The Fragility of Social Norms:
Evidence from a Youth Reformative Training Center

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March 2025*

Abstract

We examine the underlying preferences and beliefs that shape the long-standing peer culture of misbehavior in a Youth Reformative Training Center (RTC). The widespread misbehavior observed in the RTC is not due to an inherent tendency among youths to commit institutional offenses, as the vast majority consider such offenses undesirable. However, most youths significantly underestimate their peers' support for positive behavior within the RTC. In a population-level randomized controlled trial, we delivered public announcements to inform youths about the actual prevailing attitudes toward offenses. Our findings show that this intervention effectively corrected widespread misperceptions and led to a significant reduction in institutional offenses. The treatment effect was strongest among youths who were well-connected within their community—even though their initial perceptions were already closer to the truth. These results highlight the importance of second-order beliefs about norms and demonstrate the effectiveness of interventions that leverage public knowledge at the population level. This study offers a policy-relevant approach for identifying and addressing social norms that diverge from individuals' private sentiments.

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> I learnt a lot when I was at RTC [Reformative Training Centre] — about human nature, about how people behave when they are stripped off of whatever trappings they have in life. And generally I think it is a good environment to observe human psychology — the herd mentality.
>
> *John (not his real name)*

1 Introduction

Individuals frequently make decisions based on concerns about their social image, others' perceptions, and conformity to societal norms (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). However, understanding what is deemed socially desirable and whether such societal pressures can be changed is a difficult yet important question, particularly from a policy-making perspective.

This study aims to understand and alter the persistent and destructive social norms among youth offenders at a Youth Reformative Training Center. Like other adolescence, youth in correction centers are susceptible to peer influence (Somerville, 2013; Blakemore and Mills, 2014). The dynamic flow of individuals, the sensitive nature of the environment, and the close quarters among the youth make this setting particularly suitable for examining the formation and persistence of social norms. In 2018, Officers in the Reformative Training Center we partner opined that youth offenders are significantly more prone to committing within-facility offenses than other groups, including adult offenders in maximum security prisons. These institutional offenses predominantly include violent behaviors such as fighting and bullying, alongside other negative behaviors like tattooing, gang affiliation, vandalism, and disrespect towards officers and staff.

These destructive norms are highly resilient and till date the use of norms has not been explored to reduce within-facility offenses. In a setting filled with vulnerable and frequently marginalized youth, policies aimed at reducing negative behavior have the potential for significant and long-term positive consequences.

We set out to understand whether undesirable behaviors are inherent preferences of youth offenders or merely products of social norms within the Reformative Training Center. To guide our investigation, we develop a model in which youths can be of either a violent or non-violent type and choose corresponding actions to signal their type. Youths have priors over the fraction of types and update their inferences about others based on the actions they observe. While youths derive private benefits from actions consistent with their type, they also consider how these actions influence others' perceptions of them. The more desirable perceived type is not predetermined but is established in equilibrium. Our theoretical framework proposes that a miscoordinated norm arises when the cost of acting 'different' is asymmetric: it is likely more costly to be perceived as non-violent by violent youths than vice versa. As a result, the equilibrium that arises may not reflect the private benefits youths gain from non-violent actions. Our framework further indicates that providing information about this misperceived social norm can shift the equilibrium towards one that aligns more closely with the private benefits of being non-violent, offering a pathway to an effective policy measure.

We implemented the study at the population level in the Reformative Training Center (RTC) in Singapore, which is a severe form of detention for youth offenders committing serious offences in the Singapore Prison Service System. The study encompassed 327 youth

offenders, largely from a low-socioeconomic background, aged between 16 and 21, over a three-year period from 2020 to 2023. We combined surveys of norms and perceptions with randomized controlled trials to influence norms, starting with a pilot in March 2020 and followed by three treatment rounds, two in 2021 and one in 2022, after the initial peak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the first part of the study, we collect information on the private preferences of youth offenders for desirable behaviors within the RTC, with a specific focus on violent and destructive institutional offenses. We also elicited their perceptions of their peers' preferences in an incentivized manner, along with their confidence in these opinions. In the language of the framework we propose, the survey aims to capture any differences in youths' updated beliefs about violent and non-violent types and their private benefits from the corresponding actions.

We find a widespread misperception of norms. While a vast majority, 93 percent, of youths believe there should be less fighting or bullying in the RTC, 85 percent of the sample underestimated their peers' inclination towards fewer offenses. Similar misconceptions were observed across other types of offenses, including tattooing and self-harm, vandalism, and disrespect towards officers and civilian staff. Not all of these offenses involve more than one youth, but even individual offenses are aimed to signal a status among youths in the RTC (Kwa, 2015). One may be concerned that youths' responses about what behavior they privately deem desirable might be influenced by a desire to align with the authority figures conducting the survey. One piece of evidence against this view is that less than half of youth offenders indicate that renouncing their gangs is a desirable behavior.[1] Despite the program officers' strong emphasis on gang renouncement as a step away from a criminal path, many youths genuinely believe that gang affiliation provides them with protection, thus showing reluctance to part with their gang.[2]

These results are particularly striking given the close physical proximity of the youths in the RTC. Our survey reveals that each youth was identified on average as a best friend two times and as popular among inmates 1.3 times, indicating that the RTC functions as a small, tight-knit social network. This finding undermines the notion that opportunities for communication are the root cause of norm misperception, suggesting instead that any lack of communication might be an equilibrium response. Youths may avoid revealing their true preferences against their perceived type in equilibrium.

In the second part of the study, we use administrative offense data from the RTC to assess the behavioral impacts of a low-cost information intervention. The intervention involves disseminating information about the proportion of peers privately endorsing positive behavior collected in the first part. We divide the sample into three groups, one control and two treatment groups, with randomization conducted at the community group level, the organizational unit the RTC uses to administer its prison programs. Youth offenders in each community group are assembled in a multifunctional room for the surveys and information intervention. While all groups are asked about their private preferences as in the first part, the control group does not receive feedback on the collective results. In contrast, the aggregated survey results were shared with all participants in each of the two treatment groups, either via a public announcement displayed on a board in the presence of their peers (public treatment T1), or through written information on a form delivered to each youth (private treatment T2). Given the communal setup of our treatments and

[1] Two-third of youth offenders declared some gang affiliation.

[2] As an anecdote, a former RTC inmate, "John," recalled his experience in the RTC and his belief that his involvement in a gang helped protect him from the bullying culture within the RTC (Kwa, 2015).

the close living quarters of these youth offenders, we expect both treatments to effectively disseminate the information.

The treatments are effective in helping youths update their beliefs about others' preferences and, importantly, in reducing offenses within prison. First, we note that the impact on behavior is not due to youths updating their private opinions about desirable behavior in prison, as measured in a follow-up survey two weeks later. This suggests that their private opinions reflect their true "type" and not peer influence. Second, youth offenders update their beliefs about others in the correct direction, approaching but not fully closing the gap with the actual proportion of youths supporting positive behavior in the RTC. Finally, the behavioral impacts are both statistically significant and substantial. Major offenses decreased by more than half, and minor offenses by over 80 percent, in the six months following the treatments. The effects are larger for those who initially underestimated their peers' support for good behavior, for youths whose term at the RTC were due to physical crimes, for youth with higher cognitive abilities, for youth not from broken families, and for youths identified as popular by at least one other youth. This aligns with our framework, suggesting that behavioral changes are greater when the information about others' true types is more impactful, when youths place more weight on others' perception, and when they have stronger priors about other youths being of the misbehaving type.

Our analysis of the origins and effects of peer culture in the RTC points to a prescription for shifting social norms. Rather than viewing social norms as dictating a predetermined desirable type or behavior, our study highlights the importance of understanding the social coordination processes that shape what is deemed socially desirable. This perspective differs from the framework proposed by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and further developed in Bursztyn and Jensen (2017). Such a framework helps guide empirical approaches to identify image-driven behaviors, particularly through variations in observability of behavior. It is, however, less often associated with a policy intervention to alter norms. Increasing visibility of actions can in theory encourage prosocial behavior such as voting (Gerber *et al.*, 2008) or charitable giving (DellaVigna *et al.*, 2012), raise workplace effort (Mas and Moretti, 2009), or alter students' schooling investments (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015).[3] However, transitioning from negative to positive social norms entails more than just changing visibility; it involves redefining what is considered socially desirable.

Perceptions about others play a crucial role in the formation of social norms. Bursztyn and Yang (2022) document the widespread nature of misperceptions about others across various domains. This includes the general public's perceptions of others' political opinions and behaviors (Ahler, 2014; Bonomi *et al.*, 2021), perceptions regarding politicians (Kendall *et al.*, 2015), parents' perspectives on their children (Ashraf *et al.*, 2020), and beliefs about economic facts like tax inflation expectations (Coibion *et al.*, 2021) or immigrants' socioeconomic characteristics (Alesina *et al.*, 2023). Our work adds to a smaller set among these studies, focusing on misperceptions of social norms where prevalent perceived norms diverge from the private preferences that guide desirable actions. Among the 81 papers published in the past 20 years reviewed by Bursztyn and Yang (2022), we count 7 papers in this set. This includes work by Bursztyn *et al.* (2020b) on correcting misperception of husbands about the acceptability of wives working outside the home, Cantoni *et al.* (2019) on aligning citizens' beliefs and participation in antiauthoritarian protests, or Yu (2023) on providing accurate perception about HIV stigma to increase HIV testing.

[3] Karing (2018) brings this idea to the field and introduces visible bracelets to increase childhood vaccination in Sierra Leone. In this setting, there is already a strong social norms supporting the importance of vaccination with the majority of individuals completing vaccination on schedule at baseline.

Our study stands out for two reasons. First, it encompasses the entire relevant population by covering all youths in the RTC. Second, our treatment not only provides information about private preferences and beliefs but also ensures the information is public knowledge. The public nature of our intervention potentially increases its effectiveness as suggested by our theoretical framework, which could explain the higher impacts of our treatments. While our framework builds on Bursztyn *et al.* (2020a), this result is new and is of policy importance. Additionally, our framework sheds light on the origin of miscoordinated norms, suggesting that our youths end up in an equilibrium where the majority engage in violent offenses despite privately favoring nonviolence because being nonviolent in a violent environment carries a higher cost. This asymmetry in the cost of deviating from others offers a lens to understand other settings with misperceived norms.

The setting of our study is particularly conducive for exploring social norms and peer influence. The literature on peer effects, as highlighted in Sacerdote (2014), often focuses on the impact of peers on youth in educational settings. This emphasis is greatly influenced by important works such as the Coleman report (Coleman *et al.*, 1966; Coleman, 1968) and Harris (2011), which argue that changing peer groups is a key pathway to improving outcomes for disadvantaged students. Furthermore, Glaeser *et al.* (1996) attribute large variations in crime across time and space to social interactions. Instead of documenting the influence of peers, our study aims to alter a long-standing peer culture within the RTC without altering the peer group itself. We demonstrate that the influence exerted by the same set of peers can shift with changes in social coordination. In uncovering misperceived social norms in the RTC, our study also connects to the concept of "pluralistic ignorance," as described by Katz *et al.* (1931). This describes a scenario where most individuals privately hold one opinion but act contrary to it, mistakenly believing that others favor the opposite view. Interestingly, notable studies in this space, including Katz *et al.* (1931) on college students' attitudes, and Prentice and Miller (1993) on alcohol use on campus, predominantly focus on youth.[4] Our study contributes to this research by demonstrating how providing public knowledge of private beliefs can shift peer culture.

Lastly, our paper adds to a small set of papers studying the special and vulnerable population of prisoners and their behaviors within prison such as Bayer *et al.* (2009) and Cohn *et al.* (2015). The closest paper among these is Heller *et al.* (2017) which provides experimental behavioral treatments for disadvantaged youths including juvenile arrestees in a pretrial detention center in Chicago. They find large behavioral improvements from programs that encourage youths to "slow down" and respond nonviolently. Notably, following Heller *et al.* (2017), a similar program was previously implemented in the RTC setting we study, but it did not yield similar successful outcomes.

2 Motivating framework

To motivate our investigation into the roots of the persistent social norms within the RTC, we present a simple model of social image in which there are two types of players, but no ex-ante "desirable" type. The model is based on that of Bursztyn *et al.* (2020a).

[4]Other significant studies describe pluralistic ignorance in historical contexts, including Kuran (1991) on the misperceived support for the communist regime in the Soviet Union, or O'Gorman (1975) on the overestimated support among white Americans for racial segregation in 1968.

2.1 Model setup

A society has n members of two possible types, $t_i \in \{G, H\}$ (good or hostile), with $\Pr(t_i = H) = p$ where p itself is a random variable: $p \in= \{p_H, p_G\}$ with $0 < p_G < p_H < 1$.

Each member knows their own type but not others' type nor do they know the realization of p, having a prior on p such that $\Pr(p = p_H) = \theta \in (0, 1)$.

Members have identical action space $a_i \in \{G, H\}$. Their utility function from choosing an action is a sum of two components: a direct payoff from their actions, and a payoff from their image perceived by other members. Members of type t_i receive V_{t_i} direct payoff if $t_i = a_i$ and 0 otherwise. Members of type t_i pay a cost of being perceived as being different from another member, with the cost of being perceived as type H by type G is $-h_i$ and the cost of being perceived as type G by type H is $-g_i$.

The utility function that each agent i maximizes is then:

$$\begin{aligned} U_i(a_i) = \mathbb{I}\{a_i = t_i\} V_{t_i} \\ - \sum_{j \neq i} [\, h_i \mathbb{P}_j \left(t_i = H \mid s, a_i, t_j = G\right) \mathbb{P}_i \left(t_j = G \mid s, t_i\right) + \\ + g_i \mathbb{P}_j \left(t_i = G \mid s, a_i, t_j = H\right) \mathbb{P}_i \left(t_j = H \mid s, t_i\right)]. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Members may receive a public signal s that is informative of p, where $s \in \{p_G, p_H\}$ and $\Pr(s = p) = \mu > 1/2$.

We assume that $g_i = kh_i + c$ where both k, c are non-negative, and that h_i follows distribution F on $[m, M]$. Let r_G, r_H be the equilibrium probabilities of a type G and type H, respectively, playing the action H:

$$r_G(s) := \mathbb{P}(a_i = H \mid s, t_i = G) \tag{2}$$

$$r_H(s) := \mathbb{P}(a_i = H \mid s, t_i = H). \tag{3}$$

Assumption 1. *The payoffs from action are not too low compared to the disutilities from image concerns:*

$$\frac{\min\{V_G, V_H\}}{n-1} \geq \frac{1+k}{2}(p_H - p_G)M \tag{4}$$

and also, c is not too large:

$$\frac{\min\{V_G, V_H\}}{n-1} > c. \tag{5}$$

2.2 Model analysis

The following proposition summarises the equilibrium characterisation.

Proposition 1. *Under Assumptions 1 there is a unique PBE that satisfies the intuitive criterion such that*

1. *If $V_G \leq -(n-1)m_H\varphi_G(1 - \varphi_G - k\varphi_H) + c(n-1)\varphi_G\varphi_H$, then all agents play H*
2. *If $V_G \in (-(n-1)m_H\varphi_G(1 - \varphi_G - k\varphi_H) + c(n-1)\varphi_G\varphi_H, -(n-1)M_H(1 - (k+1)\varphi_G) + c(n-1)\varphi_G)$, then all type H agents play H, and all type G with image concern h_i above some threshold play H, all other agents play G*
3. *If $V_H \leq -(n-1)m_H(1-\varphi_H)(\varphi_G + k\varphi_H - 1) - c(n-1)\varphi_H$, then all agents play G*

4. *If* $V_H \in (-(n-1)m_H(1-\varphi_H)(\varphi_G+k\varphi_H-1)-c(n-1)\varphi_H, -(n-1)M_H((k+1)\varphi_H-1)-c(n-1)\varphi_H)$*, then all type* G *agents play* G*, and all type* H *with image concern* χ_i *above some threshold play* G*, all other agents play* H

5. *If* $V_G \geq -(n-1)M_H(1-(k+1)\varphi_G)+c(n-1)\varphi_G$ *and* $V_H \geq -(n-1)M_H((k+1)\varphi_H-1)-c(n-1)\varphi_H$*, then all agents play their own type.*

The cases above are collectively exhaustive.

The next Proposition looks at the comparative statics on the number of agents that play H when k and c changes.

Proposition 2. r_H *and* r_G *weakly increase in* k *and* c*.*

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Setting and Background

Our experiment was conducted at the Reformative Training Centre (RTC)[5], where the entire population[6] of incarcerated male youth offenders served as our target subjects. These youth offenders participate in a variety of programs and activities during their stay at RTC, including psychology-based correctional programs, family programs and education programs/employability skills training and personal development programs and religious programs.To optimize management and minimize interactions among inmates, RTC employs a random assignment system to place inmates into community groups based on their risk level and whether they are reformative trainees or recallees[7]. Each community group comprises 12 to 16 inmates from 3 to 4 cells, with the community size subject to moderate fluctuations based on the intake of new inmates and the release of others. Limited contact is maintained between inmates from different community groups.

The experiment was conducted in a multifunctional room. Given the segregation of inmates from different community groups, we administered the survey to one community group at a time within this room. The multifunctional room is equipped with six long tables, each accommodating up to five individuals on either side. We seated 2 to 3 inmates at each table, with one or two occupants positioned at each end. The choice of long tables was deliberate, aimed at preventing inmates from viewing each other's responses and inhibiting communication between them.

The experiment spanned a three-year period. It commenced with a pilot study in March 2020, involving approximately 50 subjects, to confirm our hypothesis regarding the misalignment of individual beliefs and perceptions of normative misconduct and good behaviours. Subsequently, we proceeded with full implementation, with the initial round taking place between August 2020 and January 2021. However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a series of social distancing measures, including the suspension of family visits, limited yard time, and the pause of religious and sports programs. These institutional changes disrupted the normal routine of youth inmates within the correction center,

[5]According to SG Court (2023), reformative training is the most severe punishment for youth offenders, surpassing probation, boys' home, and juvenile rehabilitation centre. RTC incarcerate youth offenders aged between 16 and 21.

[6]There were 11 youth offenders residing in the correctional facility who did not participate in our experiment because they were expected to be released within 2 weeks.

