Vitalii Tubdenov

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Curriculum Vitae

Research Fields Econometrics, Economic Theory

Education

Harvard University: Ph.D. in Economics, 2023 to 2029
References:
Shengwu Li (shengwu_li@fas.harvard.edu)
Jesse Shapiro (jesse_shapiro@fas.harvard.edu)
Elie Tamer (elietamer@fas.harvard.edu)

Lomonosov Moscow State University: Bachelor of Economics, 2021

Employment

Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University
Research Fellow, 2021– 2023

Moscow State Institute of International Relations
Research Fellow, 2019– 2021

Publications

Pol Antràs and Vitalii Tubdenov (2025): "Measuring the Average Production Period", *AEA Papers and Proceedings,* (115)

Phillip Kartaev and Vitalii Tubdenov (2021): "The Transparency of Monetary Policy and the Effect of Exchange Rate Pass-Through", *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (6)

Presentations (*coauthor presentations)

2025: ASSA Annual Meeting (San Francisco) *

2020: Modern Econometric Tools and Applications (Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod)

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant, Econ 1052: Game Theory and Economic Applications, Harvard University, 2025

Teaching Assistant, Methodology of Mathematical Proofs in Economics, Lomonosov MSU, 2019

Lecturer, Introduction to Economics, School of Economics and Mathematics at Lomonosov MSU, 2017–2019

Academic Service

Referee for: Journal of Economic Theory

Awards	Nikolai Kondratiev Fellowship (Lomonosov MSU, 2020)
	Fellowship in Memory of Serezha Kravchenko (Lomonosov MSU, 2017)
Languages	Russian (native), English (fluent), Korean (beginner)
Software skills	Python (fluent), R (fluent), Stata (intermediate)

Unofficial Transcript

Harvard University
PhD in Economics, 2023-2029

Class Number	Class Name	Grade
Core classes		
Econ 2010A	Economic Theory (Micro I)	B+
Econ 2010B	Economic Theory (Micro II)	A
Econ 2010C	Economic Theory (Macro I)	A
Econ 2010D	Economic Theory (Macro II)	A-
Econ 2120	Principles of Econometrics	A-
Econ 2140	Econometric Methods	A-
Electives		
Econ 2003	Computing for Economists	A
Econ 2030	Psychology and Economics	B+
Econ 2040	Experimental Economics	A
Econ 2052	Game Theory I	A
Econ 2060	Contract Theory	A
MIT 6.7700	Fundamentals of Probability	A
MIT 6.7720	Discrete Probability and Stochastic Processes	A
MIT 14.281	Contract Economics	A

Research Statement

I study the design of markets and organizations using tools from microeconomic theory. Below I discuss two of my ongoing projects.

How to Sell Signals

Imagine a relationship between a contract research organization (CRO)—for example, Thermo Fisher Scientific—and a pharmaceutical company, such as Moderna. The pharmaceutical company hires the CRO to perform multiple phases of clinical trials needed to understand the

effects of a new drug. How should the CRO set its prices for each phase of drug testing? Is it beneficial for the CRO to make the price of Phase II conditional on the results of Phase I?

I study these questions using a model in which a monopolist (the CRO) controls a sequence of experiments and can adjust the price of each experiment based on the buyer's (the pharmaceutical company's) current beliefs. The buyer needs to make a single decision—whether to start producing the drug—and can stop purchasing experiments at any time. The buyer will stop once its beliefs are sufficiently close to certainty.

From the buyer's perspective, this setup resembles Wald's sequential decision problem. From the seller's perspective, it is akin to a standard information design problem, with the added constraint that the buyer must be incentivized to follow the purchasing strategy proposed by the seller. I characterize the optimal pricing scheme and derive comparative statics with respect to the informativeness of the experiments and the buyer's value of information. The model helps explain the pricing patterns observed in real-world contracts. Beyond CRO services, it can also be applied to the pricing of market research surveys and consulting services.

Optimal Task Assignment

In any organization, there are multiple tasks and multiple workers. For example, consider a police department that must assign officers to several patrol districts. How should the chief of police allocate the officers to these districts?

A given allocation of tasks induces a strategic interaction among the workers: everyone will respond optimally to the actions of the others. The manager (in this case, the chief of police) has preferences over the potential outcomes of this interaction. One question is whether rearranging the assignments (i.e., permuting the agents) could lead to better outcomes for the manager.

For a given profile of workers' preferences, the manager's problem is inherently combinatorial. To make progress, I focus on linear-quadratic games and analyze the expected value of the manager's decision, assuming a joint distribution of the workers' preferences. I then compare the expected manager's value under the optimal assignment to that under a random assignment.

These conclusions, however, rely on the manager knowing the workers' true preferences—preferences that the workers may be incentivized to conceal or misrepresent. To address this issue, I also examine strategy-proof assignment mechanisms, in which the manager first elicits (truthfully) the workers' preferences and then determines the assignment accordingly.