Managers and the Cultural Transmission of Gender Norms*

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Abstract

This paper examines the influence of managers from countries with different gender norms on workplace culture and gender disparities within organizations. Using data from a multinational firm operating in over 100 countries, we exploit cross-country manager rotations that are orthogonal to local employees to estimate the impact of male managers' gender norms on the work outcomes of male and female employees within the same team. Managers from countries with one standard deviation more progressive gender attitudes narrow the gender pay gap by 5 percentage points (18%), primarily by promoting women at higher rates. The effects last beyond the manager's rotation and are concentrated in countries with more conservative gender attitudes. Moreover, local managers in the destination office change their own attitudes, as evidenced by those managers in turn being more gender-equal with their subordinates. Our evidence points to individual managers as critical in shaping corporate culture.

Keywords: managers, gender gaps, corporate culture, multinationals

JEL: J16, J24, F23, M14, M5

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1 Introduction

Gender gaps within firms can arise from both managers' biases and from broader aspects of firm practices, policies, and culture.[1] While some disparities may arise from specific behavior by particular managers, corporate culture can also contribute to gender inequality in shaping how women's contributions are evaluated, rewarded, and supported. A natural question, then, is whether and to what extent individual managers can influence the culture of the firm. This paper examines how such influence extends to shaping gender inequality.[2]

This paper studies the interaction of managers' values and firm culture, asking whether a single manager's gender attitudes can influence the attitudes of others in the firm. sing data on multinationals, we test whether managers with more progressive gender norms influence both the outcomes of their subordinates and the actions of other managers. Using 11 years of detailed personnel records from a large multinational operating in over 100 countries, we exploit quasi-exogenous cross-country manager rotations to estimate the impact of a manager's gender norms on the work outcomes and behaviors of employees in the destination offices. We find that expat managers impact local employees' outcomes along two dimensions. First, expat managers from countries with progressive gender norms narrow gender gaps in pay and promotions among their direct subordinates. Second, expat managers have a lasting influence on firm culture through their impact on local managers, who become more progressive through their interactions with the expat manager.

Studying this question in the context of multinationals offers four advantages. First, the multinational operates in over 100 countries that range in their degree of gender attitudes, providing sufficient variation in gender norms. For example, the firm has offices in India and Pakistan, countries with more conservative attitudes, and in the Netherlands and Canada, countries with more progressive attitudes. Second, the multinational em-

[1] On the role of managers, see Ronchi and Smith (2021); Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2023); Fortin, Markevych, and Rehavi (2022). On the role of policies, and culture, see, for example, the role of evaluation practices (Benson, Li, and Shue, 2019) and negotiating practices (Masso, Meriküll, and Vahter, 2022).

[2] An existing literature has shown the lasting impact that individuals can have on organizations (Xu, 2018; Minni, 2024b). We look at the lasting impact of managers on gender inequality within firms.

phasizes foreign rotations as necessary for promotions into senior leadership positions, and the locations of rotations are determined by factors orthogonal to managers' gender views. This allows us to estimate the impact of a manager on employee outcomes in the destination offices. Third, because we have a panel of employees, we can include worker fixed effects to control for possible changes in worker composition that come with manager rotations. Last and most importantly, the structure of the company allows us to test for cultural spillovers to other managers and workers in the local subsidiaries within the firm, both during and after the expat manager's rotation.

We begin by assessing expat managers' impact on the gender gaps among their direct subordinates. We first measure a manager's inherited gender norms as the average gender attitudes among World Values Survey respondents of the same home country and birth cohort, building on the economics of transmitted and inherited cultural traits that emphasize the role of cultural origin in shaping an individual's cultural values (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009).[3] We then use a triple differences strategy that compares men's and women's pay before and after they are exposed to managers from more and less progressive countries. We find that women exposed to a manager with one standard deviation higher progressive gender norms — a difference roughly equivalent to that between an American and a Chinese manager, or between a Chinese and an Indian manager, born in the 1980s — have a 4.9 percentage point smaller gender pay gap relative to those exposed to a manager with more conservative norms, corresponding to a narrowing of the gender pay gap of 18%. This effect is larger in destination offices with more conservative gender norms. Moreover, it persists well after employees' exposure to the expat manager, and even after the expat has left the destination office. These findings are in line with a literature showing that exposure to a more diverse workforce, even via temporary policies, can have long-lasting effects on workplaces (Miller, 2017; Miller, Peck, and Seflek, 2022).

The gender pay gap may narrow under a more progressive expat manager in these

[3]There is a large body of literature establishing the role of cultural origin in influencing economic outcomes, such as the theoretical foundation by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001); Tabellini (2008); Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), and the empirical evidence in Giuliano (2007); Fernández and Fogli (2009); Algan and Cahuc (2010); Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016), among others.

offices for a variety of reasons. For example, women in conservative offices may be positively selected (Ashraf, Bandiera, Minni, and Quintas-Martınez, 2024) but underpaid, and the expat manager may actively adjust pay to reflect productivity. Alternatively, there may be no productivity differences or underpayment, but the expat manager mentors women or assigns them to tasks better suited to their skills. The expat manager may additionally be better at retaining high-potential women, ultimately strengthening the firm's female talent pool.[4] We find that a substantial portion of the narrowing pay gap comes from women being promoted to higher salary grades and work levels, and that these results are not driven by changes in the composition of employees. There is some evidence that expat managers move women to different tasks. Leveraging the company's annual pulse surveys, we find that expat managers with progressive gender norms positively influence employees' perceptions of managerial effectiveness and overall morale, though these effects diminish after their departure, suggesting some role for continued personal interactions.

We then turn to estimating the impact of progressive managers on local managers' behaviors. We identify two types of managers: those who were direct employees of the expat manager (lower-level) and those who were at the same manager level as the expat manager (same-level). We look at the outcomes of each of these managers' subordinates both during and *after* the expat manager has left. Both the lower-level and same-level managers tend to improve the pay of their own female subordinates if the expat manager they interacted with had more progressive norms. This phenomenon of managerial inheritance of norms applies to both male and female subordinates. It underlines the long-lasting influence of "first-generation" managers on workplace culture. On the other hand, an expat manager's prior experience in other foreign countries matters less to the gender gaps among their subordinates.

These results highlight the role of managers in transmitting and shaping workplace culture by influencing workers' outcomes and attitudes, particularly in the context of gender norms. In this regard, the paper contributes novel evidence of how corporate cul-

[4]Note that worker fixed effects already account for differences in employees' time-invariant productivity and hence corresponding composition changes. However, these fixed effects cannot account for differences in how employees' productivity evolves over time.

ture forms, evolves, and matters within the firm. The reuslts speak to a growing literature documenting the lasting impact that managers and, in turn, corporate culture play in determining firm performance (Xu, 2018; Graham, Grennan, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2022; Adams, Akyol, and Grosjean, 2021). Beyond the existing evidence on the CEOs' influence on corporate culture (e.g., Nguyen, 2025), this paper's perspective permeates down the firm's hierarchy. This expansion of scope allows much richer implications for corporate policies to influence corporate culture, beyond the simple selection of CEOs.

Our paper then contributes to three additional literatures. Within the literature on the impact of managers on firm and worker outcomes, a set of papers focus specifically on the impact managers have on gender gaps within the firm (Fortin et al., 2022; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2023). Two papers most closely related to ours are Ronchi and Smith (2021) and Chen, Hou, and Lei (2024). Ronchi and Smith (2021) uses variation in managers' gender attitudes, induced by the manager having a daughter rather than a son, to show that managers with more progressive attitudes hire more women and pay them more. Chen et al. (2024) use the quasi-random assignment of male managers to test for gender bias in the allocation of performance-based bonuses. Similar to our paper, they use variation in regional sex ratios to argue that the bias is cultural. We bring complementary evidence that managers can affect gender pay gaps when there is cultural mismatch between the manager and workers through mechanisms beyond hiring and pay adjustments. We are able to not only test for managers' direct impacts on their subordinates, but also test for the manager's impact on other local managers through horizontal and vertical spillovers, measuring the long-term impact of these expat managers.

Second, we contribute to a growing body of evidence that documents multinationals' role in transposing wages and practices across national borders (Hjort, Li, and Sarsons, 2022; Alfaro-Urena, Manelici, and Vasquez, 2022; Minni, 2024a; Boudreau, 2024). This paper highlights managers' rotations as a transmission channel for norms across establishments. This channel will become increasingly more important, as multinationals have been a major contributor to the recent accelerating globalization of labor markets that has made cross-cultural working relations ever more necessary.[5]

[5]Globally, there are 50,000 multinational enterprises, with 450,000 subsidiaries, employing 200 million

Finally, we contribute to the research on the evolution of (gender) norms and economic disparities (Giuliano, 2021; Aneja, Farina, and Xu, 2025). Several studies show that inherited gender norms are a key determinant of women's labor market outcomes (Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004; Bertrand, 2011; Olivetti, Patacchini, and Zenou, 2020) and more broadly, gender disparities (Tur-Prats, 2019; Ashraf, Bau, Nunn, and Voena, 2020). Such norms are often deeply ingrained and slow to change (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013), raising the questions of how they are transmitted across space and over time and how they can be altered. While the existing literature has mostly focused on the intergenerational aspect of gender norms transmission, our paper documents the vertical and horizontal mechanisms of transmission of gender norms within the organization, as well as their consequences on the within-firm gender gaps.

2 Institutional Context and Data

2.1 Institutional Context

The multinational. Our empirical analysis uses administrative data from a global consumer goods multinational headquartered in Europe with operations in over 100 countries worldwide. The multinational has a workforce of about 155,000 people, of which approximately 60,000 are white collars, and turnover of well over €50 billion in 2019.[6] This setting is ideal for studying the impact of culture within firms since its geographic reach has an unparalleled global presence and its business activities span a wide variety of jobs, which allows us to further investigate how the nature of the job mediates the effects of manager gender norms on gender gaps.

International assignments. Similar to many other multinationals, the company follows a policy of international assignments among its top managers (director and vice-president levels), whose rationale is for the manager to acquire global experience and build leadership capability. To progress to the upper echelon of the firm and become a global leader,

people worldwide (ILO, 2017).

[6] For a detailed description of the firm's structure and workforce, see **?**.

a manager must do at least one international assignment, in which he works in a foreign country for a limited period of between one and three years on average.[7] Although the managers can submit their country preferences, the final placement is mostly determined based on availability within their function and the associated relocation costs. Furthermore, managers do not have any say over which team they will lead in the destination country. This institutional setting provides variation that enables us to study the impact of expat managers' gender norms on the performance of local employees who experience managerial turnover.

Since being on an international assignment is part of the career progression of managers, these individuals are considered the "most promising" managers. Our identification strategy looks at the effects that expat managers have on women compared to men, hence netting out the level effect that expat managers might have on worker performance, being on average better managers. Moreover, given that they have already reached some seniority within the company, their subordinates consist of middle managers, who, in turn, manage other employees. We leverage this aspect to examine how the expat managers' gender norms permeate down the hierarchy.

Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the countries of origin of the managers (panel A) and their destination countries (panel B).

2.2 Multinational Data

Our primary dataset comes from the personnel records of the firm between 2011 and 2021, which are monthly snapshots of employees all around the globe with detailed information on performance and pay (since 2016), as well as job rotations, promotions, and leaves. Very importantly, the data also contain information on supervisory relationships. This feature enables us to precisely reconstruct the entire managerial chain and the structure of teams, thereby observing the entire organizational hierarchy.

Employees of the firm are organized into six work levels (WL1 to WL6), with WL6 being C-suite executives. In addition to the work levels, twelve salary grades further

[7] As we focus on male expat managers in our analyses, we will refer to a manager as he/him/his throughout this paper.

differentiate employees within work levels. We analyze both work level and salary grade promotions in our analysis.

Jobs are also organized into functions and sub-functions. Functions include typical divisions within a firm, such as Marketing, Human Resources, Sales, and Supply Chain. Sub-functions are finer job distinctions within each function. For example, within the Human Resources function, an employee can work in Data Analytics, in Rewards, or in Occupational Health, among others. While workers typically are not transferred across functions, we will analyze how expat managers allocate male and female workers across sub-functions.

We perform further analysis utilizing individual responses from four worldwide annual surveys administered by the company between 2017 and 2021. These surveys were designed to assess the overall "pulse" of the workforce, capturing employees' perceptions of the organization, their work environment, and overall job satisfaction. The surveys provide a rich dataset with standardized questions that track key aspects of workplace experiences, including employees' views on managerial effectiveness, opportunities for professional growth, sense of autonomy, and overall well-being.

2.3 Gender Attitudes Measures

We proxy for a manager's gender attitudes using aggregated data on attitudes from the World Values Survey (WVS), a representative comparative social survey conducted globally in more than 100 countries every 5 years since 1990.[8] In particular, we construct a proxy for each employee's gender attitudes as the average gender attitudes among World Values Survey respondents in the employee's home country and birth cohort, which accounts for the fact that gender views vary not only cross-country but also over time.[9] Although we do not observe individual employees' gender attitudes, this approach of using the cell-average of the right-hand-side variable as a new regressor does not introduce at-

[8] We follow a method similar to Kleven (2022), who measures state-level gender norms in the US using survey data from the US General Social Survey, the US equivalent and predecessor of the WVS.

[9] We find that improvements in gender norms across countries in recent decades are driven mostly by composition effects, while respondents from the same birth cohorts hold fairly consistent gender views over time. This then motivates our gender norms measure that varies by country and birth cohort.

tenuation bias as in the case of classical measurement errors but likely produces unbiased estimates of the true effect (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, chapter 2).[10] Throughout the paper, we use the terms gender attitudes and gender norms interchangeably.

Our main measure of gender attitudes is constructed using responses to three statements regarding women's roles in the workplace: (i) *"When jobs are scare, men should have more of a right to a job then women,"* (ii) *"When mother works for pay, the children suffer,"* and (iii) *"On the whole, men make better business executives than women do."* These questions were asked in both early and recent WVS waves, with responses standardized as "strongly agree/agree" (1 for being conservative) or "disagree/strongly disagree" (2 for being progressive). We first average the responses to each question by country and birth year, showing that the resulting measures are highly correlated with country-cohort-level female labor force participation.[11] We then compute our main gender attitudes measure as the average of these three measures and merge it into the multinational data.

A one standard deviation change in gender attitudes corresponds approximately to the difference between an American and a Chinese manager born in the 1980s, or between a Chinese and an Indian manager born in the 1980s. Appendix Table A.1 shows that the paper's main results are unchanged when using alternative measures of gender attitudes constructed based on responses to individual or alternative questions.

In addition, for some analyses, we create a binary measure of country office norms by dividing countries into those with progressive and conservative gender attitudes. A country's gender attitudes are computed as the average individual attitudes of all local managers from that country, hence a larger score reflects a more progressive culture within the firm's offices regarding women's roles in society in general and in the workplace in particular. More specifically, progressive countries include those in the top quartile by country

[10] In the classical case, measurement errors are correlated with the regressor and orthogonal to the latent variable. In this "cell-average" approach, measurement errors are orthogonal to the regressor and correlated with the latent variable. In addition, a group-average measure helps smooth out individual-level measurement errors that are often present in survey- or game-based measures of individual's beliefs or preferences. Nguyen (2025) evaluates a similar group-average measure for trust attitude and shows that the group-average measure is about 80% as precise as an individual-level game-based measure.

[11] As there may be too few WVS respondents in each country $\times$ birth year cell, we also include same-country respondents born "around" the focal birth year in our computation, yet attributing higher weights to those born closer to the focal birth year. In addition, the specific weight kernel and bandwidth are picked to minimize the mean squared error between predicted and actual responses.

and conservative ones include those in the bottom three quartiles. This split divides the sample into two roughly equal halves in terms of the number of employees.

Panel A of Figure I shows the manager flows to the foreign offices, grouping countries by quartiles of their gender attitudes. Roughly one-third of managers from countries in the top quartile of gender progressivity go to countries in the bottom two quartiles in terms of gender attitudes. Panel B shows expat managers' flows based on geography.

3 Empirical Strategy

In this section, we describe our empirical strategy that involves the rotation of managers across country offices and we describe our analysis sample.

3.1 Sample Construction

Expat managers. We leverage manager rotations across country offices to identify the impact of an expat manager's gender attitudes on the outcomes of male and female employees. As mentioned, international rotations are an important prerequisite for moving to upper-level positions within the company. Typically, at least one international rotation is required for employees to enter into WL5 positions, as such rotations are seen as crucial for understanding the firm and developing the skills necessary to lead diverse teams.

As such, the managers we study in this paper are relatively senior and are identified as those in WL3 or above (directors or vice presidents). Employees in WL3 through WL6 have substantial responsibility and oversight within the company. They guide the company's strategy and set long-term goals, but also work to translate those strategic goals into actionable plans and ensure their execution within the respective departments.

We further identify international rotations as cases in which managers are no longer located in their home country and spend at least three months in the foreign office location. Figure I shows where managers from different geographic areas go on their first, second, third, and fourth rotations. Managers tend to go to other countries in the same region, but there are a number of rotations across regions, with managers from Europe

going to South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, for example. Panel A of Table I compares the characteristics of male managers who do and do not become expat managers within a year. For each expat manager, we compare his characteristics in the year before he goes on his rotation with those of other managers in his office who do not go on rotation the next year.[12] Managers who go on rotation within a year are younger and have a shorter tenure with the firm.

Exposed employees. To look at the impact of expat managers on employees, we focus on all employees who are ever directly exposed to an expat manager. In this sense, we do not have a set of "untreated" employees who are never exposed to an expat manager.[13] This is because employees who do not have expat managers are different than those who work under an expat manager, even within the same office. Panel B of Table I compares the characteristics of employees who are and are not exposed to an expat worker within a given office. Characteristics are measured the year prior to the expat entering the office. Employees who work for the expat manager are younger, have been at the firm for a shorter period of time, and are therefore at a lower work level. They do, however, receive slightly higher pay, suggesting that expat managers are allocated to high-performing teams.

We make three further restrictions when constructing our main analysis sample. We first restrict to employees who have had "sufficiently long" exposure to an expat manager, which we define as spending at least three months working together in the same office. This ensures that we are considering cases where the expat manager spends enough time in the local office to interact with employees and potentially change workplace culture. We then restrict these worker-manager pairs to a worker's first exposure to an expat manager as this gives us the cleanest identification of an expat manager's impact on local employees. Finally, we restrict the sample to male expat managers. A growing literature has found a positive impact of female managers, and a negative impact of male managers,

[12] As we focus on male expat managers in our analyses, we will refer to a manager as he/him/his through this paper.

[13] In a robustness check, we also include the set of "never-treated" employees as a control group in the sample and find qualitatively similar results.

on women's outcomes (Fortin et al., 2022; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2023; Biasi and Sarsons, 2022). Given that most managers are men, focusing on male managers allows us to directly estimate the impact of gender attitudes on the managerial decisions of men, net of any "same gender" effect.

Baseline sample. These restrictions give us a final sample of 917 male managers (0.4% of the firm's workforce) who complete an international rotation. Figure II shows that there is considerable variation in these expat managers' (home country) gender norms. Appendix Figure A.2 shows the fraction of expat managers moving from and to various countries in terms of their gender norms among the baseline sample. Around 25% of the managers go to countries with gender norms in a quartile below their home country's gender norms while 35% travel to countries with gender norms in a quartile above their home country's norms. We therefore additionally test whether expat managers traveling to countries with more progressive norms negatively influence women's outcomes.

The vast majority (95%) of managers are in WL3 or WL4 when they do their first rotation. Just under 90% of these managers do more than one rotation, allowing us to look at whether an expat manager's behavior changes as they move to different countries. The median time that an expat spends on an international rotation is 32 months. There are 4,755 employees working across 74 countries who are "first-time" exposed to these expat managers, who correspond to roughly 250,000 employee $\times$ month observations between 2016 and 2021.

3.2 Triple Differences Design

We use a triple difference design to estimate the impact of an expat manager on exposed employees' outcomes. Specifically, we look at before and after expat manager exposure and compare the outcomes of male and female employees who receive an expat manager with more progressive gender attitudes to the outcomes of those who receive an expat

manager with conservative attitudes. Our main estimation equation is:

$$Y_{imlkt} = \sum_{k=0,1,2} \gamma_k \mathbf{1}[K_{it} = k](Norms_m \times Fem_i) + \theta_i + \theta_{mk} + \theta_{l,Year(t),Fem(i)} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{imlkt} \quad (1)$$

where i indexes the worker, m the expat manager, l i's contemporaneous manager at calendar month t, and k the time period relative to i's exposure to m. In our main specifications, we consider three time periods: before, during, and after exposure.

To test for the differential impact of expat managers on men and women, we interact our measure of the expat manager's gender norms, $Norms_m$, with the worker's female indicator Fem_i.[14] For ease of interpretation, we standardize $Norms_m$ by its standard deviation across expat managers. Our main coefficients of interest, $\hat{\gamma}_k$, therefore tell us how the outcomes of women change relative to men before ($k = 0$), during ($k = 1$), and after ($k = 2$) their exposure to an expat manager with one standard deviation more progressive gender norms (relative to exposure to an expat manager with less progressive gender norms). For brevity, we will refer to these coefficients as the impact of a more progressive expat manager on gender gaps when discussing their magnitudes.

To account for changes in the composition of workers or local managers when the expat manager arrives, we include worker fixed effects θ_i and contemporaneous manager fixed effects $\theta_{l,Year(t),Fem(i)}$.[15] The contemporaneous manager fixed effects are interacted with the worker's gender and calendar year when $k \neq 1$ to allow for the fact that contemporaneous managers may have differential impacts on male and female employees over time.[16] We include expat manager $\times$ exposure period fixed effects θ_{mk} to account for the expat manager's overall impact on exposed employees. In an augmented specification

[14] The uninteracted $Norms_m$ and Fem_i are absorbed by worker and expat manager fixed effects.

