An Anatomy of Managerial Attention: Evidence From Retail*

Achyuta Adhvaryu†, Parker Howell‡, Andrea Neyra-Nazarrett§, Anant Nyshadham¶, and Jorge Tamayo‖

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Abstract

How does a manager's ability to manage their own scarce attention affect productivity? We study this question using administrative data from a large retail firm operating over 200 stores and employing more than 20,000 workers across Colombia. Leveraging both the inherent complexity of store management and a policy of rotating middle managers across stores, we examine the role managers play in driving productivity. Specifically, we ask: Who are the managers that increase sales, what do they do differently, and how do they manage their own scarce attention? The average store carries 55,000 products and works with 800 suppliers making it impossible for managers to oversee everything at once. We find that managers who successfully increase sales navigate this complexity through four distinct strategies that less effective managers fail to implement. First, they reduce stockouts. Second, they decrease the size of the inventory—both in terms of overall value and the inventory-to-sales ratio. Third, they simplify the store's portfolio by reducing the number of products and suppliers. Fourth, they execute more effective pricing decisions. We also observe that the arrival of a high-performing manager leads to changes in store organization, reallocating personnel toward sales, pricing, and inventory-related roles. Finally, we draw on a survey of managers at our partner firm to explore potential mechanisms underlying these findings.

Keywords: managerial attention, span of attention, retail, Colombia
JEL: J24, M10, M53

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†University of California, San Diego, NBER, J-PAL, Good Business Lab; aadhvaryu@ucsd.edu
‡University of Michigan; parhow@umich.edu
§Harvard University; aneyra@g.harvard.edu
¶University of Michigan, NBER, J-PAL, Good Business Lab; nyshadha@umich.edu
‖Harvard University, Harvard Business School; Digital Reskilling Lab; jtamayo@hbs.edu

1 Introduction

A large body of research has established that managers account for a substantial share of variation in firm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). In particular, managerial fixed effects have been shown to explain a significant portion of productivity differences across firms and establishments (Lazear et al., 2015; Metcalfe et al., 2023). Dessein and Santos (2021) further develop a theoretical model in which, under conditions of high complexity, differences in how managers allocate their attention amplify these fixed effects—suggesting that complexity can intensify the impact of individual managerial styles on performance.

Management involves a broad array of tasks, and managers must constantly make difficult decisions about how to allocate their scarce attention across competing priorities such as employee supervision, hiring, firing, promotions, pricing, product administration and general operations. However, managers face significant informational constraints and often do not know where their own marginal effort—or that of their subordinates—has the highest impact on outcomes. These span-of-control and cognitive hierarchy problems can lead to the misallocation of attention and effort, particularly in complex environments (Adhvaryu et al., 2022; Bandiera et al., 2014).

Importantly, these decisions unfold in environments where complexity is high and attentional bandwidth is limited. It is well-established that decision-makers are bounded in their cognitive capacity and often rely on heuristics to manage complexity (Simon, 1973). In such environments, having more choices or more information does not necessarily lead to better decisions—in fact, large assortments can induce cognitive strain and reduce engagement (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper (2000)). This suggests that what sets effective managers apart may not only be what they know or what they do, but also how they allocate attention and simplify decision-making under constraints.

A growing literature has begun to unpack the specific types of skills that matter for effective management, moving beyond broad measures such as education or tenure. For instance, Weidmann et al. (2024) and Adhvaryu et al. (2023) highlight how interpersonal and cognitive skills are closely tied to managerial effectiveness and productivity outcomes. Another set of recent papers opens the black box of *what* managers actually do to influence performance. Rather than focusing solely on traits, these studies document specific actions and behaviors—such as performance monitoring (Adhvaryu et al., 2024) and rapport-building with subordinates (Adhvaryu et al., 2025)—that distinguish high-performing managers from their peers.

Building upon this literature, we examine how differences in managers' ability—and willingness—to navigate complexity translate into differences in firm performance. We

focus on a setting in which complexity is not just present, but defining: large retail stores managing tens of thousands of products, hundreds of suppliers, and dozens of employees.

This complexity is especially pronounced in core operational areas such as supply chain coordination, inventory management, and pricing. In our setting, each store works with an average of 826 suppliers and carries 54,875 products, making it impossible for managers to monitor every item individually. Yet they remain responsible for ensuring that products are consistently stocked, competitively priced, and aligned with firm-wide goals. These conditions create a natural testbed for studying how managers cope with complexity: who succeeds, what decisions they prioritize, and how attention is allocated when it cannot be spread evenly.

To answer this question, we use rich administrative data from a large Colombian retailer. Our dataset includes scanner-level sales data, detailed records on inventory, supplier characteristics, and supplier-store transactions. Crucially, we exploit the firm's policy of randomly rotating managers across stores between January 2017 and June 2020. Leveraging this quasi-experimental variation, we first estimate an Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis (AKM) model using store sales to separately identify manager and store fixed effects. We then classify managers as high type or low type, with high type managers defined as those whose estimated fixed effects fall above the median of the distribution.

Next, we combine these estimates with personnel records to characterize what high-type (good) managers look like in terms of observable behaviors and team composition. We complement this with a managerial survey, which captures information on managerial style and traits, allowing us to better understand which types of managers drive superior performance. Finally, we return to the internal data to examine how these high type managers operate—focusing in particular on inventory management, pricing, and other internal metrics that reflect how they handle complexity on the ground.

We find that effective management of complexity is a key differentiator in managerial performance. Good managers distinguish themselves not by increasing attention to all aspects of operations, but by strategically focusing on critical areas. Specifically, we identify four mechanisms through which high-performing managers navigate this complexity:

First, good managers reduce stockouts by 16.7 percent, directly enhancing sales by ensuring product availability. Second, they simultaneously decrease inventory size, with reductions in both overall dollar value of inventory and the ratio of inventory to sales. The combination of fewer stockouts alongside leaner inventory suggests that good managers allocate their attention more efficiently to inventory management. Third, they simplify their store's product portfolio by reducing both the number of products and suppliers. Finally, they make more effective pricing decisions, as evidenced by increased revenues immediately following a price change.

Upon a good manager's arrival, we also observe a significant restructuring, with more personnel being allocated to sales, pricing, and inventory-related (SPI) departments. Specifically, good managers reduce turnover among SPI (sales, pricing, and inventory) managers while increasing hiring in these departments. This organizational adaptation suggests that good managers recognize the outsized impact of effective SPI management on overall store performance.

Our survey evidence, while highly suggestive, complements these empirical findings, revealing that good managers report spending more time on accounting and inventory-related procedures and are more likely to identify pricing as a critical determinant of store performance. For example, while not statistically significant, we observe that good managers are nearly three times as likely to list basic math skills as critical to their job compared to managers of lower-performing stores—suggesting that quantitative skills may facilitate better decision-making in complex environments.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the institutional context, store operations, and the organizational structure of our partner firm. We also present evidence from a survey of managers as additional context. Section 3 describes the administrative data used in our analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy, beginning with the estimation of manager fixed effects and continuing with our main event-study design and mechanism analysis. Section 6 offers robustness checks and addresses potential concerns around identification. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for managerial effectiveness and organizational design in complex environments. An online appendix provides additional results and robustness exercises.

2 Context

Our partner firm is the Colombian branch of one of the largest supermarket chains in Latin America. We leverage administrative data from the firm's 220 locations in Colombia from January 2017 and June 2020.

2.1 Store operations

The setup, layout, and operational structure of each store is highly standardized and centrally determined by central headquarters. The organizational structure has three layers, comprising central headquarters (where the main strategic direction, financial decisions, production processes, and HR policies are determined), middle management working in the stores (these managers supervise production activities and manage the

day-to-day operations of each store), and front-line workers (who oversee production activities).

Importantly, each store's data systems are integrated and standardized by our partner firm, ensuring that the metrics we rely on are standard across stores.

2.2 Employees and Sections of the Store

The typical store operated by our partner firm employs 103 workers, works with an average of 826 suppliers, and sells 54,875 distinct products. As in many large supermarkets (e.g., Walmart or Costco), the type of products sold varies, with any given store selling everything from non-perishable goods like flat-screen TVs and car batteries to perishable goods like sushi and donuts. While many of these products are standard across stores, demand varies greatly store-to-store.

Employees are spread across several departments (e.g., Bakery, Butchery, Customer Service, Product Replenishment and Display, Cashier and Payment, Logistics and Storage, Security, Administrative Support, etc.). We refer to workers and managers whose main responsibilities are *sales*-, *pricing*-, or *inventory*-related as "SPI" employees. Any worker or manager whose job title is not primarily associated with a sales, pricing, or inventory task is a "non-SPI" employee (for example, stock control or warehouse workers, supply and sales coordinators, and price analysts are all SPI roles, while the store manager, cashiers, janitorial staff, call center consultants, customer management, or butchery/bakery roles would all be non-SPI roles).

