You Are Fired, My Lord: Democratic Narratives and Accountability in the World's Third Largest Democracy*

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Abstract

We study how narratives shape voter preferences and behavior using a large, multi-wave survey experiment conducted during the 2024 Indonesian General Election—the world's largest single-day election. Employing a full-factorial design within a random utility framework, we find that while voters prefer co-ethnic and co-religious candidates, they place even greater weight on candidate track record, particularly with respect to corruption. We provide causal evidence that democratic narratives influence voting behavior by altering the criteria voters use to evaluate candidates. We show that narratives can be shifted by a low-cost informational intervention. A 75-second animated video framing elections as mechanisms of accountability—where politicians are "employees" of the voter—significantly increases the weight voters assign to competence and policy. The intervention also affected actual voting outcomes by reducing last-minute switching to poll-predicted winners. Both effects are driven primarily by voters with limited prior understanding of electoral accountability. These findings underscore the malleability of voter preferences and demonstrate that a simple, scalable educational intervention can strengthen democratic accountability in identity-divided settings.

*We thank Jamus Lim, Steve Monroe, Rohini Pande, and Pavithra Suryanarayan for insightful comments and constructive feedback. We are also grateful to participants at the NUS SIG Seminar, SIOE Conference (University of Chicago), Monash Indonesia, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) Japan, the 2024 APSA Annual Meeting, the Singapore Political Economy Group Seminar at ESSEC Singapore, and the SMU Southeast Asia Seminar for valuable suggestions. We thank Katya Loviana and Wan Hasjim Omar Jacob Saleh for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are our own. Shofia acknowledges support from the Yale–NUS College Internal Grant (IG23-SG015). This project was pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0012872)

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Why do some democracies deliver accountable governance and broad-based prosperity, while others remain locked in cycles of patronage, corruption, and weak state capacity? We argue that a critical, yet underexplored determinant lies in citizen narratives of democracy, i.e., the underlying beliefs of voters about the purpose and goals of electing representatives. Rather than seeing elections as a mechanism for selecting competent *agents* and holding them accountable for past performance (**an agency narrative**), voters might see elections as contests between rival potential *rulers*, shaped by patronage, identity, or charisma (**a deferential narrative**).[1] According to the latter narrative, leaders are not accountable representatives, but patrons, "godfathers", or champions of ethnic or religious groups. As a result, voters may prioritize traits such as perceived popularity, power, or group affiliation over integrity, competence, and policy commitment.

This distinction is crucial as it shapes voter expectations and behavior. Voters who see politicians as public servants (an agency view) are more likely to reward competence and punish failure. In contrast, deferential voters view politicians as powerful patrons who distribute favors and thus, deserve loyalty or gratitude, not scrutiny. This belief system reorients the purpose of voting —from selecting or disciplining agents to expressing allegiance or gratitude. Thus, when mass belief is shaped by a deferential narrative, democratic systems tend to sustain clientelistic exchange (Kitschelt, 2000; Auyero, 1999), limiting the capacity of the system to deliver accountable governance. Clientelism weakens incentives to provide public goods, exacerbates inequality, and fosters corruption (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2020; Pande, 2011; Bardhan, Mitra, Mookherjee and Nath, 2024). Over time, it can also entrench weak institutions, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of poor governance and low state capacity (Fergusson, Molina and Robinson, 2022).

In this paper, we use Indonesia—the world's third largest democracy—as a testing ground to study the role of narratives in shaping voter preferences and behavior. First, using an implicit elicitation of preferences and random utility model, we estimate the weights assigned by voters to different characteristics of political candidates, such as identity, competence, and policy position. Second, we provide causal evidence that democratic narratives influence voting behavior by differently shaping the criteria voters use to evaluate candidates. Finally, we provide evidence that these narratives can be shifted through an intervention, and that this shift loops back to voters preferences and behavior.

We embed a large-scale experiment in Indonesia's 2024 general election—hailed by CNN as the world's largest single-day election. Our study draws on a multi-wave panel survey of a nationally representative sample of voting-age Indonesians, conducted in three waves: two before the election, capturing baseline attitudes and campaign-period dynamics, and one immediately afterward, measuring electoral choices and

[1]The terms we use in this study, i.e. agency vs. deferential narrative are conceptually close to *permissive* vs. *nonpermissive* norms as used in Bidner and Francois (2013) In their conception, *nonpermissive* norms are held by voters who put a heavy weight on the elected officials transgressive acts, such as corruption, while *permissive* norms are held by those who believe that deviant acts of politicians are "acceptable", part of the normal functioning of the political system.

post-election outcomes.

Our design combines a full-factorial candidate-choice experiment with an embedded randomized informational treatment. In the choice task, respondents evaluate pairs of hypothetical —but realistic— political candidates whose attributes are fully randomized, allowing clean identification of the weights that voters place on each attribute and an interpretation within a random-utility model of voting. Within this experiment, we randomize exposure to a 75-second animated video that explains political agency using a lay metaphor; the treatment is delivered in the second survey wave, 4–20 days before election day. Across waves, we measure baseline political views and positions, pre-election vote intentions, and post-election self-reported votes.[2]

Based on our pre-registered analysis, we find that in the control group—that received no information treatment about electoral control of politicians—candidate track record (valence) was the most influential factor in voter decision-making, followed by ethno-religious identity and ideological proximity. When presented with two otherwise identical candidates, respondents were 26 percentage points more likely to choose the candidate with high valence. In comparison, shared ethno-religious identity increased the probability of selection by about 6 percentage points, while alignment on divisive ideological issues increased it by about 3 percentage points.[3] Interestingly, this weightage—which reflect the decision criteria of voters—differs quite substantially between the two types of voters. In particular, agency voters assign a significantly higher weight on valence and ideological proximity as compared to deferential voters. The difference on the weight assigned to identity markers is not statistically significant, however. This evidence suggest two things: First, when presented with well-structured information about political candidates, Indonesian voters would prefer a high-valence out-group candidate over a low-valence in-group candidate.[4] Second, in line with our framework, different narratives of democracy shape differently the decision criteria of voters in a significant way.

Moreover, our brief, scalable informational intervention produces a substantive and statistically significant

[2]Conducting the experiment during an active election campaign enhances external validity: voters are highly engaged with political choices and continuously exposed to campaign information, enabling us to capture preferences in a context of genuine electoral salience. Importantly, the panel structure further allows us to track the evolution of these preferences—from pre-election attitudes and stated intentions to self-reported vote choices immediately after the election.

[3]These results are robust to a non-parametric estimation of Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014). An additional methodological innovation in this study is the use of response time in the candidate choice task as an alternative outcome measure. The Qualtrics infrastructure allow us to record the time spent by respondents on each candidate pair before making their choice and move to the next pair. By analyzing how long respondents take to choose between candidate pairs, we infer which traits are most salient. Specifically, we test whether decision-making is delayed when candidates share the same attribute—e.g., religious affiliation—thereby forcing respondents to focus on other traits. Delays are observed when salient attributes are held constant, particularly for track record and religious identity, consistent with our main findings.

[4]This results follows if the assumption of additive separability of utility components holds. We test this assumption through interaction analysis within the AMCE framework (Hainmueller *et al.*, 2014) and find that high-valence candidates are equally rewarded whether they belong to the respondent's in-group or out-group, supporting the additive utility specification assumption.

re-weighting of voters' candidate evaluations. This treatment allows us to estimate the causal effect of lay beliefs about electoral democracy on decision criteria, i.e., on the weights in the utility function of voters. Treated voters place greater weight on valence and on ideological proximity, with effects concentrated among deferential voters who, prior to the treatment, do not conceive of political representation as an agency relationship. By contrast, we find no effect on the weight placed on identity congruence, including within the deferential group, suggesting a persistent role for ethno-religious identity in shaping voting preferences in Indonesia.

Crucially, these preference shifts translate into observable changes in voting behavior in the actual presidential election. We document systematic differences in vote switching between agency and deferential voters: agency voters are less prone to the bandwagon effect—i.e., switching to the candidate considered the frontrunner according to pre-election polls—and more likely to stick with their initial choice even when the candidate is polling as an underdog.[5] The informational treatment significantly alters deferential voters' behavior: post-treatment, their switching patterns converge toward those of agency voters, with statistically significant reductions in band-wagoning and greater persistence of initial choices.

This paper contributes to the literature on the political economy of democracy. Building on the theoretical model of Bidner and Francois (2013)—who highlight the importance of democracy-sustaining mass-beliefs in undergirding democratic success—we are the first to provide causal evidence on the micro-foundational role of narratives in affecting voting behaviour. Our work also highlights an alternative path to improve democratic governance: intervening on the ideational side, which shapes mass beliefs. As argued in Bidner and Francois (2013), shifting mass-beliefs about democracy may substitute for the reform of institutions themselves. This is key, as the ability of democracy to "deliver" contributes to making it self-sustaining (Acemoglu, Ajzenman, Aksoy, Fiszbein and Molina, 2024). Reforming political institutions is essential for development, because institutional constraints are highly consequential. In practice, strengthening democratic institutions is perhaps best pursued incrementally, with each step sustaining the next as we learn—based on evidence—what works and what backfires (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Crucially, opportunities to randomize institutional reforms is rare, if possible at all, while belief-based interventions offer a more scalable lever.

This paper also contributes to the vast literature on policies to improve accountability in developing democracies by providing information to voters. First, a substantial body of work examines the electoral effects of candidate-specific information. For instance, performance report cards and the disclosure of audits or criminal records can increase support for high-performing or less corrupt politicians (Banerjee, Kumar,

[5]This is in line with our framework, where agency voters are less likely to be swayed by perceived popularity or power, as they put a higher weight on track record on performance and ideological position which may be formed long before the election day and thus, is more difficult to change in the short period leading to the election day

Pande and Su, 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; George, Gupta and Neggers, 2019), particularly when the information is amplified by media exposure (Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder, 2020). However, such interventions can also reduce turnout or provoke backlash in polarized settings (Chong, De La O, Karlan and Wantchekon, 2015; Arias, Balan, Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin, 2019; Baysan, 2022). Our study shifts the focus from candidate-specific disclosure to the institutional logic of elections, framing this as a principal-agent relationship through which voters can hold leaders accountable. This ideational approach has the advantage of avoiding partisan cues and the potential perception as "black campaigning", offering a promising alternative in contexts where candidate-specific information may be politically sensitive or polarizing.

Another strand of literature emphasizes policy-oriented information, such as exposure to candidate debates and campaign promises. Starting with the seminal contribution of Wantchekon (2003), studies show that such interventions can enhance voter knowledge and reduce identity-based or partisan voting (Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster, 2020; Bowles and Larreguy, 2020; Brierley, Kramon and Ofosu, 2020; Platas and Raffler, 2021). Similarly, Kendall, Nannicini and Trebbi (2015) and Cruz, Keefer and Labonne (2021); Cruz, Keefer, Labonne and Trebbi (2024) find that programmatic messaging increases the salience of policy and performance considerations in voter decision-making. Our study complements this work by taking a different approach: rather than intervening on the content of candidate platforms, we focus on how voters conceptualize their relationship to office-holders and the act of voting itself. Because our intervention does not rely on candidate participation nor alter campaign content, it is particularly well-suited for real electoral settings where neutrality and scalability are essential.

This paper is also to related to work on clientelism and vote buying, which highlights how economic insecurity and social norms sustain personalized exchanges (Wantchekon, 2003; Bobonis, Gertler, Gonzalez-Navarro and Nichter, 2022). Prior work shows that community engagement and deliberation can shift preferences toward programmatic politics (Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Wantchekon and Guardado, 2023; López-Moctezuma, Wantchekon, Rubenson, Fujiwara and Pe Lero, 2022), and that legal or moral appeals to discourage vote buying have mixed effects (Vicente and Wantchekon, 2008; Vicente, 2014; Hicken, Leider, Ravanilla and Yang, 2015). Our work complements these by taking a distinct ideational route. We show that we can rely on normative and cognitively coherent rationale for electoral accountability rather than appealing to legality or moral virtue, strategies that may lack credibility in low-enforcement context.

Methodologically, our approach also differs from the majority of the works previously mentioned. With few exceptions, most studies in this topic adopt designs where the randomization takes place at the cluster (village, constituency, precinct, town, or district) level (Bidwell *et al.*, 2020; Bowles and Larreguy, 2020; Cruz *et al.*, 2021, 2024; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Kendall *et al.*, 2015; López-Moctezuma *et al.*, 2022; Platas and Raffler, 2021; Vicente, 2014; Wantchekon, 2003; de Albuquerque, Finan, Jha, Karpuska

and Trebbi, 2025). In many cases, also outcomes (vote shares) are observed at the aggregate (e.g., village or precinct) level. While arguably high in terms of "naturalism", this type of aggregate intervention might make it harder to pinpoint what happens at the individual level, in terms of decision rules of voters themselves. This might hinder the ability to pinpoint the micro-foundations, in terms of decision criteria at the time of election.[6] Our study uses randomization at the individual level instead since the main thrust of our contribution is to highlight and recover the micro-founded decision-making mechanism at the individual level within the random utility framework. It is worth pointing out that the individual-level approach we adopt does not hinder our ability to study this issue in a naturalistic way: in a panel survey design, we are able to observe candidate preferences at the beginning of the campaign, and the final vote choice in the actual presidential election. We can therefore recover the causal effect of the intervention we administer on actual vote choice. [7] We also make additional methodological contributions. First, we introduce a simple method, based on analogies, to measure how voters conceptualize elections, which allows us to identify the types of voters most responsive to ideational interventions.[8] Second, we develop a brief and scalable intervention with an animated video that effectively shifts voter preferences —offering a civic education tool that can be adapted to other democratic contexts. Third, we propose a straightforward approach to incorporate ethno-religious identity considerations in the voter utility framework initially proposed by Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr (2000) and Londregan and Romer (1993).

Finally, this study is set in Indonesia—the world's third-largest democracy—where competitive elections coexist with clientelism and persistent identity-based voting. This context make it possible to perform a crucial test of whether low-cost, non-partisan interventions can foster accountability in environments marked by polarization and clientelism. Our findings suggest that even brief, educational interventions can serve as scalable and politically feasible tools for strengthening democratic norms in similarly complex settings.

In the following section, we develop a conceptual framework that links identity politics, clientelism, and vote choice. Section 2 provides background on Indonesia's political landscape, highlighting its defining

[6] In particular, if a given location (e.g., village) receives a specific type of campaign message (e.g., focus on promises of broad provision of public goods) or a set of informations (e.g., about government budget allocation) as a clustered assigned treatment, the whole dynamics of that election might be affected. For instance, informal political discussion between citizens or responses of local political elites (unobserved to the researcher analyst econometrician) create feedback effects. These make it harder to pinpoint the mechanism at the individual level. While it is indisputably of interest to estimate the total effect of different types of promises or platforms on the political dynamics and ultimately on election outcomes, these studies are unable to enlighten on the individual micro-foundations of any of the effects that might be detected. In clustered-randomized setting, indirect evidence —in the form of interviews or other micro-level evidence— could only provide some insight about the individual level inclusive of any context level feedback effect. This is indeed an inescapable consequence of the level at which the intervention is assigned.

[7] Actual and reported vote choice might differ due to respondents misremembering their choice or outright misreporting, for instance for desirability bias reasons. However, in a three-way high salience presidential race, measurement error due to incorrect recall should be minimal, especially as we interviewed a few days immediately after the election; it is unclear that there were incentives for respondents to misreport their choice, given that all three candidates were ex ante viable.

[8] This classification is proven to show strong face validity: agency-minded individuals are significantly more likely to report willingness to punish politicians for misconduct and less tolerant of self-interested political behavior. The measure also exhibits a clear educational gradient and correlates strongly with factual political knowledge, corroborating further its validity.

features and offering a brief overview of the 2024 General Election. Section 3 details our empirical design, including the survey methodology, the strategy used to measure respondents' conceptions of democracy, the randomized informational intervention, and the candidate choice experiment employed to capture voter preferences. In Section 4, we present results from a random utility model estimating the weights voters assign to various candidate attributes. Section 5 examines the effects of the informational treatment on candidate choices, on real-world electoral behavior, and on response time in the candidate-choice exercise. In Section 6, we explore additional analyses adopting the Average Marginal Component Effects and Average Component Interaction Effects non-parametric approach. Section 7 concludes.

1 Conceptual framework: Clientelistic linkages, and voter conception of democracy

Democratic systems are built on the premise that elected officials serve as agents of the people, accountable to voters and responsive to their interests (Barro, 1973; Besley, 2006; Ferejohn, 1986a). Yet in practice, many democracies fall short of this ideal. One key explanation for this is the erosion of accountability, particularly in settings dominated by clientelism. Even with regular, free, and fair elections governments politicians prioritize the targeted distribution of state resources in exchange for political support over broad-based policy performance (Anderson, Francois and Kotwal, 2015; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008). Clientelism weakens incentives to provide public goods, exacerbates inequality, and fosters corruption (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2020; Pande, 2011; Bardhan *et al.*, 2024). Over time, it can also entrench weak institutions, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of poor governance and low state capacity (Fergusson *et al.*, 2022) and low legitimacy (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2024).

Clientelism is a form of political exchange in which material goods or services are selectively distributed by politicians to individuals or groups in return for political support, typically votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). It is sustained through informal, personalized relationships rather than impersonal, programmatic commitments. A defining feature of clientelism is the presence of a two-sided commitment problem: voters may renege and fail to reciprocate, just as politicians may not deliver promised benefits (Robinson and Verdier, 2013). To function, clientelistic linkages require both the effective distribution of benefits and mechanisms to ensure compliance, often through monitoring and threats of exclusion (Kitschelt, 2000; Stokes, 2005).

Much of the literature, in economics and political science, emphasizes the enforcement side of clientelism—highlighting how brokers monitor voter behavior or deny services to non-supporters (e.g., Stokes,

2005; Bardhan *et al.*, 2024). However, this perspective risks overlooking how clientelism can also be sustained by normative beliefs and social expectations, even in the absence of direct enforcement.

Several scholars argue that hierarchical social norms and moral obligations of loyalty can substitute for monitoring. Voters may feel a duty to support a patron perceived as generous or powerful, especially when political authority is understood as rooted in personal relationships rather than citizen agency (Kitschelt, 2000; Auyero, 1999). In this view, clientelism is underpinned not only by exchange but also by a broader understanding of politics as a realm of deference and domination rather than mutual accountability.

This distinction is crucial: voters who see politicians as public servants (an agency view) are more likely to reward competence and punish failure; in contrast, deference-minded voters view politicians as powerful patrons whose favors deserve loyalty, not scrutiny. This belief system reorients the purpose of voting—from selecting or disciplining agents to expressing allegiance or gratitude. Such views can become internalized and persistent, shaping how citizens engage with democratic institutions even without active reinforcement by political actors.

These deferential beliefs also help explain the strong link between clientelism and identity politics. In ethnically or religiously divided societies, shared identity can reduce the transaction costs of clientelistic exchange. Politicians can more easily target benefits to co-ethnic or co-religious supporters, while voters may interpret those benefits as signals of solidarity rather than strategic exchange (Kitschelt, 2000; Hale, 2007). Identity-based trust substitutes for formal enforcement, further entrenching clientelistic relationships.

Group identity also blurs the line between patronage and representation. Politicians elected on the basis of ethnic or religious affiliation may not be evaluated on competence or policy performance, but on their ability to deliver resources to the group. This reinforces the tendency for voters to tolerate poor governance from in-group candidates, especially when those candidates are perceived as effective in securing group-specific benefits—even when they have criminal backgrounds or track records of corruption (Vaishnav, 2017; Landa and Duell, 2015; Klašnja, Little and Tucker, 2018).

