How Taxing Bachelors Empowered Italian Women

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Abstract

Unpaid domestic work continues to fall largely on women, despite their growing presence in the workforce. This paper asks whether policies changing the relative bargaining position of spouses can disrupt this pattern. I use the introduction of a bachelor tax in fascist Italy to show that altering men's incentives to marry shaped the allocation of domestic work. Men in tax-induced marriages took on more domestic work, while their wives gained time, agency, and better economic outcomes. Effects are long-lasting and transmitted across generations: women raised in households with more equitable labor divisions also perform less housework. The findings suggest shocks in bargaining power can loosen the hold of social norms and reconfigure domestic life.

Keywords: domestic work, female labor force participation, intra-household bargaining, bachelor tax, marriage market, gender-based taxation.


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1 Introduction

Women's increasing involvement in the labor force has not alleviated their unequal share of household responsibilities. The unequal distribution of unpaid labor persists worldwide: in Scandinavian countries, women perform 30 percent more housework than men, while in conservative societies like Iraq and Pakistan, they do up to ten times as much (see Figure 1).[1] A survey conducted in Italy revealed that 88 percent of married women performed the majority of housework, yet only 16 percent found this division satisfactory (ISTAT 2013). In particular, this pattern holds even when women earn the same as or more than their husbands (Bertrand et al. 2015). Such disparities limit women's leisure time and labor market opportunities, while also hindering social welfare by perpetuating traditional gender roles and underutilizing human capital (Hsieh et al. 2019; Bertrand 2020; Boerma and Karabarbounis 2021).

Figure 1: Domestic Work and Unpaid Care by Gender



Note: Unpaid care and domestic work includes food preparation, dishwashing, upkeep of a dwelling, laundry, ironing, gardening, caring for pets, shopping, servicing and repair of personal and household goods, childcare, and care of the sick, elderly or disabled household members, among others. Data from the United Nation, Statistics Division, 2024 version.

Current academic thinking highlights three fundamentally distinct explanations for the origin of this gender gap (see Albanesi et al. (2024) for a recent review). One view that could sustain such a finding is comparative advantage: women may be inherently more productive (or derive more pleasure) in performing activities such as home duties or childcare (Becker 1991). In this case, the gendered allocation of housework would simply be a manifestation of essential differences between men and women. A second explanation

[1]For time-use studies highlighting the greater share of domestic responsibilities undertaken by women, see Aguiar and Hurst (2007), Burda et al. (2013), and Andrew et al. (2024). A gender gap is also evident in *total* work hours, combining both market and domestic labor (see Appendix Figure C1).

emphasizes gender norms: culturally and socially transmitted beliefs about what men and women ought to do (Bertrand et al. 2015). These norms can shape preferences and behavior independently of economic incentives (Ichino et al. 2024). A third explanation suggests that the gendered distribution of housework may indicate an imbalance in bargaining power between spouses (Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Alesina et al. 2011). Under this perspective, the allocation of housework is a negotiated outcome that reflects each partner's relative outside options. This view highlights the policy relevance of the issue: if the distribution of housework is driven by bargaining dynamics, rather than preferences or norms alone, then it may be responsive to economic shocks and policy interventions.

This paper leverages a quasi-natural experiment to examine how reducing the bargaining power of unmarried men in the marriage market affects the intra-couple allocation of housework. I use the introduction of a bachelor tax during fascist Italy (1927-1943) as a shock to the distribution of bargaining power. During this period, unmarried men faced a tax liability that was 25 to 75 percent higher than that of married individuals. Women, instead, were exempted from the tax. As a result, the cost of singlehood for men increased, while women gained bargaining power due to higher demand in the marriage market. I test the following prediction derived from a simple search framework: in marriages formed under the pressure of the bachelor tax, women leverage their strengthened bargaining position to negotiate a more equitable division of housework.

It is not ex ante clear whether this distribution factor shock can impact the division of domestic labor. The fascist regime idealized men as breadwinners, while women were primarily envisioned as mothers and wives (Saraceno 1994). The government's explicit goal was not to redistribute household responsibilities, but to promote marriage and boost fertility.[2] This raises a key empirical question: to what extent can socially constructed gender roles be influenced by shocks or policies that alter the relative bargaining power between spouses?

The features of the bachelor tax, which specifically targeted unmarried wealthy men aged 25 to 65, provide the basis for a triple-difference and event-study approach. I leverage three sources of variation: temporal (the tax was enforced between 1927 and 1943), cross-cohort (affecting men who married after turning 25), and across income groups (the tax mainly targeted top incomes). Therefore, a marriage is considered to have occurred under the influence of the tax if it took place between 1927 and 1943 and involved a wealthy groom who was at least 25 years old. The empirical approach rests on comparing marriages "more exposed" to the bachelor tax with those where the groom was ineligible due to his age, the year of the marriage, or his presumed income. The analysis rests on the "Aspects of Daily Life" surveys, which provide information on time spent on domestic work,[3] demographic, and socio-economic characteristics of couples who married during

[2] As prior demographic studies have shown (see, e.g., Forcucci 2010), this policy did not succeed in increasing birth rates. The demographic effects will be discussed in Section 2.4.

[3] Throughout the paper, I use the terms "domestic work", "housework", and "domestic labor" interchangeably. In line with the classification proposed in the OECD Time Use Database, it refers to the time household members spend on activities such as housecleaning, cooking, caregiving, and household maintenance.

and after the bachelor tax period.

The event-study evidence shows that the effects of the bachelor tax are concentrated exactly where treatment exposure predicts: (i) among couples where the husband was over 25 at the time of marriage; (ii) among those who married while the tax was in force; and (iii) among wealthier households. Quantitatively, the share of housework performed by wives falls by about one-fourth in affected couples. This redistribution translates into a decline of 11.5 hours of domestic work per week for wives, offset by a 5.2-hour increase for husbands.[4] Estimates remain remarkably similar when controlling for each spouse's birth cohort, age at marriage, education, wealth, and region of residence. This suggests that the reallocation of marital output is not explained by differences in marital quality or socio-economic and demographic characteristics, but rather by the altered bargaining conditions induced by the tax.

An important feature of the data is that the earliest survey waves were collected after the abolition of the bachelor tax, when couples directly exposed to the policy were already older, with many in retirement.[5] This feature allows the analysis to capture the *long-run* legacy of bargaining conditions established at the time of marriage. Consistent with partial commitment models of the household (Mazzocco 2007; Theloudis et al. 2025), the survey evidence shows that the division of household labor is remarkably stable over the lifecycle: the female share of domestic work remains relatively constant across marriage duration and partners' ages. A likely reason for such persistence is that couples had little opportunity to renegotiate arrangements once the tax was repealed, as divorce was unavailable in Italy until 1971.

Did these persistent differences in household labor division translate into changes in labor market participation? Using retrospective questions on labor force participation, I find that the decrease in women's housework is associated with a reduction in their probability of leaving the labor force for family-related reasons. In contrast, there is no significant effect on their spouses' labor market participation. Consistent with the "battle of the sexes" game theory problem (Cooper et al. 1993), lower domestic work and enhanced female bargaining power influenced not only the quantity but also the *type* of leisure activities. While no significant change is observed in attendance at sports-related events (a typical male activity), there is a significant increase in participation in dance-related events (traditionally favored by women) for both spouses. As a result, the bachelor tax improved

[4] To put this magnitude into perspective, Bertrand et al. (2015) show that U.S. wives increase their home production by about 3 hours per week (roughly a 10% rise) when they start to earn more than their husbands, interpreted as a compensatory response to the violation of the male breadwinner model. The bachelor tax represents a different type of shock, which altered the relative bargaining power of men and women at the point of marriage entry. This arguably generates more substantial and persistent changes in household labor arrangements than reactive adjustments to norm violations within existing marriages.

[5] Domestic production remains highly relevant at older ages, encompassing care work, household chores, and other forms of time use. Retirement may even sharpen the signal of bargaining power, as both spouses are out of the labor market and the household becomes the central sphere of economic interaction. This reduces concerns that results are confounded by labor market participation, occupational choices, or efficiency considerations common among working-age individuals (Browning and Chiappori 1998; Goldin and Katz 2011; Goussé et al. 2017).

women's quality of life. Women who married due to the tax are more likely to report feeling healthy and economically satisfied.

Changes in assortative matching, fertility, or education choices do not drive these effects. Moreover, there is no evidence of increased reliance on domestic workers or other labor-saving technologies for housework (e.g., washing machines) among couples marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax. These findings support the interpretation of the bachelor tax as a distribution factor shock that enhanced women's bargaining power. However, the domestic work reallocation effect is attenuated in couples likely to adhere to more conservative gender norms, suggesting that cultural expectations constrain the negotiation of household responsibilities (see, among others, Alesina et al. 2011, Bertrand et al. 2015, Goussé et al. 2017, Cavapozzi et al. 2024, Ichino et al. 2024).

Using multigenerational information from the survey data, I provide evidence that the effects of the bachelor tax extend across generations: daughters of mothers who married under the influence of the tax also present lower hours of domestic work. On average, a one-hour reduction in a mother's weekly domestic work leads to an approximate 0.235 hours (i.e., around 14 minutes) decrease in her daughter's weekly domestic work. This result suggests that the experience of growing up in a home where the mother performs fewer domestic chores can help daughters internalize less conventional norms, potentially leading to greater labor market engagement (Fernández et al. 2004, Alesina et al. 2013, Farré and Vella 2013, Bertrand 2019, Grosjean and Khattar 2019, Farré et al. 2023).

This paper contributes to the literature on gender inequality, taxation, and family economics in several ways. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first study to examine the effects of taxing bachelors, a historically popular policy tool aimed at promoting childbirth (see Section 2.1 for a historical overview). While bachelor taxes have largely disappeared as explicit policies, their legacy persists in modern income tax systems, where variations in tax rates, credits, or exemptions based on marital status function as indirect manifestations of this concept.[6]

I show that a bachelor tax, as a form of gender-based taxation, provides an instrument to address within-household inequality. Alesina et al. (2011) develop a model that is able to explain several facts of the time use behavior of men and women. They develop optimal gender-specific linear tax schedules following the Ramsey tradition. However, their proposed tax schedules are applied to individuals regardless of marital status, making their approach distinct from policies that impose differential income taxation solely on bachelors. Nevertheless, this paper's findings lend empirical support to the theoretical mechanism proposed by Alesina et al. (2011): gender-based taxation can influence the bargaining positions of men and women, shaping marriage market dynamics. The results imply that tax policy influences not only economic incentives for marriage, but also the

[6]Many government programs have implicit penalties or subsidies for marriage (OECD 2022). For instance, the U.S. General Accounting Office has identified 1049 federal laws in which marital status is a factor (Alm et al. 1999). See Apps and Rees (1988, 1996, 1999), Giommoni and Rubolino (2025), and Ichino et al. (2024) for evidence of how family taxation affects intra-household choices.

allocation of responsibilities within households. This is particularly important given that many existing studies, as Gayle and Shephard (2019) point out, "take the married unit as given and ignore the distortionary effect of taxation on who gets married, to whom they get married, and the intra-household allocation of resources."

The literature that analyzes how couples' decisions depend on factors that influence each spouse's relative bargaining power also relates to this work. The collective approach to household behavior (Chiappori 1988, 1992) emphasizes the significance of decision-making power within the household. Chiappori et al. (2002) propose a model of household decision-making that implies bargains are efficient. In such models, a bachelor tax is an exogenous "distribution factor" shock that differently affects spouses' bargaining power.[7] Several empirical studies have explored factors influencing spousal bargaining power, including divorce laws (Stevenson 2008, Voena 2015, Persson 2020), sex ratios (Angrist 2002; Grosjean and Khattar 2019; Teso 2019; Battistin et al. 2022), alimony laws (Chiappori et al. 2017), access to birth control and the legalization of abortion (Goldin and Katz 2002; Chiappori and Oreffice 2008), targeted policies that lower the child care burden (Doepke and Kindermann 2019), and dowry and bride price (Anderson and Bidner 2015). While much of the literature emphasizes the impact on female labor force participation, it overlooks the fact that changes in market hours do not necessarily translate to changes in domestic labor, especially when housework is culturally viewed as a woman's responsibility (West and Zimmerman 1987; Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2010; Apps 2004; Bertrand et al. 2015; Bertrand 2019).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the origins and implementation of the bachelor tax in Fascist Italy. Section 3 presents a simple search model showing how a bachelor tax can influence the division of marital output in marriages formed under the tax. Section 4 outlines the empirical approach and the data. Section 5 presents evidence of how the bachelor tax empowered Italian women, while intergenerational effects are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 Historical Background

This section provides a historical synopsis of the bachelor tax. Far from being a policy solely implemented during Italian fascism, the tax has been a popular tool throughout history as a means to promote childbirth (Section 2.1). Section 2.2 and 2.3 provide details on the policy and historical context. Finally, Section 2.4 presents the demographic effects.