This distinction is an important one: SPI workers and managers are focused on the logistics of stocking a large store (e.g., receiving shipments in the warehouse, physically stocking shelves, negotiating with suppliers, setting prices, etc.), while non-SPI managers focus more on customer-facing tasks (e.g., ensuring speedy checkouts, managing customer service and returns, overseeing the deli, meats, and/or bakery, etc.) and personnel-specific tasks (e.g., scheduling, general training, and hiring). While the complexities of personnel management and customer-facing work are not negligible (Adhvaryu et al., 2025), we find it useful to differentiate between the types of problems inherent to these roles and the types of problems that come from managing the logistics of keeping 55,000 products well-priced and appropriately stocked.

Of the 103 workers in an average store, 25 are SPI workers and 77 are regular, non-SPI workers (see Table 1). Stores hire an average of 4.73 workers per month, with 4.34 hires going to non-SPI jobs, and only 0.40 hires working within SPI.[1]

[1]The low share of SPI hires appears to be offset by the fact that non-SPI workers are more likely to be pulled into an SPI role than vice versa.

Table 1: Pre-treatment summary statistics for all stores

	All stores	
	Mean	S.D.
Total workers	104.30	101.28
SPI workers	25.68	27.38
Non-SPI workers	78.61	75.72
Total managers	8.09	7.41
Total directors	0.68	0.79
Total bosses	0.62	1.27
Total leaders	4.80	6.67
Total coordinators	1.99	2.78
SPI managers	6.13	5.53
Non-SPI managers	1.96	3.09
Ratio managers to non-managers	0.11	0.10
Ratio managers to non-managers - SPI only	0.48	0.59
Ratio managers to non-managers - non-SPI only	0.05	0.08
Manager turnover	0.21	1.08
SPI manager turnover	0.15	0.87
Non-SPI manager turnover	0.05	0.30
Total hiring	4.80	10.86
SPI hiring	0.38	1.06
Non-SPI hiring (non-SPI)	3.97	6.73
Hiring of managers	0.01	0.13
Hiring of SPI managers	0.01	0.10
Hiring of non-SPI managers	0.00	0.08
Hiring of managers (No coordinator)	0.01	0.09
Hiring of SPI managers (No coordinator)	0.00	0.05
Hiring of non-SPI managers (No coordinator)	0.00	0.08
Manager moves	0.02	0.24
SPI manager moves	0.02	0.21
Non-SPI manager moves	0.01	0.08
Arrival of any manager	0.10	0.30

Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for organizational variables for all stores prior to the arrival of a good manager. All statistics are reported at the store-monthly level for positions in all, SPI and non-SPI departments. *Workers* refer to any person employed in the retail store during the period analyzed. *Managers* are defined as those workers who are coordinators, leaders, bosses and directors. Conversely, *Non-managers* are those workers who are not in those positions. *Turnover* indicates the number of workers in the store that left the company entirely (i.e., it excludes moves between stores), while *Hiring* represents the number of workers in the store that were hired. Finally, *Moves* indicates the number of moves from one position to another within the company (including vertical or horizontal moves).

2.3 Managers

Middle managers can have one of four titles: "Administrator" is the highest position. This is followed by "Boss", then "Leader", and finally "Coordinator." The responsibilities and actions of each category of manager vary by store and over time, such that the distinction between the day-to-day actions of managers with different titles is not clear-cut. The clearest distinction between manager types is that the lowest level of managers (coordinators) tend to be front-line managers of specialized departments (e.g., a shift manager for the deli section), while higher level managers are more likely to be the ones making decisions affecting product sales, pricing, and inventory. These higher-level managers are also more likely to handle non-scheduling personnel issues (e.g., hiring and firing). For this reason, we do not consider coordinators when we conduct the AKM analysis (described in section 4) to classify managers by their fixed effects. As an additional robustness check, we re-run the AKM analysis and replicate all the results presented in the main body of the paper in Appendix A.4.1.[2]

One distinction that is important in our context is that of SPI and non-SPI managers, with SPI managers generally sharing the duties relating to the logistics of stocking a large store (e.g., most or all SPI managers spend some time negotiating with suppliers, ordering goods, and setting prices.).

The lower panel of Table 1 presents statistics specific to the management team within stores. On average, stores employ 8 managers, 6.1 of whom are SPI managers. SPI departments are far more rectangular than non-SPI departments: the ratio of managers to non managers in SPI departments is 0.50, compared with 0.06 in non-SPI departments. On average, 0.16 managers arrive at a store in a given month. We discuss the movement of managers across stores at length in section 4. Manager turnover and hiring are both low, with the average store losing 0.20 managers to turnover, and gaining 0.01 managers to hiring each month.

2.4 What managers do

Managers also oversee personnel management, training, workflow coordination, and are responsible for maintaining quality standards and addressing operational issues. They typically lead teams, support front-line workers, and assign workers to tasks to ensure tasks are completed following centralized guidelines.

[2]The results with and without this lowest tier of managers are quite consistent, with the notable exception of several organizational change results (see section 4.7) which appear to be attenuated when we include coordinators. We interpret this attenuation as confirmation of our anecdotal evidence that these lower-level managers are less likely to be engaging in hiring and firing or other departmental restructuring decisions.

In addition to personnel-related tasks, for any given product a manager must decide *when*, *how much*, and *from which suppliers* to order. Demand for consumer goods varies by region (e.g., a winter coat will sell better in Medellín than Cali) meaning that each store needs to stock different products. However, even within a store, demand is sensitive to everything from weather, time of year, and day of the month.

To appreciate the complexity of this task, imagine a toy version of this problem in which a manager's only duty is to worry about maximizing sales for a single product (i.e., this manager doesn't worry about personnel issues like training or hiring). In this example, the manager's only job is to ensure that a single good is appropriately stocked (i.e., she wants to avoid excess inventory while avoiding stockouts) and priced (i.e., regular sales should generate enough margin to make the product worth selling, but not so much so that consumers seek out the good via other channels) so as to maximize store sales.

To fix ideas, suppose that product is a soccer jersey for Colombia's national soccer team. After looking through historical data to determine the right proportion of shirts to order in each size, our manager might predict that her store will experience increased demand before each game. If so, she may consider it a good use of time to look up the national team's schedule and place orders ahead of time to ensure her store has enough jerseys for each game, perhaps ordering a few more jerseys for games she considers more important than others. Once the jerseys arrive (not too far in advance so the store doesn't carry excess inventory, but also far enough in advance so that consumers can purchase the jerseys in time for the big game) she must consider how best to price the jerseys. The profit-maximizing price may be a function of both time and the team's success; It likely makes sense to charge a high price the day of the game, but it's unclear how to price the jerseys the day after the game: a loss may portend a price cut, while a win may require an increase.

In this example our manager is likely to do a good job maximizing sales for her one product. Of course, as the manager's attention becomes more divided, she will need to spend less time maximizing sales on soccer jerseys to ensure she maximizes sales on all the products she manages. Intuitively, there is a trade-off between extracting a higher margin from a lower number of products and extracting a lower margin from a higher number of products.

Thus, managers who are most likely to increase store sales are those who optimize along two dimensions: (1) how many goods to spend time thinking about (i.e., forecasting, stocking, and pricing), and (2) how much inventory to hold. Specifically, allocating attention to any one product increases the chances that sales are maximized on that product, but simultaneously decreases the likelihood that the manager will maximize store-level sales (see Figure A.8 for one potential visualization of this trade-off). Conversely,

spending too little attention on all products increases the chances that a store carries excess inventory or experiences excessive stockouts. As the number of products (and/or suppliers) increases, so too does the likelihood that the attention constraint binds.

2.4.1 Survey of Managers

In 2023, Good Business Lab, in conjunction with Weidmann et al. (2024) surveyed the universe of managers at our partner firm (achieving a 77.6% response rate), capturing information on managers' demographics, job histories, psychometric profiles, personality traits, managerial practices, leadership styles, job descriptions and job satisfaction. Because this survey was conducted for an unrelated project it has two limitations:

First, the survey was conducted nearly three years after the end of our administrative data sample.[3] Since some managers from our 2017-2020 sample were not the same as the managers surveyed in 2023, we can analyze responses only for individuals who were managers in both time periods.[4] Fortunately, because managerial turnover is low, and initial survey take-up was high we still have a workable sample size of 177 respondents. Second, this survey targeted only higher-ranking middle managers, while our empirical results include all middle managers except the lowest level of managers.[5]

While these limitations mean we must take care to not overanalyze the findings, this survey guided the questions we asked in the empirical analysis presented in section 4, making it a useful, albeit suggestive, supplement to those findings. We present the findings from subset of relevant questions in Figure 1.[6]

Figure 1 compares the survey responses for all managers at bad stores (red triangles) to the survey responses of the subset of good managers who moved stores (blue dots). We group respondents in this way to match the definition of treatment[7] we use in the empirical analysis.