In this way, identity politics and clientelism become mutually reinforcing. Group identity facilitates targeted exchange, while clientelistic benefits reinforce loyalty to group-based parties or leaders. The result is a form of democratic politics in which representation and governance are subordinated to identity-based distribution, weakening accountability and distorting political selection. Voters may apply different standards to in-group candidates, rely on ethnic or religious heuristics over performance information, and even support parties that work against their economic interests if those parties align with their identity group (Banerjee and Pande, 2007; Suryanarayan, 2019).

Whether identity politics always overrides concerns for competence is ultimately an empirical question. Some studies show that voters do penalize in-group candidates with poor records (Banerjee, Green, McManus

and Pande, 2014; Chauchard, 2016), but the broader concern remains: when elections are shaped more by loyalty and identity than accountability and performance, the promise of democratic responsiveness is undermined.

1.1 Changing Political Norms and Voter Conceptions of Elections

In this paper, we focus on ideational interventions—specifically, how voters understand the role and purpose of democratic institutions. A central premise of our argument is that individuals differ in how they conceptualize the relationship between voters and elected politicians. Do citizens view elections as mechanisms of agency and accountability, where politicians act as representatives of the public interest? Or do they see them as ritualized contests embedded in entrenched social hierarchies, where ascriptive characteristics—such as ethnicity, religion, or patronage networks—play a decisive role?

This distinction is fundamental. In normative theories of democracy, particularly in "electoral control" or "agency" models (Ferejohn, 1986b; Besley, 2006), elections establish a principal-agent relationship: voters, as principals, use the threat of non-re-election to incentivize politicians, their agents, to act in the public interest (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999). Yet, in many real-world contexts—including Indonesia—this agency model does not neatly apply. Instead, voting may resemble a transactional exchange in which political support is traded for private, excludable benefits, such as cash or favors—a logic well-documented in the literature on clientelism and vote buying (Stokes, 2011). In such settings, voters may evaluate candidates not by their public record or policy positions, but by the direct material benefits they offer.

More generally, elections need not create a representation or accountability relationship at all. In the extreme, they may function more like mechanisms for selecting figures with broad discretionary power—comparable to the selection of a feudal lord—rather than empowering public servants bound to citizen interests. Not all elections choose an agent acting on behalf of voters. For instance, the Pope is elected by cardinals, but the vote serves to identify the most spiritually worthy candidate, not to delegate authority in a representative sense. Similarly, a vote in a talent competition is a tool for aggregating preferences, not enforcing accountability.

These alternative conceptions of elections—as mechanisms for recognizing identity, rewarding generosity, or displaying deference—are particularly salient in settings characterized by clientelism and identity politics. Voters may use the ballot to signal loyalty to a patron, to affirm ethno-religious solidarity, or to reward the most "generous" candidate, rather than to select a competent or honest public servant.

This is where ideational change becomes critical. Even in contexts where material incentives and identity cleavages are deeply entrenched, shifts in voters' mental models—whether in the form of new heuristics,

evolving social norms, or redefined understandings of democratic purpose—can have meaningful effects on democratic accountability. Changing how voters think about elections may be as consequential as institutional reforms.

Theoretical work by Bidner and Francois (2013) highlights this potential. They introduce the concept of "gripped" citizens—voters who are committed to punishing political transgressions even when it may not be individually rational due to the lack of better alternatives. These norm-enforcing voters help sustain an equilibrium where politicians, motivated by re-election incentives, refrain from misconduct. Crucially, even a minority of voters committed to such norms can reshape expectations and shift the broader political equilibrium toward greater accountability.

In sum, when citizens begin to reinterpret the meaning of elections in agency terms—as opportunities to hold power to account—democratic institutions can function more effectively, even in environments marred by clientelism and identity-based politics. Understanding and shifting these ideational foundations is therefore central to promoting programmatic politics and strengthening democratic governance.

2 Contextual background

Indonesia is a presidential democracy that transitioned from authoritarian rule in 1998, following the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime after more than three decades in power. The democratic transition ushered in the Reformasi era, marked by sweeping political reforms including direct presidential elections, decentralization, the proliferation of political parties, and a strengthened role for civil society (Aspinall, 2010; Hadiwinata, 2003). Today, Indonesia is widely regarded as one of the most vibrant democracies in the Global South, though persistent institutional weaknesses and political practices continue to challenge democratic consolidation (Mietzner, 2015).

Two central features of Indonesian democratic politics are clientelism and identity-based mobilization. It is a widely accepted view in the literature that clientelistic linkages are deeply entrenched in the country's political life (Berenschot, 2018; Aspinall, 2014). On the supply side, the state's dominance in the economy — particularly through public employment and infrastructure spending— creates fertile ground for personalized exchanges between politicians and voters (Allen, 2015; Berenschot and Mulder, 2019). In many cases, electoral machines operate through informal networks of brokers and community leaders who distribute favors in exchange for political loyalty. Some have argued that these practices reflect a lingering "feudal" logic, in which hierarchical norms of patronage and loyalty shape political expectations and behavior (Komarudin and Pramuji, 2023).

Alongside clientelism, identity politics has taken on increasing prominence in Indonesia's democratic

landscape (Pepinsky, 2019; Shofia and Pepinsky, 2019). The country is characterized by both religious and ethnic majorities—Muslim and Javanese, respectively—as well as significant minority groups, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and ethnic Chinese Indonesians (Mietzner, 2020; Buehler, 2016). While the national ideology of Pancasila emphasizes pluralism and unity, in practice, electoral competition often reflects exclusionary tendencies. Discrimination typically flows from dominant groups toward religious and ethnic minorities, with implications for representation and civil rights. For example, Toha, Gueorguiev and Sinpeng (2021) document high levels of intolerance toward non-Muslims and Chinese-Indonesians, measured through survey-based indicators of exclusionary political attitudes.


Identity politics also manifests in the form of ingroup favoritism. Members of minority communities may display strong preferences for co-ethnic or co-religious candidates, sometimes regardless of qualifications or track records. A striking illustration is the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, in which Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), an ethnic Chinese Christian, was defeated despite strong approval ratings. Many observers view his loss—and subsequent imprisonment on a blasphemy charge—as a consequence of orchestrated identity-based attacks (Soedirgo, 2018; Fealy, 2016). More broadly, the near-total absence of class-based electoral discourse—due in part to the legacy of anti-communist violence and repression following the 1965–66 mass killings—means that identity categories frequently become the primary axis of political alignment (Robinson, 2018; Aspinall, 2010). Nonetheless, some evidence shows that elected officials skew in favor of wealthier voters (Warburton, Muhtadi, Aspinall and Fossati, 2021), and that Islamist cues can convey economic positions in contexts where programmatic platforms are underdeveloped (Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani, 2012).

2.1 2024 General Election in Indonesia

Indonesia's 2024 general elections were held concurrently across multiple levels of government, including the presidency, the national legislature, regional representative councils, and local executives. The presidential race featured three major candidates, reflecting a shift away from the previously dominant two-way contests that had characterized the past two electoral cycles. The election was widely viewed as a referendum not only on the outgoing administration's legacy but also on the broader direction of the country's democratic trajectory (Mietzner, 2024).

The campaign period was marked by intense political competition, widespread mobilization, and renewed concerns about the roles of patronage and identity-based appeals in shaping voter preferences. Despite formal improvements in electoral administration and transparency, observers noted the continued prevalence of vote buying, the mobilization of state resources for electoral gain, and appeals to ethnic and religious identity in

Figure 1: Survey Timeline



both overt and coded forms (Buehler, 2023). Hence, the 2024 elections underscore the ongoing relevance of clientelism and identity politics in Indonesia's democratic practice, even as institutional reforms and civic engagement continue to evolve.

3 The Survey Experimental Design

We conduct a large, three-wave panel survey experiment of Indonesian voters around the 2024 Indonesian General Election (February 2024). The sample is nationally representative of eligible voters, and the baseline wave is oversized to accommodate attrition.

Wave 1 (baseline) was fielded 4–5 weeks before the election. Wave 2, conducted 1–3 weeks before the election, delivered the informational video treatment (or control) and implemented a candidate-choice task. Per the pre-analysis plan, two-thirds of respondents were randomly assigned to complete the candidate-choice task pre-election, with the remaining one-third scheduled to complete it post-election in Wave 3. We obtained approximately 3,000 complete pre-election candidate-choice observations and about 750 post-election observations. Wave 3 was fielded 3 days to 2 weeks after the election and collected reports of actual voting, along with the post-election candidate-choice task for the holdout group.

The survey is distributed online in collaboration with a local marketing polling companies which maintains a panel of respondents with an excellent reach of the population across islands in Indonesia. We collect the responses via a Qualtrics questionnaire designed and managed by our research team; the survey company only plays the role of connecting their panel respondents to our survey links. We instructed the company regarding quotas by province of residence, gender, age group, rural-urban, and education conditional on age group (over or under-40), based on the 2010 census, and the 2024 voter distribution published by the Indonesian Electoral Commission. The full questionnaire is reported in the Appendix H and I. Here we briefly discuss a small subset of variables the definitions of which are important in the following.

3.1 Agency vs. deference: conceptions of democratic elections

As previewed earlier, a central component of our argument is that individuals may vary significantly in how they conceptualize the relationship between voters and elected politicians. Importantly, we cannot assume ex-ante that voters necessarily view elected officials as their agents. In this study, we introduce a novel survey-based strategy to directly assess voters' underlying models of democratic representation. Specifically, we distinguish between *agency-minded* individuals, who understand democratic elections as establishing a principal-agent relationship in which voters hold politicians accountable, and *deferential* individuals, who perceive elections as a form of "electoral feudalism," whereby voting serves to legitimize hierarchical relationships in which elected officials rule over, rather than represent, their constituents.

We measure the extent to which voters subscribe to these visions using a *drag-and-drop* categorization game: we ask respondents to sort objects in boxes based on which category they think is most appropriate. The illustration of this game is presented in the Appendix A. The wording of the question is: "From the three objects on the left, there is one object that is similar to the object in each right box. Move (drag and release) one object from the left box to each corresponding right box. (There is only one correct object in each of the right boxes)" The first two items in this block of the survey are practice questions, asking respondents to categorize fruits and tools.[9] There are two substantive questions following the practice questions. Respondents are asked to place two objects among those listed on the left, one each per box. In the first substantive question, the objects to be placed are: "subjects (of a king)", "principal", and "agent".[10]

Box 1 already contains "Voter", while box 2 contains "Political candidate". We consider as thinking of democracy as an agency relationship those respondents who match "voter" with "principal" and match "political candidate" with"agent" (scored as 1). We consider as thinking in deferential terms those who match the voter with the agent, and the political candidate with the principal (scored as -1). Other combinations are given an intermediate score of zero. For the second substantive question, the objects to be categorized are: "King", "Shop employee", "Shop owner", "Subjects (of a king)". The first box already contains "Voter" and the second box "Parliament member." We consider as fully subscribing to the agency view the respondents who place the principal (Shop Owner) in the same box as "Voter", and the agent (Shop Employee) with "Parliament Member" . These answers are scored as 2. Answers that place "King" in the voter box and "Subject" in the parliament member box are less precise, as the king has authority over the subject, but the subject is not responsible to the king in the same way in which an employee

[9] We consider this an exercise and acclimation to the actual questions and do not use this question as filtering in the main analysis. In robustness checks, we restrict analysis to respondents who correctly completed the practice rounds.

[10] While principal and agent might sound sophisticated for laypersons in an English-speaking environment, Bahasa Indonesia has actually a quite straightforward and accurate counterpart for these words: we are using "Pemberi amanat", giver of mandate, to represent the principal and "Penerima amanat", receiver of mandate, to represent the agent.

responds to their employer; yet this reflects a non-hierarchical view of democratic politics where voters hold sovereignty; these are scored as 1. Answers where the parliament member is associated with "King" and voters with "Subjects", or parliament members with employers and voters with employees, reflect a fully hierarchical and deferential vision and are scored -2. Other combinations are considered intermediate and are scored zero. All the scoring rules were pre-specified in full detail in the pre-analysis plan, available at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12872. From these two questions, we create an aggregate score at the respondent level as the weighted average of the two scores, where the second gets twice the weight of the first.[11]

Figure 2 displays the distribution of the scores, compared to those that would have obtained under the same scoring rules if respondents chose each of their answers randomly. One can notice that both the very high scores and the very low ones are significantly more frequent than random, hence they plausibly reflect a deliberate choice.


3.2 The experiment

The main experimental intervention is an informational video explaining the agency view of electoral democracy. Respondents are randomly assigned, in the second wave, to one of two arms, control and treatment, with equal probability. The video explains the accountability view of democracy using animation to make an explicit parallel between the owner of a small store who hires a manager to tend to it, and voters who hire politicians to make policy decisions on their behalf. In the video, the manager turns out to mismanage the store, not opening it on time and stealing from the cash register. Upon discovering this, the store owner fires the manager. Similarly, a politician is seen receiving a suitcase with money and granting a permit to a businessman, in front of a polluting factory. Voters are invited to use their vote to "fire" malfeasant politicians.

Half of the respondents in the control arm watch a video of the same length and graphical presentation, presenting some organizational facts about elections: these include the number of previous elections held in

[11] One could be concerned that those who give a deferential response to the boxes exercise, rather than being ill-informed about how the roles of voters and representatives are conceived in standard democratic theory, are simply manifesting cynicism or disillusionment. Later in the survey, we also ask respondents whether (and why) voters can or cannot punish politicians with their vote. We can classify as *normatively* hierarchical those respondents who respond "No, because society must obey political leaders" and 'No, because political leaders have higher power than society". Respondent who hold these hierarchical normative view score more than one quarter of a point lower on average than respondents who do not hold these views. Similarly, we can classify as tolerating self-interest of politicians those respondents who *normatively* think that politicians can pursue their own self-interest. These are few (around 2% of the sample) but score around half of a point lower on the metric. As these questions were asked after the video treatment, we restrict the analysis here to respondents in the control arm. In addition, if cynicism were driving the boxes responses, we'd probably find that more educated voters, with more general cognitive sophistication, engage in cynicism more. Yet there is a clear monotone educational gradient, where respondents with university and graduate degrees score highest on average, and respondents with elementary and middle school score lowest. In addition, and even conditional on education and other demographics, respondents with better factual knowledge about the political system score higher. For all these reasons, one can propose to treat the score based on the boxes as a measure of agency vs deference. Notice that this interpretation is the one originally adopted in the pre-registration documents.

Figure 2: Distribution of scores on agency knowledge



Note: The graph presents histogram comparison between the distribution of actual scores of agency knowledge in our data and the simulated data if the respondents were responding randomly in the *drag and drop* agency game.

the country, the requirements to be a valid voter in the election, how voters could check whether they are registered in the official voter rolls by the election committee, and what to do if they are not or if there are discrepancies between the registered information and the actual information of the voters. The other half of the control group does not receive a video. Full video scripts (in English translation and Bahasa Indonesia original) are found in Appendix C. The videos themselves will be made available online.

One key aspect of our experimental manipulation is that the informational intervention exogenously alters the belief of voters. We can therefore estimate the effect on voter decisions of changing beliefs regarding the hierarchical (as opposed to principal-agent) relationship between voters and politicians at the individual level. With few exceptions, most studies in this topic adopt designs where the randomization takes place at the cluster (village, constituency, precinct, town, or district) level (Bidwell *et al.*, 2020; Bowles and Larreguy, 2020; Cruz *et al.*, 2021, 2024; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Kendall *et al.*, 2015; López-Moctezuma *et al.*, 2022; Platas and Raffler, 2021; Vicente, 2014; Wantchekon, 2003; de Albuquerque *et al.*, 2025). In many cases, also outcomes (vote shares) are observed at the aggregate (e.g., village or precinct) level. While arguably high in terms of "naturalism", this type of aggregate intervention might make it harder to pinpoint what happens at the individual level, in terms of decision rules of voters themselves. This might hinder the ability to pinpoint the micro-foundations, in terms of decision criteria at the time of election.

In particular, if a given location (e.g., village) receives a specific type of campaign message (e.g., focus on promises of broad provision of public goods) or a set of informations (e.g., about government budget

allocation) as a clustered assigned treatment, the whole dynamics of that election might be affected. For instance, informal political discussion between citizens or responses of local political elites (unobserved to the researcher analyst econometrician) create feedback effects. These make it harder to pinpoint the mechanism at the individual level. While it is indisputably of interest to estimate the total effect of different types of promises or platforms on the political dynamics and ultimately on election outcomes, these studies are unable to enlighten on the individual micro-foundations of any of the effects that might be detected. In clustered-randomized setting, indirect evidence —in the form of interviews or other micro-level evidence— could only provide some insight about the individual level inclusive of any context level feedback effect. This is indeed an inescapable consequence of the level at which the intervention is assigned. Our study uses randomization at the individual level instead since the main thrust of our contribution is to highlight and recover the micro-founded decision-making mechanism at the individual level within the random utility framework.

It is worth noting that in the experimental manipulation we focus directly on an accountability view of democracy. What we do not manipulate experimentally is the salience or information regarding a pure version of an interest representation view of democracy, where stances on substantive policies, more than intrinsic quality, or track record of accomplishments, or malfeasance and policy mistakes, drive vote choice. Our general expectation is that the treatment will plausibly have a larger impact on good governance ("valence") considerations, given that the track records as described in the profiles provide information that mostly lends itself to be used in this type of logic. Yet, by stressing how elected officials are expected to act in the interest of voters, the video might also hint to the fact that interest alignment between voters and representatives (sharing policy position and worldview) makes for a better functioning agency relationship.

3.3 Full factorial design

Conceptually, our outcome of interest is the importance that voters assign to various traits of candidates when making electoral choices. As discussed above, the standard view of "identity politics" can be interpreted as involving a large weight assigned by voters to ascriptive features of the candidates —related for instance to ethnicity and religion— and lower weight assigned to competence (or "valence") and actual policy positions of the candidates. Conversely, in a context where electoral control of politicians is at the forefront, valence characteristics such as past performance and intrinsic quality should be assigned higher weights. In the logic of interest representation, the largest weight should be assigned to policy stances but also, plausibly, to quality of the candidate.

Rather than directly asking people what features they value in a politician —something they might not

be correctly cognizant about, or might want to misrepresent for social desirability reasons— we estimate the importance voters assign to different candidate features via a candidate choice experiment (a full-factorial design) in which respondents pick their favorite among pairs of candidate profiles with randomized traits.

This approach and its modification is becoming increasingly popular in economics (Fong and Luttmer, 2009, 2011; Kessler, Low and Sullivan, 2019; Low, 2024) and political science (Bansak and Yamamoto, 2022; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015; Svolik, 2019). It has a longer history in market research (Green and Rao, 1971) but the modern approach, especially in the study of policy preferences and voting, owes to Hainmueller *et al.* (2014). One of the advantages of this research design is that it makes it possible to study multi-dimensional preferences in a very compact survey format.

In practice, the data collection in our study involves showing respondents fifteen pairs of hypothetical candidates to the national legislature. The candidate traits are fully randomized, hence orthogonal to each other. Candidates differ on the following characteristics: gender, age, religion, ethnicity, education, marriage status, occupation, position on a contentious issue, and valence. The characteristics are presented in this order to all respondents. Importantly, we do not mention party affiliation of the candidates. These profiles contain what one can consider "high-quality" information regarding track record, stances, and ethno-religious membership. Crucially, the information about candidates in actual legislative races in Indonesia might not be of such a high quality, and might not be organized in the tidy format that we show to our respondent. Yet, our evidence shows that voters, in the presence of high-quality information, actually use it quite competently: hence it should also be in the interest of candidates and parties to spread better information.

