Lean In or Shy Away? Workers' Responses to Gender Pay Gap Transparency*

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Abstract

This study examines the effects of gender pay gap transparency on workplace recommendations, beliefs about labor market experiences, wage negotiation, and job applications. I first present survey evidence showing that, across workplace contexts, jobs with a transparent gender pay gap are less likely to be recommended to women and are expected to offer them worse pay, promotion prospects, and workplace treatment. In addition, I design an experiment to test workers' willingness to ask for higher pay when pay gap information is either provided or withheld. I find that there is no substantial gender gap when such information is absent, but a significant gap emerges when it is made transparent. Specifically, women are much less likely than men to request higher wages when they learn that prior interactions with their counterpart resulted in outcomes favoring men. This highlights an unintended consequence of pay gap transparency: rather than encouraging women to negotiate, it discourages them, widening the gender gap in asking for higher wages. However, this effect disappears when workers face conditions that remove concerns about rejection or gender discrimination. In another part of the experiment, I also examine behavioral responses at the job application margin and find that women are similarly less likely to apply for jobs when the associated pay gap is made transparent, leading to increased gender imbalance in both applications submitted and jobs accepted.

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1 Introduction

Gender inequality in the labor market remains a persistent challenge, with women consistently earning less than men across many industries and occupations (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010; Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn, 2017). In recent years, salary transparency has emerged as a promising policy tool to address these inequalities (Cullen, 2024; Roussille, 2024). Transparency policies aim to reduce information asymmetries, hold discriminatory firms accountable for pay disparities, and empower lower-paid groups to take corrective actions by revealing pay differences. A well-known historical example is Lilly Ledbetter, whose discovery of pay inequality led to the landmark Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, marking a significant step toward combating systemic gender discrimination. Workers seem to be interested in learning about the gender pay gap as well.[1]

It can be tempting to infer from these facts that greater transparency in salaries would help disadvantaged workers negotiate for higher pay. Indeed, recognizing the potential of pay transparency, many countries have adopted policies mandating the disclosure of gender pay gaps. Among OECD countries, 21 out of 38 now require private-sector firms to report pay disparities (OECD, 2023). The advocacy for these policies is predicated on the belief that transparency will encourage action to reduce gender inequality, particularly by employers but possibly also by employees. However, while transparency is often viewed as a tool to empower women and other disadvantaged groups, its actual effects on behavior remain underexplored. Specifically, does gender pay transparency encourage female workers to ask for higher pay? In light of substantial gender differences in negotiation behavior (Babcock and Laschever, 2009; Dittrich, Knabe and Leipold, 2014; Leibbrandt and List, 2015; Card, Cardoso and Kline, 2016; Cortés et al., 2024), can gender pay gap transparency help mitigate the gender gap in negotiation outcomes?

To investigate this question, I first present evidence from a survey-based study examining workers' responses to pay gap information across a broad set of labor market contexts. In the *Job Recommendation Survey*, Prolific participants evaluate workplaces described in vignettes and make recommendations on whether female and male workers should work

[1] As revealed by the *Job Recommendation Survey* in this study, 74% of individuals express interest in learning about gender pay gaps in workplaces, yet only 24% have encountered such information during job searches.

there. Each vignette describes an establishment, occupation, or industry, and respondents are randomly assigned to receive either general workplace information or additional disclosure of the workplace's gender pay gap. The survey also measures respondents' own willingness to work at the given workplace and their beliefs about female workers' labor market experiences relative to male workers.

The survey reveals several key findings regarding workers' responses to gender pay gap transparency. When a gender pay gap favoring men is disclosed, recommendations for female workers to work at the workplace significantly decrease, and female respondents become less willing to work there themselves. Additionally, beliefs about female workers' treatment worsen: the share who think women are more likely to be promoted falls from 25% to just 5%; 40 percentage points more believe women face gender barriers; and 51 percentage points more believe women are paid less for the same work. Interestingly, when a workplace is revealed to have no gender pay gap, this information alleviates concerns that women are more likely to face unfavorable conditions. Similar patterns hold in an additional undergraduate sample recruited from the University of Michigan.

To further investigate the impact of gender pay gap transparency on wage negotiation and job application behavior, I also design a controlled lab experiment. The experiment involves workers and evaluators, in which workers make a series of wage negotiation and job application decisions under exogenously varied conditions of gender gap transparency. Workers, who are the primary focus of the study, begin by completing an incentivized math and science test to assess their performance. They then provide self-evaluations of their performance, such as their belief about the number of correct answers out of ten, without knowing their actual scores. Finally, workers decide whether to ask for higher wages and submit job applications under risk, in a setting akin to an ultimatum game, where the matched evaluator has the power to accept or reject proposed wages and job applications. In total, 1060 participants are recruited on Prolific for the experiments.

For wage negotiation decisions, workers choose either to accept a guaranteed fixed payment of \$1 without interacting with the evaluator or to propose a higher wage between \$1.50 and \$3.00 from the total revenue, which depends on their true performance. Before making their decisions, workers are informed that the evaluator will see the worker's self-evaluation of performance and gender (revealed through a gender-representative name). The remainder of the total revenue, net of the proposed wage, will go to the evaluator if the proposal is

accepted. If the evaluator rejects the proposal, both parties earn nothing.

The main experiment is conducted in the *Main Worker Study*, where workers initially make wage negotiation decisions without knowing the earnings gaps of prior workers when matched with the evaluator (the no-information condition).[2] Subsequently, they are matched with evaluators under different transparency conditions in random order: scenarios revealing gender gaps favoring men (where men earned more in prior interactions), favoring women (where women earned more), or showing zero gap. The gender gaps are presented at two levels—10% and 20%—intentionally selected from the earnings gap distribution, allowing for an analysis of how both the type and magnitude of the gap influence workers' behavior. Each worker makes a total of 24 wage negotiation decisions, providing within-subject variations to study responses to pay transparency.

The experiment uncovers several interesting results on wage negotiations. When earnings gaps favoring men are revealed, women are significantly less likely to propose higher wages, effectively "shying away" rather than "leaning in." In contrast, men are encouraged by such information, resulting in a gender gap in wage negotiations that is three times larger than before. On the other hand, when pay gaps favoring women are shown, women are clearly encouraged and more likely to ask for higher wages, while men's behavior changes very little. This reverses the gender gap in requests for higher wages compared to the no-information condition, but the gender difference is not significantly different from zero in either case. Furthermore, the larger the revealed earnings gap in absolute terms, the greater the gender differences in requests for higher wages. This effect is especially pronounced when the gap favors men—the gender gap in requests for higher wages increases from 11 percentage points to 17 percentage points as the earnings gap widens from 10% to 20%. This finding suggests that both the type of information—whether it favors men or women—and the extent of the disclosed gap play a role in influencing workers' responses.

What drives the pattern observed in the *Main Worker Study*? The potential loss from negotiations may arise in the form of backlash, which is often more salient for women (Bowles, Babcock and Lai, 2007; Tinsley et al., 2009; Amanatullah and Morris, 2010; Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013). In this experiment, where the interaction between the worker and evaluator

[2] A baseline group of workers is recruited to decide whether to negotiate with the evaluator by proposing a higher wage without any information about the matched evaluator. Following this, a distribution of gender earnings gap is realized after matching baseline workers with evaluators, forming the basis for drawing earnings gap information.

is a one-time event that results in either acceptance or rejection of the proposal, negative repercussions may show up as a higher chance of rejection when women try to negotiate. If a gender earnings gap favoring the opposite gender increases women's fear of rejection by the evaluator, while having no similar effect on men, this could explain the observed pattern. Under these conditions, women may become less likely to propose higher wages, whereas men remain unaffected.

To examine whether fear of rejection plays a role in responses to gender gap transparency, the experiment incorporates a *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study*, where all requested wages are guaranteed to be accepted by the evaluator. This design also eliminates the influence of risk aversion, which has known gender differences (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Kagel and Roth, 2016), on wage negotiation decisions. This version of the study yields two main findings. First, participants are significantly more likely to ask for higher wages, showing that they respond to changes in the negotiation setting. Second, when the possibility of rejection is removed, men and women propose higher wages at similar rates, even when an earnings gap favoring men is revealed. Taken together, the findings from the *Main Worker Study* suggest that making the gender earnings gap transparent may amplify gender differences in requests for higher wages. However, when there is no risk of rejection in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study*, women are just as likely as men to negotiate for higher pay.

Admittedly, pay transparency may affect not only wage-asking decisions but also whether workers choose to engage with a given employer. To examine this, I also study how workers respond on the job application margin, where the experimental design closely parallels the wage negotiation decisions. Workers' responses in job applications reveal that when an earnings gap favoring men is revealed, women become significantly less likely to apply for the job, further widening gender differences compared to the no-information condition. Men are also less inclined to apply for jobs where the earnings gap favors women. In short, gender pay gap transparency appears to influence workers' job preferences, leading them to favor opportunities that benefit their own gender. As men and women gravitate toward jobs where their gender is advantaged, future research could further examine how such behavior contributes to gender segregation in the labor market.

In summary, these findings highlight a factor that may hinder the intended impact of pay gap transparency: rather than empowering female workers to negotiate or pursue op-

portunities, it makes them less likely to ask for higher wages when there is a possibility of an adverse response from their counterparts. Survey results suggest that disclosing a gender pay gap can influence stated job preferences, expectations about labor market experiences, and anticipated employer behavior—potentially serving as a negative signal associated with gender discrimination, thereby further exacerbating gender disparities in asking for higher wages.

I contribute to two strands of the literature. First, there is a related body of literature documenting workers' responses to unequal payment. For example, Card et al. (2012), Breza, Kaur and Shamdasani (2018), and Gagnon, Bosmans and Riedl (2022) show that unequal payment can reduce worker morale and lead to a decline in labor supply. Similarly, unequal payment has been shown to negatively impact worker productivity, as demonstrated by findings from Gächter and Thöni (2010), Cohn et al. (2015), and Ockenfels, Sliwka and Werner (2015). By examining the decision to ask for higher pay, this paper complements existing studies and provides further insights into how making pay disparities transparent affects wages workers ask for. Moreover, by showing how perceived discrimination affects behavior, this paper contributes to a nascent but expanding literature on anticipated discrimination (Gagnon, Bosmans and Riedl, 2022; Koutout, 2022; Ugalde, 2022; Exley et al., 2024; Lepage, Li and Zafar, 2025), highlighting how concerns about bias shape women's perceptions and responses.

This paper also contributes to the growing literature on the effects of pay transparency, as recently reviewed by Cullen (2024). Most of the existing literature has focused on evaluating pay transparency policies using quasi-random variations, such as firm size cutoffs for reporting requirements across various countries (Böheim and Gust, 2021; Bennedsen et al., 2022; Blundell et al., 2025). These studies often find small or negligible effects, typically driven by reductions in men's pay growth. This paper points towards the importance of considering worker-side responses, particularly when they counteract the policy's goal of reducing gender inequality, potentially diluting the intended effects of pay transparency. If workers respond in ways that inadvertently reinforce disparities—for example, if women are less likely to engage in negotiations—then the overall equilibrium effects of transparency policies may be attenuated, even if employers adjust their behavior in response to the transparency requirements.