This split is also intuitive: the blue dots correspond to the set of "treating" managers (i.e., good managers who move to bad stores) while the red triangles correspond to the set of managers at "treatable" stores.

[3]The administrative data is described in detail in section 3.


[4]Even though many managers rotated to different stores in the years between 2020 and 2023 we match the survey respondents back to the store(s) in which they worked during our 2017-2020 period of analysis. Thus, the mismatch between the samples is due to managerial attrition.

[5]We also report results including coordinators in Appendix A.4.1.

[6]We report additional survey questions in appendix Figure A.14 along with results using alternative sample splits in Figure A.15, in which we find largely consistent results.

[7]We define treatment in section 4 in greater detail. Briefly, a treated store is a store in which (1) the mean of all that store's managers' fixed effects on log productivity is below median and (2) a manager with above-median fixed effects is (exogenously) moved to that store. Thus, our shorthand definition of treatment is "the arrival of a good manager to a bad store."

Figure 1: Survey Results



Notes: Figure 1 compares survey results for all managers at a "bad" store (red triangles) and all "good" managers who moved stores (blue dots). Formal definitions of bad stores and good managers are provided in Section 4.

The first row ("Inventory work is one of my most time consuming tasks") shows that 81 percent of good managers classify inventory-related tasks as some of their most time-consuming tasks, compared to 62 percent of managers at bad stores. Rows two ("I count inventory to ensure product availability daily or every other day"), three ("I check the placement/storage of inventory daily or every other day"), and four ("Ordering products from suppliers is one of my most time-consuming tasks") offer insight into why managers might report that inventory management is so time-consuming. In all three cases, good managers dedicate more time and attention to these tasks than the managers of bad stores do.

Row five shows that 100 percent of managers say that pricing is important to store performance. 81 percent of managers at bad stores agree. On the other hand, 0 percent of good managers agree that "No one is specifically responsible for determining prices." Meanwhile—a still-low, but statistically different from 0—8 percent of bad managers agree with this statement.

Taken together, these results underscore two themes which appear to differentiate good managers: First, they care about product availability and spend a lot of hands-on time with their inventory. Second, good managers are more likely to prioritize product pricing.

We also observe other interesting correlations. For example, while not statistically significant, we observe that good managers are nearly three times as likely to list basic math skills as critical to their job compared to managers of lower-performing stores, suggesting that quantitative skills may facilitate better decision-making in complex environments

(Figure A.14). Another interesting (and statistically significant) pattern is that managers of bad stores are more than twice as likely (42 percent to 19 percent) to report spending more time with personnel scheduling than good managers (Figure A.14). This finding stands in contrast to Adhvaryu et al. (2025) who find that scheduling is not only one of the most time-consuming tasks in the quick service restaurant industry, but also one of the most important predictors of store performance. This supports the idea that good managers are not simply doing more of everything. Indeed, even the best managers have finite time, requiring them to decide how to allocate their limited attention.

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

We use administrative data from the supermarket chain's 220 stores that operated across all of Colombia between January 2017 and June 2020. This data includes start and end dates, wages, promotions, and attendance logs for every employee. We also have sales, pricing, and inventory for every product as well as a record of all suppliers for any product sold by the firm. Importantly, each store's data systems are integrated and standardized by our partner firm, ensuring that the metrics we rely on are standard across stores.

The most important indicator of store performance is sales. We also define productivity as a store's sales divided by its number of employees.[8] Two variables that are particularly important in the retail context are "stockouts" and value of inventory.

A *stockout* refers to the situation in which a store runs out of a given product due to excess demand.[9] Minimizing the frequency of stockouts is a key task for SPI managers, both because a stockout means that the store is actually losing out on sales every time a customer would have purchased that product[10], and because of potentially negative impacts on customer satisfaction. Prior to receiving a good manager, stores experience an average of 886 stockouts per month costing approximately $1.3M COP each month (see

[8]Our data does not include a reliable measure of the costs incurred when a store acquires a product from a supplier. Thus, we focus on sales instead of profits.

[9]We categorize cases in which a product sells out but is not re-purchased (i.e., the product is discontinued) as stockouts, even though this means we may slightly overcount unintentional stockouts. We do so due to data limitations–because we do not observe sales or inventory after the end of our sample we cannot say whether a manager has not yet had a chance to reorder the product or whether it was truly discontinued. Our inability to differentiate between truly discontinued products and temporary stockouts should result in attenuation bias of the stockout coefficient so long as treatment (1) decreases stockouts and (2) increases the number of discontinued products. Both assumptions seem plausible given the results presented below. Although we do not have a direct way to test the second assumption, a consistent interpretation of the complete set of actions taken by good managers suggests that if the number of discontinued products does, in fact, change under a good manager, it is more likely to increase than decrease.

[10]Of course, some within-store substitution of products is likely to occur, but on average, stockouts certainly reduce a store's sales.

Table 2). On average, stores have

Stockouts can be avoided given a large enough inventory, but, of course, large inventories can have significant monetary-, time- and space-related costs. While it is unclear whether store managers fully internalize the cost of tying up money in inventory costs (i.e., it is unlikely that holding too many products in inventory means the store managers cannot afford to buy more products), it is very likely that managers experience time- and space-related costs of holding too much inventory.

For example, carrying excess inventory of perishable goods–or even non-perishable, seasonal products–may require stores to sell these products at lower prices to make room for newer products. Moreover, space constraints bind not only on customer-facing shelves, but also in the store's warehouse: indeed, as seasons change a manager may prefer to sell larger non-perishable products (e.g., synthetic Christmas trees) for a loss to avoid storing them for several months.

Finally, a key input in determining both the frequency of stockouts and the value of inventory is how managers price their products. Table 2 reports summary statistics for several variables relating to stockouts, inventory size/value, and product pricing. On average, stores sell $1.72 million USD per month, while holding $900 million USD in inventory. Price increases (5,622 per month) are far less common than price cuts (9,015 per month).

Table 2: Pre-treatment summary statistics for sales-, pricing- and inventory-related outcomes

	All stores	
	Mean	S.D.
Sales USD	1,728,697.38	1,524,042.88
Productivity USD	19,083.77	9,103.91
Num. out of stock products	890.33	673.02
Stock out value in millions	1,270.72	1,803.09
Num. of days of item out of stock	1,161.55	815.61
Stock value in millions	1,513.55	1,177.02
Stock value over sales	0.25	0.10
Price changes	14,651.48	13,096.78
Number of suppliers	827.31	336.35
Number of products	54,897.79	49,466.60
Num of bad sold products	469.89	1,103.69
Number of positive price changes	36,189.77	37,174.10
Number of negative price changes	100,481.90	115,196.39
Number of any price changes	100,484.14	115,194.51

Notes: Table 2 reports means and standard deviations for sales-, pricing-, and inventory-related variables for all stores prior to the arrival of a good manager. All statistics are reported at the store-month level. *Productivity* refers to the sales by worker (sales divided by number of workers). *Out of stock products* indicates the products with negative inventory levels in a given month, while *Inventory value* shows the product value with positive inventory levels. *Number of days out of stock* refers to the total number of days a store was out of stock. *Price changes* indicates counts the number of times a product have a positive or negative price change between two months. *Low-selling products* are products with sales 0.5 standard deviations below the mean.

4 Empirical Analysis

We first establish the existence of large manager fixed effects on sales and productivity. We then observe that the arrival of a high-type (good) manager to an underperforming (bad) store does, in fact, increase store productivity and sales. Finally, we uncover the specific mechanisms managers used to achieve such increases and then consider how the organizational structure responds to the arrival of a good manager.

4.1 Measuring Value-Added of a Manager

We start with the, by now well-established, observation that individual managers may exert large effects on productivity (Lazear et al., 2015; Metcalfe et al., 2023) and classify managers according to their fixed effects on store performance. These fixed effects will be biased unless moves are uncorrelated with time-varying components of store productivity. Consequently, we are able to leverage the rotation of managers across stores only if these rotations are for reasons unrelated to performance. In our context, the rotation of managers across store branches is unrelated to store or manager performance (see Section 2), permitting us to estimate the differences in sales attributable to individual managers. We use the AKM framework (Abowd et al., 1999) to estimate the fixed effect on log productivity attributable to a given manager. Specifically, we estimate the following two-way fixed effects (TWFE) model:

$$\log(sales)_{ijt} = \theta_i + \psi_{j(i,t)} + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ijt} \tag{1}$$

where $log(sales)_{ijt}$, is total log sales in store j reporting to manager i, in month t; $\psi_{j(i,t)}$ is a store-fixed effect, δ_t is month fixed effect, and θ_i is a manager fixed effect.