[7]Recallees refer to reformative trainees placed on probation before their formal release, who were subsequently recalled to RTC due to probation rule violations

potentially affecting their perceptions of social norms and behaviors. To mitigate the potential interference with the treatment's effectiveness, we decided to restart the entire project. We then conducted three rounds of the experiment: February and May 2021 (Round 1), November-December 2021 (Round 2), and October-December 2022 (Round 3). Each round covered either the entire population or newly admitted inmates as a whole. The initial sentence duration for the target subjects ranged from 6 months to 18 months, with substantial instances of youth inmates exceeding their expected release date due to misconduct or rule violations during probation. Admissions to RTC were dynamic and unpredictable. Multiple rounds of implementation allowed us to compare and validate the treatment effects across different subject pools, ensuring the general applicability of our results.

3.2 Main Experiment

Prior to commencing our experiment, we conducted a comprehensive briefing for the subjects. We clarified the purpose of the study and outlined our expectations for their participation. It was made abundantly clear that their involvement in the survey was entirely voluntary, and they retained the option to opt out at any point. As an incentive, participants were informed that by completing all the survey forms, they would earn a minimum of 60 token points[8]. Because all inmates started with a similarly low number of token points, between 20 and 25, we are not worried about potential income effects. It was emphasized that their survey responses would remain confidential and would not have any impact on their circumstances within the RTC. Participants were allotted time to review the informed consent and provide their signature before the official commencement of the experiment.They had the opportunity to raise any questions they had at this point.[9]

The experiment was executed in two phases. In the first phase, we administered two sets of surveys. The first survey, referred to as the "norm survey," aimed to elicit the subjects' individual perceptions regarding misconduct within the prison. It presented queries related to their beliefs about the desirability of reduced occurrences of various institutional offenses, such as fighting/bullying, tattooing, gang affiliation, disrespect towards peers/officers, and vandalism. Additionally, the survey probed their desirability of engaging in positive activities, including cleaning, book reviews, and bookkeeping as a librarian. Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of their peers within the same correctional facility who concurred with the aforementioned statements and indicate their confidence in their estimates. The second survey, known as the "general survey," was designed to collect a comprehensive set of information concerning the subjects' social networks and characteristics. Further details on this survey will be provided in the next survey subsection. The second phase, occurring one to two weeks later, involved a follow-up resurvey of the subjects with the norm survey, along with an inquiry about their willingness to participate in programs such as cleaning and bookkeeping.

Our treatment is administered right after the completion of the general survey in phase one. The treatment is an information dissemination where we announce the pre-calculated statistics on what percent (i.e 91%) of youth inmate population agree that it is better to have less offence and share of population (70%) actually agreed with this statement. Similar diverging misconception is observed for positive activities and was also announced.

Randomization was conducted at the community level, with the same treatment applied consistently across all communities in subsequent rounds. The subject pool was

[8]Ten token points enable them to purchase 5 pieces of candies.

[9]For standardized answers to potential questions, please refer to Online Appendix E.1.

randomly assigned to one of three groups: T1 (public announcement), T2 (private announcement), and C (no treatment). In the case of T1, the treatment involved presenting the statistics on private beliefs and perceptions of social norms on a whiteboard, followed by an announcement to all inmates from the same community group in the room. This announcement included the statistics presented on the whiteboard, emphasizing the disparity and providing a brief causal summary. For T2, the announcement was attached to the survey, and subjects were informed of its presence while working on that page. They were encouraged to check whether their guesses in the norm survey aligned with the announcement. C represented the control group and did not receive any treatment.[10]

Participants received 20 token points for each norm survey and general survey they completed. To incentivize accurate estimations of social norms, additional opportunities were provided to win 40 token points if their guesses were within 5 points of the correct answer. Similar additional token points were rewarded for certain games in the general survey. Participants were allotted ample time to complete the surveys, with the phase one surveys typically completed within 45 minutes and the follow-up surveys within 20 minutes. Participants were not made aware of the follow-up survey in phase one. For a more detailed account of the preparation and implementation process, please refer to Online Appendix A. Refer to Figure 1 for an illustrative representation of the experimental design.

3.3 Survey

Our survey comprises two main components: the norm survey and the general survey. The norm survey aims to collect information about individual beliefs regarding misconduct and various positive activities, as well as their perceptions of normative beliefs regarding these behaviors by estimating what percentage of inmates in RTC would agree with these statements and indicating their confidence in their estimates. To solicit private beliefs, for each of the common misbehaviors (fighting, tattooing/hurt themselves, disrespecting officers/civilian staff, vandalism), subjects are asked to express agreement or disagreement with statements like:

In your opinion, there should be less [fighting or bullying] in the RTC.

Similarly, individual perceptions about beneficial activities for youth offenders (renouncing gangs, area cleaning, book review, bookkeeping) are solicited through statements such as:

In my opinion, it is better if more people [renounce their gang].

We refer answer solicited from these questions as individual *perception* hereafter. To assess potential misdirected norms, respondents are reminded of their previous opinions and asked:

How many out of 100 inmates do you think answered AGREE? How confident are you in your guess (rate from 1 to 5)? [11]

[10] Refer to Online Appendix A.3 for detailed discussion on the statistics presented in the announcement and how public and private announcement were administered.

[11] An incentive is added to encourage accurate responses for this estimate. For details on the survey activities and additional questions, refer to Online Appendix A.2.

We refer answer solicited from former question as *perception on norm* and latter question as *confidence in norm* hereafter.
Finally, to gauge the importance of group opinions, subjects are asked about interest in potential new activities (area cleaning, laundry/folding, book review, bookkeeping, skill-upgrading course) with:

If this activity is [area cleaning], will you be interested in participating in it?[12]

In the general survey, we collect information in four key areas. First, participants are asked to list up to three of their closest friends and individuals with high social standing within their community group and the entire correction facility. This allows us to explore how the treatment effect may vary based on social status and network size. Second, cognitive ability is assessed using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and Raven's Progressive Matrices. Third, basic demographic data are gathered, including information on religion, education, reasons for discontinuing education, family size, marital status of parents, and the living arrangements prior to admission to RTC. Finally, details about the current convictions and the number of admissions to RTC are collected. Additionally, the survey solicits participants' time preferences and their trust levels towards their peers in the RTC through standard games. For the complete survey questionnaire, please refer to Online Appendix E.

General Survey - Time Preference Game

We utilized a standard multiple price list game, following the approach of Cameron *et al.* (2019), to gauge participants' time preferences. In this game, participants were presented with 11 rows, each containing two options. The first option offered a fixed, smaller payment (20 token points) that could be obtained within one week. The second option presented a larger payment (ranging from 21 to 41 token points) that required waiting for three weeks. The specific row for payment was chosen randomly at the end of all experiments. A rational participant's choice would involve initially selecting the fixed payment and switching to the larger, albeit more patient, payment at some point. The timing of this switch reflected each participant's patience level, with more patient individuals willing to wait for smaller incremental increases and less patient individuals waiting only for substantial increases. Our constructed variable ranges from 0 (most patient, always choosing the 3-week option) to 11 (most impatient, always preferring the 1-week fixed amount).

General Survey - Trust Game

Lastly, we follow the design and protocol in Aksoy *et al.* (2018) to measure participants' trust and trustworthiness. Subjects are randomly assigned as sender or receiver. The "sender" is endowed with 10 token points and is asked to indicate his willingness to send to the "receiver". The amount he sends is tripled and shown to the trustee, then the receiver will decide how much he is willing to return to the sender. Both participants have complete information and it has been made clear that no one is under any obligation to send any amount to the other one. Although this game is relatively complicated than all other games, we believe it is important to understand the trust preference of the participants as one may be more susceptible to influence of social norm if they exhibit more trust to the people in the social circle. So it is worthwhile to further use objective measurement to accurately quantify their trust preferences and how it will change in the special environment in the prison.

[12]They were told that they will be automatically enrolled in the activity when it is implemented if they answered YES

We initiated the trust game with random questions about their perceptions of income levels based on education and their beliefs about luck. These questions were intentionally included to divert the attention of the T2 group from the upcoming announcement on the following page.[13]

General Survey - Loss Aversion Game

We use a simple lottery design to measure participants' risk aversion and loss aversion (Binswanger, 1980; Eckel and Grossman, 2008) There are six lotteries and participants are asked to choose one of them. For each lottery, there is 50/50 chance to win each payoff. In the risk game, the average payoff increases from lottery one to lottery six with the variance increasing too. As a result, the most risk averse participant will choose lottery one while the most risk loving participant will choose lottery six. For the loss aversion game, each lottery includes a positive payment and a negative payoff, which suggests that participants may lose some token points given their choice. From lottery one to lottery six, the positive payment increases as the loss increases too.

4 Data and Main Results

4.1 Basic Characteristics

The data analyzed in this paper is a combination of information gathered through a ground survey and data extracted from administrative records related to offenses. Our dataset consists of 327 subjects, representing the entire male population at RTC from 2021 to 2022. This population includes 115 subjects in T1 (public announcement), 91 subjects in T2 (private announcement), and 121 subjects in C (control group). Offense records span nearly 3 years from 2020 to 2023, providing details on offenses occurring at least 1 months before and 6 months after treatment for each subject.

Table 1 provides a comprehensive summary of key findings derived from the general survey. In Panel A, we present the basic demographic characteristics of the youth offenders hosted in RTC. The average age of these subjects is 20, while their mean age at the first admission to RTC is 18.43. The subjects have spent an average of nearly 500 days in RTC since their initial admission on the date of treatment, with approximately 6 months remaining until their release. Notably, one-third of the sample comprises recallees.[14] When excluding the recallee population from consideration, the average duration of incarceration since the initial admission stands at 255 days. This duration is further reduced to 208 days when narrowing down the subset to individuals whose first admission occurred after January 2020.

The majority of subjects profess a religious affiliation, with the dominant religion representing 60% of the sample. The average family size, including immediate kin and the individual, is relatively large at 6, contrasting with the national average household size of 3 (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2023). Only 52% of subjects report that their parents are happily married, and 28% did not reside with their parents before incarceration. A significant portion (72%) of the subjects holds a job, with an average monthly earning of S$1645. Furthermore, two-thirds of the sample have attained at least N-level education, equivalent to secondary school. Reasons for discontinuing education vary, with 43% halting their studies due to arrests, 27% citing a lack of interest, 11% facing expulsion, and

[13] Refer to Online Appendix E.6 for the survey form.

[14] reformative trainees are those who previously released on supervision but were subsequently called back to RTC due to new offenses or probation rule violations.

14% discontinuing studies due to insufficient financial support.Performance in cognitive assessments reveals an 85% accuracy rate in basic Raven Progressive Matrices questions, contrasting with poorer performance in basic math questions.

Panel B outlines the nature of criminal charges for which the subjects were incarcerated, revealing a prevalence of multiple charges for each individual. The sample subjects are categorized into three major groups based on the criminal offenses committed: theft/robbery-related property crimes (30%), drug consumption or trafficking (26% & 11%), and offenses related to voluntarily causing harm to others (CAP-CH/VCH/VCGH) (27%). Additionally, there is an emerging trend of commercial crimes (11%), aligning with the increasing incidents of spam-related crime in society. Notably, approximately one-tenth of the sample committed sexual offenses.

Panel C provides a comprehensive overview of the subjects' social networks within (RTC). Approximately 90% of the sample identified at least one best friend, either within their community group or RTC, while 70% indicated popular inmates in either their community group or RTC. On average, each subject was identified as a best friend around 2 times and as popular 1.3 times. This might be attributed to the relatively small social circles within the RTC, limiting the number of individuals they can identify as best friends or popular acquaintances.

The final columns in Table 1 display the p-values resulting from t-tests assessing the statistical differences between the public/private treatment groups and the control group across these characteristics. Notably, each treatment and control group exhibits substantial similarity in these aspects. However, a notable exception arises concerning the frequency of an inmate being labeled as the best friend or popular within the RTC, as indicated in the last two rows. This difference is not of particular concern due to its subtle nature.

Table 2 presents a summary of key findings derived from the norm survey, with Panel A and B providing statistics before and after the treatment, respectively. Prior to the treatment, we observe stark difference between youth offenders' private perceptions of misconduct and their estimations of normative beliefs within the RTC.[15] Regarding physical misconduct, such as fighting/bullying and tattooing/hurting oneself, 94% (87%) of youth offenders perceive it as a bad idea, but they believe only 74% (66%) of their peers share the same perspective. [[I am thinking to add a table to describe how I categorize offence into these types. What do you think? For example, while many of the offence has clear definition like fighting, there are other description of offence could also indicate someone is involved in fighting, so all these cases are categorized as fighting.]] Similar trends are observed for non-physical misconduct, such as vandalism and disrespecting officers/civilian staff, as well as for positive behaviors like cleaning the room, reviewing books, and bookkeeping. Notably, this misconception dissipates when considering behaviors like renouncing their gang. Approximately half of the youth offenders believe more individuals should renounce the gang, but they estimate that 40% of their peers actually share this sentiment. In terms of confidence in their estimates about the norm, youth offenders express moderate confidence, with an average confidence rating ranging between 3.5 and 4.0 out of 5. All of the above observations are consistent between each treatment group and control group with no statistical difference.

Intriguingly, the introduction of information treatment has proven effective in influencing youth offenders' perceptions of normative beliefs across both good and bad conducts in both the public and private information treatment groups, with similar magnitudes of impact observed.

[15] Refer to additional statistics on Appendix Table B1 for statistics when T1 and T2 are combined as one group.

While the treated youth offenders marginally adjusted their private beliefs concerning misconduct and positive behaviors, this adjustment wasn't statistically significant within the private treatment group. This hints at the potential limitation of private information treatment in shaping private beliefs by altering normative beliefs within the social sphere.

However, there is a noteworthy positive aspect of the treatment — the average proportion of peers believed to align with the avoidance of misconduct and engagement in positive behaviors has observed a remarkable 10% increase, and this increase is statistically significant.

Altogether, we affirm the notable reduction, albeit not complete eradication, of the initial gap between private beliefs and perceived norm beliefs regarding both misconduct and positive behaviors. Additionally, the informative treatment improves understanding of the norm with higher confidence, resulting in an increase in normative belief estimates, transitioning from below 4 to above 4 out of 5. The increase in confidence is statistically significant in the public treatment group but shows less significance or lack thereof in the private treatment group, particularly in cases related to gang renouncement, where statistical significance wasn't observed in either group.

Last not the least, we have made insightful observations from the three behavioral games.[16] Participants displayed varying time preference attitudes when it came to receiving token points, resulting in a widespread distribution. Notably, this distribution revealed three prominent modes: 20% had a discounting factor of at least 0.95, another 20% had a factor around 0.86, and the remaining 20% had a factor less than 0.74. However, the average monthly discounting factor is 0.86, which is highly consistent with 0.84 of average individuals like tax payers in Boston, MA (Meier and Sprenger, 2010), and more patient compared to those individuals heavily indebted to illegal money lenders with an average discounting factor of 0.77 (Leong *et al.*, 2021).

Participants also displayed a notable level of trust toward their fellow inmates at RTC in the trust game. On average, the senders transmitted half of their 10 token points (5.46) to the receivers and anticipated that the receivers would reciprocate by sending back an amount at least equivalent to what they had received. Interestingly, the estimated reciprocation amount by the senders increased proportionally with the points transferred to the receivers. This aligns closely with the concept of "conditional cooperation" in prosocial behavior, a theory tested in Frey and Meier (2004).Equally intriguing, the receivers themselves expected the senders to dispatch half of their points (5.53) and, as predicted by the senders, indicated their intention to send back at least the amount they had received, with the reciprocation amount also growing proportionally with the sender's initial transfer.

Participants demonstrated a strong inclination toward risk-taking and displayed a low degree of loss aversion, as 60% of the sample chose to engage in the riskiest game featuring the highest potential gain and potential loss.

4.2 Institution Offence

It's a common observation that young offenders within RTC engage in rule-breaking behavior more than adults, leading to institutional offenses (referred to hereafter as "offenses"). These offenses encompass various types, including physical offences like fighting, tattooing or hurting oneself, as well as non-physical offences like gang-related activities, vandalism, disrespect towards officers or staff, and miscellaneous misconduct that includes actions such as secreting contraband, loitering in the yard, abetting the commission of offence, lost pen and sparring in the cell. Our offence records spans nearly 36 months between

[16]Refer to Appendix Table B5 and B6

2020 and 2023. We are not able observe the offences committed by youth offenders like recallees before 2020.

Figure 2 depicts the offense patterns during this timeframe, highlighting treatment rounds at months 13, 21, and 30. The average monthly count of adjudicated inmates, indicated by the yellow line, remained consistently low, hovering around 25 individuals (less than 10% of the inmate population) for the initial ten months of offense data. This period coincided with COVID-related social distancing measures, influencing the reduced counts. Subsequently, offense counts began an upward trend after the tenth month, sharply escalating until reaching a peak around month 20. This levelled off to a stable monthly average of 75 incidents (about 20% of the population) for approximately ten months, followed by a decline post our third treatment intervention. Noteworthy observations from the figure include the high proportion of investigated inmates subsequently being adjudicated, with rare instances of more individuals being adjudicated than investigated. Additionally, minor offenses constitute the majority of cases, while major offenses exhibit consistent patterns throughout the data period. Despite the varying time trend for offence, treatment groups and control group all exhibit similar patterns (see figure 3).

To better comprehend the potential impact of our treatment on youth offenders' behavioral patterns, we delve into understanding offense likelihoods across their period of incarceration, as depicted in Figure 4. We present two columns in the figure: the average monthly offenses per inmate aggregated by treatment groups, firstly from admission to treatment, and secondly from treatment to release. For both time dimension, we study the trends by including or excluding control variables: offender's duration spend in RTC since first ever admission to the expected release date and round. When considering offenses since admission, a consistent pattern emerges across treatment groups: offenses commence approximately four months post-admission and maintaining a stable monthly count of 1 thereafter.[17] Regarding offense patterns from treatment to release, control variables become irrelevant. Youth offenders display a reduced propensity for offenses as their release date approaches.[18]

To facilitate our upcoming treatment analysis, we redirect our focus toward examining offense trends concerning a distinct temporal dimension—pre and post-treatment. Figure 5 replicates the data showcased in Figure 2, presenting the proportion of offending inmates across treatment groups within this time framework. Before the treatment, the offense trends across treatment groups mirror each other significantly, evident in the statistics for investigated inmates, adjudicated individuals, and those adjudicated for major offenses. This consistency in pre-treatment patterns holds true for both physical and non-physical offenses (refer to Figure 6). However, it's post-treatment that reveals distinctions: groups receiving information treatment exhibit a decline, sustained over approximately six months.

