Causal Inference in Financial Event Studies*

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Abstract

We study financial event studies—empirical settings where asset market returns assess the impact of information or policy changes. We show that abnormal return estimators are sensitive to factor model misspecification, making them inconsistent estimators of causal effects. We demonstrate that staggered event timing can mitigate this issue in short-horizon studies but not in long-horizon analyses, where misspecification bias accumulates over time. Synthetic control methods emerge as a solution that avoids these issues by directly modeling counterfactual security paths without requiring correct specification of the factor structure. Our empirical applications to political connections (Acemoglu et al., 2016) and S&P 500 index inclusion (Greenwood & Sammon, 2025) demonstrate the practical implication of these methodological insights, particularly in settings that lack both short horizons and random event timing.

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1 Introduction

Financial event studies are among the most widely used empirical tools in financial economics, serving as a critical methodology for assessing how financial markets react to new information. Since the pioneering work of (Fama et al., 1969), researchers have employed event studies to examine the economic impact of corporate announcements, regulatory changes, and macroeconomic news across a variety of settings. The central premise of these studies is straightforward: if markets efficiently incorporate information, asset prices should adjust to reflect the economic consequences of an event. By measuring abnormal returns around event dates, researchers can quantify the market's assessment of an event's effect on firm value.

Despite their widespread use and intuitive appeal, the identification assumptions underlying financial event studies have rarely been examined through the lens of modern causal inference. This gap is particularly concerning given that similar empirical methodologies in other fields—such as difference-in-differences designs—have undergone substantial methodological scrutiny in recent years (e.g., De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020), Sun and Abraham (2021), and Goodman-Bacon (2021)). Moreover, the econometric framework typically used in financial event studies relies on correctly specified factor models to generate counterfactual returns, yet little attention has been paid to how factor model misspecification influences causal estimates.

In this paper, we bridge this gap by developing a potential outcomes framework for financial event studies and clarifying the conditions under which these studies identify causal effects. Our approach accommodates both short-horizon and long-horizon event windows, allowing us to analyze identification challenges that arise when studying immediate market reactions versus extended price responses. This distinction is crucial, as many influential studies in the literature examine long-horizon returns to investigate phenomena such as post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard & Thomas, 1989), long-run merger performance (Savor & Lu, 2009), and gradual market responses to other corporate events (Kwon & Tang, 2022).

Our analysis yields several important insights. First, we demonstrate that abnormal return estimators in financial event studies can be understood as attempting to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) by constructing counterfactual returns for treated securities. The typical approach—using a factor model estimated during a pre-event window to predict counterfactual returns during the event window—relies on both limited anticipation of the event and correct specification of the factor structure. When these conditions fail, abnormal returns may provide misleading estimates of the true causal effect, especially when there is only one time period that the event occurs.

Second, we show that the bias in abnormal return estimators due to factor model misspecification is generally negligible in short-horizon studies with multiple event timings, but

the bias can accumulate substantially in long-horizon analyses. This result provides formal justification for the common intuition among empirical researchers that model specification matters little for studies of immediate price reactions but becomes critically important for extended windows. The key insight is that while expected returns from factor exposures are typically small over short horizons (e.g., daily or weekly), they compound over longer horizons and can generate substantial bias if the factor structure is misspecified.

Third, we clarify how the assignment of events across securities and time affects identification. While randomized event timing can help mitigate concerns about factor-related bias in short-horizon studies, it does not guarantee identification in long-horizon analyses. We show that even with random timing, misspecified factor models can produce substantial bias in long-horizon studies if omitted factors exhibit drift or risk premia.

Fourth, we demonstrate that synthetic control methods (Abadie et al., 2010; Abadie & Cattaneo, 2021) offer a natural solution to the identification challenges in financial event studies. By directly modeling the counterfactual security path without requiring correct specification of the factor structure, synthetic control approaches can significantly reduce bias in both short-horizon with single events and long-horizon settings. This application represents a novel contribution to the financial event studies literature, where synthetic control methods have been underutilized despite their natural fit for the empirical task.

We illustrate our theoretical results through two empirical applications. First, we revisit Acemoglu et al. (2016), who study the role of political connections on stock returns following Timothy Geithner's nomination as Treasury Secretary. We show that the standard abnormal return approach may overstate the effect of political connections, as the event occurred during a period of market turbulence when factor model misspecification is particularly consequential. Using synthetic control methods, we show that the results from the paper disappear. This highlights the importance of abnormal return misspecification with single events.

Second, we examine S&P 500 index inclusion effects over several decades, following Greenwood and Sammon (2025). We find that, consistent with our analytic results, short-horizon price reactions are relatively robust to estimation method. However, we find that long-horizon pre-announcement drifts—often interpreted as evidence of anticipation or information leakage—are partially attributable to factor model misspecification. By implementing synthetic control approaches and propensity score matching based on firm characteristics, we can account for approximately half of the pre-announcement drift, suggesting that previous studies may have overstated the magnitude of anticipatory price movements.

Our findings have important implications for both the interpretation of existing financial event studies and the design of future research. Many influential findings in the literature rely on long-horizon abnormal returns to study phenomena such as post-announcement drift,

merger performance, and gradual information diffusion. Our results suggest that some of these findings may reflect factor model misspecification rather than genuine causal effects. At the same time, we provide a constructive way forward through synthetic control methods, which can significantly reduce bias while maintaining the intuitive appeal of the event study approach.

2 A simple example

In this section, we illustrate how the assignment of events in a financial event study framework affects the bias of estimators, using a stylized two factor case.

2.1 Model with Two Factors

Let $i = 1, \ldots, N$ index securities and $t = 1, \ldots, T$ index discrete time. Each security i may or may not experience an event at time T_i (possibly varying by i). If a security never experiences a return, we denote $T_i = \infty$. For this section, we assume the following "true" model for returns:

$$R_{i,t} \;=\; \alpha_i \;+\; \beta_{i,1}\, F_{1,t} \;+\; \beta_{i,2}\, F_{2,t} \;+\; \tau_{t-T_i} D_i \;+\; \varepsilon_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

where:

- $F_{1,t}$ and $F_{2,t}$ are two risk factors
- $\beta_{i,1}, \beta_{i,2}$ are constant factor loadings for security i,
- $D_i = 1(T_i \neq \infty)$, whether the event has occurred for security i at time t,
- τ_{t-T_i} is the effect of the event $t - T_i$ periods from the event,
- $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is a mean-zero idiosyncratic error.

As we discuss further in Section 3.1, we will assume that $\tau_\kappa = 0$ for $\kappa < 0$ or some larger lag. In other words, the event has no impact on prices before it occurs. This assumption is necessary for the abnormal returns assumption we will discuss below.

2.2 The abnormal returns estimator using one factor

We know that the asset has a true model of two factors, but imagine a researcher studying this asset only include the first factor $F_{1,t}$ in its "benchmark" model when estimating abnormal returns, following Campbell et al. (1997), Brown and Warner (1985), and Kothari and Warner

(2007) or other guidance. This may because the second factor is unobserved/unmeasured, or for reasons of parsimony. Let

$$\widehat{R}_{i,t}^{(0)} \;=\; \widehat{\alpha}_i \;+\; \widehat{\beta}_{i,1}\, F_{1,t}$$

be the predicted return under no treatment (estimated from pre-event data). Due to the omitted factor,

$$\hat{\beta}_{i,1} \to_p \beta_{i,1} + \beta_{i,2}\frac{Cov(F_{2,t}, F_{1,t})}{Var(F_{1,t})}. \tag{2}$$

The *abnormal return* on the day of the event for a single firm treated in period s is

$$AR_{i,0} \;=\; R_{i,s} \;-\; \widehat{R}_{i,s}^{(0)} \;\approx\; \tau_0 \;+\; \beta_{i,2}\left(F_{2,s} - \frac{Cov(F_{2,t}, F_{1,t})}{Var(F_{1,t})}F_{1,s}\right) + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

As a result, our estimator contains three terms: the firm treatment effect on the day of the event, the omitted variable bias from the second factor, adjusted for the factor correlation, and the idiosyncratic noise for the firm in period s. Note that if $F_{2,t}$ and $F_{1,t}$ are uncorrelated or independent, the omitted variable bias term simplifies to just $\beta_{i,2}F_{2,t}$. Regardless, because $F_{2,t}$ is omitted from the benchmark, if it is non-zero on average *after* the event, the difference $R_{i,t} - \widehat{R}_{i,t}^{(0)}$ will be biased relative to the true event effect τ_0.

