt}\right)$$

We use the Phillips curve (8) and its derivative (9)

$$\kappa x_t = \Phi(t)p_t.$$

$$\kappa\frac{dx_t}{dt} = -\alpha_t p_t + \Phi(t)\frac{dp_t}{dt}.$$

Eliminating x_t and dx/dt, the price response function solves the differential equation

$$-m\alpha_t p_t + m\Phi(t)\frac{dp_t}{dt} - (1-m)\Phi(t)p_t = \sigma\kappa\left(i_t - \frac{dp_t}{dt}\right)$$

$$[m\Phi(t) + \sigma\kappa]\frac{dp_t}{dt} - [(1-m)\Phi(t) + m\alpha_t]p_t = \sigma\kappa i_t.$$

For the exponential case,

$$\left(me^{-at} + \sigma\kappa\right)\frac{dp}{dt} - \left[1 - m(1-a)\right]e^{-at}p_t = \sigma\kappa i_t.$$

The initial condition linking inflation, price level and interest rate is

$$p_0 = \frac{m\pi_0 + \sigma\kappa(\pi_0 - i_0)}{1 - m(1-a)}$$

The integrating factor is

$$[me^{-at} + \sigma\kappa]^{\frac{1-m(1-a)}{ma}} = [me^{-at} + \sigma\kappa]^{1+\frac{1-m}{ma}}.$$

Check:

$$\frac{dp}{dt}-\frac{\left[1-m(1-a)\right]e^{-at}}{(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)}p_t=\frac{\sigma\kappa}{(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)}i_t$$

$$[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{1+\frac{1-m}{ma}}\frac{dp}{dt}-[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{1+\frac{1-m}{ma}}\frac{\left[1-m(1-a)\right]e^{-at}}{(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)}p_t=[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{1+\frac{1-m}{ma}}\frac{\sigma\kappa}{(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)}i_t$$

$$[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{1+\frac{1-m}{ma}}\frac{dp}{dt}-[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{\frac{1-m}{ma}}\left[1-m(1-a)\right]e^{-at}p_t=[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{\frac{1-m}{ma}}\sigma\kappa i_t$$

$$d\left[(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)^{\frac{1-m(1-a)}{ma}}p_t\right]=[me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa]^{\frac{1-m}{ma}}\sigma\kappa i_t$$

The solution is

$$(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)^{\frac{1-m(1-a)}{ma}}p_t-(m+\sigma\kappa)^{\frac{1-m(1-a)}{ma}}p_0=\sigma\kappa\int_{s=0}^{t}[me^{-aj}+\sigma\kappa]^{\frac{1-m}{ma}}i_s ds$$

$$p_t=\left(\frac{m+\sigma\kappa}{me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1-m(1-a)}{am}}p_0+\frac{\sigma\kappa}{me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}\int_{s=0}^{t}\left(\frac{me^{-as}+\sigma\kappa}{me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1-m}{am}}i_s ds.$$

Inflation follows

$$\pi_t=e^{-at}\left(\frac{m+\sigma\kappa}{me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1-m}{am}+2}\frac{m\pi_0+\sigma\kappa(\pi_0-i_0)}{m+\sigma\kappa}+$$

$$+[1-m(1-a)]\frac{\sigma\kappa e^{-at}}{(me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa)^2}\int_{s=0}^{t}\left(\frac{me^{-as}+\sigma\kappa}{me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}\right)^{\frac{1-m}{am}}i_s ds$$

$$+\frac{\sigma\kappa}{me^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}i_t.$$

B.2 Fiscal calculations

To calculate the fiscal surplus needed to support a given inflation path, or to choose the initial price level and thus inflation path that requires a specific value of the surplus, I use the inflation solution (15) and the fiscal equation (24), which I repeat here:

$$\int_{t=0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}\tilde{s}_t=\int_{t=0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(i_t-\pi_t)dt-p_0-\int_{t=0}^{\infty}e^{-(r+\omega)t}i_t dt. \tag{32}$$

$$\pi_t=\frac{(1+\sigma\kappa)\,ae^{-at}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2}p_0+\frac{\sigma\kappa ae^{-at}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2}\int_{j=0}^{t}i_j dj+\frac{\sigma\kappa}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa}i_t. \tag{33}$$

