Outrage Against Corrupt Politicians?: Misperceived Social Norms and Political Accountability*

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Abstract

Do (mis)perceptions of social norms matter for political accountability? This paper examines how voters' perceptions of other voters' beliefs about political malfeasance influence their voting behavior against malfeasant incumbents. We document significant misperceptions: some voters, particularly those supporting the malfeasant incumbent's party, hold more lenient views (i.e., they believe that others are more tolerant of political corruption), while others, especially those who do not have a particular party support, hold more stringent views. Using a randomized experiment, we found that informing voters of social norms, on average, increased support for the incumbent candidate, which was mainly driven by those with lenient views. The treatment also increased voter turnout and the likelihood of voting for an alternative candidate, with these effects concentrated among voters who hold more stringent views. These findings underscore the crucial role of voters' perceptions of other voters' beliefs in political accountability, a factor that has been largely overlooked in the literature.

Keywords: Political accountability, voting behavior, strategic voting, corruption, misperception, social norm, information campaign

1 Introduction

Democracy is a crucial driver of modern economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2019). However, its effectiveness depends on how well its institutions function. Elections, a core institution of

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democracy, serve multiple roles, including promoting political accountability. Understanding the conditions under which elections effectively fulfill this role is essential for sustaining democracy.

The political agency model predicts that voters can hold their political leaders accountable through elections (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley, 2006). For instance, if politicians engage in malfeasance while in office, voters may punish them by withholding their votes in the next election. Conversely, strong political performance can increase electoral support. These theoretical predictions give rise to empirically testable hypotheses about whether voters effectively punish or reward incumbents, thereby discouraging poor political performance while incentivizing strong performance.

Prior research has found that publicizing irregularities through audits lowers re-election rates for corrupt incumbents and reduces overall corruption levels (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Bobonis et al., 2016; Avis et al., 2018). However, other studies highlight the challenges of using corruption-related information to promote political accountability. For instance, Chong et al. (2015) found that while exposing corruption decreased support for incumbents, it also eroded trust in municipal government and politicians, leading to lower voter turnout and reduced support for the challenger party. In contrast, using seven randomized controlled trials across six countries, Dunning et al. (2019) found no overall effect of positive or negative information campaigns. Furthermore, Arias et al. (2022) showed that revealing politicians' malfeasance increased the incumbent's vote share, particularly among voters with unfavorable prior beliefs. These mixed results underscore the complexities of how voters process political information.

Our study builds upon this strand of literature, but it distinguishes itself by focusing on voters' perceptions of *other voters* in political accountability. The political agency model typically assumes no strategic interactions among voters.[1] In reality, however, strategic voting is widespread. For instance, using structural estimation, Kawai and Watanabe (2013) found that a large fraction (between 63.4 percent and 84.9 percent) of voters in Japan vote strategically. This raises the question of how political accountability functions in the presence of strategic voting. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first evidence on the role

[1] Instead, it generally assumes that representative voters choose to reelect the incumbent if the incumbent is expected to provide at least as much utility as the reservation utility (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).

of voters' perceptions of others' beliefs in political accountability.

Our study focuses on a major political funding scandal that unfolded in Japan between 2023 and 2024. Key factions within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including one linked to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, failed to disclose approximately 6.5 million US dollars (USD) in funds, allegedly used for personal slush accounts. This scandal deeply eroded public trust, causing approval ratings for both the LDP and the Kishida Cabinet to plummet. In the 2024 general election, the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito, lost their Lower House majority for the first time since 2009.

Against this backdrop, we conducted a pre-registered online survey experiment to examine how voters' perceptions of other voters' beliefs influence their voting behavior. Specifically, we provided participants with social norms—the average value of second-order beliefs among participants—regarding intolerance toward politicians' corrupt behaviors and analyzed how they responded to this information in relation to their prior beliefs.

First, we discovered substantial misperceptions: some voters believed that others were highly tolerant of corruption (lenient views), while others assumed they were very strict (stringent views). Next, we randomly provided information about social norms and examined how this affected participants' posterior beliefs and voting behavior.

On average, the treatment increased both voter turnout and support for alternative candidates, with these effects being more pronounced among individuals holding more stringent views. However, a backfire effect was also observed: the treatment increased support for the incumbent, particularly among voters with more lenient views. These individuals were also more likely to perceive the incumbent as competent and trustworthy, and to believe that their vote had greater influence on the election outcome.

To further understand the mechanism, we examined the interplay between perceptions of social norms and party identity. We found that individuals with lenient views tended to support the LDP, while those with stringent views tended to be swing voters, i.e., individuals who did not support any particular political party. Although the heterogeneous results with respect to prior beliefs about intolerance norms still hold within each subgroup, these results suggest that individuals with lenient views engage in a form of defensive behavior (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Jost, 2004) upon realizing that others are less tolerant of the incumbent's malfeasance, while those with stringent views are mobilized and vote for an alternative

candidate upon realizing that others are more tolerant of malfeasance.

Related literature This study contributes to the extensive literature on political accountability. Prior research examines whether publicizing audits affects incumbent re-election rates and corruption levels (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Bobonis et al., 2016; Avis et al., 2018). Relatedly, other studies investigate the impact of randomly disseminating information about politicians' past performance through field or survey experiments (Banerjee et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2015; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017; Buntaine et al., 2018; Adida et al., 2020; Cruz et al., 2020; Arias et al., 2022; Figueiredo et al., 2023). As noted earlier, these studies yield mixed results, highlighting the need for a deeper understanding of how voters respond to information.

Unlike previous studies, which typically present information about incumbents' past performance to voters, we instead provide information about other voters. In our study, voters' prior beliefs play a crucial role. The most closely related study, Arias et al. (2022), examines how voters' prior beliefs about political malfeasance shape their reactions to revelations of incumbents' misconduct. Using a field experiment in Mexico, they found that malfeasance revelations increased incumbent vote share on average, particularly among voters with low expectations. In contrast, our study focuses not on prior beliefs about corruption levels within the incumbent party but rather on how prior beliefs about social norms, or specifically, other voters' intolerance toward malfeasance, influence political accountability.

In this respect, our study also relates to research examining the persistence of corruption-related norms in practice. Using an overlapping-generations model with interactions, Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) demonstrate that social norms of high corruption can become self-perpetuating. Similarly, a field experiment in Costa Rica found that highlighting widespread corruption in the information treatment increased individuals' willingness to engage in bribery, illustrating how perceived norms can turn corruption into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Corbacho et al., 2016). Typically, corruption rates are higher in developing countries (Svensson, 2006; Olken and Pande, 2012; Fisman and Golden, 2017), often posing a significant challenge to economic development. Although our study focuses on a developed country, where corruption is generally low, our findings have policy implications for developing countries as well.

Our findings of systematic relationships between party identities and prior beliefs also relate to the growing literature on misinformation (Jerit and Zhao, 2020; Flynn et al., 2017) and motivated reasoning (Thaler, 2024; Kunda, 1990). This literature examines how individuals with different political identities and priors form their beliefs and attitudes, and how they are selectively exposed to and interpret new information. While investigating the origins of prior beliefs lies beyond the scope of this study, our results suggest that such beliefs are not independent of party identities.

Finally, this study also closely relates to the growing literature on social norms, which demonstrates that perceptions of others influence behavior across diverse domains in politics, including political contributions (Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2017), protest participation (Cantoni et al., 2019), political activism (Hager et al., 2023), and climate action (Andre et al., 2024).[2] Building on this strand of literature, this study demonstrates that perceptions of social norms about intolerance toward politicians' malfeasance play a crucial role in promoting political accountability.

2 Background

Between 2023 and 2024, Japan faced a significant political scandal involving the LDP. The scandal was initially uncovered by the communist newspaper *Akahata Shimbun*, which reported financial irregularities within LDP factions, including ex-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's faction (Akahata Shimbun, 2022). A year later, major media outlets, including *NHK*, revealed that the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office was conducting voluntary interviews with individuals responsible for the issue (NHK, 2023).

The investigation revealed that the Abe, Nikai, and Kishida factions failed to report over 970 million Japanese yen (JPY) (approximately 6.5 million USD, at an exchange rate of 1 USD = 150 JPY) in their political funding reports over five years, up to 2022 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2024). It is alleged that in the Abe and Nikai factions, participating politicians were assigned quotas to sell tickets for political fundraising events. Any revenue exceeding

[2] Bursztyn and Yang (2022) provides a comprehensive review of this literature. Although not necessarily focused on social norms, prior research in political science has documented misperceptions among peers, such as partisan differences in political opinions (Chambers et al., 2005; Ahler, 2014; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016), the proportion of party-stereotypical groups within parties (Ahler and Sood, 2018), perceptions of election competitiveness (Gerber et al., 2020), and others' voting behavior (Carlson and Hill, 2022).

these quotas was allegedly refunded as kickbacks to those who collected the funds. These refunded amounts were not recorded in the politicians' political funding reports, leaving their use unclear and drawing criticism that they may have been turned into personal slush funds.

