Religious Mayors, Teenage Pregnancy, and Sexual Education in Schools

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Abstract

I investigate the impact of local Pentecostal politicians on teenage pregnancy rates in Brazil using a regression discontinuity design that compares close mayoral races between Evangelical and non-Evangelical parties. I find that an Evangelical party win leads to an additional 2.86 births per 1,000 teenage girls - a 10% increase from the baseline. I explore one possible mechanism: municipal schools under Evangelical governance are 11.4 percentage points less likely to offer sexual education, while there is no difference for state schools whose curriculum is not influenced by mayors. I also find an increase in STD incidence among teenagers. Finally, I show evidence that these results are not driven by the conservativeness of parties but by the religious component.

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1 Introduction

The rise of Pentecostalism represents one of the most significant religious transformations of the modern era. In Brazil alone, the Pentecostal population surged by an extraordinary 350% between 1980 and 2010, making it one of the fastest-growing religious movements in Latin America. Pentecostals are characterized by their socially conservative positions, particularly regarding gender norms and sexual morality. This dramatic demographic shift has translated into substantial political power; approximately 40% of Brazil's national Congress is affiliated with the Evangelical lobby[1], highlighting their considerable societal influence. Despite their growing national prominence, the local policy implications of this Pentecostal surge remain underexplored. Understanding how Pentecostal leadership affects municipal governance is crucial, as mayors in Brazil have significant autonomy over important local policies.

One public debate where Pentecostal influence has been particularly strong is on sexual education in schools. Pentecostal leaders have been often at the forefront of opposition to comprehensive programs. Conservative voices argue that comprehensive sexual education encourages premature sexual activity and increases adolescent pregnancy rates. Progressive advocates counter that evidence-based sexual education, including instruction on contraception and STI prevention, is essential for improving public health outcomes and reducing unintended pregnancies among youth. The empirical evidence has mixed results on the effectiveness of sexual education on teenage pregnancy.

This paper examines the causal impact of Pentecostal local political leadership on sexual education and teenage pregnancy rates in Brazil. Employing a regression discontinuity design that exploits close race mayoral elections, I show that, when a Pentecostal party narrowly wins, municipal schools are 10 p.p. less likely to offer sexual education. I

[1] *The Economist* magazine, June 5th 2021 Edition.

find an increase of 2.86 births per 1,000 adolescent girls — representing a 10% increase from baseline rates. Although I cannot rule out that mayors may have changed other policies that could also affect fertility, I show that the effects are concentrated on school-age girls, who are the ones that should be affected by the change in the curriculum. I find no effect for older women or for girls with three or less years of education. Both these groups are unlikely to be enrolled in school and be affected by the curriculum. In addition, I document a corresponding increase in sexually transmitted infections among adolescents in these municipalities, but no effect on other populations. I also show that all the outcomes of interest were similar in the years before the studied election, which reassures that the municipalities were comparable prior the election.

I focus on municipal schools because mayors in Brazil have the authority to appoint individuals to headmaster positions in municipal schools.[2] Headmasters wield influence over the school curriculum and can determine which activities are included. Consequently, mayors can appoint headmasters who align with their stance on sexual education, shaping the implementation of related policies. Importantly, I do not find any effect for state schools, where the mayors cannot directly influence the choice of the headmasters.

I show that mayors affiliated with Pentecostal parties are able to influence the curriculum of municipal schools through their discretion in appointing school principals. While the headmasters' turnover is not higher when an Pentecostal mayor is elected, those mayors are more likely to directly appoint headmasters, rather than select them through a competitive process. This political appointment process gives the mayor greater control over who leads the schools and, by extension, the curriculum. By appointing principals who align with their ideological agenda, these mayors can shape the educational environment in ways that promote their preferred approaches, particularly on sensitive

[2]Approximately 60% of these appointments are politically motivated rather than selected through a competitive process or elected by the school community.

topics like sexual education.

I do not find evidence of changes in other courses such as racism, inequality, bullying, environment, or violence, topics in which Pentecostals' opinions do not systematically differ from others. However, I find that municipal schools are also less likely to provide activities related to drugs. This result is consistent with their approach to other sensitive topics, where Pentecostals may seek to limit discussions that they believe could promote behaviors contrary to their moral and religious views. I do not find evidence of changes in any of those courses for state schools, where mayors do not have influence over the curriculum.

Although I cannot directly test for differences in social views, I provide two pieces of evidence against that. First, I show that municipalities where a Pentecostal party won the election by a small margin do not differ from the municipalities where it lost in terms of observable socioeconomic characteristics in the years before the studied election. Second, I show that mayors are also comparable in terms of observables. This provides confidence that any observed effects can be attributed to the religious orientation of the party, rather than confounding factors.

One potential concern with my results is that the observed effects may be driven by the general conservativeness of the Pentecostal parties, rather than their specific religious orientation. Given the significant overlap between the policy agendas of Pentecostal political candidates and conservative parties more broadly, it is possible that the impact on teenage pregnancy and sexual education is attributable to the conservative ideology, rather than the religious component. To address this alternative explanation, I examine close races between right-wing parties (excluding the Pentecostal ones) and other non-right-wing parties. If the results were simply a function of conservative politics, I would expect to see similar effects when non-Evangelical right-wing parties win the elections.