Taken together, this paper provides novel insights into the unintended consequences of

transparency initiatives and has important implications for policymakers. While pay transparency is well-intended to reduce gender inequality in the labor market, the unintended behavioral responses of workers could inadvertently reinforce or exacerbate existing inequalities.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the design and results of the *Job Recommendation Survey*; Section 3 outlines the design for negotiation and job application experiments; Section 4 presents the main results from the experiments; Section 5 discusses robustness and heterogeneities; and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Job Recommendation Survey

To examine how workers respond to information on pay gaps across a wide range of contexts, I collect data through the *Job Recommendation Survey*. In the following subsections, I first describe the survey design and then present the key findings. Lastly, I discuss the robustness of the results across different measures and contexts.

2.1 Survey Design

The survey is designed to examine how individuals respond to gender pay gap information across various workplace settings, including firms, industries, and specific job contexts.[3] The primary responses of interest are (1) *job preferences* and (2) *beliefs about labor market experiences and returns*. To study these responses, I employ vignettes, where each vignette describes a specific workplace, followed by a series of related questions.

The vignettes vary in terms of the context in which gender pay gap information is disclosed, and they also exogenously vary in whether the gap is disclosed. The gender pay gap can be favoring men, indicating that men, on average, earn more than women, or zero, signifying equal pay.

The pay gap information is collected from establishments' reports or official statistics. The establishment-specific gender pay gap includes 10 cases: five with a gender pay gap

[3] A growing body of research uses surveys to understand people's responses to and perceptions of policy, highlighting that survey-elicited attitudes are correlated with real-world behavior (see the review in Stantcheva (2020)).

favoring men and five with zero gender pay gap. The names of the establishments are represented by randomly assigned letters A–J. The occupation-specific gender pay gap consists of two cases based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: one representing an occupation with a gender pay gap favoring men (financial clerks) and the other with equal pay (chemical engineers). Similarly, the industry-specific gender pay gap includes two cases, with one favoring men (the finance and insurance industry) and one with zero gender pay gap (the arts, entertainment, and recreation industry).

For each workplace, the survey presents a pair of vignettes: one scenario with gender pay gap information and another without it. In the no information scenario (hereafter referred to as the "No Info" case), participants are shown only general information about the workplace, such as the number of employees, primary services, and organizational goals. In the pay gap information scenario (hereafter referred to as the "Info" case), gender pay gap details about the workplace are added below the general workplace description (see Appendix Figure C.1). Specifically, the gender pay gap is conveyed in the format: "On average, women earn $X for every $1 earned by men," which is a common way workplaces report the gender pay gap in many countries with gender pay gap transparency policies. In total, participants are presented with 28 vignettes—14 pairs of workplace contexts—each with two cases: one with gender pay gap information and one without. The full list of vignettes is provided in Appendix Table C.1. The vignettes are presented in a randomized order. This design allows for within-subject analyses, comparing responses when gender pay gap information is revealed versus when it is not, while holding all other aspects of the workplace constant.

For each vignette, participants are asked to consider two identical workers who differ only by gender and to answer two sets of questions. In the first set, participants make binary recommendations on whether the female and male workers should work at the given workplace and indicate their own willingness to work there (Appendix Figure C.2).[4] In the second set, participants provide their beliefs about female workers' labor market experiences and expected returns relative to male workers (Appendix Figure C.3). Specifically, they report their beliefs on whether women are more likely to be paid less for the same work, to be promoted first, or to face gender-related barriers in the workplace after seeing the introduction about the firm, sometimes with the gender pay gap revealed and sometimes

[4]To test the robustness of the results to measurement differences, I also include a percent chance scale for the recommendation decision regarding female workers.

without.

Finally, after going through the vignettes, participants answer follow-up questions about their general beliefs regarding the implications of the gender pay gap, their interest in gender pay gap information, and their demographic characteristics. A total of 303 participants are recruited via Prolific and compensated at a rate of $3 for completing the 15-minute survey.

2.2 Results


2.2.1 Workplace Recommendations and Willingness to Work by Gender Pay Gap Disclosure

First, I present results from the vignettes. As shown in panel (a) of Figure 1, the share of respondents who recommend a female worker declines significantly—from 88% in the "No Info" condition to 26% when a gender pay gap favoring men is disclosed. In contrast, the share recommending a male worker decreases only slightly, from 93% under the "No Info" condition to 80% when the gap is revealed. On the other hand, when a zero gender pay gap is revealed, the fraction of respondents recommending female and male workers both increases to approximately 97%. Appendix Table A.1 provides additional summary statistics. Similar patterns emerge when considering respondents' own willingness to work for the firm, as shown in panel (b): When a gender pay gap favoring men is revealed, the fraction of female respondents who would like to work for the firm drops significantly from 60% to only 9%. These results suggest that job preferences increase for workplaces with equal gender pay, whereas a gender pay gap favoring men suppresses them; in both cases, the effect is significantly stronger for women than for men. Directionally, the changes in workplace recommendations in response to the revealed gender pay gap persist when restricting the analysis to either female or male respondents, though the effects are significantly larger among female respondents (Figure A.1).


Figure 1: Workplace Recommendations for Female and Male Workers and Own Willingness to Work

(a) Recommendations for Female and Male Workers by Gender Pay Gap Type and Its Disclosure Status

(a1) Gender Pay Gap Favoring Men




(a2) Zero Gender Pay Gap




(b) Respondents' Willingness to Work by Gender Pay Gap Type and Its Disclosure Status

(b1) Gender Pay Gap Favoring Men



(b2) Zero Gender Pay Gap




Notes: This figure displays the proportion of respondents who recommend female and male workers for each vignette workplace, categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed during the recommendation process (panel (a)) and respondents' own willingness to work in the workplace by gender (panel (b)). Panels (a1) and (b1) focus on workplaces with a gender pay gap where men outearn women; Panels (a2) and (b2) focus on workplaces with no gender pay gap. Solid bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts per panel from 303 participants.

2.2.2 Beliefs about Labor Market Experiences and Gender Pay Gap Disclosure

Additional questions in the *Job Recommendation Survey* show that respondents' beliefs about workers' labor market experiences are also significantly influenced by the knowledge of the gender pay gap. In Figure 2, when a gender pay gap favoring men is revealed, compared

to the "No Info" case, there is a substantial increase in respondents who believe that women are more likely to be in unfavorable situations relative to men. Specifically, the fraction of respondents who believe that, relative to men, women are more likely to be promoted first decreases significantly from 25%, an already low level, to 5%. Additionally, 40 percentage points more respondents believe that women are more likely to face gender barriers, and 51 percentage points more respondents think that women are more likely to be paid less for doing the same work (see Appendix Table A.2 for additional summary statistics).

Figure 2: Beliefs about Labor Market Experiences by Presence of a Gender Pay Gap



Notes: This figure shows the fraction of respondents, categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed, who agree with the statement: "Among workers at this firm, relative to men, do you think women are more likely to..." Panel (a) shows the fraction agreeing with "be promoted first." Panel (b) shows the fraction agreeing with "face gender-related barriers at the workplace." Panel (c) highlights "be paid less for doing the same work." Solid bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts per panel from 303 participants.

Interestingly, when a workplace is revealed to have no gender pay gap, this information alleviates respondents' worry that women are more likely to be in an unfavorable situation. The fraction of respondents who believe that women are more likely to be promoted increases from 25% to 41%, while the fraction who think women are more likely to face gender barriers decreases from 48% to 30%, and the fraction believing that women are more likely to be paid less decreases from 40% to 10%. Appendix Figure A.2 further splits the respondents by gender. Again, the impact of the gender pay gap is present for both female and male respondents, but female respondents hold more negative views about female workers' labor market experience when a gender pay gap favoring men is revealed.

2.3 Discussion

The robustness of the results presented in subsection 2.2 is further examined using survey design features, variations in vignette contexts, and an additional undergraduate student sample (see Appendix A for more details). I also use open-ended responses to further examine how respondents process the information about the gender pay gap.

Do the Results Persist with Ordering Effects, Across-Subject Variations, and Percent Chance Scales in Questions?

I address potential ordering effects by leveraging across-subject variations and restricting the analysis to the first vignette shown to each respondent, which helps mitigate recall and experimenter demand effects (panel (a) in Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4). I also test the robustness of the results using questions framed in percent chance scales (Appendix Figure A.3). The results remain consistent, showing that a gender pay gap favoring men significantly reduces recommendations for female workers and female respondents' willingness to work at the associate workplace.

Do the Results Persist with Different Types of Gaps: Conditional on the Same Position, Specific Firms, Occupations, and Industries?

I further split the results by different types of pay gaps (e.g., establishment-specific, industry-specific, occupation-specific, and position-specific contexts). The findings hold consistently: a gender pay gap favoring men continues to lower job recommendations and reinforces beliefs about women's disadvantage in the labor market (Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4).

Do the Results Persist with the Undergraduate Sample?

I recruit an additional sample of 303 senior students from the University of Michigan in June 2025 to examine the robustness of the sample choice. I find significant reductions in job recommendations for female workers and more pessimistic beliefs about women's treatment in the labor market when gender pay gaps favoring men are disclosed. These results demonstrate that the findings hold both in the general sample and among undergraduate seniors who are about to enter the labor market (Appendix Figures A.4 and A.5).

Do the Results Persist with Open-Ended Responses?

While results from the vignettes clearly show the sizable impact of revealing gender pay gap information on job preferences and beliefs about labor market experiences, I further

examine how respondents process this information by presenting additional evidence based on open-ended responses.

In the survey, respondents are explicitly asked about their perceived implications of the gender pay gap without being provided any specific reasoning in an open-ended response question. Notably, over 70% explicitly mention some notion of discrimination or differential treatment against women. See Appendix Table A.5 for example responses. Similarly, when asked to what extent they agree with several possible implications of a gender pay gap favoring men in response to the following question: "In general, consider a scenario where you know a firm, on average, pays men more than women. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?" The statement "This firm is gender-biased and discriminates against women." receives the highest average level of agreement, as shown in Appendix Figure A.6, with 43% of respondents selecting "strongly agree" and 33% selecting "somewhat agree."

Respondents also believe that the gender pay gap has direct behavioral implications for employer decision-making. In one question, respondents are asked: "If this gap is calculated based on workers in the same job position at this firm, and both a female worker and a male worker initiate the same wage proposal, whose proposal do you think is more likely to be accepted?" Strikingly, 93% of respondents choose the male worker.

