How Does Women's Employment Affect Their Time Use? Evidence from a Randomized Encouragement Design in India*

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Abstract

This paper studies how paid employment affects women's time allocation in rural India. I use an encouragement design, randomizing whether women's families were shown a video promoting a new job opportunity for women. The treatment increased women's employment and paid work hours over the following months. This reduced the time women devoted to leisure and had a negative but insignificant effect on hours of household chores, with leisure being significantly more elastic than chores. Perhaps as a result, the effect on women's employment had faded one year post treatment.

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1 Introduction

Expanding female employment opportunities has become a key focus for development policymakers (World Bank, 2012). This focus is motivated by a large body of evidence documenting benefits of female employment in developing countries, including its potential to improve the allocation of talent in economies (Hsieh et al., 2019), and to empower women and raise human capital investments in their children (Duflo, 2012). Increases in female labor force participation (FLFP) have indeed been an important trend in many developing countries in recent decades, reflecting both the rise in FLFP that typically accompanies later stages of the development process (Goldin, 1995), and rising participation rates across national income levels during this period (Heath and Jayachandran, 2018).

However, relatively little is known about the potential costs of women's employment in developing countries, and in particular, how it affects their leisure time (Heath and Jayachandran, 2018). Working for income requires a shift in time allocation. Strong gender norms around the allocation of housework (Jayachandran, 2021), or a lack of substitutes for women's housework from the market (Dinkelman and Ngai, 2022) or other family members, could make the time women devote to household chores inelastic. Work may therefore come at the cost of a more elastic resource: leisure hours. This is important, as leisure is widely seen as key for psychological wellbeing (Newman et al., 2014). Further, one mechanism through which leisure supports wellbeing is allowing individuals to detach and recover from work (Newman et al., 2014); this suggests gains in women's employment may not be sustainable if they come at the cost of women's leisure.

In this paper, I ask how paid work for women in rural India affects their time use. Specifically, I ask (1) does employment allow women to spend less time on housework, come at the cost of their leisure, or some of each? And (2) is one category of time use – chores or leisure – more elastic with respect to paid work time than the other?

India has one of the lowest FLFP rates in the world, and raising it is a policy priority (Fletcher et al., 2018). I partnered with Obeetee, a large Indian carpet manufacturer, as it introduced a new employment program for women in Uttar Pradesh. The program offered full-time carpet weaving positions in all-female weaving centers located within women's villages. It began with four months of paid training in carpet weaving, followed by long-term weaving jobs for any women who completed training. I consider participation in the training as a form of employment as the training and post-training phases shared key characteristics of employment, particularly those that would affect time use: they had the same (full-time) hours and location, while training pay was very similar to what women ultimately earned as weavers. I partnered with the firm as it introduced the program in six villages. My

sample includes women in these villages who were married, aged 18 to 40, and eligible for the program.

I use an encouragement design, randomizing whether women's husbands and parents-in-law were shown a video promoting the program. These are the family members who generally make decisions about women's labor supply in my setting. The intervention was delivered in the week before women could apply for the program, or about four weeks before the program began. All family members were given basic details about the program, like the compensation and hours. Treated family members were additionally shown a six-minute, promotional video. The video featured testimonials from individuals involved in the program in other villages, discussing the friendly, all-female work environment and participants' daily routines. Shots of the women's workplaces were interspersed with the testimonials. All women, regardless of treatment status, were both given basic details and shown the video.

I consider effects of the treatment on women's time use four months later, interpreting the treatment as an instrument for women's employment. The treatment produced significant first-stage effects on women's take-up of the firm's program and overall employment during this time period, increasing the fraction of women who ever participated in the program by 7.9 percentage points (a 71% increase relative to the control group mean) and the fraction who were employed at the time of the four-month survey by 9.6 percentage points (a 41% increase). The control group averaged 58.7 minutes a day on paid work at four months, and the treatment raised this by 34.2 minutes (a 58% increase).

The treatment is unlikely to have affected time use through channels aside from employment. One concern is that the treatment could have made family attitudes towards female employment more positive even for women who did not become employed, and this could have affected women's time allocation. However, I see no evidence of a shift in attitudes for women who did not work; the treatment did not affect the fraction of women who were unemployed *and* whose family members had positive opinions of women's employment. Another concern is that the video could have had a direct effect on family expectations about the allocation of housework, separate from any effect via employment. I consider data from a survey experiment that was collected immediately after family members were given basic details about the firm's program or also shown the promotion, before any effect on women's employment could materialize. I find no effects on expectations about who would do household chores if women were to become employed, beliefs about whether women could care for their children if they worked, or attitudes about chores being a woman's main role.

Time use was measured using assisted time diaries at four months. Surveyors asked women what time they went to bed and woke up the previous day, and what they did each hour in between. Surveys were scheduled so that the previous day would have been a work

day. I categorize activities as paid work, chores, leisure, sleep, or other.

I find that the treatment reduced women's leisure time, produced a negative but insignificant effect on chore hours, and that leisure is more elastic than chores. The treatment reduced women's leisure time by 23.1 minutes, a 24% drop relative to the control group. This decrease is driven by less time spent watching television or listening to music and, to a lesser extent, time spent socializing at home. I estimate a negative effect of 15.5 minutes on time devoted to chores, but this effect is not significant ($p = 0.428$) and represents only a 3% decline relative to the control mean of nearly nine hours a day on chores. The percentage drop in leisure hours is significantly larger than the percentage drop in time devoted to chores, implying leisure is more elastic with respect to paid work than is chores. I do not find significant effects on time devoted to sleep or the "other" category.

I present 2SLS effects to interpret magnitudes, using treatment to instrument various measures of women's employment.[1] Like any 2SLS effects, these are effects for compliers: that is, effects of employment for women who became employed because their family members were given the promotion. This is a relevant population in my setting, where women's labor supply decisions are typically made by these family members. The 2SLS estimates suggest that a typical work day for women who were employed at four months as a result of the treatment involved 7.0 hours of paid work, 3.9 hours of chores, and 30 minutes of leisure. Their control complier counterparts instead spent 1.1 hours on paid work, 6.8 hours on chores, and 4.6 hours on leisure. I estimate an elasticity of chore hours with respect to paid work hours of -0.054, and I cannot reject the null of perfect inelasticity. The leisure elasticity is -0.419, for which I can reject the null.

The effect of the treatment on women's employment faded over time. An endline survey conducted one year after the intervention revealed no significant effects on employment in the firm's program or in general. A significant effect on daily hours devoted to paid work remained, though it was 28% smaller than the same effect at four months and only significant at the 10% level. One explanation for the fading of the employment effect is that it was unsustainable for women to balance paid work with their housework responsibilities and little leisure time. Indeed, the women in the treatment group who dropped out of employment between four months and one year were the ones who had a lower ratio of leisure to chore hours at four months. I find no evidence that women stopped work because they did not like work itself; in fact, women in the treatment group had more favorable opinions of the firm's program at one year than those in the control group.

[1]For some measures of employment, the first-stage F-statistic falls below the conventional cutoff of 10. However, a recent paper of Angrist and Kolesár (2024) finds that for single-variable, just-identified IV estimates like mine, usual 2SLS standard errors are generally reliable, even when F-statistics are low.

These results have important policy implications. There are well-documented benefits of women's employment, for macroeconomic output, female empowerment, and investment in the next generation, among other outcomes (Duflo, 2012; Heath and Jayachandran, 2018; Hsieh et al., 2019). However, female job opportunities may need to be combined with initiatives that alleviate the burden of housework to reduce the costs of employment on women and to ensure female employment is sustained.

There exists limited evidence on how paid work for women in developing settings causally affects their time use. Literature has examined how women's work, chores, and leisure hours co-vary with GDP and over time (Aguiar and Hurst, 2006; Engler and Staubli, 2008; Gottlieb et al., 2024; Ramey and Francis, 2009; Sayer, 2014), but this evidence is correlational. Other studies have made progress towards causality by studying variation in whether female NREGA applicants were given work (Maity, 2020), variation in demand for female labor across two similar areas of Ecuador (Newman, 2002), and variation in women's wages in panel data from India (Skoufias, 1993). In terms of experimental evidence, Ho et al. (2024) find job offers for women in India affected children's reports that they and their fathers helped with chores, but do not observe women's time use to test whether this translated into reduced chore hours for women or how women's leisure was affected. Hsu et al. (2024) find reductions in women's chore and leisure hours from a randomized employment offer in refugee camps in Bangladesh, but this is a setting where idle time is high and there may be many family members willing to help with chores when women work.[2] I contribute experimental evidence on how employment affects women's time use in rural India, a context that is emblematic of many developing settings in terms of constraints on women's time.

2 Experimental Design

2.1 Setting

The experiment was conducted in rural Uttar Pradesh, India. Uttar Pradesh is India's most populous state and one of its least developed (NITI Aayog, 2018). Gender gaps in employment and other dimensions are high in India (Jayachandran, 2015), and Uttar Pradesh has some of the highest levels of gender inequality within India (NITI Aayog, 2018). Women's labor supply decisions in this setting are generally made by husbands and parents-in-law; 80.2% of women in my control group report one or more of these individuals make decisions about their labor supply, and just 29.9% say they themselves are decision-makers. Further,

[2] An earlier experiment in the same setting presented effects of women's employment on time use but did not have power to detect which activities employment supplanted (Hussam et al., 2022).

husbands and in-laws in this area are often less supportive of women working for income than women themselves are (Bernhardt et al., 2018; Field et al., 2021; Lowe and McKelway, 2024).

I partnered with Obeetee, one of India's largest carpet producers. Carpet weaving is a common occupation of lower castes (i.e. other backwards castes and scheduled castes/tribes) in my setting but, like most occupations, is typically done by men. Motivated by corporate social responsibility goals and shortages of male weavers, Obeetee began a weaving employment program for women. These are full-time positions, lasting eight hours a day for six days a week, though in practice absenteeism is high. The work is done in all-female weaving centers located in women's villages. The program begins with four months of paid training in carpet weaving, and any women who complete training can work long-term as weavers in their centers.[3]

While this initial period is technically a training period, it has the key hallmarks of employment, and particularly the key hallmarks through which employment is likely to affect time use. The training and employment phases have the same (full-time) hours and occur in the same weaving centers. The training pay is substantial, close to what women earn as weavers, and like pay for weavers, training pay is a function of performance. Further, trainees begin weaving (practice) carpets within the first month of training, meaning training and employment involve very similar activities. I therefore consider participation in the program both during and after the training period as forms of employment.

2.2 Sample

I worked with Obeetee as it introduced the program in six villages, with training set to begin November 1, 2017 (see Figure 1 for a study timeline). The study was conducted among women living in the catchment areas for the six new weaving centers. The catchment areas were neighborhoods where the loom centers would have targeted their recruitment efforts for the program in the absence of the study. They typically included all lower-caste neighborhoods in walking distance of the centers.

In August 2017, surveyors went door-to-door in the catchment areas to invite eligible women to participate in the study. Surveyors introduced themselves as part of a J-PAL/IFMR research team but did not mention affiliation with Obeetee, avoiding selection into the sample based on attitudes towards the firm or its female weaving program. To be eligible for the study, women needed to be in the demographic Obeetee targeted for its pro-

[3]As much as possible, payments are deposited in bank accounts in women's names, which often means accounts are created for women when they begin the program. Results from Field et al. (2021) suggest this is one channel through which employment could raise women's bargaining power in my setting.

gram: aged 18 to 40 with no disabilities. Women also needed to be currently or previously married, available to meet when a surveyor visited their home, not have plans to leave the village for a long period, not have had permission to participate in the study denied by family members, and not be the mother-in-law of another eligible woman in their households.[4] In practice, the age and marital status requirements were the most important of the eligibility criteria; 56.2% of adult women on household rosters met the age and marital status requirements, and 41.7% met all criteria. 98.4% of the eligible women consented for the study, giving a sample of 1,022 women from 927 households.

2.3 Design and Randomization

The random variation this paper relies on was nested in a broader experiment, which cross-randomized a psychosocial intervention to raise self-efficacy with the promotion intervention. The idea was that self-efficacy would motivate women to pursue economic goals like employment, but family members may not allow women to become employed (Bernhardt et al., 2018; Field et al., 2021; Lowe and McKelway, 2024), hence I cross-randomized the promotion. McKelway (2025) presents results from the full experiment, studying how the interventions affected self-efficacy and economic goals (employment, household savings, and child education). The present paper was borne out of the observation that, in the self-efficacy control group, assignment to the promotion treatment significantly raised women's employment and is unlikely to have affected women's time use through channels outside of employment; I therefore use assignment to promotion treatment only as an instrument to study how women's employment affects their time use. That is, the present paper studies effects *of* employment, while McKelway (2025) studies effects *on* employment. The other arms – self-efficacy treatment only and both treatments – do not work as instruments because they have weaker effects on employment and are unlikely to satisfy exclusion. I control for them in the regressions but do not present their coefficients. Throughout the paper, for brevity, I refer to the group assigned neither treatment as the control group, the group assigned the promotion treatment only as the treatment group, and the differences in outcomes between these two groups the treatment effects.[5]

The promotion treatment was assigned at the household level. Randomization was stratified by self-efficacy treatment, village, and neighborhood within village.