Noteworthy are spikes in offenses observed during the treatment month for the control group and preceding the treatment month for the private treatment group. These spikes occur sporadically across rounds and treatment groups (refer to Appendix Figure A1). Such offense spikes, constituting a mere 4% of total cases, primarily involve acts categorized as vandalism, often involving tampering with prison property. At times, hike incidences involve inmates from more than one community group.

One thing to highlight is that there are spikes of offence displayed in the treatment

[17]The analysis shall focus on patterns from month 0 to 20, as observations beyond 20 months post-admission pertain to recallees, whose early incarceration offense data isn't observable.

[18]Incidences of offenses post-release date occur due to instances where inmates extend their stay in RTC owing to committed offenses.

month for control group and other spike occurred few months before the treatment month in private treatment group. These hikes does not consistently occurs in all rounds nor in one treatment group, and they are rather random (see Appendix figure A1). Such offence spikes are rare incidences in RTC, which only counts 4% of total offence cases, majority of which falls categorized as vandalism involving "tampering in any way with prison locks, lamps or lights or other property with which he has no concern" and can involve inmates more than one community group. Moreover, the majority (two-thirds) of adjudicated offense cases involve a single inmate, while 15% engage two inmates, and 5% involve three individuals. Physical offenses constitute about 10% of all offense cases, yet 26% of cases involving multiple individuals relate to physical offenses. Additionally, nearly half of the major offense cases involve physical infractions.

With the trend in mind, we now delve into exploring offense statistics. Table 3 provides a breakdown of individual-level offense data categorized by treatment groups, presenting insights into both the pre-treatment phase (panel A) and the post-treatment period (panel B). Starting with panel A, which focuses on the pre-treatment statistics:

The likelihood of offenses occurring in a given month before treatment stands at approximately 37%. Notice that the occurrence rate for major offenses and physical offenses remains consistently low at 6% each per month, maintaining this steadiness across the months leading up to the treatment. There were no significant irregularities or unusual offense patterns observed in the months preceding treatment. In the three months preceding treatment, the cumulative offense count stands at 2, gradually increasing to 3-4 within the six months before treatment.

Aligning with our visual analyses, there is suggestive evidence indicating a short-term positive impact of treatment in reducing offenses within three months post-treatment. This reduction is evident across both physical and non-physical offense categories and spans various specific offense types, except for low-incidence gang-related offenses (refer to Appendix Tables B7 and B8).

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Treatment Effect: DD Estimation

We employe the DD (Difference-in-Difference) to gauge the treatment effect on youth offender's offence and perceptions of norms. The analysis involves comparing the aggregate differences before and after the treatment period, utilizing following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it} = \alpha_1 &+ \beta_1 \text{Public}_i \times (Post = 1)_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Private}_i \times (Post = 1)_{it} \\ &+ \beta_3 (\text{Post}{=}1)_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Public}_i + \beta_5 \text{Private}_i \\ &+ \Phi_1 X_i + \gamma_t + \lambda_1 \text{Months from Admission to Treatment}_i \\ &+ \delta_1 \text{Months from Treatment to Release}_i + \epsilon_{it}, \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

where Y_{it} encompasses various offense measures and perceptions about norms. For offence outcomes, we use the accumulative offence counts across various times windows: 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months and 12 months. Public_i is a dummy indicating subject i is in public treatment group. Private_i is a dummy indicating the subject i is in private treatment group. $(Post = 1)_{it}$ is a binary variable with 1 indicates the period after the treatment date for i and 0 otherwise. As evident in Figure 3, offence incidents fluctuate over the months though common trend assumption is satisfied as such fluctuations is similar across treatment and control groups pre-treatment.To maintain a conservative

approach, we nevertheless control for the treatment month fixed effects γ_t. X_i controls for all individual level characteristics presented in table 1. Youth offenders exhibit varying propensities to commit offenses during different stages of their incarceration. They display a decreased likelihood of committing offenses in the initial months after admission and preceding their release. As depicted in Figure 4, the offense patterns appear more balanced across both treatment and control groups when controlling for the incarceration tenure from admission to treatment and treatment to release.To account for these differences, we include these two variables in our estimations.The key parameter of interest are β_1 and β_2.

In all the regression analyses presented throughout this paper, we consistently employed a sample exclusion criterion. Specifically, we excluded 11 individuals either admitted within 2 weeks before the treatment or expected to be released within 2 weeks after the treatment. This selection criterion ensured the availability of adequate pre- and post-treatment information for robust analysis. It also aimed to mitigate biases in the treatment effect results arising from individuals who were brand new to the facility or those completing their sentences. Moreover, to account for heterogeneity across treated units, all regressions were clustered at the individual level, enhancing the robustness of our estimations.

5.1.1 Treatment Effect on Perception

We explore whether the information treatment corrects misdirected norms by analyzing three perception measures collected from norm surveys: *perception*, *perception on norm*, *confident in norm* (as defined in section 3.3). We present estimates from Equation 6 in Table 4 using these measures as dependent variables and categorize these them into Panels A, B, and C. Within each panel, the first 5 columns address perception measures related to mischievous behavior, while the latter 3 columns cover preferences for good behavior.

The information treatment demonstrates significant overall effectiveness in shaping youth offenders' private beliefs regarding both mischievous and good behaviors. It also notably corrects misdirected norms and enhances individuals' confidence in their understanding of behavioral norms.

Panel A indicates substantial shifts in individual's private perceptions regarding mischievous behaviors among the public treatment group. Post-treatment, there's a 6.5% to 11% increase in believing it's better to avoid offenses like fighting and tattoos, compared to the control. However, the effect regarding perceptions of vandalism, with a 6.1% increase, is not statistically significant ($p > 0.05$). Positive effects are also extends to good behaviors like renouncing the gang and engaging in book reviews. There's a significant 16% increase in favoring renouncing the gang and an 8.2% increase in interest in book reviews ($p < 0.05$). In contrast, the private treatment group displays weaker effects, which are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, suggesting potentially different mechanisms in shaping perceptions.

These findings indicate that public and private information treatments might influence youth offenders' perceptions differently. Individuals in the private group might discount the credibility of the information disseminated when it is not made public. Additionally, the pre-existing attitude of 90% of youth offenders favoring less offense and more positive activities might contribute to the muted results.

Panel B highlights the treatment's effectiveness in correcting youth offenders' misconceptions about normative beliefs, evident across various mischievous and good behaviors. Comparing to the control group, both treated groups, whether through public or private

announcements, believe an average of 12-15% (10%) more peers in the correction facility agree on avoiding offenses (engaging in good behaviors).

Furthermore, the information treatment also enhances treated individuals' confidence in estimating the behavioral norm within the correction facility. On a scale of 1-5, youth offenders in the public treatment group report an average increase of 0.4 in confidence concerning offensive behaviors, while those in the private treatment group exhibit a more moderate increase of around 0.1-0.2, albeit not all statistically significant. Importantly, these consistent findings hold regardless of the inclusion of control variables, aligning with the assumption that the treatment is random and independent of other observable characteristics of individual offenders.

The discussions presented above stem from a comprehensive analysis of the full sample. It's crucial to note that the treatment's effect on correcting youth offenders' perceptions about their peers' norm beliefs remains largely similar and robust across all three rounds of field trials. Likewise, there's consistency observed in the increase in confidence regarding their estimations of the norm.

Regarding individual perceptions, the treatment effect remains consistent in magnitude across the rounds for both physical and non-physical offense-related perceptions. However, these effects tend to be weaker in significance, possibly attributed to the relatively high mean perception levels pre-treatment.[19]

5.2 Treatment Effect on Program Enrolment

To assess the tangible positive effect of information treatment on the behavioral change of youth offenders resulting from the correction of misconceptions, we examine their willingness to enroll in various programs outlined in the norm survey (section 3.3).

Table 5 summarizes youth offenders' interests in engaging in beneficial activities. Notably, the treatment exhibits its most pronounced effect on program enrollment in book review activities. Individuals in both the public and private treatment groups display a 14% higher likelihood of expressing interest in enrolling in book reading and reviewing activities if offered, compared to the control group. Moreover, the private group also shows a 6.5% increased interest in enrolling in leadership courses if available. While changes in *perception* remain relatively muted in both treatment groups, the private group demonstrates a reasonably strong inclination toward behavioral change.

5.3 Treatment Effect on Offence Outcomes: DD estimation

Our primary focus regarding treatment impact is on observing behavioral changes among youth offenders in terms of offenses. To assess this impact, we employ three empirical methods. Initially, we continue the DD estimation using equation 6, analyzing changes in accumulative offense counts before and after the treatment across various time spans.

Panel A in table 6 present the treatment effects on the total number of adjudicated offenses over time spans ranging from 1 month to 1 year. Notably, estimates in consistently demonstrate a positive treatment effect, reducing offenses for both the public and private treatment groups. Comparatively, individuals from both treatment groups commit, on average, 0.30 fewer offenses per month within the first 3 months post-treatment, leading to a reduction of 0.98 offenses within this period. This effect is particularly strong considering the average cumulative offense within 3 months pre-treatment stands around 2.2, resulting in an impressive 45% reduction within the same period post-treatment. However, this

[19] See section C in Appendix Table

effect doesn't follow a monotonic pattern over time and tends to weaken after 3 months. For instance, between 3 and 6 months post-treatment, the treatment effect is 1.4 to 1.5 fewer offenses, indicating a 42% reduction.

Interestingly, no further reduction in offence is observed between 6 months and 1 year for the public treatment group, maintaining a treatment effect of around 1.4 compared to the control group. Conversely, for the private group, the treatment effect remains consistent, showcasing a reduction of 2 offenses compared to the control group at 9 months post-treatment, sustaining this rate until 1 year, equivalent to nearly 100% reduction within the first 9 months post-treatment. Importantly, these treatment effects remain stable with and without addition of control variables.

Panel B of our analysis represents the treatment effect categorized by the severity of the offense. Minor offenses notably constitute the majority, comprising 82% of the observed offenses. In contrast, the occurrence of major offenses among youth offenders remains low, with a likelihood of committing a major offense at a rate of 0.06 per month. Consequently, the treatment impact in reducing accumulative offenses predominantly stems from the decrease in minor offenses. It's noteworthy that the majority of activities related to gangs (secret societies), tattooing/self-inflicted injuries, and assault are categorized as major offenses. While other offense types also have cases classified as major, their occurrence rates are comparatively lower.

From a policy perspective, we aim to understand the specific offense types on which the information treatment has the most significant impact in reducing. Table 7 presents the results categorized by offense type for periods of 6 months (Panel A) and 1 year (Panel B), both pre- and post-treatment. Once again, the treatment effects are prominently observed in offense types with higher occurrence rates, notably vandalism, disrespect, and misconduct. The reduction resulting from the treatment amounts to approximately 80% in their respective offense categories. It is worth mentioning that that we observe an increase in gang-related activities among the private treatment group post-treatment, possibly attributed to the decrease in the incidence of gang-related activities for the control group during the same period. However, due to the very low occurrence rate of gang-related offenses, even a subtle change could result in substantial alterations in the treatment effect. Considering the minimal occurrence and the potential sensitivity of treatment effects to small fluctuations in gang-related activities, we will not delve further into this specific observation.

The DD analysis performed in fully sample assume uniform treatment effects across round. To delve deeper into understanding the treatment effects across individual rounds, we extended our analysis at the round level using equation (7).

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it}^{r} = {} & \theta_1^r \text{Public}_{ir} \times (Post = 1)_{tr} + \theta_2^r \text{Private}_{ir} \times (Post = 1)_{tr} \\ & + \theta_3^r (\text{Post=1})_{tr} + \theta_4^r \text{Public}_{ir} + \theta_5^r \text{Private}_{ir} \\ & + \Phi_2^r X_i + \gamma_t^r + \lambda_2^r \text{Months from Admission to Treatment}_{ir} \\ & + \delta_2^r \text{Months from Treatment to Release}_{ir} + \epsilon_{it}^r, \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

, where $r \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ represents the sub-experiment or rounds.

Appendix Table section D.2 present estimates from this extended analysis. Due to the smaller sample size when examining individual rounds, achieving a balanced pre-trend becomes less likely. As a result, insights derived from these round-specific results are not entire consistent. However, noteworthy insights emerge from these results. The treatment effect seems to intervene in a manner that prevents the continuation of offense incidence along its existing trend. Specifically, it appears to halt the rise observed in the control

group in some instances, indicating a potential stabilizing effect rather than a perpetuation of the trend observed in the absence of treatment.

5.4 Treatment Effect on Offence Outcomes: Stacked DID Estimation

Given the staggered adoption design of our study, we employ a stacked Differences-in-Differences (DID) framework. This choice arises from the staggered nature of the treatment rollout across multiple periods. The stacked DID approach allows us to effectively examine the time-varying treatment effects across various sub-experiments/rounds and post-periods. Our inclusion criteria are straightforward: within each round, treated individuals in the same group received treatment within a one-week span, unless treated on the same date. We have clean control units who were never treated, and all individuals in the analysis sample fall within the event window of each round.

We will use following specification to estimate the varying treatment effect in each round, as well as for the stacked full sample.

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_{it}^{r} = & \sum_{k=-\kappa_b}^{\kappa_a} \rho_{1k}^{r} Public_{ir} \times 1(TSE_{tr} = k) + \sum_{k=-\kappa_b}^{\kappa_a} \rho_{2k}^{r} Private_{ir} \times 1(TSE_{tr} = k) \\
& + \sum_{k=-\kappa_b}^{\kappa_a} \rho_{3k}^{r} \times 1(TSE_{tr} = k) + \rho_4^{r}\text{Public}_{ir} + \rho_5^{r}\text{Private}_{ir} \\
& + \Phi^{r} X_i + \gamma_t^{r} + \lambda_3^{r}\text{Months from Admission to Treatment}_{ir} \\
& + \delta_3^{r}\text{Months from Treatment to Release}_{ir} + \epsilon_{it}^{r},
\end{aligned} \tag{8}
$$

, where Y_{it}^{r} represents the series of offense outcomes of individual i from round r in period t. Let ω_r symbolize the adoption/treatment date of round r marking the earliest policy event of round r compliant within the event window. Our investigation involves an event window spanning κ_b periods before and κ_a periods after ω_r.

For this analysis, we've transformed our data chronologically by calendar week (with period t indicates week number), subsequently aggregating offense outcomes at two-month, one-month, and two-week levels. Hence, we define the variable TSE_{tr}, denoting the time since the treatment, at two months from treatment, one month from treatment, and two weeks from treatment. Our primary focus revolves around event windows 6 months before and after the treatment for TSE_{tr} at the two-month and one-month levels. Additionally, we consider a timeframe of 3 months before and after the treatment for TSE_{tr} at the two-week level. To align with this specific time frame, we've adjusted κ_b and κ_a accordingly."

We begin by examining the time-varying treatment effects using the full sample, followed by analyses on subsamples grouped by rounds.Tables 8 and 9 present the treatment effects at two-month and one-month intervals following/preceding the treatment, with an event window spanning 6 months before and after the treatment. "Zero months since treat" refers to the initial two-month or one-month period post-treatment in these tables. Consistent with the findings from the basic DID results in the preceding section, we observe the most pronounced treatment effects within the first 2 months after the intervention, showcasing an average reduction of approximately 0.4 offenses per month for both public and private groups compared to the control group. Over the subsequent month, this effect decreases to 0.3, then stabilizes at 0.2 for up to 6 months before gradually declining to 0.1 in the 7th month. The results remain consistent in the full sample regardless of

whether we include the additional variables outlined in equation 8 (see Appendix Table Section E). For the analysis based on subsamples grouped by rounds, we opt for the most comprehensive specification, including all available controls.

A similar diminishing trend in treatment effect is noted across rounds 1 and 2, displaying more substantial reductions. However, in round 3, the treatment effect varies over time yet remains relatively stable with minor fluctuations. We attribute the relatively subdued effect observed in round 3 to a decline in the aggregated offense rate coinciding with the rollout of round 3 (refer to figure 3), making it challenging to detect monthly-level effects. However, at the two-month level, we observe relatively robust results in the initial 2 months post-treatment, although these effects weaken subsequently and are not statistically significant.

The results obtained at the two-week interval are inconclusive due to the low offense rate observed at this bi-weekly level, rendering the outcomes less meaningful.

5.4.1 Treatment Effect on Offence Outcomes: Two-Step DID Estimation

Finally, we employ the Two-Stage Difference-in-Differences (2SDD) approach following Gardner (2022)[20] to further assess the time-varying nature of the treatment effect. The first-stage and second-stage estimation equations are outlined in equations (9) and (10) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{igt} = \gamma_t + \Phi_i + \lambda_4 \text{Months from Admission to Treatment}_{ig} \\ + \delta_4 \text{Months from Treatment to Release}_{ig} + \psi_{igt} \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

,where Y_{git} is the incidence of offence of individual i from group g at time t. g is the treatment group ($1 = public, 2 = private, 0 = control$) and t is the week number in chronological order. Φ_i captures the individual fixed effects. Rest of the independent variables follow the same definitions as in equation 6.

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\psi}_{igt} = \sum_{k=-\kappa_b}^{\kappa_a} \pi_{1k} Public_i \times 1(TSE_t = k) + \sum_{k=-\kappa_b}^{\kappa_a} \pi_{2k} Private_i \times 1(TSE_t = k) \\ + \sum_{k=-\kappa_b}^{\kappa_a} \pi_{3k} \times 1(TSE_t = k) + \pi_4 \text{Public}_i + \pi_5 \text{Private}_i + \mu_{igt} \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

In the first stage, we estimate equation (9) using the control sample $g = 0$ to identify time effects while controlling for confounding factors from control variables. We retain the estimated fixed time effects $\hat{\gamma}t$, individual fixed effects $\hat{\Phi}$, $\hat{\lambda}4$, and $\hat{\delta}4$, and calculate the estimated residuals $\hat{\psi}igt$.

For the second stage, we estimate the treatment effect by regressing $\hat{\psi}igt$ on treatment dummies interacted with $TSEt$. This method helps us determine $E(\pi_{1k}|Public_i = 1)$ and $E(\pi_{2k}|Private_i = 1)$, considering the potential heterogeneity in the adoption and average effects of the treatment across different time periods.

In our 2SDD analysis, we aggregate data at two-month, one-month, and two-week intervals, focusing on event windows of 12 months from the treatment for the two-month interval and 6 months from the treatment for the latter two intervals. In the second-stage estimation, we explore both OLS and individual fixed-effect estimation approaches. Tables 11 to 16 summarize the results from these methodologies.