However, I do not find any evidence that a conservative party winning the election, in the absence of a religious Evangelical affiliation, changes the provision of sexual education or impacts teenage pregnancy rates in municipal schools. This pattern of results suggests the effects I observe are specifically tied to the religious orientation of the Pentecostal parties, and not solely a function of their conservative policy positions.

I rely on three sets of administrative data. I use birth data from SINASC/SUS to construct a proxy of teenage pregnancy.[3] This data contains information on all deliveries in hospitals or health clinics, and it also provides information on mothers' characteristics. The availability of sexual education activities in public schools comes from *Prova Brasil*, a nationwide, standardized exam administered every two years to fourth and eighth-graders in public schools. To identify municipalities where there was a close race between a mayor affiliated to an Pentecostal party and a mayor from any other party, I rely on the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE).

A significant body of literature examines the economic effects of political parties (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004; Pettersson-Lidbom 2008). However, studies investigating the impact of alternative political divisions such as religion are still scarce. A notable exception is Meyersson (2010), who shows that in Turkish municipalities where an Islamic party narrowly secured victory, there was a notable increase in female secular high school education. Additionally, Henderson and Kuncoro (2011) demonstrates a decline in corruption levels subsequent to heightened representation of Islamic parties in Indonesia. Blaydes (2010) further contributes to this literature by reporting improved health outcomes for women residing in a district of Cairo under the control of radical Islamists in autocratic Egypt.

This paper contributes to the social science literature on the ability of educational

[3]Abortion is illegal in Brazil, except when pregnancy is the result of rape, poses a risk to the mother's life, or when the fetus is anencephalic.

content to shape individuals' beliefs and behaviors. Cantoni et al. (2017) studies the effect of school curricula on students' political attitudes, exploiting a major textbook reform in China between 2004 and 2010.

The literature on the effect of sexual education on teenage pregnancy has mixed results. Some studies find that providing teenagers information about the risks of unprotected sex reduces teenage pregnancy (Arcand and Wouabe 2010; Dupas 2011; Dupas, Huillery, and Seban 2018; Cabezón et al. 2005). Other papers show that sexual education alone does not impact teenage pregnancy (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2015).

2 Background

I study the effect of mayors affiliated with Evangelical parties on teenage pregnancy and sexual education, using close race elections between candidates affiliated with Evangelical parties and others. Mayors are elected in municipal elections that are held every four years on the same day across the country, and they can hold office for two consecutive terms. I consider the *Partido Social Cristão* (PSC) and *Partido Republicano Brasileiro* (PRB) as the Pentecostal parties in my analysis.

2.1 Pentecostal Parties in Brazil

Brazil has a multiparty system with around 30 political parties. Within this landscape, two parties are closely associated with Pentecostal churches in Brazil: the *Partido Social Cristão* (PSC) and the *Partido Republicano Brasileiro* (PRB). Although not all candidates from these parties are exclusively affiliated with Pentecostal churches, they are heavily influenced and led by Pentecostal pastors.

The *Partido Social Cristão* (PSC) was founded in 1985 and has taken a conservative stance on social issues, opposing abortion and drug legalization. Despite its relatively small number of elected officials, the party gained visibility in 2014 due to its strong opposition to LGBTQ+ rights. One of the prominent figures of the party is Pastor Everaldo, a member of the Pentecostal *Assembleia de Deus* church, who served as the party's vice president and then president.

The *Partido Republicano Brasileiro* (PRB) was organized in 2003 and founded by pastors from the Pentecostal *Universal do Reino de Deus* church. Although the party does not have any explicit religious references in its name or stated ideology, it remains strongly associated with this Pentecostal denomination, with almost all of its executive members being pastors.

These Pentecostal parties play a significant role in Brazil's political landscape, reflecting the growing influence of Pentecostal in the country's public life and policy debates.

2.2 School System in Brazil

Municipalities are responsible for important public services such as education, health, and transportation. They count on federal and state transfers to fund public expenses (Gardner 2013). Since the focus is looking at availability of sexual education in schools, I focus only on schools offering middle school education.[4]

In 2023, Brazil had 61,806 schools offering middle school education. Of these, 47% were under the municipal administration, 29.3% were controlled by states, 23.5% were private, and fewer than 1% were controlled by the federal government. The municipality

[4]Unfortunately there is no data for high schools.

is responsible for managing the daily operations of public schools, such as providing school lunch, transportation, and hiring and paying school personnel like teachers and administrators. Most municipal employees are civil servants who passed a civil service exam and have job security. However, some are hired under contracts for more flexible and controllable personnel management, such as quick hiring or specialized skills. The mayor must justify contract hires and could face investigation for any misconduct (Akhtari, Moreira, and Trucco 2022).

Importantly, the position of principal is considered a "position of trust", which allows politicians to appoint someone they trust to the position and hold discretion over it. Sixty percent of principals in public schools are politically appointed, rather than selected through a competitive process or elected by the school community. The vast majority of principals in Brazil are women (80%), half of them are white, and almost all have a college degree. In 2011, 18% of the principals were in that position for less than one year, 50% were there between 2 and 5 years, and 32% for more than five years.

3 Data

To measure the impact of mayors affiliated with Evangelical parties on sexual education and teenage pregnancy, I rely on three administrative datasets. I use data on voting to select the municipalities where there was a close race between a mayor from an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party. To measure teenage pregnancy, I use data from SINASC/SUS. Finally, I use data from *Prova Brasil* to analyze the presence of sexual education activities in the schools.