[4] 98.1% of the sample were living in their in-laws' villages. For those living in their natal villages, parents replaced parents-in-law in all study activities. For brevity, I refer to both types of elders as "parents-in-law" throughout the paper.

[5] The self-efficacy intervention was delivered in the month prior to the promotion. It used an active control group, meaning that before the promotion intervention, the women studied in the present paper spent time taking group surveys on their daily lives.

Table A.1 presents treatment-control differences on 13 baseline characteristics. The randomization was successful in achieving balance, with just one of the 13 differences significant at the 10% level, and none at the 5% or 1% levels. I include baseline variables selected by post-double-selection (PDS) Lasso (Belloni et al., 2014) when estimating treatment effects, which should help address any important imbalances. I also find that results are robust to entropy weighting (Hainmueller, 2012) the data to generate exact balance on baseline characteristics (Tables A.3 and A.4).[6]

2.4 Promotion Intervention

In early October 2017, surveyors delivered information about Obeetee's program in individual meetings with women and separate meetings with women's family member(s). The family members eligible to participate were husbands and, if they were living in women's households, parents-in-law. All but seven women had at least one eligible family member (family-member meetings were not attempted for these seven women).

All family members were told Obeetee had arranged a weaving training and employment program for women, then given information on the pay, hours, location, and application process. Those assigned promotion treatment were additionally informed about a few job perks (the loom center facilities, all-female workplace, and a policy allowing women to bring young children to work), and then shown a six-minute video. The video featured testimonials from program supervisors, female weavers, and a weaver's husband, all from villages where the program was already established. The speakers discussed the positive, safe, all-female work environment and participants' daily routines (e.g. their work hours, how they managed household chores).[7] Shots of the speakers were interspersed with shots of women's workstations and loom center facilities. Appendix E provides the transcript of the treatment and a screenshot from the video. All women, regardless of treatment status, were given both the basic details and the promotion.

Family-member meetings were successfully held for 77.4% of women. Women's own meetings were successfully held 84.9% of the time. These rates are balanced by treatment (Table A.2).

[6]When I conduct the balance tests among women surveyed at the four-month endline, a difference in baseline employment emerges which is significant at the 10% level (Table A.1). However, the difference is negative, meaning any bias to treatment effects would be downwards. Further, there is no imbalance in whether women were employed off their households' farms, which is the type of employment the treatment targeted. Finally, the results are robust to entropy weighting to achieve balance on the variables in Table A.1 among non-attritors (Tables A.3 and A.4).

[7]In principle, the discussion of household chores could have affected family expectations about the allocation of housework, violating the exclusion assumption. I discuss and test for this in Section 4.2, finding no evidence for a violation.

3 Data, Outcomes, and Empirical Specification

3.1 Program Participation Data

I observe whether women applied for Obeetee's program. The application process was administered by the research team. Applicants needed to go to their catchment area's loom center on application day, held two to eight days after individuals had been informed about the program, and complete a 10-minute application process administered by a surveyor. Applicants had to come with their husbands, mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law, or household heads to ensure they were applying with the support of their households. Applicants' ages were verified through identification cards or confirmation from their village heads, and only those in Obeetee's targeted age range (18 to 40) could apply. A small number of women applied outside the official application day, by attending an alternate application day two weeks later or by contacting the research team about their interest in applying. In five of the centers, more women applied than there were slots for, so I randomly determined who could begin the program and who was placed on a randomly-ordered waitlist. The research team delivered application results in late October 2017 and monitored retention during training, drawing from the waitlist when participants dropped out.

I also observe whether women attended the program during the first three months of training. This data come from records of daily attendance maintained by loom centers.

3.2 Survey Data

Women were surveyed at the time of study enrollment (baseline) and one week, four months, and one year after the intervention (Figure 1). I also use data from four-month surveys with family members, taken with husbands when possible and, if not, with mothers- or fathers-in-law, provided they lived in women's households. Surveys were administered verbally, in private, and, except for some phone surveys with husbands, in person. Surveyors were assigned different participants at endline than when delivering information on Obeetee's program.

There was some attrition on the endline surveys. 83.7% of women were surveyed at one week, while 77.9% and 75.5% of women's and family members' four-month surveys were taken. Attrition was higher at one year, with 66.0% of women being surveyed.

Several facts assuage concerns about attrition. First, higher attrition at one year was partly due to constraints on the number of surveying days, and surveyors attempted surveys in random order; this makes the subset of women surveyed quasi-random. Indeed, women's random ordering on their surveyors' assignment lists significantly predicts whether they were

surveyed, and 80% of women assigned top priority were surveyed (Table A.2). Second, rates of attrition do not differ by treatment at any endline (Table A.2). Third, balance tests in the subgroups of women surveyed at each endline look similar to balance tests in the full sample (Table A.1).[8] Fourth, the results are robust to entropy weighting (Hainmueller, 2012) the data to achieve exact balance on baseline characteristics among non-attritors (Tables A.3 and A.4). Fifth, the results look similar when I restrict to women surveyed at both the main short-run endline (four months) and the long-run endline (one year) (Tables A.3 and A.4). Finally, I include control variables selected with PDS Lasso (Belloni et al., 2014) when estimating treatment effects, which should help address any important differences between the treatment and control groups resulting from attrition.

3.3 Opinions Survey Experiment

I conducted a survey experiment in a separate sample of households to understand how the treatment affected opinions. The goal was to isolate effects of the information in the treatment rather than estimating the combined effects of the treatment and any behavioral changes the treatment led to. The survey experiment was conducted in early 2018 in the catchment areas for two female weaving centers Obeetee planned to open later that year. Surveyors went door-to-door in these areas and identified women who met key eligibility requirements for participation in the main study.[9] Surveyors then asked to speak individually with husbands of married women and, if they were in women's households, mothers- and fathers-in-law. Surveyors informed participants about Obeetee's program, to be offered in the area later that year. A randomization at the start of the survey determined whether individuals in a household received the basic details alone or with the promotion. Immediately afterwards, surveyors elicited detailed opinions about the opportunity and broader gender attitudes.

I analyze data at the woman level, using responses from a single family member. The family member is the husband, but if he was not surveyed, the mother-in-law, and if neither surveyed, the father-in-law. In total, I identified 463 eligible women and have family member responses for 372 (80%) of them.

One concern with the opinions survey results is that they are estimated in a separate

[8] As discussed in footnote 6, the treatment-control difference in baseline employment among women surveyed at four months is significant at the 10% level. However, the difference is negative, meaning any bias to treatment effects would be downwards. Further, there is no imbalance in women's employment off their household farms, the type of employment the treatment targeted. Finally, the results are robust to entropy weighting to achieve balance on the variables in Table A.1 among non-attritors (Tables A.3 and A.4).

[9] The requirements that women be present and not have had permission to participate denied by family were not enforced since the survey experiment did not involve any participation from women. As discussed in Section 2.2, these criteria screened out only a small number of women in the main experiment.

sample which may not have experienced the same effects as the main sample. However, as detailed above, the two samples were selected in nearly identical ways. Moreover, I see similar control means and treatment effects for outcomes measured in both samples. In the opinions survey control group, 73.3% of family members said the firm's program was a good opportunity, and 61.5% said it was alright for women to work outside the home; the corresponding statistics in the main experiment at four months were 66.3% and 62.2%. Likewise, the treatment effects on these two outcomes in the survey experiment were 10.4 and 5.3 percentage points, compared to 7.1 and 5.4 in the main experiment (Tables 2 and A.5).

3.4 Outcomes

Women's time use is the main outcome. I also present first-stage effects on women's employment, and consider effects on opinions from the survey experiment to investigate exclusion as well as mechanisms driving the first-stage effects. I focus on time use at four months; time use was not measured at one week, and the first-stage effect on employment had faded at one year. I provide more information about the outcomes as I present effects on them and describe all outcomes in detail in Appendix B.

As discussed in Section 2.3, this paper was motivated by initial results from the broader experiment the promotion treatment was embedded in. After seeing these results, I uploaded a supporting document to the initial study's registration (McKelway, 2019) detailing my intention to write a separate paper using the promotion as an instrument for employment in the self-efficacy control group, along with primary and secondary outcomes I would consider. The primary outcomes are variables that may have been affected by women's employment, while the secondary outcomes are responses from the opinions survey to understand how the treatment shifted family member beliefs. The document was uploaded after the data had been collected but before I analyzed effects on the primary outcomes. Effects on many of the secondary outcomes had been analyzed when the document was uploaded.

The main deviation from the document I make is to focus the paper on the time use primary outcomes due to concerns about statistical power. Appendix D lists all deviations and details the rationale for each.

3.5 Empirical Specification

The basic regression specification is

$$Y_{i,h} = \beta T_h + \alpha X_{i,h} + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{i,h} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,h}$ is the outcome for woman i from household h, and T_h is an indicator for promotion treatment assignment. $X_{i,h}$ is a vector of control variables which includes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment, the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators, and baseline variables selected through PDS Lasso (Belloni et al., 2014). μ_s denote strata (neighborhood) fixed effects. I cluster standard errors by household.

The parameter of interest is β. Given random assignment and the controls for the self-efficacy treatment arms, β will be the effect of assignment to promotion treatment only rather than neither treatment. As discussed in Section 2.3, I do not present effects of the self-efficacy treatment arms as they are not valid instruments for employment. I include the full sample with controls for the self-efficacy arms rather than restricting to the self-efficacy control group because doing so improves power in estimating the strata fixed effects without changing estimates of β.

I estimate the same specification when analyzing results from the opinions survey experiment, except that controls for the self-efficacy arms are excluded as that treatment was not assigned in the opinions survey sample. While the survey experiment randomization was not stratified, I include neighborhood fixed effects (the main-experiment stratification variable, or μ_s) when analyzing results from the opinions survey; I do this to produce similar power in regressions from the two samples, though I note opinions survey results look very similar without these fixed effects.

4 Results

4.1 First-Stage Effects

I begin by documenting the first-stage effects of the promotion on women's employment in the four months following the intervention. I focus on these months as my main time-use outcomes come from the four-month survey (time use was not measured at one week, and as we will see below, the first-stage effect on employment had faded at one year). The firm's program was in its training phase over this period, but as discussed in Section 2.1, I view participation in training as a form of employment: the training phase had the same (full-time) hours as the employment phase, occurred in the same place, and paid women similarly.

I consider effects on: (1) application for the firm's program, (2) participation in the first three months of the program (or equivalently, prior to the four-month survey), (3) employment at one week, (4) employment at four months, and (5) any employment between the intervention and four months, and (6) hours of paid work at four months. (3) and

(4) come from survey questions asking women if they had worked for income in any of a comprehensive list of sectors in the preceding two weeks. (5) is an indicator for any of the indicators (2), (3), or (4) equaling one. I note that (5) would miss any employment that was outside of the firm's program, started after the one-week survey, *and* was not occurring in the two weeks prior to the four-month survey; this seems unlikely to describe much employment, and hence I view (5) as a reasonably comprehensive measure of employment in the four months following the intervention. (6) is the hours women spent on paid work the day prior to the four-month survey, as measured in the time-use module detailed in Section 4.3 below. When estimating effects on these first-stage outcomes, I restrict to women whose time use I observe at four months.

The promotion had positive effects on all six outcomes (Table 1). The effects on program participation, employment at four months, and any employment are 7.9, 9.6, and 16.0 percentage points ($p = 0.017$, 0.023, and 0.000). These represent increases of 41-71% relative to the control means. The fact that the effects on general employment are a bit larger than the effect on participation suggests the treatment made family members more open to women's employment in general, not just in the firm's program. Indeed, I see an effect on employment at one week, which was before the firm's program had begun.[10] Turning to time spend working, I find a treatment effect of 34.2 minutes ($p = 0.027$). This is a 58% increase relative to the control average of 58.7 minutes. This shift reflects both an effect on the extensive margin of spending any time on paid work, and a positive but statistically insignificant intensive margin increase in time spent working among women who spent any time working (Table A.5).

These are remarkable effects for such a light-touch intervention. The treatment may have been particularly persuasive because it was delivered when households had little pre-existing knowledge of Obeetee's program. In a sample with limited access to smartphones and televisions, the video format likely also helped. However, as we will see below, the effect on employment had faded by one year.