The public reacted with widespread disapproval, as evidenced by the LDP's approval ratings plummeting to 21% by February 2024—the lowest for the party since its return to power in 2012 (Asahi Shimbun, 2024). The scandal had profound electoral consequences. In the October 2024 general election, the LDP, along with its coalition partner Komeito, lost its majority in the House of Representatives. The LDP's seat count dropped from 237 to 191, marking its first failure to secure a Lower House majority since 2009. Of those involved in the fraud issue who ran for office in this election, 28 out of 46 lost. This outcome was a severe blow to Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who had assumed office on October 1, 2024.

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Sample

The pre-registered experiment (AEARCTR-0014635) took place between October 18th and 28th, 2024, while the election occurred on October 27th. We conducted the experiment in collaboration with *Myvoice Inc.*. The target population consisted of 2,800 registered individuals aged between their 20s and 60s in target constituencies in Japan.

These constituencies fall into two types, both of which had incumbent candidates from the LDP: *Fraud Districts*, where the incumbent politicians were involved in the slush fund issue, and *Clean Districts*, where the incumbent politicians were not involved. We determined this target sample size through a power calculation described in the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP). The final sample includes 10 Fraud Districts and 15 Clean Districts. The details of the selection process for the target constituencies are provided in Section A.1 of the Online Appendix. As shown in Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix, these constituencies are distributed across various regions.

Due to limitations in the demographic characteristics of the survey company's registered sample pool, we conducted stratified sampling based on constituency types. Table A.1 in the Online Appendix compares these constituencies with others, demonstrating that they

are comparable to each other as well as to non-targeted constituencies where incumbent candidates were implicated in the slush fund issue or to non-targeted constituencies in general.

3.2 Survey procedures

This study involved three surveys: the baseline, post-treatment, and endline surveys. We conducted the baseline survey between the 18th and 23rd, the information intervention and post-treatment survey between the 25th and 26th, and the endline survey between the 28th and 31st. The election took place on the 27th (Sunday). Participants were informed at the outset that the surveys were related to the upcoming election, conducted for academic research by university researchers, and that no moral judgment would be made based on their responses. To avoid the experimenter demand effect, the general but specific purpose of the surveys was disclosed. Participant anonymity was guaranteed, and they were free to withdraw from the experiment at any time.

To incentivize completion, we limited the number of survey questions as much as possible and kept the questions clear and straightforward to avoid complications or confusion.[3] Furthermore, in addition to a baseline participation reward, payments increased toward the end of the experiment. By completing all surveys, participants could earn up to 65 points (one point is equivalent to one JPY).

We also incentivized certain questions, including primary outcomes, to encourage truth-telling and minimize the experimenter demand effect. Questions were incentivized by informing participants in advance that questions with a special icon were bonus questions, and 100 participants who answered them correctly would receive an additional 100 points.

Screening & Baseline survey (October 18th) Before conducting the baseline survey, screening questions were administered. The screening questions included postal code, whether the respondent had already voted in early voting, and an attention-check question. Those who did not live in the target constituencies, had already voted, or did not pass the attention-check question did not continue to the baseline survey. For those who proceeded to the baseline survey, we asked about their demographics and questions related to politics

[3] The baseline survey, which includes the most questions, contains only 11 questions and is designed to be completed within 5 minutes.

and policy. Importantly, one question asked about respondents' perceptions regarding the proportion of other voters who consider the fraud issue unacceptable. Its responses were used in the information treatment. The baseline survey included a total of 11 questions.

Intervention & Post-treatment survey (October 25th) We first provided the treatment group with information about social norms regarding intolerance toward politicians' malfeasance (the details are explained in Section 4.2). In contrast, the control group proceeded without receiving any additional information. The post-treatment survey was administered immediately afterward and included three primary outcomes of interest. The first two questions assessed the respondent's posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior in the same constituency: the respondent's posterior belief about the proportion of other voters who *will* vote for the incumbent candidate, and her posterior belief about the proportion of other voters who *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. These questions are asked separately because descriptive and injunctive norms are widely recognized as distinct constructs in psychology (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990). Lastly, the third question asked about the respondent's voting behavior, particularly the likelihood of voting for the incumbent candidate in her constituency.

In addition, as intermediate outcomes, we asked questions about the respondent's perceptions of the incumbent candidate's competence and trustworthiness, as well as the perceived pivotability of their own vote. Finally, we also asked about the respondent's support for policies or NGOs aimed at increasing transparency in political funding.

There were a total of eight questions, of which those about posterior beliefs regarding others' voting behavior and the valence and trustworthiness of the incumbent candidate were incentivized. The same set of questions was asked of both treatment and control groups.

Endline survey (October 28th) The endline survey asked two questions: whether the respondent voted, and if so, which political party candidate she voted for.

All survey questions (originally in Japanese) and their English translations are provided in the Online Appendix.

3.3 Balance and attrition

We conducted a statistical test (t-test) to check the balance between the treatment and control groups. The variables used to check the balance were pre-specified in the PAP. Table A.2 in the Online Appendix shows that all variables, except for education attainment, are balanced at a false discovery rate of 0.05. Following the PAP, we included this variable as a baseline control in the subsequent regression analyses.

We also checked the balance between attritors and non-attritors using the same set of variables. Table A.3 in the Online Appendix shows the result. First, the number of attritors after the treatment is minimal (95/2280 or 4%). Second, the table shows that all variables, except gender and marital status, are balanced at a false discovery rate of 0.05. As pre-specified in the PAP, we computed bounds using the method proposed by Lee (2009).

The summary statistics of the final sample are provided in Table A.4 in the Online Appendix.

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Empirical model

In the main regression analyses, we estimate the following model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \mathbf{X}_i \gamma + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

for individual i, where y_i is the outcome, T_i is the treatment indicator, $\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of control variables, and ε_i is the error term. The control variables include the baseline control variable and prefecture fixed effects. We use a randomized experiment to estimate the causal effect β. We use robust standard errors in the main analyses and conduct robustness checks using the Wild bootstrap and randomized inference.

4.2 The information treatment

As mentioned in Section 3.2, to measure respondents' prior beliefs about intolerance norms, we asked about the proportion of other voters who are intolerant of the slush fund issue in

the baseline survey. The answers to this question were used to create the intervention screen.

We intentionally designed the questionnaire to incentivize respondents to provide their best estimate of social norms, regardless of their personal beliefs (i.e., voters make their best guess, even if they personally believe that the slush fund issue is acceptable or unacceptable). We then took the average of their perceptions (67%) to define social norms in the following analyses.

Figure 1 shows the intervention screen. We provided this information to the treatment group at the intervention stage, while the control group proceeded without receiving any additional information.

5 Results

5.1 Perceptions of social norms

Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows the actual distribution of respondents' prior beliefs about other voters' corruption intolerance, with the vertical line indicating the average value, or our definition of social norms.

First, the distribution is widely dispersed. Second, it is skewed, with many respondents perceiving other voters as less tolerant of corruption. However, importantly, some respondents view other voters as more tolerant of corruption. We will later use this distribution to estimate heterogeneous effects.

5.2 Effects of the information treatment

5.2.1 Correlation between beliefs and voting behavior

As observed, prior beliefs about intolerance norms vary substantially across voters. We anticipate that providing social norms may influence respondents' posterior beliefs and voting behavior.

As detailed in Section 3.2, we measure beliefs about others' voting behavior using two variables: the respondent's posterior belief regarding the proportion of other voters who *will* vote for the incumbent candidate, and their posterior belief regarding the proportion who

should vote for the incumbent. We also examine the respondent's own voting decision. While we incentivized questions about others' voting behavior, the nature of self-reported voting decisions made incentivization impractical.[4] To mitigate self-reporting bias, we conducted surveys immediately after the election, allowing participants to provide responses that accurately reflected their election experiences. Although post-election survey responses (collected the day after the election) are considered a closer approximation of actual voting behavior, we also present results based on participants' pre-election declared choices.

If a respondent bases her voting decision on her perception of others' voting decisions, we should expect these variables to be highly correlated. The relationship between respondents' perceptions of others' voting behavior and their decision to vote for the incumbent candidate, as shown in Table 1, indicates strong correlations. The results in the second row suggest that voters with strong posterior beliefs that others should vote for the incumbent candidate are more likely to do so themselves. Similarly, the results in the first row indicate that voters with strong posterior beliefs that others will vote for the incumbent candidate are also more likely to vote for her. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the two variables (will and should) are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.69, making it difficult to disentangle their effects.

Table A.5 in the Online Appendix also presents the correlation between the same posterior beliefs (i.e., the proportion of other voters who will/should vote for the incumbent candidate) and the decision to vote for an *alternative* candidate. In that table, we find that the relationship between these beliefs and voting behavior is generally negative, although the correlation between voting behavior and beliefs about the proportion of voters who will vote for the incumbent is statistically insignificant.

5.2.2 Treatment effects

Posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior Table 2 shows the effects of the information treatment on posterior beliefs about others' voting behavior. It indicates that providing social norms, on average, *increases* respondents' posterior beliefs about others'

[4] We considered methods such as the Bayesian Truth Serum (Prelec, 2004) to incentivize belief reporting in unverifiable contexts. However, we opted against this due to concerns that its complexity might increase participant attrition. Charness et al. (2021) provides a discussion of belief elicitation strategies addressing this concern.

voting behavior. The estimated coefficients indicate that the information treatment leads individuals to believe that 6% more people will vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (4)) and 7% more people should vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (8)), relative to the control group means.