3.1 Voting

To identify close races between a mayor affiliated with an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party, I use data on mayoral elections from 2008, 2012, and 2016. I classify as Evangelical parties the "*Partido Social Cristão*" (PSC) and "*Partido Republicano Brasileiro*" (PRB).

I use data from the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* (TSE). The data contains information on the number of votes received by each candidate, the characteristics of the candidates, and their party. I drop municipalities that can potentially go to second-round elections. Second-round elections can only occur if the municipality is above the population threshold of 200,000 and no candidate wins the majority of the votes. Given that the average municipal population in Brazil is 33,000, this restriction drops a small number of municipalities.

Table 1 shows the number of municipalities in each electoral cycle where one of the two top candidates was affiliated with an Evangelical party and the other belonged to any other party. My final sample constitutes of of 700 municipality-cycles across the 2008, 2012, and 2016 cycles.

3.2 Teenage Pregnancy

Brazil is one of the countries with the highest teenage pregnancy rates in South America. In 2023, the number of births per 1,000 teenage girls aged 13-17 was approximately 24. This high rate of teenage pregnancy is a significant public health and social concern, as it can have substantial consequences for the individuals and communities involved. Due to the legal restrictions on abortion in Brazil, birth rate serves as a reliable proxy for measuring teenage pregnancy.

To construct the teenage birth rate data, I utilize information from the Brazilian Public Health System (SINASC/SUS). This dataset contains comprehensive records of all hospital and clinic deliveries, including the municipality of birth and the mothers' municipality of residence. It also provides valuable details on the mothers' characteristics, such as age and education. Focusing my analysis on teenage girls aged 13-17, I am able to establish a robust measure of the teenage birth rate.

Table 2 presents the birth rate of teenage girls by mayors' party affiliation in the years preceding the election. The sample is restricted to municipalities where the two top mayoral candidates were an Evangelical party representative and a non-Evangelical party candidate. The data shows the birth rate is slightly higher in municipalities with Evangelical mayors compared to those with non-Evangelical mayors (25.1 vs. 23.9 per 1,000 teenage girls), though the difference is small.

3.3 Sexual Education and Headmaster Replacement

The data on the availability of sexual education in municipal schools comes from the Prova Brasil, a nationwide, standardized exam administered every two years since 2007 to fourth and eighth-grade students in public schools with at least 20 enrolled students per grade. For the purposes of my analysis, I restrict the sample to schools that offer middle school education.

Beyond the standardized test, the Prova Brasil data collection also includes questionnaires completed by students, teachers, and headmasters. The principal questionnaire provides information on their individual characteristics, such as age and gender, as well as details about how they were appointed to the position. Specifically, it asks whether they were selected through a competitive process, appointed by a politician, a combination of these methods, or elected by the local school community.

The principal questionnaire also includes data on the various educational activities and programs offered at the school, including sexual education, as well as topics like violence, bullying, and discrimination. This comprehensive dataset allows me to examine not only the availability of sexual education, but also how it may be influenced by the characteristics and appointment process of school principals.

4 Empirical Strategy

Identifying the impact of policymakers' conservatism on the presence of sex education in schools and teenage pregnancy is challenging because their social views might also be correlated with variables that influence the schools' curricula. To identify the effect of a Evangelical party, we compare outcomes in municipalities where the Evangelical party barely loses to outcomes in municipalities where the Evangelical party barely wins; that is, we use a sharp regression discontinuity design for close elections.

The main specification is a linear regression for close elections, where "close" is defined according to the optimal bandwidth selection of Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019). I estimate the effect of Evangelical parties on outcomes of interest by estimating the following equation at the municipality-level or the school-level, depending on the outcome, for municipalities with close elections:

$$Y_{jmt} = \alpha + \beta \cdot T_{mt} + \tau \cdot MV_{mt} + \rho \cdot MV_{mt} \times T_{mt} +_{jmt} +\varepsilon_{mt}$$

where Y_{jmt} is the outcome variable of interest (municipality-level teenage pregnancy and STD or school-level presence of sexual education activities and headmaster replacement) in municipality m, measured a few years after the election (election time t is either 2008,

2012, and 2016). The running variable of the RD is the vote margin, MV, and it is computed as the vote share of the Evangelical party minus the vote share of the non-Evangelical party. The treatment variable is T, an indicator variable equal to one if the Evangelical party wins the election. X_{jmt} is a set of controls that includes municipality-level teenage birth rate at the baseline (when the outcome variable is teenage birth rate), school-level characteristics (when the outcome is sexual education), an election-cycle dummies to control for a general time effect between the three election cycles, and state dummies to account for state policies. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

The parameter of interest, β, provides the estimated local effects of Evangelical parties on the outcome of interest. This estimator not only assumes that municipalities are comparable close to the threshold, but also that agents (i.e. politicians and voters) are unable to precisely manipulate the running variable. I discuss and provide support to these assumptions in Section 5.1.

5 Results

Using a close race election regression discontinuity design, I show that having a mayor affiliated to religious party leads to an increase in teenage birth rate. I also perform an event-study analysis finding that teenage births only increased in the second year of the election term, remaining higher for the following four years.

5.1 Validity Checks

To these estimates be interpreted as causal, we need the assumption of random assignment of party identity around the threshold to hold. If elections could be perfectly manipulated

around the threshold, the assumption is violated (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). As long as politicians, municipalities or voters do not have precise control over the running variable, random assignment is still valid.