I use the survey experiment to understand how the treatment affected family opinions about women's employment. One concern is that the effects on opinions may have been different between the main and survey-experiment samples. However, as discussed in Section 3.3, the two samples were selected in nearly identical ways, and I see similar control means and treatment effects for outcomes measured in both samples (Tables 2 and A.5).

[10] I make two notes about the one-week effect. First, it is a bit larger than the effect at four months, despite the fact that the firm's program began between the two endlines. This can be explained by some women switching to work in the program once it began and others stopping work by four months. Second, while a one-week time horizon may seem short for employment to shift, this effect is consistent with employment in the setting relying largely on causal arrangements rather than formal contracts.

The treatment made family members in the survey experiment more likely to think the program was a good opportunity for women (Table 2, column (1)). To investigate which opinions about the program shifted, I form indices of favorable opinions on the program's financial value (including the pay, hours, and work stability), the physical workspace (including loom center facilities and safety of participants), and workplace interactions (including participant-participant, participant-supervisor, and participant-male interactions). I find significant effects on opinions of the financial value and physical workspace, and a positive but insignificant effect on the workplace interactions index (columns (2)-(4)). The effect on financial value is surprising given both the treatment and control groups were given compensation details; this effect suggests the firsthand accounts in the video lent credibility to these details. The treatment also raised the share of family members who felt it was alright for women to work outside the home by 5.3 percentage points, though this effect is not significant ($p = 0.363$) (column (5)). In sum, the promotion improved perceptions of the firm's program, its financial value and physical workplace in particular, and may also have made family members more supportive of women's employment in general.

These results make clear that the treatment raised employment in the following months. Two issues remain regarding the use of these first-stage effects in a 2SLS estimation: which measure of employment to instrument, and the F-statistic falling below the conventional cutoff of 10 for some measures. I return to these issues when estimating 2SLS effects in Section 4.4 below.

4.2 Exclusion

The treatment is likely to have affected women's time use at four months only through its effect on employment. I had two concerns about exclusion ex ante, but I find no evidence for either. First, the treatment could have shifted family opinions about women's employment even for women who did not become employed, and this shift in perceptions alone could affect time use (e.g. by raising perceptions of women's earnings potential and thus their bargaining power). However, I see no evidence of a shift in opinions for women who did not become employed. I define an indicator for women not working *and* their family members having positive opinions about women's work; it is an indicator for all of the outcomes in columns (2)-(6) equaling zero, *and* for family members saying at four months that Obeetee's program was a good opportunity or that it was alright for women to work outside the home.[11] These are the same opinions as in columns (1) and (5) of Table 2, just measured in the main sample rather than the survey experiment. The treatment had a small, statistically

[11] Table A.5 presents effects on these opinions on their own.

insignificant effect on the indicator (column (7) of Table 1). This suggests that the women whose families' opinions shifted, at least as measured at four months, became employed; a shift in opinions for women who did not become employed is therefore unlikely to create a violation of the exclusion restriction.

The second concern was that speakers in the video discussed how women managed their household chores while working; this could have directly strengthened the expectation that women do household chores, violating exclusion. However, I see small and statistically insignificant treatment effects on whether family members in the survey experiment would expect their wife/daughter-in-law to do the same amount of chores if she participated in the firm's program, would plan to help with chores if she participated, thought she could properly care for her children if she participated, or thought a woman's main role should be chores (Table 2, columns (6)-(9)). Perhaps expectations around chores are too firmly held to be moved by a short video, or perhaps discussions in the video were aligned with what family members in this setting expect regarding chores. But either way, these results suggest that such discussions did not create a violation of exclusion.[12]

4.3 Effects on Time Use

Time use was measured using assisted time diaries; surveyors asked women when they woke up and went to bed the previous day, and what they did each hour in between. Surveys were scheduled, as much as possible, so that the previous day would have been a workday and not a Sunday or a holiday.[13] There were 36 answer options for daytime activities, which I assign along with nighttime sleep to one of five categories of time use:

1. Paid work, including work for income or in-kind pay, at or outside home
2. Household chores, including any unpaid work for household benefit, e.g. cooking, cleaning, childcare
3. Leisure, e.g. spending time with family/friends, watching television, listening to music
4. Sleep/rest, including nighttime sleep and daytime sleep/rest
5. Other, e.g. eating, bathing, in transit

[12]One concern, also discussed above, is that the effects on opinions may have been different in the main and survey-experiment samples. However, the two samples were selected in nearly identical ways (see Section 3.3 for details), and I see similar control means and treatment effects for outcomes measured in both samples (Tables 2 and A.5).

[13]Saturdays are generally workdays in this setting.

See Appendix B for full details on the time use module.

I present effects on both the total hours women devoted to each category, and on the percentage change in hours from the control group mean. Percentage changes are important to consider for two reasons. First, standard labor supply models feature diminishing marginal utility of leisure and convex costs of work/chores effort. This means that a one-hour decrease in leisure could reduce a woman's utility by more than a one-hour decrease in chores would increase it, depending on the initial hours devoted to the two categories. Utility from time allocation, not time allocation itself, would determine whether women wanted to stay employed. Second, percentage changes reflect elasticities, a standard unit in economics. To estimate percentage effects, I cannot simply log hours spent on a given activity as there are 0's. Following Chen and Roth (2023), I normalize the outcomes rather than using $ln(1+Y)$ or $arcsinh(Y)$. Specifically, the percentage outcomes are percentage changes from the control group mean, which I obtain by subtracting the control mean from the variable in hours, dividing by the control mean, and multiplying by 100.

As we saw in Section 4.1, the treatment significantly increased the time women devoted to paid work at four months. The effect is 34.2 minutes ($p = 0.027$), a 58% increase above the control mean (columns (1)-(2) of Table 3). This effect is driven by work for income outside the home (Figure A.1), and reflects increases in both the extensive and intensive margins of hours worked, though only the extensive margin shift is statistically significant (Table A.5).

The treatment significantly reduced women's leisure hours at four months and had a negative but statistically insignificant effect on hours devoted to chores (columns (3) and (5) of Table 3). The effect on leisure was -23.1 minutes ($p = 0.028$). It is driven by a significant decline in the time women spent watching television or listening to music, and a negative but statistically insignificant drop in time spent with family or friends at home (Figure A.1). The reduction in leisure is concerning as a large literature in psychology (summarized in Newman et al. (2014)) views leisure activities as key for individual wellbeing. The fact that paid work reduces leisure is particularly concerning, as leisure is seen as important in helping individuals detach and recover from work (Newman et al., 2014). Turning to chores, I find a -15.5 minute effect that is statistically insignificant ($p = 0.428$). Likewise, there is a positive but statistically insignificant effect on hours devoted to chores by family members surveyed at four months (Table A.6). I cannot reject that the effects on women's chore and leisure hours are equal ($p = 0.753$). These results are consistent with women making some adjustment to both leisure and chore hours to accommodate employment.

While the effects on leisure and chores in hour units do not differ significantly, the effects are quite different in percentage terms because women in my sample spend a great deal of time on household chores. Households in developing settings like mine have many members,

small farms to tend to, and few modern home appliances, all of which increase the chore hours required to run a household. The demographic I study – married women aged 18 to 40 – is likely to bear the brunt of these hours; gender norms and comparative advantage often lead women in developing countries to specialize in housework, while women who are married and aged 18 to 40 in my setting often have both young children and parents-in-law they are expected to care for.[14] Indeed, my control group averaged 8.7 hours a day on chores (column (3) of Table 3). The chores occupying the most hours in my sample are cooking, cleaning, and childcare (Figure A.1). My estimate of 8.7 hours is in line with estimates of women's time use in rural Uttar Pradesh from the Indian Time Use Survey (MoSPI, 2019).[15]

The treatment reduced women's leisure time by 24%, but reduced their chore time by just 3% (columns (4) and (6) of Table 3). These effects differ significantly from each other ($p = 0.087$). This implies that women's leisure time is significantly more elastic than their chores time; for the given percentage change in work hours the treatment produced, the percentage drop in leisure was significantly larger than the percentage drop in chores.

Finally, I turn to effects on the sleep/rest and "other" categories of time use at four months. The effect on sleep/rest is positive (14.1 minutes), which might suggest treated women felt more fatigued, but the effect is not statistically significant ($p = 0.360$) and represents only a 2% drop relative to the control mean (columns (7)-(8) of Table 3). The control mean for sleep is high, at 10.4 hours a day, but it is in line with the estimate of 9.3 hours for females in rural India from the Indian Time Use Survey (MoSPI, 2019).[16] I also note that 10.4 hours is time in bed, not time asleep, and the latter can be substantially lower in developing settings than the former due to environmental factors that disrupt sleep (Bessone et al., 2021). Sleep is likely to be disrupted in my setting, where homes often have a single room where several adults and children sleep together on cots or on the floor, while low housing quality means families cannot control the indoor temperature and are likely to be awoken by noises outside. Lastly, I find a small (6.8 minute) and non-significant ($p =$

[14]See Dinkelman and Ngai (2022) and Jayachandran (2021) for reviews of the gendered burden of housework in developing countries.

[15]My chores category is most comparable to the sum of three MoSPI (2019) categories: time spent on production for own final use, unpaid domestic work, and unpaid care work. Summing these gives 6.6 hours per day for the average woman aged 15 to 59 in rural Uttar Pradesh. This likely underestimates time spent by women in my demographic (married, aged 18-40), who tend to have more housework responsibilities, as discussed above. MoSPI (2019) also reports time use conditional on participating in each activity, which can help adjust for underestimation to the extent that it comes from non-participation of women outside of my demographic. Weighting the conditional estimates by the participation rates of women in my sample and summing across the three categories yields an alternative MoSPI (2019)-based estimate of 9.1 hours per day on chores.

[16]The MoSPI (2019) report does not present sleep time by state or age. Personal maintenance – which includes sleep but also eating/drinking, personal hygiene, and personal care – is broken down this way, and is estimated to be 11.8 hours for females aged 15-59 in rural Uttar Pradesh.

0.425) effect on time devoted to the "other" category (columns (9)-(10) of Table 3).[17]

4.4 2SLS Effects on Time Use

I estimate 2SLS effects on time use at four months to interpret the magnitudes of the reduced form effects. We have seen that the treatment increased women's employment over this period and is unlikely to have affected time use through channels aside from employment. Two questions remain regarding 2SLS estimation. First is which measure of employment to instrument. Using any employment following treatment as the endogenous variable would capture the broadest first-stage effect, while employment at four months would be a natural endogenous variable as that is when time use was measured. Alternatively, instrumenting time spent working would be a logical way to estimate how work displaced other activities, would estimate elasticities when using percentage units, and would capture both extensive and intensive margin effects on work. Ultimately, with a single-variable, just-identified IV regression, the choice of endogenous variable is simply a matter of how one wishes to scale the reduced-form effects to interpret magnitudes. I do not view this choice as threatening exclusion; I view exclusion as the assumption that treatment only affects time use through employment, however employment is defined, and evidence presented in Section 4.2 suggests exclusion holds. I therefore do not take a stance on which variable is best to instrument and present 2SLS results using each of the endogenous variables discussed here.

The second concern is that the F-statistics for some of the first-stage effects (specifically, the effects on employment at four months and time spent working) are below the conventional cutoff of 10. However, a recent paper of Angrist and Kolesár (2024) finds traditional 2SLS estimates are reliable for single-variable, just-identified IV regressions even when F-statistics are low, provided endogeneity is not extremely high. Table A.7 presents the F-statistics and endogeneity parameters corresponding to my 2SLS effects.[18] In all cases, my F-statistics and endogeneity parameters fall well below the contour where Angrist and Kolesár (2024) estimate true null second-stage t-statistics are rejected at the 5% level more than 10% of the time. For reference, the definition of weak instruments in Stock and Yogo (2005) is rejection of true nulls more than 10% of the time. To minimize bias in single-variable, just-identified IV regressions, Angrist and Kolesár (2024) recommend simply screening out estimated first stages that are not of the expected sign; all of my first-stage effects are positive, as expected. In sum, results of Angrist and Kolesár (2024) imply weak instruments are not a concern in

[17] I also use the time use data to investigate effects on women's mobility, often seen as a measure of female empowerment (Glennerster et al., 2018). The treatment increased the total time women spent outside their homes by 25.4 minutes ($p = 0.122$), but the effect is about zero (-1.9 minutes, $p = 0.817$) if paid work is excluded from time outside (Table A.6).

[18] The endogeneity parameters are calculated as in Appendix A.1 of Angrist and Kolesár (2024).

my case.

Under the assumptions of the LATE theorem, my 2SLS effects, like any 2SLS effects, will be effects among compliers. Here, compliers are women who became employed because their husbands and/or parents-in-law were given the promotion. This is a relevant population in my setting as most women (80.2% of the control group) report that decisions about their labor supply are made by these family members.