Often, we will observe many treated firms at a single time period s, such that we consider the average abnormal return:

$$\overline{AR}_{s,0} = n_s^{-1}\sum_{i:T_i=s} AR_{i,0} \;\approx\; \tau_0 \;+\; \underbrace{\beta_{s,2}\left(F_{2,s} - \frac{Cov(F_{2,t}, F_{1,t})}{Var(F_{1,t})}F_{1,s}\right)}_{\text{asymptotic factor bias}} + \underbrace{n_s^{-1}\sum_{i:T_i=s}\varepsilon_{is}}_{\text{goes to zero with } n_s} \tag{4}$$

where $\beta_{s,2} = n_s^{-1}\sum_{i:T_i=s}\beta_{i,2}$ is the factor loadings for the average portfolio made up of securities experiencing the event in period s. While averaging across these many units helps average out the idiosyncratic error as $n_s \to \infty$, it has no impact on the omitted factor.

Intuitively, this result highlights that have many *cross-sectional units* does not help alleviate common shocks. Econometrically, this estimator is inconsistent, since it converges to a random variable – the value will vary as a function of the omitted factor times the factor loading for the firms experiencing the event (Andrews, 2005).

Of course, intuitively, in many applications the factor loadings are often not too large, and the underlying risk premia are, on average, typically small relative to τ_0. For example, the one-day index inclusion effect is estimated to be somewhere between 1-4%, depending on the time period. By comparison, the market return is, on average, 0.05%, two orders of magnitude smaller than the treatment effects. However, there are many periods when the market return can be far larger, such as during periods of market volatility. As a result, this bias can be

quite large. We will demonstrate this issue in simulations in Section 5 and empirically in Section 6.1.

One natural question is whether averaging over *many* events can solve this issue, analogous to a staggered difference-in-difference design. As we show in Section 3, the misspecified abnormal returns estimator will still be biased, even when the factor premia F_t are as-if randomly assigned:

$$\overline{AR}_{\kappa=0} \approx \tau_0 \; + \; E(\beta_{i,2}|T_i = s)\left(E(F_{2,s}) - \frac{Cov(F_{2,t}, F_{1,t})}{Var(F_{1,t})}E(F_{1,s})\right). \tag{5}$$

Again, this abnormal returns estimator has a bias term hanging around, but with enough events, this will average to a constant. This bias is the average effect of the omitted risk factor on the returns of a portfolio of firms experiencing the event.

The astute finance reader will note that this bias term is typically *quite* small in practice, since the average factor premium at the daily level is typically quite small relative to overall stock movements. Hence, while the abnormal return estimator is biased, the bias is nearly negligible for a short-horizon. For example, imagine the the factors were uncorrelated, and $E(F_{2,s})$ was 0.02 percent. Then, for a factor loading of 1.5, this bias would be 0.03 percent, which is quite small relative to many abnormal returns reported in the literature. However, if the factors are not as-if randomly drawn (e.g. the treated firms on a given day's factor loadings are correlated with the omitted factor on that day), then this bias could be larger.

An implication of this small bias is that the abnormal returns estimator is often quite close to the true treatment effect, even when the factor model is misspecified. Moreover, this bias could be small even for a model that ignores both factors, consistent with the simulation evidence in Brown and Warner (1985) that the form of the abnormal return estimator has limited effects on the estimates.[1] Of course, this small bias assumption crucially relies on the idea that the effect size, τ_0, is large. The presence of this bias will make smaller effects harder to detect.

However, this small bias can be larger for longer-horizon event studies, as we will discuss in Section 4.2. As we cumulate the abnormal returns over time, the bias term will accumulate, potentially leading to substantial bias in the estimated treatment effect. Intuitively, the bias documented above will be scaled by the length of the period: if the factor premium is 0.02 percent per day, then the bias will be proportional to 0.02 percent for a one-day event, 0.04 percent for a two-day event, and so on. For a 250 day period, the magnitude of the bias will

[1]The simulations in Brown and Warner (1985) are such that the event days are exactly randomly assigned across time: "Each time a security is selected, a hypothetical event day is generated. Events are selected with replacement, and are assumed to occur with equal probability on each trading day from July 2, 1962, through December 31, 1979."

be scaled by 5 percent which is quite large relative to many treatment effects. It could be negative if the factor loading is negative, or positive – the sign is ambiguous.

In all of the previous results, the inconsistency and bias of the estimator comes from the misspecified returns model. A challenge faced by many empirical practicioners is that the set of relevant factors is unknown or unobserved. In the next section, we will discuss how synthetic control methods can help alleviate this issue by directly modeling the counterfactual security path without requiring correct specification of the factor structure. We additionally discuss how random assignment of the event can help alleviate these issues.

3 Identification

This section formalizes the setup of our event study in the language of potential outcomes. We begin by introducing the basic notation (Section 3.1), defining potential returns and treatment indicators for each security over time. We then specify the causal estimands of interest (Section 3.2), clarifying what it means to identify a treatment effect in an event study context. Finally, we discuss how these causal quantities relate to traditional event study methods based on "abnormal returns" and factor model adjustments.

3.1 Setup

Let $i = 1, 2, \ldots, N$ index securities (e.g., stocks), and let t index discrete time periods (e.g., daily or monthly observations), $t = 1, 2, \ldots, T$. Let $D_{i,t}$ be a binary variable that identicates whether an event has occured. We assume the event is irreversible:

Assumption 1 (Irreversibility of Treatment)**.** $D_{i,1} = 0, \quad D_{i,t} = 1 \quad \textit{if } D_{i,t-1} = 1 \forall i.$

This assumption is in line with many financial event studies, where an event (e.g., an earnings announcement, merger, or policy change) occurs at a single point in time and does not reverse. It is also implied by Equation (1), and is a common assumption in many difference-in-difference settings (Callaway & Sant'Anna, 2021).

Let the treatment timing T_i denote when the event occurs for security i,

$$T_i = \begin{cases} t & \text{if security } i \text{ is treated (event occurs) at time } t, \\ \infty & \text{if never treated.} \end{cases} \tag{6}$$

In many empirical settings, there is a single event date t_0 (e.g., an earnings announcement, merger announcement, or policy change) for all securities, so $T_i = t_0$ (and ∞ otherwise), which is isomorphic to writing $T_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Let $\mathcal{C}$ denote the set of securities where $T_i = \infty$, and the set of possible event timings $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \{1, \ldots, T\}$.

Now, we setup the potential outcomes framework for our returns. Let $R_{i,t}(s)$ be the potential return for security i at time t if it has the event occur in period s, and $R_{i,t}(\infty)$ the potential return in the absence of any event. Because a security cannot be both treated and untreated, we only observe one of the potential returns for each (i,t):

$$R_{i,t} = R_{i,t}(\infty) + \sum_{s=2}^{T} (Y_{i,t}(s) - Y_{i,t}(\infty)) 1(T_i = s). \tag{7}$$

Next, we turn to a crucial modeling assumption about the structure of expected returns, based on a long literature in asset pricing (Chamberlain & Rothschild, 1983; Connor, 1984).

Assumption 2 (Linear Factor Model of Expected Returns)**.** *We assume that in the absence of the event, each security i's return follows a linear factor model with intercept α_i, K time varying factors $\mathbf{F}_t$ and factor weights β_i, such that*

$$E\left(R_{it}(\infty) \mid T_i = s, \mathbf{F}_t\right) = \alpha_s + \beta_s \mathbf{F}_t, \tag{8}$$

where $\alpha_s = E(\alpha_i | T_i = s), \beta_s = E(\beta_i | T_i = s)$.

Note that this assumption is quite strong. For example, it does not allow for changing factor loadings (Barberis et al., 2005). It also does not allow for the market to *anticipate* an event (rationally) in the future if the event does not eventually occur. In future work, we will relax this assumption (this issue is considered in a series of papers in the finance literature, e.g. Prabhala (1997), that consider conditional events).

There may be cases where assignment of T_i in time and across units can be useful for identification. We will consider two types of assignment mechanisms: random timing and random assignment. Let $\boldsymbol{X}_i = (\alpha_i, \beta_i)$ be the vector of security-specific parameters. Let $\boldsymbol{F} = (F_1, \ldots, F_T)$ be the vector of factor realizations.

Definition 1. Let $p_t(\boldsymbol{X}_i, \boldsymbol{F}) = \Pr(T_i = t | \boldsymbol{X}_i, \boldsymbol{F})$ be the probability that firm i experiences the event at time t, given its characteristics X_i and the vector of factor realizations. We refer to this as the *timing propensity score.*

We can consider special versions of the timing propensity score:

Assumption 3 (Random Assignment)**.** $p_t(\boldsymbol{X}_i, \boldsymbol{F}) = p_t(\boldsymbol{F})$*, implying that which firms experience events is independent of their characteristics $\boldsymbol{X}_i$. This is analagous to a randomized intervention.*

Assumption 4 (Random Timing)**.** ***Random Timing:*** $p_t(\boldsymbol{X}_i, \boldsymbol{F}) = p_t(\boldsymbol{X}_i)$*, implying that event timing is unrelated to market factors $\boldsymbol{F}$.*

We will not require Assumption 3 for identification, but it will be useful for understanding the properties of our estimators. Moreover, we will show (unsurprisingly) that random assignment implies that simple difference-in-means estimators are unbiased relative to the a (misspecified) abnormal return estimator.