An commonly used validity check is to examine whether baseline covariates are continuous around the threshold. Figure 5 shows that there are no clear and statistically significant jumps at the threshold of the control variables.

Another testable hypotheses underlying the RD design is local continuity in the density of the running variable at the threshold ex post. If the running variable can be manipulated, there could be sorting around the threshold. McCrary (2008) proposes a two-step procedure for explicitly testing for a discontinuity in the density of the running variable. In the first step, the running variable is partitioned into equally spaced bins and frequencies are computed within those bins. The second step treats the frequency counts as a dependent variable in a local linear regression. This is shown graphically in Figure 1. This test rejects any discontinuity in the density at the threshold with a comfortable margin.

5.2 Teenage Pregnancy

Figure 3 plots the covariate-adjusted teenage birth rate against the margin of victory, binned in 1p.p wide intervals. From this figure, we can clearly see a discontinuity in the birth rate when the margin of victory becomes positive, i.e. when a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party wins the election. Result shows an increase of 3.8 births per 1,000 teenagers, an increase of 10% from the baseline.

Table 3 shows the result of the RD estimation using different specifications. The estimated coefficient coefficient is stable across all the specifications. In Column (1), I

include only the baseline teenage pregnancy as a control The local effect of a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party winning the election is 2.98 births per 1,000 girls, significant at 5% using the conventional and at 10% using the robust p-value. In Column (2), I include election cycle fixed-effects. The point estimate is to 2.79, significant at 5% for both p-values. In Column (3), my preferred specification, I add state fixed-effects. Because health policies are at the state level, the state fixed-effects account for those policies. The effect of Evangelical mayors on teenage birth rate is 2.86, significant at 5% for both p-values, which correspond to an increase of 10% relatively to the baseline.

As a placebo test, I conduct the same analysis but moving the timing of the election. I assume that the close race election between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and other mayors happened in the previous electoral cycle, i.e, four years before. Figure 4 shows that there is no discontinuity for this outcome around the cutoff. Table 4 shows that the estimated effect is statistically not significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient very small or even negative. This exercise rules out that the municipalities where the Evangelical candidate won by a small margin of votes had different trends compared to the municipalities where the candidate lost the election.

Next, I analyze whether the mayors' religious affiliation impacted birth rates among older women as well. If the Evangelical mayors were implementing policies that generally reduced the cost of having children, such as expanding childcare services, we would expect to see similar effects for older women. However, the results show no significant impact on birth rates among 22-27 year-old women (Figure 5). This suggests that the effects are specifically targeted towards teenage girls, rather than reflecting broader pro-natalist policies. The lack of spillover effects on older women indicates the mayors' policies and initiatives were likely focused on influencing the sexual and reproductive behaviors of teenage girls, rather than just generally incentivizing childbearing across all age groups.

These findings help isolate the mechanisms at play - the Evangelical mayors appear to be implementing measures that directly impact teenage pregnancy and sexual activity, rather than broadly supporting increased fertility. The differential effects by age group provide important insights into the nature and targeting of the mayors' policies and interventions.

5.2.1 Heterogeneous Effects

To further investigate the heterogeneous impacts of Evangelical mayors, I examine the effects on teenage pregnancy rates across different demographic subgroups. Specifically, I look at the results broken down by the race and educational attainment of the teenage girls. As shown in Figure 6, the increase in teenage birth rates is concentrated among non-white girls and those with 4 or more years of education. This pattern of results aligns with my expectations based on the proposed mechanisms.

In Section 5.3, I show that when Evangelical parties win local elections, there is a significant reduction in the provision of sexual education activities within municipal schools. Given that the majority of public school students in Brazil come from lower-income backgrounds, we would expect the impacts on teenage pregnancy to be more pronounced among non-white girls. As shown in Panel a) of Figure 6, the increase in birth rates for white teenage girls is not statistically significant, amounting to 1.041 additional births per 1,000. In contrast, Panel b) of Figure 6 reveals a much starker impact for non-white teenage girls. In municipalities where an Evangelical party wins the mayoral race, there is an increase of 3.36 births per 1,000 non-white teenage residents - a effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level.

Additionally, if the effects are primarily driven by changes to the sexual education curriculum and programming in middle schools, we would anticipate the impacts to be

more salient for girls who are actually attending and enrolled in this level of schooling - those with 4 or more years of education. As shown in Panel c) of Figure 6, the changes in birth rates for teenage girls with 3 or less years of education is not statistically significant, amounting to 0.85 less births per 1,000. In contrast, Panel d) of Figure 6 shows that, n municipalities where an Evangelical party wins the mayoral race, there is an increase of 3.93 births per 1,000 teenage with at least 4 years of education - a effect that is statistically significant at the 1% level.

5.2.2 Dynamic Effects

Next, I analyze the dynamics of fertility. To check whether teenage pregnancy was already increasing prior before the mayor taking office, I estimate the effects separately for three years before the election and six years after it. More specifically, I estimate the following model:

$$Y_{mtk} = \sum_{k} \alpha_k + \sum_{k,k\neq -1} \beta_k \cdot T_{mt} + \sum_{k} \tau_k \cdot MV_{mt} + \\ + \sum_{k} \rho_k \cdot MV_{mt} \cdot T_{mt} + \sum_{k} \gamma_{s(m)k} + \sum_{k} \delta_{tk} + \varepsilon_{mtk}$$

where m denotes the municipality, t denotes the electoral cycle, and k is the period relative to election. MV_{mt} is the margin of victory of the mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party in a race with a candidate from an Evangelical party and a non-Evangelical party. MV_{mt} assumes positive value if the Evangelical party is elected. T_{mt} is dummy indicating whether the winner is Evangelical. I allow for election cycle ($\delta_t k$) and state fixed-effects ($\delta_{s(m)k}$) to vary by period k. I estimate the equation allowing $f(\cdot)$ be a flexible polynomial on each side of the cutoff for the optimal bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric

procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) .