Taken together, the survey reveals that when a gender pay gap favoring men is made transparent, it significantly influences workers' responses. It reduces women's willingness to work at the workplace and makes respondents less likely to recommend it to women, while also substantially worsening perceptions of women's labor market experiences. The transparency of a gender pay gap may therefore inadvertently signal disadvantage, shaping beliefs about employers, and potentially influencing subsequent wage negotiation and job application behavior.

3 Design for Negotiation and Job Application Experiments

To further examine the impact of gender pay gap transparency on wage negotiation and job application behavior, I design a controlled lab experiment detailed below.

3.1 Design Overview

The experimental design involves two main types of participants, "workers" and "evaluators," and two independent types of decisions initiated by workers: negotiation regarding wage proposals and applications for jobs. Specifically, workers decide whether to negotiate by proposing higher wages and submitting job applications under circumstances where the gender earnings gap of previous workers, after negotiation or application with the evaluator, is either revealed or not. Evaluators decide whether to accept or reject wage proposals and job applications. Workers complete the decisions for wage negotiation and job applications in separate parts sequentially. The design for workers' job applications largely overlaps with the wage negotiation process. In the following subsections 3.2-3.3, I introduce the design details of the *Worker Study*. Subsection 3.4 introduces the *Evaluator Study*. Following this, subsection 3.5 briefly details the recruitment and implementation processes. In total, 1060 participants are recruited on Prolific.

3.2 The Main Worker Study

The *Main Worker Study* proceeds as follows: each participant completes a math and science test, provides responses to self-evaluation questions about their test performance without knowing the true performance, decides whether to negotiate with an evaluator by asking for a higher wage, and then decides whether to apply for a job associated with an evaluator. More specifically, the main version has three parts followed by a short survey, described in order below. See Appendix D for screenshots and additional details.

1. *Part 1: Performance and Self-evaluations.* In part 1 of the study, participants are asked to take a test comprised of 10 multiple-choice questions. They have up to 30 seconds to answer each question. Given the gender gaps that motivate this study and the fact that gender gaps are often more prevalent in stereotypically male-typed tasks, I select questions related to math and science. Specifically, questions are selected from the following four categories in the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR): Letter and Number Series, Matrix Reasoning, Three-Dimensional Rotation, and Verbal Reasoning (see Appendix Figure D.1 for an example). ICAR is a public-domain assessment tool widely used in psychology and other social sciences to assess cognitive abilities (Dworak et al., 2021), and

participants are told that performance on this test is often used as a measure of cognitive ability by academic researchers. If part 1 is randomly selected for payment, a participant's bonus payment is equal to 10 cents times the number of questions answered correctly.

Then, participants are asked questions about their performance on the test without knowing their actual performance. Each question measures workers' self-evaluations regarding their absolute performance (the number of questions they get right on the test), their relative performance (whether and what percent chance their test performance is in the top half among all workers), or their subjective performance (e.g., the extent to which they agree with the statement, "I performed well on the test").[5]

Workers are incentivized in the following ways: they are informed in advance that their self-evaluation responses may be used in subsequent parts of the study. Their responses are not incentivized for accuracy, as the precision of their beliefs is not central to the study's design. Instead, workers face strategic incentives, as their responses influence the evaluators' decisions detailed later in subsection 3.4.[6]

2. *Part 2: Wage Negotiations.* In part 2 of the study, a worker makes a series of decisions about whether to negotiate with an evaluator by proposing higher wages. The transparency of the gender earnings gap among prior workers matched with this evaluator is exogenously varied.

Participants are informed that if part 2 is randomly selected for payment and they choose to negotiate with the evaluator, one of the wage proposals will be matched with the evaluator. The evaluator will only be provided with one of the self-evaluations answered in part 1 without knowing the worker's true performance, and the worker's gender will be indicated by one of the top 5 popular names of each gender as the "representative name."[7] As in part 1, the actual performance in the test is not revealed to the workers when they make the wage proposal decisions in part 2.

[5] I include different types of self-evaluations—absolute, relative, and subjective—since they have been used in prior research and are relevant in many contexts beyond the experimental setting, ensuring robustness in measurement and external validity.

[6] If self-evaluation questions are asked twice, and one of the two is incentivized for accuracy, participants may provide similar responses across both instances to maintain consistency. This behavior could undermine the intended purpose of the incentives.

[7] The gender-representative names used are Mary, Jennifer, Linda, Elizabeth, and Patricia for women, and John, James, Robert, Michael, and David for men.

Participants have two options: receive a guaranteed $1 payment directly or negotiate with an evaluator by asking for a wage (W) higher than $1. The proposed wage is drawn from the total revenue, which equals $5 plus 50 cents for each question answered correctly, and can be accepted or rejected by the evaluator.

Wage proposal decisions are made in $0.50 increments, ranging from $1.50 to $3.00, allowing for potential heterogeneity as wages increase. If a worker chooses not to engage with the evaluator, they receive a guaranteed $1. If a worker chooses to negotiate and their wage proposal is rejected by an evaluator, neither the worker nor the evaluator will earn anything. If a worker's wage proposal is accepted by an evaluator, the worker will earn the proposed wage (W), which is higher than the guaranteed payment. The evaluator's profit will equal total revenue ($5 + 0.5 × worker's score) minus the wage (W) paid to the participant. The risky negotiation process can be viewed as akin to an ultimatum setting, where prior literature (Tisserand, 2014) shows that about half of the participants tend to reject offers below 30–40% of the total amount, with fairness concerns being a common reason for rejection.[8]

To investigate how transparency about gender earnings gap information affects workers' negotiation responses, I vary the information treatment provided to workers before their negotiation decisions. After a brief review of the negotiation process and payment rules, workers first make negotiation decisions without any information about the gender earnings gap among prior workers, which I refer to as the no-information condition. Subsequently, I introduce information about the gender earnings gap as typical outcomes from prior negotiations with certain evaluators, presented in a random order with variations of gaps favoring men (women) by 10%, 20%, or gender-neutral with zero gap.[9][10] In total, each worker makes 24 (6 sets of information × 4 wage levels) negotiation decisions, comprising one set of decisions without information and five sets of decisions with varying earnings gap information,

[8]Consistent with the literature, the average rejection rate for wage proposals in the *Evaluator Study* is 34%.

[9]I introduce the gender pay gap in the following way (10% as illustration): "Prior negotiation with the evaluator in this scenario, on average, resulted in women earning $0.90 for every $1 that men earn. Consequently, women's average wage is 10% LOWER than men's."

[10]Note that the realized distribution of the gender earnings gap associated with the evaluators can have a wider range and various values depending on the workers matched with them. In the study, I recruit a group of baseline workers to match with evaluators who complete the *Evaluator Study* (detailed later) and use the realized distribution as the basis for drawing earnings gap information.

across four different wage proposals.

3. *Part 3: Job Applications and Follow-up Survey.* In part 3 of the study, participants make decisions on job applications, following the same process as in part 2, except for payment rules described in detail below.

For each job working with an evaluator, workers make job application decisions across three levels of wages (W) offered by the evaluator: \$2, \$2.5, and \$3. If a worker chooses not to apply for the job, they receive a guaranteed \$1. If a worker chooses to apply for the job but is not hired by the evaluator, the worker's wage (W) will be \$0 while the evaluator's profit will equal \$1. Conversely, if the worker is hired by the evaluator, they earn the wage (W) offered by the evaluator (ranging from \$2 to \$3.5, all higher than the guaranteed \$1 payment), and the evaluator's profit will be 0.5 times the worker's score. Similar to part 2 wage negotiations, participants first make job application choices without information about the evaluator and then make decisions with information about the prior gender earnings gap with the evaluator, where the information treatment follows a random order.

Finally, I collect demographic information on participants, including gender, as well as attitudes towards gendered issues and pay gap policy in the workplace.

3.3 The Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study

To understand the mechanisms underlying the gender differences in response to prior gender earnings gap information documented in the *Main Worker Study*, additional data were collected over 2 waves in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study*.

Given gender differences in fear of backlash or risk aversion (Bowles, Babcock and Lai, 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Kagel and Roth, 2016), I specially investigate how the fear of adverse behavioral repercussions, including rejections, may influence workers' responses to gender earnings gap information differently by gender.

The *Guaranteed Acceptance* version follows the same structure as the *Main* version, except that parts 2 (wage negotiation) and 3 (job application) are repeated twice before moving to the next part. In one of these repetitions, the negotiation and job application processes take place under a guaranteed outcome scenario, where the possibility of rejection by the matched evaluator is removed. This setup aligns with the dictator game framework.

I conducted the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study* twice: in one instance, the guaranteed outcome scenario occurred first, followed by the scenario where rejection was possible (as described in the *Main Worker Study* in subsection 3.2); in the other, the order was reversed. This design enables the examination of the role of fear of rejection by comparing workers' responses in the presence and absence of the possibility of rejection. Additionally, reversing the order of the two studies enables testing the robustness of potential game ordering effects.

3.4 The Evaluator Study

The *Evaluator Study* consists of two main parts, each assessing wage proposals and job applications from workers, corresponding to those described in subsection 3.2. As mentioned in the *Worker Study*, only one of the self-evaluations and the gender-representative names are disclosed when evaluators make their decisions. To obtain a full decision function for each evaluator, every possible combination of the worker's gender and self-evaluation is presented in each part. For each combination, evaluators face a price-list-style decision screen (see Appendix Figure D.4 for details), where possible wage proposals are displayed in ascending order. Rejection decisions are restricted to a linear switch—if a smaller proposal is rejected, all larger proposals must also be rejected. Additionally, evaluators are randomized into one of three self-evaluation measures—detailed in subsection 3.2—when assessing workers' responses: objective, subjective, or relative. One of the matched wage proposals or job applications will be implemented for the evaluator's payment, in addition to a fixed payment of $5 for a 25-minute study.

3.5 Implementation and Recruitment Details

A total of 900 participants are recruited from Prolific to participate in the *Main Worker Study* and the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study*. Table 1 reports the number of participants in each study across different waves of data collection, presented separately for negotiation responses and job application responses.[11] Each participant is guaranteed a completion fee plus a possible bonus payment from one randomly selected part of the study. In all of the

[11]To be eligible for this study, participants need to have completed at least 100 prior submissions on Prolific with an approval rating of 95% or greater and choose the United States as their residence. Also, since I recruit a gender balanced sample, participants must have selected either Male or Female for their sex on the Prolific platform—although I use their self-identified gender from the follow-up survey.

studies, participants receive ample instructions and are required to answer understanding questions before proceeding to the main parts of the study[12].

For the *Main Worker Study* in wave 1, 303 participants complete the study. After excluding 11 participants who neither identify as men nor women due to insufficient power to consider this group, as well as 5 participants who prefer not to disclose their gender, the final sample consists of 287 workers. Following the same criteria, 285 and 292 participants are included in the analysis for the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study* from waves 2 and 3.