3.2 Average Treatment Effect Estimands for Event Studies

We are interested in identifying causal effects of the event (treatment) on returns. Commonly, researchers focus on the *average treatment effect on the treated* (ATT) over some event window. We will build these treatment effect parameters from the building block of individual treatment effects:

$$\tau_i(s,t) = R_{i,t}(s) - R_{i,t}(\infty), \tag{9}$$

the difference between the treated and untreated returns in period s for firm i that is treated in period t. Then, we can define an ATT:[2]

$$\tau(s,t)^{ATT} = E(\tau_i(s,t) \mid T_i = s) = E(R_{i,t}(s) \; - \; R_{i,t}(\infty) \mid T_i = s). \tag{10}$$

Often, researchers will combine these ATTs to study effects relative to an event time. This can be written as:

$$\theta_\kappa = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \tau(s, s+\kappa)^{ATT}, \tag{11}$$

where w_s denotes the relative weight put on each event timing. The weights w_s can be chosen based on the propensity score structure. Under random timing, a natural choice is $w_s = \frac{N_s}{\sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}} N_{s'}}$, where N_s is the number of firms with $T_i = s$. This corresponds to the approach in Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021, where weights are based on the relative density of each treatment timing group. This combines the different event timings.

Generally, there may be a vector of treatment effects that a researcher is interested in, such as the ATT in each period from the event to H periods after, or some functional transformation, such as the *cumulative* treatment effect over the period (which is analogous to the cumulative abnormal return commonly studied in the literature): $\theta_H^{CATT} = \sum_{\kappa=0}^{H} \theta_\kappa$.

Generally, the ATE will be unidentified in our setting, but we can identify the ATT. Note that the ATT requires us to estimate the counterfactual outcome return for the treated group:

$$\tau(s,t)^{ATT} \; = \; \underbrace{E(R_{i,\,T_i+\kappa} | T_i \neq \infty)}_{\text{observed}} \; - \; \underbrace{E(R_{i,\,T_i+\kappa}(0) | T_i \neq \infty)}_{\text{counterfactual}}. \tag{12}$$

We now turn to the relevant assumptions for identifying these treatment effects.

[2] Note we can define equivalent ATEs, but they are not identified, and hence we ignore them.

3.3 Identifying Assumptions

In addition to our model of factor returns, we will need to make an assumption on when the events can begin to have an effect.

Assumption 5 (Limited Anticipation)**.** *For all securities i and all time periods $t < T_i - \delta$, the potential returns are unaffected by the future treatment:*

$$R_{i,t}(T_i) = R_{i,t}(\infty) \quad \forall t < T_i - \delta \tag{13}$$

Remark 1. Since we can write

$$E(R_{i,t}(T_i) \mid T_i = s, \boldsymbol{F}_t) = E(R_{i,t}(\infty) \mid T_i = s, \boldsymbol{F}_t) + \tau(t,s)^{ATT} \tag{14}$$

$$= \alpha_s + \beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_t + \tau(s,t)^{ATT}, \tag{15}$$

Assumption 5 implies that $\tau(s,t)^{ATT} = 0$ for all $t < T_i - \delta$. This means that the event has no impact on the returns of the treated group prior to the event.

This assumption implies that the treated group cannot have an impact from the announcement prior to the date of the release. There is obvious evidence in the finance literature of hidden information leaking out, with prices responding beforehand (e.g. Schwert (1996)). Indeed, this is often pointed to evidence for the strong version of the efficient markets hypothesis. Hence, limited anticipation will be necessary to set a benchmark for when leakage has not yet occurred. This will allow the researcher to identify the periods in which we can estimate the counterfactual returns. This is the assumption necessary to use the pre-event estimation window commonly used in financial event studies (Campbell et al., 1997; Kothari & Warner, 2007).

However, it is important to distinguish between selection into the treatment (e.g. $\{R_{it}(s)\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ being correlated T_i) and anticipation of the treatment. The former is quite plausible, as we see in our analysis of the S&P 500 index inclusion effect in Section 6.2 – firms that are growing and having a large market cap are more likely to be selected into the S&P. The latter will bias our estimates of the true treatment effect, and can be caused by market participants anticipating the event. We will discuss this further in future work.

3.4 Estimators

Now consider the following estimators. First, consider the canonical abnormal returns model used in finance research (Campbell et al., 1997; Brown & Warner, 1985). We define an observed set of $\boldsymbol{F}_t^o$, and then estimate (using OLS), $(\hat{\alpha}_i, \hat{\beta}_i)$ using data prior to $T_i - \delta$:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \boldsymbol{F}_t^o + \varepsilon_{it},\ t < T_i - \delta. \tag{16}$$

Hence, $\hat{\alpha}_i, \hat{\beta}_i$ are the squared minimizers of a linear model for a stock's returns, using observed factors (which may include no factors, or a single factor, or many).

Definition 2 (Abnormal returns estimator)**.** Define the predicted value of R_{it} for a given $\boldsymbol{F}_t^o$ and estimated $\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}$ as $\hat{R}_{it} = \hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\beta}_i \boldsymbol{F}_t^o$. Hence,

$$AR_{it} = R_{it} - \hat{R}_{it} \tag{17}$$

and

$$\tau^{AR}(s,t) = E(AR_{i,t}|T_i = s) = E(R_{i,t}|T_i = s) - E(\hat{R}_{it}|T_i = s) \tag{18}$$

We next consider two alternative methods to estimation. The first is a simple difference-in-means estimator:

Definition 3 (Difference-in-means estimator)**.** The difference-in-means estimator is defined as:

$$\hat{\tau}^{cont}(s,t) = E(R_{i,t}|T_i = s) - E(R_{i,t}|i \in \mathcal{C}) \tag{19}$$

$$\hat{\theta}_\kappa^{cont} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \hat{\tau}^{cont}(s, s+\kappa). \tag{20}$$

This estimator is the difference between the average return of the treated group and the average return of the untreated group. If the control group includes all equities, and is weighted by market cap, then this estimator is equivalent to the "market-adjusted-return model" (Campbell et al., 1997; Brown & Warner, 1985).

Second, we consider a synthetic control estimator (Abadie & Cattaneo, 2021) that uses the pre-event data to construct a synthetic control group:

Definition 4 (Synthetic control estimator)**.** Let $\overline{R}_{s,t} = E(R_{it}|T_i = s)$ be the average return of the treated group at time t for event timing s. The synthetic control estimator is defined as:

$$\hat{\tau}^{synth}(s,t) = \overline{R}_{s,t} - \sum_{j:j \in \mathcal{C}} \hat{\omega}_j R_{j,t} \hat{\theta}_\kappa^{synth} \qquad = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \hat{\tau}^{synth}(s, s+\kappa). \tag{21}$$

where $\hat{\omega}_j$ is chosen using a synthetic control estimator to minimize

$$\hat{\omega} = \arg\min_{\omega} \sum_{t < s-\delta} (\overline{R}_{s,t} - \sum_{j:j \in \mathcal{C}} \omega_j R_{j,t})^2. \tag{22}$$

Note that for our estimator, we focus on using the portfolio of securities treated in period s as a single unit ($\overline{R}_{s,t}$) rather than the individual returns. This approach is debated within the synthetic control literature, but in the financial setting, studying a portfolio of firms in this way is quite natural.

We will need to make the assumption that there exists a portfolio from the set of control securities that can exactly replicate the returns of the treated group. This is a strong assumption, but it is often made in the synthetic control literature. These weights, however, do not need to be known.

Assumption 6. *There exists a set of weights $\{\omega_s^*\}_{j\in\mathcal{C}}$ for each event period such that*

$$\overline{R}_{s,t} = \sum_{j:j\in\mathcal{C}} \omega_{s,j}^* R_{j,t} \quad \forall t < s - \delta. \tag{23}$$

In practice, this assumes that there are a set of stocks who construct an exact replicating portfolio for the set of treated of stocks. This is quite unlikely if there are only a few stocks in the treated stocks. However, if there are many treated firms, this is more likely to hold. In future work, we can also consider the case where we allow for imperfect fit, as in Abadie and L'hour (2021) and Ben-Michael et al. (2021, 2022).

It is also important to note that in many synthetic control approaches, the weights are required to be non-negative. This is done to ensure that the synthetic control is a convex combination of the control units. This is a restrictive assumption in finance – it would disallow the opportunity to short stocks, and significantly lower the likelihood of generating a matching portfolio and spanning the set of risk factors. Hence, this assumption is not necessary for our estimator, and we will not impose it. In fact, many other synthetic style methods (such as matrix completion methods) should work well in this setting as well. We defer this to future work.[3]

We can now consider our first set of results.