Table 4 presents all 2SLS estimates. I focus on two sets of 2SLS results which I view as most useful for interpreting magnitudes. First are the results from instrumenting employment at four months (Panel B). The average control group complier spent 1.1 hours a day on paid work, 6.8 hours on chores, and 4.6 hours on leisure.[19] [20] Employment raised hours of paid work by 5.9 (a 603% increase, $p = 0.017$), reduced chore hours by 2.9 (a 33% decrease, $p = 0.379$), and reduced leisure hours by 4.1 (a 251% decrease, $p = 0.079$). These results imply that a typical workday for compliers in the treatment group involved 7.0 hours of paid work, 3.9 hours of chores, and 30 minutes of leisure. This is reminiscent of the "second shift" (Hochschild and Machung, 1989) idea; women employed roughly full time were doing the equivalent of a part-time job on chores at home.

Next, I turn to the effects of time spent working on time spent on chores and leisure, in percentage units (columns (4) and (6) in Panel C of Table 4). Note that these estimates are elasticities: they provide the percent increase in chores and leisure for a 1% increase in paid work. I estimate an elasticity of chores with respect to paid work of -0.054. I cannot reject that this is zero, or perfectly inelastic ($p = 0.338$). The leisure elasticity, on the other hand, is -0.419, and I can reject that this is zero ($p = 0.078$).

4.5 Mechanisms

So far we have seen that women's employment reduced the hours women devoted to leisure, had a negative but insignificant effect on chores hours, and that leisure is more elastic than chores. Here I discuss possible explanations for this pattern of results. I focus on constraints to reallocating chores, for two reasons. First, time use sums to 24 hours, so anything that explains why chores did not drop by more helps to explain the significant reduction in leisure.

[19] Using the LATE theorem's assumptions, one can show that the complier control mean can be computed in the data as $\frac{E[Y|D=0,Z=0](1-E[D|Z=0])-E[Y|D=0,Z=1](1-E[D|Z=1])}{E[D|Z=1]-E[D|Z=0]}$ where Y is the outcome, D is employment at four months, and Z is treatment.

[20] The control complier mean for work hours is positive rather than zero because the employment and work hours variables come from separate survey questions. The two may disagree because of measurement error (whereby women said they did not work in the previous two weeks, but reported work when recounting the previous day) and work for in-kind pay (employment comes from a question asking about work for income, but work hours also include work for in-kind pay).

Second, existing literature has identified various factors leading to the gendered allocation of housework in developing countries (see Dinkelman and Ngai (2022) and Jayachandran (2021) for summaries) which I can consider as potential constraints in my setting.

One possibility is that there was no feasible alternative to women doing the chores. This is not a setting where housework is easily outsourced to the market (Dinkelman and Ngai, 2022); homes generally do not have the electricity, piped water, or space required for many home appliances, and there is not a market for home helpers in my sample. Male family members may be unable to help with chores as they tend to be busy with employment and may not have ever learned how to do certain chores like cooking. However, a majority of women in my sample have another female in their household who, in principle, could help; at baseline, 54% had another adult woman in their household, 41% had a daughter between the ages of 8 and 17, and 76% had either. Thus there was likely a lack of market-based alternatives to women's housework, but not necessarily a lack of other household members to help with chores.

Another explanation, motivated by Bertrand et al. (2015), is that husbands felt threatened by their wives' earnings and women limited any reductions in their chore hours to make their husbands feel better. While I do not have good data on earnings, it seems unlikely that the treatment would have led to women earning more than men; about 75% of husbands in both treatment arms were employed at four months, while women's weaving earnings tend to be on the low range of what laborers in this setting might earn.[21] More generally, I do not see evidence of backlash. In fact, the treatment increased women's reported involvement in household decision-making (Table A.8). Consistent with a shift in bargaining power, there is a significant effect on women's reports of deciding how their husbands' earnings are spent (Table A.8).[22] These effects are likely to be driven by the shift in women's employment; results discussed in Section 4.2 suggest it is unlikely there were effects on bargaining power for women who did not become employed, while results from the survey experiment suggest the treatment did not directly affect expectations about how the firm's program would change women's control in the household (Table A.5).[23]

Instead, it seems likely that strong norms around prime-age women doing chores (Jay-

[21]This is not because female weavers are paid a lower piece rate than male weavers, but rather because female weavers tend to work fewer hours and have less experience than male weavers, and because weaving tends to be a lower-paying occupation than others in this setting.

[22]Effects on husbands' reports of women's decision-making are positive but not significant (Table A.8). It is possible that men in this setting are reluctant to admit when their wives are making many household decisions. But even so, the positive point estimates on husbands' reports coupled with the effects on women's reports are not consistent with backlash.

[23]I also implemented a novel incentivized choice that captures bargaining power. It involved a cross-randomization and so statistical power is limited, but effects are broadly consistent with the treatment raising bargaining power. See Appendix C for details.

achandran, 2021) could have constrained reallocation. At four months, 86% of family members and 85% of women thought that a woman's main role should be to tend to household chores, and the treatment did not affect these opinions (Table A.8). These norms could keep families and women themselves from wanting chores to be reallocated when women become employed.

4.6 Long-Run Effects on Employment

The treatment effects on employment had faded by one year. Women in the treatment group were 1.7 percentage points more likely to report they were working in the firm's program at one year, but this difference is not significant ($p = 0.354$) (column (1) of Table 5). Likewise, there was not a significant effect on overall employment, and the point estimate is actually negative (column (2)). These results are consistent with Dean and Jayachandran (2019), who find that a video intervention like mine had no effect on women's employment 13 months later. I do see an effect on hours worked at one year (column (3)), suggesting the women in the treatment group who were working at that time worked longer hours than those in the control group. However, the effect on work hours at one year is only significant at the 10% level and 28% smaller than the effect at four months.

Table A.9 presents effects on time use at one year. I interpret these with caution given the weak first-stage effects; even for the strongest first-stage at one year (on paid work), I am above the Angrist and Kolesár (2024) 10% rejection contour for the leisure outcome.[24] I find the positive effect on paid work at one year was accompanied by a negative effect on leisure and no significant effects on other categories of time use. Broadly speaking, these results are consistent with the first-stage effect fading over time, but also with the time use of women who continued to work more hours being reallocated like we saw at four months.

Why did the effect on employment fade? I first note that the fading does not appear to be driven by spillover to the control group. The control means for work in the firm's program and hours worked declined between four months and one year. The control mean for overall employment did increase, which could be due to spillover or to seasonal trends that increased overall employment at the same time as the treatment effect was fading. To distinguish between these two stories, I examine transitions in and out of employment between the two endlines. Both stories would predict the control group was more likely than the treatment group to start work between the two endlines, but the spillover story would predict the treatment group was more likely to be working at both time periods, while the seasonality story would predict the treatment group was more likely to stop work.

[24]The F-statistic is 3.574 and endogeneity parameter 0.820.

The data are more consistent with the latter; the fraction of women in the treatment group who stopped work between the two endlines was significantly higher than in the control group (Table A.10). Also consistent with the story of seasonality is the type of employment driving the increased control group mean. This increase is driven by women working on their households' farms; the control means for the fraction of women working off their household farms are virtually identical at four months and one year (0.187 and 0.190).

The short-run time use results might explain why the effect on employment faded. We saw that at four months, compliers in the treatment group were working roughly the equivalent of a full-time job outside the home and a part-time job inside the home, while their leisure time had fallen 251% (Panel B of Table 4). This may have been unsustainable. Indeed, one way leisure has been found to promote psychological wellbeing is by helping individuals detach and recover from work (Newman et al., 2014). Consistent with this theory, I find that among women in the treatment group who were employed at four months, those who had a larger ratio of leisure to chore hours were more likely to remain employed at one year (column (4) of Table 5). I see the opposite relationship in the control group; this suggests a lower leisure-chore ratio is not predictive of drop-out in general, but that lower leisure relative to chores made employment unsustainable for the marginal women brought into employment by the treatment.

Additional support for this explanation comes from reasons provided for women dropping out of the firm's program. This information was only recorded during the program's first three months, but it nevertheless provides some indication for why women leave employment in this setting. Having too many chores was the most common reason, provided 50.0% of the time (Figure A.2). The second most common reason would not have applied between four months and one year, and the third most common was provided just 12.5% of the time.

I find no evidence that women stopped work because they did not like work itself. In fact, at one year, women in the treatment group were more likely than those in the control group to believe that the firm's program was a good opportunity for women (column (5) of Table 5).

5 Discussion and Conclusion

There is much policy interest in expanding job opportunities for women in developing countries, especially in countries like India where FLFP is low (Fletcher et al., 2018; World Bank, 2012). An important question is how employment will affect women's time allocation. I study this question using an encouragement design, randomizing whether women's families were shown a video promoting a new job for women in rural India. This treatment raised

women's employment in the following months and is unlikely to have affected women's time use through channels aside from employment.

There are several key take-away's from my results. First, employment reduces women's leisure time. This suggests ambiguous implications of employment for women's wellbeing. On the one hand, many women in my setting report interest in becoming employed; at four months, 50.3% of the control group said they wanted to work for income in the coming month, yet only 23.4% of the control group was employed at that endline. My results also suggest employment raises women's say in the household, which should increase their utility. On the other hand, a reduction in leisure could reduce psychological wellbeing (Newman et al., 2014). Consistent with these offsetting effects, the treatment did not affect women's self-reported happiness at four months (Table A.8).

In terms of housework, I find a negative but insignificant effect on time devoted to household chores. This is consistent with women making some adjustment to both leisure and chore hours to accommodate employment. However, women spend a great deal of time on chores in my setting. As a result, chore hours are significantly less elastic with respect to paid work than is leisure, and compliers in the treatment group were working the equivalent a full-time job outside the home and a part-time job inside the home at four months.

Finally, the effect on employment had faded by one year. One explanation is that it was not sustainable for women to balance employment with many hours of housework and little leisure. Indeed, the women in the treatment group who stopped work between four months and one year were the ones who had a lower ratio of leisure to chore hours at four months. There is no evidence that women stopped work because they did not like work itself; at one year, women in the treatment group actually had more favorable opinions of the firm's program than women in the control group.

The contribution of this paper is to provide causal evidence on how paid work for women in developing countries affects their time allocation. My results should be seen as representing the effects of short-run shocks to women's employment. Short-run effects on time use are important to understand because they are likely to influence whether women remain employed. The time use results at one year provide suggestive evidence that short- and long-run effects may look similar, but these results should be interpreted with caution given the weak first stage at one year. Estimating the effects of longer-term shocks to women's employment is an important direction for future research.

My results have important implications. Policymakers or employers may need to combine female job opportunities with interventions to alleviate the burden of household chores to reduce costs of employment for women and to reduce their workplace attrition. Example interventions include providing childcare (Clark et al., 2019; Donald et al., 2024; Martínez

A. and Perticará, 2017), allowing women to work from home (Ho et al., 2024; Jalota and Ho, 2024), or expanding access to electricity and home appliances to speed up chores (de V. Cavalcanti and Tavares, 2008; Dinkelman, 2011). An alternative approach would be to try to change the norm of women as homemakers, using an intervention similar to the one Dhar et al. (2022) evaluate. Relaxing this norm could make women and households willing to reallocate chores to the market or other family members when women work.