Table 1: Study Versions by Wave

	Baseline	**Baseline**	**Main**	**Guaranteed Acceptance**	**Main**	**Guaranteed Acceptance**
	Negotiation	**Job Application**	**Negotiation**	**Negotiation**	**Job Application**	**Job Application**
Preparation	N= 100	N= 100				
Wave 1			N= 287		N= 287	
Wave 2			N= 285	N= 285	N= 285	N= 285
Wave 3			N= 292	N= 292	N= 292	N= 292

Notes: Data are collected in April 2024 for wave 1, May 2024 for wave 2, and June 2024 for wave 3. Each wave aims to recruit 300 participants.

In addition to the data described, 60 participants are recruited to complete the *Evaluator Study*. Another 100 workers are recruited to be matched with evaluators to generate the gender earnings gap used in the information treatment for the *Worker Study*. These 100 workers make wage negotiation decisions in part 2 and job application decisions in part 3 without any information about the potential evaluator; in other words, their decisions are made under the no-information condition, which I refer to as the *Baseline* version of the *Worker Study*.

[12]Participants have two attempts before the correct answer with explanations is revealed.

4 Experimental Results

4.1 Wage Negotiation in the *Main Worker Study*


In the *Main Worker Study*, workers first make a wage proposal decision without any information about the earnings gap among prior workers matched with the evaluator. They then make a series of wage proposal decisions after the gender earnings gap is revealed. In this section, I pool wage negotiation responses at each wage proposal level in figures and tables. A robustness check, further holding wage proposal levels constant, will be discussed in Section 5, showing that the results persist across different wage proposal levels. Panel (a) of Figure 3 presents raw wage asking responses by worker gender under the no-information condition, as well as conditions where the revealed gap is neutral (zero), favors men (pooling the 10% and 20% levels), or favors women (pooling the 10% and 20% levels).

Under the no-information condition, there is no substantial gender gap (4 percentage points). When workers are informed that there is no gap, this small gender gap persists (3 percentage points). Surprisingly, when a gap favoring men—where men, on average, earn more than women—is revealed, women become significantly less likely to propose higher wages, while men increase theirs. This response exacerbates the gender gap in requests for higher wages by 10 percentage points, making it three times larger than before. Finally, the gender difference in asking for higher wages reverses when a gap favoring women is revealed.

Panel (b) of Figure 3 plots the gender gap in requests for higher wages across information treatments. A clear pattern emerges: as the revealed earnings gap widens in absolute terms, gender differences in requests for higher wages grow. This suggests that both the type and magnitude of the disclosed gap influence workers' responses. Specifically, the gender gap in requests for higher wages increases from 11 to 17 percentage points as the earnings gap favoring men rises from 10% to 20%—a much larger change than the corresponding shift when the gap favors women.

Table 2 further analyzes the statistical significance of gender gaps in asking for higher wages, controlling for performance using fixed effects for each possible test score (0 to 10). This approach controls for potential ability differences in the test across genders by comparing between equally performing men and women. Columns (1) and (6) present results under the no-information and zero gap conditions, respectively. In both cases, the gender gap is

Figure 3: Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages Across Information Treatment



Notes: This figure illustrates gender differences in asking for higher wages across information treatment using data collected in wave 1 of the *Main Worker Study*. Panel (a) presents responses by the type of information, pooling data for gaps favoring men or women at both the 10% and 20% levels. Panel (b) displays responses for each specific piece of information. The gender gap in asking rates is calculated as the difference between men's and women's rates of asking for higher wages (men - women).

statistically insignificant. Columns (2) and (3) confirm the large and significant negative coefficients when gaps favoring men at the 10% and 20% levels are revealed. Specifically, holding performance constant, revealing a prior earnings gap suggesting women earn \$0.9 (\$0.8) for every \$1 earned by men results in a 10 percentage points (16 percentage points) gender gap in asking for higher wages. In contrast, Columns (4) and (5) present results for earnings gaps favoring women at the 10% and 20% levels. Although the coefficients for women are positive in these cases, they are not statistically significant after controlling for performance with fixed effects. Appendix Table B.1 replicates a similar pattern in workers' responses using data collected in waves 2-3 under the same scenario as the *Main Worker Study*, where rejection is possible.[13]

Table 2 also compares the coefficient for "Female" across the no-information condition and the information-revealing conditions for each treatment by reporting the p-values of pairwise testing. Compared to the no-information condition, gaps favoring men at the 10% and 20% levels further increase the gender gap in asking for higher wages by 7 percentage points and 14 percentage points, respectively, and these increases are statistically significant.

[13]Note that for wave 2, in the scenario where rejection is possible, as in the *Main Worker Study*, the gender gap favoring men or women is only at the 10% level.

Table 2: Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages Across Information Treatment

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.025	-0.099**	-0.163***	0.044	0.070	-0.007
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148
P(F)	0.463	0.437	0.400	0.517	0.545	0.497
P(M)	0.500	0.545	0.575	0.490	0.493	0.528
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.142	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.070
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.023	0.001	0.567	0.724	0.176
P-value	.	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.499

Notes: This table presents results for each specific information treatment based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation responses collected in wave 1. P(F) and P(M) show the rates of asking for higher wages for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ P(F): P-value" and "Δ P(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in asking rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). "Female" is an indicator variable for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Conversely, gaps favoring women at the 10% and 20% levels reverse the gender gap in wage negotiation relative to the no-information condition by a significant change of 6 percentage points and 9 percentage points. Finally, the gender gap remains largely unchanged under the zero-gap condition compared to the no-information condition.

4.2 Wage Negotiation in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study*

One hypothesis for why an earnings gap favoring men causes women to shy away from asking for higher wages—thereby widening the gender gap in requests for higher wages—while an earnings gap favoring women does not discourage men, could be related to gender differences in fear of negative repercussion or risk aversion. By "negative repercussion," I refer to potential adverse actions taken by evaluators in response to a worker's request for higher

wages. Specifically, observing a prior earnings gap favoring the opposite gender may increase women's fear of rejection, whereas men may remain unaffected.

Table 3: Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Study*

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	0.049	-0.027	-0.035	0.045	0.057	0.062
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
P(F)	0.668	0.650	0.647	0.729	0.753	0.747
P(M)	0.680	0.736	0.731	0.739	0.745	0.741
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.504	0.407	0.006	0.001	0.001
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.038	0.050	0.010	0.006	0.005
P-value	.	0.051	0.025	0.904	0.827	0.702

Notes: This table reports results for each specific information treatment under the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation responses collected in wave 3. P(F) and P(M) show the rates of asking for higher wages for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ P(F): P-value" and "Δ P(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in asking rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

To examine the role of fear of negative repercussion, the *Guaranteed Acceptance Worker Study*—detailed in subsection 3.3—removes the possibility of rejection. Table 3 presents workers' responses in a regression framework. First, comparing the mean rates of asking for higher wages with Table 2, we observe a substantial increase when the possibility of rejection is eliminated, indicating that participants are responsive to changes in the negotiation environment. Under the no-information condition, the asking rate for women increases from 48% to 67%, and for men from 50% to 68%. Next, as shown in panel (a), once the possibility of rejection is removed, across Columns (1) through (6), men and women propose higher wages at similar rates, even when an earnings gap favoring men is revealed. In addition to the gender gap in asking for higher wages no longer being statistically different from zero,

the gap also becomes significantly smaller.[14] Appendix Table B.3 presents similar results using data collected in wave 2, where the scenario with the possibility of rejection is shown to participants first, rather than the guaranteed outcome scenario.

Taken together, these experimental results highlight an important unintended consequence of the transparency of the gender earnings gap: revealing an earnings gap favoring men may discourage women while encouraging men, ultimately widening gender disparities in asking for higher wages significantly. Eliminating the role of fear of rejection or adverse responses cancels the significant gender difference in asking for higher wages even when a gender earnings gap favoring men is revealed, underscoring the impact of rejection possibility on workers' responses. Related, if workers cannot avoid the fear of rejection in contexts of interest, then future research may naturally examine whether the gender gap in wage negotiation persists, as suggested by the insights from this experiment.

4.3 Results for Job Applications

In part 4 of the experiment, workers also make decisions regarding whether to apply for jobs associated with evaluators, with the understanding that these job applications may be accepted or rejected. Do workers' responses in this context mirror their behavior in the wage negotiation decisions? Figure B.1 illustrates the application rates across four conditions: when no information about prior earnings gaps is provided, when no gender earnings gap exists, when the gap favors men, and when the gap favors women. Panel (a) reveals that an earnings gap favoring men widens the gender gap in application rates by 13.6 percentage points, while information favoring women reverses this trend, reducing the gender gap by 12.6 percentage points. Panel (b) further disaggregates the gender gap in application rates by specific levels of the earnings gap, revealing that the gender gap in applications widens as the magnitude of the earnings gap increases. This suggests that not only the type of information but also the size of the gap influences job application behavior in a similar way as in wage negotiation decisions.

Table 4 further controls for score fixed effects in a regression framework and presents

[14]Further comparisons between *Main* scenario and the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario in panel (b) of Table B.2 reveal that under both the no-information condition and the condition with a pay gap favoring men, gender differences in wage negotiation directionally shrink—and in most cases significantly—when the fear of rejection is mitigated.

Table 4: Gender Differences in Job Applications by Information Treatment


	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.042	-0.143***	-0.220***	0.048	0.099*	-0.053
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	861	861	861	861	861	861
A(F)	0.483	0.371	0.331	0.503	0.548	0.499
A(M)	0.549	0.535	0.572	0.470	0.461	0.572
Δ A(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.000	0.142	0.001	0.290
Δ A(M): P-value	.	0.496	0.302	0.004	0.002	0.215
P-value	.	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.776

Notes: This table presents results for each specific information treatment based on OLS regressions of job application responses collected in wave 1. A(F) and A(M) show the job application rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ A(F): P-value" and "Δ A(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in job application rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). "Female" is an indicator variable for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.


similar results while comparing equally performing men and women. These findings are consistent across data collected in three experimental waves, as replicated in Appendix Table B.1. Taken together, the results indicate that transparent information about the gender pay gap influences job application behavior as well. Similarly, this effect is particularly strong for women—they are more (less) likely to apply for jobs associated with evaluators when the earnings gap favors women (men). Symmetrically, in this context, men are also less inclined to apply for jobs where their gender is at a disadvantage. These behavioral responses lead to increased gender imbalance in both job applications submitted to evaluators and jobs accepted by evaluators, as shown in Figure 4. The fraction of applications from women decreases from 47% to 38% when a gender gap favoring men is revealed, compared to the no-information condition, while the fraction conditional on being hired by an evaluator drops even further to around 33%.

Figure 4: Consequences of Gender Differences in Job Applications

(a) Fraction of Job Applications from Women



(b) Fraction of Hired Female Applicants



Notes: This figure shows the fraction of job applications submitted by women in panel (a), and the fraction of female workers among job applications accepted by evaluators after matching each application with all evaluators in panel (b), under each information treatment.