The distributions from which the demographic traits of the candidates are drawn are approximately the real distributions for candidates who ran in the general election in the previous cycle (election in 2019) and the conditional distribution of ethnicities across Indonesian provinces. This increases the realism of the exercise (Hainmueller *et al.*, 2015). Here we briefly discuss the attributes, with an eye to the substance. The detailed list of characteristics and the distribution of each level of the attribute is reported in appendix D. The detailed list of provinces and candidate ethnicity distributions is presented in appendix J.

Religion can take the following values, with probabilities in parenthesis: "Islam" (.7) ,"Kristen Protestan" (.1), "Katolik" (.1), "Hindu" (.05), and "Buddha" (.05). The probabilities reflect broadly the actual distribution of religious affiliation in Indonesia, but we assign higher probability to minority religions: understanding how voters (from minority and majority backgrounds) react to minority candidates is one of our key goals, and therefore drawing a sufficient number of minority religion candidate profiles is desirable.

The distribution from which candidate ethnicity is drawn is province-specific. In the survey, the respondent is asked in which province they vote; the respective province-specific distribution is then used to randomize the ethnicity of the candidates. To ensure comparability across provinces in the meaning of ethnic

affiliation, the distributions are designed so that the probability of a candidate being from the largest ethnic group in the province ("Titular ethnic group" in the following) is one half. The probability of being from other "native" ethnic groups (2^{nd} - 5^{th} largest groups in the province, "Non-titular" in the following) is 40%. The probability of being Chinese Indonesian (*Tionghoa*), a politically-salient ethnic minority that is present throughout the country, is 10%. While in the profile an actual ethnicity (e.g., "Minang" or "Balinese") is displayed, the traits that are actually analyzed below are Titular, Non-Titular, and Chinese. [12]

Importantly, it is documented that in the Indonesian public, ethnic (anti-Chinese) and religious prejudice are to a large extent independent: Mietzner and Muhtadi (2019) document that anti-Chinese sentiments are more common among Muslims than among religious minorities, but that also Muslims that were more tolerant of non-Muslims were equally like to harbor anti-Chinese views. Hence it is worth studying separately, and randomizing religion and ethnicity separately helps in this direction, making it possible to estimate also the effect of being "double-minority" on candidate choice.

Ideological position on contentious issues We assign to candidates a position on one of several policy issues. These are chosen based on "divisive" issues that were discussed in the Indonesian public sphere in the recent past. The policy positions map directly to the ideological positions of respondents as measured in the baseline survey. Appendix H reports the exact wording used. Each candidate is assigned a position on only one of the items, while during the baseline survey we ask respondents their positions on five issues. The policy areas covered are: the role of the Indonesian National Armed Forces; enforcement of traditional morality; freedom of association; freedom of speech; and economic nationalism. Traditional morality is measured via one of several sub-issues.[13] For each profile, one of the issues is selected randomly, and then the polarity of the statement ("progressive" vs "conservative") is selected with equal probability.

Valence Candidates also differ in their valence (quality), which can be high (the candidate has a positive track record) or negative. The valence issues are by definition constructed to be non-divisive. The valence item for each candidate is chosen from one of several issue areas: corruption; education and health; the economy; the environment; and the rights of women and children. Appendix E reports the full list of statements that can be associated to a candidate. The valence item can be positive (high valence) or

[12] We exclude from the distribution of traits a handful of combinations of ethnicity and religion that are highly unlikely to appear in the real world. Notice that these would themselves be unlikely (albeit possible) in the joint randomization. Yet, to avoid possible distraction caused by these among respondents, we eliminate them completely. The excluded combinations are those for religions that have less than .0005 probability —equivalent to 500 people per million— conditional on ethnicity according to the 2010 census. In section Z below we will adopt the strategy proposed by Hainmueller *et al.* (2014) to deal with the (very weak) correlation between traits introduced by these excluded combinations.

[13] Due to miscommunication when coding the distributions, there is a small deviation from the pre-analysis plan. The probability of drawing a traditional morality position is higher than the other four policy areas. Note that this is ultimately inconsequential as the traits are fully randomized; but a larger proportion of the candidates than originally planned has a position on traditional morality than on other issues.

negative (low valence). For instance, high-valence descriptions for the issue area of corruption are "No track record of corruption" or "Successfully reduced the level of corruption in local government"; low-valence descriptions are sentences like "Previously involved in corruption cases" or "Involved in bribery cases for business permits".

For each profile, first one of the five issues is selected (with equal probability), then the polarity is selected (with equal probability), and finally a wording within the chosen issue-polarity combination is selected (with equal probability). The number of alternative items (specific wording) within a given issue-polarity combination is not balanced; yet the probability of selecting any one issue is constant at 1/5 and the probability of having a positive or negative valence trait is constant at one half. The reason why we use several alternative wordings for a given issue is to increase the natural appearance of different issues across candidate profile choice. Being presented with two identical descriptions across profiles could be potentially confusing or distracting, and detract from the realism of the choice exercise. With this design, ex ante the probability of facing two profiles with exactly the same description is quite small.[14]

Recoding distances and creating aggregate traits As previously mentioned, the stances on divisive issues for candidates in the candidate choice exercise are assigned on the same dimensions on which respondent preferences were measured in the baseline survey. Each candidate is assigned a position on one of the five dimensions, while we observe respondents' positions on all five. In the analysis, we recode the traits on the divisive issues in terms of distance or congruence between the position of the respondent and of the candidate.

How these distance-based variables are defined in practice differs slightly across the two approaches (random utility and AMCE) that we use to analyze the candidate choice data, as per the pre-registration documents. In the random utility estimation, we use a "continuous" measure of distance: respondent and voter have zero distance if they are both, for instance, supportive of traditional morality policies, and have high distance if the respondent is supportive of traditional morality and the candidate is progressive on this issue, or vice-versa. The position of the candidate can be coded as -1 or 1, and the position of the respondent is coded so that "strongly agree" is coded -1, "agree" -.5, "disagree" .5, and "strongly disagree" 1. In the AMCE estimation, we simply consider that candidates can be congruent with, or divergent from, the position stated by the respondent in the baseline. To this aim, "strongly agree" and "agree", and "strongly disagree" and "disagree", are recoded into a binary agree/disagree feature. We then create binary indicator variables for when a profile is congruent with or divergent from the respondent's stance.

[14] In the experiment as actually implemented, only around 5% of the pairs of profiles feature two candidates with the exact same description of the valence items hence the modal respondent does not encounter choices with this type of redundancy.

4 Random utility model: Importance of candidate's traits on vote choices

We analyze the candidate choice data in a utility maximization framework, where we study the choices made by respondents within each pair of alternatives (Louviere, Flynn and Carson, 2010). In the following section, we also discuss the non-parametric approach proposed by Hainmueller *et al.* (2014) which has some advantages in terms of flexibility. The utility framework has the advantage of permitting —conditional on the assumed model of decision-making— a direct interpretation of the estimates in terms of weights assigned to features of candidates in the utility function of the voter, something that might not be fully warranted in the Hainmueller *et al.* (2014)'s framework (Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik, 2022).

Following standard models of vote choice, we can write the utility that respondent i receives from candidate j based on positional features on dimension k and valence issues m as

$$U_{ij} = -\sum_{k} \gamma_{ik}(x_i^k - \tilde{x}_j^k)^2 + \delta_1 \mathbb{1}(E_i = \tilde{E}_j) + \delta_2 \mathbb{1}(R_i = \tilde{R}_j) + \sum_{m} \beta_{im} V_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

where γ_{ik} and β_{im} are respectively the weight that respondent i assigns to positional issue k or valence characteristic m; individual observed position x_i^k on issue k is compared to (randomly assigned) candidate position $\tilde{x}_j^k$; individual has ethnicity E_i and religion R_i, while the candidate j has ethnicity $\tilde{E}_j$ and religion $\tilde{R}_j$ and $\mathbb{1}$ is the indicator function; and ϵ_{ij} is a random shock to the utility of candidate j for individual i. Following the practice in the literature, we model utility from the positional issues as the negative of the squared difference between the position of the individual and the position of the candidate (Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr, 2000). This is convenient, and adopted as default in voting behavior research, as it provides a function concave in ideological proximity and symmetric about zero. Notice that the crucial distinction is between valence items, which all voters should value in the same way, and ideological stances where citizens disagree (Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr, 2000; Londregan and Romer, 1993). Notice also that in this formulation, the relevant ethno-religious feature of the candidate is congruence (sharing ethnicity or religion) with the voter. One could also consider religion and ethnicity as pure valence items, where for instance being a member of a given religion confers a "bonus" (or "malus") regardless of the religion of the voter, or on average across the electorate. We address this issue in subsection 6.1.

In the main analysis, we proceed by assuming that the utility weights γ, δ and β are constant across respondents. We then explore their heterogeneity across groups of respondents. The formulation of the utility function, following standard practice in the literature, embeds the assumption of additive separability of valence, identity traits, and ideology. It is worth noting that departures from additive separability have

observable counterparts that we assess below, finding no evidence of large departures, with the exception of some that might be of substantive interest but do not invalidate the overall message of the analysis we present in this section. Existing work using an approach close to ours (Kendall *et al.*, 2015; Cruz *et al.*, 2024) also finds little evidence that modeling the interactive elements of the utility function is consequential.

We observe, for a pair of candidates $j = 1, 2$, whether $U_{i1} \geq U_{i2}$ based on the stated choice across the pair of profiles. We can take the difference between U_{i1} and U_{i2}, as in equation 1, for a pair of candidates (1,2). Define $\sigma_{ik} = -(x_i^k - \tilde{x}_1^k)^2 + (x_i^k - \tilde{x}_2^k)^2$, the difference in the ideological distance utility between the the two candidates. This term ranges from -4, when candidate 1 is on the opposite side of the ideological dimension from the respondent, and candidate 2 has a position that coincides with the voter bliss point, to 4 in the opposite situation; it takes value of zero when both candidates are equally distant, or equally close, to the voter. As an aside, it is important to keep in mind that the information about the ideal points of respondents (the x_i^k) comes from the baseline survey, carried out weeks before the candidate choice experiment.

Similarly, define $\xi_i^E = \mathbb{1}(E_i = \tilde{E}_1) - \mathbb{1}(E_i = \tilde{E}_2)$ and $\xi_i^R = \mathbb{1}(R_i = \tilde{R}_1) - \mathbb{1}(R_i = \tilde{R}_2)$ as the difference between the ethnic (religious) congruence between respondent and candidates. Notice $\xi_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ indicating respectively a non-congruent candidate 1 vs. a congruent candidate 2, two equally (non-)congruent candidates, and a congruent candidate 1 vs. a non-congruent candidate 2.

The difference in valence $V_{1m} - V_{2m}$ takes values from -2 to 2, corresponding respectively to a low-quality candidate 1 matched with a high-quality candidate 2 and a high-quality candidate 1 matched with a low-quality candidate 2. In our exercise, differences of -1 and 1 are possible when one candidate is low quality on dimension m and the other has no information on that dimension (hence is imputed the expected value 0). A difference of zero implies that either the two candidates have the same level of valence on dimension m, or neither of the candidates has information about dimension m.

Given that in a given profile, only one of the positional policy issues and one of the valence topics are displayed, we impute zeros to the position of candidates on the issues —for valence and for ideology— that are not displayed in the profile. Due to randomization (with equal probability) of "high" and "low" positions, zero is the expected value. In other words, if for instance a profile does not mention the candidate position on military intervention (which, if displayed, can take two values, -1 and 1) we treat the candidate as having an intermediate position 0 on that issue. This corresponds to the expected value (taken over the randomization of profiles) of the position of candidates on military intervention.[15]

We assume that the random components of the utility $\epsilon_{ij'}$ and $\epsilon_{ij''}$ are independently distributed for a pair (j', j''). This yields an error term ϵ_i for the difference in utilities.

[15] In the AMCE analysis, we investigate whether positive and negative features are actually symmetric in terms of their effect on choices.

The predictors are based on the difference between the characteristics of the candidates in the pair, where the various elements of the utility of candidate 2 for respondent i are subtracted from their counterparts for candidate 1. Assuming constant weights across respondents, this yields an equation for the utility differential between candidates in a given pair as

$$\Delta U_i = \sum_k \gamma_k \sigma_{ik} + \delta_1 \xi_i^E + \delta_2 \xi_i^R + \sum_m \beta_m (V_{1m} - V_{2m}) + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where $\epsilon_i = \epsilon_{ij'} - \epsilon_{ij''}$. Notice also that, following the pre-analysis plan, we do not include in the random utility models the additional information (about age, occupation, education, marital status) that the profiles contain. Under independent randomization of the profile traits, these are orthogonal to the included features and therefore they can be comfortably relegated to the error term without introducing bias; in the AMCE analysis below we study also these additional candidate features.

The outcome variable we observe is whether the respondent chooses candidate 1 or 2, hence the sign of ΔU_i, and under the assumption of normality of the residual random part of the utility, this defines a probit model. Therefore utility weights can recovered by estimating a probit model where the outcome is an indicator variable for choosing candidate 1, equal to zero if the respondent choose candidate 2. Notice weights are identified up to the scale of the utility, which is fixed by choosing a variance for the latent random component of the utility. Fixing the variance at one yields the standard probit model. Given that the amount of randomness —the magnitude, i.e., variance, of the random shocks— depends on the specification, and this in turn defines the scale of the utility, one cannot compare absolute magnitudes of the coefficients across specifications; but it is still legitimate to compare ratios of coefficients. In the main analysis we fix the specification to include only the traits in equation 1. Each observation is a respondent-pair combination, hence every respondent contributes 15 observations. We cluster standard errors at the respondent level.

For ease of interpretation, we also estimate a simpler specification where a candidate is either ideologically close or distant, regardless of the specific policy issue mentioned in the profile; high or low-valence, regardless of the topic; and congruent both in terms of ethnicity and religion, or different in at least one. Ultimately this is equivalent to estimating a probit model with three predictors: difference in ideological congruence for the two candidates; difference in valence of the two candidates; and difference in ethno-religious congruence between the two candidates. The difference in ideological distances is given by comparing the distance between candidate 1 and the respondent on the dimension k_1 observed for candidate 1, and the distance between candidate 2 and the respondent on the dimension k_2 observed for candidate 2. These need not be the same: so for instance we calculate the distance between respondent and candidate 1 on role of the military, and the distance between respondent and candidate 2 on traditional morality, and then treat these

Table 1: Weight assigned to traits–Control arms

	$P(voted_1 = 1)$			
Traits	Combined	Deferential	Agency	Difference
Identity	0.158***	0.172***	0.142***	0.030
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.038)
	[0.055]	[0.061]	[0.048]	[0.013]
Valence	0.757***	0.693***	0.833***	-0.140***
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.050)
	[0.264]	[0.246]	[0.282]	[-0.036]
Ideology	-0.095***	-0.029	-0.171***	0.142***
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.047)
	[-0.033]	[-0.010]	[-0.058]	[0.048]
Observations	26,191	12,133	14,058	–

Note: The table reports probit estimates of Equation (2) for the untreated (control) sample. The *Deferential* column includes voters with a drag-and-drop score < 0; the *Agency* column includes those with a score ≥ 0; the *Combined* column includes both types of voters. The *Difference* column reports Deferential minus Agency. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses; Marginal effects are in square brackets. *Identity* aggregates religion and ethnicity traits; *Valence* captures the candidate's track record on any one of key governance issues; *Ideology* is the respondent–candidate distance on any one of key ideological dimensions. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.


distances as homogeneous. Importantly, the difference in valence in this case takes only on values -1 , 0, and 1, as we treat the valence as high or low for a given candidate, regardless of the specific topic mentioned. Hence either one candidate is high valence and one is low valence (hence values -1 and 1), or they both have the same valence (hence value 0). We refer to these as "aggregated traits" in the following.

The distance metric —which as we said can range from -4 to 4, is rescaled by dividing by 4, and the topic-wise valence differences are divided by 2, so that their range is the same as the ethnic and religious congruence and the aggregated valence differential.

4.1 Results: Random Utility Model

Results following the main specification are reported in Table 1 for the aggregated version of the traits and Figure 3 for the full multidimensional traits (full regression table is available in appendix B.1). Among untreated (control) respondents, all three attributes matters significantly: Valence (track record) receives the largest weight, followed by Identity (religion and ethnicity) and then Ideology (ideological distance). Average marginal effects indicate that, when a voter is otherwise indifferent, having higher valence than one's rival will increase the probability of being chosen by approximately 26 percentage points. Sharing identity with the voter when the other candidate does not and being ideologically aligned with the voter when the other does not increase the probability of being chosen by around 6 and 3 percentage points respectively.

Figure 3: Weight assigned to traits–disaggregated



Note: The graph presents the weight assigned to disaggregated traits of candidates. Each dot represents the marginal value of the probit regression estimates following the model in equation 2. The bars represent 95% confidence interval.

In other words, the weight assigned by voters at the baseline to Valence is more than four times the weight assigned to Identity, while Ideological distance is assigned a (slightly) lower weight than identity. This implies that respondents would prefer to vote for a high-valence candidate from an ethno-religious outgroup than a low-valence candidate from the same ethno-religious group. However, holding valence differential constant, respondents display a (small) preference for ethno-religiously congruent candidates with whom they disagree about divisive issues over ethno-religiously incongruent candidates with whom they agree on the divisive issue.[16] Overall, the evidence indicates that, when provided with high-quality information, Indonesian voters prioritize candidate quality and competence over identitarian considerations

Importantly, the evaluation criteria (reflected in the weight assigned) differ sharply across voter types. Agency-minded voters place significantly greater weight on Valence and Ideology. In fact, for Ideology, the estimated weight is indistinguishable from zero among deferential voters but positive and significant among agency voters. In substantive terms, among initially indifferent agency voters, ideological disagreement implies a vote loss of six percentage points; on the other hand, ideological disagreement is inconsequential (around 1 percentage point, but not statistically significant) among deferential voters. The punishment for ideological disagreement is therefore around five percentage points larger when facing an agency-minded voter. While Identity receives a larger weight among deferential voters, the between-group difference on

[16]This result points to a less prominent role played by ideology in the Indonesian context, which may deviate from what obtains in advanced democracies.

this dimension is not statistically significant. These patterns align with our prediction that narratives shape the weights voters assign to candidate attributes, a mechanism that we show translates into distinct voting behavior in the next section.

When we perform the analysis with disaggregated traits, the message is analogous, but some interesting variation across policy areas emerges. In particular, congruence on religion is much more important than on ethnicity.[17] Among the valence traits, corruption carries the most weight, followed by the economy and education and health; valence on environmental topics, and about women and children rights, rank last and have around half of the weight of corruption. For the ideological traits, the role of the army, traditional morality, and freedom of association (vs. extremism prevention) have approximately the same weight, while free speech and economic nationalism carry less weight.

5 Video treatment effects

We preregistered three hypotheses about the video's effect on the attribute weights used in the candidate-choice task. Treated respondents—those who viewed an informational video framing elections in terms of political agency and accountability—will (i) assign a smaller weight to Identity, (ii) assign a larger weight to Valence, and (iii) assign a larger weight to ideological proximity (Ideology). Crucially, we expect these effects to be concentrated among respondents with limited prior understanding of electoral accountability.