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Figure 1: Study Timeline




Table 1: Effects on Women's Employment

	Applied to Program (1)	Attended Program (2)	Employed, at 1 Week (3)	Employed, at 4 Months (4)	Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon (5)	Paid Work Hrs, at 4 Months (6)	No Emp, but Good Opinion (7)
Promo Treat	0.119***	0.079**	0.113***	0.096**	0.160***	0.570**	-0.032
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.257)	(0.049)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.274	0.112	0.221	0.234	0.376	0.979	0.422
N	793	793	732	793	793	793	676

Notes: The sample in all columns is restricted to women for whom the four-month time-use outcomes are observed. The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) come from records on participation in the firm's program. Column (1)'s outcome is an indicator for applying for the firm's program. Column (2)'s outcome is an indicator for ever attending the firm's program in the first three months, or equivalently, ever attending prior to the four-month survey. The outcomes in columns (3) and (4) are indicators for women reporting they had done any work for income in the two preceding weeks on the one-week and four-month surveys. Column (5)'s outcome is an indicator for any of the outcomes in columns (2)-(4) equaling 1. The outcome in column (6) is the hours women spent on paid work the day before their four-month survey. It comes from the time-use module, detailed in footnotes for Table 3. The outcome in column (7) takes the value of 1 if all outcomes in columns (2)-(6) equal 0, *and* if family members said at four months that the firm's program was a good opportunity for women or that it's ok for women to go out for work to earn money; it takes the value of 0 otherwise. Column (7)'s sample only includes women who completed the four-month time-use module and whose family members were surveyed at four months. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. The control means are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Effects on Opinions in Survey Experiment

	Opinions on Firm's Program and Women's Employment					Expecations about Housework			
	Program Good (=1) (1)	Financial Value Index (2)	Physical Space Index (3)	Workplace Interactions Index (4)	Ok for W to Work (=1) (5)	Expect Same Chores (=1) (6)	Would Help (=1) (7)	Could Care for Kids (=1) (8)	Chores Should Be Main Role (=1) (9)
Promo Treat	0.104**	0.477***	0.283**	0.103	0.053	-0.010	0.033	-0.024	-0.000
	(0.047)	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.035)
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.733	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.615	0.447	0.665	0.570	0.888
N	372	371	371	370	370	370	370	370	370

Notes: The outcomes are from the opinions survey experiment. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for family members saying the firm's program was a good opportunity for women. The outcomes in columns (2)-(4) are indices of favorable opinions on the financial value of the firm's program (including the pay, hours, and work stability), the physical workspace (including loom center facilities and safety of participants), and workplace interactions (including interactions between participants, between participants and supervisors, and between participants and men outside their households). Column (5)'s outcome is an indicator for saying it's ok for women to go out for work to earn money. The outcome in column (6) is an indicator for respondents saying they would expect their wife/daughter-in-law to do the same amount of chores if she enrolled in the firm's program, while the outcome in column (7) is an indicator for respondents saying they would do more chores if she enrolled. Column (8)'s outcome is an indicator for respondents saying their wife/daughter-in-law could properly care for her children if she enrolled. The outcome in column (9) is an indicator for saying a woman's main role should be to tend to household chores. As discussed in Section 3.5, these regressions include neighborhood fixed effects, the main-experiment stratification variable. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Effects on Women's Time Use

	Paid Work		Chores		Leisure		Sleep/Rest		Other	
	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.570**	58.170**	-0.258	-2.955	-0.385**	-23.816**	0.235	2.250	-0.113	-5.055
	(0.257)	(26.240)	(0.326)	(3.729)	(0.175)	(10.813)	(0.256)	(2.458)	(0.141)	(6.335)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.979	0.000	8.745	0.000	1.615	0.000	10.427	0.000	2.233	-0.000
N	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793
P-Val: (1) = -(3)	0.309									
P-Val: (2) = -(4)	0.023**									
P-Val: (1) = -(5)	0.513									
P-Val: (2) = -(6)	0.190									
P-Val: (3) = (5)	0.753									
P-Val: (4) = (6)	0.087*									

Notes: The outcomes are from women's four-month endline surveys. Women were asked what time they woke up and went to bed the previous day, and then asked what they did each hour in between. As much as possible, surveys were scheduled so that the previous day would have been a work day. There were 36 answer options for hourly activities, which I assign along with nighttime sleep to one of five categories of time use: (1) paid work (including work for income or in-kind pay, at or outside home), (2) household chores (e.g. cooking, cleaning, childcare), (3) leisure (e.g. spending time with family/friends, watching television, listening to music), (4) sleep/rest (including nighttime sleep and sleep/rest during the day), or (5) other (e.g. eating, bathing, in transit). The outcomes in the odd-numbered columns are the number of hours devoted the previous day to each of these five categories. The even-numbered outcomes are the same outcomes in units of percentage deviations from the control group means. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. The control means are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. The p-values are for tests of equality of treatment effects in various columns; for instance, the first p-value is for the test that the treatment effect in column (1) equals -1 times the treatment effect in column (3). Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: 2SLS Effects on Women's Time Use

	Paid Work		Chores		Leisure		Sleep/Rest		Other	
	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A										
Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon	3.542**	361.595**	-1.726	-19.735	-2.434**	-150.756**	1.229	11.791	-0.611	-27.364
	(1.471)	(150.200)	(1.964)	(22.463)	(1.172)	(72.561)	(1.640)	(15.726)	(0.893)	(39.972)
Complier Control Mean	0.759	-22.544	8.080	-7.612	2.940	82.061	9.136	-12.381	3.086	38.170
Panel B										
Employed, at 4 Months	5.905**	602.911**	-2.878	-32.905	-4.059*	-251.365*	2.050	19.660	-1.019	-45.625
	(2.484)	(253.587)	(3.269)	(37.379)	(2.309)	(143.032)	(2.937)	(28.170)	(1.565)	(70.072)
Complier Control Mean	1.079	10.159	6.817	-22.053	4.575	183.331	7.742	-25.754	3.788	69.604
Panel C										
Paid Work Hrs			-0.478		-0.691*		0.342		-0.173	
			(0.499)		(0.392)		(0.505)		(0.255)	
Paid Work Pct				-0.054		-0.419*		0.032		-0.076
				(0.056)		(0.238)		(0.047)		(0.112)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793

Notes: This table presents 2SLS effects of women's employment on women's time use at four months. The outcomes are the same as in Table 3. Panel A instruments any employment between the intervention and four-month endline (the outcome in column (5) of Table 1), while Panel B instruments employment at four months (the outcome in column (4) of Table 1). The odd-numbered columns of Panel C instrument paid work hours (the outcome in column (1)), while Panel C's even-numbered columns instrument paid work time in percentage units (the outcome in column (2)). The complier control means are the averages among compliers in the group of women assigned neither self-efficacy nor promotion treatment. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Effects on Women's Employment at One Year

	At One Year:				
	Employed at Firm	Employed	Paid Work Hrs	Employed, 4 Mon Emp Sample	Program Good
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Promo Treat	0.017	-0.035	0.412*	-0.172	0.097**
	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.218)	(0.119)	(0.046)
Leisure-Chore Ratio at 4 Mon				-0.203***	
				(0.043)	
Promo Treat X Leisure-Chore Ratio at 4 Mon				0.388***	
				(0.092)	
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE Arms X Ratio	No	No	No	Yes	No
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Control Mean	0.017	0.368	0.380	0.528	0.690
N	674	674	674	183	674

Notes: All outcomes are from the one-year endline surveys with women. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for women reporting they had worked in the firm's program in the two preceding weeks, while column (2)'s outcome is an indicator for women reporting any work for income in the two preceding weeks. The outcome in column (3) is the hours women spent on paid work the preceding day and comes from the time-use module. The outcome in column (4) is the same as in column (2), but that column's sample is restricted to women who were employed at four months (i.e. restricted to women with a value of 1 for the outcome in column (4) of Table 1). Column (5)'s outcome is an indicator for women saying that the firm's program was a good opportunity for women. The leisure-chore ratio covariate is the ratio of the hours women spent on leisure at four months to the hours women spent on chores at four months (i.e. the outcome in column (5) of Table 3 over the outcome in column (3) of that table). One woman is dropped from column (4) due to having zero hours of chores at four months. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. "SE Arms X Ratio" denotes two interactions between the leisure-chore ratio and each of the controls for the self-efficacy treatment arms. The control means are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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Table A.1: Baseline Characteristics and Balance

	Full Sample			*1 Wk Sample*			*4 Mon Sample*			*1 Yr Sample*		
	C Mean (SD)	Treat (SE)	N	C Mean (SD)	Treat (SE)	N	C Mean (SD)	Treat (SE)	N	C Mean (SD)	Treat (SE)	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Age	29.461	-0.045	1022	29.953	-0.109	855	29.929	0.006	796	29.770	0.366	675
	(5.793)	(0.510)		(5.755)	(0.546)		(5.856)	(0.568)		(5.830)	(0.637)	
Married (=1)	0.984	0.005	1022	0.981	0.008	855	0.980	0.005	796	0.983	0.009	675
	(0.124)	(0.010)		(0.136)	(0.012)		(0.141)	(0.014)		(0.131)	(0.014)	
Number of Children	2.674	-0.089	1022	2.762	-0.031	855	2.803	-0.010	796	2.787	0.067	675
	(1.508)	(0.139)		(1.506)	(0.151)		(1.510)	(0.155)		(1.461)	(0.170)	
Pregnant (=1)	0.078	0.004	1022	0.070	0.007	855	0.081	-0.019	796	0.057	-0.006	675
	(0.268)	(0.024)		(0.256)	(0.026)		(0.273)	(0.026)		(0.233)	(0.026)	
Lives in In-Laws' Village (=1)	0.992	-0.013	1022	0.991	-0.005	855	0.990	-0.019	796	0.994	-0.013	675
	(0.088)	(0.011)		(0.096)	(0.011)		(0.100)	(0.014)		(0.076)	(0.012)	
Number of Adults in HH	4.097	0.078	1022	4.005	-0.175	855	3.924	-0.230	796	4.011	-0.347	675
	(2.511)	(0.276)		(2.420)	(0.263)		(2.352)	(0.254)		(2.475)	(0.264)	
M-in-Law in HH (=1)	0.469	-0.019	1022	0.453	-0.048	855	0.439	-0.036	796	0.471	-0.085	675
	(0.500)	(0.046)		(0.499)	(0.049)		(0.498)	(0.051)		(0.501)	(0.055)	
F-in-Law in HH (=1)	0.407	0.037	1022	0.402	-0.024	855	0.389	-0.016	796	0.414	-0.076	675
	(0.492)	(0.047)		(0.491)	(0.049)		(0.489)	(0.051)		(0.494)	(0.054)	
From Scheduled Caste or Tribe (=1)	0.481	0.018	1022	0.500	0.011	855	0.520	0.030	796	0.529	0.031	675
	(0.501)	(0.030)		(0.501)	(0.031)		(0.501)	(0.031)		(0.501)	(0.034)	
No Education (=1)	0.419	0.079*	1022	0.435	0.102**	855	0.439	0.106**	796	0.420	0.149***	675
	(0.494)	(0.044)		(0.497)	(0.048)		(0.498)	(0.049)		(0.495)	(0.053)	
Employed (=1)	0.283	-0.037	1022	0.299	-0.055	855	0.323	-0.081*	796	0.310	-0.061	675
	(0.451)	(0.038)		(0.459)	(0.042)		(0.469)	(0.043)		(0.464)	(0.046)	
Employed off Own Farm (=1)	0.143	-0.004	1022	0.164	0.000	855	0.182	-0.025	796	0.155	0.030	675
	(0.351)	(0.031)		(0.371)	(0.036)		(0.387)	(0.038)		(0.363)	(0.040)	
Woman's Happiness (SD)	-0.000	0.015	1022	0.006	-0.023	855	-0.039	0.012	796	0.036	-0.104	675
	(1.000)	(0.085)		(0.993)	(0.094)		(1.007)	(0.098)		(0.941)	(0.104)	

Notes: Column (1) presents means and standard deviations of baseline variables among women assigned neither promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. Column (2) presents coefficients and standard errors from regressions of the baseline variables on an indicator for promotion treatment. The regressions also include strata fixed effects, an indicator for self-efficacy treatment, and the interaction between the promotion and self-efficacy treatment indicators. Standard errors are clustered by household. Column (3) presents the sample sizes of the regressions. Columns (4)-(6), (7)-(9), and (10)-(12) do the same thing, but restrict to the subgroups of women surveyed at the one-week, four-month, and one-year endlines, respectively. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2: Balance in Compliance and Attrition

	Attended Info Meeting		Surveyed at 1 Wk	Surveyed at 4 Mon			Surveyed at 1 Yr	
	Woman	Family	Woman	Woman	Family	Husband	Woman	Woman
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Promo Treat	-0.009	-0.021	-0.016	0.010	0.018	-0.029	-0.032	
	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.042)	
Randomized Priority Order								-0.003*
								(0.002)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Village X Surveyor FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Control Mean	0.841	0.791	0.829	0.767	0.736	0.558	0.674	0.800
N	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	998

Notes: The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) are indicators for women and women's family members attending the meetings in which the job details and/or promotion were given. The outcomes in columns (3)-(5) are indicators for women's one-week, women's four-month, and family members' four-month surveys being taken. The outcome in column (6) is an indicator for four-month family surveys being taken by husbands. The outcome in columns (7)-(8) is an indicator for women being surveyed at one year. "Randomized Priority Order" is the order in which women appeared on their surveyors' assignment lists at one year. Surveyors were given lists of randomly selected participants to survey in given villages. Each village $\times$ surveyor list was randomly ordered, and surveyors were asked to attempt surveys in a village in that order. The control means in columns (1)-(7) are the means among women assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment, while the mean in column (8) is the average among women assigned priority order #1. Standard errors are clustered by household in columns (1)-(7) and robust in column (8). * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3: Robustness of Employment Results to Attrition