[20] Stata package by Butts and Gardner (2021)

Examining all three tables, we notice findings somewhat contrasting with the previous results. The treatment effect appears relatively mild in the first 2 months after treatment but becomes more pronounced as time progresses when pooling the sample from all rounds. To delve deeper, we explore the effects round by round in tables 12 to 14. The results from individual rounds consistently mirror those discovered from DD estimation and Stacked DD: the treatment effect is short-lived and gradually diminishes after 6 months.

5.5 Mechanism

Our evidence strongly supports the effectiveness of the information treatment in reducing offenses, albeit with diminishing effects over time. Understanding the mechanism behind this behavioral change is crucial for policy-making, particularly if correcting misdirected norms underlies the improvement in offense behavior. In this scenario, we anticipate the most pronounced reduction in offenses among youth offenders whose misconceptions of offense norms fall below the norm's mean.

Inspired by Bursztyn and et al. (2017), we utilize the concept of a "perception wedge" to capture the discrepancy between an individual's perception and the actual norm. Specifically, $Dwedge_{offence}$ is set to 1 if an individual's perception of a particular $offense$ norm is above the average perception of that offense's norm; otherwise, it is 0. For streamlined analysis, we create an aggregate measure, $Dwedge$, set to 1 if the average perception of all offenses by a youth offender is above the mean norm perception across all offense types. Likewise, following this logic, we define $Dwedge_{physical}$ and $Dwedge_{nonphysical}$. We find that the aggregate $Dwedge$ correlates strongly with individual $Dwedge_{offence}$; for instance, it correlates at 0.56 with $Dwedge_{physical}$ and at 0.85 with $Dwedge_{nonphysical}$. Before the treatment, 85% of the entire sample had underestimated ($Dwedge = 0$) their peers' inclination toward fewer offenses."

To examine the mechanism, we analyze if treated youth offenders with $Dwedge = 0$ have updated their beliefs post-information treatment. We conduct an analysis using subsamples of $Dwedge_{offence} = 0$ and $Dwedge_{offence} = 1$ and report the results in Table 17 and 18, respectively, focusing on panel B in both tables. Evidently, treated individuals initially with $Dwedge_{offence} = 0$ sufficiently adjusted their beliefs upwards compared to the control group. However, minimal change is observed for treated individuals with initially $Dwedge_{offence} = 1$, as expected due to the announcement reaffirming their beliefs.

Subsequently, we employ the baseline DD estimation (equation (6)) by first interacting $TreatmentX(Post = 1)$ with the $Dwedge$ dummy. The resulting marginal effects are detailed in Table 19. Extending this analysis, we further interact $TreatmentX(Post = 1)X(Dwedge = 1)$ with round dummies and present the associated marginal effects in Table 20.

Noteworthy observations emerge from these tables. Firstly, compelling evidence suggests that the treatment effect on offense reduction predominantly stems from youth offenders initially underestimating ($Dwedge = 0$) their peers' preference for fewer offenses. This holds for both public and private treatment groups, displaying an average reduction in offense counts of 0.7-0.8/1.1/1.4-2.0 post-treatment across event windows of 3/6/12 months before and after treatment, respectively. These effects are highly significant and consistent across rounds, except for round 1. These findings support the hypothesis that rectifying underestimation of norms leads to reduced offenses and the behavioral changes are greater when the information about others' true types is more impactful.

Secondly, for youth offenders overestimating ($Dwedge = 1$) the norm, we observe a greater reduction in offenses post-treatment for both treated groups across all event win-

dows. However, these estimates carry larger standard errors, suggesting that the reduction could be influenced by a few individuals rather than the entire group. Potential explanations for the reduction in offenses among this group might include the announcement reaffirming their existing beliefs, thereby reducing their likelihood of offending, as well as the potential positive influence from the group identified with $Dwedge = 0$.

6 Heterogeneous Effects

In this section, we delve into a detailed analysis to explore the heterogeneous effects of our information intervention on youth offenders. This exploration aims to uncover which groups are more challenging to rehabilitate and whether the intervention has a uniform impact across all youth offenders. To focus on these diverse effects, we combine the public and private groups into one treatment group and compare it with the control group. We continue to employ the Two-Stage Difference-in-Differences for this analysis. Overall, we observe pronounced and significant treatment effects under specific circumstances: when the offenders' term in the RTC is due to physical crimes, when they possess higher cognitive skills, and when they are not from broken families. Additionally, we note significant effects when youths place more weight on others' perceptions.

First of all, the short-term treatment effects within six months in the full sample primarily stem from the subset of youth offenders sentenced to RTC for committing physical crimes. This category includes offenses such as crimes against property like robbery, crimes against public order, voluntarily causing harm to others, sexual offenses, and crimes related to unlawful assembly or rioting, accounting for 63% of the sample offenders.

Forty-two percent of the sample subjects scored full marks for both the three math questions and the six Raven Matrix questions included in the survey. The treatment effect is highly significant and strong, persisting up to 12 months after treatment for this group of youth offenders with higher cognitive abilities. However, the effect is not significant for youth offenders outside of this subset. This finding is crucial in understanding the intervention's effectiveness, suggesting that disseminated information may be more effectively received and understood by individuals with higher cognitive abilities. To enhance the effectiveness of the information intervention, authorities may need to provide stronger or more repetitive information to individuals with lower cognitive abilities to achieve the desired effect.

Family support is widely recognized as crucial in the rehabilitation of youth offenders. Those from broken families often receive less parental attention or guidance during their formative years, potentially leading to the prolonged development of negative behaviors or reduced motivation to improve. This lack of motivation can hinder their incentive to leave RTC and reunite with their families. We find that 48% of the sample comes from broken families (unhappily married, divorced, separated). We observe a strong and persistent treatment effect within one year after intervention on youth offenders with happily married parents, while the treatment effect is weaker for those from broken families.

Lastly, we observe a strong treatment effect on the reduction of offenses by 0.158 eight months after treatment among popular inmates, compared to a muted effect on non-popular inmates. Popular inmates are defined as those identified as popular by at least one other peer in RTC, constituting 63

The heterogeneous analysis is policy-informative, suggesting that for any information intervention like ours to be effective, authorities need to consider that different target groups may require different levels of intervention. Additionally, the unfavorable family

background of youth offenders may compromise treatment effectiveness, and youth offenders' desire to conform to social norms should be taken into account.

7 Spillover Analysis

To gain further insights for policy prescription, we delved into the spillover effects of information treatment by examining a residual sample of individuals who had interactions with treated individuals but were not part of our primary study. By matching with population data, we curated a spillover sample comprising 68 individuals. "Individuals were admitted either during the weeks when treatment announcements were made within a round or between the final treatment announcement of a round and the initiation of treatment announcements for the subsequent round. Most spillover subjects constituting those admitted after the last round. For an in-depth understanding of how this spillover sample was constructed, please refer to Online Appendix Section B.

Within this spillover sample, we observe a distribution of 2 individuals from round 1 (2 in the public), 4 from round 2 (1 in the private and 3 in the control group), and 62 from round 3 (6 in the public, 14 in the private, and 42 in the control group) (for a comprehensive breakdown of treatment status across rounds, see Online Appendix Section D1).

Given that nearly all these individuals were admitted post the treatment weeks within a round, our analysis primarily focuses on their behavioral patterns regarding offenses post-treatment. Specifically, we aim to compare differences in offenses across the treatment groups. This involves regressing various offense outcomes against treatment, while controlling for treatment month, months from admission to treatment, months from treatment to release, and days from the initial admission to the anticipated release date. For the balance test of control variables utilized in the regression, refer to Online Appendix Tables D2 and D3.

Tables 25 and 28 encapsulate the regression results when considering three treatment groups (Public, Private, Control) and when consolidating into two treatment groups (Public and Private combined, compared against the control group). The focus lies on the latter scenario where treatment groups are combined due to a more balanced sample between treated and control groups.

The spillover effect, as shown in Tables 27 and 28, mirrors a similar magnitude and temporal decline to what was observed in our primary study sample. The treatment's spillover effect reduces the accumulative offense counts of the treatment group by 0.56 after 6 months from treatment announcement, representing a 43% reduction observed in the primary study sample. This effect remains notably consistent at the 12-month mark post-treatment, aligning closely with findings from the primary sample. Notably, the observed spillover effect predominantly affects minor offenses. Particularly, this effect is more pronounced in offense types like misconduct, while its impact appears less pronounced for other offense categories, except for incidents involving fighting.

8 Conclusion

Our study underscores the complexity and malleability of social norms within the unique environment of a Youth Reformative Training Center. Our findings reveal the significant gap between private preferences and perceived norms among youth offenders, consistent with the idea of pluralistic ignorance, even in the presence of an abundance opportunity

for communication. The effectiveness of our information intervention in altering these perceptions and subsequently reducing institutional offenses demonstrates the power of targeted, informed strategies in reshaping social norms. For the Singapore Prison Services, the insights drawn from RTCs are valuable in aiding them to better understand the prison population at large, potentially informing policy prescriptions that could be generalized to the entire prison population.

This research adds to the broader understanding of social norms, peer influence, and the potential for policy interventions to effect positive change, especially among vulnerable populations. The effectiveness of our approach suggests that similar strategies could be beneficial in other settings where misperceptions of social norms contribute to undesirable behaviors. Recognizing the importance of understanding the cost of deviating from others is key in revealing the potential direction for miscoordinated norms. An essential initial step in positively shifting social norms is thus to understand private preferences for various actions. We additionally emphasize the unique aspect of our intervention: making it publicly known that all community members receive the same corrected information about private beliefs. This is important when the lack of communication is a consequence, rather than a cause, of miscoordinated norms. In our setting, the close living quarters of the youths limited our ability to clearly compare the effects of correcting individual perceptions without shared knowledge of others' information. This presents an interesting avenue for future research, such as comparing the impact of social media versus private efforts in correcting misperceptions.

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Figure 1: Experimental Design: Main Experiment




Figure 2: Offence Pattern Over Time





Figure 3: Offence Pattern Over Time By Treatment Groups



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Figure 4: Offence Pattern Since Admission and Before Release




Figure 5: Aggregate Offence Overview




Figure 6: Physical v.s Non-Physical Offences




Figure 7: Offences Adjudicated by Type



Table 1: Summary Statistics

	All		Public		Pravite		Control		Pub - Ctrl	Pri - Ctrl
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	*p*-value	
Panel A: Individual Characteristics										
Age	19.79	1.98	19.53	2.49	20.09	1.55	19.81	1.67	0.310	0.218
Age at first admission	18.43	1.88	18.23	2.40	18.67	1.52	18.44	1.51	0.415	0.270
Major religion group	0.59	0.49	0.57	0.50	0.57	0.50	0.62	0.49	0.474	0.479
Number of family members	5.59	2.81	5.59	2.75	5.40	2.16	5.73	3.27	0.730	0.402
Living with: no parent	0.29	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.32	0.47	0.27	0.45	0.925	0.469
Had a job before RTC	0.73	0.45	0.68	0.47	0.85	0.36	0.69	0.47	0.900	0.007
Edu: N level and above	0.72	0.45	0.71	0.45	0.71	0.45	0.73	0.45	0.809	0.836
Why stop stduying: arrested	0.43	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.35	0.48	0.47	0.50	0.578	0.082
Correct math questions (%)	0.17	0.30	0.17	0.30	0.18	0.31	0.17	0.29	0.879	0.783
Correctly raven questions(%)	0.85	0.16	0.84	0.19	0.87	0.12	0.85	0.16	0.645	0.490
Days from first admit to treatment	493.80	459.21	461.31	468.46	519.53	470.00	505.31	443.93	0.460	0.822
Days to release on treatment date	184.87	119.89	173.80	126.43	183.34	112.86	196.53	118.55	0.155	0.414
Recallee	0.32	0.47	0.26	0.44	0.33	0.47	0.36	0.48	0.090	0.610
Panel B: Convicted Crime										
Property Crime-Theft/Robbery	0.29	0.45	0.24	0.43	0.33	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.286	0.713
Drug Offences-Consumption	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.43	0.22	0.42	0.31	0.46	0.286	0.164
Drug Offences-Trafficking	0.11	0.31	0.10	0.30	0.12	0.33	0.11	0.31	0.766	0.761
CAP-CH/VCH/VCGH	0.27	0.44	0.30	0.46	0.22	0.42	0.27	0.45	0.698	0.381
Unlawful assembly	0.12	0.33	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.31	0.17	0.37	0.071	0.254
Property Crime-Others	0.07	0.26	0.04	0.20	0.09	0.28	0.08	0.28	0.219	0.892
CAP-CH/VCH/VCGH	0.27	0.44	0.30	0.46	0.22	0.42	0.27	0.45	0.698	0.381
Commercial Crime	0.11	0.31	0.12	0.33	0.13	0.34	0.07	0.26	0.222	0.167
CAP-Sexual Offence	0.09	0.28	0.09	0.28	0.13	0.34	0.06	0.23	0.390	0.062
Traffic Offence	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.26	0.681	0.945
Crime Against Public Order	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.24	0.04	0.21	0.08	0.28	0.520	0.264
Unlicensed Moneylending Related	0.06	0.25	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.23	0.08	0.28	0.354	0.439
CAP-Others	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.16	0.04	0.21	0.06	0.23	0.228	0.653
Other	0.23	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.20	0.40	0.28	0.45	0.199	0.165
Panel C: Social Network										
No best friend (community group)	0.11	0.31	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.31	0.11	0.31	0.891	0.955
No best friend (RTC)	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.32	0.15	0.36	0.14	0.35	0.529	0.787
No popular inmate (community group)	0.30	0.46	0.35	0.48	0.22	0.42	0.31	0.47	0.583	0.129
No popular inmate (RTC)	0.32	0.47	0.35	0.48	0.26	0.44	0.34	0.48	0.885	0.242
Times named as best friends (RTC)	1.86	1.94	1.61	1.45	1.87	2.13	2.09	2.18	0.047	0.457
Times named as popular (RTC)	1.30	1.70	1.08	1.42	1.26	1.64	1.54	1.96	0.041	0.283
Observations	327		115		91		121		236	212

[1] Last two columns present p-values testing for mean difference between treatment and control group.

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Beliefs and Norm

	Public		Private		Control		Pub - Ctrl	Pri - Ctrl
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	*p*-value	
Panel A: Pre-Treatment Perception								
Less Fighting or Bullying	0.94	0.24	0.93	0.25	0.93	0.25	0.870	0.996
Less Fighting or Bullying (Norm)	0.74	0.22	0.72	0.23	0.76	0.20	0.361	0.152
Less Fighting or Bullying (Norm-Conf)	4.04	0.99	4.09	0.89	4.11	0.93	0.610	0.884
Fewer People Tattoo or Hurt Themselves	0.87	0.34	0.85	0.36	0.88	0.33	0.882	0.533
Fewer People Tattoo or Hurt Themselves (Norm)	0.66	0.24	0.64	0.26	0.70	0.23	0.157	0.055
Fewer People Tattoo or Hurt Themselves (Norm-Conf)	3.80	1.06	3.86	1.04	3.89	0.96	0.482	0.797
More People Renounce Their Gang	0.44	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.422	0.859
More People Renounce Their Gang (Norm)	0.39	0.31	0.36	0.30	0.39	0.27	0.869	0.474
More People Renounce Their Gang (Norm-Conf)	3.43	1.31	3.79	1.30	3.64	1.18	0.215	0.366
Less Vandalism	0.93	0.26	0.95	0.23	0.95	0.22	0.518	0.863
Less Vandalism (Norm)	0.65	0.27	0.63	0.28	0.66	0.27	0.779	0.423
Less Vandalism (Norm-Conf)	3.81	1.14	3.77	1.04	3.98	0.91	0.214	0.127
Fewer People Disrespect the Officers and Civilian Staff	0.94	0.24	0.90	0.30	0.93	0.26	0.681	0.528
Fewer People Disrespect the Officers and Staffs (Norm)	0.69	0.27	0.72	0.26	0.71	0.24	0.503	0.759
Fewer People Disrespect the Officers and Staffs (Norm-Conf)	4.00	1.00	3.99	0.96	4.11	0.92	0.391	0.364
Clean Room	0.90	0.31	0.88	0.33	0.90	0.30	0.896	0.617
Clean Room (Norm)	0.70	0.26	0.68	0.26	0.72	0.24	0.543	0.289
Clean Room (Norm-Conf)	3.96	1.03	4.00	0.86	4.16	0.83	0.100	0.179
Review Books and Present Them	0.91	0.28	0.86	0.35	0.91	0.29	0.916	0.239
Review Books and Present Them (Norm)	0.65	0.25	0.63	0.27	0.66	0.25	0.634	0.296
Review Books and Present Them (Norm-Conf)	3.77	1.16	3.76	1.05	3.94	1.05	0.220	0.208
Do Bookkeeping Like a Librarian	0.94	0.24	0.86	0.35	0.91	0.29	0.387	0.239
Do Bookkeeping Like a Librarian (Norm)	0.69	0.27	0.66	0.28	0.72	0.23	0.356	0.101
Do Bookkeeping Like a Librarian (Norm-Conf)	3.85	1.09	3.90	1.03	4.05	0.99	0.146	0.290
Panel B: Post-Treatment Perception								
Less Fighting or Bullying	1.00	0.00	0.98	0.15	0.93	0.25	0.005	0.135
Less Fighting or Bullying (Norm)	0.87	0.10	0.86	0.11	0.79	0.20	0.000	0.001
Less Fighting or Bullying (Norm-Conf)	4.39	0.76	4.31	0.76	4.11	1.06	0.022	0.126
Fewer People Tattoo or Hurt Themselves	0.97	0.16	0.90	0.30	0.88	0.33	0.004	0.571
Fewer People Tattoo or Hurt Themselves (Norm)	0.83	0.12	0.81	0.14	0.73	0.21	0.000	0.001
Fewer People Tattoo or Hurt Themselves (Norm-Conf)	4.32	0.76	4.04	0.94	3.99	1.00	0.005	0.701
More People Renounce Their Gang	0.54	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.155	0.101
More People Renounce Their Gang (Norm)	0.60	0.27	0.54	0.25	0.45	0.28	0.000	0.025
More People Renounce Their Gang (Norm-Conf)	3.83	1.21	3.67	1.14	3.66	1.36	0.302	0.958
Less Vandalism	0.95	0.22	0.98	0.15	0.92	0.28	0.354	0.059
Less Vandalism (Norm)	0.84	0.13	0.81	0.16	0.70	0.25	0.000	0.000
Less Vandalism (Norm-Conf)	4.33	0.80	4.22	0.84	4.05	1.05	0.022	0.205
Fewer People Disrespect the Officers and Civilian Staff	0.93	0.26	0.97	0.18	0.95	0.22	0.518	0.555
Fewer People Disrespect the Officers and Staffs (Norm)	0.83	0.15	0.87	0.11	0.75	0.23	0.002	0.000
Fewer People Disrespect the Officers and Staffs (Norm-Conf)	4.36	0.73	4.10	0.92	4.10	0.99	0.024	0.998
Clean Room	0.93	0.26	0.88	0.33	0.95	0.22	0.518	0.059
Clean Room (Norm)	0.81	0.18	0.82	0.15	0.74	0.23	0.013	0.007
Clean Room (Norm-Conf)	4.13	0.91	4.10	0.96	4.15	0.87	0.875	0.693
Review Books and Present Them	0.90	0.31	0.85	0.36	0.82	0.39	0.091	0.593
Review Books and Present Them (Norm)	0.80	0.17	0.78	0.18	0.70	0.24	0.000	0.010
Review Books and Present Them (Norm-Conf)	4.15	0.93	4.00	1.02	4.01	0.95	0.256	0.952
Do Bookkeeping Like a Librarian	0.94	0.24	0.90	0.30	0.94	0.23	0.922	0.265
Do Bookkeeping Like a Librarian (Norm)	0.81	0.17	0.79	0.19	0.73	0.22	0.003	0.031
Do Bookkeeping Like a Librarian (Norm-Conf)	4.21	0.93	4.09	0.94	4.11	0.91	0.400	0.879
Observations	115		91		121		236	212

[1] Last two columns present p-values testing for mean difference between treatment and control group.