The event study analysis presented in Figure 7 provides further insights into the timing and dynamics of the effects. In the years leading up to the election, the conception rate[5] among teenage girls is similar in municipalities where Evangelical mayors narrowly won versus narrowly lost. Starting in the third year of the new Evangelical administration, the conception rate among teenage girls increases by 3 per 1,000 compared to the counterfactual municipalities. This elevated conception rate persists for the remainder of the seven-year period examined, suggesting the effects are not transitory but rather represent a sustained impact of the Evangelical mayors' policies and priorities. The gradual emergence and persistence of the effect over time also indicates that the Evangelical mayors are able to gradually implement and entrench their agenda within the municipal school system, with tangible impacts on teenage pregnancy rates.

5.3 Sexual Education

To understand the mechanisms, I analyze the presence of sexual education in schools. I find that after an Evangelical mayor is elected, sexual education is less frequently taught in municipal schools, but there is no effect on state schools where mayors have no control over the curriculum. While this is not the only channel, I also show the effects on teenage pregnancy are larger in municipalities with at least one municipal middle school, compared to those without. This suggests the reduction in sexual education availability within the municipal school system is an important pathway through which Evangelical mayors influence teenage pregnancy.

Figure 8 shows the covariate-adjusted share of municipal schools offering sexual education activities against the margin of victory, binned in 1 p.p. wide intervals. Re-

[5]I define as conception rate the birth rate minus nine months.

sults show that, in municipalities with mayors affiliated to Evangelical parties, municipal schools are 11.4 p.p. less likely include sexual education the in the curriculum, a 14.25% reduction. Results are statistically significant with a p-value of 2.2%.

I do not find a similar reduction in state schools, where mayors do not have direct power over school principals. Figure 9 repeats the analysis from Figure 8, but for state schools. Since mayors do not hold any power over state schools, we should not expect to find any results. Indeed, we find that there is no discontinuity when mayors affiliated to Evangelical parties win the election at these types of schools.

To analyze the robustness of the findings, Table **??** shows the coefficient of the RD estimation is stable across different specifications for municipal schools. In *Column 1*, I do not include any control, and find a reduction of 0.10 percentage points on sexual education, significant at 10% using the conventional p-value and marginally significant using the robust p-value (10.1%). In *Column 2*, I include election cycle fixed effects. The magnitude of the coefficient increases to -0.12 percentage points, significant at the 5% level using the conventional p-value and 10% significant using the robust p-value. Finally, in *Column 3*, I add state fixed effects. The magnitude of the coefficient is the same as in *Column 2*, statistically significant at the 5% level for both conventional and robust p-values. Table 6 shows the results for state schools. The results show the coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant for all specifications of the state school analysis.

To better understand whether sexual education in municipal schools is playing any role on the increase of teenage pregnancy, I split the teenage pregnancy analyze by the presence of at least one municipal schools in the municipality offering middle school education (70% of the sample). If the results from municipalities with at least one municipal schools were exactly the same or smaller than in municipalities with any municipal schools, then we could conclude that sexual education has no effect on teenage

pregnancy. Figure 10 shows that municipalities with at least one municipal school have had higher increase in teenage pregnancy (3.21 births per 1,000 teenage girls) compared to municipalities with no municipal schools (1.88 births per 1,000 teenage girls).

While my findings indicate that the reduction in sexual education in municipal schools under Evangelical mayors is an important contributing factor to the observed increase in teenage pregnancy and STD rates, it is unreasonable to assume this is the sole causal mechanism at play.

First, my analysis is limited to measuring the extensive margin - whether schools offer any sexual education activities at all, based on the principals' self-reporting. I do not have data on the frequency or content of these educational programs. It is possible that even if the activities are still provided, the Evangelical mayors may seek to influence the curriculum and messaging to be less comprehensive or effective. Second, the mayors could be restricting access to free contraceptives and family planning services at local public health clinics. While I do not find effects on birth rates for older women, the Evangelical administrations may still be making it more difficult for younger, teenage patients to obtain contraception and other reproductive health resources.

Finally, the Evangelical mayors may also be reducing or undermining public health campaigns and messaging that promote the use of condoms and other contraceptive methods. Such efforts to limit access to information and resources related to sexual and reproductive health could further contribute to the increases in teenage pregnancy and STD rates, beyond just the impacts on in-school sexual education. In summary, while the school-based sexual education channel is a key part of the story, the Evangelical mayors may be leveraging multiple policy levers to shape the sexual and reproductive behaviors of local youth, requiring a more holistic consideration of the causal pathways.

5.4 Other Courses

One potential concern is that mayors affiliated with Evangelical parties may remove or reduce courses that are not part of the mandatory curriculum, making the schools less attractive to students. If this were the case, my results could be explained by teenagers changing their behavior due to these broader changes in the school environment, rather than just the impact on sexual education.