(a) Using Entropy Balancing

	Applied to Program	Attended Program	Employed, at 1 Week	Employed, at 4 Months	Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon	Paid Work Hrs, at 4 Months	No Emp, but Good Opinion	Emp at Firm, at 1 Year	Employed, at 1 Year	Paid Work Hrs, at 1 Year
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.128***	0.085***	0.103**	0.101**	0.161***	0.571**	-0.037	0.027	-0.065	0.508**
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.259)	(0.050)	(0.018)	(0.053)	(0.210)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.274	0.112	0.218	0.217	0.360	0.918	0.438	0.012	0.396	0.328
N	793	793	732	793	793	793	676	674	674	674

(b) Including Only Women Surveyed at 4 Months and 1 Year

	Applied to Program	Attended Program	Employed, at 1 Week	Employed, at 4 Months	Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon	Paid Work Hrs, at 4 Months	No Emp, but Good Opinion	Emp at Firm, at 1 Year	Employed, at 1 Year	Paid Work Hrs, at 1 Year
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.148***	0.096**	0.093*	0.111**	0.147***	0.573*	0.009	0.019	-0.023	0.410*
	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.316)	(0.059)	(0.020)	(0.052)	(0.243)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.291	0.126	0.248	0.238	0.411	1.071	0.400	0.020	0.391	0.428
N	606	606	572	606	606	606	523	606	606	606

Notes: The outcomes are the outcomes from columns (1)-(7) of Table 1 and columns (1)-(3) of Table 5. Panel (a) presents the same analyses as in those columns, except that the data are weighted using entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). The weights are generated such that, among women included in a given regression, weighted averages of the baseline variables in Table A.1 in the groups assigned neither treatment and promotion treatment only match. Panel (b) presents the same analyses as in columns (1)-(7) of Table 1 and columns (1)-(3) of Table 5, except that here I only include women surveyed at both four months and one year. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.4: Robustness of Time Use Results to Attrition

(a) Using Entropy Balancing

	Paid Work		Chores		Leisure		Sleep/Rest		Other	
	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.571**	58.335**	-0.282	-3.230	-0.353*	-21.857*	0.169	1.616	-0.121	-5.413
	(0.259)	(26.426)	(0.330)	(3.774)	(0.183)	(11.340)	(0.257)	(2.464)	(0.144)	(6.454)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.918	-6.246	8.797	0.594	1.569	-2.851	10.474	0.447	2.242	0.390
N	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793

(b) Including Only Women Surveyed at 4 Months and 1 Year

	Paid Work		Chores		Leisure		Sleep/Rest		Other	
	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.573*	58.528*	-0.100	-1.146	-0.648***	-40.144***	0.249	2.392	-0.095	-4.238
	(0.316)	(32.280)	(0.373)	(4.266)	(0.190)	(11.759)	(0.299)	(2.867)	(0.173)	(7.727)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	1.071	9.334	8.511	-2.682	1.678	3.927	10.417	-0.099	2.323	4.032
N	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606

Notes: The outcomes are the outcomes from Table 3. Panel (a) presents the same analyses as in Table 3, except that the data are weighted using entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). The weights are generated such that, among women included in a given regression, the weighted averages of the baseline variables in Table A.1 in the groups assigned neither treatment and promotion treatment only match. Panel (b) presents the same analyses as in Table 3, except that here I only include women surveyed at both four months and one year. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5: Additional First-Stage and Exclusion Analyses

	Paid Work Hrs, at 4 Months		Family Opinions, at 4 Months			Survey Experiment
	Work Hrs > 0 (=1)	Work Hrs, Working Sample	Program Good (=1)	Ok for W to Work (=1)	Good, or Work Ok (=1)	W's HH Control Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Promo Treat	0.066*	0.700	0.071	0.054	0.079**	0.004
	(0.037)	(0.704)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.110)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.168	5.847	0.663	0.622	0.795	-0.000
N	793	144	770	764	770	370

Notes: The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for paid work hours at four months (i.e. the outcome in column (6) of Table 1) being positive. Column (2)'s outcome is paid work hours at four months, but that column's sample is restricted to women who had a positive number of work hours. The outcomes in columns (3) and (4) are the same as those in columns (1) and (5) of Table 2 except they come from family members in the main sample at four months. The outcome in column (5) is an indicator for the outcome in column (3) or (4) equaling 1. Column (6)'s outcome is from the survey experiment and reflects expectations about how women's participation in the firm's program would affect their control in the household. Specifically, it is an index of: the extent to which the respondent thought participation would lead their wife/daughter-in-law to make more important decisions in their household, and an indicator for saying she would decide (either alone or together with others) how her earnings were spent if she enrolled in the program. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. As discussed in Section 3.5, the analyses of the opinions survey include fixed effects for the main-experiment stratification variable (neighborhood). In column (2), the PDS-Lasso variables are selected before conditioning on a positive number of work hours; that is, the selection is done in the full sample of women whose paid work hours I observe, and I control for the selected variables in column (2)'s regression. The control means in columns (1)-(4) are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. The mean in column (5) is the mean among those assigned promotion control (the opinions survey experiment did not have a self-efficacy treatment). Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: Additional Time Use Analyses

	Night Sleep Hrs	Chores Hrs, Family	Outside Hrs	Outside & Not Work Hrs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Promo Treat	0.025	0.362	0.424	-0.032
	(0.162)	(0.332)	(0.274)	(0.137)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	8.629	3.287	1.288	0.543
N	793	762	793	793

Notes: The outcomes are from the time use module administered at four months. Column (1)'s outcome is women's hours of nighttime sleep the previous day. The outcome in column (2) is the time women's family members spent on household chores; it is the same as the outcome in column (3) of Table 3 except that it comes from surveys with family members rather than women. Column (3)'s outcome is the hours women spent outside their homes the previous day, while column (4)'s outcome is hours outside not including hours spent on paid work. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. The control means are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.7: OLS Estimates, First-Stage F-Statistics, and Endogeneity Parameters Corresponding to the 2SLS Effects in Table 4

	Paid Work		Chores		Leisure		Sleep/Rest		Other	
	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A										
Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon	2.008***	205.033***	-1.206***	-13.794***	-0.306**	-18.921**	-0.843***	-8.087***	0.347***	15.535***
	(0.214)	(21.880)	(0.282)	(3.219)	(0.129)	(8.007)	(0.210)	(2.012)	(0.128)	(5.741)
First-Stage F-Stat	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134	13.134
Endogeneity Parameter	-0.192	-0.192	-0.042	-0.042	0.410	0.410	-0.222	-0.222	0.100	0.100
Panel B										
Employed, at 4 Months	2.886***	294.665***	-1.563***	-17.871***	-0.356***	-22.056***	-1.287***	-12.347***	0.320**	14.345**
	(0.260)	(26.591)	(0.296)	(3.380)	(0.128)	(7.921)	(0.217)	(2.077)	(0.146)	(6.546)
First-Stage F-Stat	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181	5.181
Endogeneity Parameter	-0.447	-0.447	0.086	0.086	0.636	0.636	-0.440	-0.440	0.313	0.313
Panel C										
Paid Work Hrs			-0.600***		-0.084***		-0.313***		-0.002	
			(0.034)		(0.018)		(0.030)		(0.018)	
Paid Work Pct				-0.067***		-0.051***		-0.029***		-0.001
				(0.004)		(0.011)		(0.003)		(0.008)
First-Stage F-Stat			4.914	4.914	4.914	4.914	4.914	4.914	4.914	4.914
Endogeneity Parameter			-0.161	-0.161	0.642	0.642	-0.494	-0.494	0.201	0.201
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793

Notes: The outcomes are the same as in Table 4. The first two rows in Panels A and B, and first four rows in Panel C, present coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions corresponding to the 2SLS regressions in Table 4. That is, the regressions here are regressions of time use on employment, without instrumenting using treatment. The regressions here include the same control variables as the corresponding 2SLS regressions in Table 4. The F-statistic is for the first stage of the corresponding 2SLS estimate in Table 4. The endogeneity parameter is calculated as in Appendix A.1 of Angrist and Kolesár (2024). It is a measure of the endogeneity of employment in the un-instrumented, OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.8: Understanding Time Use Results

	W Makes Decisions, W's Report		W Makes Decisions, H's Report		Chores Should Be Main Role (=1)		Woman's Happiness
	Index	on H's Earn (=1)	Index	on H's Earn (=1)	Family's Report	Woman's Report	(SD)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Promo Treat	0.187**	0.084*	0.040	0.016	0.006	-0.004	0.011
	(0.091)	(0.048)	(0.119)	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.098)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.016	0.376	0.000	0.389	0.856	0.832	0.000
N	793	793	559	558	764	793	795

Notes: All outcomes are from the four-month surveys. The outcome in column (1) is an index of indicators for women saying that they usually make household decisions about: spending on food, spending on clothing, spending on education, whether to purchase large household items, how much to save, what to do if a child falls sick, and how money their husbands earn is spent. I consider women to make decisions if they said they alone or they plus others decide. Column (2)'s outcome is the indicator for women making decisions about their husbands' earnings. The outcomes in columns (3) and (4) are the same as in columns (1) and (2), except they come from husbands' reports rather than women's reports. The outcomes in columns (5) and (6) are indicators for family members and women, respectively, saying a woman's main role should be to tend to household chores. The outcome in column (7) is women's reports of how happy they were overall in life, in units of standard deviations from the mean in the control group. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. The control means are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.9: Effects on Women's Time Use at One Year

	Paid Work		Chores		Leisure		Sleep/Rest		Other	
	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct	Hrs	Pct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.412*	108.284*	0.385	4.898	-0.529***	-29.752***	-0.138	-1.247	-0.168	-5.783
	(0.218)	(57.281)	(0.333)	(4.233)	(0.172)	(9.690)	(0.293)	(2.640)	(0.213)	(7.330)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.380	0.000	7.861	0.000	1.777	-0.000	11.080	-0.000	2.901	0.000
N	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674


Notes: This table presents the same analyses as Table 3, except the outcomes are from the one-year rather than four-month survey. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.10: Employment Transitions between Four Months and One Year

	Never Employed (1)	Stopped Employment (2)	Started Employment (3)	Always Employed (4)
Promo Treat	-0.024	0.070*	-0.076	0.030
	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.040)
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.497	0.113	0.265	0.126
N	606	606	606	606


Notes: The outcomes are based on employment at four months and one year (the outcomes in column (4) of Table 1 and column (2) of Table 5), and are only defined for women surveyed at both endlines. Column (1)'s outcome is an indicator for not being employed at either endline, column (2)'s outcome an indicator for being employed at four months but not one year, column (3)'s outcome an indicator for being employed at one year but not four months, and column (4)'s outcome an indicator for being employed at both endlines. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. The control means are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A.1: Hours Spent on Each Daytime Activity at 4 Months



Notes: This figure shows the hours women spent per day on each of the daytime activity options in the time use module at four months. The activities are grouped by category: paid work (W), household chores (C), leisure (L), sleep/rest (S), and other (O). Except for sleep/rest, each time use outcome in Table 3 is the sum of hours spent on activities in a category. The sleep/rest outcome in Table 3 is the sum of the daytime sleep/rest variable shown here and the nighttime sleep variable in Table A.6. The black dots are the means among women assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. The blue dots are the control means plus the promotion treatment effects. The treatment effects are the coefficients on a promotion treatment indicator from a regression which also includes a self-efficacy treatment indicator, the interaction between the promotion and self-efficacy treatment indicators, strata fixed effects, and baseline covariates selected via PDS Lasso (Belloni et al., 2014). Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample size for each regression is 793.

Figure A.2: Reasons for Dropping Out of the Firm's Program in the First Three Months



Notes: This figures visualizes the reasons women dropped out of the firm's program in its first three months, the months for which reasons for dropout were recorded. Each bar represents the percentage of women for whom a given reason was provided. Multiple reasons could be selected for each woman. The sample is restricted to women who (1) applied and were invited to participate (either when the program began or later from the waitlist), (2) attended at least once, (3) later dropped out, and (4) were assigned self-efficacy control.

Appendix B: Details on Outcomes

B.1 Women's Employment Outcomes

Applied to Program. This is an indicator for women in the main experiment applying to the firm's program on the official application day, the alternate application day, or outside of the two application days, and being in the correct age range (18-40). It comes from program participation data.

Attended Program. This is an indicator for women in the main experiment ever attending the firm's program prior to the average date of women's four-month surveys. It comes from program participation data.

Employed. On their surveys, women in the main experiment were asked whether they had worked to earn income for themselves or their families in any of the following employment sectors in the preceding two weeks: agriculture on own household's land, agriculture off own household's land, husbandry of own household's animals, husbandry of animals not owned by own household, own household's micro-enterprise, casual non-farm labor, Obeetee's women's weaving program, other employment with a firm,[25] anganwadi work, teaching, NREGA, or other. This outcome takes the value of 1 when women reported any work for income, and the value of 0 when women had done no work or said don't know.

Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon. This is an indicator for *Attended Program*, *Employed* at one week, or *Employed* at four months equaling 1. If any of these variables are missing, the outcome is defined based on the variables that are observed.

Paid Work Hrs. This comes from the time use module and is described in Section B.3 below.

No Emp, but Good Opinion. This is an indicator for (1) *Paid Work Hrs* and *Any Emp., 1 Wk–4 Mon* equaling zero, *and* (2) *Program Good* or *Ok for W to Work* according to family members at four months equaling one. It is only defined for women who completed the four-month time-use module and whose family members were surveyed at four months. See Section B.2 below for details on *Program Good* and *Ok for W to Work*.

[25] On the one-week survey, done before the firm's program began, this and the preceding category were replaced with a single option for employment with a firm.

Employed at Firm. This comes from the same question as *Employed*. It takes the value of 1 when women said they had worked in the firm's program, and 0 if they had worked only in other sectors, had done no work, or said don't know.

Never Employed, Stopped Employment, Started Employment, and *Always Employed.* These are indicators for each possible combination of *Employed* at four months and one year. Specifically, they are indicators for not being employed at either endline, being employed at four months and not one year, being employed at one year and not four months, and being employed at both endlines. They are only defined for women surveyed at both endlines.

B.2 Opinions Outcomes

Program Good. Respondents in the opinions survey experiment and main experiment were asked how good they thought the firm's weaving training and employment opportunity for women was. The options were (1) bad - very, (2) bad - somewhat, (3) good - somewhat, (4) good - very, and (5) don't know. This outcome takes the value of 1 when family members chose (3) or (4), and the value of 0 if they chose (1), (2), or (5). I convert responses to a binary variable so that I can test for effects on women not working but their family members having favorable opinions of work (in column (7) of Table 1), an analysis that is most straightforward with binary variables.

Financial Value Index. This is an index of three variables from the opinions survey experiment. The first comes from a question asking respondents if they thought the amount women in the firm's program would be paid is too low, too high, or reasonable. The first variable takes the value of 1 if they said the pay was reasonable or too high, and 0 if they said too low or don't know. Respondents were also asked if they thought the hours women would be expected to work are too long, too short, or reasonable. The second variable takes the value of 1 if they said reasonable or too short, and 0 if they said too long or don't know. The third comes from a question asking respondents to assess on a 1-4 scale how stable they thought the work in the program was. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

Physical Space Index. This is an index of two variables from the opinions survey experiment. Respondents were asked to assess on a 1-4 scale how good the facilities in the loom center would be and how safe women participating in the program would be. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

Workplace Interactions Index. This is an index of three variables from the opinions survey experiment. The first two come from questions asking respondents to assess on a 1-4 scale the extent to which women participating in the program would get along well with one another and the extent to which they would be respected by people who supervise them during work. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3. The third variable comes from a question asking respondents how often they thought women participating in the program would be around men who are not in their households. The options were never, once every few months, once a month, 2-3 times a month, once a week, 2-6 times a week, once a day, more than once a day, and don't know. The third variable in the index takes the value of 1 when family members said never; it takes the value of 0 when they provided any other response, including don't know.

Ok for W to Work. Respondents in the opinions survey experiment and main experiment were asked if it is alright if women go out for work to earn money. This outcome is an indicator for saying yes rather than no or don't know.

Expect Same Chores. Family members in the opinions survey experiment were asked if they would expect their wife/daughter-in-law to do the same amount of household chores as she does now if she enrolled in the firm's program. This variable takes the value of 1 if they said yes, and 0 if they said no or don't know.

Would Help. Family members in the opinions survey experiment were asked if they would plan to do more household chores than they do now if their wife/daughter-in-law enrolled in the firm's program. This variable takes the value of 1 if they said yes, and 0 if they said no or don't know.

Could Care for Kids. Family members in the opinions survey experiment were asked if they thought their wife/daughter-in-law would be able to properly care for her children if she enrolled in the firm's program. This variable takes the value of 1 if they said yes, and 0 if they said no or don't know.

Chores Should Be Main Role. Respondents in the opinions survey experiment and main experiment were asked if they think a woman's main role should be to tend to household chores like cooking, cleaning, and managing children. This outcome takes the value of 1 if respondents said yes, and the value of 0 if respondents said no or don't know.

Good, or Work Ok. This is an indicator for *Program Good* or *Ok for W to Work* equaling 1.

W's HH Control Index. This is an index of two variables from the opinions survey experiment. Family members were asked who in their households they thought would decide how money their wife/daughter-in-law earned were spent if she enrolled in the firm's program. The first variable takes the value of 1 if they said the woman alone or the woman and other household members would decide; it takes the value of 0 if they said others would decide or said don't know. The second variable comes from a question that asked family members to assess on a 1-4 scale the extent to which they thought participation in the firm's program would lead their wife/daughter-in-law to make more important decisions in their households. Responses of 3 and 4 were re-coded to 4 and 5, respectively, and don't know responses set to 3.

B.3 Time Use Outcomes

These outcomes come from a time use module administered in the main experiment. Respondents were asked what time they woke up and went to bed the previous day (rounded to the nearest hour) and then asked what they did each hour in between. As much as possible, surveys were scheduled so that the previous day would have been a workday, not a Sunday or a holiday.[26] Surveyors matched responses for each waking hour to one or more of the following options:

1. Sleeping or resting
2. Personal hygiene (e.g. bathing, getting dressed, urinating/defecating, etc)
3. Eating
4. Preparing/serving food
5. Cleaning (e.g. cleaning the home, cleaning utensils, etc)
6. Washing clothes
7. Fetching water or firewood
8. Tending to own livestock
9. Tending to own field

[26]Saturdays are generally workdays in my setting.

10. Producing item for household consumption (e.g. cow dung cakes, baskets, blankets, making/repairing clothes, etc)
11. Building or repairing own home
12. Caring for young children (e.g. bathing young children, supervising young children, playing with young children, etc)
13. Educating children (e.g. helping children with homework/studies, taking children to school, etc)
14. Going to market or store
15. Work for in kind payment, at home
16. Work for in kind payment, outside home
17. Work for income, at home
18. Work for income, outside home
19. Seeking health care for self
20. Seeking health care for child
21. Seeking health care for other adult
22. In transit to destination outside of neighborhood
23. Spending time with friends or family, at home
24. Spending time with friends or family, outside of home but in village
25. Spending time with friends or family, outside of village
26. Talking on phone with household member
27. Talking on phone with friend or family member who lives outside of home but in village
28. Talking on phone with friend or family member who lives outside of village
29. Studying or learning something new
30. Gambling
31. Watching television or listening to music
32. Praying at home
33. Visiting temple
34. Attending organized village activity outside of home (e.g. village fair, self-help group meeting, panchayat meeting, wedding, funeral)

35. Other
36. Don't know

I total the hours spent on each activity across the day. When multiple activities were selected for an hour, I allocate the hour evenly across the activities. I compute the time allocated to the don't know option in the same way, meaning don't know's are counted as 0 minutes for every other category. The don't know option was selected very rarely; don't know occupies less than 15 seconds of the day for the average woman who completed the time-use module at four months.

Paid Work Hrs. This is the total hours spent on activities 15, 16, 17, or 18.

Chores Hrs. This is the total hours spent on activities 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.

Leisure Hrs. This is the total hours spent on activities 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, or 34.

Sleep/Rest Hrs. This is the hours spent on activity 1 plus the hours of nighttime sleep. The latter is computed based on the times reported for waking up and going to bed the previous day. If respondents said they woke up before 12am the preceding day, their wake-up time is treated as 12am. If they reported going to bed after 12am on the current day, they are treated as having gone to bed at 12am.

Other Hrs. This is the total hours spent on activities 2, 3, 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 35, or 36.

Paid Work, Chores, Leisure, Sleep/Rest, and *Other Pct.* These variables are the percent difference of hours spent on the given category from the control mean (the mean in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment). For instance,

$$Chores\ Pct = 100 \times \frac{Chores\ Hrs - \text{Avg}(Chores\ Hrs)}{\text{Avg}(Chores\ Hrs)}$$

Work Hrs > 0. This is an indicator for *Paid Work Hrs* being positive.

Night Sleep Hrs. This is the same as *Sleep/Rest Hrs*, except that it excludes time devoted

to activity 1.

Outside Hrs. This is the total hours spent on activities 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 33, or 34.

Outside & Not Work Hrs. This is the same as *Outside Hrs*, except that it excludes time spent on activities 16 or 18.

B.4 Miscellaneous Outcomes

W Makes Decisions Index. Women and husbands in the main experiment were asked who in their households usually makes decisions about: spending on food, spending on clothing, spending on children's education, whether to purchase large household items, how much money to save, what to do if a child falls sick, and how money the husband earns will be spent. For each category of decisions, I create an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the woman or the woman plus others was said to make the decision, and the value of 0 if respondents said others make such decisions, don't know, or not applicable (because their households do not make such decisions). This outcome is an index of these seven indicators, standardized against the mean in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment.

W Makes Decisions on H's Earn. This is one component of the *W Makes Decisions Index*, namely, the indicator for women making decisions about spending their husbands' earnings.

Woman's Happiness. Women in the main experiment were asked if overall in life they were not at all happy, not very happy, rather happy, or very happy. I assign these responses the values of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. I assign any don't know responses the value of 3 to be consistent with how I handle don't know's for psychological outcomes in McKelway (2025), though I note the effect on this outcome looks similar if I instead assign don't know's a 3 on a 1-5 scale like I do for the opinions outcomes described above. I then convert the variable into units of standard deviations from the mean in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment.

Appendix C: Incentivized Measures of Decision-Making

In addition to the survey measures, I implemented incentivized choices to measure household decision-making. The choice that captures bargaining power involves a cross-randomization so has limited power, but effects on it are broadly consistent with the treatment raising women's bargaining power. I discuss the incentivized measures and effects on them here. All results are presented in Table C.1. Note that the incentivized measures are likely to satisfy exclusion for the same reasons as the survey measures of decision-making are (see Section 4.5 for a discussion on exclusion for the survey measures).

Women who took the four-month survey were invited to enter lotteries at no cost. Each lottery offered various prizes and women had to choose during the survey the prizes they would want in case they won. The prize for the winner of the first lottery would be 500 rupees allocated as she wished across four goods: women's bangles, men's sunglasses, women's saris/salwar suits, and men's pants/kurtas. Husbands surveyed at four months were invited to enter an identical lottery for men. Women who entered the lotteries were also entered into a second drawing, provided they were married. The prize in this second lottery was the winner's choice between: (1) the same allocation of 500 rupees across the four goods that her husband had or would choose during his survey,[27] and (2) an allocation of $500-P$ rupees her husband would choose after a discussion with her. A randomization set P, the price of discussion, to 0, 50, or 100. The discussion, if chosen, would happen at a later time and only for the winner.[28] The treatment did not affect whether individuals entered the lotteries (columns (1)-(2) of Table C.1).

I first consider women's allocations in the first lottery. Kabeer (1999) argues part of disempowerment is an internalization of a lesser status that affects women's preferences. The money women allocated towards goods for themselves could be seen as reflecting this preference dimension of empowerment. It is also possible that this outcome captures women's control in the household since the winner's prize would not necessarily be hidden from her husband. Either way, greater spending on women's goods would be consistent with greater empowerment. The treatment raised the amount of money women allocated towards women's goods (column (3) of Table C.1), consistent with employment empowering women. On the other hand, I find no effects on husbands' spending or on women's predictions of their husbands' spending (columns (4)-(6)).

[27]Women were not told what their husbands had chosen, and often their husbands had not yet been surveyed when women made their choices, so this decision reflects what women thought their husbands would choose.

[28]I note two limitations in the discussion choice as implemented in my study. First, many husbands were ultimately not surveyed. Second, women could have chosen not to discuss in the game but instead persuaded their husbands outside of the game to change the prize the husbands selected in their lottery.

I then turn to women's discussion decisions, the incentivized decision that most closely captures bargaining power. In making this decision, a woman would have traded off the utility she expected to gain from a joint allocation of $500-P$ rupees rather than her husband's allocation of 500 rupees, against the time and effort cost of having a discussion. Increasing women's bargaining power could make them more or less likely to choose discussion. Greater bargaining power would give women more control in the discussion, motivating them to choose that option. But greater bargaining power would also mean women had more money in their control outside of the lotteries that they could spend on women's goods, which could make discussing this particular spending decision not worth the time and effort. The price of discussion varies the strength of these two forces. The higher P, the less money to be bargained over in the joint decision, and the weaker the first force would be. Thus an increase in bargaining power could make women more likely to choose discussion at low prices, but less likely at high prices. Games used previously to measure women's agency in the household are designed around one of these two forces (Almas et al., 2018; Schaner, 2017), while the price variation here offers a way to account for both.