Table B.4 presents the job application responses in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Study*. Consistent with the findings from the wage negotiation part, removing the possibility of rejection effectively closes the gender gap in job application rates when the earnings gap favoring men is disclosed. This result highlights the critical role of fear of negative repercussions in shaping workers' responses to gender pay gap transparency across different behavioral margins.

5 Discussion

In this section, I present additional analyses of the experiments, focusing on robustness and heterogeneity. I refer to the following as the main results: while there is little to no gender difference in asking for higher wages in the absence of information, a significant gender gap in wage requests emerges when an earnings gap favoring men is made transparent. I then discuss heterogeneous effects by examining differences across wage proposal levels and by splitting the sample based on ability, confidence, gender attitudes, and labor market experience.

5.1 Are the Main Results Robust to Different Waves?

The experiment's *Main Worker Study* is replicated across three waves, and workers' responses to the gender earnings gap remain consistent across all three waves as shown in Appendix Table B.1. The pooled raw results, showing a similar pattern for gender differences in responses under each piece of information, are displayed in panel (b) of Appendix Table B.5. I then use the pooled data for the following robustness checks and heterogeneity analysis.

5.2 Are the Main Results Robust to Different Controls?

Appendix Table B.5 panel (a) includes controls for score fixed effects and compares responses among equally performing men and women. Consistent with the main findings detailed in Section 4, an earnings gap favoring men significantly exacerbates gender differences in wage negotiation by discouraging women and encouraging men to propose higher wages. Conversely, an earnings gap favoring women eliminates the male advantage and even reverses the gap, leading women to be more likely to ask for higher wages, without discouraging men from doing so.

Further robustness checks using the pooled data confirm that the treatment effect of information on requests for higher wages is robust to a variety of additional controls. Panel (c) of Appendix Table B.5 examines the results while further controlling for wage proposal levels, which are discretized into each category ranging from \$1.50 to \$3.00. Panel (d) further incorporates controls for demographic characteristics, providing additional validation for the stability of the findings.

5.3 Do the Main Results Persist Across Wage Proposal Levels?

In Section 4, I pool the main results across wage proposal levels from \$1.50 to \$3. Appendix Table B.6 further breaks down the results by each proposal level, showing consistency with the main findings. Notably, the average rate of requesting higher wages increases with the wage proposal level, with the increase being more pronounced for men. This leads to a widening gender gap under the no-information condition, as shown in Column (1) across panels.

5.4 Do the Main Results Persist Across Ability Differences Among Workers?

One might expect that lower-ability workers may respond differently by gender compared to higher-ability workers. To explore this further, I split the performance scores at the median (5) and conduct the analysis separately for below-median and above-median performance samples. Although the average rate of asking for higher wages is significantly higher among participants with above-median performance, a similar pattern to that observed in the main results emerges in both subsamples, as shown in Appendix Table B.7.[15]

5.5 Do the Main Results Persist with Gender Differences in Confidence?

Recall that when workers make wage negotiation decisions, their true performance is not revealed. A well-documented finding in the literature is the gender confidence gap (Lundeberg, Fox and Punćcohaŕ, 1994; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle, 2016; Bordalo et al., 2019; Exley and Kessler, 2022), which is also evident in this experimental setting, as shown in panel (b) of Figure B.2: women report lower self-evaluations compared to men, by an average of 1.5 points out of 10.[16] One might expect that individuals with different levels of confidence are influenced differently by new information regarding prior gender earnings gaps. To examine this possibility, Appendix Table B.8 explores the differences between underconfident workers (who report lower self-evaluations than their true performance) and overconfident workers (who report higher self-evaluations than their true performance). The main results persist in these two subsamples for underconfidence in panel (a) and overcon-

[15] If anything, among workers performing above the median, there is no significant gender gap in requests for higher wages when no information is provided. However, when an earnings gap favoring men is introduced, women are less likely to request higher wages, increasing the gender gap in negotiation to 9 and 17 percentage points in Columns (2) and (3). For the low-ability subsample, a gender gap of 6 percentage points already exists. Introducing an earnings gap favoring men further exacerbates this disparity by incentivizing low-ability men and deterring low-ability women, increasing the gap to 13 and 15 percentage points in Columns (2) and (3).

[16] Similarly, the gender gap in self-evaluations using subjective and relative measures is 16% in agreeing with "I did well on the test" and 17% in the believed probability of being in the top half among all participants.

fidence in panel (b).[17] In fact, when a pay gap favoring men is revealed, the gender gap in asking for higher wages is larger among overconfident workers than among underconfident workers.

5.6 Do the Main Results Persist with Differences in Gender Attitudes?

When a non-zero earnings gap is revealed, whether workers "act on" this information may depend on how seriously they perceive the gap as unjust. For instance, a worker who believes that men are inherently better workers than women may not feel compelled to address a gap favoring men by proposing higher wages for disadvantaged women. To explore this possibility, a follow-up survey conducted after the main experiment includes several questions about gender attitudes.[18] Based on these responses, workers are categorized as holding "traditional gender norms" if they agree with at least one statement that favors men. The analysis in Appendix Table B.9 splits the sample by this categorization. The main results persist in both panel (a) and panel (b) for workers who hold "traditional gender norms" and those who do not.

5.7 Do the Main Results Persist Across Participants' Different Labor Market Experiences?

There are several reasons to expect that personal experience in the labor market, particularly regarding gender inequality, may influence workers' responses to the gender earnings gap in the experiment. The direction of the impact, however, may vary. For instance, experiencing gender inequality in one's own workplace might motivate someone to fight for equality when an opportunity arises. Conversely, such experiences could also demoralize individuals, reducing their incentives to "lean in" due to prior negative encounters with gender inequality.

[17] The results also remain robust when including fixed effects of self-evaluations, holding workers' beliefs about their performance constant.

[18] The questions are as follows: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1) "When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women." (2) "On the whole, men make better business executives than women do." Response options range from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7).

The following two sets of analyses provide suggestive evidence that workers' responses are systematically correlated with their actual labor market experiences and beliefs.

First, I split the sample based on participants' self-reported employment status, as shown in Appendix Table B.10. Interestingly, employed female participants are significantly more responsive to the earnings gap favoring men. As a result, while there is no gender gap under the no-information condition among employed workers in Column (1) of panel (a), revealing a pay gap favoring men increases the gender gap in asking for higher wages to 10–16 percentage points in Columns (2) and (3).

Second, I split the sample based on whether participants report believing there is a gender gap in their own workplace in Appendix Table B.11. Consistent with the employment status findings, workers who hold the beliefs that men earn more at their workplace are substantially more sensitive to information revealing an earnings gap favoring men.[19] While the gender gap is not statistically different from zero under the no-information condition in either panel, the gap in requests for higher wages—when a pay gap favoring men is made transparent—is nearly 50% larger among participants who believe that men earn more at their workplace.

6 Conclusion

This study examines the effects of gender pay gap transparency on workplace recommendations, beliefs about labor market experiences, wage negotiation, and job applications. While transparency policies are often designed to empower disadvantaged groups—particularly women—to promote equity, the findings suggest that they may also lead to unintended consequences that counteract these goals. When earnings gaps favoring men are disclosed, women become less likely to negotiate, creating gender disparities in asking for higher pay that are not present when the information is absent. In contrast, when earnings gaps favor women, women are more likely to propose a higher wage without significantly deterring men. The pattern that women also shy away from job applications when gaps favoring men are disclosed further underscores the need for caution in implementing transparency policies. Given that gender pay gaps are typically larger in higher-wage workplaces and roles, such

[19] In fact, the responses are especially pronounced among male workers—those who believe there is a pay gap favors men at their workplace are also more encouraged to ask for higher wages (by 10 percentage points).

disclosures may further discourage women from pursuing more lucrative opportunities.[20]

The survey study not only highlights the broad applicability of these findings—showing that workers respond to gender pay gaps consistently across different contexts, in line with results from the controlled experiment—but also sheds light on why transparency affects workers' responses. Disclosing a gender pay gap influences job preferences, expectations about labor market experiences, and anticipated employer behavior. As a result, when there is a possibility of an adverse employer response—such as rejecting wage proposals from women—female workers may become less likely to ask for higher wages, exacerbating the gender gap in wage negotiation.

These findings raise important questions for future research. First, if gender pay gap transparency leads to disparities in requests for higher wages, what types of information are most effective in mitigating them? One alternative may be to provide additional information about the underlying sources of any revealed pay gaps.[21] Second, how do employers respond to pay transparency? Given workers' reactions, it is crucial to understand whether employers anticipate these effects and whether they adjust their hiring and wage-setting practices accordingly, as suggested by Exley and Nielsen (2024).

A well-intended policy may have unintended consequences. By providing novel empirical evidence on workers' responses, this study contributes to the broader effort of designing policies that effectively address labor market inequalities and foster more equitable workplaces.

[20]For example, evidence shows that gender pay gaps are substantially larger in high-paying occupations and at the top of the overall wage distribution, compared to those in lower-paying occupations or among low earners (Gould, 2024; UK House of Commons Library, 2024).

[21]Recent work finds that informing women about the gender gap in competition entry as a nudge can increase their willingness to compete, as shown in Pink et al. (2025).

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A Additional Results from the Survey

In this section, I further discuss the robustness of the results shown in subsections 2.2.1-2.2.2 by taking advantage of survey design, variations in vignette contexts, and an additional undergraduate student sample.

Does the Result Persist with Ordering Effects, Across-Subject Variations, and Percent Chance Scales in Questions? The design detailed in subsection 2.1 not only provides within-subject variations to analyze the effect of revealing gender pay gap information but also allows for testing the ordering effect and assessing the robustness of the results using across-subject variations. Since the vignettes are shown in random order, I restrict the analysis to responses from the very first vignette shown to each respondent, where some are randomized to see gender pay gap information while others only see general workplace information. This approach mitigates potential ordering effects that could arise if respondents remember the gender pay gap information for certain establishment when the randomization causes the "Info" case to appear earlier than the "No Info" case, as well as experimenter demand effects that could arise in within-subject variations. Panel (a) of Appendix Table A.3 confirms the robustness of the results, showing a similar pattern when using across-subject variations and eliminating the ordering effect: a gender pay gap favoring men leads to a significant reduction of 69 percentage points in the fraction of respondents who recommend female workers to work there and a 70 percentage point reduction in female respondents who would like to work there.

Moreover, as mentioned in subsection 2.1, another version of the question regarding work recommendations for female workers is presented using a percent chance scale. The results persist, as shown in subsection 2.2.1, with the likelihood of recommending a female worker for a workplace significantly decreasing from 69% to 34% when a gender pay gap favoring men is revealed and increasing from 70% to 82% when a zero gender pay gap is revealed (Appendix Figure A.3).