Table 3: Offence Statistics

	Public		Private		Control		Pub - Ctrl	Pri - Ctrl
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	*p*-value	
Panel A: Individual's Offence (Pre Treatment)								
Offended within 2 Week pre Treatment	0.17	0.38	0.29	0.45	0.21	0.41	0.525	0.184
Offended within 1 Month pre Treatment	0.37	0.48	0.38	0.49	0.36	0.48	0.876	0.664
Offended within 1st-2nd Month pre Treatment	0.36	0.48	0.40	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.708	0.820
Accumu Offences 3 Month pre Treatment	2.16	3.84	2.35	3.21	2.21	4.27	0.912	0.798
Accumu Offences 6 Month pre Treatment	3.55	5.60	3.90	4.97	3.20	6.15	0.649	0.373
Last time offended pre Treatment (in Days apart)	75.14	126.62	70.20	125.91	86.71	118.89	0.512	0.378
Monthly offence counts over 6 months	0.32	0.53	0.33	0.43	0.28	0.53	0.491	0.445
Monthly major offence counts over 6 months	0.06	0.14	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.663	0.988
Monthly minor offence counts over 6 months	0.26	0.42	0.26	0.38	0.21	0.43	0.316	0.358
Monthly offence counts over 3 months	0.40	0.72	0.38	0.53	0.36	0.71	0.696	0.844
Monthly major offence counts over 3 months	0.07	0.22	0.08	0.17	0.10	0.24	0.423	0.681
Monthly minor offence counts over 3 months	0.33	0.58	0.30	0.46	0.27	0.54	0.409	0.677
Monthly physical offence counts over 6 months	0.06	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.06	0.14	0.668	0.966
Monthly physical offence counts over 3 months	0.06	0.16	0.08	0.18	0.08	0.22	0.453	0.942
Monthly non-physical offence counts over 6 months	0.27	0.48	0.26	0.38	0.21	0.44	0.363	0.371
Monthly non-physical offence counts over 3 months	0.34	0.66	0.30	0.44	0.28	0.57	0.491	0.787
Panel B: Individual's Offence (Post Treatment)								
Offend within 2 Week post Treatment	0.22	0.41	0.27	0.45	0.42	0.50	0.001	0.027
Offend within 1 Month post Treatment	0.28	0.45	0.37	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.001	0.099
Offend in 1st-2nd Week post Treatment	0.15	0.36	0.18	0.38	0.26	0.44	0.039	0.165
Offend in 2nd-4th Week post Treatment	0.13	0.34	0.20	0.40	0.21	0.41	0.088	0.763
Offend within 2 Month post Treatment	0.42	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.60	0.49	0.006	0.025
Accumu Offences 1 Month post Treatment	0.55	1.27	0.65	1.20	1.22	2.02	0.003	0.017
Accumu Offences 3 Month post Treatment	1.06	1.77	1.20	1.96	2.71	4.06	0.000	0.001
Accumu Offences 6 Month post Treatment	2.03	3.24	2.09	2.57	4.11	5.70	0.001	0.002
First time offend post Treatment (in Days apart)	83.77	106.47	77.20	109.06	59.46	109.77	0.154	0.312
Monthly offence counts over 6 months	0.16	0.29	0.15	0.23	0.33	0.50	0.001	0.002
Monthly major offence counts over 6 months	0.03	0.09	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.12	0.004	0.026
Monthly minor offence counts over 6 months	0.13	0.23	0.12	0.20	0.27	0.43	0.004	0.003
Monthly offence counts over 3 months	0.17	0.33	0.16	0.33	0.45	0.75	0.000	0.001
Monthly major offence counts over 3 months	0.02	0.11	0.03	0.11	0.08	0.18	0.002	0.021
Monthly minor offence counts over 3 months	0.14	0.27	0.13	0.30	0.37	0.67	0.001	0.002
Monthly physical offence counts over 6 months	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.11	0.005	0.012
Monthly physical offence counts over 3 months	0.03	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.002	0.002
Monthly non-physical offence counts over 6 months	0.13	0.25	0.12	0.20	0.27	0.46	0.005	0.005
Monthly non-physical offence counts over 3 months	0.14	0.30	0.14	0.32	0.37	0.72	0.001	0.004
Observations	115		91		121		236	212

[1] Last two columns present p-values testing for mean difference between treatment and control group.

Table 4: Treatment Effect on Perception

	Better to have less Offence like ...				Better to have more activity like ...			
	(1) Fighting	(2) Tattoo	(3) Vandalism	(4) Disrespect	(5) Renounce Gang	(6) Cleaning	(7) Reading	(8) Bookkeeping
Panel A: Individual Perception								
Mean (Post = 0)	0.93	0.87	0.94	0.92	0.47	0.89	0.89	0.90
Public X Post	0.065*	0.111**	0.061	-0.025	0.160**	-0.004	0.082*	-0.024
	(0.093)	(0.028)	(0.103)	(0.450)	(0.014)	(0.937)	(0.081)	(0.559)
Private X Post	0.045	0.045	0.067*	0.043	0.127*	-0.050	0.080	0.012
	(0.305)	(0.433)	(0.086)	(0.293)	(0.084)	(0.378)	(0.167)	(0.818)
Post	-0.000	0.000	-0.033	0.025	-0.058	0.050	-0.092***	0.033
	(1.000)	(1.000)	(0.168)	(0.191)	(0.172)	(0.117)	(0.005)	(0.261)
Public	0.008	-0.030	-0.013	0.016	-0.069	-0.005	0.002	0.041
	(0.811)	(0.497)	(0.698)	(0.611)	(0.318)	(0.911)	(0.953)	(0.245)
Private	0.005	-0.041	0.010	-0.021	-0.009	-0.009	-0.052	-0.039
	(0.899)	(0.415)	(0.763)	(0.621)	(0.902)	(0.852)	(0.300)	(0.398)
N	632	632	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.057	0.075	0.083	0.054	0.102	0.061	0.096	0.071
Panel B: Individual Perception on Norm Belief								
Mean (Post = 0)	0.74	0.67	0.65	0.71	0.38	0.70	0.64	0.69
Public X Post	0.107***	0.130***	0.158***	0.102***	0.166***	0.091***	0.119***	0.109***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Private X Post	0.122***	0.146***	0.148***	0.103***	0.110***	0.110***	0.118***	0.121***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Post	0.024	0.030	0.032	0.039**	0.060***	0.024	0.039	0.015
	(0.174)	(0.132)	(0.106)	(0.034)	(0.004)	(0.289)	(0.157)	(0.516)
Public	-0.033	-0.046	-0.015	-0.030	-0.032	-0.026	-0.009	-0.021
	(0.248)	(0.144)	(0.698)	(0.378)	(0.427)	(0.457)	(0.783)	(0.535)
Private	-0.042	-0.063*	-0.032	0.007	-0.030	-0.021	-0.031	-0.047
	(0.161)	(0.074)	(0.421)	(0.845)	(0.477)	(0.565)	(0.423)	(0.198)
N	632	632	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.158	0.174	0.143	0.149	0.155	0.127	0.147	0.137
Panel C: Confidence in Estimating Norm Belief								
Mean (Post = 0)	4.08	3.86	3.86	4.05	3.63	4.04	3.83	3.94
Public X Post	0.331**	0.373***	0.425***	0.305**	0.318	0.176	0.287*	0.268*
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.130)	(0.185)	(0.069)	(0.067)
Private X Post	0.243*	0.073	0.391**	0.122	-0.139	0.125	0.189	0.095
	(0.090)	(0.640)	(0.023)	(0.458)	(0.516)	(0.371)	(0.300)	(0.594)
Post	0.000	0.108	0.075	-0.008	0.025	-0.000	0.083	0.075
	(1.000)	(0.283)	(0.477)	(0.934)	(0.849)	(1.000)	(0.484)	(0.471)
Public	-0.027	-0.037	-0.059	-0.029	-0.111	-0.164	-0.125	-0.148
	(0.837)	(0.781)	(0.677)	(0.816)	(0.511)	(0.195)	(0.384)	(0.256)
Private	-0.051	-0.076	-0.167	-0.125	0.205	-0.139	-0.209	-0.141
	(0.700)	(0.602)	(0.245)	(0.368)	(0.274)	(0.271)	(0.173)	(0.310)
N	630	632	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.066	0.079	0.081	0.089	0.078	0.081	0.083	0.103

[1] The dependent variable is the self-reported confidence in estimating the perceived norms within a correctional facility regarding various behaviors.
[2] All regressions in this table are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Treatment Effect on Program Enrolment

	(1) Cleaning	(2) Laundry	(3) Reading	(4) Bookkeeping	(5) Courses
Public X Post	0.064	0.036	0.137**	0.079	0.027
	(0.270)	(0.476)	(0.011)	(0.117)	(0.533)
Private X Post	-0.031	0.041	0.145**	0.139***	0.065*
	(0.571)	(0.482)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.079)
Post	0.019	0.027	-0.007	-0.024	-0.008
	(0.606)	(0.385)	(0.851)	(0.455)	(0.775)
Public	-0.061	-0.067	-0.054	-0.050	0.011
	(0.288)	(0.234)	(0.399)	(0.339)	(0.800)
Private	-0.083	-0.143**	-0.115	-0.106*	-0.037
	(0.172)	(0.031)	(0.102)	(0.063)	(0.419)
N	616	616	616	616	616
R^2	0.123	0.099	0.118	0.072	0.083

[1] The dependent variable is the subject's willingness to enroll in a specific activity if it is offered. By agreeing to participate, they will be automatically enrolled should the activity become available.
[2] All regressions in this table are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Treatment Effect on Accumulative Offence

	(1) 1M	(2) 6M	(3) 9M	(4) 12M
Panel A: Full Sample				
Mean (Post = 0)	0.37	1.85	2.36	2.78
Public X Post	-0.321**	-1.311***	-1.346**	-1.113*
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.078)
Private X Post	-0.237	-1.412***	-1.883***	-1.805***
	(0.114)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Post	0.192*	0.367	0.383	0.067
	(0.094)	(0.252)	(0.283)	(0.877)
Public	0.037	0.376	0.483	0.520
	(0.755)	(0.443)	(0.381)	(0.434)
Private	-0.021	0.361	0.921	0.872
	(0.836)	(0.417)	(0.129)	(0.225)
N	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.154	0.165	0.142	0.135
Panel B: By Severity of Offence				
	Major Offence		Minor Offence	
	6M	12M	6M	12M
Mean (Post = 0)	0.40	0.62	1.46	2.16
Public X Post	-0.194	-0.275	-1.118***	-0.838
	(0.139)	(0.110)	(0.004)	(0.111)
Private X Post	-0.190	-0.203	-1.222***	-1.602***
	(0.117)	(0.214)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Post	0.008	-0.058	0.358	0.125
	(0.925)	(0.634)	(0.206)	(0.730)
Public	-0.035	0.071	0.411	0.449
	(0.776)	(0.696)	(0.298)	(0.387)
Private	-0.021	-0.002	0.382	0.873
	(0.844)	(0.991)	(0.310)	(0.145)
N	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.153	0.158	0.147	0.116

[1] The dependent variable is the accumulative offence within a time span pre and post the treatment.
[2] All regressions in this table are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 7: Treatment Effect on Accumulative Offence By Offence Type

	(1) Fighting	(2) Tattoo	(3) Vandalism	(4) Disrespect	(5) Gang	(6) Misconduct
Panel A: Accumulative Offence within 6M						
Mean (Post = 0)	0.18	0.19	0.54	0.54	0.04	0.36
Public X Post	-0.093	-0.074	-0.399*	-0.504***	0.013	-0.256*
	(0.269)	(0.373)	(0.068)	(0.007)	(0.718)	(0.079)
Private X Post	-0.068	-0.148*	-0.522**	-0.459***	0.050**	-0.268*
	(0.464)	(0.069)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.037)	(0.056)
Post	0.000	0.000	0.158	0.050	-0.050**	0.200**
	(1.000)	(1.000)	(0.359)	(0.694)	(0.037)	(0.049)
Public	-0.053	0.010	0.122	0.148	0.007	0.141
	(0.455)	(0.875)	(0.550)	(0.400)	(0.825)	(0.221)
Private	-0.009	0.027	0.087	0.063	-0.046**	0.233**
	(0.906)	(0.697)	(0.659)	(0.702)	(0.017)	(0.018)
N	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.117	0.099	0.150	0.119	0.077	0.130
Panel B: Accumulative Offence within 12M						
Mean (Post = 0)	0.28	0.25	0.83	0.89	0.08	0.47
Public X Post	-0.104	-0.129	-0.406	-0.320	0.001	-0.165
	(0.295)	(0.150)	(0.126)	(0.282)	(0.984)	(0.343)
Private X Post	-0.131	-0.224**	-0.785***	-0.420	0.064*	-0.335**
	(0.281)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.156)	(0.098)	(0.048)
Post	-0.017	0.008	0.092	-0.217	-0.075**	0.267**
	(0.834)	(0.890)	(0.647)	(0.321)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Public	-0.061	0.096	0.225	0.016	0.005	0.237*
	(0.479)	(0.181)	(0.337)	(0.954)	(0.904)	(0.095)
Private	0.040	0.110	0.397	0.074	-0.067*	0.309**
	(0.682)	(0.163)	(0.149)	(0.812)	(0.054)	(0.019)
N	632	632	632	632	632	632
R^2	0.109	0.119	0.119	0.109	0.086	0.118

[1] The dependent variable is the accumulative offence within a time span pre and post the treatment.
[2] All regressions in this table are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 8: Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment (By Round)

	(1) Full	(2) Rnd1	(3) Rnd2	(4) Rnd3
Public X 0 Month Since Treat	-0.783***	-0.546	-1.360***	-0.426*
	(0.000)	(0.154)	(0.003)	(0.085)
Private X 0 Month Since Treat	-0.883***	-0.551**	-1.334***	-0.639**
	(0.000)	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.027)
Public X 2 Month Since Treat	-0.487**	-0.586	-0.767*	-0.127
	(0.020)	(0.192)	(0.062)	(0.626)
Private X 2 Month Since Treat	-0.533***	-0.748**	-0.738*	-0.118
	(0.008)	(0.042)	(0.077)	(0.623)
Public X 4 Month Since Treat	-0.284	-0.205	-0.859**	0.125
	(0.139)	(0.582)	(0.015)	(0.680)
Private X 4 Month Since Treat	-0.403**	-0.307	-0.624	-0.343
	(0.023)	(0.211)	(0.110)	(0.158)
Public X 6 Month Since Treat	-0.217	-0.469	-0.379	0.069
	(0.269)	(0.152)	(0.273)	(0.841)
Private X 6 Month Since Treat	-0.234	-0.152	-0.361	-0.177
	(0.143)	(0.591)	(0.273)	(0.405)
Public X 4 Month Before Treat	-0.194	-0.143	-0.570	0.078
	(0.368)	(0.572)	(0.322)	(0.749)
Private X 4 Month Before Treat	-0.250	-0.241	-0.616	0.068
	(0.282)	(0.158)	(0.317)	(0.797)
Public X 2 Month Before Treat	-0.113	0.068	-0.461	0.121
	(0.627)	(0.852)	(0.407)	(0.634)
Private X 2 Month Before Treat	-0.229	0.018	-0.660	0.007
	(0.285)	(0.937)	(0.168)	(0.981)
0 Month Since Treat	0.849***	2.122***	1.482***	2.162**
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.044)
2 Month Since Treat	0.703**	2.251***		1.956*
	(0.037)	(0.002)		(0.069)
4 Month Since Treat	0.594*	1.567***	0.126	1.868*
	(0.072)	(0.006)	(0.633)	(0.083)
6 Month Since Treat	0.713**	1.675**	-0.019	4.255*
	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.948)	(0.078)
4 Month Before Treat	0.342**	0.259*	1.416**	0.258
	(0.030)	(0.087)	(0.039)	(0.305)
2 Month Before Treat	0.576***	1.065***	1.791***	0.232
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.399)
Public	0.215	0.064	0.281	0.147
	(0.169)	(0.790)	(0.377)	(0.474)
Private	0.268*	0.146	0.356	0.273
	(0.086)	(0.358)	(0.259)	(0.291)
Individual Char	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Crime Convicted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Network	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mths since 1st admit	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mths to Release	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment Mth X Reltwomonth since Treat	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2212	623	777	812
R^2	0.127	0.216	0.189	0.138

Table 9: Adj: Offence Guilty By Month from Treatment (By Round)