Following Card et al. (2013), we further decompose the error term in (1) into a match-specific component $\eta_{j(i,t)}$, a store root component ξ_{it} and a transitory error ν_{ijt}:

$$\epsilon_{ijt} = \eta_{j(i,t)} + \xi_{it} + \nu_{ijt} \tag{2}$$

Formally, our identification of manager and store fixed effects relies on the assumption that the assignment of managers to stores is conditionally mean-independent of past, present, and future values of ϵ_{ijt}. This assumption excludes the possibility of managers being assigned to stores based on their match-specific component ($\eta_j(i,t)$) or transitory shocks to store performance (ν_{ijt}). Managerial sorting based on either of $\eta_{j(i,t)}$ or ν_{ijt} would mean that this sorting is endogenous, resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates.

This assumption does not restrict the possibility that managers are assigned to stores based on permanent components of managerial ability θ_i or store components α_j. While our partner firm has told us that the assignment of managers to stores is quasirandom (specifically, managers are shuffled across stores periodically as part of their career development), we note that even if sorting on these (permanent) fixed effects does occur (e.g., managers prefer to work in stores closest to where they live) does occur, our identification is still valid.

Finally, these fixed effects are separately identified only within stores which are linked by managers moving across stores (i.e., "connected sets"). We identify 6 connected sets and estimate Equation (1) within each connected set. Appendix Table A.12 shows the

results of the AKM decomposition, suggesting that manager fixed effects explain more than 12 percent of log productivity.

In the rest of the paper we refer to a "good" manager as any manager whose fixed effect on store sales is above-median.

4.1.1 Tests for Endogenous Mobility

In addition to assurances from our partner firm, we perform a series of formal tests for endogenous mobility.

As a first test, we follow Card et al. (2013) to conduct an event study around manager moves between stores to assess the extent to which these moves might be systematically driven by productivity shocks or by sorting on the match-specific component of log-productivity. We do this by isolating movers and ranking them first by average productivity of the store they moved *from*, and second, average productivity of the store they moved *to*. We split the average productivity of stores into quartiles. In Figure A.16 we plot the average monthly (residual) efficiency of the moving manager on the y-axis. We display only moves away from either the top (quartile 1) or bottom (quartile 4) quartiles. The key insight to this test is that if match-specific components are, indeed, important determinants of when/where managers move, we should see managers systematically moving when their productivity is either particularly high, or particularly low (depending on whether managers sort positively or negatively on match-specific components). If this is the case, then we would expect managers to either gain or lose (on average) in terms of productivity from moving to a new store, regardless of the productivity of their store of origin. On the other hand, if moves are not driven by match-specific components, managers who move to higher productivity stores will become *more* productive, while managers moving to less productive stores will also become less productive.

Figure A.16 confirms this intuition. In general, managers moving to better stores gain in terms of productivity, while managers moving to less productive stores become less productive. Moreover, top (bottom) quartile managers moving to top (bottom) quartiles stores experience minimal changes in productivity.

We further follow Card et al. (2013) by plotting all potential combinations of origin and destination stores (ranked by quartiles of average manager productivity). Figure A.17 plots the average change in residual log productivity for managers who move from stores in quartile i to quartile j against the change in residual log productivity for managers who move from stores in quartile j to i. Thus, if manager moves are indeed conditionally mean independent of the match-specific component, then any productivity changes from moving from store i to store j should be equal and opposite any productivity changes incurred when moving from store j to store i. Conditional mean dependence due to the match-

specific component would show up as deviations from the 45 degree line. Reassuringly, the deviations in Figure A.17 appear to be small and non-systematic.

4.1.2 Limited Mobility Bias and Heterogeneity

Limited mobility bias may lead to biased estimates of the correlation between manager and store fixed effects (Abowd et al., 2003; Andrews et al., 2008, 2012). As a first check, we note that 27.7% percent of managers move stores at least once. For reference, the share of movers is 12 percent in Andrews et al. (2012), 25 percent in Card et al. (2013), and 35 percent in Alvarez et al. (2018). Next, we present the bias correction of Andrews et al. (2008) in Table A.14. The results are very similar to our baseline model.

We also follow Kline et al. (2020) who use a leave-one-out procedure to develop an unbiased, consistent estimator of variance and covariance terms in two-way fixed effects models, even with heterogeneity in both sets of fixed effects (in our case, at the store and manager levels). We present these results in Table A.14. Again, the results are very similar to our baseline model.

Taken together, these tests suggest that use of the AKM framework is appropriate in our setting.

4.2 Definitions

The above decomposition enables us to classify managers and stores according to their fixed effects. Specifically, we refer to any manager who exerts an above-median fixed effect (within the connected set) on log productivity as a "good" manager. To classify a store as good or bad, we first take the mean of all the fixed effects of managers who work in that store. We then compare this mean to the median fixed effect of managers across the 220 stores. Thus, "Bad" stores are those in which the mean fixed effect of all managers in that store is below median across the 220 stores. Following these definitions, there are 1376 good managers and 145 bad stores.

In the rest of the paper we define "treatment" as the arrival of a "good" manager to a "bad" store.

4.3 Baseline Specification

We estimate an event study model (Freyaldenhoven et al., 2021; Roth, 2022), testing for differential pre-trends across stores before the arrival of a manager, and measuring post-arrival impacts. We estimate the following baseline specification:

$$Y_{s,t} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{\underline{C} \leq k \leq \overline{C}, k \neq -1} D_{st}^k \delta_k + \Phi_s + \theta_t + \epsilon_{s,t} \tag{3}$$

where $Y_{s,t}$ is the performance measure of store s in month t, D_{st}^k is a relative time to treatment indicator for whether a good manager arrived in period $t-k$, defined as $D_{st}^k = \mathbb{1}[t = \tau_s + k]$ for $k \in (\underline{C}, \overline{C})$, $D_{st}^{\underline{C}} = \mathbb{1}[t \leq \tau_s + \underline{C}]$, and $D_{st}^{\overline{C}} = \mathbb{1}[t \geq \tau_s + \overline{C}]$, where $\mathbb{1}[\cdot]$ is the indicator function, k indexes the set of time indicator variables, and τ_s is the first monthly period in which the good manager works at store s. The parameters of interest are δ_k for $k \in [\underline{C}, \overline{C}]$, which measure the impact of a good manager before, during and after arrival. We normalize $\delta_{-1} = 0$ and set $\underline{C} = -11$ and $\overline{C} = 11$.

We also control for store fixed effects Φ_s and time fixed effects θ_t, and cluster standard errors at the store level for inference. Our main specification excludes the never-treated stores (133 out of 220).

4.4 Identification

Our identifying assumption is that the match of managers to stores is exogenous (see Section 4.1). Our partner firm has assured us that the rotation of managers across stores is mechanical and assignments are made without considering manager traits or store needs. As an additional check, we compare observables for stores that received a good manager earlier versus later. Table 3 shows no significant differences between early- and late-treated stores.[11] This supplements our anecdotal evidence, suggesting that the rotation of managers across stores is indeed quasirandom.

[11] We define an early-treated store as a store treated prior to February 2018 and late-treated stores as any store treated in February 2018 or later. This split ensures an equal number of early and late stores. We also present a version of this same table (see Table A.13) in which we split the sample in September 2018, the chronological middle of our sample. All outcomes of interest are balanced in both tables.

