Paying Not to Know: News Avoidance in Times of War (Work in Progress, Please Do Not Circulate)

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Abstract

Coverage of the ongoing Israel-Gaza war varies enormously across the two sides of the conflict and both sides hold sharply different beliefs about the facts of the conflict. We conduct a survey experiment in Israel and Jordan asking whether individuals try to avoid news about civilian victims from the opposing side, and how such news would affect them if they were to read them. We present several key findings. First, Israeli Jews and Jordanian Arabs are substantially less willing to read about outgroup victims compared to ingroup victims. Second, this tendency is driven less by instrumental considerations or universal affective factors, and more by social identification and group norms. Third, reading about outgroup victims increases knowledge, fosters empathy toward the outgroup, and affects policy positions. Fourth, these effects are not significantly weaker among individuals who would rather avoid such news. Together, these results suggest that avoidance of news about outgroup victims may lead to disagreements about facts and exacerbate hostile attitudes and conflict.

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
1 Introduction

In many conflicts, different sides maintain sharply divergent views about basic facts. These disagreements persist even long after the conflict has begun and even when the media is not tightly controlled by the government and factual information is in principle available to all parties. Figure 1 shows survey data we collected among Israeli Jews and Jordanian Arabs in the spring of 2024, more than six months into the Israel-Gaza conflict. The numbers show dramatic differences in stated beliefs about basic facts of the conflict. Most Israelis say that dozens of Israeli women and children were kidnapped, and that unarmed Israeli civilians were attacked by Hamas, but they do not believe that thousands of Gazan children were killed in Israeli strikes, and that the majority of those killed by Israeli strikes were not Hamas fighters. Jordanians present a diametrically opposed pattern: almost all of them agree that thousands of Gazan children were killed in Israeli strikes but very few say that Hamas attacked unarmed Israeli civilians (the sample and survey are discussed in detail in Section 2). At the same time, news coverage of the ongoing war also diverges sharply across the sides of the conflict. While both the Arab and the Israeli media reported extensively and continuously about the conflict, the reporting in each side focused almost exclusively on ingroup casualties and outgroup brutality, and rarely reported on civilian casualties of the other side.[1] This raises two questions. First, do the gaps in coverage mirror underlying differences in demand for information across different populations? Second, do these gaps in coverage affect beliefs and attitudes?

This paper examines how people choose what news to consume, and what to avoid, during times of conflict, and how exposure to different types of news affects their beliefs and attitudes regarding the conduct of the war. We focus on news about civilian casualties, a critical aspect of conflict reporting that often receives divergent coverage across different societies. Our first core finding is that both Israeli Jews and Jordanian Arabs systematically avoid news about civilian casualties from the outgroup, and are willing to forgo monetary incentives to do so. This avoidance appears primarily driven by social identity considerations rather than purely instrumental motives or universal emotional responses to negative news. To study whether this avoidance matters, we randomly assign articles about civilian victims from different groups – and incentives to read and comprehend them. Our second core finding is that avoiding news about outgroup victims may exacerbate conflicts, as articles about the outgroup victims—precisely the articles individuals typically seek to avoid—increase knowledge, foster empathy, and result in less hawkish policy positions.

[1] We are still in the process of systematically coding and quantifying these patterns. However, preliminary results—and casual observation of the news coverage in Israeli and Arab media on any given day following October 7, 2023—show very stark differences.

Figure 1: Facts about the ongoing conflict are sharply disputed



Notes: Israeli and Jordanian respondents; control group. Figure shows % who say the statement is correct/probably correct.

We establish these results through a series of incentivized experiments conducted in Israel and Jordan during the spring of 2024. Participants are presented with headlines from CNN articles about civilian casualties from various conflicts and disasters.[2] They are told in advance that they will be quizzed about one randomly chosen article and receive a reward if they answer the questions correctly. They are also told that the article has been assigned a random price and they will only read the article if they pay the price. Participants are then asked what is the maximum they are willing to pay to read each article.

Our research design builds on the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1964) incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism, but uses the randomization features inherent in the BDM mechanism to study the effect of reading different articles. This design has several important advantages for our research question. First, it allows us to precisely measure willingness to pay (WTP) for reading different types of news articles while fixing the monetary reward for doing so. Second, if participants are exposed to an article (when their stated WTP is higher than the randomly drawn price), they have a clear incentive to read it in order to pass the quiz and receive the monetary reward. Therefore, we measure how much participants are willing to pay to actually *read* the article, and not just be exposed to it. Third, the monetary reward allows us to back out the individual's willingness to forgo monetary payoffs in order to avoid reading certain articles, and thereby examine whether—and which—individuals are willing to give up money to not

[2]Each participant draws 18 articles out of 43 potential articles. All articles are about civilian victims, including Israeli, Gazan and Ukrainian victims of conflict, as well as victims of other disasters. The set of 43 articles allows us to explore a rich array of article characteristics, beyond the identity of the victims.

read about outgroup victims. Fourth, the headlines all appear as they do when shared on Facebook (with added Hebrew or Arabic translation) making the decisions by participants somewhat similar to decisions they often make in the real world: While individuals typically do not pay (in money) for individual articles, they often scroll through various headline on social media and decide which ones to click and read. Fifth, by including the same headlines in both Jordan and Israel, we can estimate the difference in demand for ingroup and outgroup victim articles after controlling for article fixed effects, as the same article can be about ingroup victims in Israel (Jordan) and about outgroup victims in Jordan (Israel). The article fixed effects allow us to isolate the demand for different articles after taking into account the headline style, image, story discussed, or other idiosyncratic factors that may affect demand for a specific article.

Sixth, the implementation of the BDM mechanism involves randomly assigning prices to different articles. This generates exogenous variation in the likelihood that individuals read about ingroup, outgroup, or other victims. In turn, this variation allows us to identify the effect of reading these articles on attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. Finally, the same individuals participate in both parts of the study. This allows us to examine whether the response to reading news about outgroup (vs. ingroup) victims is systematically different among those individuals who do not want to read such articles (or even the specific article they were assigned to read).

Our first main finding is that both Israeli and Jordanian participants systematically avoid articles about civilian casualties from the other side of the conflict. The average (within-individual) gap in WTP between articles about ingroup and outgroup victims is substantial, equivalent to about 35-50% of the baseline WTP. The gap is larger in Israel compared to Jordan, perhaps because Israel is an active side in the conflict, but exists in both samples and when controlling for article fixed effects. While the ingroup-outgroup WTP gap varies by some individual-level characteristics, a large gap in WTP exists across all the demographics groups we study.

We next explore several potential mechanisms that could explain this systematic avoidance of outgroup victim news: monetary considerations, other instrumental consideration, affective motives, and social identity factors. To disentangle these channels, we conduct an additional survey asking participants from the same sampling frames to classify the article headlines on several dimensions. We also leverage differences across individuals as well as participants' detailed self-reported answers. Monetary considerations cannot explain our results. Indeed, participants believe that they will increase the odds of receiving the reward more if they read an article about outgroup rather than ingroup victims (participants typically think that they are more likely to correctly answer the quiz questions about the ingroup victim article even without reading the article). Other instrumental considerations are also unlikely to explain our results. Participants offer a higher WTP for stories judged by their peers as more familiar, in contrast to a standard

model which would expect individuals to seek new information, where they have weaker priors. Furthermore, we include both new and old headlines in the set of articles presented to participants and find a large WTP gap even for old articles that are unlikely to contain relevant information. We also do not find evidence consistent with universal affective motives such as seeking to avoid sad articles. We find that individuals are willing to pay more for article that evoke negative feelings and indeed report feeling more sad after reading an article about ingroup victims. Thus, their behavior is not simply about an attempt to avoid negative feelings.

Instead, the evidence appears driven by identity-centered cognitive dissonance (avoiding information threatening one's group attachment) and by social norms regarding what ingroup members ought to read. First, the gap in WTP is strongly associated with the strength of participants' subjective national identification. Second, we find that individuals are willing to pay more for articles that are perceived as important for people in the ingroup to read, and that controlling for this dimension closes most of the ingroup-outgroup WTP gap. Finally, the most common consideration that individuals say explains their WTP is related to social norms, i.e., that it is important that people in their group read certain things.

These results immediately raise the question: Is news avoidance consequential? Perhaps the people who choose to avoid certain news, would not be affected by such news anyway. Indeed, exposure to such news might even backfire. Beyond documenting selective news avoidance, we therefore examine its consequences by randomly assigning participants to read (and understand) different types of articles. As we inform participants, we randomly assign each an article and a price. The vast majority of participants receive either the minimal price of 0, ensuring that they are exposed to the article, or the maximal price of 100, meaning they are almost never exposed to the article (unless their WTP was 100). Participants are randomized to one of three articles: an article about Israeli victims, an article about Gazan victims, and a neutral article about Chinese victims of a natural disaster.