[15] We rely on a triple difference strategy to account for level differences in gender gaps that may exist independently of expat exposure. This is particularly important for outcomes such as bonuses, where pre-existing gender disparities exist, as shown in Appendix Table A.2. By including worker and contemporaneous manager fixed effects, we aim to isolate the effect of being exposed to a progressive manager from underlying differences that persist across teams or over time.

[16] These fixed effects also help account for the fact that within-team gender gaps widen as employees progress up the rank. This is particularly important as we find that promotions are a key driver of the narrowing of the gender pay gap. Hence excluding these fixed effects yields qualitatively similar results of smaller magnitudes.

we further include country $\times$ exposure period $\times$ worker's gender fixed effects to ensure that we are comparing employees within the same destination country during and surrounding exposure; this does not materially change our results. Other worker controls X_{it} include worker age, age squared, tenure, and tenure squared. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country times worker's gender, following Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge's (2023) advice to cluster at the level of treatment variation.

The primary outcomes we consider are pay, which we define as the combination of base and bonus pay; promotions; lateral moves; and retention. The manager has considerable influence over these metrics. Performance assessments, which encompass the determination of pay and bonus, are set by the manager taking into account the views of all the colleagues that have interacted with the employee and are conducted in a standardized way across functions so that comparisons can be made between employees with different types of jobs. Similarly, promotions and lateral moves depend on the manager's recommendations.

To visualize the impact of expat managers on employee outcomes, we also estimate an event study equation,

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{imlkqt} = &\sum_{q=-6}^{16} \sigma_q \mathbf{1}[Q_{it} = q](Norms_m \times Fem_i) \\ &+\theta_i + \theta_{mk} + \theta_{l,Year(t),Fem(i)} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{imlkqt} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where the coefficients $\hat{\sigma}_q$ give the impact of a manager with one standard deviation more progressive gender norms on women's pay relative to men's pay in the q-th quarter of exposure. We restrict our sample to all employees who ever interact with an expat manager, meaning that we have no "never treated" groups. Identification thus comes from differences in the timing of exposure to an expat manager and variation in expat managers' gender norms.

Identification assumption. Our main identification assumption is that managers from countries with more progressive gender norms are not systematically sent to teams with

improving (or worsening) gender gaps, which then allows us to interpret our estimates as the impacts of the manager himself. This identification assumption likely holds in our setting as managers do not get to choose their teams in the destination offices. However, we test for this directly by estimating an event study equation and checking for trends in gender pay and promotion gaps.

4 Direct Impacts on Exposed Employees' Outcomes

In this section, we estimate the impact that an expat manager with more or less progressive gender norms has on the gender gaps among his direct subordinates in the destination office. We find that a more progressive manager narrows the gender pay gap in the team he supervises (relative to a conservative one). To shed light on what drives this result, we then estimate the impact of an expat manager on promotion rates, task assignment, and retention rates.

4.1 Gender Pay Gap among Exposed Employees

Expat manager's gender norms. Panel A of Table II reports the results from estimating equation (1). The first row presents the estimates for γ_1, i.e., the impact of an expat manager's gender norms on the within-team gender pay gap (the pay of exposed local female employees relative to that of corresponding male employees) *during* the period of exposure. The second row presents the estimates for γ_2, i.e., the expat manager's impact *after* the exposure period. The baseline is the period prior to exposure ($k = 0$).

Expat managers with more progressive gender norms have a significant positive impact on the gender pay gap. Controlling for worker and manager fixed effects (column 1), a one standard deviation increase in the manager's gender norms is associated with a 4.9% pay increase for exposed female employees relative to exposed male employees under his leadership. For comparison, the overall baseline gap among countries that receive an expat manager is 28%, meaning that progressive managers close this gap by about a sixth ($\frac{4.9}{28} = 17.5\%$). After an expat manager leaves, the gender gap remains 4.9% smaller

than it was before the manager's arrival. These results are robust to including destination country $\times$ exposure period $\times$ worker's gender fixed effects (column 2) and sub-function fixed effects (column 3). When we include work-level fixed effects in column (4), the size of the coefficient falls by nearly 50%. This indicates that a large share of the pay increase is attributable to women being promoted as opposed to the manager raising women's pay relative to men's pay.

Figure III visualizes the effect of an expat manager's gender norms on pay, plotting event study coefficients from estimating equation (2).[17] Importantly, we do not see any trends in the gender pay gap prior to the expat manager rotation. Expat managers with progressive norms then have an immediate impact on the gender pay gap and, notably, the effect persists beyond exposure to the manager. A worker's average expat exposure is 6 quarters (while the average expat manager rotates out completely after 8-12 quarters) and, consistent with the previous results, we continue to see an impact on the gender pay gap 16 quarters out.

The immediate change in the pay gap, though statistically insignificant in the first four quarters, can be attributed to two reasons, supported by anecdotal evidence from HR managers. The first reported observation is that expat managers often foster an open and transparent work environment from the outset. Unlike local managers, they are not entrenched in the pre-existing network of workplace relationships and alliances, which allows them to approach their role with fresh perspectives and fewer social constraints (Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2022). This external position gives them greater freedom to question existing practices and introduce new ideas without being influenced by prior relational dynamics. Moreover, employees are often more willing to reach out and open up to these managers, perceiving them as neutral and less biased, which further immediately enhances communication and trust within the team. Second, expat managers typically have the opportunity to gather information and learn about their new team and work context before their relocation and thus make changes as soon as they arrive in the destination country. With a pre-existing understanding of the team's dynamics and challenges, combined with the team's increased willingness to engage with the new manager,

[17] Appendix Figure A.3 shows the same estimates using the promotion gap as the outcome.

they can quickly implement changes and make an impact early on.

A natural question is whether women's gains under an expat manager come at the expense of men's careers. Figure IV shows the average pay of male and female employees who are exposed to expat managers with conservative and progressive gender norms. Before exposure to an expat manager, there is no statistically significant difference between the women who are eventually exposed to expat managers. During exposure to the expat manager, the pay of women exposed to progressive expat managers improves relative to the pay of women exposed to conservative expat managers. However, this does not come at the expense of men's pay. A similar pattern persists beyond exposure.[18]

Destination country's gender norms. We next examine whether gender norms in the destination country matter. In principle, it could be easier to affect the gender pay gap in countries that are already somewhat progressive as there might be less resistance to promoting women. On the other hand, if there is only a small gender pay gap to begin with, expat managers will have no impact. Managers may therefore have a larger impact in countries with conservative gender norms. Panel B of Table II shows the results from estimating equation (1), splitting by destination countries with progressive or conservative gender norms in columns (1) and (2) (as described in subsection 2.3), and by destination countries with more or less progressive gender norms than the expat manager in columns (3) and (4). Expat managers indeed have a larger impact in countries with conservative gender norms, either relative to other countries (column 1) or relative to the expat manager (column 3).

Table A.5 shows that results are robust when only considering the first international rotation for the expat manager, although the sample decreases by 40%.[19]

Worker Performance In Appendix Table A.6 we test whether women do better in terms of performance under managers with more progressive gender norms. We estimate equation (1) and in column (4) using performance ratings as the outcome of interest. Women

[18] Appendix Figure A.4 shows the same estimates using work level as the outcome. Appendix Figure A.5 shows the same figures but includes employees who are never treated; that is, they are never exposed to an expat manager.

[19] We are already restricting to a worker's first exposure to an expat manager.

receive higher performance ratings under managers with more progressive gender norms, although the estimates are noisy and insignificant. Importantly, though, we see that these women receive significantly higher performance ratings *after* an expat manager has departed. Notably, these results on performance ratings hold even when controlling for work level, indicating that within the same work level, women consistently receive higher ratings. These results suggest that expat managers may be better at identifying and promoting talented women, a possibility that we test in the next subsection.

Other expat manager's characteristics. The absence of a pre-trend in Figure III allows us to interpret this narrowing of the gender pay gap as expat managers' impact on their employees' outcomes. However, this effect could be driven by managers' gender norms, or it could be driven by other characteristics and cultural traits that correlate with gender norms but directly influence the gender pay gap. Recall that in equation (1) we control for expat manager fixed effects, which account for all characteristics of the expat manager that similarly affect male and female employees. For example, more progressive managers are likely from more developed countries and thereby are different from their more conservative counterparts from less developed countries in managerial ability.[20] This is only a concern for us if managerial ability impacts male and female employees differently, e.g., if higher-ability managers are better at identifying and grooming female talents.

To assess the extent of this concern, we explicitly control for a range of expat managers' other characteristics and other cultural traits and report the results in Appendix Table A.3. In particular, in Panel A, we control for the manager's age, tenure, quadratics in age and tenure, and work level at the time of exposure in column (1), and for his performance in column (2).[21] In columns (3) and (4), we control for his home country's level of development using GDP per capita and average education attainment. In column (5), we control for his home country's average management talent score, as measured by

[20]This difference in managerial ability could be positive if managers from more developed countries have access to better education, training, and managerial technologies. This difference could also be negative if managers from less developed countries face greater barriers to going on international rotations and as a result, are more positively selected.

[21]Following **?**, we measure performance as the age and tenure at which the expat manager progressed to WL3. High performers are more likely to progress to the next work level sooner than others.

the World Management Survey - Management.[22] In Panel B, we control for the other cultural traits that have been shown to matter to both macroeconomic and firm outcomes, including trust (e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012; Nguyen, 2025), work ethic (e.g., Weber, 1905; Spenkuch, 2017), preference for redistribution (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), and risk preference.[23] In all columns, we interact the additional controls with worker's gender and exposure period, similar to $Norms_m$, and find that the impact of expat managers' gender norms on the within-team gender pay gap remains robust to the inclusion of these controls. These results suggest that while we cannot completely rule out managers' other characteristics and cultural traits as potential confounding factors, they are unlikely a first-order concern. Moreover, the fact that preference for redistribution is also correlated with the gender pay gap does not affect the interpretation that managers transmit culture and shape workplace outcomes.

Excluding Headquarters (HQ)-Linked Expats. Appendix Table A.4 provides further evidence that our main results capture the effect of expat managers' gender norms rather than reflecting a broader headquarters-driven policy to reduce gender pay gaps. We progressively restrict the sample to address this concern. In columns (1) and (2), we exclude cases where the expat manager is assigned to the HQ country. In columns (3)-(5), we exclude managers who either originate from the HQ country or have previously worked there. Across all specifications, the results remain robust, supporting the interpretation that it is the individual manager's norms–rather than HQ-driven directives–that drive the observed effects.

4.2 Promotions, Lateral Moves, and Retention

Promotions. Motivated by the result in column (4) of Table II, we directly explore the impact of managers on gender gaps in promotions. Panel A of Table III presents the

[22]The average management talent score is based on the following questions from the WMS: 1) instilling a talent mindset, 2) building a high-Performance culture, 3) making room for talent, 4) developing talent, 5) creating a distinctive EVP, and 6) retaining talent (Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and Van Reenen, 2021).