2.1 A Brief History on Taxing Bachelors

Historically, marriage has often been promoted to encourage childbirth, with bachelor taxes serving as a means to this end. The practice dates back to ancient Rome, where

[7] This concept dates back to Becker (1991) (chapter 3), who highlighted marriage market conditions as a crucial determinant of intrahousehold utility distribution.

censors imposed taxes on unmarried men to incentivize family formation. A notable example is the *Lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus*, created by the Emperor Augustus in 9 AD (Long 1875). This law included the *aes uxorium* tax, imposed on unmarried men aged 25 to 60, and additional penalties to bachelors, such as the forfeiture of inheritance rights and exclusion from public festivities.[8]

Similar measures have emerged globally.[9] In medieval France, the town of Nevers taxed bachelors (Chisholm 1910), while the Ottoman Empire introduced a bachelor tax named the *resm-i mücerred* to motivate men to start families (Cosgel 2005). England's 1695 Marriage Duty Act taxed bachelors and widowers, later evolving into a more targeted income tax on bachelors (Arnold-Baker 2015). In the early 20th century, several U.S. states used taxation to deter bachelorhood, driven by fears of population decline. A bachelor tax was advanced as a remedy to what Americans at that time perceived as a critical concern: "the suicide of the Anglo-Saxon race" (King and Ruggles 1990).[10] For instance, in 1898, the U.S. Census Bureau issued what the popular press termed an "Old Maids Chart" (see "A Chart for Old Maids: Hints for Unmarried Women Offered by Uncle Sam", *The New York Times*, 4 September 1898 and Appendix Figure A1), which illustrated the density of bachelors and spinsters per square mile across various localities. The objective of this chart was to facilitate the relocation of single men and women to areas where their prospects of marriage would be most favorable. The Soviet Union also maintained a bachelor tax from World War II until 1992 to counter war-related population declines (Ironside 2017).

Recent concerns over population decline and aging demographics have led to renewed discussions about bachelor taxes (see, e.g., "Should We Tax Childless?", *The Times*, 3 July 2022 and Giorgetti, Zero Tasse Per Chi Fa Due Figli, *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 19 April 2023 for recent discussion in the UK and Italy, respectively).[11] In present-day income tax systems, a bachelor tax is manifested indirectly through the differentiation in tax rates, tax credits, or tax exemptions based on marital status (Alm et al. 1999; OECD 2022).

2.2 The 1927 Bachelor Tax in Italy

Inspired by ancient Roman practices, Benito Mussolini introduced a bachelor tax (*tassa sul celibato*) on March 4, 1927, as part of his broader demographic policy designed to increase Italy's population (see Regio Decreto 124/1927). Mussolini was a firm believer that a large population was essential for the political, economic, and military strength of a nation (Morgan 1995; Eatwell 1997). In his famous "*Discorso dell'Ascensione*", Mussolini ar-

[8] Other examples during the Roman period include censors Marcus Furius Camillus and Marcus Postumius Albinus (403 BC), who levied a tax on men who reached old age without marrying (see Fayer (1994) for a comprehensive overview).

[9] Appendix A1 provides a detailed list of countries imposing (or trying to impose) a bachelor tax.

[10] As part of racial anxiety, South Africa also introduced a bachelor tax aimed at balancing the population growth rates of the white and black populations (The Union of South Africa, Government Gazette, Volume XXXVII, No. 992, Pretoria, 22 August 1919).

[11] In Italy, an initiative to reintroduce a bachelor tax was proposed in Vastogirardi in 1999 ("Blissful Bachelorhood and the Shrinking Village", *The New York Times*, 26 November 1999).

ticulated that the tax was designed to provide a "*demographic jolt*" by encouraging young men to marry and have children.[12]

The bachelor tax applied to unmarried men between the ages of 25 and 65, with both age and income determining the tax burden.[13] As shown in Table 1, the tax consisted of a small fixed fee combined with an income-dependent surcharge, calculated as a percentage of income taxes already paid that year (see Appendix Table A1 for details on income taxes during the Italian fascist regime). In 1927, unmarried men aged 25-35 were subject to a fixed charge of 35 *lire* (approximately 1.05 of current euros) and an additional 25 percent on the income taxes already paid.[14] The tax was revised twice, in 1934 and 1937, each time increasing both the fixed rate and, in particular, the tax burden-specific additional rate. By July 1934, a bachelor incurred a tax liability that was 75 percent higher than a married individual.

Table 1: The Bachelor Tax

Age class	Annual tax burden faced by a bachelor in period:		
	4 Mar 1927 - 31 Dec 1928 (1)	1 Jan 1929 - 31 Jun 1934 (2)	1 Jul 1934 - 27 Jul 1943 (3)
-24	0	0	0
25-35	35£ + 0.25 T(y)	70£ + 0.5 T(y)	105£ + 0.75 T(y)
36-50	50£ + 0.25 T(y)	100£ + 0.5 T(y)	150£ + 0.75 T(y)
51-65	25£ + 0.25 T(y)	50£ + 0.5 T(y)	75£ + 0.75 T(y)
66-	0	0	0

Note: This table provides details on the bachelor tax, implemented from 4 March 1927 to 27 July 1943 in Italy. The bachelor tax was applied to all unmarried men between the ages of 25 and 65, with both age and income determining the tax burden. The tax was designed to be composed of a fixed (relatively minor) amount along with a rate contingent upon the amount of income taxes normally paid. Sources: Regio Decreto 13 Febbraio 1927, n. 124 (*Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno* n. 39, published on the 17th of February of 1927); Regio Decreto 24 Settembre 1928, n. 2296 (*Raddoppiamento della misura dell'imposta sui celibi*, *Gazzetta Ufficiale Del Regno* n. 3, published on 4th of January 1929).

The pool of men exposed to the tax was considerable: according to the 1921 census – the last available census before the introduction of the tax – 1,623,653 men aged 25–65 were single, representing 21% of the male population in that age bracket. However, the bachelor tax primarily impacted individuals who were liable for income taxation. In particular, it disproportionately affected men from upper-income backgrounds, as the income

[12]The rationale is emphasized in Mussolini's speech: "*The bachelor tax brings in between 40 and 50 million. But do you really believe that I introduced this tax only for that purpose? I took advantage of this tax to give a demographic jolt to the nation. Some unintelligent people say: we are too many. The intelligent ones respond: we are too few. I assert that the fundamental, though not decisive, factor for the political power - and therefore the economic and moral strength - of nations is their demographic power*" (author's translation based on "*Discorso dell'Ascensione*", Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 26 May 1927).

[13]Exemptions were given to catholic priests and candidates for the priesthood who had already taken a vow of chastity, war invalids, and foreign residents. Widowers were also exempted.

[14]I use Istat conversation rates from Istat - Rivaluta to transform these amounts to current (2024) euros. Using the revaluation coefficient (58.026) from Jan 1947 to June 2024 and the fact that 1 *lira* = 1.936,27 euros, we see that 35 *lire* corresponds to about 1.05 euros.

exemption threshold of 3,000 *lire* made lower and middle-income individuals much less affected by the tax. To enforce compliance, penalties for failing to declare or provide false information were introduced, amounting to one-sixth of the annual tax owed, and fines ranging from 100 to 1,000 *lire*. For employees, the tax was automatically deducted from their paychecks by their employer. Leading Italian economists of the period, such as Corrado Gini, publicly endorsed the tax as an instrument to stimulate demographic growth (Gini 1930). The policy also attracted widespread international attention (see, e.g., "Tax on Bachelors Decreed in Italy", *The New York Times*) and even inspired cultural works, such as the 1977 Oscar-nominated film *Una Giornata Particolare* (A Special Day).

2.3 The Italian Society During Fascism and Female Resistance

The fascist regime exerted profound control over Italian society, seeking to control private lives to bolster state power and cultivate loyal fascists. Within fascist ideology, marriage was not merely a private agreement, but a social institution central to advancing both demographic and ideological objectives. The regime sought to reinforce traditional gender roles (Saraceno 1994). A strong emphasis was placed on militarism and physical strength, portraying men as the defenders of the family and the nation (Spackman 1996). Conversely, fascist rhetoric confined women's roles primarily in terms of motherhood and domesticity, emphasizing their function as caregivers and moral anchors of the family.

However, many Italian women voiced deep dissatisfaction with their roles as homemakers and mothers. As De Grand (1976) and De Grazia (1992) note, women played an active role in the anti-fascist resistance, rejecting the patriarchal order imposed by the regime.[15] In fact, the regime's failure to fully suppress female autonomy was evident even at the time: despite sweeping pro-natalist policies, the so-called "battle for births" fell short, and women's participation in the labor force increased during the years the bachelor tax was in force. Census data from the mid-1930s show that female employment rose by approximately 1.1 percentage points.[16] Cultural sources also document female resistance: novels and memoirs from the era reflect a growing disillusionment with state-imposed gender roles, implicitly acknowledging that some marriages formed under the tax may have subverted the regime's intended gender hierarchy.[17]

2.4 Descriptive Evidence on the Alleged "*Demographic Jolt*"

This subsection presents a descriptive analysis of the "intended" effect of the bachelor tax (i.e., marriages and fertility rates), using historical data from civil status registers. These


[15] Italy granted women suffrage in 1945, shortly after the regime's collapse and earlier than many other European nations, such as Greece (1952) and Switzerland (1971 for federal elections).

[16] Dynamic social tables further support this trend, indicating rising female labor force participation and a declining gender wage gap during the Fascist period (Gabbuti and León 2023).

[17] For instance, Paola Masino's *Birth and Death of the Housewife*, written in 1938–39 and published in 1945, offers a fierce critique of domestic confinement and the role of the housewife. Later satirical portrayals reinforced this undercurrent of rebellion by depicting reluctant husbands as overwhelmed, or even subordinated, within domestic life.

data, provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), contain historical marriage and birth data.

Figure 2: Historical Evolution in Marriage and Birth Rates



Note: Panel A depicts the long-run trend in the marriage rate (number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants); panel B shows the birth rate (newborns over the population in a given year). The dashed vertical lines indicate the inception (1927) and removal (1943) of the bachelor tax. The bottom panel depicts the number of marriages by groom's age group: men eligible for the bachelor tax ($\geq$ 25 years, red circles) versus younger, non-eligible men ($<$ 25 years, blue squares). Trends are normalized to 1 in the pre-bachelor tax year. Each series excludes data points relative to the First World War and its immediate aftermath, from which the data are noisy. The orange-shaded areas divide the bachelor tax period according to its income-dependent tax rate (25%, 50%, and 75%). The triangles report the aggregate number of marriages. Sources for *marriage rate*: Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio, Rilevazione mensile degli eventi di stato civile; Istat, Rilevazione sui matrimoni. Sources for *birth rate*: Istat, Ricostruzione della popolazione residente e del bilancio demografico, Rilevazione del movimento e calcolo della popolazione residente; and Sviluppo della popolazione italiana dal 1861 al 1961; *Annali di Statistica*, Serie VIII, Vol. 17. Istat, 1965.

Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the long-term trend in marriage rates, measured as the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants. The dashed lines indicate the inception (1927) and repeal (1943) of the bachelor tax. Marriage rates remained relatively stable throughout the bachelor tax period, with only a small discernible upward shift starting in the mid-

1930s. Panel B presents the long-run trend in the birth rate, measured as the number of births relative to the total population. The data reveal a steady decline in fertility rates during the bachelor tax period. These results provide elusive evidence of a "demographic jolt", as envisioned by Mussolini's pro-natalist agenda. This is consistent with previous findings in the demographic literature (Forcucci 2010).

However, these trends might be confounded by other shocks that simultaneously impacted marriage and fertility choices. To offer a more detailed analysis, Panel C disaggregates the number of marriages by groom's age group: men eligible for the bachelor tax ($\geq$ 25 years, red circles) versus younger, non-eligible men ($<$ 25 years, blue squares).[18] Before 1927, trends for both groups moved in parallel, as expected given the shared economic and demographic environment (trends are normalized to 1 in the pre-bachelor tax year).[19] Marriages among eligible men began to increase after the tax hike in 1934. This suggests that the policy primarily impacted men who faced higher financial penalties, especially wealthier bachelors subject to the steeper income-contingent tax rates. Additional evidence on how the bachelor tax shaped marriage patterns is provided in Appendix Figure A3-Figure A5, which documents an increase in the average age of grooms, particularly in occupations more likely to be affected by the bachelor tax.