Does the Result Persist with Different Types of Gaps: Conditional on the Same Position, Specific Firms, Occupations, and Industries? Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 presents the impact of revealing gender pay gap information on job preferences and be-

liefs about labor market experience by each type of gap (when the gap is position-specific, as shown in "Among supervisors at firm G, on average, women earn $X for every $1 earned by men.") and across different contexts, including firm-specific, occupation-specific, industry-specific, and even restricted to tech firms, manufacturing firms, pharmaceutical firms, and public institutions. Across all cases, the results remain robust: a gender pay gap favoring men consistently reduces the fraction of respondents recommending women to work at the workplace and lowers female respondents' willingness to work there. Additionally, it consistently leads more respondents to believe that women have a worse labor market experience relative to men. This confirms that workers' responses to gender pay gap information hold across broader contexts, aligning with the findings from the experiment.


Does the Result Persist with the Undergraduate Sample? I recruit an additional sample of 303 senior students from the University of Michigan in June 2025 to examine the robustness of the sample choice.[22] The survey follows exactly the same structure and content described in subsection 2.1 (see question screenshots in Appendix C), except that the incentives are adjusted to appropriate levels for the undergraduate population. Each participant receives a $10 Amazon gift card for completing the study.

I find that when gender pay gaps favoring men are disclosed, job recommendations for female workers decrease significantly, and perceptions of women's treatment in the labor market worsen (Appendix Figures A.4 and A.5). These results demonstrate that the findings hold both in the general sample and among undergraduate seniors who are about to enter the labor market. Undergraduate students seem to hold even more pessimistic views about women's labor market experiences regardless of whether gender pay gap information is revealed. For example, fewer than 20% of students believe that women are more likely to be promoted under "No Info," and revealing that there is no gender gap in pay increases that fraction only to about 20%, compared to about 40% in Figure 2.

[22] I invite 4,000 randomly selected seniors to participate and close the survey once I reach the predetermined cutoff of 300 students, allowing in-progress surveys to be completed. This results in a final sample of 303 students.


A.1 Appendix Figures

Figure A.1: Workplace Recommendations for Female and Male Workers by Presence of a Gender Pay Gap and Gender of Respondents




Notes: This figure displays the proportion of female and male respondents who recommend female and male workers for each vignette workplace. Recommendations are categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed during the recommendation process, as shown in panels (a) and (b), respectively. Panels (a1) and (b1) focus on workplaces with a gender pay gap where men outearn women, while panels (a2) and (b2) focus on workplaces with no gender pay gap. Solid bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts per panel from 303 participants.

Figure A.2: Beliefs About Labor Market Experiences by Presence of a Gender Pay Gap and Gender of Respondents



Notes: This figure shows the fraction of female and male respondents, categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed, who agree with the statement: "Among workers at this firm, relative to men, do you think women are more likely to..." Panel (a) displays responses from female respondents, while panel (b) displays responses from male respondents. Panel (a1) and (b1) show the fraction agreeing with "be promoted first." Panel (a2) and (b2) show the fraction agreeing with "face gender-related barriers at the workplace." Panel (a3) and (b3) highlight "be paid less for doing the same work." Solid bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts per panel from 303 participants.

Figure A.3: Workplace Recommendations for Female Workers by Presence of a Gender Pay Gap




Notes: This figure shows the distribution of respondents' reported likelihood (in percentages) of recommending female workers for each vignette workplace. Recommendations are categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed in workplaces with either a favoring men gap or a zero gender pay gap. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts for each pay gap category from 303 participants. The dashed line represents the sample mean.

Figure A.4: Workplace Recommendations for Female and Male Workers and Own Willingness to Work, Undergraduate Sample

(a) Recommendations for Female and Male Workers by Gender Pay Gap Type and Its Disclosure Status

(a1) Gender Pay Gap Favoring Men


(a2) Zero Gender Pay Gap



(b) Respondents' Willingness to Work by Gender Pay Gap Type and Its Disclosure Status


(b1) Gender Pay Gap Favoring Men

(b2) Zero Gender Pay Gap




Notes: This figure displays the proportion of respondents who recommend female and male workers for each vignette workplace, categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed during the recommendation process (panel (a)) and respondents' own willingness to work in the workplace by gender (panel (b)), using the undergraduate student sample. Panels (a1) and (b1) focus on workplaces with a gender pay gap where men outearn women; Panels (a2) and (b2) focus on workplaces with no gender pay gap. Solid bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts per panel from 303 participants.

Figure A.5: Beliefs about Labor Market Experiences by Presence of a Gender Pay Gap, Undergraduate Sample



Notes: This figure shows the fraction of respondents from the undergraduate student sample, categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed, who agree with the statement: "Among workers at this firm, relative to men, do you think women are more likely to..." Panel (a) shows the fraction agreeing with "be promoted first." Panel (b) shows the fraction agreeing with "face gender-related barriers at the workplace." Panel (c) highlights "be paid less for doing the same work." Solid bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes seven pairs of workplace contexts per panel from 303 participants.

Figure A.6: Implications of the Gender Pay Gap



Notes: This figure shows the agreement levels with statements about the implications of the gender pay gap. The corresponding question is "In general, consider a scenario where you know a firm on average pays men more than women. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?"

A.2 Appendix Tables

Table A.1: Workplace Recommendations for Female and Male Workers and Own Willingness to Work

	Recommendation		**Own Willingness to Work**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
By Gender Pay Gap	Favoring Men	Zero	Favoring Men	Zero
Female: No Info	0.88	0.89	0.60	0.58
Female: Info	0.26	0.97	0.09	0.75
Δ	-0.62	0.09	-0.50	0.17
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	2,121	2,121	1,071	1,071
Male: No Info	0.93	0.94	0.64	0.63
Male: Info	0.80	0.96	0.46	0.69
Δ	-0.13	0.02	-0.17	0.06
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
N	2,121	2,121	1,015	1,015

Notes: This table shows changes in the proportion of female and male respondents who recommend female and male workers for each vignette workplace, depending on whether gender pay gap information is disclosed during the recommendation process, as presented in Columns (1)–(2). Changes in respondents' own willingness to work based on the disclosure of gender pay gap information are shown in Columns (3)–(4).

Table A.2: Beliefs About Labor Market Experiences by Presence of a Gender Pay Gap

	Be Promoted		**Face Gender Barriers**		**Be Paid Less**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
By Gender Pay Gap	Favoring Men	Zero	Favoring Men	Zero	Favoring Men	Zero
No Info	0.25	0.25	0.49	0.48	0.43	0.40
Info	0.05	0.41	0.89	0.30	0.94	0.10
Δ	-0.20	0.16	0.40	-0.18	0.51	-0.31
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,121	2,121

Notes: This table presents the fraction of respondents who agree with the statement: "Among workers at this firm, relative to men, do you think women are more likely to...," categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed. Columns (1)-(2) report the fraction agreeing with "be promoted first." Columns (3)-(4) show the fraction agreeing with "face gender-related barriers at the workplace." Columns (5)-(6) indicate the fraction agreeing with "be paid less for doing the same work."

Table A.3: Robustness of Results by Gender Pay Gap Disclosure and Context-Specific Subsamples

	Recommendation		Own Willingness to Work	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
By Gender Pay Gap	Favoring Men	Zero	Favoring Men	Zero
Panel (a): Across-Subject Variations				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.69	0.05	-0.63	0.16
P-value	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.13
N	74	63	41	41
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.16	0.03	-0.01	0.10
P-value	0.00	0.47	0.95	0.38
N	74	63	32	32
Panel (b): Establishment-Specific Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.57	0.08	-0.50	0.17
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	1,515	1,515	765	765
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.11	0.02	-0.18	0.06
P-value	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
N	1,515	1,515	725	725
Panel (c): Industry-Specific Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.73	0.05	-0.46	0.07
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.19	0.05	-0.15	0.01
P-value	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.90
N	303	303	145	145
Panel (d): Occupation-Specific Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.77	0.16	-0.54	0.27
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.15	0.02	-0.17	0.07
P-value	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.23
N	303	303	145	145
Panel (e): Position-Specific Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.56	0.11	-0.46	0.18
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.11	0.05	-0.17	0.07
P-value	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.21
N	303	303	145	145
Panel (f): Tech Firm Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.54	0.12	-0.51	0.18
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.10	0.01	-0.19	0.06
P-value	0.00	0.49	0.00	0.30
N	303	303	145	145
Panel (g): Manufacturing Firm Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.65	0.07	-0.48	0.23
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.13	0.01	-0.12	0.06
P-value	0.00	0.41	0.05	0.28
N	303	303	145	145
Panel (h): Pharmaceutical Firm Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.58	0.05	-0.49	0.15
P-value	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.11	0.01	-0.17	0.06
P-value	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.26
N	303	303	145	145
Panel (i): Public Institution Vignettes				
Female Δ: Info - No Info	-0.52	0.05	-0.57	0.09
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08
N	303	303	153	153
Male Δ: Info - No Info	-0.11	0.02	-0.24	0.07
P-value	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.21
N	303	303	145	145

Notes: This table shows changes in the proportion of female and male respondents who recommend female and male workers for each vignette workplace, depending on whether gender pay gap information is disclosed during the recommendation process, as presented in Columns (1)–(2). Changes in respondents' own willingness to work based on the disclosure of gender pay gap information are shown in Columns (3)–(4). See Appendix Table C.1 for the list of vignettes.

Table A.4: Robustness of Results by Gender Pay Gap Disclosure and Context-Specific Subsamples

	Be Promoted		Face Gender Barriers		Be Paid Less	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
By Gender Pay Gap	Favoring Men	Zero	Favoring Men	Zero	Favoring Men	Zero
Panel (a): Across-Subject Variations						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.16	0.21	0.35	-0.41	0.37	-0.53
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	74	63	74	63	74	63
Panel (b): Establishment-Specific Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.18	0.17	0.40	-0.18	0.52	-0.31
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	1,515	1,515	1,515	1,515	1,515	1,515
Panel (c): Industry-Specific Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.16	0.10	0.34	-0.14	0.44	-0.22
P-value	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303
Panel (d): Occupation-Specific Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.32	0.17	0.51	-0.21	0.54	-0.36
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303
Panel (e): Position-Specific Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.17	0.16	0.36	-0.23	0.49	-0.36
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303
Panel (f): Tech Firm Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.13	0.18	0.39	-0.15	0.50	-0.36
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303
Panel (g): Manufacturing Firm Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.16	0.18	0.44	-0.17	0.49	-0.34
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303
Panel (h): Pharmaceutical Firm Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.18	0.16	0.37	-0.17	0.52	-0.29
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303
Panel (i): Public Institution Vignettes						
Δ: Info - No Info	-0.26	0.15	0.43	-0.17	0.61	-0.22
P-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	303	303	303	303	303	303

Notes: This table presents the fraction of respondents who agree with the statement: "Among workers at this firm, relative to men, do you think women are more likely to...," categorized by whether gender pay gap information is disclosed. Columns (1)-(2) report the fraction agreeing with "be promoted first." Columns (3)-(4) show the fraction agreeing with "face gender-related barriers at the workplace." Columns (5)-(6) indicate the fraction agreeing with "be paid less for doing the same work." See Appendix Table C.1 for the list of vignettes.