To address this concern, I examine the offering of several other courses, including Environment, Inequality, Racism, Violence, Bullying, and Drugs. As shown in Figure 11, there is no evidence of changes in the availability of these courses, with one exception. I find a 20 percentage point decrease in the offering of drug-related courses in municipal schools under Evangelical mayors.

This reduction in drug education is consistent with the Evangelical mayors' approach to sensitive topics, where they may seek to limit discussions that they believe could promote behaviors contrary to their moral and religious views. However, the lack of effects on other course offerings suggests the Evangelical mayors are not broadly making schools less attractive by removing non-mandatory curriculum.

For state schools, I do not find evidence of changes in the availability of any these courses, as shown in Figure 12. There are no significant changes in the availability of these other courses in state schools, further reinforcing that the Evangelical mayors' influence is primarily targeted at the specific topic of sexual education within the municipal school system.

5.5 Headmasters' replacement

In Brazil, mayors have the authority to appoint individuals to headmaster positions in municipal schools. Headmasters can influence the school curriculum and can determine which activities are included. Consequently, mayors can appoint headmasters who align with their stance on sexual education, shaping the implementation of related policies.

Panel a) of Figure 13 shows no effect on the turnover of headmasters in municipal schools when the Evangelical party wins by a small margin of votes. Panel b) of Figure 13 provides evidence that headmasters in municipal schools are 16 percentage points, significant at 10%, more likely to be appointed for the position by politician when a mayor affiliated with an Evangelical party wins the election. This analysis includes all headmasters, not only the new ones.

5.6 Sexually Transmitted Diseases

Given that municipalities governed by Evangelical parties are less likely to provide comprehensive sexual education, I also analyze whether this translates to higher incidence of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) among local teenagers. Using data from the Brazilian Notifiable Diseases Information System (SINAN/SUS), I investigate whether municipalities where an Evangelical party won by a small margin of votes experience an increase in the incidence of syphilis among 13-17 year-olds.

As shown in Panel a) of Figure 14, there is a statistically significant increase of 0.046 syphilis cases per 1,000 teenage residents in these municipalities. This effect size is quite large, corresponding to an almost 75% increase from the mean rate. The relatively large magnitude of this impact is concerning and could be attributed to the ease with which STDs can spread in the absence of comprehensive sexual health education and

services.

Importantly, Panel b) of Figure 14 demonstrates that the syphilis rates were identical between the treatment and control groups in the period prior to the Evangelical mayors' election. This parallel trend lends confidence that the subsequent increase can be attributed to the policy changes implemented by the newly elected Evangelical administrations, rather than pre-existing differences between the municipalities.

These findings on elevated STD rates provide an additional concerning consequence of the Evangelical mayors' approach to sexual education and reproductive health in their communities. The data suggests their policies not only impact teenage pregnancy, but also contribute to worrying public health outcomes for local youth.

5.7 Can results be explained by conservative parties?

One possible concern with my results is that the results are driven by the conservativeness and not by the specific religious component. Because there is significant overlap between the agendas of Pentecostal political candidates and conservatives more broadly, it is possible that the conservative agenda is responsible for the results. If that were the case, I should observe similar effects when looking at the effects of other conservative, non-Evangelical, parties winning elections.

To address this concern, I look at close races between right-wing parties and other non-right-wing parties, excluding the Evangelical ones, i.e., PRB and PSC. I use the Atlas Político—Mapa do Congresso to categorize party ideology as belonging to the left, center, or right, following Akhtari, Moreira, and Trucco (2022).

Figure 15 shows there is no statistically significant effect for teenage pregnancy or sexual education when conservative parties win the elections. Beyond the lack of

statistical significance, the magnitude of the point estimates are about four times smaller. This result suggests that the effects are related to the religious orientation of the party, and not solely the conservativeness of the party.

These findings help rule out the alternative explanation that the results are driven by the conservativeness of the parties rather than their religious orientation. The lack of effects for non-Evangelical right-wing parties indicates that the religious component, and not just the conservative leanings, is a key factor in explaining the observed impacts on teenage pregnancy and sexual education policies.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, I investigate the impact of local Pentecostal politicians on teenage pregnancy rates in Brazil using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections. This approach allows me to compare municipalities where an Evangelical party candidate narrowly won the mayoral election against those where a non-Evangelical candidate barely won.

The results indicate that an Evangelical party victory leads to a significant increase in the teenage birth rate - an additional 2.86 births per 1,000 girls aged 13-17, amounting to a 10% rise from the baseline level. I also find an increase in the incidence of syphilis on teenagers. This sizable impact on teenage pregnancy and STD cases is concerning, as it can have profound social and economic consequences for young mothers and their communities.

My analysis points to a key contributing factor - municipal schools under Evangelical mayors are 11.4 percentage points less likely to provide sexual education. I find no such effect for state schools. The impact on teenage pregnancy is larger in municipalities

with at least one municipal middle school, compared to those without. This suggests the reduction in comprehensive sexuality education within the municipal system is an important pathway.

The effects are more pronounced for non-white girls and those with 4+ years of education - populations more likely to attend these municipal schools. By restricting sexual health resources, Evangelical mayors appear to be shaping the educational environment in ways that increase teen birth rates, especially in marginalized communities.