[23]Measures of these other cultural traits are constructed analogously to those of gender norms using World Values Survey responses to the relevant questions (details in notes to Appendix Table A.3).

results from re-estimating equation (1) but using three measures of promotions as the outcomes. Columns (1) and (2) report the impact of an expat manager's gender attitudes on the cumulative number of times a worker is promoted to a new salary grade (column 1) or a new work level (column 2). Under the supervision of an expat manager with progressive norms, women see an average of 0.07 more salary grade promotions (5% of the mean) and 0.05 more work level promotions (14% of the mean) relative to cases when a manager with conservative norms is in charge. These effects translate into these women moving up 0.06 work levels within the firm (column 3).[24] In column (4), the outcome is an indicator of a worker being promoted to a manager-level position. Women are more likely to be promoted to management-level positions when they work under an expat manager with progressive norms.

Moreover, as in the case of pay, women exposed to a more progressive expat manager continue to be promoted after they are no longer supervised by the manager, and even after the manager rotates out of the office. This suggests that there is a longer-term change in the destination office: since the expat manager is no longer in charge of promotions, other managers must promote women more. We study this possibility in subsection 5.

Appendix Table A.7 investigates whether expat managers' gender norms influence broader patterns of workplace inequality beyond gender. Specifically, we test whether these norms affect differences in pay and promotion gaps based on tenure. To do so, we re-estimate our main specification, replacing the gender indicator with a dummy variable for whether a worker is above the median tenure in the office, measured in the pre-period. The results show no significant relationship between managers' gender norms and tenure-based disparities in pay or promotion. These null effects reinforce the interpretation that our main findings reflect gender-specific mechanisms rather than a broader managerial bias toward certain worker characteristics.

[24]Because promotions are zero-sum in many organizations, the gains in promotions among women who are exposed to more progressive managers could come at the loss of some other group(s), including other women. As the triple differences design does not directly estimate each group's gains and losses, we investigate this possibility by examining the changes in promotions across different worker groups, including "never-treated" ones, controlling for a range of worker, job, and office characteristics. Our results indicate that the "lose-out" groups are men and women who are never exposed to expat managers, particularly the women, and not women who are exposed to less progressive expat managers or men who are exposed to more progressive ones.

Lateral moves. We next explore whether more progressive expat managers partially improve women's earnings by changing the task allocation of their team, e.g., by better identifying and allocating female talent to tasks (**?**). This could happen if these expat managers more readily acknowledge a range of tasks that women can do, or are better at recognizing female talent. Panel B of Table III examines whether the horizontal allocation of employees to jobs after the arrival of an expat manager varies by the manager's gender norms. In column (1), we estimate equation (1) using whether a worker is transferred to another function as the outcome. Columns (2) and (3) look at sub-function transfers, splitting by whether the worker changes sub-function but remains within the same function. Women are less likely to be moved to another function but more likely to be moved within the same sub-function, suggesting that managers may be reallocating women into roles that better suit their talents.

Retention. As more progressive expat managers improve women's pay, promotions, and other positive aspects of the job, it is likely that they also have a positive impact on the retention of female employees. We estimate this effect at the worker level and report the results in Table IV. Similar to equation (1), the main explanatory variable is $Norms_m \times Fem_i$, separately for progressive and conservative destination countries, with controls for worker characteristics at the time of exposure , destination country fixed effects, and exposure year fixed effects (all interacted with worker's gender to account for gender differences in career trajectory), together with expat manager fixed effects.

The outcome variables in columns (1) and (3) indicate if the worker leaves the firm within one year of their first month of expat exposure; in column (1), we further require that the worker's first month of expat exposure is at least one year prior to the end of the study period.[25] The outcome variables and samples in columns (2) and (4) consider a five-year period instead and are constructed analogously to those in columns (1) and (3). In column (5), the outcome variable indicates if the worker leaves at any point; for this analysis, we consider all exposed employees and account for differences in observation

[25]In column (3), we only require that we know for sure if the worker leaves within one year of expat exposure. Compared to column (1), column (3) additionally includes employees whose first months of expat exposure are within the end of the study period but who already left the firm by then.

period length with exposure year fixed effects.

Expat managers have a significant impact on the retention of female employees, particularly in more conservative destination countries. There, under a more progressive manager, women are 5.6 percentage points less likely to leave the firm within one year of their exposure, relative to a baseline of 10%. However, we are unable to distinguish between mechanisms that could be driving this result; for example, whether the improved retention is due to changes in workplace culture or other job amenities.

Appendix Table A.9 shows that the pay and promotion effects are concentrated among employees who stay at the firm, suggesting that managers are not applying a blanket policy of raising the pay of all women at the firm. Rather, they seem to be recognizing and rewarding talented women.

Quantification. In Appendix Table A.10 we summarize the main findings regarding the contribution of each channel to the change in the gender pay gap: promotions, lateral moves, and worker retention. Column (1) reports the baseline results; column (2) adds work-level fixed effects to quantify the impact of promotions; column (3) adds cumulative function and subfunction transfers and sub-function fixed effects to net out the effect of lateral moves; column (4) estimates a two-step Heckman selection estimator to control for selective worker retention. In particular, we use the number of worker exits in the same office $\times$ function $\times$ year as the excluded variable for the exit equation, following Benson et al. (2019). Column (5) then includes all three channels.

Overall, around half of expat managers' contemporaneous effect on the gender pay gap and their entire effect post-exposure are due to promotions, while lateral moves and worker retention do not meaningfully contribute to the narrowing of the pay gap. Put differently, the primary driver behind the smaller gender pay gap induced by more progressive expat managers is a more equal representation of women in managerial positions, which likely also explains its persistence.

Parental leave. Another dimension of workplace gender inequality is the extent to which managerial attitudes influence not only pay and promotions but also employees' deci-

sions regarding parental leave. Access to parental leave, particularly for women, is closely tied to career progression, yet managerial norms and workplace culture can shape both the uptake of leave and post-leave career trajectories.

Table A.8 investigates how exposure to expat managers with progressive gender norms affects employees' pay and parental leave behavior. Columns (1) and (2) examine the impact of expat managers' gender norms on overall pay, distinguishing between employees who have taken parental leave and those who have not. The results show that female employees exposed to expat managers with more progressive gender norms experience a significant increase in pay both during and after exposure, with slightly larger effects for those who have taken parental leave compared to those who have not. These findings suggest that progressive managers may particularly help mitigate the parental leave penalty, supporting women in maintaining earnings parity after taking leave.

Columns (3) to (5) shift the focus to whether exposure to expat managers with progressive gender norms influences employees' likelihood of taking parental leave within the next year. Column (3) suggests that the female-male gap in taking parental leave is larger among those exposed to more progressive expat managers. When disaggregating by gender (columns 4 and 5), the effect remains statistically significant for women but is insignificant for men. Hence, these managers primarily influence women's parental leave decisions rather than changing men's uptake of leave.

4.3 Employees' Perceptions from Surveys

We leverage the company's annual pulse surveys between 2017 and 2021 to shed some light on how workplace experiences are shaped by the expat managers. Due to the shorter time frame of these surveys, the sample includes observations from employees during and after their exposure to an expat manager, with the observation unit defined at the worker-year level. Table V's empirical specification thus relates expat managers' gender norms to the gender gaps in employees' perceptions of managerial effectiveness and job satisfaction. The dependent variables correspond to standardized worker responses to six main survey questions related to managerial effectiveness, feedback, sense of autonomy,

development opportunities, motivation, and overall morale. The results provide evidence of a significant and positive effect during expat managers' tenure, though these effects diminish or become null once the expat manager departs.

The results indicate that during exposure to expat managers with more progressive gender norms, female employees report significantly more positive perceptions of managerial effectiveness, feedback, job control, development opportunities, motivation, and morale. Specifically, column (1) shows that female employees rate their expat managers as more effective leaders (coefficient = 0.098, $p < 0.05$). Column (2) reveals that they also report receiving greater feedback that supports their growth (0.156, $p < 0.05$). Similarly, columns (3)–(6) show positive and statistically significant effects on perceived control over task prioritization (0.089, $p < 0.05$), development opportunities (0.116, $p < 0.05$), motivation to go the extra mile (0.078, $p < 0.10$), and overall morale (0.077, $p < 0.05$). Appendix Table A.11 confirms that the positive coefficient on gender heterogeneity is primarily driven by improvements in outcomes for female employees, rather than declines among their male counterparts.

However, these effects seem to dissipate in the post-exposure period, with most coefficients on the Expat mgr norms × Fem × Post interaction being small and statistically insignificant. The only exception is column (2), where the perceived feedback effect remains positive and significant (0.076, $p < 0.05$), suggesting some persistence in employees' perceptions of managerial support.

5 Spillovers Along and Across the Hierarchy

Expat managers have a lasting impact on the gender pay and promotion gaps of their direct subordinates, suggesting possible longer-term changes in the workplace culture of the destination offices. In this subsection, we investigate whether expat managers additionally influence the behavior of local managers in the destination offices. In particular, we test for two forms of spillovers. First, we focus on the behavior of expat managers' direct subordinates who are themselves managers, testing whether their behavior is differ-

ent even after the expat manager leaves.[26] We refer to this as the "vertical transmission" of culture. Second, we test whether other local peer managers who are exposed to but are not subordinates of the expat manager change their behavior. We refer to this as the "horizontal transmission" of culture.

Figure V shows these two levels of possible cultural transmission. The dark blue circles are the managers who are directly impacted by the expat manager and the light blue circles are those who are indirectly affected by the exposed manager. Panel A shows the structure of an expat manager's subordinate employees (vertical transmission). Expat managers only directly influence the outcomes of their direct subordinates, 60% whom are themselves managers.[27] In this figure, we are analyzing the impact of an expat manager on his subordinates' behavior by looking at how these direct subordinates as local managers (as labeled in the figure) in turn influence their own subordinates' outcomes. These subordinates are not directly impacted by the expat manager. Panel B shows the structure for horizontal transmission. We focus on other peer managers at the same level as the expat managers and who are in the same function within the establishment. These managers therefore likely have interactions with the expat manager. We can look at how these managers' subordinates' outcomes change.

5.1 Vertical Transmission

To test for vertical transmission of culture, we first identify "second-generation" managers, i.e., direct subordinates of a "first-generation" expat manager, and the employees they begin to manage after their exposure to the expat manager.[28] We then estimate how the gender norms of the "first-generation" expat manager matter to the gender pay gap

[26] These managers are middle managers in WL2.

[27] Appendix Table A.12 shows that the pay and promotion results are indeed concentrated among subordinates who are managers.