We first study the effects of exposure to the article on comprehension and recollection. Recent papers have theorized that even when individuals are exposed to the same information, they process it differently and may even suffer from biased memory (Amelio and Zimmermann, 2023). Since all participants randomly assigned the article are asked the comprehension questions, even in cases when the price is higher than their WTP and they are not exposed to the article, we can analyze how exposure affects comprehension. As expected, we find that being exposed to the article increases comprehension substantially, meaning that individuals actually read the articles presented to them. We find that reading about the ingroup increases comprehension more compared to reading about the outgroup, but the differences are not dramatic and exposure to outgroup articles also increase comprehension substantially. The difference between the effect of exposure for

ingroup and outgroup articles is less than 20% of the effect of exposure to any article. To study recollection and persistence, we conduct a followup survey 1-7 days later and ask participants the same comprehension questions along with new comprehension questions about the article. We do not find evidence for biased memory. The effect of exposure to the article in baseline on comprehension in the followup survey is similar among participants assigned to ingroup and outgroup victims. These results suggest that when individuals are exposed to news (and have a small incentive), they read and understand news that in other circumstances they may avoid.

The fact that most individuals seemed to have read and understood the articles allows us to estimate the effect of the content on attitudes and behavior. We focus on three preregistered outcomes: knowledge, empathy, and policy attitudes, and compare the effects of reading about ingroup victims versus about outgroup victims. Unfortunately, we are underpowered to detect effects among the small Jordanian sample, and therefore, this section of the paper focuses on the Israeli sample.[3] We find that reading about Gazan civilian victims significantly affects our outcomes. First, the article increased the share of Israelis agreeing that thousands of children were killed in Gaza, but did not affect the other knowledge question mentioned in Figure 1. Second, reading about Gazan victims, compared to Israeli victims, also increased the share of Israelis who say that Israel (Hamas) should take into account the suffering of the Gazan (Israeli) civil population during combat. Third, we find an effect on empathy—feeling sorry for the suffering of some Gazan civilians hurt in the war. The effects are substantial. For example, the Intention-To-Treat (ITT) effect on feeling sorry for the suffering of Gazans is seven percentage points, compared to a baseline of 30%.

To analyze whether reading also affects behavior, we ask participants whether they want to donate to one of two charities. Both charities operate in both Israel and Gaza, along with many other countries, and we randomize the countries we mention when describing the charities. We always mention that both charities operate in the ingroup country (Israel) but randomly mention that one of the charities also operates in the outgroup country (Gaza). We find that reading about outgroup victims significantly increases the share of participants donating to the charity that also helps outgroup victims.

Finally, we ask if the effect of news depends on whether and how much people want to hear it. In the last section of the paper, we combine the WTP estimates with the randomization of articles to study whether the effects of reading vary by the demand for them. Interestingly, we do not find evidence for substantial heterogeneity. The effects

[3]In Jordan, the survey company we worked with was not able to recruit the intended number of valid participants. We still have enough power when analyzing WTP as each observation is a participant-article pair. We can also study comprehension where the treatment effects are expected to be large and we can exploit variation among all participants who were assigned an ingroup or outgroup article. However, we are underpowered to study the effect of ingroup vs. outgroup articles as these estimates are based on only 114 Jordanian participants in baseline and 45 participants in the followup survey who were assigned the ingroup or outgroup article *and* a price of zero for the article.

on knowledge, empathy, and policy positions are not significantly smaller among participants who would otherwise avoid such news, implying that selective exposure plays a meaningful role in maintaining gaps in knowledge and attitudes across societies, and that exposure to news about the outgroup can affect even people who typically avoid such information. This has important policy implications because it suggests that making the supply of information less one-sided during conflicts (perhaps through an NGO campaign or a change in the policy of mainstream channels), could increase empathy and decrease knowledge gaps, potentially promoting deescalation.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to research on demand for news (Chopra et al., 2024). Previous papers have shown that individuals tend to consume like-minded news (Gentzkow and J. Shapiro, 2011; Durante and Knight, 2012; González-Bailón et al., 2023; Braghieri et al., 2024) and discuss potential theories explaining that behavior (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and J. M. Shapiro, 2006; Chan and Suen, 2008). We provide a new method to estimate the preference for news favorable to one's ingroup and unfavorable to the outgroup. We use this approach to quantify the demand for news about conflict victims but it can be used in other settings as well. In addition, we systematically study the mechanisms explaining the gap in demand for news about ingroup and outgroup victims and show that they relate to norms and social identity, in contrast to obtaining information.[4]

Second, we contribute to a literature studying media effect (Enikolopov et al., 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2014; Adena et al., 2015; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017; Levy, 2021). Previous studies have shown that information and narratives can affect opinions and empathy (Alesina et al., 2023; Kalla and Broockman, 2023; Andries et al., 2024). We show that a simple and scalable intervention—reading an article about outgroup victims—can increase empathy during wartime. More generally, previous studies have typically analyzed either the demand for news or the effects of news. Our framework combines both of these components in one framework, and thus, allows us to study how the effect of news varies based on demand. We find an effect among people with both low and high demand, suggesting that policies increasing exposure can make a difference because even people who avoid news about outgroup victims are affected when they encounter such news.

Our study also relates to research on conflict and asymmetric information. Classical theories highlight how information problems can lead to conflict (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999; Wagner, 2000; Jackson and Morelli, 2011). We identify selective news avoidance as a potential mechanism sustaining information asymmetries, even when factual information is technically available to all parties. This provides a novel perspective on why

[4]Our results on news avoidance also relate to a literature to information avoidance (Golman et al., 2017). While prior work has documented various motives for avoiding information, including both instrumental reasons (Oster et al., 2013) and psychological factors (Ganguly and Tasoff, 2017), we highlight the role of social identity as a driver of systematic information avoidance.

disagreements about basic facts often persist in conflict situations.

Finally we contribute to the growing literature on social identity in economics, building on foundational work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Recent studies have demonstrated how social identities affect various economic behaviors (Shayo, 2009; Chen and Li, 2009; Hjort, 2014; Cohn et al., 2015; Atkin et al., 2021). We extend this literature by showing how identity considerations shape information acquisition decisions.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design. Section 3 presents results on willingness to pay for different types of news and explores mechanisms. Section 4 examines the effects of news exposure. Section 5 concludes.

2 Research Design

We conducted a series of incentivized experiments in Israel and Jordan to measure willingness to pay for different types of news and estimate the effects of news exposure. In this section we discuss our survey design and empirical strategy. We first discus our primary survey experiment, and then discuss additional surveys and our empirical specification. Figure 2 summarizes the design.

2.1 Primary survey

Our survey is comprised of five main parts: 1) we present participants with various headlines and elicit their willingness to pay to read the associated news articles ; 2) we ask a series of baseline demographics and attitude questions.[5]; 3) we assign all participants one of three random articles, and expose some participants to the article based on a random price and their previously expressed willingness to pay; 4) we ask all participants three incentivized knowledge questions about the assigned article 5) we elicit our primary outcomes related to knowledge, policy positions, and empathy. The survey firms paid participants for taking the survey and we provided additional bonus payment as detailed in the next section.[6] We discuss each of the five survey parts below, besides demographics and baseline attitudes, which are straightforward and discussed when relevant.

2.1.1 Elicitation of Willingness to Pay

The core of our design involves eliciting participants' willingness to pay (WTP) for reading different news articles. Participants were presented with headlines from CNN articles about civilian casualties from various conflicts and disasters. For each article, they had

[5]These are asked at this phase so as not to affect willingness to pay and not be affected by the following reading (or lack thereof)

[6]In Israel, the average survey took 66.19 minutes and the average bonus payment we provided was 3.91 USD. In Jordan the mean time was 37.80 minutes and the average bonus payment we provided was 2.46 USD. Participants in Jordan could only receive the bonus payment if they all took the followup survey. Among those participants, the average survey time was 32.18 minutes and the average bonus payment was 6.68 USD.

to specify their WTP to read it, knowing they will need to answer questions about its content to receive a monetary reward.

We elicited willingness to pay to read articles through a variation of the BDM method (Becker et al., 1964). Participants were told that they are about to see a collection of news article headlines, that one article will be chosen at random, and that they will then be presented with three quiz questions relating to it. Participants who answer at least two quiz questions correctly will receive a bonus prize of 90 points.[7] We also told participants that the quiz questions are directly related to the relevant article, and not the general topic, and that (based on pilot studies) "Around 95% of those who read the article answered correctly and got the prize. In contrast, only around 20% of those who did not read the article manage to answer the questions correctly". In other words, we explained to participants that they will probably have to read the article in order to receive the bonus prize.

Participants were told that a random price has been chosen for the relevant article. They were then asked how much they are willing to pay to read it. If their stated WTP for that article is greater than or equal to the randomly chosen price, they would pay the price, get to read the article, and have a high likelihood of answering the quiz questions correctly and winning the reward. If their WTP is less than the price, they would do not pay but also would not be able to read the article, and therefore, would probably not answer the comprehension questions correctly and not receive the reward. We then asked a series of comprehension questions to ensure that participants understood the WTP method.