Table A.5: Example Quotes Illustrating Implications for the Gender Pay Gap

1. *"Sexism, to a degree. Or you could say it shows signs of immoral work practices from a broader perspective"*
2. *"Unfairness among employees, a bad work culture. Not something I would want anyone, male or female, to be a part of. This is discrimination."*
3. *"Women's work and time are less valued."*
4. *"It implies either the lack of women in higher paying positions or underpaying of women."*
5. *"Men are better at negotiating salaries, promotions, and raises."*


Notes: This table presents quotes from an open-ended question in the survey. The corresponding survey question was "In general, consider a scenario where you know a firm on average pays men more than women. What do you think this gender pay gap implies?"

B Additional Results from the Experiments


B.1 Appendix Figures

Figure B.1: Gender Differences in Job Applications Across Information Treatment

(a) Response by Type of Information




(b) Response by Piece of Information



Notes: This figure illustrates gender differences in job applications across information treatment using data collected in wave 1 of the *Main Worker Study*. Panel (a) presents responses by the type of information, pooling data for gaps favoring men or women at both the 10% and 20% levels. Panel (b) presents responses for each specific piece of information. The gender gap in application rates is calculated as the difference between men's and women's rates (men - women).

Figure B.2: Performance and Performance Belief Distribution



Notes: This figure displays the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the associated outcomes. Performance refers to the number of questions a participant answered correctly out of the 10 questions on the test. Belief represents the number of questions a participant believes they answered correctly. Belief - Performance is the difference between these two variables, calculated for each participant. Data are drawn from all study versions across waves 1–3 involving the math and science test.

B.2 Appendix Tables

Table B.1: Replication of Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages and Job Applications across Information Treatment in the *Main Worker Study*

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Panel (a): Main Wage Negotiation						
Panel (a1): Wave 1						
Female	-0.025	-0.099**	-0.163***	0.044	0.070	-0.007
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148	1,148
P-value	.	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.499
Panel (a2): Wave 2						
Female	-0.056	-0.139***		0.018		-0.078
	(0.046)	(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.048)
Score FE	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,168	1,168		1,168		1,168
P-value	.	0.001		0.014		0.378
Panel (a3): Wave 3						
Female	-0.052	-0.104**	-0.166***	0.039	0.078	-0.001
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
P-value	.	0.064	0.001	0.005	0.000	0.077
Panel (b): Main Job Application						
Panel (b1): Wave 1						
Female	-0.042	-0.143***	-0.220***	0.048	0.099*	-0.053
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	861	861	861	861	861	861
P-value	.	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.776
Panel (b2): Wave 2						
Female	-0.027	-0.198***		0.130**		0.012
	(0.051)	(0.051)		(0.052)		(0.052)
Score FE	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	876	876		876		876
P-value	.	0.000		0.000		0.145
Panel (b3): Wave 3						
Female	-0.003	-0.171***	-0.168***	0.100**	0.101*	-0.003
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	855	855	855	855	855	855
P-value	.	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.004	0.839

Notes: This table presents results for each specific information treatment based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation and job application responses collected in waves 1-3. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). "Female" is an indicator variable for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.2: Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Study*

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Panel (a): Guaranteed Acceptance Scenario						
Female	0.049	-0.027	-0.035	0.045	0.057	0.062
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
P(F)	0.668	0.650	0.647	0.729	0.753	0.747
P(M)	0.680	0.736	0.731	0.739	0.745	0.741
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.504	0.407	0.006	0.001	0.001
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.038	0.050	0.010	0.006	0.005
P-value	.	0.051	0.025	0.904	0.827	0.702
Panel (b): Comparison with Main Scenario						
Guaranteed	0.079***	0.148***	0.104***	0.127***	0.153***	0.118***
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Female	-0.050	-0.096**	-0.160***	0.042	0.083*	-0.002
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Guaranteed × Female	0.097**	0.060	0.120**	-0.001	-0.031	0.066
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,280	2,280	2,280	2,280	2,280	2,280

Notes: This table presents results for each specific information treatment based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation responses collected in wave 3. Panel (a) reports results for each specific information treatment under the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario. P(F) and P(M) show the rates of asking for higher wages for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ P(F): P-value" and "Δ P(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in asking rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). Panel (b) compares workers' responses between the *Main* scenario and the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario. "Guaranteed" is an indicator for responses under the guaranteed acceptance scenario, and "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.3: Replication of Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages and Job Applications in the *Guaranteed Acceptance Study*

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Women 10%	(4) Zero Gap
Panel (a): Wage Asking Rates				
Female	0.029	-0.067	0.012	-0.005
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,168	1,168	1,168	1,168
P(F)	0.741	0.626	0.716	0.707
P(M)	0.782	0.774	0.765	0.786
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.213	0.132
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.683	0.415	0.825
P-value	.	0.005	0.590	0.203
Panel (b): Job Application Rates				
Female	0.034	-0.057	0.079*	0.032
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	876	876	876	876
A(F)	0.795	0.694	0.825	0.798
A(M)	0.796	0.794	0.780	0.805
Δ A(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.152	0.916
Δ A(M): P-value	.	0.888	0.468	0.636
P-value	.	0.005	0.192	0.944

Notes: This table presents results for each specific information treatment based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation and job application responses collected in wave 2. Panel (a) reports results for wage negotiation under the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario, while Panel (b) presents results for job applications. P(F) and P(M) show the rates of asking for higher wages for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ P(F): P-value" and "Δ P(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in asking rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. A(F) and A(M) show the job application rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ A(F): P-value" and "Δ A(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in application rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.4: Gender Differences in Job Application Rates Under the *Guaranteed Acceptance Study*

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Panel (a): Guaranteed Acceptance Scenario						
Female	0.026	-0.033	-0.067	0.126***	0.132***	0.060
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	855	855	855	855	855	855
Y Mean	0.816	0.771	0.751	0.811	0.815	0.839
A(F)	0.807	0.723	0.690	0.841	0.853	0.846
A(M)	0.826	0.819	0.812	0.779	0.777	0.831
Δ A(F): P-value	.	0.008	0.001	0.130	0.030	0.051
Δ A(M): P-value	.	0.725	0.478	0.022	0.039	0.813
P-value	.	0.125	0.021	0.003	0.003	0.281
Panel (b): Comparison with Main Scenario						
Guaranteed	0.282***	0.225***	0.225***	0.261***	0.230***	0.246***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Female	-0.002	-0.163***	-0.162***	0.115**	0.113**	0.000
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Guaranteed× Female	0.028	0.122**	0.089*	-0.004	0.008	0.057
	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,710	1,710	1,710	1,710	1,710	1,710

Notes: This table presents results for each specific information treatment based on OLS regressions of job application responses collected in Wave 3. Panel (a) reports results for each specific information treatment under the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario. A(F) and A(M) show the job application rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ A(F): P-value" and "Δ A(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in application rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). Panel (b) compares workers' responses between the *Main* scenario and the *Guaranteed Acceptance* scenario. "Guaranteed" is an indicator for responses under the guaranteed acceptance scenario, and "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Score fixed effects are included as dummies for each possible performance level out of the 10 questions on the test. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.5: Robustness Checks for Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Panel (a): Score FEs						
Female	-0.046*	-0.117***	-0.160***	0.032	0.079**	-0.031
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.027)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,456	3,456	2,288	3,456	2,288	3,456
P(F)	0.457	0.419	0.412	0.534	0.588	0.497
P(M)	0.551	0.573	0.601	0.547	0.542	0.576
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.000
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.032	0.003	0.730	0.883	0.011
P-value	.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.333
Panel (b): No Controls						
Female	-0.094***	-0.154***	-0.189***	-0.014	0.046	-0.080***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.027)
Constant	0.551***	0.573***	0.601***	0.547***	0.542***	0.576***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Observations	3,456	3,456	2,288	3,456	2,288	3,456
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.032	0.008	0.730	0.627	0.011
P-value	.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.330
Panel (c): Proposal FEs						
Female	-0.046*	-0.117***	-0.160***	0.032	0.079**	-0.031
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.027)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Proposal FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,456	3,456	2,288	3,456	2,288	3,456
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.000
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.032	0.003	0.730	0.883	0.011
P-value	.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.334
Panel (d): Demographics Controls						
Female	-0.029	-0.101***	-0.142***	0.049*	0.094***	-0.012
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.028)
College(+) degree	0.021	0.041	0.019	0.009	0.055	0.028
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003**	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Republican Leaning	0.039	0.070**	0.098**	0.013	0.016	0.052*
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Employed	0.040	0.031	0.010	0.060**	0.033	0.051*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Constant	0.792***	0.824***	0.969***	0.767***	1.012***	0.603***
	(0.133)	(0.142)	(0.242)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.122)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,456	3,456	2,288	3,456	2,288	3,456
Δ P(F): P-value	.	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000
Δ P(M): P-value	.	0.032	0.003	0.730	0.851	0.011
P-value	.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.330

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation responses collected in waves 1–3.Panel (a) includes performance fixed effects, as in the main specification, using dummies for each possible score on the 10-question test. Panel (b) reports raw results with no controls, pooling data across waves 1–3. Panel (c) further incorporates proposal fixed effects, adding dummies for each wage proposal level. Panel (d) further controls for demographic variables. P(F) and P(M) show the rates of asking for higher wages for female and male respondents, respectively. "Δ P(F): P-value" and "Δ P(M): P-value" indicate the p-values testing the significance of changes in asking rates from no information to information among females and males, respectively. P-values test differences in the gender gap in responses ("Female" coefficient) between the no-information condition (Column (1)) and the information conditions (Columns (2)-(6)). "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.6: Gender Differences in Asking for Higher Wages Across Wage Proposal Level

	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Panel (a): Proposal = $1.5						
Female	-0.016	-0.110***	-0.136***	0.053	0.092**	0.004
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	864	572	864	572	864
P(F)	0.399	0.374	0.364	0.478	0.528	0.429
P(M)	0.460	0.510	0.524	0.469	0.465	0.471
Panel (b): Proposal = $2.0						
Female	-0.032	-0.120***	-0.165***	0.046	0.059	-0.017
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	864	572	864	572	864
P(F)	0.462	0.404	0.409	0.536	0.601	0.499
P(M)	0.552	0.561	0.608	0.547	0.573	0.577
Panel (c): Proposal = $2.5						
Female	-0.052	-0.113***	-0.183***	0.012	0.069*	-0.050
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.034)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	864	572	864	572	864
P(F)	0.471	0.436	0.413	0.564	0.601	0.513
P(M)	0.577	0.596	0.629	0.598	0.573	0.619
Panel (d): Proposal = $3.0						
Female	-0.083**	-0.126***	-0.154***	0.017	0.096**	-0.061*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.033)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	864	572	864	572	864
P(F)	0.497	0.462	0.462	0.557	0.622	0.545
P(M)	0.614	0.624	0.640	0.575	0.556	0.637