3 Conceptual Framework

This section introduces a standard search model (Mortensen 1988; Rogerson et al. 2005; Browning et al. 2014) to examine how a bachelor tax can influence the allocation of marital output. Each individual i engages in active search, s_i, and initiates meetings with cost $c_i(s_i)$. Individuals meet potential partners randomly and sequentially. When individuals meet, the potential match quality, z, is drawn stochastically from a predetermined distribution $F(z)$. Based on the value of z, the pair decides on marriage. Under the assumption of transferable utility, the marriage decision is based on whether the total potential marital surplus outweighs the value of continued search. Formally, marriage occurs if $z \geq v_m + v_f$, where v_i represents the reservation utility (the value of remaining single) for each gender $i = m, f$. If both perceive marriage as more advantageous than waiting for another match, they agree to marry. Otherwise, they part ways and continue searching.

The current value of remaining single for men is given by the following optimization problem:[20]

$$rv_m = \max_{s_m} \left\{ (s_m + s_f) \int_{v_m+v_f}^{\infty} (w_m(z) - v_m) dF(z) - c_m(s_m) - \tau_m \right\}, \tag{1}$$

where r is the instantaneous interest rate (the cost of waiting for future rewards) and

[18] See Appendix Figure A2 for a similar analysis based on the bride's age. A comparable analysis for birth rates is not possible, as disaggregated data by the groom's age are unavailable.

[19] This analysis drops data points relative to the First World War and its immediate aftermath, from which data are noisy.

[20] See Appendix A1 for a formal derivation of this equation.

$w_m(z)$ denotes the share of marital output allocated to men, subject to the constraint $w_m(z) + w_f(z) = z$. The term $\int_{v_m+v_f}^{\infty}(w_m(z) - v_m)dF(z)$ represents the expected gains from search, given that marriage occurs only when match quality exceeds the reservation value. Integration over all acceptable offers yields expected gains from search. The bachelor tax, τ_m, directly reduces the net expected utility of remaining single.

Individual search strategies lead to an equilibrium condition that balances the marginal benefits and costs of search:

$$\int_{v_m+v_f}^{\infty}(w_m(z) - v_m)dF(z) = c'_m(s^*_m), \tag{2}$$

where the left-hand side captures the expected benefit of intensified search, while the right-hand side reflects the marginal cost of searching more aggressively.

The equilibrium marital surplus depends on the allocation rule, which determines how marital output is divided. A widely used approach relies on the Nash bargaining solution (Lundberg and Pollak 1996):

$$w_m(z) = v_m + \gamma_m(z - v_m - v_f), \tag{3}$$

where $0 \leq \gamma_m \leq 1$ represents bargaining asymmetry, ensuring that outside options, v_m and v_f, influence the division of marital output. The allocation rules depend not only on the bilateral bargaining between genders due to preferences or social norms, but also on the market-determined values of remaining single.[21]

Since the bachelor tax directly reduces the reservation utility of men, men enter negotiations with a weaker outside option. As v_m decreases, the right-hand side term of the equation (3) becomes smaller, leading to a lower share of marital output for men. Formally, the sensitivity of the men's share of marital output to changes in the value of continued search is given by $\frac{\partial w_m(z)}{\partial v_m} = 1 - \gamma_m$. As the tax lowers the expected benefits of continued search, the share of marital output decreases as long as $\gamma_m < 1$. This outcome reflects the bargaining dynamics in the marriage market, where a decline in one partner's outside option strengthens the relative position of the other.

The model gives a testable prediction: in marriages formed under the influence of a bachelor tax, women leverage their increased bargaining power to secure a more favorable allocation of marital output. While the theoretical framework remains general by focusing on the allocation of marital output, the empirical examination focuses on the division of housework as a proxy for intra-household bargaining, reflecting a measurable aspect that tends to be severely gendered (Aguiar and Hurst 2007, Burda et al. 2013, and Andrew et al. 2024). Since the fascist regime reinforced gender roles, γ_m is likely to be high. Therefore, the bachelor tax is a conservative setting for studying whether reducing the bargaining power of unmarried men can alter the distribution of domestic labor.

[21] This result aligns well with Becker (1973)'s original intuition: *"theory does not take the division of output between mates as given, but rather derives it from the nature of the marriage market equilibrium."*

4 Identification Strategy and Data

This section begins by outlining the identification strategy used to estimate the bachelor tax effects (Section 4.1), followed by a description of potential threats to identification (Section 4.2). Finally, I illustrate the data (Section 4.3).

4.1 Empirical Approach

To estimate the causal impact of the bachelor tax, I adopt a triple-difference strategy that exploits three sources of variation: (i) over time, since the tax was introduced in 1927 and repealed in 1943; (ii) across cohorts, as only bachelors aged 25 to 65 were eligible; and (iii) across income levels, since the tax disproportionately burdened wealthier individuals.[22] The econometric specification is the following:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i = \beta \cdot 1(MarYear_i \in [1927-1943]) \cdot 1(Age_i \in [25-65]) \cdot 1(Inc_i \in [Top]) \\ + \gamma_{MarYear(i),MarAge(i)} + \delta_{MarAge(i),Inc(i)} + \eta_{MarYear(i),Inc(i)} + X'_{i,t}\psi + u_i, \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where y_i is the outcome of interest for individual or household i. The coefficient of interest, β, identifies the effect of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax, defined as marriages that (i) took place between 1927 and 1943; (ii) involved a groom aged 25–65; and (iii) belonged to the top income group subject to the tax.

The specification includes a saturated set of two-way fixed effects, which absorb all lower-dimensional variation in eligibility rules. These fixed effects ensure that identification comes only from the three-way overlap of time, age, and income. Specifically, $\gamma_{MarYear,MarAge}$ flexibly controls for common shocks to specific age-by-year cells, such as changes in cohort size or war-related disruptions. $\delta_{MarAge,Inc}$ accounts for systematic differences in marriage timing across age–by-income cells, such as life-cycle patterns of marriage within socioeconomic strata. $\eta_{MarYear,Inc}$ captures heterogeneity in marriage market conditions across income groups that may evolve over time, such as policy shocks or differential exposure to economic downturns.[23]

In alternative specifications, I additionally control for individual characteristics X_i, including survey year, bride's year of birth, educational attainment of both spouses, and region of residence. u_i is the error term, and standard errors are clustered at the marriage year–age–income group level (4,058 clusters), corresponding to the variation in treatment exposure. Each observation is weighted by the household's survey weight, so that results are representative of the relevant cohorts in Italy.

[22] A fourth source of variation arises from tax adjustments over time, as the rate was increased in 1929 and 1934. Since most observed marriages in the data occurred after 1934, this additional dimension plays a limited role in the analysis.

[23] Note that, by saturating the model with these interactions, the single fixed effects for marriage year, groom's age at marriage, and income become redundant, since the pairwise interactions already absorbed any single fixed effect.

This specification ensures that identification of β comes only from the triple interaction: the overlap of marriage year, groom's age at marriage, and income status. Its estimation rests on the assumption that, in the absence of the tax, trends across these three groups would have remained parallel. To test this assumption, I run three event-study regressions. First, I let the triple difference coefficient vary across different k time periods:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i = &\sum_{k=1}^{N} \beta_k \cdot 1(MarYear_i \in [i = k]) \cdot 1(Age_i \in [25 - 65]) \cdot 1(Inc_i \in [Top]) \\ &+ \gamma_{MarYear(i),MarAge(i)} + \delta_{MarAge(i),Inc(i)} + \eta_{MarYear(i),Inc(i)} + X'_{i,t}\psi + u_i, \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

I expect the β_k coefficient estimated for the period $k = [1927, 1943]$ to be statistically significant, while post-tax "placebo" estimates should be zero (i.e., $\beta_k = 0 \; \forall k \neq [1927 - 1943]$).

Second, I let the triple difference coefficient vary across a groups of groom's age at marriage:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i = &\sum_{a=1}^{N} \beta_a \cdot 1(MarYear_i \in [1927 - 1943]) \cdot 1(Age_i \in [i = a]) \cdot 1(Inc_i \in [Top]) \\ &+ \gamma_{MarYear(i),MarAge(i)} + \delta_{MarAge(i),Inc(i)} + \eta_{MarYear(i),Inc(i)} + X'_{i,t}\psi + u_i, \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

I expect the β_a coefficient estimated for the age group $a \geq 25$ to be statistically significant, while placebo estimates for younger grooms should be zero (i.e., $\beta_a = 0 \; \forall a < 25$). This model also allows me to test for two additional potential identification threats. First, anticipation effects: if couples adjusted marriage timing in anticipation of the tax, it would bias estimates. If this is the case, then I would conservatively estimate the treatment effect. Second, I assume no spillover across groups: If younger men (control group) were indirectly affected (e.g., due to increased competition for unmarried women), the estimates would be contaminated. If $\beta_a \neq 0$ for $a < 25$, it suggests bias due to anticipation or spillovers.

Finally, I examine effects across w income groups:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i = &\sum_{w=1}^{N} \beta_w \cdot 1(MarYear_i \in [1927 - 1943]) \cdot 1(Age_i \in [25 - 65]) \cdot 1(Inc_i \in [i = w]) \\ &+ \gamma_{MarYear(i),MarAge(i)} + \delta_{MarAge(i),Inc(i)} + \eta_{MarYear(i),Inc(i)} + X'_{i,t}\psi + u_i, \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

I expect the β_w coefficient to be significant for high-income men, while estimates for lower-income groups should be zero or minor because of the small income-independent fee ($\beta_w = 0$ for all $w < Top$).

4.2 Other Potential Threats to Identification

This subsection discusses other plausible confounders that may bias the estimated effects of the bachelor tax.

Other concurrent policies. The bachelor tax was implemented amid a broader set of pro-natalist policies and socio-economic changes, raising concerns about potential confounding factors.[24] The empirical strategy addresses these concerns using a triple-difference approach that flexibly absorbs time-, age-, and income-related shocks. Specifically, the interaction of marriage year and income group fixed effects, $\eta_{MarYear(i),Inc(i)}$, controls for differential exposure to policies or shocks that varied by income over time. Marriage year-by-groom's age effects, $\gamma_{MarYear(i),MarAge(i)}$, capture how life-cycle effects evolved over the bachelor tax period. Finally, groom's age-by-income effects, $\delta_{MarAge(i),Inc(i)}$, allow the influence of life-cycle dynamics and concurrent policies to vary flexibly across income groups.

The role of World War II. Military mobilization during World War II might have influenced women's labor supply (just like in the U.S. "Rosie the Riveter" phenomenon studied in Acemoglu et al. 2004). To illustrate how the empirical strategy accounts for this, consider two couples who married in the same year: couple A, in which the groom was 24 years old (and thus not subject to the bachelor tax), and couple B, in which the groom was 28 and wealthy (thus subject to the tax). If war mobilization increased female labor force participation generally, both wives would have increased market work, irrespective of the bachelor tax. Such general effects of the war are absorbed by the marriage year fixed effects, and any differential impact by income and/or age is captured by the marriage year-by-income class and marriage year-by-groom's age fixed effects. The triple-difference design then isolates whether couple B – whose marriage was pressured by the bachelor tax – exhibited a change in housework compared to couple A. If such a difference emerges, it can be attributed to the bachelor tax rather than to the broader effects of World War II. Moreover, the inclusion of marriage year-by-groom's age fixed effects controls for the possibility that military conscription led to re-timing the marriage, in particular among the younger men who might have been drafted more heavily.

Survival bias. A potential concern is that the analysis includes only individuals who survived until the time of the survey, which may introduce selection bias if survival is systematically related to treatment exposure or outcomes of interest. For example, if men exposed to the bachelor tax live longer, the observed effects could reflect differential survival rather than the true impacts of the policy. To address this, the empirical approach

[24] Mussolini's *Battle for Births* campaign included measures such as the criminalization of contraception and abortion (labeled as "crimes against the race"), a reduction in the legal marriage age for women, expanded state maternity programs, subsidized marriage loans (partially forgiven with each child), and tax exemptions for fathers of large families, among other incentives (Gini 1930).

implements multiple safeguards. First, the event-study specification in equation (6) restricts the analysis to narrow windows around key birth cohorts, helping to ensure that comparisons are made among individuals with similar survival probabilities. Second, I control for cohort-by-wealth group fixed effects. These absorb any systematic variation in survival patterns that correlate with both age and socioeconomic status. For instance, if wealthier men born in a given year are disproportionately more likely to appear in the data than less wealthy men born in the same year, my set of fixed effects ensures that comparisons are made within the same cohort and wealth group, thereby mitigating bias in the estimation of treatment effects.

4.3 Data

I use household survey data from the historical *Aspects of Daily Life* survey, conducted by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) between 1993 and 2003. This cross-sectional dataset consists of approximately 20,000 households per year, covering around 50,000 individuals, and is representative of the Italian population. It provides detailed information on a wide range of topics, including domestic responsibilities, labor market participation, economic and health well-being, family life, and socio-economic conditions. Each household member directly responds to survey questions.