After the comprehension questions, participants were asked to state the maximum number of points they are willing to pay in order to read each article with a slider ranging from 0 points to 100 points. They provided their WTP for 19 different articles (18 actual articles and an attention check) knowing that both the article and the cost of reading it are determined by lottery. The payment was taken from an initial participation bonus of either 100 points (Israel) or 450 points (Jordan) ensuring that the participation bonus is never negative. Appendix Figure A.6 presents an example for a screen eliciting WTP. It also show that participants were reminded in every question that the bonus prize is 90 points.

Several features of the design are worth highlighting. First, our method provides an incentive-compatible way to quantify the willingness to pay for different content. Second, participants knew in advance that once they see the article they will have an clear incentive to read it. Therefore, they provided the amount they are willing to spend to actually *read* the full article and not only be exposed to it. Indeed, we show in Section 4.1 that most participants spent considerable time reading the article and received the bonus

[7]The survey companies we work with provide payment in points. In Israel, 100 points are worth about 10 ILS ($2.70) and in Jordan 1 JOD ($1.41).

payment. Third, under reasonable assumption, the 90-point reward allows us to convert our WTP estimate into willingness to forgo monetary payoffs. For example, someone who chose 0 is willing to forgo at least 90 points (with a high probability) in order not to read the article. Fourth, all participants answer quiz questions regardless of whether they read the article, enabling us to estimate effects on comprehension. We believe this method can be used to analyze the demand for and effect of different media content in other contexts as well.

Ensuring high quality answers To make sure participants provided high-quality answers we took the following steps. First, we asked the aforementioned comprehension questions. The comprehension checks were intentionally not easy (e.g., participants had to calculate their final reward under certain scenarios and understand that they would pay the random price of the article and not the amount they offer), and participants were given three opportunities to answer them correctly. Participants who failed the compression questions three times were screened out. Second, we included an attention check question within the WTP section, shown in Appendix Figure A.7. As participants were gradually shown 19 headlines, one of the headlines states: "This is an attention check. Please mark a maximum price of 41 points". Participants who did not choose to offer 41 were excluded from the experiment.

Article Selection and Characteristics All the articles are CNN news articles about civilian victims of various conflicts and disasters. We focus on CNN since it is a well-known brand and the leading international website that is popular in both Israel and Jordan. This design choice rules out variation in "source utility" or overall source credibility as alternative explanations for our findings.

All of our articles cover civilian casualties. The casualties are Israeli, Palestinian, and Ukrainian conflict victims, and non-conflict related victims from around the world. To vary the possible instrumental value of the articles, we include both recent events (2023) and older incidents (2010s). We only include news-reporting articles and not opinion pieces or explainers, specifically selecting articles that explicitly mention civilian victims of a specific nationality and focus on the situation on the ground.

External Validity We took two steps to increase external validity. First, we created a pool of 43 potential articles meeting these criteria and randomly selected 18 articles for each participant to keep the survey length reasonable. All participants were shown the attention check and the three treatment articles discussed in Section 2.1.2. The rest of the articles were randomly selected within categories, as shown in Table A.1. This approach allows us to control for article characteristics while capturing responses to a broader set of news stories. Overall, we included in our pool most of the recent articles we found about Palestinian and Israeli victims in the Gaza war, and therefore, our WTP estimates for these articles have high external validity, at least with respect to CNN.

Second, the article headlines are displayed in a manner meant to emulate their appearance on social media and are accompanied by the thumbnail picture they were originally matched with.[8] Figure A.1 shows an example of how articles are shown along with how they appear when shared on social media. The resemblance is meant to invoke the social media landscape. Though the WTP setup is not natural, by making the articles emulate their appearance on social media, we provided participants with a familiar task: they were going through the survey (just as they scroll their feed), viewed the headlines almost exactly as they would appear in their feed, and decided to what extent they are willing to engage with each post.

2.1.2 Randomization and Treatments

Following the willingness to pay elicitation, as per the BDM mechanism, survey participants were randomly assigned an article and the price of read the article. To identify the causal effect of exposure to news about civilian casualties, we leverage the random assignment of articles and prices. The vast majority of participants are randomly assigned to one of three article types (ingroup victims, outgroup victims, or neutral victims) and one of two price levels. At the minimum price (0 points), participants always gain access to the article. At the maximum price (100 points), they almost never gain access given typical WTP levels.[9]

The probability of being assigned each article and price is based the following distribution (also shown in Appendix Table A.2): a 30% probability of being assigned minimum price (0) for ingroup victim articles, 30% of being assigned the minimum price for outgroup victim articles, 18% probability of being assigned minimum price for neutral articles, and 10% each of being assigned the maximum price for ingroup and outgroup articles.[10] A small fraction (2%) received randomly drawn intermediate prices and one of the articles with equal probability. To simplify the analysis, these participants were excluded from the analysis.

The Treatment Articles Participants were ultimately assigned one of three articles. The article about Gazan victims tells the story Khaled Nabhan, a Palestinian man who lost two of his grandchildren in an Israeli airstrike in November 2023. The article about Israeli victims recounts the story of Alma Or and Noam Or, two teenagers who were held by Hamas militants and released as part of the 2023 truce agreement, only to find out that their mother has been murdered during the October 7 attacks. The final article describes the aftermath of a deadly earthquake which resulted in over 130 deaths in China's Gansu

[8] We make two changes to the figure compared to their social media appearances. First, we add the translation of the headline to Hebrew (in Israel) or Arabic (in Jordan). Second, we add the date of the article.

[9] In only 4% of cases, participants offer the maximum 100 points.

[10] Most of our analysis compares participants who read articles about ingroup versus outgroup victims and, therefore, we set a higher probability to receive a zero price on those articles.

province. All three articles tell personal stories but also mentioned basic facts throughout. They are fairly similar to other CNN articles about conflict victims.

We translated the articles to Hebrew in Israel and Arabic in Jordan and presented the full text of the articles (without any pictures or links). Participants could view the translated version or switch to the original English by clicking a button on the article screen.

2.1.3 Article Comprehension

We wrote five quiz questions for each article, and presented each participants with three of the five questions. The questions were in multiple choice format and participants were presented with four possible answers.

Participants were asked the questions even if they were not exposed to the article (WTP $<$ price), allowing us to estimate the effect of reading the article on comprehension. However, the questions are very specific and it is highly unlikely that participants would know the answer even if they are familiar with the case discussed in the article. For example, the question about the Gazan victims article asks "Khaled describes his granddaughter favorite game, what was the game?". Furthermore, participants had only 60 seconds to answer all three questions and therefore, could not look up the answers. We told participants in advance that they will only have 60 seconds, so they would know that they are required to read the full article, and take this into account when setting the WTP.

Through the paper, we measure *article comprehension* as the share of correct answers to the quiz questions.

2.1.4 Knowledge, Attitudes, and Opinions

Primary outcomes We pre-registered the following outcome variables focused on the effect of reading an article: factual perceptions of the conflict, policy positions towards the war, and empathy towards the outgroup.

Factual perceptions of the conflict are captured through a list of four statements regarding the war. Participants are asked to respond to these statements and indicate on a 5-point scale the likelihood with which they are correct or incorrect. The statement are as follows: "Dozens of Israeli women and children were kidnapped by Hamas"; "Thousands of Gazan children were killed by Israeli strikes in Gaza"; "Israeli towns were attacked by Hamas, but no unarmed civilians were attacked"; "The absolute majority of those killed by Israeli air strikes in Gaza are Hamas militants and not civilians". There is widespread agreement among researchers that the first two of these statements are true, the last two are false.[11] The article mentioning Israeli victims states the first fact explicitly and third

[11]We refer the reader to the UN OCHA data (https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-208, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-9-october-2024), the ACLED Initiative's 2024 reports (https://acleddata.com/report/after-

fact implicitly. The article mentioning the Gazan victims lists the second fact explicitly and the firs and third facts implicitly. As anticipated in the pre-analysis plan, virtually all participants already knew the facts that portray their ingroup as victims. We therefore focus on the two facts that portray the outgroup as victims. We define *Agreement* as saying a statement is most likely or definitely true, and *Agreement* as saying it most likely or definitely not true. Those who said they do not know were excluded from both categories.

We measure policy positions based on a question asking participants whether Israel (Hamas) should take into account the suffering of the Gazan (Israeli) civil population during the war. We define *consider OG suffering* as saying that suffering should be taking into account to a large degree or very large degree, as opposed to a small degree or not at all.