Table 3: Balance table for early- and late-treated stores

Variable	Early arrivals		Late arrivals		Difference
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	P-value
Sales USD	1,474.57	1,523.52	1,472.28	2,022.71	1.00
Productivity USD	17,290.43	5,694.23	15,865.56	6,642.24	0.32
Num. out of stock products	765.65	706.20	646.70	634.58	0.45
Stock out value in millions	949.29	1,500.38	1,137.42	1,967.84	0.64
Num. of days of item out of stock	1,006.31	719.89	955.95	862.43	0.78
Stock value in millions	1,279.59	1,134.08	1,065.79	1,242.49	0.44
Stock value over sales	0.25	0.10	0.25	0.11	0.90
Price changes	13,527.27	13,506.65	9,703.34	13,486.68	0.22
Number of suppliers	756.07	340.51	651.81	385.59	0.22
Number of products	49,770.41	50,378.85	45,141.76	57,001.93	0.71
Low-selling products	280.58	809.53	0.03	0.15	0.04
Total workers (SPI)	25.74	32.14	25.62	35.98	0.99
Total workers (non-SPI)	83.81	100.51	80.10	113.40	0.88
Total managers (SPI)	6.20	6.30	4.91	5.70	0.36
Total managers (non-SPI)	3.12	7.47	2.72	2.25	0.75
Turnover managers (SPI)	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.15	0.70
Turnover managers (non-SPI)	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.52
Total hiring (SPI)	0.34	0.46	0.70	1.74	0.23
Total hiring (non-SPI)	5.87	11.38	3.97	6.32	0.38
Hiring managers (SPI)	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03
Hiring managers (non-SPI)	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.94
Hiring managers (SPI) - NoCoord	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.33
Hiring managers (non-SPI) - NoCoord	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.94
Moves managers to SPI	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.12	0.55
Moves managers to non-SPI	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.18
Stores	38		37		

Notes: shows the mean and standard deviation of the period before the early (before February 2018) and late (February 2018 onward) arrival of a good manager for the first time to a bad store. In the last column of the table, we show the p-value associated with the difference in the mean between both types of store.

4.5 Managerial Quality and Performance


Given the large literature documenting that managerial practices drive performance (e.g., Syverson (2011)), we first confirm that this is true in our context. Table 4 shows that log sales and log productivity both increase by more than 10 percent after the arrival of a good manager. Figures 2 and A.9 show that these increases occur shortly after the good manager's arrival and increase over time.

Table 4: Log productivity AKM on log sale and log prod

VARIABLES	(1) Log of sales	(2) Log of productivity
Treatment effect	0.131***	0.117***
	(0.0231)	(0.0239)
Observations	8,163	8,163
R-squared	0.985	0.819
Stores	220	220
Mean of Dv	21.56	17.91
Relative Effect	14.0%	12.4%

Notes: Table 4 shows the point estimates of log sales and log of productivity (measured as sales over number of workers per store). The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.

Figure 2: Effect of Treatment on Log Sales



Notes: Figure 2 shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on log sales. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of the good manager.

4.6 What do good managers do?

In this section we ask what specific mechanisms are associated with the large increase in sales and productivity. We find evidence that good managers implement the following four changes shortly after their arrival to a store:

First, they *reduce stockouts*. Second, they *make inventory leaner*. Specifically, both the overall dollar value of inventory and the ratio of inventory to sales decrease. Third, they *simplify their store's portfolio* by reducing both the number of products and suppliers. Fourth, good managers *make better* (i.e., revenue-increasing[12]) *price changes*.

4.6.1 Action 1: Good managers reduce stockouts

Prior to the arrival of a good manager, bad stores experience an average of 875 stockouts per month (see Table A.10). Good managers cause their stores to experience 117 (or 16.7 percent) fewer stockouts per month (see column 1 of Table 5). Fewer stockouts means that the total value of stocked-out inventory decreases by 161 million COP, or 17.5 percent (column 2). Panels (a) and (b) of Figure A.10 show that both effects begin shortly after the arrival of a good manager and increase over time.

Table 5: Effects on stockouts and on-hand inventory value

VARIABLES	(1) Stockouts	(2) Value of stocked-out inventory (millions COP)	(3) Num. days item out of stock	(4) Inventory value (millions COP)	(5) Inventory value over sales
Treatment effect	-116.7***	-160.9**	-52.97**	-84.53***	-0.0304***
	(34.93)	(63.12)	(21.06)	(32.13)	(0.00659)
Observations	8,163	8,163	8,163	8,163	8,163
R-squared	0.901	0.890	0.949	0.987	0.802
Stores	220	220	220	220	220
Mean of Dv	698.4	918.5	955.3	1201	0.250
Relative Effect	-16.7%	-17.5%	-5.6%	-7.0%	-12.2%

Notes: Table 5 shows the point estimates of stockouts and on-hand inventory. A stockout is defined as a product whose number of items is equal to or below zero. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.


4.6.2 Action 2: Good managers make their inventory leaner

Column 4 of Table 5 shows that the arrival of a good manager causes a drop of approximately 85 million COP (a 7 percent drop) in the overall value of a store's inventory. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that this drop occurs in the period after the manager's arrival

[12]We deal with revenue instead of profit due to the data limitations described in Section 3. Even so, in the retail context revenue is an excellent proxy for profits so long as most goods are sold for a weakly positive profit.

and that inventory values further decrease post-arrival. Column 5 of Table 5 shows that the inventory value relative to sales drops by more than 12 percent. This drop is especially impressive when considering the previously documented increase in sales and decrease in stockouts, both of which seem likely to cut against the existence of a smaller inventory. Panel (b) shows that this pattern too intensifies over time: the longer a good manager stays at a bad store, the better she manages the ratio of inventory value to sales.

Figure 3: Value of inventory (in millions COP)



(a) Total value of inventory (in millions COP) (b) Value of inventory over sales (in millions COP)

Notes: This figure shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on the total value of inventory and the value of inventory divided by total sales. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of a good manager.

4.6.3 Action 3: Good managers simplify their stores' portfolios

Prior to the arrival of good manager, bad stores deal with 840 suppliers and sell 54,081 products. Table 6 shows that good managers work with (a statistically insignificant) 10-15 (1-2%) fewer suppliers and stock 385 fewer products (a 0.8 percent decrease). Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4 show the corresponding event studies: in both cases, we observe significant reductions in the number of suppliers and products. These patterns are suggestive of a general, if small, pattern: the arrival of a good manager to a bad store precedes reductions in a store's portfolio of suppliers and products.

In Column 3 we consider one likely mechanism through which managers might achieve these simplifications: by addressing low-selling products[13]. Good managers cut the number of low-selling products by more than 25 percent. While the coefficient estimating the

[13]We define a low-selling product as any product with sales at least a standard deviation below the pre-arrival mean.


number of low-selling products is only marginally significant, the pattern in Figure 5 is a bit clearer: the number of low-selling products is stable prior to arrival, stays near its pre-arrival mean for the first month post-arrival and then decreases over time before leveling off again around month seven.

Table 6: Effects on suppliers, products, and low-selling products

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Suppliers	Products	Low-selling Products
Treatment effect	-3.082	-384.9	-62.78
	(5.112)	(709.3)	(42.28)
Observations	8,163	8,163	8,163
R-squared	0.992	0.981	0.922
Stores	220	220	220
Mean of Dv	713.2	47258	234.6
Relative effect	-0.43%	-0.81%	-26.8%

Notes: Table 6 shows the point estimates of number of suppliers, products, and low-selling products. Low-selling products are those with sales at least 1 standard deviation below the pre-arrival mean. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.

Figure 4: Number of Suppliers and Products




(a) Number of suppliers

(b) Number of products

Notes: This figure shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on the number of suppliers that a store works with and products that a store sells.The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of a good manager.

Figure 5: Total number of low-selling products



Notes: This figure shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on the number of low-selling products. We define a low-selling product as any product sold for at least 1 standard deviation below the mean sales for that store. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of a good manager.

4.6.4 Action 4: Good managers make better pricing decisions

Table 7 presents the effects of the arrival of a good manager to a bad store on the outcome of price changes. Column 1 shows that sales for any product with a price change increase by a statistically significant 14 percent. Column 2 shows that the effect on sales for products that do not undergo a price change is indistinguishable from zero. Taken

together, these columns suggest that good managers are making sales-increasing pricing decisions. Column 3 shows that good managers don't appear to make *more* price changes, they just make *better* price changes.

Figure A.11 presents the event study analogs to these three columns. Panel (a) shows that sales for products with a price change increase post-treatment and continue to rise over time. Panels (b) and (c) show no clear patterns, further supporting the point estimates reported in the table.

Table 7: Pricing decisions

	(1) Log sale products *with* price change	(2) Log sale products *without* price change	(3) Num. price changes
Treatment Effect	0.131***	0.0426	38.47
	(0.0370)	(0.0309)	(279.3)
Observations	7,933	7,934	8,163
R-squared	0.921	0.884	0.931
Stores	220	220	220
Mean of Dv	17.83	15.79	12,404
Relative Effect	0.74%	0.27%	0.31%

Notes: Table 7 shows the point estimates of log sales of product that did (column 1) and did not (column 2) undergo price changes, and the number of price changes in a month. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.

4.7 Personnel Management and Changes to Store-level Organizational Structure

In this section we discuss shows how a store's organizational structure changes following the arrival of a good manager. In all results, we remove the moving manager from the estimates so as to ensure that what we present does simply reflect the mechanical effect of one additional manager moving to the store.