The dataset records marriage year, the age at marriage for each spouse, and proxies for income, allowing me to define exposure to the bachelor tax. The primary outcome variable is the weekly hours of domestic work, measuring time devoted by household members to activities such as housecleaning, cooking, caregiving, and household maintenance. In line with the classification proposed by Chadeau and Fouquet (1981) and the OECD Time Use Database, the survey defines "domestic work" as any activity that (i) is unpaid labor; (ii) is productive; (iii) could be outsourced to someone else; (iv) benefits family members. This definition remains consistent across survey waves. The data also includes retrospective questions about prior labor force participation for a representative subsample of the population. In particular, it collects retrospective information on whether individuals left the workforce for family-related reasons. Appendix Table C1 reports summary statistics.[25]

Most households that married during the bachelor tax period were retired by the time of the survey interviews. This demographic characteristic presents both advantages and limitations. On the one hand, studying retired households avoids biases introduced by labor market participation, as the domestic work allocation in working-age households is often confounded by employment or occupational choices (see Goldin and Katz 2011; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2016), and childcare responsibilities (Kleven et al. 2019). In retirement, these influences are minimized, making the domestic work distribution a more

[25] In the baseline analysis, I include all marriages covered in the data. Among these, 72% are from men who were at least 25 when married, and 7% of marriages are potentially treated (i.e., before 1943). The decision to keep the full sample is primarily to gain precision. When restricting the analysis to marriages formed until 1960 – where pre-1943 marriages become more representative –, coefficient estimates remain remarkably similar (see Appendix Table D2), though they become somewhat less precise (albeit still statistically significant at conventional confidence levels).

accurate reflection of intra-household bargaining and long-term gender roles.

A potential concern is whether the allocation of domestic work observed in retirement accurately reflects the arrangements established earlier in marriage. The literature on commitment within households emphasizes that the allocation of marital output depends critically on the enforceability of marriage agreements and the availability of divorce.[26] If couples can commit, at least partially, to a binding contract at the time of marriage, the initial division of output remains relatively stable, even if external conditions later change (such as with the repeal of the bachelor tax). By contrast, if agreements are non-binding and divorce is costless, the division of output is renegotiated continuously to satisfy ongoing participation constraints for both spouses. In this setting, the allocation at each point in time replicates the Nash bargaining solution of equation (3) given *current* outside options. However, when divorce is unavailable (or highly costly), the distinction between binding and non-binding agreements becomes less relevant, as the threat of divorce cannot lead to renegotiation.

To shed light on this issue, I examine how the division of housework evolves over the lifecycle. Using repeated cross-sections, Figure 3 shows that the share of housework performed by women remains relatively stable over time, whether measured by marriage duration (panel A), wife's age (panel B), or husband's age (panel C).[27] These results suggest that the allocation of domestic work observed in later life is representative of the arrangements established earlier. One plausible reason for this stability is that divorce was unavailable in Italy until 1971, limiting the scope for renegotiation after the abolition of the bachelor tax. Accordingly, my empirical approach assumes that couples can, at least partly, commit ex ante. Nevertheless, if renegotiation after the tax's repeal did occur and systematically favored men, my results would be conservative: the observed long-term housework allocation would be less equitable than it was at the time of marriage.


As previously discussed, the bachelor tax disproportionally affected richer taxpayers. Since past income information is unavailable, I use property ownership as a proxy for wealth. Property ownership is a relatively stable component of household wealth and has historically served as a robust proxy for long-term economic status, particularly compared to more volatile financial assets (see, e.g., Davies and Shorrocks 2000). I categorize individuals as wealthy if they live in a property classified as a villa (13.2% of households),

[26] The literature has identified three main commitment structures within households (Mazzocco 2007; Theloudis et al. 2025). At one end of the spectrum is *full commitment*, where spouses agree to a long-term plan governing resource sharing, regardless of shocks that may impact them unequally (e.g., Chiappori et al. 2018). At the opposite end is *no commitment*, where the relationship is modeled as a series of short-term bargaining games (see Lundberg and Pollak (2003) for a theoretical model; Goussé et al. (2017) for empirical work). *Limited commitment models* fall between these extremes. Here, spouses commit to a plan as long as both are better off than with their outside option. If a shock causes one partner's utility to fall below a threshold, the plan is renegotiated or abandoned, potentially triggering unilateral divorce (Mazzocco 2007; Voena 2015).


[27] Some small changes occur around retirement, when men modestly increase their contribution to domestic work. Yet, these adjustments do not vary by socio-economic status, suggesting that comparing households of different socio-economic status at a given point in the marriage duration and partners' lifecycle – as done in the empirical strategy – absorbs any such lifecycle variation.

Figure 3: Housework Allocation Over the Lifecycle


A. By marriage duration



B. By wife's age



C. By husband's age



Note: Each graph depicts the share of household work taken by women. The top panel shows the distribution by years after marriage; the bottom panel by wife's (left-hand side graph) and husband's age (right-hand side graph). "Wealthy households" (red circles) are those living in a property classified as a villa; "low and middle wealth households" (blue squares) in standard buildings or council houses. Data from the Aspects of Daily Life Survey, provided by ISTAT.

compared to standard buildings (64.1%) or council houses (22.7%). To address potential measurement errors in using property ownership as a wealth proxy, I also employ educational attainment as an alternative indicator. Since education is time-invariant and highly predictive of long-term economic status, it offers a robust supplementary measure.

The data includes a family identifier that enables me to link generations. I focus on daughters to construct a sample of parent-daughter matches, which I use to examine the intergenerational effects of the bachelor tax. Summary statistics for this sample are presented in the Appendix Table C2.

5 How Taxing Bachelors Empowered Italian Women

This section first presents empirical evidence on how the bachelor tax affected the allocation of domestic work (Section 5.1). Section 5.2 then examines its impact on labor force participation, leisure, and well-being. Finally, Section 5.3 explores potential mechanisms.

5.1 Domestic Work

Descriptive evidence. Figure 4 depicts the women's share of housework during two periods: marriages formed during the bachelor tax era (panel A) and those formed afterward (panel B). Panels C and D break down the weekly domestic work hours by gender. Two main remarks emerge. First, housework is heavily gendered, with women shouldering 84% of the total housework. This implies approximately 38 hours for women and 7 hours for men, on average.[28] Second, in nearly half of the marriages formed after 1943, men did not do housework at all (panel D). This proportion was 5 percentage points lower among couples married during the bachelor tax period (panel C). These patterns provide prima facie evidence that the presence of a bachelor tax correlated with a less traditional division of housework.


Triple difference estimates. Table 2 presents the impact of the bachelor tax on the intra-household allocation of domestic labor. It reports the triple difference estimate from equation (4). The baseline specification (column 1) controls for fixed effects at the three baseline levels: marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage, marriage year-by-wealth class, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class. The results indicate a statistically significant reduction in the share of housework performed by women in marriages more likely to be formed under the pressure of the tax (panel A). Specifically, women's share of domestic work decreased by approximately 21.2 percentage points. It corresponds to a decline of about one-fourth of the average share of domestic work performed by women.

This effect partly reflects a redistribution of domestic labor: women's weekly hours of domestic work decreased by 11 hours (panel B), while men's contribution increased by 5 hours per week (panel C). This represents a substantial relative increase in men's domestic work hours (about 71%). Appendix Table D1 shows a significant extensive margin response among men. In marriages formed under the bachelor tax, the likelihood of husbands engaging in housework rose by approximately 24 percentage points from a baseline of 71 percentage points.

These findings indicate that households formed under the influence of the bachelor tax tend to *jointly* spend fewer hours on domestic work. Two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations can account for this pattern. First, positive returns to scale might be at play: when both partners contribute to household tasks, their combined efforts might improve efficiency, reducing the total time required. Alternatively, these families may

[28] This is consistent with previous studies using time-use data from Italy for more recent years (see, e.g., Bloemen et al. 2010).

Figure 4: The Distribution of Domestic Work Across Periods



Note: The top panel presents the women's share of domestic work within the household for the bachelor tax period (1927-1943, left-hand side graph) and the post-bachelor tax period (1943-1960, right-hand side graph). The bottom panel depicts weekly hours of housework over the two periods for women (red) and men (blue). Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

rely less on domestic production and instead purchase more market-provided goods and services. As I will show later, this second explanation appears plausible, as women's labor market participation increased, likely driving greater demand for market substitutes for housework.

The rest of the table tests the robustness of these findings to the inclusion of additional controls. Column 2 includes bride's age at marriage and both spouses' birth year fixed effects to account for cohort-specific trends, as well as region fixed effects to control for geographical differences in cultural norms that might influence housework distribution. The coefficient estimates remain stable. One concern is that the observed changes in housework allocation may reflect other bachelor tax-induced changes. If women who married under the tax had systematically different education levels, the results might stem from selection effects rather than changes in bargaining power. To inspect this, I control for

Table 2: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on the Allocation of Housework


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. *Outcome:* Women's share of housework			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.212***	-0.221***	-0.218***	-0.216***
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)
	B. *Outcome:* Women's housework (hours)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-11.501***	-12.868***	-12.041***	-12.436***
	(4.082)	(3.942)	(3.866)	(3.847)
	C. *Outcome:* Men's housework (hours)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	5.231**	5.260***	5.326***	5.116**
	(2.081)	(1.982)	(1.996)	(1.995)
Observations	147,110	147,110	147,110	147,110
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes
Mean outcome (panel A)	0.840	0.840	0.840	0.840
Mean outcome (panel B)	38.592	38.592	38.592	38.592
Mean outcome (panel C)	7.192	7.192	7.192	7.192

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the share of housework performed by women (panel A), women's weekly hours of domestic work (panel B), and men's weekly hours of domestic work (panel C). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

the husband's (column 3) and the wife's higher educational attainment (column 4). The estimates remain consistent, indicating that the redistribution of housework persists even after accounting for these factors.

Inspecting the identifying assumptions. The estimation of this effect rests on the assumption that, in the absence of the bachelor tax, the treated and control groups (i.e.,

Figure 5: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on the Allocation of Housework



Note: This figure depicts separate coefficient estimates on the women's share of housework by time periods (panel A), groom's age at marriage (panel B), and wealth class (panel C). The coefficient estimates are obtained by running equations (5), (6), and (7), respectively. Each specification includes marriage year-groom's age at marriage, marriage year-wealthy, and groom's age at marriage-wealthy fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

those more versus less exposed based on the marriage year, groom's age at marriage, and wealth) would have exhibited parallel trends in the outcomes of interest. Figure 5 tests this assumption for each source of variation used in the analysis: time periods, groom's age at marriage, and wealth class.

First, panel A presents the estimated impact of the bachelor tax on women's share of housework across different marriage periods: during the bachelor tax period (1927–1943), immediately after its repeal (1944–1950), and in subsequent decades. Each coefficient corresponds to the β_k parameter from equation (5). The coefficient for the bachelor tax period is consistently negative and statistically significant, while those for the post-tax periods are not, indicating that the observed change in housework allocation was specific to marriages formed under the tax. This result challenges the alternative explanation that wealthy men marrying after age 25 – regardless of the time period – systematically select partners with fewer domestic responsibilities.

Second, panel B presents the effects of the bachelor tax by groom's age at marriage,

as specified in equation (6). The results reveal a clear pattern: the impact is statistically significant for grooms aged 25 and older, the group directly affected by the tax. In contrast, the coefficients are close to zero and not significant for younger grooms not subject to the tax. This result suggests that the observed impact is unlikely to be driven by other policies that similarly affected all bachelors, regardless of age. The absence of effects for men who married below age 25 also implies that anticipation of future tax exposure did not substantially shape domestic work allocation. Household bargaining dynamics are determined at the time of marriage: even if younger men anticipated future exposure, their outside options were not directly reduced until they crossed the age threshold.

Finally, panel C explores the impact by wealth class, as outlined in equation (7). The results indicate that the effects are concentrated among wealthy households (those residing in villas), where the financial penalties for remaining unmarried were most substantial. In contrast, the effects for middle-class households (living in standard buildings) and lower-income households (living in council housing) are not statistically significant, consistent with their lower exposure to the tax.

Other robustness checks. In the baseline analysis, I keep all marriages covered in the data, including those formed up to the 1990s. A potential concern with this choice is that marriages contracted long after the repeal of the bachelor tax may reflect household dynamics shaped by changing social norms and other long-run shifts in gender roles, thereby biasing the estimated effect. To address this, I restrict the sample to marriages formed until 1960, which are closer to the abolition of the tax and less exposed to underlying changes in norms and household arrangements. The resulting estimates, shown in Appendix Table D2, remain remarkably stable compared to the baseline, though slightly less precise, and continue to be statistically significant at conventional levels. This stability is not surprising, as long-run cohort shocks and gradual changes in social norms are well absorbed by the granular set of fixed effects included in the baseline specification.