[28] In particular, for each "second-generation" manager, we consider all employees he/she begins to manage between the second and twelfth quarters since his/her exposure to the "first-generation" expat manager.

among these employees, using the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{jimlkt} = & \sum_{k=0,1,2} \kappa_k \mathbf{1}[K_{jt} = k](Norms_m \times Fem_j) \\ & + \sum_{k=0,1,2} \gamma_k \mathbf{1}[K_{jt} = k](Norms_i \times Fem_j) \\ & + \theta_j + \theta_{ik} + \theta_{l,Year(t),Fem(i)} + \mathbf{X}_{jt}\beta + \varepsilon_{jimlkt} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where j indexes the worker, i the "second-generation" manager, m the "first-generation" expat manager, l j's contemporaneous manager at calendar month t, and k the time period relative to j's exposure to i. Note that this equation is analogous to equation (1) but with two differences. First, the perspective shifts from *i-m* being the worker-manager pair in equation (1) to *j-i* being the worker-manager pair in equation (3). As such, exposure is defined based on the worker's exposure to the local manager. Second, equation (3) additionally includes $Norms_m \times Fem_j$, i.e., the expat manager's gender norms interacted with the worker's gender, which is also the main explanatory variable. That is, we are interested in the coefficients $\hat{\kappa}_k$, which tell us the impact of a "second-generation" manager's exposure to a more progressive expat manager, relative to one exposed to a conservative expat manager, on the gender pay gap. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country times worker's gender.

The results, presented in Panel A of Table VI, show that expat managers also have a large, indirect impact on the outcomes of future employees under their direct subordinates. That is, a "second-generation" manager who has worked under a more progressive expat manager considerably narrows the gender pay gap among his/her team members (relative to a "second-generation" manager who has worked under a conservative expat manager) (column 1). As this effect also persists after the worker's exposure to the "second-generation" manager, which in most cases is well beyond the expat manager's tenure in the destination office, it is unlikely the direct impact of the expat manager himself but instead reflects his influence on the gender attitudes (and/or management styles) of his direct subordinates, i.e., the "second-generation" managers. Columns (2) and (3) further show that this vertical transmission of managerial gender norms affects both female and male "second-generation" managers and is likely stronger for male managers

(although the differences between the coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are not statistically significant). Column (4) repeats the analysis using work level as the outcome. We see a similar pattern with the "second-generation" managers exposed to expats with more progressive gender norms promoting women to higher work levels than "second-generation" managers exposed to expats with less progressive gender norms.

5.2 Horizontal Transmission

Panel B of Table VI tests whether expat managers influence the behavior of their local peer managers. We estimate equation (3) but the worker manager pairs are now the peer managers and their subordinates. Column (1) shows that exposure to an expat manager has a lasting influence on peer managers' behavior. The gender pay gap narrows among employees who work for a manager who interacted with an expat manager with more progressive gender norms, both before and after exposure. In columns (2) and (3) we split the sample into female peer managers (column 2) and male peer managers (column 3). Here we see that the results are larger among female peer managers. In column (4) we again consider work level as the outcome and see the same pattern of peer managers exposed to expats with more progressive norms promoting women to higher work levels.

5.3 Reverse Transmission on Expat Managers

If expat managers impact the destination office environment, could the norms in the destination office influence the manager? We study whether managers pick up the norms of the destination office by identifying managers from the same home country who do a rotation in different countries. We then look at whether and how the gender pay gap under those managers differs in the immediate next country they work in, i.e., the office after their rotation. This immediate next country could be their home country, or it could be another rotation. For example, we would like to compare two British managers, one of whom does a rotation in India (conservative gender norms) and one of whom does a rotation in Denmark (progressive gender norms). If the manager who completes a rotation in India picks up conservative norms, the gender pay gap under that manager in his

next office location should be larger than the corresponding gender pay gap under the manager who spent time in Denmark.

Formally, we test this by estimating:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{imlkt} = & \sum_{k=0,1,2} \kappa_k \mathbf{1}[K_{it} = k](LowPriorNorms_{mt} \times Fem_i) \\ & + \sum_{k=0,1,2} \gamma_k \mathbf{1}[K_{it} = k](Norms_m \times Fem_i) \\ & + \theta_i + \theta_{mk} + \theta_{l,Year(t),Fem(i)} + \mathbf{X}_{imt}\beta + \varepsilon_{imlkt} \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where the variable $LowPriorNorms_{mt}$ is an indicator that takes the value one if the manager was previously in a country with conservative gender norms, and all indices have the same meaning as those in equation (1). This specification also includes the same suite of fixed effects and controls as equation (1). In addition, we further control for low norms expat manager's home country x low norms next country interacted with exposure period $\times$ worker's gender. The outcomes are measured at the expat manager's next country rotation (which could be the expat's home country) for their direct subordinates there. Equation (4) thus estimates the impact of the manager's exposure to one destination country on the gender gap in the teams in their next office. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country times worker's gender.

The estimates in column (1) of Table A.13 show that managers who previously visited countries with less progressive norms do not increase the gender pay gap in their next rotation country, if not the opposite, suggesting that the norms do not rub off on the expat manager. Columns (2) and (3) present the results from estimating equation (4) but interact $LowPriorNorms_{mt} \times Fem_i$ with an indicator for the manager being from a country with progressive gender norms. The positive and statistically significant coefficients in column (3) imply that among expat managers from high norm countries, those who spent time in low norms countries *narrow* the gender pay gap in their next country rotations more than those who spent time in high norms countries, i.e., a "reversal" effect.[29] The

[29]Note that the coefficients on the expat manager's own norms remain positive throughout the columns as in Table II, i.e., managers from progressive countries continue to have a positive impact on the gender pay gap in their next country rotation.

results are qualitatively similar when looking at work-level promotions (columns 4 to 6). Albeit counterintuitive at first glance, these results are consistent with Ashraf et al.'s (2024) finding from the same firm that women employees are more positively selected in low norms countries, which potentially induces exposed expat managers to update positively on the overall quality of the female workforce.[30]

5.4 Aggregate Effects

Overall, we ask whether offices that are more exposed to expat managers with progressive gender norms exhibit different workplace outcomes compared to those with greater exposure to expat managers holding conservative norms. To examine this question, we exploit variation in gender norms at the office-function level and analyze outcomes at this unit of observation. This approach allows us to assess the broader influence of managerial gender norms on the office environment, beyond their direct effect on exposed employees, at a correlational level.

To quantify exposure to progressive versus conservative gender norms, we construct a continuous measure based on the composition of expat managers within an office-function unit. Specifically, for each quarter, we compute the average gender norms measure among all expat managers in a given office-function. We estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{jfq} = \phi AvgNorms_{jfq} + \theta_j + \theta_{f,Year(q)} + \boldsymbol{X}_{jfq}\delta + \mu_{jfq} \tag{5}$$

where j indexes the office, f the function, and q the quarter. The variable $AvgNorms_{jfq}$ represents the standardized average gender norms of male expat managers in an office-function unit. For interpretability, we standardize $AvgNorms_{jfq}$ using its standard deviation across office-functions that have at least one expat manager in a given quarter. Appendix Figure A.7 presents the distribution of this measure. The coefficient ϕ thus captures the change in outcomes at the office-function level associated with a one standard deviation increase in exposure to more progressive gender norms, relative to exposure to

[30] Although speculative, we do find evidence that this "reversal" effect exists only when the next country rotation is new to the expat manager, consistent with this story of belief updating.

more conservative norms.

We include office fixed effects θ_j and function-by-year fixed effects $\theta_{f,Year(q)}$, ensuring that ϕ is identified from within-office variation in exposure to progressive gender norms while controlling for time-varying function-specific shocks. Our specification also includes office-function level controls, such as the number of local employees, their average age, their average tenure in years, and the fraction of expat managers.

The analysis focuses on three key outcomes among local employees: (i) the promotion rate of female employees, (ii) the gender pay gap, and (iii) exit rates of local managers.[31] Panel A of Table VII presents the estimated effects of equation (5) on the promotion rate of women and the gender pay gap. While these estimates do not establish causal relationships, they provide suggestive evidence that exposure to progressive gender norms within an office-function is associated with an increase in women's representation in leadership positions and a reduction in the gender pay gap. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the average gender norms measure is linked to a 2.4 percentage-point increase in the share of women promoted to work level 3 or above, along with a 5.2 percent reduction in the gender pay gap among employees at work level 2 and above. To examine heterogeneity in these effects, we partition employees into those directly exposed to expat managers (treated) and those who were not yet exposed or never exposed.[32]

Table VII suggests that the observed increase in promotions is largely driven by a higher fraction of treated women attaining leadership positions, without evidence that these gains come at the expense of untreated employees. Similarly, while the coefficient for the gender pay gap among treated women is relatively large and positive compared to untreated women, the latter group's coefficient remains positive. However, neither

[31] Promotion rate is defined as the share of women in the office-function unit who attain work level 3 or above. The gender pay gap is computed at the office-function-quarter level using worker-quarter data. To construct this measure, we estimate a worker-level wage regression controlling for age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2, and store the gender coefficient for each office-function-quarter unit. Exit rates are measured separately for male and female managers, defined as the fraction of managers at work level 2 and above who leave the firm in a given quarter.

[32] To compute the fraction of women in leadership positions by treatment status, we divide the number of treated (untreated) women by the total number of employees in the office-function-quarter. Similarly, we compute the gender pay gap by estimating it separately for treated (untreated) women relative to all men in the office-function-quarter.

estimate is statistically significant.[33]

We next examine whether offices with more progressive gender norms exhibit lower exit rates, particularly among female managers. Panel B of Table VII reports the results of estimating equation (5) on exit rates by gender. Consistent with our worker-level findings, column (1) shows that offices with more progressive expat managers experience lower female manager turnover. A one standard deviation increase in the average gender norms measure is associated with a 0.1 percentage-point decrease in the exit rate of female managers, though this effect is not statistically significant. For male managers, the estimated coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, providing further evidence that reducing gender disparities is not a zero-sum game where gains for women come at the expense of men. When we differentiate between treated and untreated employees, our findings indicate that lower exit rates are primarily driven by treated women.

We next examine whether the presence of expat managers is associated with changes in aggregate performance, as captured by the bonus-to-pay ratio. Table VIII presents results using two complementary levels of aggregation: team-level (defined by current local managers) and office-function-level, focusing only on local employees. Column (1) shows that in the post-expat period, teams with a higher share of workers exposed to expat managers exhibit a significantly higher bonus-to-pay ratio. This suggests that performance-based rewards increase among teams more exposed to expats. Column (2) reports results at the office-function level, where the average gender norm of expat managers is used as the key explanatory variable. We find no statistically significant effect on the bonus-to-pay ratio at this level, suggesting that the observed improvements in gender equity are not leading to trade-offs in aggregate performance. If anything, the team-level evidence points to a positive association between exposure to expats and bonus-to-pay ratio.

[33]The results are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample of office-function-quarters to be identical across outcomes.

6 Conclusion

Firm culture is increasingly recognized as a key determinant of firm performance, particularly when it comes to employee recruitment, motivation, and retention (Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013; Adams et al., 2021). However, identifying the role that culture plays in shaping worker outcomes is challenging as measures of firm culture are often unobserved and correlated with employee characteristics. For example, firm culture may directly impact worker productivity, but more productive workers may also be drawn to firms with specific cultures.