As discussed in Section 5.1, voters hold varying perceptions of others' intolerance levels. Next, following the PAP, we examine whether the treatment effect varies depending on how individuals perceive these social norms.

Figure 3 presents the conditional marginal effects of our treatment. Panel (a) uses the measure of beliefs that others will vote for the incumbent candidate as the dependent variable, while Panel (b) uses the measure of beliefs that others should vote for the incumbent candidate as the dependent variable. The figure illustrates that the positive main effects observed earlier are primarily driven by individuals with lenient views—those who tend to believe that others are more tolerant of corruption. In contrast, no discernible effect is found for individuals with stringent views.

Columns (1), (3), (6), and (8) in Table 3 present the estimation results from the subsample analysis, where the sample is divided into two groups based on the average value. Columns (1) and (6) show that the treatment effect is absent for individuals who believe others are less tolerant of corruption, i.e., those scoring above 67 in Figure 2. In contrast, Columns (3) and (8) indicate that the positive main effects are observed only among those who perceive others as more tolerant of corruption. The treatment increases beliefs about others' voting behavior by 13 to 14 percent of the control mean.

Voting for the incumbent candidate Next, we investigate whether the treatment affects voters' decision to vote for the incumbent candidate. The results are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (4) do not show clear evidence that the information treatment affects the likelihood of voting for the incumbent candidate. The same results appear even if the sample is split based on social norms in Columns (1), (3), (6), and (8) in Panel A of Table 5. However, as we will discuss later, this masks important heterogeneity.

Voting for an alternative candidate Did the treatment affect voters' decision to vote for a candidate other than the incumbent? Columns (2) and (5) in Table 4 suggest that

the treatment increased the likelihood of voting for an alternative candidate. In terms of magnitude, the estimated coefficient in Column (5) indicates that the likelihood of voting for an alternative candidate increased by 7 percentage points. According to Table 5, this effect is primarily driven by individuals with stringent views on intolerance norms (Columns (1) and (6) in Panel B). Figure A.4 in the Online Appendix visualizes these findings.

Turnout Finally, we examine the effect on voter turnout. First, Columns (3) and (6) in Table 4 suggest that the treatment increased turnout, with Column (6) indicating that the magnitude of the effect is 6 percentage points. Second, Panel C of Table 5 shows that this effect is concentrated among individuals with stringent views (Columns (1) and (6)). These results are also seen in Figure A.5 in the Online Appendix.

Combining the results of voting for an alternative candidate and voter turnout, one possible interpretation is that those with stringent views experienced a shock upon learning that social norms are more tolerant of corruption than they had initially believed, prompting them to turn out and vote for an alternative candidate.

5.2.3 Robustness checks

We conducted various robustness checks in the Online Appendix. Table A.6 reports p-values using randomized inference, considering multiple hypothesis testing (Young, 2019), and applying the Wild bootstrap (e.g., Cameron et al., 2008). Table A.7 shows Lee bounds (Lee, 2009), accounting for attrition. Finally, Table A.8 presents estimates using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (Correia et al., 2020). Overall, the qualitative results are similar across these exercises.

5.2.4 Other outcomes

Although our primary outcomes are respondents' posterior beliefs and voting behavior, we also examined the effect on other outcomes as specified in the PAP.

Policy support and donations First, we analyzed the treatment effect on respondents' support for policies promoting more transparent political funding and their donations to

NGOs working to enhance transparency, as shown in Table 6. For these outcomes, we found only a weak positive effect among swing voters with stringent views (Column (1)).

Political attitudes Second, we examined three intermediate outcome variables. The first outcome measures respondents' beliefs about the proportion of other voters in their constituency who perceive the incumbent candidate as competent (Kendall et al., 2015). The second outcome captures respondents' posterior beliefs about the proportion of other voters who view the incumbent as trustworthy (Chong et al., 2015). The third outcome evaluates respondents' belief in their vote's influence on the election outcome, reflecting their perception of pivotality.

The results in Columns (6) and (8) of Table 6 indicate that the treatment increases respondents' perceptions that more voters in their constituency view the incumbent candidate as competent and trustworthy. These findings suggest that respondents believe others perceive the incumbent as more competent and trustworthy, which may justify their decision to support the candidate. Furthermore, Column (10) indicates that the treatment reinforces respondents' belief in the influence of their vote, potentially boosting support for the incumbent. In contrast, we find no significant effects among swing voters for these outcome variables.

5.3 Mechanism

To further explore these main findings, we conducted additional analyses on the interplay between the perception of social norms and party identity. In particular, we seek to understand how the perceptions of social norms vary by party identity. The analysis using party identity was pre-registered in the PAP.

In Section 5.1, we found that some voters make lenient judgments about the malfeasance of the LDP incumbent, while others are more stringent. Further analysis reveals that the distribution of these beliefs systematically varies according to respondents' party identity. Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates that ruling-party supporters are more likely to believe others are more tolerant of the malfeasance of LDP incumbents compared to opposition-party supporters (mean for ruling-party supporters: 62; mean for opposition-party supporters:

70; the difference in means: p-value < 0.001).[5] Moreover, Panel (a) of Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix shows that this specific distribution for ruling-party supporters is primarily driven by LDP supporters. In contrast, Panel (b) of the same figure also indicates that the most stringent views are held by individuals who do not support any particular party.

These results may raise concerns that the above heterogeneous effects are merely a reflection of party identity. To address this, we restrict the sample using party identity and repeat the same analyses as before.

First, Figure A.3 in the Online Appendix shows that restricting the sample to LDP supporters yields similar marginal effects of the treatment variable as in the full sample. This finding is further supported by the regression analysis. As shown in Columns (4), (5), (9), and (10) of Table 3, significant positive effects are observed among these party supporters. Notably, the effect size approximately doubles for these subsamples. These results suggest that ruling-party supporters, particularly LDP supporters, are the primary drivers of the main effects on posterior beliefs. Crucially, heterogeneous effects based on prior beliefs about intolerance norms also exist within this group.

Second, regarding the likelihood of voting for the incumbent candidate, the full sample does not provide evidence that the information treatment influences voting outcomes. However, when restricting the sample to ruling-party supporters (Columns (4) and (9) of Panel A in Table 5) and LDP supporters (Columns (5) and (10) of Panel A), the treatment significantly increases the likelihood of voting for the incumbent. According to Column (10), the effect size reaches 12 percentage points. Combined with the results on posterior beliefs, this backfire effect may be interpreted as a form of protective behavior among those with lenient prior beliefs, who tend to be supporters of ruling parties (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Jost, 2004).

Finally, concerning the likelihood of voting for an alternative candidate and turnout, we find that positive treatment effects emerge among swing voters for both outcomes (Columns (2) and (7)). According to Column (7) in Panels B and C, the effect size is 10 percentage points for the likelihood of voting for an alternative candidate and 8 percentage points for turnout.

[5] The mean value for those who do not support any particular party tends to be similar to that of opposition-party supporters (mean: 69; the difference in means: p-value $= 0.63$).

In summary, while perceptions of social norms generate heterogeneous effects within the same party identity, these effects vary significantly across subgroups based on party identity. These results underscore the critical interplay between prior beliefs about intolerance norms and party identity, with important policy implications.

6 Discussion

In this section, we explore alternative mechanisms that could explain the main findings.

First, prior beliefs about the prevalence of corruption might account for the observed results. To test this possibility, we split the sample based on respondents' baseline perceptions of the percentage of politicians involved in the slush fund. Columns (5) and (6) of Panel A in Table 7 show that the treatment effect emerges in both sub-samples, with similar effect sizes. Combined with the results in Columns (7) and (8), this suggests that perceptions of corruption prevalence are unlikely to be the primary explanation for the findings.

Second, the effects might vary between individuals who consider the slush fund an important issue in the October election and those who do not. While the effect tends to be more pronounced among those who do not view the slush fund as a key issue, the estimates are statistically indistinguishable between the two groups.

Finally, we examine whether living in Fraud Districts versus Clean Districts explains the results. Although the effect appears to be stronger in Fraud Districts, the coefficients are similar, and the difference is not statistically significant.

Overall, these alternative explanations do not appear to account for the main findings.

7 Conclusion

In this study, we present evidence on the role of voters' perceptions of others in political accountability. Our study demonstrates that voters tend to misperceive other voters' intolerance toward politicians' malfeasance, and that informing them of social norms influences their posterior beliefs and voting behavior. These findings highlight the importance of perceptions of other voters' beliefs in promoting political accountability.

However, the study also underscores the complexities involved, as perceptions of social

norms and party identity appear to interact. For instance, we observed a backfire effect among individuals with certain prior beliefs. A deeper understanding of voters' perceptions of other voters will be essential for the effective functioning of democratic institutions.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Information Treatment

This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan. In the previous survey, participants were asked how many of the other respondents considered that "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" are "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."

As a result, it was found that people believe that out of 100 participants, 67 considered "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" to be either "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."