Proposition 1. *Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 5 hold. Then,*

1. *In finite samples, the estimators differ from their target estimands as a function of how*

[3]In Baker, Gelbach, et al. (2020), the authors explore the benefits of these methods for single firm event studies and find that synthetic control and matrix completion can do better than abnormal returns using Monte Carlo simulations. However, they do not explore the analytic properties of these methods for identifying the ATT.

closely the constructed counterfactual portfolio matches the treated portfolio:

$$\tau^{AR}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} = (\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_t - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}_t^o) \tag{24}$$

$$\hat{\tau}^{cont}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} = (\alpha_s - \alpha_\infty) + (\beta_s - \beta_\infty)\boldsymbol{F}_t \tag{25}$$

$$\hat{\tau}^{synth}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} = (\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s^{synth}) + (\beta_s - \hat{\beta}_s^{synth})\boldsymbol{F}_t, \tag{26}$$

where $\hat{\alpha}_s = E(\hat{\alpha}_i | T_i = s)$, $\hat{\beta}_s = E(\hat{\beta}_i | T_i = s)$, $\alpha_s = E(\alpha_i | T_i = s)$, $\beta_s = E(\beta_i | T_i = s)$, $\alpha_\infty = E(\alpha_i | T_i = \infty)$, $\beta_\infty = E(\beta_i | T_i = \infty)$. $\hat{\beta}_s^{synth} = \sum_{j:j\in\mathcal{C}} \hat{\omega}_j \beta_j$, *and* $\hat{\alpha}_s^{synth} = \sum_{j:j\in\mathcal{C}} \hat{\omega}_j \alpha_j$.

2. *If* $n_s, n_c, T \to \infty$, *then asymptotically, the synthetic control estimator is unbiased, but the other two estimators are inconsistent and converge to a random variable that is a function of the factor realizations:*

$$\tau^{AR}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} \to_p (\alpha_s - \tilde{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_t - \tilde{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}_t^o) \tag{27}$$

$$\hat{\tau}^{cont}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} \to_p (\alpha_s - \alpha_\infty) + (\beta_s - \beta_\infty)\boldsymbol{F}_t \tag{28}$$

$$\hat{\tau}^{synth}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} \to_p 0. \tag{29}$$

3. *If Assumption 3 holds, then the difference-in-means estimator is asymptotically unbiased, even with* T *fixed:*

$$\hat{\tau}^{cont}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} \to_p 0. \tag{30}$$

4. *If* $\boldsymbol{F}_t^o = \boldsymbol{F}_t \; \forall \; t$, *then the abnormal return estimator is consistent:*

$$\tau^{AR}(s,t) - \tau(s,t)^{ATT} \to_p 0. \tag{31}$$

The most complex part of this proof, proof of asymptotic unbiasedness of the synthetic control estimator, follows directly from Ferman (2021), who show that the synthetic control estimator is asymptotically unbiased under the assumption of exact matching. The other two results follow from the assumptions and the definition of the estimators.

Remark 2. Both the misspecified abnormal return estimator and the difference-in-means estimator in a given time period are inconsistent. Both converge to a random variable that is a linear combination of the two factors, but the linear combination varies depends on the factor loadings (and factor correlation).[4] In contrast, the synthetic control estimator is consistent and converges to the true effect. If the abnormal return estimator is correctly specified, then it is also consistent.

[4]These inconsistencies are similar to the inconsistencies highlighted in Theorem 1 of Andrews (2005).

We next consider how these results change if there are multiple event periods.

Theorem 1 (Bias in multiple event periods)**.** *Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 5 hold. Then,*

1. *In finite samples, the estimators differ from their target estimands as a function of how closely the constructed counterfactual portfolio matches the treated portfolio:*

$$\hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{ar} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \left((\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa}) \right) \tag{32}$$

$$\hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{cont} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s ((\alpha_s - \alpha_{\infty}) + (\beta_s - \beta_{\infty}) F_t) \tag{33}$$

$$\hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{synth} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \left((\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s^{synth}) + (\beta_s - \hat{\beta}_s^{synth}) F_t \right). \tag{34}$$

2. *Then, if $n_s, n_c, T \to \infty$ and $p_t(\boldsymbol{X}_i, \boldsymbol{F}) > \epsilon_i$ for a non-trival share of $t \in \mathcal{S}$, then asymptotically, the synthetic control estimator is unbiased, but the other two estimators are biased and converge to a weighted combination of conditional expected risk premia:*

$$\hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{ar} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} = E\left((\alpha_s - \tilde{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} - \tilde{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa}) \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) \tag{35}$$

$$\hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{cont} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} = E\left((\alpha_s - \alpha_{\infty}) + (\beta_s - \beta_{\infty}) F_t \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) \tag{36}$$

$$\hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{synth} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} \to_p 0. \tag{37}$$

3. *If in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then the difference-in-means estimator is asymptotically unbiased, even with T fixed.*

4. *If instead Assumption 4 holds, then the abnormal return and difference-in-means estimators can be written as:*

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{ar} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} &= E\left(\alpha_s - \tilde{\alpha}_s \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) && (38) \\ &+ E\left(\beta_i \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) E\left(\boldsymbol{F}_t \right) && (39) \\ &- E\left(\tilde{\beta}_i \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) E\left(\boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa} \right) && (40) \\ \hat{\theta}_{\kappa}^{cont} - \theta_{\kappa}^{ATT} &= E\left(\alpha_s - \alpha_{\infty} \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) + E\left(\beta_s - \beta_{\infty} \mid T_i \in \mathcal{S} \right) E\left(\mathbf{F}_t \right) && (41) \end{aligned}$$

4 Discussion of estimator performance in different settings

4.1 Negligible bias in short-run (high-frequency) event studies

A common phrase described in event studies is that the structure of the model used in τ^{AR} does not have significant impacts on the estimated effects. For example, in footnote 5, Shleifer

(1986) states "The [index inclusion] results were not materially different when returns were not corrected for market movements. Similarly, combining the before and after estimation periods did not make much difference." Or in Edmans (2012) "I use the standard short event-study window so that the calculation of abnormal returns is relatively insensitive to the benchmark asset pricing model used."

We can show why short-run abnormal return models work quite well, regardless of modeling choices, using our results from the previous section. First, consider the estimated ATT for a stock market event on announcement day on a given day, $\tau^{AR}(s,s)$. The bias in this estimate relative to $\tau(s,t)^{ATT}$ is:

$$\tau^{AR}(s,s) - \tau^{ATT}(s,s) = (\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_s - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}_s^o). \tag{42}$$

First, note $(\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s)$ is typically quite small. One reason is because the average return in excess of aggregate risk exposure for the portfolio of assets experiencing the event in period s, α_s, is typically quite small (e.g. under many models of returns, this should be zero for a full portfolio (Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1983)). Hence, α is ruled out as a source of error for much of our discussion.

Second, the error component associated with the factors, $(\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_t - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}_t^o)$ is likely very small in the short run. To see why, consider the extreme case where $\boldsymbol{F}_t^o = 0$, and hence no factors are considered. Then, it is a simple exercise to consider how large $\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_t$ can be in a daily return. Note that this effect is typically quite small *on average* – for example, the average daily return for the market factor is 0.05%. However, there is substantial variation in the size of these factors, with an interquartile range of 1% and very large fat tails. Hence, the correlation of the factors with the timing of the event is very important. This will be apparent in our first empirical example of Acemoglu et al., 2016. Formally,

Proposition 2. *Hold fixed $\alpha, \beta, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}$ and $\mathcal{F}_t^o$. Then, $|\tau^{AR}(s,s) - \tau^{ATT}(s,s)|$ is increasing in $|F_t|$ for entries where β_s is non-zero.*

Remark 3. Let $|\beta_s F_t|/|\tau^{ATT}(s,t)| = a(s,t)$ be the relative size of the aggregate factor impact compared to the treatment effect size. If $a(s,t)$ is small, then the percentage bias for $\tau^{AR}(s,t)$ will be small (so long as the estimated model does not make the estimate significantly worse).

Remark 4. The volatility of $|\beta_s F_t|$ is time varying (e.g. the market is much more volatile in some time periods), then there some periods where $a(s,t)$ is large, and the percentage bias may be large.

Remark 5. The percentage bias may be large simply if $|\tau^{ATT}(s,t)|$ is small. Hence, these biases become much more significant when the effects are smaller in size.

Now consider the aggregated ATT θ_κ^{ATT}:

$$\hat{\theta}_\kappa^{ar} - \theta_\kappa^{ATT} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \left((\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa}) \right) \tag{43}$$

Here, $\sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s (\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s)$ is even more likely to be zero, as the portfolio across all events likely has small alpha. The second term, $\sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \left(\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa} \right)$, can be written as

$$\sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \left(\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa} \right) = E \left(\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}^o_{s+\kappa} \mid s \in \mathcal{S} \right), \tag{44}$$

integrating over the different event time periods. Assumption 4 assumes that factors are randomly drawn and the factor loadings of the firms who are treated are not correlated with the factor draw on a given day. Thus, if event timings are *random*, such that $E(\boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} \mid s \in \mathcal{S}) = E(\boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa})$, then we can effectively assume $E(\boldsymbol{F}_{s+\kappa} \mid s \in \mathcal{S}) \approx 0$ (in the case of the market, average daily return is four basis points).