The wealth classification used in this analysis, based on property ownership, may be subject to measurement error. For example, men categorized as wealthy at the time of the survey might not have been wealthy at the time of their marriage. To address this concern, I use education as an alternative proxy: a fixed characteristic that strongly correlates with income and long-term economic status, as shown in prior research (see, e.g., Chetty et al. 2011). Appendix Table D3 presents the results of this robustness check, showing that the coefficients remain consistent with the baseline estimates.

Another potential limitation involves the use of self-reported domestic work hours, which may introduce bias.[29] For instance, men might overreport their contribution, while women might underreport theirs due to prevailing social norms. To mitigate this con-

[29] As noted in previous research (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), subjective survey data can be prone to issues such as cognitive biases, social desirability bias, and measurement errors. However, if these biases remain consistent across groups, they are unlikely to systematically affect the internal validity of the estimates.

cern, I use an alternative measure: whether domestic work is perceived as "too heavy." This subjective proxy is less susceptible to inaccuracies in time reporting and instead captures the perceived burden and fairness of domestic responsibilities. Appendix Table D4 presents the results using this measure, which aligns closely with the original analysis.

The empirical strategy relies on the assumption that wealthier individuals faced higher tax liabilities, reflecting the progressivity of the fascist-era income tax system. However, as with any policy affecting financial incentives, individual responses may have varied. Some wealthy bachelors may have had strong preferences for remaining single or differed in their ability to avoid or absorb the tax burden. For example, self-employed professionals with flexible income reporting, such as lawyers or landowners, may have been better positioned to underreport earnings and reduce their tax exposure. Similarly, individuals receiving income through non-taxable sources (e.g., in-kind compensation or family wealth held in real estate) may have found it easier to absorb the tax without altering their marital decisions. These sources of heterogeneity, while plausible, are addressed through the inclusion of a rich set of fixed effects, which flexibly account for time-varying marriage preferences (even within a given wealth group) and selection into marriage across groups.

Finally, another potential concern is that the analysis includes only couples who remained married and alive until the survey, raising the risk of selection bias. However, this is unlikely to undermine the results. By the time divorce was legalized in 1971, couples formed under the pressure of the bachelor tax were already in late adulthood, making marital dissolution rare.[30] Moreover, there is no clear reason to expect that survival is systematically related to earlier intra-household bargaining, and the inclusion of birth cohort and wealth controls further mitigates concerns about differential mortality.

5.2 Labor Force Participation, Leisure, and Well-Being

This subsection examines how the bachelor tax influenced other outcomes possibly associated with the allocation of domestic work and changes in bargaining power.

Labor force participation. Table 3 examines the effects of the bachelor tax on labor force participation. The first analysis assesses whether women report being "housewives" rather than "employed" or "retired".[31] Estimates from the model in equation (4) indicate that women who married under the bachelor tax were 13.6 percentage points less likely to report being housewives, a substantial reduction from a baseline of 46 percentage points (column 1). This effect strengthens slightly and gains precision when additional controls

[30] If anything, selection likely biases estimates downward: longer-lasting couples tend to be more traditional and thus less prone to equitable housework division. For instance, Giommoni and Rubolino (2025) provide evidence that marriages are more stable among Italian couples who share more traditional gender norms.

[31] In the data, the "housewife" category is not restricted to women below statutory retirement age: even women older than 64 – the maximum legal retirement age for Italian women during the period – can report themselves as housewives if they never qualified for retirement benefits (e.g., because they had no prior employment history). Indeed, 39.4% of women aged 65 and above in the sample report being housewives rather than retired.

are included (column 2). This result aligns with evidence on how external shocks can reshape bargaining dynamics within households. For instance, Fernández and Wong (2014) find that the introduction of unilateral divorce laws in the U.S. accounted for more than half of the increase in married women's labor force participation between the 1940 and 1960 cohorts. However, the results contrast with studies on the effects of skewed sex ratios, where Angrist (2002) finds that greater female bargaining power led to a decline in female employment.

Table 3: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Labor Supply Behavior

	Outcome variable:					
	Housewife		Stop working for family duties:			
			Men		Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.136*	-0.175**	0.029	0.033	-0.119***	-0.079**
	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.039)
Observations	166,582	166,582	14,175	14,175	14,175	14,175
M year x Groom age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
M year x Wealth FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom age x Wealth FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bride's age at mar FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Groom birth year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bride birth year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean outcome	0.458	0.458	0.003	0.003	0.112	0.112

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the probability that the women report being housewives instead of retirees or workers (columns 1 and 2), that men or women exited the labor force before retirement for family-related reasons (columns 3-6). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (columns 1, 3, and 5). It then adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects, and groom's and bride's highest educational attainment (columns 2, 4, and 6). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey (columns 1 and 2) and Multiscopo sulle famiglie: famiglia e soggetti sociali (columns 3-6).

To further explore labor supply behavior, I use retrospective questions about labor force participation for a representative sample of the survey population. I construct a binary indicator equal to one if an individual reported having "left the labor force before retirement for family-related reasons." The results indicate no significant effect for men. However, among women, there is a substantial reduction in the likelihood of early labor force exit

in marriages formed under the tax.[32] An important implication emerges when examining the link between within-family housework allocation and women's labor market participation. By reducing women's share of domestic work, the bachelor tax alleviated traditional time constraints, enabling greater participation in market work.[33] The disproportionate burden of domestic responsibilities following childbirth frequently results in career interruptions or transitions to part-time work for women (Kleven et al. 2019). My findings suggest that household bargaining dynamics can shape women's labor market trajectories, potentially mitigating some of the long-term career penalties traditionally associated with marriage and childrearing. These findings have direct implications for contemporary policy debates on gender equality in labor markets.

Leisure and "the battle of the sexes." The reallocation of domestic work within households can have significant implications for leisure. To examine this, I first analyze changes in time spent watching television, the most common leisure activity among Italian households, averaging approximately 13.8 weekly hours for men and 15 for women. As shown in Table 4, men reduce their time spent watching TV by about 5.7 hours per week. While this estimate is not statistically significant at conventional confidence levels, it is noteworthy that this decline in leisure time closely matches the additional time men allocate to domestic work (see panel C of Table 2). In contrast, women's television consumption remains unchanged.

Beyond the total amount of leisure, an increase in women's bargaining power within the household can also influence the *types* of joint leisure activities chosen. This mechanism can be understood through the framework of the "battle of the sexes", a game-theoretic model that describes situations in which individuals benefit from coordinating their actions but have divergent preferences (Cooper et al. 1993). A classic example is the choice between attending a sporting event or a dance-related activity: men tend to prefer sports, while women may favor dance. When men hold greater bargaining power, household decisions are more likely to reflect their preferences. However, as wives gain greater bargaining power, they should become more likely to "win" the battle of the sexes, exerting greater influence over the selection of joint leisure activities.

To test this prediction, I use survey data on whether each spouse attended a sporting or dance-related event in the past year. The results, presented in columns 3-6 of Table 4, support this hypothesis. While the likelihood of either spouse attending a sporting

[32] Although retrospective labor market information may be subject to recall bias, this is unlikely to systematically distort the estimated effects if the bias is consistent across comparison groups. That is, I expect the bias to be similar between couples who married just before versus just after 1943 or those with grooms younger versus older than 25 at the time of marriage. Moreover, the inclusion of birth cohort and marriage year fixed effects helps mitigate potential confounding from time-varying factors that could influence recall accuracy. Note that here I cannot run the model presented on equations (5)-(7) because the sample size is much smaller and estimates become noisy.

[33] As Goldin (1990) observed, at the turn of the twentieth century, most women were employed either as domestic servants or in manufacturing. In this context, a married woman's employment was often perceived as a sign that her husband could not adequately support the family. As a result, approximately 80 percent of women used to leave the workforce upon marriage.

Table 4: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Leisure Activities

	Outcome variable:					
	Watch TV (hours)		Attend sport event (0/1)		Attend dance event (0/1)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-5.645	-0.750	0.028	0.017	0.035**	0.045**
	(6.322)	(5.279)	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Observations	159,175	159,257	166,576	166,574	166,576	166,574
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean outcome	13.807	14.995	0.326	0.126	0.156	0.153

Note: This table reports the weekly hours spent watching TV (columns 1 and 2), the probability of attending a sporting event in the past year (columns 3 and 4), and the probability of participating in dancing activities in the past year (columns 5 and 6). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). Each specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects, and groom's and bride's highest educational attainment. Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

event increases slightly, the effect is not statistically significant. However, a significant effect emerges for dance-related activities, where both men and women are more likely to participate. Appendix Figure D1 further validates these results by showing that the event-study effects from equations (5)-(7) are consistent with the treatment exposure; and Table D5 shows that they remain robust when additional controls are included.

Economic and health well-being. Did the reallocation of household responsibilities influence measures of well-being? I examine two key measures. First, economic satisfaction, which may improve as women who married under the bachelor tax remained more actively engaged in the labor market. Second, health satisfaction, as the redistribution of domestic work and increased labor force participation among women may have alleviated the physical and emotional strain of traditional housework allocations.

To assess these effects, I construct a binary variable equal to one if an individual reports being greatly satisfied with her economic or health conditions. I then estimate regressions as in equation (4). The results, presented in Table 5, show that the bachelor tax significantly improved women's economic and health satisfaction. This indicates that the redistribution of domestic labor and greater workforce participation likely enhanced women's financial autonomy, while reducing the burdens associated with household responsibilities. In contrast, there is no significant effect on men's satisfaction. Appendix Figure D2 reinforces these findings by demonstrating that the event-study effects from equations (5)–(7) align with treatment exposure. Additionally, Table D6 confirms their robustness when incorporating additional controls.

Table 5: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Well-Being

	Outcome variable:			
	Economic satisfaction		Health satisfaction	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.048	0.072**	-0.006	0.072*
	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Observations	166,574	166,574	166,574	166,574
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean outcome	0.033	0.033	0.167	0.150

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the share of men (columns 1 and 3) and women (columns 2 and 4) who reported being greatly satisfied with their current economic or health situation. It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). Each specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects, and groom's and bride's highest educational attainment. Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

These findings suggest that intra-household bargaining power can influence overall well-being. By restructuring traditional household roles, the bachelor tax not only enabled women to better balance domestic and professional responsibilities, but also contributed to significant improvements in their quality of life.

5.3 Potential Mechanisms

This section explores the potential mechanisms through which a bachelor tax influenced the allocation of domestic work. Bargaining models of marriage suggest that shocks, social norms, and institutions can shape the intra-household resource distribution (Lundberg and Pollak 1996). Building on previous literature, I test various explanations that may account for this effect.

Assortative matching. A change in assortative matching may explain the observed change in the allocation of domestic work. By creating financial incentives for men to marry (or to marry earlier), the bachelor tax could have altered how individuals select partners with similar socioeconomic or personal characteristics.[34] For instance, men affected by the bachelor tax might have compromised on traits they previously prioritized less in a spouse, leading to less conventional matches. Such changes could, in theory, influence the division of domestic work.

[34]Previous literature has examined various sorting mechanisms, such as educational attainment, personality, and cultural traits (see, e.g., Choo and Siow 2006; Dupuy and Galichon 2014; Coles and Francesconi 2019; Bertrand et al. 2021; Chiappori et al. 2022).

Table 6: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Assortative Matching

	Outcome variable:				
	Same edu attainment	Both participate in activities related to: religion	politics	culture	volunteering
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.088	-0.020	-0.015	-0.037	0.019
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.022)
Observations	166,582	166,582	166,582	166,582	166,582
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean outcome	0.607	0.511	0.908	0.865	0.896

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the following proxies for assortative matching: whether the couple has the same education level (column 1); whether both participate in religious activities (column 2); whether both participate in political activities (column 3); whether both participate in cultural activities (column 4); whether both participate in volunteering activities (column 5). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

Evidence from Table 2 already suggests that changes in match composition are unlikely to drive the main results: controlling for spousal characteristics leaves the estimated effect of the bachelor tax essentially unchanged. To evaluate this channel more formally, Table 6 examines differences in spousal education (column 1) and social or cultural interests (columns 2-5). Each coefficient represents the triple-difference estimate from equation (4). The findings reveal only minor and statistically insignificant changes in assortative matching, a conclusion that remains robust when additional controls are included (see Appendix Table D7).

Although the negative coefficient for educational attainment is not statistically significant, it implies that the bachelor tax may have led to more couples where women had lower education levels than their husbands. This relative educational gap suggests that women in these couples had lower earnings potential. From a household efficiency perspective, this would predict a *decrease* in men's contributions to domestic work, as higher-earning spouses typically specialize in market labor. Therefore, if assortative matching patterns had remained unchanged, the observed increase in men's housework contributions could have been even larger. These results suggest that distortions in assortative matching are unlikely to be the primary driver behind the observed reallocation of domestic labor.