	(1) Full	(2) Rnd1	(3) Rnd2	(4) Rnd3
Public X 0 Month Since Treat	-0.441***	-0.507*	-0.794**	-0.122
	(0.001)	(0.066)	(0.014)	(0.374)
Private X 0 Month Since Treat	-0.401***	-0.288	-0.735**	-0.224
	(0.003)	(0.124)	(0.020)	(0.158)
Public X 1 Month Since Treat	-0.389***	-0.401	-0.586***	-0.234**
	(0.000)	(0.124)	(0.006)	(0.013)
Private X 1 Month Since Treat	-0.425***	-0.283	-0.649***	-0.325***
	(0.000)	(0.104)	(0.001)	(0.009)
Public X 2 Month Since Treat	-0.334***	-0.526*	-0.459**	-0.138
	(0.003)	(0.099)	(0.015)	(0.190)
Private X 2 Month Since Treat	-0.321***	-0.478*	-0.319	-0.245*
	(0.007)	(0.083)	(0.138)	(0.071)
Public X 3 Month Since Treat	-0.203	-0.262	-0.362	-0.039
	(0.101)	(0.346)	(0.104)	(0.813)
Private X 3 Month Since Treat	-0.146	-0.185	-0.472**	0.138
	(0.229)	(0.302)	(0.031)	(0.525)
Public X 4 Month Since Treat	-0.153	-0.221	-0.291	0.018
	(0.217)	(0.420)	(0.101)	(0.932)
Private X 4 Month Since Treat	-0.202**	-0.300*	-0.183	-0.204
	(0.047)	(0.082)	(0.350)	(0.189)
Public X 5 Month Since Treat	-0.237**	-0.266	-0.599***	0.077
	(0.033)	(0.325)	(0.007)	(0.553)
Private X 5 Month Since Treat	-0.208*	-0.006	-0.521**	-0.101
	(0.065)	(0.970)	(0.031)	(0.522)
Public X 6 Month Since Treat	-0.138	-0.333	-0.163	-0.020
	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.365)	(0.878)
Private X 6 Month Since Treat	-0.041	0.064	-0.145	-0.048
	(0.685)	(0.770)	(0.422)	(0.718)
Public X 5 Month Before Treat	-0.050	-0.229	0.007	0.010
	(0.572)	(0.216)	(0.963)	(0.949)
Private X 5 Month Before Treat	0.011	0.003	-0.058	0.051
	(0.928)	(0.981)	(0.782)	(0.818)
Public X 4 Month Before Treat	-0.191	-0.238	-0.273	-0.124
	(0.197)	(0.300)	(0.455)	(0.459)
Private X 4 Month Before Treat	-0.136	-0.099	-0.368	0.010
	(0.391)	(0.476)	(0.328)	(0.969)
Public X 3 Month Before Treat	-0.103	-0.256	-0.267	0.097
	(0.426)	(0.254)	(0.380)	(0.468)
Private X 3 Month Before Treat	-0.102	-0.157	-0.291	0.052
	(0.474)	(0.194)	(0.402)	(0.772)
Public X 2 Month Before Treat	-0.098	-0.228	-0.038	-0.075
	(0.519)	(0.450)	(0.907)	(0.656)
Private X 2 Month Before Treat	-0.093	0.001	-0.205	-0.094
	(0.501)	(0.998)	(0.484)	(0.565)
Public X 1 Month Before Treat	-0.117	0.074	-0.520*	0.136
	(0.378)	(0.781)	(0.088)	(0.224)
Private X 1 Month Before Treat	-0.171	0.005	-0.639**	0.107
	(0.147)	(0.971)	(0.014)	(0.551)
0 Month Since Treat	0.690*	2.413***	1.192	0.078
	(0.052)	(0.000)	(0.123)	(0.885)
1 Month Since Treat	0.836**	2.434***	1.076	0.571
	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.193)	(0.275)
2 Month Since Treat	0.839**	2.558***	2.736***	0.481
	(0.025)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.360)
3 Month Since Treat	1.031***	2.557***	3.156**	0.897*
	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.012)	(0.074)
4 Month Since Treat	1.086**	2.685***	3.007**	0.496
	(0.014)	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.314)
5 Month Since Treat	1.227***	3.022***	3.413***	0.404
	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.424)
6 Month Since Treat	1.189***	2.994***	3.077**	0.559
	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.244)
5 Month Before Treat	0.261**	0.013	1.137***	0.207
	(0.012)	(0.936)	(0.004)	(0.129)
4 Month Before Treat	0.498***	0.178	1.462***	-0.596
	(0.002)	(0.373)	(0.001)	(0.173)
3 Month Before Treat	0.549***	0.374	1.358**	0.315
	(0.001)	(0.125)	(0.017)	(0.533)
2 Month Before Treat	0.659***	1.103**	1.185*	0.440
	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.075)	(0.388)
1 Month Before Treat	0.632**	1.124**	1.308*	0.030

Table 10: Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Week from Treatment

	(1) Full	(2) Rnd1	(3) Rnd2	(4) Rnd3
Public X 0 Week Since Treat	-0.259***	-0.184	-0.561**	-0.159
	(0.010)	(0.174)	(0.044)	(0.156)
Private X 0 Week Since Treat	-0.277**	-0.093	-0.559*	-0.169*
	(0.014)	(0.448)	(0.067)	(0.087)
Public X 2 Week Since Treat	-0.119	0.002	-0.241	-0.146*
	(0.152)	(0.990)	(0.221)	(0.099)
Private X 2 Week Since Treat	-0.094	-0.048	-0.199	-0.054
	(0.272)	(0.671)	(0.343)	(0.531)
Public X 4 Week Since Treat	-0.089	0.100	-0.123	-0.235***
	(0.313)	(0.583)	(0.537)	(0.005)
Private X 4 Week Since Treat	-0.151	-0.042	-0.224	-0.177**
	(0.132)	(0.778)	(0.372)	(0.021)
Public X 6 Week Since Treat	-0.157**	-0.259**	-0.139	-0.129
	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.336)	(0.120)
Private X 6 Week Since Treat	-0.143**	-0.176	-0.214	-0.062
	(0.043)	(0.138)	(0.202)	(0.432)
Public X 8 Week Since Treat	-0.089	-0.121	-0.107	-0.107
	(0.281)	(0.518)	(0.523)	(0.203)
Private X 8 Week Since Treat	-0.095	-0.183	-0.066	-0.051
	(0.299)	(0.253)	(0.756)	(0.520)
Public X 10 Week Since Treat	-0.169*	-0.222	-0.108	-0.127
	(0.065)	(0.253)	(0.550)	(0.159)
Private X 10 Week Since Treat	-0.160	-0.212	-0.125	-0.084
	(0.105)	(0.332)	(0.533)	(0.340)
Public X 12 Week Since Treat	-0.050	-0.021	-0.046	-0.079
	(0.535)	(0.900)	(0.768)	(0.423)
Private X 12 Week Since Treat	-0.025	-0.216*	-0.081	0.196
	(0.790)	(0.062)	(0.657)	(0.205)
Public X 10 Week Before Treat	-0.012	0.063	-0.036	-0.063
	(0.874)	(0.622)	(0.825)	(0.568)
Private X 10 Week Before Treat	0.003	0.004	-0.062	0.073
	(0.970)	(0.973)	(0.739)	(0.580)
Public X 8 Week Before Treat	-0.064	-0.119	0.100	-0.202
	(0.482)	(0.359)	(0.605)	(0.158)
Private X 8 Week Before Treat	-0.036	-0.051	-0.068	0.004
	(0.753)	(0.723)	(0.787)	(0.976)
Public X 6 Week Before Treat	-0.002	0.123	-0.072	-0.050
	(0.983)	(0.419)	(0.688)	(0.696)
Private X 6 Week Before Treat	-0.140	-0.018	-0.204	-0.113
	(0.132)	(0.933)	(0.307)	(0.250)
Public X 4 Week Before Treat	0.058	0.180	0.093	-0.071
	(0.490)	(0.147)	(0.613)	(0.507)
Private X 4 Week Before Treat	-0.016	-0.025	-0.070	0.046
	(0.860)	(0.760)	(0.740)	(0.664)
Public X 2 Week Before Treat	-0.010	0.173	-0.210	-0.002
	(0.923)	(0.208)	(0.404)	(0.989)
Private X 2 Week Before Treat	-0.080	0.080	-0.346	0.026
	(0.417)	(0.284)	(0.174)	(0.825)
0 Week Since Treat	1.376**	1.808***	1.498*	1.729***
	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.089)	(0.000)
2 Week Since Treat	1.494***	1.655***	1.579*	1.901***
	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.075)	(0.000)
4 Week Since Treat	1.755***	1.915***	1.874*	1.990***
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.056)	(0.000)
6 Week Since Treat	1.871***	2.217***	1.964**	1.952***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.039)	(0.000)
8 Week Since Treat	1.866***	2.586***	1.880*	1.988***
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.070)	(0.000)
10 Week Since Treat	1.985***	2.231***	2.008*	2.944***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.071)	(0.000)
12 Week Since Treat	2.155***	2.495***	2.073*	3.544***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.074)	(0.000)
10 Week Before Treat	0.036	0.284**	-0.063	0.531***
	(0.855)	(0.030)	(0.800)	(0.002)
8 Week Before Treat	0.471	0.887***	0.286	1.084***
	(0.213)	(0.001)	(0.591)	(0.000)
6 Week Before Treat	0.671	1.168***	0.497	1.232***
	(0.119)	(0.000)	(0.429)	(0.000)
4 Week Before Treat	0.778*	1.024***	0.705	1.128**
	(0.096)	(0.005)	(0.308)	(0.010)
2 Week Before Treat	1.138**	1.205***	1.245	1.448***

Table 11: 2SDD - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) FE
12 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	-0.015
	(0.899)	(0.896)	(0.886)	(0.845)
12 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.100	-0.100	-0.100	-0.047
	(0.200)	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.504)
10 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.047	-0.047	-0.047	-0.049
	(0.489)	(0.526)	(0.509)	(0.446)
10 Month Before Treat × Private	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.162*
	(0.316)	(0.273)	(0.348)	(0.088)
8 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.923)	(0.927)	(0.929)	(0.892)
8 Month Before Treat × Private	0.395**	0.395**	0.395*	0.448**
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.066)	(0.016)
6 Month Before Treat × Public	0.165	0.165	0.165	0.162*
	(0.180)	(0.138)	(0.154)	(0.065)
6 Month Before Treat × Private	0.229*	0.229**	0.229*	0.281***
	(0.091)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.005)
4 Month Before Treat × Public	0.147	0.147	0.147	0.144
	(0.171)	(0.125)	(0.181)	(0.123)
4 Month Before Treat × Private	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.217*
	(0.218)	(0.267)	(0.276)	(0.077)
2 Month Before Treat × Public	0.421***	0.421***	0.421**	0.419***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.005)
2 Month Before Treat × Private	0.346***	0.346***	0.346***	0.399***
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
2 Month After Treat × Public	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-0.025
	(0.816)	(0.768)	(0.807)	(0.777)
2 Month After Treat × Private	-0.065	-0.065	-0.065	-0.013
	(0.548)	(0.570)	(0.517)	(0.899)
4 Month After Treat × Public	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.041
	(0.626)	(0.655)	(0.680)	(0.665)
4 Month After Treat × Private	-0.030	-0.030	-0.030	0.023
	(0.723)	(0.735)	(0.728)	(0.829)
6 Month After Treat × Public	-0.092	-0.092	-0.092	-0.094
	(0.329)	(0.363)	(0.364)	(0.414)
6 Month After Treat × Private	-0.151**	-0.151*	-0.151*	-0.099
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.273)
8 Month After Treat × Public	-0.117	-0.117	-0.117	-0.119
	(0.283)	(0.354)	(0.330)	(0.394)
8 Month After Treat × Private	-0.094	-0.094	-0.094	-0.041
	(0.266)	(0.320)	(0.260)	(0.705)
10 Month After Treat × Public	-0.108	-0.108	-0.108	-0.110
	(0.289)	(0.226)	(0.183)	(0.169)
10 Month After Treat × Private	-0.169**	-0.169**	-0.169**	-0.116
	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.215)
12 Month After Treat × Public	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.017
	(0.878)	(0.872)	(0.883)	(0.854)
12 Month After Treat × Private	-0.173***	-0.173**	-0.173***	-0.120
	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.133)
N	7854	7854	7854	7854
R^2	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.188

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Column (1) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 12: 2SDD - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment (Round 1)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) FE
12 Month Before Treat × Public	0.239	0.239	0.239	0.079
	(0.320)	(0.345)	(0.259)	(0.754)
12 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.134*	-0.134*	-0.134	-0.104
	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.204)
10 Month Before Treat × Public	0.083	0.083	0.083	-0.077
	(0.481)	(0.463)	(0.568)	(0.559)
10 Month Before Treat × Private	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.044
	(0.923)	(0.920)	(0.922)	(0.756)
8 Month Before Treat × Public	0.415**	0.415**	0.415**	0.255**
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.047)
8 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055	-0.025
	(0.505)	(0.484)	(0.422)	(0.739)
6 Month Before Treat × Public	0.097	0.097	0.097	-0.063
	(0.515)	(0.525)	(0.567)	(0.568)
6 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.043	-0.043	-0.043	-0.013
	(0.647)	(0.636)	(0.680)	(0.877)
4 Month Before Treat × Public	0.058	0.058	0.058	-0.102
	(0.630)	(0.606)	(0.602)	(0.268)
4 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.109	-0.109	-0.109	-0.079
	(0.217)	(0.221)	(0.271)	(0.327)
2 Month Before Treat × Public	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.039
	(0.209)	(0.217)	(0.251)	(0.826)
2 Month Before Treat × Private	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.085
	(0.730)	(0.710)	(0.683)	(0.565)
2 Month After Treat × Public	-0.243	-0.243	-0.243	-0.402
	(0.353)	(0.257)	(0.401)	(0.117)
2 Month After Treat × Private	-0.486**	-0.486**	-0.486**	-0.456**
	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.043)
4 Month After Treat × Public	-0.238	-0.238	-0.238	-0.398
	(0.393)	(0.358)	(0.416)	(0.109)
4 Month After Treat × Private	-0.600**	-0.600***	-0.600**	-0.570***
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.010)
6 Month After Treat × Public	-0.264	-0.264	-0.264	-0.424
	(0.333)	(0.375)	(0.313)	(0.107)
6 Month After Treat × Private	-0.553*	-0.553**	-0.553**	-0.522*
	(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.071)
8 Month After Treat × Public	-0.068	-0.068	-0.068	-0.228*
	(0.652)	(0.658)	(0.665)	(0.087)
8 Month After Treat × Private	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.056
	(0.902)	(0.895)	(0.905)	(0.785)
10 Month After Treat × Public	0.074	0.074	0.074	-0.086
	(0.779)	(0.781)	(0.802)	(0.742)
10 Month After Treat × Private	-0.091	-0.091	-0.091	-0.061
	(0.417)	(0.431)	(0.412)	(0.583)
12 Month After Treat × Public	0.173	0.173	0.173	0.013
	(0.465)	(0.504)	(0.538)	(0.960)
12 Month After Treat × Private	-0.063	-0.063	-0.063	-0.033
	(0.251)	(0.273)	(0.291)	(0.625)
N	2224	2224	2224	2224
R^2	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.245

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Column (1) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 13: 2SDD - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment (Round 2)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) FE
12 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.026	-0.026	-0.026	0.012
	(0.789)	(0.797)	(0.805)	(0.854)
12 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.044	-0.044	-0.044	-0.105
	(0.614)	(0.639)	(0.652)	(0.158)
10 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.018
	(0.628)	(0.639)	(0.576)	(0.801)
10 Month Before Treat × Private	0.190	0.190	0.190	0.129
	(0.245)	(0.277)	(0.247)	(0.324)
8 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.155	-0.155	-0.155	-0.116
	(0.141)	(0.121)	(0.146)	(0.196)
8 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.082	-0.082	-0.082	-0.143
	(0.466)	(0.472)	(0.432)	(0.221)
6 Month Before Treat × Public	0.206	0.206	0.206	0.245
	(0.295)	(0.301)	(0.309)	(0.160)
6 Month Before Treat × Private	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.176
	(0.247)	(0.301)	(0.249)	(0.327)
4 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.278	-0.278	-0.278	-0.239
	(0.292)	(0.306)	(0.224)	(0.267)
4 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.241	-0.241	-0.241	-0.302
	(0.422)	(0.479)	(0.491)	(0.330)
2 Month Before Treat × Public	0.196	0.196	0.196	0.235
	(0.642)	(0.643)	(0.622)	(0.560)
2 Month Before Treat × Private	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.027
	(0.691)	(0.752)	(0.754)	(0.915)
2 Month After Treat × Public	-0.915***	-0.915***	-0.915***	-0.876***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
2 Month After Treat × Private	-0.786***	-0.786**	-0.786**	-0.847***
	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.002)
4 Month After Treat × Public	-0.567***	-0.567***	-0.567***	-0.529***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
4 Month After Treat × Private	-0.525**	-0.525***	-0.525**	-0.586***
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.001)
6 Month After Treat × Public	-0.496***	-0.496***	-0.496***	-0.457***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)
6 Month After Treat × Private	-0.266	-0.266	-0.266	-0.327*
	(0.199)	(0.156)	(0.145)	(0.077)
8 Month After Treat × Public	-0.126	-0.126	-0.126	-0.088
	(0.317)	(0.265)	(0.284)	(0.524)
8 Month After Treat × Private	-0.110	-0.110	-0.110	-0.171
	(0.274)	(0.283)	(0.316)	(0.193)
10 Month After Treat × Public	0.254*	0.254	0.254*	0.293**
	(0.091)	(0.109)	(0.067)	(0.017)
10 Month After Treat × Private	0.057	0.057	0.057	-0.004
	(0.545)	(0.487)	(0.492)	(0.976)
12 Month After Treat × Public	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.073
	(0.631)	(0.638)	(0.664)	(0.467)
12 Month After Treat × Private	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.079
	(0.804)	(0.781)	(0.809)	(0.535)
N	2775	2775	2775	2775
R^2	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.249