Hence, for θ_k^{AR}, so long as the event timings are random across time, the choice of the model is irrelevant for point identification.

Corollary 1. *If the timing of $\mathcal{S}$ is random, then θ_k^{AR} is approximately unbiased, regardless of the choice of $\boldsymbol{F}_t^o$.*

4.2 Increasing cumulative bias in long-run event studies

Researchers are often interested in the trends or cumulative impact of events on returns. These are sometimes referred to as cumulative abnormal returns or buy-and-hold abnormal returns (referring to additive vs. geometric return differences). This gets mapped to different economic and behavioral theories about how the market processes information (e.g. Daniel et al. (1998) is a theory to explain these effects from a behavioral perspective; Kwon and Tang (2022) consider 90 day post-announcement effects relative to announcement day effects).

Some papers have pointed to flaws in studying these types of long-run perspectives – for example, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) highlight the flaws in the inference around long-run abnormal return studies of firm activity. We use our results to highlight exactly how these problems become amplified as we focus on the long-run.

Fix our aggregate average treatment effect estimand for a single event timing s to be

$$\tau^{AATT}(s) = \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K_0} \tau(s, s+\kappa) \tag{45}$$

and over all timings

$$\tau^{AATT} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} w_s \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K_0} \tau(s, s+\kappa). \tag{46}$$

Our estimators are analogous, summing up over the different estimators. For example,

$$\hat{\tau}^{AR,AATT}(s) = \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K_0} \hat{\tau}^{AR}(s, s+\kappa). \tag{47}$$

Now consider the impact of cumulating the bias over time:

$$\hat{\tau}^{AR,AATT}(s) - \tau^{AATT}(s) = K_0(\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s) + \beta_s \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F_{s+\kappa} - \hat{\beta}_s \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F^o_{s+\kappa} \tag{48}$$

$$\hat{\tau}^{cont,AATT}(s) - \tau^{AATT}(s) = K_0(\alpha_s - \alpha_\infty) + (\beta_s - \beta_\infty) \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F_{s+\kappa} \tag{49}$$

$$\hat{\tau}^{synth,AATT}(s) - \tau^{AATT}(s) = K_0(\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}^{synth}_s) + (\beta_s - \hat{\beta}^{synth}_s) \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F_{s+\kappa}. \tag{50}$$

Note that the bias in these estimators is intimately related to the properties of $\sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F_{s+\kappa}$ – the cumulative sum of daily returns for the different factors. Unlike in the short-run, factors are expected to have a positive drift associated with (as the risk of the factors leads to positive expected return). Hence, we can rewrite $\sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F_{s+\kappa} \approx K^0 E(F_t | s+\kappa \geq t \geq T_i)$. Now we can see that it's possible to generate drift proportional to the expected value of the factors during the time period, scaled by the relative estimation error in β_s.

Now consider estimating the long-run impact of a merger on stock market prices. Raghavendra Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find a three-year long run effect of -4% for all mergers, while Savor and Lu (2009) find a three-year long-run effect of -13.1% for stock-financed mergers and 1.6% for cash financed mergers. These results are well-motivated by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), but their magnitude may reflect bias due to the errors in $\hat{\beta}$. To give an example, assume that $E(F_t \mid s+\kappa \geq t \geq T_i)$ is strictly positive (reflecting risk premia). Then, the bias will be negative if the synthetic portfolio is more exposed to the risk factors with larger premia:

$$(\beta_s - \hat{\beta}_s) E(F_t) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} (\beta_{sk} - \hat{\beta}_{sk}) E(F_{tk}). \tag{51}$$

If $K = 1$, for example, and was equal to the market, then our expected excess return is 6%. If $\beta_{sk} - \hat{\beta}_{sk}$) was -0.1, then at the three year level, we might expect a bias of -1.8%. This is of course an empirical question of which way the biases would go; is the constructed

portfolio of firms too heavily loaded on risk factors?

Note that these issues do *not* disappear as we move to integrate over all event timings. This bias in factors cannot average out to zero, and so the only source by which we can achieve zero bias is through mean zero differences in the loadings.

It is also worth remarking how the results from Mitchell and Stafford (2000) can be seen analytically in our statistical terms. While the misspecification term $(\beta_s - \hat{\beta}_s) \sum_{\kappa=0}^{K^0} F_{s+\kappa}$ creates bias, it also creates cross-correlation in errors for every event-timing.[5]

4.3 Individual estimates are noisy, but not necessarily biased

Consider the case of a single firm being treated. To analyze this case, we need to allow for slightly more flexibility in our notation.

Assumption 7. *Let $R_{it}(\infty) = \alpha_i + \beta_i \boldsymbol{F}_t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where ε_{it} is i.i.d. across firms, and i.n.i.d. across time, and mean zero.*

Remark 6. This assumption implies we can write $R_{it}(T_i) = R_{it}(\infty) + \tau_i(s,t) = \alpha_i + \beta_i \boldsymbol{F}_t + \tau_i(s,t) + \varepsilon_{it}$.

Then, consider the case of a single firm estimated in each estimator:

$$\tau_i^{AR}(s,s) - \tau_i(s,s) = (\alpha_s - \hat{\alpha}_s) + (\beta_s \boldsymbol{F}_s - \hat{\beta}_s \boldsymbol{F}_s^o) + \varepsilon_{it}. \tag{52}$$

Statistically, there are now three objects with randomness to worry about: the estimated parameters, the aggregate factors, and the idiosyncratic variance for the individual firm. Note that with several treated units, this last term disappears, but with a single unit, we have insurmountable noise. This is a common problem flagged in the event studies literature looking at securities litatigation (Baker, Gelbach, et al., 2020).

However, consider an approach that estimates many individual treatment effects in this manner (such as Kogan et al. (2017)). On, average, these estimates will be subject to the same results outlined above, but each one is quite noisy. This is equivalent to problems associated with estimating many treatment effects. One approach is to consider shrinkage estimators. Another would be to pool the firms based on characteristics of interest, and construct portfolios this way. This would remove ε.

4.4 Key takeaways re: randomness

Key takeaways for practitioners are three-fold:

[5] As they state: "[M]ajor corporate events cluster through time by industry. This leads to positive cross-correlation of abnormal returns, making test statistics that assume independence severely overstated."

1. If treatment is randomly assigned across firms, then comparing returns to the average of the market is as good as any other approach.

2. If treatment is randomly assigned across periods, and there are multiple event timings, then the model used to estimate effects does not matter in the short-run.

3. If treatment is randomly assigned across periods, but the model used to estimate effects is misspecified, then the estimates will be biased, even with many event timings.

4. These results are identical whether there is a single treated firm or many treated firms.

5 Simulations

We highlight how the non-random timing and assignment matter together with a mis-specified model using a simple simulation exercise. In the simulation, the returns follow a two-factor structure with the second factor omitted in the estimation of abnormal returns. We show the expected bias and root mean square error with random vs. nonrandom assignment and timing.

5.1 Simulation Design with 2 Factors and Selection

We simulate a panel of stock returns with a simple linear factor structure:

- Returns follows:

$$r_{it} = r_{f,t} + \beta_{i,mkt}(r_{mkt,t} - r_{f,t}) + \beta_{i,smb} r_{smb,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- β's follow normal distributions with mean 1 and std 0.3
- Baseline ε's follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and std such that residual variance is 50% of total variance (around 0.1)
- Factors (+risk-free) sample without replacement as a block (preserve the correlation structure)
- Number of firms: 500, number of pre-treatment period: 239, number of post-treatment period: 10
- Assignment selection: probability of treated follows a logit function of the beta on the second factor:

$$p(treated)_i = \frac{\exp(\delta\beta_i)}{1 + \exp(\delta\beta_i)},$$

where $\delta = \log(0.1)/mean(beta_i) < 0$ to achieve an average probability of 10%. So the lower the beta, the more likely to be treated.

  - If assignment selection is turned off, each treatment is drawn from an independent binomial distribution of 10% probability.

- Treatment period selection: rank the realizations of the second factor in the 250 possible treatment periods (raw factor returns have positive/negative with mean close to 0, which will make the logistic function too large/small). Each period has the following probability to be the treatment period

$$p(selected)_t = \frac{\exp(\delta F_{2t})}{1 + \exp(\delta F_{2t})},$$

  where $\delta = \log(1/250)/mean(rank_t)$. Draw from binomial distribution with respective probabilities for each period. Multiple periods may be selected, among which choose the one with the highest factor realization.