Gender norms. The conceptual framework outlined in Section 3 illustrates how spousal bargaining power influences the allocation of marital resources. According to this framework, the bachelor tax reduced men's reservation utility by increasing the cost of remain-

ing single, thereby weakening their outside options and shifting the bargaining power toward women. However, the extent to which women could leverage this depends on γ, which captures social and gender norms. In settings with conservative norms, the impact of the bachelor tax on domestic labor allocation may have been limited. Cultural expectations regarding gender roles can limit the potential for renegotiation, even when changes in bargaining power occur. For instance, the pervasive belief that housework is inherently a woman's responsibility might have tempered men's willingness to take on additional domestic tasks or discouraged women from requesting greater contributions from their husbands.

To examine whether these effects vary with the conservatism of gender norms, I use two proxies: residence in Southern Italy and religiosity. Southern Italy has historically been associated with traditional family structures and gender roles compared to Northern Italy. Religiosity serves as another well-established proxy for conservative gender norms, as religious teachings often reinforce traditional family roles and hierarchies. For instance, Burda et al. (2013) show that domestic labor allocation tends to be particularly gendered in countries with a Catholic cultural background.

Table 7: The Heterogeneous Impact by Region and Religiosity

	Outcome: Women's share of housework			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.244***	-0.247***	-0.414**	-0.384**
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.195)	(0.167)
x 1(Southern Italy)	0.163**	0.133**		
	(0.065)	(0.063)		
x 1(Catholic)			0.225	0.185
			(0.197)	(0.170)
Observations	147,110	147,110	147,110	147,110
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the heterogeneous impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the share of housework performed by women by region (columns 1-2) and by religiosity (columns 3-4). It augments the model presented in equation (4) with a further interaction for households living in the South of Italy (panel A), or that went to church at least once during the past year (panel B). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (columns 1 and 3). In columns 2 and 4, I further add survey year fixed effects, each spouse's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects, region fixed effects, and both spouses' highest educational attainment fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

Table 7 indicates that the impact of the bachelor tax on domestic labor allocation is weaker in households located in Southern Italy and, while not statistically significant at

conventional levels, appears similarly attenuated in highly religious households within the same region. These findings highlight the constraining influence of deeply rooted gender norms on the effectiveness of policy-driven changes. Given that the analysis takes place in a context characterized by conservative gender norms and rigid traditional roles, the results likely provide a lower-bound estimate of the potential for policy interventions to reshape intra-household dynamics.

Substitute technologies. Previous research highlights that technological advancements in household production have significantly reduced women's housework hours and facilitated their labor market participation (Greenwood et al. 2005). Similarly, hiring domestic workers could alleviate the burden of household tasks for family members. If marriages formed under the bachelor tax were associated with greater adoption of such technologies or increased reliance on domestic workers, this could explain the observed reduction in women's housework. Table D8 tests this hypothesis, but finds no significant increase in the ownership of labor-saving appliances, such as washing machines, or in the employment of domestic workers among couples more likely to have married due to the bachelor tax.

Fertility. By empowering women within marriage, the bachelor tax may also have shaped fertility preferences. Theory suggests that stronger female bargaining power can reduce desired fertility (Doepke and Kindermann 2019). Changes in fertility patterns, in turn, may have affected the domestic division of labor. Research on the "child penalty" (Kleven et al. 2019) shows that parenthood amplifies gender gaps in both labor market participation and household responsibilities. A decline in fertility could therefore lower the domestic workload disproportionately borne by women, leading to a more equal allocation of household tasks. However, as shown in Table D9, I find no significant differences in fertility rates among couples more likely to have married under the bachelor tax, suggesting that this mechanism does not account for the observed redistribution of domestic labor.

Human capital. The introduction of the bachelor tax may also have indirectly influenced women's educational choices. Chiappori et al. (2009) theorize that reducing the time women spend on household production increases the returns to education within marriage, potentially encouraging women to invest more in their education relative to men. Appendix Table D10 examines whether marriages influenced by the bachelor tax were associated with differences in women's educational attainment. The results show no significant changes in average years of schooling or in the likelihood of completing secondary or higher education for women.

6 Intergenerational Effects

The effects of the bachelor tax on the allocation of domestic work may have extended beyond the immediate generation. Previous literature has shown that policy changes and shocks influencing women's employment and household roles can have lasting intergenerational consequences (Fernández et al. 2004, Alesina et al. 2013, Farré and Vella 2013, Bertrand 2019, Grosjean and Khattar 2019, Farré et al. 2023, Agostinelli et al. 2025). By promoting a more equitable division of household labor, the bachelor tax may have influenced the norms and expectations children internalized during their formative years. Daughters raised in households where their mothers had greater bargaining power and reduced domestic burdens might have aspired to greater economic independence and been more likely to challenge traditional gender roles.

The bachelor tax offers a unique opportunity to explore whether the intergenerational link in domestic work is causal. Leveraging the tax as an exogenous shock that altered the distribution of housework, I estimate its intergenerational transmission using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. In the first stage, variation in mothers' domestic work is predicted using eligibility for the bachelor tax as an instrument, following the specification presented in equation (4). In the second stage, daughters' domestic work is regressed on the instrumented value of their mothers' domestic work:

$$y_d = \beta \cdot y_m + FE_m + FE_d + u_d, \tag{8}$$

where y_d represents the daughter's domestic work hours, and y_m is the (instrumented) domestic work hours of the mother. FE_m includes the full set of fixed effects presented in equation (4), including parental characteristics such as education, labor market status, year of birth, and marriage year. FE_d captures the daughters' characteristics, including fixed effects for the year of birth, marital status, educational attainment, and labor market status. The coefficient of interest, β, calculates the extent to which domestic work hours are transmitted between generations.

Table 8 presents the intergenerational effects of the bachelor tax. It shows the β coefficients from the 2SLS approach, alongside OLS estimates for comparison. Column 1 shows that a mother's domestic work is significantly correlated with her daughter's domestic work. This positive association is visually represented in Panel A of Figure 6, which plots daughters' weekly hours of housework against those of their mothers. The graph shows a clear upward-sloping linear trend, indicating that daughters raised in households where mothers performed more domestic labor tend to replicate similar patterns themselves.

When exposure to the bachelor tax is used as an instrument for mothers' domestic work (column 2), the estimated coefficient increases significantly. Specifically, a one-hour increase in a mother's weekly domestic work results in an approximate 0.235-hour (about 14 minutes) increase in her daughter's weekly domestic workload. This suggests that

Table 8: Intergenerational Transmission of Domestic Work Hours

	Outcome: Daughter's housework (hours)					
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mother housework (hours)	0.051***	0.235***	0.050***	0.204***	0.073***	0.208***
	(0.003)	(0.049)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.004)	(0.048)
Observations	43,580	43,580	43,580	43,580	43,200	43,200
Baseline FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Father controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mother controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean daughter (hours)	10.093	10.093	10.093	10.093	10.093	10.093
Mean mother (hours)	40.915	40.915	40.915	40.915	40.915	40.915

Note: This table reports the intergenerational effects of the bachelor tax on daughters' domestic work. Each coefficient presents estimates of the relationship between daughters' domestic work and mothers' domestic work (weekly hours). Columns 1, 3, and 5 use OLS, while columns 2, 4, and 6 leverage exposure to the bachelor tax as an instrument in a 2SLS approach. Columns 1 and 2 include the full set of fixed effects presented in equation (4) and the following set of controls for daughters: region of residence, year of birth, marital status, educational attainment, and labor market status. Columns 3 and 4 further control for fathers' educational attainment and occupation, while columns 5 and 6 augment the model with mothers' educational attainment and occupation. Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.


naive OLS estimates understate the true strength of this intergenerational transmission.[35]

The rest of the table tests the sensitivity of these estimates to the inclusion of additional controls. In columns 3 and 4, I control for the father's education and labor market status; in columns 5 and 6, I include the same controls for the mother. These variables capture differences in household socioeconomic status, time availability, or unobserved preferences that correlate with both maternal domestic work and daughters' outcomes. The coefficient estimates remain remarkably similar across all specifications, suggesting that the estimated intergenerational effect is not driven by omitted variable bias related to parental human capital or labor supply decisions.

As in the earlier section, the identification of this effect rests on the assumption that, in the absence of the bachelor tax, the treated and control groups – defined by daughters' differential exposure to bachelor-tax-induced marriages – would have followed parallel trends in the outcome of interest. Figure 6 tests this assumption by stratifying the analysis by marriage year and wealth class, following the same logic as in the main specification

[35]Intuitively, there are several reasons why the parent–child relationship in domestic work is attenuated in OLS estimates. One reason is measurement error. Similar attenuation issues have been documented for the intergenerational transmission of income (Solon 1992). Another explanation is linked to the fact that children are influenced not only by parents, but also by peers, schools, and surrounding culture, as argued by Bisin and Verdier (2001). Even if a mother models an egalitarian division of chores, her daughter is simultaneously exposed to other social norms. These outside influences introduce variability in the child's behavior that is unrelated to the parent, which might weaken the parent–child correlation.

Figure 6: Intergenerational Transmission of Housework



Note: The top graph depicts the positive relationship of domestic work hours between mothers (horizontal axis) and daughters (vertical axis). It depicts the residuals obtained by regressing the two variables on region, year of birth, labor market status, and educational attainment fixed effects. The figure plots the residuals in 30 equal-sized bins and shows the line of best fit. The bottom graphs depict separate coefficient estimates of the hours of domestic work supplied by daughters ("reduced-form" of the 2SLS) and mothers ("first-stage" relationship of the 2SLS) by time periods (panel B) and wealth class (panel C). The coefficient estimates are obtained by running equations (5) and (7), separately for mothers and daughters. Each specification augments the baseline fixed effects presented in equations (5) and (7) with the following set of controls for mothers and daughters: region of residence, year of birth, marital status, educational attainment, and labor market status. 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

presented in equation (5) and (7).[36] The figure provides reassuring evidence in support of the identifying assumption. First, it shows that the "first-stage" relationship (i.e., the effect of bachelor tax exposure on mothers' domestic work) is significant only where expected: for marriages that occurred between 1927 and 1943 (panel B), and among wealthy households subject to the tax (panel C). These patterns are fairly similar to those found in the full sample, validating the consistency of the intergenerational sample. Second, the figure also shows that the "reduced-form" relationship (i.e., the effect of bachelor tax exposure on daughters' domestic work) is significant only in the expected subsamples:

[36]Note that, unfortunately, I cannot exploit variation by groom's age at marriage in the intergenerational sample due to limited variation in that dimension.

among daughters whose mothers married during the bachelor tax period and in households classified as wealthy.

7 Conclusions

This paper examines how a reduction in men's bargaining power within the marriage market influences the allocation of domestic labor. It leverages the introduction of a bachelor tax in fascist Italy (1927-1943) as an exogenous shock to the distribution of bargaining power between genders. During this period, unmarried men faced tax liabilities that were 25 to 75 percent higher than those of married individuals, while women were exempt. As a result, the cost of remaining single increased for men, while women gained greater bargaining power due to higher demand in the marriage market.

The empirical approach combines data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey with a triple-difference approach, exploiting variation in exposure to the bachelor tax across time, age, and wealth groups. The findings indicate that marriages formed under the pressure of the bachelor tax exhibited a more equitable division of domestic labor: women spent less time on domestic tasks, while men contributed more. This redistribution of housework facilitated greater female labor force participation by alleviating traditional time constraints. The study also documents intergenerational effects, showing that daughters of mothers who married under the tax spent less time on housework themselves.

These findings have significant implications for contemporary policy debates on gender equality and public policy. While explicit bachelor taxes no longer exist, modern tax systems continue to embed marriage-related incentives and penalties that can affect not only marriage decisions (Alm et al. 1999), but also household decision-making (OECD 2022; Giommoni and Rubolino 2025; Ichino et al. 2024). Yet, recent concerns over population decline have reignited discussions about imposing taxes on childless couples (see, e.g., "Should We Tax Childless?", *The Times*, 3 July 2022 and Giorgetti, Zero Tasse Per Chi Fa Due Figli, *Il Sole 24 Ore*, 19 April 2023 for recent discussion in the UK and Italy).

Another implication of this study is that the gendered division of labor is not immutable, even in contexts where cultural norms strongly reinforce traditional roles. However, despite the robustness of the empirical approach, the external validity of these findings might be constrained by the historical and political context of fascist Italy. Previous literature has shown that policies that alter the bargaining power within the household - such as gender-based taxation (Alesina et al. 2011), alimony and divorce laws (Voena 2015; Chiappori et al. 2017; Persson 2020), and parental leave reforms (Farré et al. 2023) - can encourage changes in household behavior. Future research could explore the role of the tax system in influencing the bargaining positions of men and women. As emphasized by Gayle and Shephard (2019), most studies take the married unit as given and ignore the effect of taxation on the intra-household allocation of resources. Understanding these effects could help us to design policies that promote gender equity both within households and in the labor market.