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Column (1) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 14: 2SDD - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment (Round 3)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) FE
12 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.059	-0.059	-0.059	-0.114
	(0.725)	(0.749)	(0.697)	(0.480)
12 Month Before Treat × Private	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034	-0.045
	(0.854)	(0.869)	(0.860)	(0.776)
10 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.146	-0.146	-0.146	-0.201
	(0.308)	(0.301)	(0.277)	(0.170)
10 Month Before Treat × Private	0.009	0.009	0.009	-0.002
	(0.951)	(0.948)	(0.958)	(0.991)
8 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.254*	-0.254*	-0.254**	-0.309**
	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.046)	(0.015)
8 Month Before Treat × Private	1.145***	1.145***	1.145**	1.134***
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.003)
6 Month Before Treat × Public	-0.067	-0.067	-0.067	-0.122
	(0.608)	(0.634)	(0.558)	(0.347)
6 Month Before Treat × Private	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.139
	(0.383)	(0.332)	(0.437)	(0.396)
4 Month Before Treat × Public	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.058
	(0.402)	(0.365)	(0.359)	(0.646)
4 Month Before Treat × Private	0.265	0.265	0.265	0.254
	(0.137)	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.147)
2 Month Before Treat × Public	0.098	0.098	0.098	0.044
	(0.408)	(0.426)	(0.294)	(0.720)
2 Month Before Treat × Private	0.162	0.162	0.162	0.151
	(0.247)	(0.251)	(0.209)	(0.282)
2 Month After Treat × Public	-0.472***	-0.472***	-0.472***	-0.527***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)
2 Month After Treat × Private	-0.560***	-0.560***	-0.560***	-0.571***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
4 Month After Treat × Public	-0.109	-0.109	-0.109	-0.164
	(0.372)	(0.383)	(0.379)	(0.229)
4 Month After Treat × Private	0.178	0.178	0.178	0.167
	(0.279)	(0.358)	(0.360)	(0.361)
6 Month After Treat × Public	0.156	0.156	0.156	0.102
	(0.501)	(0.409)	(0.450)	(0.626)
6 Month After Treat × Private	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055	-0.067
	(0.606)	(0.648)	(0.616)	(0.538)
8 Month After Treat × Public	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.047
	(0.695)	(0.666)	(0.695)	(0.855)
8 Month After Treat × Private	0.115	0.115	0.115	0.103
	(0.447)	(0.523)	(0.472)	(0.538)
10 Month After Treat × Public	-0.067	-0.067	-0.067	-0.122
	(0.321)	(0.294)	(0.259)	(0.163)
10 Month After Treat × Private	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.094
	(0.415)	(0.495)	(0.482)	(0.530)
12 Month After Treat × Public	0.350**	0.350**	0.350**	0.295*
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.070)
12 Month After Treat × Private	0.203	0.203	0.203	0.192
	(0.119)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.173)
N	2855	2855	2855	2855
R^2	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.163

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Column (1) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 15: 2SDD - Adj: Offence Guilty By Month from Treatment

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) FE
6 Month Before Treat × Public	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.043
	(0.611)	(0.559)	(0.476)	(0.463)
6 Month Before Treat × Private	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.042
	(0.480)	(0.478)	(0.466)	(0.476)
5 Month Before Treat × Public	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.097
	(0.203)	(0.168)	(0.152)	(0.154)
5 Month Before Treat × Private	0.150*	0.150	0.150*	0.151*
	(0.072)	(0.123)	(0.060)	(0.064)
4 Month Before Treat × Public	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.010
	(0.963)	(0.964)	(0.967)	(0.884)
4 Month Before Treat × Private	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.051
	(0.556)	(0.547)	(0.504)	(0.429)
3 Month Before Treat × Public	0.104	0.104*	0.104*	0.110**
	(0.111)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.037)
3 Month Before Treat × Private	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.077
	(0.376)	(0.263)	(0.356)	(0.329)
2 Month Before Treat × Public	0.238**	0.238***	0.238***	0.245***
	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
2 Month Before Treat × Private	0.226***	0.226***	0.226***	0.227***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.005)
1 Month Before Treat × Public	0.168**	0.168**	0.168**	0.175*
	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.059)
1 Month Before Treat × Private	0.101*	0.101	0.101*	0.102
	(0.067)	(0.115)	(0.082)	(0.110)
1 Month After Treat × Public	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.016
	(0.885)	(0.883)	(0.891)	(0.823)
1 Month After Treat × Private	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013
	(0.878)	(0.879)	(0.873)	(0.852)
2 Month After Treat × Public	-0.022	-0.022	-0.022	-0.015
	(0.620)	(0.577)	(0.588)	(0.746)
2 Month After Treat × Private	-0.069	-0.069	-0.069*	-0.068
	(0.152)	(0.111)	(0.084)	(0.180)
3 Month After Treat × Public	-0.066	-0.066*	-0.066*	-0.059
	(0.123)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.122)
3 Month After Treat × Private	-0.067	-0.067	-0.067	-0.066
	(0.141)	(0.205)	(0.169)	(0.180)
4 Month After Treat × Public	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.011
	(0.952)	(0.943)	(0.946)	(0.865)
4 Month After Treat × Private	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009
	(0.887)	(0.903)	(0.893)	(0.889)
5 Month After Treat × Public	-0.048	-0.048	-0.048	-0.042
	(0.575)	(0.540)	(0.559)	(0.583)
5 Month After Treat × Private	-0.120***	-0.120***	-0.120***	-0.119**
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.024)
6 Month After Treat × Public	-0.109**	-0.109**	-0.109**	-0.103**
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.044)
6 Month After Treat × Private	-0.096**	-0.096*	-0.096**	-0.095*
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.016)	(0.083)
N	15334	15334	15334	15334
R^2	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.141

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Column (1) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 16: 2SDD - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-week from Treatment

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) FE
2 Week After Treat × Public	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
	(0.562)	(0.572)	(0.547)	(0.565)
2 Week After Treat × Private	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.015
	(0.697)	(0.708)	(0.696)	(0.784)
4 Week After Treat × Public	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032
	(0.270)	(0.354)	(0.292)	(0.250)
4 Week After Treat × Private	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.003
	(0.888)	(0.885)	(0.894)	(0.904)
6 Week After Treat × Public	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059
	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.166)	(0.107)
6 Week After Treat × Private	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.000
	(0.855)	(0.862)	(0.856)	(0.998)
8 Week After Treat × Public	-0.071***	-0.071***	-0.071***	-0.071***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
8 Week After Treat × Private	-0.034*	-0.034	-0.034	-0.041**
	(0.053)	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.037)
10 Week After Treat × Public	-0.062*	-0.062*	-0.062*	-0.061**
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.049)
10 Week After Treat × Private	-0.059	-0.059	-0.059*	-0.067*
	(0.147)	(0.129)	(0.097)	(0.100)
12 Week After Treat × Public	-0.059**	-0.059***	-0.059**	-0.060**
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.037)
12 Week After Treat × Private	-0.074***	-0.074**	-0.074**	-0.082**
	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.010)
14 Week After Treat × Public	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.716)	(0.677)	(0.717)	(0.685)
14 Week After Treat × Private	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.029
	(0.523)	(0.448)	(0.515)	(0.589)
16 Week After Treat × Public	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014
	(0.789)	(0.742)	(0.775)	(0.773)
16 Week After Treat × Private	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.003
	(0.774)	(0.780)	(0.762)	(0.929)
18 Week After Treat × Public	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.788)	(0.768)	(0.770)	(0.731)
18 Week After Treat × Private	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.066***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)
20 Week After Treat × Public	-0.027	-0.027	-0.027	-0.027
	(0.547)	(0.558)	(0.624)	(0.589)
20 Week After Treat × Private	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.023
	(0.662)	(0.633)	(0.634)	(0.459)
22 Week After Treat × Public	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034
	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.325)	(0.309)
22 Week After Treat × Private	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.025
	(0.581)	(0.624)	(0.538)	(0.450)
24 Week After Treat × Public	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054*	-0.054
	(0.173)	(0.134)	(0.089)	(0.136)
24 Week After Treat × Private	-0.040	-0.040	-0.040	-0.048
	(0.309)	(0.315)	(0.347)	(0.245)
N	30280	30280	30280	30280
R^2	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.095

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Column (1) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 17: Treatment Effect on Perception (Dwedge =0)

	Better to have less Offence like ...				Better to have more activity like ...			
	(1) Fighting	(2) Tattoo	(3) Vandalism	(4) Disrespect	(5) Renounce Gang	(6) Cleaning	(7) Reading	(8) Bookkeeping
Panel A: Individual Perception								
Mean (Post = 0)	0.93	0.84	0.93	0.94	0.41	0.86	0.86	0.90
Public X Post	0.082*	0.086	0.086**	-0.047	0.125	0.031	0.094	-0.009
	(0.076)	(0.173)	(0.042)	(0.185)	(0.177)	(0.630)	(0.118)	(0.858)
Private X Post	0.072	0.041	0.090**	0.008	0.188*	-0.031	0.094	0.040
	(0.170)	(0.599)	(0.046)	(0.853)	(0.052)	(0.665)	(0.197)	(0.507)
Post	-0.010	0.025	-0.051*	0.022	-0.075	0.065	-0.094**	0.021
	(0.772)	(0.581)	(0.065)	(0.171)	(0.185)	(0.146)	(0.023)	(0.544)
Public	-0.015	-0.010	-0.019	0.019	-0.066	-0.042	-0.013	0.024
	(0.695)	(0.857)	(0.637)	(0.584)	(0.457)	(0.498)	(0.813)	(0.560)
Private	-0.015	-0.037	0.003	-0.006	-0.025	-0.016	-0.043	-0.074
	(0.732)	(0.575)	(0.934)	(0.886)	(0.786)	(0.803)	(0.503)	(0.184)
N	494	446	520	476	358	418	466	482
R^2	0.067	0.117	0.088	0.080	0.169	0.098	0.101	0.087
Panel B: Individual Perception on Norm Belief								
Mean (Post = 0)	0.67	0.56	0.57	0.62	0.16	0.56	0.53	0.59
Public X Post	0.133***	0.165***	0.197***	0.142***	0.264***	0.113***	0.097**	0.142***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.000)
Private X Post	0.172***	0.211***	0.161***	0.127***	0.192***	0.137***	0.113***	0.167***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Post	0.052***	0.079***	0.061***	0.075***	0.125***	0.101***	0.127***	0.053**
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.040)
Public	-0.049	-0.030	-0.021	-0.034	-0.086***	-0.023	-0.001	-0.046
	(0.112)	(0.320)	(0.582)	(0.314)	(0.007)	(0.510)	(0.979)	(0.176)
Private	-0.081***	-0.088***	-0.019	0.008	-0.038	-0.019	-0.051	-0.099***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.634)	(0.839)	(0.197)	(0.617)	(0.139)	(0.007)
N	494	446	520	476	358	418	466	482
R^2	0.268	0.385	0.221	0.276	0.443	0.279	0.279	0.233
Panel C: Confidence in Estimating Norm Belief								
Mean (Post = 0)	3.89	3.58	3.72	3.84	3.63	3.73	3.56	3.72
Public X Post	0.412***	0.444**	0.527***	0.323**	0.372	0.149	0.284	0.343*
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.266)	(0.385)	(0.137)	(0.056)
Private X Post	0.252	0.122	0.388**	0.031	-0.205	-0.034	0.191	0.335
	(0.139)	(0.562)	(0.044)	(0.869)	(0.514)	(0.855)	(0.405)	(0.103)
Post	0.071	0.222	0.112	0.133	-0.134	0.221**	0.271*	0.126
	(0.544)	(0.102)	(0.357)	(0.261)	(0.502)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.307)
Public	-0.030	0.014	-0.096	-0.005	-0.200	-0.196	-0.241	-0.261*
	(0.844)	(0.923)	(0.546)	(0.974)	(0.450)	(0.219)	(0.139)	(0.085)
Private	-0.127	-0.261	-0.175	-0.124	0.099	-0.214	-0.480***	-0.369**
	(0.390)	(0.121)	(0.237)	(0.428)	(0.711)	(0.174)	(0.006)	(0.021)
N	493	446	520	476	358	418	466	482
R^2	0.103	0.171	0.107	0.127	0.110	0.146	0.141	0.123

[1] The dependent variable is the self-reported confidence in estimating the perceived norms within a correctional facility regarding various behaviors.
[2] All regressions in this table are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 18: Treatment Effect on Perception (Dwedge =1)

	Better to have less Offence like ...				Better to have more activity like ...			
	(1) Fighting	(2) Tattoo	(3) Vandalism	(4) Disrespect	(5) Renounce Gang	(6) Cleaning	(7) Reading	(8) Bookkeeping
Panel A: Individual Perception								
Mean (Post = 0)	0.94	0.92	0.96	0.88	0.56	0.95	0.98	0.92
Public X Post	-0.004	0.162*	-0.045	0.041	0.201**	-0.080	0.046	-0.080
	(0.957)	(0.069)	(0.635)	(0.644)	(0.037)	(0.196)	(0.515)	(0.362)
Private X Post	-0.045	0.051	-0.045	0.157	0.038	-0.092	0.042	-0.080
	(0.609)	(0.531)	(0.405)	(0.189)	(0.754)	(0.368)	(0.676)	(0.502)
Post	0.045	-0.051	0.045	0.033	-0.038	0.023	-0.086	0.080
	(0.384)	(0.368)	(0.405)	(0.615)	(0.592)	(0.600)	(0.115)	(0.206)
Public	0.151	-0.046	0.020	0.064	-0.057	0.111**	0.043	0.078
	(0.111)	(0.510)	(0.738)	(0.448)	(0.599)	(0.038)	(0.288)	(0.295)
Private	0.116	-0.012	0.007	-0.109	0.084	0.018	-0.107	0.077
	(0.239)	(0.852)	(0.845)	(0.322)	(0.461)	(0.788)	(0.122)	(0.466)
N	138	186	112	156	274	214	166	150
R^2	0.309	0.221	0.389	0.261	0.173	0.152	0.313	0.283
Panel B: Individual Perception on Norm Belief								
Mean (Post = 0)	0.98	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.66	0.97	0.96	0.99
Public X Post	0.043	-0.019	0.020	-0.021	0.053	0.023	0.112**	0.039
	(0.420)	(0.689)	(0.697)	(0.560)	(0.328)	(0.606)	(0.037)	(0.466)
Private X Post	0.027	-0.011	0.017	0.022	-0.032	0.036	0.096*	0.029
	(0.659)	(0.807)	(0.775)	(0.505)	(0.595)	(0.349)	(0.090)	(0.590)
Post	-0.100**	-0.070**	-0.094*	-0.070**	-0.023	-0.113***	-0.175***	-0.131***
	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.471)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Public	0.015	0.021	0.006	0.028*	0.040	0.017	-0.008	0.011
	(0.570)	(0.298)	(0.813)	(0.097)	(0.327)	(0.384)	(0.733)	(0.721)
Private	0.047*	0.045*	0.046	0.037**	0.059	0.008	0.004	-0.010
	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.201)	(0.045)	(0.190)	(0.745)	(0.889)	(0.697)
N	138	186	112	156	274	214	166	150
R^2	0.383	0.212	0.380	0.396	0.149	0.327	0.371	0.376
Panel C: Confidence in Estimating Norm Belief								
Mean (Post = 0)	4.75	4.54	4.55	4.69	3.64	4.64	4.57	4.65
Public X Post	0.110	0.054	0.045	0.248	0.243	0.167	0.131	0.083
	(0.619)	(0.840)	(0.879)	(0.295)	(0.333)	(0.363)	(0.611)	(0.728)
Private X Post	0.297	-0.057	0.341	0.386	0.002	0.395**	0.111	-0.532
	(0.234)	(0.779)	(0.451)	(0.309)	(0.994)	(0.039)	(0.668)	(0.119)
Post	-0.318**	-0.128	-0.091	-0.433**	0.226	-0.395***	-0.371*	-0.120
	(0.047)	(0.368)	(0.699)	(0.027)	(0.183)	(0.008)	(0.068)	(0.550)
Public	0.172	0.313	0.255	0.029	0.014	0.179	0.517**	0.400
	(0.285)	(0.240)	(0.273)	(0.894)	(0.949)	(0.293)	(0.034)	(0.189)
Private	0.030	0.350*	0.427	-0.178	0.407	0.151	0.771**	0.474
	(0.885)	(0.054)	(0.211)	(0.571)	(0.145)	(0.434)	(0.013)	(0.114)
N	137	186	112	156	274	214	166	150
R^2	0.443	0.237	0.388	0.255	0.174	0.279	0.363	0.290

[1] The dependent variable is the self-reported confidence in estimating the perceived norms within a correctional facility regarding various behaviors.
[2] All regressions in this table are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 19: **Accumulative Offence within N Months Pre and Post the Treatment**

	(1) 3M	(2) 3M	(3) 6M	(4) 6M	(5) 12M	(6) 12M
Control X Dwedge (= 0)	0.317	0.317	0.475	0.475	0.129	0.129
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.790)	(0.788)
Control X Dwedge (= 1)	-0.158	-0.158	-0.211	-0.211	-0.263	-0.263
	(0.709)	(0.715)	(0.770)	(0.766)	(0.687)	(0.699)
Public X Dwedge (= 0)	-0.787***	-0.787***	-0.904**	-0.904**	-0.840*	-0.840*
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.082)	(0.072)
Public X Dwedge (= 1)	-0.429	-0.429	-1.214*	-1.214	-2.429*	-2.429*
	(0.220)	(0.252)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Private X Dwedge (= 0)	-0.667***	-0.667***	-1.067***	-1.067***	-1.787***	-1.787***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Private X Dwedge (= 1)	-0.769***	-0.769***	-0.923**	-0.923**	-1.462	-1.462
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.164)	(0.174)
Observations	632	632	632	632	632	632

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] Coefficients in odd columns are estimated with no control, whereas coefficients in even columns are estimated with full control of individual characteristics, social network, criminal records, months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment and treatment month dummies.
[3] Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 20: **Accumulative Offence within N Months Pre and Post the Treatment (By Round)**