Bad stores prior to arrival of a good manager employ 24 workers in SPI departments, roughly 6 of whom are managers, whereas non-SPI departments employ more than three times that number of workers, but with less than half as many managers managers (see Table A.10).

Column 1 of Table 8 shows that the arrival of a good manager to a bad store causes SPI departments to gain an average of 1.8 workers. Panel (a) of Figure A.19a shows that the growth in these SPI departments begins shortly after the arrival of a good manager and increases in all periods thereafter. More than 1 in 4 of these new workers are managers, with the average SPI department gaining 0.51 new managers. In non-SPI departments, neither the number of workers nor managers changes significantly.

In Table 9 we probe the mechanisms underlying these organizational changes. The increase in SPI managers comes from significant reductions in turnover (SPI departments retain 0.13 more managers) and increases in hiring (SPI departments hire 0.25 more managers). Very little movement of managers to SPI departments occurs. For non-SPI departments we observe no effects on turnover, hiring, or moves of managers.


Finally, we note that we cannot know for certain whether the arriving manager is the one causing the changes we observe, only that the arrival of the good manager precedes the changes. One indirect way of testing this is to compare the results presented in this section with the results presented in section A.4.1 in which we present all the same results, but including the lowest level of managers (coordinators) in the AKM decomposition of moving managers. When we compare Table A.15 to Table 8 the direction of our point estimates are unchanged, but the coefficients in the results that include coordinators tend to be smaller. Specifically, when we exclude coordinators (the junior-most level of managers who are likely not in charge of hiring or firing) we see that the treatment effect on the number of workers in SPI department shrinks from 1.8 to 1.3. Similarly, the effect on the number of managers in SPI departments falls from 0.51 to 0.36. Comparing Tables 9 and A.16 shows the same pattern: the magnitudes of both turnover and hiring in SPI departments shrink. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that the arriving manager is the driving force behind these organizational changes.

Table 8: Workers and Managers (SPI/non-SPI)

	(1) Total workers (SPI)	(2) Total workers (non-SPI)	(3) Total managers (SPI)	(4) Total managers (non-SPI)	(5) Ratio managers to non-managers (SPI)	(6) Ratio managers to non-managers (non-SPI)
Treatment Effect	1.778***	-1.351	0.507***	0.127	0.0401	-0.0307***
	(0.622)	(1.583)	(0.166)	(0.138)	(0.0346)	(0.0104)
Observations	8,163	8,163	8,163	8,163	5,461	8,163
R-squared	0.990	0.980	0.973	0.965	0.643	0.599
Stores	220	220	220	220	220	220
Mean of Dv	24.32	76.25	5.549	2.846	0.351	0.0909
Effect on mean	0.0731	-0.0177	0.0914	0.0446	0.114	-0.338

Notes: Table 8 shows the point estimates of number of workers, managers, and the ratio of managers to non-managers in SPI and non-SPI departments. SPI refers to departments whose main responsibilities are related to sales, pricing or inventory activities, while non-SPI departments are those with main responsibilities other than those mentioned above. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.

Figure 6: Workers and Managers (SPI/non-SPI)



a) Workers in SPI

b) Workers in non-SPI

c) Managers in SPI

d) Managers in non-SPI

Notes: This figure shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on the number of total workers and/or managers in SPI and non-SPI departments. Workers counts all workers at the store, including managers. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of a good manager.

5 Alternative Mechanisms

Our preferred interpretation of the results presented is that the increased sales and productivity are the direct result of the arrival of a manager who manages his/her attention more effectively. We have shown that the arrival event causes four inventory- and pricing-related changes (specifically, (1) stockouts fall, (2) inventory becomes leaner, (3) the number of suppliers and products a store works with falls, and (4) price changes result in higher sales)) along with a general restructuring of the organizational structure.

While the most obvious explanation is that all of these changes are the direct result of manager actions, in this section we address several mechanisms other than our preferred interpretation that might explain the observed results. We provide additional evidence supporting our preferred interpretation.

Table 9: Turnover, hiring, and moves in SPI and non-SPI departments

VARIABLES	(1) Turnover managers (SPI)	(2) Turnover managers (non-SPI)	(3) Total hiring (SPI)	(4) Total hiring (non-SPI)	(5) Moves managers to SPI	(6) Moves managers to non-SPI
Treatment Effect	-0.132***	-0.0117	0.250***	0.141	0.0126	-0.00480
	(0.0337)	(0.0173)	(0.0602)	(0.201)	(0.0133)	(0.00775)
Observations	8,163	8,163	8,163	8,086	8,163	8,163
R-squared	0.479	0.238	0.288	0.563	0.061	0.078
Stores	220	220	220	220	220	220
Mean of Dv	0.0655	0.0327	0.349	3.460	0.0215	0.0103
Effect on mean	-2.022	-0.356	0.716	0.0407	0.584	-0.466


Notes: Table 9 shows the point estimates of number of workers, managers, and the ratio of managers to non-managers in SPI and non-SPI departments. SPI refers to departments whose main responsibilities are related to sales, pricing or inventory activities, while non-SPI departments are those with main responsibilities other than those mentioned above. *Turnover* is defined as the monthly number of manager departures per store. Similarly, *Hiring* is the number of workers hired in the month. As for *Moves*, this variable is constructed as all the movements that occur within the stores in a month, whether vertical or horizontal. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.

5.1 Strategic Expansion of Stores

The most intuitive alternative explanation of the large increase in sales following the arrival of a good manager to a bad store is simply that the stores in which sales increased were stores that our partner firm had strategically chosen to expand. In fact, we find no evidence of strategic expansion at treated stores, and even find some evidence of strategic reductions in store inventory. Specifically, the following findings lead us to reject the possibility that our results might be explained by a pre-planned expansion of stores:

First, Figure 7 shows that the total number of workers post-treatment does not increase. Second, Figure 3 shows that the arrival of a good manager to a bad store actually causes both the total value of inventory (panel (a)) and the ratio of inventory to sales (panel (b)) to steadily decrease over time.

Figure 7: Workers



5.2 Demand for Additional Manager(s)

Another possible explanation is that the effects we see following the arrival of a good manager are driven by problems preceding the arrival. If, for example, a specific store were struggling to manage inventory they might request (or central management could even proactively assign) an additional manager. While our conversations with the partner firm lead us to believe that that happens only rarely, we address the possibility as if it were a common occurrence.

In order for this to explain the results, we should see a dip (or rise) in the outcome of interest prior to treatment (Ashenfelter, 1978). Throughout the paper we present event study plots for every outcome of interest. Reassuringly, we see no evidence of pre-trends that might be consistent with store-level demand for a manager. As further confirmation that the results are not caused by pre-treatment problems, we also verify that all outcomes are balanced when we split stores by whether they were treated "early" or "late" (see Tables 3 and A.13).

6 Robustness

In this section we conduct a series of alternative estimation exercises to demonstrate the robustness of our baseline event-study specification and sample.

6.1 Heterogeneous Effects

Because our treatment timing is staggered, we must account for the possibility of negative weights in multiple-period difference-in-difference estimators (Athey and Imbens, 2021; De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2020). Otherwise heterogeneous treatment effects within stores over time or between groups of stores treated at different times might contaminate leads and lags in which all treated stores are pooled across groups (Sun and Abraham, 2020). Goodman-Bacon (2021) shows that difference-in-differences models of the form in (3) yield a weighted average of all possible permutations of pairwise difference-in-differences estimators, where, in our case, a pair is a cohort of stores treated at time t paired with a cohort of stores treated at time $t' > t$.

We address these issues in two ways. First, we estimate the cohort-specific average treatment effect suggested by Sun and Abraham (2020), which translates Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) group-time average treatment effect from calendar time into relative periods, allowing us to compare cohorts while holding their exposure to the treatment constant. Second, we estimate the group-time average treatment effect, where a group is defined by the time period when stores are first treated. The key assumption in our main

sample excluding "never-treated" stores is the conditional parallel trends between stores treated in period g and groups that are "not-yet-treated" by time t.

For both alternate specifications, the point estimates are similar to what we observe in our baseline event-study specification and sample: The treatment effect on log sales is 0.117 using our baseline specification, 0.101 using the Sun and Abraham (2020) specification, and 0.104 when following Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020). For log productivity, our baseline treatment effect is 0.112 compared to 0.113 using the Sun-Abraham specification, and 0.110 using the Callaway-Sant'Anna specification.

7 Discussion

We exploit the quasi-random movement of managers across stores to document substantial sales and productivity gains attributable to manager fixed effects. Our findings reveal that effective management of day-to-day complexity is a key differentiator in managerial performance. Good managers distinguish themselves not by increasing attention to all aspects of operations, but by strategically focusing on the limited set of tasks they can reasonably address. We observe that good managers enhanced sales by ensuring product availability (i.e., reducing stockouts) and making better pricing decisions. They did this while decreasing inventory size and value and simplifying their store's product portfolio by reducing both the number of products and suppliers. This hard-to-achieve combination of fewer stockouts alongside leaner inventory suggests that good managers allocate their attention more efficiently to inventory management.