By restricting the availability of information and resources related to sexual and reproductive health, Evangelical mayors seem to be shaping the educational environment in ways that ultimately lead to higher rates of teenage childbearing and STD cases. This underscores how the religious ideology and policy priorities of local political leaders can have tangible impacts on critical public health outcomes for youth.

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
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Figures


Figure 1: Manipulation Test




Notes: This figure shows the McCrary test for manipulation of the running variable in the RDD, *Margin of victory*. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the *Margin of victory* is continuous at the zero threshold. The estimated discontinuity is 0.4337 with a standard error of 0.6645.

Figure 2: Evangelical Mayors and Municipality Characteristics


(a) Log Population




(b) Share Urban Population



(c) Share of Literacy




(d) Share of Evangelicals




Notes: This figure shows the a) log of population, b) share of urban population, c) share of literacy, and d) share of evangelicals against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).

Figure 3: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births from Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old)




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted teenage birth rate against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 4: (Placebo) Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births from Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old)




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted lagged teenage birth rate against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 5: (Placebo) Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births from Teenage Girls (22-27 years-old)




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted lagged teenage birth rate against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 6: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births from Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old) by race and years of schooling




Notes: This figure shows the teenage pregnancy rate for a) Whites, b) Non-whites, c) 3 or less years of education, and d) 4 or more year of education against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 7: Dynamic Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births from Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old)




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted lagged teenage birth rate against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 8: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Sexual Education in Municipal Schools



Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted share of municipal schools offering sexual education activities against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).


Figure 9: (Placebo) Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Sexual Education in State Schools




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted share of state schools offering sexual education activities against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 10: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births from Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old) by Presence of Municipal Schools in the Municipality

(a) Has at least one municipal school




(b) No municipal school



Notes: This figure shows the teenage pregnancy rate in municipalities a) with at least one municipal school and b) without municipal schools offering middle school education against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).


Figure 11: Evangelical Mayors and Other Courses in Municipal Schools



Notes: This figure shows share of municipal schools offering activities related to a) Environment, b) Inequality, c) Racism, d) Violence, e) Bullying, and f) Drugs against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).


Figure 12: Evangelical Mayors and Other Courses in State Schools

(a) Environment




RD estimate: 0.006
Robust p-value: 0.650

(b) Inequality




RD estimate: 0.072
Robust p-value: 0.314

(c) Racism




RD estimate: -0.019
Robust p-value: 0.754

(d) Violence




RD estimate: -0.110
Robust p-value: 0.172

(e) Bullying



RD estimate: -0.016
Robust p-value: 0.854

(f) Drugs




RD estimate: 0.006
Robust p-value: 0.782


Notes: This figure shows share of state schools offering activities related to a) Environment, b) Inequality, c) Racism, d) Violence, e) Bullying, and f) Drugs against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 13: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Headmaster Replacement

(a) Headmaster replacement




(b) Political Appointment of Headmasters




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted share of a) headmasters in that school less than two years b) headmasters appointed by a politician against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 14: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Sexually Transmitted Diseases

(a) Syphilis cases per 1,000 teenagers




(b) (Placebo) Syphilis cases per 1,000 teenagers




Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted share of a) headmasters in that school less than two years b) headmasters appointed by a politician against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an Evangelical party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects. The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Figure 15: Effect of Right-Wing Parties on Teenage Pregnancy and Sexual Education

(a) Teenage Pregnancy



(b) Sexual Education



Notes: This figure shows the covariate-adjusted share of teenage pregnancy and sexual education against the vote share difference between a mayor affiliated to an right-wing party and a mayor from any other party by bins of *margin of victory*. This analysis excludes the Evangelical parties. Municipalities with margin of victory > 0 had a mayor affiliated to a Evangelical party in the 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections. Covariates include the election cycle and state fixed-effects, and lagged teenage birth rate (for teenage pregnancy analysis only). The fitted lines are obtained by local linear regression with optimal-bandwidth calculated using the non-parametric procedure from Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, and Titiunik (2019).

Tables

Table 1: Number of municipalities where one of the top two mayor candidates was affiliated to an Evangelical party

Electoral Cycle	Number of municipalities
2008	186
2012	226
2016	288
Total	700

Notes: This table shows the number of races where one of the top two candidates was from an Evangelical party and the other one was from another party by election cycle.

Table 2: Average Birth rate

	Evangelical Parties		Other Parties	
Electoral Cycle	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
2008	33.1	11.4	33.4	12.8
2012	30.0	12.6	29.4	12.8
2016	24.2	12.9	21.6	10.8
Total	28.4	12.9	27.4	13.0

Notes: This table shows the teenage birth rate mean and standard deviation in municipalities governed by a mayors affiliated with an Evangelical party and by a mayor from any other party. This sample is restricted to races where one of the top two candidates was from an Evangelical party and the other one was from another party by election cycle.