Self-Reported Empathy towards the outgroup is defined as whether participants strongly or very strongly agree with the statement ("I feel sorry for the suffering of some [outgroup] civilians hurt in the war")

Donations We also measure empathy based on a donation question with actual stakes. We ask participants whether they want to make a small donation to Project HOPE, Direct Relief, or neither. Both organizations have activities in the Palestinian Territories as well as in Israel. For each organization, we mentioned three territories in which it operates. We always mentioned the ingroup territory (Israel or Gaza) so participants would never have to choose between donating to an organization helping ingroup victims or an organization helping outgroup victims. We also always mentioned other neutral country where the organizations operate and randomly mentioned either the outgroup territory in the conflict (Gaza for Israelis, Israel for Jordanian) or another third-country. For example, some Israeli participants were told that Project HOPE *"is active in Uganda, Mexico, Israel and other countries*", while Direct Relief *"is active in the Philippines, Gaza, Israel and other countries*". Other Israeli participants were told Project HOPE "*is active in Uganda, Gaza, Israel and other countries*", while Direct Relief "*is active in the Philippines, Mexico, Israel, and other countrie*s". Both statements are correct so we did not deceive participants. Our *behavioral empathy* outcome is defined as donating to an organization operating in the introup territory as well as the outgroup country, as opposed to donating to the organization operating only in the ingroup territory, or not donating at all.

year-war-hamas-militarily-weakened-far-eliminated, https://acleddata.com/brief/middle-east-crisis-year-war-numbers), the Tel Aviv University affiliated Institute for National Security Studies database (https://www.inss.org.il/publication/all-fronts, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/war-data/) and the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies analyses of the fighting (https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/al-aqsa-flood-offensive-israeli-strategic-failures-in-gaza.aspx, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/western-news-coverage-of-israels-war-on-gaza-in-the-post-truth-era.aspx, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/the-future-of-the-war-on-gaza.aspx).

2.1.5 The Sample

We recruited our primary sample in spring 2024, with roughly 1,700 Israeli Jews and 200 Jordanian Arabs. In Israel participants were recruited through *Panel4All* and in Jordan they were recruited through *Qualtrics*. While the Jordanian sample is smaller and more selected, limiting statistical power for some analyses, it provides valuable complementary evidence on the generalizability of our findings across conflict parties.

2.2 Additional surveys

2.2.1 Followup survey

We invited participants to a follow-up survey 1-7 days after our primary survey. In this survey, participants answered all five comprehension questions on the article allowing us to test whether recollection is affected by whether someone reads about their ingroup or outgroup. To measure persistence, we also ask in this survey the self-reported empathy question and the policy question on considering the suffering of the outgroup. The followup survey also included some of the secondary outcome questions.

2.2.2 Article classification

To supplement information regarding our chosen articles, we ran a secondary, unincentivized, survey to classify the articles. Participants recruited from the same sampling frame answered the following questions regarding the article headlines: Do you believe the article portrays Israelis/Palestinians positively or negatively? Do you expect the article to evoke negative emotions in you? Are you familiar with the details of the incident covered in the article? Do you expect the information in the article to be credible? Is it important that members of your ingroup read this article?

We use these answers to analyze heterogeneity in WTP based on how articles are perceived by the ingroup.

2.3 Empirical Specifications

WTP To estimate the WTP for articles we run specifications of the following form:

$$WTP_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IG_j + \beta_2 OG_j + \beta_3 Z_j + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

WTP_{ij} is how much participants i is willing to pay to read article j. β_1 is the difference in WTP between ingroup articles and neutral articles, β_2 is the difference in WTP between outgroup articles and neutral articles. γ_i controls for individual fixed effects. In some specification we control for various article characteristics (Z_j) to analyze mechanisms. We cluster standard errors at the article level. Our main pre-specified test is whether and when $\beta_1 > \beta_2$. When studying heterogeneity, we also add interactions of individual level characteristics and whether the article focuses on IG or OG victims.

One potential concern is that WTP of specific articles might be unusually high or low, and that this will occur regardless of whether they focus on ingroup or outgroup victims, because they seem more interesting (based on the headline or picture). A unique feature of our study is that we can control for article fixed effects and still estimate WTP. Since some articles about specific incidents appear as reporting about ingroup victims in one country and outgroup victims in another. Therefore, we also run the following regression:

$$WTP_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IG_j + \mu_j + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where μ_j control for article fixed effects. This regression only captures differences in articles about the ingroup and the outgroup (other articles will be absorbed by the fixed effects). Therefore, β_1 in this regression is our coefficient of interest and should be interested as the difference in WTP between ingroup and outgroup articles.

Effect of articles on comprehension To analyze the effect of reading an article on comprehension, we compare participants who were assigned a zero price and those that were assigned a price of 100. In this regression, we exclude participants who were assigned the neutral article with a zero price as we do not have a control group for those participants. We run the following regression

$$Comprehension_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot ZeroPrice_i + \beta_2 \cdot IGVictim_i + \beta_3 \cdot ZeroPrice_i \cdot IGVictim_i + X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{3}$$


β_1 estimates the effect of being exposed to an article on comprehension and β_3 measures the differential effect of begin exposed to an ingroup article, compared to an outgroup article. X_i controls for the following pre-registered variables: age, gender, income, religiosity, news consumption habits, ideology, position regarding the two-state solution, identification with one's ingroup (defined using both ethnicity and religion), the feeling thermometer gap between the ingroup and outgroup, and survey-week fixed effects. In Jordan we also control for whether the respondent is of Palestinian origin. In Israel we also control for ideology and the party the respondent voted for.

Effect of articles on primary outcomes Finally to estimate the effect of reading an article on our primary outcome variables, we compare participants exposed to different articles using the following specification:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot IG_ZeroPrice_i + \beta_2 \cdot OG_ZeroPrice_i + X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{4}$$

We focus on the $\beta_2 - \beta_1$, the difference in the effect of ingroup and outgroup articles. Note that the reference group pools both participants who were exposed to the neutral article, and participants who were assigned a price of 100 and were typically not exposed to any article.

Figure 2: Experiment design



2.4 Pre-Analysis Plan

We pre-registered a pre-analysis plan at the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0015576) The plan included details of our outcome variables, randomization, and specifications. The main deviation from the pre-analysis plan is that the survey company we worked with was not able to recruit enough Jordanian participants who passed our comprehension checks. Since our Jordanian sample is much smaller than intended, we do not have enough power to study the effects of articles on attitudes in Jordan, but can still study WTP for articles in both countries.

3 Results: WTP for Articles


In this section we present the results on demand for news. We first show that there is clear gap in the WTP for ingroup and outgroup articles, and then discuss the mechanisms explaining this gap.

3.1 Willingness to Pay for Ingroup and Outgroup Articles

Our first key finding is that both Israeli Jews and Jordanian Arabs systematically avoid news about civilian casualties from the other side of the conflict, even when this entails foregoing monetary rewards. Figure 3 shows the distribution of WTP for articles about ingroup victims, outgroup victims, and neutral victims (Ukrainians and non-conflict casualties). In both countries, we find a substantial gap between WTP for ingroup versus outgroup casualties.

We can benchmark these numbers by considering a participants attempting to maximize monetary rewards. Participants who believed they would win the prize if any only if they read the article and who attempted to maximize the monetary reward should have offered 90 points (an offer above 90 point indicates interest in the article beyond the reward). Risk-neutral participants who believe the odds we provided (95% odds of getting the report if the article is read and 20% others) should have offered 67.5 points (0.95*90-0.20*90). Of course, participants may have been willing to pay less than that due to the opportunity cost of the time it takes to read the article.[12] Importantly, all of these consideration should apply to both articles. Therefore, any gap between the article, is due to the article's *content*.

Figure 3: Distribution of WTP



To quantify the differences between the WTP for articles about ingroup and outgroup victims in a regression framework, we begin by studying the extensive margin of people who completely avoid news in our price range. Columns 1-3 of Table 1 find that participants are more likely to completely avoid (WTP = 0) articles about outgroup victims.

[12]While we did not tell participants the length of each and every article, the average length of articles in English is 881 words, which should take participants about 4 minutes (as per CNN's reading time estimates). The median participant spent about 4.19 minutes reading the treatment articles.

In Israel, the probability of zero WTP is 4.3 percentage points higher for articles about Palestinian victims compared to neutral articles, while it is 1.7 percentage points lower for articles about Israeli victims. Column 3 shows that the results are robust to including article fixed effects, meaning that the differences between ingroup and outgroup articles are not due to idiosyncratic article characteristics but due to the same articles being values more or less, depending on whether they discuss ingroup or outcome victims.

We next study the mean differences in WTP. Column 4 of Table 1 shows that In Israel, participants are willing to pay an average of 15.1 points more for articles about Israeli civilian victims compared to neutral articles ($p < 0.01$). Conversely, they are willing to pay 4.8 points less for articles about Palestinian civilian victims ($p < 0.01$). The total gap of approximately 20 points represents a 35-50% difference in WTP relative to the baseline. To put this magnitude in perspective, 20 points is equivalent to approximately seven minutes worth of survey time in our setting. In other words, one way to interpret our results is that participants are willing to take an additional seven-minute survey instead of switching from reading about ingroup victims to reading about outgroup victims. Column 5 finds a similar pattern in Jordan, though with somewhat different magnitudes. Jordanian participants are willing to pay 13.2 points more for articles about Palestinian victims compared to neutral articles ($p < 0.01$), while showing no significant difference in WTP between Israeli victim and neutral articles. One potential explanation could be that Jordanians are not a direct side in the conflict, and therefore, even though they identify more with Gaza, they do not consider Gazans as their ingroup and Israelis as their outgroup to the same extent that Israelis consider Israelis as their ingroup and Gazans as their outgroup.[13] Again, the results are robust to controlling for article fixed effects.