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A Background on the Bachelor Tax

A1 A Brief History on Taxing Bachelors

Ancient Rome (several times from 403 BC to 9 AD; passed: Yes). The imposition of taxes on bachelors can be traced back to the ancient Roman era (Treggiari 1993; Fayer 1994). In 403 BC, Roman censors Marcus Furius Camillus and Marcus Postumius Albinus tackled the issue of bachelorhood by levying a tax on men who reached old age without marrying. This concept re-emerged three centuries later, when censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus publicly exhorted bachelors to marry, thereby associating marriage with civic responsibility. Notable figures such as Cicero also supported this notion, advising Julius Caesar in 46 BC to endorse population growth and prohibit celibacy. In response, Caesar introduced financial incentives for large families to counteract the population decline caused by warfare. This initiative culminated in 9 AD, when Emperor Augustus implemented a more extensive strategy with the *Lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus* (Long 1875). This strategy included the *aes uxorium* tax, imposed on unmarried men aged 25 to 60, and additional penalties such as the forfeiture of inheritance rights and exclusion from public festivities.

Nevers, France (1223; passed: Yes). Charged a yearly tithe of five solidi to any bachelor as part of a moral panic (Chisholm 1910).

Ottoman Empire (15th century; passed: Yes). Resm-i mücerred was a bachelor tax instituted in the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with the resm-i çift and the resm-i bennâk (Cosgel 2005). Gumuscu (2004) show that, in response to the tax, bachelors exhibited a higher propensity to migrate to burgeoning urban centers.

England (1695; passed: Yes). The Marriage Duty Act 1695, also known as the Registration Tax, imposed a tax on births, marriages, burials, childless widowers, and bachelors over 25. It was abolished by 1706 (Arnold-Baker 2015).

England (1798; passed: Yes). An income tax was passed particularly discriminating against bachelors (Arnold-Baker 2015).

United States, Missouri (1821; passed: Yes). Applied a $1 tax on all unmarried men, replaced by a poll tax the following year (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, New York (1825; passed: No). A bill was proposed comparing bachelors with dogs, aiming to tax bachelors instead (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, Connecticut (1857; passed: No). The legislature repealed a motion to implement a bachelor tax, under the argument that different taxation methods already

taxed bachelors more heavily (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, Michigan (1837, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1897, 1901, 1911, 1919, 1935; passed: No). Michigan made repeated attempts to instantiate a bachelor tax, all of which failed due to various reasons including economic considerations (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, Wyoming (1890; passed: No). Briefly considered a $2.50 bachelor tax, but the motion was tabled (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, New Jersey (1898-02-12; passed: No). A bachelor tax proposed as a sumptuary tax was not passed (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

Argentina (1900 est.; passed: Yes). A bachelor tax existed, with exemptions for men who had been rebuffed in marriage proposals (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, Delaware (1907; passed: No). Started as a joke before generating much discussion and ultimately being defeated (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, Georgia (1911; passed: No). A $50 yearly tax on bachelors was proposed, suggesting funds should go to schools (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

United States, Minnesota (1911; passed: No). Proposed a $5 yearly levy on bachelors (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

France (1913; passed: No). Proposed a large tax on bachelors, and also "spinsters" (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024).

Reichenburg, Germany (1915; passed: Yes). Part of a progressive taxation measure (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

South Africa (1919; passed: Yes). Imposed a bachelor tax for racial reasons to match the white population growth with the black one (source: The Union of South Africa, Government Gazette, Volume XXXVII, No. 992, Pretoria, 22 August 1919)).

United States, Wisconsin (1921; passed: No). Generated frequent moral debate at the time (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

United States, Montana (1921; passed: Yes). Applied a $3 tax on all bachelors in the state. The tax was struck down in 1922 on constitutional grounds (source: Kornhauser 2012); Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Germany, Repelen (1923; passed: Yes). Passed a bachelor tax of 2,000 marks per month, quickly overturned by federal authorities (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Italy (1927; passed: Yes). Levied as part of a race-based pronatalist policy until the fall of Mussolini in 1943.

Spain (1928; passed: Yes). Implemented a bachelor tax following Italy's example, with few exceptions, including priests (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Germany (1934; passed: Yes). Part of Nazi "family values", aimed at encouraging women to focus on church, kitchen, children (Kirche, Küche, Kinder) (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

United States, California (1934; passed: No). A bachelor tax was proposed in response to low birth rates but did not succeed due to economic considerations (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Finland (1935; passed: Yes). Increased tax burden for unmarried, childless citizens over the age of 24 from 1935 to 1975 (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

France (1939; passed: No). A proposal to match similar measures in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Soviet Union (1941; passed: Yes). Enforced a childlessness tax from 1941 to 1992 on childless men and women within certain age ranges (source: Ironside 2017; Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Bulgaria (1925, 1943, 1968; passed: Yes). Efforts to introduce a bachelor tax began in 1917, formally proposed in 1925, and passed in 1968, applying to both sexes (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).


Poland (1946; passed: Yes). Introduced Bykowe, a tax on childlessness and unmarried individuals over certain ages, repealed in 1973 (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Turkey (1949; passed: Yes). Passed as a wealth transfer from bachelors to families (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Romania (1986; passed: Yes). Instituted after the population increase from the decreţei 770 generation, continued until the Romanian Revolution of 1989 (source: Wikipedia, Bachelor Tax, accessed on 10 December 2024.).

Italy, Vastogirardi (1999; passed: No). The mayor proposed to reinstitute a bachelor tax locally, but it was not enacted (source: "Blissful Bachelorhood and the Shrinking Village", *The New York Times*, 26 November 1999).

Figure A1: Excess of Bachelors in the US, 1898



Note: This chart shows the excess of bachelors in various parts of the United States in 1898." Source: "Figures Out the Chicago Girl's Chance of Marriage", Chicago Tribune, August 28, 1898.

A2 Imposta Complementare Progressiva al Reddito


Table A1: *Imposta Complementare Progressiva al Reddito*

Lower bracket	Upper bracket	Marginal tax rate (%)	Tax burden (lire)
0	3,000	0.00	0
3,000	3,025	1.00	30
3,025	3,075	1.01	30.81
3,075	3,125	1.01	31.31
3,125	3,175	1.02	32.13
3,175	3,225	1.03	32.96
3,225	3,275	1.03	33.48
3,275	3,325	1.04	34.32
3,325	3,375	1.04	34.84
3,375	3,425	1.05	35.70
3,425	3,475	1.06	36.57
3,475	3,525	1.06	37.10
3,525	3,575	1.07	37.70
3,575	3,625	1.08	38.88
...	...	...	...
945,000	950,000	9.59	86,310
950,000	955,000	9.63	87,633
955,000	960,000	9.68	89,056
960,000	965,000	9.72	90,396
965,000	970,000	9.76	91,744
970,000	975,000	9.80	93,100
975,000	980,000	9.84	94,464
980,000	985,000	9.88	95,836
985,000	990,000	9.92	97,216
990,000	995,000	9.96	98,604
995,000	1,000,000	10.00	100,000

Note: This table provides information on the income tax during Italian Fascism (*Imposta Complementare Progressive al Reddito*). Each table reports the lower tax bracket (column 1), the upper bracket (column 2), the marginal tax rate (column 3), and the tax burden (column 4). Values for incomes between 3,625 and 945,000 are not reported for the sake of space (see the source for details). Values are Italian lire. Source: Regio Decreto 19 Febbraio 1925, n. 177.

A3 Number of Marriages by Bride's Age


Figure A2: Number of Marriages by Bride's Age



Note: The figure depicts the number of marriages by bride's age group: $\geq$ 25 years (red circles) versus $<$ 25 years (blue squares). Trends are normalized to 1 in the pre-bachelor tax year. Each series excludes data points relative to the First World War and its immediate aftermath, from which data are noisy. The orange-shaded areas divide the bachelor tax period according to its income-dependent tax rate (25%, 50%, and 75%). The triangles report the aggregate number of marriages. Sources for *marriage rate*: Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio, Rilevazione mensile degli eventi di stato civile; Istat, Rilevazione sui matrimoni.

A4 Groom's Average Age at Marriage


Figure A3: Groom's Average Age at Marriage



Note: The figure depicts men's average age at marriage. The orange-shaded areas divide the bachelor tax period according to its income-dependent tax rate (25%, 50%, and 75%). Sources for *marriage rate*: Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio, Rilevazione mensile degli eventi di stato civile; Istat, Rilevazione sui matrimoni.

A5 Bride's Average Age at Marriage


Figure A4: Bride's Age at Marriage



Note: The figure depicts women's average age at marriage. The orange-shaded areas divide the bachelor tax period according to its income-dependent tax rate (25%, 50%, and 75%). Sources for *marriage rate*: Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio, Rilevazione mensile degli eventi di stato civile; Istat, Rilevazione sui matrimoni.

A6 Groom's Average Age by Occupation

Figure A5: Groom's Average Age by Occupation



Note: The figure depicts men's average age at marriage across industries. The selection of year and industry is based on data availability. Sources: Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio, Rilevazione mensile degli eventi di stato civile; Istat, Rilevazione sui matrimoni.

B Conceptual Framework: Proofs and Extentions

A1 Proof of Equation (1)

The frequency of meetings follows a Poisson distribution, where intervals are exponentially distributed with an average length of $1/\lambda$. Over a short time interval h, the probability of a meeting occurring is given by $\lambda h + o(h)$, while the probability of no meeting is $1 - \lambda h + o(h)$, where the term $o(h)/h \approx 0$ as $h \to 0$. The matching rate, denoted by λ, depends on the search efforts exerted by individuals of both genders, s_i, for $i = m, f$ (where m represents men and f represents women).

The dynamic programming principle leads to the following Bellman equation for the value function V_m of being unattached for men:

$$V_m = \max_{s_m} \Big\{ e^{-rh} \left[\lambda h (s_m + s_f) \left(p(z \geq v_m + v_f) \mathbb{E}[z | z \geq v_m + v_f] - v_m \right) dF(z) \right.$$
$$\left. - c(s_m) - \tau_m \right] + (1 - \lambda h (s_m + s_f)) v_m \Big\} + o(h),$$

where r is the discount rate, λ is the arrival rate of matches, s_m and s_f are the search intensities of the unattached individuals, z is the quality of a potential match, v_m and v_f are the continuation values of searching for males and females, respectively, $c(s_m)$ is the cost function of searching, and τ_m is the bachelor tax. The term $o(h)$ denotes the higher-order terms that vanish as $h \to 0$.

Approximating $e^{-rh} \approx 1 - rh$, cancelling terms independent of h, and rearranging, I obtain:

$$\max_{s_m} \left\{ \lambda (s_m + s_f) \left(p(z \geq v_m + v_f) \mathbb{E}[z | z \geq v_m + v_f] - v_m \right) - c(s_m) - \tau_m \right\} = r v_m.$$


Dividing both sides by h and taking the limit as $h \to 0$, we arrive at Equation (1):

$$r v_m = \max_{s_m} \left\{ \lambda (s_m + s_f) \left[\int_{\underline{z}}^{\bar{z}} (w_m(z) - v_m) dF(z) \right] - c(s_m) - \tau_m \right\},$$

where the integration bounds $\underline{z}$ and $\bar{z}$ define the range of acceptable match qualities, and $w_m(z)$ represents the payoff from a match of quality z. This equation captures the value of being unattached for men, taking into account the potential gains from future matches, the costs of search, and the discounting of future utilities.

C Data Appendix

Figure C1: Total Paid and Unpaid Work Hours by Gender



Note: This figure plots the sum of paid and unpaid work hours by gender. Data from the United Nation, Statistics Division.