Table 2 reports the estimates of treatment effects. Three findings emerge. First, two of the three preregistered hypotheses are supported: treated respondents place greater weight on Valence and on ideological proximity, with no detectable change in the weight on Identity. Second, this pattern does not arise from reduced emphasis on identity; rather, AMCE-based decompositions show that the gains for valence and ideology come from lower weights on other (non-core) attributes and from reduced residual randomness in choices—that is, greater attentiveness. Third, the effects are concentrated among voters who did not initially frame elections in agency terms: within this group, treatment increases the weight on valence by about 19 percent and on ideology by nearly fourfold. Among voters who already thought about elections in agency terms, treatment effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Crucially, the last column of Table 2 shows that the informational treatment substantially closes the gap in attribute weights between voter types. Among deferential voters, treatment lifts the weights on Valence and Ideology toward agency-minded levels while leaving Identity essentially unchanged. This convergence offers causal evidence that lay conceptions of democracy are pliable and that narrative shifts can reshape

[17] Notice that here we treat ethnic congruence as a binary trait: hence a respondent of the titular ethnicity is classified as facing a non-congruent candidate both if the candidate is of Chinese ancestry or a member of a non-titular ethnicity.

Table 2: Treatment Effects

	$P(voted_1 = 1)$			
Traits & Treatment	Combined	Deferential	Agency	
Treated × Identity	-0.006	-0.019	0.009	
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.028)	
Treated × Valence	0.062*	0.133***	-0.023	
	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.027)	
Treated × Ideology	-0.084**	-0.111***	-0.058	Deferential
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(treated)
Identity	0.158***	0.172***	0.142***	0.153***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Valence	0.757***	0.693***	0.833***	0.826***
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Ideology	-0.095***	-0.029	-0.171***	-0.139***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.033)
Treated = 1	0.007	0.015	-0.002	–
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.018)	
Observations	52,504	25,208	27,296	13,075

Note: The table presents the treatment effect on different traits of candidate. The *Deferential* column includes voters with a drag-and-drop score < 0; the *Agency* column includes those with a score ≥ 0; the *Combined* column includes both types of voters. The last column calculate the weights assigned by deferential voters to different traits after receiving treatment. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. *Identity* aggregates religion and ethnicity traits; *Valence* captures the candidate's track record on any one of key governance issues; *Ideology* is the respondent–candidate distance on any one of key ideological dimensions. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

evaluation criteria. From a policy-oriented point of view, this is reassuring, as it implies that if the preferences and behavior of the agency voters are desirable, a simple and easily scalable informational intervention may improve the quality of electoral selection.

5.1 Treatment effects on real-world votes

The effects of the informational treatment go beyond simply affecting the responses in the candidate-choice experiment. The election took place between four and twenty days after the respondents received the video treatment. In the pre-election survey, before the treatment, we asked the respondents about their presidential vote intention; they were re-surveyed in the days after the election, and they were asked about their actual presidential vote choice. Based on national polls and media coverage, the presidential election of 2024 was a three-way race with a clear favorability ranking: a favored ticket ("front-runner"), a serious contender ("contender"), and an "underdog" ticket.[18]

[18]This last ticket involved the party with which the incumbent president had run in 2019, but was not endorsed by the president himself.

In our pre-election survey, around 20 percent of respondents stated they were still undecided, and eleven percent intended to vote for the underdog. Of particular interest is understanding how these voters ultimately behave: how they make up their mind if they were initially undecided, and whether they stick to their initial choice of the underdog as it becomes clearer, in the final phase of the election campaign, that it is a hopeless ticket. The top two panels of table 3 report the transition matrix for respectively the agency and deferential voters in the control arm. Each entry is the conditional probability of supporting one of the options in columns, conditional on the vote intention in the pre-election survey (in the rows), i.e. the fraction of respondents in a row that ultimately voted for one of the options in a column.

Table 3: Presidential votes: Intention vs. Actual

	Actual votes				
Intention	Control - agency-minded				
	Contender	Underdog	Front-runner	No vote	Total
Contender	89.29	0.00	5.95	4.76	100.00
Underdog	6.76	**67.57**	25.68	0.00	100.00
Front-runner	1.82	2.43	92.71	3.04	100.00
No vote	14.29	0.00	28.57	57.14	100.00
Don't know	24.41	17.32	**47.24**	11.02	100.00
Total	26.51	10.31	56.41	6.77	100.00
	Control - deference-minded				
Contender	86.73	2.04	6.12	5.10	100.00
Underdog	10.39	**53.25**	31.17	5.19	100.00
Front-runner	3.51	2.88	91.69	1.92	100.00
No vote	25.00	0.00	18.75	56.25	100.00
Don't know	**19.17**	11.67	**60.00**	9.17	100.00
Total	20.99	10.58	62.82	5.61	100.00
	Treated - deference-minded				
Contender	82.96	1.48	11.11	4.44	100.00
Underdog	5.41	**75.68**	18.92	0.00	100.00
Front-runner	3.01	0.90	92.17	3.92	100.00
No vote	14.29	0.00	23.81	61.90	100.00
Don't know	**31.75**	10.32	**52.38**	5.56	100.00
Total	24.56	10.76	59.01	5.67	100.00

The tables presents the distribution of the actual votes (self-declared during the post-election survey) conditional on the vote intention declared in the pre-election survey. Each number in this table is the percentage of voters who initially declare the intention to vote for the candidate in the rows (Intention) and eventually vote for the candidate in the column (Actual votes), e.g. the first cell of the table shows that 89.29 % of voters who initially intended to vote for the contender eventually vote for the contender, while the cell below it shows that 6.76% voters who initially intended to vote for the underdog eventually vote for the contender.

In the control group, there are clear differences in the vote switching patterns of the agency and the deferential voters.[19] Take the initial supporters of the underdog. Two thirds of the agency-minded stick

[19]Full regression table in Appendix B.2.

Table 4: Treatment effect on actual votes

	Actual votes			
Intention & Treatment	Front-runner	Underdog	Contender	No vote
intent: Underdog	0.250***	0.512***	-0.763***	0.001
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.034)
intent: Front-runner	0.856***	0.008	-0.832***	-0.032
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.024)
intent: No vote	0.126	-0.020	-0.617***	0.511***
	(0.101)	(0.014)	(0.114)	(0.126)
intent: Don't know	0.539***	0.096***	-0.676***	0.041
	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.035)
Treated = 1	0.050	-0.006	-0.038	-0.007
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.047)	(0.029)
intent: Underdog#Treated	**-0.172****	**0.230*****	-0.012	-0.045
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.064)	(0.038)
intent: Front-runner#Treated	-0.045	-0.014	0.033	0.027
	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.049)	(0.031)
intent: No Vote#Treated	0.001	0.006	-0.069	0.063
	(0.140)	(0.018)	(0.141)	(0.166)
intent: Undecided#Treated	**-0.126***	-0.008	**0.164****	-0.030
	(0.073)	(0.044)	(0.073)	(0.044)
Base Intent: Contender	0.061**	0.020	0.867***	0.051**
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.022)
Observations	1,312	1,312	1,312	1,312
R-squared	0.485	0.421	0.511	0.167

Note: The table present the OLS regressions of actual presidential votes on the respondent's own vote intention and the treatment indicator. The analysis in this table is restricted to respondents classified as deferential voters. Actual votes are self-declared during post-election survey, while vote intention is declared during the pre-election survey. Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

with their initial choice, while only around half of the deferential do; this difference is statistically significant. When it comes to the initially undecided, six out of ten of the deferential choose the front-runner, vs. less than half of the agency-minded, and also this difference is statistically significant. These differences, driven by the narrative of democracy embraced by the respondent, might emerge through several tightly-related mechanisms. First of all, as contended by Hicken, Leider, Ravanilla and Yang (2018), vote switching might reflect direct inducements of a clientelistic nature (e.g., outright vote buying or other promises of rewards conditional on support) received during the campaign. The agency-minded should be less amenable to this type of inducement. Second, if the election is understood as a popularity contest rather than as the choice of an agent, horse-race information received during the campaign period should be less consequential; conversely new information about who is leading the race might induce vote switching if popularity assessment is the goal (Lanoue and Bowler, 1998; Mutz, 1998; Rothschild and Malhotra, 2014). Third, the evidence from the candidate choice exercise shows that ideology and track record matter more for the agency voters. If ideology and track record of presidential candidates can be assessed sufficiently precisely —especially as these are figures with long involvement in politics— earlier in the campaign, the preferences/choices of the agency voters should be well-formed based on verified information of ideology and track record, and thus less likely to change in the short period leading to the election.

Most importantly, the experiment allows us to estimate how inducing an agency narrative shifts the final choices of deference-minded voters. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the transition matrix for treated deference-minded voters. The shares of previously undecided voters who chose the contender and the front-runner move toward the levels observed among agency-minded voters; likewise, roughly three-quarters of treated voters who initially backed the underdog remain with that choice. In short, the informational treatment brings deference-minded voters' revealed choices closer to those of agency-minded voters, consistent with dampening one or more of the mechanisms discussed above.

To corroborate that the treatment changes voting behavior among deference-minded voters, we regress post-election votes on pre-election vote intentions, interacting intention with treatment assignment. The results are presented in Table 4. Among those who initially backed the underdog, treated respondents are significantly more likely to stick with that choice and less likely to switch to the front-runner. Among those initially undecided, the treated are significantly less likely to drift to the front-runner and more likely to choose the contender. All effects are statistically significant and consistent with the transition patterns documented above.

Table 5: Treatment effect on response time

	Log (Response Time)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.057	-0.052	0.015	0.023
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Deferential	-0.182***	-0.179***	-0.178***	-0.175***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Treated*Deferential	0.139**	0.130**	0.156***	0.148***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Low-knowledge			-0.106***	-0.108***
			(0.039)	(0.039)
Treated*Low-knowledge			-0.132**	-0.136**
			(0.057)	(0.057)
Constant	9.536***	9.740***	9.594***	9.810***
	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.102)	(0.113)
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion and worldview controls		✓		✓
Observations	52,897	52,897	52,897	52,897
R-squared	0.028	0.030	0.037	0.040

Note: The table reports OLS regressions of log(response time) on indicators for treatment status, a Deferential respondent indicator, and their interaction, controlling for pre-treatment demographic covariates. Demographic controls include gender, age group, college education, ethnicity, and socio-economic status. Religion/worldview controls include a Muslim indicator, an index of religiosity (summarizing baseline frequency and importance items), and an Islamist (vs. civic-nationalist Pancasila) worldview indicator. Columns (3)–(4) additionally include a binary measure of factual knowledge of Indonesian politics (below/above median) and its interaction with treatment. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

5.2 Response time

In the exercise with hypothetical candidate profiles, on top of recording the individual choices made by the respondents over the pairs of candidate shown, we also record the response time for each pair of profiles. Importantly, response time is a completely non-obtrusive measure of the decision process: while the respondents might suspect that their response time is being recorded, they are not necessarily cognizant of the fact that this is in itself an outcome studied. Hence, much more than in the case of profile choice, demand effects here are going to be minimal: while a respondent might choose candidates as if religion did not matter for them for reasons of social acceptability (e.g., it is not respectable to favor candidates of one's own religion, hence respondents try to choose at least some religious out-group candidates in the course of the exercise) it is hard to imagine they strategically delay their response to project a more socially acceptable image of themselves as decision-makers.

We first provide cross-sectional evidence that the treatment affects the response time of deferential

respondents, making their behavior more similar to that of the agency-minded. The models in Table 5 regress log response time on an indicator for treatment status, an indicator for deferential respondents (those scored below zero in *drag-n-drop* game), and pre-treatment demographics that account for possible systematic differences in response time across the population. The model in Column 1 only includes basic demographic controls: age, college education, dummies for socio-economic status, ethnicity, and gender; in Column 2 we also include religion (dummy for Muslim respondents), a score of religiosity that summarizes items asked at baseline, and political worldview (Pancasila vs. Islamism). Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Given that the treatment is randomly assigned, these controls are included to increase precision; in addition, their inclusion allows for a more targeted interpretation of the heterogeneity we document.

On average, conditional on demographics, deferential voters under control spend significantly less time (16.5% less) to make a choice between the profiles. The treatment does not have a statistically significant effect on response time for agency-minded voters. Conversely, there is a statistically significant treatment effect for the deferential, and they take on average 14.9% longer to make a choice. Importantly, the treated deferential respondents are not statistically significantly different from the agency-minded under control. The results in column 2, that accounts for a broader set of covariates, are almost identical. This evidence further corroborates that the informational intervention arguably affected the narrative of democracy held by the respondent, making their observable choices similar to those of individuals who already viewed democracy in an agency frame.

In columns 3 and 4 we adopt the specifications of columns 1 and 2, but we also include an indicator for respondents with low factual knowledge of politics, and the interaction between the treatment and factual knowledge. These models further support the contention that the treatment does not simply affect a specific subgroup of respondents with worse political knowledge. Conversely, the deferential narrative is empirically distinct from political knowledge, and the treatment acts by informing (deferential) respondents that they should think of politicians as their agents. In fact, also in these models we find that the treatment induces deferential voters, who are otherwise quicker at making a choice, to take more time, making them again statistically non-distinguishable from agency-minded voters. In addition, we also find that the heterogeneity of the effect for respondents with low factual knowledge goes in the opposite direction: treated low-knowledge respondents give even quicker responses than low-knowledge respondents under control[20]. Hence, the evidence suggests that heterogeneity is driven by the agency view, not merely by the fact that less knowledgeable voters are more influenced by the treatment.

The response time data allows us to further shed light on the importance respondents assign to various

[20]It is worth noting that this result holds also if we omit the indicator for deferential voters and the interaction between treatment and deferential voters, hence this is not just an artifact of overconditioning.

traits of candidates, in a fixed-effects (within subject) design. Arguably, longer response time indicates a harder choice for the respondent to make. In particular, if respondents base their decision on a particular trait of the candidate, when facing two candidates with the same trait (e.g., both are of the same religion) they have to scan the profile to look for other characteristics that make it possible to choose one over another. This strategy, to our knowledge, has not been used in political economy studies, but it is a relatively well-established approach in market research (Haaijer, Kamakura and Wedel, 2000; Moskowitz and Silcher, 2006).

We model log response time as a function of the similarity in candidate traits in a given pair, with indicators that take the value of one if the profiles share that feature, and zero otherwise. If religion is an important consideration for a respondent, showing two profiles with the exact same religion will delay the time to choose, as the respondent needs to inspect closely some other pair of traits in order to make a choice. We estimate linear regressions with individual fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by respondent. A positive coefficient on the indicator for pairs with the same ethnicity, or on the indicator for pairs with same valence, would indicate that choosing between profiles with the same ethnicity is harder and analogously that choosing between profiles that differ in terms of valence is easier. Given the full randomization of the candidate traits, all these coefficients have a causal interpretation. Individual fixed effects remove variation across individuals in reading speed, cognitive ability, or impulsiveness, increasing precision. The log-linear specification ultimately models response delay as a proportional increase in response time.

In this analysis, define $\tilde{X}_j = \tilde{x}_j^m$ if ideological trait m was presented for candidate j. The log time respondent i spent on choice pair k is modeled as

$$\log(t_{ik}) = \alpha_i + \theta_1 \mathbb{1}(R_1 = R_2) + \theta_2 \mathbb{1}(E_1 = E_2) + \theta_3 \mathbb{1}(V_1 = V2) + \theta_4 \mathbb{1}(\tilde{X}_1 = \tilde{X}_2) + \eta_{ik} \tag{3}$$

where $\mathbb{1}()$ is the indicator function and α_i is a respondent fixed effect. The coefficients θ estimate the (causal) effect of having identical traits on response time. They are all on the same scale —hence they can be compared to each other— given that they are coefficients on dummies for pairs of candidates with the same trait. Exponentiating the coefficient and subtracting one gives the percentage change in response time when the two candidates have the same characteristic.

Results are reported in Table 6. We can observe that the coefficient on valence is again the largest: When faced with two candidates with the same valence characteristic, respondents take about 15% longer to choose. The next largest coefficients are the ones on religion and on ideology: Respondents take 4.5% longer to choose if faced with candidates of the same religion, and 5% longer when the two candidates have the same stance on divisive positions. The coefficient on gender is also statistically significant: respondents take 1.6% longer to choose if the two candidates are of the same gender. The remainder of the coefficients are not

Table 6: The importance of candidate traits: Response time analysis

	Log(response time)				
VARIABLES	ALL	Male	Female	Islamist	Nationalist
Similar religion	0.045***	0.051***	0.038***	0.052***	0.037***
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Similar ethnicity	0.016**	0.033***	0.000	0.029***	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Similar valence	0.143***	0.116***	0.170***	0.129***	0.159***
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Similar ideology	0.049***	0.040**	0.058***	0.049**	0.049**
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Similar gender	0.016**	0.013	0.019*	0.015	0.019*
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Similar education	0.000	-0.003	0.005	-0.002	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Similar Marriage stat	0.007	0.021*	-0.003	0.016	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Similar Age category	-0.007	-0.004	-0.011	-0.005	-0.009
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Similar Occupation	-0.004	0.005	-0.014	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Observations	58,803	26,423	32,228	32,444	26,359
R-squared	0.508	0.545	0.466	0.504	0.514


Note: The table presents the OLS regression of logarithmic value of response time on identifiers of whether the pair of candidate share the similar value of traits shown. The number in brackets signifies the standard errors clustered at the individual respondent level. All regression includes individual fixed effects and are weighted to be representative of Indonesian voter in the 2024 General Election. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

statistically distinguishable from zero. Overall, the message is in line with the random utility estimates (and the AMCE estimates in the next section) in substantive terms: respondents choose based on valence traits first and foremost, but also assign importance to religion of the candidates and stances on divisive issues.

In addition, the evidence suggests that women are delayed more then men when a pair of candidates have the same valence and ideology feature, and men are delayed more than women when the pair have the same religion. This can be interpreted as implying that women care more about valence and ideology than men, and men care more about candidate's religion than women. Unsurprisingly, voters who state their worldview as "Islamism" (or as a compromise between Islamism and Pancasila) care more about religion (they are delayed when facing two candidate profiles with the same religion), while voters who subscribe to the pluralist and civic-nationalist Pancasila ideology are delayed more when faced with candidates sharing valence.

In addition to studying what happens when two candidate profiles share the exact same characteristic, we can also exploit the multi-dimensional nature of the valence traits in the experiment. In particular, we

Figure 4: Delay in response when faced with equally low valence candidates pair by pair of issues.



Note: The figure plots log (response time) when respondents are faced with equally low quality candidate pair by pair of issues. Both candidates with low track record on corruption is the omitted reference category.

can compare response times when the two candidates both have high (or both low) valence, but they differ in terms of the specific trait that was presented in their profile (e.g., one candidate has a low economic record and the other has a low record on education). Full regression tables are in the appendix. Figure 4 displays the coefficient estimates for pairs of low-valence candidates.

What is interesting from the figure is that having bad corruption record seem to be a "deal breaker", significantly reducing the time to choose: in practice, if facing two low-valence candidates, the fact that one of them has a bad record on corruption (as opposed to a bad record on some other subject matter) makes respondents choose more quickly. The coefficients are statistically significant for any of the pair involving corruption. There are no differences in response times with other pairs of negative valence traits that do not involve corruption. This is an additional piece of evidence to emphasize how crucial is the track record on corruption in affecting the political choice of voters.