  - If timing selection is turned off, the treatment period is period 240 (first period in the possible 250 treatment periods).

In the four tables below, we show the bias from four different models of abnormal returns: mean difference between treated and control firms, CAPM model with estimated beta, two-factor model with estimated betas, and generalized synthetic control method (Gsynth). Several takeaways:

- Consistent with Case 1 in Section 5.3, with timing selection on days with large factor realizations, the bias from an incorrect model (CAPM) can be large

Table 1: Simulation Estimates for n=500, Percent Treated= 10, Estimation Period=239, one-shot-treatment, Assign Selection:FALSE, Timing Selection:FALSE

	All Periods		Treated Periods		Untreated Periods	
Model	E(Bias)	RMSE	E(Bias)	Coverage	E(Bias)	Coverage
Simple Means	0.00	0.58	0.01	1	0.00	0.03
CAPM	-0.06	2.11	-0.07	1	-0.06	0.44
Correct Factor Structure	-0.01	0.54	0.00	1	-0.01	0.04
Gsynth (PCA)	0.00	0.56	0.02	1	0.00	0.03

Table 2: Simulation Estimates for n=500, Percent Treated= 10, Estimation Period=239, one-shot-treatment, Assign Selection:TRUE, Timing Selection:FALSE

	All Periods		Treated Periods		Untreated Periods	
Model	E(Bias)	RMSE	E(Bias)	Coverage	E(Bias)	Coverage
Simple Means	0.02	0.71	0.04	1.00	0.02	0.11
CAPM	-0.05	1.78	-0.04	0.98	-0.05	0.40
Correct Factor Structure	-0.01	0.54	0.02	1.00	-0.01	0.04
Gsynth (PCA)	0.00	0.57	0.03	1.00	0.00	0.06

Table 3: Simulation Estimates for n=500, Percent Trated= 10, Estimation Period=239, one-shot-treatment, Assign Selection:TRUE, Timing Selection:TRUE

	All Periods		Treated Periods		Untreated Periods	
Model	E(Bias)	RMSE	E(Bias)	Coverage	E(Bias)	Coverage
Simple Means	-0.05	0.88	-0.52	1	-0.01	0.08
CAPM	0.21	2.92	2.26	1	0.00	0.40
Correct Factor Structure	-0.02	0.52	0.01	1	-0.02	0.05
Gsynth (PCA)	-0.01	0.56	-0.01	1	-0.01	0.04

Table 4: Simulation Estimates for n=500, Percent Trated= 10, Estimation Period=239, one-shot-treatment, Assign Selection:FALSE, Timing Selection:TRUE

	All Periods		Treated Periods		Untreated Periods	
Model	E(Bias)	RMSE	E(Bias)	Coverage	E(Bias)	Coverage
Simple Means	-0.01	0.63	0.00	1	-0.01	0.05
CAPM	0.25	3.49	2.71	1	0.00	0.46
Correct Factor Structure	-0.02	0.54	0.00	1	-0.02	0.04
Gsynth (PCA)	-0.01	0.57	0.01	1	-0.01	0.04

Current RMSE calculation seems to be the cumulative sum of SEs across periods?

For each simulations $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$ and post-event periods $t \in \{1, ..., 11\}$, we have a bias, $bias_{it}$, and in the current code, MSE are calculated as

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{11} bias_{it}^2 \right)$$

However, the RMSE for each period t, by definition, is

$$rmse_t = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} bias_{it}^2}$$

Then if we want to report the average RMSE across all post periods, we take

$$\frac{1}{11}\sum_{t=1}^{11} rmse_t = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\frac{1}{11}\sum_{t=1}^{11}\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} bias_{it}^2}$$

6 Applications

6.1 Geithner as Treasury Secretary

In the setup of Acemoglu et al., 2016, we highlight that

- In a setting with simultaneous event, if the event happens during periods with turbulent returns (tail realizations), bias from incorrect factor structure may be huge
- Bias comes from using control firms with very different factor exposures
- Find the "correct" counterfactual matters: multiple synthetic methods match the underlying betas well and reduces the bias

We study how different counterfactuals would infer different results for the stock price reaction for firms with a connection to Timothy Geithner after the announcement of his nomination as U.S. Treasury Secretary. We study the 11-day average treatment effect, day-by-day treatment effect for pre-event (as a test of anticipation) and post-event, and the pre- versus post-event estimated beta to see if the announcement changes the underlying factor structure of returns.

6.1.1 Post-Event ATT

In this section, we compare how different counterfactuals affect the 11-day (day 0 to day 10) average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) after the event announcement. In column 1, we report the result from a standard t-test for mean differences. This effectively imposes the counterfactual of the simple average of returns from firms without a connection with Geithner. In column 2, we report the estimate from the standard difference-in-differences, in column 3, we report the estimate from standard synthetic control, and in column 4, we use the synthetic difference-in-differences estimator from Arkhangelsky et al., 2021. For columns 2 to 4, the pre-period we use in estimation is day -256 to -31, which is similar to day -280 to -31 used in

the original paper as the estimation period for the beta. We keep a shorter estimation period to maintain a balanced panel for synthetic methods.

We see that on average, treated firms have 2.6% higher daily returns within 10 days after the event. Using standard DinD does not change much the estimate, but using synthetic controls decreases the estimated effect by 33%. Synthetic DinD has a smaller decline of 25%.

Table 5: Connections to Geithner and stock price reactions to Treasury Secretary announcement (Schedule connections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Average	DID	SC	SDID	Gsynth
Treated	0.026***	0.027***	0.016***	0.018***	0.012**
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	5,995	129,165	129,165	129,165	129,625

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6: Connections to Geithner and stock price reactions to Treasury Secretary announcement (Personal connections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Average	DID	SC	SDID	Gsynth
Treated	0.029***	0.030***	0.004	0.009**	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Observations	5,995	129,165	129,165	129,165	129,165

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 7: Connections to Geithner and stock price reactions to Treasury Secretary announcement (New York connections)

	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID	(5) Gsynth
Treated	0.019***	0.020***	0.009***	0.012***	0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	5,995	129,165	129,165	129,165	129,165

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

6.1.2 Post-Event ATT: All Public Firms as Control

Table 8: Connections to Geithner and stock price reactions to Treasury Secretary announcement (Schedule connections)

	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID	(5) Gsynth
Treated	0.020**	0.020***	0.004	0.009	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Observations	45,045	966,420	966,420	966,420	916,388

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 9: Connections to Geithner and stock price reactions to Treasury Secretary announcement (Personal connections)

	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID	(5) Gsynth
Treated	0.020*	0.021***	-0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	45,045	966,420	966,420	966,420	916,388

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 10: Connections to Geithner and stock price reactions to Treasury Secretary announcement (New York connections)


	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID	(5) Gsynth
Treated	0.011**	0.011***	0.004	0.003	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	45,045	966,420	966,420	966,420	916,388

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

6.1.3 Market Returns around Event

Figure 1: S&P 500 Returns around Event



6.1.4 Treated and Synthetic Betas

In this section, we investigate how control beta is compared to treatment beta with different control weights from various synthetic methods. The betas are estimated over daily returns from day -280 to day -31 in the pre-event periods. First, we see that indeed synthetic control weights match control beta to treatment beta the best, compared to equal, synthetic diff-in-diff, and generalized synthetic method weights. For the pre-event, we see a control beta of

1.33 with synthetic control, compared to a treatment beta of 1.43. The same conclusion can be drawn with Fama-French three-factor betas. Synthetic control weights give the closest control betas to treatment betas for market, size, and value factors.

Second, if we extend the set of control firms from the bank controls in Acemoglu et al., 2016 to the full CRSP database, we get a better match on the betas across all synthetic methods. For synthetic control specifically, controlled firms give an average beta of 1.38, closer to 1.43 in the treated firm. There is also a significant improvement in matching the fama-french three-factor betas, synthetic control betas are 1.22, 0.38, and 0.67 (compared to treated betas of 1.28, 0.23, and 0.61).

Table 11: Treated and Control Beta from Synthetic Methods

	Treated	Control	Control (All CRSP)
CAPM Beta	1.427	0.825	0.832
FF3F Market Beta	1.275	0.659	0.857
FF3F Size Beta	0.233	0.748	0.553
FF3F Value Beta	0.607	0.720	0.144

	Bank Controls			All CRSP Controls		
	SC	SDID	Gsynth	SC	SDID	Gsynth
CAPM Beta	1.331	1.111	1.581	1.383	1.281	1.074
FF3F Market Beta	1.148	0.905	1.082	1.220	1.165	0.873
FF3F Size Beta	0.480	0.819	2.164	0.377	0.627	1.291
FF3F Value Beta	0.750	0.872	2.037	0.674	0.593	0.970

6.1.5 Period-by-Period ATT

In this section, we compare how different counterfactual affects the daily ATT in the post-event period. The 'Average' column computes the difference in the simple mean of treated versus control firms, as reported in Panel A of Table 2 in the original paper. The 'Synthetic Control' column computes the weighted average daily return with synthetic control weights, and the 'Synthetic Diff-in-Diff' column uses the synthetic diff-in-diff weights instead.