Figure 2: Distribution of Prior Beliefs about Intolerance Norms




(a) Full sample




(b) By supporting party

Note: The figures show the distributions of prior beliefs about intolerance norms. Panel (a) uses the distribution of prior beliefs about intolerance norms using the full sample. Panel (b) shows the distribution of prior beliefs about intolerance norms by supporting party. The group omitted in the second panel consists of those not supporting any particular party and those unwilling to report a supporting party.

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior



(a) Others will vote



(b) Others should vote

Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable with the 95% confidence intervals using the *interflex* package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Panel (a) uses respondents' perceptions about the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent as the dependent variable. Panel (b) uses respondents' perceptions about the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent as the dependent variable. The distributions at the bottom of each panel show the distributions of prior beliefs about intolerance norms. The baseline control and prefecture fixed effects are included.

Table 1: Correlation between Beliefs and Voting Behavior

	Dependent variable: Vote incumbent					
	Before election			After election		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Others will vote	0.003	0.003		0.003	0.003	
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***		(0.000)***	(0.000)***	
Others should vote			0.003			0.003
			(0.000)***			(0.000)***
Female		−0.061	−0.060		−0.076	−0.073
		(0.018)***	(0.018)***		(0.021)***	(0.021)***
Age		0.013	0.018		0.004	0.010
		(0.008)	(0.008)**		(0.010)	(0.010)
Education years		−0.003	−0.001		−0.002	−0.000
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Log income		0.022	0.022		0.013	0.014
		(0.012)*	(0.012)*		(0.014)	(0.014)
Married		0.072	0.071		0.091	0.090
		(0.017)***	(0.017)***		(0.021)***	(0.021)***
Control mean	0.226	0.226	0.226	0.307	0.307	0.307
Control std.	(0.419)	(0.419)	(0.419)	(0.461)	(0.461)	(0.461)
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04
N	2280	2280	2280	2047	2047	2047

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) to (3) is the respondent's stated intention to vote for the incumbent candidate, as reported in the baseline (pre-election) survey. For Columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the respondent's actual vote for the incumbent candidate, based on the post-election survey. "Others will vote" captures respondents' perceptions of the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent candidate, while "Others should vote" reflects respondents' perceptions of the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 2: Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior

	Dependent variable:			
	Others will vote			Others should vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	3.103	3.047	2.933	3.150
	(0.954)***	(0.954)***	(0.957)***	(1.060)***
Baseline controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	no	no	yes	yes
Control mean	46.679	46.679	46.679	43.746
Control std.	(24.225)	(24.225)	(24.225)	(26.399)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
N	2280	2280	2280	2280

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) to (3) is the respondent's posterior belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. In contrast, the dependent variable for Column (4) is the respondent's posterior belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior

Dependent variable:	Others will vote					Others should vote				
Sample:	Prior > Norm		Prior ≤ Norm			Prior > Norm		Prior ≤ Norm		
		Swing		LDP+Komei	LDP		Swing		LDP+Komei	LDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	0.886	0.130	5.921	10.237	9.827	1.835	1.367	5.539	9.331	9.308
	(1.127)	(1.367)	(1.787)***	(3.277)***	(3.458)***	(1.270)	(1.548)	(1.921)***	(3.749)**	(3.961)**
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	49.323	48.925	42.170	47.236	47.692	44.669	44.111	42.172	48.250	47.658
Control std.	(23.340)	(22.693)	(25.050)	(24.494)	(23.235)	(25.692)	(24.771)	(27.517)	(28.189)	(26.768)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.06
N	1508	965	772	206	177	1508	965	772	206	177

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) to (5) is the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. The dependent variable for Columns (6) to (10) is the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. Columns (1), (2), (6), and (7) include individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are above the average value. The remainder uses individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are below or equal to the average value. Columns (2) and (7) restrict the sample to those who do not support a particular party, Columns (4) and (9) restrict the sample to ruling-party supporters, and Columns (5) and (10) limit the sample to LDP supporters. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 4: Effects of Information Treatment on Voting Behavior

	Dependent variable:					
	Before election			After election		
	Vote incumbent	Vote alternative	Turnout	Vote incumbent	Vote alternative	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.017	0.085	0.100	−0.009	0.074	0.063
	(0.018)	(0.021)***	(0.021)***	(0.021)	(0.022)***	(0.019)***
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	0.219	0.310	0.552	0.309	0.373	0.708
Control std.	(0.414)	(0.463)	(0.497)	(0.462)	(0.484)	(0.455)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.04
N	2280	2280	2280	2047	2047	2047

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) to (3) is the respondent's stated intention, as reported in the baseline (pre-election) survey, to vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (1)), an alternative candidate (Column (2)), or to turn out to vote (Column (3)). Similarly, the dependent variable for Columns (4) to (6) is the respondent's actual voting behavior, as reported in the post-election survey, indicating a vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (4)), an alternative candidate (Column (5)), or turnout (Column (6)). Baseline controls include education attainment. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Voting Behavior

Sample:	Before election					After election				
	Prior > Norm		Prior ≤ Norm			Prior > Norm		Prior ≤ Norm		
		Swing		LDP+Komei	LDP		Swing		LDP+Komei	LDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A	Dep. var.: Vote incumbent					Vote incumbent				
Treatment	0.014	0.002	0.048	0.162	0.164	0.005	−0.017	−0.005	0.172	0.123
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.066)**	(0.069)**	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.065)***	(0.068)*
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	0.187	0.122	0.273	0.643	0.675	0.268	0.211	0.381	0.687	0.737
Control std.	(0.390)	(0.327)	(0.446)	(0.481)	(0.470)	(0.443)	(0.409)	(0.486)	(0.466)	(0.442)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.09	0.09
N	1508	965	772	206	177	1361	861	686	197	171
Panel B	Dep. var.: Vote alternative					Vote alternative				
Treatment	0.078	0.106	0.079	−0.100	−0.071	0.078	0.095	0.040	−0.121	−0.089
	(0.025)***	(0.031)***	(0.035)**	(0.044)**	(0.043)*	(0.027)***	(0.034)***	(0.038)	(0.051)**	(0.048)*
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	0.344	0.305	0.251	0.157	0.111	0.407	0.388	0.313	0.187	0.140
Control std.	(0.475)	(0.461)	(0.434)	(0.365)	(0.316)	(0.492)	(0.488)	(0.464)	(0.391)	(0.349)
R^2	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.09
N	1508	965	772	206	177	1361	861	686	197	171
Panel C	Dep. var.: Turnout					Turnout				
Treatment	0.093	0.105	0.122	0.013	0.035	0.080	0.077	0.032	0.028	0.023
	(0.025)***	(0.032)***	(0.036)***	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.023)***	(0.032)**	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	0.551	0.441	0.554	0.850	0.838	0.701	0.616	0.721	0.896	0.886
Control std.	(0.498)	(0.497)	(0.498)	(0.358)	(0.370)	(0.458)	(0.487)	(0.449)	(0.307)	(0.319)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.05
N	1508	965	772	206	177	1361	861	686	197	171

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In Panel A, the dependent variable for Columns (1) to (5) is the respondent's declaration to vote for the incumbent candidate, according to the baseline (pre-election) survey. The dependent variable for Columns (6) to (10) is the respondent's vote for the incumbent candidate, according to the post-election survey. In Panel B, the dependent variable for Columns (1) to (5) is the respondent's declaration to vote for a candidate other than the incumbent, according to the baseline (pre-election) survey. The dependent variable for Columns (6) to (10) is the respondent's vote for a candidate other than the incumbent, according to the post-election survey. In Panel C, the dependent variable for Columns (1) to (5) is the respondent's declaration to turn out, according to the baseline (pre-election) survey. The dependent variable for Columns (6) to (10) is the respondent's turnout decision, according to the post-election survey. Baseline controls include education attainment. Columns (1) and (5) include individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are above the average value. The remainder uses individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are below or equal to the average value. Columns (2) and (7) restrict the sample to those who do not support a particular party, Columns (4) and (8) restrict the sample to ruling-party supporters, and Columns (5) and (10) limit the sample to LDP supporters. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Other Outcomes

Dependent variable:	Policy support		Donation		Competent		Trustworthy		Pivotal	
Sample:	Prior > Norm & Swing	Prior ≤ Norm & LDP	Prior > Norm & Swing	Prior ≤ Norm & LDP	Prior > Norm & Swing	Prior ≤ Norm & LDP	Prior > Norm & Swing	Prior ≤ Norm & LDP	Prior > Norm & Swing	Prior ≤ Norm & LDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	0.113	−0.077	6.791	333.010	1.543	10.456	1.818	9.576	0.028	0.236
	(0.065)*	(0.109)	(394.088)	(1126.759)	(1.345)	(3.849)***	(1.306)	(3.654)***	(0.050)	(0.118)**
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	2.837	2.803	1947.600	3241.598	31.425	32.479	29.991	33.821	2.222	2.624
Control std.	(1.005)	(0.710)	(6712.429)	(6506.688)	(21.480)	(25.273)	(21.343)	(25.158)	(0.809)	(0.763)
R^2	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.09
N	965	177	965	177	965	177	965	177	965	177