We note the differences we find are probably a lower bound to the actual gap in WTP for articles about ingroup and outgroup victims for two reasons. First, in our setting, participants complete surveys in exchange for rewards, and therefore, monetary considerations are probably more salient than typical news consumption, and still we find that many participants are willing to give up money to avoid reading about the outgroup. Second, the bunching of participants around the minimum value of zero for outgroup victim articles suggests that some of these participants would have offered a lower amount if possible. In any case, the systematic differences in WTP suggests that differences in media coverage across societies may reflect underlying differences in demand.

3.2 Mechanisms

We explore three potential mechanisms that could explain the avoidance of news about outgroup victim: instrumental considerations, universal affective motives, and social iden-

[13] Conducting our survey experiment in Gaza was not feasible during the war.

Table 1: Willingness To Pay

	WTP=0			*WTP (Points)*		
	Israel	Jordan	Both	Israel	Jordan	Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IG Victim	-0.017***	-0.029***	-0.052***	15.122***	13.179***	16.238***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(1.199)	(0.788)	(0.945)
OG Victim	0.043***	0.014+		-4.835***	0.664	
	(0.003)	(0.007)		(0.828)	(1.030)	
N	31,554	3,582	35,136	31,554	3,582	35,136
R^2	0.467	0.433	0.464	0.708	0.705	0.716
Ind. FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Article FE			X			X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note:
The table presents estimated coefficients from regressions analyzing the impact of In-Group victim versus Out-Group victim news headlines on willingness to pay (WTP) and the probability of reporting zero WTP for reading news, while IGvictim and OGvictim are dummy indicators. Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) report results separately for Israeli and Jordanian respondents, while columns (3) and (6) include the full sample. All regressions control for individual fixed effects. Article fixed effects are included in the combined sample specification (columns (3) and (6)), but not in the country-specific regressions. All S.E. are clustered at the article level.

tity factors. We study these mechanisms by comparing effects across different types of articles, different types of participants, and based on participants' self-reported answers. The evidence most strongly supports social identity as the primary driver in both Israel and Jordan. We focus in this section on the Israeli survey where we have more power, where the definitions of the ingroup and outgroup are clear cut, and perhaps relatedly, there is a larger gap in WTP between ingroup victim and outgroup victim articles. We discuss the results for the Jordanian survey in the end of this section and provide more details in Appendix B.1.

Before discussing the mechanism, we describe two exhibits that this section relies on. First, Table 3 displays the WTP for articles when controlling for various article characteristics. In each column we add one characteristic to the regression and estimate the WTP for articles about ingroup and outgroup victims when controlling for that characteristic. The last column controls for all characteristics. The article characteristics are determined based on the article classification survey described in Section 2.2 and the table includes all the characteristics we asked about. Second, we show participants the articles with the highest and lowest WTP, and ask participants to explain in their own words why they were willing to pay more for one articles compared to the other. We then provide a multiple choice questions asking participants to mark all the considerations that affected their WTP. Figure 5 displays the considerations participants reported and

Appendix Figure A.2 presents participants' self-reported answers and allows us to rule out additional explanations. [14]

3.2.1 Instrumental considerations

There could be two instrumental considerations to prefer specific articles. First, standard political economy model suggest that people choose what to read in order to use this information to make better decisions, such as deciding who to vote for (Persson and Tabellini, 2002). Second, in our experiment, individuals' WTP could also be driven by monetary considerations.

Informational considerations One potential explanation for reading article about ingroup victims is that these articles contain more useful actionable information, perhaps on the dangers posed by the outgroup. To study whether the gap between ingroup and outgroup articles stems from the information contained in the article, we included both recent and old articles. If participants viewed some articles as providing more valuable information, we would expect the WTP gap to exist mostly for recent events. However, columns (1)-(3) of Appendix Table A.3 show that the gap in WTP persists even for articles about older events from the 2010s, where instrumental value is minimal.

We next use the article classification survey described in Section 2.2 to test whether participants provide a higher WTP for articles they are not familiar with, under the assumption that familiar articles do not contain new information. Column 2 of Table 3 shows that participants actually display a higher WTP for articles covering familiar events, contrary to what an information-value explanation would predict. Column 3 shows that article credibility is positively correlated with higher WTP (the effect is not statistically significant), but that even when controlling for credibility a large gap remains in WTP between ingroup and outgroup articles.


Further evidence is provided by the consideration participants report in Figure 5. While some participants mentioned wanting to read articles with new information, at least as many participants said they offered a high WTP to read about things they already know.

Monetary considerations It is also possible that participants' WTP is driven by their expectations regarding the likelihood of receiving the reward. For example, participants may have thought that articles about ingroup victims would be easier to comprehend and that they are more likely to win the reward if they read that article. We directly

[14] For example, one potential explanation is that participants were willing to pay more for articles about the ingroup becuase they wanted to see how the international media covers their group. Since we thought such a mechanism was unlikely to drive our results, this consideration was not included in the list of consideration participants could mark. However, we can still check whether participants mentioned the consideration in the open-ended question, which was asked before the multiple choice questions, and thus, is not affected by the list of considerations we asked about. We find that only only 1% of participants in Israel and no participant in Jordan mentioned that interest in how the international media covers the conflict was a consideration in their willingness to pay.

assess perceived instrumental value through personalized retrospection questions asked after the WTP elicitation but before article assignment. Participants were reminded of either their lowest or highest article WTP and asked to report their perceived probability of winning the monetary prize with and without reading the article. Figure 4 shows that the difference in these probabilities (Δ) is actually smaller for articles that receive higher WTP, with $\Delta = 33.8\%$ for maximum-WTP articles versus $\Delta = 41.1\%$ for minimum-WTP articles. In other words, participants were willing to pay more for the article that they thought would increase their expected monetary payoff less. While these results sound surprising, they make sense if the main consideration was not maximizing monetary rewards. Many participants were familiar with the stories about ingroup victims, and therefore, some participants (incorrectly) assumed that they will receive the reward even without reading these articles. Offering high WTP for these articles despite these expectations suggests that monetary considerations are not driving the WTP differences between articles about ingroup and outgroup victims.

Figure 4: Expected Chances of Wining Bonus Payment With and Without Reading




Further evidence of the non-instrumental nature of evaluation is provided by the consideration participants report in Figure 5. Fewer than 10% of participants reported that they offered a higher WTP to an ingroup articles compared to an outgroup article, becuase they thoughts it would be easier to get the reward for the ingroup article or because they thoughts they could get the reward for the outgroup articles without reading it.

3.2.2 Affective motives

A second potential explanation is that individual avoid the negative emotions associated with outgroup articles. We leverage the classification survey and control for whether the article is expected to cause negative emotions. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that participants display a *higher* WTP for articles expected to induce negative emotions. Reading about ingroup victims make participants feel more negative, yet they still prefer reading these articles. Moreover, 5 shows that fewer than 10% of participants reported offering a higher WTP for an ingroup article over an outgroup articles because the outgroup article seemed sad.

We also ask participants at the end of the survey, which emotions they felt when taking the survey. This question does not focus on any specific part of the survey, but we can use it to test whether participants who were exposed to article about ingroup or outgroup victims had a different survey experience. Table 4 shows that participants who were exposed to articles about the ingroup report feeling more sad during the survey. We do not find statistically significant differences across other emotions (happiness, shame, concern, anger), suggesting that emotional avoidance cannot explain the preferential consumption of ingroup victim news.

Figure 5: WTP Rationales, Ingroup vs Outgroup Articles, Israel



3.2.3 Social identity factors

Ultimately, the strongest evidence points to social identity considerations as the key mechanism. First, Table 2 shows that the gap in WTP is significantly larger among participants who report high levels of pride in their ingroup.[15] The heterogeneity is sub-

[15]We define identity based on nationality and ask Israelis how proud they are to be Israeli and ask Jordanian how proud they are of the Palestinian people. The results hold when replacing the national

stantial—the difference in WTP for article about ingroup and outgroup victims is about 11-19% larger for participants who very strongly identify with their group, compared to participants who do not.

Table 2: Difference in WTP by Ingroup Pride

	Israel	Jordan	Both
IG victim	12.634***	10.618***	12.669***
	(1.148)	(1.079)	(0.845)
OG victim	-2.596**	0.238	
	(0.819)	(1.132)	
IG victim * Very proud	4.180***	3.665*	5.519***
	(0.550)	(1.409)	(0.576)
OG victim * Very proud	-3.763***	0.609	
	(0.417)	(1.511)	
Individual FE	X	X	X
Article FE			X
Reference Group Mean	42.53	37.77	
Num.Obs.	31554	3582	35136
R2	0.711	0.706	0.718

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All S.E. clustered at article level.