	(1) 3M	(2) 6M	(3) 9M	(4) 12M
Control X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 1	1.235***	1.765***	2.147***	2.000***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Control X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 2	-0.333	-0.273	-0.212	-0.485
	(0.488)	(0.719)	(0.784)	(0.575)
Control X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 3	0.029	-0.088	-0.471	-1.147
	(0.884)	(0.682)	(0.261)	(0.178)
Control X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 1	0.000	-0.400	-0.600	-0.400
	(.)	(0.336)	(0.137)	(0.435)
Control X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 2	-0.000	1.000	1.000	0.600
	(1.000)	(0.713)	(0.707)	(0.783)
Control X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 3	-0.333	-0.778	-0.667	-0.667
	(0.255)	(0.220)	(0.369)	(0.347)
Public X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 1	0.000	0.333	0.083	-0.125
	(1.000)	(0.540)	(0.908)	(0.908)
Public X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 2	-1.242**	-2.091**	-1.909**	-1.909**
	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.029)
Public X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 3	-0.892***	-0.649*	-0.459	-0.351
	(0.000)	(0.061)	(0.407)	(0.545)
Public X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 1	-0.000	-0.250	-1.250	-1.500*
	(1.000)	(0.608)	(0.234)	(0.072)
Public X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 2	-0.600	-1.200	-1.200	-1.200
	(0.464)	(0.276)	(0.279)	(0.260)
Public X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 3	-0.600	-2.000	-3.000	-4.400
	(0.304)	(0.303)	(0.289)	(0.233)
Private X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 1	-0.053	-0.053	0.158	-0.158
	(0.742)	(0.804)	(0.701)	(0.752)
Private X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 2	-0.813**	-1.562**	-1.750**	-1.906***
	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Private X Dwedge (= 0) X Round 3	-0.958***	-1.208***	-2.417***	-2.917***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Private X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 1	0.000	-0.000	0.333	1.000
	(.)	(1.000)	(0.281)	(0.288)
Private X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 2	-1.000*	-0.333	-1.333	-1.000
	(0.068)	(0.670)	(0.543)	(0.743)
Private X Dwedge (= 1) X Round 3	-1.000***	-1.571**	-2.571	-2.714*
	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.126)	(0.070)
N	632	632	632	632

[1] Dependent variable is accumulative offence within the period specified in column head pre and post the treatment.
[2] No further controls are added in all columns.
[3] Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 21: DD2S - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment

	Physical Crime = 1			Physical Crime = 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
12 Month Before Treat	0.045	0.057	0.045	-0.087***	-0.093***	-0.087***
	(0.312)	(0.204)	(0.312)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
10 Month Before Treat	0.015	0.026	0.015	-0.019	-0.025	-0.019
	(0.725)	(0.503)	(0.725)	(0.644)	(0.542)	(0.644)
8 Month Before Treat	-0.046	-0.041	-0.046	0.008	0.006	0.008
	(0.324)	(0.368)	(0.324)	(0.903)	(0.929)	(0.903)
6 Month Before Treat	0.047	0.064	0.047	0.034	0.033	0.034
	(0.389)	(0.226)	(0.389)	(0.461)	(0.460)	(0.461)
4 Month Before Treat	0.171**	0.196***	0.171**	0.140***	0.140***	0.140***
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2 Month Before Treat	0.195***	0.168**	0.195***	0.051	0.059	0.051
	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.475)	(0.413)	(0.475)
2-Month After Treat	0.064	0.037	0.064	-0.053	-0.050	-0.053
	(0.475)	(0.690)	(0.475)	(0.654)	(0.672)	(0.654)
4-Month After Treat	-0.347***	-0.361***	-0.347***	0.057	0.069	0.057
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.592)	(0.511)	(0.592)
6-Month After Treat	-0.283***	-0.309***	-0.283***	0.008	0.022	0.008
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.941)	(0.831)	(0.941)
8-Month After Treat	-0.117*	-0.170**	-0.117*	-0.156***	-0.135***	-0.156***
	(0.097)	(0.019)	(0.097)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)
10-Month After Treat	-0.133**	-0.175***	-0.133**	-0.085	-0.064	-0.085
	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.206)	(0.363)	(0.206)
12-Month After Treat	-0.098**	-0.124**	-0.098**	-0.128**	-0.101*	-0.128**
	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.100)	(0.034)
N	2652	2652	2652	1456	1456	1456

[1] Dependent variable is offence incidence within the period specified.
[2] Column (1) and (4) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) and (5) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) and (6) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 22: DD2S - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment

	Cognitive Test Full Marks = 1			Cognitive Test Full Marks = 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
12 Month Before Treat	-0.016	-0.004	-0.016	0.001	0.010	0.001
	(0.687)	(0.924)	(0.687)	(0.982)	(0.756)	(0.982)
10 Month Before Treat	-0.072**	-0.082***	-0.072**	0.009	0.030	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.786)	(0.318)	(0.786)
8 Month Before Treat	0.018	0.029	0.018	-0.037	-0.026	-0.037
	(0.775)	(0.646)	(0.775)	(0.413)	(0.538)	(0.413)
6 Month Before Treat	0.118**	0.110**	0.118**	-0.021	-0.005	-0.021
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.692)	(0.920)	(0.692)
4 Month Before Treat	0.272***	0.275***	0.272***	0.062	0.081	0.062
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.283)	(0.154)	(0.283)
2 Month Before Treat	0.022	0.059	0.022	0.094	0.095	0.094
	(0.856)	(0.605)	(0.856)	(0.179)	(0.184)	(0.179)
2-Month After Treat	-0.091	-0.069	-0.091	0.040	0.040	0.040
	(0.351)	(0.487)	(0.351)	(0.726)	(0.722)	(0.726)
4-Month After Treat	-0.285**	-0.272**	-0.285**	-0.118	-0.108	-0.118
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.109)	(0.147)	(0.109)
6-Month After Treat	-0.357***	-0.327***	-0.357***	-0.115	-0.111	-0.115
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.247)	(0.253)	(0.247)
8-Month After Treat	-0.139*	-0.073	-0.139*	-0.027	-0.042	-0.027
	(0.095)	(0.440)	(0.095)	(0.659)	(0.526)	(0.659)
10-Month After Treat	-0.118**	-0.070	-0.118**	-0.007	-0.012	-0.007
	(0.032)	(0.349)	(0.032)	(0.906)	(0.851)	(0.906)
12-Month After Treat	-0.116**	-0.041	-0.116**	-0.071	-0.065	-0.071
	(0.024)	(0.662)	(0.024)	(0.131)	(0.212)	(0.131)
N	1742	1742	1742	2366	2366	2366

[1] Dependent variable is offence incidence within the period specified.
[2] Column (1) and (4) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) and (5) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) and (6) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 23: DD2S - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment

	Parent Happily Married = 1			Parent Happily Married = 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
12 Month Before Treat	-0.041	-0.011	-0.041	0.024	0.009	0.024
	(0.311)	(0.800)	(0.311)	(0.621)	(0.844)	(0.621)
10 Month Before Treat	0.004	0.014	0.004	-0.011	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.912)	(0.668)	(0.912)	(0.830)	(0.860)	(0.830)
8 Month Before Treat	-0.043	-0.035	-0.043	-0.009	-0.004	-0.009
	(0.314)	(0.386)	(0.314)	(0.879)	(0.946)	(0.879)
6 Month Before Treat	0.054	0.061	0.054	0.055	0.071	0.055
	(0.325)	(0.268)	(0.325)	(0.286)	(0.142)	(0.286)
4 Month Before Treat	0.182***	0.179***	0.182***	0.198***	0.209***	0.198***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2 Month Before Treat	0.136*	0.136*	0.136*	0.118	0.140	0.118
	(0.063)	(0.092)	(0.063)	(0.266)	(0.165)	(0.266)
2-Month After Treat	0.086	0.067	0.086	-0.048	-0.050	-0.048
	(0.294)	(0.440)	(0.294)	(0.691)	(0.675)	(0.691)
4-Month After Treat	-0.286***	-0.294***	-0.286***	-0.025	-0.005	-0.025
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.779)	(0.951)	(0.779)
6-Month After Treat	-0.151**	-0.162**	-0.151**	-0.127	-0.119	-0.127
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.164)	(0.196)	(0.164)
8-Month After Treat	-0.134**	-0.148**	-0.134**	-0.071	-0.040	-0.071
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.321)	(0.577)	(0.321)
10-Month After Treat	-0.199***	-0.235***	-0.199***	-0.052	0.001	-0.052
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.456)	(0.989)	(0.456)
12-Month After Treat	-0.134***	-0.120*	-0.134***	-0.067	-0.030	-0.067
	(0.004)	(0.068)	(0.004)	(0.228)	(0.596)	(0.228)
N	2132	2132	2132	1976	1976	1976

[1] Dependent variable is offence incidence within the period specified.
[2] Column (1) and (4) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) and (5) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) and (6) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 24: DD2S - Adj: Offence Guilty By Two-Month from Treatment

	Popular Inmate = 1			Popular Inmate = 0		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
12 Month Before Treat	-0.032	-0.034	-0.032	0.012	0.044	0.012
	(0.428)	(0.363)	(0.428)	(0.765)	(0.404)	(0.765)
10 Month Before Treat	0.016	0.020	0.016	-0.017	0.015	-0.017
	(0.665)	(0.561)	(0.665)	(0.763)	(0.757)	(0.763)
8 Month Before Treat	0.024	0.019	0.024	-0.101	-0.085	-0.101
	(0.605)	(0.667)	(0.605)	(0.153)	(0.218)	(0.153)
6 Month Before Treat	0.111***	0.127***	0.111***	-0.076	-0.045	-0.076
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.343)	(0.587)	(0.343)
4 Month Before Treat	0.169***	0.192***	0.169***	0.155***	0.177***	0.155***
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
2 Month Before Treat	0.134**	0.140**	0.134**	0.166*	0.114	0.166*
	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.090)	(0.296)	(0.090)
2-Month After Treat	-0.043	-0.045	-0.043	0.117	0.039	0.117
	(0.591)	(0.581)	(0.591)	(0.433)	(0.799)	(0.433)
4-Month After Treat	-0.191***	-0.174***	-0.191***	-0.157	-0.240*	-0.157
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.253)	(0.095)	(0.253)
6-Month After Treat	-0.278***	-0.265***	-0.278***	0.002	-0.074	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.984)	(0.514)	(0.984)
8-Month After Treat	-0.158**	-0.167**	-0.158**	-0.061	-0.198***	-0.061
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.358)	(0.005)	(0.358)
10-Month After Treat	-0.078	-0.074	-0.078	-0.191***	-0.327***	-0.191***
	(0.160)	(0.218)	(0.160)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.009)
12-Month After Treat	-0.124***	-0.096*	-0.124***	-0.052	-0.126	-0.052
	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.008)	(0.339)	(0.249)	(0.339)
N	2626	2626	2626	1482	1482	1482

[1] Dependent variable is offence incidence within the period specified.
[2] Column (1) and (4) coefficients are estimated with no control. Column (2) and (5) coefficients are estimated with individual characteristics, social network, criminal records controlled. Column (3) and (6) coefficients are estimated with further control of months from treatment to release, months from admission to treatment
[2] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 25: Treatment Effect on Accumulative Offence (Spillover Sample)

	(1) 1M	(2) 6M	(3) 9M	(4) 12M
Panel A: Spillover Sample				
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
Mean (Post = 1)	0.01	0.99	1.90	2.34
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.12	1.19	1.63	1.71
Public	-0.011	-0.798***	-1.102	-0.992
	(0.557)	(0.007)	(0.114)	(0.328)
Private	-0.014	-0.546**	-1.432***	-1.461***
	(0.385)	(0.029)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Months to release on treatment date	-0.008	0.477	0.484	0.417
	(0.504)	(0.266)	(0.334)	(0.418)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.000	0.792*	0.714	0.587
	(0.983)	(0.062)	(0.166)	(0.267)
Days from first admit to release	0.000	-0.018	-0.019	-0.016
	(0.559)	(0.195)	(0.260)	(0.357)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.027	0.527	0.395	0.261
Panel B: By Severity of Offence				
	Major Offence		Minor Offence	
	6M	12M	6M	12M
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03
Mean (Post = 1)	0.07	0.16	0.91	2.18
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.26	0.44	1.09	1.58
Public	-0.040	0.064	-0.758***	-1.056
	(0.546)	(0.767)	(0.006)	(0.240)
Private	-0.070	-0.105	-0.476**	-1.356***
	(0.117)	(0.258)	(0.042)	(0.003)
Months to release on treatment date	-0.033	-0.159	0.509	0.577
	(0.781)	(0.284)	(0.208)	(0.258)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.002	-0.094	0.790*	0.682
	(0.983)	(0.490)	(0.051)	(0.195)
Days from first admit to release	0.001	0.005	-0.019	-0.021
	(0.801)	(0.330)	(0.149)	(0.225)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.126	0.131	0.512	0.244

[1] The dependent variable is the accumulative offence within a time span pre and post the treatment.
[2] Regression performed on spillover sample.
[3] ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Table 26: Treatment Effect on Accumulative Offence By Offence Type

	(1) Fighting	(2) Tattoo	(3) Vandalism	(4) Disrespect	(5) Gang	(6) Misconduct
Panel A: Accumulative Offence within 6M						
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Mean (Post = 1)	0.25	0.07	0.24	0.03	0.01	0.38
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.66	0.26	0.58	0.17	0.12	0.69
Public	-0.192	-0.285*	0.200	-0.024	-0.009	-0.488***
	(0.244)	(0.059)	(0.298)	(0.434)	(0.598)	(0.001)
Private	-0.145	-0.014	-0.076	-0.022	-0.015	-0.274*
	(0.268)	(0.872)	(0.477)	(0.243)	(0.377)	(0.087)
Months to release on treatment date	0.257	0.135	0.166	0.058	-0.017	-0.122
	(0.373)	(0.358)	(0.630)	(0.604)	(0.369)	(0.534)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.328	0.152	0.237	0.066	-0.010	0.019
	(0.244)	(0.299)	(0.505)	(0.529)	(0.415)	(0.922)
Days from first admit to release	-0.008	-0.006	-0.005	-0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.371)	(0.235)	(0.671)	(0.599)	(0.375)	(0.727)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.130	0.139	0.258	0.041	0.029	0.304
Panel B: Accumulative Offence within 12M						
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Mean (Post = 1)	0.35	0.10	0.50	0.06	0.03	1.28
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.75	0.31	0.72	0.24	0.17	1.18
Public	0.136	-0.291**	0.393	-0.051	-0.044	-1.172**
	(0.722)	(0.019)	(0.407)	(0.287)	(0.472)	(0.028)
Private	-0.011	-0.047	-0.170	-0.062*	0.022	-1.277***
	(0.949)	(0.596)	(0.264)	(0.100)	(0.593)	(0.000)
Months to release on treatment date	0.180	0.057	0.434	0.018	-0.004	-0.279
	(0.559)	(0.710)	(0.305)	(0.879)	(0.859)	(0.436)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.263	0.093	0.479	0.035	0.003	-0.309
	(0.381)	(0.533)	(0.265)	(0.752)	(0.867)	(0.415)
Days from first admit to release	-0.006	-0.003	-0.014	-0.001	-0.000	0.008
	(0.557)	(0.515)	(0.333)	(0.872)	(0.862)	(0.515)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.077	0.145	0.185	0.060	0.124	0.248

[1] The dependent variable is the accumulative offence within a time span pre and post the treatment.
[2] Regression performed on spillover sample.
[3] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 27: Treatment Effect on Accumulative Offence (Spillover Sample)

	(1) 1M	(2) 6M	(3) 9M	(4) 12M
Panel A: Spillover Sample				
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
Mean (Post = 1)	0.01	0.99	1.90	2.34
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.12	1.19	1.63	1.71
Treatment	-0.013	-0.586**	-1.380***	-1.387***
	(0.391)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Months to release on treatment date	-0.007	0.454	0.514	0.460
	(0.510)	(0.287)	(0.284)	(0.342)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.000	0.770*	0.743	0.628
	(0.955)	(0.069)	(0.133)	(0.209)
Days from first admit to release	0.000	-0.017	-0.020	-0.018
	(0.562)	(0.223)	(0.198)	(0.259)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.027	0.525	0.393	0.258

	Major Offence		Minor Offence	
Panel B: By Severity of Offence				
	6M	12M	6M	12M
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03
Mean (Post = 1)	0.07	0.16	0.91	2.18
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.26	0.44	1.09	1.58
Treatment	-0.065	-0.078	-0.521**	-1.309***
	(0.136)	(0.425)	(0.019)	(0.003)
Months to release on treatment date	-0.030	-0.144	0.484	0.604
	(0.793)	(0.315)	(0.232)	(0.215)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.005	-0.080	0.765*	0.708
	(0.963)	(0.546)	(0.059)	(0.161)
Days from first admit to release	0.001	0.004	-0.018	-0.022
	(0.824)	(0.384)	(0.180)	(0.171)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.125	0.125	0.509	0.242

[1] The dependent variable is the accumulative offence within a time span pre and post the treatment.
[2] Regression performed on spillover sample.
[3] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 28: Treatment Effect on Accumulative Offence By Offence Type (Spillover Sample)

	(1) Fighting	(2) Tattoo	(3) Vandalism	(4) Disrespect	(5) Gang	(6) Misconduct
Panel A: Accumulative Offence within 6M						
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Mean (Post = 1)	0.25	0.07	0.24	0.03	0.01	0.38
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.66	0.26	0.58	0.17	0.12	0.69
Treatment	-0.153	-0.057	-0.032	-0.022	-0.014	-0.308**
	(0.221)	(0.557)	(0.759)	(0.221)	(0.385)	(0.037)
Months to release on treatment date	0.253	0.110	0.191	0.058	-0.017	-0.141
	(0.370)	(0.460)	(0.568)	(0.596)	(0.369)	(0.459)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.323	0.129	0.261	0.066	-0.009	-0.000
	(0.239)	(0.387)	(0.449)	(0.519)	(0.423)	(0.999)
Days from first admit to release	-0.008	-0.004	-0.006	-0.002	0.001	0.003
	(0.367)	(0.354)	(0.574)	(0.587)	(0.372)	(0.597)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.130	0.090	0.247	0.041	0.029	0.300
Panel B: Accumulative Offence within 12M						
Mean (Post = 0)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Mean (Post = 1)	0.35	0.10	0.50	0.06	0.03	1.28
Std Dev (Post = 1)	0.75	0.31	0.72	0.24	0.17	1.18
Treatment	0.012	-0.086	-0.081	-0.060*	0.011	-1.261***
	(0.942)	(0.355)	(0.632)	(0.098)	(0.731)	(0.000)
Months to release on treatment date	0.193	0.035	0.485	0.019	-0.010	-0.270
	(0.514)	(0.821)	(0.226)	(0.869)	(0.622)	(0.439)
Months from first admit to treatment	0.276	0.072	0.528	0.036	-0.003	-0.300
	(0.340)	(0.631)	(0.194)	(0.739)	(0.817)	(0.416)
Days from first admit to release	-0.007	-0.002	-0.016	-0.001	0.000	0.007
	(0.489)	(0.670)	(0.216)	(0.856)	(0.794)	(0.524)
Treatment Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	68	68	68	68	68	68
R^2	0.075	0.117	0.157	0.060	0.117	0.247

[1] The dependent variable is the accumulative offence within a time span pre and post the treatment.
[2] Regression performed on spillover sample.
[3] $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.