For standard errors, in the 'Average' column, we use the same approach as the original paper and adjust the standard errors for pre-event correlation between firms. In the 'Synthetic Control' column, we report bootstrap standard errors estimated separately for each period. Since synthetic control weights will not change with the post-period, this method gives the

correct standard errors period-by-period. We cannot use the same methodology for synthetic difference-in-differences because the estimated unit weight also depends on the data from the post-period.

We see that with synthetic control weights, the estimated ATT is much smaller compared to the simple mean.

Table 12: Period-by-Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (Schedule connections)

		Average			Synthetic Control			Synthetic Diff-in-Diff		
Event day	Date	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference
0	11/21/08	0.086	0.042	0.043***	0.086	0.066	0.019*	0.086	0.058	0.028
1	11/24/08	0.130	0.046	0.084***	0.130	0.080	0.050**	0.130	0.063	0.067
2	11/25/08	0.026	0.015	0.011	0.026	0.045	-0.019	0.026	0.018	0.008
3	11/26/08	0.112	0.041	0.071***	0.112	0.070	0.042	0.112	0.055	0.057
4	11/28/08	0.056	0.018	0.038**	0.056	0.028	0.027	0.056	0.025	0.030
5	12/1/08	-0.131	-0.076	-0.056***	-0.131	-0.119	-0.013	-0.131	-0.102	-0.030
6	12/2/08	0.046	0.043	0.003	0.046	0.039	0.007	0.046	0.056	-0.010
7	12/3/08	0.034	0.018	0.016	0.034	0.035	-0.001	0.034	0.024	0.011
8	12/4/08	-0.009	-0.013	0.005	-0.009	-0.028	0.019	-0.009	-0.016	0.008
9	12/5/08	0.063	0.024	0.038**	0.063	0.034	0.028**	0.063	0.031	0.031
10	12/8/08	0.064	0.027	0.037**	0.064	0.047	0.017	0.064	0.033	0.031

Table 13: Period-by-Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (Personal connections)

		Average			Synthetic Control			Synthetic Diff-in-Diff		
Event day	Date	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference
0	11/21/08	0.075	0.043	0.033	0.075	0.073	0.003	0.075	0.069	0.007
1	11/24/08	0.143	0.047	0.096***	0.143	0.106	0.037	0.143	0.074	0.069
2	11/25/08	0.057	0.014	0.043*	0.057	0.059	-0.002	0.057	0.023	0.034
3	11/26/08	0.112	0.042	0.071***	0.112	0.113	0.000	0.112	0.070	0.042
4	11/28/08	0.085	0.018	0.067***	0.085	0.077	0.008	0.085	0.031	0.054
5	12/1/08	-0.144	-0.076	-0.067***	-0.144	-0.140	-0.004	-0.144	-0.121	-0.023
6	12/2/08	0.044	0.043	0.001	0.044	0.063	-0.019	0.044	0.066	-0.022
7	12/3/08	0.043	0.018	0.024	0.043	0.033	0.010	0.043	0.025	0.017
8	12/4/08	0.005	-0.014	0.019	0.005	-0.024	0.029	0.005	-0.015	0.020
9	12/5/08	0.042	0.025	0.017	0.042	0.046	-0.004	0.042	0.039	0.003
10	12/8/08	0.043	0.028	0.015	0.043	0.055	-0.012	0.043	0.042	0.002

Table 14: Period-by-Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (New York connections)

		Average			Synthetic Control			Synthetic Diff-in-Diff		
Event day	Date	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference	Conn.	Non-conn.	Difference
0	11/21/08	0.085	0.040	0.044***	0.085	0.069	0.016*	0.085	0.051	0.033
1	11/24/08	0.078	0.046	0.031***	0.078	0.082	-0.004	0.078	0.058	0.020
2	11/25/08	0.032	0.014	0.018	0.032	0.011	0.021*	0.032	0.016	0.016
3	11/26/08	0.087	0.040	0.048***	0.087	0.065	0.022	0.087	0.048	0.040
4	11/28/08	0.016	0.019	-0.003	0.016	0.023	-0.006	0.016	0.022	-0.005
5	12/1/08	-0.105	-0.075	-0.030***	-0.105	-0.106	0.001	-0.105	-0.093	-0.012
6	12/2/08	0.090	0.040	0.050***	0.090	0.052	0.037***	0.090	0.050	0.039
7	12/3/08	0.031	0.018	0.013	0.031	0.025	0.005	0.031	0.021	0.009
8	12/4/08	-0.020	-0.013	-0.008	-0.020	-0.031	0.010	-0.020	-0.014	-0.006
9	12/5/08	0.050	0.024	0.026**	0.050	0.046	0.004	0.050	0.029	0.021
10	12/8/08	0.050	0.027	0.023**	0.050	0.055	-0.006	0.050	0.031	0.018

6.1.6 Placebo Period ATT

Table 15: Placebo Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (Schedule connections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Average	DID	SC	SDID
Treated	-0.006*	-0.006**	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	16,350	139,520	139,520	139,520

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 16: Placebo Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (Personal connections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Average	DID	SC	SDID
Treated	-0.007	-0.006**	0.001	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	16,350	139,520	139,520	139,520

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 17: Placebo Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (New York connections)

	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID
Treated	-0.003	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	16,350	139,520	139,520	139,520

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

6.1.7 Placebo Period

In this section, we test how synthetic methods perform in a placebo period before the event. The placebo period is day -30 to day -1, which is not used in estimation but also the event is not yet happening. If we assume that synthetic methods perform well in capturing the underlying factor structure and the factor loadings stay stable before the event, we would expect that the ATT in the placebo period is close to 0.

Figure 2 plots the average treatment effect of raw returns on the left and the average treatment effect of abnormal returns (relative to a CAPM model with beta estimated using daily returns from day -280 to -31). In Figure 3, we plot all the ATT on one graph for better comparison.

We see that synthetic control does the best job in the placebo period, but also has the least treatment effect post-period. By comparing the treatment effect of raw returns using synthetic controls with the treatment effect of abnormal returns with a simple average, we see that they are relatively close, which suggests that synthetic control does a good job matching the underlying market beta exposure of treatment firms.

Figure 2: Period-by-Period ATT in Placebo and Post Period (Schedule connections)





Figure 3: Period-by-Period ATT in Placebo and Post Period (Schedule connections)



6.1.8 Pre- versus Post-Event Beta and Weights

In this section, we investigate how control beta is compared to treatment beta with different control weights. We also compare beta estimated pre-event with beta estimated post-event to see if the event also has a treatment effect on beta loadings. The pre-event beta is estimated over daily returns from day -280 to day -31, and the post-event beta is estimated over daily returns from day 31 to day 65. We exclude the immediate post-period because the returns can be confounded by the event effect. We also compare the synthetic weights estimated with pre- and post-period by comparing the treatment effect with pre- and post-weights.

First, we see that indeed synthetic control weights match control beta to treatment beta the best, compared to a simple average and synthetic diff-in-diff weights. For the pre-event, we see a control beta of 1.33 with synthetic control, compared to a treatment beta of 1.43. For the post-event, we have a control beta of 1.71, which is very close to a treatment beta of 1.73. The same conclusion can be drawn with Fama-French three-factor betas. Synthetic control weights give the closest control betas to treatment betas for market, size, and value factors.

Second, we see that post-betas are on average higher than pre-betas, suggesting that the

event does have an effect on the underlying factor loadings of treatment firms. CAPM market beta increases from 1.43 to 1.73, a 21% increase. In the three-factor model, we see the largest increase in size and value betas. Size beta increases from 0.23 to 0.41 (78%), and value beta increases from 0.61 to 1.00 (64%).

Third, Figure 4 show the daily ATT with synthetic control weights for the placebo period (day -30 to -1), post-event period (day 0 to 30), and post-event-estimation period (day 31 to 65). We see that using post-event synthetic control weights gives us a larger event treatment effect, but it also gives a more positive ATT in the placebo period.