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) and (2) is the respondent's support for a policy that makes political funding more transparent. The dependent variable for Columns (3) to (4) is the amount of donation (measured in JPY) to an NGO working to increase transparency in political funding. The dependent variable for Columns (5) and (6) are the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who she thinks that the incumbent candidate is competent. The dependent variable for Columns (7) and (8) are the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who she thinks that the incumbent candidate is trustworthy. The dependent variable for Columns (9) and (10) are the respondent's belief that her vote has an influence on the electoral result. Baseline controls include education attainment. In all regressions, the sample uses individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are below or equal to the average value. Odd columns restrict the sample to swing voters who hold stringent views, and even columns limit the sample to LDP supporters who hold lenient views. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior: Alternative Explanations

Panel A

Dependent variable:	Others will vote		Others should vote		Others will vote		Others should vote	
Sample:	Intolerance norms				Prevalence of corruption			
	Prior > Norm	Prior ≤ Norm	Prior > Norm	Prior ≤ Norm	Above Median	Below Median	Above Median	Below Median
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.886	5.921	1.835	5.539	2.656	3.123	4.700	1.688
	(1.127)	(1.787)***	(1.270)	(1.921)***	(1.450)*	(1.270)**	(1.580)***	(1.432)
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	49.323	42.170	44.669	42.172	46.925	46.444	43.766	43.727
Control std.	(23.340)	(25.050)	(25.692)	(27.517)	(25.102)	(23.376)	(26.878)	(25.954)
Stat. difference (p-value)	0.017		0.106		0.808		0.156	
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
N	1508	772	1508	772	1110	1170	1110	1170

Panel B

Dependent variable:	Others will vote		Others should vote		Others will vote		Others should vote	
Sample:	Importance of the slush fund				District types			
	Listed	Not listed	Listed	Not listed	Clean	Fraud	Clean	Fraud
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	1.917	3.209	1.813	3.714	2.013	3.719	2.263	3.941
	(1.645)	(1.188)***	(1.823)	(1.306)***	(1.352)	(1.355)***	(1.485)	(1.518)***
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	48.090	46.044	43.333	43.932	47.861	45.520	45.095	42.425
Control std.	(23.872)	(24.368)	(26.116)	(26.537)	(24.483)	(23.931)	(26.450)	(26.300)
Stat. difference (p-value)	0.522		0.394		0.371		0.427	
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
N	736	1544	736	1544	1186	1094	1186	1094

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) is the respondent's posterior belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *will* vote for the incumbent candidate. In contrast, the dependent variable for other columns is the respondent's posterior belief about the proportion of other voters in the same constituency who, she thinks, *should* vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. In Panel A, Columns (1) and (3) include individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are above the average value, while Columns (2) and (4) include individuals whose prior beliefs about intolerance norms are below or equal to the average value. Columns (5) and (7) include individuals who believe that the percentage of politicians involved in the slush fund issue is above the median value, while Columns (6) and (8) include individuals who believe it is below or equal to the median value. In Panel B, Columns (1) and (3) include individuals in Clean Districts, while Columns (2) and (4) include individuals in Fraud Districts. Columns (5) and (7) include individuals who listed the slush fund as one of the important issues in the October election, while Columns (6) and (8) include individuals who did not list it. *, **, and *** indicate p <0.10, p <0.05, and p <0.01, respectively.

Online Appendix for *Outrage Against Corrupt Politicians?: Misperceived Social Norms and Political Accountability*

Shuhei Kitamura* Ryo Takahashi† Katsunori Yamada‡

Abstract: This supplementary material includes additional text, tables, figures, and the survey questionnaire. For references to the tables and figures, please refer to the main text.

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A.1 Sampling

The target constituencies consist of two types, both of whose incumbent candidates are from the LDP: Fraud Districts, where the incumbent politicians were found to have failed to report information in their political fund balance reports correctly, and Clean Districts, where the incumbent politicians were not involved.

We selected target constituencies to make clean comparisons by removing the influence of other factors. The starting number of incumbent candidates in the House of Representatives is 43, excluding eight individuals who did not run for office due to reasons such as suspension of civil rights, retirement, or health issues.[1] First, we excluded candidates who won through the proportional representation (PR) system (8) and focused on candidates who won in the single-member district (SD) system in the previous election.[2] Second, we excluded candidates related to another scandal involving the former Unification Church (16).[3] Third, we excluded those who would not be officially endorsed by the party in the election due to the fraud scandal (4) to avoid capturing this additional shock in our estimates. The number of candidates becomes 15.

Each of these 15 LDP candidates represents a single constituency in the SD system, who re-runs for office.[4] We further restricted constituencies based on the following criteria: (a) The constituency does not include any municipality split between multiple constituencies (3) and (b) The constituency is not significantly affected by the 2022 amendment to the Public Offices Election Law (1).

In prefectures where a Fraud District exists, we selected Clean Districts where the incumbent LDP candidates are not involved in the slush fund scandal and satisfy the above criteria. Finally, we excluded a Fraud District where Clean Districts do not exist within the same prefecture.

[1] This also excludes three individuals who ran for office but are not incumbent candidates in the House of Representatives: Younosuke Kano, Tamayo Marukawa, and Yasuhide Nakayama.

[2] Some PR election winners actually *lost* in the SD election, making comparisons difficult. PR candidates represent larger, multi-prefecture constituencies, which are very different from the local constituencies we consider. Furthermore, electoral outcomes in the PR system depend on the party's list, not necessarily representing local constituents' preferences.

[3] A scandal surrounding the Unification Church attracted significant attention in the 2020s, especially after the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2022. The LDP has been accused of close ties with the Unification Church.

[4] Japan does not impose term limits for political office.

The final sample includes 10 Fraud Districts and 15 Clean Districts. As shown in Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix, these constituencies are not concentrated on a particular region: Iwate (Fraud District: 1; Clean District: 1), Tochigi (1,1), Saitama (1,4), Chiba (1,2), Tokyo (1,3), Ishikawa (1,1), Nagano (1,1), Aichi (2,2), and Mie Prefectures (1,1), where the first and second numbers in parentheses represent the number of Fraud and Clean Districts within each prefecture, respectively. In addition, the figure also shows that Fraud Districts are adjacent to Clean Districts in most prefectures.

Table A.1 compares these constituencies with others, demonstrating that they are comparable to each other as well as to non-targeted constituencies where incumbent candidates were implicated in the slush fund issue or to non-targeted constituencies in general.

The target population for the study consists of 2,800 registered individuals aged between 20s and 60s in these target constituencies. We derived this target number through the power calculation described in the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP).

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icance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134*(2), 557–598.

A.2 Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Target Constituencies






Figure A.2: Distribution of Prior Beliefs about Intolerance Norms




(a) LDP versus Opposition




(b) Komei versus Opposition

Note: The figures show the distributions of prior beliefs about intolerance norms by supporting party. In Panel (a), LDP supporters are contrasted with opposition-party supporters. In Panel (b), Komei Party supporters are contrasted with who do not support any particular party.

Figure A.3: Marginal Effects of Information Treatment on Beliefs about Others' Voting Behavior (LDP Supporters Only)




(a) Other will vote




(b) Other should vote

Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable with the 95% confidence intervals using the *interflex* package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Panel (a) uses respondents' perceptions about the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent as the dependent variable. Panel (b) uses respondents' perceptions about the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent as the dependent variable. The distributions at the bottom of each panel show the distributions of intolerance norm. The baseline control and prefecture fixed effects are included. The sample only includes LDP supporters.

Figure A.4: Marginal Effects of Information Treatment on Voting for an Alternative Candidate




(a) Vote alternative




(b) Vote alternative (swing voters only)

Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable with the 95% confidence intervals using the *interflex* package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Panel (a) uses the likelihood of voting for an alternative candidate, reported in the post-election survey, as the dependent variable. Panel (b) uses the same dependent variable, but the sample is restricted to swing voters. The distributions at the bottom of each panel show the distributions of prior beliefs about intolerance norms. The baseline control and prefecture fixed effects are included.

Figure A.5: Marginal Effects of Information Treatment on Voter Turnout



(a) Turnout



(b) Turnout (swing voters only)

Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of the treatment variable with the 95% confidence intervals using the *interflex* package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). Panel (a) uses voter turnout, reported in the post-election survey, as the dependent variable. Panel (b) uses the same dependent variable, but the sample is restricted to swing voters. The distributions at the bottom of each panel show the distributions of prior beliefs about intolerance norms. The baseline control and prefecture fixed effects are included.

Table A.1: Target and non-target constituencies

	(1) Fraud	(2) Clean	(3) Other fraud	(4) Other all
Turnout	0.534	0.528	0.533	0.522
	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Log(registered)	12.678	12.732	12.788	12.787
	(0.162)	(0.185)	(0.154)	(0.169)
Female-male ratio	1.037	1.035	1.073	1.077
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.065)
Vote share (LDP)	0.222	0.254	0.199	0.221
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.065)
Vote share (DP)	0.202	0.228	0.235	0.209
	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.066)
N	11	15	39	263

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Constituencies without candidates from the relevant parties were excluded when calculating vote shares.