6 Alternative models

6.1 Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE)

So far, we have presented evidence using the random utility model and ancillary evidence based on response time. Despite its advantage of providing a more structural way of modelling voter utility with clearly laid out

assumptions and hence permitting the interpretation of the estimated coefficients as the weights assigned to traits (Abramson *et al.*, 2022), the random utility framework is somewhat inflexible since we cannot really compare the estimates across different specifications, e.g. with interaction terms or different sets of regressors. In this section we will use a non-parametric approach; these estimates provide complementary perspectives on how respondents choose, which may not be obtained using the random utility model.

AMCE analysis following Hainmueller *et al.* (2014) has been the most widely used technique to analyze full factorial choice data in political science. Using this method, one can obtain a non-parametric estimate of the effect of a given value of a trait, compared to the base category. The effect of moving from base category t_0 to the category of interest t_1 for a given trait is defined as

$$\hat{\pi}(t_1, t_0) = \mathbb{E}(Y_{ij}|T_{ij} = t_1) - \mathbb{E}(Y_{ij}|T_{ij} = t_0) \tag{4}$$

where Y_{ij} is an indicator for whether individual i chose candidate j. Notice that in practice, this involves pooling the data from 15 choices made by each respondent, for a total of 30 profiles. Given that the profiles are randomly and independently drawn, and under the assumption that *when* a profile is viewed is inconsequential for the choice (no profile-order effects), one can pool all the profiles seen by a respondent (of which fifteen were chosen and fifteen were rejected) and calculate the effect as the difference in mean approval for profiles that have value t_1 on the trait (averaging over all other characteristics) and the mean approval for profiles that have value t_0. One valid interpretation of $\hat{\pi}(t_1, t_0)$ in the AMCE framework, that carries substantive meaning, is the expected change in vote share of a candidate due to a change of their attributes from t_0 to t_1, regardless of the remainder of the traits (Abramson *et al.*, 2022).

AMCE estimation is somewhat more flexible than the random utility model, and does not rely on a fully-specified utility model for the voters. All inferences for the estimation strategy in this section are based on the standard errors clustered at the respondent level as per Hainmueller *et al.* (2014). The results of the basic AMCE estimation counterpart of the Random Utility model are reported in Tables 7. It is very reassuring that the results are substantially equivalent to those of the random utility estimation.[21] Valence is the trait with the largest effect, followed by identity and then ideology. The magnitude is also comparable with the marginal effects resulted from the RU model. Importantly, by and large, similar conclusion can be drawn for the treatment effects. While no treatment effect is detected on the role assigned to identity, the informational treatment significantly increases, the effect of valence (track record of the candidates) and the

[21] Notice that while parametrization of identity and valence are done by using one dummy variable, the effect of Ideology in the AMCE model is done by including two dummies instead of one, i.e. one dummy for neutral position, and one dummy for same position; the opposing position is used as the base category.

Table 7: Importance of traits and treatment effects: AMCE analysis

			$P(voted = 1)$		
VARIABLES	All	Knowledge	Knowledge	Deferential	Agency
Share Identity = 1	0.049***	0.049***	0.049***	0.056***	0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Treated = 1			-0.017**	-0.028***	-0.006
			(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)
1.Share Identity#1.Treated			-0.001	-0.004	0.003
			(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Valence: High = 1	0.278***	0.278***	0.270***	0.252***	0.291***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)
1.Valence: High #1.Treated			0.016	0.034**	-0.004
			(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Ideology side = Neutral	0.015***	0.017***	0.017**	0.004	0.032***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Ideology side = Same	0.035***	0.036***	0.024***	0.006	0.044***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
1.Neutral#1.Treated			-0.000	0.010	-0.009
			(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
2.Same#1.Treated			0.023***	0.028**	0.021*
			(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Observations	117,348	108,852	108,388	52,220	56,168
R-squared	0.080	0.080	0.081	0.076	0.088

Note: The table reports the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) for the main traits estimated in the Random Utility model for different splits of the sample. The estimates in column 1 use all respondents in the sample, column 2 only respondents who completed the political agency knowledge game. The deferential sample in column 4 consists of respondents obtaining lower than median knowledge scores, while the agency-minded sample of column 5 consists of respondents obtaining above median knowledge scores; the median score is zero. Share Identity is a dummy for sharing religion and ethnicity (base: not sharing identity), Valence: High is a dummy for having high track record in any one of the five governance policies (base category = Low track record, poor performance), Ideology side takes the value of one if the respondent is respectively neutral or on the same ideological side of the candidate, in any one of the five ideological dimension (base category = opposing side). The numbers in round brackets are the standard errors clustered at the individual respondent level. All regressions are weighted to be representative of voter's population in Indonesia's 2024 general election. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


ideological position of the candidate. These effects are driven by the deference-minded. [22]

Similarly, the pattern of importances documented in the RU model is also observed from analysis of the disaggregated traits. In particular, Figure 5 shows that compared to ethnicity, religious congruence is much more important. Among the valence traits, corruption has the highest effect, followed by economic, health and education policy, while environment, and women and child protection, rank last.

Some additional results are of substantive interest, however. In particular, we can estimate separate effects for being on the same side or the opposite side of the ideological divide (testing whether the bonus from ideological proximity is symmetric to the malus from ideological distance, where the base category is being located at the middle). Overall, with aggregated traits we do not find evidence of asymmetry: Being on the same of the voter gives a small but significant electoral advantage, while being on the opposite side has an opposite effect approximately identical in absolute value. One notable exception concerns the view

[22] Some small difference occur in the effect of treatment on the same ideological position for the agency-minded voters: we obtain a small and barely significant effect in the AMCE model, while in the RU model, this effect is not detected.

Figure 5: Weight assigned to disaggregated traits: AMCE analysis




on freedom of speech and immigration.[23]

Importantly, we can also look at asymmetric effects of high vs low valence, disaggregating by policy area. The bonus from high valence (compared to neutral, meaning that the topic was not mentioned in the profile) is always larger than the malus from having low valence. This is the case for all dimension of valence, except on corruption, where the malus of having a bad record is almost symmetrical to the bonus of having a good record.

We can also estimate the component effects of the raw original value traits instead of the congruence terms. This is informative of which features, averaging across the entire electorate, might make a candidate more successful. The analysis is presented in Figure 6. First, compared to the the previous graph —where the traits are computed in terms of voter-candidate congruence— the effect of the raw traits is not as large. Note that in this framework we can directly compare the magnitude in Figure 5 and Figure 6: the effect of valence is much larger than the effect of education, age, gender, or previous occupation of the candidate. This provides further justification of the choice of the main traits in the RU model, as these are basically the candidate characteristics that matter the most. Second, we can conclude that the profile of a successful candidate in the eyes of the Indonesian electorate is that of a non-Chinese, Muslim, male, of prime age (30-40), master-level educated, married, with prior experience as a politician.

[23] We find a small anomaly on the effect of the view on army role, where having the same position is found to give a disadvantage; however, this effect is not significantly different from zero. Overall, profile mentions of *any* stance on the role of the army in national politics harm candidates.

Figure 6: Weight assigned to raw traits of candidates



6.2 Interaction Effects

Another advantage of this framework is that one can straightforwardly estimate the Average Component Interaction Effect (ACIE), based on the interaction of two or more traits. This allows us to answer questions about, for instance, whether being corrupt matters more for candidates that share the ethno-religious identity of the respondent, or more for outgroups.[24] Significant interactions between candidate traits constitute deviations from the additive separability assumption adopted in the utility modeling. In substantive terms, deviations from additive separability mean that the effect of one trait depends on the value that another trait takes: for instance, if voters value competence more when facing an ideologically close candidate, while they value it less (or even dislike it) when facing an ideologically distant candidate; or if they value valence more for candidates of their own ethno-religious group than for outgroups.

We first estimate the interaction effect for valence, ideology and ethno-religious congruence. We estimate the effect for the binary identity-congruence variable (equal to one if *both* ethnicity and religion match between respondent and candidate, zero otherwise) and respectively the valence and the ideological congruence in any of the five dimensions shown for the candidate. Results are reported in table 8. The result shows that valence carries the same consequences for candidates that are ethno-religious in-groups and out-groups (column 1). The same pattern holds if we use religion and ethnicity separately as the moderator (column 2 and column

[24]Notice that the inclusion of multiplicative interactions is clearly possible also in a probit setting. Yet, as we said, in order to meaningfully interpret the estimates of the coefficients as utility weights, the variance of the error term, hence the specification, needs to be fixed once and for all; comparing across specifications does violence to the "structural" interpretation of the random utility formulation.

Table 8: Interaction Effects between Valence, Ideology traits and Identity traits

	$P(voted = 1)$		
Valence & Ideology	Identity	Religion	Ethnicity
Valence: High = 1	0.276***	0.279***	0.276***
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Share Identity = 1	0.040***		
	(0.007)		
1.Valence: High#1.Share Identity	**0.006**		
	(0.008)		
Ideology side = Neutral	0.013*	0.016	0.015*
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Ideology side = Same	0.032***	0.023***	0.039***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Ideology side = Neutral #1.Share Identity	**0.009**		
	(0.015)		
Ideology side = Same#1.Share Identity	**0.011**		
	(0.008)		
Share Religion = 1		0.065***	
		(0.007)	
1.Valence: High#1.Share Religion		**-0.002**	
		(0.009)	
Ideology side = Neutral#1.Share Religion		**-0.001**	
		(0.015)	
Ideology side = Same#1.Share Religion		**0.019****	
		(0.008)	
Share Ethnicity = 1			0.015**
			(0.006)
1.Valence: High#1.Share Ethnicity			**0.005**
			(0.007)
Ideology side = Neutral#1.Share Ethnicity			**0.003**
			(0.014)
Ideology side = Same#1.Share Ethnicity			**-0.008**
			(0.008)
Observations	117,348	117,348	117,348
R-squared	0.080	0.083	0.079

Note: The table reports the interaction effect of valence, ideology and identity traits. "Identity" is the aggregated traits of religion and ethnicity (base: not sharing identity), "Valence: High" is the dummy for having high track record of candidates in any one of the five governance policies (base category = Low track record, poor performance), "Ideology side" is an identifier for respondent ideological position relative to the candidate in any one of the five ideological dimension (base category = opposing side). Number in round brackets signify the standard errors clustered at the individual respondent level. All regressions are weighted to be representative of voter's population in Indonesia's 2024 general election. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3 respectively). This means that sharing identity with a candidate does not affect voter valuation of the importance of valence. This is reassuring, as these patterns give additional grounds for making a claim, that we cautiously made already in the random utility section, that between a corrupt in-group, and a clean out-group, voters would choose the non-corrupt candidate in spite of religious differences.

On the other hand, we do not reach such a conclusion in the case of ideological congruence: Ideological congruence of non-religiously congruent candidates is rewarded, but it is much more consequential for candidates who share religion with the respondent. These patterns are obscured if one looks at overall ethno-religious congruence (considering as congruent candidates that share both religion and ethnicity with the respondent). Using the disaggregated ideological position shows that this differential valuation is driven by the fact that a shared stance on traditional morality and on economic nationalism gives a bonus only to candidates of the same religion as the respondent, and opposed views on traditional morality and freedom of speech damage more religious out-group candidates.[25] These interactions are not present when we look at ethnic congruence or if we use the aggregate ethno-religious congruence variable (Share Identity).

7 Implications and conclusions

This study offers new evidence on the cognitive underpinnings of voter behavior in low-accountability democracies. Drawing on a large, nationally representative sample of Indonesian voters during the 2024 general election campaign, we provide causal evidence that how individuals conceptualize the relationship between voters and elected officials fundamentally shapes their preferences and their electoral choices. While identity-based preferences—particularly religious congruence—remain salient, voters across the board place a greater premium on candidate valence, especially on issues such as corruption and economic performance. Importantly, this is not merely a descriptive finding. Our randomized intervention, which framed elections as a principal-agent relationship, led to a marked increase in the weight voters assigned to candidate performance. This shift occurred without crowding out identity considerations, suggesting the persistence of identity consideration within Indonesia's politics.

The implications of these findings are far-reaching. At the most immediate level, they reveal the presence of informational frictions in political selection: voters may not instinctively view elections as opportunities to hold politicians accountable, particularly in settings where clientelism is prevalent and elite dominance is normalized. Yet, once prompted to adopt an accountability frame, voters recalibrate their priorities. This indicates that performance-based voting may be latent rather than absent—constrained not by voters'

[25] This comes as no surprise as specific stances on these dimension are highly influenced by religious values. Voter may not be interested in this dimension if the candidates do not share their religious affiliation. For instance, "defense of traditional morality" might differ in its specifics for a Muslim and a Protestant candidate.

preferences, but by how they have been socialized to understand democratic practice. By shifting voters' mental models, even a brief, non-partisan informational cue can enhance their ability to reward competent politicians and, conversely, penalize underperformance.

This has direct implications for the scalability and cost-effectiveness of civic education efforts. Our intervention was intentionally brief and low-cost, yet it produced substantively meaningful changes in voter behavior. In contrast to more resource-intensive or enforcement-driven reforms, ideational interventions offer a politically feasible and financially sustainable approach to improving democratic accountability at scale. This is particularly relevant in developing democracies where institutional constraints and budgetary limitations often preclude more ambitious governance reforms. The potential to deliver such interventions through media campaigns, public service announcements, or voter outreach initiatives makes this strategy both practical and impactful.

The governance implications are equally significant. When voters become more attuned to performance, political elites are likely to adjust their strategies. Rather than relying primarily on identity appeals or clientelistic inducements, politicians operating in such environments will face increasing pressure to demonstrate tangible results. In this sense, our findings speak to the endogenous nature of clientelism: it persists not simply because of elite manipulation, but because voters have come to expect and reward it. Changing voter expectations therefore has the potential to shift the political equilibrium itself—encouraging greater programmatic competition, reducing distortionary patronage, and ultimately fostering more effective policy and responsive public institutions.

Finally, this research offers a new lens through which to interpret some of the most consequential events in Indonesia's recent political history. The 2017 blasphemy trial of former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—a double minority with a strong performance record—has often been cited as evidence of the primacy of identity in Indonesian politics. Yet our results suggest a more nuanced picture: Purnama's popularity likely stemmed from his performance in office, and it was precisely because identity-based attacks alone could not erode his support that opponents resorted to mobilization, prosecution, and legal exclusion. This interpretation reinforces our broader point: when performance matters, the political stakes are raised, and so too are the tactics used to suppress viable challengers.

In sum, this study highlights the cognitive dimension of democratic accountability. Voter beliefs about what elections are for—whether they are acts of loyalty, expressions of group identity, or instruments of oversight—profoundly shape political outcomes. By demonstrating that these beliefs are malleable, and that even a short intervention can shift them toward a more accountability-oriented frame, we point to a promising and underutilized lever for democratic reform. In contexts where formal institutions are weak, cultivating the norms and expectations that underpin accountability may be one of the most effective routes

to strengthening democratic governance and advancing inclusive development.

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A Drag and drop game

Figure A.1: *Drag and drop* game: Practice question




Figure A.2: *Drag and drop* game: Substantive question 1





Figure A.3: *Drag and drop* game: Substantive question 2



B Auxiliary Figures and Tables

Figure B.1: The (a)symmetry of the effect of sharing vs. opposing ideology




Table B.1: Weight assigned to traits–disaggregated

VARIABLES	All	PRE	POST	Knowledge
Diff in religion	0.299***	0.296***	0.309***	0.300***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.016)
	[0.100]	[0.0996]	[0.104]	[0.101]
Diff in ethnicity	0.043***	0.049***	0.013	0.043***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.011)
	[0.0146]	[0.0165]	[0.00427]	[0.0145]
Diff in valence: Corruption	1.173***	1.165***	1.216***	1.160***
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.071)	(0.033)
	[0.394]	[0.391]	[0.408]	[0.390]
Diff in valence: Economy	0.973***	0.971***	0.982***	0.967***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.069)	(0.032)
	[0.327]	[0.326]	[0.329]	[0.325]
Diff in valence: Educ & Health	0.819***	0.818***	0.823***	0.818***
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.070)	(0.029)
	[0.275]	[0.275]	[0.276]	[0.275]
Diff in valence: Women & Children	0.543***	0.552***	0.496***	0.546***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.058)	(0.026)
	[0.182]	[0.186]	[0.166]	[0.184]
Diff in valence: Environment	0.542***	0.557***	0.464***	0.553***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.061)	(0.026)
	[0.182]	[0.187]	[0.156]	[0.186]
Diff in ideology: Army role	-0.198***	-0.181***	-0.292***	-0.196***
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.094)	(0.041)
	[-0.0665]	[-0.0608]	[-0.0978]	[-0.0658]
Diff in ideology: Morality	-0.157***	-0.156***	-0.161***	-0.148***
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.024)
	[-0.0527]	[-0.0525]	[-0.0540]	[-0.0498]
Diff in ideology: Freedom to organise	-0.176***	-0.185***	-0.126	-0.184***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.086)	(0.033)
	[-0.0591]	[-0.0621]	[-0.0422]	[-0.0617]
Diff in ideology: Free speech	-0.061	-0.074*	-0.001	-0.078*
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.091)	(0.041)
	[-0.0206]	[-0.0247]	[-0.000295]	[-0.0263]
Diff in ideology: Immigration	-0.102***	-0.097**	-0.126	-0.108***
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.093)	(0.037)
	[-0.0343]	[-0.0327]	[-0.0422]	[-0.0363]
Observations	56,798	46,707	10,091	52,706

Note: The table reports the Probit estimates of the weight assigned to candidate's full dimensional traits corresponding to the model in equation 2. Number in round brackets signify the standard errors of the Probit estimate clustered at the individual respondent level, while number in square brackets signify the marginal effect of the Probit estimates. The estimates in column 1 corresponds to all respondents in the sample, column 2 to only respondents in pre-election wave, column 3 to only respondents in post-election wave, and column 4 to only respondents who completed the political agency knowledge game. All regressions are weighted to be representative of voter's population in Indonesia's 2024 general election. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.2: Regression of actual vote on vote intention

	Actual votes			
Intention & voter types	Front-runner	Underdog	Contender	No vote
intent: Underdog	0.197***	0.676***	-0.825***	-0.048
	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.030)
intent: Front-runner	0.868***	0.024	-0.875***	-0.017
	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.020)
intent: No vote	0.226**	-0.000	-0.750***	0.524***
	(0.096)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.060)
intent: Don't know	0.413***	0.173***	-0.649***	0.063**
	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Deferential = 1	0.002	0.020	-0.026	0.003
	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.027)
intent: Underdog#Deferential	0.053	-0.164***	0.062	0.049
	(0.071)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.044)
intent: Front-runner#Deferential	-0.012	-0.016	0.042	-0.015
	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.032)
intent: No vote#Deferential	-0.100	-0.020	0.133	-0.012
	(0.134)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.083)
intent: Don't know#Deferential	0.126**	-0.077*	-0.027	-0.022
	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.039)
Base intent: Contender	0.060**	0.000	0.893***	0.048***
	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Observations	1,336	1,336	1,336	1,336
R-squared	0.512	0.351	0.584	0.131

Note: The table present the OLS regressions of actual presidential votes on the respondent's own vote intention and the voter types indicator. The analysis in this table is restricted to respondents in the control arm. Actual votes are self-declared during post-election survey, while vote intention is declared during the pre-election survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C Video scripts

Duration: 75 seconds

C.1 Video 1 - treatment

EN:

Imagine you inherit a convenient store from your grandparents. However, you have your own job and do not have the expertise to manage it.

Therefore, you run a search for the store manager who will act on your behalf to manage it, so you need to find someone that you can trust to act for your best interest.