To calculate the required surplus numerically, one can simply evaluate the integrals on the right hand side of (32). To find p_0 or ω given the other variables, I substitute (33) in (32). First, write

$$i_t - \pi_t = -\frac{(1+\sigma\kappa)\, a e^{-at}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} p_0 - \frac{\sigma\kappa a e^{-at}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} \int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj + \frac{e^{-at}}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa} i_t.$$

Then substitute in (32) to obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-rt}\tilde{s}_t = -p_0 \left[1 + \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1+\sigma\kappa)\, a e^{-(r+a)t}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} dt\right] \\ + \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(-\frac{\sigma\kappa a e^{-(r+a)t}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} \int_{j=0}^{t} i_j dj + \frac{e^{-(r+a)t}}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa} i_t \right) dt - \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-(r+\omega)t} i_t dt.\end{aligned}$$

The first term on the right hand side does not depend on the interest rate path, and only the last term contains ω. Thus, one can add solutions, for example calculating the answer for a combination of AR(1) from the solutions for a simple AR(1). I will nonetheless present the formula for a sum of two AR(1) directly. Using

$$i_t = i_s(e^{-\eta_1 t} - we^{-\eta_2 t})$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned}\int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-rt}\tilde{s}_t = -p_0 \left[1 + \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1+\sigma\kappa)\, a e^{-(r+a)t}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} dt\right] \\ - i_s \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\sigma\kappa a e^{-(r+a)t}}{\left(e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa\right)^2} \left(\frac{1-e^{-\eta_1 t}}{\eta_1} - w\frac{1-e^{-\eta_2 t}}{\eta_2} \right) dt \\ + i_s \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-(r+a)t}}{e^{-at}+\sigma\kappa} (e^{-\eta_1 t} - we^{-\eta_2 t}) dt \\ - i_s \left(\frac{1}{r+\omega+\eta_1} - w\frac{1}{r+\omega+\eta_2} \right)\end{aligned}$$

I evaluate the integrals numerically. Setting $\tilde{s}_t = 0$, we can then solve for p_0. Alternatively, given a surplus and a value of p_0, we can solve for the ω that produces them.

B.3 Habits and Calvo Pricing

One may wonder if habits alone are enough to induce hump-shaped responses in both output and inflation, using the traditional forward-looking Phillips curve. To that end I solve a model with habit IS and standard Phillips curve,

The response solves

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = b(x_t - X_t)$$

$$\frac{dx_t}{dt} - \theta b(x_t - X_t) = \sigma(i_t - \pi_t)$$

$$\frac{d\pi_t}{dt} = r\pi_t - \kappa x_t$$

$$\frac{di}{dt} = -\eta_i i_t$$

The initial condition is given by $X_0 = 0$, π_0, and i_0. I use the one forward-looking eigenvalue to find x_0. I solve the model by the standard matrix method, reviewed in the Appendix .




Figure 9: Autogressive Habits and Calvo Phillips Curve. Parameters $\theta = 0.7$, $b = 1$, $\pi_0 = -0.5\%$, $\eta_i = 0.3$, $\phi = 1.1$, $r = 2\%$, $\kappa = 0.2$, $\sigma = 0.2$, $i_0 = 1\%$.

Figure 9 presents the results. No, at least at the parameter values we have been using so far, habits alone together with the standard forward-looking Phillips curve do not generate a hump-shaped inflation response.

Algebra: Define

$$dX_t = b(x_t - X_t)dt$$

The first order condition is

$$E_t dx_t - \theta b(x_t - X_t)dt = \sigma[i_t dt - E_t(dp_t)]$$

The impulse response is

$$\frac{dX}{dt} = bx_t - bX_t$$

$$\frac{dx_t}{dt} - \theta b(x_t - X_t) = \sigma(i_t - \pi_t)$$

$$\frac{d\pi_t}{dt} = r\pi_t - \kappa x_t$$

Write it in matrix form

$$\frac{d}{dt}\begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ x_t \\ \pi_t \\ i_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -b & b & 0 & 0 \\ -\theta b & \theta b & -\sigma & \sigma \\ 0 & -\kappa & r & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -\eta_i \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ x_t \\ \pi_t \\ i_t \end{bmatrix}$$

There is one forward-looking (positive real part) eigenvalue and two jump variables, π and x. I specify π_0 and use the explosive root to find x_0.