Table A.2: Balance Check

	(1) Control	(2) Treatment	(1) vs. (2)	N
Female	0.397	0.374	0.278	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
20s	0.026	0.021	0.457	2280
	(0.004)	(0.005)		
30s	0.081	0.060	0.058	2280
	(0.007)	(0.008)		
40s	0.212	0.204	0.613	2280
	(0.011)	(0.013)		
50s	0.337	0.358	0.301	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
60s	0.344	0.358	0.502	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
Education years	14.044	14.318	0.001	2280
	(0.053)	(0.062)		
Married	0.576	0.595	0.366	2280
	(0.013)	(0.016)		
Log income	14.549	14.588	0.206	2280
	(0.019)	(0.023)		
N	1366	914		

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The third column shows p-values.

Table A.3: Attrition Check

	(1) Not attrited	(2) Attrited	(1) vs. (2)	N
Female	0.388	0.558	0.001	2375
	(0.010)	(0.051)		
20s	0.024	0.021	0.869	2375
	(0.003)	(0.015)		
30s	0.073	0.063	0.722	2375
	(0.005)	(0.025)		
40s	0.209	0.200	0.837	2375
	(0.009)	(0.041)		
50s	0.345	0.274	0.150	2375
	(0.010)	(0.046)		
60s	0.350	0.442	0.065	2375
	(0.010)	(0.051)		
Education years	14.154	14.242	0.662	2375
	(0.041)	(0.181)		
Married	0.584	0.695	0.031	2375
	(0.010)	(0.047)		
Log income	14.565	14.459	0.153	2375
	(0.015)	(0.067)		
N	2280	95		

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The third column shows p-values.

Table A.4: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std	Min	p10	p50	p90	Max	N
A. Outcomes								
Fraction of others who will vote	47.92	23.01	0.00	5.00	50.00	75.00	100.00	2280
Fraction of others who should vote	45.07	25.33	0.00	2.50	50.00	80.00	100.00	2280
Vote incumbent (before election)	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Vote incumbent (after election)	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2047
Turnout (before election)	0.60	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Turnout (after election)	0.74	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2047
Policy support	2.84	0.97	1.00	1.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	2280
Donation	2790.38	7928.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	10000.00	50000.00	2280
Competent	32.15	21.75	0.00	3.00	30.00	60.00	100.00	2280
Trustworthy	31.32	21.52	0.00	3.00	30.00	60.00	100.00	2280
Pivotal	2.37	0.81	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	2280
B. Treatment dummy								
Treatment	0.40	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
C. Covariates								
Female	0.39	0.49	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
20s	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2280
30s	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2280
40s	0.21	0.41	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
50s	0.35	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
60s	0.35	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Education years	14.15	1.93	9.00	12.00	14.00	16.00	16.00	2280
Married	0.58	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2280
Log income	14.56	0.71	12.61	13.53	14.63	15.42	17.91	2280

Table A.5: Correlation between Beliefs and Voting Behavior

	Dependent variable: Vote alternative					
	Before election			After election		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Others will vote	−0.000	−0.000		−0.000	−0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	
Others should vote			−0.001			−0.001
			(0.000)***			(0.000)***
Female		−0.061	−0.059		−0.024	−0.022
		(0.020)***	(0.020)***		(0.023)	(0.023)
Age		0.046	0.043		0.057	0.054
		(0.010)***	(0.010)***		(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Education years		0.028	0.027		0.033	0.032
		(0.005)***	(0.005)***		(0.006)***	(0.006)***
Log income		−0.006	−0.006		0.003	0.002
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.016)	(0.016)
Married		0.000	0.003		−0.013	−0.010
		(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.023)	(0.023)
Control mean	0.346	0.346	0.346	0.404	0.404	0.404
Control std.	(0.476)	(0.476)	(0.476)	(0.491)	(0.491)	(0.491)
R^2	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.04
N	2280	2280	2280	2047	2047	2047

Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) to (3) is the respondent's stated intention to vote for a candidate other than the incumbent, as reported in the baseline (pre-election) survey. For Columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the respondent's actual vote for a candidate other than the incumbent, based on the post-election survey. "Others will vote" captures respondents' perceptions of the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent candidate, while "Others should vote" reflects respondents' perceptions of the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent candidate. Baseline controls include education attainment. *, **, and *** indicate $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Table A.6: Robustness Check: Wild Bootstrap and Robust Inference

	Dependent variable:				
	Others will vote	Others should vote	Vote incumbent	Vote alternative	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	2.933	3.150	−0.009	0.074	0.063
	(0.767)***	(0.940)**	(0.021)	(0.016)***	(0.022)**
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	46.679	43.746	0.309	0.373	0.708
Control std.	(24.225)	(26.399)	(0.462)	(0.484)	(0.455)
Wild bootstrap (p-value)	0.003	0.034	0.682	0.001	0.001
Randomized inference (p-value)	0.003	0.005	0.683	0.002	0.002
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.04
N	2280	2280	2047	2047	2047

Note. Standard errors, clustered at the prefecture level, are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) and (2) is the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent candidate and the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent candidate, respectively. The dependent variable for Columns (3) to (5) is the respondent's actual voting behavior, as reported in the post-election survey, indicating a vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (3)), an alternative candidate (Column (4)), or turnout (Column (5)). Baseline controls include education attainment. Wild bootstrap p-values are computed using the *boottest* package (Roodman et al., 2019) with 3000 replications and Webb weights. Randomized p-values are computed using the *randcmd* package (Young, 2019). *, **, and *** indicate p <0.10, p <0.05, and p <0.01, respectively.

Table A.7: Robustness Check: Lee (2009) bounds

	Dependent variable:				
	Others will vote	Others should vote	Vote incumbent	Vote alternative	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A	Selection indicator is *Married*				
Upper	6.114	7.061	0.017	0.119	0.130
	(2.210)***	(2.217)***	(0.032)	(0.035)***	(0.041)***
Lower	3.018	3.819	−0.034	0.068	0.080
	(1.895)	(2.198)*	(0.038)	(0.036)**	(0.024)***
Panel B	Selection indicator is *Female*				
Upper	2.877	2.971	0.010	0.135	0.113
	(2.384)	(3.061)	(0.056)	(0.055)**	(0.042)***
Lower	−2.529	−2.682	−0.038	0.088	0.066
	(3.216)	(3.191)	(0.037)	(0.042)**	(0.052)
N	2280	2280	2047	2047	2047

Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) and (2) is the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent candidate and the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent candidate, respectively. The dependent variable for Columns (3) to (5) is the respondent's actual voting behavior, as reported in the post-election survey, indicating a vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (3)), an alternative candidate (Column (4)), or turnout (Column (5)). Upper and lower bounds are computed using the *leebounds* package (Tauchmann, 2014). *, **, and *** indicate p <0.10, p <0.05, and p <0.01, respectively.

Table A.8: Robustness Check: Poisson pseudo-Maximum Likelihood

	Dependent variable:				
	Others will vote	Others should vote	Vote incumbent	Vote alternative	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	0.061	0.069	−0.028	0.180	0.084
	(0.020)***	(0.023)***	(0.068)	(0.053)***	(0.026)***
Baseline controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Prefecture F.E.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Control mean	46.679	43.746	0.309	0.373	0.708
Control std.	(24.225)	(26.399)	(0.462)	(0.484)	(0.455)
pseudo-R^2	0.005	0.008	0.002	0.011	0.006
N	2280.00	2280.00	2047.00	2047.00	2047.00

Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable for Columns (1) and (2) is the respondent's belief about the proportion of other voters who will vote for the incumbent candidate and the proportion of other voters who should vote for the incumbent candidate, respectively. The dependent variable for Columns (3) to (5) is the respondent's actual voting behavior, as reported in the post-election survey, indicating a vote for the incumbent candidate (Column (3)), an alternative candidate (Column (4)), or turnout (Column (5)). All models are estimated using the *ppmlhdfe* package (Correia et al., 2020). *, **, and *** indicate p <0.10, p <0.05, and p <0.01, respectively.

A.3 Survey Questionnaire

A.3.1 English-translated Version

Screening & Baseline Survey - October 18th

As of July 14, 2024, please provide the postal code of your address listed on your certificate of residence.

※Please respond with a 7-digit number without a hyphen.

(　　)

Next　Back

In this House of Representatives election (national election), have you already voted during early voting?

○ Voted during early voting

○ Did not vote during early voting

In social surveys, it is important for respondents to fully understand the questions and provide their answers accordingly.

From the following options, please select "None of the above."

○ Employment

○ AI

○ 42

○ Globalization

○ None of the above

Thank you for accessing this survey page. This survey is being conducted by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Osaka University, the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, and the Faculty of Economics at Kinki University to understand public perceptions regarding elections.

This survey aims to academically investigate your thoughts and opinions leading up to the House of Representatives election.

The information you provide will be used only for academic research and not for any other purposes. The survey is anonymous, and your privacy will be fully protected. It is designed to understand your honest perspectives, without any judgment of right or wrong. We request your understanding in this regard and hope you are comfortable while answering the following questions.

In addition to this survey, some participants will be invited to complete additional surveys at approximately 6:00 PM on Friday, October 25, and Monday, October 28. This survey consists of 11 questions, while the survey on Friday, October 25, includes 8 questions, each expected to take about 5 minutes to complete. The survey on Monday, October 28, is a simple one with only 2 questions, which are expected to take no more than 2 minutes to complete.

Please note that if you leave the survey, any answers provided before your leave will still be submitted to the research team.