Second, column (7) of Table 3 shows that controlling for whether participants think that is important that people from their group will read an article ("group norms") explains a substantial portion of both the positive effect for ingroup victims and negative effect for outgroup victims. In contrast to the perceived familiarity of the article's topic, its reliability, or the emotions it is expected to evoke, controlling for groups norms closes almost all of the gap between the WTP for ingroup and outgroup articles.

Finally, Figure 5 shows that when participants were asked directly about their rationales for their WTP values, over 40% of participants mentioned injunctive group considerations ("it is important that Israeli read certain things"). Furthermore, when we classified participants answers to open-ended questions explaining their considerations, attitudes toward the outgroup were also an important driver with 46% participants saying that they prefer to read about their group and an additional 25% expressing lack of interest or hate for the other group (Appendix Figure A.2).

Mechanisms in Jordan Appendix B.1 discusses the mechanisms explaining the gap in WTP for ingroup victim and outgroup victim articles in Jordan. Overall, we find mostly similar qualitative results. Based on the explanations participants provided, Jordanians

identity with the religious or ethnic identity and asking Israelis how proud they are to be Jews and asking Jordanian how proud they are to be Arabs.

did not offer different WTP due to monetary considerations. Furthermore, based on the classification of articles, participants did not offer a higher WTP for articles that evoked less negative emotions or for articles they are less familiar with. Social identity seems to be a a key mechanism in Jordan as the WTP gap is higher for participants with a stronger identification with their group, participants offer a higher WTP for articles perceived as important for their group, and a plurality of participants mention injunctive group considerations. The main difference between the samples is that for Jordanians the reliability of articles also seems to be an important mechanism, with many participants mentioning reliability as a consideration for offering lower WTP for outgroup victim articles.

3.3 Heterogeneity and Robustness

Figure 6 show that the gap between the WTP for article about ingroup victims and articles about outgroup victim news is remarkably robust across various subgroups and specifications. We find similar patterns across age groups, among men and women, across income groups, and among both religious and not religious participants. The WTP gap is larger among Israelis who oppose a two-state solution (a more Hawkish position), those with more negative attitude toward the outgroup and as previously mentioned, participants who are more proud of the ingroup. However, even among the group with the smaller gap, we still find a substantially higher willingness to pay for ingroup articles.

These results suggest that selective exposure to victim narratives during conflict is not driven by a small subset of extreme individuals, but rather reflects broader patterns of identity-motivated information consumption. The systematic nature of these choices may help explain why different sides of a conflict often maintain very different understandings of events, even when factual information is technically available to all parties.

Figure 6: Ingroup-Outgroup gaps in WTP across subgroups




Table 3: WTP Based on Classification of Articles, Israel

	Dependent variable: WTP							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
IG Victim	15.122***	10.199***	13.29***	11.206***	14.582***	8.584**	2.115	4.041
	(1.199)	(1.394)	(2.052)	(2.127)	(3.986)	(3.348)	(2.609)	(2.829)
OG Victim	-4.835***	-4.889***	-1.324	1.819	-4.053	0.548	0.536	-7.375*
	(0.828)	(0.978)	(3.275)	(3.321)	(5.366)	(2.84)	(1.537)	(3.795)
Familiarity		2.932***						1.785***
		(0.635)						(0.626)
Credibility			2.237					0.087
			(1.976)					(1.219)
Negative Emotions				4.438**				-1.81
				(1.99)				(1.807)
IG Positive Image					0.542			-5.195*
					(3.675)			(2.935)
OG Positive Image						-4.897**		-2.677
						(2.378)		(1.783)
Group Norms							7.8***	6.726***
							(1.579)	(1.732)
R^2	0.708	0.711	0.709	0.71	0.708	0.71	0.712	0.714

Note: All S.E. are clustered at individual, article levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

IG Victim and *OG Victim* are dummy indicators. All other coefficients refer to a S.D change in the article characterization score. All specifications use only the Israeli dataset, with 31,536 observations.

Table 4: End of Survey Emotions

	Did you feel...					Overall enjoyment
	Happy	Sad	Ashamed	Concerned	Angry	(1-5 scale)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IG Victim	-0.014	0.126***	0.013	-0.028	0.057**	0.035
	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.048)
OG Victim	-0.028***	0.062**	0.023*	-0.039*	0.101***	-0.123**
	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.05)
OG - IG	-0.013	-0.064**	0.01	-0.011	0.044	-0.158***
(P-value)	(0.214)	(0.027)	(0.495)	(0.62)	(0.147)	(0.002)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reference Group Mean	0.051	0.562	0.044	0.184	0.342	3.325
Observations	1717	1717	1717	1717	1717	1717
R^2	0.048	0.073	0.052	0.027	0.086	0.094

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4 Results: The Effect of Reading the Articles

Does it matter that individual prefer reading about ingroup victims? In this section we test whether reading these articles affects participants. We first study whether participants understood and remembered the content of the articles, then analyze the effect on knowledge, empathy, and policy positions, and finally study heterogeneity.

4.1 First Stage: Article Comprehension

We begin by examining whether our experimental manipulation successfully affected article comprehension, as measured by performance on the quiz questions. This analysis has three purposes. First, it serves as a manipulation check and tests whether at least some participants read the article. Second, it allows us to test whether participants read, understand, or remember, ingroup and outgroup articles differently. Third, in the next section we use the comprehension questions as a first stage for estimating the local average treatment effect of reading the article.

We find that being exposed to the article substantially increases comprehension, compared to a price of 100. Table 5 show that the average probability of answering a comprehension question correctly increased by 54 percentage points in Israel and 35 percentage points in Jordan when participants were assigned a zero price, compared to those assigned the maximum price. These results confirm that our price manipulation effectively influenced article reading and comprehension.

We next test whether comprehension increased more for ingroup victim articles. Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 show that the increase in comprehension is higher for the ingroup, but not dramatically so. The fact that exposure to both ingroup and outgroup articles increase comprehension dramatically, means that people read and understand content that they prefer to avoid when they have an incentive to do so. Indeed Figure A.3 shows the time spent reading the articles. The average time spent, about 3-4 minutes, is remarkably very similar for ingroup and outgroup articles in Israel and in Jordan.

While we do not find dramatic differences in the time spent reading the article, or its comprehension, participants may still suffer from motivated memory (Amelio and Zimmermann, 2023), and remember better the article that is portray their group more favorably. Table A.5 shows we find no evidence for biased memory, at least in the short run. Participants do a slightly worse job in the followup survey (they answer 76% of the questions correctly instead of 82%) but their performance is almost identical for ingroup and outgroup articles.

4.2 Effects on Knowledge, Empathy, and Policy Support

We next examine three primary outcomes: knowledge regarding basic facts about the conflict, willingness to consider civilian casualties in military operations, and empathy

Table 5: Comprehension

	Dependent variable: share of correct answers					
	Israel	Jordan	Both	Israel	Jordan	Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Zero Price	0.538***	0.353***	0.523***	0.543***	0.306***	0.521***
	(0.027)	(0.069)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.085)	(0.026)
IG Article*Zero Price	0.1***	0.07	0.094***	0.097***	0.133	0.095***
	(0.035)	(0.105)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.119)	(0.034)
IG Victim Article	-0.086***	0.03	-0.072**	-0.085***	-0.009	-0.074**
	(0.031)	(0.083)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.097)	(0.03)
Individual Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reference Group Mean	0.288	0.208	0.277	0.288	0.208	0.277
Observations	1403	159	1562	1403	159	1562
R^2	0.468	0.238	0.433	0.493	0.442	0.471

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

toward outgroup civilians. In this section, we focus on the Israeli participants since we are underpowered to detect effects among our small sample of participant in Jordan.

Table 6 reveals that reading the articles had a strong and statistical significant effects on most of our outcomes. In these regressions, the ingroup and outgroup are compared both to people who read the neutral article (about Chinese victims), and to participants who did not read any article. As we pre-specified, we pool these groups because their outcomes are similar. First, we study the effect on beliefs regarding two objective facts related to outgroup victims. We find that the shares of Israelis who correctly agree that thousands of Gazan children dies in Israeli strikes increased from 25% to 36%. However, the treatment did not effect agreement with the fact that most of the victims in Gaza are civilians. This perhaps could be explained by the focus of the treatment article on the death of a child.

Second, reading about outgroup victims increases support for consideration of outgroup civilian casualties in military operations by 7.1 percentage points ($p < 0.01$), from a baseline of approximately 24%. This effect is meaningful since public opinion can determine not only whether a country goes to war or ends a war, but also how the war is conducted. Armies constantly make decision on what is acceptable number of civilian casualties and they are more likely to try to prevent civilian deaths when public pressure (within or outside the military) argues that these the suffering of the outgroup should be taken into account.