This paper uses an observable measure of firm culture, gender attitudes, to test for the impact that culture has on employee outcomes. Specifically, we test whether the gender norms that a manager brings to a firm can shift workplace culture and impact employee outcomes. Using data from a large multinational operating in over 100 countries, we exploit quasi-exogenous manager rotations to estimate the impact of a manager's gender attitudes on the work outcomes and behavior of male and female employees. Building on the economics of cultural origins, we measure a manager's gender norms as the average gender attitudes among respondents of the World Values Survey of the same nationality and age.

We find that managers with more progressive gender norms persistently narrow the gender pay gap in foreign establishments. This is primarily achieved through increased promotion rates of women into senior management roles. Despite ongoing efforts, women are still vastly underrepresented in leadership positions, and progress in identifying effective policy remedies has been limited (Bohnet, 2016; Bertrand, 2018; Azmat and Boring, 2020). Our findings indicate that the views of the managers just below the top echelons of the firm, who are tasked with guiding the company's strategy and ensuring effective implementation, can significantly impact gender disparities in career trajectories. These managers can initiate a positive feedback loop by fostering the careers of their direct reports – who are middle managers – which in turn influences those reporting to them. This underscores the potential for managerial influence to create lasting shifts in organizational culture.

Our results suggest that multinational firms play a role in shaping global workplace practices and transmitting cultural norms across borders, beyond their role in inducing productivity catch-up throughout the economy (Alfaro, 2017). By operating in diverse cultural environments but sharing a common internal labor market, these firms can serve as conduits for the diffusion of values, managerial practices, and workplace norms. In this paper, we focus on the role of managers as key agents of cultural transmission within firms. Specifically, we examine how the gender norms that managers bring from their home countries influence workplace culture and the career trajectories of women and men in foreign establishments. Hence, the practice of rotating managers across space is not only a tool for knowledge transfer but also a catalyst for social development. By exposing workers to managers from different cultural contexts, multinational corporations facilitate the spread of progressive gender norms and equitable management practices.

While the results pertain to a single multinational company, we are exploring next whether our core findings extend to other multinationals using administrative employer-employee data from Brazil (RAIS). We plan to focus on the set of multinationals that have establishments in Brazil and investigate how the gender norms of the countries of their headquarters correlate with the gender pay gap in their Brazilian subsidiaries.

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
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
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Figures and Tables

Figure I: Expat Managers' Origins-Destinations




A. By country gender norms



B. By geographical region


Notes: This figure shows baseline sample's manager flows during their expat rotations across countries based on the origin and destination countries' gender norms and geographical regions. In both figures, the top row corresponds to the home countries of expat managers (the origin countries) and the bottom row corresponds to the countries where expat managers are posted during their expat rotations (the destination countries). In the top figure, the country gender norms measure is divided into quartiles, with low/below median and above median/high countries being those with the more conservative and progressive gender norms. In the bottom figure, the regions of the countries are borrowed from the World Bank classification and abbreviated for simplicity; Latin America stands for Latin America and Caribbean countries, SSA stands for Sub-Saharan Africa, and MENA stands for Middle-East and North Africa.

Figure II: Distribution of Expat Managers' Gender Norms




Notes: This figure plots the distribution of baseline sample's expat managers' gender norms, on the original scale of 0-1 before standardization.

Figure III: Evolution of Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on the Gender Pay Gap




Notes: This figure shows the effects of the expat manager's gender norms on the female-male gender pay gap in the quarters before and after the expat manager rotates into the office. All coefficients are plotted relative to the pay gap in the quarter before the expat manager enters.

Figure IV: Pay by Gender and Expat Managers' Gender Norms




Notes: This figure plots the average log(pay + bonuses) of male and female employees exposed to expat managers with conservative and progressive gender norms before, during, and after such exposure, after partialling out worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and office x year fixed effects.

Figure V: Transmission Along and Across the Hierarchy



A. Vertical transmission



B. Horizontal transmission

Notes: This figure illustrates the vertical and horizontal transmissions of expat managers' gender norms along and across the hierarchy.

Table I: Expat Managers and Exposed Employees versus Peers

Panel A: Expat managers vs. peers prior to international rotations

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Age**	(2) **Tenure**	(3) **Log(Pay)**	(4) **Log(Bonuses)**	(5) **Bonuses to Pay**	(6) **Work Level**
Expat managers	-2.439***	-2.251***	-0.037*	-0.044**	-0.001	-0.273***
	(0.3380)	(0.4495)	(0.0197)	(0.0193)	(0.0024)	(0.0570)
Mean peer outcome	45.500	15.920	11.970	10.600	0.270	3.170
N	219,295	219,295	99,182	96,862	99,182	219,493

Panel B: Exposed workers vs. peers prior to expat exposure

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Female**	(2) **Age**	(3) **Tenure**	(4) **Log(Pay)**	(5) **Log(Bonuses)**	(6) **Bonuses to Pay**	(7) **Work Level**
Exposed workers	-0.012*	-1.879***	-1.067***	0.010*	0.016**	-0.000	-0.187***
	(0.0068)	(0.1472)	(0.1374)	(0.0056)	(0.0077)	(0.0004)	(0.0189)
Mean peer outcome	0.490	39.010	9.930	10.730	8.870	0.150	1.730
N	2,325,815	2,332,619	2,332,619	1,266,279	1,161,656	1,266,279	2,333,325

Notes: Panel A compares the characteristics of male employees in the year before they become expat managers with their peers who do not become expat managers but do work at WL3 or above in the same year. Panel B compares the characteristics of employees in the year before they work under an expat manager with their peers who never work under expat managers but do work under managers of WL3 or above in the same year. In columns (1) to (6) of both panels, we control for the office $\times$ year $\times$ function $\times$ work level fixed effects. In column (7) of both panels, we control for office $\times$ year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by office.

Table II: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on the Gender Pay Gap

Panel A: All destination countries

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)			
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.049***	0.039**	0.041***	0.027***
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.049***	0.057***	0.042***	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.013)
P-value: During vs Post	0.994	0.106	0.924	0.553
Team Gender Gap Pre-Expat	-0.278			
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dest. country × Period × Fem FEs		✓		
Sub-function FEs			✓	
Work level FEs				✓
N	249,968	249,968	249,968	249,968

Panel B: Split by destination country gender norms

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)			
Destination country sample:	Conservative	Progressive	Conservative	Progressive
Relative to:	All countries		Expat mgr's home country	
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.070***	0.020	0.085*	0.065***
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.049)	(0.020)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.054*	0.050***	0.145**	0.047**
	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.061)	(0.022)
P-value: During vs Post	0.286	0.064	0.099	0.151
Team Gender Gap Pre-Expat	-0.253	-0.293	-0.345	-0.199
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	233,989	233,989	249,968	249,968

Notes: Panel A shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). Panel B splits the sample into destination countries with conservative gender norms (columns 1 and 3) and progressive gender norms (columns 2 and 4). Columns (1) and (2) report the results from one single regression with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_i$ coefficients for conservative and progressive destination countries; the same holds for columns (3) and (4). In both panels, we control for worker's age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender. The baseline gender pay gap (women - men) is -0.28: women earn 28% less than men on average.

Table III: Impacts of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on Worker's Promotions and Lateral Moves

Panel A: Impact on promotions

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Salary promotion**	(2) **Work level promotion**	(3) **Work level achieved**	(4) **Work level 3 or above**
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.067*	0.048***	0.064***	0.070***
	(0.040)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.046	0.052***	0.079***	0.096***
	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Dependent variable mean	1.552	0.345	1.968	0.222
Dependent variable std. dev.	1.363	0.508	0.843	0.416
P-value: During vs Post	0.365	0.728	0.219	0.028
Team Gender Gap Pre-Expat	-0.034	-0.056	-0.271	-0.074
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,968	249,968	249,968	249,968

Panel B: Impacts on lateral moves

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Function transfer**	(2) **Sub-function transfer**	(3)	(4) **Standard job transfer**
		All	**Same function**	
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	-0.096***	0.018	0.114**	0.061
	(0.024)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.060)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	-0.041	0.067	0.107*	0.161**
	(0.029)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.081)
Dependent variable mean	0.331	1.419	1.088	2.412
Dependent variable std. dev.	0.755	1.446	1.271	1.904
P-value: During vs Post	0.014	0.185	0.851	0.020
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,968	249,968	249,968	249,968

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). Promotions and transfers are cumulative counts. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table IV: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on Worker's Retention

Sample:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Restricted		Unrestricted	
Dependent variable:	**Leave during**	**Leave 1 yr**	**Leave 5 yrs**	**Leave 1 yr**	**Leave 5 yrs**
Expat mgr norms × Female × Conservative	-0.057**	-0.055**	-0.276***	-0.055**	-0.131***
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.023)	(0.034)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Progressive	-0.009	-0.001	0.003	-0.006	-0.072**
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.055)	(0.017)	(0.032)
Dependent variable mean	0.134	0.102	0.509	0.103	0.714
Dependent variable std. dev.	0.341	0.303	0.500	0.305	0.452
Expat manager FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Work level × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Function × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dest. country × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,792	1,925	448	1,928	857

Notes: Observation unit is a worker. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and log(pay + bonuses), measured at the first month of expat exposure, interacted with worker's gender. Standard errors are clustered by expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table V: Expat Manager's Gender Norms and Worker's Pulse Surveys

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Manager**	(2) **Feedback**	(3) **Control**	(4) **Development**	(5) **Extra mile**	(6) **Morale**
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.098**	0.156**	0.089*	0.116**	0.078*	0.077**
	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.033)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.057	0.076**	-0.054	-0.041	-0.019	-0.007
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.030)
P-value: During vs Post	0.394	0.266	0.008	0.001	0.014	0.015
Team Gender Gap Pre-Expat	-0.059	-0.228	-0.034	-0.146	-0.158	-0.116
Work level × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Function × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dest. country × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	7,152	4,112	6,386	7,894	7,903	7,880

Notes: Observation unit is a worker × year. Sample includes observations during and after worker's expat exposure. Dependent variables are worker's standardized responses to the MNE's annual employee survey. Column (1) considers worker's response to the question *"My line manager is an effective leader"*, column (2) *"I receive feedback from my line manager that helps me grow"*, column (3) *"I have control over prioritising tasks when facing multiple demands at work"*, column (4) *"I am satisfied with my development opportunities at [MNE NAME]"*, column (5) *"My job inspires me to go the extra mile"*, and column (6) considers worker's average responses to three questions *" Overall, I am extremely satisfied with [MNE NAME] as a place to work"*, *" I am proud to say that I work for [MNE NAME]"*, and *" I would gladly refer a friend or family member to [MNE NAME] for employment"*. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and log(pay + bonuses). Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table VI: Impacts of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on Local Managers' Subordinates

