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Institution: University of Virginia

Program: PhD in Economics

Years of Enrollment: 2021-present (5th year)

Research Interests: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Game Theory, Industrial Organization

GPA: 3.83

Completed Coursework

First-Year Core: sequences in Micro, Macro, and Econometrics.

Electives: Experimental Economics, Industrial Organization, International Trade Theory, Financial Economics, Antitrust Economics, Cross Section Econometrics, Time Series Econometrics, Data-Rich Econometrics and Machine Learning, Development Economics.

Dissertation

Coordination under Uncertainty and Restricted Communication: An Experiment

Committee: Charles Holt, Po-Hsuan Lin, Noah Myung

Description: This paper examines which information-transmission processes facilitate efficient coordination under noisy communication and strategic uncertainty. I conduct a laboratory experiment to study equilibrium selection in a coordination game with one-shot communication, varying the communication protocol across treatments. Noise is implemented as a 30% probability that a message is lost in transit. Preliminary evidence shows that allowing one player to voluntarily choose whether to send a message significantly improves coordination efficiency relative to automatic delivery, because the voluntary message credibly signals the sender's intent to coordinate. However, imposing a sunk cost on the voluntary protocol backfires: message adoption falls in response to the cost and many potential senders opt out. These results highlight a trade-off between the intensive margin (credibility) and the extensive margin (adoption), and they illuminate the behavioral role (and limits) of sunk costs in strategic belief updating.

Latest Draft and Slides of dissertation

Ongoing Project

Directed Search in the Lab: Position Prominence and Price Transparency

In digital markets characterized by information frictions, "position" is the scarce resource. A central question for market efficiency is whether firms seek top search rankings to exercise market power over a captive audience, or whether they use prominence together with aggressive pricing to direct consumers' visits in favor of themselves. Isolating these competing strategic incentives in field data is challenging due to unobserved quality differences that confound price and position. To address this, we utilize a laboratory experiment consisting of markets with three ex ante homogeneous firms bidding for search slots that carry explicit search cost advantages for consumers (where "top results" are more accessible).

The experiment adopts a 2x2 factorial design that varies: price transparency (Hidden vs. Advertised Price) and position assignment (Exogenous vs. Endogenous via a generalized second-price (GSP) auction). We conjecture that in advertised-price settings, bids and prices become strategic complements, leading firms to combine high bids with low prices to capture initial attention, thereby lowering average transaction prices. Conversely, hidden prices may incentivize firms to exploit the prominence of top positions by raising prices. The findings offer critical insights for platform design and antitrust policy, regarding whether sponsored ranking systems enhance consumer welfare by directing search to efficient, low-price firms, or whether they incentivize rent-seeking and market obfuscation. This distinction is vital for determining if algorithmic sorting requires deeper regulatory oversight to internalize search externalities.