C1 Summary Statistics

Table C1: Summary Statistics - Survey Data

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
			A. Marriage and demographic information		
Marriage year	169,041	1973.962	14.329	1923	2003
Groom's age at marriage	169,046	27.999	5.557	15	80
Bride's age at marriage	169,046	24.324	5.190	15	80
Groom's birth year	169,046	1945.963	14.336	1897	1984
Bride's birth year	169,046	1949.639	14.081	1898	1984
Number of children	169,046	1.154	1.311	0	17
Live in the North	169,046	0.363	0.481	0	1
Live in the Center	169,046	0.289	0.453	0	1
Live in the South	169,046	0.348	0.476	0	1
			B. Market and non-market work		
Groom works	169,046	0.652	0.476	0	1
Groom retired	169,046	0.323	0.468	0	1
Bride works	169,046	0.365	0.481	0	1
Housewife	169,046	0.458	0.498	0	1
Bride is retired	169,046	0.154	0.361	0	1
Groom's housework (weekly hours)	152,199	7.161	9.436	0	99
Bride's housework (weekly hours)	165,543	38.384	20.566	0	99
Female share of housework	149,125	0.840	0.182	0	1
Bride thinks domestic work is heavy	160,729	0.271	0.445	0	1
			C. Education information		
Groom has uni degree	169,046	0.074	0.262	0	1
Groom has college	169,046	0.228	0.420	0	1
Groom has middle school	169,046	0.432	0.495	0	1
Groom has no education	169,046	0.260	0.438	0	1
Bride has uni degree	169,046	0.058	0.233	0	1
Bride has college	169,046	0.232	0.422	0	1
Bride has middle school	169,046	0.419	0.493	0	1
Bride has no education	169,046	0.284	0.451	0	1
Groom and bride have same education	169,046	0.564	0.496	0	1
			D. Wealth and ownership		
Live in a villa	166,984	0.132	0.339	0	1
Live in standard building	166,984	0.641	0.480	0	1
Live in a council house	166,984	0.227	0.419	0	1
Own a washing machine	97,476	0.992	0.088	0	1
Employ a domestic collaborator	124,094	0.054	0.227	0	1
			E. Well-being and leisure		
Wife is economically satisfied	169,046	0.033	0.178	0	1
Husband is economically satisfied	169,046	0.033	0.179	0	1
Wife is healthy	169,046	0.150	0.357	0	1
Husband is healthy	169,046	0.167	0.373	0	1
Watch TV - husband (weekly hours)	161,385	13.808	30.806	0	99
Watch TV - wife (weekly hours)	161,463	14.997	31.740	0	99
Attend sport event (husband)	169,046	0.326	0.469	0	1
Attend sport event (wife)	169,046	0.126	0.332	0	1
Attend dance-related event (husband)	169,046	0.156	0.363	0	1
Attend dance-related event (wife)	169,046	0.153	0.360	0	1

Note: Data from the Aspects of Daily Life Survey, provided by ISTAT over the 1993-2003 period.

C2 Summary Statistics - Intergenerational Sample

Table C2: Summary Statistics - Intergenerational Sample

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
			A. Daughters		
Housework (weekly hours)	47,969	10.357	11.294	0	99
Birth year	47,969	1975.430	6.665	1912	1988
Has uni degree	47,969	0.062	0.241	0	1
Has college	47,969	0.465	0.499	0	1
Has middle school	47,969	0.458	0.498	0	1
Has no education	47,969	0.014	0.116	0	1
Works	47,969	0.476	0.499	0	1
Housewife	47,969	0.044	0.204	0	1
Retired	47,969	0.016	0.125	0	1
Student	47,969	0.465	0.499	0	1
			B. Parents		
Live in the North	47,969	0.326	0.469	0	1
Live in the Center	47,969	0.266	0.442	0	1
Live in the South	47,969	0.408	0.491	0	1
Live in a villa	47,969	0.142	0.350	0	1
Marriage year	47,969	1971.060	7.830	1918	2001
Father's age at marriage	47,969	27.161	4.669	15	69
Mother's age at marriage	47,951	23.161	4.252	15	65
Father's housework (weekly hours)	43,905	6.168	8.781	0	99
Mother's housework (weekly hours)	47,969	41.171	20.797	0	99
Father's birth year	47,969	1943.899	8.949	1903	1973
Mother's birth year	47,969	1947.901	8.649	1906	1972
Father has uni degree	47,969	0.066	0.249	0	1
Mother has uni degree	47,969	0.047	0.212	0	1
Father has college	47,969	0.202	0.402	0	1
Mother has college	47,969	0.185	0.388	0	1
Father has middle school	47,969	0.451	0.498	0	1
Mother has middle school	47,969	0.459	0.498	0	1
Father has no education	47,969	0.277	0.447	0	1
Mother has no education	47,969	0.304	0.460	0	1
Father works	47,969	0.693	0.461	0	1
Mother works	47,969	0.353	0.478	0	1
Mother is a housewife	47,969	0.529	0.499	0	1
Father is retired	47,969	0.307	0.461	0	1
Mother is retired	47,969	0.118	0.323	0	1

Note: Data from the Aspects of Daily Life Survey, provided by ISTAT over the 1993-2003 period.

D Robustness and Alternative Specifications

D1 Extensive Margin Response from Husbands

Table D1: Extensive Margin Response from Husbands

	Outcome: Husband's housework > 0			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.236**	0.273***	0.263***	0.258***
	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.087)
Observations	143,110	143,110	143,110	143,110
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes
Mean outcome	0.706	0.706	0.706	0.706

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the probability that husbands do some housework. It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth level fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth level fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D2 Restricting the Sample to Earlier Marriages

Table D2: Restricting the Sample to Earlier Marriages

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. *Outcome:* Women's share of housework			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.212***	-0.221***	-0.220***	-0.216***
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)
	B. *Outcome:* Women's housework (hours)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-10.677**	-10.500**	-10.136**	-10.535**
	(4.185)	(4.157)	(4.160)	(4.144)
	C. *Outcome:* Men's housework (hours)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	4.895**	5.073**	5.103**	4.794**
	(2.205)	(2.091)	(2.087)	(2.088)
Observations	26,592	26,585	26,585	26,584
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes
Mean outcome (panel A)	0.806	0.806	0.806	0.806
Mean outcome (panel B)	38.592	38.592	38.592	38.592
Mean outcome (panel C)	9.106	9.106	9.106	7.192

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the share of housework performed by women (panel A), women's weekly hours of domestic work (panel B), and men's weekly hours of domestic work (panel C). It restricts the sample to marriages formed before 1960, and it depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D3 Using Education Attainment As a Proxy for Exposure

Table D3: Using Education Attainment As a Proxy for Exposure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. *Outcome:* Women's share of housework			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.257***	-0.239***	-0.238***	-0.229***
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
	B. *Outcome:* Women's housework (hours)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-13.141*	-14.719*	-14.241*	-16.078**
	(7.964)	(8.307)	(8.294)	(7.833)
	C. *Outcome:* Men's housework (hours)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	8.055**	7.060**	7.084**	6.225*
	(3.642)	(3.445)	(3.471)	(3.493)
Observations	147,110	147,110	147,110	147,110
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Education FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Education FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the share of housework performed by women (panel A), women's weekly hours of domestic work (panel B), and men's weekly hours of domestic work (panel C). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4), but using educational attainment as a proxy for being wealthy (having at least a college degree). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-education level fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-education level fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D4 Alternative Definition of Housework


Table D4: Alternative Definition of Housework

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. *Outcome:* Domestic work is heavy (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.236***	-0.267***	-0.261***	-0.268***
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Observations	143,113	143,113	143,113	143,113
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes
Mean outcome	0.269	0.269	0.269	0.269

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on a dummy equal to 1 if a woman reports that "her domestic work is too heavy." It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D5 The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Leisure Activities

Figure D1: Event-Study Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Leisure Activities



Note: This figure depicts separate coefficient estimates on the probability of performing a dance-related activity from women by time periods (panel A), groom's age at marriage (panel B), and wealth class (panel C). The coefficient estimates are obtained by running equations (5), (6), and (7), respectively. Each specification includes marriage year-groom's age at marriage, marriage year-wealthy, and groom's age at marriage-wealthy fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

Table D5: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Leisure Activities


	A. Watching TV (weekly hours) - Men			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-4.975	-7.423	-6.957	-7.031
	(6.546)	(6.046)	(6.024)	(6.050)
Observations	159,183	159,183	159,183	159,183
	B. Watching TV (weekly hours) - Women			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.040	-1.802	-1.533	-1.788
	(5.393)	(4.952)	(4.948)	(4.943)
Observations	159,265	159,265	159,265	159,265
	C. Attend sport event (0/1) - Men			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.031	0.046**	0.018	0.027
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Observations	166,584	166,584	166,584	166,584
	D. Attend sport event (0/1) - Women			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.013	0.023**	0.011	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Observations	166,582	166,574	166,574	166,574
	E. Dance-related activity (0/1) - Men			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.028*	0.040**	0.031*	0.033*
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Observations	166,584	166,584	166,584	166,584
	F. Dance-related activity (0/1) - Women			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.033*	0.048**	0.040**	0.043**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Observations	166,582	166,582	166,582	166,582
Triple diff set of FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Each spouse year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's ed FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's ed FE	No	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the weekly hours spent watching TV (panels A and B), the probability of attending a sporting event in the past year (panels C and D), and the probability of participating in dancing activities in the past year (panels E and F). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.


D6 The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Well-Being

Figure D2: Event-Study Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Well-Being


A. Economic satisfaction: By period




B. Economic satisfaction: By groom's age




C. Economic satisfaction: By wealth class




D. Health satisfaction: By period



E. Health satisfaction: By groom's age



F. Health satisfaction: By wealth class



Note: This figure depicts separate coefficient estimates on the share of women who reported being satisfied with their current economic (top panels) or health situations by time periods (panels A and D), groom's age at marriage (panels B and E), and wealth class (panels C and F). The coefficient estimates are obtained by running equations (5), (6), and (7), respectively. Each specification includes marriage year-groom's age at marriage, marriage year-wealthy, and groom's age at marriage-wealthy fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

Table D6: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Well-Being

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. Economic satisfaction - Men			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.053	0.052	0.047	0.049
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
	B. Economic satisfaction - Women			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.075**	0.075**	0.071**	0.073**
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
	C. Health satisfaction - Men			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.006	0.003	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
	D. Health satisfaction - Women			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.070*	0.079*	0.074*	0.074*
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Observations	166,582	166,582	166,582	166,582
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Groom's labor market FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes
Bride's labor market FE	No	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the share of men (panels A and C) and women (panels B and D) who reported being satisfied with their current economic or health situation. It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment and labor market status (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment and labor market status (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D7 The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Assortative Matching

Table D7: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Assortative Matching

	A. *Outcome:* Same educational attainment (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.088	-0.106	-0.023	-0.112
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.074)	(0.086)
	B. *Outcome:* Both participate in religious activities (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.020	0.007	-0.005	0.010
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
	C. *Outcome:* Both participate in political activities (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.015	-0.013	-0.000	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
	D. *Outcome:* Both participate in cultural activities (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.037	-0.047	-0.023	-0.048
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.038)
	E. *Outcome:* Both participate in volunteering activities (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.019	0.010	0.026	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Observations	166,582	166,574	166,574	166,574
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the following proxies for assortative matching: whether the couple has the same education level (panel A); whether both participate in religious activities (panel B); whether both participate in political activities (panel C); whether both participate in cultural activities (panel D); whether both participate in volunteering activities (panel E). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then adds survey year, bride's age at marriage, groom's and bride's year of birth and region fixed effects (col 2), groom's highest educational attainment (col 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (col 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable.

D8 The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Substitution Technology

Table D8: The Use of Substitution Technologies and External Help

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. *Outcome:* Use a domestic collaborator (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.046	0.049	0.020	0.032
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.084)
Observations	122,507	122,507	122,507	122,507
	B. *Outcome:* Owns a washing machine (0/1)			
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.016	-0.029	-0.035	-0.031
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Observations	96,078	96,078	96,078	96,078
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on whether the household employs a domestic collaborator (panel A), and whether it owns a washing machine (panel B). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D9 The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Fertility

Table D9: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Fertility

	Outcome: Number of children			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.406	0.357	0.339	0.334
	(0.265)	(0.267)	(0.266)	(0.265)
Observations	166,582	166,582	166,582	166,582
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's education FE	No	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on the number of children. It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), groom's highest educational attainment (column 3), and bride's highest educational attainment (column 4). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.

D10 The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Women's Human Capital

Table D10: The Impact of the Bachelor Tax on Women's Human Capital

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	A. *Outcome:* Graduate degree (0/1)		
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.006	0.007	-0.006
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)
	B. *Outcome:* At least college (0/1)		
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	-0.001	-0.006	-0.042
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.038)
	C. *Outcome:* At least high school (0/1)		
1(More exposed to bachelor tax)	0.036	0.045	-0.015
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Observations	147,110	147,110	147,110
Marriage year x Groom's age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage year x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groom's age x Wealthy FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's age at marriage FE	No	Yes	Yes
Groom's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes
Bride's year of birth FE	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	Yes
Groom's education FE	No	No	Yes

Note: This table reports the impact of marrying under the pressure of the bachelor tax on i) the likelihood that the bride has a graduate degree (panel A); ii) the likelihood that she has at least completed college (panel B); and iii) the likelihood that she has at least completed high school (panel C). It depicts the triple difference coefficient estimated from equation (4). The baseline specification includes marriage year-by-groom's age at marriage fixed effects, marriage year-by-wealth class fixed effects, and groom's age at marriage-by-wealth class fixed effects (column 1). It then cumulatively adds survey year fixed effects, bride's age at marriage fixed effects, groom's and bride's year of birth fixed effects and region fixed effects (column 2), and groom's highest educational attainment (column 3). Standard errors clustered by marriage year-groom's age-wealth group, representing the level of the treatment variable. Data from the "Aspects of Daily Life" survey.