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage negotiation responses collected in waves 1–3. Panels (a)-(d) restrict the sample to wage proposals of $1.5, $2, $2.5, and $3, respectively. P(F) and P(M) show the rates of asking for higher wages for female and male respondents, respectively. "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.7: Gender Differences in Wage Asking Rates by Ability

Panel (a): Above Median Performance						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.021	-0.093**	-0.169***	0.056	0.053	-0.009
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.043)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,424	1,424	920	1,424	920	1,424
P(F)	0.597	0.539	0.506	0.676	0.684	0.636
P(M)	0.629	0.640	0.684	0.626	0.636	0.652
Panel (b): Below Median Performance						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.062*	-0.134***	-0.153***	0.015	0.096**	-0.046
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.036)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,032	2,032	1,368	2,032	1,368	2,032
P(F)	0.397	0.368	0.371	0.473	0.546	0.437
P(M)	0.465	0.499	0.517	0.461	0.448	0.493

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage asking responses collected in waves 1–3. Panels (a) and (b) restrict the sample to participants with scores below or above the median score, respectively. The median score is 5 out of 10 questions answered correctly. P(F) and P(M) show the wage asking rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.8: Gender Differences in Wage Asking Rates by Confidence

Panel (a): Underconfidence						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.012	-0.078*	-0.126**	0.053	0.096*	-0.013
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.044)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,560	1,560	1,036	1,560	1,036	1,560
P(F)	0.476	0.426	0.402	0.539	0.567	0.512
P(M)	0.552	0.559	0.583	0.546	0.525	0.581
Panel (b): Overconfidence						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.063	-0.155***	-0.178***	0.005	0.040	-0.060
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.047)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,200	1,200	820	1,200	820	1,200
P(F)	0.470	0.448	0.440	0.544	0.613	0.506
P(M)	0.564	0.617	0.634	0.568	0.570	0.594

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage asking responses collected in Waves 1–3. Panels (a) and (b) restrict the sample to participants based on confidence type: panel (a) includes underconfident participants—those whose self-evaluation is lower than their true performance score—while panel (b) includes overconfident participants—those whose self-evaluation exceeds their true performance score. P(F) and P(M) show the wage asking rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.9: Gender Differences in Wage Asking Rates by Gender Attitude

Panel (a): Holding Traditional Gender Norms						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.038	-0.105**	-0.171***	0.037	0.115**	-0.006
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.041)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,372	1,372	892	1,372	892	1,372
P(F)	0.447	0.418	0.409	0.529	0.599	0.503
P(M)	0.557	0.577	0.610	0.550	0.533	0.573
Panel (b): Holding Non-traditional Gender Norms						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.048	-0.125***	-0.155***	0.029	0.057	-0.047
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,084	2,084	1,396	2,084	1,396	2,084
P(F)	0.462	0.419	0.413	0.536	0.583	0.493
P(M)	0.545	0.570	0.593	0.545	0.550	0.579

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage asking responses collected in waves 1–3. Panels (a) and (b) restrict the sample to participants based on whether they report agreement with at least one of the following two statements in the follow-up survey: (1) "When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women", or (2) "On the whole, men make better business executives than women do". Participants categorized as holding "Traditional Gender Norms" agree with at least one of these statements; Otherwise, they are classified as holding "Non-traditional Gender Norms". P(F) and P(M) show the wage asking rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table B.10: Gender Differences in Wage Asking Rates by Employment Status

Panel (a): Employed						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.013	-0.100**	-0.158***	0.064*	0.078*	-0.016
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.038)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,908	1,908	1,312	1,908	1,312	1,908
P(F)	0.498	0.447	0.409	0.581	0.608	0.534
P(M)	0.563	0.589	0.617	0.568	0.564	0.603
Panel (b): Not Employed						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.070*	-0.123***	-0.130***	0.013	0.102**	-0.032
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.040)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,548	1,548	976	1,548	976	1,548
P(F)	0.418	0.392	0.415	0.487	0.567	0.460
P(M)	0.531	0.548	0.573	0.515	0.507	0.534

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage asking responses collected in Waves 1–3. Panels (a) and (b) restrict the sample to participants based on whether they self-report being employed. Not employed statuses include unemployed, retired, disabled, and student. P(F) and P(M) show the wage asking rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.


Table B.11: Gender Differences in Wage Asking Rates by Beliefs about Pay Inequality at Own Workplace

Panel (a): Holding Beliefs That Men Earn More						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.012	-0.186**	-0.236**	0.064	0.115	-0.039
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.080)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	396	396	280	396	280	396
P(F)	0.435	0.380	0.372	0.523	0.591	0.477
P(M)	0.556	0.639	0.681	0.544	0.534	0.600
Panel (b): Holding Beliefs That Women Earn More or Pay Is Equal						
	(1) No Information	(2) Favoring Men 10%	(3) Favoring Men 20%	(4) Favoring Women 10%	(5) Favoring Women 20%	(6) Zero Gap
Female	-0.044	-0.106***	-0.145***	0.032	0.080**	-0.026
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Score FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,060	3,060	2,008	3,060	2,008	3,060
P(F)	0.460	0.424	0.418	0.535	0.588	0.499
P(M)	0.550	0.565	0.591	0.548	0.543	0.573

Notes: This table presents results based on OLS regressions of wage asking responses collected in waves 1–3. Panels (a) and (b) restrict the sample to participants based on whether they believe there is a gender gap favoring men at their workplace. This categorization is based on the survey question: "Do you think there is a difference in wages between females and males at your workplace? The options are: male/female higher, about the same." P(F) and P(M) show the wage asking rates for female and male respondents, respectively. "Female" is an indicator for the participant being female. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.


C Survey Instructions

Figure C.1: Vignette Example: Introduction of a Workplace




Notes: This figure shows a screenshot of a vignette example with general information and the gender pay gap in the introduction of a workplace.

Figure C.2: Questions on Recommendations for Female and Male Workers and Own Willingness to Work



Notes: This figure shows the questions on recommendations for female and male workers and their own willingness to work, displayed below the introduction of the vignette.

Figure C.3: Questions on Beliefs About the Workplace



Notes: This figure shows the questions on beliefs about the workplace, displayed below the introduction of the vignette.


Table C.1: List of Vignette Workplaces with Gender Pay Gap Information

Case	Name in Vignettes	Real Name	General Information	Gender Pay Gap Information
Establishment 1	Firm A	Google UK	Firm A is a tech company that opened its first office in 2003. Over 4,000 people work at firm A today.	At firm A, on average, women earn $0.88 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 2	Firm B	Royal Bank of Canada	Firm R is one of North America's leading diversified financial services companies and provides personal and commercial banking, wealth management, insurance, investor services, and capital markets products and services on a global basis.	Among senior managers at firm R, on average, women earn $0.89 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 3	Firm C	Johnson & Johnson	Firm J is a large multinational corporation with more than 275 subsidiaries, and operations in more than 60 countries. The company is a producer of medical devices and pharmaceuticals, and the owner of many well-known consumer brands.	At Firm J, on average, women earn $0.88 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 4	Organization D	University of Cambridge	Organization C is a public research university, covering a vast array of subjects and specialized areas of research. Its mission is to contribute to society by advancing education, learning, and research at the highest standards of international excellence.	In this organization, on average, women earn $0.91 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 5	Firm E	PepsiCo	Firm S is the leading manufacturer of savory snacks, hot cereals, and juices, and the second-largest producer of carbonated soft drinks and dairy, employing 318,000 people globally.	At Firm S, on average, women earn $0.85 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 6	Firm F	Microsoft US	Firm M is a tech company, and it creates platforms and tools powered by AI to deliver innovative solutions that meet the evolving needs of our customers.	At Firm M, on average, women earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 7	Firm G	Toronto-Dominion Bank	Firm T engages in providing financial products and services. The firm offers accounts, cards, certificate of deposits, life and non-life insurance, mortgage and borrowings, international banking, merchant solutions, investment, cash management and wealth advisory.	Among supervisors at firm T, on average, women earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 8	Organization H	City of London Corporation	Organization L delivers local government services to 8,600 residents and 614,500 city workers. It is committed to providing modern, efficient, and high-quality local services for everyone.	In this organization, on average, women earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 9	Firm I	Pfizer US	Firm P is a biopharmaceutical company that develops and produces medicines and vaccines to improve health and well-being.	At firm P, on average, women earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.
Establishment 10	Firm J	Nestlé UK	Firm N is a large food and beverage company with approximately 270,000 employees, over 2,000 brands, and operations in 188 countries.	At firm N, on average, women earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.
Occupation 1	Financial Clerks	/	Financial clerks do administrative work, help customers, and carry out transactions that involve money.	On average, women working as financial clerks earn $0.59 for every $1 earned by men.
Occupation 2	Chemical Engineers	/	Chemical engineers apply the principles of chemistry, physics, and engineering to design equipment and processes for manufacturing products such as gasoline, detergents, and paper.	On average, women working as chemical engineers earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.
Industry 1	The Finance and Insurance Industry	/	The Finance and Insurance industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in financial transactions (transactions involving the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of financial assets) and/or in facilitating financial transactions.	On average, women in the Finance and Insurance industry earn $0.61 for every $1 earned by men.
Industry 2	The Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Industry	/	The Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation industry includes a wide range of establishments that operate facilities or provide services to meet varied cultural, entertainment, and recreational interests of their patrons.	On average, women in the Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation industry earn $1 for every $1 earned by men.

Notes: This table presents the establishments, occupations, and industries included in the vignettes, along with their general descriptions and gender pay gap information.

D Experimental Instructions


Figure D.1: Example ICAR question




Notes: This figure illustrates an example ICAR question. Participants are instructed to identify which of six geometric shapes presented as response choices will best complete the stimuli.

Figure D.2: Wage Negotiation Decisions in the *Main Worker Study*: No-Information vs. Information Conditions

(a) Wage Negotiation Decisions under the No-Information Condition




(b) Wage Negotiation Decisions under the Information Condition




Notes: This figure displays the decision screens where participants choose whether to request higher wages. Panel (a) corresponds to the No-Information condition, and panel (b) to the Information condition, where gender pay gap information is made transparent.

Figure D.3: Job Application Decisions in the *Main Worker Study*: No-Information vs. Information Conditions

(a) Job Application Decisions under the No-Information Condition




(b) Job Application Decisions under the Information Condition



Notes: This figure displays the decision screens in which participants choose whether to apply for a job. Panel (a) corresponds to the No-Information condition, and panel (b) corresponds to the Information condition, where gender pay gap details are made transparent.

Figure D.4: Evaluator's Decisions



Notes: This figure shows a screenshot where evaluators decide whether to accept wage proposals.