However, this cross-randomization reduces power; I do not see strong effects of the promotion on the first-stage employment outcomes at each prize level (columns (7)-(9) of Table C.1). The promotion produced positive, and often sizeable, effects at each prize level on each first-stage outcome, but only three of the effects are statistically significant.

I present effects on discussion choice for completeness, but interpret results with caution given the weak first stage results. I find a positive but insignificant effect on discussion choice at the low price, no effect at the middle price, and a significant negative effect at the high price (column (10) of Table C.1). This pattern is consistent with an increase in bargaining power, but again, should be interpreted with caution.

Table C.1: Effects on Incentivized Measures of Decision-Making

	Entered Lotteries		Spending on W's Goods		W's Prediction of H's Spending		Employed, at 4 Mon	Any Emp, Treat–4 Mon	Hrs Work, at 4 Mon	W Chose Discussion
	Woman	Husband	Woman	Husband	Don't Know Missing	Don't Know = 250	Discussion Sample	Discussion Sample	Discussion Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Promo Treat	0.023	-0.008	23.250**	-1.644	10.245	5.007	0.099	0.114	0.879*	0.128
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(11.218)	(24.005)	(22.988)	(18.586)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.499)	(0.079)
Mid Price							0.055	0.016	0.316	-0.183**
							(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.447)	(0.089)
Promo Treat X Mid Price							-0.036	-0.007	-0.704	-0.129
							(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.675)	(0.124)
High Price							0.057	-0.006	-0.103	-0.117
							(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.388)	(0.090)
Promo Treat X High Price							0.043	0.138	-0.101	-0.338***
							(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.741)	(0.122)
P-Value: Promo + Promo X Mid = 0							0.443	0.182	0.710	0.994
P-Value: Promo + Promo X High = 0							0.081*	0.003***	0.130	0.021**
SE, SE X Promo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE Arms X Prices	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PDS Lasso X	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	0.694	0.465	410.894	326.500	192.361	202.571	0.196	0.375	0.938	0.696
N	1022	1022	720	465	561	706	705	705	705	705

Notes: The outcomes in columns (1) and (2) are indicators for women and husbands entering the lotteries. The outcome in column (3) is the amount women allocated, in rupees, to women's goods (i.e. bangles or saris/salwar suits) in their first lottery. Column (4)'s outcome is the amount husbands allocated to women's goods. The outcome in columns (5) and (6) is women's predictions of how much their husbands would allocate towards women's goods. Don't know's are set to missing in column (5), while in column (6) they are coded as 250, the expected value with a uniform belief distribution. The outcomes in columns (7)-(9) are the same as those in columns (4)-(6) of Table 1. The outcome in column (10) is an indicator for women choosing discussion in their second lottery. Columns (7)-(9) only include women for whom column (10)'s outcome is observed. "Mid Price" and "High Price" are indicators for being assigned the medium and high discussion prices. "SE, SE X Promo" denotes an indicator for self-efficacy treatment and the interaction between the self-efficacy and promotion treatment indicators. "SE Arms X Prices" denotes four interactions between each discussion price variable and the controls for the self-efficacy treatment arms. The control means in columns (1)-(6) are averages in the group assigned neither the promotion nor self-efficacy treatment. The means in columns (7)-(10) are averages in the group assigned neither treatment and assigned no discussion price. Standard errors are clustered by household. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix D: Pre-Registration Appendix

Here I detail deviations from the outcomes described in the document I uploaded to the original study's registration. See Section 3.4 for background on the document and registration.

The most substantial deviation is to focus the paper on the time use primary outcomes. This is due to concerns about statistical power; the first-stage effect on employment is not large enough to expect effects on many downstream outcomes in a sample of my size, unless they are effects that nearly all women who become employed are likely to experience. For instance, one of the registered primary outcomes is whether women had a savings goal at four months. When I estimate the effect on this outcome using equation (1), the standard error on the promotion treatment coefficient is 0.047. A back-of-the-envelope calculation using this standard error suggests the effect on this outcome would need to be at least 7.8 percentage points for me to detect a significant effect at the 10% level. Recall the effect on employment at four months was 9.6 percentage points, while the effect on any employment between the intervention and four months was 16.0 percentage points (Table 1). In other words, I could only detect an effect on savings goals if employment shifted goals for 49-81% of women (depending on whether I consider any employment post intervention or only employment at four months), which seems implausibly high.

Time use, on the other hand, will shift for any women who are employed. I therefore focus the paper on time use. I keep several other categories of primary outcomes which are likely to shift for most women who become employed and which fit into the narrative of a paper on time use, namely: household decision-making, women's mobility, women's happiness, and gender attitudes about women's employment. I exclude the following categories of outcomes because they are unlikely to shift for all employed women or because they do not tie into the narrative around time use: women's risk taking, women's generalized self-efficacy, gender attitudes about topics aside from women's employment,[29] husbands' work, household saving, fertility, and children's education.

The other deviations, and their rationale, are as follows:

- Rather than restricting the sample to the self-efficacy control group, I include the full sample and control for the self-efficacy treatment arms. This improves power in estimating the strata fixed effects.

- While I present effects on time use at one year, I do not present effects on any other primary outcomes at that endline as the effect on employment had faded by then.

[29] i.e. Attitudes about women's involvement in household decision-making, women's ideas, domestic violence, and female children.

- I do not consider the primary outcomes on women's involvement in decisions regarding their work (i.e. whether they work and how their earnings are spent) because: (i) the treatment could have had a direct effect on family members' involvement in decisions about women's work, separate from any effect via employment, and (ii) the treatment would have affected whether women had earnings and not just who controlled them.
- I add effects on women's predictions of husbands' spending in the incentivized task as many husbands were not surveyed and as these outcomes are useful for interpreting effects on women's incentivized discussion decisions.
- I add daytime sleep/rest to the sleep time use category and add an "other" time use category so that time use outcomes sum to 24 hours.
- The outcome on attitudes about women's employment has one component relating to women's role as homemakers, while the rest are related to acceptability of women's work outside the home. I focus only on the former because results from the opinions survey suggest the treatment may have directly affected the latter, which would be a violation of exclusion. I do, however, use family reports on whether it is ok for a woman to work to investigate whether effects on women's employment capture the full first-stage effect.
- The document mentions excluding gender attitudes variables for which over 75% of control group responses are the same. The women's role as homemakers variable would technically be excluded by this criteria (with around 85% of control responses being the same), but I keep it because it is useful for understanding why employment did not result in a larger re-allocation of household chores.
- I add effects on opinions about Obeetee's program from family members at four months and women at one year. I use the former to investigate whether effects on women's employment capture the full first-stage effect, while I use the latter to investigate why the effect on employment faded.
- For brevity, I focus on seven categories of secondary outcomes rather than the full set of 20 listed. I focus on outcomes that: (i) were strongly affected by the treatment and document how the treatment might have changed employment, (ii) were not affected but were discussed a great deal in the treatment, or (iii) test the exclusion assumption.
- To match what I do for primary outcomes, I study secondary outcomes at the woman level rather than at the family-member level or separately for husbands, mothers-in-law, and fathers-in-law.

- I make three modifications to the secondary outcomes on basic program details and exposure to men: (i) I exclude opinions on distance to the loom center because many respondents said the loom center was too close to their house for a woman in their household to participate, which suggests the question was not well understood, (ii) I split the index into indices on the financial value of the program, the physical workspace, and workplace interactions as this makes it clearer which opinions about the program were changed, and (iii) I put the outcome on exposure to men in the workplace interactions index as that outcome is a component of work-related interactions.

- I exclude one item – woman will be part of enrollment decision – from the secondary outcome index on women's control in the household. The two items I consider provide a more direct test of exclusion for the household decision-making outcomes.

- I present effects on the two components of the household chores secondary outcome separately rather than in an index. I felt it was best to present the full set of effects on these outcomes as they test the paper's core exclusion assumption.

- I make three modifications to the secondary outcome on attitudes about women's employment: (i) I exclude the component on men and women earning to contribute to the household because it has virtually no variation,[30] (ii) I present effects on the component on a woman's main role on its own as it helps test the paper's core exclusion assumption, and (iii) I exclude the component on husbands' and wives' earnings as the treatment did not directly target this belief (and indeed I see no effect on it).

- The document discusses aggregating by indexing components and jointly testing effects on individual components. For brevity, I only do the former.

[30] In the control group, 97% of respondents said both should contribute.

Appendix E: Details on Promotion Intervention

Transcript of Promotion Intervention

Information on Job Perks

Surveyor: Great. Now I'll provide a few additional details about this opportunity. The loom center is completely new and was constructed for this program. The center has water and toilet facilities. The program allows women to bring young children to work and take care of them while working. The loom owner will provide cradles for young children and will also provide a completely private area for feeding of young children. Both during and after training, the only weavers in this center will be women from this area. There will be no male weavers working in this center. I will now show you a short video about this opportunity on behalf of Obeetee.

Video Transcript

Female Narrator: Greetings. I want to tell you about a unique and exciting opportunity your household has been selected for. This is a special woman's weaving training and employment program arranged by Obeetee. Now let us talk to an Obeetee official.

Obeetee Official: I am [name, omitted from transcript to protect confidentiality] and I manage all of Obeetee's hand-knotted carpet weaving business. The working environment for people who work here is really good and the weavers who are associated with the company also work under a good environment. I would like to reiterate that all of you should be aware about this program and come to work under this program.

Female Narrator: Today we will meet a few households who have participated in this program in other villages. Now, let us talk to a loom owner.

Female Loom Owner: Only females work in this loom. The male loom center is located separately. Only the female center is located here and only females work here. They live nearby. I am responsible for ensuring the safety of the women who work here. If any need arises, if their children have any problem, they tell me and I solve them as much as I can. For very small kids, we have arranged a cradle. The females feed their children and put them to sleep in the cradle after that. The children keep sleeping while women continue their work. Once the child wakes up, she can check up on them since they're nearby. There is also a toilet facility and water supply available. People don't have to go outside since everything is available here. They come between 8-8:30am and work for around 4 hours and go home at 12pm. The lunch lasts for 1 hour. When they leave at 12pm, they eat food, solve any issues

at home and return after an hour. If they live far away, there are arrangements for them. There is a room for them to have lunch and it also has a water facility available. They wash their tiffins and keep them here itself.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to the husband of another loom owner.

Husband of Another Loom Owner: The unemployed women from 2-3 nearby villages came to our loom and work in the loom operated by Obeetee. Only females work in the female center, not males. Their household members are very satisfied with their work because they complete household chores both in the morning and in the afternoon. They come during the day and work from 8am to 5pm and have lunch in the afternoon and also earn money. The place is also safe for them to work. Till 8am, they finish off all their household chores and because they live nearby and in case of emergencies, because they live nearby, they can go home easily since there are no hindrances. They maintain a cordial relationship with each other and are positively predisposed to each other. If need be, they can borrow and lend amongst one other. I also maintain a brotherly relationship with them and help them overcome any problems. This helps them out and this improves their household financial status.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to a female weaver.

Female Weaver 1: I wake up at 5 in the morning and then I keep something to cook on the stove, then I prepare tiffins for my children. Then after washing clothes, I report to the loom at 8am to work. Then I go back to my home after 5pm. Then I meet my kids and ask them what they were taught in school that day. Then they tell me, then I give them some homework which they complete while I complete other household work. The loom is always very clean. The atmosphere is also very cordial and all the females working here are my friends. I like meeting and talking to them. Spending time with them helps me overcome any emotional trouble and I get to learn something new. The atmosphere is also very cordial.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to another female weaver.

Female Weaver 2: I feel very happy that I am working here and I want that if I am working, so should everyone else. Eating and drinking facilities are also available here. There is an electric handpump installed nearby. I am very happy that everything is really nice here.

Female Narrator: Now let us talk to a female weaver's husband.

Husband of a Female Weaver: My wife is weaving at the center. I feel really good. She needs to wake up a little early in the morning to do household chores, she finishes off her

work by 8am and then reaches the center. After that, when her shift gets over at 5pm, she takes a little bit more time than usual and finishes off her household chores like cooking and washing utensils by 9pm, which she earlier used to be done by 8pm. She thinks positively that if everybody works in the household, the household will progress and this is why she is very satisfied (with her work). Earlier, fewer women used to work in the loom but after watching them work, more women started working.

Female Narrator: As you can see, this is a very attractive and unique training and employment opportunity. I hope you make the best out of this unique and exciting opportunity. Thank you.

Figure E.1: Screenshot from Video



Notes: This figure shows a screenshot from the video used in the promotion intervention. In it, a female weaver in the firm's program is discussing her experience in the program while seated at her workstation.