Third, compared to reading about ingroup casualties, exposure to outgroup victim articles increases stated empathy toward outgroup civilians by 11.1 percentage points in Israel ($p < 0.01$), from a baseline of approximately 30%. To study whether the articles affected behavior and not only self-reported answers, we use our behavior outcome regarding donations. The last column of Table 6 finds a statistically significant effect on this outcome. The probability of donating money to a charity that works with the outgroup increases from 4% to 6.8% ($p < 0.05$) for participants assigned the outgroup

article, compared to participants assigned the ingroup article. .

These effects represent the ITT of article assignment, however not all individuals assigned to an article necessarily read it. To estimate the effect of reading the article's content, we use an instrumental variable approach, where our independent variable is fully comprehending the article as proxied by answer all comprehension questions correctly and our independent variable is treatment assignment. We present the results of the average treatment effect on the treated in Table 7, and find effects that roughly 50% larger than our ITT estimates. This approach requires a stronger exclusion restriction assumption that the entire effect of the articles on policy preferences, empathy, and knowledge is driven through reading the article sufficiently to answer the comprehension questions, and therefore, should be interpreted more carefully. Overall, the effect presented in this section are quite large. It is perhaps surprising that one article can have such large effects. One potential explanation for the magnitudes is that individuals are rarely exposed to articles about outgroup victims. As we discussed in Section, most mainstream news channels mostly cover ingroup victims. Even when the outgroup victim is covered, it is almost always covered through the narrative of the ingroup, in contrast to the CNN articles participants were exposed to.

A follow-up survey conducted 1-7 days after the main experiment shows that many of these effects persist (See Table 8). The impact on stated empathy toward outgroup civilians remains just as large as in the immediate aftermath, with a 12.1 percentage point difference between outgroup and ingroup article conditions ($p < 0.05$). Similarly, the effect on considering outgroup civilian casualties persists, with a 9 percentage point difference ($p < 0.05$). This persistence is notable given that participants were exposed to just a single article in a controlled setting. It suggests that systematic differences in news consumption patterns could have lasting effects on attitudes and beliefs in conflict settings.

Table 6: ITT Effects on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Empathy

	Disagree: Most killed are militants	Agree: Thousands of children killed	Consider OG's Suffering	Empathy towards OG (Stated)	Empathy towards OG (Donation)
IG Zero Price	0.032	0.037	−0.025	−0.037	−0.017
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.012)
OG Zero Price	0.024	0.109***	0.045*	0.074**	0.011
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.014)
OG - IG	-0.008	0.073**	0.071**	0.111***	0.028*
	(0.690)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.042)
Reference group mean	0.121	0.250	0.240	0.331	0.057
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X
N	1717	1717	1717	1717	1717
R2	0.095	0.144	0.300	0.285	0.056

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The table presents estimated coefficients on the effect of assigned articles and prices. IG Zero Price indicates the individual was assigned to read about ingroup victims and the price of reading was 0 which assures exposure. OG Zero Price indicates the same for outgroup victims. The reference group are those who assigned a neutral article or a price of 100 points which means they were most likely not presented with the articles. The 'OG - IG' difference calculates the estimeted difference in effect between the two groups. Its p-value was calculated using a T-test.

The sample includes only participants from Israel who were assigned a reading price of either 0 or 100 points. Standard errors are robust.

Table 7: LATE Effects on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Empathy

	Disagree: Most killed are militants	Agree: Thousands of children killed	Consider OG's Suffering	Empathy towards OG (Stated)	Empathy towards OG (Donation)
IG Read	0.051	0.061	−0.035	−0.055	−0.025
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.019)
OG Read	0.040	0.177***	0.072*	0.115**	0.017
	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.022)
OG - IG	-0.011	0.116**	0.107**	0.170***	0.042*
	(0.735)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.044)
Reference group mean	0.121	0.250	0.240	0.331	0.057
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X
N	1717	1717	1717	1717	1717
R2	0.096	0.136	0.297	0.284	0.053

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The table presents estimated 2SLS coefficients on the effect of reading articles discussing victims from the individual's ingroup or outgroup. IG Read indicates the individual read about ingroup victims (estimated via the assigned article and price). OG Read indicates the same for outgroup victims. The reference group are those who read a neutral article or nothing at all. The 'OG - IG' difference calculates the estimeted difference in effect between the two groups. Its p-value was calculated using a T-test.

The sample includes only participants from Israel who were assigned a reading price of either 0 or 100 points. Standard errors are robust.

Table 8: Persistent of Effects on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Empathy

	Disagree: Most killed are militants	Agree: Thousands of children killed	Consider OG's Suffering	Empathy towards OG (Stated)
IG Zero Price	0.028	0.028	−0.034	−0.041
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.025)
OG Zero Price	0.022	0.107***	0.055*	0.081**
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.027)
OG - IG	-0.006	0.079**	0.090***	0.121***
	(0.786)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Reference group mean	0.122	0.248	0.241	0.322
Individual controls	X	X	X	X
N	1449	1449	1449	1449
R2	0.092	0.157	0.310	0.284

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The table presents estimated coefficients on the effect of assigned articles and prices. IG Zero Price indicates the individual was assigned to read about ingroup victims and the price of reading was 0 which assures exposure. OG Zero Price indicates the same for outgroup victims. The reference group are those who assigned a neutral article or a price of 100 points which means they were most likely not presented with the articles. The 'OG - IG' difference calculates the estimeted difference in effect between the two groups. Its p-value was calculated using a T-test.

The sample includes only participants from Israel who were assigned a reading price of either 0 or 100 points. Standard errors are robust.

4.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Demand for News

A key question is whether the effects of news exposure vary with participants' ex-ante willingness to read such news. This speaks to whether selective exposure matters: if those who choose to avoid outgroup victim news would not be affected by it anyway if they encountered it, then consumption patterns might be less consequential. Our unique design allows us to answer that question by analyzing heterogeneity based on participants' WTP.

We find no evidence that effects are smaller among participants who would typically avoid such news. Table 9 tests whether the effects of being assigned an article about outgroup victims is smaller among participants who avoid such articles. Specifically, we interact the article assignment with the gap in WTP between the ingroup and outgroup treatment articles. The point estimates of the interaction terms are close to zero and not statistically significant. It is possible that our measure of news preference is too noisy since it focuses only on the treatment articles. In Appendix A.4 we use the mean differences in WTP for each participants across all ingroup and outgroup victim articles, and still do not find substantial heterogeneity.

These findings suggest that selective exposure to different victim narratives likely plays a meaningful role in sustaining gaps in knowledge, attitudes, and policy preferences across conflict parties. The fact that exposure affects even those who would choose to avoid such information implies that systematic differences in news consumption may contribute to persistent disagreements about basic facts and appropriate policies.

Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects by WTP for the Treatment Articles

	Disagree: Most killed are militants	Agree: Thousands of children killed	Consider OG's Suffering	Empathy towards OG (Stated)	Empathy towards OG (Donation)
OG Zero Price	−0.007	0.071*	0.071**	0.115***	0.028*
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.014)
WTP Difference	−0.051***	−0.016	−0.025	−0.045**	−0.015*
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.007)
OG Zero Price * WTP Difference	0.067**	−0.021	−0.013	−0.005	−0.009
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.011)
Reference group mean	0.121	0.250	0.240	0.331	0.057
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X
N	1064	1064	1064	1064	1064
R2	0.115	0.155	0.318	0.319	0.082

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The table presents estimated coefficients on the effect of assigned articles whether they differ by individual differences in WTP valuations. OG Zero Price indicates the individual was assigned to read about outgroup victims. The reference group are those who were assigned an ingroup article.

Treatment WTP Diff is the standardised difference between the two articles' WTP values calculated per person (IG victims - OG Victims). The sample includes only participants from Israel who were assigned a reading price of 0 and either an IG or OG victim article.

5 Conclusions

This paper provides experimental evidence on how social identity shapes news consumption during conflict and how exposure to different victim narratives affects knowledge and attitudes. Using incentivized experiments in Israel and Jordan, we document systematic avoidance of news about outgroup civilian casualties, even when such avoidance carries direct monetary costs. The gap in willingness to pay between articles about ingroup and outgroup civilian victims is substantial, equivalent to 35-50% of baseline WTP. Several pieces of evidence point to social identity as the key mechanism driving these patterns.

The consequences of selective exposure appear meaningful. When randomly assigned to read about outgroup civilian casualties, participants display increased empathy toward the outgroup, greater willingness to consider civilian casualties in military operations, and are more likely to hold correct beliefs about basic facts of the conflict. These effects persist for at least several days and are not smaller among participants who would typically avoid such news. This suggests that systematic differences in news consumption may help sustain gaps in knowledge and attitudes across conflict parties.