Furthermore, questions marked with the following icon are bonus questions. For these questions, after collecting responses from all participants in this survey for each question, 100 participants who answered correctly will be randomly selected to receive an additional 100 yen worth of points. Across the three surveys, there are a total of 5 bonus questions, allowing participants to earn up to 500 yen in bonus points.



If you are able to participate, we would greatly appreciate your cooperation in completing all the surveys.

Next Back

Q1. We would like to ask about your political values. Do you support any political party?

○ I support the Liberal Democratic Party.
○ I support another ruling party.
○ I support an opposition party.
○ I do not support any political party.
○ I prefer not to answer.

Q2. Regarding the upcoming House of Representatives election (national election), please select up to three issues that you personally consider important, in order of priority.

	Most important	Second most important	Third most important
	↓	↓	↓
Inflation	○	○	○
Declining birthrate	○	○	○
Aging population	○	○	○
Climate change and the environment	○	○	○
Fiscal policy	○	○	○
Foreign policy	○	○	○
Pension	○	○	○
Nuclear power and energy	○	○	○
	Most important	Second most important	Third most important
Constitutional amendment	○	○	○
Issues related to the former Unification Church	○	○	○
Politics and money/slush funds	○	○	○
Regional revitalization	○	○	○
Disaster relief	○	○	○
Others	○	○	○
There is no second/third important issues		○	○

Q3. Among the candidates in this House of Representatives election, which political party does the incumbent member of the House of Representatives in your constituency belong to?

○ Liberal Democratic Party
○ Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
○ Japan Innovation Party
○ Komeito
○ Democratic Party for the People
○ Japanese Communist Party
○ Reiwa Shinsengumi
○ Social Democratic Party
○ Other parties/Independent
○ I don't know

Q4. In the previous House of Representatives election (2021), which party or independent candidate did you vote for?

○ Did not vote
○ Liberal Democratic Party
○ Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
○ Japan Innovation Party
○ Komeito
○ Democratic Party for the People
○ Japanese Communist Party
○ Reiwa Shinsengumi
○ Social Democratic Party
○ Other parties/Independent
○ Other/Prefer not to answer

Q5. How frequently have you been exposed to election-related news since October of this year?
○ Almost every day
○ Several times a week
○ Rarely
○ Hardly at all

Q6. What percentage of Japanese politicians do you believe are involved in issues such as omissions in political fund balance reports or kickbacks from political funds?
(　　)%

Next　Back



Q7. This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan.

Regarding the following question, how many out of 100 participants do you think answered "Completely unacceptable" or "Somewhat unacceptable"?

<Question>
To what extent can you tolerate issues such as omissions in political fund balance reports or kickbacks from political funds?

<Responses>
1. Completely unacceptable 2. Somewhat unacceptable 3. Somewhat acceptable 4. Completely acceptable

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered "1. Completely unacceptable" or "2. Somewhat unacceptable."

Next　Back

Q8. What is your highest educational level?
○ Junior high school graduate
○ High school graduate
○ Junior college, technical college, or vocational school graduate
○ University or graduate school graduate

Next Back

Q9. What is your marital status?

○ Married

○ Single

○ Divorced/Widowed

Next Back

Q10. How many people live in your household?

○ 1 person (living alone)

○ 2 people

○ 3 people

○ 4 people

○ 5 people

○ 6 people

○ 7 or more people

Next Back

Q11. What was your household's annual income before taxes in 2023?

○ Less than 2 million yen

○ 2 million to less than 4 million yen

○ 4 million to less than 6 million yen

○ 6 million to less than 8 million yen

○ 8 million to less than 10 million yen

○ 10 million to less than 12 million yen

○ 12 million to less than 15 million yen

○ 15 million to less than 20 million yen

○ 20 million to less than 30 million yen

○ 30 million to less than 50 million yen

○ 50 million yen or more

Intervention & Post-treatment survey - October 25th

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This survey aims to academically investigate your thoughts and opinions leading up to the House of Representatives election.

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Please note that if you leave the survey, any answers provided before your leave will still be submitted to the research team.

Furthermore, questions marked with the following icon are bonus questions. For these questions, after collecting responses from all participants in this survey for each question, 100 participants who answered correctly will be randomly selected to receive an additional 100 yen worth of points. Across the three surveys, there are a total of 5 bonus questions, allowing participants to earn up to 500 yen in bonus points.




If you are able to participate, we would greatly appreciate your cooperation in completing all the surveys.

Next Back

This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan. In the previous survey, participants were asked how many of the other respondents considered that "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" are "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."

As a result, it was found that people believe that out of 100 participants, 67 considered "omissions in political fund reports and kickbacks from political funds" to be either "completely unacceptable" or "somewhat unacceptable."



Next Back



This survey project brings together a diverse group of participants, whose responses can be said to represent the views and attitudes of the average voter in Japan.

Q1. We would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that they "will vote" for the incumbent candidate in your constituency?

<Question>
Will you vote for the incumbent candidate in your constituency in this election?

<Responses>
1. Will vote 2. Will not vote

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered "1. Will vote".



Q2. Similarly, we would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that they "should vote" for the incumbent candidate in your constituency?

<Question>
Do you think you “should vote” for the incumbent candidate in your constituency in this election?

<Answers>
1. Should vote 2. Should not vote

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered "1. Should vote."



Q3. Similarly, we would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in their constituency is "very competent" or "competent"?

<Question>
How competent do you think the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in your constituency is?

<Answers>
1. Not competent at all 2. Not competent 3. Competent 4. Very competent

To the above question, I believe that ( ) out of 100 people answered “4. Very competent” or “3. Competent”.



Q4. Similarly, we would like to ask your opinion.
Regarding the following question, how many people out of 100 in your constituency, whom we surveyed, do you think answered that the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in their constituency is "very trustworthy" or "trustworthy"?

<Question>
How trustworthy do you think the incumbent House of Representatives member (elected in the previous 2021 election) in your constituency is?

<Answers>
1. Not trustworthy at all 2. Not trustworthy 3. Trustworthy 4. Very trustworthy

To the above question, I believe that (　　) out of 100 people answered “4. Very trustworthy” or “3. Trustworthy”.

Next　Back

Q5. How much influence do you think your vote has on the election outcome?
○ Not at all
○ Not much
○ Some
○ A great deal

Next Back

Q6. In this House of Representatives election, will you vote in the single-member district for the incumbent candidate (elected in the previous 2021 election) in your constituency?

○ Vote for the incumbent
○ Vote for another candidate from the same party as the incumbent
○ Vote for a candidate from a different party or an independent candidate
○ Do not plan to vote
○ Not sure

Next Back

Q7. To what extent do you support policies that aim to make the flow of political funds more transparent, including legal reforms?

○ Do not support at all
○ Do not support much
○ Somewhat support
○ Strongly support

Next Back

Q8. Suppose you have 50,000 yen at your disposal. How much of it would you donate to an NGO working to increase the transparency of political funding?

I would like to donate ( ) yen out of 50,000 yen.

Endline Survey - October 28th

Thank you for accessing this survey page. This survey is being conducted by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Osaka University, the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, and the Faculty of Economics at Kinki University to understand public perceptions regarding elections.

This survey aims to academically investigate your thoughts and opinions leading up to the House of Representatives election.

The information you provide will be used only for academic research and not for any other purposes. The survey is anonymous, and your privacy will be fully protected. It is designed to understand your honest perspectives, without any judgment of right or wrong. We request your understanding in this regard and hope you are comfortable while answering the following questions.

Please note that if you leave the survey, any answers provided before your leave will still be submitted to the research team.

If you are able to participate, we would greatly appreciate your cooperation in completing all the surveys.

Next Back

Q1. Did you vote in the current House of Representatives general election (national election)?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Prefer not to answer

Next Back

Q2. In the single-member district of the current House of Representatives general election,

did you vote for the incumbent candidate (elected in the previous 2021 election)?