Due to the power you give him, he may be tempted to do things that benefit himself but costly for you. Therefore, you need to check on him from time to time, making sure that he manages your store with competence, dignity, and integrity. If you think he does not fulfill your expectations, or is betraying your trust, you have all the right to fire him and elect someone else to do the job.

This is a metaphor of an election (PEMILU) in democracy. In an election, we choose a political candidate to run the country on our behalf.

Just like the case of the store manager, political leaders will be tempted to abuse their power to benefit themselves at our cost.

Therefore, in an election, we can "punish" them by electing someone else when they were lying, cheating, or under-performing.

So, are you ready to vote in the coming election?

ID:

Bayangkan kamu mewarisi sebuah toko serba ada dari kakek kamu. Namun, kamu memiliki pekerjaan sendiri dan tidak memiliki keahlian untuk mengelolanya.

Karena itu, kamu mencari seorang manajer toko yang bertindak atas nama kamu untuk mengelolanya. Orang ini harus bisa kamu percayai akan bertindak sebaik-baiknya demi kepentinganmu.

Karena kepercayaan yang diberikan kepadanya, dia mungkin akan tergoda untuk melakukan hal-hal yang menguntungkan dirinya sendiri tetapi merugikan kamu; sehingga kamu perlu mengawasinya dari waktu ke waktu, memastikan dia mengelola tokomu dengan kompetensi, martabat, dan integritas. Jika dia tidak memenuhi harapanmu, atau mengkhianati kepercayaanmu, kamu punya segala hak untuk memecatnya dan memilih orang lain untuk melakukan pekerjaan itu

Ini adalah perumpamaan PEMILU dalam demokrasi. Dalam pemilu, kita memilih CALEG untuk menjalankan negara atas nama kita. Seperti kasus manajer toko di atas, pemimpin politik sering tergoda untuk menyalahgunakan kekuasaan demi keuntungan sendiri; merugikan kita tanpa kita sadari. Dengan PEMILU, kita bisa "menghukum" mereka dengan memilih orang lain jika kita dapati mereka berbohong, curang, atau berkinerja buruk.

Jadi, apakah kamu siap untuk memilih pada pemilu mendatang?

C.2 Video 2 – control

EN:

Election (PEMILU) is around the corner, but what do we know about election? PEMILU stands for Pemilihan Umum. We held our first democratic election in 1995 and had experience twelfe general election since. An interesting fact for this year's election is that we will held the national as well as the regional level election ALL at once.

Who are eligible to vote? If you are 17 years old or older, or you have had been married before, then you are eligible to vote. Obviously, you need to have a valid national ID (KTP) to certify that you are indeed the citizen of the Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, a person who are eligible to vote has be mentally sound, and they cannot be a member of national police force (POLRI) or a member of national army (TNI).

We should check whether our names are registered as a valid voter (Daftar Pemilih Tetap - DPT) at the KPU website. When you find yourself registered, then you should also check if your information details are accurate. Make sure that your residence is in line with the location where you will vote (Dapil). If you detect any discrepancy, then you should report this to KPU and request for data change. You will then be added to the additional voter list (Daftar Pemilih Tambahan).

So, are you ready to vote in the coming election?

ID:

PEMILU sudah dekat, tapi apa yang kita ketahui tentang pemilu? PEMILU adalah singkatan dari Pemilihan Umum. Kita menyelenggarakan pemilu demokratis pertama kali pada tahun 1995 dan telah menjalani dua belas kali semenjak itu. Fakta menarik pada pemilu tahun ini adalah kita akan menyelenggarakan pemilu tingkat nasional dan tingkat daerah secara serentak.

Siapa yang berhak memilih? Jika kamu sudah berusia 17 tahun, atau pernah menikah sebelumnya, maka kamu berhak memilih. Tentunya kamu harus memiliki KTP yang masih berlaku untuk membuktikan bahwa kamu memang warga negara Republik Indonesia. Selain itu, orang yang berhak memilih harus sehat secara mental, dan anggota POLRI atau TNI tidak boleh ikut PEMILU.

Kita bisa mengecek apakah nama kita terdaftar sebagai pemilih sah dalam Daftar Pemilih Tetap (DPT) di website KPU. Ketika terdaftar, kamu juga sebaiknya memeriksa apakah rincian informasi kamu akurat. Pastikan tempat tinggal kamu sesuai dengan tempat kamu akan memilih (Dapil). Jika kamu menemukan kesalahan, kamu bisa melaporkannya ke KPU dan meminta perubahan data. Kemudian, kamu akan ditambahkan ke daftar pemilih tambahan (DPT).

Jadi, apakah kamu siap untuk memilih pada pemilu mendatang?

D Attributes and levels: Candidate profiles

Table D.1: Attributes and levels for candidate profiles

Attribute	Level	Distribution (%)
Age	23 - 30	10
	30 - 55	70
	56 - 69	15
	70 - 75	5
Gender	Male	60
	Female	40
Ethnicity	Titular-ethnic	50
	Native non-titular	40
	Chinese non-titular	10
Educational Background	Primary school/Junior high school	5
	Senior high school	50
	D1/D2/D3	5
	D4/S1	30
	S2/S3	10
Religion	Islam	70
	Christian	10
	Catholic	10
	Hindu	5
	Buddha	5
Marital Status	Married	75
	Not married	20
	Divorced/Widowed	5
Occupational Background	Worker	50
	Entrepreneur	10
	Domestic	10
	Teacher	5
	Student	5
	Retiree	5
	Politician	5
	Others	10

E List of valence statements associated to candidates

The candidates differ on the following valence dimensions. This item maps to questions included in the baseline survey, where respondents are asked to list two most important problem to tackle in the country. Yet, we treat these as positive/negative traits of the candidate regardless of whether the respondent indicated, in the baseline, that a given dimension was important.

1. Corruption:
    - High
        - No track record of corruption.
        - Successfully reduced the level of corruption in local government.
    - Low
        - Previously involved in corruption cases.
        - Involved in bribery cases for business permits.
        - Former convict.
2. Education and health:
    - High
        - Improved the quality of schools in the region.
        - Improved the quality of service and infrastructure for health facilities in the region.
        - Established free schools.
        - Increased school participation rates in the region.
    - Low
        - Failed to reduce maternal and infant mortality rates and cases of stunting in the region.
        - Unsuccessful in curbing the dropout rate in the region.
3. Economy:
    - High
        - Successfully reduced poverty, inequality, and unemployment rates in the region.
        - Improved guidance and support for SMEs to boost the local economy.
    - Low
        - Failed to control the stability of basic commodity prices in the region.
        - Increased poverty, inequality, and unemployment rates in the region during the term.
4. Environment:

- High
  - Successfully emphasized carbon emissions in the region.
  - Addressed the emergency waste issue in the region.
- Low
  - Failed to address air pollution and river pollution from factory waste.
  - Failed to address the waste emergency in the region.
  - Granted permits for the opening of mining companies.

5. Rights of women and children:

- High
  - Proposed various new programs for the empowerment of women.
  - Improved the quality of reporting services for domestic violence.
- Low
  - Unsuccessful in reducing the number of domestic violence cases in the region.
  - Failed to control the number of child laborers in the region.

We use several alternative wordings for a given issue to increase the natural appearance of different issues across candidate profile choice, as the appearance of two identical positions across profiles could be potentially confusing and detract from the realism of the choice exercise.

F The weighting method

We detect some discrepancies between the marginal distributions of some traits in our sample and those in official census data. We instructed the survey firm to collect data based on the marginal distribution of age, province, and gender, and the conditional distribution of education by age. Yet, our sample is more educated than the general population and there are some discrepancies in terms of geography, in particular an over-representations of the city of Jakarta. In addition, there is some imbalance in terms of gender, with an over-representation of females. Hence we estimate raking weights based on census data and individual education (treated as a binary indicator for university-educated respondents), gender, and a six-category variable for residence in one of the five largest provinces in terms of population [26], aggregating the remainder of the provinces in one residual category. We use the `anesrake` package in the R environment to estimate weights to match the sample marginals to the census. We estimate three different vector of weights, to account for attrition. The first vector of weights rebalances the full sample interviewed at baseline with census marginals. The second vector of weights rebalances participants in the pre-election wave with census marginals, and the third vector rebalances participants in the post-election wave with census marginals. Ultimately, given the small number of variables used in the raking exercise, we are able to rebalance the sample to census marginals with "gentle" weighting: the maximum weight in the baseline sample is 2.9; it is 2.6 for the pre-election wave, and 2.4 in the post-election wave. In any case, we are able to exactly match the census targets for these three variables.

[26] Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, Sumatera Utara, DKI Jakarta.

G Descriptive evidence on democratic erotion and identity politics

The empirical literatures on democratic erosion and identity politics in Indonesia that we summarize above documents a series of patterns which we can also assess from our survey. In particular, at baseline we ask respondents their stance regarding five "divisive" issues that include the role of the military in democratic politics, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. In addition, we ask respondents whether they agree that non-Muslims and non-Javanese candidates should have a chance to run for president. While a full exploration of these patterns goes beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly report some of the results here to contrast and compare them with those in the literature. In the baseline survey, we ask voters a set of questions about their stance on a set of divisive issues that have played a significant role in Indonesian political debate over the past decade.

An overwhelming majority (95%) of the public supports disbanding extremist organizations, and a clear majority (62%) supports restrictions to speech.

One main point regarding freedom of speech and association that emerges from the literature is that the non-Islamist ("Pancasila") camp tends to be less supportive of these freedoms. In fact, provisions in this direction were introduced exactly with the aim of restricting the ability of the Islamist camp.

We find that among the public, those who consider themselves Islamist tend to be (by a very small extent) more skeptical of restrictions on the political activity of "extremists". Anti-extremist laws have been cast by scholars as illiberal as they assign to the government (rather than courts) the power to decide who and what is an extremist. Importantly, this finding is in line with a pattern detected in several other context, where citizens seem to be comfortable with illiberal provisions if they perceive that they mainly affect their political opponents. This is in line with Aspinall and Mietzner (2019) contention that pluralist Indonesians have abandoned democratic principles in order to ensure that Islamists are excluded from power, even at the cost of reducing democratic freedoms. The pattern does not really emerge with free speech, where the most in favor of free speech are those who choose "compromise" when given the alternative between Pancasila and Islamism. It is also interesting to notice that it's the college-educated non-Islamists who are most in favor of restrictions to speech. There's no detectable difference in terms of support for restrictions to "extremist" organizations.

A slight majority of the public agrees with the right of non-Muslims to run for president (52% are ok with it). Unsurprisingly, a majority of self-declared Islamists opposes non-Muslim, while 63% of the self-declared Pancasila supporters are ok with non-Muslims running for president. An overwhelming majority (92%) is ok with non-Javanese as presidential candidates, with college-educated and non-Islamists slightly (but

significantly) more supportive. This pattern is comparable to the finding by Mietzner and Muhtadi (2019) who find more than 50% object to non-muslim president. Notice also they find that university educated, as of 2018, were more opposed than the rest of the electorate to non-Muslim governors! (This might be useful for us as it basically shows that our sample is not especially tolerant).

H Questionnaire: Baseline

H.1 English

Introduction

You are invited to participate in a survey about politics and public affairs. This survey will take approximately 10 minutes, and you will be asked a number of questions about yourself and your views on politics. Your participation is completely voluntary. You may stop at any time or skip any questions without penalty. You will receive a point reward from JakPat for your participation. Moreover, we hope that the results will contribute to our knowledge about political attitudes in this country.

This survey is anonymous. The researcher will not know your name, and your responses will not be linked to your personal identifying information (PII) in any way. This survey is meant for academic purposes only and not for any other purposes. Please fill in the survey based on your preferences

- I declare that I am at least 17 years old and agree to participate
- I do not agree to participate

Before starting this survey, please click on the box below

- I am not a robot *[Captcha]*

Demographic (DG)

In which province and city/district **will you vote** in the upcoming election?

- Province: *[Dropdown]*
- *City/District: [Dropdown]*

What is the highest level of education you completed?

- Elementary school or equivalent (SD/MI/Paket A)
- Junior high school or equivalent (SMP/MTs/Paket B)
- Senior high school or equivalent (SMA/SMK/MA/Paket C)
- Diploma (D1/D2/D3)
- Undergraduate degree (D4/S1)
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)
- Others: (Please specify below)

Which ethnic group best describes you?

- *[Dropdown]*

What is your religion?

- Islam
- Christian Protestant
- Catholic
- Hinduism
- Buddhism
- Other

(If "Islam" is selected) How often do you perform 5 prayer times a day?

- Always
- Almost Always
- Sometimes
- Almost Never
- Never

(If "Christian Protestant" or "Catholic" is selected) How often do you attend church services?

- More than once a week
- Once a week
- More than once a month
- Once a month
- Less than once a month

(If "Hinduism" or "Buddhism" is selected) How often do you visit the temple?

- More than once a week
- Once a week
- More than once a month
- Once a month
- Less than once a month

How important is religion to you when making important decisions in life (getting married, changing jobs, moving homes)?

- Very important
- Somewhat important
- Not too important
- Not at all important

Tolerance and Trust (TT)

This survey is anonymous. The researcher will not know your name, and your responses will not be linked to your personal identifying information (PII) in any way.

Below is the list of various groups in society. **Which group do wish not to have as your neighbors?** (you can choose more than one answer)

- Drugs users
- People from different ethnicities/race
- People with AIDS
- Immigrant/foreign workers
- Homosexuals
- Alcohol addict
- Cohabiter
- People speaking different languages

Media Use (PM)

In the past 24 hours, have you done any of the activities below? (you can choose more than one answer)

- Used social media (such as Facebook, Youtube or WhatsApp)
- Watched TV News
- Read a newspaper in print or online
- Listened to a radio
- None of the above

(If "Used social media (such as Facebook, Youtube or Whatsapp)" is selected) In the past 24 hours, did you do any of the following on social media (such as Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, or WhatsApp)

- Posted a content/story or link about politics
- Posted a comment about politics
- Read a story or watched a video about politics
- Participated in a political demonstration/activity
- Forwarded a story, photo, video or link about politics to family/friend
- None of the above

Economy (EK)

In your opinion, over the past year, the nation's economy has...

- Gotten much better
- Gotten somewhat better
- Stayed about the same

- Gotten somewhat worse
- Gotten much worse
- Unsure

Over the past year, your household's income has...

- Increased significantly
- Somewhat increased
- Stayed about the same
- Somewhat decreased
- Decreased significantly
- Unsure

Political Knowledge (WP)

Which of the following currently is holding the position of the vice-president of Indonesia?

- Budiono
- Probowo Subianto
- Ma'ruf Amin
- Anies Baswedan

For how long is the member of DPR RI elected, that is, how many years are there in one full-term of office for the member of DPR RI?

- 2 years
- 4 years
- 5 years
- 7 years

Which party has the **second-largest number of seats** in the Indonesian House of Parliament?

- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
- Partai Golkar
- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
- Partai Nasdem
- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
- Partai Demokrat
- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
- Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

Satisfaction Level (TK)

How satisfied are you with the current government's achievements?

- Very satisfied
- Satisfied
- Unsatisfied
- Very unsatisfied
- Unsure

(If "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied" is selected) In your opinion, who has contributed the most to the current government's achievements?

- President Joko Widodo
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
- Ministers in the cabinet
- All coalition parties in government

(If "Unsatisfied", "Very unsatisfied", or "Unsure" is selected) In your opinion, who is most responsible for the current government's achievements?

- President Joko Widodo
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
- Ministers in the cabinet
- All coalition parties in government

Issues and Principles (IP)

Among the following problems in our country, which **two are the most important** issues to be addressed?

- Corruption and law enforcement
- Labor market and unemployment
- Freedom of speech
- Environment
- Women's and children's rights
- Pluralism
- Education and health quality

Which principles should your ideal political party be based on?

- Pancasila
- Mix of both
- Islam

Opinion (OP)

Please fill out the survey honestly according to your own choices. This survey is anonymous. The researcher will not know your name, and your responses will not be linked to your personal identifying information (PII) in any way.

How much do you agree with the following statement?

Non-Muslim candidates should be allowed to become the president of Indonesia

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

Non-Javanese candidates should have the same opportunity as Javanese candidates to become the president of Indonesia

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

Knowledge About Democratic Election 1 (WP1)

Below are several activities and practices that may be occurring during an election campaign period. Please give your rating on whether this practice is very good, good, bad or very bad

Political activists put up posters/signs around the neighbourhood

- Very good
- Good
- Neutral
- Bad
- Very bad

Political activists remind the people about the election dates and urge people to vote during the election

- Very good
- Good
- Neutral
- Bad

- Very bad

Knowledge About Democratic Election 2 (WP2)

Below are several activities and practices that may be occurring during an election campaign period. Please give your rating on whether this practice is very good, good, bad or very bad

Political activist distributes gift (sembako) on behalf of a candidate during election campaign

- Very good
- Good
- Neutral
- Bad
- Very bad

Political activists invite influential figures in the neighborhood on behalf of the candidates to a restaurant for a meeting and give them a gift during the meeting.

- Very good
- Good
- Neutral
- Bad
- Very bad

Political activists organize a public music concert around the town square before the candidates deliver a political campaign speech.

- Very good
- Good
- Neutral
- Bad
- Very bad

Position on Contentious Issues in Democracy 1 (POS1)

People in a democracy may have different opinions about the various roles of government and other states apparatus in the country. Below is a list of roles of different state apparatus. **We are asking you to give your opinion on whether you agree or disagree with the following practices.**

The army takes over when the government is incompetent

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju

- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Position on Contentious Issues in Democracy II (POS2)

People in a democracy may have different opinions about the various roles of government and other states apparatus in the country. Below is a list of roles of different state apparatus. **We are asking you to give your opinion on whether you agree or disagree with the following practices.**

The government prosecutes agents involved in abortion of fetus

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

The government prosecute agents involved in prostitution

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

The government prosecute agents involved in adultery

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

Position on Contentious Issues in Democracy III (POS3)

People in a democracy may have different opinions about the various roles of government and other states apparatus in the country. Below is a list of roles of different state apparatus. **We are asking you to give your opinion on whether you agree or disagree with the following practices.**

The government bans organizations that are considered extremist

- Strongly agree

- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

Position on Contentious Issues in Democracy IV(POS4)

People in a democracy may have different opinions about the various roles of government and other states apparatus in the country. Below is a list of roles of different state apparatus. **We are asking you to give your opinion on whether you agree or disagree with the following practices.**

The government issues laws that facilitate the litigation of hate speech is social media

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

Position on Contentious Issues in Democracy V(POS5)

People in a democracy may have different opinions about the various roles of government and other states apparatus in the country. Below is a list of roles of different state apparatus. **We are asking you to give your opinion on whether you agree or disagree with the following practices.**

The government opens the local labor market to skilled foreign workers

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Unsure

[Authentication Question Here]

H.2 Bahasa Indonesia

Pengantar

Anda diundang untuk mengikuti survei mengenai politik dan urusan publik. Survei ini memakan waktu sekitar 10 menit dan Anda akan diminta menjawab beberapa pertanyaan mengenai diri Anda dan pandangan

politik Anda.

Partisipasi Anda bersifat sukarela, Anda dapat berhenti mengisi survei kapan saja atau melewati pertanyaan apa pun tanpa sanksi. Anda akan mendapatkan poin hadiah dari JakPat untuk partisipasi Anda. Selain itu, kami berharap hasil survei ini akan berkontribusi terhadap wawasan kita mengenai sikap politik di negeri ini.