Our findings have several implications. First, they suggest that divergent media coverage during conflict may reflect demand-side factors as much as supply-side editorial decisions. Second, they highlight social identity as an important driver of information acquisition choices, extending previous work on identity in economics to the domain of news consumption. Third, they suggest that exposure to news about outgroup suffering can affect attitudes and beliefs even among those predisposed to avoid such information.

These results point to both challenges and opportunities for reducing conflict-related polarization. While social identity considerations create systematic biases in information consumption, our finding that exposure affects even those who would avoid such news suggests potential benefits from policies that increase exposure to diverse conflict narratives. Future work might explore how such exposure could be increased while respecting individual autonomy and accounting for identity-related preferences.

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Online Appendix

A Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Composition of Articles Participants were Asked About

CNN Headline	2010s	2023
Palestinian victims	2/5	2/7
Israeli victims	2/6	2/7
Ukrainian victims	2/4	3/5
Other disasters	1/3	1/3
Treatment articles	0	3
Attention check	1	

Table A.2: Randomization probabilities

Article Type	Israeli Victims	Gazan Victims	Chinese Victims
Minimum Price (0)	30%	30%	18%
Maximum Price (100)	10%	10%	0%
Uniformly random price	2% (dropped from analysis)		

Figure A.1: Examples of headline presented to participants



Figure A.2: Consideration for WTP between Ingroup and Outgroup Article based on an Open-Ended Question, Israel








Figure A.3: Time spent reading the articles

(a) Israel









(b) Jordan

Table A.3: WTP for New and Old Articles

	2010 Israel	2010 Jordan	2010 Both	2023 Israel	2023 Jordan	2023 Both
IG victim	11.764***	12.660***	13.738***	17.411***	13.534***	17.908***
	(1.176)	(1.391)	(1.094)	(0.883)	(0.851)	(0.703)
OG victim	-5.777***	2.909+		-4.156***	-0.823	
	(1.155)	(1.396)		(0.940)	(0.979)	
Individual FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Article FE			X			X
Reference Group Mean	41.77	37.63		42.99	37.86	
Num.Obs.	12271	1393	13664	19283	2189	21472
R2	0.745	0.726	0.748	0.712	0.713	0.716

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All S.E. clustered at article level.

Table A.4: Heterogeneous Effects by WTP for All Ingroup and Outgroup Articles

	Disagree: Most killed are militants	Agree: Thousands of children killed	Consider OG's Suffering	Empathy towards OG (Stated)	Empathy towards OG (Donation)
OG Zero Price	−0.005	0.073**	0.072**	0.116***	0.028*
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.014)
WTP Difference	−0.044***	−0.037	−0.025	−0.026	−0.016*
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)
OG Zero Price * WTP Difference	0.047*	−0.020	−0.028	−0.018	−0.003
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.011)
Reference group mean	0.121	0.250	0.240	0.331	0.057
Individual controls	X	X	X	X	X
N	1064	1064	1064	1064	1064
R2	0.111	0.161	0.321	0.315	0.081

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The table presents estimated coefficients on the effect of assigned articles whether they differ by individual differences in WTP valuations. OG Zero Price indicates the individual was assigned to read about outgroup victims. The reference group are those who were assigned an ingroup article.

Treatment WTP Diff is the standardised difference between the two article groups' average WTP values calculated per person (IG victim articles - OG Victim articles).

The sample includes only participants from Israel who were assigned a reading price of 0 and either an IG or OG victim article.

Table A.5: Recollection

	Dependent variable: share of correct answers					
	Israel	Jordan	Both	Israel	Jordan	Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Zero Price	0.476***	0.348***	0.469***	0.493***	0.473***	0.488***
	(0.026)	(0.115)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.151)	(0.026)
IG Article*Zero Price	0.003	-0.178	-0.004	-0.015	-0.404*	-0.027
	(0.038)	(0.163)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.229)	(0.038)
IG Victim Article	0.022	0.194	0.029	0.036	0.408**	0.046
	(0.035)	(0.144)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.184)	(0.035)
Individual Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reference Group Mean	0.293	0.355	0.297	0.293	0.355	0.297
Observations	1177	62	1239	1177	62	1239
R^2	0.391	0.194	0.378	0.437	0.521	0.425

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B Additional Analysis

B.1 Mechanisms Explaining the WTP Gap in Jordan

In section 3we discussed the main mechanisms explaining the gap in WTP between ingroup victim and outgroup victim articles in Israel. In this appendix, we discuss the mechanisms in Jordan using the same methods.


B.1.1 Instrumental considerations

Informational considerations Column (5) of Table A.3 shows that the gap in WTP persists even for articles about older events from the 2010s, where immediate instrumental value is minimal. We next use the article classification survey described in Section 2.2 to test whether participants provide a higher WTP for articles they are not familiar with. The results are very similar to the Israel sample. Column 2 of Table A.6 shows that participants actually display higher WTP for articles covering familiar events, contrary to what an information-value explanation would predict. Column 3 shows that article credibility is positively correlated with higher WTP (the effect is not statistically significant), but that even when controlling for credibility a large gap remains in WTP between ingroup and outgroup articles.

The main difference between the Israeli and Jordanian samples is that many more Jordanians mentioned instrumental consideration when asked why they offered a higher WTP for an ingroup victim article. Over 30% of participants mentioned that the article about outgroup victims seemed less reliable and close to 30% of victims mentioned that the article about ingroup victims contained more useful information. Figure A.5 shows

that reliability was also the most common answer participants mentioned in the open-ended question asking them to explain their WTP considerations.

Figure A.4: WTP Rationales, Ingroup vs Outgroup Articles, Jordan



Monetary considerations Further evidence is provided by the consideration participants report in Figure A.4. Like the Israeli sample, only a small share of Jordanian participants reported that they offered a higher WTP to an ingroup articles compared to an outgroup article because they thoughts it would be easier to get the reward for the ingroup article or because they thoughts they could get the reward for the outgroup articles without reading it,

B.1.2 Affective motives

A second potential explanation is that individual avoid the negative emotions associated with outgroup articles. We leverage the classification survey and control for whether the article is expected to cause negative emotions. Column 3 of Table A.6 does not find any correlation between WTP abd articles expected to induce negative emotions. Moreover, A.4 shows that a relatively small share of participants reported offering a higher WTP to an ingroup article over an outgroup articles because the outgroup article seemed sad.

B.1.3 Social identity factors

Social identity considerations are also a key mechanism in Jordan. First, table 1 shows that the gap in WTP is significantly larger among participants who report high levels of pride in their ingroup, these result hold both when defining identity based on nationality (Israeli vs Palestinian) and when defining it based on religion or ethnicity (Jew vs. Arab). Second, we find that controlling for whether participants think that it is important that people from their group will read an article ("Group norms") explains a substantial

portion of both the positive effect for ingroup victims and negative effect for outgroup victims (Column 7 of Table A.6). Third, like the Israeli sample, when Jordanian were asked directly about their rationales for giving high vs low WTP values, the common answer mentioned injunctive group considerations (Figure A.4).


Table A.6: WTP Based on Classification of Articles, Jordan

	Dependent variable: WTP							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
IG Victim	13.179***	7.987***	12.257***	13.197***	14.744***	14.358***	4.124**	4.257***
	(0.788)	(1.287)	(1.673)	(1.619)	(2.564)	(1.68)	(1.671)	(1.43)
OG Victim	0.664	0.218	1.383	0.644	0.791	-0.026	-1.278**	-4.199***
	(1.03)	(0.716)	(0.927)	(1.267)	(0.979)	(0.709)	(0.497)	(0.761)
Familiarity		2.523***						1.48**
		(0.414)						(0.636)
Credibility			0.756					-1.502*
			(0.726)					(0.781)
Negative Emotions				-0.018				0.415
				(0.865)				(0.834)
IG Positive Image					0.74			1.53**
					(0.839)			(0.743)
OG Positive Image						-0.905		-1.575**
						(0.657)		(0.624)
Group Norms							4.038***	5.603***
							(0.691)	(0.817)
R^2	0.705	0.048	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.049	0.052

Note: All S.E. are clustered at individual, article levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


IG Victim and *OG Victim* are dummy indicators. All other coefficients refer to a S.D change in the article characterization score. All specifications use only the Jordanian dataset, with 3,582 observations.

Figure A.5: Consideration for WTP between Ingroup and Outgroup Article based on an Open-Ended Question, Jordan



C Survey Screenshots

Figure A.6: Willingness to Pay Elicitiation



This figure displays examples of WTP elicitation from the Israeli survey. The two examples are for the two main treatment articles. The top text says "this is article X out of 19". We then present participants with the headline, along with its translation, and ask the following: "what is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this article? (reminder: those answering the bonus questions correctly will receive 90 points)".

Figure A.7: Attention Check Question



This figure displays examples of an attention check from the Israeli survey. The top text says "this is article 15 out of 19" (the actual position was randomized). We then present participants with the headline and ask the following: "what is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this article? (reminder: those answering the bonus questions correctly will receive 90 points)".