The organizational response to the arrival of a good manager is also revealing. Upon a good manager's arrival, we observe a significant restructuring, with more personnel being allocated to sales, pricing, and inventory-related departments. Specifically, good managers reduce turnover among SPI (sales, pricing, and inventory) managers while increasing hiring in these departments. This organizational adaptation suggests that good managers recognize the outsized impact of effective SPI management on overall store performance.

Our survey evidence complements these empirical findings. Good managers report spending more time on inventory-related procedures and are more likely to identify pricing as a critical determinant of store performance.

Taken together, these insights have important implications for retail management practices and organizational design. Firms operating in similarly complex environments may benefit from technologies that help managers better allocate attention across products and suppliers. Training programs that enhance managers' abilities to identify high-leverage areas for intervention could yield substantial returns. Additionally, organizational structures that facilitate focus on critical inventory, pricing, and sales functions may

enhance performance.

Future research should explore whether similar patterns emerge in complex organizational settings beyond retail, and whether technological innovations that reduce the cognitive burden of managing complexity can substitute for managerial quality or instead complement it by allowing good managers to focus their attention on even higher-value activities.

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A Appendix

A.1 Additional Statistics

Table A.10: Additional pre-treatment summary statistics for good and bad stores

	Bad stores		Good stores	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Sales USD	1,515,075.25	1,381,831.50	1,912,481.88	1,614,266.88
Productivity USD	18,663.57	7,236.22	19,445.28	10,434.45
Num. out of stock products	789.98	609.00	976.66	712.45
Stock out value in millions	936.06	1,407.38	1,558.63	2,041.00
Num. of days of item out of stock	1,006.66	632.72	1,294.80	924.60
Stock value in millions	1,292.74	1,044.35	1,703.51	1,249.50
Stock value over sales	0.24	0.10	0.25	0.10
Price changes	12,573.14	11,783.50	16,439.53	13,884.21
Number of suppliers	766.40	309.25	879.71	349.69
Number of products	45,964.76	43,214.74	62,583.09	53,088.61
Num of bad sold products	882.78	1,396.83	114.67	561.23
Number of positive price changes	32,159.23	33,106.66	39,126.89	39,887.36
Number of negative price changes	90,251.94	103,316.35	107,367.00	123,056.71
Number of any price changes	90,255.96	103,312.95	107,367.66	123,056.16

Notes: Table A.10 reports means and standard deviations for sales-, pricing-, and inventory-related variables for all stores prior to the arrival of a good manager. All statistics are reported at the store-monthly level. A *Good (Bad) store* is a store where the average fixed effect of its managers, computed at the store-month level, is above (below) the median of managers' fixed effects within the connected set. *Productivity* refers to the sales by worker (sales divided by number of workers). *Out of stock products* indicates the products with negative inventory levels in a given month, while *Inventory value* shows the product value with positive inventory levels. *Number of days out of stock* refers to the total number of days a store was out of stock. *Price changes* indicates counts the number of times a product have a positive or negative price change between two months. *Low-selling products* are defined as those with sales 0.5 standard deviations below the mean.

Table A.11: Pre-treatment summary statistics for good and bad stores

	Bad stores		Good stores	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Total workers	90.53	88.01	116.14	110.07
SPI workers	22.11	24.42	28.76	29.34
Non-SPI workers	68.43	66.43	87.38	81.88
Total managers	7.20	7.29	8.85	7.42
Total directors	0.71	1.02	0.65	0.52
Total bosses	0.64	1.45	0.61	1.11
Total leaders	3.72	5.57	5.73	7.36
Total coordinators	2.13	3.00	1.87	2.58
SPI managers	5.23	4.76	6.90	6.01
Non-SPI managers	1.97	4.09	1.95	1.82
Ratio managers to non-managers	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.09
Ratio managers to non-managers - SPI only	0.52	0.70	0.46	0.49
Ratio managers to non-managers - non-SPI only	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.07
Manager turnover	0.18	0.93	0.23	1.20
SPI manager turnover	0.13	0.73	0.18	0.96
Non-SPI manager turnover	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.31
Total hiring	3.96	12.35	5.53	9.33
SPI hiring	0.28	0.88	0.47	1.19
Non-SPI hiring	3.07	5.14	4.74	7.76
Hiring of managers	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.13
Hiring of SPI managers	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.10
Hiring of non-SPI managers	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.09
Hiring of managers (No coordinator)	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.10
Hiring of SPI managers (No coordinator)	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.04
Hiring of non-SPI managers (No coordinator)	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.09
Manager moves	0.02	0.25	0.02	0.23
SPI manager moves	0.02	0.23	0.01	0.19
Non-SPI manager moves	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.09
Arrival of any manager	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.31

Table A.11 reports means and standard deviations for organizational variables for all stores prior to the arrival of a good manager. All statistics are reported at the store-monthly level for positions in all, SPI and non-SPI departments. A *Good (Bad) store* is a store where the average fixed effect of its managers, computed at the store-month level, is above (below) the median of managers' fixed effects within the connected set. *Workers* refer to any person employed in the retail store during the period analyzed. *Managers* are defined as those workers who are coordinators, leaders, bosses and directors. Conversely, *Non-managers* are those workers who are not in those positions. *Turnover* indicates the number of workers in the store that left the retail store, while *Hiring* represents the number of workers in the store that were hired. Finally, *Moves* indicates the number of moves from one position to another within the company (it includes vertical or horizontal moves).

A.2 Additional Evidence

Figure A.8: Trade-offs in expected sales between attention and inventory management






Figure A.9: Effect of Treatment on Log Sales




Notes: Figure A.9 shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on log productivity. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of a good manager.

A.2.1 Additional Evidence on Manager Actions

Figure A.10: Number and Value of Stockouts




Number of products out of stock




Stock out value (in millions COP)


Figure A.11: Price Changes



(a) Log sales of products *with* a price change



(b) Log sales of products *without* a price change




(c) Number of price changes


Notes: This figure shows the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from estimating a good manager's arrival on the log sales of products with and without price changes, as well as the number of price changes. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The vertical line represents the arrival of a good manager.

A.2.2 Additional Evidence on Organizational Changes


Figure A.12: Turnover, hiring, and moves in SPI and non-SPI departments)




a) Turnover in SPI




b) Turnover in non-SPI




c) Hiring in SPI



d) Hiring in non-SPI



e) Moves to SPI




f) Moves to non-SPI

Figure A.13: Ratios of Managers to Non-managers (SPI/non-SPI)




a) Mngrs/Non-Mngrs in SPI



b) Mngrs/Non-Mngrs


A.2.3 Additional Survey Evidence

Figure A.14: Additional Survey Results



Notes: Figure A.14 compares survey results for all managers at a bad store (left bar) and all good managers who moved stores (right bar).

Figure A.15: Survey Results for Alternate Samples



Notes: Figure A.15 compares survey results for all managers at a *treated* bad store (left bar) and all good managers who moved stores (right bar).


A.3 Additional Evidence from the AKM Decomposition

Table A.12: Explanatory power of AKM on log productivity

Covariance term	Fraction of $var(\omega)$
$Cov(\omega, x\beta)$	0.0916
$Cov(\omega, \theta)$	0.1205
$Cov(\omega, \psi)$	0.7183
$Cov(\omega, \varepsilon)$	0.0696


Table A.12 reports the explanatory power of each term in the AKM decomposition on the variance of productivity (ω). Each row refers to the covariance between log productivity and the covariates ($x\beta$), the manager fixed effects (θ), the store fixed effects (ψ), and the residuals of the model (ε).

Figure A.16: Event Study Around Movers - Log Productivity



Notes: Figure A.16 ranks movers in terms of (i) quartiles of average log productivity in their initial store and (ii) quartiles of the average log productivity in the store where they moved to. The average log productivity is computed over the entire sample period, and quartiles are calculated for each store. The graphical representation depicts the average residual of log productivity of movers on the y-axis; the residual is computed for specific periods: from 3 to 4 months (Period = -2) and 1 to 2 months (Period = -1) before the move from the initial store, and 1 to 2 months (Period = 1) and 3 to 4 months (Period = 2) after the move to the new destination store, plotted on the x-axis. The analysis focuses on moves away from stores in the top quartile (lines in quartile 4) and stores in the bottom quartile (lines in quartile 1). To create the residual variable, we run a regression of the monthly log productivity of each store on year and month fixed effects. Then we predict the residuals and run the movers analysis.