Table 18: Pre-/Post-Event Market Beta from CAPM

Panel A: Pre Beta, Pre Weights		
	Market	
	Treated	Control
Average	1.4269	0.8251
SDID	1.4269	1.1111
SC	1.4269	1.3309
Panel B: Post Beta, Post Weights		
	Market	
	Treated	Control
Average	1.7304	0.9377
SDID	1.7304	1.4076
SC	1.7304	1.7083
Panel C: Pre Beta, Post Weights		
	Market	
	Treated	Control
Average	1.4269	0.8251
SDID	1.4269	1.0954
SC	1.4269	1.0751
Panel D: Post Beta, Pre Weights		
	Market	
	Treated	Control
Average	1.7304	0.9377
SDID	1.7304	1.2105
SC	1.7304	1.3664

Table 19: Pre-/Post-Event Beta from Fama-French Three Factors

Panel A: Pre Beta, Pre Weights						
	Market		SMB		HML	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Original	1.2748	0.6592	0.2330	0.7484	0.6068	0.7196
SDID	1.2748	0.9051	0.2330	0.8187	0.6068	0.8724
SC	1.2748	1.1477	0.2330	0.4796	0.6068	0.7495
Panel B: Post Beta, Post Weights						
	Market		SMB		HML	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Original	1.2454	0.6265	0.4139	0.5633	0.9991	0.6898
SDID	1.2454	0.9544	0.4139	0.6791	0.9991	0.9785
SC	1.2454	1.2130	0.4139	0.4697	0.9991	1.0273

Figure 4: Period-by-Period ATT with Pre & Post SC Weights



6.1.9 Beta: All Public Firms as Control

Table 20: Pre-Event Market Beta from CAPM

Panel A: Pre Beta, Pre Weights		
	Market	
	Treated	Control
Average	1.4269	0.8324
SDID	1.4269	1.2814
SC	1.4269	1.3830

Table 21: Pre-Event Beta from Fama-French Three Factors

Panel A: Pre Beta, Pre Weights						
	Market		SMB		HML	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Original	1.2748	0.8569	0.2330	0.5526	0.6068	0.1436
SDID	1.2748	1.1654	0.2330	0.6273	0.6068	0.5934
SC	1.2748	1.2201	0.2330	0.3774	0.6068	0.6743

6.1.10 Placebo Period ATT: All Public Firms as Control

Table 22: Placebo Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (Schedule connections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Average	DID	SC	SDID
Treated	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Observations	122,850	1,044,225	1,044,225	1,044,225

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 23: Placebo Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (Personal connections)

	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID
Treated	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	122,850	1,044,225	1,044,225	1,044,225

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 24: Placebo Period ATT to Geithner Announcement (New York connections)

	(1) Average	(2) DID	(3) SC	(4) SDID
Treated	-0.000	0.000	-0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	122,850	1,044,225	1,044,225	1,044,225

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

6.2 Index Inclusion


We use S&P 500 index inclusion announcements as events to highlight the following points:

- In a staggered event setting, bias on the event day is small because the average factor returns on different event days are close to 0
- Bias is small also because average betas of treated and control are close to 1
- Substantial pre-announcement drift may suggest anticipation: estimates propensity scores based on pre-placebo characteristics (model explains better in more recent years, matching on propensity score reduces the effects from anticipation)
- Synthetic control also alleviates parts of pre-announcement drift

6.2.1 Factor Returns on Announcement Days

We show that the distributions of daily market returns on S&P 500 index inclusion announcement days are very similar to the ones on no-event days. This is true from 1980-1989 when the data starts, to recent decade 2010-2020. We also see that the distribution

Figure 5: Distribution of Daily Returns on Announcement vs. No-Event Days by Decade



6.2.2 Betas of Included Firms

We estimate the CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor betas for included firms using the daily returns from -250 to -100 days to the announcement date. In the table below, we show the beta distributions separately for each decade from 1980 to current.

We see that in every decade, the average beta on the market portfolio is close to 1. Therefore, using a market model as the abnormal return model may not lead to material biases in the short run, as on average, the betas of treated firms are close to 1.


Table 25: Beta Distributions of Included Firms across Decades

	Mean	Std	25th Percentile	Median	75th Percentile
Panel A: 80-89					
CAPM Beta	0.961	0.523	0.637	0.887	1.226
FF3F Mkt Beta	1.108	0.539	0.722	1.143	1.430
FF3F SMB Beta	0.558	0.604	0.183	0.597	0.926
FF3F HML Beta	-0.148	0.987	-0.553	-0.056	0.384
Panel B: 90-99					
CAPM Beta	1.025	0.660	0.570	0.928	1.361
FF3F Mkt Beta	1.171	0.660	0.776	1.153	1.561
FF3F SMB Beta	0.489	0.661	0.027	0.456	0.792
FF3F HML Beta	-0.015	1.242	-0.589	0.239	0.763
Panel C: 00-09					
CAPM Beta	1.087	0.697	0.560	0.985	1.427
FF3F Mkt Beta	1.079	0.560	0.697	0.998	1.413
FF3F SMB Beta	0.271	0.674	-0.092	0.211	0.613
FF3F HML Beta	-0.002	1.227	-0.641	0.032	0.617
Panel D: 10-20					
CAPM Beta	1.060	0.388	0.796	0.997	1.255
FF3F Mkt Beta	1.026	0.343	0.794	0.984	1.210
FF3F SMB Beta	0.225	0.520	-0.079	0.136	0.440
FF3F HML Beta	-0.273	0.590	-0.542	-0.215	0.039

6.2.3 Pre-announcement Drift

In this section, we replicate the main result in Greenwood and Sammon, 2025. We find the same disappearing index effect as well as a strong pre-announcement drift. Instead of focusing on the short-term event effect, we discuss potential reasons for a strong pre-announcement drift: anticipation and/or bias in long-term cumulative returns.

Figure 6: Cumulative pre-addition market-adjusted returns



6.2.4 Anticipation and Propensity Scores


We estimate a logistic regression each year as follows:

$$I(Treated)_{i,y,m} = \alpha + \beta RankMktCap_{i,y,m-1} + \varepsilon_{i,y}$$

where we use the lagged market capitalization in end of last month before announcement to predict the probability of getting added to S&P. Consistent with Greenwood and Sammon, 2025, we also find that in recent years, the addition to S&P is becoming more predictable using lagged size.


Then for index inclusion events in each month, we do a propensity score matching using the propensity scores from above and find the nearest neighbor for each stock added in that month. We then plot the average market-adjusted return for both the treated firms and the matched control firms by each decade.

Figure 7: Cumulative pre-addition market-adjusted returns (Treated vs. propensity score matched)



We also plot the cumulative abnormal return directly using the PSM returns as the benchmark. We find that across four decade, the pre-announcement drifts drop by half (for example, in 2010-2020, the pre-announcement drift decreases from 20% with market-adjusted return to 10% with PSM abnormal returns). This suggests that part of the pre-announcement drift is due to anticipation and hedge funds front-running the inclusion event to make a profit.

Figure 8: Cumulative abnormal pre-addition returns (Treated - PSM control)



6.2.5 Long-Term Bias in Pre-Periods: Cumulative Factor Returns

Figure 9: Pre-addition Cumulative Market Factor Returns (Event vs. Randomoized No-event Days)





Figure 10: Pre-addition Cumulative Size Factor Returns (Event vs. Randomoized No-event Days)



6.2.6 Synthetic Methods

For each announcement date, we estimate a Gsynth model using -250 to -101 event days as the estimation period. We use the average counterfactual returns as the benchmark return and compare them with the average return on the included firms. We plot the cumulative market-adjusted and abnormal return on the out-of-sample test periods from -100 to 15. We see that using synthetic methods kill the pre-announcement drift for 1980-89 and 2000-09, and reverse the drift in 1990-99. For the only period that the drift persists (2010-20), the pre-announcement drift shrinks from 20% over 100 days to 10% (again only half of the effects).

Figure 11: Cumulative pre-addition market-adjusted returns (Treated vs. synthetic method)





Figure 12: Cumulative abnormal pre-addition returns (Treated - Synthetic control)



6.3 Mergers & Acquisitions

TK: Bias in long-run effects

7 Conclusion

This paper brings modern causal inference techniques to financial event studies, highlighting important limitations in standard approaches while providing constructive solutions. We demonstrate that traditional abnormal return estimators face inconsistency problems due to factor model misspecification—a concern that becomes particularly severe in long-horizon analyses where small daily biases accumulate substantially over time. While staggered event timing helps mitigate these issues in short-horizon studies by averaging out factor realizations, this solution proves inadequate for long-horizon analyses. The key insight is that misspecification bias compounds over longer horizons, regardless of how events are distributed across time.

Synthetic control methods offer a promising alternative by directly modeling counterfactual security paths without requiring correct specification of the underlying factor structure. Our empirical applications to political connections during market turbulence and S&P 500 index inclusions convincingly demonstrate the practical value of these methods.

Our findings suggest that many influential results based on long-horizon event studies may reflect factor model misspecification rather than genuine causal effects. We recommend that researchers employ synthetic control methods as a robust complement to traditional approaches, particularly when studying extended price responses or when events occur during periods of high market volatility.

In future versions of this work, we plan to examine inference procedures as well, as the synthetic control methods provide an alternative approach to estimating standard errors. We also plan to extend our analysis to other event studies, such as mergers and acquisitions, where the long-horizon bias is particularly pronounced.

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