○ Did not vote

○ Voted for the incumbent candidate

○ Voted for another candidate from the same party as the incumbent candidate

○ Voted for a candidate from a different party or an independent candidate

○ Prefer not to answer

Next Back

A.3.2 Original Version

Baseline Survey - October 18th

本アンケートページにアクセスしていただきましてありがとうございます。本アンケート調査は、みなさまの「選挙に関する意識」を理解する目的のために、大阪大学社会経済研究所、早稲田大学政治経済学術院、近畿大学経済学部が共同で実施するものです。

この調査は、みなさまが今回の衆議院議員総選挙に先立ち、どのような考えを持っていらっしゃるのかを学術的に調査することを目的としています。

ご回答いただいた内容は学術調査にのみ使用され、その他の目的では一切使用されません。また、アンケートは匿名調査で、みなさまのプライバシーは完全に保護されます。アンケートはみなさまのありのままの姿を理解することを目的としており、それに関する善悪の判断をすることは一切ありません。その点をご理解いただき、気楽にお答え頂けますと幸いです。

今回の調査に加えて、一部の方には、10月25日(金)と28日（月）の午後18時ごろにアンケートのご案内を行います。今回の質問数は11問、10/25(金)の質問数は8問となっており、それぞれ5分程度の完了時間を想定しています。10/28（月）の質問数は2問の簡単な調査になっており、所要時間が2分を越えることはないと想定しています。

本調査では、回答を中断した場合も、中断までに回答されたデータは調査委託者に納品されます。

また、以下のマークがついている質問は、ボーナス質問です。これらの質問は、質問ごとにこの調査に参加されている皆さんの回答を集計した後、正解した方の中から100名様に追加で100円相当のポイント差し上げます。ボーナス質問は3回のアンケート合計で5問あり、最大で500円相当のポイントが獲得可能です。



ご参加頂ける方は、是非全てのアンケートにご協力くださいますよう、お願い申し上げます。

Q1 あなたの政治的価値観についてお尋ねします。あなたには支持している政党はありますか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 自民党を支持している
- ○ その他与党を支持している
- ○ 野党を支持している

◯ 支持している政党は無い

◯ 答えたくない

Q2 今回の衆議院議員総選挙(国政選挙)に関して、以下の点について、あなたが個人的に重視する順に1つから最大３つまで選んで下さい。

ひとつだけ　必須

	最も重視する	2番目に重視する	3番目に重視する
	↓	↓	↓
物価高	○	○	○
少子化	○	○	○
高齢化	○	○	○
気候変動・環境	○	○	○
財政	○	○	○
外交	○	○	○
年金	○	○	○
原発・エネルギー	○	○	○
	最も重視する	2番目に重視する	3番目に重視する
憲法改正	○	○	○
旧統一教会問題	○	○	○
政治とカネ・裏金	○	○	○
地方創生	○	○	○
被災地援助	○	○	○
その他	○	○	○
2番目／3番目に重視するものはない		○	○

Q3 今回の衆議院議員選挙の候補者のうち、あなたの選挙区の現在の衆議院議員(現職)の政党はどれですか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 自民党
- ○ 立憲民主党
- ○ 日本維新の会
- ○ 公明党
- ○ 国民民主党
- ○ 日本共産党
- ○ れいわ新選組
- ○ 社会民主党
- ○ その他の政党・無所属
- ○ わからない

Q4 前回(2021年)の衆議院議員選挙では、どの政党・無所属の議員に投票しましたか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 選挙に行っていない
- ○ 自民党
- ○ 立憲民主党
- ○ 日本維新の会
- ○ 公明党
- ○ 国民民主党
- ○ 日本共産党
- ○ れいわ新選組
- ○ 社会民主党
- ○ その他の政党・無所属
- ○ その他・答えたくない

Q5　今年の10月以降、どの程度の頻度で選挙関連のニュースに触れましたか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ ほぼ毎日
- ○ 1週間に数回程度
- ○ あまり触れていない
- ○ ほとんど触れていない

Q6 あなたは、日本の政治家の何%ぐらいが「政治資金収支報告書への記載漏れや政治資金のキックバック」問題に関係していると思いますか。

必須

[ ] %



Q7 この調査プロジェクトには、様々な方々が集まっており、調査参加者の回答は、日本の平均的な有権者の見解と態度を表しているといえます。

以下の質問について、私たちが尋ねた中の100人のうち、何人が
「全く許容できない」または
「それほど許容できない」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは、「政治資金収支報告書への記載漏れや政治資金のキックバック」問題についてどれぐらい許容できますか。

＜回答＞
1.全く許容できない、2.それほど許容できない、3.まあ許容できる、4.全く許容できる

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [ ]
人が、「1.全く許容できない」または「2.それほど許容できない」と答えたと思う

Q8 あなたの最終学歴をお答えください。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 中学卒
- ○ 高校卒
- ○ 短大・高専・専門学校卒
- ○ 大学・大学院卒

Q9 あなたの婚姻状況をお答えください。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 既婚
- ○ 未婚
- ○ 離死別

Q10 あなたのご家庭の同居人数をお答えください。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 1人（1人暮らし）
- ○ 2人
- ○ 3人
- ○ 4人
- ○ 5人
- ○ 6人
- ○ 7人以上

Q11 2023年のあなたのご家庭の世帯年収（税引き前）をお答えください。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ○ 200万円未満
- ○ 200万円～400万円未満
- ○ 400万円～600万円未満
- ○ 600万円～800万円未満
- ○ 800万円～1000万円未満
- ○ 1000万円～1200万円未満
- ○ 1200万円～1500万円未満
- ○ 1500万円～2000万円未満
- ○ 2000万円～3000万円未満
- ○ 3000万円～5000万円未満
- ○ 5000万円以上

Intervention & Post-treatment survey - October 25th

本アンケートページにアクセスしていただきましてありがとうございます。本アンケート調査は、みなさまの「選挙に関する意識」を理解する目的のために、大阪大学社会経済研究所、早稲田大学政治経済学術院、近畿大学経済学部が共同で実施するものです。

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
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この調査プロジェクトには、様々な方々が集まっており、調査参加者の回答は、日本の平均的な有権者の見解と態度を表しているといえます。前回の調査では、「政治資金収支報告書への記載漏れや政治資金のキックバック」について、他の回答者の中に、「全く許容できない」または「それほど許容できない」と考えている方がどれぐらいいるかお聞きしました。

その結果、100人のうち、67 人が「政治資金収支報告書への記載漏れや政治資金のキックバック」を「全く許容できない」または「それほど許容できない」と考えていることがわかりました。





この調査プロジェクトには、様々な方々が集まっており、調査参加者の回答は、日本の平均的な有権者の見解と態度を表しているといえます。

Q1 あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、 私たちが尋ねた中の 、あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職候補に「投票する」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは今回の選挙で、自分の選挙区の現職候補に投票しますか。

＜回答＞
1．投票する　2．投票しない

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [ ] 人が、「1．投票する」と答えたと思う



Q2 同様に、あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、 私たちが尋ねた中の 、 あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職候補に「投票すべき」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは今回の選挙で、自分の選挙区の現職候補に投票すべきだと思いますか。

＜回答＞
1．投票すべき　2．投票すべきではない

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [ ] 人が、「1．投票すべき」と答えたと思う



Q3 同様に、あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、私たちが尋ねた中の、あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）は「とても能力がある」または「能力がある」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは、自分の選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）にはどれぐらい能力があると思いますか。

＜回答＞
1．全く能力がない　2．能力がない　3．能力がある　4．とても能力がある

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [　　] 人が、「4．とても能力がある」または「3．能力がある」と答えたと思う



Q4 同様に、あなたのお考えについてお聞きします。
以下の質問に関して、私たちが尋ねた中の、あなたの選挙区の人たち100人のうち、何人が自分たちの選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）は「とても信頼できる」または「信頼できる」と答えたと思いますか。

＜質問＞
あなたは、自分の選挙区の現職の衆議院議員（前回の選挙（2021年）で当選した人）はどれぐらい信頼できますか。

＜回答＞
1．全く信頼できない　2．信頼できない　3．信頼できる　4．とても信頼できる

必須

上記の質問で、100人中 [　　] 人が、「4．とても信頼できる」または「3．信頼できる」と答えたと思う

Q5 あなたの票は、選挙結果に対してどれぐらい影響力があると思いますか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ◯ 全くない
- ◯ あまりない
- ◯ 少しある
- ◯ とてもある

Q6 あなたは今回の衆議院議員選挙の小選挙区で、自分の選挙区の現職候補(前回の選挙(2021年)で当選した人)に投票しますか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ◯ 現職に投票する
- ◯ 現職と同じ政党だが別の候補者に投票する
- ◯ 現職とは別の政党・無所属の候補者に投票する
- ◯ 選挙に行く予定はない
- ◯ わからない

Q7 あなたは、法改正などを含め、政治資金の流れをより透明にする政策をどれぐらい支持しますか。

ひとつだけ　必須

- ◯ 全く支持しない
- ◯ それほど支持しない
- ◯ まあ支持する
- ◯ 強く支持する

Q8 仮に自由に使える5万円が手元にあるとします。そのうちの一部を、政治資金の透明性を高める活動をしているNGOに寄付できるとします。あなたは、5万円のうちいくらを寄付しますか。

必須

5万円のうち、 [　　] 円、寄付する

Endline Survey - October 28th

本アンケートページにアクセスしていただきましてありがとうございます。本アンケート調査は、みなさまの「選挙に関する意識」を理解する目的のために、大阪大学社会経済研究所、早稲田大学政治経済学術院、近畿大学経済学部が共同で実施するものです。

この調査は、みなさまが今回の衆議院議員総選挙に先立ち、どのような考えを持っていらっしゃるのかを学術的に調査することを目的としています。

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本調査では、回答を中断した場合も、中断までに回答されたデータは調査委託者に納品されます。

ご参加頂ける方は、是非全てのアンケートにご協力くださいますよう、お願い申し上げます。

Q1 あなたは今回の衆議院議員総選挙(国政選挙)で投票しましたか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ はい
- ○ いいえ
- ○ 答えたくない

Q2 あなたは今回の衆議院議員選挙の小選挙区で、現職候補(前回の選挙(2021年)で当選した人)に投票しましたか。

ひとつだけ 必須

- ○ 選挙に行ってない
- ○ 現職に投票した
- ○ 現職と同じ政党だが別の候補者に投票した
- ○ 現職とは別の政党・無所属の候補者に投票した
- ○ 答えたくない