Panel A. Vertical transmission through direct employees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable:	**Log(Pay + bonuses)**			**Work level**
Worker's exposure to 2nd-gen mgr:	Within 3 yrs of 2nd-gen mgr's expat exposure			Within 3 yrs
2nd-gen manager sample:	Full sample	Female manager	Male manager	Full sample
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.021*	0.008	0.029*	0.049***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.030***	0.029	0.027**	0.060***
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
2nd-gen manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	375,509	375,509		375,509

Panel B. Horizontal transmission through peer managers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable:	**Log(Pay + bonuses)**			**Work level**
Worker's exposure to peer mgr:	Within 3 yrs of peer mgr's expat exposure			Within 3 yrs
Local peer manager sample:	Full sample	Female manager	Male manager	Full sample
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.037**	0.052***	0.024	0.060***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.024*	0.054**	0.003	0.065***
	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Local peer manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,308	249,308		249,308

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (3). Panel A considers vertical transmission through local direct employees who are "second-generation" managers. Panel B considers horizontal transmission through local peer managers in the same function. Exposure periods are defined based on the worker's exposure to the local manager. Columns (2) and (3) report the results from one single regression with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_j$ coefficients for female (column 2) and male (column 3) local managers. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and local manager's gender norms × worker's gender × exposure period. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table VII: Aggregate Impacts on Office-Function Gender Promotion, Pay Gaps, and Exit Rates

Panel A. Promotion and Gender Pay Gap

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	% of Women in Leadership Positions (WL$\geq$ 3)			**Gender Pay Gap (WL$\geq$ 2)**		
	All local employees	Treated	Untreated	All local employees	Treated	Untreated
Male Expat Managers' Average Norms	0.0242***	0.0297***	-0.0060	0.0518**	0.1194	0.0216
	(0.0091)	(0.0085)	(0.0057)	(0.0229)	(0.3967)	(0.0343)
Office FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Function $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
% of Expat Managers as Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	18,658	17,521	18,657	7,885	5,849	5,958

Panel B. Managers' Exit Rates

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Exit Rates Among Women (WL $\geq$ 2)			**Exit Rates Among Men (WL $\geq$ 2)**		
	All local employees	Treated	Untreated	All local employees	Treated	Untreated
Male Expat Managers' Average Norms	-0.0013	-0.0011	-0.0002	0.0008	0.0005	0.0003
	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0004)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0004)
Office FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Function $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
% of Expat Managers as Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	25,974	23,453	25,965	32,480	28,848	32,449

*Notes:*This table presents the coefficients from estimating equation (5). Columns (1) and (4) report estimates using the full sample of local employees in each office-function-quarter unit, while Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) report separate estimates for treated and untreated employees. Controls include the number of local employees, their average age, and their average tenure (in years). Standard errors are clustered at the Office $\times$ Year level. Office-function units with fewer than 10 local employees are excluded.


Table VIII: Impacts of Expat Managers on Aggregate Performance

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)
	Bonus-to-pay ratio	
Level of analysis:	Team	Office-Function
Share of Exposed Workers	0.009***	
	(0.002)	
Male Expat Managers' Average Norms		-0.0017
		(0.0014)
Mgr FEs	✓	
Office FEs		✓
Office × Year FEs	✓	
Function × Year FEs		✓
Expat mgr share control		✓
N	168,241	23,343


Notes: This table reports results from regressions of the bonus-to-pay ratio using team-level and office-function-level specifications, including only local employees. Column (1) is based on team-level data defined by current local managers. The main explanatory variable is the share of team members exposed to expat managers in the post-expat period. Column (2) uses office-function-level data, where the key regressor is the average gender norm of expat managers assigned to that office-function, as defined in equation (5). All regressions control for the number of local employees, their average age, and their average tenure (in years), measured at the corresponding level of aggregation. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level in column (1) and at the office-function-by-year level in column (2). Office-function units with fewer than 10 local employees are excluded from column (2).

A Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Distributions of Expat Managers' and Workers' Countries




A. Expat managers' countries



B. Workers' countries


Notes: The figure shows the geographical distributions of baseline sample's expat managers' home countries (origin countries) and baseline sample's workers' countries at exposure (destination countries).

Figure A.2: Expat Managers' Origins-Destinations by Country Gender Norms




Notes: This figure shows baseline sample's manager flows during their expat rotations across countries based on the origin and destination countries' gender norms. The X-axis corresponds to the home countries of expat managers (the origin countries) and the Y-axis corresponds to the countries where expat managers are posted during their expat rotations (the destination countries). Country gender norms measure is divided into quartiles, with low/below median and above median/high countries being those with the more conservative and progressive gender norms.

Figure A.3: Evolution of Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on the Gender Promotion Gap




Notes: This figure shows the effects of the expat manager's gender norms on the female-male gender promotion gap in the quarters before and after the expat manager rotates into the office. All coefficients are plotted relative to the pay gap in the quarter before the expat manager enters.

Figure A.4: Work Level by Gender and Expat Managers' Gender Norms




Notes: This figure plots the average work level of male and female employees exposed to expat managers with conservative and progressive gender norms before, during, and after such exposure, after partialling out worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and office x year fixed effects.

Figure A.5: Pay and Work Level by Gender and Expat Managers' Gender Norms Including Never Treated Employees




A. Log(Pay + bonuses)




B. Work level

Notes: This figure plots the average log(pay + bonuses) and work level of male and female employees not exposed and exposed to expat managers with conservative and progressive gender norms before, during, and after such exposure, after partialling out worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and office x year fixed effects.

Figure A.6: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms by Destination Country




A. By destination country absolute gender norms



B. By destination country relative gender norms

Notes: This figure plots semi-parametric estimates of the impact of expat manager's gender norms on the gender pay gap as a function of the X-axis variable. The point estimate at each value of is obtained from the baseline regression in equation (1), weighted by a Gaussian kernel function of the X-axis variable around that particular value with a bandwidth equal to 25% of the range of X-axis variable. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients of interest (Expat mgr norms $\times$ Female $\times$ During and Expat mgr norms $\times$ Female $\times$ Post).

Figure A.7: Distribution of Male Expat Managers' Average Gender Norms at the Office-Function-Quarter Level



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of male expat managers' average gender norms at the office-function-quarter level after standardization.

Table A.1: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms Using Other Norms Measures

Panel A. Other Norms Measures

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)					
Gender norms measure:	Baseline (all three)	Right to jobs	Working mothers	Business executives	University education	Working to be independent
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.049***	0.042***	0.039***	0.046***	0.046***	0.048***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.049***	0.050**	0.043***	0.046***	0.046***	0.038*
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.021)
P-value: During vs Post	0.994	0.575	0.677	0.964	0.990	0.532
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,968	253,514	251,612	249,113	250,575	247,386

Panel B. Baseline Gender Norm Measure by Education

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)				
Sample:	All respondents		Male respondents		
	Upper-level education	College education	Any education	Upper-level education	College education
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.050***	0.044***	0.052***	0.044***	0.043***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.050***	0.049***	0.052***	0.048***	0.049***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
P-value: During vs Post	0.995	0.650	1.000	0.720	0.621
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	248,479	249,113	249,968	249,225	249,113

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). In panel A, the baseline gender norms measure used in column (1) is the average of those used in columns (2) to (4) on a 1-2 scale, following Kleven (2022). The gender norms measure used in column (2) is constructed from WVS responses to the statement *"When jobs are scare, men should have more of a right to a job than women"* (1-2 scale); column (3) *"When mother works for pay, the child suffer"* (1-4 scale); column (4) *"On the whole, men make better business executives than women do"* (1-4 scale); column (5) *"A university education is more important for a boy than a girl"* (1-4 scale); and column (6) *"Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person"* (1-2 scale). Panel B reports coefficients using the baseline gender norms measure across different respondent samples. Columns (1) and (2) restrict the sample to respondents with upper-level and college education, respectively. Columns (3) to (5) include only male respondents, with samples defined by any education level, upper-level education, and college education, respectively. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.2: Gender Differences among Exposed Workers 1–6 Months before First Expat Rotation

Panel A: Differences across Teams

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Age**	(2) **Tenure**	(3) **Log(Pay)**	(4) **Log(Bonuses)**	(5) **Bonuses to Pay**	(6) **Work Level**
Expat mgr norms × Female	-0.417	0.022	-0.018	-0.126*	0.002	0.025
	(0.3035)	(0.2789)	(0.0163)	(0.0685)	(0.0015)	(0.0214)
N	32,007	32,007	12,379	12,539	12,379	32,133

Panel B: Differences within Teams

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Age**	(2) **Tenure**	(3) **Log(Pay)**	(4) **Log(Bonuses)**	(5) **Bonuses to Pay**	(6) **Work Level**
Expat mgr norms × Female	-0.524	-0.024	-0.029	-0.155**	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.3758)	(0.3234)	(0.0193)	(0.0671)	(0.0016)	(0.0181)
Expat mgr FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	31,999	31,999	12,371	12,531	12,371	32,124

Notes: Panel A reports gender differences in characteristics of workers exposed to more versus less progressive expat norms, measured up to six months before the first expat rotation. Panel B presents gender differences within teams–defined by the expat manager to whom workers were assigned–comparing those exposed to more versus less progressive expat norms, also up to six months prior to the first expat rotation. Columns (1)–(5) in both panels include office × year × function × work level fixed effects. Column (6) includes office × year × function fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the office level.

Table A.3: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms
Controlling for Other Characteristics and Cultural Traits

Panel A. Other characteristics

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)				
Other characteristics:	Of expat manager		Of home country		
	Demo-graphic	Performance	GDP per capita	Education	Talent management score
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.039***	0.036***	0.053*	0.059***	0.047**
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.031**	0.035**	0.083**	0.108***	0.051***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.015)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,099	249,968	243,540	247,244	194,051

Panel B. Other cultural traits

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)			
Other trait:	Trust	Work ethic	Redistribution	Risk
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.051***	0.040***	0.083***	0.036**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.043**	0.032	0.077***	0.028
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Other trait × Female × During	0.005	-0.023	0.043**	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Other trait × Female × Post	0.016	-0.033	0.038**	-0.031
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	247,706	247,706	245,238	234,305

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2. In column (1) of Panel A, we additionally control for expat manager's age, tenure, and work level at the time of exposure; in column (2) expat manager's performance, measured as his age and tenure at achieving WL3; column (3) expat manager's home country's GDP per capita; column (4) expat manager's home country's average years of schooling; and column (5) expat manager's home country's average management talent score from the World Management Survey (WMS) - Manufacturing. In column (1) of Panel B, we additionally control for expat manager's trust; column (2) expat manager's work ethic; column (3) expat manager's preference for redistribution; and column (4) expat managers' risk preference. Trust, work ethic, preference for redistribution, and risk preference are constructed analogously to gender norms, using WVS responses to the statements *"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"* (1-2 scale); *"Important in life: work"* (1-4 scale); *"In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" or "Hard work doesn't generally bring success – it's more a matter of luck and connections"* (1-10 scale); and *"Adventure and taking risks are important to have an exciting life"* (1-6 scale) respectively. All additional controls are interacted with the worker's gender and exposure period. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.4: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms By Expat Manager's Link with HQ