Figure A.17: Symmetry Test - Log Productivity



Notes: Figure A.17 ranks movers in terms of (i) quartiles of average log productivity in their initial store and (ii) quartiles of the average log productivity in the store where they moved to. Average log productivity is computed over the entire sample period, and quartiles are calculated for each store. We then plot the average change in residual of log productivity of movers from lines in quartile X to quartile Y, against the change in residual of log productivity for movers in the opposite direction; for example, the point labeled "2 to 4, 4 to 2" corresponds to the average change for movers from lines in quartile 2 to quartile 4, plotted against the change for movers from lines in quartile 4 to quartile 2. The changes are calculated for average residual of log productivity in the two months before the move and the two months after the move. The solid line corresponds to the 45-degree line. To calculate the log productivity residual, we run a regression of log productivity in the stores on year and monthly fixed effects. We then predict the residuals and run the movers analysis.

A.4 Additional Robustness Results

Table A.13: Balance table for early- and late-treated stores using the chronological midpoint of the sample

Variable	Early arrivals		Late arrivals		Difference
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	P-value
Sales USD	1,032.75	1,225.82	1,644.82	1,930.16	0.18
Productivity USD	18,279.10	6,347.02	15,929.65	6,045.27	0.14
Num. out of stock products	660.09	792.63	725.20	623.22	0.71
Stock out value in millions	681.24	1,133.31	1,182.44	1,912.60	0.26
Num. of days of item out of stock	791.25	638.77	1,055.44	833.07	0.19
Stock value in millions	984.21	1,135.80	1,247.97	1,206.65	0.39
Stock value over sales	0.25	0.10	0.25	0.11	0.82
Price changes	9,738.93	11,976.98	12,380.41	14,140.55	0.45
Number of suppliers	640.75	339.73	729.47	374.14	0.35
Number of products	36,958.71	47,115.63	51,581.25	55,567.40	0.29
Low-selling products	220.30	718.58	111.80	535.85	0.48
Total workers (SPI)	17.97	25.50	28.68	36.36	0.22
Total workers (non-SPI)	68.40	104.53	87.26	107.55	0.49
Total managers (SPI)	4.26	5.44	6.07	6.19	0.24
Total managers (non-SPI)	3.81	10.00	2.58	2.06	0.39
Turnover managers (SPI)	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.58
Turnover managers (non-SPI)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.79
Total hiring (SPI)	0.27	0.41	0.62	1.47	0.30
Total hiring (non-SPI)	5.99	14.02	4.52	6.64	0.54
Hiring managers (SPI)	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00
Hiring managers (non-SPI)	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.99
Hiring managers (SPI) - NoCoord	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.54
Hiring managers (non-SPI) - NoCoord	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.99
Moves managers to SPI	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.41
Moves managers to non-SPI	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.67
Stores	21		54		


Notes: shows the mean and standard deviation of the period before the early (before August 2018) and late (August 2018 onward) arrival of a good manager for the first time to a bad store. In the last column of the table, we show the p-value associated with the difference in the mean between both types of store.

Table A.14: AKM based on different approaches


	Baseline	Andrews et al. (2008)	Leave-out Estimator
Var(θ)	0.024	0.018	0.018
Var(ψ)	0.205	0.199	0.120
Cov(ψ, θ)	-0.010	-0.005	-0.005
Corr(ψ, θ)	-0.138	-0.081	-0.078

Table A.14 reports the baseline model which comes from the estimation of equation (1) following Abowd et al. (1999), the bias correction of Andrews et al. (2008) and leave-out Estimator from Kline et al. (2020). The data spans over January 2017 to June 2020 through 220 stores. For each model we compute the variance of the manager fixed effects $Var(\theta)$, the variance of the stores fixed effects $Var(\psi)$, and the correlation $Corr(\psi, \theta)$ and covariance $Cov(\psi, \theta)$ of both type of fixed effects.

Figure A.18: Effects of a good manager on log productivity: Sun-Abraham and Callaway-Sant'Anna specifications



Sun-Abraham Log productivity



Callaway-Sant'Anna Log productivity

A.4.1 Robustness Results When Including Lowest-level Managers as Movers


The figures and tables in this section replicate the output reported in the main paper, with the sole difference being that we include the lowest tier of managers (coordinators) in the AKM in these results. Results are generally consistent with the results in the main paper that exclude this lowest tier of manager from the AKM decomposition.

Table A.15: Workers and managers (SPI/non-SPI), including coordinators as movers


VARIABLES	(1) Total workers (SPI)	(2) Total workers (non-SPI)	(3) Total managers (SPI)	(4) Total managers (non-SPI)	(5) Ratio managers to non-managers (SPI)	(6) Ratio managers to non-managers (non-SPI)
post_time_treat_4	1.262**	-0.375	0.358**	0.175	0.0855	-0.0184**
	(0.539)	(1.486)	(0.146)	(0.112)	(0.0718)	(0.00926)
Constant	25.86***	78.35***	5.955***	1.939***	0.429***	0.0326***
	(0.626)	(3.708)	(0.0930)	(0.0843)	(0.0360)	(0.00352)
Observations	9,007	9,007	9,007	9,007	6,193	9,007
R-squared	0.990	0.980	0.972	0.964	0.660	0.602
Obs in post	1420	1420	1420	1420	908	1420
Control group	nevert	nevert	nevert	nevert	nevert	nevert
Balanced Panel	nobal	nobal	nobal	nobal	nobal	nobal
stores	220	220	220	220	220	220
stores treated	87	87	87	87	87	87
Arrival controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sales control	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mean of Dv	24.82	77.84	5.496	2.387	0.423	0.0732
Effect on mean	0.0509	-0.00480	0.0652	0.0732	0.202	-0.251

Notes: Table A.15 shows the point estimates of number of workers, managers, and the ratio of managers to non-managers in SPI and non-SPI departments. SPI refers to departments whose main responsibilities are related to sales, pricing or inventory activities, while non-SPI departments are those with main responsibilities other than those mentioned above. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.

Figure A.19: Workers and Managers (SPI/non-SPI), including coordinators as movers



a) Workers in SPI



b) Workers in non-SPI




c) Managers in SPI



d) Managers in non-SPI



e) Mngrs/Non-Mngrs in SPI




f) Mngrs/Non-Mngrs

Table A.16: Turnover, hiring, and moves in SPI and non-SPI departments


VARIABLES	(1) Turnover managers (SPI)	(2) Turnover managers (non-SPI)	(3) Total hiring (SPI)	(4) Total hiring (non-SPI)	(5) Moves managers to SPI	(6) Moves managers to non-SPI
post_time_treat_4	-0.117***	-0.0269	0.188***	-0.0842	0.00679	-0.00154
	(0.0335)	(0.0210)	(0.0462)	(0.134)	(0.0115)	(0.00476)
Constant	-0.0236	-0.0757	0.416***	3.624***	0.0143*	0.00568
	(0.0232)	(0.0795)	(0.0314)	(0.147)	(0.00863)	(0.00604)
Observations	9,007	9,007	9,007	8,919	9,007	9,007
R-squared	0.483	0.235	0.277	0.564	0.061	0.076
Obs in post	1420	1420	1420	1395	1420	1420
Control group	nevert	nevert	nevert	nevert	nevert	nevert
Balanced Panel	nobal	nobal	nobal	nobal	nobal	nobal
stores	220	220	220	220	220	220
stores treated	87	87	87	87	87	87
Arrival controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sales control	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mean of Dv	0.0754	0.0331	0.369	3.373	0.0169	0.00634
Effect on mean	-1.547	-0.813	0.510	-0.0250	0.402	-0.243

Notes: This table shows the point estimates of number of workers, managers, and the ratio of managers to non-managers in SPI and non-SPI departments. SPI refers to departments whose main responsibilities are related to sales, pricing or inventory activities, while non-SPI departments are those with main responsibilities other than those mentioned above. *Turnover* is defined as the monthly number of manager departures per store. Similarly, *Hiring* is the number of workers hired in the month. As for *Moves*, this variable is constructed as all the movements that occur within the stores in a month, whether vertical or horizontal. The sample consists of store-monthly panel data for the 220 stores during our analysis period of January 2017 to June 2020. The treatment effect is defined as the arrival of a good manager to a store with low performance (average manager fixed effects of the store above the median). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant 10%, ** significant 5%, *** significant 1%.


Figure A.20: Turnover, hiring, and moves in SPI and non-SPI departments)




a) Turnover in SPI




b) Turnover in non-SPI




c) Hiring in SPI



d) Hiring in non-SPI



e) Moves to SPI



f) Moves to non-SPI