Table 3: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old)

VARIABLES	(1) Birth Rate	(2) Birth Rate	(3) Birth Rate
RD_Estimate	3.46	3.36	2.58
	(1.825)	(1.480)	(1.338)
Dep. Var. t-1	Y	Y	Y
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	27.90	27.90	27.90
Effective N. Obs.	312	396	368
Conventional p-value	0.0582	0.0233	0.0540
Robust p-value	0.0464	0.0233	0.0446
Optimal Bandwidth	0.106	0.141	0.130
Order polyn.	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on birth rate per 1,000 teenage girls. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 4: (Placebo) Effect of Evangelical Mayors on Births Teenage Girls (13-17 years-old)

VARIABLES	(1) pcl_births Winsorized fraction .025 high only	(2) pcl_births Winsorized fraction .025 high only	(3) pcl_births Winsorized fraction .025 high only
RD_Estimate	-0.06	-0.06	-1.94
	(0.589)	(0.584)	(1.549)
Dep. Var. t-1	Y	Y	Y
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	32.21	32.21	32.21
Effective N. Obs.	497	495	350
Conventional p-value	0.917	0.913	0.211
Robust p-value	0.804	0.804	0.173
Optimal Bandwidth	0.204	0.201	0.123
Order polyn.	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on birth rate per 1,000 teenage girls in the previous election cycle. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 5: Effect of Evangelical Mayor on Sexual Education in Municipal Schools

VARIABLES	(1) Sexual Education	(2) Sexual Education	(3) Sexual Education
RD_Estimate	-0.10	-0.12	-0.12
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.763	0.763	0.763
Effective N. Obs.	1047	1032	770
Conventional p-value	0.0754	0.0493	0.0286
Robust p-value	0.101	0.0588	0.0264
Optimal Bandwidth	0.131	0.127	0.0833
Order polyn.	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on share of municipal schools offering activities related to sexual education. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 6: Effect of Evangelical Mayor on Sexual Education in State Schools

VARIABLES	(1) Sexual Education	(2) Sexual Education	(3) Sexual Education
RD_Estimate	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.059)
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.810	0.810	0.810
Effective N. Obs.	646	644	739
Conventional p-value	0.806	0.849	0.936
Robust p-value	0.698	0.756	0.931
Optimal Bandwidth	0.126	0.125	0.147
Order polyn.	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on share of municipal schools offering activities related to sexual education. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 7: Effect of Evangelical Mayor on Other Courses in Municipal Schools

VARIABLES	(1) Environment	(2) Inequality	(3) Racism	(4) Violence	(5) Bullying	(6) Drugs
RD_Estimate	-0.03	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04	-0.10	-0.16
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.052)
Cycle FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.909	0.541	0.682	0.702	0.738	0.785
Effective N. Obs.	749	1034	881	945	757	651
Conventional p-value	0.494	0.182	0.615	0.419	0.0826	0.00211
Robust p-value	0.469	0.201	0.609	0.465	0.147	0.000979
Optimal Bandwidth	0.0805	0.129	0.0985	0.115	0.0814	0.0691
Order polyn.	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on share of municipal schools offering activities related to 1) Environment, 2) Inequality, 3) Racism, 4) Violence, 5) Bullying, and 6) Drugs. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 8: Effect of Evangelical Mayor on Other Courses in State Schools

VARIABLES	(1) Environment	(2) Inequality	(3) Racism	(4) Violence	(5) Bullying	(6) Drugs
RD_Estimate	0.01	0.07	-0.02	-0.11	-0.02	0.01
	(0.038)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.052)
Cycle FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.922	0.630	0.810	0.738	0.846	0.841
Effective N. Obs.	385	632	631	607	645	555
Conventional p-value	0.885	0.253	0.746	0.0869	0.785	0.909
Robust p-value	0.650	0.314	0.754	0.172	0.854	0.782
Optimal Bandwidth	0.0693	0.118	0.119	0.111	0.125	0.0953
Order polyn.	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on share of state schools offering activities related to 1) Environment, 2) Inequality, 3) Racism, 4) Violence, 5) Bullying, and 6) Drugs. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 9: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on the share of Principals that were appointed to the position

VARIABLES	(1) 2 years or less	(2) 2 years or less	(3) 2 years or less	(4) Appointed	(5) Appointed	(6) Appointed
RD_Estimate	0.12	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.16
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.093)
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.627	0.627	0.627	0.787	0.787	0.787
Effective N. Obs.	1497	1472	1278	1849	1837	1793
Conventional p-value	0.199	0.262	0.537	0.288	0.311	0.0788
Robust p-value	0.250	0.312	0.447	0.237	0.270	0.0824
Optimal Bandwidth	0.110	0.107	0.0868	0.161	0.160	0.149
Order polyn.	1	1	1	1	1	1

Table 10: Effect of Evangelical Mayors on the STD cases

VARIABLES	(1) Syphilis Rate	(2) Syphilis Rate	(3) Syphilis Rate
RD_Estimate	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.0574	0.0574	0.0574
Effective N. Obs.	419	389	436
Conventional p-value	0.0763	0.0552	0.0638
Robust p-value	0.140	0.0514	0.0474
Optimal Bandwidth	0.150	0.135	0.162
Order polyn.	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on syphilis cases per 1,000 teenagers (13-17 years old). Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.

Table 11: Placebo Effect of Evangelical Mayors on the STD cases

VARIABLES	(1) Syphilis Rate	(2) Syphilis Rate	(3) Syphilis Rate
RD_Estimate	0.01	0.02	-0.00
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Cycle FE	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.0366	0.0366	0.0366
Effective N. Obs.	392	426	378
Conventional p-value	0.687	0.267	0.981
Robust p-value	0.630	0.372	0.941
Optimal Bandwidth	0.168	0.182	0.159
Order polyn.	1	1	1

Notes: This table shows the RDD estimate effect of electing an Evangelical party on syphilis cases per 1,000 teenagers (13-17 years old) in the previous election cycle. Sample includes 2008, 2012, or 2016 elections.