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)				
Sample:	Non-HQ Destination		Excl. Expats from HQ Country	Excl. Expats with HQ Experience	Excl. Cols (3) & (4)
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.065***	0.082***	0.077***	0.066***	0.085**
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.035)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.039*	0.034	0.052	0.041*	0.064
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.040)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat from HQ × Female × During		✓			
HQ Expat Experience × Female × During		✓			
N	187,268	187,268	144,074	173,567	130,405

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). Columns (1)-(2) excludes HQ as destination country. Column (3) excludes expat managers who are from the HQ country. Column (4) excludes expat managers who have previously spent time working in the HQ country. Column (5) excludes both types of expats: those from the HQ country and those with HQ experience. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.5: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms Using Alternative Samples

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:	**Log(Pay + bonuses)**					
Sample type:	Expat managers	Workers				
Sample:	First rotation	Local	Non-local	First team	Non-first team	All
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.065**	0.043***	0.075*	0.047**	0.052***	0.032***
	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.010)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.097***	0.056***	0.029	0.042**	0.053***	0.077***
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Next expat						-0.007
						(0.016)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	146,674	249,968		249,968		249,698

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1) using alternative samples. Column (1) restricts the sample to expat managers' first international rotations. Columns (2) and (3) report the results from one single regression with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_i$ coefficients for exposed employees who are local employees in the destination country (column 2) and non-local employees (column 2). Columns (4) and (5) report the results from one single regression with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_i$ coefficients for employees who join the expat manager's team within the expat manager's first quarter in the destination country (column 4) and employees who subsequently join the expat manager's team (column 5). Column (6) splits the post-exposure period into before and after the worker's next expat exposure. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.6: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on Performance

Panel A. Effects across Work Levels

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Log(Pay)**	(2) **Log(Bonuses)**	(3) **Bonuses/Pay**	(4) **Perf. rating**
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.046***	0.167	0.006	1.634
	(0.010)	(0.151)	(0.005)	(1.459)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.043***	0.137	0.010*	2.766*
	(0.013)	(0.172)	(0.006)	(1.658)
Dependent variable mean	11.105	8.725	0.169	102.189
Dependent variable std. dev.	0.801	2.511	0.120	22.409
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,968	252,097	249,968	219,174

Panel B. Effects within Work Levels

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Log(Pay)**	(2) **Log(Bonuses)**	(3) **Bonuses/Pay**	(4) **Perf. rating**
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.027***	0.121	0.000	1.988
	(0.009)	(0.128)	(0.003)	(1.497)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.019	0.110	0.003	3.305**
	(0.013)	(0.146)	(0.004)	(1.632)
Dependent variable mean	11.105	8.725	0.169	102.189
Dependent variable std. dev.	0.801	2.511	0.120	22.409
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Fem FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
WL FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,968	252,097	249,968	219,174

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2. Panel A reports results from regressions that do not control for the worker's work level, while Panel B includes work level FEs. Standard errors are double-clustered by worker and by expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.7: Impact of Expat Manager's Gender Norms on Tenure Pay and Promotion Gaps

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Log(Pay + bonuses)**	(2) **Salary promotion**	(3) **Work level promotion**	(4) **Work level achieved**
Expat mgr norms × Abv Median Tenure × During	0.011	-0.050	-0.010	-0.016
	(0.014)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Expat mgr norms × Abv Median Tenure × Post	0.026	0.005	0.010	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.037)
Dependent variable mean	11.258	1.552	0.345	1.968
Dependent variable std. dev.	0.848	1.363	0.508	0.843
Team Tenure Gap Pre-Expat	0.060	0.361	0.091	0.032
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Abv Median Tenure FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	250,005	250,005	250,005	250,005

Notes: This table presents estimates from equation (1), replacing the gender indicator with a dummy variable indicating whether a worker is above the median tenure in the office (measured in the pre-expat period). Table reports the effects on tenure-based gaps. All regressions control for worker age, age^2, tenure, and tenure^2. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker level and by expat manager's home country × the respective tenure group (i.e., above-median dummy).

Table A.8: Heterogeneous Impacts by and on Parental Leave

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)		**Parental leave within 1 yr**		
Worker sample:	Has par leave	No par leave	All	Female	Male
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.075**	0.045***			
	(0.037)	(0.012)			
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.082**	0.045***			
	(0.040)	(0.015)			
Expat mgr norms × Female			0.013**		
			(0.006)		
Epxat mgr norms				0.008*	-0.004
				(0.005)	(0.005)
Dependent variable mean	11.156	11.212	0.078	0.117	0.037
Dependent varianle std. dev.	0.624	0.854	0.268	0.322	0.189
Worker FEs	✓	✓			
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓			
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓			
Expat manager FEs			✓		
Work level × Female FEs			✓	✓	✓
Function × Female FEs			✓	✓	✓
Dest. country × Female FEs			✓	✓	✓
Year × Female FEs			✓	✓	✓
N	249,968		2,083	1,124	1,085

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1) with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_i$ coefficients for employees with (column 1) and without (column 2) parental leave prior to their expat exposure. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2. Observation unit in columns (3) to (5) is a worker. Column (3) includes all employees, while columns (4) and (5) include only female and male employees respectively. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and log(pay + bonuses), measured at the first month of expat exposure. In column (3), these controls are further interacted with worker's gender. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country.

Table A.9: Heterogeneous Impacts by Worker's Retention

Dependent variable:	(1) **Log(Pay + bonuses)**	(2)	(3) **Work level**	(4)
Worker sample:	Leave 3 yrs	Stay 3 yrs	Leave 3 yrs	Stay 3 yrs
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.054**	0.076***	0.031	0.021
	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.036)	(0.022)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.055*	0.049***	0.025	0.039**
	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.041)	(0.019)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	206,729		206,729	

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1) with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_i$ coefficients for employees that leave within three years of their expat exposure (columns 1 and 3) and those that stay (columns 2 and 4). Columns (1) and (2) report the results from one single regression; the same holds for columns (3) and (4). Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.10: Contributions of Promotions, Lateral Moves, and Retention

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)				
Channel:	Baseline	Promotions	Lateral moves	Retention	All three
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.049***	0.027***	0.039***	0.050***	0.021**
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.049***	0.021	0.038***	0.050***	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Work level FEs		✓			✓
Lateral move controls			✓		✓
Sub-function FEs			✓		✓
Heckman selection correction				✓	✓
N	249,968	249,968	249,968	249,968	249,968

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1). Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2. In columns (3) and (5), lateral move controls include second-order polynomials of cumulative function and sub-function transfers. In columns (4) and (5), the Heckman selection correction term is a third-order polynomial of worker's estimated exit probability, using the number of worker exits in the same office × function × year as the excluded variable for the exit equation, following Benson et al. (2019). Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.11: Expat Manager's Gender Norms and Worker's Pulse Surveys, by Gender

Panel A: Female employees

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Manager**	(2) **Feedback**	(3) **Control**	(4) **Development**	(5) **Extra mile**	(6) **Morale**
Expat mgr norms × During	0.053**	0.068***	0.024	0.014	0.002	0.007
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.016)
Expat mgr norms × Post	0.031	0.045*	0.018	-0.013	-0.012	-0.005
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.014)
Work level FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Function FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dest. country FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,604	2,110	3,215	3,930	3,940	3,926

Panel B: Male employees

Dependent Variable:	(1) **Manager**	(2) **Feedback**	(3) **Control**	(4) **Development**	(5) **Extra mile**	(6) **Morale**
Expat mgr norms × During	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002	-0.012	0.007	-0.025
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Expat mgr norms × Post	-0.006	-0.003	0.011	-0.002	0.016	-0.012
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Work level FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Function FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dest. country FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,613	2,111	3,229	4,030	4,030	4,020

Notes: Observation unit is a worker × year. Sample includes observations during and after worker's expat exposure. Panel A reports estimates for female workers; Panel B for male workers. Dependent variables are worker's standardized responses to the MNE's annual employee survey. Column (1) considers worker's response to the question *"My line manager is an effective leader"*, column (2) *"I receive feedback from my line manager that helps me grow"*, column (3) *"I have control over prioritising tasks when facing multiple demands at work"*, column (4) *"I am satisfied with my development opportunities at [MNE NAME]"*, column (5) *"My job inspires me to go the extra mile"*, and column (6) considers worker's average responses to three questions *" Overall, I am extremely satisfied with [MNE NAME] as a place to work"*, *" I am proud to say that I work for [MNE NAME]"*, and *" I would gladly refer a friend or family member to [MNE NAME] for employment"*. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2, and log(pay + bonuses). Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.12: Heterogeneous Impacts on Managers vs. Non-managers

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log(Pay + bonuses)		**Work level**	
Worker sample:	Managers	Non-managers	Managers	Non-managers
Expat mgr norms × Female × During	0.059***	0.028	0.086***	0.040
	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.039)
Expat mgr norms × Female × Post	0.064***	0.018	0.102***	0.046
	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.043)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	249,968		249,968	

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1) with separate $Norms_m \times Fem_i$ coefficients for exposed employees who are managers (columns 1 and 3) and non-managers (columns 2 and 4) prior to expat exposure. Columns (1) and (2) report the results from one single regression; the same holds for columns (3) and (4). Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.

Table A.13: Impacts of Destination Country's Gender Norms on Expat Manager

Panel A. Progressive vs. conservative prior destination country

Dependent variable:	(1) **Log(Pay + bonuses)**	(2)	(3) **Work level**	(4)
Worker sample:	Exposed	All	Exposed	All
Progressive prior dest. × Female × During	-0.062	-0.043**	-0.177***	-0.056*
	(0.055)	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.031)
Progressive prior dest. × Female × Post	-0.076	-0.030	-0.164**	-0.045
	(0.066)	(0.022)	(0.066)	(0.040)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	162,113	2,037,536	162,113	2,037,536

Panel B. Prior destination country's gender norms

Dependent variable:	(1) **Log(Pay + bonuses)**	(2)	(3) **Work level**	(4)
Worker sample:	Exposed	All	Exposed	All
Prior dest.'s norms × Female × During	-0.036	-0.015	-0.112***	-0.037*
	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.035)	(0.020)
Prior dest.'s norms × Female × Post	-0.053*	-0.009	-0.084*	-0.022
	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.024)
Worker FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expat manager × Period FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Manager × Year × Female FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	162,113	2,037,536	162,113	2,037,536

Notes: This table shows the coefficients from estimating equation (4). Columns (1) and (3) in both panels consider only expat-exposed employees in expat managers' next destination countries. Columns (2) and (4) in both panels consider all employees in expat managers' next destination countries. Controls include worker's age, age^2, tenure, tenure^2; expat manager's norms x worker's gender x exposure period; low norms expat manager's home country x low norms prior destination country x low norms next destination country. Standard errors are double clustered by worker and expat manager's home country × worker's gender.