Survei ini bersifat anonim. Peneliti tidak akan mengetahui nama Anda, dan respons Anda tidak akan dihubungkan dengan informasi pribadi Anda. Survei ini hanya digunakan untuk keperluan akademik dan bukan untuk kepentingan lain. Tolong isi survei dengan jujur sesuai pilihan Anda

- Saya menyatakan bahwa saya berumur 17 tahun ke atas dan setuju untuk berpartisipasi
- Saya tidak setuju untuk berpartisipasi

Sebelum memulai survei, harap klik box dibawah ini

- Saya bukan robot *[Captcha]*

Demografi (DG)

Di provinsi dan kota/kabupaten mana **Anda akan mencoblos** pada kegiatan Pemilu mendatang?

- Provinsi: *[Dropdown]*
- *Kabupaten/Kota: [Dropdown]*

Apa tingkat pendidikan tertinggi yang anda sedang/pernah diikuti?

- SD/Sederajat (SD/MI/Paket A)
- SMP/Sederajat (SMP/MTs/Paket B)
- SMA/Sederajat (SMA/SMK/MA/Paket C)
- Diploma (D1/D2/D3)
- Sarjana (D4/S1)
- Pascasarjana (S2/S3)
- Lainnya: (Sebutkan di kolom bawah ini)

Suku mana yang paling cocok mendeskripsikan anda?

- *[Dropdown]*

Agama apa yang anda anut?

- Islam
- Kristen Protestan
- Katolik

- Hindu
- Buddha
- Lainnya

(Apabila "Islam" dipilih) Seberapa sering anda shalat lima waktu?

- Selalu
- Sering
- Kadang-kadang
- Jarang
- Tidak Pernah

(Apabila "Kristen Protestan" atau "Katolik" dipilih) Seberapa sering anda beribadah di gereja?

- Lebih dari sekali dalam seminggu
- Seminggu sekali
- Lebih dari sekali dalam sebulan
- Sebulan sekali
- Kurang dari sekali dalam sebulan

(Apabila "Hindu" atau "Buddha" dipilih) Seberapa sering anda beribadah di kuil?

- Lebih dari sekali dalam seminggu
- Seminggu sekali
- Lebih dari sekali dalam sebulan
- Sebulan sekali
- Kurang dari sekali dalam sebulan

Seberapa penting agama bagi Anda dalam membuat keputusan penting dalam hidup? (pernikahan, menganti pekerjaan, pindah tempat tinggal)?

- Sangat penting
- Lumayan penting
- Tidak terlalu penting
- Sangat tidak penting

Toleransi dan *Trust* (TT)

Tolong isi survei dengan jujur sesuai pilihan Anda. Survei ini bersifat anonim. Peneliti tidak akan mengetahui nama Anda, dan respons Anda tidak akan dihubungkan terhadap informasi pribadi Anda.

Dibawah ini merupakan berbagai kelompok yang ada di masyarakat. **Kelompok manakah yang Anda**

tidak inginkan untuk menjadi tetangga Anda? (Anda dapat memilih lebih dari satu jawaban)

- Pecandu obat-obatan
- Orang dari ras/suku bangsa yang berbeda
- Orang yang mengidap penyakit AIDS
- Imigran/pekerja asing
- Homoseksual (hubungan sesama jenis)
- Pecandu minuman keras
- Pasangan belum menikah yang hidup bersama
- Orang yang berbicara bahasa yang berbeda dengan Anda

Penggunaan Media (PM)

Dalam 24 jam terakhir, apakah Anda melakukan aktivitas di bawah ini? (Anda dapat memilih lebih dari satu jawaban)

- Menggunakan media sosial (Facebook, YouTube, atau WhatsApp)
- Menonton berita di televisi
- Membaca koran cetak atau digital
- Mendengarkan radio
- Tidak melakukan apa pun di atas

(Apabila "Menggunakan media sosial (Facebook, YouTube, atau WhatsApp)" dipilih) Dalam 24 jam terakhir, apakah Anda melakukan beberapa hal berikut di media sosial (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp)

- *Posting* konten/cerita atau tautan tentang politik
- *Posting* komentar tentang politik
- Membaca cerita atau menonton video tentang politik
- Mengikuti aksi/demonstrasi politik
- Membagikan cerita, foto, video atau tautan tentang politik ke keluarga/teman
- Tidak melakukan apa pun di atas

Ekonomi (EK)

Menurut Anda, selama satu tahun terakhir, ekonomi negeri ini telah menjadi...

- Sangat lebih baik
- Lebih baik
- Sama saja
- Lebih buruk
- Jauh lebih buruk

- Tidak yakin

Selama satu tahun terakhir, penghasilan keluarga Anda ...

- Sangat meningkat
- Meningkat
- Sama saja
- Menurun
- Sangat menurun
- Tidak yakin

Wawasan Politik (WP)

Dari jawaban di bawah ini, siapakah yang menjadi wakil presiden Indonesia saat ini?

- Budiono
- Probowo Subianto
- Ma'ruf Amin
- Anies Baswedan

Berapa tahun anggota DPR RI dapat menjabat dalam satu periode?

- 2 Tahun
- 4 Tahun
- 5 Tahun
- 7 Tahun

Partai apa yang memiliki **kursi terbanyak kedua** di DPR RI saat ini?

- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
- Partai Golkar
- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
- Partai Nasdem
- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
- Partai Demokrat
- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
- Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

Tingkat Kepuasan (TK)

Seberapa puas Anda dengan pencapaian pemerintah sekarang?

- Sangat Puas
- Puas
- Tidak Puas
- Sangat Tidak Puas
- Tidak Yakin

(Apabila "Sangat Puas" atau "Puas" dipilih) Menurut Anda, siapakah yang paling berandil dalam pencapaian pemerintah sekarang?

- Presiden Joko Widodo
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
- Menteri - menteri dalam kabinet
- Semua partai koalisi dalam pemerintahan

(Apabila "Tidak Puas", "Sangat Tidak Puas", atau "Tidak Yakin" dipilih) Menurut Anda, siapakah yang paling bertanggung jawab dalam hasil capaian pemerintah sekarang?

- Presiden Joko Widodo
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)
- Menteri - menteri dalam kabinet
- Semua partai koalisi dalam pemerintahan

Isu dan Prinsip (IP)

Dari permasalahan negara kita di bawah ini, manakah **dua isu yang paling penting** untuk ditangani?

- Korupsi dan penegakan hukum
- Lapangan kerja dan pengangguran
- Kebebasan berpendapat
- Lingkungan hidup
- Hak perempuan dan anak
- Kebhinekaan
- Kualitas pendidikan dan kesehatan

Prinsip apa yang seharusnya dimiliki partai politik ideal Anda?

- Pancasila
- Kompromi keduanya
- Islam

Pendapat (OP)

Tolong isi survei dengan jujur sesuai pilihan Anda. Survei ini bersifat anonim. Peneliti tidak akan mengetahui nama Anda, dan respons Anda tidak akan dihubungkan terhadap informasi pribadi Anda.

Seberapa setuju Anda dengan kalimat berikut

Kandidat non-Muslim diperbolehkan menjadi presiden Indonesia

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Kandidat asal luar Jawa harus memiliki kesempatan yang sama dengan kandidat asal Jawa untuk menjadi presiden Indonesia

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Wawasan Pemilu 1 (WP1)

Di bawah ini merupakan aktivitas yang mungkin terjadi saat periode kampanye Pemilu. Kami minta tolong Anda memberikan penilaian apakah aktivitas ini sangat baik, baik, buruk, atau sangat buruk.

Kader partai memasang poster dan baliho di lingkungan tempat tinggal

- Sangat baik
- Baik
- Netral
- Buruk
- Sangat buruk

Kader partai mengingatkan masyarakat tentang tanggal Pemilu dan mendorong masyarakat untuk memilih saat Pemilu

- Sangat baik
- Baik
- Netral
- Buruk
- Sangat buruk

Wawasan Pemilu 2 (WP2)

Di bawah ini merupakan aktivitas yang mungkin terjadi saat periode kampanye Pemilu. Kami minta tolong Anda memberikan penilaian apakah aktivitas ini sangat baik, baik, buruk, atau sangat buruk.

Kader partai membagi-bagikan sembako mewakili kandidat saat periode kampanye

- Sangat baik
- Baik
- Netral
- Buruk
- Sangat buruk

Kader partai mengundang figur penting di lingkungan tempat tinggal untuk bertemu di restoran dan memberikan bingkisan kepada figur tersebut

- Sangat baik
- Baik
- Netral
- Buruk
- Sangat buruk

Kader partai mengadakan pertunjukkan musik di tengah kota sebelum kandidat politik memberikan pidato politik

- Sangat baik
- Baik
- Netral
- Buruk
- Sangat buruk

Posisi Terhadap Isu hangat Dalam Demokrasi I (POS1)

Masyarakat dalam sebuah demokrasi dapat memiliki pendapat yang berbeda-beda terhadap peran pemerintah dan lembaga negara lain dalam suatu negara. Berikut adalah beberapa contoh peran berbagai lembaga negara. **Kami meminta pendapat Anda apakah Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan aktivitas berikut.**

Tentara mengambil alih pemerintahan jika pemerintah tidak kompeten

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju

- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Posisi Terhadap Isu hangat Dalam Demokrasi II (POS2)

Masyarakat dalam sebuah demokrasi dapat memiliki pendapat yang berbeda-beda terhadap peran pemerintah dan lembaga negara lain dalam suatu negara. Berikut adalah beberapa contoh peran berbagai lembaga negara. **Kami meminta pendapat Anda apakah Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan aktivitas berikut.**

Negara mengkriminalisasi pihak yang terlibat dalam aktivitas aborsi

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Negara mengkriminalisasi pihak yang terlibat dalam prostitusi

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Negara mengkriminalisasi pihak yang terlibat dalam perzinahan

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Posisi Terhadap Isu hangat Dalam Demokrasi III (POS3)

Masyarakat dalam sebuah demokrasi dapat memiliki pendapat yang berbeda-beda terhadap peran pemerintah dan lembaga negara lain dalam suatu negara. Berikut adalah beberapa contoh peran berbagai lembaga negara. **Kami meminta pendapat Anda apakah Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan aktivitas berikut.**

Pemerintah membubarkan organisasi yang dianggap sebagai ekstremis

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Posisi Terhadap Isu hangat Dalam Demokrasi IV(POS4)

Masyarakat dalam sebuah demokrasi dapat memiliki pendapat yang berbeda-beda terhadap peran pemerintah dan lembaga negara lain dalam suatu negara. Berikut adalah beberapa contoh peran berbagai lembaga negara. **Kami meminta pendapat Anda apakah Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan aktivitas berikut.**

Pemerintah membuat undang-undang yang memfasilitasi proses hukum terhadap penghinaan pejabat publik di media sosial

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

Posisi Terhadap Isu hangat Dalam Demokrasi V(POS5)

Masyarakat dalam sebuah demokrasi dapat memiliki pendapat yang berbeda-beda terhadap peran pemerintah dan lembaga negara lain dalam suatu negara. Berikut adalah beberapa contoh peran berbagai lembaga negara. **Kami meminta pendapat Anda apakah Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan aktivitas berikut.**

Pemerintah membuka pasar tenaga kerja lokal dengan mendatangkan tenaga kerja terampil asing

- Sangat Setuju
- Setuju
- Tidak Setuju
- Sangat Tidak Setuju
- Tidak Yakin

[Authentication Question Here]

I Questionnaire: Conjoint

I.1 English

Introduction

You are invited to take a survey on politics and public affairs.

Pre-Election Survey: This survey takes approximately 8 minutes. You will be shown a one-minute political educational video and will be asked to answer several questions related to the video material and your personal opinions about politics.

Post-Election Survey: This survey takes approximately 10 minutes. You will be asked to answer several questions about your personal opinions on politics.

Your participation is voluntary, you can stop filling out the survey at any time or skip any questions without penalty. You will get reward points from JakPat for your participation. In addition, we hope that the results of this survey will contribute to our insight into political attitudes in this country. This survey is anonymous. **Researchers will not know your name, and your responses will not be linked to your personal information. This survey is only used for academic purposes and not for any other purposes. Please fill out the survey honestly according to your choice**

- I declare that I am at least 17 years old and agree to participate
- I do not agree to participate

(If "I do not agree to participate" is selected) Are you sure you don't want to continue with the survey? If you do not continue the survey, you will not get points from JakPat. To continue, please confirm your age and willingness: :

- I declare that I am at least 17 years old and agree to participate
- No, I don't want to continue working on the survey

Before starting this survey, please click on the box below

- I am not a robot *[Captcha]*

The quality of this survey data is very important to us. To accurately gauge your opinion, please answer each question in this survey carefully and thoroughly.

Are you committed to answering the questions in this survey carefully and thoroughly?

- Yes, I'm committed
- No, I'm not committed

Demographic (DG)

Pre-Election Survey: In which province and city/district **will you vote** in the upcoming election?

- Province: *[Dropdown]*
- *City/District: [Dropdown]*

Post-Election Survey: In which province and city/district **did you vote** in the election a few days ago?

- Province: *[Dropdown]*
- *City/District: [Dropdown]*

Opinion and Vote in the Election (PP)

Pre-Election Survey:

In your opinion, is voting during elections an obligation, a choice, or neither?

- Obligation
- Choice
- Neither an obligation nor a choice

(If "Obligation" is selected) How strong is your opinion that voting during elections is an obligation?

- Very strong
- Moderately strong
- Not too strong

Do you intend to vote in the next election?

- Yes
- No

Whom do you intend to vote in the coming general election for presidential position?

- Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar
- Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD
- Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming
- Does not intend to vote in the next election
- Unsure

Which party's legislative candidate will you choose as a member of the Republic of Indonesia's DPR in the next election?

- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)
- Partai GOLKAR

- Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem)
- Partai Buruh
- Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia (Gelora)
- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
- Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara (PKN)
- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)
- Partai Garda Republik Indonesia (Garudua)
- Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
- Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)
- Partai Demokrat
- Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI)
- Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo)
- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)
- Does not intend to vote in the next election
- Unsure

Post-Election Survey:

Did you vote in the general election a few days ago?

- Yes
- No

Whom did you vote for in the general election a few days ago for the presidential position?

- Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar
- Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD
- Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming
- Did not vote in the general election a few days ago

(If "Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming" is selected) What was your main reason for choosing the candidate pair you chose in the election a few days ago?

- My family/I always support Prabowo Subianto
- Because they want to ensure the sustainability of the current government program
- Because they are supported by my favorite party
- I chose the candidate pair who was predicted to win
- Because it supports Gibran Rakabuming Raka
- Other reasons, please write below

)If "Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar" is selected) What was your main reason for choosing the candidate pair you chose in the election a few days ago?

- My family/I always support Anies Baswedan
- Because they want change from the current government program
- Because they are supported by my favorite party
- I support the side that is considered weak
- Because it supports Muhaimin Iskandar
- Other reasons, please write below

(If "Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD" is selected) What was your main reason for choosing the candidate pair you chose in the election a few days ago?

- My family/I always support Ganjar Pranowo
- Because they want to ensure the sustainability of the current government program
- Because they are supported by my favorite party
- I support the side that is considered weak
- Because it supports Mahfud MD
- Other reasons, please write below

Which party's candidate did you vote for in the general election a few days ago for DPR RI position?

- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)
- Partai GOLKAR
- Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem)
- Partai Buruh
- Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia (Gelora)
- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
- Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara (PKN)
- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)
- Partai Garda Republik Indonesia (Garudua)
- Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
- Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)
- Partai Demokrat
- Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI)

- Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo)
- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)
- Tidak berniat memilih pada Pemilu mendatang
- Tidak tahu

What was your main reason for choosing the DPR RI legislative candidates you chose in the election a few days ago?

- Because I like the supporting party, even though I don't know the legislative candidates too well
- Because the quality of the legislative candidates is good, even though I lack sympathy with the supporting party
- Because the quality of the legislative candidates and the supporting parties are both good
- Because I follow my family's or friends'/colleagues' choice
- ther reasons, please write below

Who did you vote for in the 2019 presidential election?

- Joko Widodo – Ma'ruf Amin
- Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno
- Did not vote in the 2019 election
- Do not remember

Who did you vote for in the 2014 presidential election?


- Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla
- Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa
- Did not vote in the 2014 election
- Do not remember

Understanding of Election (KP)


Pre- and Post-Election Survey:

Different people have different styles of thinking. Next, we would like to know your style of thinking by asking you to play some simple game. In this section you have to categorize objects and activities according to what you think is the correct category.


From the three objects on the left, there is two object that is similar to the object in each box on the right. **Drag one item from the left box to each corresponding right box.**



Just like the task on the previous page, please **match one item in the left box with the correct category in the right box.**



Just like the task on the previous page, please **match one item in the left box with the correct category in the right box.**



Treatment Video (VID_T) and Control Video (VID_C)

Only in the Pre-Election Survey:

Next, we will show an informational video about elections based on political theory.

Please watch this video until the end because you will be asked to answer several questions regarding the contents of this video.

Respondents are requested NOT to EXIT the application and NOT to TURN OFF their cellphones while the video is running, please click the next button when the video is finished

[Treatment/Control Video Here]

The quality of this survey data is very important to us. Please answer the following questions carefully and thoroughly

For Treatment Video

Who is the equivalent of the store **owner** in the story in the video?

- King
- Political candidate
- Voter
- Subject (of a king)

Who is the equivalent of the store **manager** in the story in the video?

- Political candidate
- Boss
- Voter
- Subject (of a king)

For Control Video

From the following, which are the requirements to be an eligible voter?

- Aged 17 or above
- TIs not mentally ill
- Is not a member of the Indonesian army
- All of the above

When was the first democratic election held in Indonesia?

- 1945
- 1955
- 1965
- 1975

Pre- and Post-Election Survey: Political Question (PQ)

For Both Video in the Pre-Election Survey

Can voters punish the political leaders if they are not doing a satisfactory job?

- Yes, because political leaders are supposed to be held responsible to the voters
- No, because political leaders are more powerful than voters
- No, because voters supposed to follow their leader
- Yes, because political leaders are not allowed to run more than once

Whose needs should the political leadership pay most attention to?

- Voters
- The leaders themselves
- Religious leaders
- Experts (economist, medical professional)

Conjoint (CON)


Pre- and Post-Election Survey:

In the next section, you will be asked to choose between one of two legislative candidates for a state legislature (DPR RI). These candidates are only hypothetical, but their characteristics (e.g. age, gender, occupational background, etc.) are drawn from the actual pool of candidates running in the 2019 election. There will be 15 total pairs to choose from.

Conjoint Game

Pre- and Post-Election Survey:

If the legislative elections were held today, which legislative candidate would you choose from the two options below?



Parliament Member Characters (DPR)

Pre- and Post-Election Survey:

Next, we would like to know what characteristics are important for a member of the House of Representatives (DPR). On the next screen, you will see four pairs of characteristics. Please select which trait you think is more important for a DPR RI member to have.

- Competence/Education/Ability
- Both are equally important
- Have the same religion/ethnicity
- Competence/Education/Ability
- Both are equally important
- Track record of corruption/intergity
- Competence/Education/Ability
- Both are equally important
- Material wealth
- Competence/Education/Ability
- Both are equally important
- Policies to be implemented

I.2 Bahasa Indonesia

Pengantar

Anda diundang untuk mengikuti survei mengenai politik dan urusan publik.

Survei Pre-Pemilu: Survei ini memakan waktu sekitar 8 menit. Jika terpilih, Anda akan ditunjukkan sebuah video edukasi politik selama satu menit dan akan diminta menjawab beberapa pertanyaan terkait materi video dan pendapat pribadi Anda tentang politik.

Survei Pasca-Pemilu: Survei ini memakan waktu sekitar 10 menit. Anda akan diminta menjawab beberapa pertanyaan terkait pendapat pribadi Anda tentang politik.

Partisipasi Anda bersifat sukarela, Anda dapat berhenti mengisi survei kapan saja atau melewati pertanyaan apa pun tanpa sanksi. Anda akan mendapatkan poin hadiah dari JakPat untuk partisipasi Anda. Selain itu, kami berharap hasil survei ini akan berkontribusi terhadap wawasan kita mengenai sikap politik di negeri ini.

Survei ini bersifat anonim. Peneliti tidak akan mengetahui nama Anda, dan respons Anda tidak akan dihubungkan terhadap informasi pribadi Anda. Survei ini hanya digunakan untuk keperluan akademik dan bukan untuk kepentingan lain. Tolong isi survei dengan jujur sesuai pilihan Anda

- Saya menyatakan bahwa saya berumur 17 tahun ke atas dan setuju untuk berpartisipasi
- Saya tidak setuju untuk berpartisipasi

*(Apabila "Saya tidak setuju untuk berpartisipasi" dipilih)*Apakah Anda yakin tidak ingin melanjutkan kuesioner? Jika Anda tidak melanjutkan kuesioner, Anda tidak akan mendapatkan poin dari JakPat. Untuk melanjutkan, silakan konfirmasi usia dan kesediaan Anda:

- Saya menyatakan bahwa saya berumur 17 tahun ke atas dan setuju untuk berpartisipasi
- Tidak, saya tidak ingin melanjutkan mengerjakan kuesioner

Sebelum memulai survei, harap klik box dibawah ini

- Saya bukan robot *[Captcha]*

Kualitas data survei ini sangat penting bagi kami. Untuk mengukur pendapat Anda dengan akurat, mohon jawab setiap pertanyaan dalam survei ini dengan cermat dan teliti.

Apakah Anda berkomitmen untuk menjawab pertanyaan - pertanyaan dalam survei ini dengan cermat dan teliti?

- Ya, saya berkomitmen
- Tidak, saya tidak berkomitmen

Demografi (DG)

Survei Pre-Pemilu: Di provinsi dan kota/kabupaten mana **Anda akan mencoblos** pada kegiatan Pemilu mendatang?

- Provinsi: *[Dropdown]*
- *Kabupaten/Kota: [Dropdown]*

Survei Pasca-Pemilu: Di provinsi dan kota/kabupaten mana **Anda mencoblos** pada kegiatan Pemilu

beberapa hari lalu?

- Provinsi: *[Dropdown]*
- *Kabupaten/Kota: [Dropdown]*

Pendapat dan Pilihan Pada Pemilu (PP)

Survei Pre-Pemilu:

Menurut Anda, apakah mencoblos saat Pemilu merupakan kewajiban, pilihan, atau bukan keduanya?

- Kewajiban
- Pilihan
- Bukan Kewajiban dan Bukan Pilihan

(Apabila "Kewajiban" dipilih) Seberapa kuat pendapat Anda bahwa mencoblos saat Pemilu merupakan kewajiban?

- Sangat Kuat
- Lumayan Kuat
- Tidak Kuat

Apakah Anda berniat untuk mencoblos pada Pemilu mendatang?

- Ya
- Tidak

Siapa yang Anda akan pilih pada Pemilu presiden mendatang?

- Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar
- Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD
- Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming
- Tidak berniat memilih pada Pemilu mendatang
- Tidak tahu

Caleg dari partai apa yang Anda akan pilih sebagai anggota DPR RI pada Pemilu yang akan datang?

- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)
- Partai GOLKAR
- Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem)
- Partai Buruh
- Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia (Gelora)
- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

- Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara (PKN)
- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)
- Partai Garda Republik Indonesia (Garudua)
- Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
- Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)
- Partai Demokrat
- Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI)
- Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo)
- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)
- Tidak berniat memilih pada Pemilu mendatang
- Tidak tahu

Survei Pasca-Pemilu:

Apakah Anda ikut mencoblos pada Pemilu beberapa hari lalu?

- Ya
- Tidak

Siapa yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu presiden beberapa hari lalu?

- Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar
- Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD
- Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming
- Tidak memilih pada Pemilu beberapa hari yang lalu

(Apabila "Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming" dipilih) Apa alasan utama Anda memilih Paslon yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu beberapa hari yang lalu?

- Saya/keluarga selalu mendukung Prabowo Subianto
- Karena ingin memastikan keberlanjutan program pemerintah sekarang
- Karena mereka didukung partai favorit saya
- Saya memilih Paslon yang diprediksi akan menang
- Karena mendukung Gibran Rakabuming Raka
- Alasan lain, tolong tuliskan di bawah ini

(Apabila "Anies Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar" dipilih) Apa alasan utama Anda memilih Paslon yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu beberapa hari yang lalu?

- Saya/keluarga selalu mendukung Anies Baswedan
- Karena menginginkan perubahan

- Karena mereka didukung partai favorit saya
- Saya mendukung kubu yang dianggap lemah
- Karena mendukung Muhaimin Iskandar
- Alasan lain, tolong tuliskan di bawah ini

(Apabila "Ganjar Pranowo – Mahfud MD" dipilih) Apa alasan utama Anda memilih Paslon yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu beberapa hari yang lalu?

- Saya/keluarga selalu mendukung Ganjar Pranowo
- Karena ingin memastikan keberlanjutan program pemerintah sekarang
- Karena mereka didukung partai favorit saya
- Saya mendukung kubu yang dianggap lemah
- Karena mendukung Mahfud MD
- Alasan lain, tolong tuliskan di bawah ini

Caleg dari partai apa yang Anda pilih sebagai anggota DPR RI pada Pemilu beberapa hari lalu?

- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)
- Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)
- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)
- Partai GOLKAR
- Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem)
- Partai Buruh
- Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia (Gelora)
- Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
- Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara (PKN)
- Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)
- Partai Garda Republik Indonesia (Garudua)
- Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
- Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)
- Partai Demokrat
- Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI)
- Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo)
- Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)
- Tidak berniat memilih pada Pemilu mendatang
- Tidak tahu

Mengapa Anda memilih Caleg DPR RI yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu beberapa hari yang lalu?

- Karena suka partai pengusungnya, walaupun tidak terlalu mengenal Caleg nya
- Karena kualitas Caleg yang baik, walaupun kurang simpati dengan partai pengusung
- Karena kualitas Caleg dan partai pengusung dua-duanya baik
- Karena mengikuti pilihan keluarga atau teman/kolega
- Alasan lain, tolong tuliskan di bawah ini

Siapa yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu presiden tahun 2019 silam?

- Joko Widodo – Ma'ruf Amin
- Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno
- Tidak memilih pada Pemilu 2019 silam
- Tidak ingat

Siapa yang Anda pilih pada Pemilu presiden tahun 2014 silam?

- Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla
- Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa
- Tidak memilih pada Pemilu 2014 silam
- Tidak ingat


Pemahaman Mengenai Pemilu (KP)

Survei Pre- dan Pasca-Pemilu:

Anggota masyarakat memiliki pola berpikir yang berbeda. Selanjutnya, kami ingin mengetahui pola berpikir Anda melalui beberapa permainan. Di bagian ini, Anda akan mencocokkan benda dan aktivitas menurut kategori yang menurut Anda benar.

Dari tiga benda di sebelah kiri, terdapat satu benda yang mirip dengan benda di tiap kotak kanan.


Pindahkan (seret dan lepas) satu benda dari kotak kiri ke setiap kotak kanan yang sesuai. (hanya ada satu benda yang benar di setiap kotak di sebelah kanan)



Sama seperti sebelumnya, kami minta tolong Anda **mencocokkan satu benda di kotak kiri dengan kategori di kotak kanan yang menurut Anda paling cocok.**



Sama seperti sebelumnya, kami minta tolong Anda **mencocokkan satu benda di kotak kiri dengan kategori di kotak kanan yang menurut Anda paling cocok.**



Treatment Video (VID_T) dan Control Video (VID_C)

Hanya Survei Pre-Pemilu:

Selanjutnya, kami akan menunjukkan sebuah video informasi mengenai Pemilu berdasarkan teori ilmu politik. **Harap tonton video ini sampai selesai karena Anda akan diminta menjawab beberapa pertanyaan mengenai isi dari video ini.**

Responden dimohon TIDAK KELUAR dari aplikasi dan TIDAK MEMATIKAN handphone ketika video berjalan, mohon klik tombol selanjutnya ketika video telah selesai

[Treatment/Control Video Here]

Kualitas data survei ini sangat penting bagi kami. Mohon jawab pertanyaan berikut dengan cermat dan teliti.

Untuk Treatment Video:

Siapakah perumpamaan **pemilik** toko (pemberi amanat) pada cerita video di atas?

- Raja
- Caleg
- Pemilih
- Rakyat Jelata

Siapakah perumpamaan **pegawai** toko (penerima amanat) pada cerita video di atas?

- Caleg
- Bos
- Pemilih
- Rakyat Jelata

Untuk Control Video:

Dari bawah ini, manakah yang merupakan syarat pemilih?

- Berumur 17 tahun ke atas
- Tidak memiliki gangguan mental
- Tidak merupakan anggota TNI
- Semua Benar

Kapan Pemilu pertama kali dilaksanakan di Indonesia?

- 1945
- 1955
- 1965
- 1975

Survei Pre- dan Pasca-Pemilu: Political Question (PQ) Untuk Kedua Video di Survei Pre-Pemilu

Apakah pemilih dapat menghukum pemimpin politik jika mereka tidak melakukan pekerjaannya dengan baik?

- Iya, karena pemimpin politik harus bertanggung jawab terhadap masyarakat
- Tidak, karena pemimpin politik memiliki kekuasaan yang lebih tinggi dari masyarakat
- Tidak, karena masyarakat harus patuh pada pemimpin politik
- Iya, karena Caleg tidak boleh maju lebih dari sekali

Kepentingan siapa yang harus diutamakan oleh pemimpin politik?

- Kepentingan masyarakat
- Kepentingan pemimpin politik itu sendiri
- Kepentingan pemuka agama
- Kepentingan para ahli (ekonom, dokter, dll)

Conjoint (CON)

Survei Pre- dan Pasca-Pemilu: Selanjutnya, Anda diminta memilih satu dari dua Caleg untuk DPR RI. Profil calon berikut hanyalah replika, akan tetapi, karakteristik (umur, gender, mata pencaharian, dll.) calon merupakan representasi dari kandidat yang maju di Pemilu 2019. Akan ada lima belas pasangan yang akan Anda pilih.

Conjoint Game

Survei Pre- dan Pasca-Pemilu:

Jika Pemilu legislative dilaksanakan hari ini, Caleg manakah yang akan Anda pilih dari dua pilihan di bawah ini?

Calon 1	
Jenis Kelamin	Perempuan
Umur	51
Agama	Buddha
Daerah Asal/Suku	Batak
Pendidikan	S1
Status Pernikahan	Menikah
Profesi	Pengusaha
Posisi Kandidat Terhadap Isu	
Melindungi hak dan kewajiban tenaga kerja lokal di daerah	
Rekam Jejak Isu	
Meningkatkan pembinaan dan pendampingan UMKM untuk menggejot perekonomian daerah	

Calon 2	
Jenis Kelamin	Laki-laki
Umur	28
Agama	Islam
Daerah Asal/Suku	Minang
Pendidikan	D4
Status Pernikahan	Menikah
Profesi	Tenaga Pengajar
Posisi Kandidat Terhadap Isu	
Menjamin hak kebebasan berpendapat dan berekspresi dalam ruang lingkup digital, termasuk dalam mengkritik kinerja pejabat publik	
Rekam Jejak Isu	
Terlibat dalam kasus penyuapan izin usaha	

Karakter Anggota DPR (DPR)

Survei Pre- dan Pasca-Pemilu:

Selanjutnya, kami ingin mengetahui karakter apa yang penting dimiliki anggota DPR. Pada layar selanjutnya, akan ditunjukkan empat pasang karakter. Pilih sifat manakah yang lebih penting menurut Anda untuk menjadi anggota DPR RI

- Kompetensi/Pendidikan/Kemampuan
- Dua duanya sama penting
- Memiliki Agama/Suku Yang Sama
- Kompetensi/Pendidikan/Kemampuan
- Dua duanya sama penting
- Jejak Korupsi/Integritas
- Kompetensi/Pendidikan/Kemampuan
- Dua duanya sama penting
- Kekayaan Material
- Kompetensi/Pendidikan/Kemampuan
- Dua duanya sama penting
- Kebijakan yang akan diterapkan

J Distribution of ethnicity by province

Distribution of ethnicity by province

Province	Ethnicity	Status	Probability (%)
Bengkulu	Sumatera	Titular ethnic	50
Bengkulu	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Bengkulu	South Sumatera	Native non-titular	10
Bengkulu	Minang	Native non-titular	10
Bengkulu	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
Bengkulu	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Lampung	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
Lampung	Lampung	Native non-titular	10
Lampung	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
Lampung	South Sumatera	Native non-titular	10
Lampung	Banten	Native non-titular	10
Lampung	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Riau Islands	Melayu	Titular ethnic	50
Riau Islands	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Riau Islands	Batak	Native non-titular	10
Riau Islands	Minang	Native non-titular	10
Riau Islands	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
Riau Islands	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Bangka Belitung	Sumatera	Titular ethnic	50
Bangka Belitung	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Bangka Belitung	South Sumatera	Native non-titular	10
Bangka Belitung	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Bangka Belitung	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
Bangka Belitung	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
DKI Jakarta	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
DKI Jakarta	Betawi	Native non-titular	10
DKI Jakarta	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
DKI Jakarta	Batak	Native non-titular	10
DKI Jakarta	Minang	Native non-titular	10
DKI Jakarta	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
West Java	Sunda	Titular ethnic	50
West Java	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
West Java	Betawi	Native non-titular	10
West Java	Cirebon	Native non-titular	10
West Java	Batak	Native non-titular	10
West Java	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Central Java	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
Central Java	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
Central Java	Batak	Native non-titular	10
Central Java	Asing	Native non-titular	10
Central Java	Madura	Native non-titular	10
Central Java	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10

Province	Ethnicity	Status	Probability (%)
D I Yogyakarta	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
D I Yogyakarta	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
D I Yogyakarta	Melayu	Native non-titular	10
D I Yogyakarta	Batak	Native non-titular	10
D I Yogyakarta	Madura	Native non-titular	10
D I Yogyakarta	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
East Java	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
East Java	Madura	Native non-titular	10
East Java	Batak	Native non-titular	10
East Java	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
East Java	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
East Java	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Banten	Banten	Titular ethnic	50
Banten	Sunda	Native non-titular	10
Banten	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Banten	Betawi	Native non-titular	10
Banten	Batak	Native non-titular	10
Banten	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Bali	Bali	Titular ethnic	50
Bali	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Bali	Madura	Native non-titular	10
Bali	Melayu	Native non-titular	10
Bali	Sasak	Native non-titular	10
Bali	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
NTB	Sasak	Titular ethnic	50
NTB	NTB	Native non-titular	10
NTB	Bali	Native non-titular	10
NTB	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
NTB	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
NTB	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
NTT	NTT	Titular ethnic	50
NTT	Kalimantan	Native non-titular	10
NTT	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
NTT	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
NTT	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
NTT	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
West Kalimantan	Dayak	Titular ethnic	50
West Kalimantan	Melayu	Native non-titular	10
West Kalimantan	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
West Kalimantan	Madura	Native non-titular	10
West Kalimantan	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
West Kalimantan	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10

Province	Ethnicity	Status	Probability (%)
Central Kalimantan	Kalimantan	Titular ethnic	50
Central Kalimantan	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Central Kalimantan	Banjar	Native non-titular	10
Central Kalimantan	Dayak	Native non-titular	10
Central Kalimantan	Melayu	Native non-titular	10
Central Kalimantan	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
South Kalimantan	Banjar	Titular ethnic	50
South Kalimantan	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
South Kalimantan	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
South Kalimantan	Dayak	Native non-titular	10
South Kalimantan	Madura	Native non-titular	10
South Kalimantan	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
East Kalimantan	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
East Kalimantan	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
East Kalimantan	Kalimantan	Native non-titular	10
East Kalimantan	Banjar	Native non-titular	10
East Kalimantan	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
East Kalimantan	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
North Kalimantan	Javanese	Titular ethnic	50
North Kalimantan	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
North Kalimantan	Kalimantan	Native non-titular	10
North Kalimantan	Banjar	Native non-titular	10
North Kalimantan	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
North Kalimantan	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
North Sulawesi	Minahasa	Titular ethnic	50
North Sulawesi	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
North Sulawesi	Gorontalo	Native non-titular	10
North Sulawesi	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
North Sulawesi	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
North Sulawesi	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Central Sulawesi	Sulawesi	Titular ethnic	50
Central Sulawesi	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Central Sulawesi	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Central Sulawesi	Bali	Native non-titular	10
Central Sulawesi	Gorontalo	Native non-titular	10
Central Sulawesi	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10

Province	Ethnicity	Status	Probability (%)
South Sulawesi	Bugis	Titular ethnic	50
South Sulawesi	Makassar	Native non-titular	10
South Sulawesi	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
South Sulawesi	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
South Sulawesi	NTT	Native non-titular	10
South Sulawesi	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Southeast Sulawesi	Sulawesi	Titular ethnic	50
Southeast Sulawesi	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Southeast Sulawesi	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Southeast Sulawesi	Makassar	Native non-titular	10
Southeast Sulawesi	Bali	Native non-titular	10
Southeast Sulawesi	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Gorontalo	Gorontalo	Titular ethnic	50
Gorontalo	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
Gorontalo	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Gorontalo	Minahasa	Native non-titular	10
Gorontalo	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Gorontalo	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
West Sulawesi	Sulawesi	Titular ethnic	50
West Sulawesi	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
West Sulawesi	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
West Sulawesi	Makassar	Native non-titular	10
West Sulawesi	Bali	Native non-titular	10
West Sulawesi	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Maluku	Maluku	Titular ethnic	50
Maluku	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
Maluku	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Maluku	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Maluku	NTT	Native non-titular	10
Maluku	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
North Maluku	Maluku	Titular ethnic	50
North Maluku	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
North Maluku	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
North Maluku	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
North Maluku	Minahasa	Native non-titular	10
North Maluku	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10

Province	Ethnicity	Status	Probability (%)
West Papua	Papua	Titular ethnic	50
West Papua	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
West Papua	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
West Papua	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
West Papua	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
West Papua	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Papua	Papua	Titular ethnic	50
Papua	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Papua	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
Papua	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Papua	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
Papua	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Central Papua	Papua	Titular ethnic	50
Central Papua	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Central Papua	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
Central Papua	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Central Papua	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
Central Papua	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
South Papua	Papua	Titular ethnic	50
South Papua	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
South Papua	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
South Papua	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
South Papua	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
South Papua	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Highland Papua	Papua	Titular ethnic	50
Highland Papua	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Highland Papua	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
Highland Papua	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Highland Papua	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
Highland Papua	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10
Southwest Papua	Papua	Titular ethnic	50
Southwest Papua	Javanese	Native non-titular	10
Southwest Papua	Sulawesi	Native non-titular	10
Southwest Papua	Bugis	Native non-titular	10
Southwest Papua	Maluku	Native non-titular	10
Southwest Papua	Chinese	Chinese non-titular	10